An Assessment of Gulf States' Perceptions of US Hegemony and Security in the Persian/Arabian Gulf

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Abstract

This thesis assesses the Gulf states' perceptions towards US hegemony security in the Persian/Arabian Gulf. A number of questions are asked regarding security and stability in the Gulf, the tools, means and objectives of the USA in the region, regional powers and their role in achieving stability in the Gulf. Special references is given to the perspectives of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Iraq and Iran regarding regional security, stability, the role of US hegemony, and their roles in building a new security system in the region. Moreover questions addressed include the occupation of Iraq by the USA and how it has impacted the Gulf region and the capabilities of the Gulf states to build a regional security system independent of US protection.

The aim of this study is to provide a conceptual foundation for a discussion about the future shape of security and stability arrangements in the Gulf. Secondly, this research aims to analyse the role of the USA in the regional security complex, its key interests in the region, and its means to achieving its objectives there. Finally, this thesis examines the perceptions of the GCC states, Iraq and Iran toward the role of the USA and its hegemony in the Gulf. Furthermore, this research project also aims to study the failure of the region's states to develop a regional security regime and their perceptions of this failure.

The Persian/Arabian Gulf is a strategic economic, political and military region that has increased its vital significance to neighbouring regions and the world as a whole in the past two decades or more. In particular its important position as a source of gas and oil for the global energy market has caused this region to be of interest to state and non-state actors around the world, and arguably has made the region more unstable. The hypothesis tested in this work is, that consider the importance of the Gulf states perception of the security and stability and the US hegemony and its role, as the only possible way to stabilize the region. as

well as considering the Gulf states perception of protect themselves and build their own regional security system. That the USA has succeeded to a great extent in controlling and exercising hegemony over the Persian/Arabian Gulf region in a way compatible with its interests and objectives, which are: primarily, guaranteeing the flow of oil and gas, protecting current regimes in the GCC and guaranteeing the security and supremacy of Israel. The originality of this thesis in part lies in focus on the Gulf states' perceptions of US hegemony in the Gulf and its impact on security there., By employing a constructivist approach and combining it with a theory of Hegemonic Stability, an alternative understanding of the capabilities of the USA as hegemonic state in the Gulf is developed to examine its ability to control and gain support from states in the Gulf.

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Contents

Table, figures, Maps

List of abbreviations

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GRC	Gulf Research Centre
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
ILO	International Labour Organization
MNNA	Major Non-NATO Ally
MNNA	Major Non-NATO Ally
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
UAE	United Arab Emirates
US	United States
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

INTRODUCTION

Security in the Persian/Arabian[1] Gulf refers to the interactions of regional and international powers to create and maintain a system of regional security intended to ensure the interests of the Gulf countries and of major international actors, such as the United States. This, of course, immediately creates not one but a number of conflicts, since their interests, their geostrategic positions, and their perceptions do not coincide. This thesis explores some of these conflicts and attempts to manage them between 2001 and 2012.

The security of the Gulf has attracted the attention of many researchers, and much scholarly literature has been written on it. For example, Anthony H. Cordesman[2] is interested in the security issues particularly the balance of power in the Gulf region. For example, he wrote books entitled *"The Gulf Military Balance"* and the more recent *"The Gulf Military Balance"* (Cordesman and Wilner 2012) and *"The Gulf Military Balance"* (Cordesman and Gold 2013) and *"The Gulf Military Balance"* (Cordesman and Gold 2014b). Moreover Cordesman wrote about other several issues such as *"The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons"* (Cordesman 2003), where he provided an in-depth examination of the Iraq war which is the most significant issue since the war on Vietnam and he trying to understand the USA's awesome power and its role and position in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Another book, *"US and Iranian Strategic Competition"* (Cordesman, Mausner and Nerguizian 2012), discussed and analysed US and Iranian strategic competition in four key areas, sanctions, energy, arms control, and regime change. It shows that shifts in

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[1] The researcher have chosen to use the term of "Persian/Arabian Gulf" to be neutral. That the term Arabian Gulf become predominant in Arab countries. and the term Persian is predominant in Iran. Moreover, from here out I will refer to it simply as 'the Gulf' through this thesis.

[2] Dr. Anthony H Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is also a national security analyst for ABC News. His analysis has been featured prominently during the Gulf War, Desert Fox, the conflict in Kosovo, the fighting in Afghanistan, and the Iraq War. During his time at CSIS, Cordesman has been director of the Gulf Net Assessment Project and the Gulf in Transition Study, as well as the principle investigator of the CSIS Homeland Defense Project. He is the author of a wide range of studies on U.S. security policy, energy policy, and Middle East policy. Also he is the author of more than 50 books, including a four-volume series on the lessons of modern war. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony_Cordesman

the nature and intensity of sanctions on Iran have radically changed. In addition, another specialist Kenneth Katzman, a senior analyst of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Persian Gulf Affairs at the Congressional Research Service, has served in the USA Government and the private sector as an analyst of Persian Gulf affairs. In his current position, Dr. Katzman analyzes U.S. policy and legislation on the Persian Gulf region for members of Congress and their staffs. He also has written numerous reports for Congress such as *"Iran: US concerns and policy responses"* (Katzman 2010) and *"The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy"* (Katzman 2012b) and *"Oman: Reform, Security, and US Policy"* (Katzman 2013b) and *"Kuwait: security, reform, and US policy"* (Katzman 2008) and many other reports about all the Gulf States. Mustafa Alani Senior Advisor and Program Director in Security and Terrorism Studies, Gulf Research Centre, he author of several books and essays on security and defence such as *"Regional Security in the Gulf"* (Alani, M. Stracke, N. Adomeit, H. Legrenzi, M. July 2006) and *"The case for a Gulf weapons of mass destruction free zone"* (Alani 2005) and *"The Gulf NW and WMD free zone: A Track II initiative"* (Alani 2008) and many others. Furthermore Dr Kristian Ulrichsen, an expert in Gulf security, wrote others, particularly *"Gulf security: changing internal and external dynamics"* (Ulrichsen 2009) and *"Gulf security: challenges and responses"* (Ulrichsen 2008). These are some of the researchers who are interested in the issue of security in the Gulf region; other researchers have been reviewed in the following pages and chapters.

In addition, the geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of the region, and its vast oil and gas wealth, imposed the need to find a formula to achieve regional security in the light of international and regional threats. Nowadays, we cannot talk about Gulf security without reference to the USA, which maintains a significant presence in the region. This is more pervasive and influential in the present in the regional system, although it and fluctuated

during the period this thesis covers, rising to a peak during the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent complex conflicts there, and declining in some important respects since the US withdrawal from Iraq. Regional actors large and small have to factor into their policies a range of possible levels of US involvement in the region into the future. This presence and influence places further burdens on the security and stability of this vital and strategic part of the world, because the USA often seems to try to manage the affairs of the regional system alone. Furthermore, the regional system remains insecure and unstable.

The geopolitical perspective on Gulf security refers to approaches based on regional security, where a group of countries are geographically contiguous. This perspective accommodates the impact of regional policies on the security system in the Gulf. Eight countries border the Gulf, namely the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Iraq and Iran. In addition, there is the traditional perspective, which locates Iraq in the North, Iran in the East, and the GCC countries in the West. These countries were formed at different stages of history; indeed, in 1971 saw the independence of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE after British withdrew from the Gulf, in 1961 the independence of Kuwait, in 1932 the independence of Iraq, in 1932 the independence of Saudi Arabia and in 1925 the independence of Iran. In talking about a system of regional Gulf security, conflict has been a dominant feature, as the region experienced three wars in the period between 1980 until withdraw of the USA troops from Iraq in 2011-2003.

With regards to the title of thesis, this seeks to demonstrate the relationship between the USA and Gulf security, in terms of positive and negative influences on the protection, and ensuring the continuation and development of the security system in the Gulf. The researcher chose the word, *variable*, to refer to role of the USA as an important factor in stability and security. This is due to the heavy US military presence in the Gulf, as well as the change in

policy from military support to direct intervention. In addition, the title focuses on security in the Gulf.

The purpose of this study is to analyse and provide the necessary means to build a system of security able to protect the region from any internal or external threat. Regardless of whether this system is built by regional or international powers, the important issue is the protection of the region. In fact, the region contains huge reserves oil and gas as shown in Figure 5 OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2012 and Figure 6 Gulf States share the world Crude oil reserves, and so the interests of the world within the stability of the region. This is the reason for the interference and large presence of international forces in the region, especially the USA.

Within the framework of study of security in the Gulf, this study will explain the role of the USA that is currently acting as the principal power in the Gulf in its relations with international and regional players. At the time of writing, the battle for dominance over the security of the region has been decided in favour of the USA. It could be argued that the USA waged war on Iraq (in 1990-91, subsequent sanctions, limited military action from 1991 to 2003, and then full scale invasion and occupation in 2003) in order to achieve complete control over the Gulf region (Hunter 2010). It is possible, therefore, that the war was not about confronting Iraq, which in the 1980s and early 1990s was attempting to expand its influence in the Gulf, rather it was directed against those allies who had contributed to the international coalition against Iraq (Ibid). The struggle for influence and strategic control over the Gulf region is likely to continue as long as oil and gas continue to flow from that part of the world (Kraig 2006). Moreover, with regards to the Gulf region, the USA's greatest concern is how to secure stable oil and gas supplies to the global market, and thus increase its negotiating position with its allies from the industrialised world (Kraig 2006). It is not strange

that the USA has pursued strategic dominance over the Gulf. This policy direction stems from the interests of large US businesses, and the self-interested goals of national economic competitiveness, which tirelessly seek to dominate foreign markets, raw materials, and strategic areas in the world (Maceyko, J. Pomeroy, E. Schneider, M. 2005). The Gulf is to a large extent an exception in the global system, given its huge oil and gas wealth, which have been the prime reasons for repeated attempts to penetrate and undermine the region's political systems (Khaṣawinah 2001)

The region's wealth and riches, as well as its unique strategic position, have made it the target of international competition in attempts to polarise some or all the states of the region. In this regard, the USA can be seen to have adopted strategies of escalating crises and condoning conflict between neighbours with the aim of destabilising the region and at the same time turning it into a very lucrative weapons market. The impact of this type of US strategy has been to encourage the states in the region to drift steadily and gradually away from their origins to become more closely tied to the West, its principles, and strategic plans (Nabil 2001).

From the US perspective, bilateral military, security, trade and socio-cultural pacts between it and individual states in the region, while encouraging some cooperation and alliances between these states (such as in the GCC) while discouraging others (such as cooperation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia) to better serve its goals. Kaye and Lorber (2012 p. 52) mention that;

"In the 1980s, containment translated into a ban on U.S. arms and dual-use material to Iran, as well as assistance to Iraq in its war against Iran for much of the decade. In the 1990s, after the United States reversed its tilt toward Iraq and launched Operation Desert

Storm, the United States pursued dual containment to prevent both Iran and Iraq from dominating Gulf security".

In the meantime, the USA keeps active watch of developments in Iran constantly intervening in its domestic affairs (Sokolsky, and Murphy 1997p. 3-4). The sum of US activities to control events, including putting pressure on governments, contribute naturally to the wider US policies in the Middle East and North Africa that hinge on offering (often) unlimited support to Israel. In light of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations between Arab states and Israel, attempts at normalising relations and the end to the economic embargo, the USA seeks to establish a system of regional security that is wholly dependent on a US force being stationed in the Gulf and on Israel, (which is considered by most observers to be a US forward base and integral part of American national security) (Al-Thani 2000).

The attacks of 11 September 2001 (or 9/11) convinced the USA of the necessity of changing/transforming the Middle East and North Africa, or at least achieving regime change. This led to increased feelings of threat and sensitivity on the part of people and governments in the region regarding US intentions towards them (Laipson, et al. 2010), in attempting to change traditional values, culture, economics, and politics (Rathmell, Karasik and Gompert 2003). There is a system of variables in US security strategy regarding the region, among them:

- o Using the United Nations to provide international legitimacy for US acts in the region.
- o Building a new military strategy based on US hegemony in the region (Fontaine and Lord May 2012 p. 17).
- o Revising US methods of achieving change; the USA no longer discounts the use of force to change political regimes, as stated in Harlan Cleveland's book:

"We have it in our power to begin the world all over again. A situation similar to the present has not appeared since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand" (Cleveland 1993 p. xv).

In addition to that oft-repeated phrase of the Second World War: "America has reached the age of maturity"(Ibid). US Citizens were gripped by a feeling of power and glory. They had saved the world from Hitler, and in this context, US authority and control would spread. US high strategists agreed on defining US policy aims in the Middle East, based on US national and global interests. These interests drive its policy in the region, and may be summarised in the following:

o Permanent and fixed commitment to Israel in protecting its security, existence, and strategic superiority, and considering the protection of Israel's security as protection of US security (Department of Defence 2012 p. 2).

o Influence over the world's largest oil reserves in the region, and therefore, guaranteeing the flow of oil at moderate and acceptable prices, and the surpluses generated remaining in safekeeping.

o From the geo-strategic perspective of one of the world's most dangerous areas; preserving the Middle East and North Africa as a region free of weapons of mass destruction as a national interest, since any conflict involving Israel, oil, or both is a massive threat that cannot be ignored (Fontaine and Lord May 2012 p. 17) and (Department of Defence 2012 p. 2).

o Achieving and consolidating US influence in the region as the world's sole super power.

As a result of acts and role of the USA in the Gulf, The problem addressed by this research is the US presence in the Gulf, and in whose interest it is, while seeking to determine

its reasons and motivations. The work seeks to elicit the reasons for the failure of the regional security regime, and its shortcomings in displacing the US strategic presence deployed there.

Therefore, the key objective of this thesis has been to understand the perceptions of the Gulf States toward the US and its policy in the Gulf. Furthermore, it aims to examine the Gulf States' perceptions of US hegemony and its impact on security in the region. The region needs stable and peaceful relationships that provide security for all states, as well as to ensure the interests of the external powers. A second objective of this research is to examine the role and goals of the US in the P Gulf region, and the methods utilised to achieve these objectives, whether political, economic, or military. Finally, this study has also considered the causes for the failure of the region's states to develop a regional security regime, and the role of the US in contributing to (or otherwise) security in the region.

In terms of the hypothesis, this thesis test the following statement: that consider the importance of the Gulf states perception of the security and stability and the US hegemony and its role, as the only possible way to stabilize the region. As well as considering the Gulf states perception of protect themselves and build their own regional security system. The USA has succeeded to a great extent in controlling and exercising hegemony over the Gulf region in a way compatible with its interests and objectives, which are: primarily, guaranteeing the flow of oil and gas, protecting current regimes in the GCC and guaranteeing the security and supremacy of Israel. That the US continues to hold influence on strategic events and processes in the Gulf such that it becomes important to assess and study the Gulf states perception about the security, stability, the role of the USA in the region and how they perceiving the US hegemony. Furthermore, the US seeks to re-design the region in a way that agrees with its economic, political, and military interests.

There are a number of research questions that need to be addressed in this work. The first question being: what are the tools and means used by the USA to achieve its objectives in the region. This includes US objectives in the Gulf represented by safeguarding the flow of oil and gas, preserving the governing regimes, as well as protecting Israel's security and strategic superiority, and the means utilised to achieve US aims in the Gulf, such as economic, military, or political means, which are discussed in chapter two. The second question is: who are the most important regional powers that influence security in the Gulf and what are their roles. The question explains the visions for security in the Gulf region from the perspective of the GCC states, Iraq, Iran, and the USA, with reference to the regional hegemonic states and their role in achieving stability in the Gulf. The third question: considers whether the occupation of Iraq by the USA served the interests of the region's states or protects US national security. The question will analyse this strategy, and how it impacts the Gulf region. The fourth question is: What are the Gulf states' visions of security in the region, and how do they perceive the role of US hegemony? The fifth question is: what is the possibility for a regional regime to build a regional security system independent of US protection. This question discusses the capability of the Gulf states to build a new security system based on the abilities of the regional powers and with regional cooperation.

The significance of this study is that it is a security study in an important region in the world, and at the present time, no other area in the world holds so much US interest with regards to strategic issues than the Gulf. The importance of oil and gas from the Gulf, and the struggle against terrorism and religious extremism guarantee a prominent place for the region in US strategic planning. In addition, the period of the research between 2000 and 2012 includes several issues, such as 9/11, the occupation of Iraq, a new security system in the Gulf, and US national security; all these issues will be integral to the study. I know that the

1990s have been studied and analysed, especially after the second Gulf war in 1991, but this project analyses the Gulf states' perceptions of the role of the USA and its hegemony in the Gulf after 2000 – an area of investigation that has largely been ignored.

Originality

The research will use sources in both English and Arabic. This allows me to analyse more sources and gather different opinions from various perspectives about security in the Gulf region, and to interview both Arabic and English speakers.

After the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, the Gulf region still hosted one of the largest concentrations of US forces in the world which is include all the USA military facilities in the region include a base for its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain and other bases, camps and arms storage in Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Oman. The region is of prime importance in US short-term security strategy (Parrish Dec. 7, 2013). Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel In a speech before the Manama, Bahrain Dialogue security conference on Dec. 7, 2013 emphasized the strength of the USA presence in the Middle East and called for closer cooperation with the Gulf states. Hagel set out the US presence which included *"ground, air and sea forces number more than 35,000 US troops in the Gulf area, including more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers in the region, along with heavy armor, artillery, and attack helicopters, to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against aggression, the secretary said the United States has deployed its most advanced aircraft, including F-22 fighters, throughout the region to ensure that we can quickly respond to contingencies"* (Parrish Dec. 7, 2013). Parrish (Dec. 7, 2013) mention that *"The United States also employs its most advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets here to provide a continuous picture of activities in and around the Gulf"*. The region is of prime importance in US short-term security strategy. The occupation of Iraq in 2003 has fundamentally changed the scene

in the Gulf by decisively terminating half the factors that have shaped the policies of the previous US administration represented by "dual containment" of both Iran and Iraq, even after the USA withdrawal from Iraq, the situation in the Gulf that Iraq receiving great support particularly in terms of military and arms sale from the USA this mean no more containment for Iraq.

In any case, many of the strategic features of the region continue to exist, and so pose uncomfortable questions to US policymakers. This research explores how far the Gulf is in harmony with US security planning. Initially, it presents the principal security issues and ends by exploring how the US may confront them. The importance of the research lies in its focus on a period of time distinguished by the large number of variables in US strategy towards the Gulf region. The research will address the principal US policy variables before 2000, due to the changes witnessed, which need to be addressed. Perhaps the most important of these events, was intensification of US presence following British withdrawal from the Gulf in the early 1970s, followed by the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and finally the US occupation of Iraq. During the 1990s, the Gulf region and the world witnessed changes that transformed the structure of the regional security regime, in addition to the demise of the Soviet Union, which abandoned the area to US monopoly. The absence of any security regime inclusive of the region's states has caused instability, leading the GCC states to sign defence and security agreements with the USA, France, and Britain in order to protect themselves from external threats. Constructivism is pivotal to this project, through studying the security visions of each Gulf State, and how each individual State perceived US hegemony. Moreover, Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) has also been used, and forms the study's background in assessing the capability of the hegemonic State in controlling and

supporting other states in the Gulf and preserving stability. The aim of combining these theories is to explore a new approach or way to apply these theories.

The balance of power has been discussed in this study, with updated data to 2013. This reflects the most recent information on the military and economic capability of each Gulf state, with special reference to US support to states in the region, which includes arms sales and direct military support.

With regards to the contribution of the thesis to the broader area of research, its significance lies in its contribution to understanding Gulf states' security and their perceptions of the US role in security and stability in the region as a whole. The following analysis through the collection and processing of data on Gulf states' perceptions, regarding the role of the hegemonic states (whether international or regional) and explore the why to build new security system in the Gulf that have been understudied. By undertaking a number of interviews and collecting a large amount of data, the thesis provides a valid contemporary image of the Gulf states' policy, problems, relationships and the role of the USA in the Gulf. (See methods section page 62 - 66 and Interviews list in the appendix)

The research fieldwork managed to access to the policy makers, perhaps the prestigious and elitist government department, which are the embassies and other diplomatic missions and presents valuable information on the Gulf security and the perceptions of themselves and of the organisation which they serve. The field work itself contributed to the knowledge of the security studies in the Gulf. As this was conducted recently, the field work updated many of the standing questions about the security, stability, Gulf States security visions, and the role of the USA as a hegemonic state with the ability to control the region by cooperating with its allies in the Gulf. The interviews conducted on the two field research trips. The first was to Tripoli which conducted in some of Gulf states embassies and the

second conducted in the UAE with the Gulf states embassies and in UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These interviews was to collect the information from the state actors. Furthermore, these interviews and the interviews questions represent the originality of this thesis by providing very recent information about the security, hegemony and the perception of the Gulf states about the USA role and its hegemony over the Gulf. In addition the interviews questions about the Gulf states perception of the US hegemony was very important, which I have collected information about this issue from interviewees from all the Gulf states which have been discussed in chapter four, six particularly. Furthermore I have collected all the necessary information about the possibility of building new security system able to protect the region from internal and external threat.

The research is interested in security and stability in the Gulf, and the chapters will focus on the role of the USA in dealing with Gulf security, using the realist version of HST to analyse this situation, as well as constructivism, to examine the perceptions of security and how decision-makers in Gulf states perceive US hegemony in the Gulf (see the theory and methodology chapter). The review of an existing body of literature shows that many researchers have different ideas about security and stability in the Gulf, but in some issues there is some agreement among them regarding creating a system of security able to protect the region from any internal or external threat. However, each researcher has a different way of analysing security, stability and the US role in the Gulf. Furthermore, researchers have used different theories and methodologies.

The topic of this thesis is similar to others, in terms of studying security and stability, the US role, balance of power in the Gulf, and creating a new system of security in the Gulf, because all researchers tried to include these topics as main ones in their studies. This thesis is different in the way of study and analysis, and also the period of study, where most studies

similar to this one date before 2000. This thesis started the investigation to cover from 2000 to 2012, which is a significant time to begin investigating this topic, because this period covers the events of 9/11 and invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as most factors that impacted the security and stability in the region, such as the regional and international interests, the security view from the Arab and Iranian perspectives, and the role and interests of the USA's impact on the region.

The following will provide a literature review of the competing interpretations of the US variable in the security of the Gulf, with specific regard to the period after the year 2000, and the three topics under scrutiny in this thesis, namely the hegemony in the Gulf, the perceptions of the Gulf states, the balance of power in the region, and creating a new system of security in the Gulf.

The literature review will aim to locate gaps in the previous scholarship in the field of study that are commensurate with what this thesis proposes. The work of Mirarab (1996) analysed "*the role of the USA in the new system of power relations in the Gulf region, with particular reference to security and stability*", which is similar to my work, but in a different period of study. He discussed the three decades since the British withdrawal in the early 1970s, and attempts to construct an analytical framework for the study regarding the effect of regional developments on US policies in the region. In contrast, my thesis investigates from 2000 until 2012. Furthermore, this study applies different methods in dealing with its different procedures of analysis, namely analysing historical background, conceptual clarifications, explaining the problem, hypothetical illustrations, reasoning, and theory building and prescription.

Mirarab (1996 p. 1-3) mentioned that "*the new era for the US involvement in the Persian Gulf started by its military intervention which practically reaffirmed the importance*

of the region for it overseas interests, this era began after the second Gulf war in 1991". This fact had been declared by the US officials on many occasions. Pisani (1991p. 45) argue that "*the Gulf war may be behind us but the questions it raised as well as its consequences are not*". Their work is a study of the underlying characteristics of the interaction between US policies and the Gulf regional developments, in terms of political and economic issues. As such, the work focuses on the US policies and how the Gulf countries dealt with them from 1971 until 1996. Slocombe (1991) pointed out that, dealing with political and economic issues is much easier than the military challenges, but any political and economic issues can become military challenges, if we do not solve the problems in the right way, particularly in the Gulf region.

Salmon (1998) and Shata (1990) in their studies have included analysis of the 1980s, 1990s and the Second Gulf War. In addition, the study of Shata (1990) a discussed the security relations between the GCC states and US military policy in the Gulf 1979-88, and international disengagement and regional politics relating to Iran and the Gulf. All these studies are very useful and will help build a strong background on the security and stability in the Gulf. On the other hand both studies did not clearly mention to the US hegemony and the Gulf states perception about the hegemony in the Gulf, as the USA play the hegemonic role particularly in the Gulf which have direct impact in all parties that interesting in this region. In addition study the Gulf states perception security and stability also become very important to understand and build the security system in the region which consider all the visions in internal and external level.

Sadeghinia (2008) wrote about "*Gulf security arrangements with special reference to Iran's foreign policy*", employing a variety of conceptual and analytical tools to understand the reasons for the failure of security models in the Gulf and to confront the huge obstacles to

a security system for this region. The relevance of this model is supported by the modern global political landscape, especially the events that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, in addition to various successful cooperation models that are to be found in other regions of the globe, e.g. the European Union (EU). This is assisted by the unprecedented opportunity for regional cooperation and the conditions for the creation of new security arrangements in the Gulf, beyond what had been created since the downfall of Saddam's regime in 2003, which was one of the major elements of insecurity in the region. The study analysed various security models in this significant geopolitical region of the world from 1962 until 2003, with special reference to Iran's foreign policy.

With regard to the military balance in the Gulf, Cordesman (April 22, 2010 p. 2) mentioned "*five dominant and major factors in the Gulf: The GCC states, Iran, Iraq, and outside powers like the USA, and non-state actors like the various elements of Al Qa'ida, the Mahdi militia in Iran, and various tribal forces*". He showed that the USA now dominates the balance of Gulf military forces, along with its allies. US land capabilities have been, however, heavily committed to Iraq before it withdraw in 2011 and Afghanistan which will withdraw by end of 2014 (Obama Announces 27 May 2014). The USA would face far more serious problems in dealing with a well-planned campaign for asymmetric or irregular warfare than it would in fighting a conventional conflict. Rathmell, Karasik and Gompert 2003 p. 8) agree that in the "*foreseeable future, the balance of power in the Gulf will be underwritten by the USA. But removal of the need to contain Iraq militarily, combined with US expeditionary force transformation, should enable the USA to reduce its presence*". This clearly shows that the USA will not contain Iraq anymore, because Iraq has joined the US side; in contrast, the USA will continue to contain Iran to protect its interests, and ensure Gulf security. Rathmell and Gompert (2003) also discuss several topics related to the Gulf, such

as the Gulf's strategic conditions, past attempts to build a Gulf security system, the wars in 1980-88, 1991, 2003 and reform in the Gulf regimes. They proposed building a new security system based on three interlocking elements, i.e. balance of power, reform, and multilateralism. Only such a combination will provide both the progress and the stability needed for enduring security, while also relieving the USA of excessive costs and exposure to risk as the sole security provider.

Suwaidi. and others (2008) presented the internal and external challenges in the Gulf as most important issues in a book, titled *"Arabian Gulf internal and external challenges"* published in 2008 by the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research. The book was written by several experts, such as Al-Suwaidi, Al-Attiyah, Rod Larsen, Ahmad Al-Amir, Cordesman, Mack David, J. E. Eeterson and others, with some contributions in Arabic. They discussed the security threats and the opportunities Gulf countries face today, with special reference to the foreign military presence in the region, and referring to the recent developments in the Gulf, including the war in Iraq in 2003, and the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme, which present new challenges to security and stability in the region. Furthermore, the book mentions that international developments are exacerbated by regional factors, such as increasing openness to the global economy and demographic stresses stemming from vast immigration into the GCC states. In addition, the instability stemming from Iraq, Iran and the impact of the USA's "War on Terror", as well as terrorism. They investigated the need to establish a coherent and permanent defence system in the region, and addressed internal security challenges facing the Gulf countries, which have cross-border repercussions, such as organized crime, migrant labour and terrorism.

With regard to the Gulf states perception of the US hegemony and the security in the Gulf, Amirsadeghi (2012 p. 174, 189, 217) discussed the Arab Gulf states perception toward

Iran in early stage from 1968 and after Iran-Iraq war. Moreover, Amirsadeghi did not discuss the Gulf states perception of the US hegemony, which different from this research project in terms of research period

Regarding the methodology, this research while analytical and qualitative in nature, is also quantitative, by considering GDP, economic and industrial output and growth, military budgets, military sizes, and weapons capabilities. Moreover, it investigates the security variables in the Gulf region between the Gulf states and the USA on the domestic and international levels. Marsh (2010) point out that qualitative methods include several types can be used in this study, such as case study, in-depth interviews, text/discourse analysis, and historical analysis. In terms of interviews, the purpose of doing interviews was to collect more data about the security of the Gulf and the US role to protect the Gulf area. The interviews were very helpful to study and analyse people's opinions, and interviews were with policy-makers, i.e. people at a relatively high level, and authors interested in Gulf studies. In addition, the information sought from the intended interviewees was not accessible anywhere else, and so these interviews proved very important to the overall analysis. Furthermore, some information gained from the interviews reinforced and added authority to information gained from secondary sources. For more information see the theory and methodology chapter.

The security system in this region, i.e. security of the Gulf as regional security, is distinct from international security, which includes US national security and its interest in the Gulf (Davis, et al. 2003). Hence, this research also assesses the interaction between US national security and regional security developments.

This project uses the historical method in its primary stages, and the second chapter gives background information about the relationship between the USA and the Gulf states.

Since the research topic deals with politics, and international and security relations, it has also adopts the descriptive analytical methodology. The historical presentation is of no value unless accompanied by analysis and supporting evidence for all the events, coupled to the necessity of comparing the different positions and factors influencing US political directions regarding the Gulf.

The presence of the USA in the Gulf limits the ability of countries in the region to develop a regional security system based on their capabilities, because the USA as a hegemonic state assumed this role at this time. This thesis will study the impact of the hegemon on the ability of countries in the region to develop an independent system of regional security using the realist version of HST to analyse this situation. Furthermore, the state of hegemony in international relations as a result of the anarchy in international relations (Donnelly 2009). HST, as espoused by Charles Kindleberger in the 1970s, focuses on the role of leading states as hegemonic states in the world--for example, Great Britain in the 19th and the USA in the 20th and 21st centuries. In addition, to Kindleberger, key figures in the development of HST include Modelski (1996), Gilpin (2011), and Keohane (1984) Stephen Krasner, and others (Milner 1998). HST has an important position in both International Political Economy and International Relations. It holds that a state with power is needed in order to provide global stability (Grundig, F., Ward, H., September, 2007). In addition, the realist approach used here will allow me to analyse security in the Gulf since 2000 by exploring how the hegemonic state punishes those states which do not comply with the established 'rules of the game'. This approach also provides a framework to examine global strategies and national security issues. This is beneficial for studying US strategy in the Gulf, which aims at preventing the spread of violence while maintaining political and economic security and stability. Moreover, constructivist theory is used in the research to provide an

understanding of the behaviour of external powers and their role according to the perceptions of the states of the Gulf. Indeed, constructivism allows for a new perspective on the security visions of each Gulf state and how they perceive US hegemony.

This dissertation consists of six chapters, including 14 main sections. The first chapter addresses theory and methodology and includes two main sections. The first section covers the theory, which is the realist version of HST and constructivist theory. The second section relates to the methodology that this research uses to analyse the information related to security in the area. The second chapter addresses the roots of US variables influencing security in the Gulf, and includes three main sections. The first covers the background to the US presence in the Gulf, and deals with the early beginnings of US-Gulf relations, including the period of oil exploration and discovery, the Second World War, and studying the Nixon and Carter principles in US policy towards the Gulf. Moreover, studying the period of the Reagan Administration and its vision of security in the Gulf, as well as the Iran-Iraq war. The second section relates to US objectives in the Gulf, represented by safeguarding the flow of oil and gas, preserving the governing regimes, as well as protecting Israel's security and strategic superiority. The third main section covers the means utilised to achieve US aims in the Gulf, whether economic, military, or political.

The third chapter reviewing international and regional events that have affected security in the Gulf and explains and details the important international and regional events that affected security in the region. The chapter subdivided into five main sections. The first main section relates to the demise of the two superpowers equation with its implications internationally and in the Gulf. In addition, the demise of the Soviet Union and its effect on the Gulf. The section includes a study of the New World order. The second main section explores the Second Gulf War, and the accompanying intervention and deployment of

international forces in the Gulf. It reflects on Arab reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the effect of the Second Gulf War on Iraq. The third main section discussed the implications of the events of 9/11 on the Gulf. The fourth main section examines the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and use of force to protect US interests. The chapter finally, explores and assess the period since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

The fourth chapter explains and details the visions for security in the Gulf region from the perspective of the GCC states, Iraq, Iran, and the US, and includes four main sections. The first which is overview section discussed the development of the relations and the security concept. The second section explores the concept of security in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The third section analysis and assess the Iranian perception of security in the Gulf. The final section discussed the Iraqi perception of security in the Gulf. The fifth chapter covers the regional balance of power in the Gulf. It explores the capabilities of those states overlooking the Gulf to protect and develop the stability in the Gulf region. and is subdivided into four main sections, which analyse the effect of regional and international powers on achieving balance in the region. The first was overview section which discussed the meaning of the balance of power and analysis the system of balance and its ability to protect the security and stability in the region from perception of the Gulf States. The next three sections discussed and addresses the GCC states, Iran and Iraq and its capability in terms of economy, military, population and the States area. The fifth section, assess the balance power in the Gulf by analysis the perceptions of decision makers in the Gulf.

The sixth chapter addresses the future of the Gulf stability and search for a new security system; the first section it just overview section explores the position of each states in the Gulf and its perception about the security requirement in the regional. The second section discussed the GCC states Security requirement in the regional level. The third section

assess the perceptions of the Gulf states about the U.S. hegemony in the Gulf and the regional hegemony. The fourth section discussed the Gulf states Options to improve its regional position, and the ability to deal with hegemonic over the Gulf.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarises the findings of this project and offers some final thoughts on the value of the theoretical and methodological approach used, as well as a review of the project's originality and prospects for further study.

CHAPTER ONE THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Introduction

It is important at this stage to establish the theoretical framework and the research methods used to collect, analyse and evaluate information and evidence in this dissertation. The structural framework of this chapter comes in three main sections: the first section of the chapter addresses and outlines hegemonic stability theory, HST, as the main theoretical approach of this research project. The section will review the literature relevant to HST with regard to a neo-realist version of HST, the concept of hegemony, regional hegemony, rational hegemons, and regional integration. The USA in the Gulf limits the ability of countries in the region to develop a regional security system based on their capabilities, because the USA as a global hegemonic state holds this role. This work studies the impact of the hegemonic state on the ability of countries in the region to develop an independent system of regional security. It uses a neo-realist version of HST to analyse this situation. Furthermore, this project views the state of hegemony in international relations as a result of an overarching anarchy in the international system (Donnelly 2009).

In addition, the neo-realist approach will analyse security in the Gulf since 2000 by exploring how the hegemonic state(s) punishes those states that do not comply with the established rules of the game. This approach also provides a framework to examine global strategies and national security issues. This is beneficial for studying US strategy in the Gulf, which is claimed to aim at preventing the spread of violence, while maintaining political and economic security, and stability.

The second section of the chapter discusses constructivist theory, because this research project also draws on an analysis of Gulf states' security visions and perceptions of the role of the USA, particularly with regards to individual officials and decision-makers. As such, constructivism provides the basis for studying how the Gulf states perceive and deal

with US hegemony. The third section introduces the research methodology used in this study. In order to achieve the research aims, and answer the research questions, this study adopts a qualitative and quantitative research methodology, with a primary emphasis on qualitative historical methods. This section explains the methodology and the analytical approach in further detail. However, first it is useful to clarify a few conceptual issues. In order to evaluate success in the security of the Gulf and build a new security system to bring peace and stability to the region, it is important first to determine what, in this context, is meant by the terms security in this region and discuss the historical analytical method, and, finally, understanding the ontological and epistemological foundations. The fourth section describes the methods used to collect data, where the research used several methods; one of these is to conduct interviews with security experts in the region. At the same time, the literature review is another method to collect data, where there are many books, journals, articles, theses, conferences papers and other documents written in both English and Arabic, which may be useful to this research.

Hegemonic stability theory (HST)

Snidal (1985) explains that most studies of HST followed two paths; the first by prominent theorists, such as Kindleberger (1970), Keohane (1984) and Ikenberry (1990) focused on the international political economic system, while the second pursued by theorists, such as Gilpin (2011) looked at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict (Hubbard 2010). Hegemonic stability theory derives in large part from work by Waltz (1979) and from the re-discovery in the 1970s and 1980s of Albert Hirschman's *"National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade"*, originally published in 1945.

This research will focus on the second aspect of HST, which is about military conflict in the international system. Hence, this thesis uses a realist version of HST. According to the

theory of stability and hegemony, the dominant authority or actor plays a positive role in the dissemination of the rules of the capitalist system, and in monitoring the global system to ensure the public interest, such as securing access to energy resources at reasonable prices. It is assumed that dominance depends on the legitimacy of its leadership, as well as its military and economic capabilities. In a system of states, the dominant authority is inevitably the most powerful state providing it has the capacity to regulate the system – and in exploring international security rather than political economy it is the leading actor's management of security that counts.

Hegemony is not necessarily stable for a particular state, because it requires significant commitment of resources to ensure continued economic and military dominance. This typically causes the collapse of the dominant actor. In the beginning, the dominant state achieves a position at the top of the pyramid of global power, because it has the largest economic system, and the greatest competitive ability alongside massive military forces. However the hegemonic position leads to assuming responsibilities in the world without limit, and continuing to invest in military capabilities, especially as the hegemon infringes on the interests of other countries, and faces the challenge inherent in the rise of a second or third power. Thus, over-investment in the military –what Paul Kennedy called imperial over-stretch– leads to depletion of its economy, decline and its replacement either by another dominant actor or by a period of more unstable or even chaotic international politics.

What is the aim of the US presence in the Middle East? Salmon (1998) and Davis, et al. (2003) pointed out that the US control of the Gulf's oil is the primary key to its global hegemony. It has been accepted as a leader in the capitalist world, because they considered the USA essential in order to secure the flow of Gulf oil to the economies of the capitalist

world; it is argued that the USA managed, through its presence and its alliances in the Gulf, to secure its competitive position.

Snidal (1985 p. 581) started writing about the limits of HST, by explaining the derivation and implications of HST. He then discussed the theory from two perspectives: *"the first investigates the limitations of the public goods hypothesis in understanding many issues of international politics"*. *"The second analyses the implicit assumptions of the theory"*, as Snidal (1985) considers that collective action is impossible in the absence of the dominant state in the international system. Furthermore, Jesse Hubbard (2010) discussed that Snidal's (1985) analysis is useful for demonstrating the logical feasibility of Keohane's, Deudney's and Ikenberry's arguments, even if his numerical models are ultimately somewhat arbitrary. Moreover, the works of Deudney, Ikenberry and Keohane follow the path of Kindleberger's work on international economics, which places a good deal of attention to the security studies of HST. Snidal (1985) pointed out that cooperation between states does not necessarily recede with a hegemon's decline, but the cooperation may be enhanced in many cases with some conditions.

Snidal (1985) in his article mentioned that the theory entails two significant conclusions; first, the presence of a dominant actor will lead to the provision of a stable international regime of free trade. The second is that although the dominant leader will reap benefits from this situation, smaller states will gain even more, as they bear none of the costs of provision, yet share fully in the benefits. In contrast, the situation in the Gulf is different, because the small states in the Gulf share the costs with the dominant states, and when this region is stable, all countries gain the economic, political, security and military benefits.

"*After Hegemony*", published by Robert Keohane (1984), attempts to explain the influence of the USA in world affairs after 1945. Keohane, in this book, focused on the

reasons for a decline in American influence since the 1970s, and tried to explain international cooperation in the post-hegemonic era. The book connects international political influence with economic performance, evaluating some of the theories, which have been used to interpret international politics, HST among them. Keohane uses these theories to establish a framework for the evaluation of cooperation between countries. He evaluated HST, as applied to the world political economy, and defines hegemony as preponderance of material resources, where four points of resources are especially important. Hegemonic powers must have control over (i) raw materials, (ii) sources of capital, (iii) markets, and must secure (iv) competitive advantage in the production of highly valued goods.

With regard to military power and hegemony in the world political economy, a hegemonic state must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international political economy. Yet, the hegemonic power will face challenges from other powers; for instance, both Britain and the US were challenged by other militaries during the 19th and 20th centuries, such as France, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union.

Webb and Krasner (1989) wrote "*Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Assessment*" examined and assessed the hegemonic stability thesis and its empirical validity to explain the trend in the international political economy since 1945. In addition, they attempted to study several trends in the international political economy. They began by examining the capability of the US first, and then looked at developments in international trade and finance.

It is however, important to note that the hegemonic stability thesis draws on two versions to explain the stability of hegemonic systems; firstly, the collective goods version, which has dominated the academic debate. Keohane (1984), "*After Hegemony*" focuses on the collective goods version, in which he discussed that all countries will benefit from

liberalization of the international economy, but not in the absence of a hegemon. Secondly, the security version of the HST, where Webb and Krasner (1989 p. 193-185) pointed out that it:

> *"does not assume that states have a common interest in international economic liberalization and stability, even though an open system may raise the absolute level of welfare of all participants, some states will gain relative to others. If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system".*

Sotirios (2007) in his article, "*Rethinking hegemonic stability theory: some reflections from the regional integration experience in the developing world*", tested the ability of HST to interpret the creation and development of regional integration schemes in the developing world. In addition, his paper performed comparative analysis between three regional integration schemes, which are the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in Sub-Saharan Africa, ASEAN in South-East Asia, and Mercosur in South America. Sotirios (2007) in his paper pointed out that HST can be used to explain why a series of groups of states in the developing world have agreed to the creation of a regional cooperation bloc. Regional hegemonic states look to increase their power and their negotiating capabilities against other states or groups of states in the same region. Within the above, Sotirios tried to use a new theoretical framework called Regional HST that could explain the regional cooperation development schemes developing in countries worldwide. Within this new framework, three conditions must be met, in order for a regional cooperation agreement to be formulated.

- The presence of a hegemonic state that has the appropriate power to influence its neighbouring states. This influence can be intentional or otherwise, and can act cohesively as an initiative or as an external threat.

- Neighbouring states, and states in the region in general, must not be fully internationalised. Global interest in the area and its states should be relatively minimal.

- The formation of the regional body must be based on a loose organizational structure of low institutionalization, minimising, therefore, the sense of transferring national sovereignty to the regional level.

In the article, "*Neorealist and neo-gramscian hegemony in international relations and conflict resolution during the 1990's"*, Ozcelik (2005) explained in his article the conflict resolution in international relations that worked in combination with the neorealist and neo-Gramscian notions of hegemony in the 1990s Sezai Ozcelik (2005) began by studying and discussing the neorealist concept of hegemony and HST. He mentioned that there are two versions of HST, namely the collective goods, and security versions. The security version in his article holds that the hegemonic state created the world order by using its capabilities and power to organise relations among states.

Grunberg (1990) wrote "*exploring the myth of hegemonic stability*", which began by discussing HST, and its acceptance, particularly in world economy dynamics. She reaffirmed the emphasis on variables of the international powers, often referred to as neorealism. In terms of cooperation, Grunberg (1990 p. 431-462) pointed out that:

> "*the theory basically holds that cooperation and a well-functioning world economy are dependent on a certain kind of political structure, a structure*

characterized by the dominance of a single actor. Dominance by a hegemonic power constitutes the optimal situation for ensuring and maintaining an open and stable world economy".

The article is a critical study of HST, where Grunberg believes that there are many reasons that HST is far from accurate. She used the experts' ideas to mention weaknesses of the theory; for example, Lake (1983p. 518) described the theory as "*powerful and parsimonious*", Keohane (1980p. 156) noted that it is "*almost simple-minded*", and Duncan Snidal (1985) described it as potentially one of the most powerful and general of all international relations theories. Grunberg wrote on several topics to criticise HST under titles such as the fallacy of hegemonic stability; the cycles of hegemony, hegemony and free trade; the enigma of hegemonic benevolence; the public goods assumption; where the USA fits in; the appeal of hegemonic stability; formalizing the "myth" of hegemonic stability; stories latent in the HST; myths, religious beliefs, and experiences relevant to the HST; how myths and ideology affect the process of theory-building; and how myths and ideology affect the interpretation of events.

Gilpin (2011) in his book, "*Global political economy: Understanding the international economic order*", wrote on several topics, including HST. He described the theory in both liberal and realist terms as important to his argument. Gilpin tried to justify and defend against the theoretical criticisms of scholars, because they emphasised that cooperation is a possible solution, between non-hegemonic nations, to solve and associate the problems in these states in order to maintain a liberal international economy. In addition, Gilpin (2011 p. 93) states that "*political criticisms have ranged from denunciations of the theory as a defence of or rationale for American policies to the opposite idea that the theory predicted the absolute decline of the US*". However, he agrees, that there is no proponent of

HST that justifies American behaviour in the world, particularly in the international economic order. The reason for the criticism was because the theory was underdeveloped, and was more of an intuitive idea based on a particular reading of history rather than a scientific theory.

With regard to international cooperation, he confirms that hegemony makes cooperation more feasible, because he thinks that hegemony is acceptable, however it is not a necessary condition to establish the liberal international economy. This author considers the point regarding cooperation is very important, particularly in the Gulf region to achieve stability with regional hegemonic states, and the hegemonic state at the international level, such as the USA.

Walter (1996 p. 6) in his chapter, "*The US and Western Europe: the Theory of Hegemonic Stability*" wrote about HST, and explained that there are two main versions of the theory, neo-liberal and neo-realist. Walter (1996 p. 6) pointed out that the: "*neo-realist version of HST is less dependent upon the idea of international public goods, though some realists employ similar language. Neo-realists hold that states have different policy preferences that depend upon their relative position in the world economy*".

In addition, he mentioned that the hegemonic state has the ability to support an open world economy, as opposed to medium-sized states; here the hegemon uses its power to ensure stability by imposing the prevailing rules. Theorists have ignored security factors in international political economy, because as Walter pointed out, realists such as Robert Gilpin did not see the Cold War security structure as significantly affecting economic relations within the Western alliance. So too neo-liberals ignored security; where to quote Keohane : "*it is justifiable to focus principally on the political economy of the advanced industrialized countries without continually taking into account the politics of international security*" (1984

p. 137). Even if this is justified in an Atlantic community of actors (and that is questionable), it is impossible to hold this view with respect to the Gulf.

In accordance with the above the ideas of Walter (1996), the political economy world has to be secure to ensure stability and security, and create a suitable environment for cooperation. This should fall within an international system, which should be guaranteed by international or regional hegemonic states. HST is one of the common theories to describe the status of the USA as a superpower in the international system. Many scholars have contributed to building this theory, such as Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and others.

Keohane (1984 p. 32) suggests that in hegemonic stability theory, as presented in international political economy, the definition of hegemony is rooted in the preponderance of material resources. There are four types of resources that are very important, and the hegemonic power must be dominant over these resources, namely: raw materials, sources of capital, markets, and production needs of high-value.

HST explains that change in the power resources of powerful states, explains change in the international systems. The theory believes that the structures of power are controlled by a single state. According to this theory, the hegemonic power should be standing on a strategy of providing the world with public goods, which are summarised by Nye Jr (2003), in these topics:

- Preserving the balance of power in important areas.

- An open economy.

- Preserving the international things in common.

- Preserving the rules and international institutions.

- Assistance in economic development.

There are complications related to HST, which are partly due to theory, because it was not originally formulated to explain international systems. The roots of this theory are related to the work of the economist, Kindleberger on the Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 1930s (Waever 1997). He suggested that if we wanted the world to be stable, then there should be a stabilising actor. HST was built on the view that the world is divided into sectors, or specific issues and areas, such as oil, the field of global transport, global tourism, medicine, and small industries. Each of these areas has rules and regimes to control them; for example, in the field of oil, we find that there are producing, consuming, and marketing countries, and if we want to understand this field, we should know that there are hegemonic powers, which have an interest in it. Therefore, the rules, procedures, and systems, reflect the interests of the hegemons. If we are to understand world politics, then we have to explain each sector, and understand the fundamental powers within them, and how to maintain this system. Keohane (1989) pointed out that there are two approaches to HST:

- The system in global politics is controlled by a single hegemonic power. This means that the formation and composition of international systems also depends on the existence of one hegemonic power in the system.

- Maintaining the system requires continuity of hegemony. This means that the existence of international cooperation, which builds on the existence of public mutual interests between the international forces, and depends on the continuity and persistence of hegemony in the system.

Keohane (1989) mentioned that the structural approach to explaining the change in the international system varies according to issues and areas. For example, change in the oil

system affects other systems; moreover, it affects the international financial and the international trade systems. However, the impact of change may also differ, as the impact on the international financial system due to the introduction of "the Bretton Woods system" was significant, and contributed to changing the rules of that system. In contrast, the impact on the international trade system was less in the GATT negotiations, until it transformed into the WTO.

From the above analysis, it can be argued that hegemony is an international system which might operate at global, sectoral and regional levels. Within it, the hegemonic state takes the role of organising and managing the system for the global economy. This means providing the capital, defining the rules for international trade, maintaining the political and military security, and converting its currency into the standard of trading. Furthermore, the hegemonic state, at the international level, represents something more important than global power. It is certainly a leader on the political, economic, social, and cultural levels. This mixing of the components of power is particularly important in the methods employed by the hegemonic state in order to determine global political criteria. Accordingly, some political economists believe that global economic stability requires one stabiliser, and that such periods of stability coincided with periods of hegemony. According to this view, "Pax Britannica" (British peace) and "Pax Americana" (American peace) were imposed in the two periods, in which Britain and subsequently the USA were strong enough to enforce the rules of the international economic system in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively. Thus, economic stability existed in history when there was one hegemonic power, and without this power, conflict would be the master of the situation. This theory also explains, according to its proponents, how periods of instability arise from the absence of an effective hegemon (as in the inter-war years).

According to the above, it can be concluded that "hegemony" in the field of international relations theories has two meanings; the first relates to the process of the distribution of power in the particular system, not only military power, but technological and financial power as well. The second concerns the control of a particular idea/ideology on the international level, such as economic liberalism or others.

With regard to criticisms, Gilpin (2011 p. 93), as one of the HST theorists, mentions that "the theory was attacked on theoretical, historical, and political grounds. The theoretical criticisms emphasised the possibility of a cooperative solution among non-hegemonic nations to the problems associated with creating and maintaining a liberal international economy. Although it may be possible to create a stable liberal international order through cooperation but without a hegemon, this has never happened, and with no counterfactual example neither the theory nor its critics can be proved wrong". Gilpin attempts to explain that this problem can address many areas of the social sciences not just HST.

Political criticisms have ranged from denunciations of the theory as a defence of, or rationale for, American policies, in contrast to the idea that the theory predicted the absolute decline of the US (Ibid).

Another criticism is that the HST neglected human capital and knowledge skills; Jeffrey and Felipe (1993) mention that "the crucial role of education in economic growth and hence the importance of investment in human capital". Furthermore, Gilpin (2011 p. 94) discussed that they tested it against late-nineteenth-century experience and found weaknesses in the theory, such as political criticisms that HST was just a defence of, or rationale for, US policies. Gilpin clarifies that the major reason for the criticisms of the theory by political scientists is that it was never adequately formulated. Indeed, the theory was more an intuitive

idea based on a particular reading of history than a scientific theory; that is to say that, as the theory was underdeveloped, it was open to both warranted and unwarranted criticisms (Ibid).

The concept of hegemony

The hegemonic state provides stability and peace, but it imposes a type of tax on beneficiary states, obliging them to contribute to the costs of the provision. Furthermore, the other states are too weak to exercise effective opposition, and will be forced to comply. In this context, and to be clear, small states in the Gulf paid the USA to protect them in 1991 from Iraqi invasion. Moreover, the USA provided its military support, as a hegemonic state has the capability to support other states, where this support could be military, economic, or political (Destradi 2008).

The word "hegemony" was used originally to describe the relationship between Athens and the other Greek cities. Gramsci (1971), who analysed the concept of hegemony with reference to social relations, made significant contributions on the issue of hegemony, and Gramsci (1971 p. xiv) in his prison notebook pointed out that the term of "hegemony" itself has two faces:

> *"On the one hand it is contrasted with domination and as such bound up with*
> *the opposition State/Civil Society and on the other hand "hegemonic" is*
> *sometimes used as an opposite of corporate or economic-corporate to designate*
> *an historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of corporate*
> *existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of*
> *leadership in the political and social arena".*

Historically, the era of a hegemonic Roman Empire (between about 144 BCE and about 210 CE) is a strong example of hegemony, while in the modern era, there are two examples, the

era of British hegemony during the 19th century, and the era of US hegemony, which prevailed since the mid-twentieth century. According to (Wallerstein 1984), hegemony means more than just "leadership" in the international system, yet it is less powerful than in the case of "the empire", where the "hegemonic power" is able to impose its rules on the international system. Hegemony does not imply total control of a global or regional system but sufficient control to generate rules and promote rule observance, and a disposition by both dominant and other actors to recognise this in their behaviour. The term hegemony is used in international relations, and its popularity has increased in the last two decades, because it is now used by those writing about international political economy and international security with regard to HST.

The concept of hegemony also implies leadership or priority. This leadership is manifested, in the international system, by a dominant state, which is a country that has sufficient capacity to undertake this role (Gilpin 2011). Therefore, other states in the international system have to define their relationship with the dominant state; they may stand in support of the dominant state, or in opposition, or even maintain a position of indifference. It is clear that there are a sufficient number of states within the total membership of the international system that have taken the first option; in order to establish the rules of hegemony, they stand with the dominant state. This could be called the approval of domination. While the dominant role of the hegemonic state depends on ability, the concept of hegemony is very similar to the concept of power.

The USA pursues a policy of combating terrorism. In the Gulf, the USA occupied Iraq, which caused a significant change in the balance of power in the region, and Iraq has come out of the regional balance of power and entered into a new stage of terrorism as well as religious intolerance between Shiites and Sunnis. The military option to resolve a crisis

always has many flaws, and affects several regions around the world, such as Iraq, which is still suffering despite the end of the war and the withdrawal of US troops in 2011. Some countries in the region, such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman had to adopt compatible policies, and support the dominant state in the region, which is the USA, in order to secure its protection against external threats. Even Saudi Arabia, despite its military power, economic potential and its political role, preferred to be under the protection of the USA, especially after the Gulf Crisis and War in 1990-91.

It is important to remember that power is comprised of two elements, the conceptual and material. There is a need to analyse the ability of dominant states in a realist study, where realism tends to give the concept of hegemony effectiveness in economic and military terms. Although this is important, it must be emphasised that the ability of the dominant state to be the leader, comes from the means used to achieve its objectives.

Regional hegemony

The concept of regional hegemony in international relations refers to a regionally powerful state that has the capability to influence and exercise its power over neighbouring, independent countries. In addition the relationship between regional hegemonic states and the other states in the same region is similar to the relationships at the international level between a global hegemonic state and other states in the international system.

Mearsheimer (2001) wrote about the regional hegemony in his book, *"The Tragedy of Great Power Politics"*. Mearsheimer discussed that regional hegemonic states and their desire for survival in the anarchic international system, lead states to continue playing the role of regional hegemon in their region; in addition, Mearsheimer (2001) mentions that it may be impossible to achieve global hegemony. Instead, a state which has reached a hegemonic state status at the regional level should work to build its capability and prevent

other states in the region to reach this level. For a state to become hegemonic at the regional level, it must have the necessary power in economic, political, and military terms.

Gulf states are still developing countries, and as Sotirios (2007 p. 9) pointed out, *"Developing countries have no power capabilities in the international level by themselves"*. Advanced states and their power in the international political system reduced the ability of advanced developing states to exercise their role and influence in a specific region. Wherein the developing state has the ability to influence other states at the regional level, not in the international system one could say this developing state is a regional hegemonic state in its region. Sotirios (2007 P. 9) pointed out that the hegemon has three fundamental differences distinguishing it from a global hegemon:

- The aim of a regional hegemon is not to preserve its present state (being a regional hegemon), but upgrading its hegemonic position to the maximum possible level; increasing its influence in the international system or even becoming a global hegemon.

- The hegemonic position of the regional hegemon is directly related to the interests of the global hegemon, or more powerful advanced states in the region, and from the level of internationalisation of its neighbouring states.

- The capability of enforcing its principles and policies in the regional level is relative to the previous two points.

Essentially, a regional hegemonic state looks to build and increase its power and its capabilities to influence other states in its region by establishing policies to deal with other developing states. This can be done by creating regional cooperation agreements with neighbouring states; hence the regional power seeks to establish a regional organisation to play the hegemonic role within this organisation and benefit from the greater power of this

organisation delivered by the participation of other. One could say that the hegemonic states in the international system have the capability to play the role of regional hegemonic power in particular regions, such as the US exercising its power at the regional level by influencing and controlling the security in the Gulf region.

Constructivist theory

Intellectual efforts over recent years have produced a number of theories in international relations, and have explained the relationship between these theories and world issues related to epistemology. These theories have been classified into either interpretive or constituent theories (Balzacq 2010). The interpretive theories are related to the behaviour of the actors being studied, and consider that the relations between countries, in particular, represent an external issue and are not *related* to theory. Constituent theories emphasise that the relations between people are founded on languages, ideas and concepts that are produced and developed by people (Smith 2000). At the beginning of the 1980s, a new project emerged on the study of behaviour and international phenomena. This project was located between the interpretive theories and the constituent theories and is referred to as constructivist theory. The key reason for the emergence of this theoretical approach is the failure of the interpretive theories in predicting the peaceful end of the Cold War. Nicholas Onuf (2012) first used the term 'constructivism' in his book: "*A world of our making*", where he focused on criticism of the ideas and assumptions of the theories of realism and modern liberalism, which are based on physical concepts.

Constructivist theory was a trend in sociology, before it found its way into international relations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s it turned into one of the core theories of international relations. Constructivist theory mentioned that the reality of a community is created by that community. Hence, all the works and actions by humans are related to their

social environments. Identity, culture and values play a key role in constructivist theory, which confirmed that the identity and interests of the states arise from the values and cultures that characterise these countries.

The central issue in the world after the Cold War was how to recognise different groups of identities and interests. Constructivist theory introduced the variables of cultural identity and privacy as two of the basic elements of the analysis. Moreover, the problems of identity increased, and as a result many countries split, as happened in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, the factors of culture and civilisation have played a significant and essential role in people's lives, according to the views of many intellectuals. However, constructivist analysis does not rule out the variable of power, but the theory is based primarily on the emergence of ideas and identities, and how they interact with each other. These inform the way that states look at different situations, and events, and how to respond to them.

However, and despite the modernity of this theory, its historical roots extend to the Italian Giambattista who mentioned that the natural world is of God's making, while the historical world is man-made This highlights the value of ideas in building a social phenomenon that requires different approaches instead of those used by the natural Sciences, which are mainly derived from positivism (Nicholls 2014 p. 45, 46).

Alexandr Wendt (1992) is known as the father of constructivism, and in his article "*Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics*", he discussed the emergence of constructivist theory with the end of the Cold War. This was due to the failure of many approaches, especially realism, in predicting the end of the Cold War in a peaceful way. This also contributed to the battle for legitimizing constructivist theories, because realism and liberalism did not expect the event as they found great difficulty in its interpretation. On the other hand, constructivism provided an explanation, especially with

regard to the revolution brought about by Mikhail Gorbachev in Soviet foreign policy with new thinking, such as collective security. Moreover, the challenge faced by traditional controls with the disappearance of borders, and the emergence of issues related to identity. This was not surprising, where researchers found approaches to explain this, and make it a focus of attention. Overall, there are multiple constructivist theories, even within a single perspective, and there is more than one trend within this "Paradigm" and epistemology seems to be the main indicator that distinguishes between these different directions.

Constructivism, according to Alexandr Wendt (1994 p. 385), is an approach to international relations that assumes the following; states are the basic units of analysis, Inter-Subjectivity, which is the infrastructure for the system based on states and the identities and interests of states, is formed in a coherent format by the social structures within the system. In Wendt's perception, the constructivist theory looks at the structure of the international system from the social view, considering that the basic unit is built on the basis of on-going social interactions that lead to behaviours that often are not independent, which is an expression of an internal social outcome.

Therefore constructivists look at states from the sociological perspective, unlike realists, even if they agree that the state is the main actor. On the other hand, these social attitudes appear in the external environment of the state, through its international relations, that those social actors ensure the lowest common denominator between the social interactions within the state. This means that international politics are understood in the Inter-Subjectivity form and this becomes the method to study phenomena in all international contexts, such as anarchy and security (Copeland 2000).

Constructivism tries to embrace a vision that is more social, in reverse to the inevitable and physical concepts of the perceptions of structural realism, by linking structures

and actors and their understanding of reality in a dialectical relationship, which is referred to as a plurality of directions. Social structure is formed from three basic elements, which are: common knowledge, physical sources that come from the interpretations of the actors that are reflected on their practices, and the practices of these actors. However, despite this perception, constructivism has been perceived as very close to realism in certain ways. By comparing the two theories we can deduce the following common elements:

- General feature of international politics: anarchy.

- The ultimate goal of the states: survival.

- The main actor for analysis: countries.

- The conduct of states: rational.

- Determinants of the states' behaviour: fraud and lack of confidence.

Among the foundational assumptions that constructivism is based on, and which emerged from a reaction to the realism approach, is its view of international reality wherein constructivism focuses on the role of ideas and social structures in the formation of this reality. Realism looks at this on the basis of the physical hierarchy of the basic units in the international system (Jackson and Sorensen 2012).

The reality, in its current form, is a social combination characterised by the continuity of the interactions between the political units, which form the international order; the nature of this interaction and observable trends define the features of the international order.

When considering the theoretical difference between the two approaches, in particular in epistemological forms between rationalists and contemplatives (Risse, 1999 p 775-776), constructivism appears to be the only way to conduct the process of theorizing in international relations, so it is closer to bridging the gap in theory; or as Steve Smith calls it,

accepted rationale for contemplatives, and accepted contemplation for rationalists (Copeland 2000 p. 189-190).

That is to say that the value is derived from not being discussed by realists and liberals in the same way that supporters of critical theory and postmodernism did, but that it has built its perceptions on the ruins of the main assumptions of these theories. In addition constructivism, in the context of the rejection of some epistemological premises of rationalism, has discussed a new social framework of knowledge, which has been reflected through the following elements:

Constructivism exceeds the separatist relationships between actor and structure established by the rationalists through the launch of the idea of mutual constitution, which is seen through the behaviours of actors based on the arrangements of the international system. Furthermore, a structural characteristic of the system is formed according to the practices of the actors in it. This argument is completely contrary to the central interest of traditional realism of analysing actors to understand the phenomenon of international conflict and excessive structural realism to rely on the structure of the international system for the interpretation of international politics.

In addition, understanding international phenomena undertaken by the actor will determine the latter's behaviour towards such phenomena, unlike through the approach of interpretatives who are interested in describing the behaviours and practices of the actor. Here constructivists attach great importance to the practices of previous states because this allows us to understand and recognise certain situations that will benefit us in the event of a recurrence.

The constructivist gives importance to the Norms as bases and determinants in the formation of the identity of the actors and its interests (Reus 2005; Wendt 1999).

Constructivism, as a product of evolution in the theory of international relations, derives its advantages from being located at the intersection of the two sets of theories referred to above, which is between the theories of rationality and contemplative theories (Baylis and Owens 2013). Furthermore, in order to understand how the theoretical construction of constructivism is reflected on the security designs in a simple image, we will use two examples to demonstrate the role of social structures in the interpretation of international reality (Ibid).

The power: the constructivist interpretation of the power, in contrast to what is brought by the realists, is not seen on the basis of physical components, but also on the perception component, whether by the state, which has the power, or by the rest of the actors and other countries involved in the system. For example, despite the acquisition of all the components of physical force, Japanese interpretation of power is based on the ideas of the role of Japanese social structure, wherein the country will not pursue becoming an international power within the international system, as in the Japanese perception power is not the consistent and active ingredient of force.

Threat: realists limit the threat to the direct enemy, which is a foreign enemy in nature. However, constructivism perceives the external enemy not by its military force, but primarily associates power with the ideas present and required to build collective strength (Legro 2005 p. 6). In addition, the constructivist theory discusses that the security-centred realism interpretation of the security dilemma is an interpretation of absolute security relations in global politics. Neo-realists adopt that the threat is one in all cases, however it can be argued that this is not always true because the collective perception element always controls the

formation of threats and their direction. For example, the USA, or any member state of NATO, perceives French nuclear weapons in a different manner to how they perceive North Korean or Iranian nuclear weapons, because the preconceived ideas about these countries are different, despite the fact that there is a possibility of nuclear threat in each case.

This constructivist perception can be called "security Intersubjectivity", which is the analysis of the formations and social interactions of the actors involved to understand the security situation, including ways to enhance the breadth of the security studies field (Wendt 1994 p. 389). Constructivists found the appropriate environment in the post-Cold War world, as the last decade of the twentieth century saw a high turnout of the culture concept, which is the development of constructivism in its focus on the importance of ideas, values and standards. Peter Katzenstein used cultural variables to interpret and assimilate the reasons that led Germany to reduce its dependence on military policy, although it possesses the technological capability to do so (Little and Smith 2006).

Constructivist theory began presenting its alternative security paradigm by criticising the rationalist perspective from two levels; as mentioned above, the failure of the liberal and realist approaches to anticipate the end of the Cold War, as the constructivists refer this to the lack of knowledge of these theories in the physical aspects of the international system, including the particular format of the new ideas that began circulating on different levels in the international community. Furthermore, the theoretical inflexibility of both realism and liberalism in understanding the reasons for the demise of the Soviet Union is identified as a key criticism; the vision of these theories limited this event within the reflection of the international environment of the Soviet Union, while neglecting the internal changes taking place within Soviet society. This shortcoming always maligned the physical interpretation of realism, according to constructivists.

According to constructivism, the deficiencies of realism are illustrated by understanding the security environment during the Cold War era, which is based on the distributional power when interpreting the end of this war. As a challenge to the sense that the demise of the Soviet Union transpired because of the strength of the USA, the truth, as perceived by constructivists, lies in the new security policies placed by Gorbachev that were dependent on the idea of international collective security (Baylis 2001p. 263-264).

In this context, we find positivist constructivist or so-called "Modernist Constructivists" like Alexandr Wendt, and neoclassical constructivists, like Kratochwil (1991a), Onuf (1999), Adler (1997), and Katzenstein (1996); most of these scholars tend to adopt an epistemological positivist position. On the other hand, postmodern constructivism was proposed by Ashley (1984), Campbell (1998) and Walker (1993), who tended to adopt a Post-Positivist epistemology (Kratochwil 1991b) and (Wendt 1999). In general, what brings these theorists together is that each of the two directions are inside the constructivist perspective, which came as a reaction to mainstream approaches (realist, liberal); indeed, everyone speaks inside the constructivist perspective about standards, and identity, and the factors of idealism. As scholars mentioned that the constructivist movement battles with prevailing theories not on epistemology, but ontology (Wendt 1999). At the time when both realism and liberalism tended to focus on physical factors, the constructivist approaches focused on the impact of ideas (Walt 1998), and instead of looking at the state as a given prior assumption that it is working for its survival, the constructivist sees that interest and identity interact through social processes (historical), and also attaches great importance to the speech prevailing in the society. This is because speech reflects and, at the same time, constitutes current beliefs and interests, and also acceptable behaviour. So, constructivism is

mainly concerned with the source of change or transformation. This approach greatly solved the replacement of Marxism as a factor in international affairs (Walt 1998 p. 40-41).

From a constructivist viewpoint, the central issue in the world after the Cold War is how different groups recognised their identities and interests (Walt 1998 p. 41). Although the constructivist analysis does not rule out variable power, it is based primarily on how ideas and identities emerge, and how they interact with each other, to understand the way that countries look on different situations, and respond to them accordingly. In addition, the inability of both realism and liberalism to provide an acceptable interpretation opened the way for constructivism as an alternative perspective to explain the changes at this stage. Depending on the perception of Wendt, constructivism stems from a set of basic assumptions to provide a deeper understanding or grasp of international politics (Wendt 1992 p.396-397). These assumptions are: states are the basic units of analysis, the infrastructure of the system based on the states is built on intersubjectivity, and the identities and interests of the states are formed by social structures.

States are the main actors in the international environment, where security is an urgent need. The assumption is that states behave rationally in terms of the perception of the national interest, if entirely within norms and standards. Therefore, the coexistence between conflict and cooperation is possible, even within the same social milieu. Furthermore, needs and interests, especially in the Gulf region require a kind of coexistence with conflict and external intervention within certain limits, and the perceptions of the presence and the role of the USA may differ from state to state in the Gulf. Through constructivist theory, this research analyses the perceptions of Gulf states of the US role in the Gulf, and how states in the region perceive US hegemony. Indeed, how their experiences, values and beliefs impact on their behaviour in terms of dealing with the security issues in the Gulf. This approach also allows

for the exploration of Gulf states' perceptions of the new security system, and its ability to protect the region, whether built by internal or external actors.

The constructivist approach in security studies was established on the following: the relationship of identity and interests and how this shapes the security behaviours of the actors, which is a departure from the anarchy as recognised by the structural realism in discussing the security dilemma. Moreover, anarchy is made by states as Wendt (392-407) noted; which is not a guaranteed situation that should be taken for granted as it is the result not the cause.

Constructivist theory focuses on the identity variable, which is ignored by the previous explanatory theories. However, more than that, some theories fail to provide a full understanding of international security mainly due to their negligence of key aspects of the system; for instance, the failure of the realists to understand new forms of conflicts, particularly the internal conflicts considering that most of them were controlled by an identity element. The identity that is defined by ideas, perceptions and criteria determines the format of the interests of other actors on the one hand, and the direction these actors take within their international behaviour (i.e. competition or cooperation with other actors).

Wendt (1994) discussed that the identities and interests that are considered by rationalists as existing facts that are produced in the international politics that we see, are not actually facts, but are things we have found or created. The constructivist interest in the factor of identity is based on building an understanding of the internal social interactions of the states, in order to accommodate political outputs, so as not to be restricted in the anarchic international environment of the international system. Rationalist theories do not deal with the identity of the actor seriously, as they are considered fixed and do not lead us to understand the differentiation in the actions of states.

For example, we find that neorealism links these acts with the anarchic structure of the international system, while neo-liberalism returns it to institutional interactive processes in international relations. In both cases, looking to the states as independent actors expresses national interests. While constructivism sees that an increased interest in the identities of actors, however, we will be able to set up a joint reflect of the interests of collective identities, which allow the perception of Statelets for Security Studies in the collective perception, which is based on ensuring compliance to the general rules that are common among nations.

In fact, the collective identity emerges after interaction unlike the narrow identity of the states that come before interaction. So riveted constructivists focus on how interactions are formed in the world of politics between international players, which focuses on the image of interaction regardless of the method of interaction.

Constructivists are involved with concepts of realist structuralism in adopting an anarchist vision of international relations. However, the concept of anarchy does not occupy the same position and the analytical value for both, the anarchy of the international system is not the cause of everything as the realists believe. Social structure and collective awareness is only able to perceive or interpret the results or effects of the anarchy of the system. So constructivists consider that anarchy is the closest to a combination of the actions of the actors themselves.

In an effort to link their rejection of the security attributes of the anarchist interpretations of the international system, constructivists adopt the new realism argument, which says that the nature of the international system places the states in front of one option, which is Self-Reliance as a basis for states to realise their interests and national objectives.

Wendt (1992, 397) says in this regard the collective meanings define structures that govern our business, and the actors are defining their interests and identities through their participation in these collective meanings. The identities and interests relationship as well as institutions are relatively stable groups of identities and interests, as we know, and self-help is one of these institutions. Therefore, it is not the only way to collect the definitions of identities and interests in the state of anarchy.

This means that self-reliance is not the only way to avoid the issue of an anarchic international order, because this is a pre-explanation of the situation of the actors. It is true that this option is imposed on the states; however, it is not imposed on the behaviour of actors (states). It is therefore certain changes in the behaviour of the state that could lead to the emergence of bilateral and multilateral understandings between actors in the system, even if the constructivists agree that on the difficulty of disposal of the issue of self-help; however, they do not aspire to become a social system controlled by states.

In light of the above, we can understand the constructivist perception of the security relations in the form of a security equation, which consists of two states (a, b), when state (a) is in accordance with the perception of the real constructivist perception to take certain political, military and economic actions in the form of self-reliance in order to achieve the goal of survival, the second country (b) pursues the same behaviours to realise the same objectives, because this state is moving on the basis of doubt in its relations foreign.

However, the constructivist theory view that if state (a) followed confidence-building measures and reduced excessive defensive actions, other countries will adopt similar confidence-building measures, making the two countries (a) and (b) pursue other tools for survival other than the system of self-help, which results in an increase in the chances of achieving international security.

Therefore, we can conclude that constructivism, albeit a theory that adopts the idea of anarchy in the same way that neorealism does, constructivists disagreed with the interpretation of the behaviour of states as subject to the interpretations of social structures in the form of beliefs and reactions and standards. Furthermore, anarchy is not perceived as driving the formation of the patterns of behaviour of actors. This is where the value of multi-dimensional analysis provided by the constructivist theory formulated frameworks includes wide variables that overtake traditional perspectives, such as social knowledge, relationships between identity and interests, and mutual configuration.

Therefore, the constructivist theory contribution emerged mainly as a result of the need to establish a bridging link between theories of rationality and contemplative theories. Constructivists do not deny all knowledge perspectives of the rationalists as both critical theorists and the post-modernists have, but the constructivist theory reached different results, as seen in the interpretation of international anarchy. Constructivism was founded on the background of deep criticism of the construction of the traditional theoretical frameworks.

Where Wendt sees, for example, that the rationalist fault lies in overstating the thinking that identities and interests exist before the interaction between different actors; this perception is based on the so-called security dilemma for states that visualises states in a similar situation to individuals, because it presupposes that the states have interests and identities before their interaction processes.

Overall, the constructivist vision of security studies is as an interactive social system, and not a static arena that only monitors the physical relations between the basic units of the international system.

Constructivist theory is criticised by both the rationalists and the reflectivist Steans, et al., (2013 p. 201), who mentioned that "the rationalist critique focuses on the empirical evidence for the proposed arguments. They argue that most of the puzzles addressed by social constructivism can be adequately explained by interests and other 'material' factors, and that the impact of such things as norms accounts for, if anything, a very small portion of the variation in state behaviour".

Furthermore, the theory has been criticised in terms of identity or norms as explanatory factors that are problematic because they cannot be readily observed in a particularly urban society; moreover, concepts that social constructivists operate are unclearly defined, such as identity, culture, norms and institutions, that all these factors are linked to each other and cannot be separate, that Steans, et al., (2013 p. 202) explain "this problem becomes more important the further social constructivist work gets to the rationalist pole and does indeed want to explain".

Wendt criticised that he did not explain how to build identity, and addressed challenges by Bozdaglıoglu, (2007 p. 5-6) regarding one of the highlights of his critics. Bozdaglıoglu criticised constructivism because of its lack of harmony in ideas, and this is confirmed by Kenneth Waltz where he sees that constructivism was based on the collection of ideas. Waltz selected it, without exclusion, but it fell within the anarchy of the ideas, which has been unable to present their ideas in a harmonious and coherent form, rather stating that constructivism is only collection of ideas (Ibid).

From the systemic perspective, there is no way to prove the validity or otherwise of constructivism ideas, as it emphasises that everything that happens in people's minds, and this is what makes it impossible to note and assess these perceptions. This is a criticism faced

by Wendt, inasmuch as he did not provide a way to understand and assess people's thoughts (Behravesh 2011).

In addition, constructivism seeks to fill the gap, which is still wide between the theories of postmodern theorists, and the question remains open as to whether the constructivism movement can represent a strong challenge to the realists, or whether it will disappear like postmodernism.

There is no doubt that constructivism highlights a lot of valuable points as it deepens our understanding of world policy, but it is not wise to try to engage in the positivism battle with realism. It is better for the constructivists to be able to offer streaming scientific theories like those submitted by realists, and the opportunity here is that constructivists will be able to provide more superior explanations of reality based on the view that they are dealing with perceptions that are actually more difficult to understand. The most notable issue is that constructivists are never able to provide theories that contain empirical evidence and enter themselves in the post-theory arguments.

In summary, it is not clear whether constructivist theory can win in a battle of knowledge with realism. If it was so, realism will continue to remain as one of the most powerful theories in the field of international relations.

The research seeks to assess the contribution of constructivist theory by testing the success of the constructivist analysis in understanding the behaviours of external powers and their role, according to the perceptions of the states of the Gulf. In addition, the theory provides an ontological and epistemological framework different from other well-known frameworks, and alternated between professionals and researchers. This explains how the

foreign policy of countries is not determined outside the internal society, and how the internal identities attempt, through their values, to determine the nature of external behaviour.

Combining two theories in one research project

This research project uses both HST and constructivist theory, which presents the problem of how to combine two rather contradictory theoretical frameworks in one study. The purpose of using these two theories is that each addresses the aims and questions relevant to it at different moments of the investigation. Constructivist theory is used to examine the perceptions of decision-makers, and the decisions and policies they take. This approach is also used to analyse how they are made by looking at individual officials as actors, and by discussing their experiences, values and beliefs – and the impact their behaviour has on the states' regional and international relations in their region. On the other hand, HST is used to discuss the role of the regional and international hegemonic powers in the Gulf, with the USA playing the leading role in the region. Furthermore, HST discusses the capability of any of the Gulf states to be a regional hegemonic power, and whether this would need to be a regional hegemonic power (such as Saudi Arabia) supported by the USA, or an un-supported regional power (such as Iran). All these elements need to be clarified by studying the balance of power, and all the factors that have direct impact on the ability of states in the region to build a regional security system able to provide stability in the Gulf area.

The aim of combining these theories is to explore a theoretical approach that I refer to as: the constructivist approach to hegemony.

Wendt and Friedheim (1995), as constructivist scholars, mentioned that "*hegemony is a type of hierarchical international order, whereby the hegemonic state in the international system exercises transnational authority over secondary states*". This fits the situation in the Gulf, in that the regional states act as secondary states or even regional hegemonic states. Moreover,

Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990) see that the constructivists believe that hegemony is founded largely on the legitimacy of the hegemon over secondary states. This means that the hegemonic state has the authority to be a key player in their region, which is true of the Gulf. The acceptance of the hegemon's conceptions of world order and ideologies by the Gulf states legitimises the hegemonic order. This acceptance provides a new basis for the Gulf states to redefine their national identity and interest in accordance with the hegemonic state, and thus prolong hegemony in their region even in the absence of the need for the hegemonic state to be in the region.

Studying the official and unofficial policy attitudes of the Gulf states towards hegemony deserves serious attention. Indeed, differentiating between official and unofficial attitudes allows the research to discuss and analyse the attitudes of the Gulf states. This is done by asking the right questions in the official interviews, where answers could be official or unofficial. Furthermore, many sources are available from recorded interviews in the media, newspapers, journal articles and reports, which provide information on the states' attitudes in differing times and themes.

Indeed, these opinions may have an independent influence on the security and stability of the hegemonic regime in the region. While ruling elites in Gulf states have the ability to make decisions away from public scrutiny, and also manipulate public opinion, ruling elites may not have a totally free hand in imposing a pro-hegemonic foreign policy that contradicts the values and interests of their societies (Wang 2003 p. 101). However, they may share the decision with domestic powers in each state, because the Gulf states are still ruled by tribes and families, and are not democracies. Moreover, while governments may change public attitudes towards foreign policy, they may not be able to change public opinion in the way they want, because public opinion is just opinion and may not reflect official attitudes.

Moreover, public opinion in many cases may be trying not to stand against the government's foreign policy regarding national interests. Public opinion varies with time, even on the same issue. This allowed governments to gain part of the public opinion to support their foreign policy. The ruling elites manipulate public opinion, and put the public under the pressure of events and national interests, which may lead to profound change in public opinion or the emergence of a new culture, which becomes resistant to further change (Kupchan 1994).

Methodology

This study uses both qualitative and quantitative research strategies. It investigates the security variables in the Gulf region between the Gulf states and the USA, at the domestic and international levels. Furthermore, the research uses a qualitative approach as the dominant method, and a quantitative approach as the less dominant method.

In this project, quantitative methods are used to look at GDP, economic change and growth, military budgets, overall military sizes, weapons capabilities, and other observable aspects of the power of the states under consideration. Moreover, quantitative methods are used to examine data from the Gulf states in order to investigate the balance of power between the leading regional states, particularly Iran, Iraq Saudi Arabia and the other states in the region. Furthermore, quantitative methods helped with the case of US hegemony. The research hypothesised that US hegemonic strength correlates with the balance of power, and the levels of armed conflict in the Gulf region. In contrast to qualitative research, quantitative methods are used to look at factual data from a wider perspective, and the relationships between variables to interpret the relations between cause and effect in these variables. The objective of quantitative research is to develop and employ mathematical models, theories and hypotheses pertaining to phenomena. More generally, quantitative research is widely used in social sciences, where economics and political science use quantitative methods to

collect and analyse data. Niglas (2000 p. 3) pointed out that *"in the social sciences, the term relates to empirical methods, originating in both philosophical positivism and the history of statistics, which contrast with qualitative research methods"*.

The qualitative method studied the security variables in the Gulf region between the Gulf states and the USA, at domestic and international level. Marsh (cited in Vromen, 2010, pp. 249, 266), points out that qualitative methods include several types, which can be used in this study, such as the case study, in-depth interviews, text/discourse analysis, and historical analysis. Burnham, et al (2008), point out that qualitative research usually provides the researcher with an in-depth understanding and comprehensive explanation of the research objective. Qualitative research is not performed through interpreting the data and results of digital and statistical methods, but the vocabulary of natural language and explanatory sentences. The researcher uses qualitative research when he believes that the quantitative and statistical metrics cannot provide an adequate description and interpretation of the problem presented. Furthermore, qualitative research, and new contemporary types of research, focused initially on the medical and psychological fields, and were then extended to the social sciences; all that has to do with the movement and activities of human society (Smith 2007) and (Mack, et al. 2005). Qualitative research is used to examine face-to-face interaction, which requires time, for the purpose of implementing and organising the observation and interview, and analysing records and documents.

Given the difference in qualitative studies, a strategy is used to distinguish common ways in this type of inquiry, namely observation and in-depth interviews, and collecting the facts through discourse analysis of documentary material. Most qualitative studies are exploratory or explanatory in nature, and were designed to understand the views of the people (members of the society under examination) of the world in which they live.

With regard to the general characteristics of qualitative research, this type of research stems from the fact that the study of social and human (behavioural) phenomena is different from the study of phenomena in the natural and physical sciences (Gitlin 1994). As such, it needs different research methods, which focus on understanding social and human behaviour. Qualitative research is linked to the coexistence of the people involved professionally in a particular institution, and specific social motives, while human behaviour is linked to the context in which it occurred, and in social fact. In addition, the reports of qualitative research are presented in simple natural language and descriptive narrative style. For example, the researcher describes the components of the interview and the personal characteristics of individuals, as well as their impressions about the interview and their work. Moreover, qualitative research can be used to study the phenomena and situations that we do not have adequate information about, or to learn new things about cases, which require in depth study. These are then studied using quantitative research later, as a method complementary to qualitative research. Hence, the researcher is the main tool of data collection. Therefore, the research conducted, for example, depends mainly on the capacity and capabilities of the researcher, who often uses his observations and information to complete the interviews (Marsh 2010). Qualitative research begins with designing a flexible plan, allowing the researcher to develop and change in the design of the research plan in light of developments and changes that will affect him. For example, the researcher does not specify the size of the sample, or the nature of its members in advance, because the information that he will get, often leads him to interview other people, from outside the sample that was chosen.

In addition, this research project uses the historical method in its primary stages, where the second chapter will provide background information about the relationship between the USA and the Gulf states. Since the topic deals with politics, and international

61

and security relations, it has also adopted the descriptive analytical methodology. The historical presentation is of little value unless accompanied by analysis and supporting evidence for all the events, coupled to the necessity of comparing the different positions and factors influencing US political directions regarding the Gulf. With regard to the historical method, and because the present is part of history, from the historical process in permanent motion, this approach studies the issues of society at the present, beginning with knowing the social reality to change it, and preoccupied with identifying the history of the social process or history of social movement. The historical method depends on recovering the past, and discovering solutions to the current problems in light of what has previously transpired, and depends on collecting historical information in order to critically analyse it.

Methods

This study will use several methods to collect data for the research. One of these is to conduct interviews with security experts and decision-makers in the region. At the same time, the literature review is another method to collect data, where there are many books, journal articles, theses, conference papers and other documents written in both English and Arabic, which are useful in this research study.

In terms of interviews, the purpose is to collect more data about the security of the Gulf and the US role to protect the Gulf area, and to analyse different perspectives on these issues. Interviews are very helpful in studying and analysing peoples' opinions, where interviewees are policy-makers, people at a relatively high level, and authors who are interested in Gulf studies. In addition, the information sought from the intended interviewees is not accessible anywhere else, and so these interviews prove very important to the overall analysis. Furthermore, some information gained from the interviews reinforced and added authority to information gained from secondary sources. The interview in the present age is

one of the most important tools in research. It is used in many fields, such as medicine, journalism, law, business management, and social sciences, and is one of the methods commonly used in field research that seeks to achieve more than one aim from the same research. Although many researchers believe it is easy to conduct interviews, this is not correct, as the interviews require significant preparation advanced planning. Moreover, accuracy in the choice of terms and words, and the design of questionnaires must be checked against the purpose for which it was prepared. We should note that the interview as a tool of research is not just a normal interview done spontaneously; it is scientific in its approach and performance in terms of preparation and planning, or in terms of implementation, and evaluation.

As Kumar (2010 p. 91) explains, interviews focus on "*a particular area of interest based on the hypothesis developed by the researcher. Therefore, in this method, the main function of the interviewer is to focus attention of respondents on a given area of interest*", and the interview questions are based upon the objectives and questions of the research.

This thesis is a study of the variable of security between the USA and Gulf states leading to suggestions of a development of a new system of power relations in the region. In addition, the security system in this region is based on the distinction between security of the Gulf under regional security, and international security, which includes US national security and its interests in the Gulf (Davis, et al. 2003). The aim is to assess the interaction between US national security and regional security developments, from the perceptions of the Gulf states.

It is difficult to do research on the Gulf states, particularly with regards to security or political issues. The research faced various obstacles particularly when it comes to sensitive questions. When this author travelled to the United Arab Emirates to conduct fieldwork to

63

obtain the data and conduct the interviews, the belief was that most senior officials and decision-makers in the Gulf states were suspicious of cooperating with a researcher doing studies about security in the region. In order to find an answer to the research questions about security and the role of the US, the researcher had to work hard to obtain answers for the right questions at the right time. However, some interviewees who were approached did not respond to initial communication, and the main reason probably was because the subject deals with security and stability in the Gulf region. In addition, some of those contacted preferred not to have their names and positions mentioned in this thesis. Face-to-face interviews were conducted for this research with eight high-level officials in Tripoli. These interviews were conducted at the embassies of the different Gulf states in Tripoli. The reason for conducting these interviews in Tripoli was encouraged as this author is from Libya, and it was easy to conduct the interviews in Libya at any time. Moreover, eleven interviews were conducted in the UAE, eight of these interviews were conducted at the embassies of Gulf states in Abu Dhabi, and three interviews in the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, some of the interviewees preferred not to mention their names and positions in the research, for various reasons, which may have been related to their positions or for security and safety reasons for more details about the interviewees see (**Error! Reference source not found.**).

Although the interviews contained more than fifteen questions, some interviews took forty minutes, others just fifteen minutes. The questions focused on the relevant security issues, such as stability, security visions, building the new security system under US hegemony, and perceptions of the hegemony in the region regarding the US presence in the Gulf. A list of interview questions is available in the appendix.

Furthermore, the project used rolling discussions with open-ended questions that allowed the interviewees to talk comfortably about the issues addressed in the questions. Moreover, data was collected from various sources, including online newspapers, press interviews, government documents and security publications in Arabic and English. In the early stages of this research, the relevant literature was carefully reviewed, particularly security studies on the Gulf, conflict studies and international security studies. Moreover, the review covered the relevant literature about the HST, generally, and the realist version of HST. The most important sources for the analysis from this literature were outlined in the above sections, such as regional security and the role of the USA in dealing with the crises in the Gulf, regarding the Gulf states' perceptions.

With regard to the secondary sources, it is important to mention that the literature on security and stability in the region has expanded greatly throughout the course of this research project. Therefore, it has been crucial to review the literature on a regular basis throughout, and to keep up to date with the newest developments in the literature. Chapter two addresses the roots of the US variable influencing security in the Gulf, particularly in section one regarding the earlier relationship with the Gulf region, which discussed the discovery of oil and the period of the development of relations, after World War II. In addition, it presents the Nixon Doctrine and US policy in the Gulf, the Carter Doctrine and US policy in the Gulf, and the Reagan Administration and its vision of security in the Gulf, as well as the Iraq-Iran War. Furthermore, Chapter three addresses security in the Gulf in the 1990s, and explains the details of important international and regional events that affected security in the region. Section one of the chapter addresses the demise of the bipolarity and its implications internationally, and in the Gulf, while section two looks at the Gulf War, and the accompanying intervention and deployment of international forces in the Gulf. These two

sections contain mostly background historical analysis. Consequently, these chapters are very important in terms of understanding and reviewing the events and conflicts, hegemonic influence, and the perception of Gulf states about the hegemonic states, and their role in terms of security and stability.

CHAPTER TWO THE ROOTS OF THE US VARIABLE INFLUENCING SECURITY IN THE GULF

Introduction

Understanding the historical background in the Gulf is very important in order to begin an investigation into the security issues in the region, particular as the region holds plenty of gas and oil resources, which have resulted in internal and external interventions affecting regional stability. The last chapter discussed the historical method as one of the methods used in this research project. It is important in this chapter to analyse and provide evidence for defining the relationship between the USA and the Gulf states. This chapter includes three main sections, the first covers the background to the US presence in the Gulf, and deals with the early beginnings of US-Gulf relations including the period of oil exploration and discovery, the development of the relationships, the Second World War, and studying the Nixon and Carter principles in US policy towards the Gulf. Moreover, an exploration is conducted of the period of the Reagan Administration and its vision of security in the Gulf, as well as the Iraq-Iran war.

The second section relates to the US objectives in the Gulf, represented by safeguarding the flow of oil and gas because of the importance of this energy source for the US and global economies. This section will also investigate how the USA has sought to control the Gulf oil resources by all available means, including the use of force, to limit the ability of the regional powers in the Gulf. Furthermore, the preserving of the governing regimes that support the US presence and interests in the Gulf is addressed, as well as protecting Israel's security and its strategic superiority in the context of the crises and wars in the Gulf, which affect the balance of power between Israel and other states in the Gulf and in the Middle East. The third main section covers the means utilised to achieve US aims in the Gulf, whether economic, military, or political. The manner in which the USA has sought to

achieve its objectives in the region by using different methods at different levels of crises and stability in the region is also assessed.

The USA's early relationship with the Gulf region:

The beginning of the relationship between the United States and Gulf states was originally limited to the commercial field. The first formal recorded relationship was in 1792 when several American sailors arrived at Muscat in order to survey and explore the area to determine the extent and quality of potential trade that could be shared with the people of Muscat (Palmer 1999). In 1833 the American Business Agent, Captain Edmund Roberts, arrived at Muscat and was accompanied by a small naval force. The United States and local authorities signed a trade agreement in 1833. On the 18th of March 1836, the first American Consul arrived in Zanzibar and he began his mission to protect American trade in the region (Al-Thani 2000). Under this agreement, the Americans found markets for their products, especially furniture, textiles, cotton and weapons. The latter were sold in the Asian part of the Sultanate not the African part. As a result of tribal problems on the coast of east Africa, the Sultanate could not control it and the United States was not allowed to intervene because of the agreement between the United States and Muscat was limited to trading only. The agreement continued and expansion in American trade continued to a point where the United States reached a virtual monopoly of trade with Muscat.

The American presence was so broad to the extent that when the British Consul arrived in Zanzibar in 1841 he found the Sultan's palace decorated with printed bulletins of the triumphs of the US Navy over the British Royal Navy in the War of 1812 (Palmer 1999). With the expansion of the American role in the region against the British influence in the Indian Ocean the American relations with the regional states continued to increase with the signing of a trade agreement in 1851 in Istanbul with the Iranian government, which was the

most active Gulf state in terms of trade (Al-Thani 2000). The agreement allowed the Americans to establish a consulate in Bushehr on the Gulf, and in return the Americans would protect Persian trade and allow Persian ships to use the American flag. The Iranian government looked forward to increasing these relations to encouraging Americans to stand with Persia against the Imam of Muscat, but the United States did not agree on the wording of this agreement and agreed to the section on trade only (Al-Nuaimi 1994).

In addition, the major European countries of Britain and Russia tried to expand their influence against the USA's agreements with the Gulf states. In spite of all the agreements that were concluded by the United States with the countries of the region, trade did not flourish because of the limited potential of the region at that time; the relations between the countries of the region and the United States were limited to trade and diplomatic visits from both sides as well as the exchange of messages and the signing of trade agreements (Macris 2009). It should be noted that the most important achievements of American foreign policy in the period (1847-1944) was the continued sending of Christian missionaries to the Gulf region. The justification for the missionaries in this area was that in the days before the spread of Islam, the region was influenced by Christianity and the Americans perceived that the Gulf must be returned to it (Macris 2009). Basra was chosen, briefly, in 1891 as a place for missionary activity in the Gulf. Furthermore the American government decided to expand its activities with the opening of new centres of missionaries in Bahrain in 1892, Muscat in 1893 and Kuwait in 1910. In fact, missionary activity was not limited to the dissemination of Christianity, but it was included in political and trade activities (Al-Thani 2000). These missionary centres were sending regular reports on all activities of political, social and economic life to their governments that depended on them in the formulation of policies in the region. In addition, the missionaries provided health assistance for people in need in the

Gulf. However, after the discovery of oil in large quantities and the improvement of living conditions and health, which was exploited by the missionaries in their presence to achieve their missionary and political objectives, these plans and hopes failed and all these centres closed to missionary activity in 1944 (Potter 2002).

The discovery of oil and the development of relations:

With the beginning of the twentieth century, oil became the centre of competition in the Gulf between Britain and the United States. In May 1901, the Englishman William Knox D'Arcy won the privilege to explore for oil from the Shah of Persia, covering all the Iranian states, except the five northern Iranian states. Vast reserves of oil were discovered after seven years of exploration, starting the age of oil in the Gulf. The American citizen Colby Sister obtained a concession to explore for oil in Mosul, in the north of Iraq, but Britain, which controlled the region, did not give the United States permission to prospect for oil in the region. However, after the Iraqi Petroleum Company was established in 1912, the United States became established as a shareholder in the company (Macris 2009). Because of British influence in the region, US companies could not expand their activities, which prompted the United States to protest against the British policy in the region, which it regarded as contrary to the open-door policy which the United States strongly advocated after the peace talks in 1919. Furthermore, the open-door policy mentioned that all nations are equal before the law in the territory of the Mandate, and that no monopoly over privileges of any resource (e.g. oil) could be granted (Potter 2002). It was not only in regards to the granting of oil concessions to the British in the Middle East that the United States stuck to the open-door principle. With this policy American and British companies were able to invest in Iran's oil, and the US Sinclair's company was awarded privileges to explore for oil in 1923, in the five states northern Iran, that Britain was not prospecting in (Palmer 1999).

In 1928, the US Geological mission visited Bahrain and confirmed the presence of oil there and established an American British company in 1932 called the Bahrain Petroleum Company. In 1933, the company of Western California got a contract to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia and then the Texas Company entered with the Western California company and they established a new company that became known as Aramco (Palmer 1999). At this level of the economic relationship between the United States and the Gulf states the former became a part of the region, which qualified it to play a significant role in the region. Furthermore, economic aspects have dominated the US relations with the countries of the Gulf, between the two world wars, especially surrounding efforts to secure oil concessions in all the Gulf countries.

The US expansion in oil production in the Gulf region as a superpower, enabled it to secure first class trade interests in the region. Further to the insistence of the US State Department on the application of the principle of the open-door policy to ensure that US companies could secure 23% of the shares of the Iraq Petroleum Company, US companies also secured 100% of the shares of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia Petroleum, and 50% of the shares of the Kuwait Oil Company, although the actual production, obtained by US companies from these privileges was of little importance compared with US domestic production. Securing these concessions was intended to compensate for the lack of reserves in the USA and to prevent Britain from controlling most of the oil resources in the world in the future, as a result of its hegemony in the Gulf region.

Figure 1 US field production of crude oil

U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration

It is interesting that this political hegemony was not exploited to ensure British monopoly over the resources in the Gulf. In any case, the USA had obtained more than 60% of Gulf oil production by 1960.

As can be seen in Figure 1 US field production of crude oil has declined since the 1970s as some of the oil fields in the US have been producing for over 100 years. This means the USA has to import more crude oil to make up the shortfall in domestic production. In addition, and because the crude oil production in the Gulf has increased since the 1960s and 1970s, the USA imported large amounts of oil from the region as seen in Figure 2 Import from OPEC and Persian Gulf as share total, 1960-2012and Figure 3 Gross imports by major sources, in addition to Table 1 U.S. Imports from Persian Gulf countries of crude oil and petroleum products (thousand barrels per day)

73

Figure 2 Import from OPEC and Persian Gulf as share total, 1960-2012

Imports From OPEC and Persian Gulf as Share of Total Imports, 1960–2012

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA)

Figure 3 Gross imports by major sources

Figure 2. Gross Imports by Major Sources
Share of gross oil imports, 2011

Non-OPEC 60%
Canada, 24%
Mexico, 11%
Other Western Hemisphere, 6%
Other Non-OPEC, 20%

Total gross imports
11.4 Mb/d

OPEC 40%
Persian Gulf OPEC, 16%
Other OPEC, 24%

Data Source: EIA, *Petroleum & Other Liquid Fuels*, February 28, 2012, http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm.

From Figure 3 Gross imports by major sources are shown as are the needs for oil resources and how the region is important in US policy. In the future the United States will continue to import oil at the same level. But the expectations show that US crude oil production will increase over the next few years because of new technologies for extracting oil shale in the USA as shown in Figure 4 US crude oil production growth forecast

Table 1 U.S. Imports from Persian Gulf countries of crude oil and petroleum products (thousand barrels per day)

Decade	Year-0	Year-1	Year-2	Year-3	Year-4	Year-5	Year-6	Year-7	Year-8
1970's				848	1,039	1,165	1,840	2,448	2,219
1980's	1,519	1,219	696	442	506	311	912	1,077	1,541
1990's	1,966	1,845	1,778	1,782	1,728	1,573	1,604	1,755	2,136
2000's	2,488	2,761	2,269	2,501	2,493	2,334	2,211	2,163	2,370
2010's	1,711	1,861	2,156						

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA)

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTIMUSPG2&f=A

Figure 4 US crude oil production growth forecast

New Oil Forecast Indexed to Pricing; Reports by Basin & Grade

Period after World War II

World War II produced new equations, and the United States' contribution was significant as it deployed its forces on all fronts, including in the Gulf region. At the same time, the United States had interests in the defence of its oil companies and investments. Consequently, it deployed a military presence to replace Britain in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, after consultation with the oil companies, the United States provided financial and military assistance to the Kingdom through the programme of Lend and Lease. The aid reached $100 million in 1947 (Macris 2009). The United States deployed military personnel to train the Saudi military in its first military mission to the Kingdom in December 1943 after a visit of the Commander-in-Royse - General of the US armed forces in the Middle East - to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and he agreed with King Abdulaziz to establish a military airport in Dhahran near the oil wells (Macris 2009). This airport was completed in 1946, to become the largest military base in the Arab region and southwest Asia. Marking the end of colonialism and the independence of the peoples and countries of the world, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States formulated the term of self-determination following World War I, where the principle of the right of self-determination was one of the foundations of the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed by the warring nations in World War I. That treaty ordered the establishment of new nation states in Europe after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Second German Reich. In the latter period of the 20th century, self-determination became a policy of decolonisation, which sought to establish independent states in Africa and Asia, rather than being European colonies (Pomerance 1976). The US position in support of the right of self-determination has helped a lot in improving the image of the United States and its role in the world and the Gulf region, which contributed to the development of the relations with countries in the region.

This was the statement of President Roosevelt in February 1943 (that the Kingdom had become a vital necessity for the national security of the United States). Furthermore, the Truman Principle, which was issued in 1947, reinforced the policy of containment of the Soviet Union in all parts of the world through a policy of alliances and military bases. The establishment of NATO in 1949, and the Southeast Asia Alliance in 1954, as well as the Baghdad Alliance in 1955 were all examples of this policy in action (Palmer 1999). In addition, George Kennan established the policy of containment of the Soviet Union in the 1940s and he is seen as one of the key figures in the emergence of the Cold War (Gaddis 2005). The defence policy of the United States that established the Truman Doctrine in 1949 and Eisenhower doctrine in 1957 were both policies built on the same concept of containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War period. These policies were refused by some of the countries in the region because of scepticism in the US policy of supporting Israel and the difficult experiences of French and British colonialism. However, the United States was keen to develop its relationships with the countries of the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran, through economic and military aid.

Thus, the Cold War began in earnest in 1947, and the Gulf region was one of the key arenas of the war, which led the United States to change its policy and military plans for a number of reasons (Al-Nuaimi 1994): -

- ❖ The primary battle against the Soviet Union by military superiority.
- ❖ The inheritance of the legacies of old colonialism, which resulted, in some instances, in wars to achieve US interests.
- ❖ Control of other capitalist countries to secure US interests.

Nixon's doctrine and the US policy in the Gulf: -

Until the beginning of the 1970s, the United States did not have an integrated foreign policy toward the Gulf region, due to the United States waiver to Britain in the region, which placed the region under British influence except for Saudi Arabia and Iran. In addition, the war of June 1967 between the Arabs and Israel was a factor of stability in the Gulf region for the United States because it put an end to Egypt's role of supporting the liberation movements in the region. Also the departure of the British in 1971, directed Nixon to devote his attention to the Gulf region, especially after the Arab oil embargo in 1973 (Levey 2008).

The United States' policy with the Shah of Iran to protect the area was the first component of US policy in the Gulf region, while the second component was the building of a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia and then Iraq and Kuwait and other Gulf emirates. Also, Washington adopted the theory of pillars in the Gulf (Iran, Saudi Arabia) to ensure the security and stability in the region and solve the problems of the continental shelf and the disputed islands. The importance of Iran and Saudi Arabia was because of several considerations: the US administration looked to Iran as a country on the front line with the Soviet Union and, furthermore, it stood firmly against the penetration of Soviet influence in the region. Iran represented an essential link in the chain of alliances of the Cold War to contain the Soviet Union. Also, Saudi Arabia was considered as very important because it was considered as the second force in the region after Iraq at that time. As a rich country, Saudi Arabia had key financial and oil resources and with its religious position it could play a key role in maintaining security and stability in the region. The US policy painted by Nixon in the Gulf region, determined the nature of this policy and this topic can be summarised in the following factors (Al-Nuaimi 1994): -

- ❖ The vacuum that would occur when the British withdrew from the Gulf, which would threaten the interests of the Western powers.

- ❖ Strengthen the centres of Iran as a stabilising factor in the local area.

- ❖ The United States did not have the conviction of the need for a military presence in the Gulf region as long as there was a country that could protect American interests in the Gulf, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia or Iraq, for example.

- ❖ American strategy viewed the Gulf region as an area vital to the stability in the world.

Through the above we can determine the foundations of the American presence in the Gulf as follows (Palmer 1999): -

- ❖ The Gulf as a main source of oil and its increasing importance.

- ❖ The Gulf as an extension of the Indian Ocean in terms of strategy.

- ❖ The Arab-Israeli conflict reflected in the Gulf region.

- ❖ The Gulf as a region to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union's influence and to maintain the regional balance of powers in favour of the United States.

The Nixon doctrine was primarily to protect and ensure US interests in the Gulf without the need for direct intervention and was applied until 1973. The United States' retreat from this principle began for several reasons, including that of international conflict with the Soviet Union, but the most important factor was the Arab oil embargo on the Western countries that supported Israel. The embargo prompted many US circles to launch a series of angry rhetoric threatening to occupy the oil wells. Then the United States deployed an aircraft carrier (Constellation), accompanied by two destroyers to the Gulf region in the process of reviewing American military power in the region in November 1974. This confirms the United States' vision of controlling the oil resources, shipping routes and international trade of the region's oil.

Carter doctrine and US policy in the Gulf region:-

Nixon's doctrine was a victory for the realistic current over the extremists, who refused to concede defeat, for instance, embodied by the 'Vietnam strategy', which called for using military force to assert leadership and protect the Western interests (Korb 2005). The Carter doctrine's reaction conflicts which had important strategic implications between East and West, called for a change in the foundations of US foreign policy, including that directed to the Gulf region. The Carter doctrine, in brief, was a call for increasing US military presence in the region and reformulating its positions in addition to planning for the future, consistent with the needs of US national security. This was implemented increasing military expenditures and the development of rapid reaction forces. The United States adopted military force to protect its interests in the Gulf and to confront the Soviet Union, which marked the beginning of a new Cold War between the two superpowers (Gause III 1994).

Following the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Carter administration recognised the need to move fast in order to preserve American influence in the region. The Gulf lacked protection after the Iranian revolution and the regimes friendly to the United States did not have political weight and military might to ensure stability in the Gulf, which was under indirect threat from the Soviet Union. The United States was concerned that the unstable situation in the region represented an opportunity for the Soviet Union to move fast and seize greater influence. The concerns of the United States were well-placed and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on 27 December 1979 (Korb 2005).

The whole of the above, led Carter's administration to develop a new US strategy based on strengthening the United States' military presence in the Gulf to ensure the continued flow of oil. President Carter advocated this strategy in early 1978. This scenario indicated that the most serious threat to the oil resources in the Middle East came from radical movements

primarily, as well as the Soviet Union's ambitions. We can sum up the reasons why the US administration sought to promote its presence in the Gulf as follows (Gause III 1994): -

1. Fear of the spread of the Iranian revolution in the region, especially to Saudi Arabia.

2. Interruptions to the flow of Iranian oil, which was exported to the United States, which caused an energy crisis which showed the US needed Gulf oil, which meant the need to ensure security and stability in the region, even using military force if necessary.

3. The persistent tensions in the Middle East, Africa and the rising role of the Soviet Union.

The foundations of the Carter doctrine (Sokolsky, Johnson and Larrabee 2000): -

1. Development of rapid deployment forces outside the United States.

2. Sharing responsibility for the defence of the Gulf with the Western countries, primarily the countries of NATO.

3. Establishing military facilities in the region.

The plan of Thomas Brzezinski of the US National Security Advisor in the Carter era is based on the following (Sokolski and Clawson 2005): -

1. Set a new US policy in the region to ensure that the Soviet Union does not exceed its limits following World War II.

2. Take practical action to protect the security of the Middle East and the Gulf, after studying the reaction of the world and the American people to the new US policy.

3. Stand ready to respond to any Soviet Union threat in the Gulf through the rebuilding of the US armed forces.

4. Establishing security alliances with the moderate and pro-Western countries in the region, such as Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

5. Strengthen the cooperation with Saudi Arabia because it is the key [state in the regional] security system after the fall of the Shah.

Through the study of the reality of the security at the end of the 1970's, we find that this principle is directed against the Soviet Union, as it is the only external power that has the ability to control the Gulf region. Also, the principle used new methods and means to adapt to the prevailing political reality of the military intervention in the Gulf during the Carter administration. This approach also had the consent of Britain, which was the first to respond to the US project, while the reactions of other Western allies ranged from reservation to acceptance. Yet, the United States succeeded in reaching agreement by NATO for the establishment of a military force for the joint naval and air defence of the strategic interests of NATO countries in the region (Sokolsky, Johnson and Larrabee 2000).

The Reagan Administration and its vision of security in the Gulf, as well as the Iraq-Iran war

A question that emerged after Reagan became president of the US, was whether he was going to adopt the Carter principle of strengthening the US presence in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Observers also questioned whether Reagan would seek access to more facilities and military bases and return to a policy of direct intervention in the region, or whether he would adopt a new, different policy? To answer this question, we say that the foreign policy of the United States has not changed since the early 1950s, especially towards the Gulf region whatever the ruling party in the United States. The region's oil reserves significantly affect the economic decision-making in the American political system, which has led to this continuity in US foreign policy in the region. The election of US President Ronald Reagan

led to a decline in the liberal trend, which had dominated American politics for a long period of time. The new US administration rather than adapt to the variables of the new political environment and agreeing to make the necessary adjustments in the global economic system, considered that these variables acted as a threat to US national security (Sokolski and Clawson 2005).

It could be argued that the Reagan administration adopted the Carter principle, but it had worked to support it with force, and the most obvious development was the re-organisation of a rapid deployment force to come under the leadership of a unified central air force base in the state of Florida and 230,000 troops. Their mission was essential to ensuring the continued transfer of Gulf oil and to prevent the Soviet Union from achieving political military control (Hastedt 2009). Moreover, the Reagan administration saw in the Soviet Union a match for the United States which weakened its ability to protect its vital interests.

From this the United States realised that there was a need to secure US interests and maintaining military superiority. The direction of Reagan's strategy towards rapid intervention in the Gulf was based on the following factors (Hastedt 2009): -

❖ The West's interest in the limiting of any military confrontation with the Soviet Union on the Gulf region within the borders of the Middle East only and not to allow such a confrontation to extend to Western Europe.

❖ To reach this result, Europeans and Americans were required to maintain military force in the Middle East or outside Europe, so that the Western alliance could act in times of crisis without the need for the use of forces in Europe to resist the policy of the Soviet Union in the Gulf. To achieve this objective, the Reagan administration took several measures, including: the threat of nuclear weapons, increasing naval

superiority, a focus on a rapid deployment force, and increasing arms sales to allied countries in the region (Palmer 1999).

With regard to the Iran-Iraq war, which erupted in 1980, questions had been raised and challenges for local and international forces, particularly the United States, which looked to the war as a threat to the production of oil and the freedom of navigation in the Gulf. This required increasing the size of the US military presence in the Gulf to protect the interests of the West and invest for the benefit of the United States, as well as the need for political and military coordination between the United States, NATO and the countries in the region (Sick 1998). The US administration looked to Iran as a sensitive area and prepared a strategy for it. Washington expressed dissatisfaction at the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran, but declared its neutrality in the conflict, despite the issuance of orders to its military forces stationed in the Indian Ocean to gather near the Gulf in order to support and protect the Gulf regimes, which stood with Iraq (Macris 2009). After reviewing the historical stages of the previous US strategy toward the Gulf it is clear that this policy has not changed much because there is no change in the vital interests of the region due to the presence of oil in the region. This shows the United States' vision of the Gulf as being based on several elements, including:

- ❖ Consider the Gulf security as a part of United States national security, in view of the United States' and Western interests in the Gulf.
- ❖ Sources of threat to Gulf security came from the Soviet Union and the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, but as long as the Iran-Iraq war did not affect Western interests in the Gulf it was not expected that the United States would play an active role to put to end this war.

❖ That United States was interested in securing oil in the Gulf; from here it started arming friendly Gulf countries and the formation of a rapid deployment force to intervene in the area when it was necessary.

US objectives in the Gulf

The victory of the international coalition led by the United States in the second Gulf War enhanced the United States' position and made the US strategy an important factor in influencing security in the Gulf, and the world, and this is clearly evident in the Gulf. The victory led the Western world to recognise the importance, legitimacy and vitality of US objectives in the region, which make the United States the most important factor with respect to international arrangements in the Gulf. According to the perceptions of the United States, this ensures its goals and interests in this region. As a result of the second Gulf War and its aftermath and the destruction of Iraq, the United States has become the only force that the GCC now relies upon in terms of protection of the Gulf region, because it has more powerful interests and the states of the GCC have the ability to pay to protect their countries.

Whatever the stated objectives of US policy in the Gulf, it is clear that the United States does not implement such a policy to help the Gulf, but in order to ensure the achievement of its own objectives of safeguarding the flow of oil and gas, preserving the governing regimes, as well as protecting Israel's security and strategic superiority in the region, which can be identified as follows: -

Safeguarding the flow of oil and gas

Safeguarding the flow of oil and gas was and still is the aim of ensuring the flow of Gulf oil in quantities and at favourable prices that meet the interests of the United States and other Western countries. Oil is at the heart of American strategy in the Gulf, as any conflict in this

region can causes rising oil prices in the world which will cause financial crises in the global economy.

The security of oil in the Gulf region is a vital issue and it is going to increase in the coming decades, because the industrial countries will continue to import large quantities of oil from the Gulf region to meet their energy needs. Any threats in this region will bring foreign forces to ensure the stability of the region. Iran, however, stands against any foreign force presence in the Gulf, in accordance with the official Iranian view about the security in the Gulf. In contrast, the GCC states hosted the US forces to protect their national security. Furthermore, the supply of oil in the Gulf will remain under a range of risks from internal and external threats, according to the security concept for each state in the Gulf which are discussed in chapter three. As a result of this situation the US military strategy will face increasing pressure to meet the requirements of stability in the region in the defence of Western interests in the Gulf region. Thus, the allies of the United States and the Europeans in the Gulf are at risk of the outbreak of a military crisis in the Gulf. As the United States was and remains the international hegemonic power in the region it has been compelled to intervene in regional affairs. As the dominant international actor the United States also has the ability to control any regional hegemonic power, such as Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The motives of US leadership in the Second Gulf War confirmed that the war in the Gulf was an extension of the policy of controlling the Gulf's oil resources, by all available means including the use of force. Moreover, (Coskun 2008) mentioned that the global and regional environment which was managing and controlling oil over the last decades has been changed, in light of global changes, following the end of the Cold War and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Furthermore, the events of September 11th 2001 and the occupation of Iraq in 2003, led the United States to increase its policy of intervention in the world, particularly in

the Gulf region. The US oil interests in the region were one of the main concerns in the formulation of US policy on the Middle East. Washington's attention search for a permanent regional state able to protect the oil wells in the region was one of the important reasons that made Iran, during the Shah's rule, the key regional ally of the United States. In the words of Henry Kissinger:

With the outbreak of war in 1973 between the Arabs and Israel and the resulting high energy prices, Washington did not hesitate to threaten direct intervention in the Gulf if the long Arab boycott was not lifted. US policy shifted from dependence on the states in the Gulf to dependence on the policy of direct intervention to protect the headwaters of oil at the first threat faced by the region, and with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, the United States interfered to protect oil tankers in the Gulf, especially Kuwaiti tankers, which raised the American flag to avoid strikes by Iranian forces. With the end of this war the international and regional arena became ripe for direct US domination. As the Soviet Union disintegrated the main players in the Gulf were at that time Iran and Iraq. Though as these two adversaries had exhausted one another during eight years of war the USA, which had been awaiting favourable conditions to enter the region as the only power, fully assumed its leading role (McMillan, Sokolsky and Winner 2003). In addition, the Second Gulf War became a bridge that the USA used to cross into the region and achieve its most important strategic and economic objectives in the Middle East and the Gulf (Coskun 2008).

In the past, the main objective of the US military presence was to secure the flow of oil from its sources to its markets in the United States, Japan and Europe. These objectives have been increased to controlling secure oil supplies at reasonable prices, and this is what justifies the pressure of the USA from time to time on the Gulf states, particularly Saudi

Arabia, to raise oil production and to maintain reasonable prices that do not impact on the economy and growth in Western countries (Gause 2010).

The importance of this expanded objective is due to the low oil production of other areas, while the Gulf retains about 60% of the world's oil reserves (McMillan, Sokolsky and Winner 2003). Furthermore, the USA has become ever more dependent upon imported oil. Thirty years ago, 28% of the oil consumed in the USA was imported. Nowadays, nearly 60% of the oil utilised and consumed in the USA is imported from other countries. This clearly shows that US oil production decreased and the costs of oil extraction increased, which lead the USA to depend on imported oil particularly from the Gulf region. Moreover, US crude oil production increased since 2008, as shown in Figure 4 US crude oil production growth forecast.

Figure 5 OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2012

OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2012

OPEC proven crude oil reserves, end 2012
(billion barrels, OPEC Share)

Venezuela	297.7	24.8%	Iraq	140.3	11.7%	Libya	48.5	4.0%	Algeria	12.2	1.0%
Saudi Arabia	265.9	22.1%	Kuwait	101.5	8.5%	Nigeria	37.1	3.1%	Angola	9.1	0.8%
Iran, I.R.	157.3	13.1%	United Arab Emirates	97.8	8.1%	Qatar	25.2	2.1%	Ecuador	8.2	0.7%

Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2013

88

Figure 6 Gulf States share the world Crude oil reserves

GULF STATES SHARE THE WORLD CRUDE OIL RESERVES

- Saudi Arabia
- Iraq
- Iran
- Kuwait
- Qatar
- UAE
- Oman
- Rest of the world

18%
9%
11%
7%
46%
7%
0%
2%

Source OPEC annual statistical Bulletin 2013. Edited and amended by the author.

Preserving the governing regimes

The political stability of the Gulf, is an objective of the USA and important not only because it is necessary to protect oil interests, but also because of regional stability in the Gulf and the Middle East in general would promote US aims in the leadership of the international system (Korb 2005). The presence of a stable political system that does not suffer from internal problems and is capable of confronting any crises with speed and efficiency would help the USA achieve its objectives. Security has been and still is the corollary of stability, there is no security without stability and the military capability to intervene and resolve any situation that threatens stability. The USA is responsible for the creation and development of these local military capabilities (Bauer 2008). The USA acts as the guarantor of security in the region in its relations with the international and regional parties and, in this context, this does not exclude internal affairs; the USA examines all the weaknesses in the Gulf states, beginning with the fragility of political systems and their isolation from the people, and the

situation of foreign workers, during the past years. The USA exercised more pressure on the local governing regimes to correct the political situation, which could be interfered as their internal affairs (Bauer 2008).

The USA was particularly sensitive to any factor or forces that could constitute sources of instability in the Gulf region whether they be local forces (Islamic fundamentalism and nationalist forces, for example: threatening the internal stability of some countries in the region, such as ISIS/the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria at the time of writing) or the regional factors associated with an imbalance in the regional power after the destruction of the Iraqi military in the Second Gulf War. The USA believes that the protection of the governing regimes in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to be the main objectives in promoting stability in the region. Saudi Arabia is the centre of the region for the USA at this time and any threat to its stability threatens the whole of the region. Kuwait became less important in this capacity after the Second Gulf War and the occupation of Iraq specifically because of the US presence in Iraq (McMillan, Sokolsky and Winner 2003). On the other hand there is a match between the official views of the Arabic Gulf countries, and US decision-makers, that the USA is the only power that can provide the protection for the Gulf, despite the big difference on the details and views about how specifically to achieve the security and stability. Furthermore, most of the GCC states want to use this deterrent to open new relations with Iran, such as Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, in contrast, the UAE is opposed to this approach before solving the problem of the sovereignty of a series of Gulf islands which it disputes with Iran (Gause 2010).

It should be noted that all wars and events that happened in the Gulf, such as war between Iraq and Iran, and the Second Gulf War, have resulted in a call for US forces and NATO to protect the governing regimes, primarily, as well as the signing of agreements of

bilateral protection, and the occupation of Iraq in 2003. All of this political behaviour by the governing regimes could not have been adopted if there were public legislative institutions that could have held the governing regimes accountable (Korb 2005).

Protecting Israel's security

It cannot be understood that the maintaining of Israel's security and its superiority in the region, as a traditional feature in American politics, as an external problem only, but it is also one of the elements of domestic politics. There is a broad political base to relations between America and Israel based on an alliance that is not necessarily written but one that has not been ignored by any American president (J.E. Peterson 2003). Although Israel is a partner in US interests and a critical ally as well, the Gulf states are not in a similar alliance with the USA. That is to say that the US-Gulf alliances do not live up to the level of the US-Israeli alliance. Moreover the relations between the Gulf states and the US reflect a great deal of imbalance, which have made the Gulf states believe that the US foreign policy is clearly in favour of Israel, while the US calls for the countries of the region to normalise relations with Israel and provide broader military facilities to the US (Addis 2010).

The crisis of the Second Gulf War exposed a group of strategic realities that called the USA to review its policy in the Gulf and the Arab world in general and to review the role that was entrusted to Israel in its strategy for the period before the Second Gulf War. From these facts that Israel's role was supposed to protect US oil interests proved that it is not useless, and the Israeli role in the security arrangements against the Soviet Union had clearly diminished after the Cold War. Furthermore, continuing support for Israel in the UN was a heavy burden on US policy, (J.E. Peterson 2003). This put the USA against the Arabic countries, Iran and several important states around the world, which hindered US political decision-makers and interests.

The USA sought to link the regional security in the Gulf and Israel with its role in the region by seeking to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as by pushing the GCC states to participate in the expansion of the normalisation of relations with Israel. This link between the security of the Gulf and the settlement process was discussed by Martin Indyk when he was an adviser to the Middle East in the US National Security Council during the Clinton administration. He explained that there was a link between the success of the call for containment of Iraq and Iran, and the success of the settlement process in the Middle East. This cyclical debate argued that if containment of Iraq and Iran was successful it would be possible to achieve progress in the settlement process, and if progress in the settlement process was achieved, then success in containing Iraq and Iran would be successful (Gause III 1994).

Hence, the USA sought to integrate Israel in the region naturally by improving political and economic relations with the countries of the region, by full normalisation with Israel, and the holding of security agreements and international commercial conferences (Bar 2004). In addition, the Second Gulf War and the destruction of Iraq, was largest service provided by the USA to Israel, because destruction of Iraq meant its removal from the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the foreseeable future. Israel has got what it was not expecting after the Second Gulf War, in return for the fall of some Iraqi Scud missiles, was able to invest that to serve its interests and it was able to elicit the sympathy and support of the USA, the Western world and Russia, then the USA provided Israel with extensive economic and military support, including the provision of Patriot missiles (Addis 2010).

It should be noted here that successive US administrations have agreed to provide continued support to Israel, while remaining silent with respect to Israel's nuclear programme. At the same time, the USA has consistently practiced various forms of pressure

to force other countries to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Such duplication is an extension of the policy of providing cover and protection pursued by Washington in favour of Israel, which enabled Israel to escape from several UN resolutions that were passed against it (Russell 2007). After the Second Gulf War some of the Gulf states supported peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and some made initiatives for cooperation and coordination with Israel. Qatar has made big steps in its relations with Israel, when it announced at the beginning of March 1996 that Qatar will allow Israel to open a diplomatic office in Doha. Moreover, Yossi Beilin, the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, has visited Qatar and Oman to develop bilateral relations with both countries (Kraig 2001).

The means utilised to achieve US aims in the Gulf

To achieve the foreign policy objectives of any country a variety of means and resources are required. When a state has extensive military force it will use this force more than the countries that do not have enough power available to militarily achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the increased use of a particular tool in foreign policy will make the state dependent on this tool (Buzan and Hansen 2009). For example, if a state uses the military tool more than is necessary it will become a militarily-dependent state. Talking about the means of achieving US objectives toward the Gulf region, we have to take into account multiple tools that overlap with each other and change according to the objectives that the US administration seeks to achieve. We can study these means as follows: -

The economic means

The USA uses various types of economic means within the tools of implementing its foreign policy toward the Gulf. Often, the use of these means is limited to the rich and capitalist states that can provide assistance or economic aid, and which therefore gave great importance

to this method in the Gulf region, as this area has important and global economies. Yet, the USA sought in its relations with Gulf countries to minimise the resources in the Gulf, particularly with the GCC, to keep these countries in need of experience and advanced technology. Oil will continue as the dominant theme of the US relationship with the Gulf states, while the states of the GCC are trying to broaden the concerns of the USA in the region to include increasing the volume of bilateral investment. The USA entered the region through oil and its conventions by two facts (Buzan and Hansen 2009): -

❖ US policy towards the Gulf states cannot be separated from the issue of oil.

❖ US strategy based on the principle that the oil wells in the Gulf must remain open to the West.

As the USA and its allies have benefited from the Second Gulf War, it is not expected for them to change this benefit by affecting the security and stability in the region. In this regard James Pknez, the previous US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, says it is in the interests of the former to keep Saudi Arabia and the UAE safe, as Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess 40% of world oil reserves, according to estimates. Both states should thank the USA for the protection it gave them from Iraqi forces in 1991 (Ottaway 2010). Accordingly, the USA has influence in both countries and the rest of the GCC.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that any change in the balance of power will take place without the involvement of the USA, because it is watching Iranian military developments closely and supporting the GCC in achieving a military balance. Furthermore, the GCC states do not have the ability to take any action against Iran without the approval of the USA. Production of oil will remain stable under US protection, because the USA acts as a guarantor of security and stability in the region, where Iran nowadays is conducting a military exercise aiming to close the Straits of Hormuz in the event of armed conflict. Should this happen it

will lead to the suspension of oil exports from the region (Talmadge 2008). If we realise that US oil consumption will not decrease, and the availability of alternative energy sources will not develop soon, this means that the USA will work to ensure a non-stop flow of oil from the region because of its needs, and therefore it needs to exercise greater control over oil production in the Gulf. See Table 1 U.S. Imports from Persian Gulf countries of crude oil and petroleum products (thousand barrels per day), also see Figure 3 Gross imports by major sources (Hastedt 2009).

The USA has sought to strengthen the commercial and financial interests in the region through increased investments of US finance in the Gulf, and by increasing the economic links of the countries in the region with the US economy. In order to grow the links between the economies of the Gulf states and the USA a relationship network has been built to promote the friendly relations with the countries of the Gulf and provide technical and military assistance (J.E. Peterson 2003). The above analysis does not apply to Iran, because Iran stands in opposition to US actions in the region. Iranian perceptions of the security of the region reject any foreign intervention in regional affairs. Iran's vision of security and stability should be taken into consideration in the development of any plans to stabilise the region, whether with the assistance of international or regional powers.

The USA has worked on the development of commercial and financial relations with the countries of the region, because the area has become a booming market for Western industries and the financial surpluses of the Gulf oil was a political pillar to power the US economy. Much of these surplus funds are deposited in US financial institutions or banks or investment projects. Furthermore, the USA has used various kinds of economic sanctions as a means to achieve its economic objectives, for example, the sanctions imposed on Iraq and Iran. US Trade Representative Ron Kirk on 09/27/2012 announced an agreement with the

GCC to strengthen economic ties and expand trade and investment. The agreement will include considering opportunities for enhancing economic, commercial, investment and technical cooperation, fostering their economic relations and increasing the volume of trade and investment between them. In addition, he mentioned that the total two-way trade (exports plus imports) between the USA and the GCC totalled almost $100 billion in 2011. The GCC countries, together, ranked tenth as an export market for the USA in 2011 with US goods exports to the region totalling nearly $38 billion. Leading US exports to the GCC region include vehicles, machinery, aircraft, electrical machinery, and optical and medical instruments. Furthermore, the GCC region collectively was the sixth largest supplier of imports to the USA in 2011 with US goods imports from the region totalling nearly $62 billion. Leading US imports from the GCC include oil, aluminium, fertilisers, and organic chemicals. US foreign direct investment (FDI) in GCC countries was $23.5 billion in 2010 (United States Trade Representative Ron Kirk 2012).

The military means

With the end of the Second Gulf War, the importance of US-Gulf military relations has increased and, and these relations have become more prominent than before. In the past, the relations were cordial and diplomatic and oil-based, but the military dimension was inflated in the 1990's, and the US military became in charge of policy formulation, planning and developing plans and visions and priorities in these relationships (Ottaway 2010). The military means that the US objectives are the security agreements and bilateral defence arrangements with the countries of the Gulf. In addition, the expansion and intensification of the military presence in the marine, ground, air, and increased arms sales to the region as well as necessary bases for the US military presence (Hunter 2010). The following sections detail the military means employed to achieve US objectives in the Persian Gulf:

Security agreements and bilateral defence with the United States

During the new security variables in the region that include the imbalance in the region and the failure of the countries of the Gulf to protect themselves and change the traditional pattern of threats exposed to the Gulf states to include the threats from within, as well as the crucial role played by foreign forces and the Arab world in ending the crisis of 1991. The international and GCC thinking agree with the importance and the need to develop new defensive security arrangements in the region to ensure the balance released by the war and its consequences, and prevent a repeat of what happened to Kuwait and to ensure stability of the region (Blanchard and (Grimmett 2010). Some of the Gulf countries have signed bilateral military agreements with the USA, such as Kuwait, signed defence agreements for ten years on the 5th of September 1991, while Bahrain signed a similar agreement during its governor's visit to Washington in September 1991 (Hajjar 2002). The agreement signed between Kuwait and the USA will provide advice on defence as well as including pre-positioning of military equipment, with the US use of Kuwait's facilities. Under this agreement, Kuwait paid a part of the financial burden of the facilities that were to be used by US troops, and the USA paid the salaries of its soldiers and the costs of arming them (3). According to this agreement, carried in 16th September 1992, the US manoeuvres in the Kuwait 90 km northwest of Kuwait City, and the US started to deploy its forces and units of 2,400 troops in the Kuwaiti desert since 12th August 1992 (1). On 22nd July 1992 Qatar signed a defence agreement with the US to enhance security and stability in the region, while Oman committed itself to an agreement that was signed in 1986, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia committed to its call made in August 1990 for US forces to protect Saudi territory without the need for open agreements (Al-Thani 2000).

In addition most of these agreements have been renewed, Kuwait increased the relationships and cooperation with the USA on 1st April 2004, the Bush Administration designated Kuwait as a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), a designation held by only one other Gulf state which is the Kingdom of Bahrain. Afghanistan also obtained that designation in 2012. The designation opens Kuwait to buy the same US equipment that is sold to US allies in NATO. Furthermore, Kuwait allowed the US troops to move into or out of Iraq using Kuwaiti territory during 2003-2011, when US troops were in Iraq, and US troops in Kuwait stood at 25,000. This did not include the troops in Iraq. Several camps in Kuwait were used by US troops, such as Camp Arifjan, Camp Buehring, and Camp Doha. Moreover, the defence secretary Leon Panetta noted, in his trip to Kuwait in December 2012, that there were about 13,500 US troops in Kuwait. He also mentioned that the US force levels will remain at that level for an indefinite period, these US force levels are lower than the 25,000 there for most of the period of US military involvement in Iraq. In the 1991 Gulf War, Qatar allowed coalition forces to operate from Qatari territory and in June 1992, Qatar signed a defence cooperation agreement with the US, opening a period of close coordination in military affairs that has continued to the present (Blanchard 2008). On 10th December 2013 the Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel visited Qatar and he signed a defence cooperation agreement with Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar the agreement will be a longstanding security partnership between both the USA and Qatar. The defence cooperation agreement will control the interactions between US and Qatari forces and including training with cooperative activities. The agreement promotes cooperation and is a testament to the longstanding security partnership enjoyed by the USA and Qatar (Blanchard 2010a). After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the USA increased its military presence in Saudi Arabia that lasted from 1990 until 2003 when the US military withdrew almost all of the troops except a long-

standing force that will continue to provide training programmes. Furthermore, the air operations centre moved to Qatar (Blanchard 2010b).

A bilateral defence cooperation agreement signed on 25th July 1994 between the UAE and the US acts a framework work for the US troops present in the UAE. Moreover, the UAE has allowed the US to store arms and equipment in the UAE. In 2012 there were about 5,000 US troops in the UAE and the forces will increase 3,000 more. These US forces are air force personnel, deployed at Al Dhafra air base, the agreement included US training to the UAE army. Furtermore, the UAE hosts the integrated air missile defence centre, which is the major training centre for the Gulf particularly for the States of the GCC (Katzman 2012b).

In 1991 the US and Bahrain signed a defence cooperation agreement DCA of the long-standing US naval headquarters presence in Bahrain. The US can access Bahrain's naval facilities. Moreover, the naval component of the US Central Command as well as the Fifth Fleet are reconstituted in June 1995 are headquartered in Bahrain (Katzman 2013a). On 10th March 2002, President Bush issued the presidential determination which designated the Kingdom of Bahrain as a major non-NATO ally of the USA for the purposes of arms export control (GEORGE W. BUSH 2002-10).

Oman signed an agreement to allow US forces access to Omani military facilities on 21st April 1980. This agreement was renewed in 1985, 1990, 2000, and 2010 and the USA uses Omani Muscat airfields, Thumrait, and Masirah Island. The USA uses these bases for air force equipment and as a storage for arms (Katzman 2013b).

On 26th November 2007 the USA and Iraq signed a declaration of principles for a long-term relationship of cooperation agreement, including several issues, such as the political, cultural, economic, and security cooperation to support the Iraqi government in

training, equipping, and arming the Iraqi Security Forces so they can provide security and stability (Mason 2009).

Map 1Facilities Used by U.S. Forces in the Gulf

Sales of US arms in the region: -

The US military presence in the region has been continuous, with sizes varying since World War II until now without interruption. This presence has increased since the Iran-Iraq war at the request of the Gulf States, especially in 1987, after the escalation of the use rockets and mines by Iran against petroleum navigation in the Gulf (Hunter 2010). Furthermore, President Bush mentioned with the beginning of military operations in the Second Gulf War that the USA and friendly forces will withdraw as soon as the 'liberation' of Iraq, though a naval force will remain to maintain a balance in the region and to meet any new military action

(Cordesman 2001). The US naval forces are present continuously in the waters of the Gulf until now and have a tight grip on international shipping in the Gulf.

In case of the possibility of war in the future, warehouses for the storage of weapons have been established in the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar as well as a number aircraft including stealth P-117 fighters in one of the Saudi bases as part of security arrangements in the Gulf. The US rights in the Gulf include: -

- ❖ Right to storage of military equipment and turning the regions countries into the US arms depots.
- ❖ Facilities in all countries of the region, sea, land and air.
- ❖ Conducting drills and exercises in common.

As a consequence of the Second Gulf War the door opened wide to aggressively arming countries in the Gulf. By February 1991, the White House notified Congress that the study subjects sales of weapons worth $23 billion to the Middle East, including $18 billion of sales of sophisticated weapons to the Gulf States, including F-16 planes and Patriot missiles, tanks, and rocket launchers (Grimmett 2010).

Summary of major arms deals with the Gulf States: -

The major sales to Kuwait (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

218 M1A2 tanks at a value of $1.9 billion in 1993. Delivery was completed in 1998.

1992 sale of 5 Patriot anti-missile fire units, including 25 launchers and 210 Patriot missiles, valued at about $800 million. Delivery was completed by 1998. Some of them were used to intercept Iraqi short-range missiles launched at Kuwait in the 2003 war.

1992 sale of 40 FA-18 combat aircraft (purchase of an additional 10 is under consideration).

September 2002 sale of 16 AH-64 (Apache) helicopters equipped with the Longbow fire-control system, valued at about $940 million.

On 4th December 2007, Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notification to Congress reported a sale to Kuwait of 80 PAC-3 (Patriot) missiles and 60 PAC-2 missiles and upgrades, valued at about $1.3 billion.

On 9th September 2008, DSCA notified a sale of 120 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), along with equipment and services, with a total value of $178 million.

On 11th August 2010, the Administration notified Congress of another potential Patriot-related sale of 209 Patriot "Guidance Enhanced Missile-T" (GEM-T) missiles valued at $900 million. The prime contractor for that system is Raytheon.

On 27th February 2012, the Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of 80 AIM-9X-2 Sidewinder missiles, and associated parts and support, with an estimated value of $105 million. The sale, if completed, would help Kuwait modernise its fighter aircraft and enhance interoperability with US aircraft.

On 20th July 2012, the Administration notified a potential sale of 60 Patriot missiles and 20 Patriot launching stations, plus associated equipment. The total value of the sale could reach $4.2 billion.

On 17th April 2013, DSCA notified a potential sale to Kuwait of one C-17 cargo aircraft and associated equipment, with an estimated total cost of $371 million.

On 10th June 2013, DSCA notified a possible sale to Kuwait of technical support to its US-made F-18s for an estimated cost of about $200 million.

The major sales to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since October 2009 (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

Sale on 6th August 2009 to the Government of Saudi Arabia of communication navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion.

Sale on 20th October 2010 for 84 F-15SA fighter aircraft, and including upgrades for 70 F-15S fighter aircraft to F-15SA configuration already in the Royal Saudi Air Force. The estimated cost is $29.4 billion.

Sale on 20th October 2010 for AH-64D Apache, UH-60M Blackhawk, AH-6i Light Attack, and MD-530F Light Turbine Helicopters (include 36 AH-64D Block III APACHE Helicopters and 72 UH-60M Blackhawk Helicopters and 36 AH-6i Light Attack Helicopters, 12 MD-530F Light Turbine Helicopters. The estimated potential cost, if all options are exercised, is $25.6 billion.

Sale on 20th October 2010, AH-64D Longbow Helicopters, Engines and Night Vision Sensors (included 24 AH-64D Block III APACHE Longbow Helicopters, T700-GE-701D engines. The estimated cost is $3.3 billion.

Sale on 20th October 2010, AH-64D Longbow Helicopters, Engines and Night Vision Sensors include 10 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow Helicopters, T700-GE-701D engines, night vision sensors and helmets, Hellfire missiles. The estimated cost is $2.2 billion

Sale on 20th June 2013 to Saudi Arabia for the continuation of the US supported effort to modernise the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $4.0 billion.

10th July 2013 sale to Saudi Arabia of 30 Mark V patrol boats and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.

9th November 2012 sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for 20 C-130J-30 Aircraft and 5 KC-130J Air Refuelling Aircraft, as well as associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $6.7 billion.

15th October 2013 sale to Saudi Arabia of various munitions and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $6.8 billion.

23th August 2013 sale to Saudi Arabia of follow-on support and services for Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.2 billion.

18th November 2013 sale to Saudi Arabia of C4I system upgrades and maintenance and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.1 billion.

All those sales include training, support, and US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services for 15 years or less.

The major arms sales to Qatar (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

On 12th July 2012, sale to the state of Qatar the 24 AH-64D Apache Block III Longbow Attack Helicopters for an estimated cost of $3.0 billion.

28th June 2012 sale to the State of Qatar, 10 MH-60R Seahawk multi-mission Helicopters, 12 MH-60S Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters with. The estimated cost is $2.5 billion.

13th June 2012 sale to the State of Qatar, 12 UH-60M BLACK HAWK Utility Helicopters. The estimated cost is $1.112 billion.

7th November 2012 sale to the State of Qatar the 11 Patriot configuration-3 modernised fire units for an estimated cost of $9.9 billion.

5th November 2012 sale to the State of Qatar for two Terminal High Altitude Area Defence Fire Units and for an estimated cost of $6.5 billion.

29th July 2013 sale to the State of Qatar, one A/N FPS-132 Block 5 Early Warning Radar and for an estimated cost of $1.1 billion.

All these sales come with associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support.

The major arms sales to the Kingdom of Bahrain since (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

28th July 2009 sale to the Kingdom of Bahrain, 25 AIM-120C-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles at an estimated cost of $74 million.

4th November 2010 sale to the Kingdom of Bahrain, 30 Army Tactical Missile Systems, T2K Unitary Missiles for an estimated cost of $70 million.

14th September 2011 sale to the Kingdom of Bahrain for armoured high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles, for an estimated cost of $53 million.

All the above sales come with associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support.

The major sales to the Emirates since (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

5th November 2012 sale to the UAE for 48 Terminal High Altitude Area defence missiles for an estimated cost of $1.135 billion.

4th November 2010 sale to the UAE of 30 AH-64D Block II lot 10 APACHE helicopters, remanufactured to AH-64D Block III configuration and 30 AH-64D Block III APACHE helicopters for an estimated cost of $5.0 billion.

3rd December 2009 sale to the UAE of 16 Chinook helicopters, and communication equipment, for an estimated cost of $2.0 billion.

15th October 2013 Sale to the UAE of various munitions for an estimated cost of $4.0 billion.

All the above sales come with associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost.

The major arms sales to the Republic of Iraq since (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

30th July 2008 sale to Iraq of light armoured vehicles with a sale value which could be as high as $3 billion.

10th December, 2008 sale to Iraq of 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks modified and upgraded to the M1A1M Abrams configuration for an estimated cost of $2.160 billion.

10th December 2008 sale to Iraq of (20) 30-35meter coastal patrol boats and (3) 55- 60 meter offshore support vessels, for an estimated cost of $1.010 billion.

5th August 2013 sale to Iraq of an integrated air defence system for an estimated cost of $2.403 billion.

15th September 2010 sale to Iraq of 18 F-16IQ Aircraft for an estimated cost of $4.2 billion.

12th December 2011 sale to the Government of Iraq for 18 F-16IQ aircraft for an estimated cost of $2.3 billion.

19th November 2009 sale to Iraq of 15 helicopters for a complete package worth approximately $1.2 billion.

All the above sales come with associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support.

The major arms sales to the State of Oman since (The USA Defense Security Cooperation Agency)**:**

19th October 2011 sale to the Government of Oman for Avenger fire units, stinger missiles and Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missiles, as well associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $1.248 billion.

3rd August 2010 sale to Oman of 18 F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $3.5 Billion.

Defence spending has been increased in the Gulf States in the field of conventional weapons, which may lead to a regional arms race. These countries have to continue their policies of diplomatic actors regionally and internationally. Diplomacy is the cheap method to successfully build regional and international relations. The US does not sell the weapons to the Gulf countries without its own interests and objectives. President Bill Clinton at the beginning of 1994 intervened with the Saudi King to ask him to buy US aircraft in favour of McDonald Douglas and Boeing, that to retained 100,000 US workers in their jobs (Macris 2009).

The political means: -

The political means are the most important means used by the USA to achieve its strategic interests in the Gulf, and this policy includes many ways and it should help the Arabs and Iran to build good relations. However, (Addis 2010) pointed out that the US policy centered

on other elements in the composition of the region, such as Israel and Turkey. It is worth mentioning that Turkey uses the oil pipeline passing through Turkish territory to pressure Iraq and Turkey is seeking to exploit the establishment of dams on the Tigris and the Euphrates.

The USA exploits the facilities of Turkey to achieve its objectives and interests in the Persian Gulf. The USA pressures the regimes to repair the political situation, and interfered in all internal affairs and wants to be a reference to the national opposition and democracy in the region, as occurs with Iraq (Ulrichsen 2008). The GCC countries are under the pressure of US policy, for example the GCC states are encouraged into buying arms from the USA but they cannot use these platforms against the USA or resell them to another country; essentially, the USA sells the weapons with conditions. The democratic transformations and human rights are required by the US to build the relationships and friendships and the USA seeks to support the friendly states in the region in terms of political, economic and military aid with special regard to stability and US interests.

Dual containment:-

The US policy does not ignore the balance of power in the Gulf region but it is starting from the analysis of the balance of power in the Gulf, and the aim here is Iraq and Iran. In May 1993, Martin Indyk the Special Assistant to the President of the USA in the affairs of the Near East and South Asia disclosed in a lecture for the determination of the Clinton administration to adopt a strategy of dual containment of both Iraq and Iran (Russell 2007).

The dual containment does not mean replication or similar, in the sense that US policy toward Iraq and Iran is not the same, because each one is a different challenge to the interests of the USA. Dual containment is from the old policy, the policy of previous administrations

in support of one party to weaken the other party while the flaw in this policy is the belief in the ability to contain both countries. Containing Iran requires a strong Iraq, and vice versa in addition to support from other countries of the Middle East, such as Turkey and Egypt, as it is certain that Gulf relations will not continue to be negative, not to mention the remarkable openness shown by the GCC countries towards Iran (Barzegar 2007).

Thus, the USA by its presence in the Gulf will be able to protect the flow of oil to the world and to achieve its objectives in the region. From this point the USA has dealt with the Gulf and considered it as one of the vital interests for US national security and it has established a strategy to deal with several issues in terms of political, military and economic aspects. There are many reasons for the US presence in the region, which is due to regional events, wars and US interests in the Gulf. In fact, instability in the Gulf is caused by the Gulf countries calling for foreign troops to ensure the security and stability of the region. The overall activities undertaken by the USA to control events include the pressure on governments, improving the political situation in the region, the signing of bilateral agreements and establishing military facilities, and the destruction of Iraq; all of this is in the general course of the project of the US, which seeks to find a system of regional security that depends on American military force stationed in the Gulf, directly or indirectly, that supports the US administration and its national security in the region.

CHAPTER THREE REVIEWING INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL EVENTS THAT HAVE AFFECTED SECURITY IN THE GULF

Introduction

The simple meaning of the security in the region is the integrity of the region from internal and external threats, but this meaning differs in this region as the GCC states demonstrate recourse to foreign great powers to ward-off internal and external threats. Furthermore, these foreign great powers are amongst the threats in the Gulf region, which have tightened the grip of these powers on the whole region (Suwaidi. and others 2008).

This chapter addresses five primary sections: the first main section of the chapter relates to the end of the two superpowers equation with its implications in the Gulf. In addition, the demise of the Soviet Union and its effect on the Gulf is explored specifically. This section also includes an overview of the New World Order. Security in the Gulf reveals links to the New World Order, and its sustainability and effectiveness in the 1990s. In that time, the Gulf was affected by bipolarity, which is shown in the US policy of containment applied against Iraq and Iran, confrontation with the Soviet Union, and other manifestations of the superpower rivalry (Hubble 1998 p. 1-2). The second main section explores the Second Gulf War in 1991, and the accompanying intervention and deployment of international forces in the Gulf. It reflects upon the Arab reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the effect of the Second Gulf War on Iraq. The third main section of this chapter addresses the implications of the events of 9/11 on the Gulf, and discusses several related topics, such as the sources of threats, whether internal or external, and the development of the sources of threats with special regard to the war on terror, particularly in the Gulf. The fourth main section discusses the invasion of Iraq and the use of force to protect US interests, which involves a discussion of the US justifications of war, and the progress of the war. The fifth main section addresses the period since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003.This section

addresses the instability situation in the Gulf after the US invasion of Iraq, which provided a new security environment that all the states in the region have had to deal with since 2003.

This chapter addresses and examines the international and regional events that have affected security in the Gulf using the historical method and by employing a theoretical framework based on the HST, as outlined in chapter one. The international power has a direct impact on the security and the stability in the Gulf, which is necessary to study and analyse the demise of bipolarity and the Soviet Union and all this led to the emergence of the new world order in 1990. In addition, the HST is intensively employed in the following sections. That the US and through its hegemony over the Gulf, particularly after the second Gulf War in 1990 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, acquired dominance and controlled the region to play a substantial role in the conflicts of the region.

The demise of bipolarity and its implications internationally and in the Gulf

The role of the hegemonic state determined by factors of power of the state on the regional and international levels (Pedersen 2002 p. 681). These factors are economic, political and military, and if there is any change in these factors, the power of the state and its role will change. This will affect its international and regional objectives and strategy. Whenever there is any change in the capacity component of this force it will change depending on the size of the power of the state and its role and effectiveness in influencing the events. Power relations are clear in every society, as well as in the relations of states among themselves and each other, every state has objectives and strategies which it seeks to achieve regionally and internationally, and even internally. This requires the availability of certain elements of force, so the state can achieve what it aspires to (Buzan and Waever 2003).

The different impacts of the international system on global stability created diverse views of this order. Both Gause (2010) and Wohlforth (2000) discuss that there is one trend

seen as a unipolar system, which is much more likely to achieve international stability, where the presence of one pole in the international system ensures stability, due to its dominant force. Furthermore, (Wohlforth 1999 p. 23) pointed out that:

> *"Unipolarity favours the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states. This argument is based on two well-known realist theories: hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory. Each is controversial, and he relationship between the two is complex. For the purposes of this analysis, however, the key point is that both theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful".*

Another trend considers that a bipolar system provides global stability, because it is characterised by the dominance of two superpowers. Thus, any change in the balance of power from any power will not significantly affect the stability of the international system, because each of these superpowers will develop their military capability to deal with changes in the balance of power (Waltz 1964).

A third trend asserts that multi-polarity provides an environment for interaction between countries, which helps them achieve their goals without resorting to war. In addition, in a multi-polar system, neutral forces may play a role in resolving international conflicts. Furthermore, the ability of small and medium-sized countries to have independent movements in the international system increases whenever there is greater multiplicity of poles (Rosecrance 1966). Indeed, whenever conflict increases between large countries comprising this system, the greater the ability of small and medium-sized countries to act in

the international system is. In contrast, polar unilateralism limits the ability of states to move independently, as they are compelled to agree in policy with this single dominant pole (Scott and et al 2009).

This is similar to the situation in the Gulf with the US position as the dominant power and acting hegemonic state in this region. On the other hand, the Gulf states have to react to the hegemony of the USA as the single dominant pole particularly in the Gulf (Senior official interview No 3).

The demise of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc detonated many regional conflicts, which had been repressed in the bipolar international system. If we look at the structure of the international system since the second half of the 1980s, we find that a significant change occurred. In addition, Calleo (2009) mentioned that the economic and social crises in the Soviet Union led to the formulation of a new foreign policy in 1985, when Gorbachev came to power. In this period, the ideological character disappeared from Soviet policy, and the ideas of interdependence and the balance of interests and peaceful solution to international problems emerged. Moreover, the Soviet Union reduced its economic and military aid to other countries, with economic interests the basis of cooperation. Brooks and Wohlforth (2000 p. 11,40,45) limit the parameters of the shift in the Soviet Union to the following elements:

1. The disappearance of the ideological nature in Soviet policy.

2. Erosion of the federal authority of Soviet Republics.

3. The growing role of Russia in the Soviet Union.

4. The growing economic, political and social crisis.

Therefore, the Soviet Union adopted a set of actions that affected its military role beyond its borders, as follows Ahmed (1992 p. 11-12):

1. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba and reducing economic aid.

2. Rapprochement with the USA.

3. Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

4. The fall of the Warsaw Pact.

As a result of these changes, the Soviet Union collapsed, with a coincident rise in US power. The main factors that contributed to the weakening of the structure, and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, which are the foundation of the Soviet Union, which was based on a single ideology (Marxism). This ideology was based on the prevention of the rest of the cultures in the Union to exercise their rights and religions. Furthermore, the economic collapse occurred as a natural result of the excessive building of the Soviet military arsenal at the expense of food and other basic necessities of its people; the Soviet Union had wanted to continue building a military machine for a superpower country with a Third World-like economy (Snyder 2003). The long years of occupation of Afghanistan had damaged the Soviet economy, as well as the psychological state of its citizens and military personnel. In addition there are many other factors that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, such as the patterns of demographic growth, the globalisation of trade, US pressure and the space race (Odom 2000 p. 393-394).

With regard to the New Union Treaty, Gorbachev implemented this Treaty, which was established by referendum in March 1991, which was the milestone of the demise of the

Soviet Union. The Treaty was called the New Union Treaty and proposed a new entity named the Union of Sovereign States. This Treaty included the establishment of a federation of republics with sovereignty, consisting of the previous Soviet Union states. Each of the Republics was allowed to establish consular relations and direct trade with foreign countries and the right of any country of the Union to withdraw according to the New Union Treaty. The Soviet Union referendum of 1991 was to determine the fate of the Union. The referendum asked one question of its citizens: "*Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully guaranteed*?" (Tishkov 1997 p. 50). Nine republics of the fifteen republics participated in the referendum. The referendum was boycotted by the remaining six republics, which were the three Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldova and Armenia (Suny 1993).

The economic factors that impacted the federation were the absence of the competitiveness elements of the Soviet economy and the deterioration of economic power as a result of the inability of the economy to provide the methods of technological, organisational and administrative development, which provides the most recent increase in the rate of development. The decline in the volume of exports of arms and oil and natural gas in the early 1990s were compounded by the huge military spending, which sapped the Soviet Union's financial resources. That the US government estimated that Soviet arms exports averaged about $20 billion annually during 1984-1989, using selling prices in 1991 dollars. The figure for 1990, in the US estimate declined to $13.3 billion in 1990 and then fell by half in 1991 to $6.5 billion. the Russian figures for arms exports are $7.8 billion in 1991 and $3 billion in 1992 (Richard 1993 p. 710). The main political factors were the deterioration in the

ability of the state and the inability of the communist regime to achieve superiority, with the weakness of the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower (Minxin and Pei 2009)

With the weak Soviet Union, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in October 1990 marked the beginning of the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc (Brennan Jr, et al. 2013 p. 338-339). On the 9 November 1990, NATO and the Warsaw Pact members met in Paris to agree on a joint declaration officially confirming the end of the Cold War. Indeed, they went further, confirming that this announcement not only meant the end of an era lasting four decades, marked by on-going conflicts, security dilemmas, arms races and mistrust, with humans living under the threat of nuclear war, but a new page in relations between East and West underpinned by a spirit of cooperation and friendship remote from the years of 1917-1945, which marked the division of the world, and the start of the Cold War (Hogan 1992).

The logical consequence of Soviet foreign policy is that the old system collapsed and bipolarity was ended. Thus, the features of the old international balance disappeared, and gave way to the possibility of one global empire or a multi-pole regime. In addition, international developments brought new challenges for the UN and its new role as a cornerstone in an effective system of global collective security, while the Non-Aligned Movement lost the traditional justification for its existence (Ibid).

The impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the Gulf

There is no doubt that the change in the international system with the collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis and War, as the USA was the only superpower that managed the crisis (Stork 1992). However, it is conceivable that had Moscow still been a significant power, with its interests in the Gulf and special relations and alliances with Iraq in that time, that it would not have been possible for the USA able to build an international coalition against Iraq. Indeed, the Gulf states had asked for Moscow's help to

counteract the effects of Iranian pressure on trade in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war, in the first eight years of the GCC. This was an important occasion for Moscow, because it broke the barrier between it and the Gulf States (Abdullah 1999). When the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, this removed the last of the Saudi reservations to the establishment of normal relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time that the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, the clear weakness of the Soviet Union's global power appeared, right at that moment, the Soviet Union desired to prioritise its economic and trade interests before ideology, which had been the source of the Gulf states' reservations over Soviet policy (Ross 1984).

The GCC, fearing Soviet policies stood against them in the region, entered the global conflict between Moscow and Washington, particularly in Afghanistan. The Gulf states also feared a direct attack from the Soviet Union on the Gulf region, because of the support given by some Gulf States to the Mujahedin in Afghanistan, motivated by political solidarity of Muslims against the Soviet invasion (Katz 1985). Moreover, because of the vital importance of the GCC and their vulnerability at the same time, many observers in the West came to fear that the Soviet Union may tried to extend its influence over the GCC countries. The Soviet alliance with Iraq, the Soviet military presence in South Yemen and Ethiopia, and the invasion of Afghanistan have been cited as evidence of a Soviet plan first to surround the region and then to take control of it (Ibid p. 25).

On the other hand, Soviet-Iraqi relations, coinciding with US support for Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, was a source of reassurance and anxiety at the same time for the GCC. Therefore, the motivation to create the GCC was to avoid the complications of the Iran-Iraq war that Moscow was definitely a part of, as well as the conflict in Afghanistan, which began with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan (Habibi 2010 p. 2-9). Both

events attracted Moscow's attention, given its proximity to the Gulf region, which was one of the most important areas for Soviet policy interests on the one hand, and a desire to compete with the West on the other hand.

Features of the New World Order

The New World Order was built on the ruins of the former World Order: a bipolar system that had prevailed in international relations since the end of World War II and until the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991. The old World Order was based on competition, conflict and Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is worth mentioning that the New World Order did not come about over the course of one day and night, but was the result of several international events (Freedman 1991):

1. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellites, i.e. the Eastern Bloc. This strengthened US domination in the world.

2. The Second Gulf War is key to the New World Order, due to its consequences on the world.

3. The arms race led to a significant drain on economic resources, especially in the Soviet Union, which led the poles to enter into arms control negotiations.

The term, New World Order, first appeared in a speech by US President, George Bush, (11.09.1990) to Congress, as he presented the US objectives in the Gulf Crisis. Among these objectives was the consolidation of a new world, free from the threat of terror and characterised by justice; a more secure peace system where the nations of the world to the west and east, north and south can live in peace and prosperity (Bush 1990) and (Slaughter 2009).

In the New World Order, economic development would be key to the future of international relations, with the opening of new markets and the launch of a free trade policy. The Middle East in this system had its own niche, where diplomacy, negotiation, and peace, opened the way to solving problems by activating the role of the UN as a tool to resolve international conflicts through military and economic sanctions and political means (Freedman 1991). In addition the Second Gulf War was a test of the credibility of US foreign policy in the new international order. Its relations with the Soviet Union were cooperative, which overcame past conflict and made decisions easier to take than in the past. This crisis was an opportunity for the USA to take a decision for war in the absence of competing powers in addressing the crisis. UNSC resolution No 660 on (02/08/1990) condemned the invasion and demanded an Iraqi withdrawal and calls for negotiations to resolve the differences through peaceful means. The resolution was issued using that power, with no objection to the resolution (Nye Jr 2003).

Thus, the demands for building a New World Order was due to the earlier periods, in the context of what is known as a dialogue of the north and south. Thus, the New World Order for developing countries is that the system will take their demands into consideration as a principle of sovereignty and equality and the right to self-determination and respect of these states' national sovereignty. These principles reflect the keenness of the countries of the South in general to stand on an equal footing with the countries of the North in the New World Order (Freedman, et al. 1993).

The second Gulf War and the accompanying intervention and deployment of international forces in the Gulf

Iraq had just concluded the war with Iran, and sought to reassure its neighbours in the Gulf that no more wars would be waged in the region, but many regional analysts believed that Iraq may or may not use its military power in a specific way, whether against Israel or against

its neighbours, especially Kuwait to realise regional claims. It was natural that the USA would seek to protect its interests in the region whether safeguarding the flow of oil and gas, or preserving the governing regimes as discussed in the last chapter. Furthermore, protecting Israel's security and strategic superiority in the region was also one of the US objectives and interests, largely because of the size and power of the Iraqi military after the Iraq-Iran war, and fear of the use of this power against other states in the region. Moreover, the Iraqi force upset the balance of power in the region, and could cause many problems for the USA in various areas, such as

1. Demanding the exit of foreign forces from the Gulf region, after exhausting their purpose of a foreign military presence in the conflict with Iran. Such demands would echo domestic and international public opinion.

2. The Iraqi regional role of protecting some of the Gulf regimes, and putting pressure on rival countries.

3. The pressure on producers in the OPEC countries to meet the demands of Iraq to raise prices at that time. (Hunter 2010):

Based on the foregoing, the USA sought to protect its interests against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 to liberate Kuwait with the help of the international coalition. The US-led intervention to liberate Kuwait, clarified the weakness of the GCC states to protect themselves and that their security was significantly weak. The USA entered directly into the balance of power in the Gulf region, as discussed in chapter two, the USA signed security agreements with the states of the GCC, which included providing arms and military support. From that time, the USA has been a key player in the regional balance of power.

Motives and reasons for the Iraqi attack on Kuwait

This event was brought about by a number of processes and issues. Firstly, the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq, which was overburdened with debts and loans, mostly from the Arab Gulf states. This was due to the depletion of resources on armaments and the war with Iran. These debts related to four groups of countries. The Paris Club creditor countries and representing 19 countries at the time debt was estimated around US$38.9 billion.[3] Creditor countries that were not members of the Paris Club, and estimated debts were more than US$20 billion. The GCC states creditors included the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, where estimated claims between US$30-40 billion, and the commercial creditors who estimated their claims up to US$20 billion. For more reading about the Iraqi debts see (Weiss 2010) also (Ministry of Finance - Republic of Iraq, 2013) and (Kuwait National Assembly 2009). In fact, Iraqi debts were reduced in November 2004, following negotiations with the Paris Club and commercial debt restructuring led to an 80% reduction of debts. Moreover the UAE cancelled its debts and most of the other countries reduced the debts on Iraq as help and support after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Paris Club 2004)

The USA refused to help Iraq economically in rebuilding after the war with Iran. This was due to US and Israeli fear from the growing Iraqi military power that threatened both Israeli national security and also US oil interests in the region (Becker 1992). Furthermore, a border dispute between the two countries, that started in 1960 when an Arab League declaration marked the Iraq-Kuwait border 2 miles north of the southernmost tip of the Rumaila field. The issue was worsened during the Iraq-Iran War when Iraq accused Kuwait of depleting the Rumaila Petroleum field, claiming that Kuwait had taken oil at a value of

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[3] The Paris Club is the forum where major creditor countries negotiate terms for restructuring or resolving official government-to-government debt It included Australia , Austria , Belgium , Canada , Denmark , Finland , France , Germany , Italy , Japan , Korea, Republic Of , Netherlands , Russian Federation , Spain , Sweden , Switzerland , United Kingdom , United States Of America.

US$2.4 billion, and Iraq had the right to restore the value of this oil, as Iraq accused Kuwait of using advanced drilling techniques to exploit oil from its share of the Rumaila field (Murray, Scales and Murray 2009, Ibrahim 1996).

As Tariq Aziz, Iraq's former Foreign Minister, mentioned in his letter to Mr. Chadli Klibi, Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, on 7/15/1990, after he accused Kuwait of crawling gradually towards the ground of Iraq, and it erected, since 1980, oil installations on the southern part of Iraq's Rumaila oil field (Kuwait National Assembly 2009). In addition he accused Kuwait and the UAE of increasing oil production to sink the oil market more production out of its assessed share of OPEC (Kuwait National Assembly 1995). On the other hand the Kuwaiti government rejected the Iraqi allegations to justify the reasons for the invasion and Iraq seeking to find a way out of a lot of internal and external problems, particularly its external debt (Kuwait National Assembly 1995)

Iraq sees that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE manipulated oil prices. In fact, and during the Iraq-Iraq War Saudi Arabia and Kuwait supported Iraq economically. Kuwaiti aid to Iraq reached US$14 billion while the aid of Saudi Arabia to Iraq was US$28 billion (Interview No 3 with Senor Official). Iraq had hoped to pay these debts by raising oil prices by reducing the production of OPEC oil. Iraq accused Kuwait and the UAE of raising their oil production, rather than reducing it in order to compensate for losses resulting from the decline in oil prices, which led to a decline in the oil prices to levels between US$10 and US$12 instead of US$18 a barrel (Lakoff 1991). In contrast, the statistics of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) indicate that 10 countries, including Iraq, were not committed to production quotas. Furthermore, although it has pledged all of Kuwait and the UAE to abide by production quotas estimated at one million and a half barrels on 10 July

1990, and on 26 July 1990 Kuwait reduced its oil production to the level of OPEC quotas (Chaudhry 1991).

In addition to these motives, there are conclusions that the Iraqi leadership had received permission from the USA for military action. The US Ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, told Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, on 25 July 1990 that the US had nothing to do with the problem of a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003). Moreover, the speech on 31 July 1990 by John Kelly, US Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs, noted that there were no formal US commitments for the defence of Kuwait (Considine and Haley 1992). As can be seen, the campaign procedures involving Iraqi politics before and during the Gulf crisis represented an integrated system of political behaviour. This system of political behaviour did not stem from nothing, but the domestic and international environment affected this behaviour, and pushed it towards the elaboration of certain demands that would help the Iraqi regime solve its domestic problems after the war with Iran (Zufle 2009).

Reactions of Arab and regional States

1. **Arab Republic of Egypt:** Egypt announced its position on this process, on 4 August 1990, where the president, Hosni Mubarak, said: Egypt refuses to intervene in the affairs of other countries, and called for the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory, and contain the crisis in the Arab framework, and to prevent interference by any foreign power and the convening of an emergency Arab summit in Cairo, and Egypt participated in Arab forces that were sent to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Ibrahim 1996).

2. **Arab Republic of Syria:** Since the first days of the invasion of Kuwait, the Syrian government announced its condemnation of the use of force or threat of force between the Arab countries. The Syrian government called for immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, and the return of the Kuwaiti government. Syria was the first Arab state that called for an emergency summit in Cairo to address the crisis. Moreover, Syria took advantage of the crisis to rearrange its position at the Arab regional and international level. It invested in the crisis to recover the strengths that had been lost, because of the international isolation that the West had imposed on Syria. Also, Syria contributed by sending troops to Saudi Arabia to participate in the international coalition (Yasin, et al. 1990).

3. **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:** There is no doubt that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the second most affected country of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Despite a non-aggression treaty between it and Iraq, there was a state of fear in the Kingdom. It did not exclude the possibility that after settling Iraqi matters in Kuwait, Iraq would attack the Kingdom to settle accounts. This was due to the Kingdom's position on the invasion, which was to call on Arab and Islamic forces to defend its territory, and with the international powers to confront the Iraqi threat. The Iraqi military attacked the Saudi border at the town of Hafr Al-Batin, though this assault was defeated by the alliance forces in what was known as the Hafr Al-Batin Battle. In addition, the Kingdom was involved in the implementation of Security Council resolutions, and stopped pumping Iraqi oil through a pipeline, which passes through the territory of Saudi Arabia (Yasin, et al. 1990).

4. **Kingdom of Jordan:** The Jordanian position was confused between trying to keep the relations with Iraq stable, and trying not to stand in front of the international

parties. Jordan had built its position on the basis of trying to maintain balanced relations with Iraq and the Arab world, with a focus on containing the problem within the Arab framework, without the interference of foreign powers. It was also focused on the Israeli threat to Jordan, and denounced the foreign intervention in the region. Jordan tried to conduct peaceful endeavours since the beginning of the crisis. However, because of Jordanian sympathy with Iraq, remittances from the Gulf were stopped from Jordanian workers and Gulf States halted their material assistance to Jordan (Yasin, et al. 1990).

5. **Turkey:** From the beginning of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Turkey condemned it, and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait. However, the Turkish government deliberately did not take the initiative to impose counter-measures on Iraq, and participate in the international coalition. It was waiting for compensation for economic losses and the negative political effects resulting from the crisis (Emad 1991). After negotiations with the USA concerning the price that Turkey would get militarily or economically, and after the issuance of the Security Council resolution on Iraq, Turkey halted pumping Iraqi oil through its territory and closed its border with Iraq. In addition, Turkey was not involved directly in the military action by the international coalition, and limited its contribution to allowing coalition military aircraft to take off from its territory.

6. **Iran:** The policy of Iran was clear, which was condemnation of the invasion from the first moments, emphasising peace with Iraq, and departure of foreign troops from the Gulf, and stressing the role of Iran in the future security arrangements in the / Gulf. These issues shaped Iranian interactions with the parties of the Gulf crisis (Yasin, et al. 1990). Furthermore, Iran was able to separate the actions of all those dimensions in

the Gulf crisis successfully, and was able to manage its actions with maximum benefit.

7. **Israel:** Israeli policy was based on the exploitation of the crises to ensure the achievement of its objectives, most notably to improve its international and regional image. It worked to make more friends and supporters, and reduce the opponents of its policies (Yasin, et al. 1990). Israel employed the Gulf crisis to gain financial and military aid from the US under the pretext of war in the Gulf, and the threat to its security, because of Iraqi missile attacks at the time. Israel was committed to neutrality, because of its unwillingness to be directly involved in this conflict, which would increase its regional problems (Emad 1991).

The impact of the war on Kuwait

When the Iraqi army began the invasion of Kuwait, it destroyed many of the infrastructure facilities in Kuwait, and captured and killed a large number of Kuwaitis. The people of Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion faced torture, capture and murder. More than 600 Kuwaiti and other nationals were captured during the Iraqi occupation, and most are still missing; later, the remains of about 236 were recovered from mass graves (Kuwaiti Government1991). In addition, the Iraqi army destroyed more than 727 out of 1080 Kuwaiti oil wells. The estimated value of the lost oil and natural gas from those wells was about US$120 million a day, as well as the loss of the value of oil that was burned. It also had the unrealised value of stopping production. Furthermore, the cost of the reconstruction of the oil sector was around US$80 billion, according to estimates by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance. The impact of the destruction of institutions and government installations, resulted in losses of billions of dollars (Kuwaiti 1991).

The impact of the war on Iraq

First: Sanctions

The UNSC imposed sanctions on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. These sanctions were articulated in a large number of international resolutions, amounting to 46, by 24 November 1998 (United Nation Security Council Resolutions Centre); (Finlan 2003).

A large number of these resolutions, if not all, had been issued originally by the US State Department and Pentagon. The Security Council just re-issued these resolutions, giving them the international character and legitimacy that the US administration needed to achieve its goals and strategic interests in the Gulf region. In addition, never before had such a regime of sanctions been applied on a state, creating a comprehensive siege. It seems clear that if the sanctions were given enough time, there was the possibility of an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait without resorting to war. However, the US administration did not take this option, mainly due to a desire to crush the Iraqi forces. In addition, the USA was worried about the disintegration of the coalition against Iraq over time.

The following is a schedule showing the sequence of Security Council resolutions passed on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, from 2 August 1990 to 24 November 1998.

Table 2 Security Council resolutions passed on Iraq

No:	Resolutions No:	Year	
1	660	02/08/1990	Condemned the invasion and demanded an Iraqi withdrawal and calls for negotiations to resolve the differences through peaceful means.
2	661	06/08/1990	Economic sanctions on Iraq and the establishment of the Sanctions Committee.

3	662	09/08/1990	Considered annexation of Kuwait by Iraq null and void.
4	664	18/08/1990	Demands that Iraq allow nationals to leave Iraq.
5	665	25/08/1990	Expansion of international sanctions on Iraq and allow the naval forces to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance.
6	666	13/09/1990	Asked the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council to determine whether there is an urgent humanitarian need to supply Iraq and Kuwait with foodstuffs.
7	667	16/09/1990	Demands on Iraq for the immediate release of the abducted foreign nationals.
8	669	24/09/1990	Request to the Sanctions Committee to make recommendations to respond to the requests for assistance from states facing problems to address the economic problems caused by the sanctions.
9	670	25/09/1990	Calls for compliance with the sanctions imposed on Iraq and confirms the applicability to all means of transport, including aircraft.
10	674	29/10/1990	Demands that Iraq release foreign nationals detained in Iraq or Kuwait.
11	677	28/11/1990	Condemning Iraq's attempts to change the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait.
12	678	29/11/1990	Authorises the Member States cooperating with the Government of the State of Kuwait to use all necessary means to support and implement the decisions of the Council on this case unless Iraq fully complies with these resolutions on January 15, 1991 or before.
13	686	02/03/1991	Stop offensive combat operations and demanding that Iraq implement all the relevant 12 Security Council resolutions.
14	687	03/04/1991	Organise a cease-fire, including, deploying observers of the United Nations, the layout of the border between Iraq and Kuwait and removal or destroy weapons of mass destruction of Iraq and the establishment of a compensation fund to cover losses and damages directly caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
15	688	05/04/1991	Demands Iraq to stop the repression of the civilian population in many parts of Iraq and to allow humanitarian organisations to reach all those in need of assistance.
16	689	09/04/1991	Approval of a plan of the Secretary-General to establish the

			United Nations Mission for the control in Iraq and Kuwait.
17	692	20/05/1991	Establishment of the United Nations Fund for Compensation
18	699	17/06/1991	Iraq should bear the full cost of the weapons destruction programme.
19	700	17/06/1991	To approve the arms embargo imposed on Iraq.
20	705	15/08/1990	Support for the Secretary-General's proposal that compensation does not exceed 30% of the annual value of the Iraqi exports of oil.
21	706	15/08/1990	Authorise the import of petroleum products from Iraq for a period of six months in order to finance the operations of the United Nations under Security Council resolution 687.
22	707	15/08/1990	Demands that Iraq disclose all the programmes to develop weapons and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its inspection teams to access to all sites.
23	712	19/09/1990	Adoption of the maximum for the sale of Iraqi oil.
24	715	11/10/1990	Approve the plans submitted by the Secretary-General and Director-General of the International Agency for Atomic Energy on ongoing monitoring and verification.
25	773	26/08/1992	Demarcation of the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
26	778	02/10/1992	On Iraqi funds frozen abroad.
27	806	05/02/1993	Expand the powers of UNIKOM.
28	833	27/05/1993	Confirm to the decision of the Commission's final demarcation of the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
29	899	04/03/1994	Compensate the Iraqi farmers affected by demarcation of the border between Iraq and Kuwait.
30	949	15/10/1994	Demands Iraq to withdraw its troops deployed near the border with Kuwait.
31	986	14/04/1995	Oil for Food programme
32	1051	27/03/1996	Import and export of dual-use materials.
33	1060	12/06/1996	Denounced the decision of the Iraqi authorities to prevent the entry of inspectors and demanding full cooperation with the Committee.
34	1111	04/06/1997	Renewal of the provisions of resolution 986 (oil for food).
35	1115	21/06/1997	Demand Iraq to cooperate with the Special Committee.

36	1129	12/09/1997	Change the duration of the resolution 1111 oil for food.
37	1134	23/010/1997	Threat to prevent travel of Iraqi officials if the Iraq continues to block the activity of the Special Committee.
38	1137	12/11/1997	Prevent travel on all Iraqi officials and members of the armed forces responsible for failure to cooperate with the Special Committee.
39	1143	24/12/1997	Renewal of the provisions of resolution 986 covering oil for food for another six months.
40	1153	20/02/1998	Iraq can increase export of oil in six months within the oil for food programme.
41	1154	03/03/1998	Adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Iraqi government.
41	1158	25/03/1998	Allow the import of petroleum and petroleum products, the Iraqi equivalent of US$1.4 billion for a period of 90 days to fill the shortage of the proceeds from the sale of oil due to the delay of pumping oil and severe decline of prices.
43	1175	19/06/1998	Allow Iraq to import spare parts and equipment for oil sector.
44	1194	09/09/1998	Stop the periodic review to condemn Iraq's decision not to cooperate with UNESCO.
45	1205	05/10/1998	Condemnation of the Iraqi government's decision on 13 October 1998 to stop cooperating with the Special Committee.
46	1210	24/11/1998	Extend the oil for food programme to another stage for a period of six months starting from 26/11/1998
47	1242	21/05/1999	Begins Phase VI of "oil for food", to start on 25 May 1999.
48	1266	04/10/1999	Allows an additional $3.04 billion in oil sales to offset deficits during previous Phases and (possibly) to slow the rise in oil prices.
49	1275	19/11/1999	Extends Phase VI to 4 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
50	1280	03/12/1999	Extends Phase VI to 11 December 1999 due to wrangling over SCR 1284.
51	1281	10/12/1999	Begins Phase VII of "oil for food", to start on 12 December 1999.

52	1284	17/12/1999	Replaces Unscom with Unmovic, demands Iraqi co-operation on prisoners of war, alters the "oil for food" programme, and discusses the possible suspension of sanctions in ambiguous terms.
53	1293	31/03/2000	Doubles permitted oil spare part imports for Phases VI and VII
54	1302	08/06/2000	Begins Phase VIII of "oil for food".
55	1330	04/12/2000	Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, to commence Phase IX.
56	1352	01/06/2001	Extends Phase IX of the oil-for-food programme by one month only.
57	1360	03/07/2001	Extends the oil-for-food programme by 150 days to begin Phase X, after no agreement was reached over the new UK proposals for a modified sanctions regime.
58	1382	29/11/2001	1382 (29 November 2001): Iraq-Kuwait. Extends the oil-for-food programme by 180 days, commencing Phase XI on 1 December 2001
59	1409	14/05/2002	Extends the oil-for-food programme by six months.
60	1441	08/11/2002	Offering Iraq under Saddam Hussein "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (Resolution 660, Resolution 661, Resolution 678, Resolution 686, Resolution 687, Resolution 688, Resolution 707, Resolution 715, Resolution 986, and Resolution 1284).
61	1443	25/11/2002	Extends the oil-for-food programme by 9 days only, due to disagreements over US proposals to broaden the Goods Review List.
62	1447	04/12/2002	Extends the oil-for-food programme by 6 months.
63	1454	30/12/2002	Implements revisions to the Goods Review List.
64	1472	28/03/2003	Gives UN more authority to administer the "oil for food" programme for the next 45 days.
65	1476	24/04/2003	Concerning the provision of humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people, the Council extended the Oil-for-Food Programme until 3 June 2003.

66	1483	22/05/2003	Recognises Britain and the United States as occupying powers ('The Authority'), and calls on them to attempt to improve security and stability, and provide opportunities for the Iraqis to determine their political future.
67	1490	03/06/2003	Disbands the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), and removes the demilitarised zone between Iraq and Kuwait. Comes into force on 6 October 2003.
68	1500	14/08/2003	Establishes UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, as proposed by the Secretary General in a report on July 17 Welcomes creation of Governing Council
69	1511	16/10/2003	Mandates the UN to strengthen its vital role in Iraq.
70	1518	24/11/2003	1518 (24 November 2003) Establishes a committee (the 1518 committee) to identify resources which should be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq.
71	1538	21/04/2004	Expressing the desire to see a full and fair investigation of efforts by the former Government of Iraq, including through bribery, kickbacks, surcharges on oil sales, and illicit payments in regard to purchases of humanitarian goods, to evade the provisions of resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990 and subsequent relevant resolutions.
72	1546	08/06/2004	The Council endorsed the formation of the Iraqi Interim Government, welcomed the end of the occupation and determined the status of the multinational force and its relationship with the Iraqi government.
73	1557	12/08/2004	Extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) for a further period of twelve months.
74	1619	11/08/2005	Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for another period of twelve months from the date of this resolution.
75	1637	08/11/2005	extended the mandate of the multinational force until the end of 2006.
76	1700	10/08/2006	Extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) for a further period of twelve months until August 10, 2007.
77	1723	28/11/2006	Extended the mandate of the multinational force until the end of 2007.

78	1762	29/06/2007	Decided to terminate the related Nuclear Verification Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq.
79	1770	10/08/2007	Approving a 12-month mandate extension for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI),
80	1790	18/12/2007	Extending the mandate of the multinational force in Iraq until December 31, 2008. The mandate had been established in 2004 by Security Council resolution 1546 and previously extended by resolutions 1637 and 1723.
81	1830	07/08/2008	The Council decided that the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) should continue to pursue their expanded mandate, in accordance with the request by the Government of Iraq and as stipulated in resolution 1770 (2007).
82	1859	22/12/2008	Extension of the arrangements for the depositing into the Development Fund for Iraq of proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas
83	1883	07/08/2009	Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of twelve months from the date of this resolution.
84	1905	21/12/2009	The Council extended until 31 December 2010 the arrangements for depositing proceeds from oil and gas export sales into the Development Fund for Iraq, established under Resolution 1483 (2003).
85	1936	05/08/2010	Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until 31 July 2011.
86	1956	15/12/2010	The Council terminated UN supervised arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq with effect from June 30, 2011.
87	1957	15/12/2010	The Council lifted sanctions relating to weapons of mass destruction, long-range ballistic missiles, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
88	1958	15/12/2010	The Council terminated the residual activities of the Oil-for-Food Programme.
89	2001	28/07/2011	Extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of twelve months
90	2061	25/07/2012	Extended the mandate for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq by another 12 months.
91	2107	27/06/2013	It removes Iraq from its obligations concerning the return of Kuwaiti and third-state nationals or their remains to their proper state that were seized under the former Saddam

92	2110	24/07/2013	Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) until July 31, 2014.
Notes			All the above resolutions except 662, 665, 688, 773, issued under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Source (United Nation Security Council Resolutions Centre). Listed and edited by the author.

Second: the attacks on Iraq

Since the end of the Second Gulf War, the USA and Britain began to threaten to strike Iraq as a reaction to Iraqi positions on the committees of weapons inspections. Indeed, Iraq had been subjected to many military strikes from the USA and the United Kingdom. In March 1993 they bombed northern and southern Iraq over a period of ten days, because Iraq moved missiles into buffer zones with Kuwait, and for preventing UN aircraft from landing in Baghdad (Wehrey, et al. 2010). Iraq was also attacked with missiles on 1 July 1994 on an intelligence building, after it was accused by Kuwait of trying to assassinate US President George W. Bush during a visit to Kuwait. In September 1996 Iraq was under rocket attack by US forces after Iraqi troops entered the city of Erbil in northern Iraq (Marr 1995).

It is worth mentioning that US and British aircraft flew daily flights over northern and southern Iraq under the UN resolution, which imposed a no-fly zone in the north and south of Iraq. These over flights included attacking Iraqi sites from time to time. On 17 December 1998, both the USA and Britain bombarded Iraqi sites suspected of storage and development of weapons of mass destruction, which was due to non-cooperation with the International Committee of International Atomic Energy Agency. This process was called Operation Desert Fox (Wehrey, et al. 2010).

Other effects on the people and environment

The war had far-reaching effects on people and the environment extending many years, where Iraqis and even US soldiers, suffered from health effects. In addition to the killing of thousands of civilians and Iraqi soldiers as a result of the bombing, the effects on the Iraqi environment were quite significant. The war led to the conversion of a large part of Iraq to a polluted environment and radiation because of the use by US forces of depleted uranium munitions (Dowdy 2010). The war in Iraq caused various environmental impacts and diseases in plants, animals and humans, and increasing incidence of cancer, and a threefold rise in birth defects, after US forces used depleted uranium weapons.

The military and economic strategy was to control the oil-rich region, and from this perspective, the USA worked continuously to exploit the UN. Madeleine Albright had said, "*we will work with others towards a common goal when we can, and on an individual basis when we should*" (Zufle 2009 p. 11). Moreover, the conditions for ending the blockade had evolved from the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, to other conditions, such as disarmament until the collapse of the Iraqi regime.

The implications of the events of 9/11 on the Gulf

The implications of 9/11 did not cause changes in the concept of security only, but also the sources of threats. Furthermore, international and regional powers that were directly concerned with security and these threats, not only of the external and easily identifiable enemy, that challenge the land or national interests, can be determined, and can be responded to. But these threats have developed to include the risk of organisations representing a strategic threat that could damage the internal and external interests of states. After 9/11 the visions about the threats changed, where it emerged that there are organisations or groups of

individuals who may be able to implement strategic threats against the USA, or other countries and paralyse political and economic life. These threats put to the test all the prevailing patterns of thinking, including the missile shield project, which was established in accordance with the vision of the traditional perception of threats and risks (Kellner 2003).

9/11 had a clear impact on the security policy of the USA and its orientations, its views of the world and its priorities, as well as categorised lists of allies and enemies, these events had a deep impact on the Gulf region (Chollet and Goldgeier 2009), which led to increased international pressure and the US pressure in the region to carry out reforms, and to reconsider the output of educational institutions to ensure that extremist students would not graduate and proceed to join terrorist groups. Furthermore, the cost of the moral physical, and social impacts, following the participation of these countries in the war on terror has become an important factor. Furthermore, the general features which have become characteristic of the strategic environment of security in the Gulf region at some point after the events of September 2001, followed the launch of the war on terror, which resulted in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge for the Gulf states is of promoting national and regional security and to imposing hegemony by the powerful states on the region to increase the foreign presence in the Gulf region (Chomsky 2011).

National security and the war on terrorism

Terrorism is any action that is intended to intimidate an individual or group or country in order to achieve objectives that are not sanctioned by local or international laws. Despite the lack of definition of the above for drawing an overarching framework for the reality of terrorism, because it differentiated according to its type and shape, it can be the basic definition of terrorism. There is individual terrorism which can be done by individuals for many reasons and personal interests, and there is a terror of disorganised groups to achieve

the aims of private entities, and finally terrorism organised on a mass scale, such as terrorism practiced by organised groups funded and supervised by the institutions or bodies of states, declared or undeclared. All this, is in order to achieve objectives whether political, religious or sectarian, also there is the international terrorism, a terrorism practiced by one or more states by using its potential diplomatic and military tools, to achieve a political goal (Kellner 2003).

That terrorism is international anarchy, which gave the major powers or small states at the same time, the right to resist terrorism by invasion or military aggression or action by one state against other states, and bring new concepts of international peace and security, which means that international legitimacy is completely threatened. On the other hand, global terrorism has caused tightened controls on the movement of citizens, especially in large crowded facilities, and increased surveillance cameras in public areas. Moreover, the control devices became capable of monitoring and photographing any accident anywhere in major cities, and human rights organisations have grown increasingly concerned about these developments, as individuals will lose their sense of privacy under constant surveillance (Mitchell 2011).

The Muslim communities in Western countries have suffered from additional restrictions and close surveillance of their activities, and even the closure of some of their associations. Furthermore, Islamic communities have suffered from smear campaigns, as well as increased radicalisation of right-wing groups and some US organisations that have attacked Islam and Muslims, and even called for expelling them or reducing their presence (Stoddard and Hess 2011).

On the other hand, the concept of national security has been developed after the events of 9/11 in terms of the political and security changes, and the emergence of the role of

the internal security services, which has led to an increase of the internal security arrangements in the Gulf countries (interview 6). The internal and external variables have caused changes in the strategic environment of the Gulf security, including terrorism and confronting it, in addition to the challenge of continuing political reforms and the peaceful democratic transformation. In addition, there has been growing US pressure on the region to reform their regimes. Countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, have increased the security procedures because of their borders with Iraq, and the fear of any security complications there, such as a breakdown of security in the south of Iraq, the outbreak of a civil war, the anticipation of a Shiite state in the south of Iraq, which means expansion of Iranian influence in the region (Krebs and Lobasz 2007). The Gulf states made some arrangements for the national security and against terrorism, where these states signed some security agreements, security and intelligence cooperation between the states of the Gulf, and between them and other countries. Thus, the process of political and economic modernisation is necessary to achieve security and stability, which is realised by the Gulf states after the events of 9/11 (Kean 2011). It is good to mention that, the political elites in the Gulf states play a vital role in achieving the balance of power in their states, where these countries are subject to social transformation, political and economic, which exceeds traditional forms to what we can call political realism.

The invasion of Iraq and use of force to protect US interests

The invasion of Iraq or the Third Gulf War (the Iraq war or the occupation of Iraq or the war to liberate Iraq or Operation Iraqi Freedom these are some of many names were used to describe the military operations in the Third Gulf War) took place in Iraq in 2003 that led to the occupation of Iraq by the USA with the help of other countries, such as Britain, Australia and some countries allied with the USA, and Table 3: Coalition Forces in Iraq a list of all the

countries that was coalition members, which included countries committed to the conflict and countries committed to the post-war reconstruction, furthermore the timeframe of when the country's forces entered or exited Iraq are included all countries, except the withdrawal dates for 17 of these countries are not found, those countries are: Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Costa Rica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iceland, Kuwait, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Panama, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan (ProCon.org 2010, September1).

Table 3: Coalition Forces in Iraq

Nation	Mar. 27, 2003	Dec. 2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Mar. 1, 2010	Aug. 31, 2010
Total Coalition Countries	49*	37	37	32	30	28	26	6	1**	1
Afghanistan	✓	--	--	--	--		--	--	--	--
Albania	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/18/08)	--	--	--
Angola	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Armenia	--	--	--	✓	✓	✓	✓ (10/6/08)	--	--	--
Australia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (7/31/09)	--	--
Azerbaijan	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/3/08)	--	--	--
Bosnia Herzegovena	--	--	--	✓	✓	✓	✓ (11/29/08)	--	--	--
Bulgaria	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/17/08)	--	--	--
Colombia	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Costa Rica	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Czech Republic	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/4/08)	--	--	--
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2008)	--	--	--
Dominican Republic	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
El Salvador	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (1/22/09)	--	--
Eritrea	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Estonia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2/7/09)	--	--
Ethiopia	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Georgia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (10/20/08)	--	--	--
Honduras	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Hungary	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

Country										
Iceland	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Italy	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2006)	--	--	--	--	--
Japan	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/6/08)	--	--	--
Kazakhstan	--	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (10/20/08)	--	--	--
Kuwait	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Latvia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (11/8/08)	--	--	--
Lithuania	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/16/08)	--	--	--
Macedonia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (11/08)	--	--	--
Marshall Islands	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Micronesia	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Moldova	--	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/18/08)	--	--	--
Mongolia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (10/4/08)	--	--	--
Netherlands	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2007)	--	--	--	--
New Zealand	--	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nicaragua	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Norway	--	✓	✓	✓ (2005)	--	--	--	--	--	--
Palau	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Panama	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Philippines	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Poland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (10/4/08)	--	--	--
Portugal	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2006)	--	--	--	--	--
Romania	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (1/22/09)	✓ (7/23/09)	--	--
Rwanda	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Singapore	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2008)	--	--	--
Slovakia	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (2008)	--	--	--
Solomon Islands	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
South Korea	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/1/08)	--	--	--
Spain	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Thailand	--	✓	✓	✓ (2005)	--	--	--	--	--	--
Tonga	✓	✓	✓ (2004)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Turkey	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Uganda	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ukraine	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (12/9/08)	--	--	--
United Kingdom	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓ (7/31/09)	--	--
United States	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Uzbekistan	✓	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total Coalition	49*	37	37	32	30	28	26	6	1**	1

Countries Nation	Mar. 27, 2003	Dec. 2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	Mar. 1, 2010	Aug. 31, 2010

The invasion of Iraq began on 19 March 2003 by the coalition forces led by the USA and Britain, which accounted for 98% of this coalition's troops. This war has caused the most civilian losses in Iraq's history and the history of the US military in several decades. The war officially ended in 15 December 2011 when the US flag in Baghdad was lowered and the last US soldier left Iraq on 18 December 2011.

Justifications of war provided by the US administration before, during and after the fall of the previous regime in Baghdad on 9 April 2003 were justifications to convince the American public and the international public about the legitimacy of the war. One of the justifications was the continuation of the Saddam Hussein government which did not apply the UN resolutions that related to allowing the weapons committees to inspect the arms in Iraq to finish their work. It is worth mentioning that the USA put a deadline for the start of military operations while the inspection teams were still working in Iraq, that Gorge W. Bush began formally making the case for an invasion of Iraq to the international community in his speech on 12 September 2002 to the UNSC (Bush 2002). The government of Saddam Hussein allegedly continued production and possession of weapons of mass destruction and the lack of cooperation in the application of a UN resolution regarding giving complete data about weapons of mass destruction. It is worth mentioning that until this day no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq; moreover, the results of the UN weapons inspectors confirmed completely that there is no possession of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Another Justification mentioned the relationship between the government of Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda and other terrorist organisations that could threaten the security and

stability of the world. This claim was not proved by any evidence, or the existence of intellectual and ideological denominators between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime.

Before the election of George W. Bush as president of the USA, (Donnelly, Kagan and Schmitt 2000) wrote a note titled "*Rebuilding America's Defenses*" in September 2000, a year before the events of 9/11, that in spite of differences with the regime of Saddam Hussein and that justification of the presence of the USA in the Gulf region, but the importance of the reasons for the US presence in the region transcends the reason for the existence of the Saddam Hussein regime.

These justifications of the war on Iraq provided by the US administration faced a widespread criticism beginning with the American public opinion to the world public opinion and ending with some of the opponents of Saddam Hussein, and these criticisms of the war on Iraq show that the USA sought to dominate the global oil market and to support the US dollar. This latter point was encouraged as Saddam Hussein had made a decision in 2000 to use the Euro as a single currency for the purchase of Iraqi oil (Clark 2003). Moreover, this was to ensure that no fuel crisis occurred in the USA by controlling the second largest oil reserves in the world. Another criticism, was that the war was motivated by the personal interests of some business companies and major defence companies in the USA. Finally, the war may have been motivated by the implementation of the new American strategy of "rebuilding America's defences" discussed above and the personal revenge of George W. Bush against Saddam Hussein for his involvement in the attempted assassination of his father, Bush Senior, in Kuwait in 1993 (Teplitz 1995). These are some of the criticisms of the justifications of the US war on Iraq.

The suspicion that Iraq possessed or was developing weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear weapons) was the most important justification that the US

administration tried in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell as promoted in the UNSC. Before the war Hans Blix the Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq, said that his team did not find nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, but did find the missiles that exceeded the range permitted in the UN resolution (150 km) No. 687 in 1991 (Iraq called these rockets Al-Samoud missiles). Saddam Hussein approved the destruction of these missiles as an attempt to avoid conflict (Blix 2005).

On 20 March 2003, President George W. Bush ordered the start of military operations in Iraq. The leaders of the US military adopted the element of surprise and the prevailing expectation was that before the ground campaign would take place an air campaign was to happen as in the Second Gulf War, but the surprise element here was to start with the two campaigns at the same time. The invasion was rapid; after three weeks, the Iraqi government fell and because the fear of a repeat of what happened in the Second Gulf War, which was the fire in the oil fields, the British forces controlled the Rumaila oil fields, Umm Qasr and Fao, with the help of Australian troops. Moreover, US tanks rumbled in the Iraqi desert, surpassing the major cities on the way to avoid them and urban warfare. On the other hand, the British troops surrounded the city of Basra for two weeks before they stormed the city, where the belief was that the blockade will weaken the morale of the army and the Fedayeen Saddam, which would eventually lead to a mass uprising by the city's residents. However, this did not happen and British forces were able to break into the city after a fierce tank battle. Meanwhile in northern Iraq, a group of US special forces landed by paragliding into northern Iraq, because the Turkish parliament did not allow Turkish territory to be used to enter Iraq. Therefore, these special forces with the support of the US Air Force and the Kurdish parties were able to control a number of areas beyond the control of the Kurds (Hampton 2008). On 9 April 2003 the US forces announced taking control of most areas and

news agencies reported scenes of a small crowd trying to topple a statue of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in the central square in front of the Sheraton Hotel.

Since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003

Since the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, tension and instability overshadowed the security landscape in the Gulf. The invasion produced a new security environment different from that which prevailed before. This environment is characterised by instability, which amounts to anarchy, as in the case of Iraq, or the mutual suspicion and fear, as is the case of relations between Washington and Tehran on the background of the nuclear programme crisis, which may portend a new showdown with implications that will impact on the countries of the region. This all refutes the perceptions before the war on Iraq, that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to the absence of sources of threat in regional security, and to inaugurate a new environment conducive to security and stability.

But after more than ten years of this war the fact still refers that the region is prone to explosion, especially with the absence of a clear vision about the future of security arrangements between the countries of the region and the major powers, and the escalation of regional crises, which are so difficult to predict the future with, as well as the growing internal threats (extremism and terrorism).

The characteristics of the security situation in the Gulf region

The renewed instability, or the reasons of the instability in the region, have led from crisis to crisis during the 1980s, since the region witnessed the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). In the 1990s the Gulf witnessed the Second Gulf War (1991), and in the first decade of the twenty-first century, it witnessed the Third Gulf War (US invasion of Iraq) in March 2003. This means that the region has faced, in less than three decades, three wars at a rate of one every

decade and the problem of dealing with these wars is that they have been concluded with temporary solutions. Moreover, a Senior Official (interview No 4) discussed that "*there have been no serious attempts to agree between constants and variables and regional power relations. Countries in the region did not make serious efforts to build the foundations of a regional security system that meets their own needs, and which contributes to the output of the regional system from the situation of instability*". Also he mentioned that in the case of the inconclusive results of the Third Gulf War in 2003, the region could see a fourth war in the future, this clearly reveals that the Gulf region since its inception is still in a state of instability, whether due to regional forces or by international forces or as a result of the conflict of interests of international powers with the interests of regional powers in the region. All this is because the region is full of conflicts and disputes, whether between its countries, or between one of the Gulf states and some external parties. For the internal conflicts, there are the problems of the border, which have mostly settled, but some are still standing, such as the problem of the border between Iraq and all of Iran and Kuwait. There is also the problem of Iran's occupation of three UAE islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa). As for the external conflicts, there is the Iranian nuclear crisis with the USA and Western countries.

With regards to the different threats facing the states of the region, including threats that are already a reality, such as the US presence in the Gulf which is an external danger, or exposure to the risk of terrorism which is an internal risk with external support and some of the states face this risk of the threat of use of military force by external forces, if one of the countries in the region refused to accept certain demands, Iran for example under the threat of the use of force by the USA. There are also potential threats that the Iranian case, itself a nuclear crisis with the USA and the West, is now being managed by peaceful means, and in

the case of failure of these efforts, they may move to other tools, such as the use of military force. Furthermore, another threat may be hidden with a concealed reason without the presence of any manifestations on the surface (Stern 2010). A Senior Official (Interview No 9) described the causes of the crisis in the political thinking and the strategic thinking of the state, *"however, it is likely the evolution of this threat to the potential or real threat in other stages of the crisis"*. For example, as in the case of Iraqi relations with Kuwait where there remains conflict between them despite the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, but still some problems remain, such as border problems, compensation and debt, not to mention the continuing of the elite circles of Iraq, and the Iraqis asking for another port on the Gulf.

Finally, the expected threats, namely those threats that do not exist with any evidence of it in the current stage, but where the nature of international and regional variables may indicate the potential for appearing it on the surface which may arrive in the end to be real threats. Examples of these threats are sectarian problems in some countries, such as Iraq, Iran and Bahrain, and encourage fears of these issues spreading to other Gulf states. There are also the problems raised by the issue of foreign workers in the Gulf, followed by a potential for internationalisation, which was even politicised in the context of globalisation and the International Labour Organization (ILO) which is moving towards localisation of foreign labour, in order to be equal with the national employment in the rights of wages, health care and education and the participation of social and political rights, which carries with it serious risks to the countries that depend largely on foreign labour, especially the GCC. Many observers warn that citizens of these countries may turn into minorities within two decades, in the event that their governments have signed the conventions of the ILO in the period ranging from ten to fifteen years.

The overlapping of the security issues in the Gulf region is partly due to the multiplicity of regional and international parties that are involved with the security of the region, and competing for influence, or in other words, the conflict of interests. There is Iran, which turned to be a regional power, and wants to use this power into political influence, not only in the Gulf region, but also in the wider Middle East and there are many international powers, including the USA and many European countries, in addition to China and Russia, which are trying to force one way or another in the Gulf region.

With so many parties, security visions will be incompatible, that vision of the GCC states is not the same Iranian vision, and the Iranian vision is incompatible with the vision of the USA and the Arabs with the multiplicity of visions and incompatible interests. Each party seeks to achieve its interests even at the expense of the other parties (Thompson 2009). This is due to the conflict of interests and the economic and strategic importance of the region, which owns two-thirds of global oil reserves. Furthermore, the strategic location entered the stage of internationalisation. The security issues in the region have overlapped and varied, and are no longer limited to the issue of oil as it was before; but these issues have widened to include many levels and overlapping frames and composites The risks faced by the GCC states, are represented primarily in some extremist groups and terrorism, which cannot be separated from the unrestrained security situation in Iraq and the security crises in the region (the Iranian nuclear crisis) cannot be separated from the US policy towards the region after the events of 9/11 and the war on terror and the war on Iraq (Interview No 7).

The features of current security perceptions

In light of the above, one could say that the current security situation in the Gulf region, with the end of 2007, faces many challenges that have the same features, which is the ability of the explosion, some of these features come from the internal environment, and the others from

the regional environment. However, there is a clear link between them, regional challenges most of which are a product of the US invasion of Iraq, and linked failure of the US policies in dealing with the post-war period.

The security situation in Iraq has seen some improvement as a result of reduced operations of terrorist groups, though the situation is still highly volatile. This may be due to the state of lawlessness, which took control of the situation over the years and which abated, but did not quite finish, and this is due to the changes of the map of terrorist groups, being able to regroup under different names and logos, and a source of risk here is the relationship between some of these groups and some terrorist elements in neighbouring countries.

The Iranian nuclear crisis is one of the most complex files of the security in the region, which have serious developments on the security of the Middle East in general, and the security of the Gulf states in particular. This issue has seen important developments to solve it or at least postpone it. A report, which was issued by the Schindler (2007), which pointed out that Tehran stopped its nuclear weapons programme in 2003 and the importance of this report in postponing US plans to strike Iran. This is because it confirmed beyond any doubt that Iran was not a threat to US national security, and then there is no need to target Iran under the framework of a strategy of pre-emptive attack as adopted by the Bush administration after the events of 9/11. As well as the development in Iran's relations with the Gulf states, that the previous Iranian President Ahmadinejad participated in the twenty-eighth GCC summit, which was held in Doha, the beginning of the month of December 2007. Finally, there is the international opposition, represented by Russia and China, which stood against the aims of the USA to target Tehran.

Despite these positive developments, the Iranian nuclear programme remains viable to escalation at any time, this is because the US administration, and Israel are still insisting that

the Iranian nuclear programme is not a peaceful programme, and that Tehran represents the biggest concern on the security and stability in the Middle East. Moreover, doubt and suspicion on Iranian relations with the Gulf states and the ignoring of the issue of the three UAE islands, and to emphasise that the Gulf is Persian.

The new balance of power after the Third Gulf War in 2003, as is well known, there is a new balance of power, temporarily tending to some extent in favour of the GCC states compared to Iraq and the situation of the Iraqi army. On the other side, Iran as a regional power in the region compared to all of Iraq and the GCC states, these security situations may not achieve security and stability in the region, especially if Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, it will have negative repercussions on the security and stability of the Gulf region. Herein, is the opportunity for Iran to play the role of regional hegemonic state that dominates the surrounding area, in order to achieve its vital interests, particularly in the area of control of the Gulf waters and marine outlets (Fawcett 2013).

The imbalance of power may be a justification for the continued US presence in the region, to achieve a kind of balance, but the issue raised by this situation is the lack of guarantees for Gulf states that the USA will continue to play this role, as well as the Iranian pressure in order to employ this situation to achieve its strategic interests in the region, also. This US presence does not have the acceptance of people, which gives it the legitimacy that is needed (Interview No 11). Hence, this situation is based upon the current balance of power which is subject to many influences that may not be directly linked to the region. It also carries significant risks to the security of the region. In addition, this situation raises a big question about the possibility of the employment of the US presence to serve US strategic interests, regardless of the interests of the states in the region, for example, if the US administration offered concessions to Iran, in terms of the recognition of the religious rights

of Tehran over Shiites in the region. This may constitute confusion in the region and its social and political situation, which would create a situation like the duplication of religious and political loyalty to large sections of the people in the region (Interview No 16).

This situation may lead the countries of the region to a new arms race and the US may or may not employ this status of confusion to control some of the states in the region to sell a huge deal of weapons with the states of the region, regardless of whether or not they need it (Barzegar 2010). Furthermore, the arms sales that were announced by Washington for the Gulf states during the past years, which are discussed in chapter two, are expected to increase in the future, in an attempt to achieve some kind of military balance between the GCC states and Iran. The imbalance of power, might be employed by regional and international powers to build new hubs in the region, as was confirmed by (O'Hanlon 2009) in his research project (Opportunity 08) prepared by the Institute of Brookings Research, which presented the recommendations to the American presidential candidates in 2008. One of the project studies indicates that: the first line of the US Defence in the face of Iran is to strengthen the allies and the states of the Arab friends as a front of a counterweight to the power of Iran.

Internal security challenges

It is inseparable from the challenges of the previous threats stemming from the regional environment and are as follows:

The growing fundamentalist tide in the region, whether in terms of the emergence of radical groups or the emergence of new so-called sleeper cells, which are linked to al-Qaeda organisation, which is one of the implications of a US invasion of Iraq, which was exploited by al-Qaeda to direct its elements gathered in Iraq under the pretext of jihad against US forces. This contrasts with the statements, which spread after the events of 9/11 about the

151

retreat of the extremist trends in the Gulf, where these events revealed that the internal situation is responsible for the emergence of the phenomenon of extremism. A senior official (Interview No 5) discussed what has happened is that *"a new stage of fundamentalist extremism has emerged in response to the indictment of Islam with terrorism and the pursuit of Islamic movements in the world"*. In addition, most Islamic currents in the Gulf region condemned the attack on Afghanistan and Iraq, which prompted some moderate currents to shift towards extremism and violence in retaliation for the invasion of two Muslim states, not to mention the fatwas issued by some of the Muslim scholars, asking for resistance against the occupation, and supporting the idea of jihad against the USA. Moreover, A senior official (interviews No 4) describe that *"the danger is that Iraq has turned into a base for many of the extremist and terrorist groups in the region"*. This confirms that the Iraqi internal security environment has repercussions in the adjacent geographical regions. However, years after the occupation of Iraq a new reality has been produced that terrorist organisations have succeeded in exploiting and harnessing to their advantage. These groups found a golden opportunity in the war to rally radical elements into Iraq under the pretext of jihad against American forces, to turn it into a hotbed of new regional alternatives to Afghanistan, to attack the USA and Western targets and the countries of the region.

The politicisation of sectarianism has become a threat to security and stability in the region. The USA used the Shiites in the beginning to achieve its own interests to install its presence there, at the expense of the Sunni community, and over time the influence of the Shiite community has grown to the extent that Washington recognises that this represents a threat to their interests. This has also resulted in the polarisation of the Sunni community (Ismael and Fuller 2009). Thus, resulting in the politicisation of sectarianism in Iraq to deepen the conflict between the two communities, this was reflected in the mutual violence

taking place in Iraq. Furthermore, Iran entered into the sectarian conflict after it found the Iraqi arena ready for its influence and support of the Shiites, hoping to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq like the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially taking into account the fact that the religious authority in Iraq, which is "Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani," belongs to the Iranian origin (Ismael and Fuller 2009). The sectarian repercussions did not stop in Iraq, but also spilled into neighbouring GCC states in the form of demands from Shiites in these countries to obtain political and economic gains, like those achieved by the Shiites in Iraq (Matthiesen 2013).

In light of the above, one could say that security will remain a source of concern for the Gulf states, that the challenges faced by countries in the region and despite the differences, but most of them will affect the security and stability in all countries of the region as noted above. Also, regional or international powers may well take advantage of these security challenges, this can be seen in many issues, such as the issues of sectarianism which have become sensitive in many states in the region, as noted above. Based on this, the traditional interaction with such issues is no longer an appropriate method to deal with it, but have become required as a comprehensive vision to deal with it realistically and objectively.

It can be concluded that by employing the HST this chapter has found that all the wars and conflicts seen in the Gulf increased the role of the hegemonic state in the region represented by the US. The regional HST framework assessed in this chapter found that the regional cooperation of the Gulf states with the US as the hegemonic state, was the only way to build security and stability in the region. The US, in particular after the second Gulf War in 1991 became the dominant state in the Gulf and imposed its hegemony in the region. The Gulf states must deal with this situation, until one of the Gulf states can present itself as a

regional hegemonic state, which requires capabilities to influence other states in its region, as

discussed in the theory chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR VISIONS OF SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE GULF

Introduction

This chapter applied constructivist approaches to understand the evolution of state behaviours by explaining the actors' roles in the Gulf region to provide stability and the security.

This chapter seeks to explain the different visions of security in the Gulf through study and analysis of the political and security trends in the region where the study will clarify visions security of Iraq and Iran and the states of the GCC. This will be in accordance to the constructivist theory; as mentioned in the theory chapter that the identity is defined by ideas, perceptions and criteria determines the format of the interests of other actors on the one hand, and the direction these actors take within their international behaviour. Where there are a lot of factors affecting security and stability, the search remains for the vision and the perception that satisfies all parties, which is one of the urgent priorities in the region.

The Gulf region has witnessed significant change over the last three decades in the perception of the importance of the region in terms of global energy security, that the regional security perception of the Gulf states determines the general policy toward the external powers that have direct impact on the region's security and stability. To be clear the hegemonic state, which is the USA, has a significant role and direct impact in the relationships, stability and the balance of power by signing bilateral agreements, which include the sale of arms and provision of military support to the states that have signed these agreements, such as the GCC states and Iraq which discussed in chapter one. As a result of this the Iranian security vision needs to be reviewed and discussed later in this chapter.

Development of relations and the security concept

Before reviewing the security visions for the countries of the region, there is a need to clarify the conceptual basis for security in general and the security of the Gulf in particular. The

concept of security in general, is to maintain against any internal or external threat, whether this concept is related to the state or the system of regional or international order, and is usually taken as one of the states' foreign policy aims that is achieved by following procedures that provide stability in their region. With regard to national security, Baldwin (1997 p. 13) mentions that *"the concept of national security has traditionally included political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added"*. But within the regional security level, Gulf states have different perceptions in terms of the way in which stability can be achieved and in protecting the region, which is discussed below. Moreover, regional security is a necessary variable for the emergence of a regional system based on agreement between the states and their commitment to a set of criteria to govern their relationships. This system does not mean the removal of all the differences between the states, but the development of an environment to reduce those differences and prevent them from becoming out of control.

The concepts of security in the Gulf region are different according to the vision of the dominant power in the region. In the past, this has meant security in the Gulf at the stage of the British presence in the region was to achieve peace (PAX BRITANICA) to guarantee near total control by Great Britain on the capabilities of the area. After the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, the meaning of security in the region was to maintain the stability of the regimes, ensure the flow of oil and prevent subversive activities (Mojtahed-Zadeh 2013).

On the other hand, there have been several US strategies, which are related to the names of many US presidents, such as: the Nixon Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine, and the principle of strategic conflict in the era of President Reagan, and the principle of dual containment under the Clinton administrations, as we have already discussed in chapter two. Security in the Gulf entered a new period after the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war and

the US intervention to protect the flow of oil tankers, as well as the Second Gulf War in 1991 and its implications and changes on the structure of the Gulf regional system. As a result, the USA has become a leader in the region and the hegemonic power inside the regional system. The states that are involved in the regional system in the Gulf, come from the international or external region, this means the regional security system is built upon both the international and external powers' interests and capabilities.

Many factors have imposed the US role in the region, including the new changes in the international system (namely the emergence of the USA as the only superpower in 1990-91), and the military and security agreements signed by the GCC states with the USA, individually and as an alternative to the collective security of the Gulf (Interview No 19). For more details about those security agreements please see above the military means chapter two page 97. After the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 by the USA, the map of powers and regional balances of power changed, where the relations of regional states have developed with remarkable convergence between most GCC states and Iraq and Iran (Amirsadeghi 2012). That the Gulf states were quick to support Iraq, and help the Iraqi people after the war, by providing humanitarian aid and cancelling some of the debt owed to them by Iraq is indicative of this new set of relationships.

The frame of the conflict between Iran and Iraq and the GCC states changed relations in a way that they can be described as cooperative relationships. Where we observe visits between senior Iranian officials and Iraqis, as well as cooperation with the GCC states, where Iran signed the security agreement with Saudi Arabia, then signed another security agreement with Kuwait, and relations of defence cooperation with Oman, then the new understandings between the UAE and Iran after the visit of Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed, the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Tehran, as well as Iran attending the 26th session of the GCC in

December 2007, and the invitation of Saudi King Abdullah to the Iranian President "Ahmadinejad" to perform the Hajj in December 2007 (Hadji-Janev 2013)

Security in the Gulf region reveals a chronic dilemma, where calm in this region is linked to foreign hegemony, in light of the inability of regional powers to take collective actions to build a system able to protect the region. Macris (2009) discusses that the situation is not secure, but the security arrangements may be difficult to achieve and will not be achieved by continuing to rely on foreign parties to achieve security. Most Gulf states are convinced that stability must come from within, far from any external interference. However, international powers impose on everyone, due to international interests in this region. Therefore, the countries of this region are forced to accept foreign parties formulating the security of the region. According to this arrangement, the USA has sought to play the role of hegemonic state, as the Gulf states, particularly those in the GCC, unable to protect the region's security. This means that the issue of security in the Gulf came out from the regional to the global stage because of the size of the growing local link with external forces.

Bilateral security agreements and protection agreements have allowed other countries to control security in the Gulf, as discussed in chapter two. However, these opened the door to a long-term Western military presence, as well as construction of military bases and weapons storage in several countries. Despite the Gulf states owning the necessary means to achieve a certain amount of security, such as the necessary funding and modern weapons as discussed in chapter two, they were not critical and may not be able to achieve or address regional threats from the beginning without the need for international assistance. The next chapter will discuss the balance of power and the capability of each state in the region to protect itself.

Economic potential can be used independently to achieve the security of the Gulf, with the military supporting national security policy. Training of armed forces, armaments, the development of skills, and attention is part of defence plans, with the aim of protecting independence, stopping dependence, and achievement of territorial integrity against any aggression. It is worth mentioning that the military aspect of national security policies varies in different countries, in terms of power. In the small countries, such as the GCC states except Saudi Arabia, the military side is limited to supporting their capacity to cope with the risks of any aggression in self-defence, which no state in the Gulf is able to achieve. However, major countries use their military capabilities to protect small states, and achieve substantial economic and political gains from this role, particularly the continuing of the flow of the gas and oil. The USA is doing this in several regions of the world, including the Gulf (Bastaki 2003).

Within this understanding of the evolution of security in the Gulf, one can talk about a lot of perceptions of the security system by applying the theoretical framework based on the constructivist theory, to understand the Gulf states' security perspective and their security conceptions. This helped to clarify the role and the behaviour of the states in the region as actors have the ability to build a conceptual framework for the security in the Gulf. The following presents the perceptions of GCC states, Iran and Iraq for the security system of the Gulf:

The concept of security in the GCC

The security concept adopted by the GCC relates to the protection of rulers and regimes, in the face of any internal or external threat, and protection of their rights in the lifestyle they choose, and the right to choose the means of achieving security even from an external state or major regional states. After the 1990-91 Gulf Crisis and War, the GCC sought to confirm the

Gulf dimension of security arrangements through building a force capable of coping with any similar crisis. A meeting of the GCC Chiefs of Staff on 22 October 1991 confirmed that Gulf security responsibility was that of the states themselves (Kamal Mohammed 2013). Moreover, each state had the right of recourse to other parties to ensure its security in the region (Ibid).

From this point the process of the use of external powers to ensure security and stability in the region developed. If we look at the potential economic benefits of oil, these are sufficient to achieve security; but what are the means used by the GCC countries to achieve security and stability? Oil revenues in the Gulf countries are not used to develop defences, but to sign protection agreements, which are driven by foreign interests, such as those of the USA, which will put its objectives and interests first, in any offensive military action or even in defensive military action (Badr al-Din, Abdul Hamid.Qasim, Zakaria. Bloomfield, Lincoln 2013). From here, it is clear that these policies are restricted to a certain extent, for example, if the UAE tried to retrieve the islands occupied by Iran, it will be powerless without external assistance. From this perspective, we can see the weakness of the GCC security system, which is based on reliance on external powers, and has its disadvantages and negative impact in the long-term. Perhaps the concept of security in the GCC has taken a new direction after the Second Gulf War, most importantly (Suwaidi. and others 2008):

❖ The priority of external security, instead of focusing on internal security, especially from the perspective of Saudi security and curtailing the role of international forces in security. The Iraqi invasion gave priority to the external threats, and texts of the security agreement provided by Saudi Arabia no longer had priority as in the 1980s.

❖ The military security approach is more important than the societal security approach, because of the presence of the external risks facing everyone. Therefore, it has

become the focus and military capability was built to face these external challenges, with increased arms purchases in terms of quality or quantity.

❖ Intensified foreign military presence in the region, thereby increasing security dependency of the GCC on an international force led by the USA (Legrenzi 2011).

❖ Marginalisation of Arab participation in the security arrangements, reduced enthusiasm for the Damascus Declaration, and most of the GCC states signed bilateral agreements with the USA, because it possessed the high-tech weapons that were used to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Perhaps the reason for the failure of the GCC countries, in terms of security, led to consolidation of the national versus the integrative approach that could unite the GCC countries in the framework of collective action. Moreover, the issue of population had a clear impact on Gulf security and its military capacity. Topping all the challenges is the lack of the local population, and so the region needed support regarding to manpower, in order to defend the region. The Gulf states could not address this problem properly, only through collective action and the search for regional and international alliances to mitigate the shortage in manpower (Pirseyedi 2012).

Moreover, the demographic depth of the GCC composed of Arab countries, which have the ability to secure the labour force needed to keep the Arab national identity of the region, for example Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and others have a surplus of labour, which can be brought to the Gulf. Therefore, the Gulf states should be able to build foundations for a security system capable of protecting the region and accommodating everyone. The GCC countries suffer from serious defects in the internal fabric, in terms of sectarian problems, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain suffer from sectarian problems between Shiites and Sunnis, the sectarian problems in Iraq, which are very serious at this time where the

country is divided between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds, which could affect or increase the sectarian problems in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain (Fürtig 2007 p.634-635)

The regimes of the GCC states must change this policy with more political participation containing all parties in Gulf states. Where Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani the Emir of Qatar, accession address Speech on (June 27, 2013) said *"as Arabs we reject dividing Arab societies on sectarian or doctrinal basis, because this affects their social and economic immunity and prevents its modernization and development on the basis of citizenship, regardless of religion, sect or religious thoughts, and because this split allows outside powers to intervene in internal Arab issues and have influence over them"*.

Furthermore, one of the main factors that caused an imbalance in the Gulf security system is the lack of democracy and popular political participation. The Gulf states vary in the political reform steps, with different approaches according to each state. Iran has advanced in terms of political participation, compared with the rest of the Gulf states in terms of the presidential and parliamentary elections but remaining problems relate to human rights and the control of the military under political jurisdiction (Marschall 2013). For example since 2000 Iran held presidential elections in 2001 and elected Mohammad Khatami, in 2005 Ahmadinejad was elected, in 2009 Ahmadinejad was re-elected, and in 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected. Furthermore, over the same period Iran held three parliamentary elections (in 2004, 2008 and 2012) which shows the gap between the GCC states and Iran regarding political participation.

Kuwait is different from the rest of the GCC states in being the first state to adopt a permanent constitution for the country, and expanded popular participation in government through elections, and more than other Gulf states in paving the way for freedom of expression and the formation of communities, trade unions and, finally, the political parties.

In Oman, the UAE and Qatar, where the internal pressure is weak and there is no possibility of extreme violence, and no economic crisis could impact on these states (Segal 2012). On the contrary, Saudi Arabia is the least developed state in the field of political development and the political reform among the states of the Gulf, also because of the nature of its inception and the existing government. One could say that the government is still capable with its economic and security means to resist the pressures of political change, but it failed apparently to convince its citizens about the importance of the changes that were brought about seven years ago, which are the Shura Council (the system of local governance areas). All these measures to devolve the political participation are not seen from the citizens that could constitute the minimum required for the reform (Szajkowski 2012).

In Oman, the UAE and Qatar, where the internal pressure is weak and there is very little possibility of extreme violence, and no economic crisis could impact on these states. Finally, Iraq after the war in 2003 developed political participation with the support of the USA to build a modern democracy that included all the parties in Iraq, but several domestic problems have prevented the process of political reform, most importantly the lack of security and stability, and sectarian problems (Worrall 2012 and Lambert 2011).

Thus, all the international powers that talk about vital interests in the region can only see the governors and their families that control the wealth, money and land, and so can reach any agreement with them, on issues affecting the essence of the security of the region and its people. This is done without transparency, or any popular control able to hold rulers accountable for what they have done to the people and the people's money (Sokolsky, Johnson and Larrabee 2000).

The absence of the GCC states' vision in dealing with Gulf security

The vision of Iran in terms of the security of the Gulf assumes the existence of a strong role for the Gulf states in any new security arrangement in the region. However, the reality is that the US occupation of Iraq and the increase in the role of Iran as well as the rise in the US role, have imposed more pressure on the GCC states. Here, the author does not mean the intimidation from the Iranian perspective of the security of the Gulf and to say that it is directed against Arab countries, rather it is that the US perspective perhaps is no less dangerous to the Gulf compared with the perceived Iranian risk. A Senior Official (Interview No 13) argued that *"Iran is an important state in the Gulf; it has become a power in the region and the GCC states have to be aware and recognise that it is a regional power, and that may not be guaranteed compatibility with the interests of the rest of the countries in the region in the future due to the different bases and principles that each party's interests"*. This may not be possible to ensure its compatibility with the interests of the rest of the countries in the region fully in the future, which is due to the different bases and principles that build upon each states' interests in the region.

The GCC states have not sought from the beginning to build a strong role in all crises and developments witnessed in the region, for they lack, as we pointed out, the tools of influence and then the absence of the perceptions and strategic visions to that reflected positively on the future of its interests. The problem is that the defence system of the GCC, which was established in 1981 (Peninsula Shield),[4] has failed in the defence of those states against a

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[4] The Peninsula Shield Force is the military side of the GCC states. It is intended to deter, and respond to, military aggression against any of the GCC member countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Which was established in 1984 the GCC defence ministers agreed on the creation of a two-brigade (10,000-man) Peninsula Shield Force. This joint intervention force was based in Saudi Arabia near King Khalid Military City at Hafar al Batin under the command of a Saudi officer. In addition to a headquarters staff, the force consisted of one infantry brigade of about 5,000 men with elements from all GCC states in 1992. Its mission, however, had not been publicly defined. It was not clear, for example, whether the joint force would have authority to intervene in a domestic emergency. The force could be

number of important events that devastated the region, in spite of the huge armament expenditures (Kostiner 2011).

The question here, is how the GCC states can face the US and Iranian security projects? There are several perceptions of the GCC states. The first perception is that the GCC states are trying to develop the system of defences (discussed further in chapter six p.207) and establish a military mechanism of cooperation between them, especially with the availability of the required finance capacity for the development of arms and defence systems, and the existence of Saudi Arabia as a pivotal state that helps to lead the GCC security system with its strategic breadth and population, as well as financial and geographic capabilities (Interview No 2 & Interview No 6). But it is difficult to achieve these perceptions because of the slow pace of the security cooperation between the GCC states, and that some of the powers, especially the USA, may not allow the GCC states to perform a growing role in the field of defence away from cooperation with the USA, which has elements of the power that protects its interests and the GCC states' interests.

The second perception, as discussed with a Senior Official (Interview No 14), is the continued reliance on the US presence in the region and agreeing on the way that the USA wants to address the Iranian issue with subsequent tension in the Iranian and GCC states' relations. Perhaps this is what makes the small Gulf states facing Iran as the next place of the confrontation. This is different from previous confrontations in the Gulf between Iran and the USA.

The third perception is to refer to the memory after the Second Gulf War and try to find an effective Arabic role in establishing security in the Gulf region, through the return of

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enlarged at a time of threat; it was apparently reinforced prior to the Persian Gulf War in 1991 but did not take part in the war as a distinct unit. For more reading see Gulf Cooperation Council. GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/Gulf/gcc.htm.

Egypt and Syria to play an active role in the case of Gulf security, but in a different and new way by integrating other powers to become a regional formula of 4 + 6 rather than the old formula of 2 + 6 , where Iran and Turkey are added, rather than just Egypt and Syria (Interview No 4 & Interview No 11 & Interview No 14). Moreover, a Senior Official (Interview No 15) clarified that "*the establishment of an effective dialogue with Iran to dispel fears, build bridges of trust and establish security arrangements does not rely on a common threat, but gives guarantees of non-aggression agreements on contentious issues and establishes a collective security arrangement that does not depend on threats*". Rather, this arrangement gives guarantees of non-aggression agreements on contentious issues. But this perception is also unlikely to be successful, because of the Iranian opposition to any Arab role in the security arrangements in the Gulf. It is perhaps worth noting that US policy has differed with Iran along many different issues, however, on one issue they agree: this is the removal of the Arab regional powers from any security role in the Gulf, as well as the US strategy, which excludes the establishment of security arrangements based upon the regional states (Kostiner 2011).

In summary, the GCC states, should be aware that they have come to a crossroads, where the projects which are raised in the region, whether Iranian or American, will serve only the interests of these powers. Furthermore, the GCC states should also recognise that the security protection of the USA despite the benefits that may be achieved in the short term, may see risks multiply in the long term. Therefore, the direction of the GCC states to improve their own capabilities became necessary; otherwise, the role may come to these states in the future, especially if their interests conflict with those of the USA, which will not hesitate to sacrifice these regimes as it did with the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. I mean that the GCC have no guarantee that the USA will continue to support them or stand with them.

The Damascus Declaration:

As a result of the second Gulf War, the GCC signed the Damascus Declaration for coordination and follow-up and cooperation among Arab countries on 6 March 1991 with Egypt and Syria. The text of the declaration was that it was open to other Arab countries on the basis of the agreement of interests and goals (Ahady 1994). The Damascus Declaration has two dimensions, the first political and the second economic. Gulf countries have sought from this declaration to link Arab security and Gulf security. The declaration represented a step forward to a new Arab system based on the principle of respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The declaration was made to reward Egypt and Syria for their support of the Gulf states. The declaration considered the Egyptian and Syrian forces that participated in the Second Gulf War as an Arab peacekeeping force to ensure the security of the Gulf and Arab states in the Gulf. The declaration also aimed to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. On the economic and cultural fields, the Declaration mentioned enhancing economic cooperation and achieving economic and social development, and encouraging the private sector to participate in the development process (Ahady 1994).

Tripp (1992) mentioned that despite all the positive aspects in this Declaration, it was not without its shortcomings. For instance, it avoided interpreting the principles of the Declaration, and did not present specific insights into the implementation of these principles. It also lacked a work programme that specifies the obligations of each state, and did not distribute roles for the parties involved. Thus, it opened the way for differing interpretations.

Even with lack of Arab interest in the Declaration, other factors prevented its further development, and rendered it without any real meaning. However, perhaps the reason for the failure of the declaration was the rush to propose and sign it, immediately after the war ended,

without a discussion to identify the interests of each state. In addition, the parties to the Declaration did not present their visions of the potential sources of threats. Another reason for the failure of the Declaration was the existence of defence agreements between the Gulf states and international powers, which superseded the Declaration, and the need for Egypt and Syria in the security of the Gulf.

Iranian perception of security in the Gulf

The Iranian state is looking to distinguish itself on the linguistic, cultural, and population fronts. Its leadership ambitions in the region are supported by a key location at the top of the Gulf, which can control the backbone of the economies of the countries of the region, i.e. energy (Legrenzi 2011). Therefore, Iran's relations with the GCC is one of the most prominent regional issues, which clearly reflect Iran's desire to exercise the role of a regional hegemon, through the establishment of a network of economic interests and cultural ties with those countries to support this Iranian role in the first place as a hidden objective. Although the apparent desire of Iran is to achieve security and stability between the two shores of the Gulf, the Gulf region has been a vital area for Iranian expansionism since ancient historical periods (Ellner 2011).

The Iranian interest in the Gulf, and the security of the Gulf, has made it benefit greatly from the Gulf crisis. This was an opportunity for Iran to break the isolation imposed on it since the Iranian Revolution, and the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, Iran did not rush to express its position on these crises, but found the opportunity to settle scores with the conflict parties, who were allies against Iran. The Iranian role in Iraq and the rest of the region is quite clear, because it has an effect on the Shiites, and supporting them is one of the priorities of Iranian politics, with its emergence as a regional power able to project regional hegemony (Interview No 6).

169

Studying the Iranian perception of the security in the Gulf after the US invasion of Iraq is particularly important. The Iranians became involved in several issues in the Gulf, for example Iranian support for the Shiites of Bahrain who account for about 70% of Bahrain's population. Iran will employ to serve its interests, as well as the Iranian intervention in Iraq, by supporting the Shiites in the region. According to a senior official (Interview No12) the external intervention or the Western presence in the region represents a major threat to the security of the Gulf. However, Iran is seeking to be a substitute for the foreign presence in the region. In addition, Iran believes that the security of the region should be the responsibility of its states, as well as the need to promote economic convergence between the countries of the region in a manner similar to the model of the European Union. As a result of this concept, Iran refuses all the agreements and security arrangements, which are held with countries outside the region, including with Arab countries. Iran has sought, since the beginning of the twentieth century, to exclude the Arabism standard from Gulf security strategies. The Iranian security concept links the security of the Gulf region with the security of the countries of Central Asia, where Iran sees itself as a balancer and security link between the two parties, namely the Persian/Arabian Gulf and Central Asian countries. A Senior Official (Interview No 12) discussed that, the importance of the Iranian perception of Gulf security is related to the nature of animosity between Iran and the USA since the Islamic revolution in 1979, and the Arab Gulf states will be the first affected in the case of a military confrontation between the USA and Iran. Moreover, a US-Iranian conflict does not put the interest of the security of the Gulf in the first place, but rather puts the interests of Iran or the USA in the first place. The Iranian perceptions about security in the Gulf represent a great importance for the future of the regional system with all internal and external parties. And the Iranian vision about the security of the Gulf and the region has no advantage if not acceptance from the rest of the

states. As the states of the region suffered from a case of not being able to put up visions of the security system that serves all the Gulf states (Ulrichsen 2009).

Security is not only in the military context, which is the key to the region's relations with the world, but with focus on the economy, culture, and security flaws, which should not be neglected. It became known that Western standards in dealing with the countries of the region from geo-political interface are based on the need to attract dependency relations to the West (Yaffe 2004). Iran always emphasises that despite the different systems of successive rule, any force trying to control the Gulf, regardless of whether Arab, regional or international, constitutes a direct source of threat to its interests in the region. This is because Iranian interests will become hostage to other states. Therefore, Iran works to prevent international forces from intervening in the Gulf states, which is a fixed feature in the Iranian perception of security in the Gulf (Interview No 12). That Iran's ambition to assume a significant leadership role in the region to protect its interests and to play the role of regional hegemonic state in the Gulf is clear (Amirsadeghi 2012).

Iran based its perception on the security arrangements in the Gulf, on relationships in the historical, religious and economic context in the region, and to ensure that the independence and sovereignty of Gulf states, and the eight Gulf states have to cover the expenses of preparing these arrangements. This is in addition to the rejection of foreign interference in the region's security arrangements, and the exclusion of all non-Gulf forces. In addition, there is a need for comprehensive cooperation between the states of the region on the political, economic, social and cultural levels to achieve security (Interview No 13). As well as the evacuation of the Gulf stocks of foreign conventional weapons, particularly the US stored weapons, there is the issue of non-conventional weapons; nuclear and chemical and biological weapons (Interview No 13).

One of the Iranian perceptions for security is to build an alliance between Iran and the GCC states, which was called by former Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, to face the Israeli threat, and this is what has been confirmed by former President Ahmadinejad with his participation in the 26th session of the GCC in December 2007 according to a Senior Official (Interview No 8). It is argued that any alliance in the region should provide the protection to the region and not be built against any states in the world. This confirms that most of the states in the Gulf are looking for peace and not to stand against other states. Another Iranian perception is the establishment of a wide regional alliance comprising Iran, the GCC states and the Islamic countries of central Asia, according to the former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, who said that Iranian national security is achieved through the establishment of peace and security in the region, which includes the states of the Gulf region and the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation "Eco"[5] or some of it (Shaaban 2009). After the Iraq War, the Iranian projects characterised by regional groupings as being based mainly on security policy, and the former Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati explains the Iranian perception by saying: the Islamic Republic of Iran believes in the importance of the principle of regional cooperation as a sign of seriousness and leadership in the development of bilateral relations, trilateral and multilateral parties, as the only way to ensure peace, stability and security in the region, and Iran's efforts to establish security, whether in the Gulf or in a group of neighbouring countries or in the region of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in order to establish peace and stability; but it is within the framework of this strategy, as the National Security of Iran is achieved through the establishment of peace and security in the region (Shaaban 2009). Other examples of the Iranian projects to

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[5] "The Economic Cooperation Organization ECO is an intergovernmental organization involving ten States. It provides a platform to discuss ways to improve development and promote trade, and investment opportunities. ECO's secretariat and cultural department are located in Tehran, its economic bureau is in Turkey and its scientific bureau is situated in Pakistan. Member states are, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan".

formulate new arrangements for the security of the Gulf are the proposals announced by Hassan Rowhani, representative of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of National Security of Iran. He called in the proposal submitted at the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Doha in April 2006, to the new arrangements in the Gulf in order to achieve cooperation, security and development in the region. He also said that the joint comprehensive cooperation requires countries in the region to search for a formula of understanding. Rowhani`s proposal based on the following points (Rowhani 2007);

- The formation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Gulf includes the GCC States, Iran and Iraq.

- Build a security arrangement common in the framework of a system of collective security in the fight against terrorism, extremism and sectarianism, organised crime, drug trafficking and the rest of the common security concerns.

- The progressive abolition of restrictions relating to cooperation in the political, security, economic and cultural fields, as the ultimate goal.

- Development of trade cooperation and expansion of it in the light of available resources and the investments in the economic projects to achieve free trade between states in the region.

- Moreover, prepare a plan to ensure the security of energy production and export, in order to ensure the interests of the states in the region, and the stability of global energy markets.

- Build confidence between the states of the region in the field of nuclear issues, such as supervision and establish a common consortium of enrichment between states in the region to provide fuel and other peaceful nuclear issues under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

173

- Serious cooperation between the states of the region to make the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

- End the arms race in the region to provide the necessary resources in order to achieve economic development and the fight against poverty.

- Withdrawal of foreign forces from the region and to ensure the full security of the countries in the region.

In fact, a careful reading of the previous Iranian proposals clarified the outline of the Iranian security projects in the region, where Iran seeks in any security project in the region, the exclusion of any role for foreign powers including the USA, and Iran is seeking in the first place to reassure the Arab states of the Gulf in general of Iranian intentions and building confidence between the states of the region. If the influential presence of any rival power in the region was generally rejected by Iran, then any military presence will be one of the sources of threats to Iranian security. This emerged clearly during the Iran-Iraq war, where Iran formally protested to the foreign naval presence in the Gulf, arguing that this presence was responsible for the consequences. In addition, Iran objected to a Russian proposal, which mentions the presence of naval forces flying the UN flag as a guarantee of freedom of international navigation. After the Second Gulf war was declared, the Iranian perception of the sources of threats to its interests in the region continued, particularly the presence of foreign military forces. However, it adopted a new political line based on improving its relations with the Gulf states, and emphasising respect for the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries, and respect for their sovereignty (Eilts 1980).

- ❖ Iran does not object to the Arab Gulf states buying weapons from the West.
- ❖ Freedom of the Gulf states to bring in Western consultants and experts to train the Gulf Arab forces.

174

In conclusion, Iran considers military cooperation with the West an issue of sovereignty of each state. However, the presence of Western forces in the region was totally unacceptable, because it is closely linked to the security of the whole region, including Iran. Furthermore, Iran's conception of Persian Gulf security is based on the benefit of the Iranian neutral position in the Third Gulf war, and not in response to Iraqi calls for a major Iranian role in the Gulf security system. Iran emphasises that the security of the Gulf is the responsibility of the Gulf states, and rejected any presence of non-Gulf parties. This succeeded in freezing the Damascus Declaration, yet did not affect the strength of the US presence and that of the West in the region (Amirsadeghi 2012). In addition, the constants in Iranian policy in the Gulf are not to compromise on islands disputed with the UAE, considering the issue as final, as stated by the Iranian Foreign Ministry in response to the final statement of the GCC on 19 September 1994, which confirmed UAE ownership of the three islands (Eilts 1980).

Iraqi perception of security in the Gulf

The Iraqi vision for security in the Gulf clarifies that Iraq rejects any regional arrangements affecting its regional security. Iraq accepted the international resolutions during the 1990s, yet rejects the current version of Gulf security, because it is based on the exclusion of Iraq, militarily and economically. The Iraqi concept of Gulf security comes from the continuation of its vision before the invasion of Kuwait, which is represented in the leading role of Iraqis within the Arab framework. However, there are many restrictions that make this vision a fantasy for Iraq under the current circumstances, despite Iraq's attempts to improve relations with Arab countries.

The Iraqi concept of security in the Persian Gulf is based on the contribution of each state in the Gulf to secure it, according to its potential, as well as freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Furthermore, Gulf states must be prepared to deal with any party trying to breach this

freedom, and signing bilateral agreements between the countries of the region. Iraq possesses the ability and potential in all aspects of being able to dominate or impose control in the Gulf, and to defend the security of the Gulf. However, Iraq's current circumstances prevent it to be in this position. As far as these visions were comprehensive and synchronised with the challenges that faced the regimes and peoples in the Gulf, but after the Second Gulf War, Iraq placed itself at the point of collision with regional and global security. Iraq has noticed this recently, and began to review the prevailing concepts of security in the region. Hence, Iraq presented a vision of the Gulf security based on (Legrenzi 2013):

- ❖ Freedom of the countries in the region to establish military alliances and regional blocs.
- ❖ Controls on freedom of navigation in the Gulf.
- ❖ Establishing a relationship of trust and mutual respect on the basis of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs.
- ❖ Abandon the so-called export of security or borrowing it, as is the case with the Iranian effort to export the revolution.
- ❖ Encourage regional cooperation, particularly in the field of economic and cultural development.

In addition, the Iraqi foreign policy has succeeded in pushing the consolidation of relations at the international level, and it has to face the challenges in the Gulf, and in particular to strengthen security and play an active role. The USA has helped to cancel most of the sanctions imposed on Iraq under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. Whatever it was, there is a need for the return of Iraq to its regional and international stage, and its participation in it (Daniel 2012).

Also, it cannot be perceived that regional security does not have a positive and constructive Iraqi role. This is a fact linked to security in general, and the security of the Gulf in particular. Today, after more than ten years since the war in 2003, it is no longer useful to look at Iraq as a party that is not interested in the security of the Gulf and its trends. Perhaps some of the states in the region are interested in seeing a security framework with Iraq. Perhaps the USA still calls for such as this is an option which can be inferred in at least some different American statements. Furthermore, there are three perceptions as discussed with the senior official (Interview No 5) that Iraq seeks to adopt to determine the security relationship with the states of the region. The first perception is to adopt a form of balance of power between the states of the region. However, this perception does not seem acceptable, strategically, as it does not seem that the Gulf states are working toward this option despite all the armament programmes in the region. The second perception is the inclusion of Iraq to the security and defence agreements in the framework of the GCC. Of course, this option could redraw the strategic environment of the Gulf. In such a development, the regional system will become less tense and there will be more ability to overcome disputes (Hunter 2010). This option will not prevent the outbreak of war between Iraq and any of the GCC states only, but also between these states and Iran. However, such a perception is still faced with different political difficulties. The third perception, is to develop a security system to include all the states in the region, under the concept of collective security as a realistic option according to political and strategic criteria. This security system creates mutual trust, and reduces the underlying tensions, which may prevent the outbreak of wars or military clashes, and putting the region on the road to regional stability (Rubin 2013).

In conclusion, after more than ten years of the occupation of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has made progress on the road to rebuilding itself, and domestic security, and the Iraqi regime has

regained the lead. The international community - particularly the neighbouring countries - have to promote the cooperative interactions with Iraq at all levels, and this is the face of the natural life.

Conclusion

Through the study of the visions of the security in the GCC, Iraq and Iran, we can conclude that the most important factors causing confusion in Gulf security are the multiple sources of threats, internal and external, whether regional or international, and the priorities assigned to these threats from state to state. Moreover, the lack of a serious threat has comprehensive effects threatening the security in the Gulf countries Moreover, the lack of a serious threat has comprehensive effects threatening the security in the Gulf countries, that the international powers led by the USA controlled the region at the moment and it will continue in the next few years, which reduces the possibility of these serious threats. Hence, these threats lose their impact, and there is no consensus about the policy of cooperation in military and security terms.

By applying constructivist theory in this chapter, and analysing the security perspective of the Gulf states the importance of the theory to study and analyse the state's role and behaviour in the region became clear. The ideas, perceptions and criteria of each state in the Gulf determines its interests, which will determine the security format that meets the requirements of this state.

In addition, the threats facing the region can be domestic, arising from the internal situation of the Gulf countries, such as political and ideological trends, conflicts over power, and political action, as well as the problems of employment and population in some Gulf countries. In addition, there are threats arising from the Gulf states themselves, such as the First Gulf War and the Second Gulf War and the acts of Saddam Hussein and his regime

against the region, which led to the US occupation of Iraq, as well as international threats represented in the economic control of the oil production and supply, to ensure the flow of oil money to the industrial West and the heavy military presence of foreign forces to control these threats and intervene directly. Furthermore, the multiple visions of security in the Arabian Gulf states, reveals no clear solution to security in the region; each party presents its conception of security according to its interests, and so there is no integrated vision of security amongst all parties in the Gulf.

The lack of understanding of the nature of the internal political reality in the region in general during the past three decades, (Interview 1; Interview 10; & Interview 18) discussed that to understand the internal political system in each state in the Gulf we have to consider the external factors that have a direct impact on the region. In fact, there is one fixed fact which is the conflict parties and the alliances between the Gulf states and the foreign powers, always ensure the security of the Gulf, especially with the USA. Under the military, economic and political hegemony of the USA and the lack of understanding and recognition of the importance of local factors and the threat under the pressures of globalisation and the enormous development in media sources within the Gulf societies. All these factors have to be considered to build a system beginning from the domestic level to the regional and international levels. In addition, achieving security and stability comes at a difficult time with many factors that control any solution, such as the relations of bilateral military arrangements, Iranian nuclear programme, arms build-ups, sectarianism, the problem of the UAE islands and Iran's pursuit of control of the Strait of Hormuz. It is unlikely to achieve stability in the Gulf; it is time to formulate a new strategy based on multi-lateral diplomacy between the GCC states, Iraq and Iran, which consider the role of the external powers to provide long-term security and prosperity in the Gulf region.

The security of the Gulf in the era of globalisation exceeds US hegemony, and the USA should adopt a multilateral approach to address the various issues on the basis of political equality, which is according to the common interests of all parties in the region, and a lack of support for partisan or religious minorities in the region. The Gulf still contains the largest oil reserves in terms of cost and quality in the world. Analysts agree that the Gulf region will remain of strategic importance in the foreseeable future. The multilateral approach for dialogue about Gulf security must be included in the economic and security relations. Opportunities for joint work for the development of the region and to achieve stability, while considering all the interests of all actors in the Gulf region and therefore should also consider the problem of weapons of mass destruction, as a problem which should generally be applied equally to all parties, including the USA, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, India and Iran, and all countries that have those weapons (Iran's nuclear programme is discussed in the following chapter)...

CHAPTER FIVE THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE GULF

Introduction

This chapter develops the overall analysis of this thesis by examining information about the political, economic and military capabilities of the Gulf states to play the role of regional hegemon and protect the region from internal or external threats. Furthermore, the chapter provides information related to the regional balance of power. The study in this chapter is based on dividing the region into the GCC states, Iraq and Iran. Moreover, it covers the ability of the powers in the region to achieve the balance of power and the need for the USA to play a role in this. Furthermore, this chapter is divided into five sections: the first provides an overview to the analysis of the system of balance and its ability to protect the security and stability in the region from the perspectives of the Gulf states. The second section addresses the GCC states and their capability in terms of economic, military, political and population power. Moreover, the section also discusses the support provided by the international powers to the GCC states to protect their security and stability, particularly from the USA. The third section is about the capability of Iran in terms of economic, military and population power, as well as its impact on the Arab Shiite communities in the other Gulf states. The fourth section discusses the weakness of Iraq in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of 2003, which put Iraq temporally out of the game in the Gulf. The fifth section analyses and assesses the balance of power between the Gulf states and the role of the USA in this from the perception of several senior officials in the Gulf states. The final section is the conclusion.

As discussed in HST, the military power of the hegemonic state in the world political economy, a hegemonic state must possess enough military power to be able to protect the international political economy. This chapter addressed the balance of power in the Gulf in the relationship between regional hegemonic states and the other states in the same region as similar to the relationships at the international level between a global hegemonic state and

other states in the international system. Furthermore, the regional version of HST has been employed to assess the balance of power in the Gulf.

Overview

The regional balance in its overall meaning exceeds the narrower sense of the balance of military power, while the narrower meaning refers to the balance of armaments between a number of countries (Leverett and Leverett 2012). The balance of armaments is the state of the relationship between the capacity of armament in quantities and qualities of certain countries. The military balance is determined by combining additional elements to armament capabilities, such as military technology, the military industry, and systems for recruiting and training, and command and control systems, communications and intelligence, and the level of military readiness and combat capability, as well as military ideology. In addition to the elements of the military balance above, the balance in its comprehensive sense also includes elements such as the economic and human potential, geopolitical and political capabilities, including the degree of political stability and the level of political cohesion at the internal and external level (Cordesman 2004). There may be a balance or an imbalance in military power, but the strategic balance in all theoretical elements and rarely the reality on the ground. It is unlikely for two or more states to be equally matched in all elements of the balance, and often a balance of armaments only is achieved, such as between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War. Therefore, an imbalance is often the case, and a balance does not necessarily mean the presence of a balance between the two states in all the elements of the balance. For instance, one state may offset the superiority of another, in a geopolitical context, with its superiority in economic capacity or in some elements of armament (Ibid 2004).

In the search for security and stability in the Gulf the first lessons to be drawn from the period of past conflicts since 1980, is that any part of the parties in the Gulf (the GCC

states, Iran and Iraq) has had, and will continue to have, the power and capabilities which could make it able to withstand and exhaust the other parties in the Gulf, if its territory and interests are exposed to the risk, for example Kuwait in 1990 was occupied by Iraq but it was able to withstand and exhaust Iraqi power by its financial power and the international support. The attempts to change the balance of power in the Gulf region by armed violence, exporting of revolutions, the Iran-Iraq war, the Second Gulf War, the siege of Iraq and its occupation, were all unwarranted and resulted in total failure. All these wars and conflicts carried the loss of life, wealth and energies in all elements; this requires the wisdom and abandonment of these actions in the region. These failures drive the need to search for the means that can build policy to protect security and stability, as well as ignore the problems that could affect the stability in the Gulf region.

The concept of a balance is a misleading idea; that the strategic security and stability of the Gulf is based on the balance, and especially the military balance, between Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, this strategy hides the fact that this balance is based on three lists, and the risks it is exposed to can lead to instability in the region because it could change for the smallest reason (Interview No 1). This leads to caution and suspicion between the parties and the lack of confidence and security in the region. Furthermore, any progress achieved by one of the parties in terms of its, military element, could be a threat to the other parties and lead to an arms race and the lack of cooperation, and thus the need for a fourth party that has the strength and ability to maintain this balance and control the balancing factors amongst all parties in the region. Britain played the role of the hegemonic state from 1820-1971 but after Britain withdraw from the Gulf in 1971 the USA entered the Gulf and it now plays this role (Onley 2009 p.1). But the Gulf wars until 2003 showed clearly to all parties, that the external powers seek in fact to serve their strategic interests at the expense of

the interests of the local parties. The policy of dual containment and sanctions by the USA against Iran and the occupation of Iraq, in addition to the whole procedure carried out by the USA to protect its interests, caused a direct impact on the economies of the states in the region (Leverett and Leverett 2012).

A senior official (Interview No 12) discussed *"that the Gulf States have to replace the strategy of a balance of power with the strategy of cooperation and interdependence, and replaced external forces with internal development, in order to reach a situation where the advancement of any party is the driving force for the advancement of the other parties in the region"*. Furthermore, the weakening of any state in the region is the weakening of the other states in the region, where the stability and security of any state is necessary for the security and stability of the other states. The strength of any state and its ability to deter any external aggression or eliminate any internal threat is determined by the availability of the elements of manpower, military and economic strength, in addition to geographical location. The following study reviews the components of the balance of power in the GCC states, Iraq and Iran.

GCC states

The domestic and regional situation in the GCC states is distinct from the rest of the region and the world; these are a group of small states except for Saudi Arabia, and some of which are tiny in terms of area and population, while others are large in area, but small in population. A critically important component of the modern state is a population that owes loyalty to the ruling authority, and who build the backbone of life and production and defend the state at times of danger. Due to the need for development, these states used expatriate labour from neighbouring countries. Therefore, the GCC states have encountered a problem of the population imbalance between citizens and non-citizens, which is seen from Map 2

non-citizens population in GCC states 2012), and Figure 7 population of GCC states in 2011). It is clearly shown that the gap in population size between the citizens and non-citizens in those states, which affects the state's need for its citizens to protect their state from any external threat. This has led to those states seeking help from the international powers to protect their security and stability. That the GCC states signed bilateral agreements with the USA which provide military corporation, support and arms sales as discussed in chapter one, moreover, in 1990 Kuwait asked for international support to defeat the Iraqi forces. Senior officials of the embassy of Kuwait confirm that if there are and threats on the Kuwaiti national security we will ask for the international support particularly form the USA and most of the GCC states will do the same (Interview No 3).

Map 2 non-citizens population in GCC states 2012

http://www.bqdoha.com/2014/02/population-saudi-arabia-30-million-2013

Figure 7 population of GCC states in 2011

GCC population	
UAE	8,264,070
Bahrain	1,195,020
Saudi Arabia	28,376,355
Oman	3,295,298
Qatqr	1,732,717
Kuwait	3,065,850

Source: GCC Statistics http://gccstat.org/

The scarcity of the population of the GCC states has formed a major obstacle towards the possibility of each state forming a national army capable of defending its independence against external and internal threats. This is a weak point in the national security of those states. All the GCC countries suffer from a severe shortage in the population of citizens, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, which has a population of 29.2 million, and an area that outweighs the rest of the GCC states combined several times. It is also relevant to note here that the territory of a state is the most important element of state-building (Al-Khouri 2012).

When the balance of power in the Gulf region is unstable there is a need for external powers to restore the balance that achieves the interests and the vision of the GCC states, especially in light of the weakness of the Gulf states system - during the First, Second and Third Gulf Wars the GCC states took advantage of the structure of the international order led by the USA in order to preserve multipolarity in the balance of power in the Gulf region, which protects the GCC states' security and sovereignty. This global order also prevents the uniqueness of other regional powers, such as Iraq and Iran, from managing the regional

187

system in the Gulf. In an interview on Al-Jazeera on September 7 2009 (Robert Gates 2009), the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates discussed that "the more that our Arab friends and allies can straighten their security capabilities, the more they can strengthen their co-operation, both with each other and with us, I think sends the signal to the Iranians that this path they're on is not going to advance Iranian security but in fact could weaken it." Robert Gates noted that a new era in the regional balance of power had emerged, particularly in the conventional military balance, which was a response to the growing Iranian nuclear threat.

In fact there are three factors that prompted the military capabilities in the GCC countries to improve, particularly after the USA invaded Iraq in 2003. The first factor was the development of weapons purchases, with more emphasis on the appropriate systems that better met the needs of these states. The GCC states, which are among the states spending the most on matters of defence in the Middle East, have purchased defence equipment in accordance to the purchasing operations plan designed to address the threats faced in the region, and to ensure that the deployment of the latest technology at the best prices (Knights 2009).

Cordesman and Wilner (2012 p.126) mention that *"the combination of high population growth, issues in educating and employing native youth, housing, infrastructure pressures, medical services, and other material issues plays a critical role in the security of each GCC state".* Moreover these issues are compounded by sectarian differences, tribal pressures, foreign labour issues, and popular perceptions of corruption, responsiveness and integrity of government services, and divisions by region and income group over the quality of government services. Senior official (Interview No 6) mention that the GCC states are attempting to deal and solve these problems according to the level of the sensitivities of these problems which is different from state to state, he confirm that the stability in terms of

economic, political, social will reduce the sectarian differences and the tribal pressures that affect the ability of the states in domestic and regional level.

The second factor relies on a more balanced approach towards the development of the military, which focuses on capabilities of military education, training, and maintenance. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are the leaders in this effort. The GCC states seek to develop their military relationships with the USA in terms of getting the latest technology provided by the US military forces (Sorenson 2014). Moreover, all these arms need military personnel with higher qualifications to enable them to use the complex technology. For example, the UAE provides school for the UAE Air Force and College Khalifa bin Zayed Air Academy recruits with a qualifying education, as does the UAE Air Force and Institute of Air Defense (Terrill 2011).

Table 4 Total Military Spending By Country

Year	Bahrain	Kuwait	Oman	Qatar	UAE	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Iran
2003	$460	$3,881	$2,655	$1,923	$2,519	$18,747	$809	$4,150
2004	$473	$3,284	$3,008	$2,060	$8,910	$20,910	2–$842	$5,328
2005	$500	$3,568	$3,695	$888	$8,747	$25,372	$584	$7,275
2006	$532	2$5,024	$4,076	$1,072	$9,482	$29,541	$1,066	$8,864
2007	$539	$5,250	$4,376	$1,266	$11,253	$35,446	$1,211	$8,040
2008	$553	$6,812	$4,671	$1,756	$13,733	$38,223	$1,492	$9,595
2009	$742	$4,184	$4,018	$2,500	$7,957	$41,276	$4,118	$8,636
2010	$736	$4,654	$4,189	$3,117	$16,057	$45,170	$4,848	$27,283
2011	$1,028	$4,070	$4,304	$3,457	$9,320	$48,	$12,028	$62,359
2012	$1,028	$4,616	$6,731	$3,670	$12,700	$52,510	$14,727	$23,932

Source: Adapted from IISS, the Military Balance, 1999-2013

The third factor has significantly changed the nature of the threats that face the GCC states. In the early 1990s, the focus was on the possibility of an Iraqi invasion of the GCC states, and it means that the states of the northern Gulf: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, faced Iraq directly, and that the forces of war have had the priority in government spending (with a focus on mechanised infantry, helicopters, anti-tank and artillery systems) (Steele 2011 p. 1-3). But with the end of Saddam Hussein's regime, the focus shifted again to Iran as a major threat to the GCC states after 2003. This has expanded the number of frontline states - so that the increased importance of the UAE, Oman and Qatar causes an increase in the weapons purchases related to air and missile defence and naval patrols in particular (Ibid 2011).

The occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the direct US presence in the Gulf region has changed the equation of the regional balance of power. Furthermore, any balance of power in the future must take into account the dominant presence of the USA in the region, especially as the GCC states and the USA will not just be partners in this balance; rather the USA will be the party that determines the form of system and the balance, as it is the strongest party in the equation of the regional balance. Regardless of the role of the USA in achieving the interests of the GGC states, the position of the GCC will not be better than it was before the occupation of Iraq (Legrenzi 2011). The presence of the USA as a stronger equivalent in this region will achieve one of the GCC's interests, which is the end of the security threat coming from Iraq. The presence of the USA will curtail the role of some power of the stronger GCC members, such as Saudi Arabia, which will benefit the smaller regional powers, such as Qatar.

In contrast, there is also the possibility of weakening the role of Iran, which is something the GCC states do not want, because it will give the USA an opportunity to control the regional balance. Thus, the GCC states will go toward reformulating a foreign affairs

strategy in order to achieve its regional and international status in a different way from previously. A Senior Official (interview No 16) argued that this cannot be achieved only by focusing on other powers in the international system, such as Russia, China, Japan, France, Germany and Britain, in order to prevent Washington from dominating the management of the regional system in the Gulf, and to preserve the future of the balance of international power that will not last long in favour of American unipolar dominance. However, the current image of the regional balance of power in the Gulf region has developed four key sides, the GCC states, Iraq, Iran, and the USA, which is no longer just a security umbrella of the GCC, but has become an effective member in the regional balance of power. The permanent US role has been established particularly after the occupation of Iraq and the demise in its threat to the GCC, especially Kuwait. Thus, the capacity and capability of the GCC to find a clear formula to deal with these powers in the region is what will shape the balance of power in the region, as well as achieving security and stability in the future (Steele 2011).

On the other hand, there are questions about ending the US military presence in the Gulf, and the GCC's vision in this regard for the regional balance of power in the region. In fact, there is no way to end this presence, where US interests converge with the GCC interests on this issue, which is confirmed by the following: if the United States has resorted to withdraw its troops from Saudi Arabia and tended to intensify their presence in other Gulf states, such as Qatar, especially with regard to the storage of weapons and military equipment. As well as the increased dependence on the Sultanate of Oman, this means that the changes for the issue of US presence has been limited to the procedural side which is the withdrawal of US troops from the regional states based on public opposition. Washington sees as one of the most important mechanisms to protect its strategic interests in the Gulf region (Cordesman and Wilner 2012). In addition, the emergence of a general trend in the

1990s that Gulf security has become an international affair, gives legitimacy to foreign presence in the area to protect the interests of all regional and international parties. Also enhancing this trend are two things, the first saw the six Gulf states experience foreign presence in the past under British protection, which is still in the memory of these states; and the second, that those states are relatively small in an area surrounded by much larger and militarily superior powers, which is reflected in the need for a foreign presence. Moreover, the US presence in the Gulf is linked to the issue of the regional balance in Asia, in addition to its link with the issue of Afghanistan and the oil in the Caspian Sea, which confirms that US interests in the Gulf region is required. This presence is required even if it is reduced or redeployed from state to state. Moreover, the close economic relationship between the GCC states and the US, which enhances the importance of this presence, where the US is one of the key trading partners with the GCC states (Posen and Ross 2012).

From the above, we come to the conclusion that the US presence will remain in the Gulf region for a long period, especially since the USA may have to find a rationale to justify it, such as the continuation of the international campaign against terrorism and some security issues that have occurred recently in the Gulf.

Iran

Iran overlooks the east coast of the Gulf and it extends for 2,440 kilometres, including the Gulf of Oman, as well as its border with Iraq, which runs for 1,458 kilometres. The area of Iran is 1,648,000 square kilometres, which is the second largest state in the Gulf in terms of area after Saudi Arabia. In terms of population Iran's population in 2012 was about 75.1 million, including 52% Persian, 24 % Azerbaijanis, 9% Kurds, this means that Iran's population exceeds the population of the Arab Gulf States including Iraq combined (Cordesman and Wilner 2012).

Figure 8 Iran population

IRAN POPULATION

Moreover the important Iranian location, and its cultural, ethnic and national identity with the presence of large numbers of Arab Shiites in the Arab Gulf States, including 70% of the population of Bahrain and 15% in the UAE and 60% in Iraq, makes Iran aspire to extend its influence in the region (for more about the population see Figure 8 Iran population) Iran overlooks the east coast of the Gulf and it extends for 2,440 kilometres, including the Gulf of Oman, as well as its border with Iraq, which runs for 1,458 kilometres. The area of Iran is 1,648,000 square kilometres, which is the second largest state in the Gulf in terms of area after Saudi Arabia. In terms of population Iran's population in 2012 was about 75.1 million, including 52% Persian, 24 % Azerbaijanis, 9% Kurds, this means that Iran's population exceeds the population of the Arab Gulf States including Iraq combined (Cordesman and Wilner 2012).

Figure 8 Iran population Map 3 Sunni and Shiite in the Middle *East*

Source:http://anaverageamericanpatriot.blogspot.co.uk/2012/11/influx-of-iraqi-shiites-to-syria-widens.html

With regard to the military side, the military administration was considered as an important element, and a tool used to achieve the purposes of the Iranian National Security. Despite the fact that a large segment of the Iranian military forces have been eroded during the Iran-Iraq war, big efforts were made after the ceasefire with Iraq in the direction of rebuilding the country's forces. In a parallel direction, the Iranian leadership has been active in the direction of the development of the capacities of the existing military industrial system, whether in increasing the qualitative level of the Iranian military products, or by entering into new areas of manufacturing (Chubin 2014; Katzman 2010).

It is noted, that the strategic balance in the Gulf began to waver, especially after the occupation of Iraq, and the growing of Iran's military capabilities with the absence of a clear and transparent policy to reassure neighbouring states, as seen in Figure 7 Total Main Battle Tanks and Figure 8 Total Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft, that the Iraqi military destroyed in 2003. Moreover, Saudi Arabia became more powerful, enabling it to counter Iran instead of Iraq.

Source: Adapted from IISS, the Military Balance 2012

Furthermore, Iran itself did not make any significant effort to prove its peaceful intentions and to reassure its neighbours, but in contrast, it proved that it posed a threat to Arab Gulf states in particular. The manifestation of the growing offensive military capacity of Iran was highlighted by the strengthening capacity of the offensive missile arsenal that Iran has exerted huge efforts to develop since the Iraq-Iran war with the support of states such as North Korea, China and Russia. Even today, Iran has the ability to develop its own missile technology independently, which is commensurate with its ambitions and behaviour to dominate the region (Zabir 2011).

Table 5 Total Active Military Manpower

	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Bahrain	10,700	11,200	11,200	11,200	11,200	8,200	8,200	8,200	8,200	8200
Kuwait	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15,500	15500
Qatar	12,400	12,400	12,400	12,400	12,400	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800	11800
Oman	41,700	41,700	41,700	39,700	39,700	42,600	42,600	42,600	42,600	42600
UAE	41,500	50,500	50,500	50,500	51,000	51,000	51,000	51,000	51,000	51,000

Saudi Arabia	199,500	124,500	124,500	199,500	224,500	214,500	221,500	233,500	233,500	233,500
Iraq	389,900	389,900	7,116	107,000	107,000	165,800	190,744	191,957	245,782	271,400
Iran	520,000	540,000	540,000	545,000	545,000	545,000	523,000	523,000	523,000	523,000

Source: Adapted from IISS, the Military Balance 2012

A senior official (Interview No 17) clearly confirmed that Iran seeks to develop the Iranian Shahab missiles - Shahab-5 and -6. The risk of these missiles is that they are capable of hitting any spot in the Arabian Peninsula, which is not limited to the Iranian threat to target US bases in the Gulf in the event of a US-Iranian or Iranian–Israeli conflict, but also to the possibility of targeting facilities vital and strategic to the Gulf oil economy and population centres.

Figure 9 Total Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft

Source: Adapted from IISS, the Military Balance 2012

Iraq

Iraq's geographical location is governed by factors of size, depth and nature of the border areas. In terms of size, it is not a small country such as Bahrain or Qatar, but also not a big country such as Saudi Arabia. Iraq is a medium-sized country with a territory of 437.400 square kilometres. This size could give Iraq the advantage of strategic depth, but the medium-size is dwarfed by the shape and location of the Iraqi territory, the difficult nature of the land of Iraqi Kurdistan and the mountains in the north, and the swamps area of the Faw in the south. All this combined with a lot of problems, such as sectarianism and terrorism, makes the control of the Iraqi state incomplete and hampers accessing services of the development and building projects, which exacerbate the problem of integrating the Iraqi state. Iraq is located in the extreme north-east of the Arab nation, and this site puts Iraq in the face of the edge and the peoples and nations and nationalities of non-Arab Iran and Turkey, both powerful states in terms of population, culture and military. Also, Iraq is suffering in its relationship with Turkey from the fact that the waters of the Euphrates originate from Turkey, which puts Iraq under pressure, moreover, Iraq is almost an internal state, because Iraq has a limited coastline on the Gulf, stretching from the Shatt al-Arab to Um Qasr port, and part of this port is controlled by Kuwait as a result of the demarcation process of the Iraqi border carried out by the Commission of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which has been mentioned in chapter three.

From the perspective of economic capacity and development, Iraq was in a distinct position in the Gulf. Iraq is a big oil state and, above all, it has excellent freshwater resources, which enable it to establish a good base for agricultural production. These capabilities could put it with its population in a special place in the region. The occupation of Iraq was the Gulf War III in the sensitive region, which caused the loss of the regional balance. The consequence of Iraq's loss of control as a hegemonic state in the region, is that instability

could be proliferate across the region, as Iraq now is in a new regional position that has a direct impact on the balance of power in the region (Fawcett 2013).

Figure 10 Iraq population

Moreover, Figure 7 Total Main Battle Tanks and Figure 8 Total Fixed Wing Combat Aircraft and Table 4 Total Active Military Manpower show clearly the weakness of the Iraqi military compared with Iran. In addition, the total Iraqi active military manpower also needs few years to be built in order to secure the country, which is facing domestic problems, such as the armed militias around the country, which puts more pressure on the Iraqi military. As result of the weakness of Iraq, the balance of power in the Gulf will be without Iraq for a few years or more until Iraq can rebuild its own power economically and militarily. However, Iraq recently signed an agreement to buy arms from the USA, which will help Iraq to rebuild its power in the short-term, as discussed in chapter two page 97-107 (Mason 2009).

An Assessment of the balance of power in the Gulf

As a result of the war in 1990/91 and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the balance of power has been disrupted, at the level of the sub-regional system between the Gulf states. In spite of the tide in Iraqi-Iranian relations, Iran has sought to invest in the weakness of Iraq using

sectarianism and support for certain parties in Iraq (Bradley 2007). In addition, Iran is working to build its military power to take advantage of the lessons of the war with Iraq and the crises of the Gulf, as well as the trend towards military manufacturing locally in order to maintain that balance of military power in its favour. In particular, Iran seeks to own different types of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and is seeking to invest its various capabilities, such as its population and economic and military power, as well as the importance of its geopolitical position in its relations with Iraq and the GCC states. This is conducted under the aim of creating unequal relationships between the parties, to make Iran a hegemonic power in the region. On the other hand, Iran is an ideological state, based on doctrine, which will remain a source of concern for the region, because it will seek to use the denominational factor to put pressure on the other states in the region. This means that the relations in the region will always be in a state of tension and remain potentially explosive (Interview No 15).

A senior official in the Embassy of Iran in the UAE discussed the perception of political leaders in these states to the fact that the US policy in the region is based on the supervision and management of the crises in the region. It was noted that the USA does not seek to achieve stability in the region as much as it is interested in maintaining the current political status quo, which is the justification for its military presence, and to ensure its military and commercial markets in these states, except Iran (Interview No 5). The importance of inter-relationships between the states of the region is the fact that the future of stability in the Gulf region does not require a transition from conflict to cooperation between the GCC states and both Iraq and Iran only, but also a shift from cooperation to integration even for each state to need the survival of the others. In fact the relationships amongst the Gulf States are not stable and remain tense and in crisis. Furthermore, the political

developments in the region are changeable, the relations between the parties in the region transition from cooperation to conflict, and vice versa, without having firm foundations for controlling the nature of interactions. It is noted that the security balance in the Gulf was based on three sides: Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Fürtig 2007).

With regard to the causes of the imbalance of power in the Gulf, a senior official (Interview No 6; Interview No 17) discussed the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the line of exporting the revolution to attract Shia populations in the Gulf, led to the establishment of the GCC in the following year. The GCC had been biased to support Iraq in the war against Iran. This means that the GCC states developed a security system depending on their capabilities and coordination of regional security. The second development was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and the formation of what is known as the International Alliance under the leadership of the USA to liberate Kuwait, and the influx of the US troops into the GCC states. This caused the collapse of the triangle of security in the Gulf, which confirmed the US interests and strategy of securing oil resources and protecting friendly states. Moreover, the US adopted a strategy of dual containment of both Iran and Iraq, and it was able to persuade the Gulf that both Tehran and Baghdad are the greatest threat to the security of the GCC states, which helped Washington in signing bilateral defence agreements with the GCC states. These agreements have ensured the US presence in the region (Edwards 2013).

A senior official (Interview No 18) confirms that Iran is now a threat in terms of its growth in asymmetrical warfare, as well as its growing missile and potential nuclear capabilities as well as its support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Mahdi Army. Moreover, political turmoil is shaking the region, terrorism remains a very real threat. From the above, many states in the region, especially the GCC states, have increased investments in security and military operations. This makes it difficult to assess the military balance. This confirms

the fact that the figures are only available for the classic measures such as military force, whereas there is no clear way to measure the balance of power in the non-traditional asymmetric warfare context. (Cordesman and Wilner 2012) discussed the capabilities of each and every one of these powers.

The GCC states, for example, have huge military resources, and many of them are spending huge amounts of money to buy arms. However, at the same time, these elements of power clash with the obstacles in the real world, which leads them to make an effort to improve their effectiveness and ability through working with the USA, Britain and France in an effort to contain Iran. Thus, the USA dominates the military balance in the Gulf today; note that the capacity of the USA itself on the ground is limited when it comes to asymmetrical warfare. In addition, Washington plays a pivotal role in the military balance in the Gulf, where it has established two military bases in Kuwait for its troops, and it has positioned its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. In Qatar the USA has established its regional headquarters and centre for air forces operations, while in Oman, it has a facility for air and sea asset, as well as storage facilities. In addition to the above, there are a wide range of trainers and consultants from the US who are coordinating with the Gulf States (Cordesman and Wilner 2012).

On the other hand, Iran is seeking to become a nuclear power in the next three to five years. However, its conventional weapons are aged and ineffective, and its total capacity is declining. For Iran, the future of it regular military forces is still unclear, which gives rise to the need to develop military capabilities and weapons (Waltz 2012). However, it is trying to work on the development of arms through local industry, by trying to design and produce its own military arms. It also showed the ability to buy weapons from China, North Korea and Russia, and has shown that it can take advantage of those deals to develop its own

capabilities. Furthermore, Iran has bought some modern aircraft and tanks from Russia and deployed long-range missiles with an increased range « Scud » , and deployed missiles « Shahab-3 » , but it is not clear what the final outcome of this type of deployment will be, or how it will be arming its warheads (Farzanegan 2012).

Iraq is still in the development stage and focusing on counter-terrorism. It is noteworthy that Iraq has lost almost all types of heavy weapons during the US invasion in 2003. However, it has many deals to compensate for these weapons as discussed in chapter two. Nonetheless, Baghdad will remain unable to deal with conventional wars on a large-scale for at least five years.

The GCC states have begun to adjust plans for national troops, taking into account the demise of Iraq as a regional threat and the need to contain Iran. In the same context, the lack of effectiveness of the GCC to unite efforts in a possible war, achieve deterrence and develop capabilities must be noted. Since its inception at the beginning of the 1980s, the GCC proposed a wide range of projects to improve military capabilities, such as; a Rapid Intervention Force, which was created without any clear function, but was a symbolic presence. It was resolved in 2005. Council members did not succeed in unifying the weapons and equipment in all the GCC states. Some of the GCC states cooperated in the field of naval exercises, and in areas exposed to mine warfare, but the GCC Navy will not have a lot of efficiency in the context of a real war without the support of the USA or UK. Furthermore, the purchase of arms still varies greatly between the Gulf states (Toukan and Cordesman 2011). There is no uniform standard or focus on type of certain military power that is needed to defend security in the GCC sates.

The GCC states started building a missile defence force to deal with Iran's missile forces, as in the construction of naval and air forces to contain the Iranian capabilities in

asymmetric warfare (Cordesman and Wilner 2012). Moreover, the GCC is looking for ways to enable it to accommodate the Iranian nuclear power as expected. It also works to adjust its forces to reduce the risk of expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq in the absence of real power in Iraq. On the other hand, the GCC states are working to buy a lot of weapons to modernise their forces. Saudi Arabia, for example, is working on the development of its air forces capabilities, and improving its capabilities in special operations and counter-insurgency. It is noteworthy that most of the GCC states have increased focus on buying short-range, medium and long-range missiles, but in practice have hardly succeeded in creating a certain level of intelligence, sensors and necessary reconnaissance capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of air defence and missile forces.

However, it is imperative for the GCC states to overcome the legacy of the old distrust and internal tension between each state. This appeared to be difficult with the introduction of the idea of a Gulf Union by the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz. Most members of the GCC did not accept the idea of the Union, including the UAE, Kuwait and Oman. In this context, the implications of the Union on the balance of power in the Gulf are not clear yet. There is no guarantee that the Union will be successful; maybe efforts to build a political union will undermine the balance and regional security.

Conclusion

For the option of a balance of power, and although this is an old concept in international relations theory, its importance as a tool for the management of conflicts between states has increased with the rise of classical realist theory and neo-realism (Morgenthau and Nations 1948). In addition, (Morgenthau and Nations 1948) identified two key elements based on the principle of the balance of power; the first, is the presence of the balance in the level of the military capabilities of the parties involved; the second, is based on the ability of these parties

to recognise the importance of the existence of that balance, as the best way to maintain security.

Furthermore, reasons for not adopting the principle of the balance of power as a way to achieve security in the Gulf include an imbalance in the relative distribution of power between the states of the region, which will lead to instability. There are two main dimensions to this dilemma: the first is linked to the physical nature of the ingredients, such as geographical, human and economic development; and the second to the level of non-physical capability, especially combat experience, and the military industry. Another reason for the imbalance is the possibility of political conflict and political polarisation in the region. Moreover, the possibility of sliding the region's states into an arms race, which is the current situation that has been witnessed in the Gulf region for many years.

The regional system of the Gulf has seen what can be defined as a form of a regional balance of power, during the 1970s and 1980s, Iran has represented the first party in this equation of balance and Iraq as the second. But the regional strategic balance collapsed in 1991 when Iraq invaded Kuwait, which caused the defeat of the Iraqi army. As result of the failure in the balance of power led the region into three major wars, the Iran-Iraq war, from 1980 to 1988, and the second Gulf War in 1990-1991, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In summary, the option of the balance of power does not seem to be an option preponderant in the accounts of the regional system of the Gulf, it does not seem worthy of the states in the region to adopt it as the basis for security, or as a guide. Moreover, the regional hegemony power does not necessarily stabilise the Gulf region, as the regional hegemonic state requires significant commitment of resources to ensure continued economic and military dominance over the Gulf. All these requirements are not available for one of the

regional powers to control the other states in the Gulf. Cooperation with the international

power is the best way to provide security and stability.

CAPTER SIX THE FUTURE OF THE GULF AND SEARCH FOR A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM

Introduction

This chapter assesses the future of stability in the Gulf according to the perception of decision makers in the Gulf states toward the role of the USA as a hegemonic player on the regional and international levels, as well as the regional hegemonic powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia This chapter is divided into three sections: the first provides an overview section which clarifies the position of each state in the Gulf and its perception on security requirements at the regional level. Moreover, it discusses the removal of Iraq from the regional military balance equation in the region following the US invasion, as well as Iranian calls for the establishment of a regional forum on security issues

The second section covers the security and stability requirements of the GCC states on the regional level. It also explores the GCC states' procedures to ensure security and stability at both the internal and external levels, and how to confront the Iranian challenges to preserve their political, economic and military security. In addition, this section discusses the establishment of a military force unified between the GCC states, as well as the impact of the current conditions required for achieving the new regional security system, known as the system of peace and stability in the GCC states.

The third section assesses the perceptions of the Gulf States of US hegemony in the Gulf. The section covers US hegemony over the Gulf and the unipolar system, with mention to the fragility of this unipolarity and the participation of other international powers in this system. In addition it discusses whether Iran is an enemy to the USA or not in the region and the effect of this on the security and stability of the region as well as the benefit of the USA from inflating the Iranian threat (Zenko and Cohen 2012 p. 78-88). The section also discusses the interventions of the international powers in the region, which may interfere with the states of the region in order to serve their interests.

The fourth section discusses the Gulf states' options to improve their regional position, and the ability to deal with hegemonic powers in the Gulf. It discusses the ability of the Gulf states to play an important role under the hegemony of the USA in order to consolidate the military and security cooperation under the comprehensive defence strategy.

The chapter applied the constructivist theory by testing the success of the constructivist analysis in understanding the behaviours of internal and external powers and their roles, according to the perceptions of the Gulf states. In addition, the theory provides an ontological and epistemological framework different from other well-known frameworks, and which has been alternated between professionals and researchers.

Overview

The Gulf states are aware that the removal of Iraq from the strategic equation in the region means that there is a certain vacuum and a chance for Iran to emerge as the leading power in the region. This means increasing the security of the GCC states, and here it should be emphasised that Iraq as an ally of the USA would reduce the need for the US presence in the Gulf to protect the GCC states and to deter Iran. However, it does not eliminate that need entirely, even if Iraq has a much more effective government than it has recently, and therefore Iran continues to represent a security challenge for both the USA and the Gulf states. In addition, Iran's influence on the Gulf's Shiites, who represent a clear majority in Bahrain and Iraq, as well as Iran's dispute with the UAE over three islands in the Gulf represent key threats to the GCC states (Wilson 2011).

In spite of the steps taken by Iran to communicate with the GCC states, the question raised now is: are the GCC states, in light of the new situation in Iraq, ready to accept Iranian calls for the establishment of a regional forum on security issues? This would likely include the

USA. There is no doubt that the answer is no, as a Senior Official (Interview No 9) mentioned that, in spite of Iran's signing of the additional protocol of the agreement to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, but the GCC states remain concerned by the Iranian nuclear programme. This reflects the growing concerns of the GCC states, which will enhance the importance of the security relationship of the GCC states with the USA. Therefore, this makes the foreign presence more palatable politically, and thus even though the USA has not extended its nuclear umbrella officially to the Gulf, its presence in these states is a deterrent aimed at Tehran. From the above it can be said that the strong relationship between the USA and Iraq will be an important variable in the path of the future of relations in the Gulf under the current strained relations between Washington and Tehran on many issues, particularly weapons of mass destruction and the Iraqi issue and the harbouring of terrorist elements (Kamrava 2012). It follows from this that a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington if a final agreement on the future of Iran's nuclear research programme was to be agreed would not necessarily be welcome in the Gulf in so far as it formed a prelude to a greater level of US withdrawal from the region.

A senior official (Interview No 2) discussed that the situation in the Gulf region and the future of the balance of power in the region may depend on the form and situation of the Iraqi state in the near future between stability and rapid development or anarchy that may undermine the security and stability of the region's states without exception. Accordingly, the scenario of the future balance of power in the region might take a new approach, such as a "balance of power with the Multilateral[6] system", which will likely include the USA; or on

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[6] In international relations, multilateralism is multiple countries working in concert on a given issue. Multilateralism was defined by Miles Kahler as "international governance of the 'many". Robert Keohane in his article "Multilateralism: an agenda for research" in 1989 defined multilateralism as "the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states".

the other hand, the call by the Iranians to establish a regional forum that includes the other States in the region, including Yemen.

This scenario is in the favour of the GCC states as it may be able it to achieve a high degree of political and economic stability and push the states in the region to intensify their efforts towards building relationships and strategic alliances with other international powers; particularly in case of any change in the structure and the nature of the international system from a unipolar to a multipolar world (Ibid 2012 p. 9-10). In order to stand in the face of international forces that dominate the region and its resources, and despite the fact that this kind of balance may be built on the American presence in the beginning, it does not necessary need to prolong the US presence in the region. On the basis that some parties in the region realise today the importance and necessity of the alliance between the region's states, which will affect the US presence, without new strategies to ensure change according to the interest of the Gulf states and other forces.

The Security and stability requirement for the GCC states at the regional level

There are several procedures, at both the internal and external levels, to ensure the security and stability of the region. According to the speech of King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (19/12/2011) of Saudi Arabia in the GCC Supreme Council's 32nd session in Riyadh city on Dec. 19 and 20, 2011, he mentioned that *"the GCC states have to move from a phase of cooperation to the phase of union"*. In addition the GCC states have to consider the future through working to increase the strength of the links between them, by developing the idea of cooperation, to establish a new type of convergence built on the composition of a confederation comprising the GCC states, so that each state has sovereignty over its territory without any external interference (Ibid19/12/2011). This Union, he believed, must be based

on two important things: the first is related to foreign affairs and establishing a higher council for foreign affairs which would be responsible for managing the foreign relations of the GCC states, to unifying the aims of foreign policy in light of the political and strategic changes in the Gulf States at the regional and international levels (Interview No 17). The second is related to military affairs, through the creation of a military force unified between the GCC states, which is more focused than the Peninsula Shield forces, so that their allegiance is to the GCC Confederacy and not to the states themselves, and the aim of this step is to form a military force, able to balance the power with Iraq and Iran, in the light of the current situation following the occupation of Iraq (Interview No 19).

On the other hand, the preservation of the security, political, economic and military support for the GCC states in the face of the Iranian challenges, which is the continued occupation of the UAE islands since the reign of the Shah, requires that there be a strategic depth to support the GCC states and this strategic dimension is to join other parties as basic players in maintaining the security of the Gulf region, such as the entry of Turkey and Yemen. Furthermore, the GCC states in the security system would, thus, achieve a multilateral balance of power as a regional system of peace and stability, which may be the right alternative approach, instead of dependence on the West and the USA in particular (Alani, 2006). After the experience of the occupation of Iraq, proved that it seeks to stabilise its national interests at the expense of others in the region, it became apparent that the USA entered the war without considering the impacts on the states in the region and their interests in terms of security and stability (Bauer 2008). Its withdrawal from Iraq marked an equally unexpected and unwelcome move, one which not only encouraged Iran but also encouraged Saudi Arabia to move towards a role which would not necessarily be welcomed even by the smaller Gulf states which have broadly supported Saudi policy in the past.

The domestic level includes the natural evolution of popular participation in politics and the expansion of freedom and democracy to overcome the limits of political reform required to pave the way toward states built on institutions rather than tribal and traditional systems. Some of the GCC states have done well in this regard, such as the case in Kuwait, and Bahrain, which have implemented political reforms in recent years (Laipson, et al. 2010)) and (Katzman 2008).

As discussed above, the GCC states have to exploit the current conditions and seek to achieve a new regional security system known as a "system of peace and stability" through holding security agreements with regional countries and neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, which is an important country in the scope of talks about the regional balance of power. Turkey, as a member of NATO and a country that may join the European Union at some point in the future, as well as being one of the countries in the region, seeks to retain a high degree of political stability in the Gulf region. The establishment of a regional coalition between the GCC, Turkey, Yemen and Iraq in the future, as well as Iran, might push the regional balance of power system for the benefit of multilateralism, which means the GCC states have a prominent and influential role more than ever before (Interview No 7), but currently seems unlikely.

Holding advanced security discussions with Iran, as Saudi Arabia did a few years ago, will be critical. Some states, such as the UAE, may disagree to signing such agreements before resolving all outstanding problems, especially the issues of the occupation of the UAE islands and the demarcation of the maritime border with Kuwait (Interview No 10). That Iran is still seeking to establish a regional forum for dialogue, security and stability, will be a good opportunity for the GCC states to liquidate all internal differences. Moreover, the continued threat of the US to Iran pushes the latter closer to the GCC states, and any form of security

cooperation or strategic alliance would prove that the balance of power is built on a multilateral system. Senior official (Interview No 8) mention that "*Iran seek to develop its relation with the region's states but there are several problems needs to be solved before transition to new period of corporation which is the occupation of the UAE islands, nuclear program and the nature of the Iranian regime that support the Shiites in the region particularly in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain*".

The GCC is no longer able to accept Yemen and Iraq at this time as partners, because it does not want to borrow other people's problems, especially since the Arab dimension has failed through history to achieve security and stability of the GCC states. The basis of the slogan to maintain the Arab identity in the Gulf will potentially lead to a move backwards instead of moving forward towards the future prospects, as is the case in the Council of the Arab League. The world today is based on technological superiority and technical progress as well as commercial and industrial development, and the GCC states have come a long way in this regard compared to other Arab neighbours, especially Yemen and Iraq (Aluwaisheg 14/12/1010).

Furthermore, a senior official (Interview No 8) mentioned that "*the GCC works to support Iraq politically and economically in line with the interests of the GCC states and the Arab regional system*". The position is that Iraq must be stable, free and democratic, because Iraq is pivotal to maintaining the regional balance of power, and that the entry of Iraq into the multilateral system, will be a focal point towards the formulation of a new regional balance of power in favour of the GCC states. The GCC will stand in front of any ambition or perception of Iran for the future of Iraq and the security system in the Gulf region. There is no doubt that the removal of Iraq from the equation of the regional balance of power will be a risk to the security and the balance of power in the region, especially for the GCC states. Thus, if Iraq is

strong and stable, it will add support to the six Gulf states and Yemen in the multipolar balance of power.

Strengthening of the form and type of the existing relations between the GCC states and the major powers can be achieved by focusing on agreements in security, political and commercial issues. However, these agreements have to be wider and more comprehensive than the current agreements, and thus a step forward towards a new security strategy needs to prepare for any possible change that may occur in the global balance of power.

All this depends on the analysis and the perception of Henry Kissinger who saw the unipolar system as being unstable, where Kissinger considers that the system of unipolarity will end sooner than everyone expects. As a system it leads to global turmoil and creates hotbeds of international conflict, as well as exhausting the resources of the USA. While in his view the multilateral system of global balance of power leads to global stability, because this system prevents the domination of one state over the affairs of the world and reinforces the idea of international peace. The events of 9/11 and the major events represented in both the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq are a confirmation of the perception of Kissinger about the future of the international system based on unipolarity.

An Assessment of the perceptions of the Gulf States about the US hegemony in the Gulf and the regional hegemony

The constructivist approach in this section allows for the exploration of the Gulf states' perceptions of the new security system, and its ability to protect the region, whether built by internal or external actors.

One dominant power controlling the capabilities of the international political system is a rare case in the history of international relations. The system that has prevailed after the collapse of the Soviet Union soon shifted gradually from a solid polarity system, characterised by high

discipline and most of the units being subject to the rules of the dominant pole, to another fragile unipolarity system which is characterised by a declining US role. This shift has forced the US to gradually accept the participation of other international powers in the management of international issues, such as the issue of the nuclear programme of North Korea, Iran and the peace negotiations in the Middle East. This gradual shift is called the transition from solid unipolarity to fragile unipolarity, where this transformation allowed some of the major international powers the ability to take positions more independent of the US. This sends clear signals about the beginning of the form of the nucleus for a new international system built on the multipolarity system (Rusi 2001 and Schweller and Pu 2011).

Recently, a message was given by two key states in the UN Security Council (China and Russia), wherein they used the right of veto (double veto) on the Syrian file on 5 October 2011, and 5 February 2012 (Russia and China veto UN resolution against Syrian regime 2011). The other message came close, but in the military aspect, where Chinese-Russian military exercises in the Sea of China were held for the first time on 22 April 2012 (BBC news Asia 22 April 2012), which added to some clear military positioning of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean, near Syrian shores.

With regards to the Gulf region, a senior official (Interview No 12) clarified that the relationship between the USA and Iran under the American umbrella over the region and the prospect of an attack on Iran, builds on the following: the nature of the relationship at the current stage between the USA and Iran is on the basis of "Mutual Service" between the two projects and the fixed and unfixed interests of both parties. Iran leads, either intentionally or unintentionally, a central role to the US strategy, which meets the requirements of the theory of "making the enemy" in US foreign policy. The US cannot move or progress without an "external enemy" as he said and this explains the process of inflating the Iranian threat and

not only on the regional level but at the level of Europe and the world. Zenko (2012 p. 87-88) discussed that "*the matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country". But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power*. Moreover, Cordesman (2014a p. 272) in his report "*The Gulf Military Balance: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions*" mention that *the Iran's "military forces have almost no modern armour, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future"*. On the other hand, a senior official (Interview No 16) partly agrees that the inflation of the Iranian threat will serve the US interests in the Gulf region. In the light of the above, and if we agree with this view this considers Iran as a hostile party against the states in the region will bring to the USA the following objectives: continuation of the Gulf states' fear of the coming Iranian threat, where the USA is helping with the sale of weapons and equipment and sending experts to the GCC states and Iraq.

This ensures the continued presence of the US military forces in the Gulf region under the pretext of protecting the region's states from the Iranian threat while the main objective is to ensure the flow of oil and gas to the USA and the West. In contrast, Iran for its part is between tension and relaxation in its relationship with the USA. Iran is trying to pass its expansion strategy to convert the Gulf to serve its interests as a Gulf of Persia. Moreover, Iran helped the USA by not resisting the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, but at the same time supporting some allied militias in Iraq for the inconvenience of US troops and interests (Brennan Jr, et al. 2013).

In addition, the operations theatres in the region are interrelated, and the Gulf states have to carefully consider the common strategic interests in the region and the changing international system from a unipolar to a multipolar world, will give way to competition

between the international powers to gain a foothold in a new area and the redistribution of spheres of influence and vital areas and the sharing of energy sources. Given that the Gulf region is part of the wider Middle East, some states such as Turkey, Israel and Egypt have an impact on the security situation in the Gulf as the regional powers in the wider circle . It is likely that the results of the new system with the multi-polar world and the competition between the powers may surprise the region's states, especially small ones, but the transition from conflict and militarisation of the region to cooperation and integration is necessary at this stage.

Political, economic and social developments in the Gulf have brought about changes in the bases of the strategies of both Iran and the USA in the past ten years, allowing the GCC the opportunity to review its strategy of security toward its interests and to build the framework and its position in the security strategy in the region. A Senior Official (Interview No 11) discussed that security strategy in the region at this time is built on three main parties: the GCC states, Iran and the USA; Iraq will join the security strategy in the Gulf after finishing building its state. Moreover, the GCC states have to move in the range of the strategic triangle with these three parties to reach a point near the axis. Therefore, the GCC states have to deal with major transformations to adopt new policies and strategies different from the previous ones that were pursued since the inception of the Council in 1981. This should develop new ways to maintain regional security, especially with regard to dealing with the Republic of Iran, building on the concept of cooperation, while considering the Iranian aspiration to dominate and expand its influence in the region.

Ghaffar (2012), advisor to the King of Bahrain for Diplomatic Affairs, mentions that the USA has begun to re-examine the mechanisms for dealing with its allies in the Middle East, and review the security and military strategy in accordance with the new variables in the

region. The GCC states today stand in front of profound transformations imposed on them to develop political, social and economic strategies before these changes are imposed on the by powers from outside region.

On the other hand, the interventions in the scope of the conflict for influence in the region may enter the countries of the region in a conflict of interest by supporting the outside parties to serve their interests, especially if some of the international players fail to control the regional parties, which will lead to political anarchy and even military conflict That the United States helped and supported the Saddam Hussein regime attack Iran in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war (US officials gave Saddam's army details about the whereabouts of Iranian forces in 1988 knowing that he would deploy chemical weapons). But documents[7] released in the National Archives show that the USA acquiesced in the use of chemical weapons as they tried to help Saddam with the war (Cooper 26 August 2013).

Moreover the experience has shown that the hegemonic state may resort, at critical stages, to bring about radical changes in its policies in order to deal with the new challenges posed by the development of events. This can be illustrated through the US occupation of Iraq to defend US national security where this work causes the lack of stability and balance in the Gulf. It could be argued that the new equation is concentrated today on Iran, where the USA and Israel seek to prevent the Tehran regime from becoming a nuclear state, while offering China and Russia political support for Tehran in order to maintain Iran as an ally in the region (Nia 2011). Furthermore, the danger is in the possibility of the rush of the USA and its allies to begin the process of military surprise, or the Iranian attempts to act according

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[7] These documents are available in dailymail online and for more about these documents see Rob Cooper *CIA 'helped Saddam Hussein carry out chemical weapons attack on Iran' in 1988 under Ronald Reagan*: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2402174/CIA-helped-Saddam-Hussein-make-chemical-weapons-attack-Iran-1988-Ronald-Reagan.html#ixzz35B7WEYxS

to miscalculations in the vital and highly sensitive Gulf region, which may lead to the outbreak of a military confrontation. The consequence of any military conflict could be disastrous as result of inaccurate calculations. In addition, the calculations that the Tehran regime will continue to develop a nuclear weapon still prevails, but some strategic analysts believe that the biggest challenge faced by the region is not the Iranian search for nuclear weapons only, but because it is looking to achieve hegemony in the region, rather than engage in regional understandings based on cooperation and achieving common security (Department of State U.S April 2009).

Moreover, the Iranian desire for regional hegemony is not limited to the problem of its leaders playing the role of a regional hegemonic power only, but is the biggest dilemma in that the composition of its system does not allow it to enter into regional understandings and because of the wide gap in political and strategic thought on the regional and international levels (Interview No 15).

The Gulf States' options to improve their regional position, and the ability to deal with hegemony in the Gulf

Through constructivist theory, this research analyses the perceptions of the role of the US in the Gulf held by the Gulf states, and how the states in the region perceive US hegemony. The constructivist approach tested how the Gulf states' experiences, values and beliefs impact on their behaviour in terms of dealing with the security issues in the Gulf.

Despite the military superiority of the USA and the development of the Iranian Navy and rocket systems, the Gulf Arab states are still able to play a greater role in the region. The measure of true superiority in the security equation is not based on power necessarily, but rather on the ability of one party to impose the regional policy that serves its interests, and not

necessarily conflict with the interests of other parties. Moreover, the main objective of the US military presence is to insure the energy needs of the USA and its allies in the West are met (Friedman 2012). In contrast, Iran is seeking recognition as a regional power capable of maintaining the security of the Gulf, and is trying to enhance its security through the development of programmes and military nuclear manufacturing, as well as extending its influence in the Middle East through the formation of networks of political, security and military proxies (Ibid 2012).

The features of a new American strategy toward the Gulf region have begun to appear since the beginning of the 1990s with the invasion of Saddam Hussein's regime of Kuwait in 1991, as well as the events of 9/11, and the US military campaigns to occupy Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. These developments resulted in the opposition of the GCC for those military operations which led to the disruption in the relations between the GCC and the USA, where Saudi Arabia asked the USA to withdraw its troops from its territory (Prados and Blanchard 2007). In spite of the negative impact of the events that followed the US invasion of Iraq, this tension in relations did not turn into a state of estrangement, and did not affect military cooperation between the USA and the GCC. The GCC still has the ability to politically influence the parties in the region to intensify their efforts to invest in its alliance with the USA, on the one hand, and to achieve military balance with Iran, on the other hand, as it continues to occupy centre stage in terms of economic landscape. In addition to the economic hegemony of the GCC states in the Gulf, a careful look at the geopolitics of the US presence in Central Asia from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan toward the Gulf, as the heart of the region vital to US strategy, will clearly indicate to the presence of a military and economic framework surrounding Iran from all sides (Cordesman FEB 3, 2014).

In addition, the continuation of the US military deployment will be a burden on the US budget. In some previous cases, the USA resorted to close some of its military bases, and because of the economic pressure it will take similar action against some of its military bases abroad within its overall security strategy. Therefore, it is necessary for the GCC states to work to achieve a common strategy, through the adoption of a new security concept does not conflict with US interests, and does not make these states dependent on the hegemony of the USA. The relationships between the actors in the region must be bases on cooperation and integration and not on the dominance of a major power, and the subordination of the other states to it. This can be achieved through the cooperation of the GCC states on the formation of a new environment for a comprehensive regional security. The GCC states have to develop the relations of cooperation which result in the achievement of a good deal of the military balance in the region so that the capabilities of the GCC states are superior to Iran in a conventional war; such as with the Air Force of the GCC states with a combined 627 aircraft, compared to 319 Iranian fighters, and 316 GCC helicopters compared with the 95 Iranian helicopters, and 22 GCC warships compared with 17 Iranian warships, and 1656 GCC tanks compared with 1613 Iranian tanks. In addition to the numerical superiority, the technical and quality superiority among the GCC states will bring it a great deal of power (Toukan and Cordesman 2011).

Furthermore, the GCC states are trying to consolidate military and security cooperation among themselves according to the comprehensive defence strategy, which was adopted at the Kuwait summit in 2009. Moreover, the GCC sates have worked to promote the concept of collective security by connecting the centres of the air force and air defence in the GCC states automatically, and linking the armed forces in the GCC states network unified communications. In addition, the GCC states have been strengthening the capacity of the air

defence of various missile defence systems, as well as working on the establishment of a joint navy, working with multiple responsibilities regarding the security of the sea, the marine environment, and rescuing ships, dealing with disasters, and everything related to the security of navigation in the Persian Gulf (The Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf states 14-15/12/2009). With regard to the threat of Iranian missiles, the GCC states have developed a defence system, but it needs to be coordinated with the USA. The GCC states are concerned about the activities of Iran's uranium enrichment, which has led the GCC states to cooperate with the relevant powers to reduce the threat of Iran's nuclear programme, particular with the US and the UN.

Whether or not one assesses that American regional hegemony has declined beyond a small extent, the willingness of the US Administration to use its hegemony has weakened after the withdrawal from Iraq, and is further weakened by the process of withdrawal from Afghanistan through 2014 and a certain level of disengagement from the Gulf. US priorities have shifted elsewhere, although the 'disengagement' from the Gulf could also be exaggerated. But Obama's foreign policy has tended to follow Clinton's in its concern with the primacy of domestic politics, and it has been seen to be weak and disorganised on the conflict in Libya and its aftermath as well as on conflict in Syria and the rise of ISIS. None of this has one unnoticed in the Gulf, and must be understood as shaping Gulf perceptions into the future. Fortunately, perhaps, the main focus of this thesis remains the period up to 2012, and the consequences of the uncertainties of US foreign policy before and after Obama leaves office do not need to form part of the main substance of the argument or its claims to originality.

Conclusion

The chapter analysed the procedures of the Gulf states to determine and protect their security and stability in the near future. The GCC states have to increase the political, economic and military cooperation between them for their own security system that provides all the means to protect their security against regional and international powers. Furthermore, the Iranian regional power is considered as a source of threat for the GCC states, which puts more pressure to join other regional powers in the maintaining of the security of the Gulf region, such as the entry of Turkey and Yemen, which will help to reform the balance of power in the Gulf. On the other hand rebuilding the relationship with Iran on the basis of cooperation and considering Iran as a neighbour not as an enemy or source of threat in the region has advantages.

The USA plays the role of hegemonic state which is unacceptable for Iran, supports the Arab Gulf States, which Iran considers an act against its national security. In addition, the role of the USA in supporting the Arab Gulf states is going to increase the instability in the Gulf, which will lead to another war against Iran, which will increase the gap between the GCC states and Iran. Moreover, Iran is considered as a threat to the security of the Gulf, which will justify the presence of the USA in the region and its continued dominance of the region. In addition the continuing sale of US arms to Iraq and the GCC states will increase the possibility of an arms race between the Gulf states. In addition, the multipolar system will increase the way for the international powers to compete in the Gulf in order to share the protection of the energy sources, which will limit the US domination in the Gulf region.

The US has therefore lost some of its ascendancy in the Gulf, but that judgement needs careful qualification. The US still has great naval strength in the region, and an overwhelming technical superiority in the air and in intelligence gathering. The US also retains compelling interests in oil and in the stability of world gas markets (even if the fracking revolution has

made it less dependent on them than before). It retains important interests also in the role major Middle East states like Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia assume in major international organisations, and it is to some extent dependent on dollar trade (not only in oil) for the continuing level of global demand for its currency and its government debt. The question which concerns policy makers in all of the Gulf countries is not whether the US has lost interest in the Gulf but whether there has been a significant shift in the saliences of major issues since the withdrawal from Iraq, and whether at the same time there has been a significant decline in Washington's willingness to use the power it has in the region –the hegemony and the structural power as well as the material resources and prestige at its disposal.

CONCLUSION

The importance of the Gulf states' perceptions about security and stability when considering the role of the hegemonic power in dealing with the states in the region are the main focus of the study. In addition the regional and international threats vary among the GCC states, Iraq, Iran and the US, where they have different perceptions on solutions, which are in line with how they perceive the problems or security issues in the Gulf region. Regardless of the difference of opinions among parties in the Gulf, the need for solutions to secure regional security in the region still exists.

Therefore, the key objective of this thesis has been to provide a conceptual and analytical foundation for discussion about the future shape of security and the stability in the Gulf. The region needs stable and peaceful relationships, which will provide security for all states, as well as to ensure the interests of the external powers. A second objective is to understand the perceptions of the Gulf states toward the US and its policy in the Gulf. A third objective of this research is to examine the role and goals of the US in the Gulf region, and the methods utilised to achieve these objectives, whether political, economic, or military. Finally, this study has also considered the causes for the failure of the region's states to develop a regional security regime, and the role of the US in contributing to (or otherwise) security in the region.

The research project has discussed five main research questions. The first question identified the tools and means used by the US to achieve its objectives in the region. The second question is: what are the most important regional powers that influence security in the Gulf and what are their roles? The third question considers whether the occupation of Iraq by the US has served the interests of the region's states or protects US national security, in that the US has a strategy to ensure its national interests. The fourth question is: what are the Gulf states' perceptions of security in the region, and how do these states perceive US hegemony.

The final question explores the role of the regional regime to build a regional security system independent of US domination.

The hypothesis of this thesis considered the importance of the Gulf states' perception of regional security and stability and the US hegemony and its role, as the only possible way to stabilise the region. It also considers their perceptions of the need to protect themselves and build their own regional security system. The US has succeeded to a great extent in controlling and exercising hegemony over the Gulf region in a way compatible with its interests and objectives in the region, and although it has withdrawn from Iraq and its influence is somewhat less than it was, it retains strong ties and important resources in the region. It retains a measure of hegemony not least, as the interview evidence cited in this thesis shows, because a number of the key actors demonstrate how much the expectations of the US informs their own security agendas. Thus, the US continues to hold influence on strategic events and processes in the Gulf; and it becomes important to assess and study the Gulf states perception about the security, stability, the role of the US in the region and how they perceiving the US hegemony. Furthermore, the US seeks, unevenly, to re-design the region in a way that agrees with its economic, political, and military interests.

In order to answer the research questions and test the hypothesis, the research defined the theoretical approach in chapter one. This focussed on a drawing together of neo realist hegemonic stability theory with a more 'realist friendly' version of constructivism (i.e. the work of Wendt in particular). Moreover, the aim of combining these two theories is to explore a new approach or a new way to discuss and analyse the security in the Gulf called "hegemonic constructivist approach". This approach is not in itself original at all, but it lends a distinctiveness to the analysis of this case which is important.

The theoretical framework used in this project based on use of two theories HST and the constructivism theory, HST assesses and analyses the role of the hegemonic powers in the Gulf. That Iran plays the role of the hegemonic power at the regional level and its seeking to be recognised by the international powers as regional power. Moreover, the US is an international power that has the ability to play the role of the hegemonic power in the entire region. Constructivist theory is used in this project to look at the perceptions of the Gulf states regarding their security and stability and the role of the US in this. Moreover, constructivism enables one to look at individual institutions and officials as actors, and discussed their experiences, values, and beliefs and the impact of their behaviour on the states' regional and international relations in their region. Furthermore, these approaches assessed and analysed the security and stability situation from the perception of the Gulf states toward the US.

Throughout the study, the security, stability, Gulf states perception of the US' role and hegemony in the Gulf have been discussed. These elements and analyses are based on literature studies, as well as field research in Tripoli and the UAE, which included a number of individual interviews with government officials in the Gulf states' embassies.

In order to conclude the assessment of the Gulf states' perceptions of US hegemony and security in the Gulf, the study provided answers to the five research questions and tested the research hypothesis. With regards to the hypothesis that the US has succeeded to a great extent in controlling and exercising hegemony over the Gulf region in a way compatible with its interests and objectives in the region, the study shows that the US has sought to play the role of hegemonic state, as the Gulf states, particular those in the GCC, are unable to protect themselves within the context of the region's security. This means that the issue of security in the Gulf emerged from the regional to the global stage because of the size of the growing

local link with external forces. This has reinforced the US hegemony in the Gulf, particularly after it signed bilateral security agreements and protection agreements with GCC states and Iraq as discussed in chapter two. These agreements allowed the US to control security in the Gulf, which opened the door to a long-term US military presence in the region, as well as the construction of military bases and weapons storage facilities in several countries. Furthermore, the study concludes that the Iranian threat in terms of military activities, particularly its nuclear programme, also reinforces the US hegemony and its presence in the Gulf. Another supposition is that the US continues to hold influence on strategic events and processes in the Gulf such that it becomes important to assess and study the Gulf states perception about the security, stability, the role of the US in the region and how they perceiving the US hegemony, as discussed in chapter four. That the regional security perception of the Gulf states is very important to determine the Gulf states general policy toward the US hegemony and its role in the region.

With regard to the answer to the first question, what are the tools and means used by the US to achieve its objectives in the region? This question has been discussed especially in chapter two, and shows that the US has sought to control the Gulf oil resources by all available means, including the use of force, to limit the ability of the regional powers in the Gulf to hold influence in the flow of oil and gas to the world, particularly Iran. Furthermore, the preserving of the governing regimes that support the US presence and interests in the Gulf has been considered as one of the most important aims of US policy in the region, as well as protecting Israel's security and its strategic superiority in the context of the crises and wars in the Middle East. Moreover, the means utilised to achieve the above US aims in the Gulf, have been discussed and described in chapter two, and the study showed that the US has heavily used military means instead of economic and political means to achieve its aims and interests

in the region, which reinforces the US hegemony over the Gulf region and increases the Gulf states' desire to seek to obtain large quantities of weapons, consequently causing an arms race in the region.

The second research question asked who are the regional powers that influence security in the Gulf and what are their roles, which has been discussed in chapter three and the next few pages clarify the conclusion of this and the other reseearch questions.

The study discussed the context of security in the region and the perception of security and the US role as a variable actor in the Gulf. What does security mean in the Gulf? There are different concepts that define the meaning of security in the Gulf wherein all powers that have an interest in Gulf security have a different perspective to each other. Of course, each power in the region defines the concept of security according to its security interests, objectives and current strategy. Moreover, there are three major powers directly concerned with the issue of the security of the Gulf, which are the US, Iran, and the GCC states.

As noted, the major powers directly concerned with the issue of the security of the Gulf which are: US, Iran, the GCC states and Iraq. With regard to the US, the Gulf security means, in short, to be a favourable situation in the region to ensure the continued flow of oil supplies and its protection, as well as the protection of Israel. Furthermore, it means that the situation in the region is favourable to US interests in the context of the US hegemony in the Gulf.

As for Iran, Gulf security means that the situation in the region does not threaten Iranian national security and allows it to play the role of the regional hegemonic power in the Gulf. As for the GCC states, security means that the Gulf region remains stable, allowing them to move forward in the implementation of projects for economic and social development. In

addition, it means the region is not witnessing developments or conditions that threaten the internal stability in the Gulf societies.

This definition of the concept of security in the Gulf for each power in the region is important, because it is according to this concept that the strategy of each power towards the region is determined. On this basis, the US strategy in the region can be summarised in one word, which is 'hegemony'. The US hegemony in the region means the region does not witness developments that threaten the security according to the US concept. In practical implementation, this hegemony comes in many manifestations including: the presence of US troops in the region, insisting on preventing Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, even going to war if necessary, and fully supporting the GCC states and Iraq

Regarding the Iranian strategy, it also seeks to be the regional hegemony power. Iran exploits the situation in Iraq by supporting the Shiites and Iran's influence there is used as an entry point for the dominance of Iran in the wider region. On the other hand, the idea of creating a regional Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Gulf includes the GCC states, Iran and Iraq. The Iranian perception here is, in essence, that Iran will have the position to allow it to play a major role in this organisation.

With regard to the GCC states, we cannot say that the group has a clear independent strategy to achieve security in the region where the GCC is directly dependent on external support, particularly that of the US, to achieve its security and stability. In other words, the attitudes and policies of the GCC with respect to security issues in the Gulf, are just a reaction to the policies and positions of others, particularly the US and Iran, in order to build a strategy to address these policies. In Iraq, the US occupation led to developments and a significant threat to the GCC states. The most serious of these threats to the countries of the region is the

sectarian conflict in Iraq and the possibility of dividing the country on a sectarian basis. This could impact other states in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

The possibility of dividing Iraq on a sectarian basis, and the establishment of a Shiite state in the south, will have a large impact on the whole region. This will open the door to ignite sectarian strife in the region, and will also feeds the tendencies of separation and division that already exist, especially in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

The Iranian nuclear programme has become a serious danger threatening the entire region. Although the possibility of war at this time is reduced, the GCC states do not rule out the possibility. Of course, should war break out, it would have a devastating impact on the region's security from each side and no one knows how it would evolve or how hostilities would be concluded. However, what is certain in any case is that the direct impact of war would be devastating to Iran and all the states in the region and it would not be unlikely that the states in the region are vulnerable to attack by Iran. Furthermore, the possibility of Iran's support for some of the local communities in the states of the region increases security problems and crises. In any case, war would push the region into a new era of instability and resource depletion for many years. However, cooperation and peaceful settlement is the only way to resolve these crises.

With regard to the sources of threat to the security of the Gulf in general and in short is the image of the security situation in the Gulf today. In light of this, it is easy to know what the basic sources of threats to the security of the Gulf are, from the perspective of the region's countries, which are basically three sources: the first source is the US, as it provides protection for the GCC states, but it is in a state of hostility with Iran, as well as failing to save the stability of Iraq after the occupation which created a state full of sectarian conflict that threatens the region's states. This affects the trust in the US as a friend for the GCC

states, to maintain security and stability. The second source of threat is Iran, where the Iranian threat stems from the belief of the Iranians, or at least some of the Iranian leadership, that the conditions in the region are becoming favourable for a new era of influence in the region. As we have seen, Iran considers its influence today in Iraq as a base for greater influence in the region. Iran is seeking to fill the vacuum in Iraq after the withdrawal of US troops in 2011. Therefore, the absence of the US in Iraq is a circumstance conducive for Iran to exercise greater influence in the region. In addition, the Iranian military's ability to destabilise the internal stability in the GCC states is a regional risk. The third source of threat is the internal threat which is no less dangerous than the external threats to the security of the Gulf. The internal threat here refers to the fact that there are some powers in the Gulf societies, particularly sectarian, which are supported by foreign powers to serve their interests. What happened in Iraq has led to sectarian congestion. The fear here is that the region is going to see more sectarian tensions; it is possible to see an open sectarian conflict, which is a serious threat to the internal security of regional states.

What is required in light of the status of the security in the Gulf now, and the various sources of threat and the requirements from the Gulf states? At this stage, high priority should be given to the dimensions of internal security. This means containing the sectarian threats, and emphasising the necessity of national cohesion and national unity. These are the responsibility of all parties in the community, at both formal and informal levels. This means on the other hand, the need to prevent the possibility of sectarian unrest in the event of war. This is the responsibility of the security services. The GCC states' efforts must be focused on trying to prevent the outbreak of a new war in the region, and to settle the problems with Iran peacefully. Third, each state in the region should provide all its potential to prevent the aggravation of sectarian conflict and the division of Iraq

The originality of this thesis derives from achieving the main objectives of this project, which is to assess the applicability of the realist version of the HST combined with small and medium states to US-Gulf states relations after 2000. Moreover, the thesis seeks to assess the perception of the Gulf states toward the US. This study offers a contribution to academic literature, and to the Gulf security formation, which argues for the introduction of additional factors to the existing elements for security, particularly the importance of the regional hegemony and the Gulf states' perceptions of the US' role in the Gulf, these elements can obtain a comprehensive security arrangement able to build a security system capable of protecting the Gulf and providing the stability for all the states in the region. In addition, the perception of the Gulf states of the security in the region did not receive the necessary attention to be considered in the formation of security in the region.

Building on regional and international experiences dealing with security and stability in the region, this study discussed and tried to offer a new security discussion model based on recognising the regional powers in the region, including regional powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, and international powers, such as the US, which are able to play the role of the regional power in the Gulf region. Furthermore, the situation in the Gulf needs to be considered that the GCC states and the US consider Iran as enemy and source of threat, but in fact Iran is one of the states that overlooks the Gulf and has the right to share in the protection of the region and has a right to protect itself and stabilise the region.

The right of all parties in the Gulf to address the major security issues is based on all the concerns of the Gulf states in terms of political, economic and military contexts. Moreover, and to provide a base for future security discussion in the Gulf, it is necessary to introduce other states in the Middle East in the security arrangement in the Gulf, such as Turkey, Yemen, and Egypt. This arrangement could give all the Gulf states the basic assurances to

gain and achieve their aims and objectives in the region, of course with the help and support

of the US as the principle power in the region.

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