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Chmura, T. 
ORCID: 0000-0001-7476-2030, Kube, S., Pitz, T. and Puppe, C.,
2005.
Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: evidence from an experimental coordination game.
Economics Letters, 88 (2), pp. 214-220.
ISSN 0165-1765
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Abstract
We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coordination on the Pareto superior distribution. While this is well in line with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are best explained not by a preference for equality per se but rather by the belief that the opponent has such a preference.
| Item Type: | Journal article | ||||
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| Publication Title: | Economics Letters | ||||
| Creators: | Chmura, T., Kube, S., Pitz, T. and Puppe, C. | ||||
| Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||
| Date: | August 2005 | ||||
| Volume: | 88 | ||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 | ||||
| Identifiers: |
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| Rights: | Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | ||||
| Divisions: | Schools > Nottingham Business School | ||||
| Record created by: | Linda Sullivan | ||||
| Date Added: | 25 Apr 2018 09:48 | ||||
| Last Modified: | 25 Apr 2018 09:48 | ||||
| URI: | https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33321 |
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