How do licensing regimes limit worker interests? Evidence from informal employment in Britain

Clark, I. ORCID: 0000-0001-7698-2715, Hunter, J. ORCID: 0000-0002-5501-6718, Pickford, R. ORCID: 0000-0001-9741-6923 and Fearnall-Williams, H. ORCID: 0000-0002-4183-4840, 2020. How do licensing regimes limit worker interests? Evidence from informal employment in Britain. Economic and Industrial Democracy. ISSN 0143-831X

1293049_a411_Clark.pdf - Published version

Download (270kB) | Preview


Informalized workplaces are a growing presence in the UK, for example, hand car washes frequently house informalized low-wage, precarious workers who are paid less than the minimum wage and who experience other forms of labour market exploitation. These ‘new’ forms of work and the related informalization of work appear to challenge the embedded interplay between formal institutions and agency. Our contribution to new knowledge advances three areas of discussion. Firstly, what enables informalized workplaces to remain apparently unregulated? Secondly, in contrast to other locations why is there is no collective hybrid form of representation and resistance at car washes in the UK? Thirdly, how do licensing schemes for car washes have the potential to marginalize worker interests?

Item Type: Journal article
Alternative Title: Evidence from informal employment in Britain
Publication Title: Economic and Industrial Democracy
Creators: Clark, I., Hunter, J., Pickford, R. and Fearnall-Williams, H.
Publisher: Sage
Date: 17 February 2020
ISSN: 0143-831X
Rights: © the author(s) 2020
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Schools > School of Social Sciences
Record created by: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 21 Feb 2020 11:23
Last Modified: 25 Feb 2020 11:41

Actions (login required)

Edit View Edit View


Views per month over past year


Downloads per month over past year