- 2 DEC 1997

FOR REFERENCE ONLY

40 0671706 0

ProQuest Number: 10182991

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.



ProQuest 10182991

Published by ProQuest LLC (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.

All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106 – 1346

A NATION AT EASE WITH ITSELF?
IMAGES OF BRITAIN
AND THE ANGLO–BRITISHNESS DEBATE
1979–1994.

STEVEN LAWRENCE JONES

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of the Nottingham Trent University
for the degree of Ph.D.

April 1995

SLC
Ref.

Stories about places are makeshift things. They are composed with the world's debris ... Things *extra* and *other* (details and excesses coming from elsewhere) insert themselves into the accepted framework, the imposed order. One thus has the very relationship between spatial practices and the constructed order. The surface of this order is everywhere punctured and torn open by ellipses, drifts and leaks of meaning:
it is a sieve–order.
Michel de Certeau

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

List of Illustrations v.

Abstract vii.

INTRODUCTION: *Democracy & Proper Drains*

1. Introduction 1.

2. Opening up the 'Britishness' Debate 6.

3. Towards a Method: Cultural Studies & British Identity 37.

CHAPTER ONE: *Landscapes & Figures: Travel, Documentary & the Construction of British National Identity*

1. Introduction 52.

2. The British Travelogue, Nationality & Modernity
    a. Sensibility & the National Culture 55.
    b. Darkest England 57.
    c. Suburbs & Spare Time 61.

3. Symbolising Boundaries
    a. Introduction 74.
    b. Home & No Home 76.
    c. Care in the Community 84.
    d. Looking Out to Sea 89.
        i. Past Swan Hunter's, Hawthorn Leslie's, Armstrong's 91.
        ii. Hunting Mr. Happiness 95.
    e. Crossing Cultures 98.

4. Perspectives
    a. The Long Shot of History 101.
    b. Two Way Street 103.

5. Bystanders & Witnesses 109.

CHAPTER TWO: *Thrusters & Toffs: Men's Magazines, British Bodies & National Identity*

1. Introduction 123.

2. Background
   a. Pretenders to Taste 1945–65 126.
   b. British Men's Magazines pre–1980 129.
   c. Style Comes to Britain 1980– 132.

3. Irony & Parody
   a. Refusing to Take it Seriously 142.
   b. Embracing 'Postmodernism' 143.

4. Reinventing the Body
   a. The Challenge of Feminism 146.
   b. Yuppie Culture & the New Lad 150.
   c. New Male Bodies & the New Consumer Nation 156.

5. The New Male Body & Consensus Politics
   a. Political Parties & Male Image 161.
   b. The Lumpen Body & Betraying the Nation 164.

6. National Ideals
   a. Flirting with the Foreign 170.
   b. The Voice of Authority 172.

7. Conclusion: Projecting the Metropolis 178.

CHAPTER THREE: *Missing the Cricket: Nostalgic Screen Fictions & National Cinema*

1. Introduction 192.

2. National Film & Heritage Britain
    a. Sneering at Sebastian: heritage studies, narrative & film
        i. Gut Reactions 195.
        ii. Subject Positions; the imaginary Briton 197.
        iii. Codifying Heritage 200.
        iv. Narratives & Heritage 207.
    b. Defenders of the Faith: demands for a national film 211.

3. Themes, Issues & the Mise–en–Scene
    a. Queers & Traitors 216.
    b. Prelapsarian Histories: periodising the Fall 225.
        i. Before the Big Guns 226.
        ii. Yield to Dull Repose 228.
        iii. Brave New World
            A. Workers & Victims 235.
            B. Sex & Snobbery 242.
    c. Opera, Literature & Commodity: Forster on Film 245.

4. Conclusion: Other Histories 255.

AFTERWORD: *Post-National Identities.* 272.

1. A Dreadful Schism in the British Nation 273.

2. Regionalism, Britsoc & the Everyday 300.

FILMOGRAPHY 310.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 316.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS **Following Page**

Chapter One

1.1 Galton *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development* 60

1.2 Humphrey Spender, untitled photograph from the Worktown project (Bolton 1937–38) 67

1.3 Bill Brandt, Northumbrian Miner from *The English at Home* 69

1.4 Martin Parr "Garden Open Day" from *The Cost of Living* 78

1.5 Martin Parr "Conservative Midsummer Madness" from *The Cost of Living* 78

1.6 Martin Parr "Craft Fair" from *The Cost of Living* 78

1.7 Martin Parr "Milton Keynes" from *The Cost of Living* 79

1.8 Chris Schwarz, from *Down & Out* 82

1.9 Chris Schwarz, from *Down & Out* 83

1.10 John Sturrock, from "Purity & Danger", *Ten.8* 88

1.11 John Sturrock, from "Purity & Danger", *Ten.8* 88

1.12 John Sturrock, from "Purity & Danger", *Ten.8* 88

1.13 Chris Kilip, "Don't Vote" from *In Flagrante* 92

1.14 Chris Kilip, "Tyne Pride" from *In Flagrante* 92

1.15 Martin Parr, from *The Last Resort* 97

1.16 Martin Parr, from *The Last Resort* 97

1.17 John Davies from *A Green & Pleasant Land* 102

1.18 John Davies from *A Green & Pleasant Land* 102

1.19 Ingrid Pollard, from the Pastoral Interlude Series 105

1.20 Ingrid Pollard, from the Pastoral Interlude Series 105

1.21 Nick Waplington, from *Living Room* 109

1.22 Nick Waplington, from *Living Room* 109

Chapter Two

2.1 *Punch* 4 March 1925 "Perils of the Dance" 130

2.2 *Punch* 1 April 1925 "Crossing the Road – 1925" 130
2.3 *Punch* 7 January 1925 "Pardonable Mistake..." 130
2.4 *Arena* 30, "The Professionals" 147
2.5 *Arena* 30, "The Professionals – Malcolm McLaren" 147
2.6 *Arena* 38 "Vibrant Notting Hill" 155
2.7 *Arena* 38 "El Morocco" 157
2.8 *Arena* 38 "El Morocco" 157
2.9 *Arena* 29 "On the Town" 157
2.10 *Arena* 30 "Looking the Business" 157
2.11 *Arena* 30 "Looking the Business" 157
2.12 *GQ* 1 "Suitable Colours" 158
2.13 *GQ* 1 "Suitable Colours" 158
2.14 Graham Smith, from *The Commercial Pub* 168
2.15 Graham Smith, from *The Commercial Pub* 168
2.16 *GQ* 30 Canali Advertisement 171
2.17 *GQ* 30 Armani Advertisement 171
2.18 *Arena* 39 "This Gun's for Ire" 171
2.19 *GQ* 1 "Another Country" 174
2.20 *GQ* 1 "Another Country" 174
2.21 *Arena* 39 "Blue Moods" 175

ABSTRACT

A Nation at Ease with Itself? Images of Britain and the Anglo–Britishness Debate 1979–1994

A thesis submitted by Steven Jones in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Ph.D.

This thesis attempts to excavate the contested ground of British cultural identity in the 1980s and 1990s through a series of contingently related images and narratives of nationhood. In the tradition of left–wing analysis it interrogates notions of place, race, belonging and representation, while at the same time problematising some of the positions associated with this form of critique. Assumptions about the pervasiveness of a dominant ideology of nationhood are studied and challenged.

The thesis suspends a series of images and ideas of Britain in a more dialogical relationship with one another than conceptual or analytical frameworks generally provide. Following an introductory review of the Britishness debate, three original case studies negotiate issues of identity formation in the recent past, concentrating on the production and dissemination of particular cultural forms.

Chapter One discusses the emergence of a new documentary movement in contemporary Britain, which takes the documentary tradition of the 1930s as its point of departure. The chapter considers the different ways in which travellers have attempted to portray the nation and map its boundaries, questioning the privileged, distanced gaze that has typified 'images of Britain' and its political homologies.

Chapter Two considers the position of the male body in the formation of national identity, specifically in relation to men's style magazines. Male and national identities have often been elided, and this chapter shows that such an association is constructed and historically variable.

Chapter Three addresses the construction of the past in recent British screen fictions. 'Heritage' has attracted a wide literature, much of it censorious. The chapter problematises such a monolithic reading by suggesting that the representation of, and response to, past times is divergent and contested.

An afterword suggests the difficulties in notions of epistemological synthesis and indicates some of the contours of emergent post–national British identities.

INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRACY & PROPER DRAINS

We are a nation of mixed blood, that has inherited the most marvellous traditions of speech, of language, of ideas, of freedom. But somehow we're ready to bow and scrape to the most inadequate, mediocre hierarchy in the world. And we think that our troubles are due to what they do to us. In fact, they're due to us letting them do those things to us.
Tony Benn[1]

Comrades, why does one love one's country? Because the bread tastes better there, the sky is higher, the air smells better, voices sound stronger, the ground is easier to walk on. Isn't that so?
Bertolt Brecht[2]

Nationalism is an infantile disease.
It is the measles of mankind.
Albert Einstein[3]

Brutishness
Spellcheck correction for 'Britishness'

1. INTRODUCTION

On 19 October 1986, Peregrine Worsthorne, editor of the *Sunday Telegraph*, printed an article about the state of the nation in his newspaper's magazine ("My Country, Right or Wrong?"). Worsthorne proposed the thesis that Britain (which he calls England when he wishes to signal special approval) now displays "more cause for shame than pride"; that the "territory is changed out of all recognition", that "punks make me sick (and) *Guardian* women are another source of intense disgust"; that apart from a few months during the Falklands War, Britain and he no longer had anything in common, except for some of "the old" – the monarchy, Parliament, Oxbridge, friends, colleagues and clubs such as the Garrick and the Beefsteak.

In the manner of such 'culture and society' interventions, Worsthorne's pronouncements were quickly circulated. The *Sun* printed a shorter version of the piece on 24 October, and asked its readers, "What do you think about life

around you today? Do punks make you sick? Do you think the Falklands War was the only thing to unite us recently? Has the Great really gone out of Britain?"

Whatever *Sun* readers thought, the readership of the *Sunday Telegraph* responded favourably to the beguiling chords of Worsthorne's article. On 26 October, 178 letters applauded the piece, with only five against. Frank Kennedy of Somerset identified the BBC as "the real enemy in our midst." Alan Kean of Hampstead saw "hordes of immigrants who, far from embracing our way of life, seem bent on forcing us to embrace theirs."[4]

Looking at this polemic, and the attention it generated, nine years later, such right–wing defeatism seems odd. From the perspective of 1995, the years 1985–1987 can be mapped as the *highpoint* of the Thatcher years, a period of economic boom and of unprecedented assault on post–war consensus politics, welfarism and libertarianism, accompanied by massive ideological work designed to "put the 'Great' back into Great Britain" (to quote a 1980s Tory Party campaign slogan). "My Country Right or Wrong?" was therefore published at what seemed to be, from a right–wing perspective, a regenerative moment in Britain's post–war history. In other words it was written before Black Monday in October 1987; before the art market crash and the demise or mutation of a series of 1980s' icons and entrepreneurs; before two separations precipitated a crisis in the popularity of the Royal Family; above all before Mrs. Thatcher's ejection from office in mid–November 1990.

My purpose in outlining this incident is threefold. Firstly, Worsthorne's article parades some of the tropes of nationhood which have been rightly and systematically criticised by left intellectuals from the New Left period onwards. Worsthorne's explicit racism (he writes of a lack of "affinity...with many of the new immigrants to this country"), his snobbery and fatalism, are positions which have been seen as consonant with, sometimes constitutive of, a prevailing discourse of 'Britishness'. This thesis is written within that tradition of critique,

at the same time critically examining some of the assumptions on which the tradition is founded.

Secondly, the conjunctural disparity between Worsthorne's *faux*–fatalism and the triumphalism of the British right in 1986 is suggestive of problems both with notions of representation and with a synchronic field of study. This thesis is located within a fairly short historical period – the years since Mrs. Thatcher's first election victory – but the crisis of Britishness speaks to a longer history and sometimes appears relatively autonomous of the historical terrain in which it has been variously articulated. Although the dialectic between 'conservatism' and 'change' has been particularly intense since 1979, these years might equally be contextualised as part of processes which began in the Second World War, or, to take a longer perspective, the 1880s. This magnification of historical scale should give pause to anyone who might take contemporary representations of the nation as symptomatic or reflective of the current political landscape. Worsthorne's diatribe and the responses to it invoke old anxieties whose 'fit' with existing forms of political articulation is imprecise and inconsistent. The 'common sense' which guides such representations of the nation may not, in Gramsci's term, bear an 'inventory', but it does bear the marks of the fractured and contradictory history which has seen its genesis.

Related to this notion of a fractured conservative common sense is a third suspicion, running throughout this thesis, of taking dominant ideologies as unified or monolithic. The mantric repetition of 'Thatcherism' in the 1980s served to disguise a conflicting array of groups and individuals loosely allied under the banner of contemporary conservatism. For many of these people, cultural or personal conservatism predominates over the economic or party–political, yet, with some notable exceptions, little effort has been made to separate these categories. Despite my profound suspicions about some of the images and ideas of nationhood worked through in this thesis, I have tried to follow Alison Light in resisting the temptation to treat these phenomena as wholly reducible to the symptoms of a particular neoconservative construction:

> The identification of common ideological concerns and transhistorical preoccupations which mark out the boundaries of what we call conservative, sometimes highly politicised, sometimes not – a commitment to family life, to the idea of nationhood, to the notion of necessary authority and so forth – is only the beginning of historical and political analysis...[T]he challenge lies in seeing how the expression of these beliefs constantly changes, the capacity of conservatism to alter its shape whilst remaining recognisably the same animal. Not one of its ideological or conceptual clothes has been the properties of the Tories alone nor have they been *per se* notions which have always worked against change.[5]

A further challenge lies in admitting that some of these concerns *matter* to the writer. There has been a common tendency to write about 'Britishness' as though it were nothing more than a well–organised species of false consciousness, systematically naturalising and obliterating a plethora of exploitative histories. This thesis attempts a less censorious form of critique, conscious of Schleiermacher's conception of philosophy as a *dialectical* treatment of myth. Rather than viewing images of Britain as morbid emanations – what Brian Doyle has termed the "Ain't it Awful" tendency in British cultural studies[6] – this thesis presumes to live up to some Althusserian idea of ideology as relations lived meaningfully (and not just meaninglessly) within the constraints of a repressive social system. Perhaps paradoxically, this emphasis on lived ideology necessitates some rehabilitation of the humanist tradition within Marxism, often dismissed for its indulgence of dangerously universalizing concepts. In *Towards 2000* (1985), for example, Raymond Williams writes of the ways in which emotions have often been dismissed by conventional Marxism as irrational and obfuscatory:

> It is in what it dismisses as 'emotional' – a direct and intransigent concern with actual people – that the old consciousness most clearly shows its bankruptcy. Emotions, it is true, do not produce commodities. Emotions don't make the accounts add up differently. Emotions don't alter the hard relations of power. But where people actually live, what is specialized as 'emotional' has an absolute and primary significance.[7]

Again, my purpose is not to absurdly valorise emotions as necessarily positive, but to argue that emotions and identities are negotiated and contested

phenomena whose 'meanings' are not automatically inscribed within them. This was given particular urgency in late 1993 with the election of Derek Beackon, a British National Party councillor, in an Isle of Dogs by–election. In the massive ensuing mobilisation of opposition to the NF/BNP, the issue of 'Britishness' was one of the major sites of heated discussion; was national identity 'essentially' complicit with racism and monoculture, or were there other traditions that might be mobilised *against* such exclusionary politics? Without wishing to position the experiential or autobiographical as some 'authentic' ground on which to form a philosophy, I have found it occasionally necessary to look at my own lived relation to this ideology, to admit, like Benjamin, that "a native's book about his city will always be related to memoirs; the writer has not spent his childhood there in vain." What Benjamin did not say is that the 'city' has always–already been written about, ordered, described and dissected. It is to this dissection that I turn next.

2. OPENING UP THE "BRITISHNESS" DEBATE

a.

In this review of the literature that has defined the Britishness debate, I propose to move from a general discussion of nationhood and national identity, through problems and contradictions in the formation and maintenance of contemporary Britishness to the specific instance of the manipulation of the discourse of nationhood by the dominant bloc since the mid–1970s. If this narrative movement appears suspiciously like the kind of conservatism/Conservatism elision that I have just criticised, then I can only plead that throughout the rest of the thesis I try to avoid such a monolithic perspective. At the same time I try to introduce some sense of the oppositional uses and approaches to nationhood and their dialogical relationship with more publicised or mobilising forms.

b.

Where Walter Bagehot could once say that nations are "as old as history"[8] the past two decades have seen a transformation of the study of nations and nationalism. Debate in British academic circles has generally focused on six salient texts: Tom Nairn *The Break-up of Britain*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger *The Invention of Tradition*, Ernest Gellner *Nations and Nationalism*, Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities*, David Lowenthal *The Past is a Foreign Country* and Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*[9]. For all their differences, these works agree that nations are cultural inventions peculiar to the modern world: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self–consciousness", writes Gellner, "it invents nations where they do not exist."[10] None of the books deny that there were numerous tribes and peoples with a strong sense of territoriality long before the onset of modernity, but they would classify these, with Hobsbawm as "proto–nationalisms" or, in Gellner's terms, as examples of patriotism rather than nationalism: "Patriotism is a perennial part of human life." Nationalism, on the other hand, "is a distinctive species of patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive and dominant only under certain social conventions, which in fact prevail in the modern world and

nowhere else."[11] Modern nationhood is connected with a politics, or at least a rhetoric, of popular sovereignty: "the arrival of nationalism in a distinctively modern sense", writes Tom Nairn, "was tied to the political baptism of the lower classes."[12] Certainly the pageantry and pomp of nationhood – the sports teams, anthems, libraries, galleries and museums – are phenomena that have been fashioned during the last two centuries, though their connection with the popular might at times seem tenuous. As Peter Taylor has noted, the unique feature of Anglo–British nationalism is that it explicitly *avoids* the politics of the people.[13]

There are two major problems with this "invention of tradition" school. Firstly, as Patrick Wright and Tim Putnam have argued, the identification of construction operates as a kind of limit to discourse: "Meanings may well be constructed, but we only gain from saying this if we use the observation as a starting point rather than a conclusion."[14] Much recent criticism of heritage offers no more than the belief that because a tradition is constructed, it is also false. The assumption tends to be that what Bagehot calls the "theatrical show" of nationhood holds the masses in awe – but this is surely an inadequate account of the workings of ideology.

Secondly, this form of historicism tends to privilege consciousness over lived relations in the experience of nationhood. At times this can offer some illuminating and enabling insights. Jonathan Rée[15], for example, has adapted Sartre's distinction (outlined in *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, 1960) between atomised, individualised *series* and sustaining but defensive *groups* to point out some of the necessary limitations in any collective or national identity. At other times, however, this psychologism masks a certain condescension. Tom Nairn, for example, has written that "'Nationalism' is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as 'neurosis' in the individual, with much the same essential ambiguity attaching to it, a similar built–in capacity for descent into dementia, rooted in the dilemma of helplessness thrust upon most of the world (the equivalent of infantilism for societies) and largely incurable."[16]

My intention here is not to advance lived relations as somehow more trustworthy than 'theory' (a manifestation of what Nairn splenetically calls "paltry English 'Empiricism'"[17]) but to resist an easy psychologism of the apparently irrational. Clearly, the lived experiences of national identity involve tacit sets of beliefs and assumptions, some of which are manifestly false. But even the most pernicious bodies of knowledge generally encode, in however mystifying a way, genuine needs and desires: however "systematically distorted" an ideology is, it must communicate to its social subjects a version of the real which is recognisable enough not to be simply rejected out of hand. Equally, while it may be false and often damaging to generalize about the qualities possessed by one's own nation, or by other nations, it is hardly "neurotic" or "infantile" and under certain circumstances it may even be very useful to do so. My practice, therefore, rather than dismiss images and ideas of national identity *tout court*, has been to historicize some of these seemingly transhistorical (or transmodern) tendencies: to ask not whether they are true or false, but whose interests does this will to create and submit to a transcendent idea of nationhood serve.

Benedict Anderson's volume on nations as "imagined communities" offers much in this respect. Although Anderson's proposition that the nation "is an imagined political community – and imagined as both limited and sovereign"[18] seems to veer towards idealism, he goes on to write that the processes of imagination which concern him, though they are not to be assimilated to "fabrication" or "falsity" are a matter of "creation", of material process. This creativity is the province of various groups (insurgent colonial vanguards, creole élites) but its paradigm instance for Anderson (as for Hegel and Habermas) is the thoroughly bourgeois ritual of reading a daily newspaper:

> The significance of this mass ceremony...is paradoxical. It is performed in silent privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion...the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his

> subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life.[19]

But, as Jonathan Rée remarks, it is only the very coolest of nationalists who will pride themselves on belonging to a nation of newspaper readers. Moreover, the newspaper itself is a more contested form than Anderson allows. The imagined national communion of readers of the *Daily Worker* was surely substantially different from that of the *Daily Telegraph*, and different again from the readers of newspapers for whom the nation is seen through a distinctive regional lens. Despite its impressive range of scholarship, Anderson's analysis is insufficiently sensitive to spatial and historical differences between manifestations of the imagined community. Carried away by the broad arch of modernity, he is prepared to say that, "the idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation."[20] Rather, to adopt another of Benjamin's aphorisms, the articulation of nationhood typically involves seizing "hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger." It is this sense of threat or contestation that gives each manifestation of national identity its conjunctural, "created" distinctiveness. The *esse* of nationhood may well be *imaginari*, but this, as for Lacan, is "the beginning of the symbolic, of representation, the infinitely renewable source of desire, memory, myth, search, discovery"[21], above all, of struggle. To flesh this out somewhat, I propose to move from nations in general to the concrete instance of 'Britishness'.

c.

Before following the new historians of nationality in considering Britishness as coeval with modernity, it is illuminating to map out some of the longer historiography of national identity. As Raphael Samuel rightly remarks[22], the roots of nationalism or patriotism are being perpetually (re)discovered by cultural historians, and several of the pre–modern figures of nationhood – language, ethnicity and institutions – continue to impact on modern constructions.

Despite twentieth century pronouncements on the homogeneity of the English 'race', the elusiveness of a national stock has long been acknowledged. The peculiarity of celebrating aristocratic (i.e. Norman) roots was noticed in a celebrated satire on national pride, Daniel Defoe's *True-Born Englishman* (1701):

> And here begins the Ancient pedigree
> That so exalts our poor nobility:
> 'Tis that from some *French* Trooper they derive,
> Who with the Norman Bastard did arrive...
> For *Englishmen* to boast of Generation
> Conceals their Knowledge, and lampoons the Nation
> A *True-Born Englishman*'s a Contradiction
> In Speech an Irony, in Fact a Fiction.[23]

Defoe's Englishman comes from "a Mongrel half–bred race". Originally he had been "in eager Rapes, and furious Lust begot/ Betwixt a Painted *Britton* and a *Scot*." Then he had been adulterated with "new Mixtures.../ Infus'd betwixt a *Saxon* and a *Dane*," and meanwhile, to spice the "nauseous Brood" his "rank daughters, to their Parents just,/ Receiv'd all Nations with Promiscuous Lust." It is striking that, writing nearly a century before the conventional onset of modernity, Defoe should so emphasise the 'creativity' and absence of anteriority in the national makeup.

Attendant upon this question of heterogeneous ethnicity was the emergence of a hybrid and protean language. Hugh Seton–Watson (1977) has offered the emergence of a vernacular juridical, religious and literary language as the crucial moment in the formation of a unified and popular national identity, prefiguring Anderson's idea of the newly 'horizontal' community by some two centuries:

> For hundreds of thousands, if not perhaps for all, subjects of the Crown, loyalty was now given not only to feudal superior, or church, or distant sovereign, but to the nation: the links which bound the population together were not only vertical but horizontal.[24]

Yet the adoption of modern English is not as conflict–free as this implies. Not

only did and do a variety of other languages, dialects and idiolects survive *within* the boundaries of Anglo–Britain but, through Britain's imperial expansion, 'English' came to be spoken as a first language by many people who would never come near the country from which it got its name, and who frequently had a contested relationship with the metropolitan centre. This has given rise to some interesting political uses of the language which are by no means consonant with the 'horizontal' conception of a unified but stratified national culture. Rée notes that many Irish nationalists, including Daniel O'Connell, have supported the replacement of Irish by English; Christopher Hitchens (1992) records the bizarre proposal by Churchill that Britain and America adopt Basic English as a step towards ultimate political union.

English has often been constructed as an 'organic' language and literature in contrast to less robust linguistic formations, such as French (Mulhern 1979, Eagleton 1983, Doyle 1989), and this bears a marked resemblance to the historiographical valorisation of Anglo–British institutions as self–regulating and necessarily progressive. Having definitively exploded such a view in *The Whig Interpretation of History* (1931), Herbert Butterfield then went on to produce one of its most seminal texts in *The Englishman & His History* (1944), a panglossian narrative of national history as quiet negotiation. That seventeenth century Britain was, as Christopher Hill has shown, quite familiar with violent and doctrinaire change, does not impinge on what Butterfield calls "the English system of moderation and compromise":

> English institutions have century upon century of the past lying fold upon fold within them...Because we English have maintained the threads between past and present we do not, like some younger states, have to go hunting for our own personalities. We do not have to set about the deliberate manufacture of a national consciousness, or to strain ourselves...to create a 'nationalism' out of the broken fragments of tradition, out of the ruins of a tragic past.[25]

Butterfield's naturalizing image of (predominantly) civil society has helped to sustain a political imaginary which would generally prefer the ideological and repressive state apparatuses to look like "part of the landscape of English life,

like our country lanes or our November mists or our historic inns."[26] This seamless passage from the immemorial past was gently satirised by two upper–class teachers of upper–class English boys, W.C. Sellar and R.J. Yeatman in *1066 and All That* (1930), but such facetiousness only served to confirm the robustness of the national construction. As Rée points out, "only the Top Nation could afford to make jokes about being the Top Nation."[27]

d.

Although the 'long' view of history satirised by Sellar and Yeatman may have had some influence on British self–conception, it is clear that a genuinely *popular* national identity could not be built upon such 'limited imaginings' as the movement of British institutional life or the robustness of the native language. Indeed, the issue of how Anglo–British national identity was constructed and disseminated as a popular politics has largely been ignored or suppressed in favour of the study of the position and philosophies of intellectuals or élites in the national culture. Before returning to national identity as a popular phenomenon, therefore, I want to outline the lineaments of a continuing debate over the dominance of apparently competing ideologies in national life: in other words whether Anglo–British identity is characterised by a commitment to an 'empirical' world view or a 'romantic' one. I want to look at how this polarity has been constructed and how to some extent the two terms can be shown to complement one another, what Wiener (1981) has called "the Janus face of modern English culture."[28]

As Iain Chambers (1988) notes, while empiricism predates the late eighteenth century, it was given a powerful fillip in British national life by the onset of the Industrial Revolution, where what appeared to be the direct application of scientific principles was transforming the natural, economic and social terrain. In this context an ideology of empirical pragmatism was constructed and maintained: the world was to be continually verified not by 'theory' but by a positivist intelligence. Knowledge is constructed in what you can touch, sense, feel and physically transform. In contrast with *a priori* speculation, the glory of

British life was its very untheoretical nature. Despite its links with positivist science, however, this form of pragmatism was distinctively untestable, relying for authority on the 'mythicizing vagueness' of antique precedent. Faced with the challenge of Jacobinism, Burke countered that the essence of England was its unbroken contact with an ordered past, "an entailed inheritance derived to us from our fore–fathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity" while Arthur Young was typical of a remarkably durable British mainstream in his condemnation of "French theory" and his reliance "merely on experience."[29] Chambers goes on, problematically, to intertwine this ideology with that of imperialism, suggesting a late Victorian highpoint for empiricism:

> [Empiricism] is also imperial. Everything falls within its domain, and is susceptible to its immediate rule. This conception of knowledge, initially encouraged in the latter half of the nineteenth century by a positivist view of science, was extensively endorsed by the very real economic, political and cultural sense of the national and the cultural projection of 'Britishness' that established itself at home and abroad at the same time. The native manner of looking at and understanding the world was the unique way. This native 'common sense', whose gendered and ethnic constructions were easily obscured beneath the neutrality of empirical data, has invariably suggested a secure native sense not only of what constitutes 'knowledge', but also of ethics, ethnicity and nation. But, for all its bluff pragmatism and endorsement of the 'facts', the Victorian attempt continually to establish a moral ground does also suggest a deeper, underlying insecurity; the neurotic suspicion that behind the rational *ratio* of its world there lay in its 'heart of darkness' perhaps altogether more disquieting realities.[30]

As some of the industrial and imperial structures from which empiricism drew its strength waned, so too did confidence in the empirical philosophical programme. Butterfield could still write, in the context of a World War which had seen Britain isolated off the coast of totalitarian Europe, that "the solid body of Englishmen, who throughout the centuries have resisted the wildest aberrations, determined never for speculative ends to lose the good they already possessed"[31] but this splendid isolation was already beginning to look rather fragile. Rée has shown how the origins of the new historiography of nationhood were closely linked to a sustained attack on Anglo–British empiricism. Tom Nairn and Benedict Anderson are both associated with the group (led by Perry

Anderson) which took over the *New Left Review* in 1961 and expelled one of its original leaders – the historian E.P. Thompson who stood accused of "indiscriminate empiricism" (as well, interestingly, as "romantic excess")[32]– meanwhile developing analyses which purported to show that, in comparison with the Continent, British national culture was backward, provincial and incapable of sustaining an authentically progressive politics. Thompson's sketchy, if passionate, defence of empiricism in "Peculiarities of the English" (1965) as an *idiom* rather than an ideology already seemed rather redundant. But equally, to *continue* to characterise British intellectual life as empirical and anti–theoretical seems somewhat perverse. The rise of rigorously theorised authoritarianism, neo–liberalism and neo–conservatism (Edgar, 1984; Hall & Jacques 1984) has offered problems for a left used to characterising the right as denying its own ideologies.

e.

More or less the opposite case to the dominance of a British empiricism can be advanced – also imbricated with the Industrial Revolution but more obviously reacting against it. To use Donald Horne's metaphor, this forms the 'Southern' pole of the national formation:

> In the *Northern metaphor* Britain is pragmatic, empirical, calculating, Puritan, bourgeois, enterprising, adventurous, scientific, serious and believes in struggle. Its sinful excess is a ruthless avarice, rationalized in the belief that the prime impulse in all human beings is a rational, calculating, economic self–interest.
> In the *Southern metaphor* Britain is romantic, illogical, muddled, divinely lucky, Anglican, aristocratic, traditional, frivolous and believes in order and tradition. Its sinful excess is a ruthless pride, rationalized in the belief that men are born to serve.[33]

This polarity can be deconstructed somewhat, and the opposition between North and South is misleading, but Wiener (1981) is surely right to suggest that the 'Southern' pole has been hegemonic since the 1880s, although the roots of English romanticism lie much earlier (Eagleton, 1983; Curran, 1993; Veldman, 1994).[34]

Wiener suggests that in the late Victorian period a structure of feeling focused on stability, tranquillity, closeness to the past and 'nonmaterialism' was constructed, whose nonindustrial and noninnovative qualities were best evidenced by the countryside (or, rather, a regionally specific image of the countryside): "England is the country, and the country is England" in Stanley Baldwin's over–used phrase. In this construction, the Anglo–British character was not 'naturally' progressive, but conservative, and this has become an accepted feature of the new historiography. Johnson (1985) concludes that "the national culture is a Tory culture" while Nairn (1983) despairs that "The real England is irredeemably Tory".[35]

While both comments playfully invoke an older sense of Toryism, they threaten to elide differences between conservatism and Conservatism. British socialism has also had its ruralist fantasies. Wiener writes that "Left–wing intellectuals developed their own variant, the 'English dream' described by Richard Wollheim as: an ideal, in contrast to the American dream of an affluent and assertive individualism, of a collective, unalienated folk society rooted in time and space, bound together by tradition and by stable, local ties, and symbolized by the village."[36]

As I will argue in the next chapter, this romanticism, whether radical or conservative, far from being contemplative often involved an active (and distinctively masculine) *search* for history. Wiener points to the emergence of civic and antiquarian societies which legitimated and revivified the industrial present by stressing continuity with the past ("Manchester" as Professor James Tait stressed in 1904, "is a place of great antiquity"), and the growth of 'pilgrimages' to sites of national–cultural significance. Thus, in travelling through the countryside, the Poet Laureate Alfred Austin's aim was to find:

> *Old* England, or so much of it as is left ... I confess I crave for the urbanity of the Past ... for washing–days, home–made jams, lavender bags, recitation of Gray's *Elegy* and morning and evening prayers. One is offered, in place of them, ungraceful hurry and worry, perpetual postmen's knocks, or intermittent showers of telegrams.[37]

Clearly, some 'sacralization' of the nation is taking place here – the mingling of registers of an intellectual 'high' culture and a pietistic 'low' culture linked by the performative aspects of nationhood – but what is most striking is the Little Englandism of the aspirations, the absence of any manifest racial or national destiny. At the highpoint of Empire, the poet looks nostalgically towards home–made jam as an adequate and resonant metaphor for England! Although Wiener offers interest in the rural aristocracy and gentry as the most common variant of ruralism before World War One, I would suggest that the discourse of village life proved more significant in hegemonising a range of practices and positions. Wiener suggests that this form of myth "was available for those of a more democratic bent", but such a culturalist perspective inadequately explains how similar opinions on the centrality of the village could have been articulated by Morris, a socialist, a patriotic liberal such as H.F.G. Masterman ("the life of old England is the life of the village"[38]) and an anti–democrat as vociferous as Hilaire Belloc ("The English village is what is left of England"[39]).

What is extraordinary about this romantic idiom or ideology is its historical versatility. Wiener effectively maps a twentieth century history of anti–industry, anti–progress Little Englandism. No doubt any scanning of the *Telegraph*, the *Spectator*, the *Field* or *Country Life* (or, with a different inflection, the *Guardian* or the *Listener*) would render up similar pastoral dreams. But Wiener is remarkably unconcerned about English romanticism's specificity: how, for example, romanticism was rearticulated after the First World War (Howkins, 1986; Hardy & Ward 1984); in the face of European fascism (Butterfield, 1944; Calder 1969), in opposition to the arms race (Harrison, 1982; Veldman, 1994) or to continuing calls for cultural modernisation (Light, 1991; Alexander, 1989). He pays close attention to the pronouncements of intellectuals and élite figures but very little to other discourses and practices: *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit* severely limits discussion of English romanticism by staging it as a ruskinite monoculture. There is very little sense of the dialectic between ruralist romanticism and popular modernity that was negotiated in such diverse forms as the Ideal Homes exhibitions, the allotment movement, garden suburbs

or buildings such as Wells Coates' Isokon Building (1934) or Andrew Mazzei's Gallery Bar in Blackpool (1931). Ironically, Wiener (like Hewison, 1987) reveals himself as something of a romantic, fatalistically pursuing a pure "industrial spirit".

Equally, Wiener is rarely prepared to admit the opposite to his case. Thus he notes how Nottingham was discursively constructed as an ancient space but neglects to mention that it also publicised itself as a modernizing and modernist city (Daniels & Rycroft, 1993). His proposition that the entrepreneurial spirit has been progressively 'ruralised' and shaped into aristocratic form is similarly open to question. A different selection of literary and historical sources would demonstrate that the British landowning aristocracy had a tendency not only to marry into the wealth of manufacturing industry but also to invest in it, join its boards and directly to manage it (Stradling 1988).[40] Finally, middle–class ruralism is by no means a uniquely English phenomenon – it is a significant aspect of such bullish industrial economies as Germany and the United States. As with the arguments over the Heritage Industry outlined in Chapter Three, therefore, Wiener's equation between aristocracy, national culture and *la nostalgie de la boue* suggests uniqueness where none exists.

f.

As Jonathan Rée remarks, "not all characteristics of a nation are national characteristics"[41] and this is certainly true of romanticism and (*contra* Hegel) empiricism. But the way in which the dialectic between the two idioms/ideologies has been managed in a national context *is* distinctive and deserves some attention. How can two such apparently diverse philosophies both characterise a distinctive way of life or structure of feeling? And why, despite their rôle as 'national' ideologies, does neither do more than gesture towards a mass politics of nationalism?

A possible answer to this conundrum, advanced by Peter Taylor (1991) lies in a distinction between nationalism and patriotism.[42] The Anglo–British, living

what Tom Nairn calls "the myth of the absence of nationalism", think they express the latter rather than the former: "in England", observed H.M Chadwick in 1945, "patriotism takes the place of nationalism."[43] Patriotism, at least in its modern form[44], tends towards the experiential and impressionistic in contrast to nationalism which is typically a popular movement through which a people are mobilized for the national cause. Thus while patriotism certainly has its moments of mass celebration and confirmation, it is also homologous with a personal and anti–popular structure of feeling where the actual–existing nation may be a source of detestation. Bommes and Wright (1982) and Wright (1985) suggest that the expatriate experience is significant in this respect since it is crucially free of popular contamination and enables the construction and maintenance of contradictory fantasies of national life.

This 'individualist' orientation in Anglo–British patriotism crucially distances it from the overt, tribal signs of nationhood adopted by more 'immature' cultures. "The most anomalous thing about England", says Tom Shippey, "is that it doesn't have the formal marks of national identity acquired even by Iceland or Finland, Luxembourg or Albania. It has no national anthem..It has no national dress..It does have a national flag, but not everyone knows what it is."[45] This is clearly untrue, and deliberately ignores the hegemonic position of England in the Anglo–British construction, but the displacement of national imaginings onto phenomena other than the conventional symbols of nationhood *is* historically significant and its paradigm forms are the landscape and the monarchy.

The management and representation of the English landscape (or rather a regionally and historically specific version of it) gives a particularly clear instance of how the idioms/ideologies 'empiricism–imperialism' and 'romanticism–ruralism' might be dialectically articulated. Bommes and Wright (1983), Lowenthal (1991) and Daniels (1993) have all suggested in different ways that discourses surrounding and constructing the landscape bind together seemingly diverse ideologies under such loaded signifiers as 'cultivation',

'stewardship' and 'improvement'. In post–war Britain the major institution enacting this *rapprochement* has been the National Trust (Wright, 1985; Hewison, 1987) which has negotiated between the absolutist pull of threatened heritage and the compromises necessitated by public access. But, while seeming to invoke an idea of the people, this combination of pragmatism and romanticism actually works against popular access:

> The Trust has 'an embarrassing reputation for underwriting comfortable existences, with nothing asked in return beyond opening a room or two once in a blue moon.' Secretive about its holdings, it is seen to protect tenants and lessees by making many historical gems and landscapes inaccessible. Thousands of 'ghost' properties unmarked on Ordnance Survey maps are omitted from Trust guides. Seen from abroad, the Trust deploys élite expertise to public benefit; seen by the Open Spaces Society chairman, the Trust is an élitist club of art experts dedicated to preserving country houses, [owing to] anti–public sentiments picked up along with ... the feudal values of the land that it has bought and inherited.'[46]

The Trust therefore plays on a distinction in the meaning of the term 'nation', prioritising its symbolic historical–territorial meaning and diminishing the sense of 'nation' as an agglomeration of people (though this too is not unproblematic). This paradoxical populism, where a people are invoked without then being allowed any participation, is a characteristic similarly exemplified by the monarchy, itself a synthesis of the empirical and the romantic[47]. As Judith Williamson (1985) notes, "the key to the great significance and popularity of Royalty is that they are at once like us and not like us ... because their only difference from us is precisely that they *are* Royal, the royal family has a quite unique rôle in social representation: they are ourselves writ large, they are the ordinary held up for everyone to see."[48] This rather echoes Trotsky's observation that "monarchy is by its very principle bound up with the personal." But, for a country which regularly pays lip–service to democratic ideals, this variant of populism is profoundly *un*democratic. Unlike, for example, the American president who shows, in theory, what the average person can achieve, the royal family "represent us by sheer analogy". The appeal of this, Williamson stresses, suggests something of the popular dissatisfaction with

modernity.

> The ideologies underlying this acceptance pre–date the bourgeois–protestant ethic in which people rise or fall by their own merits and labours and ... incorporate something of the pre–capitalist order.[49]

Yet the monarchy has itself been constantly re–invented during the period of industrialism, symbolically negotiating the dialectic between a romantic orientation towards the past and an empirical–imperial orientation in the present. David Cannadine (1979) has outlined four distinct phases in this development. Firstly, a period from the 1820s–1877 in which the display of monarchy was largely inept and unpopular; secondly the years from 1877 until the First World War in which the techniques of monarchic and imperial display were refined; thirdly a period until 1953 in which other European monarchies disappeared and the British could persuade themselves that they were leaders in the field of monarchy and monarchic display, and finally, since 1953, a period in which Britain's relative decline, coupled with increased exposure, has again altered the 'meaning' of monarchy.

This periodization does not offer much towards an understanding of the relationship between monarchy and identity – crown subjects are present only as dupes of a theatrical show, not as makers of meaning in their own right. Perhaps in order to understand how the monarchy at times effectively cements competing forces, groups and discourses in a predominantly individualist patriotic formation, one needs to look at ethnographic work such as the Mass–Observation Day Survey of Coronation Day in 1937 (Jennings & Madge 1937), Brian Masters' esoteric *Dreams About Her Majesty the Queen and Other Members of the Royal Family* (1973), or Ziegler's *Crown & People*, which devotes a chapter to the letters received by Willie Hamilton M.P. after the publication of *My Queen and I* in 1975.

Nairn (1988) develops the anxious, phobic aspect of these works in order to argue that far from providing a unifying, populist sign around which the

competing aspects of the nation might cohere, the monarchy actually offers a kind of nul–signifier. Since it is itself entirely devoid of meaning – literally unspeakable – it is paradoxically consensual in its action, binding people, parties and places together with a 'magic':

> What the taboo does is localize the fear of alien powers, and prescribe ritual antidotes. Particular 'danger spots' are chosen as the terrain of symbolic confrontation and exorcism. The whole situation can then be 'rendered free from danger by dealing with or, rather, avoiding the specified danger spots completely'. Such 'abstentive behaviour' bestows special meaning on the chosen object or institution: a magic comes to seem inherent in them. Visitors and outsiders may not understand this 'irrational' identification, because they do not share the community inwardness it represents. The point is that 'belonging' has come to be built around it, both as endearing familiarity with what is and (more significant) dread of alien forces or changes. Anything which changes it might change everything.[50]

Nairn goes on to describe this taboo or fetish in Freudian terms and suggests that those who see the monarchy as little more than harmless are themselves in denial or disavowal of the fetish. The extent to which this analogy may be sustained is debatable (how, for example, could the scene of analysis be applied to the national formation?) but the emphasis on the unspeakable or liminal point of nationhood is instructive. Rather than being a coherent set of discourses and practices, is Britishness constructed largely out of silences, misinterpretations and unspoken antagonisms? In reviewing this area, I want to focus the debate around two issues: the name of the nation, and the significance of race.

g.

Until now this thesis has reflected the standard indecision about what to call the nation by flitting nervously between 'England/English', 'Britain/British' and 'Anglo–Britain/Anglo–British'. This needs some historicization. Writing in 1940,

Orwell observed that: "We call our islands by no less than six different names. England, Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom and, in very exalted moments, Albion."[51] This indeterminacy over the boundaries and nomenclature of the nation has featured significantly in recent literature. Nairn (1977), Robbins (1984; 1988), Steed (1986), Kearney (1989; 1991), Lowenthal (1991), Crick (1991), Taylor (1991) and Rée (1992) all note the problems associated with naming the nation. Explanations for the resurgence of this 'United Kingdom Question' are various (the renewed war in Northern Ireland after 1969, demands for some sort of sovereignty in Wales and Scotland, the withdrawal from empire, the settlement by Commonwealth subjects etc.) but there is a general agreement that the question of *English* 'national' identity has been inadequately discussed. When Michael Steed[52] asks "what is England", he comes up with a variety of possible answers, without reaching any conclusive definition. The territorial definition is, Steed believes, very little used. Thus from a Scottish perspective, England comprises England and Wales, although the Welsh view things rather differently. Equally, the cultural reproduction of England *in* England tends towards a regionally specific image equatable with Horne's Southern register of national qualities.

While the grander perception of the English as central to a worldwide linguistic community may have passed out of favour, there is still a residual perception of England providing moral or cultural leadership to more unsophisticated nations. Hitchens (1992) has shown how atlanticism continues to bolster the illusion that the English have geopolitical influence as "Greece to America's Rome."

By far the most common use of 'England', however, is as a proxy for 'Britain'. As Orwell recognised, England is one of a variety of names for the territorial expanse that currently comprises Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and various islands. Other quasi–synonyms for this expanse include Great Britain (which omits Northern Ireland), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (only used in formal situations) and "the UK" which does not

lend itself to personal identification (hence Neil Ascherson and Tom Nairn's sardonic and attractive coinage of the neologism "Ukania"[53]). None of these terms make reference to the few remnants of Empire, which have been treated with varying degrees of embarrassment and/or covetousness since 1979.

In this thesis, while I have unconsciously used 'English' and 'British' as interchangeable terms, my understanding in all cases is of an *Anglo-British* construction, which emphasises the hegemonic position of England in a fairly fluent and mobile *British-imperial* culture. There are certainly limits to this hegemony – the sometimes coercive maintenance of sovereignty in Northern Ireland, for example – but I would not go so far as Jonathan Rée in arguing that the political unity of Anglo–Britain has been solely or mainly achieved by English military force. Rather, I would suggest (following Harold Laski) that power in Britain is, and has been, generally federal and that some features of the national culture (the imbrication with imperialism for example, or the struggle against European fascism) are no less pertinent to Wales or the Channel Islands than they are to England: "We have a multinational history", as Hugh Kearney puts it[54], even though power is distributed unevenly through the multinational formation.

At the same time as acknowledging the hegemonic position of England in Anglo–Britain, England's own regional hierarchies and hegemonic poles need to be conceded (the shifting hegemonic position of London is one of the recurring motifs of this thesis). A fuller description of the hegemonic form of national identity would emphasise the position of "Upper England" (Taylor 1991, 150) or the "Crown Heartland" (Nairn 1988, 191) as the apex of a territorial hierarchy, wielding unequal power in the national formation. As Johnson (1985) notes:

> It makes sense ... to view British society as a series of concentric circles which are both social and geographic in their nature. To be at the epicentre – in the royal enclosure at Ascot or on the boards of the great merchant banks – is not just a matter of being socially and economically upper class, but also, in a sense, more English. The real outer groups

> are not just the poor, the black or the working class, but those furthest from the geographical epicentre of the South–East. Thus the suburban professional from the South–East stands rather closer to this centre than, say a Welsh, Scottish or North–Eastern entrepreneur, even if the latter is somewhat wealthier than the former.[55]

Taylor (1991) goes so far as to argue that even England may be vulnerable to calls for secession and small–nation nationalism, though the form that this would take (or the collectivity who would support such a move) remains unspecified. But this move away from large collectivities to more mobilisable constituencies is analogous to another 'break–up of Britain' theory in which nationality is being replaced by ethnicity. For Hall (1987):

> The slow contradictory movement from 'nationalism' to 'ethnicity' as a source of identities is part of a new politics. It is also part of the 'decline of the West' – that immense process of historical relativization which is just beginning to make the British, at least, feel marginally 'marginal'.[56]

'Ethnicity' provides some purchase on the differences between the four nations of Britain, but it is clear that, beyond regionality, it is *race* which Hall is using as the limit against which Anglo–Britishness has historically measured itself. The tragic dialectic between race and nation has provided a particularly productive literature in recent years which merits some attention.

h.

Race is the lens through which people come
to perceive that a crisis is developing
Stuart Hall[57]

The discourses of nation and people are
saturated with racial connotations.
Paul Gilroy[58]

Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad.
We must be mad, literally mad, to be permitting the annual inflow
of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the
material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population.
It is like watching a nation busily engaged
in heaping up its own funeral pyre.
Enoch Powell[59]

Albino
Spellcheck correction for 'Albion'

Nairn (1977) has argued that racism and nationalism are fundamentally linked in that the former derives from the latter. Arguing with this, Anderson (1983, 186) has suggested that, since nationalism is an inherently relational term, one must look elsewhere for the roots of racism:

> The fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations transmitted from the origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations ... The dreams of racism actually have their origins in the ideologies of class, rather than those of nation.[60]

The optimistic corollary to this separation of phenomena, (linked with Anderson's reliance on print language as the necessary condition of the imagined nation) is that anyone can in theory learn the language of the nation they seek to join and, through the process of naturalization, become a citizen enjoying formal equality under its laws. However, the question of citizenship is far from innocent. Formally, of course, the British are 'subjects' rather than citizens, and this subjection is itself significant, since fealty demands the disavowal of cultural distinctiveness:

> So, for example, black people can become acceptable to Mrs. Thatcher and much of the Conservative Party if they respect a particular sense of 'Britishness'; that is, if they dress, talk, eat, and act as native–born Britons .. They are expected to become the mirror of a homogeneous, white Britain; the invisible men and women of the black diaspora and the post–colonial world who are required to mimic their allotted roles in the interpretative circle to which they have been assigned.[61]

Gilroy (1987) terms this 'ethnic absolutism', a process whereby cultural homogeneity is demanded of non–white cultures and in which, contradictorily, there is an implicit assumption that identities are mutually impermeable and fixed. Such assumptions have found their loudest voice in Enoch Powell. Parliament, for Powell, may change the law, but national sentiment transcends such narrow considerations: "the West Indian does not, by being born in England, become an Englishman. In law he becomes a United Kingdom citizen by birth; in fact he is a West Indian or an Asian still."[62]

Gilroy uses Powell's apparently *outré* pronouncements to provide some purchase on Anglo–Britishness as a genuinely popular politics operating across the broad range of political opinion. The distinction that Powell (and Worsthorne) make between authentic and inauthentic forms of national belonging also appears in the work of Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson and Eric Hobsbawm. All these authors, says Gilroy, concentrate on 'culture' rather than 'race' as the privileged locus of identity. "Apart from pointing out the conspicuous success of nationalist sentiment in renovating the Tory project, few arguments are made which justify the need to make the nation state a primary focus of radical political consciousness. It is as if the only problem with nationalism is that the Tories have secured a near exclusive monopoly of it."[63]

The major problem with nationhood for Gilroy is that "statements about nation are invariably also statements about 'race'" and this has gone almost wholly unacknowledged – British intellectuals stand accused of an act of bad faith. Consequently, the mutually exclusive articulation of race and nation means that attempts to constitute the poor, unemployed or working class as a group *across*

racial lines are rendered problematic through the equation of 'English' (or British) with 'white'.

While I absolutely agree that there is a *volkisch* tradition in Anglo–British life, and that some of the privileged signifiers of nationhood are highly exclusive to non–whites, I am uneasy about the presumed omnipresence of race (mostly as an unspoken category) in statements about national identity. If the discourse of belonging is "saturated" with racial connotations, then where is the space for a form of belonging outside such implications? Nor am I convinced that nationality is always and everywhere concerned with cultural anteriority and homogeneity: I would argue that there is *some* (compromised, problematic) space for the practice and observance of difference. To dismiss the celebration of certain lived or resonant customs and practices as simply "the morbid celebration of England and Englishness" is itself homogenising and absolute.

Gilroy is certainly not insensitive to practices of alliance, heterogeneity and hybridity, but these practices have been most enthusiastically outlined by Dick Hebdige (1974; 1990; 1992) and Diana Jeater (1992). Hebdige has subsequently distanced himself from some of his earlier positions in which new British identities were staged as a struggle "between rebellious goodies and establishment baddies"[64], but many of his observations continue to offer a way of thinking about British identity as mutable and self–reflective, not always enamoured by the discourse of monoculture:

> For the British Empire has folded in upon itself, and the chickens have come home to roost. And as the pressure in the cities continues to mount, the old unities have shattered: the ideal of a national culture transcending its regional components and of a racially proscribed 'British' identity, consistent and unchanging from one decade to the next – these fantasies have started cracking at the seams. More and more people are growing up feeling, to use Colin MacInnes's phrase, 'english half–English.'[65]

or, for Jeater:

> What [a Third Space] meant for me, in political terms, was something to

> do with celebrating the hybrid nature of all Britishness. There was an energy and excitement about the idea of hybrid 'ethnicities'. We would destroy the New Racism and construct a new kind of society, typified, in Homi Bhabha's words, by cultural *difference*, rather than by the liberal construct of cultural diversity. In direct opposition to the New Racism's proposition that cultural identities defined the fundamental divisions between white people and black, we all began to celebrate the complexities and interdependencies of our cultural heritages.[66]

Constructing this 'principle of hope', however, is to anticipate myself somewhat. If the whisper of a heterogeneous, 'hybrid' or 'federal' culture was audible in the 1980s, the louder blast came, as Gilroy and Chambers rightly note, from a different direction.

i.

The significance of four periods of Conservative office on the formation and maintenance of a distinctive national identity has been extensively written about, from a variety of perspectives. In reviewing some of this literature, it seems useful to divide it into work on the origins of contemporary Conservative constructions of nation, their 'performance' and their reception.

The articulation of new national identities by left and right is part of what Gramsci called an 'organic' phenomenon:

> A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves ... and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them within certain limits, and to overcome them. These incessant and persistent efforts ... form the terrain of the conjunctural and it is upon this terrain that the forces of opposition organize.[67]

The forms of the organic crisis in the British state are manifold and protean – long–term economic decline; anxieties over law and order, social order, race and Britain's international position. The efforts to conserve the *status quo* therefore takes place in the 'conjunctural' – the immediate terrain of struggle. As Hall (1983) notes, these efforts cannot be merely defensive, instead "they

will have to be *formative*: aiming at a new balance of forces. The emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new historic bloc, new political configurations and 'philosophies', a profound restructuring of the state and the ideological discourses which construct the crisis and represent it as it is 'lived' as a practical reality ... The 'swing to the right' is not a reflection of the crisis: it is itself a *response* to the crisis."[68]

The response is always in process (hence the various manifestations of Conservatism as the party of 'affluence', 'modernization', decolonization and authoritarianism in the post–war period) and this can lead to some radical discontinuities. But as Bill Schwarz (1986) has shown, the Conservative Party has managed to achieve a measure of continuity in that certain ideological elements have been carried forward into each new formation. Following Laclau (1986) he notes that some of these abstract elements may lie dormant or meaningless until combined in historically specific ways to produce the impression of continuity. Thus, the Conservative Party, associated throughout the 1960s with consensus, Europe and decolonization, could reorganise itself in order to formulate a full political and cultural programme out of another set of signs – *laissez faire*, nationalism and imperialism.

The key to the construction of this unified discourse is its ability to address 'the people' and to establish connections with the lived popular culture. It is for this reason that Laclau introduces the concept of "popular–democratic interpellations" in an attempt to theorize the relations between the popular and the political: "The political project of a party (in its widest sense) is to win cultural and moral leadership by speaking to the people and expanding its objectives and constituency such that it achieves a real popular grounding. The party, then, comes to articulate its own programme as if it were universal, the programme of the people. And in so doing, the party exerts its own cultural authority by constructing the idea of 'the people' in its own image."[69]

Laclau seems here to award the party a particularly machiavellian authority –

the party's relationship with the people is surely more 'dialogical' than this model would allow, and such a dialogue is likely to open up various fissures and contradictions within the national construction which can, on occasion, only be held together by the coercive means at the party's disposal. But there is a strong sense in which British Conservatism since the late 1960s has, as Laclau suggests, attempted to portray itself as speaking directly to the people, in contrast to the abstract bureaucratism of socialism.

Perhaps the most famous recent instance of such a populist move (though without overt party support), intending to turn the 'war of position' into a 'war of movement', was Enoch Powell's Birmingham address of 1968 and the resulting march on Westminster from the East End of London. The ubiquitous Worsthorne writes:

> It was Enoch Powell who first sowed the seeds whose harvest Margaret Thatcher reaped last Thursday. What is now called Thatcherism was originally known as Powellism: bitter–tasting market economics sweetened and rendered palatable to the popular taste by great creamy dollops of nationalistic custard. In his case, immigration control was the custard and it was a bit too rich for any but the strongest digestions. She was lucky to have the Falklands campaign handed to her on a plate, which did the same job much more effectively, turning far fewer stomachs.[70]

Worsthorne is surely right to locate the specific genesis of 'Thatcherism' in the conjuncture of the late 1960s (though other, longer histories are differently significant), a period in which some of the strains of managing the organic crisis of the British state began to show and in which radical movements enjoyed an unprecedented period of organisation, movement and expression. Powell's challenge to the post–war social–democratic consensus was a *response* to this conjuncture and though his career may not have benefitted from the challenge, the Birmingham speech and East End march represent an important moment in the formation of a Tory Right.

David Edgar (1984) has outlined the progress of this right wing after Powell's

speech, seeing in it some of the contradictions that define contemporary Conservatism. The Tory Right can be broadly divided in two: economic liberal groups and groups demanding increased social authoritarianism. The former network includes bodies such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute, the National Association for Freedom and 'middle–class' pressure groups (many, such as the National Association of Ratepayers' Associations, now defunct). Economic liberals have tended towards a faith in free enterprise, following the credos of Hayek (1983) and Friedman that the market is not just an effective vehicle for wealth creation, but an essential and sufficient foundation for the free and therefore good society. To some extent (despite its debt to American and European theorising), this ideology has been reconciled with a vision of national life, specifically the eighteenth century notion of the 'English liberties', but as Curran argues, a more significant strand of thought has come from a bloc of right–*authoritarian* ideologues. Again, this bloc can be divided. On the one hand are a body of neo–conservatives, owing a considerable intellectual debt to neo–cons in the United States, for whom the counter–culture of the 1960s, whether in the form of political radicalism or individual hedonism, was an unmitigated disaster. On the other are traditionalist defenders of the interventionist state; of order and authority against freedom and rights. Curran notes that many of the louder voices in this part of the Tory Right are associated with Peterhouse, Cambridge. Included amongst them are Maurice Cowling and Peregrine Worsthorne, but perhaps the most significant intellectual figure is Roger Scruton, co–editor of the *Salisbury Review* and founder of the Conservative Philosophy Group. Scruton (who has recently been seen indulging in some wieneresque bucolic posturing[71]) holds that the Tory Party has often betrayed Conservatism through an over–emphasis on individual freedom. In contrast:

> the conservative attitude seeks above all for government and regards no citizen as possessed of a natural right that transcends his obligation to be ruled. Even democracy – which corresponds neither to the natural nor to the supernatural yearning of the normal citizen – can be discarded without detriment to the civil well–being.[72]

"Citizen" is a curious choice of word, with its overtones of participation and constitutionalism. Scruton's extremely conservative estimate of most people's ability to understand their society leads him to advance instead a model of *subjection* akin to the master–servant relationships of feudalism and organised religion:

> Society exists through authority, and the recognition of this authority requires the allegiance to a bond that is not contractual but transcendent, in the manner of a family tie. Such allegiance requires tradition and custom through which to find enactment...[73]

Although the parliamentary Conservative Party may have made rhetorical performances out of these monological positions since the mid–1970s (giving the impression of an overwhelming Hard Right in the party), it is clear that they have also had to negotiate *between* ideologies. It is therefore worth asking how Conservatism has shaped this variety of competing forces (economic liberalism, social authoritarianism, residual Conservative formations) into a new definition of Britain and Britishness. Corner and Harvey (1991) have suggested that a dialectic has been established between the privileged signifiers 'enterprise' and 'heritage', which contain some of the force of the ideologies outlined above, but without their tendency towards closure. Other authors have suggested that the New Conservatism has not really attempted or achieved a wholesale 'revolution' at all, simply a series of localised struggles over areas with national–emblematic force, a war of position masquerading as a war of manoeuvre. Gamble (1983) records that Hayek himself urged a war of manoeuvre against the positions of social democracy in 1979, but it is questionable how popular this would have been in the party at the time or subsequently. MacKinnon (1992) suggests that a single–issue agenda is one of the major connecting features of the atlantic New Right: "Overall attitudes emerge by implication and accretion rather than by programmatic assertion."[74]

Although Thatcher–Major Conservatism has at no stage been entirely coherent, whether at the level of discourse or of practice, I would note three fairly consistent and interlocking ideological struggles designed to transform the

internal and external perceptions of Britain and Britishness.

1). A redefinition of what is meant by 'Britain' and 'the British people' (Robbins, 1984; Hall, 1988; Jessop *et al*, 1988; McDowell *et al*, 1989; Johnston, 1991). This involved various divisive measures and discourses designed to exclude groups and regions. Margaret Thatcher's 'swamping' speech and her characterisation of the miners as the "enemy within" and Norman Tebbit's suggestion for a "cricket test" to establish allegiance to the nation were the most signally publicised invocations of an 'us' against 'them' rhetoric in which outsider groups were staged as poisonous to the body politic. Similarly, the Victorian metaphor of the North–South divide was reinvoked (Johnson, 1985; Harrison, 1985; Robbins, 1988) and while this may not be strictly accurate, it has served to further indicate the centrality of London and the South East (and particularly the Square Mile and Docklands) to the national construction.

2). A struggle over national history. This has taken a variety of forms: "a complex and purposefully selective process of historical recollection is apparent in [the Conservative] project, which involves reviving the ideals of eighteenth–century free–market capitalism, for popular participation and consumption in the age of multinational corporations, but through a celebration of the values of the Victorian age."[75] Despite its own undermining actions, neo–Conservatism, both in its parliamentary and extra–parliamentary forms, has repeatedly attempted to repressively re–establish the family as the bedrock of the national formation. Far from "rolling back the frontiers of the State", personal morality has increasingly been represented as an appropriate area for surveillance and intervention. The 1960s (Wilsonite modernization, Macmillanite decolonization, liberationist legislation, the counter–culture) are invoked as an *agent* in this movement towards anarchy, to be countered by other histories (Victorian, Churchillian). Similarly, post–war Labourism becomes 'unspeakable', circumvented by an appeal to pre–collectivist values. Far from representing the national values emerging from 'the People's War', trade unions and socialism are alien impositions, complicit with tyranny (Wright, 1985; Sturrock & Taylor

1985) and legitimate targets for coercive action by the state. Paralleling this repressive imposition of a favoured history is the institutional struggle (again symbolically against the 1960s) over curricula in English and History.

However, this struggle over history is supremely fractured and contradictory. Post–1979 Toryism represents itself as the first truly *modernizing* administration, evacuating other periods (1945–51, 1964–71) of their symbolic authority. But as Chambers (1989) notes, its reclamation of a history is "as significantly indebted to a backward–looking sense of the national heritage as the patronizing intellectual and aristocratic cultures it purports to be pragmatically reassessing."[76]

3.) The advancement of a militaristic identity. David Edgerton (1991) has characterised post–war Britain, far from being a welfare state, as being a *warfare* state. The period of Conservative office has seen this become almost trumpeted as an aspect of the national construction. The Falklands–Malvinas adventure (Barnett, 1982; Hobsbawm, 1983; Gray, 1983; Nairn, 1983; Hurd, 1984; Samuel, 1989; Aulich *et al*, 1992) and the Gulf War provided an image of Britishness far removed from the peace–loving, jackboot–hating types favoured by Orwell (1940/1982) and Priestley (1963). These conflicts were brought back home in calls for conscription[77], in a popular argot of confrontation and in rhetoric and actions which ominously linked state violence with internal dissension. The paradigmatic expression of this theme was Mrs. Thatcher's Cheltenham racecourse speech of 3 July 1987. The Premier defined the 'Flaklands Factor' in such a way as to link the war against Argentina with that against British (rail)workers, whose industrial actions did not 'match the spirit' of reborn Britain:

> What has indeed happened is that now once again Britain is not prepared to be pushed around. We have ceased to be a nation in retreat. We have instead a new–found confidence – born in the economic battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away. That confidence comes from the rediscovery of ourselves and grows with the recovery of

our self–respect.[78]

Similarly, as the war in Northern Ireland has gone on, some of its techniques have been brought home to the mainland. During the 1984–5 Miners' Strike, a rumour arose that the riot police were, in fact, soldiers. Whether this is true or not, the existence of such a notion in popular consciousness indicates the extent to which contemporary Conservatism has remade the relationship between state and nation. The 'imagined community' can, it seems, be policed, cordoned and fractured when 'warfare' predominates over 'welfare'.

The effectiveness of this coercive aspect of political authority is rather more open to empirical examination than the effectiveness of neo–Conservatism's struggle to generate consent and install itself as a genuinely popular politics. While acknowledging the paucity of opinion poll data, David Sanders (1994) has argued that what information there is provides very little evidence of major shifts in attitude during the years since 1979. There is still a marked attachment to the welfare state, to the principle of limited redistribution of wealth and the right of trade union members to strike. One of the biggest apparent changes after fifteen years of authoritarian, nationalist rule is that more people than ever wish to emigrate![79]

Adopting a similarly sceptical position towards the infiltration of popular consciousness by 'dominant' ideologies, Abercrombie, Hill & Turner (1980) have argued that although ideologies may effectively unify dominant classes, they are usually much less successful in permeating the consciousness of their subordinates. The everyday discourses of *these* classes are formed largely outside the control of the ruling class, and embody beliefs and values significantly at odds with it. The advanced capitalist order is in no sense a successfully achieved unity, riven as it is by major conflicts and contradictions. In so far as the consent of the dominated is won at all, claim Abercrombie *et al*, it is achieved much more by strategies such as reformism than by ideological means. Others have gone even further, in claiming that the

consciousness of the *ruling class* is largely unaffected by their own ideologies. For the post–Enlightenment thinking of Peter Sloterdijk and Slavoj Žižek, contemporary societies incorporate cynical distance and irony, indeed to some extent rely on them.[80] In a new twist on Marx's "dull compulsion of economic life", people are quite aware of the iniquitous systems in which they live, but are too cynical or caught up in the 'objective' fantasy of commodity fetishism to do anything about it.

Most phenomena in most spheres are undoubtedly 'contaminated' with parody, but it makes little sense to talk, for example, about the 1980 Heritage Act, the behaviour of National Front members or the resistance to European federalisation as being inherently cynical gestures. I want to offer cynicism as the *ne plus ultra* of this review of literature. The lure of cynicism, as Tom Nairn (1988) notes about the monarchy, is present, but generally resisted throughout this thesis. In a sense this resistance represents one part of the push–and–pull development of cultural studies, and it is to this development, and explicitly the cultural studies 'take' on national identity, that I want to turn next.

3. TOWARDS A METHOD: CULTURAL STUDIES & BRITISH IDENTITY

a.

In constructing the Britishness debate in the preceding pages, I've been conscious of two things. Firstly, in a relatively small subject area, it is a *real* debate, not simply a process of development, accretion or gainsaying. Anglo–British national identity is a contested terrain of study – sometimes ferociously so. Secondly, it is a genuinely *interdisciplinary* debate which leads to argument not just about the 'core' subject (if such a thing is not always–already fragmented and dispersed) but the disciplinary biases which frame such a core – their lacunae, contradictions and (over)emphases. To use a phrase of Angela McRobbie's (1992), the debate is a creatively "messy amalgam", which corresponds to the protean methodology of cultural studies. This thesis also presses together a variety of epistemologies and modes of representation in what I hope is an interesting and illuminating way.

But if cultural studies is always in process, this does not imply that there is a wholesale relativism about the field, and it is perhaps worth stating some of the cultural studies positions which are not problematized in this thesis, but exist (perhaps naively) as *a priori* givens. Firstly, although I make some observations about meaningful relationships between processes of restructuring, the politics of the New Right and various discourses and representations of Anglo–British identity, I do not assume a base and superstructure model of culture in which politics and representations are reflexes of the economic base. Nor do I assume that the economy or representations are symptomatic or reflective of a particular political formation. Secondly, I try to resist the idea of false consciousness without lapsing into relativism.

Thirdly, this thesis does not reject the triad of text, context and audience which has formed a substantial part of cultural studies work, although each of these terms are in themselves problematic and problematised. 'Text' has to some extent been countered by 'performance' (Gilroy 1993a) and decentered by what has been perceived as its own inherent evasiveness, and yet, as Stuart Hall

notes, "at the same time, the shadow, the imprint, the trace of those other formations, of the intertextuality of texts in their institutional positions, of texts as sources of power, of textuality as a site of representation and resistance, all of these questions can never be erased from cultural studies."[81]

The emergence of the various poststructuralisms has similarly problematized context. Some types of discourse theory, in rejecting the 'phenomenalist' delusion that language can become somehow consubstantial with the world of natural objects and processes also reject the possibility of locating texts in any meaningful way within their historical moment. This thesis continues to argue for cultural studies as a historicized and spatialized project, as much for political as epistemological reasons.

'Audience' is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of the triad, and the area in which my practice has most signally failed to live up to my ambition. Throughout the thesis I have argued for an understanding of national identity as a lived relationship, articulating real needs, in however disguised or pernicious a fashion, but have then largely concentrated on the interpretation of cultural artifacts. Ultimately, as Angela McRobbie argues, I have a lingering suspicion that textualism should have some ethnographic justification:

> Identity could be seen as dragging cultural studies into the 1990s by acting as a kind of guide to how people see themselves, not as class subjects, but as active agents whose sense of self is projected onto and expressed in a range of cultural practices, including texts, images and commodities. If this is the case, then the problem in cultural studies today...is the absence of reference to real existing identities in the ethnographic sense. The identities being discussed, and I am as guilty of this myself as anybody else, are textual identities. The site of identity formation in cultural studies remains implicitly in and through cultural commodities and texts, rather than in and through the cultural processes of everyday life.[82]

But this separation of 'everyday life' and cultural commodities is too arbitrary to be manageable. Identities in modern societies are lived in and through representations (though not wholly so). While I have tried, wherever possible,

to give some indication of identities which exist largely outside the textual, I make no apology for concentrating on the place of cultural commodities in the formation of national identity.

A final debt to British cultural studies that needs to be acknowledged is the problematic position of marxism in this thesis, and I want to dwell on this at slightly greater length.

b.

Although the major research exertion (and writerly pleasure?) in this thesis comes from studies of three particular cultural instances, I want to use this space to attempt to address some general problems posed by the interpretation and representation of a culture/cultures – to say, in short, why I have chosen to write about Anglo–British culture and identity in the way I have.

My starting point is a dissatisfaction with the assumption, operative in much of the literature reviewed above, that a certain sort of discursive identity has been *achieved*, which is then unproblematically transmitted through various ideological apparatuses and morbidly celebrated by an entrenched *volk*. My contention is that this identity–in–formation is by no means fully realized, although some versions of it have been historically easier to transmit or enforce than others – they are, to adapt a phrase of Grmsci's, in domination rather than being dominant. Instead, even in its most conservative and terroristic manifestations, Anglo–British identity is a contradictory formation, polysemic and internally–fractured, a 'sieve–order' in the epigram I have chosen for this thesis. For the subject, enmeshed in this 'textile web' of associations and meanings, there are partial (illicit/complicit?) pleasures to be had from the existing fabric, which do not necessarily negate for that subject an over–all commitment to changing the broad principles through which this form of society is installed and reproduced. In my emphasis on this organising principle of fracture, there are two divergent perspectives on popular culture at play. The perception of the lack of a fully–achieved, static culture is consonant with a Gramscian position

in which a national culture is in constant negotiation with itself, compromising itself in order to provide some accommodation for opposing values, while at the same time reproducing a version of ruling class culture and ideology:

> Class hegemony is a dynamic and shifting relationship of social subordination, which operates in two directions. Certain aspects of the behaviour and cosnciousness of the subordinate classes may reproduce a version of the values of the ruling class. But in the process value systems are modified, through their necessary adaptation to diverse conditions of existence; the subordinate classes thus follow a 'negotiated version' of ruling–class values. On the other hand, structures of ideological hegemony transform and incorporate dissident values, so as effectively to prevent the working through of their full implications.[83]

But a pure Gramscianism is difficult to sustain in the current historical moment. Gramsci and some of his neo–Gramscian adaptors have been attacked from a variety of positions: for practicing a 'redundant academicism' in which the critic stands above and outside of everyday life (which is about as far from the notion of the 'organic' intellectual as one could imagine, as well as being a material and psychic impossibility), for the teleological and essentialist assumptions of the Marxist project (which Gramsci attempts to offer a way out of), for a working method in which, contrary to pretensions of examining a social totality, elegant (and pleasurable, and valuable) studies of the contradictions within, and magical resolutions through, discrete instances of popular culture are subject to local text–reader–audience analysis. None of these criticisms fundamentally damage a hegemonic approach, but they do generally suggest absences within it.

An alternative emphasis on the impossibility of totalisation in theories of culture is provided by the (still) emergent space (field, condition, predicament) of postmodernism. The origin of this form of enquiry has been argued over for some time (a change in global conditions of capital accumulation, the decline of socially operative master narratives, the proliferation of media technologies) but there is general agreement that *formally*, postmodernism represents a movement beyond the externality of previous critical forms which seems to

make anything other than an 'encounter'[84] with popular forms and their intertextual relations impossible:

> [The] notion of postmodernity is most usefully deployed in the study of the mass media, where it has encouraged a shift away from textual analysis towards considering more fully the broad inter–connections between different media forms, not just at the level of the patterns of ownership and control of global communications, but also in the cross–cutting of interlocking generic devices and effects, and in the constant use of trailers of narratives in advertising, in pop videos and in TV mini–dramas. Postmodern media criticism has recognised that it is as important theoretically to 'flick across' the media, as it is to linger over the single image in search of the 'preferred meaning'.[85]

So whereas a Gramscian line runs into trouble in terms of the whereabouts of the popular audience in the hegemonic process, a postmodern form of critique might typically suspend this question, subjecting hegemonic constructions instead to a kind of immanent critique "using anecdote, metaphor, collage and quotation"[86] in order to expose their edgy contingency. Whilst the mythological concept of 'the voice of the people' or the idea of 'the people' as a sociologically–determined bloc may be absent here, there is at least the representation of a plethora of voices (and people) grouping and re–grouping, to substitute for a straightforward model of domination.

This theoretical 'loosening–up', however, has not been universally well–received. The philosophical premises on which it is based (particularly as found in the work of Baudrillard and Lyotard) seem tarnished for some by a wholesale abandonment of 'sociolgical' (and therefore 'ethical') pretensions. Although postmodernism as a critical form has come to be associated with subjects largely excluded from Marxism (race, sexuality, ecology) it is hard to see how those categories have been selected, given the abandonment of a master narrative of social justice in which questions of socialism could still be meaningfully raised. The question therefore becomes how, in writing about culture, one can sustain last instance issues of Conscience with a perception of popular culture as largely resisting the possibility of all–pervasive dominant ideologies which may then be challenged, modified or accommodated from

below.

While I have no conclusive answers to this question, I have found it most consistently and flexibly debated in the work of Dick Hebdige, in tandem with an extended reading of whose work this thesis has been written, and whose essay "Digging For Britain" provided something of a problematic entry into the field. But the thesis is not a protracted reading of Anglo–British culture in relation to Hebdige, nor does his work stand as a touchstone against which to measure other sources of opinion – the often uncritical polarisation of young 'street' goodies and mortgaged old baddies smacks of the most heroic style of culturalism (while reminding me of the mainstreamness of my own record collection and wardrobe). Instead it has provided a less constricting way of writing that in its very responsiveness and ability to address (and adaptivity to?) the postmodern condition, still returns to a principle of hope.

Hebdige's work since his subcultural period has consisted of a sustained rewriting of some of the symptoms associated with postmodernism in a language of conscience associated with neo–Gramscianism, which he claims shares 'historical and intellectual ground' with more critical versions of what he terms 'the Post'. These symptoms include a "displacement of the universalising intellectual, the legislator–prophet, by the specific intellectual, the partisan facilitator–interpreter; accumulating doubts about universal validity claims; opposition to centralised, bureaucratically organised forms of politics; and the emergence of new collectivities and forms of subjectivity which reveal the limits and limitations of existing critical discourses and radical political strategies."[87] But Hebdige admits, too, that without necessarily wanting to recreate them in their entirety, other forms of knowledge, practice and experience contain, or have contained, principles of hope which we treat undialectically at our peril – petty bourgeois life[88], wartime communality and post–war planning[89], The Band Aid phenomenon[90] even such arriere–garde notions as fair play and *noblesse oblige*[91]:

> ..words like "love" and "hate" and "faith" and "history", "pain" and "joy", "passion" and "compassion" – the depth words drawn up like ghosts from a different dimension will always come back in the eleventh hour to haunt the Second World and those who try to live there in the now.[92]

It has been pointed out to me that the logic of postmodernity, that conscience–less retro–raid on history, *demands* that the ghosts of Conscience and History be dragged into the present. The critic is not therefore a magus, summoning up nostalgic truths, but instead a delineator of potentialities that are already visible in the conjuncture. In this thesis I attempt to map some of these depth words and images in the context of poplar representations of nationality, without claiming that I have access to any authoritative use of the terms or unique understanding of them. Rather than criticise mainstream representations exclusively through the medium of in–depth textual analysis in any convemtional way, I try to place them in an *inter*textual situation in which their own truth claims come to seem partial or contradictory. Clearly this does not absolve me from the problem of externality (indeed, on occasions, the only way I feel able to write about the depth words is through the authoritative, and what may read as intrusive, voices of Marx, of Gramsci, of Althusser), but it does disperse the austere obsession with certitude and fixed and single destinations. In a sense this might explain the absence of any conventional conclusion. This is a thesis without guarantees, which is not to say that it is a thesis without commitment.

c.

The three chapters that form the main original work in this thesis address the 'constellation' of ideas and images of British identity of which I have tried to give some impression: the nation as 'imagined' or invented community, the decline of national sovereignty, the contradictory dynamics of globalization and localization, the place of consumption in the construction of social identities, the reversability of centre–margin oppositions, the strategic invocation of memory and the past.

Each of the chapters looks at the production, dissemination and (more problematically) reception of a particular cultural form within a variable time–frame, and each negotiates some of the questions of nationhood outlined above. In the opening chapter, I discuss the emergence of a documentary movement in contemporary Britain. Beginning with the documentarists of the late Victorian and inter–war periods, I consider the different ways in which travellers have attempted to portray the nation and map its boundaries. Where earlier travellers articulated a discourse of consensus, contemporary representations suggest the impossibility of such a frame of reference and invoke other modes of collectivity. At the same time, such texts call into question the notion of representation itself, questioning the privileged, distanced gaze that has typified 'images of Britain' and its political homologies.

The second chapter considers the position of the male body in the process of national identity formation, specifically in relation to the men's style magazine. Male and national identities are often elided, and this chapter attempts to show that such an association is constructed and historically variable. From discussing the laminated bodies of the magazine and their imprecise 'fit' with a politics that privileges the middle–class male body, I move on to address the place in the national culture of the body of the dispossessed, and the regional specificity of these images.

The final chapter addresses the construction of the past in recent British screen fictions. The 'heritage industry' has attracted a wide literature, much of it censorious. The assumption is normally that people are held in awe by the "theatrical show" of the past. I try to show that representations of the past are generally problematised for an audience by their 'common sense' understanding of the present, and while this may in itself be retrograde in, for example, its homophobia and its entropic reading of history, it does not imply the slavish devotion to archaic political systems that is generally imputed. I go on to briefly consider the *possibility* that some representations of the past may be liberatory, in their refusal to surrender history to apathy.

Although other cultural forms could have also been used to excavate the terrain of British life since 1979, the chosen forms were not randomly selected. In one final gesture towards cultural studies as a coherent project, I would argue that much of its appeal lies in its *urgency*. The cultural forms which are addressed all negotiate three imperative questions:

1.) The question of time. How is the national past organised and managed, but also how is *futurity* imagined? Is national history constructed as entropy, revival, progress, in cycles or a line? What are the implications of this for a progressive politics given a general cynicism about teleologies?

2.) The *extent* of the nation. What are its boundaries and how flexible and/or porous are they? Where is the centre and where the periphery? Do people live this spatial hierarchy? Do other spatial imaginings of collectivity exercise similar attractions to those of nationhood, and do they have a future?

3.) The place of the *body* in the national culture. How has it been surveyed, laminated, ordered, used as a metaphor for the national virtues and vices. Which bodies *cannot* be ordered into the national construction.

This thesis can necessarily only begin to address these questions. In the afterword I suggest some of the areas that might constitute a further project and indicate some of the difficulties in thinking through a forward–looking national enterprise in a period of post–national identities.

REFERENCES - INTRODUCTION

1. Quoted in Henry Porter "England, our England" *Guardian II*, 28.7.1993, p.2.

2. Bertolt Brecht (trans. Stern, Stern & Auden 1954) *The Caucasian Chalk Circle*, London: Eyre Methuen.

3. Epigram to Raymond Briggs (1984) *The Tin Pot General & the Old Iron Lady.*

4. *New Statesman* 31.10.1986, p.3.

5. Alison Light (1992) *Forever England*, London: Routledge, p.18.

6. Brian Doyle "Ain't it Awful!" *Magazine of Cultural Studies* 1, Jan. 1990, p.3.

7. Raymond Williams (1985) *Towards 2000*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.266.

8. Walter Bagehot (1872) *Physics and Politics*. Quoted in Hobsbawm (1990) *Nations & Nationalism Since 1780* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.3 n.8.

9. Tom Nairn (1977) *The Break-up of Britain: crisis & neo-nationalism*, London: New Left Books; Ernest Gellner (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (1983) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Benedict Anderson (1983) *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London: Verso; David Lowenthal (1985) *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hobsbawm (1990).

10. Ernest Gellner (1964) *Thought & Change*. Quoted in Anderson (1983) p.2.

11. Gellner (1983) p.138.

12. Nairn (1977) p.41.

13. Peter Taylor: "The English & their Englishness: 'a curiously mysterious, elusive and little understood people'" *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 107 (3) 1991, pp.146–161.

14. Patrick Wright & Tim Putnam "Sneering at the Theme Parks" *Block* 15, 1989, p.50.

15. Jonathan Rée "Internationality" *Radical Philosophy* 60, Spring 1992, p.4.

16. Nairn (1977) p.359.

17. Tom Nairn "The English Working Class" *New Left Review* 24, p.48.

18. Anderson (1983) p.15.

19. Anderson (1983) quoted in James Donald & Stuart Hall (eds) (1986) *Politics & Ideology*, Milton Keynes: Open University, p.103.

20. ibid. p.98.

21. Stuart Hall "Cultural Identity and Diaspora" in Jonathan Rutherford (ed.) (1990) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, p.236.

22. Samuel, R. (1989) *Patriotism: The Making and Un-Making of English National Identity, Vol. 1, Politics & History*, London: Routledge.

23. From *A Short Way With Dissenters*, quoted in Rée (1992) p.5.

24. Hugh Seton–Watson "National Consciousness in Britain" from *Nations & States* (1977) London: Methuen in Donald & Hall (1986) p.111.

25. Herbert Butterfield (1944) *The Englishman and His History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.114, pp.116–7.

26. Butterfield (1944) p.2.

27. Rée (1992) p.6.

28. Martin Wiener (1992) *English Culture & the Decline of the Industrial Spirit*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.3.

29. Edmund Burke (1790) *Reflections on the Revolution in France* quoted in Eric Foner Introduction to Thomas Paine (1985) *The Rights of Man*, Harmondsworth: Penguin; Arthur Young (1793) *The Example of France: a warning to Britain*, quoted in Stuart Curran (ed.) (1993) *The Cambridge Companion to British Romanticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

30. Chambers (1988) p.92.

31. Butterfield (1944) pp.138–9.

32. Nairn (1977) quoted in E.P. Thompson (1978) *The Poverty of Theory and other essays*, London: Merlin, p.iii.

33. Donald Horne (1969) *God is an Englishman*, Sydney, pp.22–3 in Wiener (1992).

34. Like 'empiricism', 'romanticism' is more a gesture than a definition. Veldman (1994, p.2) notes that debate has produced a proliferation of meanings for the term, none of them satisfactory.

35. R. W. Johnson (1985) *The Politics of Recession*, London: Macmillan, p.234; Tom Nairn "Britain's Living Legacy" in Hall & Jacques (1983).

36. Richard Wollheim *Spectator*, 1.3.62 quoted in Wiener (1992).

37. Alfred Austin (1901) *Haunts of Ancient Peace*, quoted in ibid. p.45.

38. H.G. Masterman in Lucien Oldershaw (ed.) (1904) *England: A Nation*, quoted in Wiener (1992) p.51.

39. Hilaire Belloc "Appeal to the Squires," *New Witness* 2 (9.10.1913) quoted in ibid.

40. Although Wiener does not explicitly acknowledge a debt to Gramsci, his thoughts relate closely to the latter's on the production of 'English' intellectuals:

"In England the ... new social grouping that grew up on the basis of modern industrialism shows a remarkable economic–corporate development but advances only gropingly in the intellectual–political field. There is a very extensive category of organic intellectuals – those, that is, who come into existence on the same industrial terrain as the economic group – but in the higher sphere we find that the old land–owning class preserves its position of virtual monopoly. It loses its economic supremacy but maintains for a long time a politico–intellectual supremacy and is assimilated as 'traditional intellectuals' and as directive [*dirigente*] group by the new group in power." Antonio Gramsci (ed. Nowell–Smith, G. & Hoare, Q. 1991) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, p.18.

In *The Persistence of the Old Régime* (1981), Arno Mayer also suggests that "the landed classes managed to perpetuate [an] 'archaic' political order and culture". None of these authors acknowledge the spatial implications of national culture. In certain spaces and places the aristocratic order and their 'organic' intellectuals certainly *did* achieve a sustained period of social dominance. Whether this was the case in the North–West, the North–East, on Clydeside or in Wales, however, is open to dispute.

41. Rée (1991) p.4.

42. See also Orwell, "Notes on Nationalism" (1944) in *Collected Essays* (1984) Harmondsworth: Penguin pp.306–324.

43. H.M. Chadwick (1945) *The Nationalities of Europe*, Cambridge University Press, p.3. Quoted in Taylor (1991) p.148.

44. By which I mean the Victorian form of patriotism, bleached of its radical roots. There is heavy irony in the contemporary use of Dr. Johnson's epithet "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel" as an argument *against* chauvinism.

45. Tom Shippey "Footpaths" *London Review of Books*, 26.7.90, p.7.

46. Lowenthal (1991) p.220.

47. No more Whiggish view of history could be articulated than that of Professor B. Wilkinson who affirmed that the Coronation of 1953 "presents, as no other political event, a synoptic view of the whole development of modern democracy." Quoted in Nairn (1988) p.118.

48. Williamson, J. "Royalty & Representation" *Ten.8*, 18, 1985, pp.4–9.

49. ibid. p.6.

50. Nairn (1988) pp.105–6.

51. George Orwell (1984b) *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp.151–2.

52. Michael Steed (1986) "The Core–Periphery Dimension of British Politics", *Political Geography Quarterly* 5, pp.94–5.

53. Neil Asherson (1986) *Games with Shadows*, London: Radius; Tom Nairn (1988) *The Enchanted Glass*, London: Radius.

54. Hugh Kearney "Four Nations or One?" in Bernard Crick (1991) *National Identities*, p.4.

55. Johnson, R. (1985) *The Politics of Recession*, London: Macmillan, pp.234–5

56. Stuart Hall "Minimal Selves" *ICA Documents*, 6, 1987, quoted in Diana Jeater "Roast Beef & Reggae Music: the passing of whiteness" *New Formations*, Winter 1992, p.115..

57. Stuart Hall (1978) *Racism & Reaction* cited in ibid. p.109.

58. Paul Gilroy (1987) *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, London: Hutchinson, p.56.

59. Enoch Powell Birmingham address 20.4.1968.

60. Anderson (1983) p.7.

61. Chambers (1988) p.96. See also Homi Bhabha "The Commitment to Theory" *New Formations*, 5, 1988.

62. Enoch Powell, Eastbourne Speech, November 1968.

63. Gilroy (1987) p.53.

64. Dick Hebdige "Digging for Britain" in Dominic Strinati & Stephen Wagg (eds.) (1992) *Come on Down*, p.330.

65. ibid.

66. Jeater (1992) pp.118–9.

67. Gramsci (1991) p.178.

68. Stuart Hall (1983) "The Great Moving Right Show" in Hall & Jacques (1990) *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London: Lawrence & Wishart p.23.

69. Laclau, quoted in Bill Schwarz "Conservatism, Nationalism & Imperialism" in Donald & Hall (1986) p.183.

70. Peregrine Worsthorne *Sunday Telegraph*, 12.6.1983. Quoted in David Edgar "Bitter Harvest" in James Curran (ed.) (1984) *The Future of the Left*, Cambridge: Polity, p.39.

71. "Think of England" BBC2 November 1991.

72. Roger Scruton (1980) *The Meaning of Conservatism*, quoted in Curran (1984) p.45.

73. Scruton (1980) in James Donald & Stuart Hall (eds) (1986) *Politics & Ideology*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, p.109.

74. Kenneth MacKinnon (1992) *The Politics of Popular Representation: Reagan, Thatcher, AIDS & the movies*, London: Associated University Presses, p.22.

75. John Corner & Sylvia Harvey (1991) *Enterprise & Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture*, London: Routledge, p.14.

76. Chambers (1989) p.90.

77. *The Times* (23.5.1983) linked its call for the revival of military conscription with the mystic 'will' of the people and the instinctive bonds of nationhood: "Without a sure sense of self–preservation nourished on the root of all his instincts, an individual will bend to every whim. So it is with societies and nations." Quoted in Edgar (1984) op. cit.

78. Quoted in Gilroy (1987) p.51.

79. David Sanders, paper at ICBH summer school, July 1994.

80. Peter Sloterdijk (1988) *Critique of Cynical Reason*, Slavoj Žižek (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Glossed in Terry Eagleton (1990) *Ideology: an introduction*, chs. 1 & 2.

81. Stuart Hall "Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies" in Grossberg *et al* (1992), p.28.

82. McRobbie (1992) p.730.

83. Robert Gray (1978) *The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian Edinburgh*, Oxford. Quoted in Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer & Janet Woolacott (1986) *Popular Culture and Social Relations*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. p.20.

84.i.e. specifically not an 'engagement', the political sense of which has been de–stabilized in post modernism. I am grateful to Viv Chadder for this observation.

85. Angela McRobbie "New Times in Cultural Studies", *New Formations*, Spring 1991, p.3.

86. Hebdige (1992) p.333.

87. Barry Smart (1992) *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Strategies*, London: Routledge p.125.

88. Dick Hebdige "Training Some Thoughts on the Future" in Jon Bird *et al* (eds.) (1993) *Mapping the Futures*, London: Routledge.

89. Dick Hebdige "The Bottom Line on Planet One" in *Hiding in the Light* (1988), London: Routledge.

90. "Post–Script 1: Vital Strategies" in ibid.

91. Dick Hebdige "A Report on the Western Front" *Block* 12, 1986/7.

92. Hebdige (1988) p.176.

CHAPTER 1 - LANDSCAPES AND FIGURES

Travel, Documentary & the Construction of British National Identity

1. INTRODUCTION

A small Cornish community is preparing to repel an expected influx of up to 20,000 Travellers this week, after police foiled weekend attempts to hold a free festival near an ancient Sussex hill fort.

Landowners at Davidstow Moor, near Camelford, say they have received arson threats through the post, which they believe are from some Travellers with whom they clashed when 5,000 camped on the common last year.

They are now patrolling the moorland day and night as police prepare to mount an operation to stop a repeat of the widely-advertised White Goddess Free Festival.

Residents of 20 farms on the moor, which is mainly privately-owned, were planning to take in extra food supplies today to help them sit out this week and the bank holiday weekend.

Julie Dowton, secretary of the Davidstow Commoners, said: "We are going to be in a siege situation.

"The police will be blocking most of the roads into Cornwall. Davidstow will be a no-go area completely. I'm sure it's going to cause chaos, but we're prepared to put up with that."[1]

Since the mid–1980s, every English summer has seen a renewed moral panic over the threat of invasion. The terrain over which this incursion is presumed to take place is the mytho–symbolic heart of rural England. Military metaphors are mobilised in the newspapers ("The Battle of the Beanfield", "The Storming of Castlemorton", "The Battle of Twyford Down") and new motions tabled in Parliament[2]. The impression is generally that there is an extraordinary degree of consensus in opposition to this "tribe of human locusts".[3]

As the recent history of "Travellers", and the hysterical rhetoric which surrounds and constructs them, might indicate, conflicting metaphors of movement and stability, of transience and groundedness, have a profound resonance in (English) national life, with the former term in each dyad often being homologous with broadly radical "politics" or (often *and*) mobilised as a source of deep cultural anxiety. Piers Brandon reminds us that "the word 'mob'

stemmed from 'mobile', and British rulers have always regarded lower–class mobility as a threat".[4] Wellington, for example, reputedly worried that the railways would encourage "the lower orders to go uselessly wandering around the country"[5] and recent changes in public transport policy and legislation on freedom of movement suggests a continuing conservative anti–mobility agenda.

At the same time, travel and the record of travel are problematic terms. Edward Said and others[6], have drawn attention to the imbrication of travellers' representations of other cultures with practices of domination and exploitation, in which what visited people say about themselves has been systematically discounted.

This chapter therefore has two overlapping aims. Firstly, I want to look at the way in which the nation and other (sometimes competing) spatial imaginings of communality have been mapped in a variety of film and video records, photojournals and travelogues. At the centre of the piece are texts produced since 1979, but I have found it necessary to indicate the significance of several "founding texts" which seem to have continuing ramifications, and which problematise notions of travel and the traveller. It is significant that many of these earlier texts were produced in the period 1880–1930, what Bill Schwarz and Stuart Hall have called the 'crucible years' in the forging of the current crisis of nation and national identity.[7] In looking at all texts, I want to concentrate on the construction of local, regional or national boundaries and their awareness of the potential for movement within and between spaces and cultures, or of the possibility of transcending such categories.

Secondly, in contrasting contemporary texts with their predecessors, I concentrate on ideas of distance and perspective which, as well as acting as bridging metaphors between predominantly word–based and image–based textual forms, seem to have significant political overtones. For as the distance–defined vision of the traditional left disappears, a form of politics concerned with the "street–level" perspective emerges. In this emphasis, I make reference to

the work of Michel de Certeau, specifically the essay "Walking in the City".

In choosing appropriate texts around which to structure an argument, I have been conscious of a distinction made by Paul Gilroy between 'bystanders' and 'witnesses', with the latter term acting in a broadly affirmative sense. This principle of *bearing witness* to conflicts, boundaries and alternative images of collectivity carries, for me at least, some sense of active political worth. 'Bystanders' occasionally appear in this chapter, and their silences are, I think, instructive.

2. THE BRITISH TRAVELOGUE, NATIONALITY & MODERNITY.

a. sensibility & the national culture

If novelty pleases, here is the present state of the country describ'd, the improvement, as well in culture as in commerce, the encrease of the people, and employment for them: Also here you have an account of the encrease of buildings, as well in great cities and towns, as in the new seats and dwellings of the nobility and gentry; also the encrease of wealth, in many eminent particulars.[8]

While there can be no founding moment in the history of travel, Esther Moir[9] has suggested that the *habit* of touring England began in the sixteenth century and represents a particularly Tudor phenomenon, dependent upon infrastructural improvements such as the advent of better roads, more accurate maps and the definition of the English mile in 1598: means by which the nation could be imagined in a way that was not previously possible. The quoted passage from Defoe's *Tour* of 1726 gives some sense of this expansionist impetus, offering travel as a profoundly progressive phenomenon.

Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe, in line with the recent historiography of nationhood, that the onset of modernity decisively changes the character of travel, introducing ideas of authenticity and discrimination for the first time, and also inviting challenges to those ideas, based on notions of privilege and exploitation.

James Buzard (1993) has exhaustively chronicled the rise of 'anti–tourism' in reaction to what was perceived as mass European travel during the nineteenth century, and some of his thoughts have a particular relevance to the rise of the domestic travel record during this period. Firstly, unlike the pre–Napoleonic Grand Tour, the criteria for separating 'authentic' from 'tourist' experiences were not those visibly based on advantages of birth, but rather a loosely defined set of inner personal qualities. Licensing the notion of a superior *sensibility* that apparently owes nothing to social conditions, this has masked differences in degree of freedom from economic necessity and in what Pierre Bourdieu calls 'habitus', the internalized system of 'dispositions' which, among other things,

prepare one for the satisfactory appropriation of cultural goods. Travel, and travel literature, have tended to reproduce the power of middle– or upper–class white men, privileging their perspectives and their right to represent, and discriminate between, visited people. Travel therefore becomes a kind of 'exemplary cultural practice' in modern liberal democracies, flouting its meritocratic ideology while all the time undercutting it.

Secondly, Buzard suggests that the change in travel carries with it some sense of the increasingly problematic nature of 'culture' during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In *Culture & Anarchy*, Matthew Arnold stressed the socially affirmative character of culture in building, through its promotion of the 'best self' latent in everyone, a national unity that transcends class conflict and sectarian fractiousness. This argument had been to some extent anticipated by discussions and debates surrounding travel in the previous century. The Grand Tour had been partially coded as a patriotic endeavour, with some Britons asserting that they returned 'better Englishmen' for having contrasted the great qualities of their own country with other societies.[10] At the same time, in their contact with pre–industrial southern cultures, many visitors found (because they wanted to find) an organic culture which seemed to unite high artistic achievement with flourishing folk traditions; a contented culture in which the 'spirit of envious levelling', familiar to them in England, was absent.[11]

This perspective was incorporated into the British travelogue, but transformed into a nostalgic and fatalistic search for the vanished English organic community. The significant text here is Cobbett's *Rural Rides* (1830), a series of recollections of various journeys in the South of England. Unlike Arthur Young's journeys of the 1760s, to which they bear a certain resemblance, Cobbett's rides are away from modernity and towards the mythic yeoman stock he claimed as his own, "I was born in Old England" he writes, "bred up at the plough tail with a smock–frock on my back." In a necessary political move, this organic culture exists only in its remnants – in certain arcadian scenes and in the traces left by its slow dissolution:

> all is lassitude about [the forts]: endless are their lawns, their gravel walks, and their ornaments; but their lawns are unshaven, their gravel walks grassy, and their ornaments putting on the garments of ugliness.[12]

But far from seeing modernity as operating in this entropic terrain, Cobbett views this as a space in which History might go to work. Identifying himself with a proto–John Bull Englishness, Cobbett defines what Englishness is *not*: the various 'bumpers', 'Scottish philosophers' and Jews who swarm across the nation. Turning his face against modernity, Cobbett resurrects the notions of 'breeding' and village markets as an existent ground on which the organic nation can be reconstituted. This radical conservatism is a characteristic feature of much writing about the British tour and has, as I will suggest, a continuing significance in the Baldwinite construction of the nation to which contemporary constructions of Conservatism make reference.

b. Darkest England

> *But O Cook, O Thomas Cook & Son, path-finders and trail-clearers,*
> *living sign-posts to all the world, and bestowers of first aid*
> *to bewildered travellers - unhesitatingly and instantly,*
> *with ease and celerity, could you send me to Darkest Africa*
> *or Innermost Thibet [sic], but to the East End of London,*
> *barely a stone's throw distant from Ludgate Circus,*
> *you know not the way!*[13]

> *How much beauty there is to discover...enveloped in old age, in sickness in grief, in severe anguish...How fine the sick complexions of big-city children are, and see how often their features take on a marvellously severe beauty precisely as a result of need and deprivation.*[14]

Cobbett's articulation of a predominantly rural England was already nostalgic at the time of writing, and his general silence on the question of industrialism and the city predicts the moral crusade against urban industrialism in such novels as Dickens' *Hard Times* (1854), Ruskin's *Unto This Last* and the radical attacks on capitalism from such figures as William Morris, H.M. Hyndman and Edward Carpenter.

For other writers and travellers, however, the city was the privileged locus of modernity and its investigation gelled with increased middle–class study, penetration and reordering of working–class cultures and environments. The mid–Victorian period onwards saw the emergence of the "Into Unknown England" text in which the older traditions of personal exploration blended "into the newer techniques of sociological analysis."[15] The period witnessed the cultivation of a discourse of national division or foreignness *within* England. While this discourse was a constant feature of the reports of statistical societies, Royal Commissions and philanthropic ventures and a major theme in the Victorian novel, its purest form is the story of a middle–class person's journey into an alien working–class culture and his/her re–emergence bearing shocking findings. Engels' *Condition of the Working-Class in England* (1845), Mayhew's *London Labour and the London Poor* (1861), Andrew Mearns' *Bitter Cry of Outcast London* and George Sims' *How the Poor Live* (both 1883), Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889–1903), William Booth's *In Darkest England and the Way Out* (1890) and Jack London's *People of the Abyss* (1903) are amongst the better known works in this genre, while being in no way definitive.

Certain narrative devices and thematic concerns occur in a number of these works, and provide a point of departure in considering later generic counterparts. Firstly, visited people are invested with a degree of difference verging on the salacious. General Booth asks himself and the reader: "As there is a darkest Africa is there not also a darkest England?" And while the rhetorical question may be a valuable corrective to the 'telescopic philanthropy' derided by Dickens in *Bleak House*, it also connotes the conventional fantasized and eroticized typology of the city as a site of degeneracy and barbarism. "Incest is common", offers Mearns of the East End of London, "and no form of vice or sensuality causes surprise or attracts attention."[16] To adapt Said somewhat, the explorers' views of the poor in terms of sexual identity are highly reductive: institutionally, culturally and politically, the working class are immaterial. They are only actual in their sheer number and as the producers of families. C.F.G.

Masterman, for example, titles one section of *From the Abyss* "Of the Quantity of Us", adopting a Malthusian image of England finally choking under the numbers of the indigent working class.[17] This obsession with working–class fertility may have a political analogy in concerns over the enfranchisements of 1867 and 1884, and/or it may re–articulate in hysterical form the cross–class sexual desires of middle–class authors: "they never seem to walk or ride into a slum" writes Peter Keating, "they 'penetrate' it."[18]

Secondly, Keating observes that the period 1850–1900 sees a proliferation of references to the working class as inhabiting an 'abyss' at the edge of society. On the one hand, the use of this term expresses an element of class fear, articulating anxieties around both contagion and the growing militancy of the working–class movement. At the same time, the notion of the 'abyss' is introverted since it reflects a feeling of despair at the inability of the existing, predominantly bourgeois, institutions to alleviate poverty and gain working–class consent to middle–class rule.

A similarly important term in the writings of these authors is 'conscience' (or, for Said, 'sympathy'). An invention of the late nineteenth–century, 'social conscience', not to be confused with solidarity or affiliation, involves, according to Raymond Williams, 'a persistent sense of a quite clear line between an upper and a lower class...it is a matter of social conscience to go on explaining and proposing at official levels, and at the same time to help in organising and educating the victims."[19] Although this social conscience was actually an indication of the breadth of the gap between the classes, its discursive articulation generally relies on obliterating this distance by stressing people's similarity through suffering: emphasising the common humanity of what George Sims termed "the aching heart."

Linked with this was a new emphasis on *visualising* the poor and their environments. Documentary, for example, is significantly a nineteenth–century word. As John Tagg has demonstrated, although some late Victorian aesthetes

and pictorial photographers argued for the autonomy of photography as an art form, the technical revolution in image production ensured the vast expansion of photography as a tool for the reproduction and refinement of scientific, medical, political and juridical practices. Adapting Foucault (1977), Tagg argues that photography, amongst other disciplinary technologies, led, perhaps paradoxically, to a new curiosity about the *individual* in the late nineteenth century. Whereas in previous societies historiographical reportage had been part of the lived ritual of powerful men, now the poor, the young, the ill etc. became the object of individual descriptions and biographical accounts. But this 'turning of real life into writing', Tagg concludes, was complicit with procedures of objectification and subjection (he is principally interested in the medico–juridical aspect of photographic record), "imprisoned within an historical form [realism] of the régime of truth and sense".[20] (Figure 1)

Tagg's pessimistic attack on realism ignores the transformative power of the 'real' for many of the bourgeois documentarists, and not simply those like Engels who rejected capitalism. The compromised adoption of working–class 'disguises' suggested not only the difficulties in crossing cultures characteristic of the period, but also an ambivalence towards the 'viewing' middle–class culture itself. For Stephen Reynolds, living with a Devonshire fishing family, it is the middle class, not the peasantry and proletariat, who are the problem:

> I am often asked why I have forsaken the society of educated people, and have made my home among 'rough uneducated' people, in a poor man's house. The briefest answer is, that it is good to live among those who, on the whole, are one's superiors.[21]

This contact across classes which reverses class hierarchies in certain compromised ways, is suggestive of the Documentary Movement's iconographic enthusiasms and a continuing problem for the middle–class traveller into Britain. The dialectic of 'belonging' and 'surveillance' continues, as I hope to show, into the present. For other travellers, however, the city and its attendant problems, were a point of departure rather than an objective.

PORTRAITS.

Groups I. II. III and IV. V. VI respectively, illustrate a type of features common among men convicted of crimes of violence.



COMBINATIONS OF PORTRAITS.

The Portraits of many different persons who have the same general type of features are here combined into single figures.



Fig. 1 From Galton's "Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development."

c. Suburbs & Spare Time

If, as Stuart Hall and Bill Schwarz have observed, the inter–war period saw, "the consolidation of monopoly capitalism, the settlement of the new social order and the emergence of the 'consensus' politics of social democracy,"[22] these changes were by no means obvious in their historical moment. The possibility of genuine democracy opened up by the Representation of the People Act (1918), the anxieties and new forms of collectivity occasioned by the years of insurgent European anarchist and socialist movements between 1917 and 1923, and the first hesitant reforms of the imperial state (the partition of Ireland in 1921, the Montagu–Chelmsford reforms of 1919) all indicated a 'conjunctural' crisis, linked to (if relatively autonomous of) the long–term 'organic' crisis of British capital and its umbrella state. As Gramsci notes, this is a situation in which heightened ideological efforts are typically made to overcome the crisis:

> [oppositional] forces seek to demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient conditions exist to make possible, and hence imperative, the accomplishment of certain historical tasks ... The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds and is 'true' if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph; in the immediate, it is developed in a series of ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated to the extent to which they are convincing, and shift the existing disposition of social forces.[23]

In what Gramsci characterises as 'the war of position', the emphasis on the individual, class or group's relation with the nation, spatially and historically, becomes paramount. This terrain was struggled over during the inter–war period by various groups of bourgeois intellectuals, some establishing their own centrality in the construction of the nation and national identity, others problematically speaking for marginalised groups (largely the urban proletariat). Travel and exploration became privileged metaphors in this struggle for meaning.

One text which had a more than usually direct relationship to the manufacture of consent was Stanley Baldwin's *On England* (1926). Baldwin's text is not an

actual record of travel: his journeys are of a rhetorical, even fictional kind, inventing ancestors and local histories as he tours various dinner engagements, but it does suggest some emphases typical of the inter–war ruralists. For example, the parochial tone of *On England* indicates a belief in an England served and maintained by its surroundings[24], reinforcing the notion that the other countries of the union are parasitic and subsidiary.[25] Deep England, however, escapes such censure. Bewdeley, he tells his audience, but for its manifest destiny of remaining the heart of England, could have been greater than Manchester or Liverpool; Stourport was lighted with gas before London but has "the inestimable advantage of doing its work in rural surroundings". Finally, at the very heart of England, place names disappear altogether in a world of pure sensation:

> The sounds of England, the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil in the country smithy, the corncrake on a dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the whetstone, and the sight of a plough team coming over the brow of a hill, the sight that has been seen in England since England was a land, and may be seen in England long after the Empire has perished and every works in England has ceased to function, for centuries the one eternal sight of England.[26]

As Patrick Wright remarks, Deep England speaks to experiences other than its immediate context. Beyond the favoured images are real or imaginary old forms of security, which can be mobilised for a contemporary politics speaking to very different concerns. The fact that Baldwin's rural Toryism was a construct[27] did not distract from the narcissistic allure resident in this appeal to "the heart of an 'innermost being'"[28] and the years after *On England* saw a spate of imitative, aesthetic journeys into England in search of country smithies and plough teams: Robertson Scott's *England's Green and Pleasant Land* (1925), E.O. Hoppé's *Picturesque Great Britain* (1926), H.V. Morton's *In Search of England* (1927), C.B. Ford's *The Landscape of England* (1932), Thomas Burke's *The Beauty of England* (1933) and J.B. Priestley's *The Beauty of Britain* (1935)[29]. These works helped to establish a typology of chequer–board fields and hedgerows as the essentially English landscape form, and the countryside as the representative

space for 'Englishness'. In some respects this was a movement *against* the prevailing cultural grain. After 1918, for example, and increasingly into the 1920s, *Country Life* published fewer articles linked to a direct contact with Nature. Instead there were more devoted to collecting and connoisseurship, as if the upper–class readership were presumed to be in search of some new form of cultural authority.

The travel texts of the period suggested no such crisis of identity. The lavish physical properties of Hoppé's photographic text, for example, and the forward by C.F.G. Masterman, former wartime Director of Propaganda, marked the book as one to be collected and cherished. Its images of national life, too, smacked of prestige. The Britain the book represented was an enduring old England stripped of all signs of modernity: there were few motorcars, few people and no modern architecture. Side by side in a seemingly natural grouping were cathedrals and alms houses, churches and universities, Tudor farmhouses and Georgian terraces, meadows and moorland. As Terry Morden explains[30], the pastoral in this and other texts of the period is re–inflected to privilege the old over the new, rather than the country over the city. The heart of England, while characterised as timeless, is specifically not modern or industrial: instead it mystically provides an organic metaphor linking the native soil with both the national genius (and here England *is* elided with Britain) and with its most revered institutional and architectural structures: "...the permanence of settled life provides England with an almost unique inheritance from former ages ... This security is reflected not only in the architecture, but in the character of the people; in their placable nature and their tolerance, their delight in life and open–air existence, and also perhaps their cool air of serenity".[31]

In some ways, Hoppé's work addresses a traditional constituency of upper–middle class readers for whom the landscape was imbued with issues of power, ownership or curateship. Transposing the stately commonplaces of the English landscape tradition onto film emphasised continuity in change. Just a year later H.V. Morton's *In Search of England*, (with photographs by B.C. Clayton, J.

Dixon–Scott & D. McLeish) seemed to position the reader in a very different relationship with the landscape. The small size of the book (suitable for pocket, rucksack or glove compartment) and its breezy tone suggested newer, less patrician emphases: the discovery of England as pastime rather than stern moral purpose. "This is a record of a motor–car journey round England. Any virtue it may possess, and all its sins, spring from the fact that it was written without deliberation by the roadside, on farmyard walls, in cathedrals, in little church yards, on the washboards of country inns, and in many other inconvenient places".[32]

But far from demythologising "England", Morton's text suggested a populist remythologisation of the countryside, where in every public house and on every village green there was an old man whose memory stretched back into the deep national past and who could pass on the collective wisdom of the country people, remnant True Britons untarnished by modernity. Through journeying into this idealised social terrain, Morton proposed that one could journey into History itself, bypassing the industrial revolution to "shake up the dust of kings' abbots [and] bring the knights and cavaliers back to the road."[33] It is not an isolated instance of such an image. In Powell & Pressburger's *A Canterbury Tale* (1944), the wartime heroine hears ancestral voices as she plants her feet on the memorial turf of the Pilgrims' Way, suggesting not only the power of the past but, as for Morton, the 'natural' receptivity of those few moderns attuned to England's living heartbeat.

By 1929 *In Search of England* had been reprinted nine times, and 23 times by 1936. The book was quickly joined by a number of similar texts, addressing a similar imagined community of readers. But why did this hunger for travel narratives about Anglo–Britain arise between the wars? Why was it, in Morton's words that "...never before have so many people been searching for England."[34]

A possible answer lies in the massive displacement of identities that took place

after the First World War. Writing in 1941, Orwell identified Morton's seekers after England as part of a recently emerged social stratum: "After 1918 there began to appear something that had never existed before: people of indeterminate social class. In 1910 every human being in these islands could be 'placed' in an instant by his clothes, manners and accent. That is no longer the case."[35] The indeterminate class whose rise Orwell referred to was not a product of the war, but the social and spatial re–alignments that took place in Britain after 1918 accentuated their visibility. "Not strictly a class – as Raphael Samuel has said, more a society of orders – they differentiated themselves from the monolithic pre–war classes through a complex ideology involving a set of rituals, a style of dress and behaviour, and most importantly by a place of abode – the suburbs."[36]

Whilst the suburbs have frequently been cited[37] as one of the most pernicious, homogenising aspects of modernity, for middle–class Britons between the wars they suggested instead a step backwards from the modern world represented by its typical form, the city, with its noise, overcrowding and strong proletarian associations. A move to the suburbs may have been a symbolic change of social position, but it was articulated in different terms: "Leave the Town behind and make your home on the borders of Beautiful and Historic Epping Forest where you spend your leisure hours in lovely sylvan glades far from the madding crowds" urged one advertisement for a new estate.[38] At the same time, the inter–war demise of domestic servitude (and its concomitant reinforcement of middle–class women's household duties) fitted easily into an organic Little Englandism in which class hierarchies were less overtly marked. The move to the suburbs, therefore, was a move back to roots and towards Nature and History.

In the move to establish itself, the emergent sub–class had need of a place, both socially and geographically, and a history. The move to the suburbs – the country in the city – was both a move away from the established classes whose interrelations were embodied in the city, and a move to a place which was more

natural and therefore good. In addition to these benefits the country contained a way of life which was assumed to have been unchanged for generations. So a move towards the countryside, or a search within it became the appropriation of a history: the ancestors of the new middle class lived in old England. The pastoral, as Masterman made clear, worked together the ideas of history and nation. In the countryside there could still be seen a way of life upon which the national character had been built and on which its survival depended. To appropriate this history thereby naturalised the middle class: they had always been there and the interdependence of class and country somehow guaranteed the moral centrality of the one and the abiding ideological significance of the other.

While one group of middle–class writers and image–makers were attempting to position themselves in an 'ancestral' landscape, another group of bourgeois photographers, film–makers and writers were touring proletarian environments, in part out of a spirit of reformism and in part to document a way of life that was already beginning to disappear. There are several ways of mapping a history for the Documentary Movement: I have chosen to follow Colls & Dodd[39] in noting the centrality of John Grierson as a figure around whose films and writings some of the apparently contradictory concerns and approaches of other inter–war bourgeois travellers might be more coherently articulated.

Grierson postulated that the documentary film was originally synonymous with the travelogue and used this elision of difference to express a metaphorical desire to "travel dangerously into the jungles of Middlesborough and the Clyde"[40], which recalls the grammar and associations of the late nineteenth century social travellers. Where those writers discovered that the working class had a culture of their own, their successors wished to discover "tales of fine craftsmanship...tucked away in the Black Country."[41] The Victorian resonances of an 'authentic' native population 'discovered' by benign explorers are repeated for an audience whose relationship with the foreign was very different.

While it is tempting to try and establish correspondences between the direct experience of colonialism of some of the documentarists (Madge and Bell in South Africa, Orwell in Burma, Tom Harrison on Malekula) and their journeys into their own country[42], such overt links are perhaps less sustainable than the 'orientalist' processes of narrative and iconic homogenisation by which the 'distressed areas' became imagined during the period. Thus, for example, although Orwell's *Road to Wigan Pier* specifically addressed conditions in the north of England, the photographs accompanying the 1937 edition show scenes from South Wales and the London Boroughs of Stepney, Poplar, Limehouse and Bethnal Green. No reviewer mentioned this discrepancy and all seemed ready to accept that the information in the text was 'illustrated' by the photographs and that these conditions were endemic throughout Britain[43].

John Taylor has noted how more 'theoretical' socialists were disappointed by this emphasis on realism, where highly–charged images were used without any structural analysis: "although [photographs] might counter the 'incantation' of the prose with the benefits of 'photographic "documentaries"' they could still never establish [a] more sophisticated order of examination."[44]

A further objection to the documentarists work, both at the time and since, was their failure to transcend the gap between people of different classes. As Humphrey Spender, photographer for Mass Observation suggests, on entering a pub "I was immediately regarded as a foreigner"[45] (Figure 2) and it is significant that despite the democratic intentions that partially animated Mass Observation and the Documentary Movement, many of the more striking images are characterised by their *distance* – the high–angled, patrician perspective characteristic of European landscape art. During the Worktown (Bolton) project of 1938, for example, the Mass Observation artists Graham Bell and William Coldstream found themselves unable to work with a street–level perspective and so took a more distance–defined vantage point on the roof of the local art gallery.

TI GinJ .n biun'nlin#"* snond^r. *fror tho* ' orkx-ovT "o

As with the writings of the earlier period, the audience for these texts was overwhelmingly bourgeois. Writing on the audience's response to *Industrial Britain* (1933), Grierson privileges the West End as a symbolically–charged target for the GPO films: "the workers' portraits of *Industrial Britain* were cheered in the West End of London. The strange fact was that the West End had never seen worker's portraits before – certainly not on the screen."[46]
Yet, like the earlier period, there is some equivocal awareness of the problematic nature of bourgeois social exploration. John Trevelyan's landscape collages (*Worktown* 1937, *Bolton Mills* 1938) for example, invoke notions of the popular and the mundane in contrast to Bell and Coldstream's serene vision. Equally, Orwell's much–maligned inability to transcend his bourgeois prejudices was tempered by "a feeling of partisanship, a sense of injustice" and a willingness to adopt and inhabit (often unrepresentative) proletarian lifestyles and experiences, what V.S. Pritchett describes as Orwell's need to "'[go] native' in his own country". Again, I would suggest that such an attempt to engage with other lifestyles is suggestive of a crisis in one stratum of the *bourgeoisie* – specifically the scions of home and colonial administrative families characterised by Orwell as "the class of functionaries that constituted the shock absorbers of the bourgeoisie."[47] Raymond Williams has suggested that such a class had a particular investment in the production of national images, "often in such a group there is a kind of over adjustment to the very myths which define the membership of the class as a whole; the fear of dropping out of the class of which they are literally the bottom edge can produce more rigid and more blatant definitions of their England than might be found at the relaxed and comfortable centre."[48]

As bourgeois spectators were fixated by the alienated industrial landscape, so they offered the worker's body as a synecdoche for this terrain. Orwell celebrates miners' "most noble bodies; wide shoulders and small pronounced buttocks and sinewy thighs, with not an ounce of waste flesh anywhere"[49], and the heroic body of the worker is prominent in documentary images of the period. With one eye firmly on Soviet cinema, films such as *Industrial Britain*,

Coalface (1935) and *A Midsummer Day's Work* (1939) run together notions of national pride and heroic masculinity. The male body in these texts becomes a focus for celebration, seen at its simplest in close–ups of the male body at work. For example, in *Coalface*, a film in which the human being is often displaced by machinery and environment, the only sustained close–ups are of semi–naked miners (other toiling figures are seen at the margins of the frame). But the working man is rarely *heard*, and his mute primitiveness is sometimes stressed by the repetitive soundtrack (*Coalface*) or the dusk/dawn or pithead shots in which the workers individuality is effaced (*Spare Time*, or, in a different textual form, Bill Brandt's *English at Home* [see Figure 3]).

Sally Alexander has stressed that the key term in the documentarists' construction of the proletariat is *melancholia* since it repudiates the representation of other forms of labour, association and activity[50], and often presents its heroes as victims or ghosts – as voiceless as the animal–men on the coalface. J.B. Priestley's *English Journey*, for example, contains a particularly poignant image of the workers as utterly beaten:

> I remembered then how just after the Armistice I had been sent to look after some German prisoners of war, most of whom had been captured two or three years before. It was a strained, greyish, faintly decomposed look. I did not expect to see that kind of look again for a long time; but I was wrong. I had seen a lot of those faces on this journey. They belonged to unemployed men.[51]

Yet the inter–war period also sees the beginnings of some limited deconstruction of the voiceless worker–voiced observer, body–mind dyad. Although the mass observers were overwhelmingly bourgeois, there were some working–class volunteers and some attempt to avoid the editing or summarising of working–class speech typical of 'classical' social exploration (although even here Madge and Harrison's emphasis on the individuality of the person consorts strangely with their concept of a single "mass–mind".) Similarly, the broadcasts produced by Olive Shapley for BBC North Region attempted to bring the voices of 'ordinary people' to the microphone. This, however, involved working within

FIGURE 1.3 Bill Brandt, from "The English at Home"



and against the constraints of established views of what was permissible and/or 'good' radio. The director Geoffrey Bridson commented of BBC policy during the period:

> That the man in the street should have anything vital to contribute to broadcasting was an idea slow to gain acceptance. That he should actually use broadcasting to express his own opinions in his own unvarnished words was regarded as the end of all good social order.[52]

When Bridson interviewed Newcastle and Durham miners about their lives and work, their "unvarnished words" proved a little too much, and Olive Shapley was sent into the studio with a placard carrying the warning "Do not say bugger or bloody!" This was only one of a number of incidents which led to Lord Reith's insistence on scripted discussions, a form which virtually excluded the working class from the airwaves.

Perhaps the most famous instance of attempting the give the working class a 'voice' was *Housing Problems* (1935), directed by Arthur Elton and Edgar Anstey, though produced by Grierson with the help of his sister Ruby. It was Ruby Grierson who reputedly told the Stepney residents in the film: "the camera's yours, the microphone's yours, now tell the bastards what it's like to live in the slums." Using direct sound recording and unscripted interview, the film is something of a vanguard piece, not least in the way it uses working people's names rather than generic descriptions. Although *Housing Problems* now seems rather staged, its contextual significance can be gauged through comparison with the 1937 boast of Lord Tyrell, president of the British Board of Film Censors, that "we might take pride in observing that there is not a single film showing in London today which deals with any of the burning questions of the day."

Nonetheless, the film was criticised for the limitations imposed upon it by its sponsorship by the British Commercial Gas Association and for the upper–middle class tones of the commentary which tells us how to read the succession of images and frames the contributions of the various

participants.[53] Moreover Colls and Dodd have noted the film's preference for the occupiers to address us from around the fire or by the mantelpiece, a preference at one with Orwell's 1937 celebration of the patriarchal working–class interior: "There is a strain of English thinking on the 'poor' which stretches to Hoggart's *Uses of Literacy* which is happiest *chez* working–class". It is interesting in this context that several post–war British directors (Ken Loach, Stephen Frears, Nick Broomfield[54]) have made early films in the housing problem sub–genre, though this is not necessarily to indict them with the condescension suggested by Colls and Dodd.

For all its limitations, the inter–war period was also the first in which the working–class viewed were allowed some space in which to interrogate their viewers. The South Wales miner John Jones, interviewed by James Hanley, presented the social explorers as a menace: "The men down here, in fact all the people down here, have grown very, very sensitive about the enormous number of people who come down from London and Oxford and Cambridge making enquiries, inspecting places, descending underground, questioning women about their cooking, asking questions about this, that and the other, that's all. We're not animals in a zoo, that's what it is."[55] Similarly, Paddy Scannell has described Olive Shapley's Mass–Observation–inspired reconstruction of a vox pop criticising Chamberlain's actions at Munich as "the only critical discourse about government policy in relation to Nazi Germany ... before the outbreak of the Second World War."[56]

One final point to be made about the Documentary Movement is suggested by Grierson's concern with the construction of a national culture. Colls and Dodd note that ideas of 'citizenship', 'national education' and 'the corporate nature of community life' dominate Grierson's writings on film. Believing that "the great days of unmitigated individualism and governmental *laissez-faire* are over, and the day of common unified planning has arrived", Grierson offers the state as the neutral site for resolving class conflict and drawing the relatively autonomous regions into the ambit of the metropolis. As David Cannadine has

argued, during the nineteenth century "the national influence of London was relatively restricted as provincial England [Britain] reasserted itself."[57] I would suggest that this process continued well into the twentieth century: the journeys to the Clyde Valley, the industrial North and South Wales symbolise a process of realignment and a management of consensus centred on the metropolis, a process most clearly articulated during the Blitz when London was constructed as a metonym for Anglo–British endurance.[58] Stephen Edwards has noted that this realignment satisfied a deep sense of crisis amongst bourgeois intellectuals: "the threat that informed the investigation of the northern town was replaced by a discourse of contentment and security secreted from the South."[59]

This drawing together of core and periphery is most vividly enacted in *Night Mail* (1936) which symbolically and literally connects the light industrial South, the heavy industrial North (**"THE MINES OF WIGAN!"**) and Scotland: "And who can bear to be forgotten?" asks Auden's poem, rhetorically constructing a national unity. It is perhaps unsurprising, given this dominant discourse of unity, that many of those involved with the Ministry of Information after 1939 had earlier participated in the Documentary Movement.

This analysis may have suggested a polar opposition between the inter–war ruralists (Hoppé, Morton) and the Documentary Movement, and while I would indicate broad political homologies to support this binarism, it may be deconstructed to some extent. Humphrey Jennings has been privileged in this context, his films (and paintings and poems) running together notions of landscape, belonging and the popular to construct a 'national–collectivist myth' appropriate to the wartime and post–war construction of Anglo–Britishness. There are indications, however, of such a process of fusion operating before the war. The uncredited GPO film "*A Midsummer Day's Work*" (1939) bonds images of ancestry (Oxford, Milton's cottage, thatching) with those of modernity (Aylesbury, suburban cyclists, golf, workers) with each historical level intersecting with and passing by the other. In one sequence, characteristic rapid

cutting of heavily muscled labourers is accompanied by a repetitive soundtrack imitative of pneumatic power tools. But as the rhythm slows, so too does the cutting, until it settles on two labourers on either side of the frame, fixing a long vista extending towards a country house. The same technique, hierarchically connecting modernity and anteriority, occurs at the end of the film as the camera moves back from a scene of cable greasing, along a road which leads through a cycling party (suburbia) and then the outskirts of Aylesbury (ivy–covered cottages suggestive of premodernity) to a final fade on an almost unpopulated country lane. *A Midsummer Day's Work* does not deny industry or the state, instead it integrates them with the nation (the work in question is part of the defences for the approaching conflict). At the same time, the cable between Amersham and Aylesbury demarcates a local place – a constituent part of the nation, but not reducible to that formation. As I will suggest, one of the significant features of the contemporary travelogue is the problematisation of this link between place and nation.

In conclusion, therefore, I would adapt Said in noting five secularizing elements in British culture between 1830 and 1945 that led to a growth in travel and the political uses to which travel could be put: *Expansion* in population centres and communications led to new opportunities for travel and new objects of study. The threat of urban poverty and the centripetal effects of imperialism produced new possibilities of *Historical Confrontation*. Selective identification with cultures other than one's own was mediated through notions of *Sympathy* and *Classification*. The possibility of *Intervention* in social planning gave concrete meaning to sympathy. In an historical period, post–1979, in which processes of expansion are more equivocally interpreted and the sites of confrontation multiplied, I want to go on to ask questions about the ontological status of the remaining terms. In the final section I want to suggest that the amelioration of the traditional, distance–defined vision, renders such forms of cultural perspective problematic, but for the moment I want to concentrate on the difficulties involved in crossing cultures and mapping the various spaces of 'home', 'community' and 'nation'.

3. SYMBOLISING BOUNDARIES.

a. INTRODUCTION

In attempting to outline some problems and advantages in thinking through the representation of linkages and discontinuities between various imaginings of collectivity (home, 'community', nation), I have used Neil Smith's essay "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places"[60] to approach issues of scale and spatial metaphor. Smith notes that much social and cultural theory in recent years has depended heavily on spatial images; locality, mapping, grounding, travel and so forth. Of particular importance in this context is the work of Foucault, who argues that while temporal metaphors articulate issues of individual consciousness, the effort "to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power."[61] In most cases, however, these metaphors are applied uncritically, and Smith suggests that this lack of scrutiny, and the privileging of 'metaphorical' over 'material space' implicitly repeats existing asymetries of power which valorise the temporal over the spatial, recreating the latter as "the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile" in contrast to history's "richness, fecundity, life, dialectic."[62]

> Refracted against the mirror of a highly rigid, absolute space, metaphorical space carves out 'room to move', the space in which to be fecund, dialectical, life–giving. It is in this way that metaphorical space gains its richness – at the expense of material space, the impoverishment of which it reinforces.[63]

Resisting the prioritization of metaphorical space, Smith proceeds to argue that some discussion of geographical scale might provide a way of connecting material and metaphorical conceptions of space:

> The construction of scale is not simply a spatial solidification or materialization of contested social forces and processes; the corollary also holds. Scale is an active progenitor of specific social processes. In a literal as much as metaphorical way, scale both *contains* social activity and at the same time provides an already partitioned geography within

> which social activity *takes place*. Scale demarcates the site of social contest, the object as well as the resolution of contest. Viewed this way, the production of scale can begin to provide the language that makes possible a more substantial and tangible spatialized politics ... It is geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control is exerted *and* contested. [original italics]

The fact that scale is a relational term makes a rigid typology problematic, but Smith proposes a series of specific scales around which certain questions of power might be articulated (body, home, community, city, region, nation, globe), without proposing such a system as ontologically given. He further focuses on four aspects of each scale: its internal characteristics, internal differences, borders with other scales and the possibility for resistance inherent in the traversing of boundaries (the 'jumping of scales'). In fact the optimism of the last category is called into question by the admission that boundaries are porous in both directions and that subaltern groups' ability to control 'higher' scales is extremely vulnerable.[64]

While resistance is not an *explicit* feature of my argument, this final category of scalar mobility is central. If, as I have suggested, the major achievement of the documentary movement was a representational integration of various scales (by no means necessarily achieved at the level of popular consciousness) – home and nation, community and nation, region and nation – the impossibility of such a representational chain becomes one of the defining features of the late century text. While the significance of home and community is no less than in 1930, the fatalistic representations of region and nation suggest problems in the construction of the organic chain from hearth to flag so necessary to the articulation of the imagined community.

b. HOME & NO HOME

The home provides a (heavily gendered) site of personal and familial reproduction, and in such representations as Orwell's description of the proletarian fireside or television's construction of the Windsor's domesticity, a potential site of *national* reproduction. Such a linkage, however, is an area of contestation with some uses of home resisting incorporation into a national construction. For as Doreen Massey has noted, the identity of any place – including home, so often presented in the ideologies of both left and right as bounded and immutable – is in one sense for ever open to struggle. Most homes are, or have been, 'meeting places' and the sense of permanence attributed to home is often belied by the actual impermanence and transitory quality of residence. For bell hooks, the home seems at times to become an exemplar of New Times/Postmodern potential:

> Home is no longer just one place. It is location. Home is that place which enables and promotes varied and everchanging perspective, a place where one discovers new ways of seeing reality, frontiers of difference.

Such a fluid and metaphorical notion of 'home', however, rests uneasily with the ideological importance of the home as a severely proscribed signifier during the period of neoconservative hegemony. The encomium to buy one's council home, the growth of Neighbourhood Watch groups and other quasi–police bodies, the emergence of the urban prestige development and renewed and exacerbated anxieties over homelessness have all been refracted and rearticulated through documentary texts during the period.

The key notion uniting these ideas and texts is the decline, or inadequate realisation of, municipal socialism. In *A Journey Through Ruins* (1992), Patrick Wright sets up a fragile polarity between two neighbouring terrains of 'home' in the 1980s; the high–rise flats of the Holly Street Estate in Hackney against the "inward–looking"[65] *arriviste* development of the Bow Quarter. To adapt Smith's notion of transcending scales, it is clear that this polarity is constructed through a notion not of living space, but of the body as homologous to a particular sort

of politics. Against the vulnerable, welfarist pensioner of the high–rises, is posited the aspirational neoconservative *ubermensch*:

> I ask...what kind of person was buying into the project and he assures me that the purchasers were 'clones' of the imagery projected in the brochures: young, childless and 'aspirational' first– or second–time buyers...the Bow Quarter has its marketing consultants and young entrepreneurs, its accountants and tax consultants who work for city firms like Coopers and Lybrand, Lloyds Bank and Price Waterhouse.[66]

Wright demonstrates that this opposition between 'proletarian' and 'yuppie' homes can be deconstructed to some extent (without losing much of its rhetorical charge) by an ethnography of the occupants and through reading both notions of home in opposition to a third formulation of place – the serene, countermodernity of 'Crichel Down', the literal place and symbolic space rhetorically articulated by opponents of the welfare state to discredit a broad range of 'bureaucratic' activities. Crichel Down, in Wright's construction, collapses together a broad range of positions which seek to dissociate state from nation. One such position he refers to as "Brideshead":

> Brideshead has won by discrediting the project of 1945, not by solving the problems the architects and engineers of that project set out, however inadequately, to address. Thus, for example, Quinlan Terry's revival of classical architecture may be presented as an answer to the functional architecture of the public housing estate, but Terry builds his new country houses as homes for proper gentlemen, not council tenants. The lifestyle magazines' new emphasis on 'home' which if only in design terms also owes a lot to the interior styles of the country house, is similarly positioned. Thanks to this ongoing polarity between Brideshead and the tower blocks, the revival of 'home' has coincided with the revival of homelessness, which in recent years has been standing at the highest levels ever recorded. 'Home' spearheads the kind of modernization that Raymond Williams described as "mobile privatization".[67]

This argument will be developed further in Chapter Two, which thinks through some of the implications of the men's lifestyle magazine.

Where Wright is fairly sensitive to the difficulties in applying monolithic ideological tags to phenomena, Martin Parr has adopted a (strategic?)

insensitivity in his photographs of the contemporary middle class (or, euphemistically, "comfortable class"), *The Cost of Living* (1989). While Robert Chesshyre's oddly misjudged accompanying essay stresses that Parr is a bourgeois, looking at his own class, both essay and pictures frequently adopt a position of admonitory externality or defamiliarisation. The camera is mostly below the faces of the viewed, which then appear pale or overexposed in contrast to the colours of the surrounding possessions. Figure 4, "Garden Open Day", reworks the pessimism of the Frankfurt School about the modern body, differentiating between the downward–looking, clothed body of modernity and the Vetruvian, upturned vision of European high art: "Synthetically produced physiognomies show that the people of today have already forgotten that there was ever a notion of what human life was."[68] And while there is a mordant humour in the disparity between image and caption (one distinctly charmless looking garden party is entitled "Conservative Midsummer Madness" [Figure 5]) such a satirical position does not suggest engagement with the subject, but rather a withdrawal from what is perceived as a pervasive process of reification. Adorno and Horkheimer again:

> The bourgeois whose existence is split into a business and a private life, whose private life is split into keeping up his public image and intimacy, whose intimacy is split into the surly partnership of marriage and the bitter comfort of seeing quite alone, at odds with himself and everybody else, is already virtually a Nazi, replete both with enthusiasm and abuse; or a modern city dweller who can now only imagine friendship as a 'social contact': that is, as being in social contact with others with whom he has no inward contact.[69]

Parr and Chesshyre, perhaps uniquely, subject the middle class to the kind of opprobrium usually reserved for working–class massification, but this cannot be seen as a progressive move. Firstly, the middle classes are generally (though not exclusively) staged as *nouveaux riches*, bringing with them the worst features of an acquisitive culture untempered by any of the Arnoldian high cultural virtues. While this suggests a critique of the carefully managed class mobility of the Thatcher years, it also locates ethics and aesthetics in 'authentic' fundamental classes. "Craft Fair" (Figure 6) with its ironic suggestion of the


Access

utopian socialism of William Morris shows three people, again photographed and lit from below, apparently staring with lustful mien at a sign for Access cards. To reinforce the point, the essay adds the historically dubious proposition that "we no longer seek the solid value [sic] cherished by our parents."

The second representational strategy is the feminization of middle class culture. The shoppers in the pictures entitled "Next" and "Designer Knitwear" or indeed the demanding punkette of the title page, are suggestive of that traditional view of the middle class as under the sway of female commodity fetishism. For Lawrence:

> ...it's only the woman who idolizes "her own little home" – and it's always the woman at her worst, her most greedy, most possessive, most mean.[70]

Parr and Chesshyre stage the impossibility of the *arriviste* bourgeoisie's attempt to 'jump scales' and locate their domesticity at the centre of the nation and its history. Juxtaposed with an image of Ann Hathaway's cottage ('authentic', 'organic' national culture) is a picture metonymically entitled "Milton Keynes" (Figure 7). In some ways the photograph replicates the serene vista of the British landscape tradition – the 'cottage' in the foreground, the absence of figures, the Norman church glimpsed through trees in the distance. But the presence of pallets of bricks denies the apparent antiquity of the setting. Moreover, the prominence of the bricks' name (Redland "Olde English Range") suggests a reading of the scene as kitsch – and kitsch, for all its prominence in ceremonial, is an unspeakable feature of the national construction. The image of the hyperreal Tudorbethan home (and the following, similar image, with its massive, Constablesque sky) preclude the possibility of the middle class historically 'locating' themselves in the manner of H.V. Morton's travellers into England. Instead they are staged as deracinated, inhabiting a consumerist limbo which *denies* history:

> People even do it on Bank Holidays, dressing in their best clothes to



Milton Keynes

> travel 20 or 30 miles to the latest mall to open. The most lasting architectural legacy of the Thatcher years may prove to be the homogenised, pedestrianised shopping precinct.

If Parr's subjects can be seen as failing in their attempt to make connections between home and nation, other, working–class residences have been articulated as another country, invisible to the national culture, and this suggests some connection with earlier modes of travelogue representation. The Cutting Edge Film *A Plague on Your Home* (Charles Stewart and Malcolm Hirst C4 1991) in particular is offered as a critical reading of several documentary movement strategies, specifically those used in Anstey and Elton's *Housing Problems.*

The motivation for the film was a 150% annual increase in cockroach infestation in council properties stretching from Hackney to Poplar (including *Housing Problems*' Stepney). Ironising the nurturing emphasis of the welfare state prophesied in texts such as *A Diary for Timothy* (1946), the most arresting images in the film are of cockroaches surrounding toddlers, infecting their food and infesting their cots. The talismanic repetition of mothers' fears about the invasion of the child's cot or pram casts a profound shadow over the child–centred Christian philanthropy and socialism historically connected with the East End.

Plague resists many of the convention of the documentary film: while it includes several shots that could have been taken from *Housing Problems* (high distant shot of tower blocks; low pan from left to right of low rises; eye–level chiaroscuro shot from within a stairwell) it resists the sequential ordering of these shots into a narrative of middle–class penetration. Similarly, the patrician voiceover, telling the audience how to read the images is almost wholly absent and the filmmakers do not linger over the faces and bodies of the council residents, adopting point–of–view shots instead. But while this conscious manipulation of form offers some attempt at a *rapprochement* between viewer and viewed, it is still inscribed within a notion of documentary aesthetic –

witness the expressionistic sequence of clearing pigeons from a deck–access walkway.

I will concentrate on two thematic aspects of the film which suggest problems in making connections between home and nation. The first is the problematic nature of contact between the individual and the state. Where the actual agents and agencies of slum clearance in Anstey and Elton's film are wholly invisible, the authoritarian relationship between servers and served in *Plague* is foregrounded, whether at the council meeting where the questions of tenants are summarily dismissed or in the dystopian shots of uniformed pest controllers and policemen patrolling the corridors of the blocks. The fact that this authoritarian approach is, as the coda makes clear, *necessary* and *welcomed* suggests both the hidden centrality of discipline and surveillance to the smooth running of the 'welfare' state, and also the breakdown of consensus (forced access is required because some flats are illegally squatted or their occupants refuse to allow ingress to the council). The major lacuna of the documentary is the refusal or inability to press this question of consensus further, to ask how squatting, isolation and a fear of authority or strangers might relate to an exogenous socio–political context. All that is present is an impressionistic edit of a Town Hall meeting on finance (not unlike the meeting in *The Spongers*, 1977) in which we hear a Labour councillor call the Tory government "the real infectation".

The second problematic is the construction of 'victims' in the film. To some extent, *Plague* resists the heroic representation of the proletariat. One woman already has her bags packed in order to flee the flats, another breaks down in front of the camera. But the film also breaks with the centrality of suffering men to the documentary form. Men are present as officials in this landscape, but absent as fathers, carers or activists. When a tenants' association angrily face up to a very uncomfortable cabal of councillors, the former are almost all women, the latter (bar their secretary) besuited men. As Beatrix Campbell and Neil Smith remind us, such associations are now a major means by which

women jump scales:

> Women predominate in tenants and neighbourhood organizations largely because they refuse to recognize the physical boundaries of the home but instead treat the community as a virtually borderless extension of the home.[71]

Yet this occupation of communal space does not suggest a further occupation of national space. At the end of the film, the tension between representatives of the *state* and the women of the *estate* is palpable, and the further, holistic movement of the documentary movement which consensualised the bourgeoisie with the proletariat through some notion of 'improvement' is wholly absent.

Intersecting with this discourse of 'home' has been a representational rediscovery of homelessness. Again, these representations are directed both towards the alleviating the problems of their ostensible subject matter and towards achieving a critical understanding of their antecedents. Of overwhelming 'inspirational' importance has been Orwell's *Down & Out in Paris & London* (1933) which inspired a *Nationwide* report in 1974, Nick Danziger's film *Down & Out in Paris & London* (1993), Chris Schwarz's photojournal *Down & Out: Orwell's Paris & London Revisited* (with Sandy Craig, 1985) and, to a lesser extent, Adam Holloway's report for *World in Action*, *No Fixed Abode* (1993). Indeed, as Chris Schwarz has noted, homelessness can sometimes be debilitatingly imagined only through the historically specific realism of Orwell and his contemporaries[72]. Although the same rage against philanthropy is present in Schwarz's photographs, Orwell's generally dignified and decent tramps are virtually absent. Instead, homelessness is visualized largely through youth, coded, in a post–punk representational move, as without a future and without links to any national culture. In the photograph titled "London, Wednesday afternoon, a bed–and–breakfast hotel" (Figure 8), a group of bored young men are crashed out, smoking. Most of them show no acknowledgement of the camera. Attention is drawn instead to the brightly–lit, overdetermined image of the engagement of the Prince and Princess of Wales, which stares out

FIGURE 1.8 Chris Schwarz, [illegible], Earl's Court, from "Down and Out"



from a litter bin.

The influence of a punk anti–aesthetic is clear both in this image and in that of a heroin needle being inserted into an arm bearing the message **FUCK THE SYSTEM**, but whereas in punk's high moment Jamie Reid's designs for the Sex Pistols and Derek Jarman's for *Jubilee*[73] imagined some ambiguous role for youth in the formation of nationhood, Schwarz stages youth as aliens, their disaffection defining the impossibility of consensus or 'home'. Nor does this contemporary crisis of youth invoke some normative past of stability. A picture of the Mortimer Street employment office for casual hotel and catering workers shows a queue of middle–aged men in profile (Figure 9); the men at the back appear resigned, while those at the front fight to push their social security cards through the cracks in the door. The image specifically recalls the Pit in which dock workers fought for casual labour before the introduction of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1947, a cornerstone of historic labourism curtailed after the defeat of the 1989 dockers strike. Again the image suggests an expunging of a particular representational history which connected home with labour and this in turn with the nation.

My purpose in this section has been to suggest problems in constructing a national image out of the increasingly individualised, compromised and uncertain space of 'home' peculiar to late modernity. Though the promises of 1945 were inadequately met, 'home' played a central ideological role in post–war reconstruction. That the wartime and post–war planners had a highly gendered view of living space is not to entirely discredit their attempts to build 'homes for heroes'. Speaking of the need to avoid ghettoisation, Nye Bevan (dubbed 'a tremendous Tory' by Hugh Dalton for the 900' living space he asked for people) observed that, "The full life should see the unfolding of a multicoloured panorama before the eyes of every citizen every day"[74]. That this ideological terrain has been entirely evacuated in the present suggests the extent of Conservative hegemony over the issue of 'home'. To be sure, ideological activity surrounding the meaning of home and homeless is currently

FIGURE 1. Chris Schwarz. Night at Mortimer Street casual work office. From "Down and Out"



intense, involving issues such as squatting, 'travellers' and 'aggressive' begging, but socialist opposition to rightist assaults on these liberties is only reactive. There is an absence of any counter–ideology which would broaden the scope of home, turn it away from the 'inward–looking' model exemplified by Dulwich. Witness the plangency of Philip Cohen's *crie de coeur* for adequate youth housing:

> It is necessary to conceive of a long–term strategy for building the material and ideological conditions of a new kind of autonomy for working–class youth...The central *material* condition for this is the provision of cheap public housing available to all 16–19 year olds not in full–time education...To recognise this group as a priority for housing may seem unrealistic, but in terms of the likely saving on health and social services it certainly makes welfare sense...a youth housing programme would not only attract widespread support from existing youth organisations, it would give feminists and socialists who are working with ordinary 'apolitical' young people in working–class areas a chance to introduce a material stake around which ideological issues could be anchored.
> *I have few illusions that this suggestion will be discussed seriously within the labour movement, let alone acted upon.* (emphasis added)[75]

c. CARE IN THE COMMUNITY

"Community" is the least specifically defined of social scales, and the consequently vague yet generally affirmative meaning attached to the term makes it one of the most ideologically appropriated metaphors in contemporary public discourse. In different histories and representations, the community has been seen as the fundamental site of social reproduction, its various manifestations including the English village and the working–class neighbourhood. The diverse virtues of geographically and culturally disparate communities have been projected as national virtues, and this unity in difference might be used to refine Benedict Anderson's rather limited model of the imagined national community[76]. My argument again is that, at the level of documentary or travelogue representation, this projection is no longer sustainable, showing instead the impossibility of connecting community with nation. Rather, the community is represented as either strong in its inward–

looking defensiveness (a society of tribes) or irredeemably broken down: to apply Smith's notion of 'jumping scales', the former group of images suggest a community consciously not transcending their scale, while the latter code articulates the scale of community as defunct. I would further argue that this representational strategy of dissensus is no less constructed or negotiated than the counterdiscourse of consensus: the inward–looking community is variously constructed as desirable *and* reprehensible; the fragmented community as debilitating *and* empowering.

A particularly plangent illustration of 'breakdown' is provided by a series of photographs taken by Linder Stirling in Manchester's Miles Platting Colony[77] (referred to in Michael Bracewell's accompanying text, using the overdetermined argot of northenness, as "the Tripe Colony"). The images and text map a familiar history of urban dissolution in which structural questions are all but overlooked. Instead a 'magical' history is inscribed around these representations in which decades stand in for agents. Witness the movement between national–collectivist past, '70s betrayal and dystopian future in the following passages:

> ..one can regard the integrity of the newly constructed Tripe Colony to be almost pre–Lapsarian in its innocence. When the houses were first built, potential tenants were vetted by the builders to make sure that they were the right sort of people for the district. You had to be clean–living and honest, according to records; you also had to have a blameless record of paying your rent on time. The Miles Platting Tripe Colony was going to be one of those working–class Utopias in which working people could live healthily and happily. (p. 35)

through:

> A spokesperson for Manchester City Council explained 'There were social and housing problems throughout the '70s and '80s; a lot of money was spent in the middle '70s because the Colony was a General Improvement Area, but the situation was already dire. Bad housing, difficult families, *general decline - the rot just worsened* and we had to consider other alternatives. (p.37, emphasis added)

to:

> The Miles Platting Tripe Colony, finally, is a manifestation of Eliot's prophetic *Wasteland*; if British society were ever actually to break down, amidst police sirens, vandalism and packs of roaming mongrel dogs, our inner cities would very likely all resemble Corelli Street. (ibid.)

The photographs and article indicate a familiar typology in which 'community' is only visible in its remnants, or in memorial form. It is easy to read in this formulation a left–entropic mapping of national history. Community and commodity are elided in this construction: the orderly proletariat are a function of their housing, with little sense of the (heavily–gendered) processes and compromises involved in the maintenance of this terrain. Similarly, the crisis of the late Twentieth Century working–class community is imagined through its detritus – the tins, toys and plastic wrappers of encroaching 'inauthentic' modernity – and not through any sense of the interacting uses of community space. As Michael Bommes and Patrick Wright have observed, such a reading provides little space in which to construct an alternative view of social space: "The future apparently holds little in store but further decline, and therefore one can only hope for stalling measures imposed by necessarily conservative governments."[78]

In her tour round the sites of the 1991 riots, *Goliath*[79], Beatrix Campbell has noted how narratives such as that describing the Miles Platting Colony depend for their force on a transcendent image of *respectability*, which she defines as a discourse of masculinity:

> Respectability, which codified the settlement of the great struggle over masculinity and femininity, was one of the formative ideologies of modernity. That drama of domination defined the way men, women and children occupied space and created communities. When capital withdrew from the industrial areas which were the cradle of the 'moral view of the respectable working class' then the historic compromise between capital and men, mediated by the Labour movement, collapsed. The authority of the Labour–movement man, with his National Service haircut, his Clubs and Institutes Union card, his pride and his prejudice against women, was at an end. (312)

While Campbell's historical generalizations are open to dispute, the centrality of respectability to a linkage between community and nationhood is persuasive. Ironically, the abandonment of respectability as a fundamental aspect of the national construction (which Campbell rightly sees as complicit in women's subjugation[80]) gives rise to a Hobbesian conclusion wholly consonant with neoconservative individualism:

> There is nothing in the political economy of Britain that will make any difference to the people living in a state of emergency on the edges of the cities. The restoration of respectability is no more an option for the poor than it is for the worldly working class...or for the metropolitan middle class.
> *It is hard to imagine anything in* ***fin de siécle*** *Britain that will change the conditions of existence among the poor people.* (323, emphasis added)

While Campbell, Stirling and Bracewell articulate the fatal crisis of community (enacting Sartre's drama of collectivity as *series*), a further group of texts represent it as endangered, defensive and introverted – strong only as a *group*. Paradigmatic is Anna Fox's study of the Sussex village of Crompton *The Village* (1993) which takes issue with the constructed national–emblematic power of the rural community invoked in such seminal pieces as the *Picture Post*'s story: "What We Are Fighting For" (1941). Fox sets out to "subvert the image of the picture post–card; the images of thatched cottages, leafy lanes and quaint old people that are imprinted on our memories, fixed there by a desire to maintain our idea of the country as a pre–industrial haven, neatly packaged in the top pocket of the heritage industry."[81] The snobbish invocation of heritage is, as I will argue in Chapter Three, something of a ritual, but Fox's awareness of the implied violence of bucolic life is interesting, given the traditional construction of a matrix of qualities (gentleness, eccentricity, privateness, tolerance) around the romanticized village. Commenting on the photographs, Joanna Lowry has called them: "Bleak and empty stage sets for a play which might never take place, or which has, perhaps, been rudely interrupted and from which the players have fled. It was probably by Alan Ayckbourn or Mike Leigh and the characters have all gone indoors to murder each other over their afternoon tea."[82]

Crompton is not so much under siege as always–and–everywhere invaded – Fox's images do not appeal to some moment of anteriority or authenticity. In rather more severe conditions, a discourse of 'threatened', 'authentic' community *has* defined a good deal of left–oriented politics and imagery in the '80s. Frequently this has been used as a deliberate counter to the rightist construction of certain communities as 'enemies' to the body politic. Ken Loach's banned documentary *Which Side Are You On?* (1985) and John Sturrock's photo–sequence "Purity & Danger"[83] (Figures 10–12), both representing the 1984–5 Miners Strike, are typical of the strategic use of the working–class community as a 'pure' space outside the invasive, brutalised and brutalising British state:

> The meaning of the photograph is first defined by the context, and that in turn is decided by people who are not subjects of the picture but who gain from the 'regime of truth' it presents.
> This is the proper context for the meaning of the photographs of the dispute. They define the battle in the symbolic terms of *purity* and *danger*. It is an unequal struggle because by definition the dominant groups shape the practices in which the discourse takes place. So for some the photographs work best when they apparently defy or contradict the 'truth', as when they show police breaking the law or miners and their families acting in a coherent manner. (emphasis added)[84]

The representations of the Miners Strike, however, gesture beyond 'purity' to some broader notion of collectivity. As Smith notes, "Community–based struggles that are not simply defensive develop as political recognition of social identity...is emancipated from parochial, spatial constraint."[85] Purity is transformed (both in image culture and in political practice) into *alliance* – the women's support groups in Figure 11 testify to new forms of organisation, the battered figure of Ian Wright, a member of the Hammersmith miners support group (Figure 12) testifies, beyond its agony, to *impure* collectivities and forms of group imagining. But surrounding these forms of association, preventing them from occupying some space in the national imaginary, are the police as personifications of state power. Where, in the consensual images of the Documentarists, the uniformed representatives of the state were the guarantors of certain national virtues (tolerance, peacefulness, collective action, locality),

FIGURE [illegible].13 John Sturrock, from "Purity and Danger".



FIGURE 1.11 John Sturrock, from "Purity and Danger"



FIGURE 1.12 John Sturrock, from "Purity and Danger"



now they only signify the state divorced from the nation: an occupying army constraining and delimiting the bounds of 'community'[86].

d. LOOKING OUT TO SEA

The greatest advantage in this tour was that a country tended to seep to its coast; it was concentrated there, deposited against its beaches like the tide-wrack from the sea. People naturally gravitated to the coast, and they wore fewer clothes there - it was normal on the coast to be semi-naked, exposed.[87]

These lonely saltwater romances are all the product of suburbia and the city; they are post-industrial dreams at heart, as urban in their own way as the glass-and-steel romances of St. Pancras and the Crystal Palace...They express the simple claustrophobia of living in a country that has suddenly grown too small, too smoky, too intimate, too man-made and civilised for comfort.[88]

Between 1976 and 1993, a curiously resonant drama played itself out on Studland Bay in Dorset, a four mile stretch of sand owned by the National Trust, and the backdrop to such instances of *humeur anglaise* as the *Carry On* films and the *Benny Hill Show*. Local rumour has it that Viriginia Woolf and other members of the Bloomsbury group began the habit of bathing naked upon the beach, but immune to such historical and literary precedents local people and the police have objected to the use of the area as a centre for homosexual activity. In 1984, mounted police with whips 'cleaned up' the beach. In 1993 they returned in 'plain clothes' (trunks), to the amusement of the press. But when *Guardian* reporters arrived at the bay, their overdetermined interviewee was not a gay man, but someone for whom the seaside offered a particular kind of fatalistic comfort:

> In the dunes sits Colin James, stark naked in his little open–fronted tent. He stares up at the slate grey sky and listens to the sea breaking against the shore over the ridge behind him. Colin has been coming here to shed his clothes for 14 years now. Though only in his forties he is no longer able to work due to ill health. Instead he comes here to sit on the beach. He has left his body to Southampton University; he says he wants his corpse to have a nice tan when they get it.[89]

The seaside has provided a particularly plangent way of mapping the national decline during the years of Conservative hegemony, summoning

complementary and contradictory histories (artistic, military, collectivist) which can be imagined through their demise and occasional resurrection. At the same time, the seaside has become a problem in its own right. In July 1993 the Government acknowledged the plight of the seaside and its hinterland when it awarded assisted–area status to, *inter alia*, Bridlington, Clacton, Torbay and Great Yarmouth, at the expense of such traditional industrial areas as Bradford, Scunthorpe and Corby. The homeless charity Shelter estimates that there may be five times as many people sleeping rough in resorts as there are nationally.[90] I want to use this decay of the symbolic periphery to suggest some problems in making a link between 'place', 'community', 'region' and nation in our period.

For the documentarists of the 1930s, working at the acme of imperial extensiveness, the sea is a recurring metaphor both for Britain's world significance and for its maintenance of an organic culture. While films such as *Industrial Britain* and *Trade Tattoo* emphasise the nautical–industrial–imperial complex centred on the Clyde and the Tyne, other documentaries cultivate a 'Little Britain' image of self–sufficiency. In *The Islanders* (1939) the apparently diverse insular cultures that contribute to the national formation are shown to be working in harmony. But in contemporary representations of the nation, the sea and seaside are inherently fatalistic, looking out to the impossibility of a national future. In Paul Theroux's image of chaleted holidaymakers:

> The sea murmured back at them. The sea was a solace. It contained all life, of course, but it was also the way out of England – and it was the way to the grave, seawards, out there, offshore. The sea had the voice and embrace of a crowd, but for this peculiar nation it was not only a comfort, representing vigour and strength. It was an end too. These people were looking in the direction of death.[91]

Patrick Wright has proposed such an impossibility with reference to the resurrection of the Mary Rose, arguing that the incident is part of a 'mythical history' which flows backwards instead of forwards in time.[92] While accepting the argument that the sea acts as a repository for historical imaginings of

nationhood, I would add that the contemporary representational significance of the coastline lies in the way in which it is shown to have been progressively *evacuated* since 1945 and that this evacuation distinguishes contemporary representations of the nation from those of the documentarists in two intimately related ways: firstly, where previous travellers into Britain relied on a nexus of national power ultimately reliant on the sea as the underpinning of their visions of national unity, this nautical–imperial–industrial complex has now fundamentally broken down. Secondly, mass holiday–making to the British seaside resort was a quintessential leisure activity in that industrial society, but with recent changes in the direction of a post–industrial society, the practices of holiday–making have significantly altered and the projection of mass leisure as a major constituent of the national construction has become increasingly problematic.

i. Past Swan Hunter's, Hawthorn Leslie's, Armstrong's...[93]

The news in July 1994 was full of reminders of Britain's seafaring past. Early in the month, in anticipation of the Government white paper on defence, angry civilian workers from the Rosyth shipyard protested outside Westminster. A well–orchestrated campaign 'saved' the yard, while substantially reducing its activities and workforce. The following week it was reported that shipbuilding on Tyneside was to be "consigned to history" when the Swan Hunter company lost a refit order worth 40 million pounds[94]. While employment in shipbuilding has suffered a long–term decline, the fall–off during the period of Conservative office has been particularly severe[95].

Again, my purpose is not to offer some lament to a lost world of heroic masculine labour but to suggest instead that the demise of this culture has been variously negotiated in texts which have sought to record the nation since 1979. In *In Flagrante* (1988) Chris Killip has distanced himself from the reportage tradition which he feels did not adequately problematise notions of the real:

> The objective history of England doesn't amount to much if you don't believe in it, and I don't, and I don't believe that anyone in these photographs does either as they face the reality of de–industrialisation in a system which regards their lives as disposable. To the people in these photographs I am superfluous, my life does not depend upon their struggle, only my hopes...
> The book is a fiction about metaphor.[96]

The first and final photographs in the sequence (which feature a photographer's shadow), are part of this 'fictionalisation', but it is surely an arch (and politically disabling) reading of the image which dispenses with ontology altogether. Contrary to Killip's written statement, the photographs can be seen as a reformulation of the real, in which the emphasis is not upon achieved conditions or dominant meanings but on contradictions within the real and its vulnerability to historical change.

For example, although the two bleak 'shipyard' images in the text (Figures 13 & 14) are uncaptioned, a prominent slogan in one (DON'T VOTE: PREPARE FOR REVOLUTION) and a ship name (TYNE PRIDE) in the other act as possible ironic captions to the images. Read together, the photographs outline an 'objective' history in which imperial industrial power was intimately linked with massive labour organisation and occasional militancy. But at the same time, the 'captions' dispute the coherence of that history – "Tyne Pride" lowers over an apparently deserted row of back to backs, suggesting lives lived under the shadow of predatory industrialism, in which the ambiguous nature of 'pride' locked people into fatal life patterns. More pessimistic yet is that the Marxist–Leninist call for revolution is *just* a slogan, ignored by the huddled figures shuffling by. Viewed in the light of the subsequent de–democratisation produced by non–registration for the Poll Tax, there is a bitter irony in the call to not vote. The 'captions' then, are ambiguous markers of history; "the content", as Marx put it, "goes beyond the phrase". Read together, these images (and others such as a panorama where horses graze behind advertising billboards) testify to a 'subjective' history of thwarted attachments to place.

FIGURE 1.13 chris killip from "In Flagrante"



TYNE PRIDE

Killip's deployment of an aesthetic of grimness contrasts both with the traditional romance of the sea and with the romantic image of the industrial worker or fisherman cultivated after the First World War. Even unemployment has lost some of the 'mass' implications of Jarrow Crusading in these representations and become an isolated, normless phenomenon. The landscapes of unemployment are drained of figures and of meaning. Entering what he remembers as a busy industrial location, Jonathan Raban finds only emptiness:

> I had known that The Fishing was dead – had been dead for nearly ten years now, killed by Britain's losing to Iceland in the Cod Wars. But when the lock opened to let *Gosfield Maid*, and only *Gosfield Maid*, inside the Albert Dock, I wasn't equipped to take in the enormous empty hole which the death of The Fishing had left behind.
> "Where shall I go?" I called to the lock–keeper.
> "Anywhere you like. Anywhere you see a ladder."
> The Albert Dock was nearly a mile long and nearly two hundred yards wide. No one used its proper name. It was just the Fish Dock. You could walk from side to side and end to end across the decks of the boats...It was a self–contained city of ships with a city's non–stop lamplit clamour.
> It was just water. From the open lock–gate it yawned ahead, colours marbling on its oily surface. There wasn't even a herring gull in sight.
> Unemployment had been a public event; it was now a private misery, to be borne alone, behind the curtains. It was identifiable, not by things you could photograph and write heartstring–tugging reports about, but by gaps and absences...it was in the shops that weren't there, in the eerie feeling that the population had shrunk inside its walls, leaving a surfeit of unoccupied air. (*Coasting* [1987], 274)

The demise of the seafaring culture is represented as a mutual crisis for masculinity and nationhood. As Alison Light has shown, the sea in British culture frequently has subjective or private implications, licensing a view of masculinity as combative and emotionally unencumbered[97]. This turning of dangerous, exploitative labour into masculine romance is used by Raban as celebration and elegy for the past. He writes that as an English teacher in Hull in the 1960s, he would ask girls to compose romances about the Beatles, while asking boys for essays on the theme of "Where I'll Be This Time Next Year":

> The essays came in, misspelt, mispunctuated, big letters jumbled up with

> small ones, blotted, foodstained, often illegible, but vivid and passionate in a way that none of the girls' efforts ever came close to matching.
> In the boys' writing, frozen decks soared and plunged in black waves high as houses. Nets, throbbing with fish, were winched in under floodlights. Wild formations of ice grew on every shred of rigging, and had to be hacked off to prevent the trawler growing topheavy and turning turtle. (253)

The departure of this form of imagining is testimony, for Raban, of the demise of romanticism as a constituent part of the national construction. Unimpressed by prophets of the hyperreal, Raban calls romantic history–making "the deadly pleasure indulged in by old men blathering on with stories that make young men yawn." (256)

The evacuation of the coast by the old industries and patterns of self–narration left an open space in which to construct new industries, lifestyles and myths – a miniature version of the whole Thatcherite Enterprise & Heritage synthesis. The sea, with its suggestions of past triumphs, also carried pregnant motifs of independence, frontiers and new beginnings, values wholly consonant with the rhetorical thrust of the new right: "Ownership and independence cease to be the privilege of a few and become the birthright of all" as the suitably resonant 1987 Conservative Election Manifesto put it. Yet, as Raban shows, the rhetorical transformation of the national landscape was not – could not be – matched by substantive change to 'deep' structures:

> I felt for the amateurs. They had, after all, behaved exactly as they had been exhorted to by the British Government. They had got on their bikes. They had set themselves up in legal private enterprise. Because their boats were terribly inferior to those of the professionals (sometimes they were just stripy beach toys), and lacked professional gear like diesel winches and depth sounders, their job was absurdly difficult and dangerous. Knowing little about the sea, they were easily caught by tricks of tide and weather. Instead of being taken in hand as innocents, they were treated as enemies and pirates. (148)

and, as Thatcherism could imagine some Smilesian image of the platonic New Briton, "princes of industry, people who have fantastic ability to build things and create jobs"[98], so Raban can offer another thumbnail sketch of the (explicitly

gendered) 'Englishman' for whom the combined counter–cultural imaginings of the '60s and enterprise promises of the '80s have been stifled:

> The margins of England are lined with these men and their rotting boats. Redundant in many more senses than one, they have crossed the sea wall that defines the outer limit of society and live in a tidal no–man's land – Huck Finns going to grey, all talking in the accent of the same minor public school. The men from the Income Tax department have long ago lost touch with them...visiting them – by dinghy, or in gumboots over a hundred yards or so of soft and smelly mud – I listened to them all telling me solemnly that they were 'free'. But it was a freedom that they had all, with whatever little enthusiasm or real hope, put up for sale. (43–4)

ii. Hunting Mr. Happiness

There is a picture, taken in 1946, in Peter Hennessy's *Never Again* (1992) of Butlins at Clacton. In the packed dining hall, the camera does not detect a single grinning face – this is mass leisure apparently at its most dutiful and organised, a product (like the camps themselves) of wartime communality and group entertainment. The picture does not really do justice to the accompanying text in which Hennessy nostalgically conjures up an image of unprecedented leisure for the working class and unequalled cross–class solidarity:

> The greatest cross–section of the community came through the centres...let us take the knobbly knees competition, it was nothing weird to see a barrister, doctors, and many professional men queuing up with the road sweeper or the refuse person, all getting together and having a very good time.[99]

Mythical and conflict–free as this reading may be, Hennessy produces a range of testimony applauding the Great British Holiday. This nostalgia for 'authentic' mass leisure is an interesting recent development. As Hebdige (1988) has shown, mass seaside leisure in the 1950s was viewed with considerable unease by cultural alarmists opposed to creeping americanization and feminization. Hoggart sets one of his parodies of cheap romantic fiction in a place called the Kosy Holiday Kamp complete with "three dance halls, two sunbathing parades and lots of milk bars – just the job!"[100] The purpose is to satirise the "candy

floss" world of new consumerism with its "brash confidence". In the same way, to achieve the same effects, a series of films in the 1950s and '60s use the holiday camp or seaside holiday as a moral exemplar. Mass leisure in *O Dreamland* (1953), *The Leather Boys* (1963) and *A Taste of Honey* (1961) only serves to show up the "spiritual dry–rot" and "shiny barbarism" in the national construction.

Now fast–forward to the present. The 'masses' are still being berated for their seaside excursions, but the period of mass leisure has now come to seem an example of 'authentic' behaviour. For Tony Parsons in *The Tattooed Jungle* (Channel 4, *Without Walls*, 1992) the extent of inauthentic living is inscribed on the body (see Chapter Two) in contrast to the 'disciplined' bodies of archive footage. For Paul Theroux, a class without order becomes insects, dirt, fragmented matter out of place:

> Now I saw British people lying stiffly on the beach like dead insects, or huddled against the canvas windbreaks they hammered into the sand with rented mallets, or standing on cliffs and kicking stones roly–poly into the sea and I thought: They are symbolically leaving the country.
>
> Going to the coast was as far as they could comfortably go. It was the poor person's way of going abroad – standing at the seaside and staring at the ocean. It took a little imagination. I believed that these people were fantasizing that they were over there on the watery horizon, at sea. Most people on the promenade walked with their faces averted from the land. Perhaps another of their coastal pleasures was being able to turn their backs on Britain. I seldom saw anyone with his back turned to the sea. Most people looked seawards with anxious hopeful faces, as if they had just left their native land.
>
> I was in New Brighton ('Here Sibelius's music, conducted by the composer, was first publicly heard in England') strolling past the green–haired punks and the Rockers, who carried booming transistor radios as big as suitcases and listened to the pop group 'Raw Sewage' howl their hit *Kick it to Death.*(Theroux 1983, p.199)

The apparent aside about Sibelius evokes a unified and dignified image of the past against which to contrast the fragmented, diasporan present (even if, with the punks and their supposed 'hit', this involves a good deal of fabrication). Theroux's seaside is very much in the tradition of Hoggart and Corelli Street –

a "landscape with figures" in which people become symptoms of their ailing environment. To adapt a phrase of Stuart Hall's, this is a vision of cultural identity as pure 'being' rather than an admixture of 'being' and 'becoming'. The 'masses' are trapped in some eternal past, but without organisation (here evoked rather more in the terms of J.M. Keynes than J.F. Goebbels) their leisure is meaningless and anomic. There is no sense in which people might claim this space, adapt it or even *enjoy* themselves in it, since their leisure is so essentially fatal.

This profoundly anti–humanist perspective achieves its fullest realisation in Martin Parr's portraits of New Brighton, *The Last Resort* (Figures 15–16). The photographs include a number of 'quotations' from Hoggart – a sign saying "Candy Floss" hovers over the head of a young family, a woman shelters under a trashy magazine romance entitled "Separate Dreams" – but while *The Uses of Literacy* demonstrates some residual faith in working–class people's ability to resist incorporative 'mass' culture, Parr is wholly fatal, evoking New Brighton in the 1980s as an instance of environmental catastrophe. The cruel comedy of the pictures is of the McGill type – families *per se* are grotesque: gargantuan mothers and beer–bellied fathers covered in tattoos and most of all, children. In an extraordinarily approbative review, Ian McEwan has contrasted Thursten Hopkins' *Picture Post* construction of childhood "Skipping Lizzie" with Parr's perspective in a series of pictures which implicate the child in processes of denaturalization:

> Under the fond regard of his mother, a little boy looks content to be playing on the beach, naked in the sunshine. But the mother is overweight, like so many of the women in this series, the beach is concrete, and the boy is picking his way past a fetid stew of sea–borne garbage.[101]

There is a superficially radical appeal about Parr's photographs. John Taylor has claimed that Parr does not work is in the tradition of nineteenth–century travellers, laughing at the awkwardness of daytrippers, but instead attempts a critique of both the capitalist structures which degrade environment and visitors





alike, and the nationalist myth which proclaims a deep, horizontal comradeship between visitors. Yet while there *is* an evident distaste for late capitalism, equally in evidence is the right–wing irrationalist's distrust of people's ability to know anything of their own situation. Parr's images and Ian Walker's accompanying essay offer people as utterly in thrall to a pervasive reification which speaks to nothing but itself. Where the seaside holiday formerly played a central ideological role in the reproduction of the nation, it is now articulated as a purely anomic experience, the imperial margins of Anglo–Britain a wasteland:

> I walked along the windswept front. The beach itself had been stripped down to sandstone slabs and seaweed and assorted detritus. The golden sands had fallen foul of the chemical Mersey shortly after the war. The lower foreshore had risen up in mud silt, too. The dredgers had done their best, but it was an unequal struggle and finally it was abandoned.[102]

e. CROSSING CULTURES

To (reductively) restate the purpose of this section: I have proposed that if the mobility of the inter–war documentarists acted as a representational thread between diffuse scales and collectivities, emphasising and constructing consensus, the mobility of some late century travellers acts out the heremeticism of these phenomena and emphasises or constructs *dissensus*, or at least the incommensurability of scales and collectivities, the impossibility of totalisation. This reads a little too much like a fatalist "break–up of Britain" formulation and needs some refinement.

Firstly, these teleological national narratives are, of necessity, representations, and may indicate more about the visiting culture than about any objective social conditions. It is perhaps worth asking what the representative form of cultural journey *is* in Twentieth Century Britain, and how this may have affected the conceptualisation of recording the nation.

A useful departure is the work of Raymond Williams. Williams' developing theory of culture adopted a particular paradigm of class and cultural mobility which necessitated an original formative experience within a specific, ideal, regional identity. This identity was then fundamentally *dislocated* through the (specifically working–class) drama of moving from region to metropolis.

The 'ways to culture' are clearly rather more varied than this suggests. An alternative travelling metaphor is, historically, more consistently bourgeois and involves journeying from the metropolitan 'core' to the regional 'periphery' (both terms diversely conceived) before returning 'home' bearing both shocking findings and some sense of having sutured divergent spaces and forces. For reasons which are rarely discussed, this process has to be periodically repeated: 'the nation' seems to depend on regularly generating its own internal differences.

But in recent years, the relationship between metropolis and province has fundamentally altered. Although the great journey to the periphery is still being made, the core has itself become *unheimlich*. Parr's ruralist simulacra in *The Cost of Living*, Raban's tourist trips around his own homes (pp.169–79, 227–37), even Derek Jarman's walking in the threatened *Garden* (1990), all testify to the uncanniness of the previously secure centre, its impossibility as a source of transcendent meaning.

Secondly, bourgeois mobility to a large extent depended upon the stasis of visited people, and the false assumption that their culture was nature. But that visited culture was always peripatetic – often coercively so. The documentarists who visited 'authentic' Scottish communities, rarely gave any indication of how those communities had themselves experienced forced migration and dislocation (Prebble 1961; 1963). The discovery by bourgeois travellers that their own experience is fundamentally dislocated is, as Stuart Hall has observed, old news:

> Now that in the postmodern age, you all feel so dispersed, I become centred. What I've thought of as dispersed and fragmented comes, paradoxically, to be *the* representative modern experience! ... welcome to migranthood.[103]

But most of the texts under discussion privilege their own mobility and counter it to the immobility (Wright, Stuart & Hirst, Killip) or inauthentic mobility (Parr, Theroux) of visited people. It is still predominantly bourgeois observers who cross cultures, and as Doreen Massey has noted, such mobility often serves to entrench the spatial imprisonment of other groups.[104] For representations of visited people rarely acknowledge *their* mobility and the limitations to that mobility.[105] I want to go on to argue that this is a contested issue of *perspective*, and that this perspective then returns to impact on the national culture, advancing a politics of the street against the distance–defined politics of nationhood.

4. PERSPECTIVES

Perspective vision and prospective vision constitute the twofold projection of an opaque past and an uncertain future onto a surface that can be dealt with.
Michel de Certeau[106]

a. THE LONG SHOT OF HISTORY

If the Documentary Movement typically attempted to make connections between groups and classes, many of its techniques were themselves drawn from older patterns of representation. I want to move on to say something about how these techniques have been rearticulated in contemporary cultural forms, and some of the political implications that can be drawn from this.

Although they break with the tradition in a number of ways, Bell and Coldstream's Worktown pictures, Jennings' film landscapes etc. are deeply indebted to eighteenth century ways of looking. The rise of a cultural élite in the Georgian and Victorian periods was accompanied by the development of a privileged kind of observation which Norman Bryson has defined as the activity of the *gaze*, a "prolonged, contemplative [look] regarding the field of vision with a certain aloofness and disengagement, across a tranquil interval."[107] "Walking in the landscape, or taking in the view, required learning and time. The landscape was not to be seen at a glance but had to be brought into focus and 'read' in order to be seen."[108] This gaze emphasised ownership, or in its later, more philanthropic manifestation, paternal distance: as a political concept, the picturesque does not speak to the nation as a deep, horizontal comradeship, instead its vision of the nation is saturated with hierarchy.

To some extent, this serene mode of representation is still a significant part of the national imagining. Peter Dormer has reviewed a series of guide books to Britain[109] in which the unpicturesque is rigorously removed or sanitised. While Dormer is prepared to admit that, in late modernity, the ability to compose a fiction, in which many uncertainties over memory and location dissolve, may have its uses, he ultimately comes down on the side of seeing the picturesque

as necessarily reactionary:

> It wipes out social questions by ignoring them. The recipes of picturesque are potent because they are generally accepted and acceptable – they are used everywhere and form the standard which, with willing common consent, is the standard that most want to see by. It becomes a self–fulfilling vision where, by constantly surrounding oneself with the aids for looking on the bright side, the bright side is all that's seen. Fortunately it will not prevent days out in the country being a disappointment, however temporary, and that's something to go on.[110]

Although I have reservations about the élitist tone of this critique (is this how people *experience* landscape?), I accept Dormer's contention that a revised or alternative picturesque must include narrative or historical process in its construction of the real. Dormer focuses on Gus Wylie's photographs of Skye, but a more insistent dialogue between the picturesque and history is suggested by John Davies' photograph sequences *A Green & Pleasant Land* (1989 – Figures 17 & 18). Davies himself has suggested that only the picturesque can offer a structural critique of the late industrial landscape, moving beyond the impressionistic to the relational:

> You could see how things work in relationship to one another, whereas down in the street all you can see is buildings around you, you can't see what is behind or whether there is a railway behind houses unless you walk around. From a high view point you can see all these things at once. Not in as much detail, but you can see them as symbols of things.[111]

The problem with Davies' approach, in terms of an oppositional formation of Britain, is twofold. Firstly, the formalism of the pictures (particularly "Agecroft Power Station" and "Netherhope Housing Estate") cannot be divorced from the high–distant perspective of the post–war city planners. Far from suggesting the indifference of planners to people's living conditions, the photographs are complicit with a "security zone" green–belt philosophy in which the city is seen as an infection and city dwellers as a morbid emanation or absence. Secondly, as Hripsime Visser has noted, the assumption that an ironic title and the use of industrial or urban subject matter will necessarily be taken as critical, is

FIGURE 1 A7 John Davies, from "A Green & Pleasant Land"



FIGURE 1.18 John Davies, from "A Green & Pleasant Land"



misplaced:

> ...the broad topographic view carries with it certain expectations of form and content that Davies cannot escape. The only way out would be through the use of text – an auxiliary this book offers on too small a scale, in spite of the irony of the title. This irony is anyway considerably weakened by the choice of the too–beautiful cover photograph. The second problem associated with Davies' approach is his use of a certain form without extensive reference to texts – for the book, as it lies before me now, too closely resembles touristic ones; its strongest appeal is the beauty of Davies' photographs.[112]

What strikes me most about Davies' work (and in this it bears a close relationship to the construction of Anglo–British identity itself) is its *imporosity.* The privilege of vision, and of its corollary movement, only acts in one direction and invites no dialogue. Against this serene, and admittedly still appealing, vision, I want to advance another form of mobile imagining, based on and in the street.

b. TWO WAY STREET.

In a book of 1974, translated in 1991 as *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre writes about the sea–change of spatial representation in capitalist modernity. He supplies an organic metaphor for the processes by which borders are established but then transgressed. Lefebvre notes that early in the genesis of a biological organism, "an indentation forms in the cellular mass. A cavity gradually takes place ... The cells adjacent to the cavity form a screen or membrane which serves as a boundary .. A closure thus comes to separate within from without, so establishing the living being as a 'distinct body'". This 'closure', however, is only ever relative: "The membranes in question remain permeable, punctured by pores and orifices. Traffic back and forth, so far from stopping, tends to increase and becomes more differentiated, embracing both energy exchange (alimentation, respiration, excretion) and information exchange (the sensory apparatus)". Closure, then, rather than belonging to the natural order, is a creation of the social order. Thus, Lefebvre writes: "A defining characteristic of (private) property, as of the position in space of a town, *nation*

or nation state, is a closed frontier. This limiting case aside, however, we may say that every spatial envelope implies a barrier between inside and out, but that this barrier is always relative and, in the case of the membranes, always permeable."[113] [my italics]

Organic metaphors are rarely innocent, and I would suggest that Lefebvre himself comes close to turning a mobile class culture into nature. However, the position of the 'membrane' in the national culture – the point at which the hierarchical relationship of viewer and viewed breaks down – is not entirely reducible to a single class formation, and may have some significance in the liberation of groups previously debarred from participating in the distance–defined imagined community. The membrane most commonly advanced as a site of possible intercultural mobility is the modern city. This issue has been theorised (without much sense of its political implications) by Michel de Certeau, and I want to use his work as a way into some 'travellers' representations of Anglo–Britain that traverse and transgress the serene upland vision of nationhood.

De Certeau starts with the vision from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center, acknowledging a complicity with the angelic view of the traditional traveller–planner: "The panorama–city is a 'theoretical' (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture, whose condition of possibility is an oblivion and a misunderstanding of practices. The voyeur–god created by this fiction, who, like Schroeber's God, knows only cadavers, must disengage himself from the murky intertwining of daily behaviours and make himself alien to them."[114]
It seems fair to suggest that this city–view is also a nation–view. Not only is the nation analogous as a spatial scale, but the city itself is the representative national form in late modernity. In the collection of essays *Whose Cities* (1991), this sense of the city as a testing–ground for new forms of collectivity is returned to over and over. Where the distant vision bleaches people of their difference, the street–level perspective restores it with a vengeance; where the upland vision looks to an idealised past or a rationalised future, the city view

throws everything into flux. Writing about London, the Guyanan crime writer Mike Phillips notes that:

> In the postwar decades it has become increasingly difficult to maintain the fiction of London as part of a unity whose elements match the features of a national consensus. The arrival and establishment of a large number of racially diverse Londoners had changed all that, however vigorous our attempts to fit the present population into an assimilationist model of 'traditional' immigration. The focus is identity: the mould has been broken and the identity of London and Londoners has now become a major plank in the secret agenda of national anxiety about the future of the country. Underlying this concern is the sure and certain knowledge that London is a time machine determining and living out the next stage of our history.
> Scratch the Londoner and you uncover a loony living a British future in which the national project is reassessed, the interpretation of our history is a comparative exercise, citizenship is divorced from racial origins and you can't tell an Englishman from an Indian or an African or a Chinese.[115]

Phillips' optimism is not, of course, universal. In the same volume, his fellow Guyanan David Dabydeen expresses some scepticism about the possibility of cultural diversity, and elsewhere, Ingrid Pollard's landscape images (Figures 19 and 20) call into question the possibility of extending this diversity *beyond* the city – as if black people in particular were symptomatic of urban living. Pollard typically inserts the 'wrong' person into the picture and gives it an 'incorrect' title. "In emphasising her exclusion, she also indicts what she takes to be the oppressive homogeneity of visitors to the Lakes."[116]

Although, unlike the experience of black people, there *is* an identifiable history of women in the rural landscape, women's experience of modernity has often been through the (typically radicalizing) membrane of the city[117]. In a sense this offers a parallel history to the narrative of (predominantly male) national identity and to some extent embarrasses or upsets that narrative. As Elizabeth Wilson has suggested, the antipathy towards the city of writers as diverse as Morris and Belloc was also, in part, a rejection of the feminine:

> They feared the way in which the break–up of tradition in cities led to the



... it's as if the Black experience is only lived within an urban environment. I thought I liked the LAKE DISTRICT, where I wandered lonely as a BLACK face in a sea of white. A visit to the countryside is always accompanied by a feeling of unease, dread ...

Plate 23. Ingrid Pollard, from the Pastoral Interlude Series, 1987–88.

FIGURE 1.23 ingrid pollard, from the Pastoral Interlude Series



... a lot of what
MADE ENGLAND GREAT
is founded on the blood of slavery,
the sweat of working people...an industrial
REVOLUTION without the
Atlantic Triangle ...

> undermining of authority, hierarchy and dignity. The menace of the cities was not only disease and poverty; even more threatening were the spectres of sensuality, democracy and revolution,...urban life undermined patriarchal authority. [118]

The displeasures of the city, then, were very much connected with their invisibility, against which could be advanced the picturesque, legible, hyper–represented countryside or aerial city. I would suggest that many of the attractions of nationhood (whether in Hoppé's photographs, Jennings' films, Anderson's instance of the newspaper, public ceremonial etc.) lie in the legibility of nation, against which can be positioned what Georg Simmel called the 'blasé attitude' of modernity – its fragmentation, incompleteness and porosity. The visibility of the nation is closely linked with its *administration*, a process disrupted by the city's opacity:

> Beneath the discourses that ideologize the city, the ruses and combinations of powers that have no readable identity proliferate; without points where one can take hold of them, without rational transparency, they are impossible to administer.[119]

While recognising the dangers of the city, a series of women writers have offered the urban as the arena of new collectivities. Beatrix Campbell's *Wigan Pier Revisited* (1984) and the more pessimistic *Goliath* (1993), Elizabeth Wilson's *Hallucinations* (1987) and Jeanette Winterson's *Dreams and Buildings* (1991) amongst others, indicate a representational resistance to the distance–defined, masculinized vision of nationality. In opposition to what she sees as the determinist, essentialist discourse of nationhood, Campbell quotes Angela Carter on the feelings she shares with a black girl: "I was only born here".[120]

Such easy cosmopolitanism is both true and misleading, given that people's relationship with their place and space is rarely experienced as so arbitrary. Nonetheless, Campbell is surely right to note that the imposition of a national culture on visited people is both falsely homogenising and indicative of the problematic relationship of travellers to their parent culture. For implicit in the traditional reformist travelogue was a desire to escape from the corruptions of

consumerism into the self–dissolving otherness of other cultures, and this frequently resulted in unpalatably authoritarian prescriptions for the visited:

> [Orwell] paints a picture of the working class as still life, inert, dependent on the shoddy goods and cheap thrills of cynical consumerism. He sets up the working class as victims, and then blames them. It's as if he feels we've betrayed him; the working class has gone AWOL from its historic mission.[121]

I find encouragement in the idea of the mobile, urban identity, what Elizabeth Wilson calls the "bricolage city", with its optimistic sense of traversible frontiers. As I want to suggest in the afterword, without wishing to ditch the notion of the benevolent state, it has in many respects been found wanting. Against its teleological, distance–defined perspectives can be placed the views of new kinds of institutions and associations of a co–operative, democratic and benevolent kind. As Doreen Massey has argued, under modernity a way of seeing from the point of view of an authoritative, privileged and male position was established[122], and this scopic form has intertwined implications both in terms of the position of women in society and of representing the nation. Such a way of seeing, which I would argue reached its acme with the documentary movement, is now in serious decline, and new ways of looking, often, though not inevitably feminist–inspired, come to occupy a significant space in the national imagining.

However, it is not my intention to advance women's representations of city life as an instance of Bejaminian 'heroism', both because of the problematic connotations of such a term and because there is very little acknowledgement that these new ways of looking and organizing are themselves highly susceptible to penetration. As Patrick Wright notes in *A Journey Through Ruins*, the rolling back of the welfare state does not automatically imply a new democracy, but often the return of a forgotten autocratic form of viewing and controlling:

> ...another, very different, hue of green has been creeping through

Hackney in recent years – one that seems to harmonize far better with the bunkered Victorian vision of the Revd Donald Pateman ... with his constant struggle against urban degeneracy and his celebrations of the villages, cottages and churches of the poetic nation he calls, for the benefit of his predominantly West Indian congregation, 'Merlin's Isle' ... it is also the green of the famous overgrown stretch of urban wasteland in Middlesborough over which Margaret Thatcher walked for the television cameras in order to demonstrate her government's determination to 'tackle' the problems of the inner city ... This is a visionary green to be sure, though what it envisions is not the benign de–industrialization William Morris once imagined for the Thames or that another Victorian commentator, Richard Jeferies, thought might come 'After London', but rather the burgeoning that would surely follow once the corrupting machinery of the overweening State was rolled back.[123]

5. BYSTANDERS & WITNESSES.

In his essay "Travelling Cultures"[124], James Clifford has offered travel as a way of looking at culture ("Culture *as* travel") – movement, return, interconnection and the traversing of sites all offer ways towards a spatialised reading of culture, simultaneously offering culture as always in process, resistant to stasis.

At the same time, the record of travel, to paraphrase Benjamin, is also a record of barbarism. This is most clearly true in the space of colonial encounters, in which relations between geographically and historically separated people were typically defined by conditions of coercion and radical inequality. Similarly, for all the good intentions of middle–class philanthropists and documentarists, their journeys into their own countries consigned visited people to régimes of truth, in which they could be surveyed, ordered and patronised. I have attempted to show how, in the case of Anglo–Britain, this process was linked to a particular national imagining, and how it has become unsustainable in a period in which universalist but hierarchical representations (political and cultural) are under attack from several sides.

Mary Louise Pratt (1992) has emphasized the importance of three narrative strategies in travellers' representations of visited places and peoples: aestheticization, density of meaning and domination. I have aimed to show how writers, film–makers and photographers have tried to subvert these strategies, to suspend some of the conditions by which the nation has traditionally been mapped, and thereby to advance an alternative vision of collectivity – to be witnesses ("permanent persuaders") and not bystanders (the defeatist Left as well as the patrician Right).

Yet the status of these artifacts as representations inevitably problematises their relation to the 'real' and the 'political'. A case in point is the ongoing photograph sequence of the tenants of a Broxtowe council house, *Living Room* by Nick Waplington (Figures 21–22). The photographer has attempted to reduce




TEXAS
ALL-PURPOSE
WALLPAPER
PASTE
FRESH
MILK

the distance between visitor and visited, public and private to an absolute minimum. Attacking the fatalistic black–and–white representation of working–class people, Waplington claims that his pictures are nevertheless without an agenda:

> they are a record of my time with the family. Documentary photographs often come with a big set of morals, but I'm not trying to make any kind of statement; the work is a record of the time I've spent with them. When I began the project, I'd seen pictures of housing estates, black and white photographs of the old school. The people in them looked like victims, and I wanted to show that they're not. They're not being beaten. These people are fighting back.[125]

Domination may be explicitly absent in these photographs, but the counter–argument is that by deliberately selecting a densely meaningful aesthetic of ugliness, Waplington is actually positioning himself in ironic (and therefore dominant) relationship to his subject matter.

I have suggested that the 1980s was a period in which the documentary (in whatever medium) developed a new significance in terms of representing the nation, and indicated some of the ways in which it differed from its generic antecedents. An agenda for future work would concentrate on two things. Firstly, at the governmental and juridical levels, the issues of truth and balance in documentary representations have been struggled over, and I would suggest that this has important implications for national identity.

Secondly, the formal strategies of documentary and travelogue are likely to develop. Television documentary, for example, has drawn on the changing imagery of cinema and advertising to produce new symbolic densities at the same time as it has sought out new kinds of 'rawness'; for example, in the *Video Diaries* and *Video Nation* series (BBC2, 1990–93 and 1994 respectively) of do–it–yourself camcorder films.[126] To think optimistically, this development finally reverses the dynamics of documentary culture: in some sense the visited stage themselves even if access to technology and control of the finished product are likely to remain in the hands of élites. As the American experience

of the Rodney King video and its subsequent appropriation by Spike Lee suggest, a national culture and its representative icons can always (if briefly) be endangered by the efficiency and widespread distribution of its own technologies.

REFERENCES - CHAPTER ONE

1. Louise Downes "Villagers facing New Age siege" *The Guardian*, 24.8.82, p.3.

2. The Criminal Justice & Public Order Bill (1994) and the amendment of the 1968 Caravan Sites Act are intended to significantly reduce the possibility of trespass. Squatting on land, which is now (June 1994) a civil offence, will become a criminal act. The Bill has further implications for 'raves' and various forms of protest.

3. It was the Daily Telegraph (7.6.93) that coined this phrase, but other papers and politicians were equally keen to denigrate the Travellers. *The Guardian* (4.8.92), for example, in a leader article on a festival at Kerry, Powys, claimed "insult was added to injury when social security officials set up a mobile benefits station on the camp site to dish out unemployment benefit giros. As Labour's Frank Field MP says, it is intolerable that people who choose an alternative lifestyle in which paid employment plays little part should be provided with fast–track unemployment benefit, when people who are genuinely out of work are subjected to a draconian enforcement of the benefit rules which require them to be available for work before they get a penny. 'My ideal job would be to sit around in the sun doing absolutely nothing,' one of these jovial travellers was reported to have said."

4. Piers Brandon (1991) *Thomas Cook: 150 Years of Popular Tourism*, London: Secker & Warburg, p.15.

5. Quoted in ibid. p.15.

6. Edward Said (1985) *Orientalism*, London: Peregrine; Mary Louise Pratt (1992) *Imperial Eyes* London: Routledge; Philip Dodd "Englishness & the National Culture" and Alun Howkins "The Discovery of Rural England" in R. Colls & P. Dodd (eds) (1986) *Englishness: Politics & Culture, 1880-1920*, Bromley: Croom Helm.

7. Stuart Hall & Bill Schwarz "State & Society, 1880–1930" in Hall (1988) *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism & the Crisis of the Left*, London: Verso, pp.95–122.

8.Daniel Defoe (1959) *Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain* [1726], London: Everyman, p.1

9. Esther Moir (1964) *The Discovery of Britain*, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

10. James Buzard (1993) *The Beaten Track*, Oxford: OUP, p.8. Gibbon, for example, claimed that he had returned from France and Italy "a better Englishman than I went out. Tho'I have seen more elegant manners and more refined arts I have perceived so many real evils mixed with these tinsel advantages, that they have only served to make the plain honesty and blunt

freedom of my own country appear still more valuable to me." (*Letters of Edward Gibbon*, (1956) New York; Macmillan, vol. i. 197–8 cited in Buzard, ibid.) Such patriotism was met by a less chauvinistic, more relativist discourse stressing the cultivation of a right to rule. Richard Lassels, writing in 1670, urged the Continental tour upon the heirs of England's estates, claiming that, "..my Travelling Young Lord, who hath seen so many greater Men and Estates than his own, comes home far more modest and civil to his inferiours, and far less puft up with the empty conceit of his own greatness." Quoted in Buzard (1993), p.98.
Others still, such as Defoe, managed to combine censure of foreigners with an attack on those Britons deemed untrue to the essentials of Englishness. There is a sense here of quite how readily the ideas of foreign travel were applied to the vernacular tour: " The author says, that indeed he might have given his pen a loose here, to have complain'd how much the conduct of the people diminishes the reputation of the island on many modern occasions...; but they are ill friends to England who strive to write a history of her nudities, and expose, much less recommend her wicked part to posterity... A description of the country is the business here, not discanting upon the errors of the people; and yet; without boasting, we may venture to say, we are at least upon a level with the best of our neighbours, perhaps above them in morals..." Defoe (1959) pp. 2–3.

11. John Pemble (1987) *The Mediterranean Passion: Victorians and Edwardians in the South*, quoted in Buzard (1993), p.9.

12. William Cobbett (1968) *Rural Rides*, London: Everyman, p.230.

13. Jack London (1903) *The People of the Abyss*.

14. A. Endell (1908) *Die Schonheit der Grossen Stadt*, quoted in Andrew Lees "The Metropolis and the Intellectual" in Anthony Sutcliffe (ed.) (1984) *Metropolis*, London: Mansell, p.78.

15. Peter Keating (ed.) (1976) *Into Unknown England: Selections from the Social Explorers*, Manchester: Manchester University Press p.10.

16. ibid. p.97.

17. ibid. pp.244–8.

18. ibid. p.16. Andrew Mearns, for example, in *The Bitter Cry of Outcast London*, notes that "To get into [the rookeries] you have to penetrate courts". Robert Colls and Philip Dodd ("Representing the Nation: British Documentary Film, 1930–45" *Screen* 26, 1, 1985) have drawn an analogy between this penetrative movement and the establishing shots of the Griersonian documentary, specifically Edgar Anstey and Arthur Elton's *Housing Problems* (1935): "The opening sequence is as follows (the voice–over is of a councillor introducing the area and its 'problems'): high distant shots of slum area; pan on high from left to right of the building of new flats; mid long shot of back of slums; pan right to

left of roofs; eye level shot from *within* alley. The next five shots move us slowly and inexorably into a yard; three shots later we are inside one of the houses. We have arrived." p.23.

19. Raymond Williams (1980) "The Bloomsbury Faction" in *Problems of Materialism and Culture*, London: Verso. Quoted in Colls & Dodd (1986) p.155.

20. John Tagg "Power & Photography – A Means of Surveillance: the photograph as evidence in law." in Tony Bennett *et al* (1992) *Culture, Ideology & Social Process,* Milton Keynes: Open University Press, p.307.

21. Stephen Reynolds (1909) "why Live with the Poor?" in *A Poor Man's House.* Quoted in Keating (1976) p.271.

22. In Stuart Hall (1988) *The Hard Road to Renewal* London: Verso, p.121.

23. Antonio Gramsci (1971) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, p.178.

24. For example: 'The first thought that comes into my mind as a public man is a feeling of satisfaction and profound thankfulness that I may use the word "England" without some fellow at the back of the room shouting out "Britain". I have often thought how many of the most beautiful passages in the English language would be ruined by that substitution which is so popular to–day. I read in your dinner–book, "When God wants a thing done, He tells it, not "to His Britons", but "to His Englishmen".'
Stanley Baldwin (1926) *On England*, Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, p.1.

25. Scotland's greatest writer, says Baldwin, was Scott, not Burns, for "no–one could call Burns an interpreter to Englishmen". Addressing a St. Patrick's Day banquet Baldwin tells them, "While we in England were growing slowly into a united nation, with a consolidated government, in Ireland, whatever the reason, the great privilege was not yours because for centuries there was disunion and stable government ... had no such choice with you". (ibid. p. 246) The Welsh, meanwhile, are invidiously told, "you soften everything in Wales".

26. Quoted in Patrick Wright (1985) *On Living in an Old Country*, London: Verso, p.82.
In *Homage to Catalonia*, Orwell offers a similar evocation of England before exploding a bomb beneath it:

"The industrial towns were far away, a smudge of smoke and misery hidden by the curve of the earth's surface. Down here it was still the England I had known in my childhood: the railway–cuttings smothered in wild flowers, the deep meadows where the great shining horses browse and meditate, the slow–moving streams bordered by willows..the larkspurs in the cottage gardens; and then the huge peaceful wilderness of outer London, the barges on the river, the familiar streets, the posters telling of cricket matches and Royal weddings, the men in bowler hats, the pigeons in Trafalgar Square, the red buses, the blue

policemen – all sleeping the deep, deep sleep of England, from which I sometimes fear that we shall never wake till we are jerked out of it by the roar of bombs." Harmondsworth: Penguin 1974 p.221.

27. Roy Jenkins' biography of Baldwin notes, "His agricultural knowledge was very limited. He could not have milked a cow, and he poked pigs much more often in cartoons than in the farmyard."

28. Wright (1985) p.82.

29. Other works might include Hodder & Stoughton's 'King's England' series; Batsford Publishers' 'British Heritage' and 'Face of Britain' cycle; H.V. Morton's other works for Methuen; Odhams Press' *Lovely Britain*, *Romantic Britain*, *The Countryside Companion* and *The British Countryside in Pictures*; The Homeland Association's *Hereford & the Wye Valley*, and from the publishers Thomas Nelson *English Counties*.
Companies directly concerned with travel also produced travel books. The Great Western Railway produced country guides for the West Country, the Austin and Morris companies produced guides for their car owners and Shell produced its country guides. At the same time magazines such as *Practical Motorist* acknowledged the relationship between the small car and the weekend trip to the country, often featuring the cover car in a country setting. In addition, there were a number of magazines specifically aimed at the British traveller, such as *The Yorkshire Dalesman* and *The Countryman*.

30. Terry Morden "The Pastoral and the Pictorial" *Ten.8*, 12, 1983 pp.18–25.

31. Charles F.G. Masterman, forward to *Picturesque Great Britain* (1926) Ernst Wasmuth A.G. Berlin, p.xii. Quoted in ibid.

32. H.V. Morton (1927) *In Search of England*, Methuen, p.vii.

33. ibid. p.3.

34. ibid. p.vii.
The years before and after the First World War also saw another type of 'English journey' in which cultural conservatives found in the **sea** a space in which to create retrograde fantasies of national life. Jonathan Raban notes that he brings up "the rear of a long queue of certifiable obsessives" – John McGregor, Empson Middleton and Hilaire Belloc – for whom the sea was a better place from which to look at England's afflictions and to dream up savage fantasies of purgation:

"For every page about the sea there is another about the land, and when Belloc looks back at the shore from which he has sailed, his pillow–talk takes a dirty turn. The freedom of the sea, the lapse of a few nautical miles between himself and the British coast, released in Belloc a flood of confidences which were better not told." Jonathan Raban (1987) *Coasting* London: Picador, p.116.

35. George Orwell (1984) "The Lion & the Unicorn" in *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.164.

36. Morden (1986) p.22.

37. "Suburbia", like "Americanization", was a term around which consensual negative opinion from a variety of political positions could be articulated. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno & Horkheimer resolutely ignored other urban traces in Los Angeles in order to put forward their theory of suburbia as the highest form of false consciousness:

"..even now, the older houses outside the concrete city centre look like slums, and the new bungalows on the outskirts are at one with the flimsy structure of world fairs in their praise of technical progress and their built–in demand to be discarded after a short while like empty food cans. Yet the city housing projects designed to perpetuate the individual as a supposedly independent unit in a small hygienic dwelling make him all the more subservient to his adversary – the absolute power of capitalism."

Similarly, inter–war British writers of very different political persuasions articulated a view of the suburbs dominated by their presumed 'inauthenticity'. In his posthumously collected papers (1936), D.H. Lawrence refers to suburban housing as "little red rat traps" ("Nottingham & the Mining Countryside") while Orwell opens *Coming Up for Air* (1936) with a description of a North London suburb:

"You know how these streets fester all over the inner–outer suburbs. Always the same. Long, long rows of little semi–detached houses...as much alike as council houses and generally uglier. The stucco front, the creosoted gate, the privet hedge, the green front door, The Laurels, The Myrtles, The Hawthornes, Mon Abri, Mon Repos, Belle Vue. At perhaps one house in fifty some anti–social type who'll probably end in the workhouse has painted his front door blue instead of green."
Secker & Warburg 1971 edition p.3.

Betjeman's most famous attack on the suburbs is "Slough" (from *Continual Dew*, 1937), but his work is shot through with an amused distaste for both suburban and (a more antique term of disapproval) provincial culture. "Death in Leamington" (from *Mount Zion*, 1932) contains the memorable couplet,

> "Oh! Chintzy, chintzy cheeriness
> Half dead and half alive."

For writers between the wars, the tone is repeatedly of the suburbs as a foreign place (ironically, given the associations, elsewhere, of the proletarian areas with 'Darkest England') and their inhabitants as aliens or colonists. Wodehouse in *Sam the Sudden* (1925) refers to "The early morning patois of Suburbia, which is the English language filtered through toast and marmalade."

35. George Orwell (1984) "The Lion & the Unicorn" in *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.164.

36. Morden (1986) p.22.

37. "Suburbia", like "Americanization", was a term around which consensual negative opinion from a variety of political positions could be articulated. In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno & Horkheimer resolutely ignored other urban traces in Los Angeles in order to put forward their theory of suburbia as the highest form of false consciousness:

"..even now, the older houses outside the concrete city centre look like slums, and the new bungalows on the outskirts are at one with the flimsy structure of world fairs in their praise of technical progress and their built–in demand to be discarded after a short while like empty food cans. Yet the city housing projects designed to perpetuate the individual as a supposedly independent unit in a small hygienic dwelling make him all the more subservient to his adversary – the absolute power of capitalism."

Similarly, inter–war British writers of very different political persuasions articulated a view of the suburbs dominated by their presumed 'inauthenticity'. In his posthumously collected papers (1936), D.H. Lawrence refers to suburban housing as "little red rat traps" ("Nottingham & the Mining Countryside") while Orwell opens *Coming Up for Air* (1936) with a description of a North London suburb:

"You know how these streets fester all over the inner–outer suburbs. Always the same. Long, long rows of little semi–detached houses...as much alike as council houses and generally uglier. The stucco front, the creosoted gate, the privet hedge, the green front door, The Laurels, The Myrtles, The Hawthornes, Mon Abri, Mon Repos, Belle Vue. At perhaps one house in fifty some anti–social type who'll probably end in the workhouse has painted his front door blue instead of green."
Secker & Warburg 1971 edition p.3.

Betjeman's most famous attack on the suburbs is "Slough" (from *Continual Dew*, 1937), but his work is shot through with an amused distaste for both suburban and (a more antique term of disapproval) provincial culture. "Death in Leamington" (from *Mount Zion*, 1932) contains the memorable couplet,

> "Oh! Chintzy, chintzy cheeriness
> Half dead and half alive."

For writers between the wars, the tone is repeatedly of the suburbs as a foreign place (ironically, given the associations, elsewhere, of the proletarian areas with 'Darkest England') and their inhabitants as aliens or colonists. Wodehouse in *Sam the Sudden* (1925) refers to "The early morning patois of Suburbia, which is the English language filtered through toast and marmalade."

Textual or oral support for the suburbs is less easy to come across. Deborah Sugg curated a retrospective exhibition on "Ideal Homes" at the Design Museum in 1993 in which some "real" women had contributed everyday items and testimonies, working against the unspoken snobbery of design history with its tendency to fetishise the form and line of objects at the expense of their cultural context and the users who give them meaning. However, while the exhibition vindicated Ideal Homes as promoters of popular modernity in the 1920s and '30s, it slipped effortlessly into a sneer at suburban Little Englandism, typified by John and Norma Major's visit to Earl's Court in 1992 as part of that year's election campaign. See Alison Light "The history of indoors" *New Statesman & Society* 26.3.93 pp.32–3.

38. Advertisement for Forest Side Estate, Walthamstow, appearing in *Red Tape*, the magazine of the civil service, 1932. Quoted in Morden (1983) p.24.

39. Colls & Dodd (1985) pp.21–33.

40. Quoted in Stuart Hood "The Documentary Film Movement" in James Curran & Vincent Porter (eds.) (1983) *British Cinema History* London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, p.107.

41. Forsyth Hardy (ed) (1946) *Grierson on Documentary* London: Collins p.56. Quoted in Colls & Dodd (1985) p.23.

42. Tom Harrison, for example, returning from a three year study of New Hebridean cannibals to set up Mass Observation, could write, "The wilds of Lancashire or the mysteries of the East End were as little explored as the cannibal interior of the New Hebrides, or the head hunter hinterland of Borneo... In particular, my experience living among cannibals in the New Hebrides ... taught me the many points in common between these wild looking, fuzzy haired, black smelly people and our own, so when I came home, I determined to apply the same methods here in Britain." T. Harrison, "Introduction to Poles Apart", unpublished survey of Mass Observation, quoted in Tom Jeffrey, (1978) *Mass Observation - a short history*, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Occasional Stencilled Papers No. 55.

43. Victor Gollancz and his co–editors at the Left Book Club John Strachey and Harold Laski, took the decision to include the photographs, mostly drawn haphazardly from press agencies, and to write a foreword distancing themselves from the text, much to Orwell's dismay. See Bernard Crick (1980) *George Orwell - A Life*, London: Secker & Warburg, p.205 and John Taylor "Picturing the Past" *Ten.8* pp.15–31. Orwell had his revenge on Laski in "Politics and the English Language" where the Professor is indicted for his nonsensical use of English.

The Road to Wigan Pier was not unique in its elision of differences between description and image. Wal Hannington's LBC work *The Problem of the Distressed Areas* (1937) contained 'corroborating' photographs, some of which

were drawn from the press agencies. However, the apparent neutrality of the slum images in the book was called into question when *Left News* carried an apology to Camberwell Council for printing in *Distressed Areas* a photograph of a notorious slum called Woodland Cottages which had been pulled down when the Labour Party gained control of the Council in 1934.

44. Taylor (1983) p.17. The quoted phrase is from *The New Statesman*, 1st May 1937.

45. *The Long Summer* iv. Channel 4 1992.

46. Hardy (1946) p.134, quoted in Colls & Dodd (1985) p.23.

47. Orwell (1984a) p.109.

48. Raymond Williams (1978) *Orwell*, London: Fontana, p.19.

49. George Orwell (1984a) *The Road to Wigan Pier* Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.21.

50. Beatrix Campbell has seen this infatuation with the heroic/victimised worker's body as expressive of a profound narcissism on the part of the Documentary Movement (and it is certainly true that the contribution of women documentarists has been largely overlooked): "Miners are victims and heroes at the same time .. they command both protection and admiration. They are represented as beautiful, statuesque, shaped men. The miner's body is loved in the literature of men because of its work and because it works." Campbell (1984) *Wigan Pier Revisited*, London: Verso, pp.93–4.

51. Quoted in *The Long Summer* iv. Channel 4 1992.

52. Geoffrey Bridson (1971) *Prospero and Ariel - the Rise and Fall of Radio.* Quoted in Peter Lewis "Referable Words in Radio Drama" in Paddy Scannell (ed.) (1991) *Broadcast Talk*, London: Sage Publications.

53. See Julian Petley "Why Cathy can Never Come Home" *New Statesman and Society* 2.4.93 pp.23–5. Interestingly, W.H.Auden, himself linked to the Documentary Movement was one of the first to suggest the problems inherent in the documentary project.

54. Respectively *Cathy Come Home* (1966), *St. Ann's* (1969) and *Behind the Rent Strike* (1974).

55. *The Long Summer* iv. (1992) Channel 4.

56. ibid.

57. David Cannadine "The British Monarchy 1820–1977" in Hobsbawm & Ranger (eds.) (1993) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: CUP, p.110.

58. See the Harry Watt–Humphrey Jennings–Quentin Reynolds film for the GPO *Britain Can Take It* (1940).

59. Stephen Edwards "Dreadful Documents" *Ten.8*, 15, 1984, p.17.

60. Neil Smith "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places" in Jon Bird *et al* (1993) *Mapping the Futures*, London; Routledge pp.87–119.

61. Michel Foucault "Questions on Geography' in C. Gordon (ed.) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* p.68, quoted in Smith (1993) p.97.

62. ibid. p.98. See also David Harvey (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford; Basil Blackwell for a discussion of Heidegger on space and the following quotation from Bachelard which upsets the prioritization of time over space: "Space contains compressed time. That is what space is for: 'Is this the foundation for collective memory, for all those manifestations of place–bound nostalgias that infect our images of the country and the city, of region, milieu and locality, of neighbourhood and community? And if it is true that time is memorialised not as flow, but as memory of experienced places and spaces, then history must indeed give way to poetry, time to space, as the fundamental material of social expression. The spatial image then asserts an important power over history." note 1 p. 217.

63. ibid. p.99.

64. David Harvey has suggested that "working–class movements are ... generally better at organizing in and dominating *place* than they are at commanding *space*." Harvey (1989) p.236.

65. Inward–looking, too, in a Foucauldian sense. Wright refers elsewhere to Dulwich Gate, the walled Barratt's development bought into by Mrs. Thatcher in 1985 that "combined lily ponds, saunas and sub–classical (but distinctly anti–modernist) detailing with Belfast–style electronic surveillance." Wright (1992) pp.255–6.

66. ibid. p.259.

67. ibid. pp.133–4.

68. Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer (1947) "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception" in Simon During (ed.) (1993) *The Cultural Studies Reader* pp.29–43.

69. ibid. p.42.

70. D.H. Lawrence *Phoenix: The Posthumous Papers of D.H. Lawrence*, London: Heinemann 1961 pp.138–9. Quoted in Alison Light (1991) *Forever England*, London: Routledge, p.7. See also Orwell's pronouncements on

middle–class women, e.g. "The fact that the working class know how to combine and the middle class don't is probably due to their different conceptions of family loyalty. You cannot have an effective trade union of middle–class workers, because in times of strikes almost every middle–class wife would be egging her husband on to blackleg and get the other fellow's job". Orwell (1984a) p.103.

71. Smith (1993) p.105.

72. "The stereotype exists. Some of the middle–aged homeless have read Orwell: one of them even quoted me the whole of the first page of *Down & Out*. That book gave a certain dignity to those people: someone had actually written about them. But there is now a much larger group of hidden homeless who are unemployed and while away their hours in cafés or streets or bedsits." Chris Shwarz, "*Down & Out*" *Ten.8*, 15, 1984, pp.2–11.

73. See Jon Savage (1992) *England's Dreaming: the Sex Pistols and punk rock*, London: Faber & Faber, which makes a (perhaps over–) serious attempt to locate 1976 within a history of English radicalism.

74. Michael Foot *Aneurin Bevan 1945-1960*, p.78. Quoted in Hennessy (1992), p.171.

75. Philip Cohen "Losing the Generation Game" in James Curran (ed.)(1984) *The Future of the Left*, Cambridge Polity Press, p.120.

76. Anderson observes, for example, that it is the **imagined** fraternity between people that has made them willing to die, in their millions, for the nation during the last two centuries. Yet it is questionable, in the British context at least, whether people could have been galvanised for such "limited imaginings". The recruitment of service battalions based on special comradeship (the so–called 'Pals' units) after Kitchener's call for recruits in 1914, suggests an intermediary process between individual and nation. See Bob Bushaway "The Great War and Remembrance" in Roy Porter (ed.) (1993) *Myths of the English*, London: Polity.

77. Michael Bracewell & Linder Stirling "Corelli Street", *Observer*, 5.6.94, pp.32–7.

78. Michael Bommes & Patrick Wright "Charms of Residence" in Johnson *et al* (eds.) (1982) *Making Histories* p.291.

79. Beatrix Campbell (1993) *Goliath*, London: Methuen.

80. "The death of respectability has meant that the movement of women across both public and private space is no longer constrained: that boundary is burned out, women are anywhere. All the riot territories testify to that – it was the women who sustained the personal, public and political lives of these neighbourhoods." ibid. p. 321.

81. Anna Fox interviewed in *The Guardian* II, 13.11.93, p.36.

82. ibid.

83. John Sturrock & John Taylor "Purity & Danger" *Ten.8*, 18, 1985, pp.22–35.

84. ibid. p.35.

85. Smith (1993) p.106.

86. For a rather different perspective on new community alliances see Dick Hebdige "Digging For Britain" in Dominic Strinati and Stephen Wagg (1992) *Come on Down*. Hebdige writes: "A community of taste can thus be formed that smudges ethnic lines. In the culture of the 'casuals' of the British (or is it just the English?) inner city of the 1980s, the question of roots and 'breeding' – of where a person 'comes from' – fades into insignificance before the altogether more *soluble* question of the pedigree of his or her clothes ... (designer label roots)." (p.353) While I welcome this optimism, I feel that its construction of an imaginary space outside of state power (or other forms of violence) is rather utopian. Hebdige does then go on to analyze the more contested community space of black video and film.

87. Paul Theroux (1985) *The Kingdom by the Sea*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.17.

88. Jonathan Raban (1987) *Coasting*, London: Picador, p.37.

89. Jay Rayner "Sun, Sand, Sea & Sensibilities" *Guardian* 7.6.93 p.10.
See also Michael McCarthy "Nude Bathers Face Beach Ban" *The Times* 29.10.92 p.6.

90. David Brindle "The Last Resort" *Guardian* II, 23.7.93, p.2–3.

91. Paul Theroux (1984) *The Kingdom by the Sea*, Harmondsworth: Penguin. p.93.

92. Patrick Wright (1985) *On Living in an Old Country*, London: Verso p.176. Quote from Ernle Bradford (1982) *The Story of the Mary Rose*.

93. The line comes from Michael Roberts' poem "H.M.S. Hero"

94. *Guardian* 20.7.94, p.1.

95. Employment in shipbuilding and maritime repair fell from 16,000 in 1984 to 4,000 in 1987. By November 1994 the figure is set to be negligible. ibid. p.13.

96. Chris Killip (1988) *In Flagrante*, London: Secker & Warburg, intro.

97. Light (1991) p.168.

98. Mrs. Thatcher in the *Daily Express*, 26.7.82, quoted in Corner & Harvey (1991) p.7.

99. Peter Hennessy *Never Again* (1992) London: Cape p.314 and Paul Addison (1985) *Now the War is Over*, London: Cape/BBC p.118.

100. Richard Hoggart (1957/1968 edn.) *The Uses of Literacy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.235. Hoggart valorises the charabanc trip as an 'authentic' form of activity.

101. Ian McEwan, introduction to Martin Parr (1993) *Home & Abroad*, London: Jonathan Cape, p.i.

102. Ian Walker, introduction to Martin Parr (1986) *The Last Resort*, Liverpool: Promenade, p.iii.

103. Stuart Hall, "Minimal Selves" quoted in Diana Jeater "Roast Beef & Reggae Music: the passing of whiteness" *New Formations*, Winter 1992 p.115.

104. Doreen Massey "Power–Geometry and a Progressive Dense of Place" in Jon Bird *et al* (eds.) (1993) *Mapping the Futures*, London: Routledge.

105. Clearly, there are exceptions. Stuart Hall in Rutherford (1990) talks about Derek Bishton's *Black Heart Man*, a photojourney that starts and ends in the black diaspora of Handsworth, following meanwhile other people's movements around the triangle of Africa, America and Europe. p.232.

106. Michel de Certeau (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, London: University of California Press, p.94.

107.Norman Bryson (1983) *Vision and Painting: the logic of the gaze*, London: Macmillan, p.94.

108. John Taylor (1994) p.13.

109. Including the *Shell Guide to Photographing Britain* (1983, Jorge Lewinski) which provides an interesting continuum with the Shell advertising posters of the inter–war period (Bommes & Wright, 1982), and the AA's *Hand Picked Tours in Britain* (1977).

110. Peter Dormer "Fantasy Island" *Ten.8*, 12, Spring 1983, p.31.

111. Quoted in interview with Susan Butler "Landscapes in Transition" *Creative Camera*, 251, 1985 pp.16–23.

112. Hripsime Visser, Review: *A Green & Pleasant Land*, *Ten.8*, 26, 1990, pp.64–8.

113. Henri Lefebvre (1991) *The Production of Space*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp.175–6.

114. de Certeau (1984) p.93.

115. Mike Phillips "London: Time Machine" in Mark Fisher & Ursula Owen (eds) (1991) *Whose Cities*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

116. Taylor (1994) p.258.

117. See Elizabeth Wilson *The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder and Women*, London: Virago 1991 e.g. "most of the male modernist literary figures of the early twentieth century drew...a threatening picture of the modern metropolis (an exception being James Joyce)...modernist women writers such as Virginia Woolf and Dorothy Richardson responded with joy and affirmation."p.157.

118. Elizabeth Wilson "The Invisible Flâneur" *New Left Review*, 191, Jan/Feb 1992, p.91.

119. de Certeau (1991) p.95.

120. Unconsciously or not, Campbell, Carter and the unnamed girl echo Viriginia Woolf's celebrated statement on the patriarchal state: "As a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world." Virginia Woolf *Three Guineas*, London: Hogarth Press.

121. Campbell (1984) P.226.

122. Doreen Massey "Flexible Sexism" *Society and Space*, 9, 1, 1991, p.45. Massey argues, in part, for the restitution of the other senses rather than offering an alternative, feminist way of looking.

123. Wright (1992) p.64.

124. James Clifford "Travelling Cultures" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) pp.96–111.

125. Val Williams (1994) *Who's Looking at the Family?* Catalogue to an exhibition selected by Val Williams, Carol Brown and Brigitte Lardinois, Barbican Art Gallery, London p.73.

126. John Corner. Review of Bill Nichols (1991) *Representing Reality: Issues & Concepts in Documentary. Screen* 34, 4, 1993, pp.414–7.

CHAPTER 2 - THRUSTERS & TOFFS
Men's Magazines, British Bodies & National Identity.

The instant the criterion of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic production, the total function of art is reversed. Instead of being based on a ***ritual****, it begins to be based on another practice - politics.*[1]

Englishmen are uneasy,
they don't admit to taking fashion seriously[2]

According to the doyenne of the new wave, Rosabeth Moss Kanto,
by 1983 the figure of the entrepreneur had become
'the new culture hero' throughout the western world.[3]

1. INTRODUCTION

For no good reason I occasionally receive mailshots which position me as a conspicuous consumer and appeal to my (well–camouflaged) membership of the AB socio–economic elite. One such, in richly textured ersatz parchment came through my letterbox before Christmas 1992. In bold, authoritative type it announced:

THE CONDÉ NAST PUBLICATIONS LTD

THE MOST STYLISH GIFT YOU CAN GIVE THIS CHRISTMAS

Surprise someone this Christmas with a gift that will stay new all year long: a subscription to one of the world's finest magazines...

VOGUE – the world's most influential fashion and beauty magazine

HOUSE & GARDEN – a source of inspiration for those passionate about the way they live

TATLER – with exclusive insights into the lives of the rich and famous

THE WORLD OF INTERIORS – for those who only invest in the very best for their homes

GQ – Britain's leading monthly magazine for stylish, successful men

VANITY FAIR – with reports on the topics that matter and the people that make the news.

Such a bravura performance held my attention. So many superlatives in the

middle of a recession, and such confidence in the continuing significance of 'lifestyle'. But what particularly caught my eye was the twinning of *GQ* with Britain, a relationship that one would more readily associate with *Tatler*.
This trivial connection led me to think further on the association between the nation and the stylish man, or at least the putative stylish man's manual, a relationship which is far from new, but which appears to have acquired a new and powerful resonance during the eighties.

In this chapter I want to begin to look at the men's "style" magazine, which emerged as a recognisable, if not entirely distinctive textual form in the mid– to late 1980s. The magazines which form the focus of the chapter are *GQ* (Condé–Nast), *Esquire* (National Magazines) and *Arena* (Wagadon), although some consideration will be given to related titles including *The Face*, *Tatler* and *For Him*.

The three core magazines all appear (in Britain at least) during, or immediately after the highpoint of the Thatcherite enterprise, and in their emphasis on conspicuous consumption, modern city living and the primacy of a specific male body they are suggestive of the contours of the emergent 'yuppie' culture. This is not to say that they are aligned with, or reflective of, Conservative Party ideology. The Labour Party and non–Labour left were equally enamoured of the discourse of style during these years as they saw old party–subject positions dissolving.

The appearance of *Esquire* etc. also suggests new movements within the fields of gender, representation and body politics. Masculinity is given a variety of different inflections in these texts, varying from crude misogyny (a backlash against feminism) through the adoption of a "New Man" persona (apparent submission to some of the demands of feminism) to a compromise "New Lad" position. The male body is foregrounded for the first time in a popular cultural form, suggesting new forms of commodification and the creation of a new spectator.

The men's magazine can also be seen as a field in which the apparently incompatible discourses of national identity and (one aspect of) postmodernism interact. On the one hand is a *chic*, cosmopolitan depthlessness, as the reader is encouraged to live provisionally and glide effortlessly between the various signifiers, on the other is a voice of authority inviting (often commanding) the reader to subscribe to a particular image of taste, an invitation that is not without political significance.

This chapter attempts to show the significance of this voice of authority, the way in which it links with the body and presumes to establish an intimate connection between body and nation. I do not accept that these magazines are successful in sustaining such a monological voice, and my secondary purpose is therefore to show that authority is always under threat in these men's magazines, whether from their own tendency towards self–parody and irony, or from problematic assumptions about the constitution of their audience.

In a sense, therefore, this chapter involves some engagement with a pardigm familiar from cultural studies sub–cultural work of the 1970s, "resistance through rituals"[4]. Although the readership of *GQ*, *Esquire* and *Arena* are appellated as a *dominant* social group, there is still a residual stress on the transforming agency of members of a style culture, their resolution of real problems through imaginary solutions. But whereas the style cultures studied by Hall, Jefferson, Hebdige etc. had some sense of themselves as communities, the middle–class male culture of the 1980s is much more diffuse and resistant to notions of an homogenised identity (as I discuss in relation to the term 'yuppie'). As I want to suggest now, there are historical precedents to this anxiety about homogeneity.

2. BACKGROUND

a. Pretenders to Taste 1945–65

Evelyn Waugh's later work typically contains a character who embodies the author's feelings about the coming epoch. In *Brideshead Revisited* the post–war world is dubbed "The Age of Hooper" after a talentless parvenu subaltern. Not only does Hooper lack the obvious signs of breeding which Waugh and his protagonist, Charles Ryder, valorise, but he is also guilty of mimicry. Hooper adopts the argot of commerce, but the gap between language and man is painfully obvious: "Though himself a man to whom one could not confidently entrust the simplest duty, he had an overmastering regard for efficiency."[5]

Waugh's later novel sequence, *The Sword of Honour* (1955) contains a similar, more fully realised character named Trimmer. "Trimmer", we are told early on, "was marked for ignominy." He has worked on a transatlantic liner as a hairdresser, but through a certain peasant cunning has managed to insinuate himself into the officer class.

Trimmer bears no resemblance to a "true" officer, as represented by the saintly protagonist, Guy Crouchback. Trimmer's aspirations are "offensively apparent" Leaving one regiment, he changes his name, adopts a kilt and suddenly becomes Major McTavish:

> My mother is a McTavish. Chaps often sign on under assumed names, you know. After I left the Halberdiers I didn't want to wait around to be called up. My firm had been bombed and I was rather at a loose end. So I went to Glasgow and joined up, no questions asked. McTavish seemed the right sort of name.[6]

Trimmer's chameleon tendencies earn Waugh's censure. In the very act of attempting to become a gentleman Trimmer shows himself up as a ghastly pretender. His hair is too neat. His tie is too carefully chosen. His suits fit too well. Trimmer is condemned because his platonic vision of aristocratic life is a product not of lived experience but of the fashion magazines which he studies assiduously. Even here, however, his experience is not authentic since the

magazines are "tattered copies" discarded by the rich. For the later Waugh, then, mimicry, matter out of place and the primacy of image over bloodline are harbingers of a new and regrettable age.

Dick Hebdige has shown how the period between the mid–1930s and the early 1960s was one in which this issue of taste achieved new prominence in Britain, sometimes assuming an almost fanatical insistence on native forms in the face of an assumed 'invasion' of American or americanized cultural and commodity forms[7]. Hebdige notes that this chauvinism transcended political boundaries, as diverse cultural critics and commentators equated the expanded productive potential opened up by the automation of manufacturing processes with the erosion of fundamental British or European values and attitudes.

In fact the expected "levelling–down" process did not occur to any great extent, and the emergence of spectacular youth subcultures suggested that if some form of homogenisation was taking place, then at the very least it acted unevenly and was liable to occasional rupture. As Hebdige remarks in closing, "It is perhaps the final irony that when it did occur the most startling and spectacular revolution in British 'popular' taste in the early 1960s involved the domestication not of the brash and 'vulgar' hinterland of American design but of the subtle, 'cool' Continental style which had for so many decades impressed the British champions of the Modern Movement."[8]

Hebdige tends to concentrate more on the discourse of levelling down than on that of incorporation. Just as there was a general anxiety that new commodity and cultural forms might lead to "a shiny barbarism" ... "a spiritual dry–rot"[9], so there was a conservative phobia from both ends of the political spectrum about the demise of any "authentic" class subject, whether this be the tweed–wearing aristocrat (Waugh) or the cloth–capped northern proletarian (Hoggart), and it is this which gives the little drama of Trimmer and his fashion magazines some historical significance. It is easy to see why a reactionary like Waugh should be protective of the seigneurial class into which he had foisted himself, but the

workerist enthusiasms of some left intellectuals are less easy to justify. Herbert Marcuse – the self–consciously European marxist in California – demonstrates in *One Dimensional Man* (1964) the extent to which subordinate groups have been assimilated and won over to dominant modes of thought and action by "passive consumerism." But from this observation, Marcuse leaps to a defence of earlier forms of exploitation, presenting that exploitation as more honest because more open and therefore more easily contestable. Physical exploitation which demanded bodily strength is being replaced, says Marcuse, revealing his left–puritanism, by full and semi–automation which produces "stupefaction and torpor, often linked with sexual escapism." Marcuse is surely right to point out that automation reduces the autonomy of a worker, an autonomy which made the proletariat the most significant locus of potential change in society, but his apparent conclusion from this observation (that stasis in class relations is the only way to ensure the ultimate overthrow of established society) is open to question:

> To be sure, the former "professional" autonomy of the labourer was rather his professional enslavement. But this *specific* mode of enslavement was at the same time the source of his specific, professional power of negation – the power to stop a process which threatened him with annihilation as a human being. Now the labourer is losing the professional autonomy which made him a member of a class set off from other occupational groups because it embodied the refutation of the established society.[10]

Moreover, Marcuse is also paradoxically the defender of the higher culture of the West, a culture which he sees as confined to privileged minorities, but also expressive of a conscious, methodical alienation from the entire sphere of business and industry and from its calculable and profitable order. In an ironic echo of Waugh, Marcuse suggests that the availability and dissemination of European culture amongst the proletariat (what he describes as "Bach as background music in the kitchen"[11]) is an inheritance liable to be squandered:

> True [the Classics are available], but coming to life as Classics, they come to life as other than themselves; they are deprived of their antagonistic force, of the estrangement which was the very dimension

> of their truth. The intent and function of these works have thus fundamentally changed. If they once stood in contradiction to the status quo, this contradiction is now flattened out.[12]

A paradoxical situation existed, therefore, where anxieties were contemporaneously expressed that the lower classes were being incorporated through their acquisition of the trappings of their social superiors and that expanded productive potential was actually *flattening out* this culture.

Hebdige concludes that the debate over taste, the levelling–down process and incorporation was not one that was theoretically concluded, but was rather overtaken by similar material events to those which prompted it. Changes in consumption patterns suggested neither that the working and lower–middle classes were about to appropriate the cultural inheritance of their social superiors, nor that the upper classes were going to be forced to live what Harold Nicholson once termed "a Woolworths life"[13]. The debate over style receded without any great inroads apparently having been made into taste, class and national life.

b. British Men's Magazines pre–1980.

Whatever magazines Trimmer was assiduously studying, it is unlikely that they were gentleman's style magazines in the accepted sense of the late Twentieth Century. Although a market for general periodicals with a predominantly male readership had existed since at least the early Eighteenth Century, men's issues were indivisible from topics of general concern. This was also the period of what fashion historians have termed the "Great Masculine Renunciation" of fashion, the gradual adoption of formal, sober clothing as the common male sartorial inheritance. Consequently, publications were unlikely to position themselves as arbiters of male taste, although the dandified behaviour of certain atypical individuals may have been of interest to writers and editors.

The typical "men's" magazine of the period before 1945 was *Punch*: literary, imperial and clubbish; a cypher for the complacency of the English upper and

middle classes. *Punch* typified the British attitude towards taste, betraying a mistrust of the body not only in its avoidance of realist representation (particularly photography), but also in its role as a showcase for comic artists. The body was typically reresented as hidden, humorous and comical, while fashion was belittled for its inherent effeminacy and betrayal of common sense. For example, a cartoon of 4 March 1925 bearing the caption "**PERILS OF THE DANCE:** THE TERROR OF THE OXFORD TROUSERS" (Figure 1), shows a gentleman clutching at his dance partner as he trips over his outsize trouser bottoms. A further cartoon on 1 April of the same year ("**MANNERS AND MORES:** CROSSING THE ROAD 1925 – Figure 2) shows a man having to hold his trousers up to a ridiculous height (and in the process revealing his legs) as he steps off the pavement. Most irony however was reserved for women, generally presented as slaves to every fashion whim. A cartoon of 1925 (Figure 3) shows a fashionably short–haired 'flapper' being prepared for shaving, as though she were a man. The caption ("**PARDONABLE MISTAKE ON THE PART OF AN ABSENT-MINDED HAIRDRESSER**") suggests the indulgence by *Punch* of a conservative view of fashion and gender – a tendency repeated throughout the 1920s in representations of unisex clothing and appearance. We may remember here that Veblen's notion of conspicuous consumption originally concerned women (albeit as signifiers of their husband's wealth), with men somehow 'magically' outside the fashion system and régimes of bodily display.

Moreover, *Punch*'s lambasting of certains forms of bodily display gels with popular associations between a cult of the body and crankishness. During the period before the Second World War, the only publication to highlight the male body was *H & E* (Health and Efficiency). Originally published at the turn of the century as a bodybuilders' companion, *H & E* became a favourite on health farms after garnering a hefty postbag from a feature on naturism. George Bernard Shaw had a regular order, believing apparently that naturism and socialism were "the two ways forward". Such crankishness served only to make the British more suspicious of bodily representation in magazines and middle–class nudity was as much a target for Orwell's splenetic journalism as was the

FIGURES 2.1 & 2.2 from "Punch" March - April 1925

82 4 March 1925



PERILS OF THE DANCE.

THE TERROR OF THE OXFORD TROUSERS.

83 1 April 1925



MANNERS AND MODES.

CROSSING THE ROAD—1925.

FIGURE 2.3 from "Punch" 7 January 1925



PARDONABLE MISTAKE ON THE PART OF AN ABSENT-MINDED HAIRDRESSER.

middle–class prudishness of *Punch*.[14]

Significantly, *Punch* was subtitled "The London Charivari" and attempts after the Second World War to produce a gentleman's magazine for a more socially mixed audience emphasized this metropolitan connection. A series of magazines appeared targeting a new, upwardly–mobile city dweller: *Man About Town*[15], *London Gentleman* and *London Portrait* all arrived on the shelves, only to quickly disappear after failing to find an audience (*Punch* itself finally folded in 1992). It seemed that Britain was not prepared to support a magazine devoted to men's general interests. This baffled magazine publishers since related market areas, such as women's weeklies, women's quality monthlies (*Cosmopolitan*, *Marie Claire*, *Company*, *New Woman*, *Options*, *Prima*) and men's hobby magazines were buoyant, and in some cases highly successful[16]. As Liz Levy has commented on the appearance of *GQ* etc:

> It was not ever thus. Not so long ago, British men's magazines tended to – how shall we say – specialise. A visiting Martian on a mission to reconstruct men from their magazines would have taken back with him a story of coin–collectors, wind–surfers, motorists, hi–fi buffs and – er – wankers.[17]

Nonetheless, despite the failure of so many general interest titles, magazine publishers continued to attempt to attract the highly–prized male ABC1 readership that would generate high advertising revenues. *Cosmo Man* and *Options Man* emerged as supplements to successful women's publications, and both *Elle* and *Harpers & Queen* have included a men's section. The women's generals market therefore played an important injunctive role to publishers (if an ultimately unsuccessful one) regarding the possibility of opening up a new section of the magazine market. As Zed Zadawa, art director at EMAP Metro, succinctly put it: "Publishers look at women's magazines, their circulation figures and bottom line and they think, 'If we could put together a road test of a new Porsche with an in–depth interview with Giorgio Armani and some stuff about personal finance, then we've hit some sort of composite male who has all those interests.'"[18]

The situation for single–sex publications however looked even less favourable when the traditionally flourishing women's weekly market started to show a tendency towards dissolution. In 1960 total circulation stood at 2 million, in 1980 1.6 million and by the beginning of 1986 it was down to 1.1 million. As the *Guardian* commented:

> Conventional wisdom has it that even "Dallasty" glamour cannot save some weeklies. For in a sophisticated, increasingly competitive market, which has reached maturity, growth only comes from segmentation and adding value. A magazine which identifies with one sex, so the theory goes, is ill–defined and doomed to failure.[19]

The failure of the young–male–targetted *The Hit* in November 1985 and *Sportsweek* in 1987 may also have indicated the impossibilty of reaching a general audience of men[20]. Contrarily, however, it was at just this moment that single sex titles (including the first durable men's title) experienced a massive resurgence, amounting, in the words of one media consultant to "the greatest return from the dead since Lazarus".[21]

I want to argue later that the appearance of successful men's titles was not simply the parasitical product of an upswing in the women's market, but was largely the result of new social circumstances: changing conceptions of masculinity, the appearance of a new urban middle–class personality and the representational investment of the middle–class male body with the values of the 'new' national culture. But this arrival was also dependent on the success of a slightly earlier and less overtly gendered magazine form: the fashion victim's Bible exemplified by *The Face*.

c. Style Comes to Britain, 1980 –

The standard chronology of the style revolution begins in May 1980[22], when Nick Logan, former editor of the *New Musical Express* and the (pre–) teen–oriented *Smash Hits* (EMAP Metro[23]) raised £4,500 from personal savings and a second mortgage to finance the launch of *The Face*. As Waldemar Januszczak has observed *apropos* Logan's sense of timing:

> The history of the style rag fits ominously snugly into the eighties. They were, like Mrs. Thatcher herself, a deliberate reaction to the memorable British gloom of the seventies, to miners' strikes and three–day weeks. The style rags in their early days were notable for their sense of purpose. *The Face* was the first of them to recognise that clamouring for attention inside every drab inhabitant of Britain was a full–colour contender who wanted to be someone.[24]

However, as Dick Hebdige has remarked, "if it is tempting to regard *The Face* as the embodiment of Thatcherite drive, it should also be remembered that in a world dominated by massive publishing oligopolies...*The Face* remain[s] relatively marginal and independent...staffed by a small team of dedicated people ('The entire permanent staff of *The Face* could be comfortably fitted into the back of a London taxi' [*The Face* no. 61])"[25]

This marginal existence was highlighted in April 1992 when a controversial libel action, carried out by the singer Jason Donovan, ended in *The Face* incurring damages of £200,000 plus legal costs. This (comparatively small) sum was well beyond the resources of the group (which also owns *Arena* magazine) who were obliged to increase the cover price and launch a public appeal ("Save Face: the lemon appeal"[26]) to save the magazine. Although Donovan's substantially reduced damages were eventually met, 1992 provided a salutary lesson on the precariousness of independent magazine publication.

The Face exerted enormous influence on the design of many widely available magazines and has spawned a variety of imitations. *i-D* (Time Out) and *Blitz* (Jigsaw) also appeared in 1980, to be followed by *Tomorrow*, *Etcetera*, etc. The repertoire of photographic mannerisms, typographic innovations (principally associated with the work of Neville Brody and David Carson), techniques and styles in the fashion and music press have proliferated and "the studio has been rediscovered, in a sense re–invented as a fabulous space"[27]. But *The Face* has gone beyond the fairly narrow sphere of pop and fashion journalism, and now defines what a self–consciously 'contemporary' magazine must aspire to be. The *Sunday Times* (1987) and *The Sunday Correspondent* (1989)

magazines have followed *The Face* into the continental 30.1 cm x 25.3 cm format, while the revamped *Observer* magazine (1992), despite being slightly larger, followed the layout and section format of *The Face* closely.

Although *The Face* has never been explicit about its 'gender', it was clear that the readership was (and is) predominantly male[28], and that there was a market for a magazine which concerned men's 'lifestyle' issues (fashion, music, film, clubs and bars, etc.) This contradicted the conventional wisdom that a general magazine for men would be inevitably ill–starred. However, *The Face* was still saddled with the image of being a 'youth' magazine and therefore in the ephemeral tradition of *Fab*, *19* etc. Similarly, its left–field approach to issues was seen as somewhat unorthodox in a mainstream magazine culture which scrupulously avoids the controversial. A dose of adult *gravitas* was called for.

The first (surviving) full–colour glossy men's style magazine to appear in the UK during the 1980s was *For Him*, founded by Christopher Astridge. The magazine was launched in Spring 1985 under the auspices of the Menswear Association of Britain (MAB). It was distributed free by independent retailers, and advertising revenues came largely from the clothing trade.

In February 1988, frustrated by a failure to attract consumer advertising without expanding distribution and a cover price, Astridge bought the name from the MAB. Selling through newsagents and menswear shops, *For Him* became the market leader with an Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) claim for January to June 1990 of 64,325. At the same time Geoffrey Aquilina–Ross, the ex–editor of American Express's *Expression* magazine, *Men in Vogue* and the *Standard*'s men's page, was recruited to succeed the incumbent editor, Eric Musgrave.

For Him, however, quickly proved to be a victim of its own success in a highly competitive market niche. Stephen Quinn, publisher of *GQ*, persuaded the Audit Bureau of Circulation to investigate the purchase figure quoted for January to June 1990, and a substantially diminished claim of 51, 975 was accepted. The

ABC would not comment on the reason for this reduced estimate, but Astridge claimed in interview that all sales through menswear outlets had been discounted, leaving *GQ* the undisputed market leader.[29] At the same time, *GQ* apparently engaged in a series of 'spoilers' against its competitor, including attempting to better *For Him*'s offer to their flyposting body, and offering a photographer twice his fee for a picture of the actor Harrison Ford destined for the cover of *For Him*. Bizarrely, Stephen Quinn has insisted that the magazines are not in close competition, arguing that his title has a more educated, upmarket readership. This mirrors Chris Astridge's claim that *For Him* "is aimed at blokes, not chaps; at the high street, Wakefield, not High Street Kensington."[30] This is a confusingly democratic claim for a market segment which is patently concerned with distinctly élitist themes and values, and Astridge's title may well have already paid the price for not playing the part of brazen style arbiter. Confidence to the point of arrogance seems to be a key ingredient of the successful men's style magazine. Despite its similarities to the other titles therefore, *For Him* did not set out to address a new male constituency in the manner of the other magazines, and for this reason I have given it less attention than *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire*.

As mentioned previously, *Face* editor Nick Logan felt that there was a market for a fashion–led magazine for people who had outgrown *The Face* lifestyle and started *Arena* in November 1986, initially published every other month, but confusingly labelled with seasonal and cross–seasonal titles (Spring, Spring/Summer etc.). Launched – in contrast to *GQ* and *Esquire* – without any advertising, but with Logan's intuitive editorial touch and eye for design, *Arena* built up a circulation of around 65,000.

Arena has consistently been the most accessible and innovatory of the men's titles, and has also claimed to attract a sizeable female readership. Imitating *The Face*, fashion shots tend to be less formal than those in *GQ*, invoking the carefree rather than the serious:

> Models wear fine suits with the jacket open to show wide braces over a bare chest; or clasp each other as though bidding a last farewell on the steps of the gallows. Creating little picture dramas of apparently great import, or mystery, or absurdity, simply to sell clothes or perfumes was a way of making passion exist on the same level as a fine sports shirt: after all, a man should have both, should he not?[31]

As *The Independent* noted "*Arena* might appeal to a fashionable bus driver or dentist."[32] Almost certainly a London dentist, since *Arena*, under the editorship first of Dylan Jones, and later of Kathryn Flett has shown a consistent bias towards the capital. In a sense, *Arena* represents a kind of transitionary publication, lying somewhere between *The Face* and a fully–fledged men's magazine (*Arena*, like *The Face*, does not advertise its 'gender' in the explicit way of *GQ* or 'man at his best' *Esquire*) and it comes as no surprise therefore that Condé–Nast are reported to have expressed an interest in buying the publication from Logan[33]: *Arena* is therefore arguably complementary, rather than antagonistic, to the third publication to arrive on the shelves, *GQ*.

GQ was launched in Britain by the Condé–Nast publishing empire in November 1988 amidst considerable hype. The initials stand for *Gentleman's Quarterly*, although initially the magazine came out every two months and went monthly in January 1990. Its production values were (and are) higher than those of its competitors, and from the start it had an impressive circulation and a strong roster of advertisers (it also tends to be more fragrant than other titles through including more sachets of aftershave).

The first editor was Paul Keers, who defined the magazine as a vanguard publication for the Nineties: "the Nineties are going to be a softer, gentler decade and we'll be at the centre of that. We cover emotional, sexual topics that could quite easily fit in a woman's magazine."

Keers was being somewhat disingenuous. Condé–Nast were anxious that the magazine should not be seen as a publication for homosexuals, which to some extent had been the case with its American namesake[34], and Keers was given

the task of "hetting it up" (making it obviously heterosexual) which he chose to do by giving the magazine a fast–car, huge–expense–account macho style: "We make certain assumptions about our readers' lifestyles: the majority do fit that Armani suit–wearing, Rolex watch–owning, BMW–driving profile." Keers himself reportedly favours £900 suits and permits only black or white in his wardrobe.

Rich, successful men, he claimed, buy *GQ*: 92 per cent of readers are ABC1, a proportion matched only by *Investor's Chronicle*, and this has encouraged advertisers. Dominic Proctor, executive media director of J. Walter Thompson has commented on this (and in the process unwittingly pointed out *GQ*'s similarity to another form of men's publication): "The strong base of advertising directed at men traditionally went into soft porn magazines. But advertisers felt uncomfortable in that environment." *GQ*, it was reckoned, delivered the men who spend.

In fact Keers claim of a 92 per cent ABC1 readership is more than a little optimistic. Detailed statistics from readership surveys by Condé–Nast and the Audit Bureau of Circulation indicate that the readers are attracted by aspiration to, rather than realisation of a lifestyle. Undeterred neither by this nor the recession, Keers remained confident in his audience. "Lifestyle is too important to our readers" he said in January 1990, "Guys who wear designer suits won't take second best."[35]

After Keers' departure, the editor's job went to Alexandra Shulman who was in turn replaced by her deputy, Michael Vermeulen in March 1992. Vermeulen increased an already successful circulation to 90,884 by September 1992 – representing a 27 per cent increase on the previous year – and broke the magic figure of 100,000 the following year[36], the biggest growth enjoyed by any magazine in the UK except *Hello!*[37], making *GQ* the undisputed market leader for men's magazines. Vermeulen claims that the secret of his success is easy: "We offer guys an intelligent look at their world and it's full of neat shit to buy."

The intelligent look might be open to argument, but it was quickly clear that *GQ* had established the rules by which a men's magazine would be judged.

The UK edition of *Esquire* was launched on St. Valentine's Day 1991, backed by a rumoured advertising budget of £2 million. Advance publicity dwelt on the intellectualism of the magazine, emphasising 'depth' in contrast to the 'surface' concerns of its rivals: "A key characteristic of Esquire readers is that they can, and do, think...and enjoy thinking." As the *Guardian* noted, this over–the–top appellation suggested that "the UK is stuffed with designer–suited Nobel Prize winners."[38] In fact American *Esquire* does possess an enviable literary pedigree. Founded in 1929, its starry alumni include Ernest Hemingway, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Dorothy Parker and, latterly, Truman Capote, Tom Wolfe and Norman Mailer. The Hearst Corporation bought American *Esquire* in December 1987 for a reputed $70 million, and instigated several changes, principally involving the magazine's view of women.

When Hearst relaunched *Esquire* in January 1988 it said it was targeting post–war man; the baby–boomer who had been most affected by the 1960s, by feminism, by the increased opportunities for material well–being. But while continuing with its literary pursuits the editor–in–chief, Lee Eisenberg (later London editor–in–chief) decided it was also time to show women as objects of desire. He said he was writing for "men who really were men." The strategy seemed to work: US sales increased, and in 1991 stood at around 700,000 per month.[39]

The UK version of the magazine, marketed by National Magazines, has been fairly successful in attracting well–known writers, indeed its Christmas 1992 subscription request eschewed glossy layout in favour of listing those authors who had appeared in *Esquire*'s first year of publication – a list which included Peter Ackroyd, Martin Amis, Julian Barnes, Melvyn Bragg, David Lodge, Ruth Rendell and Salman Rushdie. Nonetheless, *Esquire* still felt obliged to follow its American big brother, with a strong emphasis on the physical celebration of

women. This included provocative photography, erotic stories and a 'blind date' section where staff writers take out glamorous women.

The timing of *Esquire*'s UK launch is open to question, and the magazine has never acquired a readership large enough to dispel the widely held impression that it is not sufficiently different from its rivals (or perhaps from top–shelf pornography). A year after claiming launch sales of around 100,000, National Magazines were quoting a figure of 63,000, although as with *For Him* the real figure was held to be considerably lower (a *Guardian* article suggested 40,000). The two–headed editorship of Eisenberg and his British appointee, Alex Finer, was reportedly unsuccessful, and to compound their anxiety, *GQ* claimed that it was benefitting massively from *Esquire*'s heavy promotion. "Our circulation never peaked like when Esquire ran their TV ads" said *GQ* editor Michael Vermeulen, a claim bolstered by GQ's considerably expanded sales.

Finer resigned in February 1992 to be replaced by his deputy, Rosie Boycott, widely publicised as a co–founder of both the feminist magazine *Spare Rib* and the publishers Virago (although Boycott is generally seen as a fellow–traveller rather than as a committed women's activist.) For a time therefore, both *GQ* and *Esquire* were edited by women (*Penthouse* was also edited by a woman, Isobel Koprowski, before she took over the women's soft–porn magazine *For Women*, and Kathryn Flett has since become the editor of *Arena*) suggesting that women know what men want to read. Boycott's own explanations for this are contradictory. In a BBC interview she argued that editing *Esquire* was a natural continuation of her *Spare Rib* activities since both magazines were involved in liberating people from the shackles of sexual stereotyping. However, Boycott has elsewhere proved sensitive to the accusation that, as a woman editor, she produces women's magazines for men: "It irks me that people are all pushing Alexandra [Shulman] and me to say the only reason you are there is because you can write about whether size matters." [40]

Boycott's criticism of the magazine at the start of her tenure of the editorship

is an interesting condensation of the arguments used against launching a men's magazine before *For Him*, and while it is clear that the magazine has been modernized/eroticized, it is hard to avoid the feeling that the failings she identifies have not been transcended in any of the men's titles: "There was a terrible feeling that this could be any time, any place, any year, any century about it. There was a sort of leisureliness, almost like a gentleman's club but one which didn't have enough members, of course."

"Members" was perhaps unintentionally phallic, but it is significant that following the establishment of men's magazines as a commercially viable form, there was a sharp increase in the erotic depiction of men in magazines. The first manifestation of this was a series of pictures of penises in women's monthly publications. Following these pictures, sales of *Cosmopolitan*, *Company* and *New Women* showed significant increases over the previous year. The *Guardian* concluded that bodies obviously sell magazines:

> Every magazine cover bears the transposition of the same few words, from the straightforward Marie Claire (Naked Men Talk About Their Bodies) to the emotional Options (The Naked Truth – How Men Really Feel About their Bodies) to the dramatic More! (whose *sine qua non* is the exclamation mark – Revealed! How Men Feel About Their Bodies)...This is the real investigative journalism. We didn't do it simply to show the girls some big ones. Honest.[41]

The germ of a new (and thoroughly flaccid) pornography had been established, and, particularly in the wake of a male striptease boom, the time seemed right for a publication, ostensibly for women, that focused on male nudity. *Ludus* and *For Women* duly appeared in 1992 amidst much hype. Simultaneously, the gay press enjoyed a substantial increase in turnover. Significantly, Britain's 'overground' gay press is male owned and dominated, as lesbian issues are felt to "scare away readers and advertisers"; here again was a magazine form concerned with attracting a lucrative male market segment. Eschewing the high moral seriousness of some gay publications, certain magazines seem to be reproducing the very young urban spenders beloved of *GQ* etc.

> [*Boyz*: a new title] "is an affirmative 'lifestyle' publication, an equivalent of Just 17 for younger men "...he [David Birdie, editor] is convinced that the paper will appeal to a younger generation of gay men who don't feel oppressed and who want to be entertained.[42]

Lifestyle, therefore, had arrived, packaged with, and packaging, men's bodies. The male body was actually shown, against the grain, to be highly *productive*: provoking commentary, imitation and pastiche. But lifestyle, for all its certainty about what is and is not fashionable, is also susceptible to accusations of privileging surface over depth[43], body over mind, play over commitment. It is no historical accident that at the moment of the men's magazine's arrival, these issues were being considered in very different contexts.

3. IRONY AND PARODY

There was no shortage of work, because there was a flash new magazine title on the newsstands every couple of weeks - all style and no content, packed with features dealing with 'image' and 'lifestyle'. It was down to people like me to keep publishers informed about the target market of upwardly mobile adults with disposable incomes. I took the 'Creative' part of my job description literally. Most of the information I provided was completely fictitious.
Anne Bilson[44]

a. Refusing to Take it Seriously

Herself a Contributing Editor to *GQ*, Anne Bilson is typical of the ambiguous relationship that exists between magazine writers and the titles for which they work. The world which she applauds in *GQ* is the same one she satirises in *Suckers* – a thinly–disguised allegory about urban middle–class vampires 'bleeding London dry'. But it would be wrong to call such catholic writing hypocritical. The freelancing and contributing system amongst newspapers and magazines means that different *personae* have to be adopted to fit with the editorial line. There is some evidence that this is a comparatively recent development: for example, it is reported that there is less 'caballing' in today's newspaper or magazine office and current working conditions militate against a sense of common interest, common identity and shared concerns amongst staff.[45] Like the 'quality' newspapers, the men's magazines have followed *The Face* in adopting separate sections, with management reportedly fostering a competitive ethos which favours specialisation and the cultivation of narrow areas of expertise. These tendencies mesh with a more general editorial scepticism towards any kind of political 'abstractions' (especially left–wing ones). The resultant prose is indicative of its atomised conditions of production: it is personalised, competitive and visceral, at times sounding like a caricature of itself: "psychodrama was the scariest thing I did last year, that and hanging around the barrios of Medellin". Writers' biographies are written to place them within the yuppie gangster milieu that, as I shall argue later, these magazines strive to create: "On the whole he [John Ashworth] would prefer to be pursuing his favourite occupations: flying and scuba–diving – in Southern Africa".

Just as the working conditions of journalists suggest a possible cause for the tendency in these magazines towards ironization of serious issues and political non–commitment or relativism, so John Berger has suggested that our entire magazine culture is necessarily parodic and promiscuous, as a consequence of its dependency on advertising revenues[46]. Reviewing two pictures in the *Sunday Times* magazine, an advertisement for Badedas bath salts and a picture of starving Bangladeshi refugees, Berger writes:

> The shock of such contrasts is considerable, not only because of the co–existence of the two worlds shown, but also because of the cynicism of the culture which shows them one above the other. It can be argued that the juxtaposition of images was not planned. Nevertheless, the text, the photographs taken in Pakistan, the photographs taken for the advertisements, the editing of the magazine, the layout of the publicity, the printing of both, the fact that advertisers' pages and news pages cannot be co–ordinated – all these are produced by the same culture.[47]

In the television version of *Ways of Seeing* (1974), Berger went further in his condemnation of this culture: "Between the images, there is such a gap, such a fissure that we can only say that the culture that produced these images is insane"[48]

b. Embracing 'Postmodernism'

From a more consciously theoretical position than Berger, Dick Hebdige has attacked style magazines in general, and *The Face* in particular, for their embracement of a version of the postmodern *zeitgeist*, at the expense of social commitment. In a chilling epigram Hebdige shows the proximity of the slogans of postmodernity to the imagery of the brutally affluent:

> "What are Chile, Biafra, the 'boat people', Bologna or Poland to us?"
> (*Jean Baudrillard*, Sur le nihilisme)
>
> "*The Tatler*: the magazine for the other Boat People."
> (*advertising slogan for* The Tatler *accompanying an image of a group of the "beautiful rich" aboard a yacht*)[49]

Hebdige argues that *The Face* operates within a "transfigured social and

ideological field", a national and global context in which the community addressed by, and in part formed out of the national–popular discourses of the late 1930s and 1940s no longer exists. The social group that *The Face*, *GQ*, *Esquire*, *Arena* and *For Him* set out to address in their different ways is not one which is generally much interested in party politics, egalitarianism and outmoded notions of community. Hebdige sees in this the pernicious effects of a 'postmodern' politics which privileges individuality and 'surface' over communality and 'depth'. Moreover, he notes the way in which lifestyle magazines attempt to distance themselves from issues of commitment by strategies of irony and the adoption of masks:

> All statements made inside *The Face*, though necessarily brief are never straightforward. Irony and ambiguity predominate ... where opinions are expressed they occur in hyperbole so that a question is raised about how seriously they're meant to be taken. Thus the impression you gain as you glance through the magazine is that this is less an 'organ of opinion' than a wardrobe full of clothes.[50]

Lifestyle magazines have undoubtedly adopted the term "postmodernism" with a certain amount of glee, using the term as a badge of their intellectualism[51]. In this embracement, *GQ* etc. have not been particularly daring: whole sections of the media (even the scatological comic *Viz*) and academic life have been keen to show an awareness of the issues, if only to reject them as so much hype.

However, both Hebdige's essay and the men's magazines appear to treat "postmodernism" as a relatively stable entity – a set of ideas available to the media *cognoscenti* rather than an emergent mood. Hebdige's article is suggestive of what Lidia Curti[52] has seen as the first set of responses to postmodernism. During this period, postmodernism was seen as a pluralist, capitalist discourse opposing Marxism and what it stood for. At the same time the connection between aesthetics and politics was presented as quite unmediated and simple. But "things have been moving rapidly: with the great changes within socialism, oppositions are not so easily established any

longer."[53] Hebdige's essay seems to in some ways predict this mutability and ends with the possibility of the postmodern mood being harnessed in the service of commitment and community. Even *The Face* which he vilifies has shown itself, during the Donovan libel action, to be prepared to contest bigotry on traditional grounds of natural justice (though to what extent this was a tactical move cannot be estimated).

Men's magazines flirtation with postmodernity, their conscious self–ironising and their existence within a compromised magazine culture seem, therefore, to undermine any claims they may make towards "authority", and I want to consider the implications of this later. But these magazines also work at the level of the body, a body which "is the inscribed surface of events", where a change in the representation or production of the body is also a change to the whole (national) culture and therefore a profound alteration to the context in which debates over representation and authority take place. I therefore want to turn now to the changes in the male body that these magazines posit and the emblematic national force of these alterations.

4. REINVENTING THE BODY

a. The Challenge of Feminism

> *There are two kinds of men - the good and the bad.*
> *If you've got the first, buy him a copy of Esquire.*
> *If he's the second, there's help at hand.*
> (Lee Eisenberg, Editor–in–Chief *Esquire* magazine)

GQ, *Arena* and *Esquire* are not explicit responses to the women's movement, though individual writers have sought to establish some direct connection between the two phenomena ("Feminist magazine pioneer joins chase for spare men" *Guardian* 19.2.92, "How sexism came back in style" *Independent on Sunday* 9.12.90.) Nonetheless, the magazine's formation of a new masculine subject inevitably calls into question issues of feminism and femininity, questions which are rarely treated with the anxious soul–searching of more explicitly antisexist publications such as the *Men Against Sexism* newsletter, *Achilles Heel*[54], and *Body Politic*.

What the glossy titles share with their more earnest brethren are certain assumptions about the existence of 'new men' who have in some way been influenced by feminist ideas and "are sympathetic to a notion of masculinity far removed from the traditional 'male chauvinist pig' variety."[55] Given the exigencies of securing market leadership, editors naturally do not claim that all the magazines support such an enlightened readership, and there is a fair degree of mud–slinging over the alleged potential of each title for being a 'fag mag' ("*GQ* is increasingly strong. But our readers are ... more heterosexual", as *Esquire* editor Rosie Boycott has put it.)[56]

However, it is clear that within the hermetic world of each magazine, writers and marketers both explicitly and implicitly presume the existence of a 'new man' constituency which shares with the magazine certain assumptions about work and sexuality. The media–created 'new man' has been through successive incarnations since his first appearance in the 1970s, but socially, economically and racially he has remained fairly specific. Generally he is professional, white,

heterosexual and tertiary–educated. For feminists the new man has been a traditional chimera, while for the right–wing press he has been a totem of liberal effeteness.[57] The challenge to the new magazines, therefore, was to attract readers with this highly profitable profile, but without appearing to portray the New Man as either a too familiar 'old man' or as a progressive wallflower.

The way in which the magazines have sought to achieve this balance is by choosing a magazine blend that is familiar to readers of women's magazines. Magazines aimed at women tend to present a mixture of information and entertainment, while men's magazines have traditionally tended to settle for one or the other. What is significant about the glossy men's magazines is that there has been a blurring of this divide. Traditionally, based on women's hidden labour, men have been able to be more singular about their activities: they are either at work or at leisure. In *Arena*, *Esquire* and *GQ* the two realms of leisure and work have invaded one another. The men who would appear to live and breathe their working lives are invited to show that they have other concerns: *how* they work, *how* they dress, talk and arrange their emotional affairs are given equal weight to the work itself (though the ruling assumption is generally that the reader is either in the media or 'in business' in some form.) Not only has leisure invaded work (the right tie, the right pen), but the seriousness of work has invaded the leisure sphere. As Paul du Gay has suggested, one of the characteristic features of enterprise culture has been a pronounced blurring between what is thought of as properly cultural and what is thought of as properly economic.[58] Using 'culture' in a rather monolithic way, this is a situation in which, for Frederic Jameson, "the corporate is now at one with culture."[59]

To demonstrate this infiltration or assimilation, *Arena* 30 ran a series of articles describing office wear in terms of fashion, fantasizing about eroticism in the workplace ("Dangerous Liaisons: sex in the office") and encouraging successful professionals to model 'the autumn collection' (Figures 4–5). The ruling assumption was that these apparently conflicting life areas are now in

FIGURE 2.4 "Arena" 90. "The Professionals"

the professionals



Håkan Rosenius, 34
Creative director at Paul Smith
Salary: "I can't really answer that"
"My job is very varied, and what I wear to work varies too – one day a suit and the next jeans and a sweater. About three-quarters of each outfit is Paul Smith, but I might wear a polo shirt from somewhere else."
Håkan wears olive-green rayon suit £485, red checked cotton shirt £95, forest-green merino/cashmere/silk/angora sweater £190 and olive silk tie £45, all by Paul Smith



Damon Hill, 29
Racing driver
Salary: "About £60,000"
"I've got a split job at the moment: racing Formula 3000, and testing Formula One cars for Williams, which is just wonderful, like driving a cruise missile(!). My wife tends to buy my clothes, as my own attempts end in disaster"
Damon wears Morrocan-style collarless cotton shirt £89 by Empono Armani; Heuer watch Damon's own (given to his father, Graham Hill, by Goodyear for winning Le Mans in '72)



Gary Rhodes, 31
Headchef at The Greenhouse
Salary: "I can't say"
"The worst thing about my job is the hours: I start work just after 7am and leave at 11.30 at night. In summer, I wear shorts, T-shirts and other simple things to work. This outfit is very different from that – it's beautifully made and good quality"
Gary wears petrol-blue gabardine zip-front jacket £340, matching trousers £205 and white cotton shirt £115, all by Yohji Yamamoto

A special ARENA parade of working men and the clothes they wear

Photography **Trevor Leighton**
Fashion **David Bradshaw**
Text **Sandra-Jane England**

harmonious accord. Inevitably, however, the tone of pastiche always threatens to move from the margins to the centre of the article:

> In the new corporate hothouses, office style–wars will accelerate as execs on the make turn to more arcane designer variations on the suit. Perhaps the super–hip will start juggling with pastiches of classic office styles of the past. Perhaps older bosses will turn to the old Victorian frockcoat to puff up their self–image...or perhaps not.[60]

What separates the contemporary men's magazine most distinctively from its clubbish forebears is a concentration on sex and sexuality and, while generally suspicious of feminism, this is undoubtedly a product of the new topicality of men's sexuality opened up by the women's movement. I follow Foucault[61] in noting that feminism's attempt to 'know' male sexuality has produced an explosion of material on the subject, much of which might be hostile or indifferent to the women's movement. Thus, unlike the often guilt–ridden tone of much writing by anti–sexist men, in which male heterosexuality is considered to be problematic and objectifying *per se*, the tone taken by the new men's magazines is above all celebratory of the readers' collective masculinity: "Don't get us wrong: sensitivity is fine in its place, but sometimes a man's just got to do what a man's got to do. This month *GQ* explores what it is."[62] Contemporary celebration, however, is couched in remarkably traditional symbolism:

> Heterosexuality, as you may have noticed, is a celebration of difference. Any additional foreignness is therefore welcome ... She's [the oriental girl] the last refuge of the roué; there when you need shore–leave from angry feminist seas.[63]

Whereas the liberal manifestation of New Man may have felt discomfited by any suspicion that he might be regarding women as sex objects, the New Man of the magazines would appear to have accepted sexuality as part of life. The problem for the men's magazines however, is that in pressing this celebration of heterosexual masculinity, they are beginning to walk an uneasy path: go too far and they might lose their place on the current affairs/style magazine rack and the desirable AB readership which attracts advertising revenue. In

interview, the editors of several of the titles have demonstrated their anxiety over the tensions involved in balancing sex and respectability. According to Dylan Jones, former editor of *Arena*, up to 25% of the readership are women, and he had to bear their sensibilities in mind, while following the rubric that sex sells magazines:

> I think we have been a bit anally retentive about women in the past ... I wouldn't want men to feel embarrassed about picking up the magazine because it looks like a dirty mag: we wouldn't have had a woman draped over a horse. But I do think we can be gratuitous, with shots of sexy women.[64]

Alexandra Shulman, editor of *GQ*, was more bullish in identifying a national culture which denies sexuality. She credits the men's magazine with having a role in changing the sexual climate of stereotypically frigid Britain: "In this country men have become very scared of being seen as sexist; it has become the custom to be po–faced and worthy for fear of offending. I think we [sic] should be more celebratory."[65] The insinuation is clearly that British men should ape the sexual mores of other nations (no doubt leaving the poor Native Briton baffled as to whether he should be a Latin Lothario or a Swinging Scandinavian); a confusing message given the valorisation, elsewhere in the magazines, of English reserve and the sexually reticent qualities of the imagined English gentleman.

A spectator of this problem, Damian O'Malley of the Woolams, Moira Gaskin and O'Malley advertising agency, has commented that the tension between sexuality and an upmarket readership in the men's magazine is a particularly British problem, noting that magazines like the French *Lui* and the Italian *King* are hybrids of *GQ* and *Mayfair*: "provocative features but also very arty, sexy pictures, more Bill Brandt than Page Three."[66]

Ultimately, the titles' tendencies towards parody and their confusion of tone make them unsuitable forums for serious debate on the role of the Women's Movement in changing conceptions of masculinity, and indeed to do so would

challenge their overwhelming economic rationale. While individual writers bemoan the pressures of masculine authority – responsibility, being cut off from women and children, the emotional impoverishment of work dedicated to status and material gain – the magazines are in the business of maintaining, or at the very least celebrating, the material economic power which accrues to men as men. Geraldine Bell puts the point succinctly: "Poor sensitive, magazine reading men: they can't win. But then, with all those looks, and clothes, and cars, and all that power, they should worry."[67]

b. Yuppie Culture and the New Lad

Most recently the new man has become realist rake
Neil Spencer

Rather, therefore, than address a New Man constituency, *GQ*, *Esquire* and *Arena* chose to fashion its own creature from an emergent cultural group with a highly visible role in redefining the nation, the yuppies or new meritocracy. "Yuppie" is an American acronym of contested meaning, sometimes used to describe a tiny class fraction of ambitious young men working in the metropolitan financial sector, and sometimes as a catch–all term for the urban middle class. Despite the indeterminacy of the term it carries almost uniformly negative overtones. As Patrick Wright has shown in a discussion of the recent redevelopment of London's Bow Quarter, 'yuppie' is an epithet that never applies to oneself:

> [I]t is scarcely surprising that an 'anti–yuppie' faction should have formed almost immediately within the Depositors' Action Group. It's members, who were mostly women in their late thirties, were appalled by the idea that they themselves might be mistaken for 'yuppies', and wasted no time in passing on the insulting epithet to their marginally younger fellows – the 'barrow boys' and the 'Sebastians' in striped shirts who talked of their flats as 'units' and 'investments' ... Here, as I was told, was 'Thatcher's generation' – a bunch of brats, all of them 'under twenty–six' who had grown up without any experience beyond the dream of personal accumulation, and who could only yelp in helpless outrage now that they had been derailed. It is only fair to say that these twice–dubbed 'yuppies' among the depositors looked back with comparable reservations of their own: they saw a collection of 'media people' who seemed more

> interested in using the situation to publicise themselves than in safeguarding their own investment.[68]

As Tom Nairn has remarked, the idea of the 'yuppie' has lost any sense of an 'exhilarating caricature' which it might have possessed in the United States, and has simply become a stilted sneer: "in no time a whole Dickensian universe of animated, yet minute contempt has arisen: all are placed and labelled, and can revenge themselves only by labelling others."[69]

The men's magazines are therefore extremely conscious that yuppie is a term to be avoided, and even launch their own occasional attacks against this unlikely folk devil. Nonetheless, the young financial or media turk is not entirely a creation of the popular imagination, and as I have suggested already, the lifestyle profile of the stereotypical yuppie *arriviste* is extremely attractive to magazine editors in search of lucrative advertising revenue. The answer has been to combine the less objectionable features of the yuppie with those of the New Man. The term coined for the resulting hybrid is the New Lad and it first appeared in a piece written by Sean O'Hagan in *Arena* 27.

Ostensibly, O'Hagan's piece bemoaned the end of the New Man experiment, as men tired of appearing sincere and regressed into sexism: "The New Lad aspires to New Man status when he's with women, but reverts to Old Lad type when he's out with the boys." O'Hagan concludes that there is "something sad about the New Lad, and that something is tied up with the utter dismissal of the New Man as a potential role model. Basically we just didn't have the will, nor the nerve, to seriously consider such a radical shift in our consciousness."

Whatever the integrity of O'Hagan's intentions, the consequences of the article were quite the opposite of its surface meaning. With *Arena* surreptitiously fuelling the debate it had itself created (through it's women's section '**pour elle**'), New Lad took on a life of his own. Louise Chunn, editor of *Guardian Women* notes the snowball effect of this kind of media creation:

> I could see it coming when I read Sean O'Hagan's piece on the New Lad in ARENA 27. My phone rang off the hook with contributors wanting to answer it in *Guardian Women*. I said no to every one of them. Other editors didn't. From *City Limits* to the *Independent on Sunday*, from the *Daily Star* to the *Standard*, the New Lad's stature grew in column inches. Once they'd compiled lists of what he drank and wore and watched, then hey, guys, he existed. [70]

Inevitably, the New Lad had to have a complement in the form of the New Lass, who was "fucking well going to take over the pubs and the football terraces – partly for the sake of it, partly for the thrill of the game, the buzz of violence and partly because all those big, strong men in shorts belonged to us too."[71] Given this libidinal–utopian programme, it is perhaps no surprise that the New Lass has not achieved the same currency as her male counterpart. Moreover, I am dubious about the existence of any sizeable community of female tyros, although several publications, including the satirical magazine *Bitch* and the lesbian sports magazine *Girl Jock* have set out to address such an audience. Nonetheless, I would persist in noting that those institutions that Ruth Picardie writes about – the pubs and football terraces – are still the strongholds of Lads, New, Old or otherwise, and contribute to the subordination of women.

At the same time, however, it would be wrong to treat this male constituency as entirely monolithic. The sites of urban masculinity, often presumed to be fairly static, are clearly changing, and *Arena*, *Esquire* etc. have attempted to map some of these changes, largely from the perspective of style, often inflecting them with a feeling of risk or adventure. For example, the creation of the New Lad has allowed magazine writers, designers, photographers and stylists to celebrate deviant archetypes that were contained in neither the yuppie nor New Man stereotypes. Gangsters, thugs and Casanovas carried a certain cachet that the New Lad could vicariously partake of; made all the more easy by the way in which minor villains were apparently as enamoured by style as *GQ*. A description of a new style football hooligan sounds like it has been drawn from a manual on New Lad dress sense:

> There was Tony's wardrobe. This is what I saw of it during his stay in

> Turin (approximately thirty hours):
> *One*: a pale yellow jump suit, light and casual and worn for comfort during the long hours in the Mercedes.
> *Two*: a pastel–blue T–shirt (was there silk in the mix?), a straw hat and cotton trousers, his 'early summer' costume, worn when he briefly appeared on the square around four o'clock.
> *Three*: his leather look (lots of studs), chosen for the match.
> *Four*: a light woollen jacket (chartreuse) with complementary olive–green trousers for later in the evening, when everyone gathered at a bar.
> *Five*: and finally, another travel outfit for the return trip (a pink cotton track suit with pink trousers.)[72]

Such a style quickly had a name ('Casual'), a meaning and a glamorised subcultural history, explained by the former *Arena* writer Neil Spencer as follows:

> He brought guile and violence to the cult of the *miha*, 'taxing' other casuals by quite literally stealing the clothes off their backs, while it was folklore that the most violent football hooligans were the most expensively dressed (much to the initial bafflement of the police and public, who still expected their hoodlums to be shaven–skulled boot boys). Influential on the growth of the casual was the continuing success of English football teams ... in European competitions. Hordes of English 'away' supporters fell ravenously upon the boutiques of Bologna, Milan, Naples and Rome, pillaging them for Armani, LaCoste and Fiorucci with which to out–trump the terraces of domestic rivals.[73]

Needless to say, this thumbnail history bears only a slight resemblance to reality (particularly as English teams were not allowed to play in European competitions from May 1985) but it is interesting for the kind of mythology it evokes – a style world not of simple expenditure, but of violence and principle (in which it echoes not only British Mod of the 1960s but also the more seductive cinematic Los Angeles of Dennis Hopper's *Colors* [1988], where consumer ephemera are imbued with heroic significance by the Blood and Crips super–gangs.)

The combination of violence and style is less evident in the everyday world than in the minds of magazine editors, and certain themes and personalities recur persistently. The boxer Chris Eubank (himself a relentless self–publicist) is

reportedly an avid *GQ* reader and has appeared in all three magazines[74], combining legitimated violence with sharp tailoring in a way that is open to easy parody:

> She [Rosie Boycott, editor of *Esquire*] launches her charm offensive. "Who's this by?" She says, feeling his sharply tailored jacket. "Hugo Boss," says the super middleweight champion of the world. "I don't really wear him much anymore. I bought some Versace two years ago and once you wear Versace you never want to wear Boss again."[75]

Similarly, a *Guardian* article described an editorial meeting of *GQ* in which the subject of parricide was tabled as a possible piece in the magazine:

> Christopher [Silvester – contributing editor]: The interesting thing ... was that they were both extremely good looking. And the idea of good looking killers is extremely interesting.
> Simon [sub–editor]: We could do it as a fashion spread.
> Michael [Vermeulen – editor]: Mod Murders?
> CS: Dress them in your favourite designer suits.[76]

This flirtation with deviance rearticulates some of the anxieties and conflicts surrounding the changing demography of British inner cities. Developers and the urban middle class moved back into previously run–down inner–city areas during the 1970s and 80s, attracted amongst other things by central locations, the prospect of early home ownership and in some cases a certain bohemian cachet. This process inevitably produced some social tensions which in turn provided a largely vicarious sense of threat. At the very historical moment in which the middle classes were adopting unprecedented technologies of property defence (neighbourhood watch schemes, accelerating alarm sales, mushrooming private security companies), a youthful class fraction could convince itself that it was transported to a city straight out of *Bladerunner*:

> They [the "trustafarians", another yuppie manifestation] have the arrogance to think they are contributing something to the area's culture, when all they give is money, chiefly to the often dreadful new restaurants and bars selling over–priced imported beers and chic spirits that coincided with their arrival.
> Yet the inference remains that Notting Hill is inner–city life on the edge, a dangerous place to live. But its crime figures are average for London,

> All Saints Road has been cleaned up and the dealers have almost completely vanished from the streets. If they disappeared altogether the trustafarians would probably want them restored to perpetuate the myth for the benefit of their own street credibility.[77]

A magazine which promotes those very 'designer' beers and spirits; which purports to represent a wealthy metropolitan group and which delights in gangster tales from around the world, criticises these very characteristics in others. Yet, as I noted earlier, in the flat, postmodern world of the glossy magazine the committed written word (and who is to say that the writer is not simply wearing another ironic mask) is only one signifier among many. For alongside the moralistic copy is a coloured block revealing who one can see and where one can go in "vibrant" Notting Hill. Over the page is an eye–catching map of the "bohemian idyll" (Figure 6). The 'message' is intentionally confused.

Despite a professed commitment towards keeping their finger on the New Lad pulse, all the magazines are scrupulous in avoiding those areas of urban life which might challenge the image of man as urban adventurer. Features on the Medellin drug cartel or Sendero Luminosa are plentiful while articles on British urban decay, drug addiction and homelessness are conspicuous by their absence. This may seem an obvious point given that general interest magazines present a generally anodyne view of existence. Yet it is interesting that other, predominantly American, textual forms in the years since 1979 have reflected the insecurities of the urban middle class. The 'yuppie nightmare' movie has been a significant sub–genre of recent years, encompassing films such as *Into the Night* (directed by John Landis, 1985), *After Hours* (Martin Scorsese 1985), *Something Wild* (Jonathan Demme, 1986), *Fatal Attraction* (Adrian Lyne, 1987) and *Wall Street* (Oliver Stone, 1987). Novels, including Tom Wolfe's *Bonfire of the Vanities* and Brett Easton Ellis' *American Psycho* have dwelt on similar insecurities. In contrast the men's magazine has maintained its urban cowboy tone, setting its face against the evidence of middle–class vulnerability. The mask is so convincing that its occasional fracture appears all


Lisbon
WESTWAY
GOLBORNE RD.
WESTBOURNE PK
WESTBOURNE PARK ROAD
CHEPSTOW ROAD
LEDBURY ROAD
WIN
192
£TO-MS
WESTBOURNE GROVE
PORTOBELLO ROAD
OLD STUFF
LADBROKE GROVE
KENSINGTON PK. ROAD
NOTTING HILL GATE
NOTTINGHILL GATE
NOTTINGHILL

the more obvious and hysterical:

> Begging defaces the city, degrades the spirit. It dehumanizes you as well as them; it brutalizes us all. You learn to walk past these people, you have to, and it makes it easier to turn away from the truly needy. These professional leeches, big strapping lads some of them, harden your heart, put callouses on your soul. They make every cry for help seem like junk mail ... We owe it to ourselves to walk past them, metaphorically gobbing in the grubby palms of their outstretched hands, chanting our protest against a world that is forever changing for the worst. No change we say, no change. Just say no change.[78]

Tony Parsons may be acting as an *agent provocateur* in his Tebbitesque condemnation of London's beggars, but the very admission that urban life can be anxious and frightening fractures the complacency of a magazine form which generally allows no contradiction of its portraiture of the New Lad as rugged individual.

In the final part of this section, I want to look at the way in which this newly–created body relates to a changing national scene: how New Lad fits into New England.

c. New Male Bodies & the New Consumer Nation

A link between consumer culture and the formation of new bodies is nothing new.[79] The Hollywood cinema, in particular, helped to create new standards of appearance and bodily presentation, bringing home to a mass audience the importance of 'looking good'. J.B. Priestley in his *English Journey* of 1933 while taking tea in a Lincolnshire cafe, noted how the country girls on the adjoining tables had carefully modelled their appearance on their favourite film stars:

> Even twenty years ago girls of this kind would have looked quite different even from girls in the nearest large town; they would have had an unmistakable small town rustic air, but now they are almost indistinguishable from girls in a dozen different capitals, for they all have the same models from Hollywood.

But 'Hollywood' also suggests massification, falsehood and fantasy; the

imitation of matinee idols somehow implies one's own powerlessness and childish mimicry – a return to the little drama of Trimmer's (inherently effeminate) impertinence. With the appearance of a new male body in the 1980s, however, this traditional tension between the body and the consumer culture was reinflected in new ways, moving, in a broad sense, from a discourse of 'imitation' to one of 'authenticity'.

Shifting patterns of consumption and the proliferation of gay and feminist critiques already touched upon, paved the way for the emergence of a variety of new male bodies in advertising and fashion photography during the 1980s and early 1990s. The decade brought a variety of definitions and representations of masculinity, conceiving men variously as father, lover, breadwinner and independent city dweller. The men's magazines largely divorced themselves from the family associations of the first three categories (no Athena–style pictures of men hugging babies in *Arena*) concentrating instead on the isolated male, or loose groups of men (men modelling clothes in a striptease parlour in *Arena* 38, a recreation of *On the Town* in *Arena* 29 etc. (Figures 7–9) Authority seemed to be on display in these photographs: the authority of personal integrity, the power to live as one pleases and the wealth to dress up or dress down depending on one's mood. With the exception of the occasional photoshoot around the themes of 'burly worker' or 'dandified aristocrat', photography in the men's magazine concentrates on images of the professional–managerial middle class at work and play (Figures 10–11). As Mike Featherstone[80] has noted, one effect of the bureaucratization of many aspects of twentieth century life is that the precise evaluation of an individual's achievement on the basis of universalistic criteria has become impossible. Consequently, "extra–functional elements of professional roles become more and more important for conferring occupational status."[81] This evaluative difficulty opens up the space for what Featherstone terms "the performing self" schooled in public relations, panache and careful bodily presentation or image management. While Featherstone sees this process operating evenly throughout western societies, Dick Hebdige's analysis of the "cartography of

FIGURE 6.7 "Arena" 38 "El Morocco"



Fig 2.8 "Aronn" 38 "El Morocco"



posite page: black bra and
ck G-string from a
ection at Fenwick and
fridges, London and other
od department stores
ecked slim-fit trousers £180
Katharine Hamnett from
tharine Hamnett, London
ped knitted tank top £75
The Duffer of St
orge from The Duffer of St
orge, London, wool cap by
ngol and black braces
th from a selection at
fridges, London

s page: single-breasted
stripe suit £675 by **YSL**
m YSL, London, white
tton shirt £79 by **Paul**
nith from Paul Smith
ndon and Nottingham
ck bra and knickers by
an Paul Gaultier from a
ection at Galerie Gaultier
d Jones, London and
hard Creme, Manchester
rt gold and black straw
nt gown by **Gaspar**
ldanha (further
ormation: 071 724 0123)

r stockists' details see
rectory

VT3UAE %% "Arena" W9 "On the Town"



FIGURE 2.1 "Arena" 3 , "Looking the Business"

looking the business



An orderly crowd of Chicagoan commuters *(right)*, homogenous in their coats and hats, shuffles off to work in 1958. *Above:* Gregory Peck as *The Man In The Grey Flannel Suit* (1956), the company man who spoke his mind and refused to allow his suit to become a strait-jacket

What we wear to work says more about our lives than we're prepared to admit. ARENA charts the history of office chic

WHAT'S THE ONE ITEM OF CLOTHING you can find in virtually every male wardrobe. 501s? Possibly. Mas underwear? Maybe. Some form of business suit? Undoubtedly. Even if you're not in business, you can't avoid it. Buying your first business suit is another one of those masculine rites of passage, a sign that you're ready for the world of adult male endeavour. You may never actually wear it to work, you may be able to kid yourself that you're not tied down by outmoded dress codes, but it will still be hanging there in the closet, a guarantee of maturity and seriousness, an inescapable sartorial destiny.

As numerous fashion historians have pointed out, the business suit is a modern universal, something which isn't tailored directly towards performing a specific task, a suit that smooths over distinctions between specific jobs to assert a class unity of intent and attitude.

But the suit has never been free from the status politics of fashion, especially today. The suit that commands attention at an ad agency client meeting wouldn't work in a City boardroom. There's still a world of difference between the made-to-measure Savile Row number, the unstructured softened re-interpretation of the same produced by someone like Armani, the Armani-style suit from Next, and the chain-store bargain.

Similarly the suit may be the central power garment of the age, the sartorial symbol of authority (remember the Men in Grey Suits who ditched Thatcher), but the power it encapsulates isn't available to all. Whether the suit is something imposed on you, or something you impose on others depends on where you sit on the job ladder. Not all those who wear suits are Suits.

Oddly enough, in its earliest incarnation the present-day basic business suit, the epitome of formal constraint, was seen as too informal and somewhat lower-class. Lightweight matched three-piece lounge suits first appeared in the 1860s, but were written off by the mid-nineteenth-century business aristocracy as too reminiscent of the livery worn by servants. Lightweight suits may have helped to facilitate rowing and scraping, but they had none ▶



After the Fifties, men wante
to escape drab conformity. By th
mid-Sixties, the executive wa
the favourite male image
advertising, used to sell car
cigarettes, booze and se

taste" might alert us to the presence in Anglo–Britain of an existing, but dormant, matrix of taste, which directs bodily presentation along certain lines. The magazines sought to harness this resurgent structure of feeling, to relay the 'natural' marks of distinction to an up–and–coming body of spenders:

> New codes were duly found to reflect the realigned status quo, which from the outset demanded that everyone 'knew their place', that the 'haves' be readily distinguishable from the 'have nots'.[82]

In this codification of taste, the magazines were assisted by a new cult of the label. As Neil Spencer has observed, the social gaffes of the *nouveaux riches* of the sixties and seventies ("suburban kitsch") were resisted by the certainty of good taste embodied in Boss, Armani, Paul Smith or Versace labels. The body was literally inscribed upon, the label "flipped through fashion's looking–glass to the outside of the garment."[83]

Just as men's magazines inscribed brand names on the male body, so they used that body as a canvas for a particular image of the nation: yachting blazers, black Oxford shoes, Trickers hunting slippers, Barbour jackets, Jermyn Street brogues and old school ties all appeared as signifiers of English good taste (Figures 12–13). *Arena*, *GQ* and *Esquire* did not, of course, create these products, they had already been popularised by, amongst others, the clothes designers Willy Brown and Vivienne Westwood, and by *The Sloane Ranger's Guide*. But the men's magazine, as I shall argue later, tried to 'authorize' them as authentic marks of taste, rather than simply report on them as part of the endless flow of innovation and rediscovery that constitutes the fashion world.

For the majority of commentators, this was another example of the kind of grand silliness of the 1980s (what Philip Norman has described as our descent into 'Fantasy Island') but others have given this retro–infatuation a more sinister gloss. Marek Kohn, again paradoxically a men's magazine journalist, has questioned the innocence of nosatalgic style:

> Some people need no prompting to leap backwards and clutch at the



Left, Black Oxfords £200, from Polo Ralph Lauren, 143 New Bond St W1. Solid silver cufflinks £65 per pair, from Penhaligon, 42 Wellington St WC2. Green and blue spot handkerchief £6.95, from Woodhouse, 27 Eastcheap EC3. Red paisley handkerchief £9.50, from a selection at Blazer, 117b Long Acre WC2.

Right, Blue suit £175, by Blazer, as before. Green and white striped shirt £48.50, paisley tie £21.75, both from New & Lingwood, 53 Jermyn St SW1. Belt £17.95, by Mulberry Co, 11-12 Gees Court W1. Watch £155, cufflinks £10, both from Paul Smith, 41-44 Floral St WC2.

SUITABLE COLOURS

Made in the shades: A classic quartet of tailored suits in four traditional colours, with the added impact of cleverly chosen accessories.

Photographs by Robert Erdmann

Still Lifes by Hugh Johnson



Left, Black and white striped detachable collar cotton shirt, sold with a pair of plain and striped collars £24.95, from Woodhouse, 27 Eastcheap EC3 and branches. Green silk cuff knots £3.50, from Blazer, 117b Long Acre WC2 and branches. Multicoloured jewel embroidered braces £25, by Ted Lapidus from a selection at Harrods. Red and black abstract floral print silk tie £26, from Simpsons, Piccadilly W1. Oblong-face watch £382, from the Watch Gallery, 129 Fulham Road SW3 and Bath. Black crocodile shoes from a limited selection and made to order, £875, at New & Lingwood, 53 Jermyn St SW1 and branches. Round-face watch £499, from a selection at Malcolm Levene, 13-15 Chiltern St W1.

Right, Black wool six-button double breasted suit, sizes 39-46, £295, and striped cotton shirt, sizes 14½-17½, £32.50, both by Woodhouse, 27 Eastcheap EC3 and branches. Coloured stripe silk tie £29.95, from a selection at Cecil Gee, 120 New Bond St W1 and branches.

> traditional and almost vanished British imperial values. We have left behind a world in which a very clear order existed, was extensively justified, had the backing of years, and was made to seem beautiful. As its outdated values recede in importance, its style comes to the fore. However, if those images become more than something in which to dabble for a few weeks, if they meet a need, some of the attitudes would be adapted to meet the inner eye. A re–interpretation of Establishment serenity, grandeur and culture would be safe, easy and readily integrated into the individualist–bohemian–petty–entrepreneur lifestyle. Very cosy: a youth version of the antique dealer's English tweed–and–brogues look and life. It is not fascist, although it is reactionary.[84]

Kohn's analysis (which brings fascism into play, even in the process of denying it) is perhaps overstating the case: one could equally point to the relative democratisation of traditional taste during this period (e.g. the way that imitation Barbour jackets have become so prevalent that the cultural significance of the 'original' has been drastically reduced). Nonetheless, it is clear that for a small group of people the nation has been inscribed upon the body as never before: rather than providing a touchstone against which the ephemeral (and frequently foreign) nature of fashion could be measured, Anglo–British good taste was suddenly a significant part of that fashion system; a symbolic negotiation of a society which was talking more than ever about classlessness, while appropriating the distinctions of the most class–stratified period of national history: "Judging a man by the quality of his shoes is common among tailors, shoemakers, and just about everyone else, come to think of it."[85]

This survival of class–distinctive taste, with its overtones of a 'natural' elite, is an embarrassment to the 'postmodern' estimation of the fashion system as a flat plain of equivalents, a web–like phenomenon that occupies all aspects of the lifeworld equally; a situation where "fashion becomes a way of life and no sphere escapes its logic."[86] For Jean Baudrillard, whose views these are, it is now impossible to speak of men's bodies and their sporting the outward marks of the *haute bourgeoisie* as being part of a matrix of domination since "no one is dominating, nothing is being dominated and no ground exists for a principle of liberation from domination."[87]

Baudrillard's inescapable régime is contested by Pierre Bourdieu, for whom domination still exists, but has to be reconceptualised in terms of the contemporary consumer society. Domination is now mediated by taste. To be dominant is to be able to determine that what a society values as having distinction will be those same qualities which members of that group are able to display, thus reproducing their own domination as legitimated 'distinction'. This is not simply a matter of owning yachts, houses, paintings and so on. For Bourdieu, as for the men's magazine, the vector of dominance passes straight through the body:

> Taste, a class culture turned into nature, that is *embodied*, helps to shape the class body. It is an incorporated principle of classification which governs all forms of incorporation, choosing and modifying everything that the body ingests and digests and assimilates, physiologically and psychologically. It follows that the body is the most indisputable materialization of class taste.[88]

Bourdieu's thesis is persuasive, but problematic in the context of Britain in the 1980s and 1990s as 'Taste' was taken up not only by the ruling class fraction (itself a problematic mixture of established, emergent and aspirational groups) but also by the fractured opposition. Black and gay cultures appropriated some of these marks of taste, as did the revamped Left who I want to discuss next, the so–called Designer Socialists.

5. THE NEW MALE BODY & CONSENSUS POLITICS

a. Party Politics and Men's Bodies

Marek Kohn's estimation of the Sloane Ranger style can be extended to the whole field of men's style which *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire* set out to map: the power suits, individualist lifestyles and valorisation of Establishment culture seem to merge with a reactionary politics. Such an estimation, however, would have to ignore some of the countercultural implications of the new male style (gay bodies, feminised bodies etc.[89]) and also the way in which the Labour Party and non–Labour left showed themselves to be equally enamoured of style during the 1980s and early 1990s.

I want to briefly outline the ways in which the main political parties shaped, or were shaped by, men's style and to suggest that a discourse of style has become, for the first time, an accepted part of the political life of the nation. I then want to look at how those who stood outside this new symbolic order could be adjudged 'traitors' and how this fits into a two–nations schema of national life.

An association between the newly designed man of *GQ* etc. and the New Conservatism has often been assumed by commentators, and it is certainly true that the absence of an overt political line in the magazines is typical of the way in which ruling elites camouflage or deny their authority and naturalise their power. The relationship between the new body culture and Conservative predilections has been outlined by, amongst others, *Marxism Today*, which throughout the 1980s provided a conscious corrective to the emergent lifestyle culture. Dealing more particularly with sport, Matt Seaton, writing in the magazine, noted several key crossover terms:[90]

Firstly, by transposing the competitive values of 'popular capitalism' on to the new popular culture of bodily presentation and fitness, image makers "have created a powerful message, because everybody wants to be a winner." Secondly, following the New Conservative's emphasis on supply–side factors

the body boom has been largely led by a retailing revolution which has transformed our city centres and our experience of being consumers (Next, Laura Ashley, Tie Rack, Bennetton etc.[91]) However, Seaton also points out that placing too much emphasis on the retailing revolution is to ignore the consumer's role as agent in the new physical culture.

Thirdly, in line with the local/global nexus of late capitalism, at the same moment as regional aspects of the body culture are emphasised, globalization dissolves the barriers of distance and enables the consumer to appropriate aspects of other cultures. Seaton writes about the world sport phenomenon, but in the context of the men's magazine, we might record the adoption of 'authentic' foreign products: Mexican spirits, Italian suits, American cotton and so on. Finally, the new body culture gels with widely promulgated ideas of meritocratic individualism. The individualism implicit in the new male body is in marked contrast to the teamwork and collective organisation of the old 'mass' forms of male collectivity (with their whiff of pre–war solidarity and post–war consensus). The successful man must be *seen* to be successful, and this is consonant with some of the more puritanical features of Thatcherism: "nobody (except perhaps Nigel Lawson) has wanted to look like the bloated plutocrat of George Grosz's 1920s' cartoons, even in our age of grotesque, market–dominated greed."[92]

Marxism Today was too acute to claim any concrete links between these two phenomena, but suggested that such possible associations were a product of the pervasive air of 'New Times', an air breathed as much by the Labour Party and non–Labour left as the Conservatives:

> Social Darwinism has returned to haunt us, as the survival of the fittest has become the main imperative of economic and social life. The invisible hand of the market takes the weak and unfit players 'out of the game.' After 11 years on the substitutes bench, 'socialism' is represented as a loser.

In this atmosphere, Labour was faced with the problem of whether to

emphasise its role as a potential 'winner', and risk charges of a sell–out to metropolitan interests, or to lay stress on its proletarian roots and risk accusations of anachronism. The argument was effectively decided at the Cenotaph in 1981 when Michael Foot, then Leader of the Opposition, came dressed in what was variously construed as a dufflecoat (with its CND connotations) and a donkey jacket (proletarian or student drabness), thereby incurring the anger of a section of the population. As Patrick Wright has observed[93], Remembrance Day 1981 indicated the extent to which the public field of meaning is already occupied and structured by some traditions to the exclusion and mockery of others. Faced with the established national modes of dress and conduct, Foot laid himself open to lampoon, and by association with Foot the labour movement was itself staged as a worn out relic. On 10 November *The Daily Mail* presented a centrefold of Foot as a cut–out doll and invited readers to 'Dress Your Own Michael Foot' while the *Daily Express* carried a feature on how Foot could look with a bit of 'image management'.

Foot's dress was, in some ways, a lament for the passing of the old working–class certainties. The electorally–crucial skilled working class in the South East of England were no longer enamoured of such a demonstration of solidarity and chose other forms of bodily display and, to an extent, other forms of political representation. Within the party, too, politicians were recreating themselves in the image of New Lad, conscious that old party–subject positions had been weakened to the point of collapse.

At the same time, groups with no 'natural' association with the external forms of the dispossessed could play with the forms of poverty: exquisitely torn jeans adorned the infamous 'Hard Times' cover of *The Face*, while the donkey jacket ended as a double–page advertisement for Libertys, complete with paisley shoulders. Angela Carter's statement that "it is ironic that rich girls (such as students) swan about in rancid long johns with ribbons in their hair, when the greatest influence on working class girls would appear to be Princess Di"[94] may be reductive and determinist, but it expresses widespread anxieties about

cross–class cultural appropriation.

The relationship of this male body culture to the dominant class fraction is therefore a highly problematic one. Clearly, politicians', managers' and middle–class professionals' adoption of the outward marks of authority are meant to signify a 'right to rule', but there is no necessary connection between a form of appearance and a political position, no class fraction which is obviously being maintained in domination through Bourdieu's taste–power régime. The question therefore becomes not whether these magazines and the discourse of the body they establish support or reflect a particular ideology (which is contingent, or at least being constantly negotiated) but who do they discursively exclude? Whose bodies are used to signify the opposite of the national ideal?

b. The Lumpen Body and Betraying the Nation.

In an apocalyptic Phillip K. Dick short story, "The Chromium Fence"[95], the inhabitants of a futuristic America have been socialized into two lifestyle–political groupings, the majority Purists (for whom careful attention to personal cleanliness and appearance have become a fetish) and the Naturalists (for whom the cosmetic is anathema). Ultimately, the Purists pass legislation compelling all citizens to conform to accepted bodily norms (sweat glands to be removed, for example) and the Naturalists are dissolved into the consensus. Dissenters are executed.

Dick's prescient fable is illuminating in the context of a post–1979 Britain where visible difference has occasionally been regarded as a form of treachery. Most attention has been given to the visible anti–British affiliations of black and gay groups, but I want to briefly look at the working–class and the poor as body traitors.

My cue is a *Without Walls* documentary from October, 1992, "The Tattooed Jungle" presented by the former *NME* writer, Tony Parsons, and developed from a piece first printed in *Arena*. Parsons' mockumentary lambasted the

appearance of the contemporary British working class, claiming that they make their differences brutally apparent:

> With their power–tattooed flesh and dyed blond hair and distended beer bellies they belch and fart and threaten their way through life. They spoil everything. They turn the country into a tattooed jungle. But who exactly are the working class? Oh, you'll know them when you see them.

Parsons' commentary is accompanied by images of the working class by the seaside (he does not acknowledge the history of using the seaside as the major locus for middle–class fulminations against poor working–class taste, such as Lindsay Anderson's Margate film *O Dreamland* [1953], or Hoggart's Kozy Holiday Kamp).

The interesting paradox of Parsons' working class is that they are branded traitors despite their overt commitment to the nation: their tattoos and "Brits on the piss" T–shirts show a knee–jerk nationalism that the documentary then inflects as a kind of treason following the characteristic double movement of the New Right which invokes populist nationalism while condemning its manifestations.

> They tattoo everything in these parts ... one of the worst things about people in the tattooed jungle is that they always act like the disenfranchised, even when they have money. You make a mark on your body when feel you can't make a mark on your life, and a bellicose national identity is how you make a mark on the world. When the tattooed Jungle crosses the English Channel it displays an inferiority complex that has murder in its heart. Treat them like animals and they'll behave like animals; treat them like human beings and they will *still* behave like animals.

Rather than through anarchy or even apathy, the lumpen class has betrayed the nation *through the body*. Rejecting the middle–class body of *GQ*, it simultaneously rejects its stake in national life. Like the authority written on the body of the politician, the lumpen body is inscribed with the marks of its treasonable behaviour: inefficiency, gluttony, self–abuse:

> In the tattooed jungle everyone turns to a fat slob at twenty. Those beer guts are like prize marrows. They mercilessly punish their flesh and blood with an unforgiving hedonism. Mine's a large pint of biryani and a vat of something yellow.

The throwaway references to curry and lager are typical of the way that, for Parsons at least, the lumpen working class has abandoned its heritage and thrown away its aspirations and sense of history ("They are the lager vomit on the Union Jack.") Unlike the narrator's own valorisation of sushi bars, biryani and Tennents lager are symbols of the undiscriminatory acceptance of a tacky global culture, an acceptance that the DJ Liz Kershaw condemned in the same programme as a failure of national education. Like Hoggart's dire prophesies of a "shiny barbarism", the eighties and nineties have been full of apocalyptic warnings of cultural invasion:

> I think people have less of an appreciation of British culture now than they ever had because we're bombarded with images from other countries and I think it's very easy for culturally–lazy people, or poorly–educated people, to just openly embrace all that, so we've forgotten what we've got in Britain really, and we're all going round in Nikes and back–to–front baseball caps and rap music and pizzas and all the rest of it.

But again, paradoxically, it is this very internationalism that has been foregrounded in the likes of *Arena* as an indication of English good taste: the discriminatory power of the Anglo–British in an increasingly global market. The lumpen culture that Parsons berates is a kind of perverse reflection of the lifestyle boom that led to the creation of *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire*: with branded sportswear and premium lager operating in both cultures as universal signifiers of leisure (albeit inflected in very different ways). Parsons steps into a karaoke bar (another 80s universal) to see a scene straight out of Hogarth:

> Ten in the morning, time for a beer. The working class look different now. They no longer look like the salt of the Earth; they look like one big Manson family. And although they have always enjoyed a drink, there never used to be all these people drinking Tennents in the street first thing in the morning. And there never used to be all these men who look as though they shop in the sports shops but live in the pubs. In the tattooed jungle they dress for the track but are built for the bar.

The quasi–comic solution to this situation offered in the documentary, is a familiar one from British history – deportation. But whereas historical deportation was, in part, an assault on the Celtic margins, Parsons targets are predominantly northern–industrial and metropolitan. The betrayers of the national ideal are the inhabitants of that traditional problem for Englishness, the City.

> Oh patriotic Tattooed Jungle, how you mock the concept of freedom, democracy and liberty when you produced this race of mindless gluttons. How profoundly depressing that the unchained spirit breeds such as you. The noble wise–cracking savages depicted everywhere from *Eastenders*, to *Brookside*, to *Boys from the Blackstuff* are exercises in nostalgia. You could deport everyone called Wayne, you could repatriate everyone with a rusty white van, you could turf out everyone with a tattoo and this England would be a better place. It's self–evident John.

Acting out his normal role as *agent provocateur*, Parsons may have merely been indulging a taste for Alf Garnett–like excess in "The Tattooed Jungle", but the documentary has a certain contemporary resonance in its assumption of an increasingly bourgeois social norm. The bourgeois body (what Bakhtin refers to as "the classical body") is, at least symbolically, a refined, orifice–less, laminated surface. This body is then homologous to the forms of the official high culture, which legitimate their authority by reference to the values – the highness – inherent in this classical body. The proletarian body, by way of contrast, is permanently marked as trouble, inferiority, grossness. We may remember that *vulgus* was the Latin word for the mob, the feared and necessary opposite to the discriminating taste culture.

In a brilliantly argued piece on the American porn magazine *Hustler*, Laura Kipnis has shown the transgressive, confrontational power of the non–bourgeois body, the body that stands outside the legitimated, laminated culture, always condemned by that culture but occasionally revenging itself upon it by its lewdness. Given that control over the body has traditionally been associated with the bourgeois political project, with both the "ability and the right to control

others"[96], *Hustler*'s insistent return to images of the body out of control, rampantly transgressing bourgeois proprieties, raises certain political questions. On the politics of such social transgressions, for example, Peter Stallybrass and Allan White[97], following Bakhtin, write of a transcoding between bodily and social topography, a transcoding which sets up a homology between the lower bodily stratum and the lower social classes – the reference to the body being invariably a reference to the social.

One only has to look at the images produced during and after the conflagration on Tyneside's Meadowell estate to grasp the significance of this piece of playful theory. Even where the iconography of the dispossessed's body is not used to present them as traitors, it always suggests another nation, a separate place (Figures 14–15). Like race, poverty is inscribed upon the body, offering seemingly obvious meanings. Let me end with an example of one of these meanings. It is evident that the *lumpenproletariat* have squandered their potential since their gluttony is inscribed upon their body in gaudy prints and fatty folds of tissue ("in the tattooed jungle everyone turns to a fat slob at twenty"), just as their 'affluence' is written on the walls of their flats and houses in the form of satellite dishes.[98] This surface meaning is transformed into the social (the poor are gluttonous, therefore welfare is counterproductive) and the 'depth' meanings (poverty produces obesity, interiorised entertainment proliferates as opportunities for communal activity are removed) are suppressed. Most of all, the difference written upon the flesh of the dispossessed helps to constitute the identity of the other nation, those who (are in a position to) valorise the non–treasonable body, the body inscribed with the national virtues. As Stallybrass and White (1986) put it, the bourgeois subject has "continuously defined and redefined itself through the exclusion of what it marked out as low – as dirty, repulsive, noisy, contaminating ... [the] very act of exclusion was constitutive of its identity." [99] England is written on the body, for England is discipline and dignity – it cannot allow itself to encompass wretchedness.

FIGURE 2.1⅛ graham smith from "The Commercial Pub"



FIGURE 2.15 graham smith from "The Commercial Pub"



Yet if the exclusion of the 'low' has helped to constitute the identity of an ascendant political group over the last fifteen years, so has the appropriation of the 'high'. The advertising group Saatchi & Saatchi's well–known maxim that there are more social differences between midtown Manhattan and the South Bronx than between Manhattan and the 7th *arrondissement* of Paris suggests the increasing importance of targeting consumers on the basis of demography, habit and aspiration rather than on that of geographical proximity. I want to turn next therefore to the global plunder of taste, carried out under the umbrella of some last–instance conception of English good taste.

6. NATIONAL IDEALS

a. Flirting with the Foreign.

'Englishness' has always had a contested relationship with foreign commodities. As Dick Hebdige has shown[100], at the very moment in which native traditions were being furiously invoked in the face of a perceived invasion of American and americanized products, design arbiters were praising the sophistication of continental style. Equally, English good taste has traditionally involved the selective adoption of commodities from the celtic nations and from the colonies, even though in their native environment they might carry no register of excellence.

The changing nature of capitalism has again highlighted the precarious nature of the 'authentic' product. Corporate philosophies have centred around 'global products'. Today's global corporations operate "as if the entire world (or major regions of it) were a single, largely identical entity; it does and sells the same things in the same single way."[101] This begs the question of how the 'English' can survive in a changing commodity landscape in which 'American' produce (variously imagined) is hegemonic.

The answer provided by *GQ* etc. is a kind of global snobbishness. Since the putative male reader cannot escape the effects of a global market, he is encouraged to be discriminatory. No nation is necessarily *infra dig.* (even America has been rehabilitated) since all nations can be scoured for the authentic commodity. As Homi Bhabha has noted, "Where once we could believe in the comforts and continuities of Tradition, today we must face the responsibility of cultural Translation".[102]

Bhabha's opposition is an imperfect one, since within the context of cultural translation, certain traditional styles and concepts are resurrected: Italian fashion, for example, is used as a touchstone of design quality, linked with the most antique of antique traditions. The pages of *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire* are littered with advertisements for sharply–cut Italian clothing – Armani, Versace,

Gucci, Conati (Figures 16–17). A range of unusual but unexceptional Fornasetti ties is given its own feature, the copy of which headily mingles terms from the argots of design, fashion and art:

> Pierro Fornasetti, a Milanese whose contribution to the decorative arts in the Twentieth Century has been described as visionary, trained as a painter and sculptor. Eager to capitalize on the commercial potential of his designs he launched a collection of stark, monochrome headscarves for ladies. They featured graphic motifs such as newspaper prints and musical scores which, by the mid–Fifties, had become a fashion byword for cosmopolitan chic.
> But it is his talent as a designer of decorative furniture and domestic accessories that is mainly responsible for Fornasetti's enduring renown ... His work, which fuses the best of both the photographic and surrealist schools is characterised by witty visual allusions, trompe–l'oeil and a teasing distortion of perspective and scale.[103]

What one might miss from this vertiginous puff is that Signor Fornasetti is now the late Fornasetti and the ties are cheap copies brought out by his son.

America too has shed some of the negative connotations of 'mass culture' and this represents a significant break from the pre–1960 period described by Hebdige. (White) America no longer seems quite so threatening nor even the preserve of youth. Rather power, solidity and durability are stressed – the American products in *Arena* etc. are 'design classics' and thus consonant with the traditionalist thrust of the magazines. Naturally, however, it takes a discerning eye (and the readers are appellated as discerning consumers) to differentiate the authentic from the ersatz:

> Nothing marks a jeans label more than the back pocket stitching. Levi Strauss introduced its 'Double Arcuate' stitch in 1873. According to legend it represents the wings of the Rocky Mountain eagle.[104]

The final reference to a powerful natural symbol is a typical legitimating device in these publications. Mythological America also fits comfortably into the urban frontiersman structure of feeling evoked by the magazines. *Arena* 39 carried a lengthy article on the Colt. 45 Auto which seemed to parody the magazine's own features on perfect ties and desirable automobiles (Figure 18):

FIGURE 2.16 "GQ" 3 . Canali Advertisement



FIGURE 2.17 "GQ" 3[illegible] Armani Advertisement



FIGURE 2.1 "Aroma" 38 "This Gun's for Hire"



Ninety per cent of
l people hit with a
bullet from a Colt
.45 will go down
and not get up
again too readily.
They may not be
ad, of course, but
hat they won't do
is claim it is just a
flesh wound and
ght up a cigarette

> The Colt. 45 Auto is a design classic. It has all the attributes, including longevity (the basic design can be seen in John Browning's patent of 1897; it had evolved to its present form by 1911; the gun is still in production today) and an integration of form and function that Walter Gropius or Dieter Rams would envy.

Yet despite the tremendous exportability of American and (to a lesser extent) continental cultures there is a sense of boundary, containment, closure in these magazines, a Voice of Authority that provides a national umbrella beneath which the vagaries of international fashion might operate.

b. The Voice of Authority

> *Originally only a true gentleman could understand and afford the niceties of classic clothes; then everyone came to enjoy their tradition and quality. But what cannot be picked up off the peg is the attitude to clothes and the* ***way*** *of wearing them which sets apart the landed and the merely loaded, the Sloane and his clone, and which puts that terrible English word class into classic.*[105]

> *I have had, you see, to resort more and more to very small, almost invisible pleasures, little extras ... You've no idea how great one becomes with these little details, it's incredible how one grows.*[106]

Despite the concessions, therefore, towards style as an international concept, the clothing and trappings of the quintessential English gentleman are often used in the men's magazines as a touchstone for taste. American and continental style are legitimated by their incorporation into a native aesthetic, and even where foreign primacy is allowed, the role of the English as originators of style is stressed, though this necessitates a selective interpretation of fashion and design history. So, for example, in a feature on autumn fashions, the French and Italians are simultaneously invoked as fashionable races, but are seen to be acting under the umbrella of English good taste:

> The French and Italians have always been **besotted** with the English country look; for them it is not only the quintessence of weekend style, but also standard office kit for all but the stuffiest of circles.

I have chosen to term this tone the 'Voice of Authority'. While it occasionally features under a writer's byline (Hardy Amies being the best–known name), this voice is generally divorced from obvious authorship and presented as a kind of divine certainty. In contrast to the *chic* relativism that characterises other parts of the magazine, certain sections ("Elements of Style" in *GQ*, "Classics" in *Arena*, "Man at his Best" in *Esquire*) brook no contradiction in their assertion of what constitutes good taste. Taste changes over time as a consequence of market imperatives, but these are not magazines to be read in sequence. Each edition is presented in the form of a manual and therefore entire, not part of a debate or ongoing narrative.

Several things can be said about this voice. Firstly, the magazines offer a highly selective view of history, more or less by–passing the decades between 1940 and 1980 and resurrecting the gentleman as an appropriate role model for a supposedly déclassé period. 'Edwardian' is something of a touchstone for good taste in this context, and it is perhaps no surprise that the Edwardian period is held up as the last before the full intrusion of modernity.

Secondly, the Voice of authority has a tendency towards codification ("The 50 best dressed men in Britain" *Arena* 31, "The 25 men who REALLY run Britain *Esquire* 2.5, "New money: Britain's top business earners under 45" *GQ* 33). The suggestion is clearly that a numeric and transcribable order exists beneath what would otherwise appear to be a shifting social surface. I think this emphasis on superlatives provides a significant point of departure from the women's magazine. Judith Williamson[107] has noted that women's magazines typically address their readership in two ways: an imperative voice telling the reader to check this, aim for that, start this, stop that; and a questioning voice, asking you to reveal what you are like and how can you be better, how do you look at work? Can your marriage survive a baby? and so on. *GQ* and the associated titles are defined much more by an air of certitude:

> Most men desire quality and authenticity in some part of their lives. Some men desire both as a matter of course. They are craftsmen, those

> accustomed to asking for the best of themselves. While rarely famous, these men are invariably respected within their own fields and known by those whose opinions count.

and time and time again, the 'English' or 'British' is a shorthand for quality and authenticity: "Another Country: designer interpretations of the country look" (*GQ* 1), "Town & Country: the return of the elegant tweed" (*GQ* 15), "On the Town: the secret of urban style" (*GQ* 43), "Country Codes: the new smart casual wear combines rustic colours with urban sophistication" (*GQ* 30). (Figures 19–20)

Yet this Voice of authority remains ultimately unconvincing. In the end this authoritarian certitude about such ephemera as braces and cufflinks is parodic, contradictory and unsustainable for at least three reasons, the first of which relates to the nature of contemporary capitalism. For it is a characteristic of our society, as Marx noted, that everything about it, including states of consciousness, is in a state of ceaseless flux, in contrast to some more tradition–bound social order. Capitalism survives only by a restless development of the productive forces; and in this turbulent social condition fashions and trends tumble upon one another's heels. The entrenched authority of any single world view is undermined by the nature of capitalism itself, which pitches together ethnic origins, lifestyles and national cultures in a state of what Mikhail Bakhtin terms 'polyphony'. For Bakhtin the Voice of Authority, the 'monological' voice is always a fiction: since authority always involves an audience, it is inherently 'dialogic' and thus mutable and insubstantial. "Within this turmoil of competing creeds, any particular belief system will find itself wedged cheek by jowl with unwelcome competitors and its own frontiers will thus be thrown into sharp relief."[108]

Paradoxically, therefore, the very dynamism of contemporary capitalism threatens to cut the authoritative ground from under its own feet; and this is particularly evident in the phenomenon of *GQ* and the associated titles. These men's magazines seek to assert the absolute truth of their own imagined national values at exactly the historical point where these values are confronting



ANOTHER COUNTRY

Exploring the classic tradition of a gentleman's country attire and adding a new twist to the perennial combination of tweed, wool and leather. Canvas jacket £290 by C P Co from Quincy, 35 Floral Street WC2; tweed wool sweater £75 and matching cap £15, both by Joseph, 77 Fulham Road SW3; Sheepskin gloves £77.50 by Henry Cotton's at Harrods. Photographs by Claus Wickrath.



***Above: Green tweed** jacket by Van Overdijk £130 at Harrods; checked plus fours £189 by Bogy's at Woodhouse, 8 Sloane Street SW1; knitted waistcoat £53 and ochre print scarf £40 both by Paul Smith, 41/44 Floral Street WC2; ivory flannel shirt £32.50 by Sabre, 120 Long Acre WC2; mustard silk tie £23 by Bowring Arundel and Co, 31 Savile Row W1; tweed knitted cap as before; gloves as before; brown shooting socks £10 by Hackett, 65b New Kings Road SW6; tan lizard brogues £140 by Johnny Moke, 396 Kings Road SW10. Right: checked plus fours as before; Treklite climbing boots £77.95 by Zamberlan at Ellis Brigham, 30-32 Southampton Street WC2; thick socks £23 by Swaine Adeney, 185/186 Piccadilly W1.*

alien cultures; and this can prove a notably disorientating experience. In a wonderful example of this cultural schizophrenia, *Arena* 39 carried a fashion spread entitled "blue moods" where cowboy culture mixed with city chic – a brown pinstripe wool gaberdine waistcoat and trousers worn with a frayed, sleeveless shirt (Figure 21). This creative confrontation of cultures scorns the rigidity of the Voice of Authority, exposing fashion's ceaseless flux.

The second reason why I am unconvinced by the Voice of Authority lies in its overconfidence about the audience to which it is addressed. In a *Guardian* piece, Michael Vermeulen, editor of *GQ*, seemed arrogantly confident of his readership:

> [On the subject of John Birt, BBC Director–General designate]
> MV: I don't think our readers give a shit. Frankly.
> Christopher Silvester: What, they don't give a shit about the most important media story of the 1990s?
> MV: No.
> CS: Am I alone in thinking this a story?
> MV: It's not a *GQ* story.[109]

The assumption in all three magazines is that the possession of certain repertoires of information authorises the distinction between less and more culturally legitimate forms of knowledge, behaviour and representation. But I want to suggest that this taste code is ideologically fractured, veering between an imaginary relation and a hegemonic tool.

On the one hand, the codification of taste is dependent upon, and reproduces, the operation of "a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operates systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups".[110] The legitimation of certain forms of consumption in *GQ* etc. draws on the presumed antiquity and necessary class location of patterns of dress, eating, drinking etc. in Anglo–British society, at the same time as it imperially legitimates Anglo–British taste as hegemonic in a global frame.

FIGURE 6.21 "Arena" 50" x "Two Moods"



However, hegemony demands a subaltern audience in order to deliver the 'spontaneous consent' of a dominated to a dominant class. Yet men's lifestyle magazines position their readership as *cognoscenti* – we may remember the claims for a 92% ABC1 readership for *GQ* – which is more akin to Abercrombie *et al*'s notion of dominant ideologies speaking only to dominant groups. We may therefore conceptualise the imagined textual community of upwardly mobile men as related to a subculture. But whereas for Phil Cohen and later writers, the subculture negotiated real *class* problems, I would suggest that the 'real' problems to which these magazines offer 'imaginary' solutions are of a more diffuse kind – anxieities over gender, age, nationality and race as well as class. The key term, as Dick Hebdige has suggested in his study of mod, is 'narcissism', "a total style...which need look no further than itself for its justifications and its ethics."[111] As *The Guardian* has noted, the Masters of the Universe approach to the real offered by *GQ* etc. is ultimately self–defeating since it depends upon ever–smaller fetish communities:

> What have you got...a tin of Patum Peperium, an Old English mastiff descended from a bitch that fought at Agincourt...a de luxe Spey salmon rod, and the shirt with the perfectly matched stripes on the arms and sleeves that no one has ever noticed but, like your jacket lining, good underwear, the width of your turn–up and the welt on your shoe, subtly differentiate you, though only you know you're wearing them?[112]

A further link with mod is the question of aspiration. Hebdige writes that although every mod was "existing in a ghost world of gangsterism, luxurious clubs and beautiful women", reality amounted to "a draughty Parka anorak, a beaten up Vespa, and fish and chips out of a greasy bag".[113] Similarly men's magazines offer a fantasy of national life in which men can be both establishment figures and deviants, and I would suggest that this offers an interesting analogy with the Thatcherite project itself. For Thatcherism too was divided between a hegemonic project and a practice of speaking to itself, refusing to draw outsiders into the national construction.

Thirdly, the exclusion of women in the magazines is a subject worthy of much

greater examination than this thesis can offer. Where *Cosmopolitan*, *Elle* and *Options* have attempted to incorporate men in some way, *GQ* and *Esquire* have been distinctively single–sexed. Like the Anglo–Britishness from which they draw much of their authority, these magazines fundamentally misrecognise the Real as a male space. While I have considerable doubts about some uses of the notion of 'otherness', the exclusion of women is the most important of a series of hierarchies and polarities which are the necessary condition of these magazines, to another of which, the primacy of the capital, I want to finally turn.

7. CONCLUSION: PROJECTING THE METROPOLIS

> *This year [1990] The Face, Blitz and i-D celebrated their 10th anniversaries, a publishing feat that provoked little praise and many gleeful obituaries, all with the same message: Style is dead! But is it? and more important, does it deserve to die? How different things were in the eighties, when the streets of Soho were paved with projects, packed with pundits and poseurs lunching and launching themselves on the back of that very same Style. Now all is quiet on the West End front; Style has become a bad memory, an ex-best friend you cross the street to avoid.*[114]

Journalists are prone towards a certain millennialism, never more so than in claiming the Death of Style. Style is not dead (since, at the very least, its death would imply a style), but what is interesting about this passage is the challenge to certain co–ordinates on the map of cultural significance: Soho and the West End. *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire* are a (small) part of the overwhelming metropolitanisation of national life during the 1980s and 1990s, what Steve Daniels has called the taking on by the term *culture* of "a very pronounced metropolitan meaning"[115]. From house prices to voting patterns, London and the South East became the key regional signifier. Of course this is nothing new. The metropolis has invariably functioned as the privileged figure of modernity, and as mapped out in the work of Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin it came to represent the highest form assumed by both aesthetic and economic forces. "The metropolis becomes both a model of economic and social development, and a metaphor of modernity, a metaphysical reality."[116] What is new, as Bill Schwarz and Patrick Wright have shown[117] is the reinvention of London in free market terms, the replacement of the old national–popular co–ordinates by those of enterprise. In the words of one enthusiast "Heron Quay, Mudchute and Canary Wharf will be names as well known worldwide as Trafalgar Square, Marble Arch and Charing Cross".[118]

Eighties London was an interesting study in miniature of two of the curiously united groups who formed the Thatcherite popular front. On the one hand was an East End culture physically displaced from East London: British *pieds noirs*

fantasizing about a lost white community of Londoners from the Tory–voting Essex strongholds of Basildon, Thurrock and Billericay. The East End from which these refugees had decamped was one in which racist agitators found a ready audience – 16 per cent of the residents of the Isle of Dogs voted for the National Front in the 1978 council elections, and while the 30–mile train ride from Fenchurch Street to Basildon may have diminished the electoral presence of the far Right, if anything it has reinforced the nostalgia for times past and the dreams of white vigilantism for the future: "The white *émigrés* on the Essex borders provide one powerful version of a Thatcherite East End: they are not the glitzy rich of the riverside, but Thatcherites of a different hue, closer to the populist sentiments of Grantham than to the hedonism of the new young things."[119] When Basildon became the "barometer town" for the 1992 election, the Guardian remarked: "for Basildon, read England".

The other London is more germane to my argument, and its central symbol is the Docklands development. In an ironic (or perhaps deliberate) historical conjunction Docklands (the reified title in itself significant) was in the process of construction just as the government brought an end to a cornerstone of historic labourism, the National Dock Labour Scheme: the Docklands development, with Canary Wharf as its symbolic heart, is not simply an expression of monetarist *chutzpah*, it is also a mystification of national history, erasing the history of labour and replacing it with Heritage and the history of entrepreneurialism:

> Take a trip around London Docklands and see what has happened. In five years it has been transformed from a desert of dereliction to a showpiece of British building, design, architecture and business. It has created thousands of jobs by stimulating private enterprise. Homes have been built and refurbished. I cannot tolerate similar dereliction elsewhere.[120]

Despite the presence of 'old wealth' in the background, Docklands came to symbolise a particular sort of young achiever, willing to participate in what a London Docklands Development Corporation puff termed "the edge situation". But if they represented a new class mobility, the lifestyle which these

conspicuously wealthy tyros were encouraged to participate in was anything but new. Amongst other things Docklands contains a plethora of marinas, encouraging an involvement in the yacht culture which "has traditionally run deep within a certain sector of the English middle classes, bestowing an aura of status on those who embrace it".[121]

Enter a series of magazines which provide an imaginary map to this new–old culture, "ways in" to Old England for high–spending parvenus. Belonging and national identity could be adopted like (often *as*) a suit, and this is consonant with British Conservatism's new–found valorisation of facades: shining architectural surfaces; voodoo economics; entrepreneurs "fit for business". *GQ* etc. were part of a magazine continuum which fawned to this surface Englishness, which celebrated 'authentic' possessions in a spectacularly brainless way. In a *Notes in the Margin* documentary "Fantasy Island", the critic Philip Norman took editor Emma Soames to task for smug old Englishness of *Tatler*, a magazine published, like *GQ,* by Condé–Nast but more blatant in its depiction of a parody 1920s world of vacuous debs and roaring chinless wonders:

> PN: Now some people say that the magazine is terrifically witless and stupid and with incredible bad taste rather like the Bollinger Club of Evelyn Waugh.
> (*Sequence - Soames in make-up, debutantes' ball, young toffs at casino, at Henley, at garden party*)
> ES: Well, I think what it is fair to say is that I think there was a genuine resurgence with the prosperity of the eighties of a sort of extended flaunted social life.
> PN: Snobbery, in fact.
> ES: Yes, but also sort of upwardly mobile.
>
> PN (*voiceover - sequence of shots of London pub*): Piling parody on parody the *Tatler* bright young thing often speaks in a music hall cockney. Mockney? City sharks wear coloured braces to prove they're just lovable wide boys from East Enders.[1]

---

[1]The transcript has been altered somewhat – Soames appears much more hesitant and unprepared.

The witlessness of it all is confusing. Is this all some colossal exercise in parody as I suggested earlier, with magazines and readers playing off one another, always conscious of the irony of their games? The ideology theorist Slavoj Žižek has observed that "in contemporary societies, democratic or totalitarian, ... cynical distance, laughter, irony, are, so to speak, part of the game. The ruling ideology is not meant to be taken seriously or literally."[122] Peter Sloterdijk has termed such a condition 'enlightened false consciousness', noting that certain groups in contemporary society know what they are doing, but carry on doing it all the same. This might be seen as somehow progressive (like the self–conscious 'postmodernism' of the magazines) since it does not position people as the automatic victims of illusions, yet as Žižek notes, awareness of the illusory nature of beliefs is no protection against the 'objective' fantasy of commodity fetishism. However much the bright young metropolitan things who crowd *Esquire* might have seen through political ideologies, they were constitutive of the new Tory nation through their aggressive pursuit of commodities; the rich nation of producers distanced by a single vertical cleavage from the parasitic nation which includes not only the pauper classes (the unemployed, pensioners etc.) but also those whose economic activities are unprofitable in terms of capitalist forms of accounting[123]. Britain has been presented in these magazines as a place "full of neat shit to buy", emphasising the good taste of an antique class without acknowledging any responsibility to the nation at large. *GQ* and its companion publications never mention decency, community, history or compassion, but these are the words that come back to haunt them time after time, to make them look flat and self–obsessed.

The 1980s and 1990s have seen a sustained ideological assault on life in Britain, aiming to transform not only the economic and political landscape but also to effect an upheaval in values, and I have tried to cover one small area of this process in this chapter: the way that a textual form acted to write some features of the Thatcher revolution upon the male body. As Stuart Hall has written, Thatcherism works as an ideology by addressing "the fears, anxieties, the lost identities, of a people. It invites us to think about politics in images. It

is addressed to our collective fantasies, to Britain as an imagined community, to the social imaginary."[124] Men's magazines operate in a similar way. They offer men the fantasy of cultural authority. They promote the acquisition of cultural capital in a variety of spheres. They simultaneously invoke a wider national community and appellate their readers as unique. Although by no means reflective of Thatcherism, these magazines do share with that ideology a necessary hostility to a particular national history – the flabby post–1945 settlement with its partial disavowal of elitism, 'natural' authority and entrepreneurialism – which "can only be defeated by summoning up and unleashing the forces of Enterprise, and, in particular, the remarkable powers of its everyday hero: the private, possessive, competitive, enterprising individual (man)."[125]

Paul du Gay has outlined the work of the critical management theorist David Guest, for whom the so–called Culture Excellence common to Reaganism and Thatcherism is heavily dependent upon dreams, images and fantasies. But du Gay feels that Guest makes a fundamental error in relying upon a reality/representation dichotomy:

> Rather than exploring the level of 'ideological fantasy' at which Excellence structures social reality, Guest tries to establish a transparent relationship between the socially active signifier and the real relations to which it might refer. Not surprisingly, it proves impossible to break out of the ideological dream by 'opening our eyes and trying to see reality as it is', by throwing away the ideological spectacles.[126]

Du Gay's althusserian assumption that there cannot be a realm outside ideology is surely right, but, I would argue, not particularly meaningful. Although all attempts to capture the Real may be doomed to failure, it is the ground on which most politics takes place. To refuse to discriminate between fantasy and [reality] is often to fulfil the governmental aspirations of the dominant. Thus Nikolas Rose has argued that the success of neo–liberalism in Britain "operates within a much more general transformation in 'mentalities of government', in which the autonomous, responsible, free, choosing self...has become central to

the moral bases of political arguments from all parts of the political spectrum."[127] No doubt the editors of *GQ*, *Arena* and *Esquire* would be heartened by this. But there are also still residual values and beliefs in a more collective Real which contest this ideology. There is still a strong commitment to voluntary bodies in Britain, still a stubborn respect for vaguely social democratic values and institutions, still a cynicism about the pursuit of personal aggrandizement. That 'yuppie' is still a sneer; that Lloyds 'names' have not attracted widespread sympathy;, that the government is currently under periodic attack for financial impropreity: inappropriate and unfocused as these phenomena are, they suggest that, at the level of common sense at least, the 'managerial man' has not become "the new culture hero."

REFERENCES - CHAPTER TWO

1. Walter Benjamin (1982) "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", *Illuminations,* ed. Hanna Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, London: Jonathan Cape, p. 226.

2. *Observer*, 26.4.87., p.29.

3. Paul du Gay "Enterprise Culture and the Ideology of Excellence" *New Formations*, 13, Spring 1991, p.49.

4. See particularly Hall & Jefferson (1976) and Hebdige (1978).

5. Evelyn Waugh (1962) *Brideshead Revisited*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 18.

6. Evelyn Waugh (1988) *The Sword of Honour Trilogy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin p. 232.

7. Dick Hebdige "Towards a Cartography of Taste" in *Hiding in the Light* (1988), London: Verso.

8. ibid. p. 75

9. Richard Hoggart (1968) *The Uses of Literacy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.193.

10. Herbert Marcuse (1964) *One Dimensional Man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial society*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.28.

11. ibid. p.64.

12. ibid.

13. Harold Nicholson quoted in Peter Hennessy (1992) *Never Again: Britain 1945-51*, London: Jonathan Cape.
In conversation with his son, Nicholson typified the anxieties of the liberal intelligentsia when in one breath he observed that he had always been in favour of democracy, and then added "I hate the destruction of elegance" which the new age seemed to presage.

14. George Orwell (1984a) *The Road to Wigan Pier*, Harmondsworth: Penguin. The British suspicion of nudism is an interesting subject in itself. It features as a source of amusement in films such as *I'm Alright Jack* and *A Shot in the Dark* as well as being endlessly represented on picture postcards. David McGillivray (1992) has covered the peculiar anti–eroticism of British nudism in *Doing Rude Things: The History of the British sex Film 1957-1981*, noting that this "utterly worthless and insignificant" genre is unlikely to ever be critically reappraised.

15. *Man About Town* was founded in 1953 as a 'gentleman's tailoring magazine'. In 1960 the magazine was bought by Michael Heseltine (*GQ*'s first cover girl) and Clive Labovitch. The new owners radically restyled the magazine and abbreviated the titlte to *About Town* (later to *Town*). The format was mixed in a highly visual style, predicting that of *GQ* etc. It achieved circulation figures of around 60,000, until its closure in 1968 under its last editor, Julian Critchley.

16. When it seemed unlikely that a men's general title would prove successful, there was some attempt to reach young men via the hobbies, specialist or music press. For Simon Ludate of Glasshouse Productions, however, all these products 'offer little potential for advertising' (*Campaign*, 16.3.84, p.54). The major exception to this is *Q*.

17. Liz Levy, *Marxism Today* April 1991, p. 13.

18. *Campaign*, 29.8.86, p.41. Acknowledging, however, that this composite approach was insufficient, Zadawa opined, "Successfully launching a general–interest men's magazine would be like finding the Holy Grail."

19. *Guardian* 7.7.86 "Dallasty and Glynis Recipe", p. 13.
Glynis Kinnock was felt to be a dynamic ingredient in the repackaging of *Woman's Own* magazine.

20. As *Media Week* (6.9.85) rightly remarked, the male teenage market is volatile and confused. This led, however, to a certain cynicsm and essentialism with regard to single–sex publications. Mark Ellan of EMAP, for example, observed:

"One of the reasons why *Just Seventeen* has been so successful is that its readers need a great deal of reassurance that other young women are going through the same physical and emotional problems. Men at that age are much more preoccupied with self and self–image. They might like BMX bikes, waterskiing and the Jesus and Mary Chain, but they don't like a magazine that suggests other men within their age group feel the same way. There simply isn't the same motivation to buy a general magazine." (*Campaign*, 15.11.85, p.15)

or Simon Marquis in the same journal:

"While women become 'friends' with their mags there is an inbuilt male resistance to the idea of a magazine that makes public and shares ideas about being a man. To men it is an unacceptable contradiction. Self–consciousness is permissible, even attractive, in a woman; it is perceived as weak and unmanly in a man." (*Campaign*, 26.7.85, pp.37–9)

See also "Magazines That Could Explode the Male Myth" *Observer*, April 1987.

21. Raymond Snoddy, writing in the *Financial Times* (12.4.1988, p.21–3) noted that the upswing in the women's magazine market stemmed from the arrival of European publishers in the UK led by Bertelsmann magazine subsidiary Gruner + Jahr (*Prima)*, and followed by *Bella* (also West Germany) and *Hello!* (Spain). Amazingly, the success of the new entrants does not seem to have been at the expense of established titles such as *Woman*, *Woman's Own* (IPC), and *Good Housekeeping* (National) which all showed circulation increases.

22. Logan has said (*Campaign*, 29.6.86) that he believed the forecast from the likes of IPC that a general title would crash, and consequently initially focussed *The Face* around music. *The Face*'s circulation started to expand significantly

in 1983/4 with the arrival of the magazine's now–distinctive house style (a word emphasised, over 'fashion' from 1982 onwards). Perhaps importantly, this was also the period in which Rod Sopp arrived as *The Face*'s first ad manager – instituting an advertising vocabulary that has become a major part of the magazine's impact.

23. EMAP, a small company new to youth publishing in the late seventies, was largely responsible for energizing the teenage market through the success, not just of *Smash Hits*, but also the innovative *Just Seventeen*. Like Wagadon, it moved into what was seen as a more adult area with *Q* in 1986. Sean Nixon (1993) in "Looking for the holy grail" *Cultural Studies* 7 (3) has written on this topic and the failure of *The Hit*.

24. "Show style: stay in bed" *Guardian* 24.9.90.

25. Hebdige (1988) p. 157.

26. So–called after Donovan's alleged practice of lightening his hair with lemon juice.

27. Hebdige (1988) p.174.

28. Logan himself acknowledged this (while showing some misgivings):

"One area where we are particularly strong is in men's fashions, which is pretty badly represented generally. I keep reading about the need for a men's mag, but I think we're closer to that than anyone. Two thirds of our readers are men. At the moment I'm caught between trying to attract more women readers, or expanding the trend towards men." (*Media Week*, 16.3.84, p.56)

29. "High stakes in style manhunt" *Guardian* 17.12.90

30. ibid.

31. John Lloyd "When magazines maketh the man" *Financial Times* 23.2.1991, Section II, p. xi.

32. *Independent* 10.1.90.

33. *Financial Times*, 23.2.91.

34. Keers was clearly unsuccessful. *The Guardian* supplement (11.9.93) ran a profile of the magazine as living up to its nickname "Gaily Queerly": "Reading GQ is like unwittingly walking into a gay bar, but less overt. There is no acknowledgement of homosexuality, just a suspicious over–emphasis on masculinity." p.76.

35. "Do Gentlemen Really Prefer Self–Scrutiny?" *Independent*, 10.1.1990, p.15.

36. *Guardian*, 8.11.93.

37. *Hello!* represents an entirely different perspective on the magazine scene. Printed in Madrid by the Spanish publishing company Hola¡ it is resolutely cheerful and unshakeably pro–monarchical.

38. "Tatler: what's with the top society sheet?" *Guardian* 11.6.90.

39. "The Schlock of the New" *Guardian* 28.1.91.

40. *Guardian* 24.2.92.

41. "Limp Members of the Press!" *Guardian* 29.7.91.

42. "Boyz are in the Pink" *Guardian* 8.7.91.

43. Carrying the notion of 'surface' into the prose style of the publications, the *Financial Times* (23.2.91) noted that the interviews which form the meat of the titles are invariably shallow and banal: "Perhaps the prose is the way it is because the subjects are the way they are. They confirm the purpose of the magazines; the surface is all. By choosing people who are famous for being famous the interviewer is faced with a face, or a body. To 'probe' behind it is beside the point. The face and the body, and the act, is what is important, what makes the person good or even great. What he or she thinks about 'life' is irrelevant."

44. Anne Bilson (1993) *Suckers*, London: Pan.

45. Dick Hebdige "Feeling the Quality", *Marxism Today*, June 1991 pp. 26–9.

46. The BBC comedy series *Absolutely Fabulous* (1993) picked up on this necessary element of parody in an episode about a women's lifestyle magazine, satirizing the slavish features articles, the repetitiveness of the beauty and fashion pages and, in an extended monologue, the pretentious food and drink columns common to both men's and women's publications:

MAGDA: (Kathy Burke) Hamish, tell me about this restaurant we're having lunch at.
HAMISH (Adrian Edmonson): Hmm..Comfortable in the grand manner, stuffed with plutocratic goodies and a decent tuck; a dining room boudoiresque fin–de–siècle eclectic and still fashionably uncomfortable; a mélange, possibly a post–Orwellian version of an Edwardian eaterie; the food, ecumenical in flavour, a cosmopolitan adventure of exuberant eclecticism full of *amuse guelles* and gastrocredibility, no flash in the bain–marie this! A comforting air... generally the tomatoes were rather *pulpeuse*.
MAGDA: Ta. (pause) It's a load of old bollocks but it uses paper and that's what the magazine's all about.

47. John Berger (1977) *Ways of Seeing*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 151

48. Quoted in Hebdige (1988), p. 169

49. ibid. p. 173.

50. ibid.

51. The novelist Gilbert Adair, a regular contributor to *Esquire* has published a series of his magazine essays nauseatingly entitled *The Postmodernist Always Rings Twice*.

52. Lidia Curti "Female fabulations" in Grossberg & Treichler eds (1992) *Cultural Studies*, London: Routledge.

53. ibid.

54. *Achilles Heel* was founded in 1978, and one of it's editors, Mick Cooper, appeared in a BBC2 series "From Wimps to Warriors" in June 1991, where he expressed the opinion that masculinity is the issue of the Nineties. However, as *The Times* (30.5.91) noted "unlike consciousness–raising women's groups, which are often equally inward looking, *Achilles Heel* is a message without a movement."

55. Richard Collier "The New Man: fact or fad?" *Achilles Heel* Winter 1992.

56. *Guardian* 19.2.92.

57. For example, a passage from the *Today* newspaper in 1987 reported a *Marxism Today* "Men for Change" event: "It could only happen in Islington – home of bean eating, knit your own yoghurt and the CRE (Consciousness Raising Exercise) ...The woman with the shampoo and set and fishnet tights turned out to be a builder from Clapham called Greg." Quoted in Collier (1992).

58. Du Gay (1991) p.45.

59. Frederic Jameson "Clinging to the Wreckage – a conversation with Stuart Hall" *Marxism Today*, September 1990, p.29.

60. *Arena* 30, Autumn 1991, p. 110.

61. See "Truth & Power" in *The Foucault Reader* (ed. Paul Rabinow, Penguin, 1987) pp.51–75 in which Foucault argues that bourgeois repression of children's sexuality resulted in a wholesale sexualisation of the familial domain. "'Sexuality" is far more of a positive product of power than power was ever repression of sexuality.'

62. *GQ*, February 1991.

63. *GQ*, October 1990, p. 158. I suspect that this self–consciously 'controversial' piece was designed to raise feminist hackles and then to downplay any righteous indignation for lacking any sense of irony. Geraldine Bell ("How sexism came back in style", *Independent on Sunday* 9.12.90) rose to the bait. Opening with a quote from *GQ*, she attacks the arrogance of editorial thinking on readership intelligence: "'This [piece] is about race and sex, and you are going to need a fine sensibility to distinguish the stereotypes.' In other words if you mind this kind of thing you are insensitive, a bit thick – as Ms. [Isobel] Koprowski [then group managing editor of the top–shelf *Penthouse*] argues, to object to *Penthouse* is to reveal that you are repressed."

64. ibid.

65. ibid.

66. ibid.

67. ibid.

68. Patrick Wright (1992) *Among the Ruins* London: Paladin, pp 262–3.

69. Tom Nairn, 'Yuppies: The fifty–first state' *New Statesman and Society*, 30.6.89. *Marxism Today* (April 1991) revealed that in America too, the mood was hardening against the yuppies, and the acronym Lombard was becoming common currency (loads of money, but a real dickhead.) For a sustained attack on the atomization of social life see *Culture of Complaint* (Harper Collins 1993) in which Robert Hughes develops the notion that all groups in the United States are trying to claim for themselves a special status, what he terms "the all–pervasive claim to victimhood".

70. Louise Chunn "Nothing new about the New Lad", *Arena*, 29.

71. Ruth Picardie "Here comes the New Lass" *Arena* 28.

72. Bill Buford (1991) *Among the Thugs*, London: Secker & Warburg, pp.55–6.

73. Neil Spencer "Menswear in the 1980s; revolt into conformity" in Elizabeth Wilson & Juliet Ash (eds) (1993) *Chic Thrills: a fashion reader*, London: Paladin.

74. It is typical for someone to appear in more than one title: "The fact that the same people are interviewed repeatedly has a ...numbing effect. It is a kind of a masque, where interviewers who want to be in the interview meet interviewees whose practised responses have placed them far back from the interview, leaving a semi–vacant [sic] space which the interviewee is almost obliged to fill." *FT* 23.2.91.

75. "Rosie's crown of thorns" *Guardian* check.

76."Putting the Gee in GQ" *Guardian* 25.9.92.

77. *Arena*, Spring 1993, p.95.

78. *Arena* 29, Summer 1991, p.21.

79. See Scott Ewen (1976) *Captains of Consciousness: Advertising and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture*, New York: McGraw–Hill.

80. Mike Featherstone "The Body in Consumer Culture" in Featherstone Hepworth & Turner (eds.) (1991) *The Body: social process & cultural theory*, London: Sage.

81. Jurgen Habermas (1976) *Legitimation Crisis*, London: Heinemann, p.81.

82. Spencer (1993) p.43.

83. Nonetheless, in the context of Britain, a brand name runs the risk of representing a certain lack of authenticity. As Martin Amis has observed: "All brand names are vulgar here...There's no such thing as a classy English brand name. It's to do with the tremendous exportability of American culture – it plays, swings in a way that ours doesn't. It's partly to do with class: America is a money society and ours a class society, so brand names can be made to mean something more over there. K–Mart means something to every American." T. Shone "Writing and label lore" *Independent on Sunday*, 12.7.92.

84. Marek Kohn "The best uniforms" in McRobbie (ed) (1989) pp.141–9.

85. *Arena* 29, p.39

86. Mike Gane (1991) *Baudrillard's Bestiary*, London: Routledge, p.166.

87. Jean Baudrillard (1988) *Selected Writings*, Stanford University Press, p.6.

88. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, London: Routledge.

89. Teal Triggs "Framing masculinity: Herb Ritts, Bruce Weber & the body perfect" in Ash & Wilson (1993).

90. Matt Seaton "Work your body" *Marxism Today* April 1990, pp.28–31.

91. See Ken Worpole "The age of leisure" in Corner & Harvey (1991), pp.137–50.

92. ibid.

93. Patrick Wright (1985) *On Living in an Old Country*, London: Verso, p.137.

94. Angela Carter, *New Society*, 1983.

95. Philip K. Dick "The Chromium Fence" in *The Father-Thing* (1988), London: Paladin.

96. L. Davidoff, "Class & Gender in Victorian England" *Feminist Studies* 5, 1979, p. 97, quoted in Laura Kipnis "Reading *Hustler*" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) *Cultural Studies*, Routledge, p.376.

97. Peter Stallybrass & Allan White (1986) *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Quoted in ibid.

98. See Charlotte Brunsdon "Satellite Dishes and the Landscapes of Taste" *New Formations*, 15, Winter 1991 pp.23–42. In an interesting spatialisation of the conspicuous consumption thesis, Brunsdon notes that satellite dishes have come to act as the register for a certain sort of poverty. In a Gallup poll for *Moneywise* on Britain's most desirable place to live, Nottingham was described as follows: "There is relatively little difference between rich and poor in Nottingham; the way to tell the middle–class area from the council estate is that the council houses all have satellite dishes." (William Leith, *Independent on Sunday*, 26.8.90, p.3)

99. Stallybrass & White (1986) p. 191.

100. Hebdige (1988).

101. Tina Levitt (1983) *The Marketing Imagination*, London: Collier–MacMillan.

102. Homi Bhabha, quoted in Corner & Harvey (1991) p.21.

103. "All tied up" *Esquire* Nov. 1991, p.95.

104. *Arena* 39, p.110.

105. Paul Keers (1987) *A Gentleman's Wardrobe; classic clothes & the modern man*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

106. W. Gambrowicz (1971) *Cosmos*, quoted in Michel de Certeau (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, London: University of California Press, p.xxiv.

107. Judith Williamson (1986) *Consuming Passions: the dynamics of popular culture*, London: Marion Boyars.

108. Terry Eagleton (1991) *Ideology: an introduction*, London: Verso, p.107.

109. *Guardian* 25.9.92.

110. P. Bachrach and M. Baratz (1962) "The Two Faces of Power" *American Political Science Review*, 56. Quoted in Hall and Jefferson (1976) p.40.

111. Dick Hebdige (1974) M.A. Thesis in ibid. p.94.

112. *Guardian* 11.9.93, p.76.

113. Hall & Jefferson (1978) p.90.

114. *Guardian* May 1990.

115. Steve Daniels (1993) *Fields of Vision*, London: Polity Press p.17.

116. Ian Chambers (1990) *Border Dialogues: Journeys in Postmodernity*, London: Routledge, p.55.

117. Bill Schwarz. "Where Horses Shit a Thousand Sparrows Feed: Docklands & East London during the Thatcher years" in Corner & Harvey (1991). Wright (1992).

118. J. Redwood (1989) *Popular Capitalism*, London: Routledge, p.144. Quoted in Schwarz (1991) p.78.

119. ibid. p.82.

120. Nicholas Ridley in *The Listener*, 3.12.1987.

121. Schwarz (1991) p.89.

122. Slavoj Žižek, S. (1989) *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London, p.28. Glossed in Eagleton (1991) p.40.

123. Bob Jessop *et al* (1985) *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

124. Stuart Hall (1988) *The Hard Road to Renewal*, London: Verso, p.167.

125. Du Gay (1991) p.57.

126. ibid. p.56.

127. Nikolas Rose (1989) "Governing the Enterprising Self", quoted in ibid. p.58.

CHAPTER 3 - MISSING THE CRICKET
nostalgic screen fictions & national cinema

1. Introduction

> *Nostalgia gives us the image of various generations of the past as fashion-plate images that entertain no determinate ideological relationship to other moments of time: they are not the outcome of anything, nor are they the antecedents of our present: they are images, simulacra and pastiches of the past. They are effectively a way of satisfying a craving for historicity, using a product that substitutes for and blocks it.*[1]
> Frederic Jameson

> *What sort of cinema have we got in Britain? First of all it is necessary to point out that it is an* ***English*** *cinema (and Southern English at that), metropolitan in attitude, and entirely middle class. This combination gives it, to be fair, a few quite amiable qualities: a tolerance, a kind of benignity, a lack of pomposity, an easy-going good nature. But a resolution never to be discovered taking things too seriously can soon become a vice rather than a virtue, particularly when the ship is in danger of going down. To counter-balance the rather tepid humanism of our cinema, it must also be said that it is snobbish, anti-intelligent, emotionally inhibited, wilfully blind to the conditions and problems of the present, dedicated to an out-of-date, exhausted national idea.*[2]
> Lindsay Anderson

This chapter negotiates an historical and cultural contradiction located in a significant post–1979 film and television genre, the nostalgic drama. On the one hand, these texts attempt to faithfully recreate a prelapsarian period of British history (and I shall try to show how the 'moment' of this particular Fall is variously constructed) yet on the other they ironise, and occasionally criticise, the cultures which they have expensively represented. Across images of mutable fashions and the seemingly immutable landscape are written narratives of race, class, sexuality and nation which call into question the stability of a 'dominant' national history.

To some extent, therefore, my review involves a tactical reading of these texts against the grain of radical criticism. This involves taking issue with those, like Jameson (above) and the multifarious detractors of the 'heritage industry', who

see these films as indicative of a general nostalgic malaise[3], and with those, like Paul Gilroy, for whom any attempt to resurrect the nation as a focus for a popular politics is an act of exclusion[4]. While accepting the broad validity of both outlooks, their negativity and flirtation with notions of false consciousness seem to lead to flippant condemnations of a popular form without considering the play between acceptance and resistance in an audience's response to representations. As Yvonne Tasker has observed: "[i]n the rigorous decoding of what images mean politically, criticism can end up unable to speak about why these images still matter to audiences."[5]

At the same time, I am not without my own doubts about this latest manifestation of British retrophilia, and parts of this essay are concerned with the ways in which history has been turned into commodity via these fictions, and the ways in which the nostalgic screen drama has been used to 'market' both an image of Britain and a particular notion of British film. Neither of these areas has been extensively documented. Despite various appeals[6] that critics should lay greater stress on the point of consumption and on the *use* of films (sounds, images, narratives, fantasies) than on the point of production, very little work has been carried out in the area of film, reception and national identity[7]. Quantitative information is also lacking. The 1985 Film Act put an end to a system devised by Harold Wilson and a civil servant, Wilfred Eady, whereby British film production was supported by a levy on film exhibition. The system demanded reports on receipts and attendances at all programmes showing films entitled to reimbursement through the levy. When the Eady Levy went, so did the principal rationale for collecting statistics[8].

Against the film studies orthodoxy that privileges a particular notion of *cinematic* viewing, this chapter is distinctively video based. I do not see this as an evasion but as a condition peculiar to both the production and reception of these texts. The manner of video viewing (watched in sections, constantly using the rewind and fast–forward) has impacted upon the style of the chapter. It is consciously fragmented and repetitive – *punctum* rather than *studium,* in Barthes' terms.[9]

I can only say that it therefore mimics the narrative of British history presented by these films – a history of radical discontinuity, minor revisions and special moments.

2. NATIONAL FILM & HERITAGE BRITAIN.

a. Sneering at Sebastian: heritage studies, narrative & film.

i. Gut reactions

My use of the phrase "nostalgic screen fiction" is an unashamed borrowing from one of the few critical pieces on historical British dramas in the eighties, Tana Wollen's "Over Our Shoulders"[10], and I want to use this piece as a way into some of the commonplaces of the attack on British heritage. Wollen makes the point that British screen fictions during the eighties seem obsessed with the idea of nationhood, endlessly repeating the tropes of a shining past, ceaselessly replaying a yearning for bounded, immobile constituencies in which social status is known and adhered to. She quotes an American reviewer of the British film scene at length:

> Britain has the means of escaping this psychological hall of mirrors, this endless self–communion, by loosening its fixation on "British" subjects. It's no surprise that a country that has lost its wealth and its political power, a country seized with insecurity and ravaged by strikes, should take refuge in hugging its past or dyspeptically trying to shake truths out of its present. It's a way of keeping alive an endangered identity. But if cultural identity has any meaning at all, or any hope of staying alive, it must be able to walk, talk and function when not fastened to nationalistic subjects.[11]

Even allowing for some lamentable national stereotypes ("ravaged by strikes") Kennedy's (and, by endorsement, Wollen's) blithe assumption that "British" film[1] endlessly reflects the national experience back to a domestic audience is

---

[1] There is no universally accepted definition of national cinema, as this essay will make abundantly clear. National cinema may be defined in several ways. First in economic terms, establishing a correspondence between 'national cinema' and 'the domestic film industry'. Yet in a global industry such as film this approach is problematic. Films such as *Flash Gordon*, the *Superman* series, *Insignificance* and *Full Metal Jacket* have qualified as British films, while such a typically British film as *Shirley Valentine* is registered as American. See John Hill "The issue of national cinema and British film production" in D. Petrie (ed.) (1992) *New Questions in British Cinema*, London: BFI p.11.

open to question. The passage presents British film as a unified whole, seamlessly consolidating levels of production, distribution, exhibition and reception in a purely national context, whereas any historical examination of "British" film would suggest a more unstable construction, emphasising the play between the parochial and the international at all levels.

Similarly, Kennedy does not distinguish between the different modes of representation for past and present. The parochialism of the nostalgic screen fiction is a target for many of those dramas which "dyspeptically...shake truths out of [the] present". Wollen herself goes on to valorise those contemporary films which interrogate and resist simplistic notions of national identity, but the question persists as to how one could avoid a "national" film form, and indeed whether such an evasion is desirable. Kennedy's argument seems close to the culturally imperialist position that national projection is only acceptable in those countries in possession of 'wealth and ... political power'.

While seeming to broadly validate Kennedy's gut anti–Britishness, Wollen's target is more specifically the way in which national history has become focused, through screen representations, on the conduct of the (southern, rural) English middle classes in the early years of this century: "The nostalgia here is a sickening for a homeland where there is endless cricket, fair play with bent rules, fumbled sex, village teas and punting through long green summers. British identities have been subsumed under a particular version of

---

Second is a text–based approach, asking to what extent are films engaged in "exploring, questioning and constructing a notion of nationhood in the films themselves and in the consciousness of the viewer?" [Susan Barrowclough: "the dilemmas of national cinema" in Barrowclough (ed.) *Jean-Pierre Lefebvre: The Quebec Connection*, BFI Dossier no. 13, 1981, p.3]

Third is an exhibition–led, or consumption–based approach to national cinema, concerning itself with questions of cultural invasion or imperialism and lastly is what Andrew Higson has called a "criticism–led approach to national cinema, which tends to reduce national cinema to the terms of a quality art cinema...rather than one which appeals to the desires and fantasies of the popular audience". See Andrew Higson "The concept of a national cinema" *Screen* 30, 4, p.37

Englishness." [12]

The past's mobilisation in the present is a persistent theme in any history of the formation of Anglo–British national identity. As Raphael Samuel has demonstrated[13], there has not been a time when the British have not had at least one eye on the past as a source of inspiration and as a touchstone against which the depredations of the present can be measured, and the British film industry has certainly indulged this penchant. At the same time, there is a long tradition, evidenced by J.H. Plumb's *Death of the Past* in the sixties, of attempting to overturn this zone of illusion and mystification in search of some superior knowledge to set against populist misapprehension.

Nonetheless, the present conjuncture seems to involve a particular explosion of 'heritage', the shorthand term for a variety of practices and discourses related to the local or national past. Suggested reasons for this expansion are as varied as the manifestations of heritage itself: the end of Empire and of Britain's role as a world power, the demise of the traditional manufacturing industries and communities which developed around them[14], the progressive erosion of the British countryside, the decline of the aristocracy, the arrival in large numbers of Commonwealth subjects, the breakdown in the postwar consensus, the expansion of innovative leisure industries and so on. No less diverse are the questions surrounding the uses to which heritage is put: how is a particular version of the past produced, privileged, installed and maintained as a public 'consensus'? Does this constrain and subordinate other groups and communities, or are they free to produce their own heritages? How does this affect 'ordinary culture' and 'everyday consciousness'? Do people accept this publicly constituted past, or do they display a diverse range of resistances to it?

ii. Subject Positions: The Imaginary Briton

Early work on these issues was carried out by the popular memory group at the Birmingham CCCS, and a key moment is the publication of Patrick Wright and

Michael Bommes' "'Charms of residence': the public and the past"[15]. Written in the wake of the 1980 National Heritage Act and the attendant political manipulation of heritage by the Conservative Party, Bommes and Wright's essay, can be seen as something of a conjunctural analysis, and Wright has since moved on to a less straightforwardly hostile position as heritage has diversified, but as a flirtation with some notion of false consciousness this early work merits attention.

Bommes and Wright note that National Heritage typically projects a unity which tends to override social and political contradictions. Diverse, glamorous articulations of nationhood and the past are offered against the more mundane experience of contemporary Britain, proffering some 'national' subjectivity to those who identify with them. Following Tony Wilden they provisionally name this subject position the 'Imaginary Briton'[16]. For the authors, while this subjectivity may not appear fully unified, there is nevertheless a publicly instituted tendency towards homogeneity and conformity, and this works to make other social groups or processes 'unspeakable'. Thus, while for the authors, the Imaginary Briton is without gender, class or region, s/he is marked as white, and this is illuminated through a passage from Sartre on the confrontation of the Imaginary Frenchman and the Jew: "Only a Frenchman, the son of a Frenchman, son or grandson of a peasant, is capable of possessing [the land] really. To own a hut in a village, it is not enough to have bought it with hard cash."

The use of this evocative passage (quoted at greater length in 'Charms of Residence') seems to obscure more than it illuminates. Is race the major locus of alienation from the nation? What the authors see as a homogenisation of various characteristics in the presumed national subjectivity I would suggest is permanently under question. Although race may be the focal subject of his polemic, the Sartre passage suggests that the Imaginary Frenchman is specifically regionalised, gendered and classed (and the quotations' absences invite the insertion of a determinate religion, sexuality etc.). The notion of the

Imaginary Briton therefore, contrary to the assertions of Bommes & Wright, seems extremely *un*stable, and the idea that National Heritage *necessarily* indulges some latent neo–tribalism open to contestation. Following the logic of this argument, one would anticipate that racism would filter down to ever more mobilisable communities rather than being mobilised through appeals to the nation. While this communitisation of racism is certainly the case in various localities, I would suggest that local, publicly instituted heritage is rarely deployed as an explicitly exclusionary practice. While not wishing to deny the existence of tribalism sheltering under a banner of nationhood (for example the paradoxical flirtation of Ulster and Glaswegian Protestants with far right nationalist politics despite their estrangement from Anglo–British culture), Bommes & Wright's analysis seems insufficiently sensitive to the different manifestations of national and local heritage or neo–tribalism.

Bommes & Wright themselves argue that there are points at which the notion of the Imaginary Briton ceases to be useful, and these boundaries are linked to the aforementioned *diversity* of National Heritage. The first of these concerns the miscellany of uses and intentions surrounding the national past. One can have a good day at a National Trust site without being enamoured of the idea of the hereditary transmission of wealth, or glory in the national flora and fauna without supporting repatriation. Secondly, there is such a tension between articulations of the national past at 'national' and 'local' levels that the pull between the two seems to prohibit the unity of any putative national subjectivity. In fact Bommes and Wright resist this contradiction, arguing instead that local and national are part of a seamless web of *micro-* and *macro-heritage*.

The authors note that while National Heritage may appear to stand above and in opposition to everyday life, micro–heritage can enter the mundane world, 'historicizing' the familiar and the local at the level of the community. Yet "the balance of forces is weighted from the start in favour of the dominant representations, for a sense of tradition constructed solely in terms of locality can be appropriated independently of any critical perspective on the larger

framework of capitalist social relations."[17]

Without wishing to jettison this reading of local heritage *in toto*, I find it strangely monolithic. It seems to uncritically establish hierarchies between the local and the national, raise the uncontested notion of 'dominant representations' and deny the users of heritage–based leisure any cultural understanding or creativity. As Adrian Mellor has noted, "the problem with this wretched scenario is that it has been devised by people who are compulsive readers of texts. They pay close attention to their semiotic surroundings and believe that others do too."[18] While this is overstating the case, it is a valuable corrective to Bommes & Wright's textualism, which 'reads' popular understanding from the phenomena themselves. As Wright himself has subsequently argued, there is considerable difference between nationally–promoted heritage and those texts or enterprises with local orientation whose concern is a (recent) past that is 'known' (albeit in a variety of ways) by the people to whom it is addressed:

> There are dangers in attributing a kind of 'authorship' to commercial imperatives or Thatcherite policies, with the result that the new museums are assumed to have unified – and inevitably reactionary – effects. We are not all Orwell's, journeying to an alien place and people, and returning with shocking revelations.[19]

iii. Codifying Heritage

In examining the texts of eighties' heritage, the authors adopt a structuralist approach which they claim identifies various 'proto–narrative' codes which can make sense of many different experiences (again, mechanisms are left unexplained). The authors quote from Patrick Cormack's book *Heritage in Danger*:

> When I am asked to define our heritage I do not think in dictionary terms, but instead reflect on certain sights and sounds. I think of a morning mist on the Tweed at Dryburgh where the magic of Turner and the romance of Scott both come fleetingly to life; of a celebration of the Eucharist in a quiet Norfolk Church with the medieval glass filtering the colours, and the early noise of the harvesting coming through the open door; or of standing at any time before the Wilton Diptych. Each scene recalls aspects of an indivisible heritage, and is part of the fabric and expression

of our civilisation.[20]

The figures and structures which Wright & Bommes identify as active in the organization of National Heritage are worth recording, since they provide a useful way of looking at the purchase on history of individual films later in this chapter. The first code the authors abstract is one where history is extracted from everyday life and restaged as 'heritage' in particular sites, images and events. In this process, the individual features of a history are lost as it loses its 'meaning' in relation to everyday life and acquires a relational meaning in respect to other manifestations of (by now capitalised) History. Adopting an analogy with exchange value, the authors term this code *'the historical' as an abstract system of equivalences*.

Adopting a notion that Wright would later develop in *On Living in an Old Country*, the authors argue that another structure projects the past as something completed and finished, which does not and must not be allowed to infect the present except in 'memorial' form. The past can exist either as a state of lost romance or as a kind of dump into which the supposed causes of present social unrest may be thrown. In this latter alignment the past is characterised not by castles or customs but by such things as trades unions. This structure is identified as *'the historical' as timelessness*.

History as entropy describes the environmental erosion of irreplaceable artifacts: it is history seen as commodity, with the land or country house owner transformed from owner to 'custodian', and the general public positioned as foot soldiers in the conflict against decay. The necessary complement to this code is one of *heritage in danger* from the barbarian activities of the masses. These two structures are linked by the impossibility of success: they are fatalistic codes of ultimate collapse.

The authors identify *objectified history* as a further structure in the operations of the 'heritage industry': the landscape becomes a palimpsest revealing the

slow accretions of national history, the country house an heroic agent in the process of producing a recognisable English aesthetic (Niklaus Pevsner is an important, if uncredited, voice here). And as the past is objectified, so it is recoverable, capable of circulation as commodity and visitable (as York's Jorvik centre suggests, this historical day–tripping can be more than metaphorical): this they term *national geography and* ***Gestalt***.

The final heritage structure is one that links *leisure and utopia* through National Heritage. "Increasingly, it is through the realm of leisure that 'the past' is encountered, and the encounter itself involves a second displacement which positions National Heritage, along with all that it engages 'behind' the present."[21] While I accept that utopianism is now rarely forward looking, increasingly finding consolation in the past, I am not convinced by Bommes & Wright's economic determinism: the growth of tourism may have linked national heritage with leisure but the impact of this at the level of subjectivity cannot be assumed: nostalgic utopianism is certainly not a product of the 'leisure age', and though new leisure practises may have made 'contact' with the past more common, their very existence as relentlessly modernising *technologies* would logically work against this identification. Again, any assumptions about audiences must remain speculative, and one of the key features of much work critical of heritage is the way it slides from valid observations about heritage production to dubious assumptions on the ways in which 'audiences' create meanings.

Attempting to avoid the pitfalls of dominant ideologies and false consciousness, John Corner and Sylvia Harvey have proposed an alternative typology[22], linking the stylistic eclecticism, hyper–reality and multi–sensory immediacies of much heritage representation with the broad contours of postmodernism. The authors propose to extract from heritage culture the existence of "*new modalities of the 'visitor experience'* and new *visualizations* of the past" (original italics).

Corner & Harvey note that heritage culture in the UK[23] is defined by a tension between the pressure of an official ideological configuration and the aspirations of a popular experience lived only partly within the official terms – using an institutional example, they illustrate this tension with the different uses and pleasures afforded by a museum and an 'historical' theme park. However, they also note that binding these poles loosely together is a scheme of constituent themes, "each of which has its particular implications both for Heritage as a political intervention and (which *might* at points come to the same thing) for Heritage as, essentially, family pleasure."[24] While noting that these themes are deeply inter–related, they propose an four–way analytical division: the Nationalist, the Aristocratic, the Rustic and the Industrial.

The *Nationalist* theme emphasises notions of inheritance, accentuating distinctions between nations and suppressing internal distinctions. Yet the operation of this theme depends upon a strategic lack of clarity – camouflaging the extent to which landscape, architecture, artifacts and values are anything but a common inheritance. The authors discern two narrative devices through which this contradiction is reconciled, the 'visionary list' and the 'hallowed symbol'. Patrick Cormack's epiphanic tour of the sights and sounds of an 'indivisible heritage' is cited as an example of the former, seamlessly connecting Nature, Place, Buildings and Culture, and a further example is quoted from the 1989 English Heritage brochure:

> You know that Summer has really arrived when the open–air concerts begin. And English Heritage can offer such enchanting surroundings – the sun setting over the lake at Kenwood, the boats passing on the Thames at Marble Hill and this year for the first time, the Grandeur of Audley End House.[25]

The hallowed symbol, or logo, is typically a resonant device which condenses all sorts of nationalist meanings into a compact, emotionally charged and frequently transportable icon: familiar examples would have to include the Union Jack, the crown, the oak, the lion, the National Trust's oak leaf, the portcullis of English Heritage and the rose. Yet already here we can see a certain

avoidance of the popular uses of heritage by the authors – all the chosen examples are from forms of high or official culture, effacing the alternative uses of visionary lists and hallowed symbols (counter–cultural mysticism, Richard Long's word landscapes, Jamie Reid's appropriation of the Union Jack, the rose as a popular tattoo symbol etc.) The effect is, contrary to authorial assertions, to focus on a frustratingly stereotyped and narrow view of heritage.

Expanding on the *Aristocratic* theme, the authors note, with Bommes & Wright, that the country house has been rigorously objectified, made to embody durable attributes of domestic continuity, tranquillity, elegance and a harmonious relationship with the natural world. In the words of the National Trust: "They look back to periods of apparent stability and order that, to some people, seem preferable to the chaos of the present."[26] Corner & Harvey assert that the televising of *Brideshead Revisited* in 1981 was a key moment in this process, a kind of dramatised 'visionary list'. Again the emphasis is on 'high' culture, although there is some acknowledgement of the trend towards representations of demotic and regional values and lifestyles, and the economies and labour practices maintaining the country house[27]. Even so, the argument is constrained by the 'dominant ideology' meanings seemingly inscribed in the institutions and artifacts and does not acknowledge other potentialities for pleasure relatively autonomous of this (country houses as sites in which to kick a ball, have a picnic, look at roses). In this context it is interesting that the National Trust has been *reluctant* to establish guided tours of NT properties. While this reluctance may have initially been based on the assumption that its visiting public could rely on its middle–class cultural instincts, it also means that country houses are remarkably open to sundry uses and interpretations by a more diversified spectrum of visitors.

The *Rustic* theme is distinguished from previous forms of *la nostalgie de la boue* by its 'mythic' focus on the quasi–Cotswoldian vision of a cultivated landscape, peopled ("with national–emblematic force") by village folk in harmony with their temporal and topographical surroundings. The authors note

the proliferation of folk–museums concentrating on the development of agriculture and (predominantly masculine) rural craft skills and the lack of any equally extensive description of rural social and labour relations. The suggested effect of these craft museums is to once again polarise the authentic–bucolic against the artificial–(sub)urban: "In a characteristic Heritage conflation, the distinctive appeal of a particular physical world (here, one of natural materials) is transferred to its related social forms – as if the latter were kinds of epiphenomena."[28] True enough, but does this not again position the spectator as a dupe of 'ideology'? Are all sites and sights so rigorously sanitised? What would a craft museum incorporating such pertinent social factors look like? Without wishing to deny that distortions *do* exist in these sites, the authors rarely ask why these phenomena might matter to visitors.

The inclusion of the *Industrial* into the Heritage canon is a recent development, often linked to local or regional redevelopment initiatives. Corner & Harvey demonstrate, however, that potentially disruptive features of this recent arrival have been smoothed over by eliding differences: monumental industrial sites are 'enchanted' through their incorporation in tastefully re–ruralized environments. Examples include Beamish in Durham, Ironbridge Gorge in Shropshire and Quarry Bank Mill at Styal.[29] Again, however, the authors detect a sustained emphasis on physical and technological history, at the expense of social context. This is unsettlingly manifested in the absence of a workforce (give or take the odd *tableau-vivant* or waxwork proletarian), and the occasional invitation to the spectator to fill that gap: "You will see how people lived a hundred years ago, and where they worked. You can eat what they ate, smell what they could smell and drink what they drank."[30] Where the site is overdetermined by 'context', as in the Wigan Pier redevelopment, potential anxiety is allayed by a chronological shift from the austerity years described by Orwell to an earlier period, just out of living memory, of relative prosperity and antiquarian charm.

Having outlined the *aporia* and blindspots of UK heritage sites, the authors go

on to criticise any simplistic reading of '80s Heritage as simply an emanation of 'Thatcherism' (shorthand in this context for an entrepreneurial, populist, chauvinist, often racist nationalism). New Heritage would almost certainly have entered the UK, whatever the complexion of the ruling fraction, as a result of leisure developments elsewhere in the world, and Thatcher's personal antipathy to museums of any provenance[31] might give pause to anyone thinking of the phenomenon as distinctively Thatcherite.

The authors also criticise some of the patrician attitudes that heritage culture has provoked. Critics from both Left and Right have adopted a similar language of complaint, rejecting what they variously construct as trivialising, tasteless, exploitative or inaccurate uses and abuses of local and national history. These critics unwittingly echo a persistent strand of cultural analysis which seeks to replace popular historical blandishments with some 'true' history (film criticism of Hollywood epics is a paradigmatic case) and in so doing align themselves with opponents of populist entertainment. Corner & Harvey quote with apparent approval Umberto Eco's account of some of the more spectacular and garish institutions of leisure culture: "It would be second–hand Frankfurt–school moralism to prolong the criticism. These places are enjoyable."[32] Yet they themselves do not seem able to speak of pleasure without countering it with displeasure:

> What is required of contemporary criticism is not an unseeing dismissal of the pleasures produced by these contemporary versions of the fairground, the side–show and the carnival, but a clear statement about who suffers, who is misrepresented and who is missing in these side–shows; and the expression of warm support and encouragement for those image–makers whose tableaux include the ghost at the feast, and some trace of the harshness of life for those outside the show.[33]

Which carries more conviction in the case of the Wigan Pier development than in that of the Tales of Robin Hood. Moreover, Corner & Harvey fail to note that there is a history of countering history–as–mythology with history–as–fact which has proved inadequate in two ways. First, it is not just as history that many of these ideas are embraced, and the historiographic question of their truth or

falsity is often peripheral to their practical appropriation in everyday life[34]. Second, such strategies of demythologisation have failed because the very ways in which the left has recourse to history are negatively over–determined in public understanding, in other words the left turns to history because it is itself old–fashioned.

iv. Narratives and Heritage.

Part of the problem with this strand of heritage study, therefore, is the conflation of diverse manifestations of heritage and of the various components of heritage culture: narratives (including the nostalgic screen fiction) and more concrete phenomena (parks, T–shirts) are collapsed into one mystificatory abuse of History. Roger Bromley has separated these discreet strands, seeing popular narrative as the main contributor to the social production of memories. Bromley's analysis of heritage narratives came at the highpoint of the Thatcherite enterprise, and focuses on the process of 'organized forgetting' by which people's complex past is taken away from them, leaving only the 'surfaces of remembrance'. This is a mechanism which Bromley sees as contributing to the success of popular conservatism after 1979.

Bromley notes that Thatcherism is commonly presented as monolithic whereas it is/was more contradictory and uneven at the level of political practice. Nonetheless, as an ideological *performance* it has depended on the consistency of its *narrative commonsense*: an apparently seamless merging of the contradictory strands in its formation: "the resonant themes of organic Toryism – nation, family, duty, authority, standards, patriarchalism, with the aggressive themes of a revived neo–liberalism – self–interest, competitive individualism, anti–statism."[35] Frequently the harmonious place of conciliation for these themes is the past, to which writers, politicians and image makers have had recourse during the post–1979 period.

For Bromley the past is predominantly conservative. Like its existence in the present for Bommes & Wright, Corner & Harvey, it is a form of 'sickening'

subject to social direction:

> The most prominent method for 'remembering' the past in this way is what, in French, is called 'la mode retro' – retrospective styling. Particular *forms* of re–articulation have come to dominate popular cultural 'space'. Outgrown or outworn tendencies are nostalgically re–affirmed by a 'coded sentimentality', which seems direct and unmediated, but derives from a mode of producing memories using certain conventions and synthesizing different discourses. Such preferred memories, whereby the past becomes an event to be pictured, styled and filmed, have a stabilizing and conciliating function.[36]

Bromley's case owes something to Patrick Wright here. The past is represented as closed: representations of conventionalised Jarrow Crusade poverty are recoverable only as a rebuke to those who claim deprivation in the present – without the outward marks of such stylized hardship, the contemporary claimant is marked as 'inauthentic'. Values, however, are presented as enduring; paradoxically *more* material than the body of the oppressed. "The passivity of a 'class' is contrasted, time and again, with the activity of the *mobile* individual."[37]

Like other thinkers on the topic, Bromley tends to extend his analysis from a considered and persuasive study of some forms of heritage narrative to a more general theory of representations of the national past. Following a broadly postmodernist line, Bromley notes that because any icon of the past is now immediately retrievable, the past has ceased to have any historic resonance. Instead the process of understanding has been surrendered to certain epochal 'values', reducing the past to a series of long shots interspersed with a few selective icons. While broadly agreeing with this, I would nevertheless dispute the politically homogeneous nature of both icons and values, arguing instead for them as sites of contestation on which rightist ideologies of national life might come to grief.

A feature of Roger Bromley's work which I would like to expand upon in the course of this chapter is his development of Marx's suggestive notion of

forgetting. Such 'forgetful' notions of the national past reproduce the tenets of bourgeois common sense by articulating the past 'as it really was' without interrogating its conditional character – without, in Gramsci's terms, offering an 'inventory':

> What is 'forgotten' may represent more threatening aspects of popular memory and have been carefully and consciously, not casually and unconsciously, omitted from the narrative economy of remembering. Part of this structure of amnesia is the recurring ideological sense that the representative individual replicates the essence of the society's experience. This is offered as the 'logic' of the period – its unvarnished truth – rather than a comment on cultural hegemony.[38]

When *Cahiers du Cinema* coined the phrase "*la mode retro*" in the mid–1970s to describe films like *The Night Porter* and *Lacombe Lucien*, they were attacking this very use of history as no more than a picturesque background against which actual political conflicts could be displaced onto personal and particularly sexual ones. Indeed, classical narrative typically prioritises the personal over the social, the individual over the systemic and the local over the national. As Bordwell and Thompson suggest, "natural causes (floods, earthquakes) or societal causes (institutions, wars, economic depression) may serve as catalysts or preconditions for the action, but the narrative invariably centres on personal, psychological causes: decisions, choices, and traits of character."[39]

As John Hill has observed, this stress on the individual helps to "confirm the ideology of containment characteristic of the [classical] narrative drive towards resolution."[40] Narratives which deal with periods of social crisis, such as the works of popular fiction and autobiography in *Lost Narratives* and their screen adaptations, rarely deal with social problems in their social aspects at all, so much as problems to be managed in terms of the individual's qualities and attributes. This is not to imply, however, as Hill sometimes does, that the personal is *per se* a fruitless ground on which to establish a political agenda. In the heritage films of the 1980s, for example, the theme of hidden and brutalised male homosexuality is a recurrent one, and it would be difficult to see

how this could be approached, in a suitably historicised manner, within the kind of pan–social framework suggested by Bromley and Hill's Gramscian positions. At the same time, it is unclear how those texts which flirt with non–classical forms of narrative (*Room with a View*'s Brechtian flourishes, for example) necessarily expose the artificial nature of the historical construction.

The contours of these various theorizations of heritage culture, then, are fairly similar: heritage stands accused of dehistoricizing the national past, of gelling with (or being strategically used by) dominant ideologies and of deploying key tropes of nationhood which obscure or negate other, potentially oppositional, histories. My argument with this approach has focused on the way in which in which it homogenises various phenomena and postulates some form of false consciousness which can be opposed to historical 'Truth'.

These criticisms of heritage culture are also, unsurprisingly, the major criticisms of nostalgic screen fictions: arguments which centre on the naturalizing aspects of representations of the national past. The defence of these fictions is a much less homogeneous entity, distinguishable by its resolute avoidance of any critical analysis of the nature of historical narrative and by its reiteration of notions of national values, 'quality' and a national film.

b. Defenders of the Faith: demands for a national film

Twelve years ago the gladiator cry "the brits are coming"[41] *was heard as the success of Chariots of Fire seemed to herald yet another renaissance of our film industry. For a few, brief, shining moments, we believed in ourselves again. On Monday night, a cluster of British writers, actors and directors entered the Dorothy Chandler auditorium in Hollywood hoping that one of our small, home-grown films - 'sleepers' in the local vernacular - might again sweep the Oscars board.*

There was the added comfort that two of our contenders, Howards End and Enchanted April, both swam against the current tide of violence, being gentle reminders of a bygone age. Together with The Crying Game, they made no attempt to portray a mid-Atlantic product, but instead were remarkable for their very Englishness... Culture should not be separate from economic, social or foreign policies, and film is the most potent medium for propagating the message that, as a nation, we still have much to offer. Historically our films have succeeded when they show our own way of life.

It is as though we have the means to build the most magnificent cars and can produce the talent to drive them in grand prix races but balk at the idea of filling the tanks with petrol to get them on the track. I applaud those who, on Monday night, got close to the finishing post; they failed, but they failed honourably and gave the rest of us the hope that their achievements will not have been in vain.

With a modicum of entrepreneurial and governmental courage, we could have a flourishing native film industry. Then we could be the bride instead of the bridesmaid.

Bryan Forbes[42]

Bryan Forbes' post–Oscar paean typifies the two strands of argument which are characteristically mobilised in defence of a national cinema. The first of these is monetary and lays stress upon the value of a national film industry to the national economy in terms of the creation of jobs, attraction of overseas investment, export earnings and general knock–on effects for the service industries and tourism. In a characteristic displacement of the post–1979 period, while Forbes does not explicitly invoke this defence, he presents his thoughts on cinema as an analogy to more concrete industrial forms. Without any apparent irony, film is compared to the automobile industry, presenting both in terms of glamour, high–performance etc. and ignoring any negative crossover implications.

The second case for a national cinema is dependent upon cultural arguments; in particular the value of a home–grown cinema to the cultural life of a nation

and the importance of supporting indigenous film–making in an international market dominated by Hollywood.[43]

In making his plea for entrepreneurial and governmental intervention, Forbes mentions *The Crying Game*, but the line of his argument should instantly raise the antennae of heritage watchers (and, presumably, strike a chord with the rump of *Telegraph* readers): "gentle reminders of a bygone age", "their very Englishness", "our own way of life." What Forbes is invoking here is not simply the artistic merits of British films, but also the versions of national identity which they have conventionally provided. Criticism of the British cinema, in this regard, often becomes a critique of the traditional concepts of nation, nationalism and national identity associated with, and projected through, British films. It is a constant criticism of 'national' films that they seek to impose not only a frozen conception of identity but also an imaginary sense of unity which ignores (and thereby helps to suppress) the range of collective identities and forms of belonging which exist within the national community.

Forbes' argument switches between two conceptual methods of establishing the imaginary coherence of a national cinema. First is the method of comparing and contrasting cinemas in order to establish degrees of otherness. Second is a more inward–looking process which explores the national cinema in its relation to other, already existing economies and cultures of the state.[44]

The first of these means rests upon the principle of producing meaning and identity through difference. The identity of one national cinema is established by its relationship to, and separateness from, other national cinemas. In Forbes' piece, American cinema, which is defined in terms of a "current tide of violence" and an ersatz and inauthentic mid–Atlantic product provide the necessary other to British cinema. As Thomas Elsaesser has argued, "Other countries try to maintain themselves on a terrain staked out by the competition ... the implications affect all developed countries whose sense of cultural identity is based on a need to maintain markers – and markets – of difference vis–a–vis

the products of the international entertainment business."[45] The definition of a unique identity is therefore paradoxically constituted by a play of differences and identities. In Benedict Anderson's words, "nations...cannot be imagined except in the midst of an irremediable plurality of other nations."[46]

It is not sufficient, however, to define national cinema solely in its relation to other cinemas. British film also relates, as practice and institution, to an already existing national political, economic and cultural identity (in so far as a single coherent identity can be established for one or all of these sectors) and set of traditions. "In this way, British cinema would be defined in terms of the established discourses of Britishness, by turning in on itself, on its own history and cultural formation, and the defining ideologies of national identity and nationhood, rather than by reference to other national cinemas"[47] (though they may themselves be an integral part of that formation as Forbes acknowledges in his reference to the '60s British film 'renaissance').[48]

Much more attention has been paid by writers on the subject (John Hill, Andrew Higson) to outlining a putative cultural defence of national cinema than in identifying who these defenders are. Duncan Petrie has noted[49] that the Oscar successes of *Chariots of Fire* and *Gandhi* in successive years, and the self–promotional exercise of British Film Year in 1985 produced a brief flurry of euphoric texts including James Park's *Learning to Dream*, John Walker's *The Once and Future Film*, and *A Night at the Pictures*, the official British Film Year publication edited by Fenella Greenfield.

But any optimistic take on national film was both cautious and short–lived. Park's later work, *British Cinema: the lights that failed* attempts to engage with what the author took to be the historical deficiencies of the British film industry. Similarly, Jake Eberts and Terry Illot's *My Indecision is Final* analyses the rise and fall of Goldcrest Films, the production company most associated with the brief British 'renaissance' of the 80s (*Chariots of Fire*, *Gandhi*). Amongst critics and film historians, I look in vain for cultural defenders of national film. As Steve

Jenkins has noted, British critics, far from waving the flag, are notoriously indifferent to their national product[50]. Critical loyalty, if anywhere, tended to be towards individual companies or teams (Goldcrest, Merchant–Ivory, Film on Four) which provides a very different model of chauvinism from that of a 'national cinema'.[51]

Rather, therefore, than asking relatively ahistorical questions about the value of representations of the past, I have chosen to look at how the heritage film of the '80s has operated as a national cinema –the way in which it locates itself, and has been located, in relation to a variety of discourses and practices (re)constructing Anglo–Britishness. Andrew Higson has argued that the areas that need to be examined in such a study are, first, the content of a body of films – what is presented (and particularly the construction of 'the national character'), the dominant narrative discourses and dramatic themes, and the traditions on which they draw – in other words, the ways in which cinema inserts itself alongside other cultural practices, "and the ways in which it draws on the existing cultural histories and cultural traditions of the producing nation, reformulating them in cinematic terms, appropriating them in order to build up its own generic conventions."[52]

Second, there is the question of the structure of feeling or world–view expressed in those films, and third there are their formal systems of representation (their construction of space and time, employment of modes of narration and motivation, deployment of visual pleasures and spectacles etc.) and their modes of subjectivity (particularly, in heritage films, the degree to which they engage with, reconstruct and rearticulate for the audience a particular form of national historical understanding).[53]

The position that I've tried to arrive at in this opening discussion is one which avoids both the monolithic rejection of these fictions typical of opponents of heritage, and the industry–based promotion of their 'typically British' characteristics. Higson's persuasive schema attempts to avoid prejudgement

and offers a way both of looking at the genre as a whole, and of isolating different and sometimes contradictory aspects of individual films in relation to the nation. Through looking at a substantial body of films, three resonant themes have emerged, which each engage with one of the heritage codes articulated by Bommes & Wright, Corner & Harvey. These themes are not offered as definitive in any way, but instead suggest some problems present both in portrayals of the past and in overarching condemnations of those portrayals. In looking at the E.M. Forster film therefore, I concentrate on *objectified history*, while for those films which deal with the demise of a way of life I focus on *history as entropy*. My first theme, however, is the representation of male homosexuality, and its links with an *aristocratic* view of national life.

3. THEMES, ISSUES AND THE MISE-EN-SCÈNE.

a. Queers & Traitors

Who stole my heart away?
Jack Buchanan

As Dick Hebdige and Bill Schwarz[54] have noted, the defection of Burgess and Maclean in 1951 paradoxically threw into relief the high culture of interwar England. Two civil servants, associated with a particular and well–defined English elite were revealed to be polyvalent traitors: betraying their sex, class and country.

From the slightly longer perspective of the 1980s, as the role of the upper class has become blurred through its preservation in heritage form, this linkage seems even more pregnant with meaning. There is a gothic quality about the way in which the most mannered and almost parodically 'English' representatives of the bureaucratic and artistic middle class should be revealed as indulging, persistently, extravagantly and dangerously, in a 'continental' or classical vice. Film–makers have persistently used this theme, whether as mainspring of the narrative (*Another Country*, *Maurice*, *An Englishman Abroad*) or as suggestive and subverting detail (the dissolute Eric in *Memento Mori*, Stephen in *Scandal*). For example, while the ecstatic comedy *Withnail & I* (1986) focuses on the tail end of the '60s (with the storm clouds of the '70s and, in the distance, Thatcherism lowering), much of the narrative tension comes from the encounter between one school of decadence (Richard E. Grant and Paul McGann as the eponymous anti–heroes) and an earlier, more classical form (Richard Griffiths as the monstrous Uncle Monty). In a central scene, Monty leads the protagonists across a Wordsworthian horizon: he dressed in tweeds, they in leather jacket and army greatcoat. The camera changes from long shot to three shot. Appropriate resonant music swells over the dialogue:

> MONTY: *Laisse-moi respirer longtemps, longtemps l'odeur de tes cheveux*[55]. Ah, Baudelaire, brings back such memories of Oxford; Oh, Oxford!
> MARWOOD (Voiceover): Followed by yet another anecdote about his

> "sensitive crimes" in a punt with a chap called Norman who had red hair and a book of poetry stained with the butter drips from crumpets.
> MONTY: I orften [sic] wonder where Norman is now. Probably wintering with his mother in Guildford. A cat and rain; midden under the sink and both bars on. But old now, old. There can be no true beauty without decay.
> WITHNAIL: *Legium pro Britannia*
> MONTY: How right you are, how right you are. We live in a kingdom of rains, where royalty comes in gangs. Come on lads, let's get home. The sky is beginning to bruise, night must fall and we shall be forced to camp! (marches off)

Monty's comic depiction connotes the traditional operation in British culture of the male homosexual as a figure of fun (in which respect, Norman Stone bizarrely remarked, gay men resemble kippers[56]). But Monty's status as a 'toff' is as overdetermined as his homosexuality and suggests a history in which class, sexuality and treachery are symbiotically linked. This linkage then casts a shadow over claims that heritage culture valorises an aristocratic register of national life.

Such a three–way association has deep roots in British culture. The Cleveland Street Affair in 1889 brought to public attention the existence of a high–ranking coterie of influential men who engaged in paid sex with procured working class boys. The notion of the upper class corrupting the working class into vice was a prevalent one, contrary to any presumed notion of working–class deference to their social superiors. The constable in charge of the boys in the affair came to the conclusion that "they were ignorant of the crimes they committed with other people" blaming instead the inversions and perversions of the ruling classes.[57]

This merging of homosexuality with the class question was recurrent both in an increasingly salacious press and in the writings of upper–class men, at least up until the 1950s.[58] I see this linking of class with male homosexuality extending into a concern for national identity in two ways. Firstly, homosexuality seemed to have a special (if covert) existence within the very interstices of state power. Jeffrey Weeks has noted how a major route into male prostitution before 1914

was through a world paradoxically symbiotic with homosexuality, the overtly masculine Brigade of Guards[59]. In the John Schlesinger/Alan Bennett drama *A Question of Attribution* this linkage acts as a condensation of a range of commonsense wisdoms. The Establishment traitor, Sir Anthony Blunt, is shown a series of slides of possible communists. A picture of a guardsman standing to attention in full dress is projected. The next slide is of the same man in the same pose, naked but for his peaked hat.

Similarly, the association of the institutions of national education with homosexuality was well documented. J. A. Symonds described his horror at the situation in Harrow school, where every boy of good looks had a female name, and was either a "prostitute" or a "boy's bitch".[60] At Oxford in the mid Nineteenth Century, the college dramatic societies specialised in farces which required the men to dress up in women's clothes to the extent that it became a cause for public scandal and was suppressed by Jowett, the then Vice Chancellor[61]. In the Nineties, open effeminacy had come into vogue, but the arrest of Wilde in 1895 put an end to this until the 1920s, when it was again fashionable as an assault on parental values: "It was *chic* to be queer, rather as it was *chic* to know something about the twelve–tone scale and about Duchamp's "Nude Descending a Staircase." In a pattern that was to be frequently repeated, the newspapers picked up on this in order to demonise the feckless upper classes[62].

This 'decadence' is located in a nexus of ideas about national life. Male homosexuality (as jurically articulated through the Wolfenden recommendations of 1957, and the legislative action of 1967) is, and has traditionally been, to an extent tolerated in privacy. But public deviance, gelling with received notions of the privacy of national life, carries an unacceptable whiff of the foreign: "Have you considered going to live abroad?" the governor of Winchester gaol asked Peter Wildeblood in 1954, "People in your position often do, you know."[63] Complex beliefs about the effeminacy and degeneracy of other national identities are contained within this statement, along with assumptions about the

efficacious expulsion from the body politic of diseased sexuality[64]. Similar notions appear in *Maurice* ("Omit the unspeakable vice of the Greeks" orders the Dean at a translation session), and in *Prick Up Your Ears*.

The second linkage is more explicit. The concatenation of homosexuality and treason is deeply rooted in British culture and periodically revived at moments of national crisis. The diaries of Roger Casement, the Irish patriot executed in 1916 (and subject of a proposed film by Isaac Julien[65]), were invoked as damning evidence of a polycorrupted personality, recording both Casement's work for the colonial service and details of his pickups in intimate confusion[66].

Casement chose his revolutionary moment during the First World War, and it should perhaps come as no surprise that the apocalyptic experience of mass conflict produced as much of a crisis for the values of male sexuality as it did of those of nationhood. In spite of the severity of penalties for male homosexuality in the armed forces, twenty–two officers and 270 other ranks were court–martialled for indecency. Recording a court martial for "homosexualism" in which he acted as defending officer, Raymond Asquith describes the prosecution witness ("tarred with much the same brush") in explicit class terms:

> [he] was a nephew of Robert Ross, lately a scholar at Eton, who aroused everyone's suspicions by knowing Latin and Greek and constantly reading Henry James' novels. He was not ill–looking but with an absurdly cushioned figure and a rather hysterical temperament more like a girl than a boy. He was the accomplice who turned King's Evidence.[67]

Two ideas at work in Asquith's account have a continuing resonance in heritage culture and the nostalgic screen fiction: the notion that the English upper classes were corrupt, and that public–school boys were effeminate aesthetes. Both relate to the idea of English decadence as a cause first of the Great War and later of the national decline. Asquith's account suggests that it was not simply a homosexual officer who was on trial, but his class, and the behaviour and tastes of that class.

This critical stance on male homosexuality and the First World War has flavoured some of the nostalgic screen fictions of the 1980s, while being altered by generic constraints. As Andy Medhurst has noted, the war film typically abolishes all the political specificities of a particular conflict, leaving an individual war to accrue particular clusters of myths. So the First World War is a vehicle for liberal humanist laments on a slain generation.[68] The Film Four International drama *A Month in the Country* (1987), for example, identifies the front line as a crisis for men's sexuality. Two scarred veterans (Colin Firth as Birkin, Kenneth Branagh as Moon) find themselves working together on a Yorkshire church. The film flirts with the notion of the idyll and the seductive power of landscape and environment, but gradually disrupts this by forcing personal and national histories into the pastoral retreat. In a late scene, Birkin is accosted by a stranger whose initially polite manner becomes increasingly sinister:

> MAN: Excuse me, are you from Oxgoodby?
> BIRKIN: Yes, but just missed it [the train].
> MAN: Have you bumped into a chap called Moon over there, James Moon? Diggin' up some fields or summat?
> BIRKIN: Yes I have.
> MAN: And is he a stocky, fair–haired sort o' chap? Smiles a lot?
> BIRKIN: That's pretty well him, yes.
> MAN: A captain in the 18th Norfolk Artillery?
> (BIRKIN nods, increasingly unsure where this line of questioning is leading)
> That clinches it then, must be the same chap. Would you give him a salute from me?
> BIRKIN: Of course.
> MAN: And all the other officers in the 18th Norfolk? The ones who didn't sit out the last six months of the war in a glasshouse like our hero did. For buggering his batman.

The directness of the last remark comes as a shock: nothing in the drama has prepared the viewer for this confidence. But the scene involves a familiar set of associations: Moon is educated and privileged while his accuser, although apparently a former officer, is not from the middle class and therefore censures the triad of education/homosexuality/betrayal.

As the drama is broadly 'liberal' in its affiliations, the stranger's comments do not remain uninterrogated. While the actualities of his accusation are not denied, Moon is allowed a defence based some notion of 'sensitivity' (he wakes up screaming, he still sees the conflict), but the narrative does not allow him any space in which to reclaim a possible future in Britain. He sets off for an archaeological dig in Basra, slipping untidily away to leave the screen to Birkin. From the perspective of the late century, while the homosexuality of the First World War may be tolerated, it is coded as doomed and psychotic. Like Owen and Sassoon, whose sexuality was equally defined by the conflict, Moon is shellshocked, and confesses himself to be "a little bit round the bend ... Always will be, I expect."

Frontline homosexuality did not, however, attract the interest generated by accusations of moral corruption at the apex of society. In January 1918 the *Vigilante* published an article by Noel Pemberton Billing MP titled 'The First 47,000' in which Billing claimed to know of the existence of a Black Book, held in German hands, in which were recorded the names and tastes of 47,000 English perverts, who were being blackmailed into betraying their country. Despite the absence of any proof for this outrageous claim, Billing's list was treated as fact, gelling as it did with pre–existing popular anxieties about authority, status, perversion and treachery. The same panic was repeated in a later period of cultural anxiety during the defection of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean in 1951, the subsequent trials of Lord Montagu, Michael Pitt–Rivers and Peter Wildeblood and the later 'outing' of other high ranking pro–soviet traitors.

Guy Burgess and Sir Anthony Blunt are perhaps the key figures here. Burgess was tolerated as a flamboyant homosexual and lauded for his ability to persuade a formidable number of men and women, with whom he seemed to be on first name terms, to broadcast on the BBC, "while passing himself off as a political eunuch with discriminating right–wing undertones"[69], while Blunt became Director of the Courtauld Institute and Surveyor of the Queen's

pictures, perched in the very symbolic centre of the nation. This existence within the matrix of the national establishment has been the source of at least three screen fictions in the period since 1979: *Another Country* (1984), in which Burgess is thinly fictionalised as Guy Bennett; *An Englishman Abroad* (1984), which deals with Burgess' meeting with the Australian actress Coral Browne in Moscow in 1959 and *A Question of Attribution* (1991), which deals with Blunt's discovery.

The other country of Kanievska's film looks both forward and back, referring both to L.P. Hartley's phrase "the past is another country" and the utopian patriotism of the hymn "I vow to thee my country". In the process it cuts across condemnations of both heritage and homosexuality, portraying both as realms of pleasure, and this is consonant with the liberal interests of the narrative. At the end of the film, the journalist interviewing Bennett asks if he misses anything. Bennett hesitates; choral music fades in, and he replies, "I miss the cricket." The music here evokes both the first flashback scene, a memorial service in the school quadrangle and the site of Bennett's first overdetermined gaze at Harcourt (Cary Elwes), while the cricket recalls an exchange of looks between the boys on the playing field.

Yet despite these utopian aspirations, narrative and mise–en–scène deflate these zones of pleasure. The image of 1930s perfection is shown to be already corrupted, the product of a military authoritarian system that is openly corrupt and exploitative. Equally, there is nothing pure about the homosexual relationships on show. As Andrew Higson has noted, if the fantasy of decadence and passion is in some ways a critique of the more mundane and repressive present:

> that critique is always contained by being accessible only through a facade of class privilege firmly set in the past. But that facade, constructed in the self–conscious artistry of these films, is itself extravagant. The discourse of authenticity is treated so seriously, and taken to such lengths, that it becomes almost self–parodic: the meticulous period piece as knowing artifice and extravagant frivolity.

> From this point of view, the films scale the heights of camp, which Susan Sontag defines as "the theatricalisation of experience."[70]

Far therefore from acting as a plea for the acceptance of difference (as Bennett's key monologue on homosexuality would suggest[71]), *Another Country* stages difference in memorial form, defining it as redundant through its class associations and theatrical affiliations.

The implications of this 'pastness' of upper–middle–class homosexual experience are deployed to semi–comic purpose in the Alan Bennett/John Schlesinger collaboration *An Englishman Abroad*, where Burgess' campy old–world raffishness comes face to face with both the brutal modernism of his adopted Moscow and a reconstructed, post–war Britain which has forgotten him and his kind. The crucial scene takes place in Burgess' Moscow apartment, the camera moving between two shots of Burgess and Coral Browne and shot–reverse shots:

> GUY: Now, tell me all the gossip. Do you see Harold Nicholson?
> CORAL: I've seen him, but I don't know him.
> GUY: Nice man, nice man. What about Cyril Connolly? He's everywhere.
> CORAL: Well, I haven't run across him either.
> GUY: Oh. Somehow one remembers everyone knowing everyone else. Everyone I knew knew everyone else. Auden, do you know him? Pope Hennessy?....
> CORAL: Do you see many people here?
> GUY: Oh yes, heaps of chums...What do *people* say about me in England?
> CORAL: They don't say much anymore.

Again, the implication is that the *rentier*/aristocratic classes and their attendant homosexuality are equally extinct: charismatic perhaps, but without any place in the post–war order. And with their demise, other 'unEnglish' proclivities disappeared too: Nicholson's Bloomsbury aesthetic, Auden's middle–class left–wing affiliations.

Disappeared, or went underground. *A Question of Attribution*[72] reverses the likeable portrayal of a shambling, drunken traitor, featuring instead a forbidding

cold fish, gliding with his upper–class drawl through marbled halls. Although not, in itself, a 'heritage' film (the narrative takes place in the late 1970s), the drama reaches into the symbolic past of pre–war Cambridge with its attendant aesthetics, homosexuality and treachery.

Allowing us to see the canvases on which he works at close quarters, Schlesinger's camera strengthens the metaphoric bond between the restoration work on a fake Titian entitled "Titian and his Friends" and the process of unmasking Blunt the human fake – Establishment pillar and traitor. The drama's core, however, is an exchange between Blunt and the Queen (Prunella Scales) in a picture gallery at Buckingham Palace: chirruping comments about Commonwealth travels; double–edged remarks about forgeries going undetected:

> HMQ: ...I suppose too the *context* of a painting matters; its history and provenance – is that the word? – confer on it a certain respectability. This can't be a forgery, it is in such–and–such a collection, its background and pedigree are impeccable; besides, it's been vetted by the experts. Isn't that how the argument goes? [Slow pan into SIR ANTHONY's face] So that if one comes across a painting with the right background and pedigree, Sir Anthony, it must be hard I imagine, even inconceivable, to think that it is not what it claims to be, and even supposing someone in such circumstances did have suspicions, they would be chary about voicing them; easier to leave things as they are, stick with the official attribution rather than let the cat out of the bag and say, "Here we have a fake."
> BLUNT: I still think the word "fake" inappropriate ma'am?
> HMQ: If something is not what it claims to be, what is it?
> BLUNT: [pause] An enigma?
> HMQ: That is, I think, the sophisticated answer.

In its consideration of the national past, therefore, the nostalgic screen fiction typically touches on the historic betrayal of norms of behaviour and attitude by the *haute bourgeoisie* and nobility, calling into question the slavish devotion to aristocratic representations of national life posited by Wollen, Corner & Harvey. In these fictions, those supposedly 'aristocratic' attributes of domestic continuity and maintenance of a national tradition are challenged, and while this may be dangerous territory, denying as it does the validity of homosexual desire, it

nonetheless problematises any claims that the nostalgic screen fiction is *solely* concerned with servile representations of an antique class. Nonetheless, there is a persistent and problematic recourse to plangency in those representations to which I want to turn.

b. Pre–Lapsarian Histories: periodising the fall

The nostalgic British screen fiction typically, though not inevitably, posits a determinate historical moment when national life changed irreparably. Fascinated with the appearance and the sound of the past, these dramas are also fascinated by a melancholy of loss, even where it is the loss of repressive and outdated institutions and modes of behaviour: as Patrick Wright has commented, "The national past is capable of finding splendour in old styles of political domination and of making an alluring romance out of atrocious colonial exploitation."[73] While the negative consequences of this melancholy of loss are clear, it differs from some simple yearning for a putative moment of stability and tranquillity in the social order. Rather, I would suggest that it represents the glimmerings of a (highly ambivalent) critique: the old imperialist, class–riven order is *of necessity* seen in its moment of decadence and corruption, the pure identity becoming tainted.

There is, moreover, no particular agreement on the period in which this Fall took place, or its class location, so we have, on the one hand, the inter–war aristocratic religiosity of *Brideshead Revisited* (1981) and on the other Terence Davies' formalist aestheticisations of the urban proletariat. Again, this indeterminacy suggests at least the beginnings of some critique of received notions of national history. I would strongly dispute Bommes & Wright's claims that 'the historical' now acts as an abstract system of equivalences, noting that there are more and less central symbols and narratives in the construction of a national history, some of which may challenge or embarrass that construction.

I have chosen to divide periodisations of this national Fall into three moments: the period before the First World War, the inter–war period and the war and

post–war era. Inevitably, in narratives that work in and through time, these periods cannot be as discrete as the schema suggests.

i. Before the Big Guns.

The representation of war on screen and in print tends, as Andy Medhurst has observed[74], to bleach each conflict of its specificity, imposing generalised registers of meaning on any particular hostility. While the Second World War becomes a manichean struggle between a generalised 'goodness' and fascism, World War One is salvaged as a protracted liberal lament for a lost generation. The narrative of this loss is familiar: young men of unusual abilities who combined great sporting prowess with deep learning, many of them at Oxford and Cambridge, embraced their country's cause and died in huge numbers on the Western Front and in the Dardanelles. Those few who limped home in 1919 found their victory a hollow one: the Empire mortgaged off and their youthful values betrayed by the Old Men. This myth of the war had entered the official history within a short time of the Armistice. Dedicating the memorial at Malvern College, the Bishop of Malvern could describe the war as "the wiping out of a generation."[75] Similarly, the war poets would present the conflict in generational terms: Owen's "Anthem for Doomed Youth", Sassoon's "unreturning army/ that was youth".[76]

While it is certainly true that the officer class suffered a disproportionately high rate of casualties[77], the sacrificial narrative was shaped in ways which privileged a particular class. It was the former Liberal MP and wartime propagandist C.F.G. Masterman who was instrumental in pointing the myth in this direction. His 1922 book *England after the War* claimed that not since the Wars of the Roses had the English aristocracy suffered such military losses[78].

Furthermore, this myth did not emerge *out of* the war, but was a constituent element of that conflict. Two strands to this are apparent: on the one hand a growing anxiety, linked to the eugenics movement, that Britain's racial stock needed to be subjected to some kind of purification or test of strength (Brooke's

"To turn, as swimmers into cleanness leaping/ Glad from a world grown old and cold and weary" [79]): the other a fatalistic myth thrown up by the aristocracy to disguise the true cause of its demise (apparent since the 1870s), emphasising on the one hand the noble sacrifice of aristocratic young men, and on the other the stab–in–the–back inflicted by aliens (often Jews[80]) and men of lesser rank and honour[81].

Alan Bridges' 1985 film of the Isobel Colgate novel *The Shooting Party* catches a group of aristocrats at this moment of anxiety: their host (James Mason) furiously scribbling pamphlets and memoirs as if to slow down the inevitable demise of his class:

> People say the military régime in Germany is going to insist on a trial of strength sooner or later. And supposing it does come, some great trial, might it not cleanse us of our materialism, our cynicism, our lax lazy hypocrisies, make us gird our sinews and find simplicity again?

But this statement is made against images of the landowning class at play, dissipating their energies in ever more regimented and time–consuming distractions. In the film's opening image of a photograph, in the way that the film is bleached of colour and finally turns into a sepia image, pleasure and rank are offered as brittle, formalist poses. The mise–en–scène is reminiscent of the formal, rigid pleasures on show in Horace Nicholls' photographs of the long Edwardian summer[82].

Yet this apparently assured surface is punctured by a series of portentous *aperçus* which suggest both a plangency over the imminent demise of the guests' class, and a critique of their own activities: "if the landowning class goes, everything goes", "I think an age, perhaps even a civilization is coming to an end", "I see the beauty of a good shoot, of course, but I resist the added solemnity the whole thing gets from that sacrificial note of death, of blood." As Richard Dyer notes, in reviewing *Passage to India*, it is clear that the audience is in the presence of a liberal drama, and this suggests the possibility of ambivalent interpretation.

For John Simons[83], and to some extent Alison Light[84], the liberal historical narrative has a limited role to play in the search for an oppositional culture which unites disparate, disaffiliated groups. The values and appeal of *The Shooting Party* to an historically imaginary but ideologically potent England "show clear reaction against hard monetary economics, the cult of success, managerial bully–worship, and the destruction of tradition."[85]

At the same time, however, the liberal narrative's tolerance of cultures other than those at the centre of the text is typically attenuated. What is peculiar about this historical drama, set at a particular moment of crisis, is its resolute ahistoricity, its vision of a society comfortable with class difference. Conscious of its contradictions, the film ends up staging its own liberalism as doomed: incapable of displaying working relationships as other than feudal ones, it ends up by validating the feudal relationship even in death. As the closing sequence turns sepia and the wartime deaths of footman, lawyer and aristocrat scroll up, there is a sense not simply of ending, but of obliteration. Liberalism is staged as without a future, and this has consequences in terms of its political articulation in the present.

I would argue therefore that far from winning consent to an existing form of rule, a drama of this sort works in a different way, by staging the impossibility of the existence of the past in the present. Far from resurrecting past values, it reinters them, allowing their operation only in 'memorial' form.

ii. Yield to Dull Repose.

While *The Shooting Party* has a very clear idea of the moment of the old order's dissolution, a further series of films position themselves across a spread of years showing the consequences of that decline. These narratives typically take as their theme some notion of inheritance, as antique lines falter and the mantle of responsibility for the nation is taken up by other individuals who lack the old order's organic relationship to place and nation.

In this context, as Corner & Harvey rightly note, the country house has been rigorously objectified, made in these fictions to embody durable attributes of domestic continuity and elegance:

> Almost all of these films contain a recurrent image of an imposing country house seen in extreme long shot ... This image encapsulates much that is typical of the films as a whole, and indicates that the notion of heritage property also needs to be extended to cover the types of ancient architectural and landscape properties conserved by the National Trust and English Heritage, and the costumes, furnishings, objets d'art, and aristocratic character–types that traditionally fill those properties.[86]

The authors are surely right to claim that the recurrent image of the country house resonates with other cultural expectations held by a British viewer. But again, this is to presume that the country house and its inhabitants are unproblematic for the spectator.

This problematic is clearly present in *A Handful of Dust* (1987) where both the country house, Hetton, and its incumbent Tony Last (James Wilby) are presented ambivalently. The establishing shot shows a fox, after which the house comes into view, in front of which is a boy on a pony being educated by a servant; suggesting continuity, tranquillity and links with nature. But Hetton is rambling, gothic and uncomfortable, all terms that Evelyn Waugh may have valorised, but none of which are likely to elicit much sympathy from a contemporary audience. Far from being in its heyday, Hetton is shown to be already something of a white elephant, and the constant shots of trains, cars and an aeroplane suggest that Hetton's pastoral repose has already been shattered. At dinner, Tony's brother–in–law Reggie (Stephen Fry) proposes an alternative use for the house:

> There's a lot in what these Labour fellows say y'know. Big houses are a thing of the past in England ... I daresay you'll have no trouble selling it to a school or something. I can remember when I was trying to get rid of Brakeleigh, my agent said it's a pity it wasn't gothic because schools and convents go for that.

Similarly, Tony himself is shown as a cold fish and the *mise-en-scène* is

sometimes built more around his faithless wife Brenda (Kristin Scott–Thomas) or various minor figures. After building up an image of Tony as a loving father, his assurance to Brenda, following his son's death, that they can have more children seems callous and unfeeling. Yet it is Tony's sensibility that the narrative requires the audience to share; indeed the film purports to criticise all that Brenda and Beaver (Rupert Graves) represent. Irony is piled on irony as the cinematic audience is required to join in the condemnation of Brenda's devotion to the cinema. Equally, while Brenda's art–deco flat may have seemed suitably modern in the 1930s[87], it is now as much part of 'heritage' as Hetton.

The film, however, can only ironise its heritage aspects up to a point, after which it reveals its reactionary literary origins. A profoundly misogynistic, snobbish and pessimistic text, it loads Brenda with a crippling weight of ideological baggage: Brenda wears fox furs while Tony shows John Andrew the living animals; Brenda is relieved that it is her son who has died rather than her lover and her 'education' is shown as a front for the gratification of sexual desires. Yet ultimately she is shown, if not as an inheritor, at least as a survivor (the reverse fate to Virginia Crouchback in Waugh's *Sword of Honour*). Eschewing Waugh's unconvincing alternative happy ending, the film closes with the memorial to Tony and the turning over of Hetton to new uses. The fox in its 'natural' habitat of the opening sequence is counterpointed to the albino, caged animals of the conclusion.

Narratives which concentrate on the corruption and dissolution of the traditional ruling class invite an audience to revaluate that class's original right to rule. But as Andrew Higson has noted, any questions of this nature become sidetracked by the welter of period detail:

> the splendor of the society in place always undercuts images of the last of England. Visual effect, the complete spectacle of the past, becomes an autonomous attraction in itself, once more displacing any narrational qualities the mise–en–scène may have.[88]

Period authenticity has become something of a fetish amongst the makers of

some nostalgic screen fictions, possibly as a result of a prevalent discourse of 'quality' in British screen drama, yet I am by no means sure that audiences are as easily beguiled as Higson and Wollen suggest. More than their attention to detail, it is the melancholic construction of a doomed, noble sensibility in these dramas that is open to question. *Brideshead* for example builds towards a moment of exquisite melancholy at Lord Marchmain's deathbed – deploying the associations of Laurence Olivier (his ringing, hammy diction, his impending mortality) rather than any spectacle of historic glories. The camera lingers over the faces of the assembled mourners before soaring outside the house to a high angle shot:

> MARCHMAIN: [Aunt Julia] always called it the New House. That was their name for it in the nursery and in the fields when unlettered men had long memories. You can see where the old house stood, near the village church – they call the field Castle Hill – Horlick's Field where the ground's uneven and most of it waste, nettle and briar, and hollows most too deep for ploughing. Those were our roots, in the waste hollows of Castle Hill. We were knights then, barons since Agincourt – the larger honours came with the Georges. They came the last and they'll go first. The Barony goes on. When Brideshead's buried Julia's son will be called by the name his fathers bore, before the fat days, the days of wool shearing and the wide cornlands; the days of growth and building; when the marshes were drained and the wasteland brought under the plough (EXTERIOR SHOT OF BRIDESHEAD); when one built a house, his son added the dome, his son spread the wings and dammed the river...

Such an image of dissolution, melancholy and the failure of a noble line resonated with at least one other aspect of heritage culture in the period around *Brideshead*'s production. After the debâcle over the sale of the opulent Mentmore Towers to the Maharishi International College in 1978, a lesser stately home, Calke Abbey, was publicly 'saved' for the nation by the Thatcher administration; the rescue of the house announced by Nigel Lawson in his first speech as Chancellor. Calke, like Deadlock Hall in *Bleak House* had symbolically 'yielded to dull repose'; a seemingly conscious aristocratic snub to the intrusion of modernity:

> When journalists from the *Observer* went up to Calke early in 1984 they found no servants remaining and a singular Henry Harper–Crew living

> alone – indeed, camping out – in two of the house's eighty rooms. That left some seventy–eight rooms on which curtains and doors had been closed at some time over the last 150 years. There was the room of Richard Harper–Crew, who dies in 1921 – his car manuals, model ships and copies of *Jane's Fighting Ships* still lying there.[89]

Patrick Wright sees the saving of Calke as an indication of the miraculous survival of some publicly–constituted essential aspect of Englishness, but I would suggest that its 'message' lies in its very dissolution, the way in which Calke demonstrates an absolute refusal (despite the coffee shops, guides and car parks) to be integrated into contemporary life.

But Brideshead is perhaps unique in eighties screen culture in its unequivocally "Toryist"[90] line (and even here the initial, more satirical episodes sit uneasily with the High Tory solemnity of the concluding sections). Other dramas have chosen to adopt a more ambivalent attitude towards the demise of the inter–war culture.

The title sequence of the Jack Clayton–directed BBC Screen 2 drama *Memento Mori*, for example, seems to promise another slice of indulgent melancholy. Two faded pictures in gilt frames and a bottle of Johnny Walker flank a clock. After a slow focus on the pendulum, it stops. The drama is full of reminders of the conventional typology of the pre–war ruling class: "Another frequent visitor at Marigold's in that magical summer of 1911 was Perceval Mainwaring", "They have a sort of gallantry, with echoes of a romantic and glamorous past", but these are ironic flourishes. The real joke, as they comment to each other, is that their youth was anything but glamorous or gallant, but consisted instead of unmeasured indulgence and betrayal. Prompted to reassess the span of their lives by a series of anonymous phone calls giving the message: "Remember you must die", they look for past achievements and find little reward in what they were and what they have become.

Unusually for the heritage drama, consideration is also given to the plight of the servant class. The stoical, patronised "grannies", brightly making the best of

their regimented public ward provide a largely unspoken criticism of their former employers, increasingly vulnerable and ridiculous in their attempts to keep up appearances.[91]

Equally ambivalent in its construction of a doomed class is the Merchant–Ivory–Jhabvala collaboration *Remains of the Day* (1993). Taking as its subject the servants of a great house, the film tactically ignores any overt representation of the demise of a country family, choosing instead to straddle the period and regret the passing of the old order only in retrospect.

At the centre of the film is Mr. Stevens (Anthony Hopkins), a cautious, deferential patriarch obsessed with the maintenance of dignity and public appearance; "England", he says at one stage, identifying himself with the national values, "where Order and Tradition still prevail". Stevens is a great man in his limited sphere, utterly self–controlled and composed. He is also a moral coward and a snob.

What is unusual about *The Remains of the Day* is that it extends this vignette into a reading of British political history. Stevens is both factotum to, and the very image of, his emotionally–repressed master Lord Darlington (James Fox), an advocate of Appeasement. Like Stevens, Lord Darlington acts from what he considers to be noble instincts. Railing bitterly against Versailles (and in the process summoning the shade of Powell & Pressburger's Theo Kretschmar–Schuldorff) he can find no higher metaphor for gallantry than that provided by sport: "Once you've got your opponent on the canvas, that should be it." But this antiquated fetishization of honour makes him a willing pawn for Nazi territorial ambitions and a temporary enthusiast for the racial policies of Oswald Mosley (here thinly disguised as "Sir Jeffrey") and the New Party. A central scene has an American senator demand that *realpolitik* should take precedence over the dabbling of enthusiastic amateurs, slyly insinuating that the British cult of amateurism, rhetorically invoked by both left and right, contributed to appeasement. At the same time, the film hints at the close association between

some of the founding figures of the country house movement (more "enthusiastic amateurs") and the British Union of Fascists[92]. For as Nancy Mitford has one of her characters say in *Pigeon Pie* (1940): "Aristocrats are inclined to prefer Nazis, while Jews prefer Bolsheviks." [93]

To some extent the film plays down Kazuo Ishiguro's examination of Stevens' own complicity with and reproduction of the hierarchical ordering of class relations, but the brutal exploitation of domestic service is not ignored. Peter Vaughan's elder Mr. Stevens stands waiting at table in his dotage, the mucus from his dripping nose falling into the soup. In another scene Stevens is summoned into his master's presence to be publicly humiliated by a group of economists arguing over the value of intellectual appeals to the Common Man.

The death of the old order is presented unsentimentally – wherever Stevens goes as an old man, people scorn his former master, and the butler is forced to consider (though not confront) the contradictory nature of his position as loyal servant and freeborn member of the polity. During his stay in a West Country guest house, for example, Stevens attempts to negotiate a path between the villagers' assumption that he is a 'gentleman', a local radical's appeal to the traditional image of all Englishmen as heirs to the 'English liberties' and the condemnation of his master's folly in the form of a bed, it's former occupant killed at Dunkirk. Yet Stevens' journey (and here the narrative turns from satire to parable) is not one towards enlightenment. As the title makes clear, his embodiment of a particular sort of Englishness is inherently thanatological – a nostalgic return to the shrouded twilight of the Great House typical of this strand of the nostalgic screen fiction. Bought up in a job lot with the house and the antiques, Stevens is nothing more than a possession – a partner–piece to the Daimler as his new (American) master observes. England is finally staged as washed–out and sold–up, looking to death as an end to its long twilight.

iii. Brave New World?

Two distinct, and problematic, strands of historical imagining which operate in elegiac or plangent representations of the war and immediate post–war period suggest themselves. One grieves for the lost window of opportunity in which a more equitable society might have been created, at the same time summoning a Hoggartian image of some putative 'pure' and now–deceased working class, while the other posits a period of increased sexual freedom, tempering this nostalgia with a certain distaste for values which are broadly coded as 'lower class'.

A. Workers & Victims

With a perfect eye for timetabling, the Trevor Griffiths drama *Country* was transmitted at the same time as the second episode of *Brideshead Revisited* (20.10.81). *Country* provides a conscious corrective to the romantic opulence of the Waugh/Mortimer vision of England: it too is 'about' a ruling class, but focuses on a powerful mercantile family regrouping in a country house in order to survive the strong socialist currents of 1945. Griffiths deliberately positioned the family in what he termed the 'foothills' of the aristocracy in contrast to *Brideshead*'s seigneurial grandees.

In one scene a character reads from Labour's 1945 manifesto, and there is a certain degree of deliberate correlation with Tony Benn's 1981 proposals for strategic change in the Labour Party. Rather optimistically, Griffiths hoped that such ideas might prove attractive, moving Labour back from its social–democratic stance to a more socialist left position: "It's possible that in two years time we could have a regeneration of the Labour Party as a Socialist force within society. I hope so because we need it. I'm sick of broad churches."[94]

This elegiac return to a moment of Labour 'purity' featured in at least two other screen fictions, *A Private Function* and *Hope and Glory*. But the latter text (like the petty bourgeoisie who form its subject matter) seems profoundly unsure of

itself, moving uneasily between a celebration of war–time communality, post–war optimism and aristocratic nostalgia. Each enthusiasm is characterised by an excess of representation, turning the film at times into an exercise in pastiche. The early shots, for example, emphasise that the events take place in an overdetermined Suburbia: the camera pans across the tea service, through the stained glass upper windows and out to a front gate bearing the house name BHIN–TAL. Suddenly all the Sunday morning lawnmowers stop in unison for Chamberlain's announcement of war!

Later in the film, signifiers of Home Front communality are laid on with cloying thickness. The Mother dusts the piano and plays "Begin the Beguine". A voice in the background says "We never used to sing so much before the war, did we." Renditions of a plangent Chopin nocturne and "We'll Meet Again" follow. Further unnecessary declarations punctuate the film. At one stage, Clive, the father of the protagonist argues with his friend about past and future. They walk through a bombed out semi:

> CLIVE (David Hayman): What kind of war is it Mac? When I rode in against the Turks I knew what it was all about.
> MAC (Derrick O'Connor): Did you? You thought you did. We've been gypped all our lives, Smiler. Take your street.
> CLIVE: What about it?
> MAC: Rosehill Avenue. No roses, no bloody hill and it's certainly not an avenue, is it?
> CLIVE: (laughs) Why not?
> MAC: Well you need trees for an avenue.
> CLIVE: There was talk of planting some when we first came.
> MAC: Propaganda. We've been had...
> CLIVE: I don't understand, there's no point to any of it.
> MAC: There is alright. This Hitler fella, we've got to winkle him out, and get shot of some of our lot at the same time...

Again, late in the film, after the family have been evacuated to the countryside, there is an excess of context: punting on the Thames, shotguns, cricket, marching scouts, scrumping and high tea with a string quartet signify a past so extravagant as to become kitsch.

Ultimately the film comes to deny its carefully–constructed commitment to 'ordinary people', increasingly focusing on Billy/Boorman's grandfather (Ian Bannen), a misogynistic curmudgeon who fills the gap left by the absent father, and constantly gives the boy lessons in how to undermine what he sees as an increasingly feminized culture[95]. The retreat to a pastoral environment where all problems (of women's roles, of education, of housing etc.) can be worked out on an individual level suggests that constant Thatcherite recourse to the image of the British people as a happily stratified folk, betrayed by the collectivist settlement of 1945. It is significant that, although the film looks beyond itself to a social democratic future (whose principal voice is uncoincidentally a cuckold), it ends before the cessation of hostilities in an eternal summer, with post–war seeming like a denial of the conflict's rationale. The war provides its own logic: the fighting is a release from the negatively–coded 'impotent' pre–war suburban culture (there are several shots of little boys enthusiastically smashing up teasets and Armitage Shanks) and the energies released by the war can only be betrayed by post–war. As Graham Dawson and Bob West have noted:

> Thatcherism has reworked the meanings of the moment when appeasement collapsed, so as to re–establish continuity with that previous glorious history: a continuity now broken, not by the disasters of 1940, but by the period of the post–war consensus, 1945–79. Britain has fallen from "her" previous self–supremacy, but can be great again. The Thatcher government is the self–appointed heir of the glorious past.[96]

Like *Hope & Glory*, *A Private Function* (1984) seems unsure about its class location. Ostensibly 'about' the impossibility of transcending class prejudices in order to construct a more equitable society, it nonetheless rarely strays from the terrain of the petit bourgeoisie. As Judith Williamson has remarked, scriptwriter Alan Bennet sometimes has "an apparent inability to envisage the 'lower' or working class as anything other than *lower middle class*. In a nostalgic haze which passes for social comment, lace curtains, rubber gloves, *Housewives' Choice* and white–collar aspirations become blended together in an all–purpose LMC."[97] And this structure of feeling is further coded as overwhelmingly

feminine and middle–aged or elderly. Alison Steadman and Liz Smith's characters are parodies both of predatory femininity and of the ineffable greed of the bourgeoisie. Joyce (Maggie Smith), while less obviously caricatured, is still a repository of Little England chauvinism. "Oh England", she cries at one crucial moment, "It's like a fairy tale."

Moreover, despite the apparent commitment to some notion of a consensual wartime political landscape, the film constructs the immediate past as already corrupted. In some respects *A Private Function* acts as a kind of conscious corrective to the utopianism of a post–war film text such as *Diary for Timothy*. Against the latter's image of a society of carers, Bennett & Mowbray position the GP, Dr. Swaby, (Denholm Elliott) as an embodiment of parochial bigotry. Portrayed in opposition to the received history of consensual, benevolent welfarism, Swaby rails bitterly against the coming age of the 'common man':

> SWABY (surrounded by co–conspirators): Practical socialism! This is what it's going to be like now. What's yours is mine...God, what a nasty, piss–stained country this is, it's like this new health service – do you realise that any little poorly pillock is now going to be able to knock on my door and say "I'm ill, treat me." Anybody! Me! (Walking out he catches sight of Gilbert [Michael Palin] sipping a cocktail) Look at him – that foot fellow. We're finished you & me Lockwood. That's what's coming to the top, the scum. No class, no breeding, no morals. I give this country five years.

Similarly, *Timothy*'s valorisation of the state is ironised. An archetypal Pathé News item parodies the *Picture Post* construction of the decent British type, indulging in some cheap sneers at the French and fawning servitude to the monarchy. The state's agents are shown to be either corrupt or, in the case of the food inspector Wormold, fanatically bureaucratic. The constant references to Wormold as 'The Gestapo' resonates with a profound mistrust of the state as a form of conscienceless collectivity.

Rather than indicating some principle of political opposition to this structure of feeling, the film offers quietism as its radical term. The chiropodist protagonist,

Gilbert, endlessly wandering around with a giant foot, the hen–pecked overweight accountant (Richard Griffiths) with his ginger biscuits and indeed the doomed pig which provides the narrative catalyst are all variants on the scrawny husband of seaside postcards – repositories of decency only because of their silence and inaction. Far, therefore, from contrasting petit bourgeois mores with a radical vision of national life, narrative and *mise-en-scène* actually offer a choice between action against inaction as a way of reading post–war history, a choice which will inevitably favour the former term.

Boorman and Mowbray, however, are 'daytrippers' to this past. Terence Davies in contrast has always emphasised the continuing centrality of his own working–class past to his work. It comes as a surprise, therefore, when *The Long Day Closes* (1992) opens with a still life: a vase of flowers, richly lit, standing out against a background fading into black. Full credits, in delicate regency script, scroll over the dark side of the screen to the accompaniment of a Boccherini minuet. Davies' second feature gestures therefore towards the quality tradition of English nostalgia while evincing an ironic self–consciousness, the opening frames after the credits returning to the familiar Liverpool landscape of Davies' working–class 'memory', seen first in the psychobiographical *Trilogy* (1980–3).

The director's memory, however, (regularly invoked as a distancing device) is not an unproblematic reference point. In interview Davies stated that, "I remember atmosphere and emotions with incredible accuracy. I don't think I've got a photographic memory, but I've got a photographic *emotional* memory."[98] For the film, production designer Christopher Hobbs attempted to exaggerate the settings in order to create an air of hyperreality predicated by this emphasis on emotional history: the film "wasn't a re–creation of 50s Liverpool, it was a re–creation of Terence's memory. I therefore went for a memory realism, which is not the same as real realism."[99]

Even leading aside Roger Bromley's persuasive reservations about individual memory acting as a final arbiter of historical understanding, this 'memory

realism' is problematic. *Distant Voices* displaces autobiography onto Davies' older brothers and sisters: born in 1945 he miraculously 'remembers' the Liverpool blitz.

But memory, however often summoned is not, I think, the major difficulty with Davies' questioning and often painful representation of a hidden history of class and, to some extent, gender. Perhaps paradoxically, two features of his work stand out as being closely related to mainstream nostalgic screen fictions. Firstly, contrary to his denial of photographic memory, Davies' films make much of the period surface. Dress, sets and props, even if, as in *Distant Voices*, minimally present, are publicised as acts of archaeology. The costume designer Monica Howe scoured the country in search of 50s originals rather than hire or make costumes for *The Long Day Closes*, and Davies himself apparently casts mainly for faces rather than on acting ability[100]. This emphasis on 'getting it right' resonates both with the quality historical drama's love affair with the period artefact and with the invocation of naturalism or realism as the defining characteristic of each new wave of British cinema.

Yet this surface naturalness does not extend to shooting, genre[101] or soundtrack. The use of music (including choral singing, film soundtracks, popular song and classical pieces) acts as a metaphor for memory and is rarely simply gratuitous. But the films have been criticized for their celebration of popular song as an expression of essential working–class stoicism, solidarity and sentimentality. In *Distant Voices, Still Lives*, most of the songs are overlaid with ironic meaning (Tommy thrashes his wife to the accompaniment of Ella Fitzgerald's "Taking a Chance on Love", Micky voices an implied threat of retribution in her version of Harry Belafonte's "Brown–Skin Girls") but occasionally the films seem to merge with the distance–defined visions of Adorno, Orwell or Hoggart, where custom becomes confused with essence. The terrified Eileen sings "Roll Out the Barrel" during an air raid in *Distant Voices*, the archetypal 'mam' in *The Long Day Closes* sings "If You Were the Only Girl in the World" over her drab washtub, an image, as John Caughie has

perceptively remarked, that operates beyond the reaches of irony[102]. Satirised in the opening sequence of *Billy Liar* (1963), this belief that the intrusion of pop modernity created an unbridgeable rift between the working class and its true, 'organic' culture, seems to be experiencing an extended afterlife, ironically echoing the perceived lament of other heritage fictions for an organic aristocratic culture.

Moreover, while Davies' insider credentials are indisputable, his valorisation of symmetry in each shot tends to produce a feeling of distance or detachment, suggesting that the history of a class can be neatly staged or boxed. The camera rarely moves, and is always square on to the filmed group, individual or object. Given his commitment to a notion of Hollywood entertainment[103] this emphasis on the *tableau vivant* curiously links Davies with Peter Greenaway, an apparently uneasy bedfellow given the latter's anti–Hollywood, anti–liberal humanist predilections, but comforting for those who would bracket the two 'auteurs' as part of a native art–house aesthetic.

A final reservation about Davies' construction of post–war history is that there seems to be no existence beyond the hermetically sealed community. As John Caughie has observed, the imagined/remembered values of this community legitimates the nostalgia of the left for a past it may never have had: "the old images of passivity and endurance .. can only celebrate happiness by celebrating stasis." Neither history nor memory are constructed purely from family get–togethers, cinema trips or *Family Favourites*, yet Davies' films seem to imply that this is the case. History, in the shape of the welfare state, Korea, Suez or Hungary or the break–up of the left is almost totally absent: a flash of war–time communality in *Distant Voices*, a black immigrant quickly told to "frig off" are the only traces of a broader history. At their best, these films recognise the proximity of memory and fantasy and highlight a particular history of consummate rage and disappointment, but there are other times when Terence Davies' works fits more closely with another kind of contemporary screen drama, one evoked by an excess of kitsch.

B. Sex & Snobbery

> Your first impression is of overpowering vulgarity. This is quite apart from the ever–present obscenity, and apart also from the hideousness of the colours. They have an utter lowness of mental atmosphere which comes out not only in the nature of the jokes but, even more, in the grotesque, staring, blatant quality of the drawings. The designs, like those of a child, are full of heavy lines and empty spaces, and all the figures in them, every gesture and attitude, are deliberately ugly, the faces grinning and vacuous, the women monstrously parodied, with bottoms like Hottentots. Your second impression, however, is of indefinable familiarity.[104]

Orwell's 1941 *Horizon* article, "The Art of Donald McGill" addresses the risqué picture postcards of the inter–war period, using them as a springboard for a discussion of the emancipatory potential of the Rabelaisian impulse. While concluding that "when it comes to the pinch, human beings are heroic"[105], Orwell applauds the millions of raspberries blown by the undistinguished masses behind the backs of Fuhrers and Prime Ministers, Popes and headmasters.

This flatulent gesture has reappeared in the post–1979 period in a series of films which cock a snook at 'authority'. Parts of *A Private Function* and *Scandal* are in this vein (while there are more fatal attacks on the post–war 'Establishment' in *Dance with a Stranger* and *Let Him Have It*), but the two films which interest me most are *Prick Up Your Ears* and *Wish You Were Here*, both of which suffuse their depictions of increased lower class sexual freedom with a sensibility of fashionable distaste.

As Judith Williamson has shown[106], the post–war milieu in these films is evoked by an excess of kitsch, but whereas kitsch usually involves an ironic relationship to objects removed from their original context, here, objects returned to their historical period retain all the curiosity of their original removal. The past becomes 'a kind of retro–unchic boutique' filled with what has been plundered from it.

But if the confusion over the intended reaction to the *mise-en-scène* is

ultimately insignificant, there is something pernicious about the ambivalence in the representation of class. As Orwell noted, the seaside postcards of McGill opened up a space for the articulation of inter–class snobberies, playing on the lower middle class or better–off working class mistrust of the "rough manners of slum dwellers". Similarly, while Frears' and Leland's films ostensibly attack middle–class hypocrisy (in the latter film by having Linda incessantly say "up your bum" to authority figures), the values actually under attack are those which the middle class despises. In *Wish You Were Here*, for example, the opening sequence has a fat middle–aged woman tap dancing on the promenade. It is supposed to be funny, but only because of a coded class prejudice. Orwell again:

> One of the few authentic class–differences, as opposed to class distinctions, still existing in England is that the working classes age very much earlier. They do not live less long, provided that they survive their childhood, nor do they lose their physical activity earlier, but they do lose very early their youthful appearance...[107]

Linda (Emily Lloyd), in contrast, has a directly–presented prettiness which places her, in the film's visual hierarchy, above the various shiny–suited, sweating men & women of her seaside town, whose problem becomes, not their social codes, but the fact that they are uglier than her. Similarly, *Prick Up Your Ears* makes Kenneth Halliwell (Alfred Molina) unnecessarily grotesque, constantly applying make–up and awkwardly fixing his wig. In contrast, the cheekily handsome Joe Orton (Gary Oldman) is to some extent salvaged for a 'straight' culture which, while deploring his sexuality, is likely to approve of his rejection of the camp, kitschy continuum from his mother's false teeth to his lover's false hair.

In both films, the chosen ground of rebellion is sex, and this is consonant with the dominant history of the nation's post–war sexual liberation, but in both cases (particularly *Wish You Were Here*) the comic disgust which is a consistent mode of representation also pervades the representation of sex. Sexuality (a dog chewing on a Durex) appears as grotesque as the middle

class which represses it. Sex is supposed to be subversive but is presented as absolutely horrible: the red, panting face of Linda's bus–conductor boyfriend as he comes too soon on their first night; the verbal abuse of her father's friend Eric (Tom Bell) as he gropes in her knickers. So when Linda jumps on a chair in a restaurant at the end of the film and yells, "I like willies" it is quite impossible to see why. The film's central confusion is that what the narrative presents as her "liberation", the imagery and *mise-en-scène* presents as humiliation. While this is profoundly unpleasurable to watch, there is at least a principle of resistance going on in the text to some notion of historical 'purity'. *Wish You Were Here* and *Prick Up Your Ears* are limit texts for the construction of a post–war national myth which would replace the attractions of privilege with those of unproblematic permissiveness. The plangent historical fiction has seemingly come unstuck on pop modernity, and it is perhaps significant that two recent films on the Beatles (*The Hours and the Times* [1992] and *Backbeat* [1994]) resisted the temptation to represent the 1960s as a period of renewed British cultural imperialism, with Swinging London as the founding centre of an empire of taste.

While the structure of feeling expressed in these films may therefore differ markedly (from a lament for the aristocracy to a compromised paean for the origins of the sexual revolution), their persistence of plangent modes of representation should be clear (and a more thorough examination of these films would have examined in greater length such recurrent features as the seaside resort as an analog for cultural demise, or the protests over the encroachment of a more 'feminized' culture). I would continue to argue that these films structure time in a potentially liberatory way: refusing to see history as hermetically sealed, they construct space and time as mutable. Occasionally a deeply problematic view of history as entropy emerges, which might be seen as resonant with a conservative fatalism. Yet elsewhere (even in such a backward–looking text as *The Shooting Party*) the incorporation of a continuing, external history resists the pull of anteriority which is such a major part in the construction of national fantasy.

c. OPERA, LITERATURE & THE COMMODITY FORM: E.M.FORSTER ON FILM

With great thanks to
The Nippon Film Finance Corporation
Howards End closing titles.

Imagine a film rich with scenes shot in Cambridge colleges and lush English countryside, set to an accompaniment of horse-drawn carriages with the occasional punctuation of bursts of steam at railway stations. This far from imaginary work is part of a cinematic genre which has had a remarkable prominence in the 80s: a genre which focuses on the English middle and upper classes at home and abroad before they were drowned by the flood of the First World War and the end of Empire. Its source is often literary - and most often E.M. Forster.[108]

The final structure of feeling evoked by these films bears a relationship to the Waugh and Colgate adaptations, but without their sense of plangency. Most closely associated with the E.M. Forster cycle, this form of film production has been attacked for a form of historic representation which refuses to look beyond itself to its moment of dissolution, thereby fetishizing the class positions and tastes it stages. This monolithic criticism, however, rarely addresses the popularity of these films, nor does it suggest how the liberal narrative concerns of the films might set up some dialectic between 'past' and 'present'.

Since 1979, every E.M. Forster novel with the exception of *The Longest Journey* has been adapted for the cinema. *Passage to India* was directed by David Lean and *Where Angels Fear To Tread* by Charles Sturridge but the partnership most familiar to audiences of Forster films is that of Ismail Merchant and James Ivory (generally using scripts by Ruth Prawer Jhabvala) who have adapted *Howards End*, *Maurice* and *A Room with a View* for the screen.

The novel *A Room with a View* was turned down for New York publication in 1908 on the grounds that it was "not sufficiently compelling for an American audience." Nearly 80 years later, the American success of the film suggested that English actors could attract an audience in America as something other

than European villains; that video sale could form a substantial part of the market for an "art–house" film and that there was a rich vein of Edwardiana waiting to be mined.

The critical animus against these films is familiar and rests on several assumptions, some less refutable than others. Most obvious is that the films have a repertory feeling about them, using actors familiar both from other Forster adaptations and from other texts in the heritage canon[109]. The directors have also worked on other heritage projects (Sturridge on *Brideshead Revisited*, Merchant–Ivory on a variety of dramas) and have shown a certain reluctance to engage with the contemporary. Sturridge has countered:

> The idea that stories set in the past exist on a sort of Dunlopillow mattress that doesn't impinge upon the audience is not true at all. A society ... which is recognizable and fixed by history, allows you to discuss ideas more forcefully than you could in a contemporary structure, where often you're dazzled by a different narrative excitement.[110]

The second charge is that the Forster films represent a safe, bland variety of cinema, luring investors away from more challenging, contemporary subjects. Given the pattern of US investment in British films since at least the 1960s, however, it seems extremely unlikely that money would be diverted from one production to another in such a simplistic fashion.[111] Moreover, while later productions may have been comparatively lavish, *A Room with a View* and *Maurice* were produced on what were publicised as limited budgets[112]:

> "Masters of boutique cinema on a flea–market budget, the producer Ismail Merchant and the director James Ivory had contented themselves, film after film, with a select audience and modest receipts. But suddenly these longtime partners were the toast of shopping–mall multiplexes across the land as their gentle Edwardian comedy of manners *A Room with a View* proceeded to rake in $65 million, reams of critical raves, three Academy Awards, even a best–selling sound–track album. It was all quite unexpected."[113]

This review from the American magazine *Connoisseur* suggests a third problem with the films: their perpetuation of a fetishized nostalgia and a preoccupation

with the appearance and possessions of the £600 a year classes. James Ivory (talking about *Mr. & Mrs. Bridge*) has said: "I'm happiest when there *is* a story that gives some structure... But maybe story *isn't* my first concern" suggesting a fixation with the appearance and surface of the past over "depth" meanings.[114]

> The dominance and success of this particular brand of film–making in the past ten years is symptomatic of the crisis of identity through which England passed during the Thatcher years. It is film as conspicuous consumption: the country houses, the pannelled interiors, the clothes which have provided a good business for New York fashion houses selling English country style to rich Americans. Then there are all those shots of crystal decanters (Lucy Honeychurch carries *two* as she breaks off her engagement), of glasses glinting on silver salvers.[115]

This caricatured analysis of the films resembles the moralism of the later Frankfurt school, positing some all–pervasive reification and, as Alison Light has pointed out, dismissing the role of the viewer in the process[116]. At the same time it fetishistically switches between the twin shades of Thatcher and "rich Americans", ignoring the history of English liberalism with which the films ambivalently deal. Positioning myself somewhere between Light and Craig, I would dispute any dismissal of the problematic or progressive features of the narratives in these films, while at the same time agreeing that they indulge in a commodity fetishism which is wholly consonant with the workings of late capitalism.

In his chapter on "The fetishism of commodities" in Volume One of *Capital* (1867), Marx argues that in capitalist society the actual social relations between human beings are governed by the apparently autonomous interaction of the commodities they produce:

> [a commodity] is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order ... to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist–enveloped regions of the religious world. In that world, the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into relations both with one another and with the human race.[117]

Marx is talking about classical industrial production, and the way in which products come to escape the control of men and women, but the production of images and forms of identity in late capitalism may be seen to be equally under the sway of this commodity fetishism, associating (in the subject under discussion) the past with its manufactured symbols, and not with its social processes. This has several consequences of an ideological kind. First, the real workings of Edwardian society are occluded: the social relations towards which Forster makes some faint, compromised gesture are concealed behind the period commodities which are defined as autonomous, self–generating signifiers of quality and not as social products. Secondly, society becomes fragmented by this commodity logic: it is no longer possible to grasp it as a totality given the atomizing operations of the commodity, which transmutes the collective activity of social labour into relations between dead, discrete things. And by ceasing to appear as a totality the capitalist order renders itself less vulnerable to political critique[118]: within the hermetic system of fetishism established by certain nostalgic screen fictions, the lifestyles and possessions on display cannot be related to larger processes and practices; their historical moment cannot be extended into its consequences. For example, the revelatory moments which all the films end with (the lovers on the railway platform in *Where Angels Fear to Tread*; George and Lucy looking out of the window; *Howards End*'s closing shot from the sisters to the already defunct plough team) cannot gesture towards the *real* future – the First World War which destroyed the secure world to which Forster's comedies of manners were tied. While the films criticise the isolation of English *bourgeois* culture, the abstraction of products from producers and the *rentier* class from its moment of crisis cannot but help to reinforce that isolation.

A further interesting feature of the *Connoisseur* evaluation of the Merchant–Ivory output is the stress on the soundtrack album. *Room with a View* features arias from Puccini's *Gianna Schicchi* and *La Rondine*, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* has a central scene in which the English characters attend a performance of Donizetti's *Lucia di Lammermoor* and *Howards End* features

two rather more demotic pieces by Percy Grainger. This stress on popular classics became a feature of British cultural life during the 1980s, linked with the new alignment of national taste outlined in Chapter Two by which some high cultural products became 'pop' during the period and some popular culture styles and artifacts were awarded high culture canonical status. Mark Stein, talking about the success of recent musicals, has seen this phenomenon as part of a wider entrenchment of middle–class, middle–England values in the national culture.

> ...It's not commercial art, this is actually the stuff that Cameron Mackintosh and Andrew Lloyd Webber like, and I think it was also seen elsewhere in the 1980s, if you look at the popular classical thing with Nigel Kennedy's *Four Seasons* getting into the charts. I think that had less to do with Nigel Kennedy wearing a Colonel Gadaffi pillbox hat and more to do with the fact that Vivaldi, *The Four Seasons*, is a good coffee table classic. And similarly with the Pavarotti in the Park thing, this idea of a resurgence of solid core, middlebrow culture.[119]

This cultural space has, while writing this chapter, become a more overtly political space with the two major parties struggling over who is best equipped to represent Middle England. The future of Middle England is a question worthy of further consideration, though ultimately beyond the scope of this thesis.

Timothy Corrigan[120] has expanded the position of opera in these films to the extent that it becomes the defining feature of the historically–conscious screen fiction. Noting the plethora of operatic arias in recent films, he suggests that "the operatic has become the other song of postmodern history. This operatic structure is not, however, the ironic counterpoint to the popular generational songs that might seem to dominate contemporary history but the full extension of what it means to see history through the generational logic of the popular."[121]

Corrigan's analysis is indebted to Catherine Clément's evaluation of opera[122], seeing it as a form of grand spectacle against which human (mostly female) subjectivity must exceed and destroy itself as a consequence of expressing that

subjectivity. He finds suitable illustration of this in such pessimistic texts as *Apocalypse Now* and *Dangerous Liaisons* which narcissistically distort history with the object of releasing the human subject from its strictures. Undoubtedly tied up in such issues of historical realignment and identity formation as British nostalgic screen fictions are, it seems unhelpful to consider them in this way – if anything the operatic arias mark their respective historical moments as periods of intellectual, emotional and artistic stability before the intrusion of the deadened sentiment of commercial music, not as moments of dislocation and breakdown. Their plangency, however, as I suggested earlier, does gesture towards an entropic history with which Corrigan partially engages.

A final criticism of these films (and by extension much of the heritage film canon) is their reliance on an established literary culture (a culture which stands accused, as the debate over the National Curriculum in English has made clear, of being racist, sexist and snobbish). "The literary source material...functions as an important selling point, playing on the familiarity and prestige of the particular novel or play, but also invoking the pleasures of other such quality literary adaptations and the status of a national intellectual tradition. The genre can also invent new texts for the canon by treating otherwise marginal texts or properties to the same modes of representation and marketing."[123] Again this resonates with another significant aspect of British culture in the 1980s, and also with a major means by which the nation has been formulated. As Richard Hoggart observed in 1966:

> ...without appreciating good literature, no one will really understand the nature of society [and] literary critical analysis can be applied to certain social phenomena other than 'academically respectable' literature ... so as to illuminate their meanings for individuals and their societies.[124]

The compilers of the National Curriculum were certainly working with this *arriére-garde* image of "good literature" in mind, but in one of those characteristic paradoxes of the post–1979 period, this fundamentally reactionary appeal to bourgeois culture comes to seem transgressive in the face of a militant phillistinism (with Mrs. Thatcher's personal preferences for Frederick

Forsyth novels and the Beverley Sisters' "How much is that doggy in the window" totemically paraded). The public library system has been decimated, while bookshops, often simulacra of libraries, have mushroomed[125]. Again, the implication is that the better–positioned can 'buy in' to the national culture, or that culture is contained within elegantly designed spaces, and not within dowdy, institutionalised, public space.

I wouldn't wish to argue with the letter of most of these criticisms, and as I've tried to show, these criticisms resonate with other well–founded forms of cultural anxiety but, as Alison Light makes clear, their spirit is harshly anti–populist, emulating the criticisms of UK heritage culture outlined earlier. In attempting a less obviously hostile form of criticism, I would therefore chose to highlight some of the more equivocal representations of Englishness and the national past in two of the later Forster adaptations.

Where Angels Fear to Tread adopts a less indulgent view of the English abroad than the broad comedy of *A Room with a View*, progressing from a sunny comedy of manners to a rain–sodden melodramatic climax in which the infant child of an English woman and Italian man (with its promise of union across cultures) is killed through the intrusion of Edwardian repressiveness. In adapting the novel for the screen, the character of Harriet (Judy Davis) is fleshed out with a range of peevish mannerism's suggestive of a parochial Little Englandism which the film sets itself up to scorn ("Where's the Walter Scott in all this?" she asks in the Donizetti performance, "Where's the Walter Scott I should like to know.")

But if the film takes a broadly progressive stance in its condemnation of English parochial snobbery and xenophobia (and here its release in the shadow of 1992 and the new air of 'Europeanness' may be significant), it is altogether more equivocal in some of its other emphases. Where Forster remains ambivalent about the Italian setting, Sturridge highlights the picturesque at every opportunity, throwing in some gratuitous shots of street urchins alongside the

inevitable long–shot of the Duomo and Michael Coulter's views of the Tuscan countryside: incorporating the exotic into a highly traditional mode of English landscape representation.

The ending is similarly altered. Whereas in the novel the scene in which Philip (Rupert Graves) realises that he remains unloved takes place on route for England, Sturridge stages it on a railway platform straight from *Brief Encounter*, invoking by association both that very English detachment which is elsewhere condemned in the film and the English countryside for which the steam train, from the LNER posters of the 30s onwards, is a paradoxical synecdoche. Again, much of the satiric intent in the representation of Englishness is deflated by an uncritical commitment to 'quality' in film production and a concomitant fetishization of the past. "A story about fine ironies and 'fine' behaviour becomes a genre exercise in fine acting and even finer linen"[126].

The adaptation of *Howards End* (1992) is possibly a sign that the Forster/Waugh screen adaptation cycle is finally grinding to a halt. Eschewing the foreign locations of *A Room with a View* and *Where Angels Fear to Tread*, the film ironically takes as its subject the very heritage industry that the 'Forster film' has become part of. The shadows of impending modernity, massification and a more 'feminized' culture are to be found in references to the suffragettes, the motor car and train, all echoing Forster's obsession with social and geographical mobility, encapsulated in the novelist's plea (absent in the film) to "only connect". At the same time the narrative centre of the film concerns issues of inheritance and disenfranchisement crucial to any consideration of the operation of heritage in national life.

The undoubted villains of the film are the outwardly agreeable Wilcoxes, led by Anthony Hopkins' patriarch. They embody all that is grasping and greedy about the *haute bourgeoisie*, buying up the symbols of an older England (Howards End, the castle in Shropshire, the house in Mayfair) with the profits of their colonial enterprises and shamelessly shirking on their responsibilities towards

others.

The most direct criticism of this acquisitive culture (and indeed also of the Fabian *bourgeoisie* represented by Helen and Margaret Schlegel) comes from the urban white collar worker, Leonard Bast (Samuel West). Bast's dreams are drawn from the stock repertoire of heritage imagery: impressionist fields through which to wander and Flatfordesque streams – but his material conditions call into question the cosiness of the heritage world view: his cramped dwelling, for example, is constantly shaken by the passing of locomotives elsewhere signified as authentic and picturesque. When Helen (Helena Bonham Carter) opines that "books are more real than anything...when people fail you there's music and meaning", Bast retorts, "That's for rich people after their dinner", a line which rests uneasily both with Merchant–Ivory's output and the assumptions of a great English literary heritage which underpin their screen adaptations.

But if Bast is awarded the most cutting critique of the film, the treatment of the working class elsewhere is less indulgent. West's accent is inflected with an irritating nasal whine and Bast is represented as pompously awkward and uncomfortable in the company of the Schlegels. Even the sisters' philanthropy is predicated on his "sensitive" differences from the lumpen mass of his class.[127] Nicola Duffett's flame–haired and buxom Jacky Bast is a caricature of a Toulouse–Lautrec show–girl, drunk at Evie Wilcox's wedding, 'guilty' of prostitution and ultimately left in narrative suspension after Leonard's manslaughter.

The plot ultimately devolves, therefore, not onto the issues briefly raised of class inheritance, but onto a more straightforward question of capitalist property relations, which is entirely consonant with the predilections of both contemporary Conservatism and the heritage lobby. The Schlegel's are represented as 'natural' inheritors of Howards End (their father's sword looks right over the fireplace, their carpets fit) and this suggests that the intrusion of

modernity into the English rural scene can be offset by a combination of sensibility and tastefulness, a combination very familiar to readers of those contemporary magazines that valorise the country home. Nonetheless, the final whereabouts of Jacky Bast is a nagging piece of narrative excess, threatening to dominate the film in a way that no working–class character managed to do in any of the other Forster/Waugh adaptations.

The Forster film then (in some ways a metonym for the nostalgic screen fiction), is not perhaps the undifferentiated product that some reviewers suggest. Certainly the satiric edge of these films is blunted by their fetishization of the appearance and possessions of the past, but these are by no means a unified whole. The presence of issues of high culture, property relations, limited class, cultural and sexual mobility in these texts are certainly tied up with the operations of late capitalism, but testify to its very diffuseness, the way in which it operates within different groups through a bewildering assortment of tropes, practices and forms of consciousness. Emma Thompson's pat description of *Howards End* – "Bohemia meets imperial Britain and the shit hits the fan" – comes to seem an appropriate image for the space created by the demise of old forms of identification, a space in which both late capitalism and the heritage industry go to work.

4. CONCLUSION - OTHER HISTORIES.

I have tried to show how the heritage film occupies an ambiguous position in the reformulation of the national culture which has taken place since the mid–1970s: lavishly recreating a past which is simultaneously coded as desirable *and* problematic. It is clear, however, from the opprobrium in which these films are often held, that the problematising gestures of each fiction (around class, sexuality, nationhood etc.) rarely transcend their period attractions: form is often taken as content, and these fictions are lionised or attacked for marketing Britain and its past.

A 'founding text' in this respect is *Chariots of Fire* (1982). While the ostensible content of the film was the struggles of two athletes within, and to some extent against the dominant national culture, the publicity for the film, and later the hype which surrounded its Academy Award success, reinflected it as a simple slice of Anglo–British triumphalism. David Puttnam's trailer appealed directly to a highly selective history of British cinema, showing clips from *The Third Man*, *Brief Encounter*, *Oliver*, *Lawrence of Arabia* and, most tellingly, *Henry V*. But, as Olivier delivers his Agincourt address, the image slowly shrinks and the sound fades away, to be replaced by a narrator asking what happened to British films like these. "America, that's what happened," comes the reply. "Suddenly every film takes place in Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco. Which is why Twentieth Century–Fox are so very proud..."[128] Cue the celebrated Broadstairs beach scene with its Vangelis accompaniment.

Representations such as this do more than market a film: they define what is speakable about the iconography of nation and of the past and what should be the appropriate form of British film. It is perhaps unsurprising that the public debate about British film has been largely galvanized by success in the Oscars, which provides a very specific model of cinematic production. While I have been cautious about discussing the industrial aspects of heritage film, it is clear that these spectacles have been used to market a singular notion of 'Britishness', emphasizing opulence, quality and 'History', all terms with

considerable crossover potential into other economic areas[129]. Looking through the British Film Commission's document[130], I am struck by the concentration of traditionally picturesque images of Britain, and the anti–modern bias in some of the endorsements:

> The simple fact is, the North has got it all. Fabulous rolling landscapes... glorious vistas (with no pylons!) and miles of stunning empty beaches. There are hundreds (no, thousands) of country houses dotted around the countryside, which, to a producer of period drama, are a godsend.[131]

This marketing of Britain has led to the articulation of significant cultural anxieties. As Thomas Elsaesser has argued, the Thatcher period has witnessed a differentiation between the projection of what one could call a 'social imaginary' of Britain and the projection of a 'national imaginary', one for 'us' and one for 'them'[132]. Many of the films I've discussed seem to fit in this latter, external view of Britain, dealing with a palatable form of history that is hardly recognisable to those who have lived though it or its consequences. This in turn has led to a phobic sense of our own insignificance: 'Fantasy Island'; 'Theme Park Britain'. Indeed, some commentators have argued (from a predominantly economic position) that national film cannot *help* but offer an ersatz view of national life since it must make its appeal in a global environment insensitive to local difference: "for a cinema to be nationally popular it must also be international in scope. That is to say it must achieve the international (Hollywood) standard."[133]

Yet such a view awards undue significance to a particular form of image production, and asks questions neither about the uses British audiences may have for these texts, nor about the diversity of representations of the past. Some 'long view' of British cinema history would note the moments at which the costume drama has turned, as it were, against itself, highlighting the past as a zone of constructed meanings. The Gainsborough melodramas of the 1940s might be one such example, or the cycle of films in the 1960s which stressed the brutality of the British military machine. In the post–1979 period, in parallel with the fetishisms of Merchant–Ivory, Sturridge and Richard Attenborough,

have come more overtly oppositional film histories which act as alternative spaces for historical identification.

For example the Alan Bleasdale–scripted BBC drama *The Monocled Mutineer*, a semi–fictionalised account of the Étaples Mutiny of 1917 and the subsequent state murder of one of the insurgents, cast a variety of shadows over the nostalgic screen drama. Firstly, national history was exposed as an explicit construction of the state (records of the mutiny were shown to have been withheld for over 60 years; the state was shown as being brutally coercive in eradicating any threats to the official history): the mythical history of stoical self–sacrifice was transformed into a more ambivalent (if still problematic) history from below. Secondly, the series ironised its own screen references: Paul McGann's pseudo–aristocratic pose and crisp officer's dress were redolent of Jeremy Irons' Charles Ryder in *Brideshead*, another founding text of the genre. Finally, Bleasdale stressed the contemporary analogs to the text, in opposition to some hermetic historical vignette which refuses to look beyond itself, "there are parallels ... between the fate of the working–class cannon fodder in 1917, sacrificed by their uncaring upper–class superiors, and the plight of the 1980s dole–queue generation."[134]

Ironically, however, *The Monocled Mutineer* was itself incorporated into a model of 'prestige' programming. Less easily assimilated was Bill Douglas' final film, *Comrades*[135]. Subtitled 'A Lanternist's Account of the Tolpuddle Martyrs and What Became of Them', *Comrades* engages with the problems of preserving and passing on working–class stories in a culture which works to suppress them. At a historical moment in which not only the political right, but also much of the left, set its face against trade union politics, *Comrades* uncritically commemorates them and in its final order to 'Go then, and make a union of lanternists' sees some future for them.

Comrades differs from other nostalgic screen fictions (including 'histories from below') in three ways. Firstly, it is a narrative without a single hero (the

lanternist of the subtitle, for example, is a series of different characters played by the same actor, Alex Norton), denying mainstream realism's typical recourse to structures of imaginary identification. Secondly, the audience's position as onlookers is made continually manifest throughout the film. As Judith Williamson has observed, a harvesting sequence in the film begins with close–ups of the exhausting, repetitive labour; shot by shot, however, the camera pulls out and the light falls, suggesting by association the pastoral tranquillity of the rural tradition. But then, the film cuts to a reverse shot of the squire's family driving past, this idyllic image is what they see; "picturesqueness is shown to be a middle–class view of labour."[136] Finally, in a bravura act, *Comrades* offers a metaphor for any act of historical representation: while the rich have the power to preserve their image, the poor must struggle to pass on their messages, throwing poems on scraps of paper through prison bars.

My purpose here is not to outline some putative "better" tradition of historical film–making, attractive as an 'heroic' reading of class history may sometimes be. *Comrades*' representations of moral worth for example, are highly problematic "The good men are all good and masculine, the good women all good and womanly, while the baddies contain a disproportionate number of campy, effeminate figures ... its sense of sexual politics (the very worst character has sex with his *dog*) verges on the tabloid."[137]

Instead, I want to argue that the nostalgic screen drama speaks to different constituencies in different circumstances. While I accept Benjamin's dictum that historical construction should ultimately be about remembering the nameless, the monolithic way in which some left critics have constructed a dominant representation of Anglo–British history actually reinters the nameless by turning that history into a monologue, whereas representations of the past tend to be ambivalent or dialogic in their treatment of social relations. At the same time people's equivocal response to history in the present is transformed into wholesale acceptance. But audiences' experiences of history and historical fictions are not just a matter of 'false consciousness' as the detractors of the

heritage industry would sometimes seem to argue. While Anglo–British history may be publicly structured in certain ways, there is no guarantee that it will be 'consumed' in such a monolithic way. In an interesting construction, Timothy Corrigan has referred to contemporary patterns of watching historical screen narratives as '*glancing* at the past', refusing the hypnotic pull into a safer world suggested by Hewison, Kennedy etc.

> In general, the dynamics within [historical] views and viewings indicate a decidedly contradictory blend of nostalgia for the older rituals of seeing epic movies and a refusal to fully believe in those images and unifying rituals. More specifically, the contradiction in these blockbuster epics today ... is that to be true to their traditional historical and social scope (as well as their financial imperatives) means making their narrative and visual excesses at heart vacancies, imagining and addressing a spuriously collective audience that is actually a diverse multiplicity, and fashioning their eternal temporal myths as always transitory.[138]

REFERENCES - CHAPTER THREE

1. Frederic Jameson *On Magic Realism* p.318. Quoted in Tomothy Corrigan (1991) *A Cinema Without Walls: movies & culture after Vietnam*, London: Routledge, p.35.

2. Lindsay Anderson, 1957. Quoted in Roy Armes (1978) *A Critical History of British Cinema*, London: Secker & Warburg.

3. See Robert Hewison *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a climate of decline*, London: Methuen, 1987; Patrick Wright *On Living in an Old Country*, London: Verso, 1985; Donald Horne *The Great Museum*, London: Pluto Press, 1984 and Martin Wiener *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).

4. Paul Gilroy (1987) *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, London: Hutchinson.

5. Yvonne Tasker (1994) *Spectacular Bodies*, London: Routledge, quoted in *Sight & Sound*, March 1994 p.32.

6. See Andrew Higson "The Concept of a National Cinema" *Screen* 30, Autumn 1989, pp.36–46.

7. Andrew Higson in "Re–presenting the national past" (in Lester Friedman (ed.) (1993) *British Cinema and Thatcherism*, London UCL Press, p.110) claims that the "audience [for heritage films] is primarily–middle–class and significantly older than the mainstream film audience", as though this were a condemnation of the films. His sources for this claim are unreferenced, though his logic – that they appeal to a film culture closely allied to English literary culture and the canons of good taste – is surely right.

8. Geoffrey Nowell–Smith (1991) "Researching the market for British films" in Duncan Petrie (ed.) (1992) *New Questions in British Cinema*, London: British Film Institute.

9. For the distinction between *studium* and *punctum*, see R. Barthes (1981) *Camera Lucida*, New York: Hill & Wang. "The *studium* is that very field of unconcerned desire ... of inconsequential taste...(That element of the photograph)...which will disturb the *studium* I shall call...the *punctum*, for *punctum* is also: sting, speck, little hole – and also a cast of the dice. A photograph's *punctum* is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me, is poignant to me)." Barthes develops a similar typology of reader–text intensities with regard to film in "The third meaning" in S. Heath (ed.) *Image-Music-Text*, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Quoted in Dick Hebdige (1991) "Digging For Britain".

10. Tana Wollen "Over our shoulders" in Corner & Harvey (eds) (1991) *Enterprise and Heritage*, London: Routledge.

11. Harlan Kennedy "The Brits have gone nuts", *Film Comment*, August 1985, quoted in ibid.

12. ibid. p.182.

13. Raphael Samuel (ed.) (1989a) *Patriotism: the making and unmaking of British national identity. Volume I: history and politics*, London: Routledge.

14. The most conjuncturally significant texts on 'the national decline' during the period have been Hewison (1987) and Wiener (1985 – see Introduction). For Hewison the heritage industry is paradoxically both a symptom and a cause of the national decline. The mythologizing of the past is a *consequence* of the decline of manufacturing industry, but it is also (following Wiener), rather curiously, *responsible* for that decline. *The Heritage Industry* resurrects the 'culture and society' arguments of Arnold, Ruskin, Eliot, Leavis and Hoggart but with more radical sympathies and a sharper sense of history than its predecessors. Nonetheless, Hewison's excoriation of contemporary nostalgia is ironically undercut by his own wistfulness over one manifestation of the national past. Witness his reference to "a so–called industrial estate of small garages, garment factories, tyre centres, carpet warehouses and the inevitable D–I–Y superstore." See also David Edgerton (1991) *England & the Aeroplane*, London: Macmillan.

15. Michael Bommes & Patrick Wright "'Charms of Residence': the public and the past" in Richard Johnson *et al* (eds) (1982) *Making Histories*, London: Hutchinson pp.253–301.

16. ibid. p.265.

17. ibid. p.299.

18. Adrian Mellor "Enterprise and Heritage in the Dock" in Corner & Harvey (1991) p.114.

19. Patrick Wright *Guardian* 14.8.1993, Supplement p. 13.

20. Patrick Cormack *Heritage in Danger*, London: New English Library, 1976 pp.11–12. Quoted in Johnson *et al* (1982) p.289, Wright (1985) p.81, Hewison (1987) p.32, Corner & Harvey (1990) p.16.

21. As Ruth Levitas shows in *The Concept of Utopia* (London: Phillip Allan 1990) it was Mannheim who pointed to the tendency of conservatives to project utopias into the past, rather than the future.

22. John Corner & Sylvia Harvey "Heritage in Britain: designer–history and the popular imagination" *Ten.8*, 36 Spring 1990 pp. 14–21.

23. Running through a variety of these texts, and particularly evident in Hewison (1987) is the implicit assumption that heritage is an Anglo–British phenomenon; any international dimension which might suggest that Britian is not unique in its concern for preserving and reconstituting the past is generally absent. Some of the features, for example, of pastiche and preservation which Hewison identifies in Wigan, Liverpool and York have parallels in the USA and other western cultures which go unacknowledged.

24. ibid. p.16.

25. 'Summer Concerts', English Heritage Brochure, Summer 1989. Quoted in Corner & Harvey (1990).

26. *The National Trust Book of the English House* cited in Hewison (1987) p.71.

27. Though unacknowledged by Corner & Harvey, the National Trust has experienced something of a paradigm shift in this direction. Erdigg on the Welsh border, for example, is now entered through the kitchen, through the service rooms, where the visitor encounters not only the 'workings' of a big house, but also a document of its paternalistic social relations in the portraits and verse which generations of the family commissioned and composed about their servants. Patrick Wright & Tim Puttnam "Sneering at the Theme Parks" *Block* 15 1989 p.52.

28. Corner & Harvey (1990) p.18.

29. Quarry Bank Mill has also been discussed by Patrick Wright and Stuart Hall in the Open University course *Continuity and Change*, contrasting and comparing the industrial heritage site with Wright's subject of choice, Lulworth in Dorset.

30. Blists Hill Open Air Museum – A Guide. Cited in Bob West "The making of the English working past" in Robert Lumley (ed.) (1988) *The Museum Time Machine*, London: Methuen, p.56.

31. In 1984 Mrs. Thatcher accused NUM leader Arthur Scargill of wanting to plunge Britain into a 'museum society', and at the opening of the Design Museum in 1985 she perversely remarked that she hated the word 'museum' because of its connotations of redundancy.

32. Umberto Eco (1987) *Travels in Hyper-reality*, London: Picador, p.52. Quoted in Corner & Harvey (1990).

33. Corner & Harvey (1990) p.21.

34. Patrick Wright & Tim Puttnam (1989) have argued that there is a tendency in heritage studies to assume that becuase a meaning or tradition is constructed then there is nothing to say about it except that it is false:

"First of all, there is no tradition which isn't constantly under reproduction, which isn't being re–synthesised if you like. And secondly, the important questions begin after that initial rather banal observation and you ask: by whom, and for whom, and what are its potentials as a synthesized tradition." p.52.

35. Stuart Hall (1984) "Authoritarian Populism: a reply to Jessop *et al*, *New Left Review* 147 pp. 32–60 in Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. & Ling, T. (1988) *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

36. Roger Bromley (1988) *Lost Narratives: popular fictions, politics and recent history*, London: Routledge p.4.

37.ibid. p.6.

38. ibid. p.12.

39. David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson (1980) *Film Art*, London: Addison–Wesley, p.58.

40. John Hill (1986) *Sex, Class & Realism*, London: British Film Institute, p.56.

41. The call to arms was rather less confrontational than it may have seemed. Alexander Walker has suggested that the "old 'Redcoat' alert may not have caused many of the Hollywood studios chief executive officers to tremble: they could always reach for their cheque books, not their muskets (and, after all, the film was 50 per cent American backed)." Alexander Walker (1985) *National Heroes* London: Harrap, p.181.

42. Bryan Forbes *Daily Telegraph* June 1993.

43. I use 'Hollywood' as shorthand for a notion of industrial organisation and practices developed in, but by no means limited to, the American West Coast. I also take 'Hollywood' to be a phenomenon akin to a 'world view', in Goldmann's phrase, based around certain ideological connotations both of the classic narrative and of US international cultural hegemony. In these respects, 'Hollywood' is an integral part of the existing British national cultural configuration at the same time as it acts as a necessary other.

44. The following discussion draws heavily on Higson (1989).

45. Thomas Elsaesser *New German Cinema: A History*, London: BFI pp.6–7, quoted in ibid. p.38.

46. Benedict Anderson "Narrating the Nation" *Times Literary Supplement*, 13.6.86, p.659, quoted in ibid. p.38.

47. ibid. p.42.

48. ibid.

49. Petrie (1992) p.1.

50. Steve Jenkins "A Critical Impasse" in M. Auty & N. Roddick (eds) (1985) *British Cinema Now*, London: British Film Institute, pp. 123–38.

51. See the distinctly uncritical surveys *Film on Four: a survey* (John Pym [1992] London: British Film Institute) and *The Films of Merchant-Ivory* (Robert Emmet Long [1992] London: Viking).

52. Higson (1989) p.43.

53. ibid.

54. Dick Hebdige (1988) "Towards a Cartography of Taste" *Hiding in the Light*, London: Commedia. Bill Schwarz, conference paper, Association of Art Historians Conference, Tate Gallery 1993.

55. Charles Baudelaire (1862) "Un Hemisphere dans une Chevelure" from the Jeanne Duval cycle. Paul McGann's character, Marwood, has long hair, which he later cuts off in a rejection of decadence.

56. Norman Stone, *Sunday Times*. In a later observation, over allegations of sexual abuse in Oxford and Cambridge, Stone remarked that things were much better when discipline in the colleges was left in "the hands of elderly gays." *Times* 26.10.93 p.7.

57. See Jeffrey Weeks "Inverts, perverts & Mary–Annes" in Duberman, H., Vicinus, M. & Chauncey, G. (eds) (1991) *Hidden From History*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.205.
also L. Chester, D. Leitch & C. Simpson (1977) *The Cleveland Street Affair*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Some of the boys involved in the scandal were post office messengers, and in one of the coincidences of research I am writing this having recently seen the 1938 GPO documentary *A Job in a Million*. The upper crust narration over images of working class boys (the protagonist particularly cherubic and defenceless) seemed rather more suggestive than perhaps intended.

58. E. M. Forster, for example, wanted "to love a strong young man of the lower classes and be loved by him", while Edward Carpenter declared his desire for "the thick–thighed, hot, coarse–fleshed young bricklayer with a strip around his waist." Weeks, ibid.

59. One guardsman–prostitute reported that "as soon as (or before) I had learned the goose step, I had learnt to be goosed." Jeffrey Weeks "The Idea of Sexual Minorities" in R. Samuel (ed.) (1989b) *Patriotism: Volume II: Minorities & Outsiders*, London: Routledge pp.256–270.

60. J.A. Symonds *Memoirs* in Weeks, ibid.

61. In *La Grande Illusion* (d. Jean Renoir 1937), notions of nationality and statelessness are played out against stereotypes of national identity: the French are gastronomes, the Germans regimented and the English, in one bizarre scene, are female impersonators.

62. In October 1925, for example, *Cherwell* parodied the Fleet Street reaction with the headline "GIRL MEN AT CAMBRIDGE", beneath which it commented:

This kind of slogan in the daily papers must cease. Oxford is not easily roused, but she cannot afford to lose her only claim to public attention. Girl men are hers, and hers alone; they have provided three dozen special reporters with their daily bread for at least six months ... I received a cutting from a newspaper in India in which an eyewitness described how he actually saw one undergraduate produce a stick of lip–salve and paint the lips of his companion! Shall Cambridge take this away from us? Never!

Quoted in Humphrey Carpenter (1989) *The Brideshead Generation*, London: Faber pp. 81–2

63. Peter Wildeblood (1955) *Against the Law*. Quoted in Weeks (1989b) p.260.

64. During WW1, the headquarters of London District Command tasked 'some of the best intelligence officers in the world' with eradicating 'the infection of Londoners, especially including soldiers, by the doctrine of the German urnings...' Arnold White, 'Efficiency and vice', *English Review*, vol. 22 (May 1916), 450; reprinted in *Vigilante*, April 20, 1918, p. 4; quoted in Samuel Hynes (1990) *A War Imagined*, London: Bodley Head, p. 227.

65. *Sight & Sound*, April 1993, p.34.

66. For example, two entries for 1903 suggest Casement's ability to move between seemingly disparate geographical and cultural locations:

December 6, 1903
Very busy on report with typer. Did 6,000 words today and revised a lot. Dined at Comedy Restaurant alone. First time there in life. Porter good, excellent dinner, French chef, then walked. Dusky depradator huge, saw 7 in. in all. Two beauties.

December 7, 1903
...Awful mistake. Dine with Cui B and Mrs. C., jolly dinner, strolled. Dick, West End, biggest and cleanest, mui mua ami.

Cited in Weeks (1991) p. 201.

67. John Joliffe (1980) *Raymond Asquith: Life and Letters*, London, p. 290, quoted in Hynes (1990) p. 225.

68. Andy Medhurst "1950s war films" in Graham Dawson & Bob West (eds) (1984) *National Fictions*, London: BFI.

69. Andrew Boyle (1979) *The Climate of Treason*, London: Hutchinson, p.151.

70. Andrew Higson "Re–presenting the national past" in Friedman (1993) p. 126. Sontag quote from "On Camp" *A Susan Sontag Reader*, 105–19, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

71. In study. Judd (Colin Firth) at table, Bennett (Rupert Everett) standing. Shot–reverse shot.

BENNETT: In your heart of hearts, like Barclay and Delahay and Fowler and Menzies, you still believe, in spite of your talk of equality and fraternity, you still believe that some people *are* better than others because of the way they make love. Well think of that for a lifetime. Think of the names, pansy, nancy, fairy, fruit, brown–nose.

72. *A Question of Attribution* reached the TV screen by the reverse route of *An Englishman Abroad*. The latter play was written directly for television, and made its stage début in Bennett's double bill, "Single Spies"; *A Question of Attribution* formed the evening's other half, with Bennett himself playing Sir Anthony Blunt.

73. Wright (1985) p.254.

74. Medhurst (1984).

75. C.F. Kernot (1927) *British Public Schools War Memorials* p. 135. Quoted in Hynes (1990).

76. Siegfried Sassoon "Prelude: the troops" (1918) in Brian Gardner (ed.) (1986) *Up the Line to Death: the war poets 1914-1918*, London: Methuen, p.100.

77. According to Cannadine (1991) around one in five officers were killed, in comparison to a national average of one in eight men. But the elision of the officer class with the aristocracy is only partially true.

78. "In the retreat from Mons, and the first battle of Ypres, perished the flower of the British aristocracy ... in the senseless slaughter of the Grenadiers on the Somme, or of the Rifle Brigade in Hooge Wood, half of the great families of England, heirs of large estates and wealth, perished ... in courage and high effort, and an epic of heroic sacrifice, which will be remembered so long as England endures." C.F.G. Masterman (1922) *England after the War: A Study*, pp 31–2.

79. Rupert Brooke (1987) '1914 Sonnets – I', *Collected Poems*, London: Faber, p.19.

80. In *The Thirty-Nine Steps* (1915), for example, although the true malefactors are German, it makes perfect sense to Richard Hannay that global war serves the interests of 'educated anarchists' and Jewish financiers: "...if you're on the biggest kind of job and are bound to get to the real boss, ten to one you are brought up against a little white–faced Jew in a bath–chair with an eye like a rattlesnake. Yes, sir, he is the man who is ruling the world just now..." John Buchan (1991) *The Thirty-Nine Steps*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, p.17.

81. Orwell offers a rather different version of the Edwardian long summer: "There never was, I suppose, in the history of the world, a time when the sheer vulgar fatness of wealth, without any kind of aristocratic elegance to redeem it, was so obtrusive as in those years before 1914." George Orwell (1984) "Such, Such Were the Joys" *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, p.447.

82. Gail Buckland (ed.) (1989) *The Golden Summer: the Edwardian Photography of Horace W. Nicholls*, London: Pavillion.

83. John Simons "The Golden Age of Cricket" in Gary Day (ed.) (1990) *Readings in Popular Culture: trivial pursuits?*, London: Macmillan, pp.151–163.

84. Alison Light (1991) *Forever England*, London: Routledge.

85. Simons (1990) p.163.

86. Corner & Harvey (1990)

87. In *Brideshead Revisited* (1944) for example, Waugh has a Georgian group complaing about the demolition of perfectly good houses to make way for luxury flats.

88. Higson (1993) pp. 124–5.

89. Wright (1985) pp 40–41.

90. Stephen Frears, quoted in Susan Torrey Barber "The Films of Stephen Frears" in Friedman (1993) p.224.

91. Philip Strick *Sight & Sound* June 1992 p. 56.

92. James Lees–Milne for example, appointed first historic buildings secretary of the National Trust at the suggestion of Vita Sackville–West (herself inevitably the subject of a glowing BBC2 heritage drama) canvassed for the New Party, backing off (like Lord Darlington) when British fascism chose to widen its sources of support. Patrick Wright (1992) *A Journey Through Ruins* London: Paladin p. 83. David Cannadine has noted the aristocratic membership of the British Fascists: Lord Govagh as their first president, the Earl of Glasgow and Lord Ernest Hamilton on the central committee, and Earl leuple of Stowe, Lord de Clifford and Baroness Zouche among their members. All, like Baronet Mosley himself, were frustrated and marginalised figures. Cannadine (1991) p.

546.

93. Nancy Mitford (1976) *Pigeon Pie*, Harmondsworth: Penguin p. 43.

94. Trevor Griffiths quoted in *The Guardian*, 17.10.81, p.10.

95. Mary Desjardins "Free from the apron strings: representations of mothers in the maternal British state" in Friedman (ed) (1993) op. cit.

96. Dawson & West (1987) p.9.

97. Judith Williamson "Up the Balls Pond Road" *New Statesman*, May 1987 p.23.

98. "Terence Davies" *South Bank Show*, June 1992.

99. Pat Kirkham & Mike O'Shaugnessy "Designing Desire" *Sight & Sound*, May 1992, p.14.

100. John Caughie "Half Way to Paradise" *Sight & Sound* May 1992 p.13.

101. Derek Malcolm regarded *Distant Voices, Still Lives* as "a musical version of Coronation Street directed by Robert Bresson with additional dialogue by Sigmund Freud and Tommy Handley" ("Voices of experience", *Guardian* 13.10.88, p.13) while Geoff Davies pithily, and perhaps oxymoronically, termed it "the first realist musical" ("Home truths", *Time Out* 946, p.16).

102. Caughie (1992) p.13.

103. Davies has said, for example, "I try to celebrate Englishness with the panache of the Americans". ibid.

104. George Orwell (1984) "The Art of Donald McGill" *Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin p.200–201.

105. ibid. p.208.

106. Williamson (1987) p.24.

107. Orwell (1984) pp.204–5. In a typical reverse–focus, Orwell attacks "the well–to–do women who try to stay young at forty by means of physical jerks, cosmetics and avoidance of child–bearing."

108. Cairns Craig "Room Without a View" *Sight and Sound*, June 1991, p.10.

109. A fairly random list would include Denholm Elliott (*A Room with a View & Maurice*) James Wilby (*Maurice, Howards End & A Handful of Dust*), Anthony Hopkins & Emma Thompson (*Howards End & The Remains of the Day*), Rupert Graves (*A Room with a View & Where Angels Fear to Tread*), Simon Callow (*Maurice, A Room with a View & Howards End*), Maggie Smith (*The*

Missionary, *A Room with a View*, *Memento Mori*, *A Private Function*), Helena Bonham Carter (*A Room with a View*, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* & *Howards End*), Hugh Grant (*Maurice* & *Remains of the Day*), Nigel Havers (*Jewel in the Crown* & *Chariots of Fire*) and Peggy Ashcroft (*A Passage to India* and *Jewel in the Crown*).

110. Charles Sturridge *The Independent* 5.7.91 p. 18. Merchant–Ivory too have been remarkably wary of the present since their ill–fated adaptation of Tana Janowitz's *Slaves of New York*.

111. See Petrie (1992).

112. John Pym (1992) lists *Room with a View* as costing £2,259,000 (10% from Channel 4) and *Maurice* as costing £1,577,000 (24% from Channel 4).

113. Frazier Moore "An offbeat way to box–office success" *Connoisseur* November 1990 p. 169.

114. ibid. p. 170.

115. Craig (1991) p.10.

116. Alison Light *Sight & Sound* July 1991 p. 63. Light's letter ends with an attack on the programmatic nature of the Craig/Wollen/Higson approach to heritage film: "Certain film school orthodoxies of the 70s have a lot to answer for, not least in their killjoy dismissal of the viewer as the simple dupe of bourgeois ideology. Something of this lurks in Craig's puritanical anxiety about cinema's "vicarious pleasures". A very different analysis of the films would have emerged if it had concentrated on the representation of sexuality rather than merely reducing all discussion to a uniform and mechanical notion of class and consumption. It would still have been dissatisfied with the films but it would have been a lot less lordly towards their audiences. And it might have suggested that we should read the return to Edwardian England in the '80s as much as a rejection of Thatcherism and its ethics as a crude reflection of it."

117. Karl Marx (1967) *Capital: Volume One*, New York p. 71. Quoted in Terry Eagleton (1991) *Ideology*, London: Verso.

118. ibid.

119. ibid.

120. Corrigan (1991).

121. ibid. p. 39.

122. Catherine Clément (1988) *Opera, or the Undoing of Women*, University of Minnesota Press. Quoted in ibid.

123. Higson (1993) p. 115. *Connoisseur* (op. cit. p. 171) repeated the (possibly apocryphal) story that Merchant–Ivory had been offered *Room With a View II.*

124. Richard Hoggart (1966) "Literature and society", *The American Scholar*, 35: 277–89.

125. A *Without Walls* special in 1991 listed the following decadal changes (implying, perhaps wrongly, an association between the two phenomena):

Libraries open for more than 60 hrs pw:	1981	52
	1991	18
Waterstones branches	1981	1
	1991	83

126. Jonathan Romney *Sight & Sound* July 1991 p. 57.

127. Forster's novel (1910) indicates a similar phobic relationship with the lower orders when he writes: "The boy, Leonard Bast, stood at the extreme verge of gentility. He was not in the abyss but he could see it, and at times people whom he knew had dropped in and counted no more."

128. Johnston, S. "Charioteers & Ploughmen" in Auty & Roddick (1985) p. 103.

129. Thomas Elsaesser argues for the economic centrality of an image (rather than film) culture in the Thatcher period, suggesting that one should not underestimate "the quite tangible 'commercial good will' that tourism, the publishing trade, luxury cars or British quality knitwear and leather goods derive even from the relatively paltry sums changing hands between American PBS stations and ITV for 'Upstairs, Downstairs' or 'Brideshead Revisited'". See "Images for Sale" in Friedman (1993) p.59.

130. British Film Commission (1992).The announcement of the BFC's formation took place at Cannes in May 1991. Funded by the Government through the DTI, the BFC provides information and services to the international film, television and allied industries in a manner intended to encourage the use of British personnel, locations and facilities for production.

131. Ray Marshall, managing director of Worldwide International Television, quoted in BFC document (1992) p.10.

132. Elsaesser (1993) p.59.

133. Higson (1989) p.41.

134. "Boys from the front" *The Listener* 28.8.86, p.28.

135. The making of *Comrades* threw up some historic ironies of its own. The Enclosures which dispossessed the Dorset farm workers in 1834, were to some

extent repeated by the seizure of land for military purposes during and after World War II. The population of Tyneham, the village in which the film was shot, were never allowed back, and the town is a relic of pre–modernity, "a lost heritage" in the resonant words of the expropriated Lady of the Manor. The original producer for the film, curiously, was Ismail Merchant. See Jill Forbes "The Dark Side of the Landscape" *Sight & Sound*, pp.34–38.

136. Judith Williamson, "Lights of the World", *New Statesman*, 28.8.87, p.16.

137. ibid.

138. Corrigan (1991) p.14.

AFTERWORD: POST–NATIONAL IDENTITIES

...the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.
Gramsci[1]

Every country is home to one man
And exile to another.
T.S. Eliot[2]

In the introduction to this thesis, I noted Jonathan Rée's suggestion that Schleiermacher's conception of the *dialectical* relationship between philosophy and myth may offer a way of conceptualising Anglo–British national identity without invoking prejudice against either term. This now needs to be expanded upon, for in a sense I have applied such a conceptualisation in markedly divergent ways. In thinking through men's magazines I privileged philosophy (in the sense of ideology critique) over representations of a mythic new masculinity. In discussing nostalgic screen fictions I occasionally favoured the 'mythic' representation of past times over a political philosophy which invoked some principle of total historical knowledge. In writing about travel texts and documentaries I hinted that the future of the mythic space represented by the imagined Anglo–British nation may be a brief one.

In line with the dialogical and 'messy' strategy of this thesis, I do not propose to totalise these discrepancies in any homogeneous way. Instead I want to offer two further representational instances of the shifting relationship of mythic thesis to philosophical antithesis. The second considers representations of the regions and of the everyday as conceptualisations of communality that may be more resistant to some of the fatal accretions of nationhood. But against this broadly affirmative strategy must be placed the wealth of images of Britain as terminally divided. I want to use this second representational strategy as a way into some remarks about Britain as a place in which the consensual image of nationhood advanced by Anderson and others has become largely redundant.

1. A DREADFUL SCHISM IN THE BRITISH NATION

a.

If one screen genre after 1979 was characterised by its deployment of the ambiguous comforts of nostalgia, another series of film and television fictions was located in a conflictual present or in a visible future. My contention in this section is that these texts have acted both anatomically and predictively in late century Anglo–British culture, on the one hand delineating the crisis of Britain and Britishness, while on the other offering images of a largely dystopian future, notably devoid of political solutions.

To establish a discursive terrain, I have considered two texts which predate the period of Conservative office, but which already suggest some of the characteristic tropes of '80s 'No Future' screen fictions. The filmic conventions on which *The Spongers* (1977), and *Jubilee* (1977) draw are very different, the former text operating within a tradition of social realist film and television drama, itself indebted to documentary realism; the latter within that of experimental and underground film. Nonetheless, there are striking points of similarity between these texts which suggest possible lines of exploration for British film culture in the 1980s and '90s.

Firstly, both films play with the privileged symbols of nationhood, while undercutting the transcendent force of those symbols. After an establishing shot of a drab council flat interior, the camera in *Spongers* moves outside to where a huge hoarding (reminiscent of Jamie Reid's "God Save the Queen" shot for the Sex Pistols) is being constructed, bearing giant portraits of the Queen and Prince Philip. Other national icons punctuate the text – an army display in a shopping mall (with a disembodied voice saying "Join the army and be a man"), a specially minted coin, renditions of "Rule Britannia" and "Land of Hope & Glory" – offering an ironic counterpoint to the lives of the women on the estate. Similarly, in *Jubilee*'s construction of a future England, the unifying symbols of nationhood (particularly the controlling myths of Renaissance England which

surround and intrude on the main quasi–narrative) have lost their transcendent power. Jordan's erotic mime to a hysterical re–rendering of "Rule Britannia" is one of a number of gestures or images which play up the camp aspect of national symbolism until 'camp' becomes the defining feature of a morbid and moribund national identity.

Secondly, both films offer a critique of the post–war consensus, articulated around opposition to the authoritarian control of people housed in insensitively designed spaces. *Jubilee* moves between different registers of criticism: a long pan across Docklands accompanied by Ian Charleson's social realist commentary gestures towards the documentary style of critique, while the overt presentation of the police as fascist thugs suggests a more heightened or impressionistic version of 'realism'. *The Spongers* largely avoids images of the British state's repressive apparatuses actively engaged in the processes of coercion (although uniformed figures are frequently in shot, suggesting the violent underpinning of hegemonic authority). Instead the apparatuses of civil society are shown to be themselves coercive. *The Spongers*, like Ken Loach's *Cathy Come Home* (1967), or the documentary *A Plague on Your Home* (1991) suggests that even the limited reformist and managerial imperatives of the post–war settlement have fundamentally broken down in the face of British capital's organic crisis. The protagonist's murder of her children and suicide gesture, beyond the generic constraints of melodrama, to a third feature of post–1979 British screen fictions of nationhood – their nihilistic take on futurity. *Jubilee*'s dialogue between past and present ends with an ambiguous retreat into history while the static camera at the end of *Spongers* contrasts with the early, sweeping shot of a national history imagined through the hyperreal images of monarchy.

These three features – the lack of homology between national symbols and national imaginary; the breakdown of a hegemonic project; the impossibility of a national future – provide the broad contours for a mapping of a particular representational strategy after 1979. To these I would add a fourth (already

apparent in *Jubilee*): the threat of cultural invasion or subversion, particularly, though not exclusively, from America. I want to use these strategies to move between screen representations of Anglo–Britishness and some consideration of the general national culture as it approaches the millennium.

b.

The crisis in nationhood is largely articulated around a lack of faith in the whiggish view that Britain is a country of quiet compromise which has successfully resisted the pull of tyranny. As I suggested in the introduction and in Chapter Three, any sense of an unproblematic national history being transmitted through representations is becoming increasingly untenable. To adapt Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy, although the discourses of British nationality may be saturated with racial, sexual and class connotations, they are also saturated with an emergent awareness of those connotations. As Dick Hebdige remarks, more and more people are growing up 'english half–English'[3], at once positioned by nationhood and positioning themselves in a variety of possible relationships to it.

This drift away from an 'official' history has been accompanied by a series of conjunctural crises in which the power, willingness and visibility of the British state to discipline and punish aberrant citizens – what Gramsci terms 'domination' – has grown more formidable. Amongst other instances, the aggressive policing of the 1984–5 Miner's Strike and the 1986–7 Wapping printworkers' dispute, the 'Battles' of Orgreave, Molesworth and Twyford Down, the suing of the *New Statesman*, the disinformation campaign over the 'Shoot–to–Kill' policy allegedly carried out by RUC officers and the banning of trade unions at GCHQ Cheltenham in 1983, all suggested a readiness to use or condone coercive or authoritarian methods when public support or indifference could be relied upon. Clearly this law–and–order drift is not unique to the period of neo–Conservative office: Hall *et al*'s seminal *Policing the Crisis* (1978), for example, isolated a *social-democratic* hegemonic strategy centred upon surveillance, discipline and punishment. Yet despite the cross–party adoption

of law–and–order solutions to the post–1960s crisis (and current Labour policy would seem to continue this fixation), there are authoritarian tropes and structures specific to the Conservatives and to the period since 1979[4]. In Colin Leys' work on the rise of the authoritarian Anglo–British state, three mutually reinforcing tendencies are of particular interest:

> (1) a struggle by the state apparatus to preserve itself from democratization and to eliminate certain democratic residues 'accidentally' established in the past;
> (2) bureaucratization ... which has greatly enlarged the 'reach' (and no doubt the grasp) of the state, and diminished its dependence on and interest in civic co–operation.....
> (5) the cumulative cultural effect of all this, reinforcing an already 'corporative–subordinate', rather than a 'hegemonic–republican', popular political culture.

The pairing of 'republican' with 'hegemonic' is misleading; while I will argue, with Jessop *et al* that the Conservative 'two nation' project represents a major shift in hegemonic strategy, the party has inadvertently become associated with a kind of quasi–republicanism, initially occasioned by Thatcher's Bonapartism and later fuelled by the party's presiding over a period of monarchic self–immolation.

The mutually–supportive character of these developments suggests a creeping authoritarianism in British national life, augmented by the dominant bloc's occasional chiliasm[5], its bracketing of broadly 'political' crimes with more obviously civil offences (what Stuart Hall and his co–authors term 'convergence' or the crossing of 'thresholds') and its turning of a blind eye to the venality of its own partisans. As Hall has noted[6], these qualities led, particularly during the early 1980s, to regular charges of 'fascism' being levelled against the Thatcher bloc, concentrating on the weakening of democratic forms, the centralization of coercive information systems, the leadership's overt racism and the 'walk–on part' of the National Front in fostering a far–right climate conducive to Conservative election success. Hall argues, however, that to invoke fascism is to miss the point that Thatcherism is essentially (if only residually) democratic.

Even in its own terms the hang 'em and flog 'em wing of the party has been strikingly unsuccessful – neither corporal nor capital punishment have been reintroduced; there have been no moves to abolish the Commission for Racial Equality nor the Equal Opportunities Commission and such retrograde proposals as the Alton Bill (introduced by a *Liberal* MP) and Clause 28/29 of the Local Government Bill[7] have failed to roll back what Mrs. Thatcher identified as the decline of manners institutionalised in the liberalizing legislation largely presided over by Roy Jenkins during the 1960s.

These reservations aside, however, it is clear that a tendency towards mutually–reinforcing forms of coercion became a pervasive feature of the national imaginary after 1979. The best–known and most rigorously theorized work on this subject has come from Stuart Hall and others at the Birmingham CCCS, who have argued for neo–Conservatism as a form of 'authoritarian populism', "successfully condens[ing] a wide range of popular discontents with the postwar economic and political order and mobiliz[ing] them around an authoritarian, rightwing solution to the current economic and political crisis in Britain."[8]

However, as Bob Jessop and his co–authors have noted, in collapsing together notions of 'authority' and 'people', authoritarian populism risks a certain ambiguity related to its hereditary similarity to Gramsci's concept of the 'passive revolution'. For the latter concept condenses, in a sometimes strained fashion, the gradual accumulation of small–scale 'molecular' changes with the act of *populist ventriloquism* in which the dominant bloc dissimulates its own ideas as those of the people.[9] Undoubtedly there are moments in which these trends have come together since 1979 (though the 'fit' between the two tendencies is never precise), but the breadth and elasticity of the concept renders it problematic. Without wishing to ditch the populist aspect of neo–Conservatism entirely, I would argue that, at the level of screen representation at least, it is the trend towards state–led coercion and de–democratization (often magically autonomous of party politics) which has predominated and proliferated.

Thus, *A Very British Coup* (1988), *Hidden Agenda* (1990) and *GBH* (1991) all propose the thesis that the intelligence services, aided and abetted by the Conservative Party, the media and, in the case of the first film, the US, would engineer a situation in which elected radicals would be undermined and overthrown. Undoubtedly all three fictions owe something to the allegations that Harold Wilson was the target of a CIA–sponsored smear campaign in the 1970s, but each film adopts a different perspective on the possibility of left–reformist government. Rather than concentrating purely on the texts themselves, I want to follow Peter Keighron[10] in saying something about how *Coup* and *GBH* were constructed through the press and the implications this might have for imagining Britain as a consensual, progressive space. I have concentrated on mainstream newspaper reviewing, agreeing in broad terms with Colin McArthur that "the agenda setting power over the terms in which cinema is consumed in Britain remains with the Fleet Street nexus and their clones in television."[11] I also want to say something about a textual 'mirror image' – the film *Who Dares Wins*, which offers a right–authoritarian position on the hijacking of democratic processes by extremists.

The most conspicuous feature of reviews of *A Very British Coup* and *GBH* was the treatment of both dramas as 'events'. Criticism moved from the culture pages to more overtly political regions, even reaching the editorial sections of some newspapers[12]. By coincidence, for example, *GBH* was transmitted during a period of exacerbated conflict in Liverpool (the Walton by–election and a strike by Council workers) and this provoked a certain synergy in talking about the drama. As Judith Williamson has noted "you'd hardly know this was a drama – you'd think it was some kind of manifesto, or even, from the tone of some commentaries, a series of real events."[13] I doubt whether such a distinction between the textual and the real is sustainable, but the need to return these dramas to the safer realm of the cultural led to the creation of new ways of describing 'challenging' television serials with high production values. *The Guardian* described *GBH* as "intimate drama [which] compels the viewer to internalise its meanings so that it becomes part of discussions and

exchanges all over the country."[14] Jaci Stephen in *New Statesman* referred ironically to the cultural capital to be gained from being familiar with such an event: "it becomes chic to mention [the dramatist's] name.. in every social setting"[15] while *The Sunday Times* referred to it as "one of those programmes that just make you hug yourself with pleasure."[16] What was largely missing was any analysis of these statements – why, for example, a piece of prime–time television should be an important discursive resource; how a viewer is 'compelled' to internalise meanings and why a 'political' drama should be intimately pleasurable in a culture which has traditionally dissociated politics from pleasure.

This last issue – the political issues raised in the two dramas – is the one most quickly closed down. As Keighron shows, the typical reviewing strategy is one in which production values are praised and political values denigrated. For *Coup* there was general agreement that the drama was "well written", with a "certain stylish force": "a first class production"[17], while on a slightly different note, the power of *GBH* apparently lay in its "non–political themes, its realistic depiction of the anguish suffered by children who are unwanted and unloved, of the desperation of sons and daughters whose fathers are not there for them, of self–loathing and the search for personal identity and self–esteem, of madness and terror and guilt."[18] In other words, in the commonplaces of bourgeois drama.

The important questions that these dramas raise about parliamentary and local democracy are not treated so indulgently, and reviews of the texts set out both to remind the viewer that s/he is watching a work of fiction, and that such fiction is wholly fantastic. The politics of *A Very British Coup* are described as "*plainly* antediluvian" and "the whole scenario is *desperately* unreal...strictly for the playground"[19], while *GBH* draws its observations:

> ... not from life but from ideological preconception and their dishonesty destroyed the art; the plot became incredible, the characters unbelievable, the language naive and the ending a fantasy of wish–

fulfilment that left you cheated.[20]

Whilst Judith Williamson is right to argue that a text does not directly impact upon 'politics' (in the sense that, for example, the huge popularity of *Boys From the Blackstuff* was not subsequently reflected in voting patterns), I would contend that this refusal to engage with the explicit politics *of* a text is in itself politically efficacious. For this denial of extreme right–wing reaction is also the denial of a situation which might provoke such response. Edward Pearce, for example, in his *Sunday Times* review of *Coup*, offered a circular argument as to why the drama was "fantastic tosh": "There is, and will be, no socialist revolutionary government to suppress, therefore it will not be suppressed". This theme was echoed by Roy Hattersley, who described the fiction as "fantasy as distinct from political thought."[21] In both cases (and Keighron lists several more) the effect is to simultaneously overestimate the power of texts and to prohibit the kind of transformative thinking that a text may initiate or position itself in relation to. Moreover, there is a kind of hysterical gap between the critical estimation that a drama is *obviously* risible in a political sense and the need to state and restate this observation. As Keighron observes, and the *GBH* debate verifies, viewers often do not accept this imposed consensus, and letters pages offer a limited, but not insignificant, space for discussion and criticism at the margins of the mainstream press.

I want to move away from the metatextual to suggest that the paradoxical and strategic depoliticisation of political drama is not unique to broadly left–wing representations of conspiracy. The spurious political agnosticism sometimes claimed for *GBH* was also evident, albeit from a very different position, in statements about the SAS drama *Who Dares Wins* (1982). The film's producer, Euan Lloyd, is quoted in the film publicity as saying: "Arguments are presented but by no means resolved. We highlight a murderous confrontation between anti–nuclear activists whose violence is matched by the SAS. We cannot and do not draw conclusions."[22] This may seem somewhat disingenuous given Lloyd's claim elsewhere that the peace movement is dominated by Left–wing

subversives and financed by Moscow.[23] Moreover, claims that any association between CND and the fictional 'People's Lobby' was unintentional are undercut by the film's own techniques – intercutting documentary footage with shots of the film's extras, utilising CND symbols etc.

Even though the political provenance of *Who Dares Wins* is very different from that of *GBH* and *A Very British Coup*, it shares their fatalism about existing political processes. The resolution is provided by the incursion into the text of anonymous, efficient professionals, undercutting the narrative centrality of the identifiable hero/protagonist Skellen (Lewis Collins):

> There is no hesitation about the calling in of the SAS, no ambiguity about right and wrong – it is a heavily loaded message, a closed text.[24]

Like Harry Perkins' television appeal to the people in *Coup*, or Jim Nelson's speech in *GBH*, the appearance of the SAS indicates a tendency towards magical resolution in contemporary cultural forms concerning the nation, transcending the constraints of institutions and democratic processes in order to make direct or heroic addresses to the people (whether conceived of in progressive or authoritarian terms). Given the increased bureaucratization of national life, this is by no means an absurd response to the crisis of national identity. Contrary to the terminating assumptions of mainstream critics (or written within their tendency towards ideological closure), the representation of such utopianism and vanguardism may have pertinent effects on the conditions under which struggle takes place.

c.

Civil liberties and 250 Cruise missiles cannot
co-exist in this island together.[25]

cultural war strikes at the head
to paralyse without killing, to conquer by slow rot[26]

Images of the authoritarian drift in British national identity were frequently accompanied by interlinked anxieties over cultural invasion and the absence of

nuclear accountability. This represents both a development and a break in the history of fears of British americanization described in Dick Hebdige's "Towards a Cartography of Taste". The anxieties about the 'levelling–down process' which Hebdige outlines are still current, but exacerbated by misgivings about the global, rather than European reach of American consumerist, and specifically entertainment, technologies. So in George Ritzer's book on the subject, *The McDonaldization of Society* (about the americanization of *America*) the author argues that the American fast–food principle, of which McDonalds is the paradigm instance, is creeping into other, non–edible, sections of the social formation (although clearly the hyper–fordist exploitation of workers and resources is a phenomenon larger than, and anterior to, McDonalds). Similarly, McDonalds buildings occupy a position equivalent to satellite dishes and shopping malls in debates over national taste and urban environmental degradation, exemplifying a presumed threat to regional distinctiveness:

> McDonalds is ubiquitous. This is another source of resentment – even in Britain where many have made the red and the yellow a part of their way of life. McDonalds has a global grip via its network of franchise holders. Each one, however remote, has been schooled in the American service and profit philosophy, given uniforms (without pockets) for their staff and sent off with a more glowing loyalty to Uncle Sam than the CIA could ever have produced. The price of a Big Mac has become a measure of worldwide inflation: since 1986, *The Economist* has been comparing international costs of living with a Big Mac index.[27]

But where Hebdige argues that Anglo–British cultural élites in the years during and after the Second World War acted as gatekeepers to, and jeremiahs about, the influx of American culture ('mass', 'homogenized', 'blasphemous'), the position of social élites in relation to America is now less clear. As Christopher Hitchens has argued, "the British élite makes an instinctive but shrewd determination that its own survival necessitates a metamorphosis of the 'Anglo–Saxon' into the 'Anglo–American'"[28]. Although this metamorphosis may involve latent connections between "race, social standing, sophistication and even religion"[29] its major contours are martial, and above all nuclear. While distinctions between the cultural and the political may be invidious, there is a

sense in which the previous polarity between a parochial *cultural* élite and the atlanticized masses has been reversed in the emphasis placed on the 'special relationship' by *political* leaders since 1980, and the hostility towards such atlanticism expressed by large portions of the British public. As Meredith Veldman has shown[30], the linking of popular anti–americanism with the nuclear issue is not a new issue, but it was brought to renewed prominence in the 1980s by the deployment of two new Tactical (cruise) Missile Squadrons, at Greenham Common and Molesworth, and the concomitant massive re–emergence of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Fears were mobilised that these and other weapons, would not only make Britain a target, but would also be used without British permission: fears which impinge crucially upon the collective imagination of nationhood. A 1952 statement for example, never superseded, defines the question of who has operational control as "a matter for joint decision... *in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time*" (emphasis added)[31] which implies, as Hitchens and Duncan Campbell have argued, that joint operational control is chimerical[32].

These fears were given some substance by America's largely unilateral and confrontational foreign policy during the 1980s, the British government's apparent acquiescence with this and its following of the US lead. Until the terminal crisis of the Soviet Union, both the American and British governments were unwilling to follow the US–Soviet *rapprochements* of the 1970s; both countries initiated major unilateral build–ups of nuclear weapons and both the Strategic Defence Initiative (the 'Star Wars' programme) and America's development of short–range and battlefield nuclear weapons seemed to point to the possibility of fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe. Beyond the nuclear issue, the US gave a symbolic affront to Anglo–British national identity by invading Grenada in 1983, and the bombing of Tripoli by US jets based in Britain in 1986 seemingly vindicated Duncan Campbell's description of Britain as an unsinkable aircraft carrier[33].

Screen representations have negotiated this contested relationship with some

circumspection – there is, for example, very little of the phobic paranoia of *Dr. Strangelove* (1963). Where American military or economic aggression is represented (e.g. *Stormy Monday*, *Edge of Darkness*, *Defence of the Realm*, *A Very British Coup*), there is either a compensating 'good' American character or some indication of the primacy of British culpability. But there *is* a persistent implication that the development of British political and military élites, and their imbrication with a nuclear–industrial complex, has led to the development of a wholly undemocratic state–within–a–state in Britain, veiling its entrenchment and atlanticist agenda behind a rhetoric of national interest. I want to argue that this conspiracy theme has significant political implications.

Although only *Edge of Darkness* and the satire *Whoops Apocalypse* dispensed with a realist mode of address to any extent, the political thriller genre which all these dramas negotiate typically moves between the public and private worlds in a way that unsettles classic realism's individualist empiricism. So *Defence of the Realm* (1985) offers the thesis that in order to cover up a potential nuclear accident, Anglo–American nuclear élites would smear opposition politicians and assassinate witnesses and investigators. *The Whistleblower* (1987) has as its backdrop a thinly–fictionalised version of the government's decision to remove trade union rights from civil service staff working at the Government Communications Headquarters in Cheltenham, against which is played out a story of state–authorised murder. *A Very British Coup* includes a triumphalist sequence in which a nuclear warhead is dismantled, leading to American consternation, the assassination of a government scientist and a manipulated enquiry. As with *Edge of Darkness*, the murderers are shadowy, depersonalized agents of the sub–state.

While the Anglo–British state has been historically secretive, and prepared to support that secrecy with coercion, the repeated representation of the atlanticist nuclear state–within–a–state marks a significant break in the representation of nationhood. For Benedict Anderson, the nation is in some sense a regime of truth, characterised by the free flow of information in the newspaper:

> the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life.[34]

Contemporary screen representations suggest that this faith in the nation–state as an *informative* entity is in crisis, replaced by a variety of what Gramsci terms "morbid symptoms" in which the nuclear nation–state acts both as an impediment to knowledge and as a source or object of rumour and disinformation. It is possible to see this conspiracy theme as transformative, since it calls into question the dominant bloc's claims to be the only group able to consensualise the nation. Lez Cooke, writing in *Movie*, notes:

> *Edge of Darkness* was produced in a far more reactionary climate than the earlier generation of BBC "social issue" dramas. The terms of debate under Mrs. Thatcher are not so much about how socialism can be achieved but about how a total hegemony of right–wing ideology can be averted...In the context of a reactionary conjuncture, the act of confirming half–formed beliefs and suspicions which viewers might hold can be considered progressive, especially if it serves to make those viewers question the ideology of "the dark forces that rule our planet".[35]

A new history of the cultural relationship between Anglo–Britain and the United States needs to be written. An outline of future work might include the relationship of different Britains and Britons to different Americas (the cultural politics of the nuclear élites; British youth's engagement with rap, hip–hop and heavy metal; the celtic margins' relationship with America; the cultural translation of far–right and identity politics etc.) But at this late stage, with the need to maintain a level of generality, I would suggest that "America" is discursively constructed as a fairground mirror of late century Anglo–British national identity, profoundly magnifying and distorting the polarised contours of a two nations formation in which the bright surfaces and endless opportunities of anti–bureaucratic populism face a welfarist sink culture "full of curious wild and poisonous growths".[36]

d.

If we tear this country in half,
we can pick up the bigger half.[37]

In an earlier section, I suggested that Stuart Hall and his co–authors' notion of 'authoritarian populism' offers a persuasive condensation of the elements of an emergent, post–consensual understanding of nationhood. Positioned against Hall's work is that of Jessop, Bonnet, Bromley and Ling (1985) which resurrects and reinflects the Disraelian idea of the Two Nations for the post–1979 period. In this section (which might stand in for a traditional conclusion) I want to attempt to synthesize these positions, through screen representations, in a consciously fatal and catastrophist way; to say that the national–popular is now explicitly constructed through the permanent and violent exclusion of large parts of the population and the national terrain.

In attempting this synthesis, I want to concentrate on two of the four points made by Jessop and his co–authors about the Two Nations strategy. Firstly, neo–Conservatism consciously sets out to distance itself from many of the (often unrealised) commitments of the Keynesian welfare state. Rather than attempt to integrate the poor, deprived and underprivileged into the nation through full employment policies and the development of a universalist welfare state, neo–Conservatism is concerned with managing the political repercussions of an 'underclass' whose existence is taken for granted rather than seen as a mark of failure:

> Indeed it is happy to expand this underclass of the unemployed and the new waged poor to stimulate the purgative effects of economic crisis. It also intends to cut an allegedly overgrown welfare state and construct a minimal, selective, 'social security' state akin to that in the United States.[38]

Secondly, where the authors argue that the keynesian welfare state typically viewed social divisions in terms of multiple, horizontal strata (generally, but not invariably, classes) which could be managed through corporatist strategies, neo–Conservatism "presents an image of social divisions based on a *single,*

vertical cleavage from top to bottom which opposes the productive to the parasitic. This opposition between 'two nations' is seen as inherently antagonistic and cannot be transcended through the collectivism of the KWS".[39] In this definition, the parasitic include not only the poor and unemployed, but also those in the state and service sectors whose product cannot be measured in terms of conventional capitalist accounting.

Although Jessop *et al* go on to argue that the Two Nations project is by no means fully achieved (as a consequence of, *inter alia*, popular support for the welfare state, the occasional strength of the 'second nation' – particularly at the local level – and the contradictions within the project itself) and assert further that the single vertical cleavage is not the only way in which division can be theorised or managed, their work, in setting out to provide a conjunctural and institutional account of Thatcherism, tends towards an account of neo–Conservatism which privileges its claims to economic management over its claims to have a monopoly on the national interest. Much consideration, therefore, is given to neo–Conservatism's supply–side enthusiasms, but very little to its law–and–order rhetoric, its attempt to shape the moral environment, or even the ways (beyond economic reward) in which it seeks to exert its leadership over the 'first nation' bloc and establish a new common sense. The polarities that Jessop and his co–authors identify lack much in the way of specificity: who constitute the 'underclass' that they rather glibly refer to? Is it the traditional community of the poor and deprived, or does it include other disaffected groups, including what Hall *et al* refer to as the "lumpen bourgeoisie"? Parts of the 'second nation' that the authors refer to may be spectacularly productive and profit–making in ways which contravene the dominant bloc's moral imperatives, while those responsible for upholding the 'strong state, traditional morality' agenda may be costly and parasitic. The question of how this division is conceptualised by its 'audience' is similarly left unconsidered: members of the first nation may be involved in productive and lucrative ventures which necessitate primary identifications with the second nation, across the vertical cleavage. Moreover it is simply untrue to claim that

neo–Conservatism has interpellated members of all classes equally: for every vision of a classless society there has been a reassurance to the traditional dominant bloc that their interests are best managed by the Conservative Party.

While there are important omissions in Jessop *et al*'s work that are relatively independent of representations (the formation of a new stratum of 'organic' intellectuals; the organization of theoretical ideas in certain strategic intellectual sites) the absence of representations (and therefore *negotiations*) from their thesis is significant. By ignoring representations, *Thatcherism: a tale of two nations* can barely address the extent to which the national culture has been penetrated by the two nations trope, or its transmutation in that process. For while the questions of productivity, profitability and efficiency may have entered and saturated *every* aspect of social life from school dinners to jet fighters, it is by no means the *only* way in which the two nations have been imagined. Throughout this thesis I have tried, without invoking the specious and determinist psychologism of 'otherness', to show that the discourses and lived relationships of 'Britishness' have historically been constructed in opposition to dissident internal minorities and/or external aggressors or subalterns. This universal of national identity formation has occasionally been interrupted by appeals to an *internal harmony*: Anglo–Britain is not what it is because of its antagonistic relationship with other cultures but because of the quasi–mystical organicism of people, landscape and culture. In this image of Britain, processes which are actually the effect of relationships between competing forces are experienced as an expression of the nature of the nation and its individual members.

We have been living for a long time in the remnants of that view. But in contrast to earlier periods, the years since the mid–1960s have seen a proliferation of discursively–constructed internal aliens, leading to a situation in which the monolithic, consensual view of a single nation is permanently and necessarily in crisis. As Dick Hebdige notes:

> Against this Nation (for identities require differences) are ranked the Enemies Without and Within: outside the gates, the swarthy terrorists, the PLO and the IRA, the 'Argies' and the Reds; inside, sliding like an asp across Britannia's milk–white bosom, the trade unions, the agitators, the wastrels, the 'scroungers', the 'moaning minnies', the 'do–gooders' and the 'loony left', the unassimilable ethnic minorities too insignificant in number to be worth courting for a vote, the out of work 'who simply don't want to work'.[40]

While I would continue to argue that it is inappropriate to conceptualize this stage–managed crisis of hegemony without paying attention to what Gramsci terms the 'decisive nucleus of economic activity' (the organic crisis of British capitalism), I would also note, with Hebdige, the importance of other phenomena relatively autonomous of the economic, which mark out the impossibility of a hegemonic project focused on a traditional national–popular: the phobic centrality of Irish republicanism to Anglo–Britishness; the visible return of the colonial repressed to the metropole; the spectre of the 'loony left'. The constant discursive recreation of these outsiders marks a permanent state of emergency (in both senses) in nationhood; all are constructed as operating on or near what Hall has called the *extreme violence threshold*, thereby validating the Anglo–British state's recourse to extreme measures in order to guarantee its monopoly over legitimate violence.

Screen representations have typically focused the two nations trope through four 'organic' and interrelated themes: the relationship between Ireland and Anglo–Britain; the division between North & South; the proliferation of lawless and normless masculinity and, in some ways unifying these themes, the symbolic primacy of the capital in the reformulation of nationhood.

Ireland (almost invariably Catholic and, to a lesser degree, republican) occupies interconnected positions in screen constructions of Anglo–Britishness. On the one hand *Northern* Ireland is represented as unfamiliar, a space and people defined by a history of internecine religious conflict and of British interference and incomprehension. The situation in the Six Counties has been one of "domination" rather than "intellectual and moral leadership" in Gramsci's terms,

and Anglo–British screen representations have generally indicated the extent of this, organizing themselves around tactical or strategic military issues rather than around any attempt to incorporate Northern Ireland in a popular national project (indeed, where previous representations, such as those of the Documentary Movement, have sought to discursively incorporate Scotland and Wales into the national community, there has been a traditional and significant silence over Ulster). At the same time, republican representations *have* sought to invoke some notion of the national–popular in their struggle with the British state (though their silence on the Protestant majority is significant). In a largely uncritical essay on Sinn Fein's use of video as an aspect of political pedagogy, John Roberts notes:

> ...the boundaries of an 'essential' Irish identity denied by imperialism, which has played such a strong part in Republican aspiration, are shifting. The link between culture and politics, nationalism and socialism, as *productive* sites of meaning (rather than the repositories of myth and allegiance) are moving hesitantly and informally into position[41]

Gramsci argues further that during a period of domination, even where a social group is attempting to "liquidate" its antagonists, it will also try to secure its leadership over allies or potential allies, and this offers some way into thinking about the representation of the Troubles as something familiar yet strange – the late century Anglo–British state as an *uncanny* phenomenon. Partly as a consequence of the generic constraints of the thriller format adopted by the majority of these texts and partly as a result of the need to widen the terms in which the Irish–British struggle has been constructed, screen fictions have typically sutured the republican issue with other concerns: *Hidden Agenda* (1990) combines a fictionalisation of the RUC's alleged 'shoot–to–kill' policy with a political thriller about an attempt to overthrow the Wilson government; *The Crying Game* (1993) merges a story about an IRA gunman with negotiations of race, gender and sexuality; *The Long Good Friday* (1979) links the Irish Question with East End construction, neo–Conservatism's most triumphalist spectacle; *In the Name of the Father* (1993) puts the drift towards authoritarian solutions on the mainland in an Anglo–Irish context.

Indeed, this uncanniness transcends both the Troubles themselves and the internal Irish border. One series of extremely popular and acclaimed fictions (*The Commitments*, *The Snapper*, *Family*) directed by Britons, but using the work of the Irish writer Roddy Doyle, used the unfamiliar backdrop of Dublin as a space in which to rework some of the characteristic tropes of the Wednesday Play and Play for Today: urban blight, alienation and family life. A further series of screen dramas (*Lamb*, *O Mary This London* and *The Crying Game*) used the figure of an Irish innocent abroad to say something about a hybrid capital city in process architecturally (all the major male figures work on building sites), sexually and ethnically. That all three films involve violent resolutions suggests the difficulties and anxieties surrounding the positioning of the uncanny at the metropolitan centre, anxieties most fully expressed in the Alan Bleasdale comedy *No Surrender* (1986), where the totem of 'community' is held up for ridicule.

Bleasdale's work has also been influential in an oppositional tradition which polarises the post–industrial North of the country against a more affluent (and generally unrepresented) South. This genre achieved considerable prominence from the late 1960s onwards in a series of dramas scripted by Jim Allen and directed by either Ken Loach or Roland Joffé. *The Big Flame* (1969), *The Rank and File* (1971), *The Spongers* (1978) and *United Kingdom* (1981) go some way, given the constraints of the realist mode of representation, towards offering a Marxist analysis of working–class life to a mainstream audience. But for all its proletarian sympathies, Bleasdale's work marks a significant break in this tradition, evacuating the northern realist drama of 'politics' beyond an antipathy towards a largely unrepresented government. Of the two politicized characters in *Boys from the Blackstuff*, for example, one is the target of his workmates' jokes and the other, while given the most plangent speech in the series ("[my dreams] still give me hope and faith in my class ... I can't believe there is no hope, I can't") is represented as already dying and part of a disappeared tradition. The decaying Albert Dock around which he is pushed stands in stark contrast to his rhetoric of classical industrial organisation (and would shortly be

redeveloped as a far–flung outpost of the eighties trend in shining riverside redevelopment). *GBH* goes even further in its condemnation of a militant culture, offering instead the worst platitudes of liberal humanism, and even Allen and Loach in *Raining Stones* (1993) seem to have abandoned a vision of working–class organization in favour of a virtual celebration of the church's authority in Catholic Manchester. This fatalism about a 'red' regional culture seems suggestive of the spatial crisis in left politics since the Thatcherite onslaught of the early eighties, the lack of certainty about whether to appeal to the traditionally excluded regions, to the nation, or to a metropolitan culture with a directing position in the national culture.

The left has similarly found the representation of youth problematic and has often followed the Right in constructing young people as a problem. As I suggested in Chapter Two, it is upon the imagined body of the young poor – the sink estate single mothers, the joyriders, the ravers and the junkies – that the tattoo of second nation status has been most often inscribed. While some screen fictions have made an attempt to sympathetically portray these forms of behaviour in context (a brief scene in *Raining Stones* about hustling for heroin money, for example), there has been a general tendency to decontextualise youth, to remove it from its surroundings. As Beatrix Campbell has noted of the dystopian *Shopping* (1994):

> Landscape is not simply the location that absorbs the joyriders' auto–acrobatics, it is where these terrestrials take control of social space. That's what they refuse to share with the people they live with. But by emptying the landscape of community, *Shopping* erases that conflict, giving instead lads who are talking only to themselves. Joyriders aren't outside society, they're having an argument *in* it. And the site of that argument is the domestic terrain, the landscape of everyday life, the neighbourhood.[42]

The same absence of context (particularly familial relationships) typifies the skinhead characters in *Oi For England* (1982), *Made in Britain* (1982) and *Meantime* (1983). The first two dramas in particular use the body of the skinhead as a tabula rasa for their social concerns, specifically the re–

emergence of British fascism and the refusal of consent by a visible subsection of British youth. In an overdetermined scene at the end of *Made in Britain*, Trevor (Tim Roth), stares angrily through a shop window at an idealised (and distinctly anachronistic) family tableau. There is clearly a point of contact here with the anti–affluence images of the British New Wave, and both *Made in Britain* and *Oi For England* suggest that beneath the surface racism of the skinheads is a rejection of the existing social order ("Law and order/ Up your arse/ The Rules are bent/ The Law's a farce" sing the group in *Oi*). Trevor Griffiths, the scriptwriter for *Oi*, has noted that the contradictions between these competing energies offer some space for a directing project which could mobilise (skinhead) youth for socialism:

> Racism is endemic in this society. It's a white problem, not a black one. And in so far as skinhead culture evinces that racism, it reflects the broader society. But skins are available to the political process and I'd like to give them a hearing ... I don't see that fascists have any automatic right to the skinhead, and if there is a struggle for his consciousness, then one has to engage in it.[43]

While the ending of *Oi* is idealist and symbolically violent, its 'distribution' into the national culture offers some notes towards the strategies by which an oppositional representational form may escape the impasse of fatalism. After the impact of the initial television screening, Griffiths reworked the drama into an 'organic' play for youth clubs, organised through regional centres which would tailor the piece with local and regional references. This strategy is certainly patronising and entryist, but it also thinks through the role of audiences in creating localised, conjunctural meanings, escaping some of the entropic weight of the 'No Future' genre:

> Oi For England seems to point forward to a relatively uncharted area of political culture. Its recognition of the need to continually regenerate representation within an urgent political moment, and its insistence on addressing an unsafe constituency of politically divided, and perhaps even culturally hostile young people is one of the ways in which independent projects can take part in the decisive action on the terraces.[44]

These questions – of generation, of centre and margin, of the alien and the vernacular – have typically been refracted through representations of London. As Steve Daniels has argued, during the eighties the very term *culture* took on "a pronounced metropolitan meaning"[45], with dominant and oppositional groups organising themselves in relation to the capital. I want to briefly argue that in the 'end–of–England' London films of the 1980s, the issue most frequently addressed is the shifting relationship between public and private space, an issue with profound implications for the post–consensual decomposition of the imagined national community.

With a number of exceptions (e.g. the 'yuppie' soap opera *Capital City*), images of London came from a pronounced 'second nation' perspective. A short film by William Raban, *Sundial* (1992), provides the starkest representation of the different political uses of space. Raban uses the Pelli Tower, neo–Conservatism's most shining architectural symbol, as a kind of disciplinary signifier, dominating the second nation sites across which it is photographed. A common narrative strategy has been to move second nation characters across the two nation divide. *Riff-Raff* (1991) centres on itinerant construction workers converting a hospital into a prestige development for "London Heritage Homes". The dialogue between private affluence and public responsibility is shown to be coercively weighted in favour of the former by punitive sackings, inadequate on–site safety precautions and police action. *Mona Lisa* (1984) uses Soho and Kings Cross as ironic counterpoints to the new acquisitive culture, second nation sites that are both necessary and dangerous to the predatory first nation.

The most consistent anatomist of this divided terrain has been Mike Leigh, who has reworked the changing dynamics of the capital in four films: *Meantime* (1983), *High Hopes* (1988), *Life is Sweet* (1990) and *Naked* (1993). All four texts involve a movement across a spatial–social divide: green–belt aunt Barbara's trip to her sister's high–rise flat in *Meantime* begins a parallel between the remorseless cheeriness of middle–class home improvement and the patronising

intrusiveness of the estate manager in the flats:

> Our job is to help you, yeah? And it helps us to help you if you help us, OK? An anthill, yeah? An anthill which can be as big as a man, as big as three men, begins as a single grain of sand, OK? Time passes, the single grain becomes the anthill, OK? It's like repairs, y'know. Small things become big things. And what I'm saying is, it helps us if you tell us about the grain of sand, OK? Don't wait until it becomes an anthill, yeah?

High Hopes involves several symbolic movements – to the home of Rupert and Laetitia, the preposterous yuppies curiously sited next to that of Cyril's mother, to Cyril's *arriviste* sister Valerie's house (all man made fibres and garish colours), to Highgate Cemetery for a symbolic yet powerless act of identification. *Life is Sweet*'s main mover is Wendy, from her lower middle class semi to the absurd bistro of the would–be restaurateur Aubrey. In Leigh's most recent film this two nation trope, and the petty comic viciousness of the suburban satires, have been frighteningly intensified. While pre–publicity focused on *Naked*'s negotiation of homelessness, a common two–nation trope in recent documentary, the London of the film is more impressionistic, "the big shitty" which provides an apocalyptic and predatory backdrop for the motormouth protagonist's self–indulgent morbidness. Where the previous films offered realism's compensating moments of emotional fulfilment, *Naked*'s resolute grimness marks it as a move into another genre that has anatomised the nation as it moves towards the millennium.

e.

> *I hate the voice of my own kind, I know who they are,*
> *brain-washed in mediocre public schools,*
> *brought up to rule over the oiks and the wogs.*
> *I see through them, God damn them, God damn you all.*[46]

On the isolated space of a video screen, contrary to its 'mass', propagandist intentions, I am watching the third part of what could loosely be constructed as a trilogy of documentary films directed by Humphrey Jennings. If *Heart of*

Britain (1941) and *Listen to Britain* (1942) are nostalgic fantasies of an organic 'folk', *A Diary for Timothy* (1946) is a more forward–looking and ambivalent text. The final notes of Vaughan Williams' 'A Lark Ascending' and the familiar, patrician voice of a BBC commentator seem to locate the viewer in an uncritical, fantasy 'England' (definitely *not* 'Britain'): but E.M. Forster's script, read by Michael Redgrave, suggests a less cosy image of the nation. The eponymous baby is told, "If you had been born in ... a Liverpool or Glasgow slum, this would have been a very different picture." Recalling Jennings' work with Mass Observation and the GPO Film Unit, *A Diary for Timothy* celebrates the everyday life of the nation rather than its grand historical narratives, tracing and juxtaposing the fortunes of a Welsh Miner, a London train driver and a crippled airman. Undoubtedly this populist narrative strategy works in the interest of legitimating exploitative social relations, but if one can isolate a prevailing abstract noun from their stories and testimonies and the voiceover narrative, it is 'fairness'. Over Myra Hess playing Beethoven, Redgrave challenges the baby to reassess wartime hatred of Germany; over the body of an injured miner he asks the boy to consider whether this will be acceptable in a now–glimpsible future. Gyronwy the miner looking over his pit village, thinks aloud (a little stagily): "the last war, the unemployed, broken homes, scattered families ... has all this got to happen again?"

This clouded vision of a more just society achieves visual form in the emphasis on Britain as a country of *carers*. Health professionals seem to be everywhere in this end–of–the–war landscape, a synecdoche for a more general process of healing, reconstruction and social intervention. Straddling the end of the war and the first year of Labour rule, *A Diary for Timothy* captures some of the optimism surrounding the institution of the welfare state. In the period of post–war consensus, these links between individual health and a caring state were fairly clear, but I want to suggest that an important feature of national representations since 1979 link health, state and nation in a way that is fundamentally different from Jennings' consensualism, leaving the individual's body in an antagonistic relationship to the national culture. Where Jennings

posits a nation built on health, I would note a tendency towards representation in terms of (to use Ruskin's word) *ilth*. This representational strategy has then been curiously reconstructed by the Right as an indication of the Left's own sickness. Writing in the *Sunday Times*, Norman Stone contrasted the "sick scenes from English life" that he found in a "worthless and insulting ... farrago of films" with the high standards of British 'quality' cinema, past and present[47].

While I would note the importance given to the health and nation dyad in films such as *The National Health* (1973), *Britannia Hospital* (1982), *Brazil* (1984) and *1984* (1984) it is Derek Jarman more than any other film–maker, who has contrasted the living body with the national ilth (and who provided one of Stone's main targets). From his first features *Sebastiane* (1976) and *Jubilee* (1977) until his penultimate release *Blue* (1993), Jarman addressed himself alternately to the decadent state of the UK (arguing for decadence as both a regime of suffering and a mark of intelligence[48]) and to the compensating promise of a mythic Mediterranean, a traditional source of meaning for the British intelligentsia. After Jarman's diagnosis as body positive, this dialectic takes on an apocalyptic tone, and an increasing anger towards the repressions and bigotries of Anglo–Britishness.

As I argued in Chapter One, the ideology of 'home' is still the fundament on which national identity is most often constructed. Jarman's *The Last of England* (1987) and *The Garden* (1990) return insistently to the problematic nature of this site of social reproduction. The former film returns to housing forms now rendered redundant and oppressive – the 8–mm home movies of a childhood spent on airbases, the red filtered destitution of abandoned housing estates: "*The Last of England* ... suffers under a political sickness, inscribed on the body of England, on its architecture and landscape, and more directly, onto the bodies of those excluded (from health, from homes, from jobs) under a regime that would make (private) patients of us all."[49] Paired with the home in the stereotype of English privateness is the garden, a site of contested (often politically and sexually reactionary) meaning visited throughout Jarman's

repeated attempts to dig for Britain. The eponymous garden of the film provides a protected ground on which to look at Britain – to the past of Turner[50], to the nuclear nemesis in the shape of Dungeness power station and to the distant contours of the Thatcherite second nation.

Neither *The Last of England* or *The Garden* could be described as optimistic films, but they retain a faith in representation and in an image culture that can transcend space and time, to make meaning out of pain and to re–enchant the everyday environment. In some ways *Blue* marks a break with that faith, a disgust with what Jarman has called "the pandemonium of the image".[51] Throughout this thesis I have made the banal point that boundaries and forms of nationhood have been created through the interplay of a diverse range of images, but this "trap of visibility" has also served to delineate and exclude groups from the national construction. Jarman's film is a minor act of revenge on this image culture. The transmission of *Blue*, the colour of Conservatism and of the shroud, is an important moment in a representational strategy which has sought to problematise the mapping of a national future, resisting the idea of the nation's power to involve people in a common sense of identity and its capacity to work as an inclusive symbol which provides 'integration' and 'meaning' as it constructs public images and interpretations of the future. This is one ending to this thesis, "a hymn to resignation, a looney tune, a lullaby to Britain". In this reading of national identity, far from seeing a resurgence of popular representations of Anglo–Britain, the 1980s and 1990s have witnessed its fragmentation, dispersal and evacuation of meaning. Hebdige writes:

> In this 'end–of–England' allegory the signifiers of national pride, consensus and heritage are decomposed and ironized. *Eros* substitutes for *logos*, 'crisis' for 'homeland'. Here among the 'liberal', 'left' or 'non–aligned', 'anarchic' or just plain 'alienated' British arts intelligentsia, the Queen indeed is dead: a victim of deconstruction along with the mythically unified 'straight and narrow' community she notionally represents.[52]

But, like Hebdige, I feel dissatisfied with this narrative at the same time as I recognise its force. On the one hand it seems strangely complicit with the very

ideologies it exists in opposition to – the right–minded public pronouncements on 'the national decline', the 'crisis' and the waning of 'national identity'. On the other it locates place–bound identity *within* those ideologies, not in relation to them. To offer another conclusion, I want to work against the grain of this entropic view of national identity, to say that there is still something in some of the 'trivial' and the 'popular' manifestations of belonging that might resist the fatalities of imperially and militarily constructed Anglo–Britishness.

2. *REGIONALISM, BRITSOC AND THE EVERYDAY.*

> *'National-popular' designates not a cultural content but ... the possibility of an alliance of interests and feelings between different social agents which varies according to the structure of each individual society.*[53]

a.

I want to start by presenting a 'worst case' view of national identity. In this argument, national identity is a form of false consciousness in which the establishment and maintenance of the nation–form gets misinterpreted as an expression of popular subjective will. It is an ideology which works in the interest of political and military élites: by requiring that political power be monopolised by central national authorities it divorces people from their geographical attachments and forces them to conform with the boundaries imposed by legal, commercial and military power. But far from experiencing this as alienation, people understand and internalise such coercion as the expression of natural and prepolitical popular feeling.

Jonathan Rée, whose views these are, rightly refuses to accept that such legitimating operations are unique to the *state*, from which the nation is somehow magically distanced. It is the state that brings the nation into existence, not vice versa as the logic of nationality[54] would have us believe. This logic conspires to make us give our consent to state power by disguising it as an expression of our own feelings.

While I would accept much of this, I would also want to ask questions of it. How might one escape this regime of meaning (as Rée has clearly done)? Because a meaning is created, is it therefore false? What are the mechanisms by which this logic is installed? Most of all, despite the historical precedents for his argument, is Rée right to accept that the Anglo–British state is necessarily a *warfare* state? As I suggested in the earlier discussion of *Diary For Timothy*, are there not (contingent, compromised) moments in which the nation–state's directing role might be in the direction of welfare rather than warfare?

b.

As with Jennings' film, my search for a form of identity that combines an affectionate sense of place with an identification with an umbrella nation begins paradoxically in time of war, with the Common Wealth Party. While Common Wealth was certainly a form of bourgeois expression, magically overcoming class distinctions through appeals to the national interest, its three principles of *Common Ownership*, *Morality in Politics* and *Vital Democracy* continue to offer broad principles through which to think new socialist politics. Vital democracy is a thoroughly nebulous phrase, but it included such ideas as proportional representation and the founding of regional parliaments. I want to argue that the region and the locale are fundamental in any project that seeks to re–enchant ideas of belonging and commonality, for they carry few of the defence–based resonances of the nation, imply an image of alliance rather than imposition in the national construction and resist some of the connotations of ethnic 'integrity' and 'authenticity' (while, arguably, retrenching them at another level).

The first thing to say is that this localism/regionalism as it currently exists, is overwhelmingly bourgeois in orientation and outlook (separatist movements are a different matter). The example of Europe suggests that one way in which bourgeois regionalism might develop is towards a commonality of interests between regions with shared economic interests (as in the 'high–tec' confederation of Baden–Württemburg, Lombardy, Rhone–Alpes and Catalunya)[55] which would logically favour already affluent regions and localities, further widening the 'two nation' gap. But as Meredith Veldman has argued, there is already a tradition of bourgeois regionalism in Britain which has often been mobilised *against* such international capitalist accumulative strategies[56]. I would suggest that one of the failures of the Left in the last fifteen years has been its disavowal of or sneering at this Little or Middle England (both inaccurately and patronisingly anglicist).

My purpose is not to absurdly valorise a middle–class perspective on located identity nor to argue for bourgeois leadership in its reconstruction. I would

however note that, like it or not, the middle class *is* likely to have a directing role in any place–centred enterprise which hopes to create a new common sense (as the brief but influential history of Green politics in Britain suggests) and that if the metropolitan Left continues to marginalize and deligitimate such practices, it risks handing such initiatives over to the Right (witness Mrs. Thatcher's bizarre claim that the Conservative Party were the first Greens).

One such venture, which strikes me as interestingly in process, is the conservation organisation Common Ground[57]. Common Ground claims to champion the ordinary and the everyday, noting that the local and the familiar are the most important sites in which meaning is made. This undoubtedly involves some disputed notions of what the 'ordinary' is, and Common Ground has been attacked for upholding archaic notions of locality, the mundane and the popular. The organisation's "rules for local distinctiveness", for example, problematically urge people to "thwart the urbanisation of the countryside" and "to kill corporate identity before it kills our high streets". Similarly, their preference for the parish as a more human–sized notion of lived space has been denigrated for its Christian and rural traditionalism (the organisation itself disputes that the term is reductive[58]). As Patrick Wright has noted:

> Critics and historians have preferred to stand back from this rural imagery of Englishness, poking at it with long bargepoles and expounding gleefully upon its awfulness – its anti–industrialism, its southern bias, its pre–war complicity with repulsive eugenicist theories.[59]

But Common Ground has attempted to stay ahead of this criticism, arguing for "the best of the new" as well as the old, for new settlements as well as 'deep' places, for the city as well as the country, for consumption as well as creation. Its *May Day Poster for Local Distinctiveness* (1992), organised as a lexicon, includes Mosques as well as Milestones and Notting Hill Carnival as well as the Cornish Pastie. Under 'X' it exorcises some of the racialist assumptions that underlay much mid–century ruralism[60]: just as we should "oppose monoculture in our fields" so we should also "exile xenophobia, which fossilises places and peoples", and "welcome cultural diversity".

Common Ground is certainly not unproblematic – its lack of a membership and its uncritical valorisation of the artist are positions which can be manipulated in reactionary directions – but its metaphor of commonality is one that strikes me as progressive, in contrast to the selfishness of individualism and the distance–defined bureaucratism of traditional collectivism. As trustee Richard Mabey has defined it, the common is "a domain where people make different, often private use of a shared resource, while all the time deferring some of that resource to others". That this is a cliché should not divert us from the failure to achieve it in any meaningful sense.

Where attempts *have* been made to implement some idea of commonality, they have invariably been at the local or regional level. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the capital's significance in the national culture, the paradigm instance has been the GLC between 1982 and 1986. Working from some of Hayek's notions of the organization of knowledge, Hilary Wainwright has argued that the GLC was an attempt to let go of the traditional social–engineering presumption that social transformation is carried out primarily through the state:

> Out of [the] combination of political commitments from elected politicians and pressure from groups of Londoners, the GLC developed mechanisms in an *ad hoc* way which made public and sometimes effective a wealth of practical knowledge ignored by the market and the conventional state alike. The knowledge of subordinate groups of their needs and possible remedies; the knowledge of consumers that is embedded in skills and daily experience..[61]

Clearly, Wainwright is not making an argument for *identity* as such. But I am struck by three things about this local/regional form of organisation which relate to spatial identity. Firstly, Wainwright places a great deal of emphasis on people's knowledge of their intimate surroundings and lived existence. Secondly, she presents this knowledge as in negotiation with other groups. Thirdly, the forms of knowledge about which she writes are deeply banal: they are to do with working and shopping, coping with the welfare institutions of schools, hospitals and benefit offices.

I would extend this argument and say that identity is largely formed through the commonplace. In its legislative and financial role the state has direct, daily influence over that identity. Criticism of national identity has often been couched in terms of its spectacular manifestations while little attention has been paid to how people's understanding of place may be linked to their mundane activities. Analysis has therefore become fixated with illusory and legitimating origins rather than with day–to–day processes (Patrick Wright's adaptation of Agnes Heller's work is clearly a major exception here). Moreover, cultural studies intellectuals have a tendency towards extrapolating this wide–eyed post–national awareness to a whole culture, as if by naming the folly of national identity, it will magically disappear. In "No Place Like *Heimat*", for example, David Morley and Kevin Robbins have argued that, "in a world that is increasingly characterized by exile, migration and Diaspora, with all the consequences of unsettling and hybridization, there can be no place for [the] absolutism of the pure and authentic."[62] This may be a very accurate description of the authors' circumstances, but it is unlikely to mean much to people living in more circumscribed circumstances. Moreover, the assumption that the benighted masses are in search of chimerical purity is made ludicrous by an analysis of everyday behaviour – behaviour which has none of the exotic attractions of Diaspora ("Culture is Ordinary", Raymond Williams once entitled an essay) but establishes much in the way of cultural dialogue.

I do not believe that the nation will always be a meaningful category, nor do I believe that there is a British 'essence' (it would smell rather rank if there was). Rather, I have been working on the probability that nations, regions and localities are likely to be around for some time longer, that they mean things to people, that they can be mobilised in different directions, and above all that they *provide* things – some intangible, some very material, most of them mundane and therefore necessary. In no sense has this been the view of nationhood and national identity in recent years. Instead, on the one hand has been a pernicious myth of origins and essence (with Thatcher's Cheltenham speech as its acme), on the other the criticism of that myth. To reclaim the nation for a

popular politics does not mean one must mimic the militarism of the dominant bloc, nor does it mean excluding people from the charmed circle of Britishness. It has nothing to do with purity or authenticity. Instead, as Butterfield was well aware, it is about environments and institutions. As the GLC example shows, for the foreseeable future a politics which does not attempt to seize national power and reconstruct British spaces and institutions (and therefore what it means to be British) is doomed to frustration or self–regarding purity of its own. The flight of many left academics from these issues to 'global' concerns (where their role as 'organic' intellectuals is left perpetually suspended) or to micro–revolutionary possibilities indicates a profound lack of belief in the transformation of everyday life. In a sense, I have had to write this piece in order to arrive at a beginning. For were I to start again, I would want to look at other images of Anglo–Britain: the ways in which Britain's welfare institutions are negotiated and used as a resource for identity formation, and how the limited, reformist, entryist imaginings of the welfare state might still be used to transcend the banal through the banal:

> For its customers it [the NHS] was a godsend, perhaps the most beneficial reform ever enacted in Britain, given that it relieved so many not merely of pain but also of the awful plight of having to watch the suffering and death of a spouse or a child for lack of enough money to do anything about it. A country in which such a service exists is utterly different from a country without it.[63]

REFERENCES - AFTERWORD

1. Antonio Gramsci *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, quoted in Colin Mercer, "Generating Consent" *Ten.8*, 14, 1984, p.5.

2. T.S. Eliot "To the Indians Who Died in Africa" *Collected Poems* London: Faber & Faber (1986) p.231.

3. Colin MacInnes quoted in Dick Hebdige "Digging for Britain" in Dominic Strinati & Stephen Wagg (1992) *Come on Down*, London: Routledge p.354.

4. Colin Leys "The Rise of the Authoritarian State" in James Curran (ed.) (1984) *The Future of the Left*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.58–73; Stuart Hall "The Great Moving Right Show" in Stuart Hall & Martin Jacques (eds.) (1983) *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, pp.19–39.

5. Peter Jenkins in *Mrs Thatcher's Revolution: the ending of the Socialist era* (Harvard University Press, 1987) has suggested that Thatcherite authoritarianism is interlocked with an explicit Puritanism; "Her agenda could have been written on a sampler. The individual owed responsibility to self, family, firm, community, country and God in that order. Economic regeneration and moral regeneration go hand in hand." p.67.

6. Hall (1983) p.22.

7. The Bill reads: "[A] local authority shall not a) promote homosexuality or publish material for the promotion of homosexuality; b) promote the teaching in any maintained school of the acceptability of homosexuality as a pretended family relationship by the publication of such material or otherwise; and c) give financial assistance to any person for either of the purposes referred to in paragraphs a) and b) above."

8. Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. & Ling, T. (1988) *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp 68–9.

9. ibid. p.72.

10. Peter Keighron "Condition Critical" *Screen* (32) 2, 1991, pp.209–19.

11. Colin McArthur "British Film Reviewing: a complaint" *Screen*, (26) 1, 1985, p.79.

12. See *The Guardian* 22.7.1991, p.18 and Keighron (1991).

13. Judith Williamson *The Guardian*, 1.8.91, p.22.

14. Andrew Clifford *The Guardian* 16.12.91. p.30. The ways in which intimate drama can be distinguished from 'quality' drama were left relatively vague, although "structural" factors (unspecified) are mentioned.

15. Jaci Stephen *New Statesman & Society* 14.6.91 p.29.

16. Patrick Stoddart *Sunday Times*, 21.7.91.

17. First and final quotes from Edward Pearce *The Sunday Times*, 13.7.88. Second quote from *The Sunday Telegraph*, 4.7.88. Quoted in Keighron (1991).

18. Leader article, *The Guardian*, 22.7.91, p.18

19. Chris Tookey, *The Sunday Telegraph*, 26.6.88; *The Sunday Times*, 13.7,88.

20. *The Guardian*, 22.7.91, p.18.

21. Roy Hattersley "Let's Pretend Politics" *The Listener*, 23.6.88. Quoted in Keighron (1991).

22. Quoted in Richard Paterson & Philip Schlesinger "State Heroes for the Eighties" *Screen*, May/June 1983 p.66.

23. Martin Auty "SAS vs CND", *Time Out*, 27.8.1982.

24. Paterson & Schlesinger (1982) p.67.

25. E.P. Thompson quoted in Leys (1984) p.68.

26. Henri Gobard (1979) *La Guerre Culturelle*, quoted in Susan Marling (1993) *An American Affair*, London: Boxtree, p.122.

27. ibid. p.94.

28. Christopher Hitchens (1992) *Blood, Class & Nostalgia: Anglo-American ironies*, New York: Farar, Straus & Giroux, p.150.

29. ibid.

30. Meredith Veldman (1994) *Fantasy, the Bomb & the Greening of Britain: romantic protest 1945-1980*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

31. Quoted in Duncan Campbell (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American military power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph. The phrase was also used in *A Very British Coup* as an argument for Britain becoming non–aligned.

32. A poll in 1986, after the Libyan bombing, recorded that 75 per cent of British people believed that the USA would fire missiles in Britain without the permission of the British government. See C. Bartlett (1992) *'The Special Relationship': a political history of Anglo-American relations since 1945*, London: Longman, p.160.

33. The raid was sanctioned by the British government, despite a previous statement by Mrs. Thatcher that such retaliatory attacks were against international law.

34. Benedict Anderson (1983) quoted in James Donald & Stuart Hall (eds) (1986) *Politics & Ideology*, Milton Keynes: Open University, p.103.

35. Lez Cooke, "Edge of Darkness", *Movie* 33, Winter 1989, p.45.

36. Louis Adamic on California quoted in Mike Davis (1992) *City of Quartz*, London: Verso, p.36.

37. Memo from Pat Buchanan to Richard Nixon quoted in Robert Hughes (1993) *Culture of Complaint*, London: HarperCollins, p.42.

38. Jessop *et al* (1988) p.88.

39. ibid.

40. Dick Hebdige "Digging for Britain" in Dominic Strinati and Stephen Wagg (1993) *Come on Down*, London: Routledge, p.340.

41. John Roberts "Sinn Fein & Video: notes on a political pedagogy", *Screen*, Spring 1988, p.97.

42. Beatrix Campbell *Sight & Sound*, July 1994, p.21.

43. Quoted in Stuart Cosgrove "Refusing Consent: the 'Oi For England' project", *Screen* 24 (1) Jan–Feb 1983, pp.92–3.

44. ibid. p.96.

45. Steve Daniels (1993) *Fields of Vision*, London: Polity Press p.17.

46. Derek Jarman (1987) *The Last of England*, London: Constable, p.181.

47. Norman Stone "Through a Lens Darkly", *Sunday Times*, 10.1.88.

48. ibid. p.47.

49. Chris Lippard & Guy Johnson "Private Practice, Public Health: the politics of sickness and the film of Derek Jarman" in Friedman (1993) p.286.

50. Jonathan Romney "The Garden of Earthly Delights" *City Limits*, 3.1.91.

51. *Sight & Sound* October 1993, p.40.

52. Hebdige (1992) p.368.

53. David Forgacs "National–popular: genealogy of a concept" in Simon During [ed] (1993) *Cultural Studies: a reader* pp. 177–90.

54. Rée reworks nationality as *internationality* to emphasise the global form of organisation which demands an answer to the question "which nation is responsible" for every piece of land. Rée "Internationality" *Radical Philosophy* 60 1992.

55. Christopher Harvie "English Regionalism: the dog that never barked" in Bernard Crick (1991) *National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom*, London: Blackwell, p.105.

56. Veldman (1994). See particularly the chapters on the Green Movement and CND.

57. Common Ground was founded in 1983, and is funded by a variety of government agencies, charitable trusts, businesses and individuals. Its campaigns include a New Milestones Project, a Local Difference campaign, an orchards campaign and Trees, Woods and the Green Man project.

58. Common Ground's Parish Maps project leaflet argues: "We have no word in English to express *heimat* in German, *bro* or *cynefin* in Welsh. Common Ground is offering the word parish in the same vein, to describe your own familiar territory or parish, the locality to which you feel a sense of belonging and which belongs to you. You may wish to draw your own line or to use old ecclesiastical or newer civil parish or community council boundaries – it is up to you". Heimat, as David Morley and Kevin Robbins have argued, is not the unproblematic term Common Ground seem to assume.

59. Patrick Wright "Lexicon of Life for the Common Man" *Guardian* 4.7.92, p.31.

60. Meredith Veldman (1994) records that a number of Soil Association members, including the association's journal editor, Jorian Jenks, were closely involved with fascism.

61. Hilary Wainwright (1994) *Arguments for a New Left: answering the free market right*, Oxford; Blackwell, p.180.

62. David Morley & Kevin Robbins "No Place Like *Heimat*" *New Formations* 12, Winter 1990, pp.1–24.

63. Peter Calvorcessi (1978) *The British Experience, 1945-1975* London: Bodley Head, pp. 35–6. Quoted in Peter Hennessy (1992) *Never Again*, London: Jonathan Cape.

FILMOGRAPHY

[The following screen texts were consulted during the writing of this thesis. Dates represent production years for cinema films and first transmission years for television dramas.]

Coalface (1935) d. Alberto Cavacanti p. John Grierson

Housing Problems (1937) d. & p. Arthur Anstey, Edgar Elton, Ruby Grierson

The Islanders (1939) d. Maurice Harvey p. J. B. Holmes

A Midsummer Day's Work (1939) uncredited (camera Jonah Jones, James Rogers)

Spare Time (1939) d. Humphrey Jennings p. Alberto Cavalcanti

Britain at Bay (1940) s. J. B. Priestley

Christmas Under Fire (1940) d. Harry Watt & Humphrey Jennings s. Quentin Reynolds

Heart of Britain (1941) d. Humphrey Jennings

Listen to Britain (1942) d. Humphrey Jennings

The Life & Death of Colonel Blimp (1943) d. p. & s. Michael Powell & Emeric Pressburger

A Canterbury Tale (1944) d. p. & s. Michael Powell & Emeric Pressburger

I Know Where I'm Going (1945) d. p. & s. Michael Powell & Emeric Pressburger

A Matter of Life and Death (1946) d. p. & s. Michael Powell & Emeric Pressburger

A Diary for Timothy (1946) d. Humphrey Jennings s. E.M. Forster

Jubilee (1977) d. & s. Derek Jarman p. Howard Malin & James Whaley

The Spongers (1978) d. Roland Joffé p. Tony Garnett s. Jim Allen

Staying On (1980) d. Silvio Narizzano p. Irene Shubik s. Julian Mitchell

Brideshead Revisited (1981) d. Charles Sturridge & Michael Lindsay–Hogg s. John Mortimer

Country (1981) d. Richard Eyre s. Trevor Griffiths

Britannia Hospital (1982) d. Lindsay Anderson p. Davina Belling & Clive Parsons s. David Sherwin

Angel (1982) d. & s. Neil Jordan p. Barry Blackmore

Boys from the Blackstuff (1982) d. Philip Saville p. Michael Wearing s. Alan Bleasdale.

Chariots of Fire (1982) d. Hugh Hudson p. David Puttnam s. Colin Welland

Gandhi (1982) d. & p. Richard Attenborough s. John Briley

P'Tang Yang Kipperbang (1982) d. Michael Apted p. Chris Griffin s. Jack Rosenthal

Made in Britain (1982) d. Alan Clarke p. Margaret Matheson s. David Leland

Another Time, Another Place (1983) d. & s. Michael Radford p. Simon Perry

The Dresser (1983) d. & p. Peter Yates s. Ronald Harwood

Meantime (1983) d. & s. Mike Leigh p. Graham Benson

Dance with a Stranger (1984) d. Mike Newell p. Roger Randall–Cutler s. Shelagh Delaney

An Englishman Abroad (1984) d. John Schlesinger p. Innes Lloyd s. Alan Bennett

The Ploughmans Lunch (1984) d. Richard Eyre p. Simon Relph & Ann Scott s. Ian McEwan.

Cal (1984) d. Pat O'Connor d. Stuart Craig & David Puttnam s. Bernard MacLaverty

Mona Lisa (1984) d. Neil Jordan p. Patrick Cassavetti & Stephen Woolley s. Neil Jordan & David Leland

A Passage to India (1984) d. & s. David Lean p. John Brabourne & Richard Goodwin.

Jewel in the Crown (1984) d. Christopher Morahan & Jim O'Brien p. Christopher Morahan s. Ken Taylor

Greystoke (1984) d. Hugh Hudson p. Hugh Hudson & Stanley Canter s. Robert Towne & Michael Austin.

Another Country (1984) d. Marek Kanievska. p. Julian Mitchell s. Julian Mitchell.

A Private Function (1984) d. Malcolm Mowbray p. Mark Shivas s. Alan Bennett.

Brazil (1985) d. Terry Gilliam p. Arnon Milchan s. Terry Gilliam, Tom Stoppard & Charles McKeown

Defence of the Realm (1985) d. David Drury p. Robin Douet & Lynda Myles s. Martin Stellman

The Shooting Party (1985) d. Alan Bridges p. Geoffrey Reeve s. Julian Bond.

Lamb (1985) d. Colin Gregg p. Neil Zeiger s. Bernard MacLaverty

Room with a View (1985) d. James Ivory p. Ismail Merchant s. Ruth Prawer Jhabvala

Stormy Monday (1985) d. & s. Mike Figgis p. Nigel Stafford–Clark

Edge of Darkness (1985) d. Martin Campbell p. Michael Wearing s. Troy Kennedy Martin

Withnail & I (1986) d. & s. Bruce Robinson p. Paul Heller

No Surrender (1986) d. Peter Smith p. Mamoun Hassan s. Alan Bleasdale

My Beautiful Launderette (1986) d. Stephen Frears p. Sarah Radclyffe & Tim Bevan s. Hanif Kureishi

Letter to Brezhnev (1986) d. Chris Bernard p. Janet Goddard & Caroline Spack s. Frank Clarke

The Queen is Dead (1986) d. Derek Jarman for the Smiths

Rita, Sue & Bob Too (1986) d. Alan Clarke p. Sandy Lieberson s. Andrea Dunbar

The Monocled Mutineer (1986) s. Alan Bleasdale

Absolute Beginners (1986) d. Julian Temple p. Stephen Woolley & Chris Brown s. Christopher Wicking, Richard Burridge & Don MacPherson.

Handful of Dust (1987) d. Charles Sturridge p. Derek Granger s. Tim Sullivan, Derek Granger, Charles Sturridge.

A Month in the Country (1987) d. Pat O'Connor p. Kenith Trod s. Simon Gray

Sammy and Rosie Get Laid (1987) d. Stephen Frears p. Sarah Radclyffe & Tim Bevan s. Hanif Kureishi

Wish You Were Here (1987) d. & s. David Leland p. Sarah Radclyffe

Hope & Glory (1987) d. p. & s. John Boorman

Maurice (1987) d. James Ivory p. Ismail Merchant s. Kit Harvey–Jones & James Ivory

Comrades (1987) d. & s. Bill Douglas p. Simon Relph

The Last of England (1987) d. Derek Jarman p. James Mackay & Don Boyd

Prick up your Ears (1987) d. Stephen Frears p. Andrew Brown s. Alan Bennett.

High Hopes (1988) d. & s. Mike Leigh p. Simon Channing–Williams & Victor Glynn

A Very British Coup (1988) d. Mick Jackson p. Ann Skinner & Sally Hibbin s. Alan Plater

The Last of England (1988) d. & s. Derek Jarman p. James MacKay, Don Boyd, Yvonne Little

Distant Voices, Still Lives (1988) d. & s. Terence Davies p. Jennifer Howarth

Tumbledown (1988) d. Richard Eyre p. Richard Broke s. Charles Wood.

Venus Peter (1989) d. Ian Sellar p. Chris Young s. Ian Sellar & Christopher Rush.

Resurrected (1989) d. Paul Greengrass p. Chris Burke s. Martin Allen

The Cook, the Thief, his Wife and her Lover (1989) d. & s. Peter Greenaway p. Kees Kasander

Scandal (1989) d. Michael Caton–Jones p. Stephen Woolley s. Michael Thomas.

The Krays (1990) d. Peter Medak p. Dominic Anciano & Ray Burdis s. Philip Ridley

Diamond Skulls (1990) d. Nick Broomfield p. Tim Bevan s. Tim Rose Price

Hidden Agenda (1990) d. Ken Loach p. Eric Fellner s. Jim Allen

The Big Man (1990) d. David Leland p. Stephen Woolley s. Don McPherson

Close My Eyes (1991) d. & s. Stephen Poliakoff p. Therese Pickard

Riff-Raff (1991) d. Ken Loach p. Sally Hibbin s. Bill Jesse

A Question of Attribution (1991) d. John Schlesinger p. Innes Lloyd s. Alan Bennett

Life is Sweet (1991) d. & s. Mike Leigh p. Alison Chitty

GBH (1991) d. Robert Young p. David Jones & Alan Bleasdale s. Alan Bleasdale.

A Plague on your Home (1991) d. & p. Charles Stewart & Malcolm Hirst

Young Soul Rebels (1991) d. Isaac Julien p. Nadine Marsh–Edwards s. Paul Hallam, Derrick Saldaan, Isaac Julien.

Where Angels Fear to Tread (1991) d. Charles Sturridge p. Derek Granger s. Tim Sullivan, Derek Granger, Charles Sturridge

The Long Day Closes (1992) d. & s. Terence Davies p. Olivia Stewart

The Crying Game (1992) d. & s. Neil Jordan p. Stephen Woolley.

Memento Mori (1992) d. Jack Clayton p. Louise Marks s. Alan Kelley, Jeanie Sims & Jack Clayton

Wild West (1992) d. David Attwood p. Eric Fellner s. Harwant Bains.

Sundial (1992) d. & p. William Raban

The Secret Garden (1993) d. Agnieszka Holland p. Fred Fuchs, Fred Roos & Tom Luddy s. Caroline Thompson

Leon the Pig Farmer (1993) d. & p. Gary Sinyor & Vadim Jean s. Gary Sinyor & Michael Norman

Howards End (1993) d. James Ivory p. Ismail Merchant s. Ruth Prawer Jhabvala

Raining Stones (1993) d. Ken Loach p. Sally Hibbin s. Jim Allen

Naked (1993) d. & s. Mike Leigh p. Simon Channing Williams

The Remains of the Day (1993) d. James Ivory p. Ismail Merchant s. Ruth Prawer Jhabvala

Shadowlands (1993) d. Richard Attenborough p. Richard Attenborough & Brian Eastman s. William Nicholson

Backbeat (1993) d. Iain Softley p. Finola Dwyer & Stephen Woolley s. Iain Softley, Michael Thomas & Stephen Ward

Blue (1993) d. & s. Derek Jarman p. James Mackay & Takashi Asai.

Shopping (1994) d. & s. Paul Anderson p. Jeremy Bolt

BIBLIOGRAPHY

During the preparation of this thesis, the following newspapers and magazines have been used:

NEWSPAPERS 1979-1994

The Daily Telgraph
The Guardian
The Sunday Times

MAGAZINES

Achilles Heel
Arena
Esquire
The Face
For Him
GQ
Granta
Harpers and Queen
Loaded
London Review of Books
Marxism Today
New Statesman and Society
Private Eye
Punch
Sight and Sound
Spectator
Tatler
Ten.8

BOOKS

Bracketed dates refer to the edition used. Original publication dates are indicated in the text.

Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. & Turner, B. (1980) *The Dominant Ideology Thesis*, London: Allen & Unwin.

Abercrombie, N. & Warde, A. (eds.) (1992) *Social Change in Contemporary Britain*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso.

Anderson. P. (1977) *Considerations on Western Marxism*, London: New Left Books.

Aitken, I. (1990) *Film & Reform: John Grierson and the Documentary Film Movement*, London: Routledge.

Aulich, J. (1992) *Framing the Falklands War*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Auty, M. & Roddick, N. (1985) *British Cinema Now*, London: British Film Institute.

Barnett, A. (1982) *Iron Britannia: why Parliament waged the Falklands War*, London: Allison & Busby.

Bartlett, C. (1992) *'The Special Relationship': a political history of Anglo-American relations since 1945*, London: Longman.

Beattie, G. (1992) *We Are the People*, London: Heinemann.

Benjamin, W. (ed. Arendt, H. 1982) *Illuminations*, London: Jonathan Cape.
Bennett, A. (1989) *Single Spies*, London: Faber.

Bennett, T. , Martin, G., Mercer, C. & Woollacott, J. (eds.) (1992) *Culture, Ideology & Social Process: a reader*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Berger, J. (1977) *Ways of Seeing*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Billson, A. (1993) *Suckers*, London: Pan.

Bird, J., Curtis, B., Puttnam, T., Robertson, G. & Tickner, L. (eds) (1993) *Mapping the Futures: local cultures, global change*, London: Routledge.

Bishton, D. & Reardon, J. (1984) *Home Front*, London: Jonathan Cape.

Blackwell, T. & Seabrook, J. (1988) *The Politics of Hope: Britain at the end of the Twentieth Century*, London: Faber & Faber.

Bloch, E. (1986) *Principle of Hope: Volume One* (Introduction), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Boyle, A. (1979) *The Climate of Treason*, London: Hutchinson.

Boyne, R. (1990) *Foucault & Derrida: the other side of reason*, London: Unwin & Hyman.

Brandt, G. (ed) (1993) *British Television Drama in the 1980s*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Briggs, R. (1983) *The Tinpot Foreign General & The Old Iron Woman*, London: Hamish Hamilton.

Bromley, R. (1988) *Lost Narratives: popular fictions, politics and recent history*, London: Routledge.

Buchan, J. (1991) *The Thirty-Nine Steps*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Buckland, G. (ed.) (1989) *The Golden Summer: the Edwardian Photography of Horace W. Nicholls*, London: Pavillion.

Buford, B. (1991) *Among the Thugs*, London: Secker & Warburg.

Butterfield, H. (1944) *The Englishman and His History*, Cambridge.

Butterfield, H. (1959) *The Whig Interpretation of History*, London: Bell & Sons.

Buzard, J. (1993) *The Beaten Track*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Calder, A. (1969) *The People's War*, London: Cape.

Campbell, B. (1984) *Wigan Pier Revisited*, London: Virago.

Campbell, B. (1993) *Goliath*, London: Methuen.

Campbell, D. (1984) *The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American military power in Britain*, London: Michael Joseph.

Cannadine, D. (1990) *The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy*, London: Yale University Press.

Carpenter, H. (1989) *The Brideshead Generation*, London: Faber & Faber.

Chambers, I. (1990) *Border Dialogues: journeys in postmodernity*, London: Routledge.

Cobbett, W. (1968) *Cobbett's England*, London: Everyman Press.

Colls, R. & Dodd, P. (eds.) (1986) *Englishness: Politics & Culture, 1880-1920*, Bromley: Croom Helm.

Corner, J. & Harvey, S. (1991) *Enterprise & Heritage: Crosscurrents of National Culture*, London: Routledge.

Corrigan, T. (1991) *A Cinema Without Walls* London: Routledge

Cosgrove, D. & Daniels, S. (eds.) (1988) *The Iconography of Landscape: essays on the symbolic representation, design & use of past emvironments*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crick, B. (1991) *National Identities: The Constitution of the United Kingdom*, London: Blackwell.

Curran, J. (ed.) (1984) *The Future of the Left*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Curran, S. (1993) *The Cambridge Companion to British Romanticism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Curtis, B. "Posters as Visual Propaganda in the Great War" *Block*, 2, 1980, pp.45–57.

Daniels, S. (1994) *Fields of Vision: landscape imagery & national identity in England and the United States*, Cambridge: Polity.

Davies, J. (1987) *A Green & Pleasant Land*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Davies, J. (1991) *Phase II*, London: The Photographers' Gallery.

Davies, J. (1992) *Crosscurrents*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Davis, M. (1992) *City of Quartz: excavating the future in Los Angeles*, London: Verso.

Day, G. (1990) *Readings in Popular Culture: trivial pursuits?* London: Macmillan.

de Certeau, M. (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, London: University of California Press.

Defoe, D.(1959) *Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain*, London: Everyman Press.

Dick, P. (1990) *The Father-Thing*, London: HarperCollins.

Dodd, P. (1982) *The Art of Travel: essays on travel writing*, London: Frank Cass.

Donald, J. & Hall, S. (eds) (1986) *Politics & Ideology*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Doyle, B. (1989) *English & Englishness*, London: Routledge.

Duberman, H., Vicinus, M. & Chauncey, G. (eds) (1991) *Hidden From History*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

During, S. (1993) *The Cultural Studies Reader*, London: Routledge.

Eagleton, T. (1983) *Literary Theory: an introduction*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Eagleton, T. (1991) *Ideology: an introduction*, London: Verso.

Eco, U. (1987) *Travels in Hyper-reality*, London: Picador.

Edgerton, D. (1991) *England & the Aeroplane: an essay on a militant and technological nation*, London: Macmillan

Engels, F. (1982) *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, London: Granada.

Featherstone, M., Hepworth, M. & Turner, B. (eds.) (1991) *The Body: social process & cultural theory*, London: Sage.

Feldman, D. & Stedman Jones, G. (eds.) (1989) *Metropolis•London: histories & representations since 1800*, London: Routledge.

Fisher, M. & Owen, U. (eds.) (1991) *Whose Cities?* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Friedman, L. (ed.) (1993) *British Cinema & Thatcherism*, London: UCL Press.

Gane, M. (1991) *Baudrillard's Bestiary*, London: Routledge.

Gardner, B. (ed.) (1986) *Up the Line to Death: the war poets 1914-1918*, London: Methuen.

Gilroy, P. (1987) *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, London: Hutchinson.

Gilroy, P. (1993a) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity & Double Consciousness*, London: Verso.

Gilroy, P. (1993b) *Small Acts*, London: Serpent's Tail.

Gramsci, A. (ed. Nowell–Smith, G. & Hoare, Q. 1991) *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Grossberg, L., Nelson, C. & Treichler, P. (eds.) (1992) *Cultural Studies*, London: Routledge.

Habermas, J. (1976) *Legitimation Crisis*, London: Heinemann.

Habermas, J. (1989) *The New Conservatism: cultural criticism & the historians debate*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. & Roberts, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: mugging, the state & law & order*, London: Macmillan.

Hall, S. & Jefferson, T. (eds.) (1976) *Resistance Through Rituals: youth subcultures in post-war Britain*, London: Hutchinson.

Hall, S. (1988) *The Hard Road to Renewal*, London: Verso.

Hall, S. & Jacques, M. (1990) *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Hardy, D. & Ward, C. (1984) *Arcadia for All*, London: Mansell.

Harrison, F. (1982) *Strange Land. The Countryside: Myth & Reality*, London: Sidgwick & Jackson.

Harrison, P. (1983) *Inside the Inner City: life under the cutting edge*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Harrison, T. (1987) *Selected Poems*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Harvey, D. (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Hebdige, D. (1974) *Reggae, Rastas & Rudies: style and the subversion of form*, Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.

Hebdige, D. (1978) *Subcultures: the meaning of style*, London: Routledge.

Hebdige, D. (1988) *Hiding in the Light: of images and things*, London: Routledge.

Hebdige, D. (1990) *Cut n'Mix: cultural identity and Caribbean music*, London: Routledge.

Hennessy, P. (1992) *Never Again: Britain 1945-51*, London: Jonathan Cape.

Hewison, R. (1987) *The Heritage Industry: Britain in a climate of decline*, London: Methuen.

Hill, J. (1986) *Sex, Class & Realism*, London: British Film Institute.

Hitchens, C. (1990) *The Monarchy: a critique of Britain's favourite fetish*, London: Chatto & Windus.

Hitchens, C. (1992) *Blood, Class & Nostalgia: Anglo-American ironies*, New York: Farar, Straus & Giroux.

Hobsbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds.) (1993) *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horne, D. (1984) *The Great Museum*, London: Pluto Press.

Hurd, G. (ed.) (1984) *National Fictions: World War Two in British film & television*, London: British Film Institute.

Hynes, S. (1990) *A War Imagined*, London: Bodley Head.

Hynes, S. (1991) *The Edwardian Turn of Mind*, London: Pimlico.

Ishiguro, K. (1989) *The Remains of the Day*, London: Faber & Faber.

Jarman, D. (ed. D. Hirst) (1987) *The Last of England*, London: Constable.

Jennings, H. & Madge C. (eds.) (1987) *May the Twelfth: Mass-Observation Day Surveys 1937*, London: Faber & Faber.

Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. & Ling, T. (1988) *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Johnson, R., McLenon, G., Schwarz, W. & Sutton, D. (eds.) (1982) *Making Histories*, London: Open University Press.

Johnson, R. (1985) *The Politics of Recession*, London: Macmillan.

Johnston, R. (1991) *A Question of Place: exploring the practice of human geography*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Kearney, H. (1989) *The British Isles: a history of four nations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keating, P. (ed.) (1976) *Into Unknown England 1866-1913: selections from the social explorers*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Keers, P. (1987) *A Gentleman's Wardrobe: classic clothes & the modern man*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Killip, C. (1988) *In Flagrante*, London: Secker & Warburg.

Kipling, R. (1992) *Selected Poetry*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Kismaric, S. (ed.) (1990) *British Photography from the Thatcher Years*, New York: Museum of Modern Art.

Levitas, R. (1990) *The Concept of Utopia*, London: Philip Allan.

Lewis, J. & Townsend, A. (1989) *The North-South Divide: regional change in Britain in the 1980s*, London: Paul Chapman.

Light, A. (1991) *Forever England: femininity, literature & conservatism between the wars*, London: Routledge.

Long, R. (1992) *The Film of Merchant-Ivory*, London: Viking.

Lowe R. & Shaw, W. (1993) *Travellers: voices of the new age nomads*, London: Fourth Estate.

Lowenthal, D. (1985) *The Past is a Foreign Country*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lucas, J. (1990) *England & Englishness: ideas of nationhood in English poetry 1688-1900*, London: Hogarth.

Lumley, R. (1988) *The Museum Time Machine*, London: Routledge.

McDowell, L., Sarre, P. & Hamnett, C. (eds.) (1989) *Divided Nation: social and cultural change in Britain*, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

MacKinnon, K. (1992) *The Politics of Popular Representation: Reagan, Thatcher, AIDS & the movies*, London: Associated University Presses.

McRobbie, A. (ed.) (1989) *Zoot Suits and Second-Hand Dresses: an anthology of music & fashion*, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Marcuse, H. (1964) *One Dimesional Man: studies in the ideology of advanced industrial societies*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Marling, S. (1993) *American Affair: the Americanisation of Britain*, London: Boxtree.

Marwick, A. (1990) *British Society Since 1945*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Marwick, A. (1991) *Culture in Britain Since 1945*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Marx, K. & Engels, F. (ed. Feuer, L. 1976) *Basic Writings on Politics & Phoilosophy*, London: Fontana.

Mellor, D., Saunders, G. & Wright, P. (1990) *Recording Britain: a pictorial Domesday of pre-war Britain*, London: David & Charles.

Moir, E. (1964) *The Discovery of Britain*, Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Morton, H. (1946) *In Search of England* London: Methuen.

Mukerji, C. & Schudson, M. (eds.) (1991) *Rethinking Popular Culture*, Oxford: University of California Press.

Mulhern, F. (1979) *The Moment of Scrutiny*, London: New Left Books.

Murphy, R. (1992) *Sixties British Cinema*, London: BFI.

Nairn, T. (1977) *The Break-Up of Britain*, London: New Left Books.

Nairn, T. (1988) *The Enchanted Glass: Britain and its monarchy*, London: Radius.

Orwell, G. (1974) *Homage to Catalonia*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Orwell, George (1976) *Down and Out in Paris & London*, Harmondsworth: Penguin

Orwell, G. (1982) *The Lion and the Unicorn*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Orwell, G. (1983) *The Penguin Complete Novels of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Orwell, G. (1984a) *The Road to Wigan Pier*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Orwell, G. (1984b) *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Ousby, I. (1990) *The Englishman's England*, Cambridge University Press.

Park, J. (1984) *Learning to Dream: the new British cinema*, London: Faber & Faber.

Parker, T. (1994) *May the Lord in His Mercy Be Kind to Belfast*, London: Jonathan Cape.

Parr, M. with Walker, I. (1986) *The Last Resort: photographs of New Brighton*, Wallassey: Promenade Press.

Parr, M. with Chesshyre, R. (1989) *The Cost of Living*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Parr, M. with Baker, N. (1992) *Signs of the Times: a portrait of the nation's tastes*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Parr, M. with McEwan, I. (1993) *Home & Abroad*, London: Cape.

Petrie, D. (1991) *Creativity & Constraint in the British Film Industry*, London: Macmillan.

Petrie, D. (1992) *New Questions of British Cinema*, London: British Film Institute.

Porter, R. (ed.) (1993) *Myths of the English*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pratt, M. (1992) *Imperial Eyes: travel writing & transculturation*, London: Routledge.

Prebble, J. (1961) *Culloden*, London: Secker & Warburg.

Prebble, J. (1963) *The Highland Clearances*, London: Secker & Warburg.

Pym, J. (1992) *Film on Four: a survey 1982-1991*, London: British Film Institute.

Pynchon, T. (1975) *Gravity's Rainbow*, London: Picador.

Raban, J. (1990) *Soft City*, London: Collins Harvill

Raban, J. (1987) *Coasting*, London: Picador

Rabinow, P. (ed.) (1987) *The Foucault Reader*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Reas, P. with Cosgrove, S. (1993) *Flogging a Dead Horse: heritage culture & its role in post-industrial Britain*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Reid, H. (1992) *Dear Country: A quest for England*, Edinburgh: Mainstream.

Roberts, J. (1982) *Walter Benjamin*, London: Macmillan.

Robbins, K. (1988) *Nineteenth-Century Britain: integration & diversity*, Oxford: Clarendon.

Said, E. (1985) *Orientalism*, London: Peregrine.

Samuel, R., Bloomfield, B. & Boanas, G. (eds.) (1986) *The Enemy Within: Pit villages & the miners' strike of 1984-5*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Samuel, R. (1989) *Patriotism: The Making and Un-Making of English National Identity*, London: Routledge.

(1989a) Vol. 1, *Politics & History*

(1989b) Vol. 2, *Minorities & Outsiders.*

(1989c) Vol. 3, *National Fictions.*

Sassoon, A. (1980) *Gramsci's Politics*, London: Croom Helm.

Savage, J. (1992) *England's Dreaming: Sex Pistols & punk rock*, London: Faber & Faber.

Scannell, P. (ed.) (1991) *Broadcast Talk*, London: Sage Publications.

Strinati, D. & Wagg, S. (1992) *Come on Down: popular media culture in post-war Britain*, London: Routledge.

Theroux, P. (1987) *The Kingdom by the Sea*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Thompson, E. (1978) *The Poverty of Theory and other essays*, London: Merlin.

Urry, J. (1990) *The Tourist Gaze*, London; Sage Publications.

Veldman, M. (1994) *Fantasy, the Bomb & the Greening of Britain: romantic protest 1945-1980*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wainright, H. (1994) *Arguments For a New Left: answering the free market right*, London: Blackwell.

Walker, A. (1985) *National Heroes*, London: Harrap.

Waplington, N. with Berger, J. & Avedon, R. (1991) *Living Room*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Waugh, E. (1987) *The Sword of Honour Trilogy*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waugh, E. (1962) *Brideshead Revisited*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waugh, E. (1973) *The Loved One*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waugh, E. (1977) *The Ordeal Of Gilbert Pinfold*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waugh, E. (19..) *A Handful of Dust*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Wiener, M. (1992) *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit*, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Williams, R. (1975) *The Country & the City*, London: Paladin.

Williams, V. (1994) *Who's Looking at the Family?* Catalogue to an exhibition selected by Val Williams, Carol Brown and Brigitte Lardinois, Barbican Art Gallery, London.

Williamson, J. (1986) *Consuming Passions: the dynamics of popular culture*, London: Marion Boyars.

Wilson, E. & Ash, J. (1992) *Chic Thrills: a fashion reader*, London: Pandora.

Wilson, E. (1988) *Hallucinations: life in the postmodern city*, London: Radius.

Wood, T. (1989) *Looking for Love: photographs from Chelsea Reach Nightclub, New Brighton*, Manchester: Cornerhouse.

Wright, P. (1985) *On Living in an Old Country*, London: Verso.

Wright, P. (1992) *A Journey Through Ruins*, London: Paladin.

Articles & Papers

Alexander, S. "Becoming a Woman in the 1920s and 1930s" in Feldman & Stedman Jones (1989) pp.245–271.

Anderson, B. "James Fenton's Slideshow" *New Left Review* 158, 1986.

Appleby, S. "Crawley: a space mythology" *New Formations*, 11, Summer 1990, pp. 19–44.

Barr, C. "Projecting Britain and the British Character: Ealing Studios"
Part I *Screen*, Spring 1974 pp.87–121.
Part II *Screen*, Summer 1974 pp.129–163.

Beezer, A. "Women & 'Adventure Travel' Tourism" *New Formations*, 21, Winter 1994, pp.119–130.

Belsey, C. "Towards Cultural History – in theory and in practice" *Textual Practice*, 3, 2, June 1989 pp.159–172.

Bishton, D. & Reardon, J. "Home Front" & "The Ali Shuffle" *Ten.8*, 4, 1984.

Bommes, M. & Wright, P."'Charms of Residence': the public and the past" in Johnson et al (1982) ref. pp.253–301.

Bourne Taylor, J. "Re–Locations: from Bradford to Brighton" *New Formations*, 17, Summer 1992, pp.86–94.

Boyd–Bowman, S. "Heavy Breathing in Shropshire" *Screen*, Winter 1986, pp.44–55.

Bristow, J. "Life Stories: Carolyn Steedman's history writing" *New Formations*, 13, Spring 1991, pp.113–131.

Brunsdon, C. "Satellite Dishes and the Landscapes of Taste" *New Formations*, 15, Winter 1991, pp.23–42.

Brunt, R. "Engaging with the Popular: audiences for mass culture and what to say about them" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) pp.69–76.

Burch, N. "*Hogarth, England Home and Beauty*: Two recent British films & the documentary ideology" *Screen*, Summer 1978, pp.119–128.

Burgin, V. "The City in Pieces" *New Formations*, 20, Summer 1993, pp.33–45.

Burns, R. "The City as Not London" in Fisher & Owen (1991) pp.62–70

Burston, P. "Pumping Ironies" *Sight & Sound*, March 1994 p.32.

Bushaway, B. "Name Upon Name: the Great War & remembrance" in Porter (1993).

Cannadine, D. "The Context, Performance & Meaning of Ritual: the British monarchy and the 'invention of tradition' *c.*1820–1977" (1979) in Hobsbawm & Ranger (1993), pp.101–162.

Chambers, I. "Narratives of Nationalism: being 'British'" *New Formations*, 7, Spring 1988, pp.88–103.

Chatwin, S. Review of Peter Sloterdijk (1988) *Critique of Cynical Reason*, *Textual Practice*, 6 (1), March 1992, pp.153–166.

Clifford, J. "Travelling Cultures" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) pp.96–111.

Collier, R. "The New Man: fact or fad?" *Achilles Heel*, 14, Winter 1992/93 pp.34–8.

Colls, R. & Dodd, P. "Representing the Nation: British documentary film, 1930–1945, *Screen* (26) 1, Jan/Feb 1985, pp.2–33.

Corner, J. & Harvey, S. "Heritage in Britain: designer–history and the popular imagination" *Ten.8*, 36 Spring 1990 pp. 14–21.

Corner, J. & Harvey, S. "Great Britain Limited" in Corner & Harvey (1991) pp.1–20.

Corner, J. & Harvey, S. "Mediating Tradition & Modernity: the heritage/ enterprise couplet" in Corner & Harvey (1991) pp.45–75.

Corner, J. Review of Bill Nichols (1991) *Representing Reality: Issues & Concepts in Documentary*. *Screen* 34, 4, 1993, pp.414–7.

Cosgrove, S. "Refusing Consent: the 'Oi For England' project", *Screen*, 24 (1) Jan–Feb 1983 pp.92–6.

Craig, C. "Rooms without a View" *Sight & Sound*, June 1991, pp.10–13.

Crick, B. "The English & the British" in Crick (1991) pp.90–104.

Crowther, M. "The Tramp" in Porter (1993), pp.91–113.

Cunningham, H. "The Language of Patriotism, 1750–1914" in Donald & Hall (1986) pp.138–151.

Curtis, B. "Posters as Visual Propaganda in the Great War" *Block* (2) 1980 pp.45–57.

Curtis, L. "British Broadcasting & Ireland" *Screen*, May/April 1986 pp.3–5.

Dabydeen, D. "On Cultural Diversity" in Fisher & Owen (1991) pp.97–106.

Daniels, S. & Rycroft, S. "Mapping the Modern City: Alan Sillitoe's Nottingham Novels" *Transactions of the Institute of British Geography* 18, 1993 pp.460–480.

Davies, G. "The End of the Pier Show" *New Formations*, 5, Summer 1988, 133–140.

Desjardins, M. "Free from the apron strings: representations of mothers in the maternal British state" in Friedman (1993), pp.130–44.

Dodd, P. "The Views of Travellers: travel writing in the 1930s" in Dodd (1982), pp.127–38.

Dodd, P. "Englishness & the National Culture" in Colls & Dodd (1986) pp.1–27.

Donald, J. "How English Is It?" *New Formations*, 6, Winter 1988, pp.31–47.

Dormer, P. "Fantasy Island" *Ten.8*, 12, 1983, pp.26–31.

Doyle, B. "Ain't it Awful!" *Magazine of Cultural Studies*, 1, 1990, pp.3–4.

du Gay, P. "Enterprise Culture & the Ideology of Excellence" *New Formations*, 13, Spring 1991, pp. 45–61

Dyer, R. "*A Passage to India*", *Marxism Today*, April 1985.

Eaton, M. "In the Land of the Good Image" *Screen*, 23 (1), May 1982.

Edgar, D. "Bitter Harvest" in Curran (1984) pp.39–57.

Edwards, S. "Disastrous Documents" *Ten.8*, 15, 1984, pp.12–23.

Edwards, S. "Snapshooters of History: passages on the postmodern argument" *Ten.8*, 32, 1989.

Elsaesser, T. "Images for Sale" in Friedman (1993) pp.52–69.

Emsley, C. "The English Bobby: an indulgent tradition" in Porter (1993), pp.114–135.

Gamble, A. "Thatcherism & Conservative Politics" (1983) in Hall & Jacques (1990) pp.109–131.

Gray, R. "The Falklands Factor" in Hall & Jacques (1990) pp.271–280.

Gruffudd, P., Daniels, S. & Bishop, P. "Landscape, Heritage & National Identity" *Landscape Research* 16 (2) 1991 pp.1–2.

Hall, S. "Thatcher's War" *New Socialist*, July/August 1982.

Hall, S. "Authoritarian populism: a reply to Jessop *et al*, *New Left Review* 147, 1984 pp. 32–60.

Hall, S. "Minimal Selves" *ICA Documents*, 6, 1987.

Hall, S. (1983) "The Great Moving Right Show" in Hall & Jacques (1990) pp.19–39.

Hall, S. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora" in Rutherford (1990) pp.222–237.

Hall, S. "Cultural Studies and its Theoretical Legacies" in Grossberg *et al* (1992), pp.277–285.

Hall, S. "Culture, Community, Nation" *Cultural Studies* 7 (3) 1993, pp.349–363.

Halsey, A. "Social Trends Since World War II" in McDowell *et al* (1989) pp.8–24.

Harley, J. "Maps, Knowledge & Power" in Cosgrove & Daniels (1988) pp.277–305.

Harrison, T. "V." (1985) in Harrison (1987)

Harvey, C. "English Regionalism: the dog that never barked" in Crick (1991) pp.105–118.

Hayek, F. "Economic Freedom and Representative Government" (1973) in Donald & Hall (1986) pp.23–6.

Hebdige, D. "A Report on the Western Front: postmodernism & the 'politics of style'" *Block* 12, 1986/7.

Hebdige, D. "Staking Out the Posts" in Hebdige (1988) pp.181–207.

Hebdige, D. "Towards a Cartography of Taste 1935–1962" in Hebdige (1988) pp.45–76.

Hebdige, D. "Feeling the Quality" *Marxism Today*, June 1991 pp.26–9.

Hebdige, D. "Digging for Britain" in Strinati & Wagg (1992) pp.325–374.

Hebdige, D. "Training Some Thoughts on the Future" in Bird *et al* (1993) pp.270–9.

Heelas, P. "The Sacralization of the Self and New Age Capitalism" in Abercromie & Warde (1992), pp.139–166.

Higson, A. "The Discourses of British Film Year" *Screen*, Jan/Feb 1986, pp.86–110.

Higson, A. "The Concept of National Cinema" *Screen* 30, Autumn 1989 pp.36–46.

Higson, A. "Re–presenting the National Past" in Friedman (1993) pp.109–29.

Hitchens, C. "Something about the Poems: Larkin and 'Sensitivity'" *New Left Review*, July/August 1993.

Hobsbawm, E. "Falklands Fallout" in Hall & Jacques (1990) pp.257–270.

Howkins, A. "The Discovery of Rural England" in Colls & Dodd (1986) pp.62–88.

Jeater, D. "Roast Beef & Reggae Music: the passing of whiteness" *New Formations,* Winter 1992, pp.107–121.

Jenkins, S. "A Critical Impasse" in Auty & Roddick (1985), pp. 123–38.

Johnston, R. & Pattie, C. "Voting in Britain Since 1979: a growing north–south divide" in Lewis & Townsend (1989) pp.213–247.

Johnston, S. "Charioteers & Ploughmen" in Auty & Roddick (1985) pp.99–110.

Kearney, H. "Four Nations or One?" in Crick (1991) pp.1–6.

Keighron, P. "Condition Critical" *Screen* (32) 2, Summer 1991, pp.209–219.

Kipnis, L. "Reading *Hustler*" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) pp.373–91.

Kohn, M. "The Best Uniforms" in McRobbie (1989) pp.141–9.

Knorr, K. "The Stamp of the Breed", *Ten.8*, 29, 1988, pp.26–37.

Lewis, P. "Referable Words in Radio Drama" in Scannell (1991) pp.14–30.

Leys, C. "The Rise of the Authoritarian State" in Curran (1984) pp.58–73.

Light, A. "Englishness" *Sight & Sound*, July 1991, p.63.

Light, A. "The History of Indoors" *New Statesman & Society*, 26.3.93, pp.31–2.

Lippard, C. & Johnson, G. "Private Practice, Public Health: the politics of sickness and the film of Derek Jarman" in Friedman (1993) pp.278–93.

Lovell, T. "Lanscapes & Stories in 1960s British Realism" *Screen* 31, 4, 1990, pp.357–376.

Lowenthal, D. "British National Identity & the English Landscape" *Rural History* 2, 2, 1991, pp.205–230.

MacCabe, C. "Language, Literature, Identity: reflections on the Cox Report" *Critical Quarterly*, 32, 4, 1992, pp.7–13.

McIntyre, S. "National Film Cultures: politics & peripheries" *Screen*, 26, 1, 1985, pp.66–76.

McRobbie, A. "Postmodernism & Popular Culture" *ICA Documents, 4*, 1986, pp.165–80.

McRobbie, A. "New Times in Cultural Studies" *New Formations*, Spring 1991, pp.1–17.

McRobbie, A. "Post–Marxism and Cultural Studies: a post–script" in Grossberg *et al* (1992) pp.719–730.

Martin, R. "The Political Economy of Nritain's North–South Divide" in Lewis & Townsend (1989) pp.20–60.

Massey, S. "A Place Called Home", *New Formations*, 17, Summer 1992, pp.3–15.

Massey, D. "Power–Geometry & a Progressive Sense of Place" in Bird *et al* (1993), pp.59–69.

Medhurst, A. "1950s War Films" in Hurd (1984).

Mellor, A. "Enterprise and Heritage in the Dock" in Corner & Harvey (1991) pp.93–115.

Mercer, C. "Generating Consent" *Ten.8*, 14, 1984, pp. 3–9.

Moore, F. "An offbeat way to box–office success" *Connoisseur* November 1990 pp. 169–70.

Morden, T. "The Pastoral & the Pictorial", *Ten.8*, 12, 1983, pp.18–25.

Morley, D. & Robins, K. "No Place Like *Heimat*: images of home(land) in European culture" *New Formations*, 12, Winter 1990, pp.1–23.

Morrell, F. "The Struggle for Space: class politics & pop culture" *New Statesman*, 23.1.1987, pp.21–2.

Mouffe, C. "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" in n/r pp.168–201.

Nairn, T. "Kailyard Culture" in Donald & Hall (1986) pp.115–119.

Nairn, Y. "Yuppies: the fifty–first state" *New Statesman & Society*, 30.6.1989.

Nairn, T. "Britain's Living Legacy" in Hall & Jacques (1990) pp.281–288.

Nichols, B. "Documentary Theory & Practice" *Screen*, Winter 1976/77 pp.34–48.

Nixon, S. "Looking for the Holy Grail" *Cultural Studies*, 7 (3) 1993, pp.466–92.

Nowell–Smith, G. "Researching the Market for British Films" in Petrie (ed) (1992).

O'Shea, A. & Schwarz, B. "Reconsidering Popular Culture" *Screen*, Summer 1987, pp.9–14.

Orwell, G. "Notes on Nationalism" (1944) in Orwell (1984b) pp.306–324.

Paterson, R. & Schlesinger, P. "State Heroes for the Eighties" Screen, May/June 1983 pp.55–72.

Phillips, M. "London: Time Machine" in Fisher & Owen (1991), pp.115–122.

Phythian–Adams, C. "Local History & National History: the quest for the peoples of England" *Rural History*, 2, 1, 1991, pp.1–23.

Poole, M. "The Cult of the Generalist: British TV criticism 1936–83", *Screen*, (25) 2, 1985.

Priestley, J. "England, their England (1963)" *New Statesman & Society*, 9.4.93.

Puttnam, T. & Wright, P. "Sneering at the Theme Parks" *Block* 15 1989 pp.48–55.

Rée, J. "Internationality" *Radical Philosophy* (60) Spring 1992, pp.3–11.

Revill, G. "The Lark Ascending: monument to a radical pastoral" *Landscape Research*, 16, 2, 1991, pp.25–30.

Rich, P. "The Quest for Englishness" *History Today*, June 1987, pp.24–30.

Roberts, J. "Sinn Fein & Video: notes on a political pedagogy" *Screen*, Spring 1988, pp.94–7.

Robbins, K. "Core & Periphery in Modern British History" *British Academy Proceedings*, 70, 1984, pp.275–97.

Robbins, K. "North & South Then & Now" *History Today*, 38, 1988, pp.23–8.

Robins, K. "Tradition & Translation: national culture in its global context" in Corner & Harvey (1991) pp.21–44.

Rose, J. "Margaret Thatcher & Ruth Ellis" *New Formations*, 6, Winter 1988, pp.3–21.

Rosen, M. "Clear the Floor, Maltworms" *New Statesman & Society*, 12.2.93, p.42.

Salecl, R. "National Identity and Socialist Moral Majority" *New Formations*, 12, Winter 1990, pp.25–31.

Samuel, R. "Patriotic Fantasy" *New Statesman* 18.7.86, pp.20–2

Samuel, R. "Signs of the Times" *New Statesman & Society* 10.5.91, pp.36–7.

Sánders, D. "The Impact of the Thatcher Governments on British Values", conference paper, Institute of Contemporary British Historians, July 1994.

Schwarz, B. "Conservatism, Nationalism & Imperialism" in Donald & Hall (1986).

Schwarz, B. "Englishness & the Paradox of Modernity", *New Formations*, 1, Spring 1987, pp.147–153.

Schwarz, B. "An Englishman Abroad...And at Home: the case of Paul Scott", *New Formations*, 17, Summer 1992, pp.95–105.

Schwarz, B. "Where Horses Shit A Thousand Sparrows Feed: Docklands & East London during the Thatcher years" in Corner & Harvey (1991) pp.76–92.

Schwarz, B. "Travelling Stars" *New Formations*, 3, Winter 1987, pp.96–102.

Schwarz, C. "*Down & Out*" *Ten.8*, 15, 1984, pp.3–11.

Scruton, R. "The Meaning of Conservatism" (1980) in Donald & Hall (1986) pp.104–9.

Seabrook, J. "Tabula Rasa" *New Statesman & Society*, 4.6.1991, p.16.

Seaton, M. "Work Your Body" *Marxism Today*, April 1990.

Seton–Watson, H. "National Consciousness in Britain" in Donald & Hall (1986) pp.110–114.

Shippey, T. "Footpaths" *London Review of Books* 26.7.90, p.7–8.

Smith, N. "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places" in Bird *et al* (1993).

Smith, P. "*Blue* & the Outer Limits", *Sight & Sound*, October 1993, pp.18–9.

Spencer, N. "Menswear in the 1980s: revolt into conformity" in Wilson & Ash (1992), pp.40–8.

Steed, M. (1986) "The Core–Periphery Dimesnion of British Politics", *Political Geography Quarterly* 5, pp.91–103.

Steedman, C. "Culture, Cultural Studies and the Historians" in Grossberg *et al* (1992), pp.613–20.

Steele, E. "Gladstone & Ireland" *Irish Historical Studies* XVIII (1970) pp. 63–70.

Stradling, R. "Review: Colls & Dodd, 1986; Wiener, 1985" *Textual Practice*, Winter 1988, pp.429–434.

Sturrock, J. & Taylor, J. "Purity & Danger" *Ten.8*, 18, 1985, pp.22–35.

Tagg, J. "Power & Photography – A Means of Surveillance: the photograph as evidence in law" in Bennett *et al* (1992).

Taylor, J. "Picturing the Past", *Ten.8*, 11, 1983, pp.15–31.

Taylor, P. "The English and their Englishness: 'a curiously mysterious, elusive and little understood people'" *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 107, 3, 1991, pp.146–161.

Thompson, E.P. "The Peculiarities of the English" (1965) in Thompson (1978).

Triggs, T. "Framing Masculinity: Herb Ritts, Bruce Weber and the body perfect" in Wilson & Ash (1992) pp.17–24.

Urry, J. "Cultural Change & Contemporary Holiday–Making" in McDowell *et al* (1989), pp.255–68.

Walker, D. "National Free–for–All?" *The Listener*, 25.10.90, pp.14–15.

Weeks, J "The Idea of Sexual Minorities" in Samuel (1989b) pp.256–270.

Weeks, J. "Inverts, Perverts & Mary–Annes" in Duberman *et al* (1991), pp.195–211.

Williamson, J. "Royalty & Representation" *Ten.8*, 18, 1985, pp.4–9.

Williamson, J. "Up the Balls Pond Road" *New Statesman*, 7.5.87 pp.23–4.

Williamson, J. "Lights of the world", *New Statesman*, 28.8.87, p.16.

Wilson, E. "The Invisible Flâneur" *New Left Review*, 191, Jan/Feb 1992, pp.90–110.

Winterson, J. "Dreams & Buildings" in Fisher & Owen (1991) pp.11–18.

Wollen, T. "Over our shoulders: representing the national past" in Corner & Harvey (1991), pp. 178–93.