This thesis is dedicated to Baranzan the progenitor of the *Bajju* of which *I am* and Mr. Isaiah Olojo for making it possible for me to come to Europe.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION: THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN MACRO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IR) AND MICRO HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGIES AS A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING AFRICA

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of The Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

November 1999

ABSTRACT

This thesis argues that while the evolution of the African Political Community is based upon both human physiological needs and historical developments, modernity and its challenges and impositions, which are constantly changing the 'memories', imagination and re-imagination of the desires of the human species, also influence it. These desires for collective dignity and respect both as desires in themselves and as vehicles to secure and protect first-order needs have been articulated by David Mitrany's Functional theory of politics. However, in his work, *A Working Peace System* (1946), Mitrany missed the human and political preconditions and contingencies of Functionalism. He failed to recognise that needs and desires while central in the evolution of political communities cannot by themselves guarantee the success of such communities. In the case of the African continent and its people, it is the authentic *articulation* of Functionalism, based on the Spiritual basis of identity – the 'cyclical' link between 'the living dead - (ancestors)', 'the living - (present generations)' and 'the many generations (future children) yet to be born' and their relationship to the geographical *space* - called *Homeland,* - what I have described as *Ntu,* which forms the African conception of *nationality* that facilitates success. Therefore, the success of African Political Communities is only possible on the basis of satisfied needs and placated desires which incorporate a Spiritual basis of identity, - what I have described as 'physiological security'. Thus, a circle is drawn, both in this theoretical statement and also, in the framework of African political history that has escaped what I have called the prevailing paradigm of African discourse. The framework, which I illustrate in this thesis, would make more rigorous the telling of African History – which I agree, has become more sympathetic and elegant (Davidson, 1994: Oliver, 1991). The thesis introduces an African-centred social science paradigm with International Relations - IR as a discipline, at its centre, based on *Understanding* Africa through the marrying of a macro International Relations (IR) approach and the concerns of micro historical sociologies. This stands as an alternative to those approaches which, aim at *explaining* the continent as a site of resistance to an external world. The project also introduces a theory of Functional politics aimed at African continental integration based on the ideals of the African Economic Community - AEC (Abuja) Treaty of 1991.

OBJECTION TO THE WRITING OF 'AFRICA' WITH THE LETTER 'C'

I strongly object to the writing of 'Africa' with the letter 'c' instead of a 'k', due to the need for meaning associated with 'African' names and the rule of grammar in 'African' languages.

As will be seen from the thesis, the concept of the 'ka' or 'kw' has a Spiritual meaning and is also central in the conception of *Ntu* and the *Ba'Ntu*. Moreover, the term 'Africa', is an invention of the Outsider in reference to the continent. While a descriptive term is necessary, however, since 'African' names generally have meanings, or are in reference to particular events, it is necessary that the name describing the continent and its people has a meaning or is in reference to some event(s) central to their history.

While I accept the descriptive term, however, it is necessary that it fulfil the criteria of naming in the classical logic of General Grammar. That is, a name should identify the *essence* of the object being named. Moreover, most 'African' languages do not have the letter 'c'. Instead, there are 'k' and 'q', but all pronounced as 'ka'. And where the 'c' does exist, it is pronounced '*cha*' and not 'ka'. Thus the current pronunciation of 'Africa' is based on European languages and not the languages of the people of the continent.

For the process of self-determination to be complete, the 'African' must be able to define himself based on the rules and grammar of his language. Thus, the continent and its people should be respectfully addressed according to the rules of naming and their languages. The people and the continent should therefore be addressed as AFRIKANS who inhabit AFRIKA.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I give thanks to *Ahgwam Kazah* (King of the Heavens) for 'His' creation, of which I am, and for giving me life and good health to have come this far in the journey of life. Also, my gratitude extends to *zwa* (many generations of) Baranzan through whom, in the long circle of life, founded *Kajju* (the land of the *Bajju*) in present Nigeria and gave it to his children the *Bajju* (the people), who speak *Jju* (language). Baranzan gave life to Ahdwang, one of the branches of the *Bajju* nation. Ahdwang himself gave life to Ahzunkwa, Dibbyi, Ahzuturung and Ahzansak. These are the Four clans of the people call Bayidwang. Ahzansak, the father and founder of my clan, gave life to many children who now constitute the larger 'family' - a town of its own in contemporary Nigeria - called Ahzansak (or Madauchi) in the Southern part of present Kaduna state. Among his many children is Zaya, the father of Kayit, who in turn gave birth to Bakut my grandfather whose *tswah* - memory I *represent* and owe the duty of continuing the circle of life for the *Bajju* nation. Bakut gave life to my own father. It is through the good fortunes and blessings that I have received through *zwa* Baranzan that I have my sense of *being*. Also, my gratitude to *Ahgwam Kazah* for the children 'He' has given me, and fatherly pride has no bounds for their sacrifice and the love they have for me all the same, even when it was not possible to be physically present with them in their formative years.

Of course along the journey of life, and in particular, in the process of writing this thesis, there have been numerous people whose blessing I have received. While for obvious reasons, I cannot name all the people as much as I will like to, however, The Nottingham Trent University, as an institution and the Department of International Studies, in particular, provided the opportunity to pursue my search. The members of the Department were helpful in their own ways, of which I am grateful. Janet Elkington in particular, has been an angel. In spite of her busy schedule for the Department, was always ready to lend a hand when I needed her assistance. Thanks Jan! My debt to Roy Smith is enormous, for in spite of my stubborn and independent nature, as my Director of Studies, he found patience to work and guide me through the process of completing the thesis. Although frustrated at times, he did not complain but believed in me and for that, I was able to keep

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INTRODUCTION

PROJECT ORIENTATION AND RATIONALE

This project is aimed at making International Relations (IR) more relevant to Africa and also, to locate the discipline at the centre of the social sciences. To achieve this, I have focussed on the concepts of self-determination and national self-determination. The central assumption is based on the human quest for security, welfare and identity, and the Spiritual basis of identity, both as individuals and collective groups, constituting the salient factors influencing the rise of conflicts and wars - the central concern of IR. These plagues - conflicts and wars, seem to have impeded on the ability of Africans to redeem themselves and their continents from their effects - poverty, disease and underdevelopment. The objectives of the project are two fold: 1) to provide a new framework for an African-centred social science discourse and, 2) to propose a theory of Functional politics in Africa, which would enable the continent to achieve it desire for integration and unification as a single Political Community.

The project, while centred on the epistemology and methodologies of IR, argues that the evolution of the African Political Community is based upon both human physiological needs and historical developments. But modernity and its challenges and impositions, which are constantly changing the 'memories', imagination and re-imagination of the desires of the human species, have also influenced the evolution. These desires for individual identity, collective dignity and respect both as desires in themselves and as

vehicles to secure and protect first-order needs have been articulated by David Mitrany's Functional theory of politics. However, Mitrany in his work, - *A Working Peace System* (1946), missed the connection between the human and political preconditions and contingencies of Functionalism required for the success of his theory. He failed to recognise that while needs and desires, central in the evolution of political communities, cannot by themselves guarantee the success of such communities. Human and political preconditions must be satisfied for Functionalism to be successful.

Taking the African continent and its people, as my focus of study of the human and political preconditions and the contingencies of Functionalism required for the success of Mitrany's theory, I have argued that, it is only the authentic *articulation* of functionalism that will facilitate its success. By authentic 'functionalism', I mean the human contingency that is based on an already existing basis of interaction of people. In Africa, peoples derive their identity from a Spiritual basis, based on the 'cyclical' link between 'the living dead - (ancestors)', 'the living - (present generations)' and 'the many generations (future children) yet to be born' and their relationship to the geographical *space* - called *Homeland*. This is what I have described as *Ntu*, which forms the African conception of *nationality*. Therefore, the success of African Political Communities is only possible on the basis of satisfied needs and placated desires which incorporates the Spiritual basis of identity, - what I have described as 'physiological security'.

The project therefore, makes a bold and controversial claim by the theoretical statement and also, the rejection of what I have called the prevailing paradigm of African discourse.

Instead, I have illustrated a framework, which would make more rigorous the telling of African history – which, although has become more sympathetic and elegant, nevertheless, fails to provide a better way of *knowing (Understanding)* the causality of conflicts and wars in the African continent. This failure has contributed to the inability to develop a system of politics; policies and programmes suitable for the nature of the societal relations of the people of the continent, despite their claim of a glorious past based on history from antiquity. The project therefore, introduces an African-centred social science paradigm with International Relations (IR) as a discipline, at its centre, based on *Understanding* Africa through the marrying of macro International Relations approach and the concerns of micro historical sociologies, rather than just *explaining* the continent as a site of resistance to an external world. It also introduces a theory of Functional politics aimed at African continental integration based on the ideals of the African Economic Community - AEC (Abuja) Treaty of 1991. The last chapter draws the different aspects of the argument together around a consideration of the problems of the possible implementation of the Treaty.

Both the African-centred social science paradigm (*Understanding*) and the 3 Functions (3F model) theory of Functional politics aimed at African continental integration have been arrived at by arguing that, while the institution of government and the political process are two important aspects in human development, the human quest for *security* (physical and spiritual) is a key factor in influencing the loyalty and allegiance of individuals to governments and political institutions. Also, the pursuit of *welfare* interest (food, housing, health, education etc) is another key factor. These two are the core factors in the human

species' pursuit of personal interest and influences their loyalty and allegiances to Political Communities. But since the human species evolves within defined and demarcated boundaries with different cultures as means of communication and identification, boundaries are created, which forms the basis of *identity* – based on either biological or spiritual location of individuals and their collective groups. The defined and demarcated boundaries, although not institutions of the Westphalian state system are nevertheless, conceived as Political Communities by individuals and collective groups asserting a claim of self-determination whether in Africa or elsewhere, especially with the impact of globalisation and technological change on peoples sense of identity. Thus, 'boundaries', the basis of identities, forms a key aspect of human development. Therefore, the human species evolves within families, societies and nations and asserts a claim of national self-determination – the quest for political and legal legitimacy to become Political Communities – states, in the Westphalian sense. While this remains general the case, however, in Africa in particular, the Westphalian state system idea in itself is an aberration and an alien concept. It can be seen as interfering with the politico-cultural institutions of African *nations* often erroneously referred to as 'ethnic groups', or by the pejorative term 'tribes'. In essence, the *nation* expressed by the term *Ntu* and not necessarily constructed on a specifically Western model, is the *hub* of the African sense of *security* and *identity*.

Christendom in the Western world was seen as the distinction between the citizen and the non-citizen – *ta ethne,* and gradually evolved to become the basis of the modern definition of the Other, constituting a form of transnational 'nationality' and 'citizenship'. And the concept of *Umma*, an Islamic and Middle-Eastern world notion of 'nationality' has been accepted by

Western scholarship as a form of transnational 'citizenship'. The concept of *Ntu*, on the other hand, an African worldview which forms the basis of African identities based on genealogical, lineage and kinship claims which are central to African spirituality, philosophy and cosmology, has however, remained a concept totally ignored by social scientists. This project has brought the concept of *Ntu* back into social science, presenting it to Western scholarship as a basis of recognising identities in Africa as well as asserting a claim of a common African identity. This in turn represents an autochthonous claim over the continent. Thus, the concept of *Ntu* is seen as the African conception of *nationality* and transnational 'citizenship' (chapters 3-5, 10-11). Consequently, the collective *Ntu (Ba'Ntu)*, contrary to Western scholarship, I have argued, is not a linguistic category, but a term used in reference to a transnational nationality by Africans. This central argument constitutes the basis of my claim of the possibility of the evolution of an African continental nationality and thus, the possibility of the creation of a single African Political Community. It is therefore within the *Ntu* that the African can pursues his *welfare* interest rather than through the institutions of the Westphalian state system.

Based on the argument of the quest of Africans, I have concluded that the human species' basic quests in life are *welfare, security* and *identity*, expressed through the pursuit of physiological security interests (chapters 6 and 9). These constitute the human quest for self-determination and can be politicised and used as *means* of pursuing legal and political legitimacy to create new Political Communities from existing ones, through the ideology of nationalism. It is this assertion of the right to create new Political Communities using nationalism that is referred to as national self-determination (chapters 8-11). To further

explain the relationship between the quest for self-determination and national self-determination, I have discussed the concept of the 'nation' and how it evolved, relating it to the concepts of 'tribes' and 'ethnic groups', which have become entrenched in Africa's Political Communities. I also looked at why African *nations*, unlike European 'nation', have not transformed their *nationalist* sentiments into *nationalism* in the assertion of the right of national self-determination to create new Political Communities from the existing ones.

However, with the aim of creating an African continent integration, I found David Mitrany's Functionalist theory of politics plausible and practical for the pursuit of the ideal, in comparison to the Neofunctionalist theory of integration upon which the Abuja Treaty seems to have been based. This is primarily because; the Mitranian proposals for politics on the basis of functional arrangements can be related to the African continent in terms of the socio-economic and politico-cultural structures of the societies. Also, the Mitranian approach is evolutionary and is not committed to any particular political position. Instead, it presents a system of political administration that will enable societies to develop distinctive ideologies based on the functional arrangement of socio-economic activities. As a theory, the Functional theory of politics de-emphasises the importance of boundaries, which in the case of Africa, was contrived and has seen by many, as the catalyst to their problems. While I consider the Westphalian state system as argued in the thesis, irrelevant and unnecessary in the era of globalisation and the advancement of technology, moreover, it has been a failure and is also divisive, nevertheless, it is not the causality of the African problem – war and poverty. The problem lies in the system of

political administration (government). Thus, a new system of political administration, which is consistent and compatible to the African politico-cultural institutions, is required. Hence, my proposed 3F (forms follows functions) model is a theory for the achievement of the ideals of the African leaders for their continent based on a new framework I have called 'Understanding' - a framework for a better studying of the African continent and its peoples' societal relations. This is a bold attempt and a radical break from the prevailing framework of African discourse which only explaining Africa as a site of resistance through storytelling. The prevailing paradigm of African discourse makes no attempt to understand the continent and its people with a view of finding solutions to the problems that bedevils its development and progress.

PROJECT'S JUSTIFICATION

This thesis, although not the first to use Mitrany's ideas as a theoretical base, is however original in the sense that it approaches the Functional theory of politics from a developing world perspective and centred its argument on the human and political contingencies which David Mitrany missed in his work. Therefore, it is the first time that the Functional theory of politics has been viewed from a non-European perspective with the argument in favour of a modification of Mitrany's classical theory for application in the African continent, rather than just arguing and defending or critiquing its tenets without any attempt at relating it to non-European political communities. The thesis focussed on the concepts of *welfare, security* and *identity* from *nations'* perspectives in their quest for both socio-economic and political rights. The conclusion is an original and bold proposal - a paradigm for the Understanding of

African-centred social sciences and a political strategy of how the ideal of the African continental integration could be pursued through the 3-F model of Functional politics.

STRUCTURE

Part One of the thesis is primarily concerned with epistemological and methodological issues in the studying of International Relations (IR). Chapter 1 traces the historical evolution of IR as a discipline, identifying the problem of accepted definition and the objectives of the discipline. It questions the scope and objectives of the discipline in its attempt to identify the causal factors exacerbating conflicts, elimination of war (if possible) and the preservation of peace. The chapter, not only questions the epistemology upon which current IR theories have been developed since the early part of this century, but, also critiques the non-inclusion of other societal relations due to a lack of clear definition of what constitutes the discipline and suggests a different epistemology, to enable a more inclusive IR. It concludes that based on the problem associated with value-relevance in the study of human actions, Understanding, as an epistemology based on Rationalist philosophy, provides a better way of *knowing*, hence, the study of IR should be from an *insider* perspective, but also, based on seeking to *know* the *motives/reasons* for the actions of actors. Therefore, IR should be studied within social sciences, and not based on the Positivist epistemology of natural sciences - an *outsider'* approach, which is not concerned with the interpretation of *motive/reasons*, but with the reoccurrence of the actions.

Chapter 2 addresses the methodology of IR. It argues that since the people of the continent of Africa were not privy to the development of the discipline, consequently, are excluded, misapplied or outrightly ignored in its development and the understanding of conflicts and wars in the continent, a more inclusive IR should address the problem of conflict and wars within the 'domestic' sphere - the nature of African conflicts and wars. While arguing in line with Suganami's 'narrative intelligibilifying' (storytelling) approach, the chapter however, favours a holistic storytelling, which starts from the beginning. Hence, it found the storytelling approach in relation to conflicts and wars in Africa, limited to the Westphalian state system, inadequate, because it ignores African *nations*. The storytelling approach, although a better method of telling the stories of wars requires that the stories be told in an inclusive manner. Thus, the stories of the *nations* of Africa, and not the Westphalian states must be the central focus of the narrative. The chapter therefore, argues that, if war remains the primary concern of scholars of African IR, its causality must be identified. Hence, Understanding wars in Africa requires an understanding of how *nations* within African states organise their 'institutions', starting from the 18th century - European Enlightenment period. This will necessitate the revisiting of the domestic analogy debate in Africa, based on African *nations'* search for Peace and Order. It argues that each *particular* conflict or war is linked to the quest for economic and social welfare and identity interests. Therefore, the stories of wars in the continent have their origin in the pursuit of economic and social welfare. In essence, societies, which constitute both agency and structures, do resort to war in asserting claims of collective *dignity and honour* – self-determination. Thus, the causality of African conflicts and wars can be understood from

the *effects* that led to the war – the pursuit of *security, welfare* and *identity* – physiological security interest.

Part Two, looks at how the stories of Africa have been written by both European and African scholars, focusing on the problem associated with the manner in which the stories have been narrated, revealing the inadequacies as well as the contrived nature of some of these works. Chapter 3 examines the limitation of the prevailing Africanist paradigm (defined in the Kuhnian sense) in telling the stories of Africa. While African historiography since the Mid-20th century has become sympathetic and elegant, nevertheless, it remains constrained by what can be called the 'Racist paradigm' of the 19th century – which empathetically asserts that Africa had no history and therefore no Civilisation. The chapter therefore, evaluates the prevailing Africanist paradigm - sympathetic African scholarship since the Mid-20th century to identify the problems associated with it, and the implications of its continual usage as the basis of explaining African socio-political relations. It argues that while the prevailing Africanist Paradigm is sympathetic, it falls short of providing a sound basis of Understanding Africans' socio-cultural and religio-political relations. Consequently, it does not help our Understanding of the African ontology and ability to understand the conflicts and wars of Africa. It fails to locate the quest for *security, welfare* and *identity*, and also, fails to explain or indeed outline how to proceed in the search for solutions. The chapter rejects the prevailing Africanist Paradigm as 'defensive and explanatory' without adequately enhancing our Understanding of the causal factors associated with the African problem. While the African state system in pre-colonial times was stable and effective precisely because it was

based on the concept of kinship and rationally integrative on a utilitarian basis guided by the philosophy of *Ntu,* the Westphalian state system has failed

Chapter 4 focuses on the uses of Social-anthropological historiography as a basis for a holistic Understanding of the African ontology and problem. It separates the 'Africa' created by the Other – Outsiders, from what the Autochthons - Indigenous people of the continent have come to define as 'Africa'. It argues against the commonly held notion that Anthropologists or Outsiders have invented African traditions, institutions and structures. And conclude that the structures and institutions of Africa evolved, as a result of the development of traditions and Spirituality, central to the autochthonous world-view hence, not imposed by Outsiders. In arguing the case, the epistemological basis for the claim of the invention of 'Africa' had been discuss, concluding that the colonisers were only interested in exploiting the continent, rather than intellectual development. The central argument of the chapter rests on the concept of *Ntu* and its centrality to the African personality, upon which, African political institutions and structures were based. It argues that the failure of the Westphalian state system has led to Africans resorting to their kinship roots, in the search for physiological security thereby perpetuating and reinforcing 'ethnicity' as a political-cultural institution within the Westphalian state system. It suggests that a new epistemology for African social sciences based on Understanding the link between the interaction of African societal relations in the modern era and the role of royal ancestors, upon which 'ethnicity' is founded and propitiating for Rain (fertility – development) is made, will see Africa once again detribalise and the kinship system reverts back to its initial role of recording lineage, rather than political institutions.

Chapter 5 looks at the uses of oral tradition as a source of African historiography, elaborating more on the concept of *Ntu* and the link between African Religions and resistance movements. It argues that for African people, oral tradition forms the locus of historiography and means of resistance. Hence, African traditions, 'create', 'invent' and 'adapt' themselves in consistence with the historical realities of the time. Therefore, they are dynamic; and flexible and not static or deeply conservative and inflexible as is generally assume. The chapter locates its discussion on the roles of Rainmakers; Priests and spirit Mediums as Historians, Chroniclers of Kings and Cult figures in Resistance movements, while looking at the uses of Songs, Poems and Dance as sources of social relations, historical narratives and instruments of popular resistance. Examples are drawn from Southern, Eastern, Western and Central regions, while implying the use of these institutions by the Autochthons in the Northern regions, before and during slavery and colonial periods. It concludes that, while African 'secondary' resistance looked back to the past for inspiration and to the future for living, rejecting modern ideological bound nationalism, their aspiration is to put Africa in modernity from an African context. The chapter therefore, concludes that the social history of Africans and the history of resistance cannot be separated from the Religions and social code of behaviour. To Understand Africa requires the understanding of Africa's oral tradition expressed in Songs, Poems and Dance as well as from the role and functions of Priests, spirit Mediums and African bards – prior to colonisation, during the colonial period and the wars of independence as well as the nature of the current struggles in modern Africa, not in the ideological developments of the wars of independence or Post-colonial historiography.

Part 3 looks at three essays from slightly different perspectives aimed at the identification of what constitutes universal human needs and desires, the Functional theory of political action and the basis of the creation of Political Communities. The three chapters identify the basis of the proposal for the creation of a continental Political Community for Africa in the attempt to rid it of the problem of war and develop its place in international relations, and as a global player. Chapter 6 looks at the concept of human nature and how it has been presented as a basis for the World Society approach in understanding IR. It argues that ontological needs can, and should form the basis of analysis in IR, based on the assumption of a notion of universality in human need. Therefore, the individual in his relationship with the environment in the pursuit of these needs should form the unit of analysis rather than the state. Chapter 7 evaluates the Mitranian Functional theory of political action as a framework for political organisation. It argues that while the Functional approach certainly has its discrepancies, the bulk of the criticisms are based on generalise assumptions that the approach is a theory of integration. The chapter makes a distinction between Mitrany's Functional approach (1946) as a theory of politics or political action and Ernest Haas' Functionalism (1968) as a theory of integration, evaluating both theories. It argues that, far from presenting a limited theory of integration, the Functional approach remains a theory of political action and includes the individual in politics at the point of his/her interest in a globalising world. Thus, Mitrany's vision of the continual existence of the state - with less emphasis on territorial sovereignty in the pursuit of human needs could be achieved through his Functional theory. The chapter concludes that the Functional approach is base on the satisfaction of basic human needs. Therefore, human agency can only be located at the point at which individuals' needs are met, and not through

forms of structural political institutions whether at the domestic, regional, continental or global level. Base on the 'forms following function' principles, functional dimensions will determine themselves and the functions determine their own organs. Therefore, the Functional approach is a *method* of achieving an end result, not the vision of an end, in itself. It includes all the levels of analysis – the individual, state and international system in moving towards the goal of a working peace system. It is a flexible holistic theory of political actions very relevant to the globalising world and applicable to Africa in particular.

Chapter 8 revisits the 'self imagination' of Political Communities in an attempt to understand how they evolve, or are created. It ague that while nationalism, as an ideology has been utilise in the 'creation' and shaping of Political Communities – states (nations), since the Enlightenment, the concepts of 'nation', 'ethnicity' and the sentiment of nationality, on the other hand, despite having played a role in the Enlightenment period, remained secondary in the explanation of nationalism. Instead, nationalism has erroneously been conceived as the sentiment for the 'creation' of the sense of belonging to states and an instrument for the formation of Political Communities. The chapter identifies the relevance of 'nations' and 'ethnic groups' in the evolution of nationalism and the creation and sustenance of Political Communities during the late 20th century. It locates how kinship-based aggregations play a part in the 'creation' of a sense of *national* identity and nationality, arguing that conflicts in the 21st century must be explained in relation to the quest for 'ethnic' or *national* identity in an evolving globalisation of cultures. The chapter therefore, takes issues with the idea of the 'nation' as an '*imagined community*' in an Andersonian sense, with nationalism as the instrument for its creation in a Gellnerian

sense (1983), critiquing these scholars' neglect of kinship-based aggregations in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities. Thus, while nationalism plays an important and influencing role in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities, the quest for 'ethnic' and national identities on the basis of distinctiveness and particularistic cultures and values is likely to dominate human development and evolution in the 21st century. It concludes that while ethnicity (culturally defined) is an instrument in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities, the *nation* (genealogically and biologically defined) can be politicised and become an instrument in the 'self imagination' of the Political Community. Thus, it establishes an Occidental and Oriental conception of the 'nation' and 'nationalism'. The 'web of kinship' – an Oriental conception, as an instrument of 'self imagination' of Political Communities will help our understanding of conflicts rooted on the basis of the claims of particularity based on genealogical and lineage difference in Africa. It will also enable us to understand the re-emergence of nationalist claims for self-determination on the basis of distinctiveness and particularity, conceived in terms of genealogy, biology, lineage as well as cultural difference in the era of globalisation. It concludes that the threat, represented by globalisation seems to re-awaken the deeply rooted sense of *nationality* of various 'webs of kinship' not only in Africa but even in Western Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, nationalism is not the instrument for the 'self-imagination' of *nations* but abstract Political Communities – states.

Part 4, as the conclusion of the thesis, marries all previous discussions in an attempt to suggest a Paradigm for the Understanding of the political and social relations of Africans' Political Communities, by revisiting the argument on human nature, locating the concept of self-determination and its politicisation and transition into the assertion of national self-

determination claims, aimed at the creation of Political Communities - states. The argument is centred on the concept of physiological security - a term, which incorporate the human quest for *security, welfare* and *identity* whether pursued on an individualistic basis or within a collective group. While *security, welfare* and *identity* are separate concepts; they are however, inextricably linked. Therefore, the quest for socio-economic and political interests, while separate, are however linked, due to human innate needs and desires, which entails welfare pursuits by individuals and the need to retain their identity within a collective group – an aspect of spiritual location. Chapter 9 looks at the concept self-determination, arguing in favour of the centrality of the physiological security interests of individuals and the politicisation of 'ethnic' or collective groups – *nations* to which, they belong. And in chapter 10, the argument is expanded to evaluate the politicised *nation* and its transformation into a Political Community. The chapter looks at how the pursuit of political sovereignty, territoriality and the pursuit of economic interests - the central issues in macro IR, and the pursuit of physiological security interests of individuals within collective groups – micro historical sociologies serve as conflict variables leading to conflicts and wars in the continent. Thus, the chapter explains the connection between the quest for physiological security interests and the emergence of conflicts and wars in the African continent.

Chapter 11, as the concluding chapter, contains the summation of the paradigm, which, is primarily centred on Understanding the stories of wars in Africa from a holistic conception. The suggested paradigm is based on the marriage of macro IR approaches and micro historical sociologies linked to the Mitranian Functional theory of political action

and the Andersonian conception of Political Communities. It suggests the possibility of imagining a continental African Political Community based on the idea of the African Economic Community (AEC) – Abuja Treaty of 1991, as the structure of a Functional federation. And since the pursuit of physiological security interest is the central issue to individuals and collective groups in Africa, a Mitranian Functional theory of political action is considered a plausible strategy for pursuing the ambition of creating a continental Political Community for Africa. It concludes that the need to circumvent the Westphalian state system in Africa is based on its decreasing relevance in international relations and the evolution of regional trading and economic blocks as key actors. Also, the experience of the EU provides a model for the creation of Political Communities at regional or continental levels. Considering also, that the Westphalian state system has not been successful in the African continent due to 'domestic' wars waged by collective groups in the pursuit of physiological security interests – defined as self-determination.

CHAPTER 1

IR: EXPLANATION OR UNDERSTANDING? - EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Since the evolution of International Relations (IR) as a discipline after World War I, it has remained widely contested. The problem of accepted definition and hence, the objectives of the discipline, has been further compounded with epistemological and methodological issues. This chapter questions the scope and objectives of the discipline in the attempt to achieve its aim – identification of the causal factor exacerbating conflicts; elimination of war (if possible) and the preservation of peace. My focus is not only to question the epistemology upon which current IR theory has been developed since the early part of this century, but to also critique the non-inclusion of other societal relations due to a lack of clear definition of what constitutes the discipline. I shall therefore be arguing that a different epistemology is necessary to enable a more 'international' dimension of the discipline.

PROBLEM OF DEFINITON

IR, since becoming a discipline after World War I, has remained a discipline without a clearly defined scope. Martin Banks notes that IR, 'must be regarded as part scholarly inquiry, part ideological discourse, shared among scholars, commentators and practitioners in all parts of the world'.[1] Banks sees the scope of IR as truly international and, as scholarly activity. However, two elements of his definition stand out - 'part ideological discourse'; 'shared among scholars, commentator and practitioners' – as contradictory to the aim of the discipline. Banks seem to imply that IR is at least partly an academic activity with a shared ideological set of parameters. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith trace the origin of the development of IR to the effects and lessons 'purportedly' learnt in World War I, and the determination to ensure that it was 'the war that ends all wars'. War, it was agreed by Western Leaders, is a senseless act which, could never be a rational tool of state policy; World War I had been the result of leaders' pursuits of state policy. These leaders became caught up in a set of processes that 'no one could control'. Hence, the causes of war lay in misunderstanding between leaders and in the lack of democratic accountability within the states involved. They argue that the underlying tensions, which had provided the rationale for conflicts could be removed by the spread of statehood and democracy.[2]

IR therefore, was conceived as a discipline in which the phenomena of war were to be studied. Since war was a result of misunderstanding, IR's task was to devise ways of

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[1] Banks, M (1984), 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory' in Banks, M, ed., *Conflict in World Society*, (England), Wheatsheaf Books Ltd.

[2] Hollis, M and Smith, S (1992), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press, p18.

reducing misunderstanding in the future. This general aim of IR therefore, according to Hollis and Smith, has implications for the organisation of both the domestic and international societies. Domestically, it was necessary to prevent 'sinister interest'[3] from dominating the political process and democracy is the key to ensure that. Internationally, the emphasis was on developing mediation processes and organisational structures, through which leaders could perceive more accurately, the non-aggressive aims of their potential adversaries. The alteration in the nature of domestic and international societies would make war like World War I, impossible.[4] From Hollis and Smith, it appears that the task of IR includes the removal of 'sinister interest' which often include ideology – defined as part of the war objectives – achieving territorial conquest, obtaining markets and raw materials or the overthrow of leaders 'who one did not approved of'.[5] While ideology was seen as the catalyst of war and, hence, should be removed – an Idealist view, - it was also a necessary justification for war itself. Hence, while Banks' definition has suggested, in my view, a *hub* of the problem of IR – war due to ideological differences defined as interest. Scholars of IR however, in examining war, do so within their own ideological constraints, or the ideology of academic boundaries.

The problem of defining IR and its objective has remained the main issue of contention among IR scholars since its inception as a discipline. The idea of a state system in which the discipline was seen to resonate evolved between the 16th century renaissance of Europe to World War I. The states system first took its roots in Western Europe before expanding to other parts of the world. Martin Wight, describing its evolution argues that it reflected a

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[3] *Ibid.,* p19
[4] *Ibid.,*

set of comprehensive ideas about the nature of post-Medieval European politics.[6] The states system therefore represents the nature of European societal relations. Hollis and Smith observe that 'the subject to study the phenomena of war took a strongly normative and prescriptive character. ... Just as generals always seem to be planning for better ways to fight ... so also, the study of international relations has often reflected the concerns of the previous generations'.[7] It is clear that IR has a clearly defined aim but lack a proper definition of the scope of the subject consequently, its objectives. In his attempt to define the subject and thereby clarify its objectives, Nicholas J. Spykman proposed the term 'interstate relations'. He made a distinction between international 'relations' and interstate relations. Thus:

International relations are relations between individuals belonging to different states, ... international behaviour is the social behaviour of individuals or groups aimed at ... or influenced by the existence or behaviour of individual or groups belonging to a different state.[8]

While the above definition implied the study of international relations, Spykman was doubtful of its wide acceptability because of its lack of a statecentric focus. But if it is defined as 'interstate relations', such definition would be inclusive of the domestic and

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[5] *Ibid.*, p17
[6] Wight, M (1978), *Power Politics*, (Harmondsworth), Penguin Books. Also, --- (1977), *Systems of States*, (Leicester), Leicester University Press.
[7] Hollis and Smith, *op cit.*, p19
[8] Spykman, N. J (1933*), Methods of Approaches to the Study of International Relations, Proceedings of the 5th Conference of Teachers of International Law and Related Subjects*, (Washington, DC), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p60.

international dimensions of the discipline.[9] Based on Spykman's definition, IR could encompass the study of different activities (international communication, business transactions, athletic contests, tourism, scientific conferences, educational exchange programmes, and religion missionary activities).[10] While Spykman's definition is broad, it however provides the scope for analysis, unlike Alfred Zimmern's definition. For Zimmern, IR is 'a bundle of subjects ... viewed from a common angle'.[11] This definition is not only too broad, but fails to provide any scope upon which the objectives of the discipline can be measured. Another scholar who attempted a definition is Frederick S. Dunn. Dunn states that international relations may 'be looked upon as the actual relations that takes place across national boundaries, or as the body of knowledge which we have of those relations at any given time'.[12] Dunn's definition incorporates the academic side of IR as defined by Banks and the identification and prevention of the catalyst of war as noted by Hollis and Smith. The definition also incorporates Spykman's inclusive definition, and is not as imprecise and broad as Zimmern's definition. Therefore, Dunn's definition can be seen as comprehensive and not limiting the subject to official relations between states and governments. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff however, argue that it is too inclusive, hence, also too broad.[13] IR scholars, they argue, are generally concerned with the relationships between or among all of the actors – states and non-states, international and transnational – who contribute to the understanding of political phenomena. They define the discipline thus:

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[9] *Ibid.*,

[10] *Ibid.*,

[11] Zimmern, A (1939), *University Teaching of International Relations, Report of the 11th Session of the International Studies Conference*, (Paris), International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, League of Nation, pp7-9

[12] Dunn, F. S (1948), 'The Scope of International Relations' in *World Politics*, 1, October, p143.

International politics ... [is] the effort of one state, or other international

actor, to influence in some way another state, or other international actor.

An influence relationship may encompass the actual or threatened use of

military force; or it may be based entirely or partly on other inducements,

such as political or economic ones. In international politics, moreover, like

all politics, represents the reconciliation of varying perspectives, goals, and

interests. Thus, international politics includes many but not necessarily all

transactions or interactions that take place across national frontiers'.[14]

Although this definition is encompassing, however, it seems to be limited to the idea of a

political phenomenon and the interaction, which explains them. The definition is

concerned with the question of influence through military, political or economic sanctions

enforced by states, their representatives or INGOs. It therefore excludes NGOs, MNCs or

other transnational interactions (Terrorist groups, Plagues like AIDS which have no

boundary restriction or *Nations* (as defined by Seton-Watson, Smith and Zernatto,[15] also,

see chapters 4 and 9) - asserting claims of self-determination. While these transnational

interactions evolved from the domestic boundary of states, they can also become trans-

boundary. Thus, this definition cannot be justifiably defined as international 'relations'.

International 'relations' includes the transnational interactions of other actors which are not

states, their representatives or INGO. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's definition focuses on

the power matrix as defined by the American's conception of nationhood synonymous to

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[13] Dougherty, J. E and Pfaltzgraff, R. L, Jr., (1996), *Contending Theories of International Relations, 4th ed.*, (New York), Longman, p18.
[14] *Ibid.,*

statehood. This conception and definition of IR, not only tears it away from the European societal relations upon which the states system evolved, it totally excludes other polities which are not defined in the American context and also exclude non-politically motivate interactions in the course of international relations. The scope of IR, according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff is the state and other domestic variables, which seek to influence the interest of another state, one way or another. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's insistence that 'international politic is like any other politics' imply their definition of IR in the Aristotelian sense of politics being mainly concerned with the polity.[16] Bernard Crick also viewed politics in the Aristotelian sense. Thus;

> the study of politics 'is the study of consensus making within the boundaries of some definable political unit which alone possess authority. ... Only the process of government itself can give rise to the phenomenon of politics. Politics is confined to the state, because only the state has a centralised and recognisable authority and identity. Without such coherence there is no body politic and consequently no politics.[17]

If Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff's definition of politics is the same as Crick's -, which it is, then they have defined international 'politics' and not 'relations'. At the domestic level, there exist a central authority/body - a polity in the Aristotelian sense. However, at the International level, not only is there an absence of a polity, there are also other actors

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[15] See Seton-Watson, H (1977), *An Enquiry into the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Boulder, Colo.), Westview Press; Smith, A. D (1991), *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, (Massachusetts), Basil Blackwell; and Zernato, G (1994), 'Nation: The history of a Word' in *Review of Politics*, 6
[16] Aristotle (1962), *The Politics*, Book XI, (Harmondsworth), Penguin Books,

besides those recognised by the polity – states and their representatives whose main duty is to pursue the interest of the polity. These other actors are not constraint by the rules of politics. Thus, the problem of definition is not yet resolved. Since in intentional relations, there is no centralised legitimate authority and no social or political coherence, there is therefore, certainly no international body politics, but only sets of changing relationships between national body politics. Charles Reynolds, concludes that based on the nature of interactions between the national body politics, 'there can be no genuine international political activity. … The only genuine political context is the states. International politics consists of the extension of national political activity and not something, which exist in its own right'.[18]

Fred A. Sonderman recognised the need to distinguish between international 'politics' and 'relations'. For Sonderman, 'politics' is relations between states while 'relations' is relations between non-political entities (e.g. cultural exchanges or economic transactions).[19] Sonderman's distinction reflects Spykman's definition of IR as 'interstates relations'. P. A. Reynolds on the other hand, made a tripartite distinction of the discipline between international 'politics', international 'relations' and international 'studies'. While international 'relations' entails 'boundary-crossing transactions of whatever nature among whatever units' and international 'politics' the 'behaviour of, and interactions among states', international 'studies' embraces 'both of these, but also all studies that would

[17] Crick, B (1964), *In Defence of Politics*, (Harmondsworth), Penguin Books.
[18] Reynolds, C (1973), *Theory and Explanation in International Politics*, (London), Martin Robertson, p4.
[19] Sonderman, F. A (1961), 'The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Politics' in James N. Rosenau edited, *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, (New York), Free Press of Glencoe, p9.

illuminate or have a bearing on them'.[20] This classification seems to be the current position in the definition problem. The discipline has been divided into three different strands – International Relations; International Politics and International Studies. William Olson and Nicholas Onuf notes that:

> If half the motivation for developing a new kind of study was the preservation of peace (which has not been achieved), surely the other half arose from recognition of the need for a different approach to the organisation and understanding of knowledge about the relations of states (which has not been achieved).[21]

The problem of definition rests on the inability to define the objectives that teachers of the subject should pursue in meeting the aim of the new discipline.

> 'What are teachers of IR trying to accomplish? Also, are they working to advance the field through their students, or aiming for something quite contradictory to that incremental intellectual process, satisfying the state by producing civil servants and diplomats to pursue its national objectives? Or, have they yet another purpose: serving the cause of peace or other cosmopolitan values?[22]

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[20] Reynolds, P. A (1975), 'International Studies: Retrospect and Prospects' *in British Journal of International Studies*, 1, (1), pp1-19. Also see Burton, J (1965), *International Relations: A General Theory*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press for similar argument.

Olson and Onuf note that 'these are very different aims and they cannot be made one merely by asserting that the intention is to produce diplomats as well as scholars, and enlarge awareness in everyone'.[23] This definitive problem could be seen as the influence in Banks' definition of IR in terms of scholarly pursuit. The search for a clear focus for IR has led to the development of different methods of explanation based on Positivist epistemology.

EXPLANATION: CURRENT METHODOLOGY

The outbreak of World War II, in 1939 coupled with the definitive problem of the discipline posed a challenge to the normative and prescriptive (Idealist) methodology. Hollis and Smith posit that IR was considered a science brought into existence by a perceived need to rid the International System of an evil – war. However, scholars became dominated by the concern with eradicating the evil before it had been properly understood,[24] they observed. In this, rests the critique of Idealism. There is a need for a proper understanding of the phenomenon before a solution can evolve for its eradication. Thus, a dispassionate focus on the root of the problem is needed, consequently the rise of Realism as an approach which will ensure that IR loses its normative character.[25] E. H. Carr highlights the explanatory nature of the new approach and the need for analysis, thus:

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[21] Olson, W and Onuf, N (1985), 'The Growth of a Discipline: Reviewed' in Steve Smith edited *International Relations: British America Perspective*, (England), Basil Blackwell in association with BISA, p1.
[22] *Ibid.,* p3
[23] *Ibid.,*

The impact of thinking upon wishing which, is the development of a science, follows the breakdown of its first visionary projects, and marks the end of its specifically utopian period, is commonly called realism. Representing a reaction against the wish-dreams of the initial stages ... it places its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences. It tends to depreciate the role of purpose and to maintain, explicitly or implicitly, that the functions of thinking is to study a sequence of events, which it is powerless to influence or to alter.[26]

For Hans Morgenthau,

[Realism] believes ... in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion – between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.[27]

Both Carr and Morgenthau's critique of Idealism rested on the notion that there is no universal moral principles upon which the analysis and practice of international relations can be applied. For Carr, the occurrence of World War II was a proof that 'wishing' could not replace 'thinking'. The failure of the post World War I Order, which was based on the

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[24] Hollis and Smith *op cit.*, p21
[25] *Ibid.*, p22
[26] Carr, E. H (1991), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939,* 2nd ed., (London), Macmillan and Papermac, p10

assumption of the goodness of human nature, has proven that humans will pursue their interest and not moral principles. Thus, while Idealism is based on 'wish dreams', the post World War II Order was to be built on facts and their consequences – thinking.[28] Morgenthau on his part also argues for the need to distinguish between wish – opinion and facts, – objective and rational facts supported with evidence. In essence states and their representatives based their decisions on facts and not opinion or wishes.[29] Thus, the concern of analysts should therefore, rest on the behaviour of national leaders and the pursuit of states' interest – national interest. Carr and Morgenthau hold the view that the laws governing politics has not changed through the years, thus, the analyst is able to ascertain what a national leader will do in any circumstances. What is needed therefore, they seem to conclude, is 'to find our way by this map in the concept of interest, defined in terms of the concept of power'.

> We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined in terms
> of power ... That assumption allow us to retrace and anticipate, as it were,
> the steps a statesman – past, present or future – has taken or will take on the
> political scene. We look over his shoulders when he writes his dispatches;
> we listen in on his conversation with other statesmen; we read and
> anticipate his very thoughts. Thinking in terms of interest defined as power,
> we think as he does, and as disinterested observers we understand his

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[27] Morgenthau, H (1985), *Politics Among Nations,* 6th ed., revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, (New York), McGraw-Hill Publishing... p4

[28] Carr, *passim.*

[29] Morgenthau, *passim.*

thoughts and actions perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene does himself.[30]

'The concept of power enables us to understand the actions of all statesmen and women regardless of their views and intention'. The Realist approach 'will guard against two popular fallacies: The concern with motives and the concern with ideological preference'.[31] Obviously from this school of thought, Realism was an objective science, hence 'a Positivistic way of analysing events, since it relied on a notion of underlying forces producing behaviour',[32] Hollis and Smith observed.

A Positivistic epistemology sees knowledge to be arising from our sensory experience from what we observe about the world around us.[33] Carr and Morgenthau saw history as 'a sequence of cause and effect, whose course is to be grasped not by imagination but by intellectual effort'. Moreover, 'theory does not create practice but is created by practice … and politics is not a function of ethics, but rather, … ethics is a function of politics, and morality is the product of power'.[34] Therefore, it is only through the interpretation of history that international relations can be properly analysed and the causality of war explained. In essence, it is a study of the interactions of states based on the *status quo.*[35] According to Russell Keat and John Urry, Positivist philosophies maintain that the explanation of an event consists basically in showing that it is an instance of a well-

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[30] *Ibid.*, p5
[31] *Ibid.*,
[32] Hollis and Smith, *op cit.*, p23
[33] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op cit.*, p33
[34] Carr, E. H *op cit.*, *passim* and Morgenthau, H *op cit.*, pp63-4
[35] Hollis and Smith *op cit.*, p20

supported regularity.[36] Carl Hempel argues that the 'scientific explanation is presented as a form of logical argument'.[37] For the Positivist, therefore, scientific theories consist of sets of highly general universal statements, whose truth or falsity can be assessed by means of systematic observations and experiment. The results of the observations can be known either with total certainty, or at least with a far greater degree of certainty than anything else, including the theories which are evaluated by reference to them.[38] Keat and Urry notes that 'the universal statement of scientific theories are usually terms 'Laws', though it is often maintained that there is an important difference between 'theoretical laws' and 'empirical laws' with only the former qualifying as constituents of a theory'. The difference depends upon the distinction between 'theoretical (or non-observational) terms and observational (or non-theoretical) terms'. Thus, a Positivist science must be

1) Statements which express laws that are universal conditionals (e.g. 'all bodies subject to no external forces maintain constant velocity').

2) Statements must not be restricted in their application to any finite regions of space and time. They must hold true for all times and places (e.g. 'all humans are mortal').

3) Terms must not refer to any individual items. They must not contain logical names (e.g. 'the highest mountain in the world').

4) Laws which do not express forms of necessity. Laws should express non-necessary, or contingent, relationships, whose truth or falsity can only be known by empirical means. 'They cannot be known by *a priori* arguments, nor be regarded

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[36] Keat, R and Urry, J (1975), *Social Theory as Science*, (London), Routledge and Kegan Paul, p9
[37] Hempel, C (1965), *Aspects of Scientific Explanation*, (New York), Free Press, p246

as expressing some mysterious non-logical necessity, a necessity, which somehow inheres in nature itself.

The conclusion is that Positivists deny the existence of natural necessity, allowing only observation that can provide an objective foundation for scientific theorising. In essence, we can predict, but cannot explain the occurrence of particular events.[39] These assertions contest Carr and Morgenthau's claims of Realism as science based on Positivist epistemology.[40] The Realist approach has generalised the experience of the states of Europe as the universal systems of societal organisation – polity-wise and also, assumes the pursuit of states' interest to be the universal nature of human interaction. Yet, the Realist approach rests on the need to maintain the *status quo* which, was built on imperialism and not on the observation of non-imperial nations (which are not states based on the European definition). Moreover, the Realist (later to be classified as Traditionalist) interprets from history, deductively explaining the causality of the event without prediction.[41] Realism therefore, has failed in its claim of being scientific on the basis of Positivist epistemology.

A 'proper scientific' method of studying international relations – Behaviouralism evolved. Behaviouralism also, based on Positivist epistemology, places emphasis on what is regarded as scientifically precise method.[42] Morton Kaplan accused the Traditionalists of using history ineptly and of falling into the trap of overparticularisation and unrelated

[38] Keat and Urry, *op cit.*, p13
[39] *Ibid.*, p13-15
[40] Hobbes, T (orig. pub. In 1651), *Leviathan*, edited with introduction by MacPherson in 1968, reprint in 1985, (London) Penguin Books.

generalisation. They (Traditionalists) are 'being unaware that many writers in the modern scientific school regard history as a laboratory for the acquisition of empirical data'.[43] Moreover, 'International theorists should be interested in all Systems – past, present, future, and hypothetical',[44] he argued. In this respect, Realism has failed in its claim of being scientific. While the Traditionalists conduct their analysis deductively, the Scientists (Behaviouralists) inductively arrive at their conclusions. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff notes the difference between deductive and inductive approaches, thus:

> The deductive [approach] differs from the inductive method in the way that historical factual evidence is collected, converted into usable data, analysed, and interpreted for purpose of theory. The deductive thinker may arrive at a concept, model, or major premise in an impressionistic, intuitive, or insightful manner rather than according to strict methodological criteria for selecting cases, rigorous coding rule for classifying events, or mathematically precise ways of determining correlation. [The] … inductive approach entails a different route towards generalising from experience. Instead of leaping to a conclusion by way of an inner mental light, as it were, the inductive empiricist is more careful about observing, categorising, measuring, and analysing facts. … [He] investigates physical and social phenomena by observing a number of instances in the same class, and by describing in detail both the research procedures followed and the

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[41] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff *op cit.*, p33
[42] *Ibid.*, p34
[43] Kaplan, M (1966), 'The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations' in *World Politics*, XIX, (October), pp15-16.

substantive results, so that others can replicate the work if they wish to do so.[45]

The disagreement between the two schools is on methodology, rather than epistemology. All are agreed on history as its source of data. However, the Traditionalists see history only in relation to the 'International System' – defined by Hedly Bull as comprising two or more states which have sufficient contacts between them and sufficient impact on one another's decisions to cause them to behave as part of a whole.[46] The Scientist on the other hand, argues that history by itself is not the data. Instead, history has to be seen in context of events which provide 'law like' patterns. Thus, the study of IR can be seen within a broader perspective. In essence, within an 'International Society' – defined as a group of states which knowingly share common interest and values and 'conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common institutions'.[47] The distinction between International System and International Society seem to have given recourse to the division of the discipline into International Politics, mainly concerned with the behaviour of states in the International System and International Relations which attempt to explain the variables influencing the behaviour of actors (including domestic actors within the states) in International Society.

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[44] --- (1976), *Systems and Process in International Politics*, (New York), Krieger, p2
[45] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff *op cit.*, p25
[46] Bull, H (1977), *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, (London), Macmillan, p13
[47] *Ibid.,*

Both Traditionalists and Behaviouralists, according to John Vasquez, operate within the same epistemology. They are all agreed on states and their decision-makers as the most important actors for understanding international relations. Also, they make a sharp distinction between domestic politics and international politics; and agree on the notion of international relations as the struggle for power and peace. Thus, for these schools, understanding how and why wars occur and suggesting ways for regulation is the purpose of the discipline. All research that is not at least indirectly related to this purpose is trivial.[48] Vasquez' critique is based on the conclusions that states are not the only actors; the distinction between domestic societies and international societies is less clear cut; and that international politics was less influenced by military factors but more by economic factors.[49] The pluralism of actors (hence, Pluralist school) is the current position of the International Society. While states remain important, however, there are non-state actors (sub-national, supranational, transnational actors) who penetrates states' territories reducing their autonomies in pursuit of specific interest and challenging this dominance.[50] Another school that has emerged since the 1970s is Structuralism. For the Structuralists, while states remain dominant, they only represent sets of economic interest. The state's role is limited or conditional on its ability to satisfy the interest of the dominant class. International capital and classes as well as the location of states in the global network of capitalism are therefore key factors.[51] While the Pluralists are concerned with the management of global relations, Structuralists on the other hand, see the management concern of the Pluralists, as another means of ensuring the continued dominance of the

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[48] Vasquez, J (1983), *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*, (New Jersey), Rutger University Press, p18
[49] *Ibid.*,
[50] Hollis and Smith *op cit.*, p38
[51] *Ibid.*, p39

rich. Thus, the solution of the class dominance complexity is through a revolution.[52] Pluralists, it will appear, based on their concerns with the global management of relations, are more likely to agree with the Behaviouralist perspective, due to its inclusiveness of other actors who operate within and across domestic boundaries, besides states and their representatives or INGOs. These other actors also pursue 'interests', not defined as power, but goals and objectives. Therefore, the Behaviouralists' concern with 'Law-like' patterns upon which the nature of interactions can be predicted at both domestic and international levels allows the possibility of plural actors pursuing their different interests. The Structuralists, however, adopts a historical approach.[53] Both schools, as we have seen, are also based on Positivist epistemology. Hollis and Smith concludes that:

> IR at the start of the 1990s is a subject in dispute. There is no dominant theory instead, there are several schools, each with it own set of special assumptions and theories –International Political Economy, Foreign Policy analysis, Strategic Studies. Peace Research, and Integration studies among others'.[54]

But what has been responsible for the fragmentation of the discipline, yet, within a single epistemology? Can IR be studied as a distinctive scientific discipline or should it be studied as an interdisciplinary subject under the rubric of 'International Studies'? I shall attempt to answer this question by looking at a different epistemology.

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[52] *Ibid.*, p40
[53] Wallerstein, I (1980), *The Modern World System*, (New York), Academic Press.

UNDERSTANDING[55]: A DIFFERENT EPISTEMOLOGY

Charles Reynolds cautioned that explanation in international politics could not be confined to the field alone since the phenomena in question are unlikely to be solely applicable to it, or that the criteria for its evaluation are purely internal. Hedly Bull on the other hand, notes that the Classical (Traditionalist) approach is derived from philosophy, history and law and the exercise of judgement, thus, cannot be studied inductively.[56] Both C. Reynolds and H. Bull agree on the interdisciplinary nature of the discipline. In essence, we can accept P. A. Reynolds' 'International Studies' which embraces 'Politics' and 'Relations' - as aspects of the discipline in our effort to study it scientifically. Therefore, IR falls within the context of social sciences and can only be studied effectively as such. Thus, it must break away from its claim of scientific objectivity based on the Positivist epistemology of the natural sciences and focus on a Rationalist epistemology. Current approaches and schools of IR tend to take their units of analysis based on an Explanation framework without attempts to Understanding the contingencies of human behaviour. 'Any type of explanation offered in the general field of human activities and experience poses problems relating to the nature of knowledge and truths, which extend beyond the specific phenomena to which it is applied', Reynolds warned. 'Such problems' he concludes, 'are innately philosophical, consequently are concerned with theoretical questions which apply not only to international politics but also, to the whole of the social

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[54] Hollis and Smith *op cit.*, p38
[55] I am using 'Understanding' in an attempt to introduce a new epistemology for African-centred social science. Hence, Understanding is use in the context of a framework (paradigm).
[56] Bull, H (1970), 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach' in Knorr, K and Rosenau, J edited, *Contending Approaches to International Politics*, (Princeton), Princeton University Press, pp20-38

sciences.[57]   It will appear that C. Reynolds is suggesting a more inclusive IR -
'International Studies' as P. A Reynolds which, is located within the social sciences in
general. If IR is to be regarded as science, it must satisfy two criterions. It must *explain* –
help us to understand why things happen in the way that they do. Also, it should *forecast* –
provide us with at least some means of anticipating how things will happen in the future.
These two criterions are inextricably linked.[58]   On these two criterions, IR in its current
epistemology would be disqualified as science, since, human contingencies renders it
unable to explain on a universally 'objective' basis of knowledge as well as to forecast
based on universal 'laws' of human behaviour.[59] But, can IR be studied scientifically? If
so, how should it be studied, considering the problem of human contingencies? To answer
these twin questions, we have to employ the epistemology used in the social sciences.

The meaning of 'science' according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, is relative. The term
'connotes nothing more than a body of knowledge and a way of discovering new
knowledge' they assert. 'Whatever satisfies intelligent human beings in any age as the
optimum means of enlarging their intellectual frontiers will pass muster as being
scientific', they concluded.[60] This definition of what is 'scientific' is based on the notion
of the search of knowledge of 'why' something occurs – the causal variables. Also, 'how'
the causal variables introduce new dimension or impact on the existing situation, and
'what' the nature or essence of these causal variables are, Keat and Urry notes.[61] This
conception is based on the Realist philosophy of science which seeks to discover a regular

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[57] Reynolds, C *op cit.*, p1
[58] Gaddis, J. L (1997), 'History, Science and the Study of IR' in Ngaire Woods edited, *Explaining
International Relations since 1945*, (Oxford), Oxford University Press, p33
[59] *Ibid.*, p35.

relationship between two kinds of phenomena which gives reasons to believe in a causal connection, although the existence of regularity by itself is not conclusive evidence for a causal connection.[62] Rom Harre argued that it is the duty of the scientist to discover and analyse the nature of the intervening mechanism, which links them together.[63]

The scientist has the task of discovering the link between the regular phenomena,[64] Keat and Urry asserts. The task of the scientist therefore is to search for the *mechanism* that links the phenomena. In doing so, the scientist must not only observe the regularity of the phenomena, but he must *know* 'why' it occurs and 'how' it affects or impacts on present reality. However, to *know* 'why' and 'how', these phenomena are linked, there must be an *understanding* of 'what' the essence or nature of the intervening variable – *mechanism* is. While the three questions: 'why', 'how', and 'what' can easily be answered by the natural scientist by observation and analysis of the components of the intervening variable – *mechanism*, this is however not clear cut for the social scientist. Although the social scientist can observe the 'how', he cannot however, fully answer the question 'why' because, he needs to explain 'what' the essence of the intervening variable is. In essence, the social scientist cannot be a *mere* observer and analyst who *only* explains the phenomena he is witnessing *without* understanding the human contingencies involved in the action he is witnessing. He must be able to *understand* the 'what' question to be able to explain the 'why', thus, making sense of the 'how' question. The social scientist must therefore understand the *motives* behind the action – intervening variable (*mechanism*)

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[60] Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *op cit.*, p42
[61] Keat and Urry, *op cit.*, p31
[62] *Ibid.*, p29
[63] Harre, R (1970), *The Principles of Scientific Thinking*, (London), Macmillan, pp105-6

influencing or impacting on the present reality. But understanding the *motives* is dependent on our *accurate* knowledge of social meanings or responses guiding the behaviour of the individual responsible for the action – intervening variable. Thus, the social scientist needs to *know* the social and cultural values determining or influencing the actions under investigation. Unlike the natural scientist, the social scientist cannot claim objectivity, since the action of his object of study is socially and culturally influenced and not static like the objects of the natural scientist. While the natural scientist takes a spectator's approach, the social scientist has to understand the worldview he is studying. This is because the events take place *within* the social world. While they remain obvious to observation, however, the actions are loaded with meanings. The social scientist must understand these meanings to be able to explain the phenomena he is studying.[65] Since the IR scholar is studying an *object* that is conditioned by human contingencies, he cannot explain the intervening variable – *mechanism* that leads to war by mere observation and empirical analysis of data. He needs to understand the social and cultural values which informs the action. Hence, the IR scholar can only adequately seek to explain the phenomenon from an Understanding approach – based on a Rationalist philosophy of social sciences.

May Brodbeck notes that 'the foundation of our self-image, our beliefs about human destiny, and our confident moral appraisals rest on what we believe or may yet learn about

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[64] Keat and Urry, *op cit.*, p30.
[65] Hollis and Smith, *op cit.*, p68

man and his relations to the natural environment'.[66] If this statement holds, then, human contingencies impact on our claim to knowledge. Our knowledge is derived from our experiences and social realities – or, worldviews. In essence, our knowledge can only be described based on subjective valuations. While some features of the world *stand out* and are easily noticeable and allocated names, other features however, will have to be *cut out* to be noticed. Even after we have noticed them, we may have problem with identifying or naming them. These features that *stand out* (e.g. concepts of clouds, thunder, table, dog, wealth, hunger, colour, shape et cetera) are different slices of reality that we may easily identify and hence, have no problem with naming. The features that have to be *cut out*, on the other hand, can only be discerned by a more subtle and devious examination of nature, man and society in everyday life.[67] The features that *stand out* can be described as inanimate, however, the human species and his actions by themselves fall into this category. We can identify and name his action as much as we can identify clouds, shapes, hunger and wealth. Thus, to some extent, we can group the human species and his action in the category of inanimate objects because we do not require any devious examination to identify and name the 'object' before us. Animate objects on the other hand, cannot be identified, named and understand by *merely* noticing their existence or observing their actions. The actions of the human species that can be easily noticed – *stand out* – often convey meanings that have to be *cut out* for our understanding of the action itself.

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[66] Brodbeck, M (1968), *Reading in the philosophy of the Social Sciences*, (London), Collier-Macmillan Ltd., p3. Also see Hollis, M (1987), *The Cunning of Reason*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press for discussion on the question of rationality in social action.
[67] *Ibid.,*

Thus, while we can observe human behaviour, we cannot however *observe* human action *per se*, because it is loaded with meaning. Behaviour, in its broadest use, comprehends any change or tendency to change in things, living or non-living (an eye blink is behaviour; a wink is meaningful behaviour).[68] In other words, an eye blink can easily be noticed without associating any meaning to it. A wink on the other hand, although is expressed in the same manner as a blink, is however, different because it conveys meanings that have to be *cut out* for our understanding of that particular human action. Brodbeck notes that 'no sharp line can be drawn empirically between meaningful action and "merely reactive" behaviour'. 'We cannot always be sure whether a man's behaviour is intentional or not, for the courses from within and from without of a specific act are frequently complex and even more frequently obscure', Brodbeck concluded. It is in this distinction that the line is drawn between what is science from a Positivist epistemology – used in the natural sciences and science in the social reality of the human species. Since IR is concerned with the social reality of the human species, then it can only be studied within an epistemology that explains the meanings associated with the obvious actions that we can see by mere observation. The Rationalist or Explanatory epistemology enables human behaviour to be studied in a scientific manner. In order to discover an explanation of behaviour, one must first, find out something about the actor. One must *know* the actor and not just his action but the *reasons* behind the action. We will have to distinguish between behaviour – physical movement – and action.[69] An action derives its identity from the aims and beliefs presupposed by the way the particular movement is described. 'What is picked out as an action is generally a physical movement – or at least begins with one. But it is identified

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[68] *Ibid.*, p13
[69] Doyal and Harris, *op cit.*, p53.

as an action because an intention can be attached to it and because it seems natural to attribute this intention to the actor who performs it', observed Doyal and Harris.[70] A *reason* therefore justifies the action – an action is done for that particular *reason*.[71] The determination of who is responsible for 'what' activity depends on answering the question 'why' the actor acted. But to understand the 'what' question requires our knowledge of 'how' the actor's social convention or value system expects him to act.

Hidemi Suganami, in *On the Causes of War*,[72] utilises the Melian war against the Athenians as narrated by Thucydides.[73] Suganami notes that, although the Melian were aware of their military weakness against the Athenian and the certainty that they will lose the war, nevertheless, fought for honour – knowing that they will die. They rejected the opportunity to live as slaves – subjects to the Athenians. 'For the Melian, honour mattered in the face of severe injustice about to be inflicted upon them by an overwhelming military power', Suganami notes.[74] Suganami is arguing that mere observation of the action of the Melian will not be adequate to provide an explanation of the *reason or motives* – (the 'why') of the action in itself, neither does their action provides a basis for the prediction of 'how' a non-Melian people will act, given the same condition. Also, interpretative understanding, through the data collected from previous wars will not give an understanding of the 'why' question. It will appear that the answer to these questions lies in our understanding of 'what' the *motives or reasons* are. While the Melian war is

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[70] *Ibid.,*
[71] *Ibid.,* p55
[72] Suganami, H (1996), *On the Causes of War*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press.
[73] See Thucydides (1954), *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans., by R. Warner with an introd. And notes by M. I Finley (Harmondsworth), Penguin Books
[74] Suganami, *op cit.,* p59

suicidal, it is however in the preservation of honour – the *motive or reason* for the action[75] which, could not be explained through observation or interpretation of historical data of wars. In his critique of Realism and the limitation of Positivist epistemology and methodologies, Stephen Chan takes a similar line of argument with Suganami. Chan argues that we should

> locate the moments and values of sacrifice, the honour and grace involved, and the love and grief they contain. These become the component that makes possible not a universalism, but a solidarity, even if it is a solidarity of the shaken. It is also a solidarity of subjectivities. What is made possible is an investigation into the preconditioning recognitions for a hermeneutics of subjectivities. Compounded, shaken, not stirred (at least not stirred with one methodology).[76]

Both Suganami and Chan, while citing Greek legends, draws from Oriental values which, cannot be explained by observation or historical interpretation, but must be understood from the social and cultural values of the actors. Thus, we need an understanding of the *motives – reasons* behind the actions from the actor's worldview. In this case we need to Understand the values attached to the Melian army's 'suicidal' battle[77] and King Priam's self humiliation before Achilles - the killer of his favourite son[78] to properly contextualise the actions. The analyst will have to penetrate the *reason – motive* behind the actions. In

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[75] *Ibid.,*

[76] Chan, S (1999), 'A Story beyond *Telos*: Redeeming the Shield of Achilles for a Realism of Rights in IR' in *Millennium,* Vol.28, No. 1, p114

[77] Suganami, *op cit,*

this case, the *honour* with which the Melians are ready to die and the *courage* with which King Priam faced his enemy knowing that the action could cost him his life. While the actions of the Melians and King Priam can be interpreted as the pursuit of interest, however, the interest is not defined as 'glory', 'dominance', 'influence' or 'victory' - *power*, but, 'honour', 'courage', 'grace' and 'dignity' – *self worth*.

Using the Rationalist epistemology as the basis of explanation and understanding in social sciences, Max Weber integrated the naturalist insistence upon causal explanation and the anti-naturalist demands for the interpretative understanding of subjective meaning. Sociology, according to Weber, is:

> a science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects ... Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented in its course.[79]

By interpretative understanding, Weber argues that the social scientist can understand the actor's action (e.g. the outbreak of anger, manifested in various bodily expressions). But he will not be able to explain the *reasons or motives* of the actions he has witnessed or recalled from historical narrative. Explanatory understanding which involves knowledge of the *motive or reason* behind the action – outbreak of anger is required. 'Motive', here,

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[78] Chan, *op cit,*

is defined as a complex of subjective meaning, which seems to the actor himself or the observer an adequate, ground for the conduct in question.[80] By ascribing *motives* to the agents, the social scientist – IR scholar is attempting to give causal explanation of the behaviour.[81] This is the point Suganami and Chan have made in their cited works. Weber distinguished between *Erklaren* - causal *explanation* in the natural sciences proper and *Verstehen - understanding* proper to the social sciences. The social scientist studies social action – 'all human action'. However, since 'all human actions' are embedded with subjective meanings, the social scientist must always understand his object from *within*. Thus, the investigator needs to *know* the rules, conventions, and context governing the actions – the *meaning* of the action. He needs to know what the agent intended in performing the action and why he acted in the way that he did. To Understand therefore is to reproduce the order in the minds of actors; to Explain is to find causes in the scientific manner.[82]

Understanding can be conceived as two kinds. The direct observational understanding of the subjective meaning of a given act (including verbal utterances). We can understand by direct observation based on a direct rational understanding of ideas. Thus, we can understand an outbreak of anger as manifested by the facial expressions, exclamation or irrational movements. This is direct observational understanding of irrational emotional reactions. So also, we can understand the actions of a man that aims a gun at an animal because the action is a rationally observatory action. However, this does not explain the

[79] Weber, M (1947), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, translated by A. Henderson and T. Parson, (Chicago), Free Press, p88
[80] *Ibid.*, p98
[81] Keat and Urry *op cit.*, p146

reasons or motives behind the observed action. We need Understanding to enable us understand the motive behind the action of the man pointing a gun, or the apparently irrational movement of the angry man. The Understanding will tell us whether the man with the gun is a hunter, killing for food, or, is acting on instruction from his superior, thus, has no *personal* reason associated with his action except that of his superior. Or indeed, his *motive* may be to remove a threat to his security. Mere observation of his action without an Understanding is inadequate in answering the questions scientists seek answers to. Also, by mere observing of the angry man's action, we are not in position to Understand the reasons for his actions. We need to understand his *motives* to contextualise his actions (which could be due to jealousy, injured pride or an insult). This is rational understanding of motivation, which consist of placing the act in an intelligible and more inclusive context of meaning.[83]

Ernest Nagel notes that 'the things a social scientist selects for study are determined by his conception of what are the socially important values. [Thus], the student of human affairs deals only with materials to which he attributes "cultural significance" so that a "value orientation" is inherent in his choice of material for investigation'.[84] This certainly is the case of current IR as a discipline. The epistemology and methodologies in use, are based on European societal and cultural values taken as synonymous to universal values. Since, however, these are subjective they cannot claim universality. Although Max Weber propounded a value-free social science, however, he acknowledges the values involved in social sciences. Thus, he asserts:

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[82] Hollis and Smith *op cit.*, pp72-87
[83] Weber, M (1968), 'The interpretative Understanding of Social Action' in Brodbeck, *op cit.*, pp20-43.

The concept of culture is a *value-concept*. Empirical reality becomes "cultures" to us because and in so far as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those segments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. Only a small portion of existing concrete reality is coloured by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us. It is significant because it reveals relationships, which are important to us due to their connection with our values. Only because and to the extent that this is the case it is worthwhile for us to know it in its individual features. We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a "presuppositionless" investigation of empirical data. Rather, perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation.[85]

Gunnar Myrdal also, has argued that it is beyond any serious dispute that social scientists do in fact often import their values into their analysis of social phenomena and even those who will argue that it is not the case, do in fact sometime make such judgements in their social inquiries.[86] This is due to the fact that the social scientist is affected by the consideration of rights and wrong, his own notion of what constitutes satisfactory social order and his own standard of personal and social justice influences his analysis of the social phenomena.[87] And Peter Winch holds that the proper object of sociological study is

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[84] Nagel, E (1968), 'The Value-Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry' in Brodbeck, *op cit.*, p98.
[85] Weber, M (1949), *The Methodology of Social Sciences*, (New York), The Free Press, p76
[86] Myrdal, G (1958), *Value in Social Theory*, (London), pp134-52
[87] Nagel, *op cit.*, p 100

to discover how behaviour is governed by the rule of the society. Thus, for Winch, 'the successful sociologist has simply learned all that the ideal native informant could tell him; sociological knowledge is the kind of knowledge possessed in implicit and partial form by the members of a society rendered explicit and complete'.[88] Martin Hollis questioned whether the social scientist could actually understand what he purport to *know*? Thus, he questioned, 'an anthropologist sets himself to understand a culture which is not his own. He has succeeded when he understands everything the natives say, do and believe. But does he always know what he has understood?[89] 'The anthropologist', Nagel notes, 'must frequently judge whether the means adopted by some society achieves the intended aim (e.g. whether a religious ritual does produce the increase fertility for the sake of which the ritual is performed).[90] In essence, the social scientist should be primarily concerned with Understanding the *reason – motive* of the action rather than what s/he interprets the actions to means – subjective interpretation based on the analyst's values or worldview.

From this problem associated with value-relevance in the study of human actions, we can conclude that although the Rationalist epistemology provides a better way of *knowing* human behaviour and action through an *insider* approach, the social scientist cannot completely explain the phenomenon without understanding the motives influencing the action he has observed. The social scientist must first and foremost be concerned with Understanding the reason/motive of the action s/he has observed. Failure to focus on the motive/reason of the actors' action, will lead to the interpretation of the actions based on a

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[88] Winch, P (1958), *The Idea of a Social Science*, (London), Routledge and Kegan Paul, p88
[89] Hollis, M (1973), 'Reason and Ritual' in Alan Ryan edited, *The Philosophy of Social Explanation*, (Oxford), Oxford University Press, p33
[90] Nagel, *op cit*

subjective explanations based on the analyst's assumed values. In essence, human contingencies cannot be known through observation and interpretation only. The social scientist – IR scholar, needs to *know* the actors' social and cultural values to be able to answer the 'what' question and be in position to explain the 'why' and 'how' questions. Therefore a more scientific IR is likely to be located in identifying the relevance attached to 'honour, grace, self-sacrifice, grief and love'[91] and how the human societies in question, react to these. Chan's call for the utilisation of these attributes of human nature to provide 'a foundation of a normative vision of IR'[92] can be located in the Rationalist philosophy of the social science. Therefore, IR should be studied within the field of social sciences proper.

Having rejected the Positivist epistemology in the studying of IR in favour of a Rationalist – Understanding epistemology for a more inclusive IR, there remain some key questions to be answered. How do we understand the *motives/reasons* behind human actions? How do we *know* the *purpose, aims or objectives* of the action we are investigating? In other words, what is our methodology for *knowing*, since, we have rejected empiricism? These questions, largely methodological issues on the 'how' of *knowing* – Understanding as the basis of studying IR within the broader scope of social sciences is the focus of the next chapter.

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[91] Chan, *Ibid*, p112
[92] *Ibid.,*

CHAPTER 2

THE CRITIQUE OF SUGANAMI AND HIS STORIES

In this chapter, I will be addressing the methodological question raised in chapter 1. The aim is to establish the method of Understanding, which will enable the broadening of IR to include Africa in particular. The people of the continent were not privy to the development of the discipline, hence, are tacitly excluded, misapplied or outrightly ignored in the development of the discipline and the understanding of war in the continent. The chapter will argue in line with Suganami's 'narrative intelligibilifying' approach. While I share Suganami's views, however, I find his work unnecessarily constrained in the conception of the domestic sphere in terms of the Westphalian state system. While acknowledging the inextricability of agents and structures in telling the stories of wars, the 'narrative intelligibilifying' approach seems to exclude the story of *nations* - another form of structures within states which, Suganami has rightly identified in the concept of 'institution'. Consequently, the approach, although a better method of telling the stories of wars, however, requires that the stories be told in an inclusive manner. The stories of the *nations* of Africa, and not the Westphalian states must be the central focus of the narrative. The chapter will therefore be arguing that for Africa to be inclusive in a more rigorous IR beyond the Westphalian states system, based on African institutions, the conception of the domestic analogy must be redefined to include African *nations*.

'NARRATIVE INTELLIGIBILIFYING' – THE STORYTELLING APPROACH

In rejecting the two Stories approach of Hollis and Smith[1], Hidemi Suganami argues in favour of 'narrative intelligibilifying' – storytelling.[2] His rejection of explaining and understanding rest on the dichotomy the approach creates in the attempt to locate the causality of wars and make sense of the phenomena. To start with, he argues, 'first, the verbs "to explain" and to "understand" are not of the same grammatical type'. '[W]e explain something *to* someone, whereas we *make* someone understand something', he asserts. 'What should be juxtaposed, if at all, is not "explaining" and "understanding", but "explaining" and "making understandable" (or what I prefer to say "intelligibilifying")', he concludes. 'Secondly, the distinction obscures the fact that "explanation" presupposes "understanding" in two ways'. '[It] is impossible to follow an explanation if we do not understand its presuppositions and the concepts it employs as shared by the community where the explanation – whether good or bad – is treated as an explanation'. Also, 'it is not possible to explain anything to someone who grasps or understand nothing'.[3] He cites Michael Scriven to substantiate his case, thus, 'an explanation is essentially a linkage of what we do not understand to what we do understand'.[4] A third and most important reason for the rejection of the 'explaining and understanding' dichotomy, is 'the juxtaposition between "story in terms of explanation" and "story in terms of understanding"'. This dichotomy, Suganami argues, 'obscures the fact that story as *such* is an explanatory device,

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[1] Hollis, M and Smith, S (1990), *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press; and --- (1994), 'Two stories about Structure and Agency', *Review of International Studies*, 20, 241-51
[2] Suganami, H (1999), 'Agents, Structures, Narratives', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 5 (3), p369
[3] --- (1997a), 'Narratives of War Origins and Endings: A Note on the End of the Cold War', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, p637.

and is something that can be understood'. Thus, '[a] story can be said to *explain* its subject matter step by step by inviting us to follow it, and we can be said to *understand* a story to the extent that we can follow and summarise it. Storytelling is a form of explaining just as much as story-following is a form of understanding'.[5] For Suganami therefore, the idea of telling the stories of wars or agency and structure from an *insider (mechanistic – explanatory)* and *outsider (voluntaristic – understanding)* perspectives, is contrived and an unnecessary distinction. He argues that 'explaining and understanding' are two sides of the same 'narrative' – story.[6] This approach, warranting the dichotomous view of knowledge in terms of explanation and understanding, is inadequate in telling the stories of wars and its causality. But narrative intelligibilifying – storytelling approach however, is a better method of telling the stories of war.

> [It] acknowledges the presence, in 'our' culture, of *a continuous range of narrative types*, some more mechanistic, some more voluntaristic, some with more stress on chance factors, and some giving more prominence to background conditions, each resolving some puzzles about the outcome in its own blended way. It is by means of such narratives that, most often, events in the social world are explained and understood – or made sense of.[7]

To provide an adequate understanding of what 'narrative intelligibilifying' constitutes, Suganami utilises Hayden White's work etymologically, to explain the words 'narrate',

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[4] Scriven, M (1959), 'Truisms as the Ground for Historical Explanations' in Gardiner, P (ed.), *Theories of History,* (London), Collier Macmillan, p449, emphasis in original
[5] Suganami, ' Narrative of War Origins and Endings: ... ' *Op cit*, p638, emphasis in original
[6] *Ibid,*

'narration' and 'to narrate', which, he states, are 'derived via the Latin *gnarus* – 'knowing', 'acquainted with', 'experts', 'skilful', and *narro* ('relate', 'tell') from the Sanskrit root *gna* ('know').[8] While the events that happens in nature (world of nature) can be observed by employing a scientific (empiricists – explanation) theory, this is not the case with social behaviour such as war. '[S]tating the cause of a given war is inextricably intertwined with telling a story about how the war came to be fought, or giving a narrative account of its origin', he concludes.[9] Based on this elaboration, we can argue that it is through 'narrative intelligibilifying' that the story of Africa, and its wars, could be told to make sense or bring to understanding. In other words, we can only *know* and answer the 'what' and 'why' questions of the origins of wars and their impact by understanding first, the 'how' question. This however, is only possible through 'giving more prominence to [the] background conditions' or, the origins of the problems from a historical – storytelling narrative. The justification for engagement in historical investigations is, 'to make sense of our past, and, in particular, unexpected events of great consequences'. Even though curiosity about the past is conducted through the narrative of representation, it is certainly historically contingent, according to White.[10] There is also nothing unnatural or absurd about wanting to hear or read about how something came about, moreover, intellectual curiosity is a sign of an advanced life form, Suganami concludes.[11] In making a claim for the use of history, Collingwood asserts, '[a]ll history is tendentious, and if it were not

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[7] *Ibid,*

[8] White, H (1987), *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*, (Baltimore), John Hopkins University Press, p215, n. 2

[9] Suganami, H (1996) *On the Causes of War*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press, p139

[10] White, *Op cit,*

[11] Suganami, 'Narrative of War Origins and Endings: ...', *Op cit*, p647

tendentious nobody would write it'.[12]   Thus, in his summation of the inextricable link between history and theory, Suganami cites Louis Mink, who stated that 'stories are not lived but told', in reply, he asserts, 'stories are not only told, but also lived'.[13]

Having establish the position of history in the development of theory, hence our ability to explain the origins of wars, through 'different sorts of explanatory situations,[14] which includes what Stephen Chan has identified as a method in Chinese poetry (storytelling) which invites the reader to complete the story.[15] Or, through the use of publications as in European historical narratives in which the author takes the reader through the story. Or as in oral tradition used in African societies (see chapters 4 and 5). The purpose of the narrative is to explain and bring to understanding the 'how' question. But to adequately answer the 'how' question in respect of wars in Africa, the story must lay emphasis on the beginning, which is recorded in the oral narrative of the various African societies. Thus, the stories of wars in Africa must be 'much more comprehensive, dealing with various aspects and phases of the subject matter',[16] whether the acts are considered noble or not.[17] The complete story must be told from the beginning[18] for a proper understanding of the 'how' question, to 'intelligibilify' the 'what', and answer the 'why' questions.   In Suganami's view, and rightly so, 'there are no such things as "origins of war", existing

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[12] Collingwood, R. G (1994), *The Idea of History: With Lectures 1926-1928*, Revised Edition, Van Der Dussen, J (ed.), (Oxford), Oxford university Press, p398

[13] Mink, L (1970), 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension', *New Literary History*, Vol. 1, No. 3, p557. See also Suganami, 'Narrative of War origins and Endings: …', *Op cit*, p649

[14] Suganami, 'Narrative of War Origins and Endings: …', *Op cit*, p633

[15] Chan, S (1999), A Story Beyond *Telos*: Redeeming the Shield of Achilles for a Realism of Rights in IR', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No.1, p103

[16] Suganami, 'Narrative of War Origins and Endings: …', *Op cit*,

[17] Chan, *Op cit*,

[18] Suganami, H (1997b), 'Stories of war origins: a narrativist theory of the cause of war', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4, p405

independently of the stories we tell about them waiting only to be discovered by historians attempting to reconstruct the past as *it actually was*.[19] For the origin of war to be identified and explained, the story must start from the beginning, through the middle leading to the very end.[20] The story of war origins therefore, must give account of four ingredients: the background, chance coincidence, mechanism and the action and inaction of individuals. Consequently, the story must give account of the geographical and demographically features of the countries involved; the characteristics of the existing international system (power and alliance configurations); governmental structure of the relevant countries and their foreign policy objectives; the political, social, economic, and military conditions of the countries concerned; national self image, ideological motivations of leaders and people, and their prevalent assumptions about the nature of international politics, diplomacy, and war; the intensity of the existing rivalry and grievance; et cetera.[21] While Suganami chided both historians and social scientists for failing to take the background condition to the emergence of war into account, or in context in their narratives,[22] his conception of 'background information; is unduly restricted to the notion of states. In essence, if we are to locate the background information on the basis of states, we will be excluding wars which occurs *within* states of which, the background of such wars predates the acquisition of statehood. In this case, the background information as conceived in a State-centric perspective excludes the beginning, but takes the middle (the Westphalian states in Africa as given, hence, the beginning).

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[19] *Ibid,* p402
[20] Suganami, *On the Causes of War, op cit,* chapter 4
[21] --- 'Stories of war origins; ...', *op cit*, p406
[22] *Ibid,*

In his elaborate work on the emergence of post-Westphalian communities, *The Transformation of Political Community*, building on his earlier works,[23] Andrew Linklater argues in favour of different patterns of inclusion and exclusion in Political Communities building. The impact of globalisation, the world economy and ethnic revolts which challenges the traditional conception of issues of inclusion and exclusion in the Westphalian state system, makes the formation of new Political Communities and citizenship possible. The ideas of Political Communities based on the Westphalian state system, according to Linklater was built on the assumption that the existence of a high level of solidarity was treasured by citizens who are prepared to risk their lives in wars for the greater communal good.[24] This solidarity 'bound' people together, though they may not share the same sentiments. But due to adversity – the possibility of war, they may consider it 'best to hang together'. This idea of the formation of 'Community' through the fear of adversity, hence a 'forced' solidarity, can be conceived as the *Gesellschaften* – Association. This is different from *Gemeinschaften* - Community[25] as we have seen in chapter 1. Consequently, this Association – state owes it survival to the social bond between citizens – insiders but does not include outsiders – aliens.[26] In essence, the very survival of the state is based on its exclusion of the Other, thus, accentuating the difference between insiders and outsiders.[27] Based on this evaluation, the Westphalian state system, according to Mattingly, in its historical evolution was organised purposefully for war.[28]

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[23] Linklater, A (1998), *The Transformation of Political Community*, (London), Polity Press; --- (1990a), *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, (London), Macmillan; and --- (1990b), *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations*, (London), Macmillan
[24] Linklater, *The Transformation of ... Ibid*, p1
[25] See Toennies, F (1955), *Community and Association*, (London), Routledge and Kegan Paul for more on the subject.
[26] Bodin, J (1967), *Six Books on the Commonwealth*, (London), Blackwell, p21
[27] Linklater, *The Transformation of ... Op cit*,
[28] Mattingly, G (1955), *Renaissance Diplomacy*, (Hamondsworth), Penguin, Chapter 5 in particular

Consequently, states were organised to be able to withstand the ordeal of war, and permit administration from a central commanding position.[29] 'Five monopolies' according to Linklater 'were acquired by states':

1)   The right to monopolise control of the instrument of violence

2)   The sole right to tax citizens

3)   The prerogative of ordering the political allegiance of citizens and of enlisting their support in war

4)   The sovereign right to adjudicate in the dispute between citizens; and

5)   The exclusive right of representation in international society which has been liked with the authority to bind the whole community in international law.[30]

These are the monopolies accorded to states from the onset. States therefore, were primarily based on 'an exclusionary process in the age before territorial boundaries hardened and the dichotomy between internal and external capacity to project their power into society and to regulate social interaction within rigorously policed frontiers before the late eighteenth century', Linklater concludes.[31] Thus, while the idea of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship was central, the notion of homogeneity – nationhood is a recent addition,[32] consequently, nationalism. Therefore, the idea of nationality as the basis of the identity of the members of the nation, built around shared cultures and other social values is a recent addition to the conception of statehood. In essence, the primary concern

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[29] *Ibid,*
[30] Linklater, *The Transformation of ... Op cit,* p28
[31] *Ibid,*
[32] *Ibid,* p29

of the pre-18th century Westphalian state system was based on the recognition of Political sovereignty, territoriality (not necessarily legally defined boundaries, but frontier), and citizenship which was inclusive on the basis of a common solidarity. Therefore, the linkage between legally defined boundaries and the notion of nationhood as the basis of the state system is recent.

Based on the engrafted nature of the idea of the nation to the conception of a state, James Mayall asked: 'What is the Nation? Is it one phenomenon or many?'[33] While Mayall has challenged the conception of the nation and rightly so, he nevertheless, seems to have conceived it as synonymous with the state,[34] a constraint shared by Suganami. Mayall therefore fails to distinguish between communities like the 'pastoralists [who] will typically share much more than their common grazing, for example, a language, a religion or even a common ancestor, any one of which can be invoked in the interest of conflict resolution'[35] from the Westphalian state where powerful states could imposed their *Will* with impunity.[36] In essence, while the Westphalian state system is based on legal settlement and an institutionalised political dispensation,[37] the *nations,* as in Africa, are linked not by mere solidarity due to adversity, but have deeper and more rooted bonds based on kinship, lineage and genealogy which strengthens the idea of nationhood. Since, according to Linklater, globalisation, internationalisation of economic activities and the rise of ethnic quest for self-determination which Mayall has also outlined, challenges the restriction of citizenship to states, we can conclude that Suganami's stories, which starts

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[33] Mayall, J (1990), *Nationalism and International Society*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p2
[34] *Ibid*, p48
[35] *Ibid*, p14
[36] *Ibid*, p18

from the Westphalian state system are inadequate in explaining the *whole* story, as far as African *nations* are concerned. The story must start from the *beginning*, namely the incursion of colonial powers in the continent (or, as a cut off point, from the Europeans' Enlightenment) and subsequent imposition of colonial boundaries later to evolve as Westphalian states with territorial sovereignties. Suganami's stories restricted to wars between states, ignores the different *nations* within the Westphalian states in Africa. These *nations* constitute the actors in African wars.

While in telling the *whole* story of wars in Africa, I accept that chance coincidences[38] can be included in the narrative, however, such coincidences must not replace the role played by Europeans as actors in the origins of the wars we find in modern Africa. Although chance coincidences may have impacted on environments conducive - the 'mechanistic process'[39] for wars, the imposition of an alien state system with rules different from the traditional and cultural ways of the different *nations*, by itself, helped in creating the 'mechanistic processes' which make wars possible even in modern Africa. To understand the role played by the 'mechanistic process' and the possibility of chance coincidence in igniting the torch of war, we need to have a complete background of the story starting from the beginning. While historians and social scientists are guilty of ignoring the background to the stories of wars in Africa, IR scholars, in particular, whose primary concern is to find solutions to the phenomenon – war, are not only guilty of the same neglect, but of assuming that war only *occurs* between states. Consequently, they neglect the 'domestic' sources of wars, except in explaining the background to wars between states. Because of

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[37] *Ibid,*
[38] Suganami, 'Stories of war origins; …', *Op cit,*

the conducive environment for war in African societies, due to the strictness of the state system and its failure to fulfil the security, welfare and identity needs of the various *nations*, human acts can easily be construed as *acts* that requires a *reaction* in forms of defence or prevention. In essence, while we could identify actions of states in terms of resistance, acts with belligerent intent, acts of contributory negligence, insensitive acts, thoughtless acts, and reckless acts against other states,[40] the same can be argued for the different *nations*, constrained in the Westphalian state system. Therefore, if the stories of wars in Africa will be told, to provide an understanding to make sense, such stories must be told in relation to Paul Veyne's tripartite factors: chance, the nature of things, and human freedom.[41] It is also within this context that Stephen Chan raises the following questions: 'Who makes the child soldier fight? The terrible officers of Musevini? Yes, but what makes the children let the officers make them fight? Are they, as children, without any subjectivity at all?' He then draws a comparison from the action of King Priam to recover the body of his son, thus, preserving his *dignity* and *self respect*, by asserting, 'For the body of his son, an old man, long ago, did something amazing. The children practice on an assault course. They dodge in and out of the pylons of the ski lift. They remembered fathers and mothers, each bullet in their AK 47 is already named',[42] he concludes. Chan's narrative is concerned with the *reasons/motives* of individual's willingness to take part in guerrilla struggles – the common wars in the continent. Why do individuals go to war? Or to rephrase the question, what causes war? The next section will be focussed on trying to understand the causes of war.

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[39] *Ibid*, p407
[40] *Ibid*, pp410-12
[41] Veyne, P (1984), *Writing History: Essay on Epistemology*, trans. Mina Moore-Rinvolucri, (Manchester), University of Manchester Press, chap. 6

CAUSES OF WAR: THE TRIPARTITE FACTORS ARGUMENT

According to Suganami, to have a proper conception of the causality of war, three questions required consideration:

1) What are the conditions, which must be present for wars to occur?

2) Under what sorts of circumstances have wars occurred more frequently?'

3) How did this particular war come about?[43]

The first condition is concerned with the presence of an *inherent* condition necessary for *any* – domestic or international war to occur. The second, on the other hand, is concerned with the *various circumstances* of which wars have *occurred frequently*. The third condition, my primary concern, is the *origin of a particular war*. Kenneth Waltz, in his *Man, the State and War*, analysed the causality of war on a three level analysis based on the nature of man, the state system and the International System.[44] Waltz's tripartite analysis had earlier been proposed by Manning who wrote: 'if the League was to succeed it must do so in spite of the nature of men, the nature of states and the nature of the society of states'.[45] In noting Manning and Waltz's identification of causality, Suganami argues that both scholars seem to have accepted the tripartite level of analysis as given. Thus, they found it natural to 'accept this tripartite analysis with great ease because it reflects a very common view of how modern political life is organised: human beings, as citizens, belong

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[42] Chan, *Op cit*, p107
[43] Suganami, *On the Causes of War, Op cit*, p6
[44] Waltz, K (1959), *Man, the state and war*, (New York), Columbia University Press.

to separate states, and these in turn form a system'.[46] Moreover, 'modern political philosophers and natural Law writers on the Law of nations articulated and reinforced this popular perception'. 'Through theories, they posit that men left the state of nature and formed separate states, and these, while formally in the state of nature, constitute a system or society of a kind'.[47] While political philosophers and Natural Law scholars accepts the tripartite level of analysis as natural, hence, given, Suganami queries, 'does this necessarily supply a good classification device for the multifarious causes of war? Can all the relevant causes be placed neatly in the three categories? Are the three in fact exhaustive?'[48]

The logical pre-requites of war, according to the tripartite level of analysis is based on the following conclusions:

1)   Human beings - have an inherent capacity to kill members of their own species (without either of which, no organised inter-social armed conflicts could take place, including war among states).

2)   Societies/states – believe that there are circumstances under which it is their function to resort to war. Without the co-operation of society members, no organise armed conflicts could take place between societies/states.

3)   The International System – lack of an anti-war device makes international wars possible.[49]

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[45] Manning, C. A. W (1942), 'The "failure" of the League of nations', reprinted in *Agenda*, 1, 59-72, in Cosgrove, C. A and Twitchett, K. J (eds.), (1970), *The New International Actors: The UN and the EEC*, (London), Macmillan, p115.
[46] Suganami, *On the Causes of war…, op cit.*, p16.
[47] *Ibid.*,
[48] *Ibid.*, p17
[49] *Ibid.*, 62

While these are logical, they however failed as scientific application, Suganami observes. This is because 'if we do not understand what it means to say something "caused" something else', he asserts, 'we cannot hope to find what "caused" a particular war'.[50] Suganami's argument rests on understanding '*a particular war*' through 'narrative intelligibilifying', rather than attempting to understand the *general* causality of wars. Thus, he agrees with Dray, that 'a historical approach far from being only capable of identifying the *origin* of war, or merely describing and narrating,[51] a historical investigation can provide answers to "what caused this war?" by answering "how did this particular war came about?"'[52] In essence, how did the story of this *particular* war begin and what are the factors that have influenced it? Answering these questions does not require answering the question 'under what sorts of circumstances have wars occurred more frequently?'[53] Because it relates to general wars, he notes. The emphasis in 'narrative intelligibilifying' however, is on *particular* wars. Suganami's focus on particular war rejects the claim of *regularity* and the existence of *independent* variables from the effects that led to the war.

Carl Hempel posited that 'regularity' is central in explicating 'causality'.[54] This view, although commonly entertained by empiricists, is rejected by Suganami,[55] and rightly so. The proponents of this view insist on studying variables that *reoccur* in various wars to

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[50] *Ibid.,* p114
[51] This is implied in Dray, W. H (1957), *Laws and Explanation in History,* (Oxford), Clarendon Press, p14
[52] Suganami, *On the Causes of War, Ibid.,* p115
[53] *Ibid.,*
[54] Hempel, C (1965), *Aspects of Scientific explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Sciences,* (New York), Free Press
[55] Suganami, *On the Causes of War, Op cit.,*

draw general patterns and conclusions on the causality of war. The empiricists' claim rests on the notion of the possibility of identifying and establishing the variables that cause wars in *general*. Another relatively common view, which is also rejected, is David Hume's conception of causality. According to Hume, 'causality' cannot be analysed with 'the effects' that 'cause' the event'.[56] Based on this view, the 'effect' that caused a particular war cannot be considered the *actual* cause of the war. The *actual* cause or the causality of the war is *independent* of the action that resulted to the war itself. Therefore, the causality must be identified as a separate variable from the effect. A less common view which, Suganami considers to be more plausible is based on the notion that 'explanation' is integral to the concept of 'causation'. This view argues that 'a cause' is intrinsically 'an explanatory factor'.[57] In essence, the explanation that can be given as the *reason* for the war, is indeed, its *cause*. In other words, the reason given by the storyteller as the cause of the war is indeed, the *cause*. Therefore, 'to state the cause of an event is to explain it occurrence and to explain the occurrence of an event is to render its occurrence more intelligible'. Doing this, Suganami concludes, will 'show the sequence of relevant events, leading to the events in question, in such a way that a specific puzzle or puzzles we have about the occurrence of the event concerned can be solved'.[58] Thus, the question, 'what caused this particular war?' can justifiably be equated with 'how did this particular war come about?' he asserts.[59] Therefore, while it is possible to understand the causality of a *particular* war from the historical narrative, this is not possible when applied to *general* wars. Such an attempt to generalise the causality of wars ignores the agency of individuals

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[56] Hume, D ([1777] 1962), *Enquiries concerning the human Understanding and concerning the principles of morals by David Hume*, with intro. By Selby-biggs, L. A, (Oxford), Clarendon Press.

[57] See Kneale, W (1949), *Probability and Induction*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press. Also, Scriven, M (1975), 'Causation as Explanation', *Nous*, 9, 3-16.

in their relationship with their societies, from which structures are created. For empiricists' to argue in favour of *regularity* of variables in the occurrences of wars, as the causality of wars, separate and *independent* of the factors that led to a particular war, they must distinguish between what constitutes human nature which can be studied *objectively* from personality traits, or behaviours which are acts of resistance.

Human nature, based on Suganami's definition, is 'a set of characteristics which are part of the human make-up; it is common to *all* human beings, and to them exclusively'. Thus, while personality traits are characteristics of human beings, they are however, not part of human nature because; they are only forms in some human beings and in various degrees. Based on this conception, the first level of analysis - the *innate* nature of man as a causal factor to war, has failed. Manning and Waltz failed to make a distinction between what is human nature found in *all* humans from personality traits found in *some* human beings. [60] To understand the causality of a particular war, we need to know the background to the war – the nature of the circumstances where the story begins. Also, other co-incidental factors – an intersection of independent causal links, or a simultaneous occurrence of two or more events which are causally unrelated to each other[61] and the mechanisms (operation where we are induced to behave in a certain way because of the working of our minds or body, social environment or the working of systems which leads to unintended consequences[62]) of the war – the causal process. For Suganami, the mechanisms itself, 'is a mini-story of a repeatable, or often encountered, non-purposive process, sometime with

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[58] Suganami, *On the Causes of War, Op cit.,* p139
[59] *Ibid,*
[60] *Ibid.,* p18

the middle part omitted because the story is too familiar'. However, he argued, although 'a mechanism *necessitates* an outcome, [it] does not *physically* generate it'.[63] This is a similar position taken by Robert Axelrod. Axelrod assets:

> There are ... a variety of standardised processes in the world, physical, physiological, psychological, or social, some of which are simply taken for granted, and some of which are thought to demand an explanation because they are puzzling, though perhaps noticeably often encountered. When called upon to explain, we, like a competent mechanic explaining the working of a mechanical device, try to give a narrative account of how a given input, not ineluctable, but when appropriate conditions are met, leads through the middle part of a given output.[64]

Thus, what could be classified as regularity in occurrence, could be a mechanism of the process, rather than causality itself. In essence, we have rejected the nature of man as the causality of war argument. However, we have not discounted man's role in the evolution of war. If man's innate nature is not responsible for wars how do we explain his action in the evolution of wars? What are the roles of humans as agents and systems as structure in the evolution of wars? What makes the individual willing to fight as a member of an organised group (regular army or a guerrilla group)? In accepting 'narrative intelligibilifying' as a method of telling the stories of war, we have by implication rejected

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[61] See Kneale, *op cit.*, pp114-17; and Carr, E. H (1964), *What is history?*, (Harmondsworth), Penguin Books, pp98-100
[62] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy op cit.*, p165
[63] *Ibid.*, pp166-7

Hollis and Smith's dichotomy between explaining and understanding. Instead, we have argued that both are factors 'to intelligibilify' – 'to make understandable or understood'[65] the story. We have also rejected the existence of independent 'unselfconscious entities' as identifiable *causes* of war claim.[66] Consequently, Waltz's 'structural fact' argument, that only the fact of international anarchy and the prevailing pattern of power distribution among the great powers are relevant to giving an account of *regular* observed phenomenon – war is found inadequate as an explanation of the causality of wars.[67] Waltz's agent-structure dichotomy according to Suganami and rightly so, is unnecessarily restrictive.[68]

Although we have rejected Waltz's 'structural fact' argument, we shall nevertheless, employ a tripartite level of analysis in our argument to show the inextricability of agents and structures in telling the stories of wars. Tzevetan Todorov, cited by Suganami, explained Christopher Columbus conviction that America was a large continent based on three reasons. Todorov states Columbus' three reasons as, 'the abundance of fresh water; the authority of the sacred books; the opinion of other men he has met'.[69] Columbus's three reasons are - Nature, Divine (Spiritual) power and Human agency. Hegel in his remark on the nature of philosophy, stated that it consists of 'speculative knowledge of God, nature and mind'.[70] In essence, Spirituality, Nature and Human agency. Johan Huzinga also, in making sense of history, remarked that it is only meaningful when it is

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[64] Axelrod, R (1990), *The Evolution of co-operation*, with Forward by Dawkins, R, (Harmondsworth), Penguin books, p21

[65] Suganami, 'Agents. Structures, Narratives' ..., *Op cit,* note 3and p369

[66] *Ibid*, p368

[67] *Ibid,*

[68] *Ibid,* p369

[69] Todorov, T (1984), *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans by Richard Howard, (New York), HarperCollins, p14, cited in Suganami, *Ibid,*

granted a goal, whether it be a goal 'set by human will, by blind necessity, or by God's providence and continual act of creations'.[71] Huzinga, like Hegel and Columbus, believed in the combination of three factors - human, natural and divine power to make sense of history. Paul Veyne also, as cited by Suganami, states that:

> [History] has no method, which means that its method is innate; in order to understand the past, it is sufficient to view it with the same eyes we use to understand the world around us or the life of a foreign people. It is sufficient to view the past in this way in order to see in it the three kinds of causes we discover around us as soon as we open our eyes: the nature of things, human freedom, and chance. Such are ... the three kinds of efficient causes that rule the sublunary world and ... the three kinds of motivating causes of universal history.[72]

In agreeing with this tripartite classification, Suganami states that Veyne has rightly observed this acceptance of the principle by historians, hence, its usage in 'our every day attempt to make sense of the world around us'.[73] The use of the tripartite principles are also found in Carr's *What is History?*[74] Thus, we can conclude that the idea of tripartite principles as factors involved in the causality of war is generally accepted, albeit, our tripartite principles differs from Waltz's three levels of analysis.

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[70] Hegel, G. W. F (1952), *Philosophy of Right*, trans with notes by T. M. Knox, (Oxford), Clarendon Press, p8
[71] Huzinga, J (1973), 'The Idea of History' in Fritz Stern edited *The Variety of History: From Voltaire to the Present*, (New York), Vintage Books, p293
[72] Veyne, *Op cit*, p105, cited in Suganami, *op cit*,
[73] Suganami, 'Agents, Structures, Narratives ...' *op cit*, p371
[74] Carr, *What is History? Op cit*, chap. 4

What then is the link between agents (individuals) and structures (societies) as factors influencing the causality of war? Does society shape individuals' behaviour or, is society shape by individuals? – A chicken and egg question, - which comes first? In answering this question, while acknowledging the impossibility of separating between individuals and their societies, Suganami notes the difference between actions attributable to societies and those to individuals. 'Imagine two stories' he writes, 'one of them is a story of how a group of individuals end up doing what they do or being what they are like. The other is a story of how their society ends up doing what it does or being what it is like'. 'Notice two things about the story', he continues,

> First, they have different endings. Second, if either of them is to constitute a satisfactory account of its ending, it ought to contain more than just one ingredient – more than just what individuals do (or are like) is needed to explain what their society does (or is like), and more than just what the society does (or is like) is needed to explain what its individual members do (or are like).[75]

He concludes therefore, that;

> comparing the role of individuals in shaping a society and the role of the society in shaping the individual is like comparing two stories with different endings. And doing so with a view to investigating the significance of one

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[75] Suganami, 'Agents, Structures. Narratives … ' *op cit*, p377

factor in one story relative to the importance of another factor in the other story. This appears to me to be an impossible task.[76]

While 'Montesquieu say that institutions mould men' and Saint-Simon responded by stating 'it is also a fact that men make institutions',[77] Suganami argues that this Structurationism, denies the human species the freedom to make institutions. 'Structurationism' he argues, 'cannot plausibly say that everything – every fact – about the agent is entirely determined by social structures, or vice versa'. 'All that it can sensibly assert, say, in the context of international relations, will be that states (supposing they are the main agents) are/do what they *partly* are/do *partly* because of what international society *partly* is, and vice versa'.[78] Although a separation between agents and structures may appear impossible, in reality, the two can be separated. Certain structures can also be agents, for example the state. Thus, the state as a structure can become an agent accorded with rights and duties by the society. An agent therefore is 'an entity which is a subject of rights and duties within a given societal structure'.[79] The society gives the agent the right of making deliberate decisions. For Suganami therefore, 'an agent is that category of being concerning which a society constructs a narrative, presenting it to be capable of deliberate acts'. Thus, 'the agent is narratively constituted', Suganami concludes, and adds, '"the self" as a particular person that he or she is, namely his particular identity, is also constituted narratively, i. e. biographically'.[80] The conclusion we can derive from this assertion therefore is that if agents are narratively constituted, so also is society. 'It is

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[76] *Ibid,*

[77] Saint-Simon, C-H de (1952), 'The Reorganisation of the European Community' in F. M. H Markham (ed. and trans.) *Henri Compte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825): Selected Writings,* (Oxford), Blackwell, pp46-7

[78] Suganami, 'Agents, Structures, Narratives …' *op cit,* p378

through the telling and retelling of stories that a society's components form a continuously present collectivity of a particular standing and identity'.[81] In other words, it is through 'narrative intelligibilifying' that both agents and societies are constituted, consequently, it is also through the same process we can understand the role of agent and structures in the causality of war. We have 'agents, structures and narratives shaping one another in a complex relationship, where narratives, in turn, will encompass the "remarkable trinity" of mechanistic processes, chance factors and deliberate actions'.[82] But, what do we mean by structures – societies? Is the argument mainly restricted to states or does it includes *nations* within states? To answer this question requires an examination of the concept of domestic analogy in IR.

THE DOMESTIC ANALOGY ARGUMENT

When IR emerged as a discipline at the end of World War I, it was initially based on the use of the domestic analogy in its conception. The term domestic analogy, according to Suganami,

> is presumptive reasoning, which holds that there are certain similarities between domestic and international phenomenon; that in particular, the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them;

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[79] *Ibid*, p380
[80] *Ibid*, p381
[81] *Ibid*,
[82] *Ibid*,

and that therefore those institutions, which sustain order domestically, should be reproduced at the international level.[83]

It was based upon this analogy that the League of Nation was built, thus, Carr in his critique of the League, blamed its failure on this assumption.[84] Before Carr's critique, there was already in existence among political philosophers and legal theorists - long before International Relations came to be treated as a special branch of academic enquiry, scholars who held the view that the only way to understand inter-state relations was to reject the domestic analogy. While recognising the basis of the critique of domestic analogy, some contemporary academic specialists of International Relations, as we have seen from Linklater, hold the view that perhaps some form of domestic analogy is acceptable.[85] Thus, 'a progressive development of international relations necessitates the transference of understanding of social relations from their original domestic setting to the international arena'.[86] Earlier in 1940, Woolf argued that war was 'nothing, but the use of force by a group of individuals against another'. Therefore, he saw 'no reason why the same kind of method as employed in controlling the use of force by one individual against another, or one class of individuals against another within the domestic sphere could not be applied to the control of war'.[87] Both Linklater and Woolf are in favour of the use of the domestic analogy at the International sphere.

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w0[83] Suganami, H (1989), *The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p1

[84] Carr, E. H (1939), *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, (London), Macmillan, *passim*.

[85] Linklater, *Men and citizens in the... Op cit*, p193.

[86] *Ibid,*

[87] Woolf,, L. S (1940), *The war for peace*, (London), Routledge, *passim*

Although the debate between the proponents and opponents of domestic analogy has highlighted the contention of the issue in international relations in our contemporary times, the debate however, can be traced back to the European Enlightenment period – 18th century. For a clearer understanding of the use of the term, Suganami explains it as:

> Presumptive reasoning (or a line of argument embodying such reasoning) about international relations based on the assumptions that since domestic and international phenomenon are similar in a number of respects, a given proposition which holds true domestically, but whose validity is as yet uncertain internationally, will also hold true internationally. A line of argument involving the domestic analogy therefore assumes explicitly or implicitly that there are some similarities between domestic and international phenomena, that there already exist some propositions, which hold true domestically and internationally. It also asserts that a certain other proposition is valid with respect to the domestic sphere. And, without being able as yet to demonstrate the truth of the proposition with regard to the international sphere, it concludes, presumptively, that the proposition will hold true internationally also.[88]

Hedley Bull, a proponent of the domestic analogy, holds that the conditions of an orderly social life among states should be as they are within them and proposes a formula that 'the

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[88] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy...*, *Op cit.*, p24

institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale'.[89] Bull's formula of domestic analogy is based on the assumption that 'the need of individual men to live in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same'.[90] This line of reasoning could also be found in the work of William Jay, who, in proposing a treaty between the United States and France in the 19th century, wrote:

> Individuals possess the same natural right of self-defence, as nations, but the organisation of civil society renders its exercise, except in very extreme cases, unnecessary, and therefore criminal ... Instead ... of resorting to force, [the citizen] appeals to the laws. His complaint is heard by an impartial tribunal, his wrongs are redressed, he is secured from further injury, and the peace of society is preserved. No tribunal, it is true, exists or the decision of national controversies; but it does not, therefore, follow that none can be established ... It is obvious that war might instantly be banished from Europe, would its nations regard themselves as members of one great society, and, by mutual consent, erect a court for the trial and decision of their respective differences.[91]

Bull, like Jay, seem to hold the view that the organisations of the international sphere (Jay's Europe) by reproducing the institutions of the domestic sphere will bring about

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[89] Bull, H (1966), 'Society and anarchy in international relations' in Butterfield, H and Wight, M (eds.), *Diplomatic investigations: essays in the theory of international politics*, (London), Allen and Unwin, p35
[90] Bull, *Op cit.*, p35.
[91] Jay, W ([1842] 1919), *War and Peace: the evils of the first and a plan for preserving the last*. With an introduction by J. B. Scott, (New York), Oxford University Press, pp52-3.

order.[92] Suganami notes that from the formula, it could be argued that Bull seems to imply that 'just as order among individuals within a states requires a national police force, so [also] order in international society requires an analogous institution, an international police force'. The same analogous reasoning, if applied to the question of unemployment, the formula will be found inadequate, Suganami concludes.

While it may be argued 'that the problem of unemployment cannot be solved without an international authority which can co-ordinate the economic policies of separate states', such proposal 'will be designed chiefly for the purpose of creating jobs for the citizens of separate states'. Therefore, this goal may not be characterised as 'international', unlike the international police force, which is aimed at the maintenance of order *between* states, and which may therefore be said to be 'international'.[93] Although the question of Order between states can be achieved by the reproduction of the domestic police force institution at the international society level, the issues of economic and social welfare organised through an international agency based on the domestic analogy, is however, not aimed at enhancing the relations *between* states coexisting in the international society. Rather, it is concerned with the interests of men and women located in separate states. Such agency, he concludes, can only be characterised as 'cross-national'. Although 'the international police idea is based on analogous reasoning involving the personification of states, the economic agency idea does not rely on the notion that states are like natural persons'. Yet the economic agency idea does 'involve the notion that just as certain economic problems within a state require domestic economic planning, so other economic problems, which are

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[92] Bull, *Op Cit.*, p35
[93] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy ..., Op Cit.*, p28

experienced within each state, but are international in terms of the location of their cause, require international economic planning'.[94]

From the use of the term 'institution' so far, it has only been in relation to states. However, from the examples outlined by Suganami, other actors: *individuals* and implicitly, *nations* - as in Africa, could also require international institution's to achieve their economic and social welfare goals as well as security. In other words, the *nations* (societies) could empower representatives. This narrative constitutions of agency accords rights and duties to the structure to make deliberate decisions on behalf of the societies. The term 'institutions', therefore, has a broader connotation than the legal arrangement or device found in states. It includes 'rules, practices and conventional technique of a society which are not expressed in the form of law'.[95] This concept of institutions is found in African *nations*, while the legal arrangement is the conception of the Westphalian states.[96] For a proposal to count as an instance of the domestic analogy, 'it is sufficient that the institution concerned is found primarily in domestic society, that the institution's effectiveness in bringing about the desired end has some substantiation from within the domestic sphere, but is as yet lacking in international substantiation'. In essence, 'the institutions need not be an *essential* institution of domestic society in the sense of being a defining condition of state'.[97] Based on Suganami's clarification, while an arbitral tribunal and the institution of the court of appeal, as opposed to a judicial authority will qualify for domestic institutions which are 'found primarily in domestic society', but not an *'essential*

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[94] *Ibid.,* pp28-9
[95] *Ibid.,* p30
[96] Linklater, *The Transformation of ... Op cit* and Mayall, *Op cit.*
[97] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy ..., Op cit.,* p33

institution of domestic society ... [defined as] state', a parliament, however, not being integral to a domestic society and the institution of the police, a modern invention according to Morgenthau,[98] do not qualify for the instance of domestic analogy. The conception of 'institutions' as 'found primarily in domestic society' but 'not integral to the concept of state', implies that the state is not necessarily *the* domestic society. We can conclude that there are 'institutions' like the arbitral tribunal and courts of appeals which are found in other *forms* of domestic societies – *nations*, who do not constitutes states.

While Bull's conception of domestic society implies states, Suganami, although restricting himself to the concept of the state, makes a distinction between a federation as a state *per se*, and a confederation. The German terms 'Bundesstaat' and 'Staatenbund', he asserts connotes two different systems. The term 'Bundesstaat' – federation, is a state (*staat*), while 'Staatenbund' – confederation, is a union of states (*staaten*). Thus, he argues that while a confederation does not qualify for the Statecentric definition of *domestic* society, because it is not 'strictly speaking' a state in the domestic analogy sense, it is however, 'not a genuine international model either'. In essence, the definition of the domestic society is based on legalistic terms, rather than on the concept of *nations* which, often have their 'institutions' but do not qualify for definition as states. Therefore, based on the Statecentric definition, 'institutions' found primarily in *nations* within the Westphalian states in Africa, are consequently, excluded from this definition of domestic society. Indeed, it could be argued that the African continent is excluded from this debate due to its focus on a European conception of nations, hence, states. But, to what extent can we

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[98] See Morgenthau, H (1964), 'The impartiality of the International police' in Engel, S and Metall, R. A (eds.), *Law, State and international legal order*, (Knoxville), University of Tennessee Press, p211ff.

accept the Westphalian state system as the domestic society, since the 'institutions' of societies, while primarily located *within* those societies, however, are not integral in the formation of states? Can we conceive the *nation* as an instance of a domestic society as far as the African continent is concerned?

Comte de Saint-Simon writing in 1814 argued that the peace and prosperity of the liberty of Europeans could not be attained without the establishment of a common government for Europe. Saint-Simon suggested that such common government was to be the same in relation to the different peoples as national governments are to individuals. His argument was that the best possible constitution that the state of human knowledge could reveal should be applied to all national governments as well as to a common government.[99] Saint-Simon's belief was based on his conviction that institutions moulded men, therefore, the European Parliament would foster 'a patriotism beyond and the limits of one's fatherland' or the 'habit of considering the interests of Europe instead of national interests'.[100] The proposal also implied that men make institutions. Thus, in order for Europe to function well, it was necessary that its members be motivated by European patriotism.[101] For Saint-Simon, therefore, it was patriotism that enabled a national government to have a 'corporate will', and the same will be the case with the European Parliament. However, he held the view that European patriotism was to be found only in a certain class of people: men of business, scientists, magistrates and administrators. These belong to that class due to their wider contacts, emancipation from purely local customs

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[99] Saint-Simon, *Op cit*, pp31-2, 39
[100] *Ibid.*, pp46-7
[101] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy ..., Op cit.*, p43

and their occupation, which were cosmopolitan in aim rather than national.[102] Because Saint-Simon's proposal was concerned primarily with unity in Europe, Suganami describes it as a 'Cosmopolitanist' argument.[103] 'Cosmopolitanist' in terms of the European-centred concerns and not the Universalism of Kant. In essence, European universal cultures constitute the centre of Saint-Simon's proposal. This approach for Europe of the 19th century can almost be restructured to read Africa of the late 20th century, based on the nature of African's societal relations on the basis of the attachment and loyalty to *nations*. Saint-Simon's proposal is concerned with national governments but not necessarily states. And if we based this argument on Suganami's notion of 'institutions' as found in societies primarily, but not integral for the formation of states, we can easily locate African *nations* in this schema. Hence, we can argue that the limitation of the definition of *domestic* society on the basis of states negates the conception of 'institutions', which would include African *nations*. In essence, we can argue that the domestic analogy should include African *nations* based on Saint-Simon's schema and Suganami's definition of 'institutions'. Therefore, 'narrative intelligibilifying' must tell the *whole* story from the beginning (the African *nations'* perspectives), and not from the middle (the attribution of statehood to colonial boundaries) toward the end (the failure of the Westphalian state system in Africa).

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[102] Saint-Simon, *Op cit.*, pp46-7
[103] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy ...*, *op cit.*,

After World War II, Schwarzenberger, having earlier proposed a form of confederation during the post World War I debate in his works,[104] found his earlier confederal proposals inadequate. Instead, in his *Power Politics*, Schwarzenberger argued that 'Power politics, international anarchy and war are inseparable'. Also, that war's 'antidote is international government' – a 'super-state or world state' with a federal constitution to balance the requirement of authority and liberty.[105] The main difference between Schwarzenberger's federalist government and Saint-Simon's united government for Europe is on the degree of inclusion. While Schwarzenberger proposed a world government, Saint-Simon is limited to Europe. However, both proposals did not include the African *nations* who, were under the yoke of slavery and later colonisation, nevertheless, had 'institutions' found primarily in their domestic societies, – but had no legal or political sovereignty due to imperial dominion and the Westphalian criteria. Another European, who earlier proposed a federalist structure before the later radicalisation of Schwarzenberger's proposal, is Frederick Schuman. For Schuman, international politics is a competitive struggle for power with war as an incident of the struggle, which, he argued, could not be eliminated by disarmament, arbitration, adjudication, conciliation, collective security or by outlawing war. He maintained that if the international system was left as it is, it would lead to a catastrophe in the form of the collapse of the social and economic foundations of the Western culture as the result of self seeking nationalism, imperialism and militarism of the nation-states. For a solution, Schuman suggested a political unification of the world to be achieved by 'institutionalised collaboration between states, through the gradual

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[104] See Schwarzenberger, C (1936a), *William Ladd*. Preface by J. B. Scott. 2nd edn., (London), Constable and his (1936b), *The League of Nations and world order: a treatise on the principle of universality in the theory and practice of the League of Nations*, (London), Constable.

strengthening of the bonds of an "international government" resting upon states gradually welding them together into a world-wide political community of interest'.[106] He cautioned political leaders thus:

> If those in authority fail to achieve a new orientation, they will not merely be endangering their own positions in western society, but they will be jeopardising the very survival of western culture. This responsibility is overwhelming in its implications. These implications will be appreciated and will be acted upon within the next decade or catastrophe will become inevitable.[107]

Although Schuman' proposed a world-wide federation, however, one can easily notice his primary concern - Western culture and the causality of European's wars – 'self seeking nationalism, imperialism (of which Africa was a victim at the time of his writing, and to some extent, still is, at the economic level in modern times) and militarism of the nation-states'.[108] Hans Morgenthau, although a proclaimed Realist, however, favoured a world state system. For Morgenthau, 'two world wars within a generation and the potentialities of mechanised warfare have made the establishment of international order and the preservation of international peace the paramount concern of Western civilisation'.[109] He argued that 'there [could] be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with the confines of the political world'. Thus, a world community must antedate a world

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[105] --- (1941), *Power politics: an introduction to the study of international relations and post war planning*, (London), Jonathan Cape, *passim.*
[106] Schuman, F. L (1933), *International politics*, (New York), McGraw-Hill, *passim.*
[107] *Ibid.,* p853

state.[110]   Although Morgenthau believed that the world-state could be achieved by the encouragement of gradual erosion of national sovereignties by increased functional co-operation in the field of specialised agencies, however, a functional co-operation could not succeed where nations were in conflict. For a world state to be achieved, he posits, there must be 'the mitigation and minimisation of international conflicts so that the interests which unites members of different nations [might] outweigh the interest which separate them'.[111]   This could be achieved through skilful diplomacy based on the realistic calculation of national interest and not crusading spirit.[112] According to Suganami, while these scholars, are in favour of the domestic analogy and appear to be proposing an 'Internationalist' form, in reality, their arguments can only be located within a 'Cosmopolitanist' form.[113]   That is, restrictive to Western cultures or exclusive to European societies. In essence, they were concerned with the peace and security of Western civilisation, rather than the whole world. Thus, Africa is not included in this debate, hence, should not be restricted to defining the domestic society in terms of the Westphalian state system.

While Saint-Simon, Schwarzenberger, Schuman and Morgenthau argue in favour of a 'Cosmopolitanist' - continental form of organisation, Carr holds an 'Internationalist' view. Carr, taking a Mitranian functionalist view, argued that the question of the shape and size

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[108] *Ibid.*, p740
[109] Morgenthau, H (1948), *Politics Among Nations*, (New York), Alfred A. Knopf, p309
[110] *Ibid.*, pp398-9, 406.
[111] *Ibid.*, pp412-15
[112] *Ibid.*, part, 10, *passim*
[113] Suganami, *Op cit.*, p100

of the requisite international institution should be determined by the end in view.[114] He asserts:

> In the national community the concentration of all authority in a single central organ means an intolerable and unmitigated totalitarianism: local loyalties, as well as loyalties of institutions, professions and groups must find their place in any healthy society. The international community if it is to flourish must admit something of the same multiplicity of authorities and diversity of loyalties.[115]

Carr is in favour of organisation of the international sphere – the governing of Europe through many functionally differentiated institutions, just as in the domestic sphere where the power of government is not concentrated in one body. Carr's sympathy with a functional form of world organisation is better understood from David Mitrany. In Mitrany's view, the difference between national government and international government is in terms of scale. While national government is focused on managing and administration within the domestic society, the international government should deal with those things, which could not be handled well, or without friction, except on an international scale. However, both forms of governments have the same purpose (see chapter 7 on the Functional approach argument).[116] Suganami concludes that both Carr and Mitrany while arguing for a world organisation, based on the domestic analogy, did not personify states. Instead, they suggest the identification of problems that are international

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[114] Carr, E. H (1945), *Nationalism and after*, (London), Macmillan, pp47-8
[115] *Ibid.*, p49

(cross-national) in nature. A cross-national organisation, they argue, is necessary for the enhancement of the welfare of individuals at the international level through executive agencies with the powers to make and implement policy.[117] Drawing a parallel between Carr/Mitrany's proposal with Immanuel Kant's proposal of a Commonwealth, Suganami notes that Kant drawing from the domestic analogy wrote:

> What avails it to labour at the arrangement of a Commonwealth as a Civil Constitution regulated by the law among individual men? The same unsociableness which forced men to it, becomes again the cause of each Commonwealth assuming the attitude of uncontrolled freedom in its external relations, that is, as one state in relations to other states; and consequently, any one state must expects from any other the same sort of evils as oppressed individual men and compelled them to enter into a Civil Union regulated by law.[118]

Compared with Carr's argument for the reinforcement of national economies by international economic planning, thus:

> The pursuit of 'free competition', of an economic principle of all against all, inevitably tends to create those extreme inequalities and forms of exploitation which offend the social conscience and drive the less privileged

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[116] Mitrany, D (1975), *The Functional Theory of Politics*, (London), Martin Robertson, pp98-9, 125
[117] Suganami, *The Domestic Analogy ...*, *op cit.*, pp108-9
[118] Immanuel Kant quoted in Forsyth, M, Keens-Soper, M and Savigear, P (1970), *The theory of international relations: selected text from Gentili to Treitschike*, (London), Allen and Unwin, p183.

to measures of self-defence, which in turn provoke corresponding counter-measures. By the end of the 19th century this process led, as it was bound to lead, to the progressive development of combination at every level and in every part of the system, culminating after 1914 in the most powerful combination yet achieved – the modern socialise nations. ... But a further stage has now been reached. What was created by a cumulative process of combination between individuals to protect themselves against the devastating consequences of unfettered economic individualism has become in its turn a threat to the security and well-being of the individual, and is itself subject to a new challenge and new process of change.[119]

The striking resemblance between Kant's and Carr's posits, is that while Kant talks in terms of the state in its external relations with other states, thereby creating a Commonwealth of states, which, Suganami differentiates from what he calls 'Cosmopolitanist' – continental organisation, thereby distinguishing his conception from Western thought conception of Cosmopolitanism. Carr's emphasis is based on the 'hazardous impact of international economic anarchy with reference to the individual men and women living in separate national communities'. Carr's emphasis relies on the pursuits of economic interest of individuals within and between states through functional organisation, rather than a world government. 'Kant', Suganami concludes, 'while starting from the individual in his theorising, nevertheless personifies states; Carr, by contrast, took individuals as the unit of his concern even in matters of international organisation'.[120]

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[119] Carr, *Op cit.*, p46
[120] Suganami, *Op cit.*, p110

Thus, while the 'Internationalist' approach recognised states, their emphasis however, is focussed on satisfying the social welfare and economic security of the individual and not Order (the prevention of war) between states in the International System. This form of organisation however, does not oppose the evolution of continental organisations of Political Communities as in the case of the European Union - EU.

In contemporary times, both the Internationalist and continental forms of organisation seem to be inevitable due to the globalisation of the world and the weakening of territorial sovereignty. Moreover, war, the subject matter of IR is more often a phenomenon *within* domestic societies rather than *between* states in the African continent. Therefore, if war remains the primary concern of scholars of African IR, its causality must be identified. Understanding wars in Africa requires an understanding of how the *nations* within African states organise their 'institutions'. Therefore, 'narrative intelligibilifying' must start from the African *nations* and the impact of self-seeking interest of the Other, to be able to tell the whole stories of each *particular* war in the continent. In essence, the stories must start at least from the 18th century European Enlightenment period. And if we hold Suganami's position as acceptable, the conception of domestic analogy in Africa must be based on African *nations'* search for Peace and Order. However, to eliminate war and bring about Peace and Order, the economic and social welfare concerns of the African people must first be met. There is a link therefore, between the quest for economic and social welfare with wars within African states since each *particular* war in Africa has security, welfare and identity undertones. Thus, we can conclude that the stories of wars in the continent have their origin in the pursuit of economic and social welfare. These *nations* fight for

dignity and *honour* as humans and as *nations*. Therefore societies which constitute both agency and structures do resort to war in asserting claims of collective *dignity and honour* – self-determination. Hence, the members of these societies co-operate in the war effort. Thus, the causality of African wars can be understood from the effects that led to the war – the pursuit of *security, welfare* and *identity*.

In part Two (chapters 3 – 5) I shall focus on how stories about Africa from Antiquity to the self-determination wars of the late 20th century has been written or told by both European and African storytellers.

CHAPTER 3

THE PREVAILING AFRICANIST PARADIGM[1]

In part Two, I shall be looking at how the stories of Africa have been written or told by both European and African scholars. The chapters (3-5) will show the problem associated with the manner in which stories about Africa have been narrated and, reveal the inadequacies as well as the contrived nature of such works. The chapters will also look at how Africans themselves became constrained in their attempt to write their stories based on their reality and the uses of oral tradition as sources of their data. Thus, Part Two will focus on the inadequacy of the anthropological approach of European and Africanist historiographers. It will dwell on the uses of social anthropology and oral traditions as the source of African historiography thus, arguing in favour of the need for a holistic storytelling from the beginning.

In this chapter in particular, the focus is on examining the works and limitation of what I refer to as the prevailing Africanist paradigm in telling the stories of Africa. Although African historiography since the Mid-20th century has increasingly become sympathetic and elegant, it has however remained constrained by what can be called the 'Racist paradigm' of the 19th century – which empathetically asserts that Africa had no History

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[1] I am using paradigm in the Kuhnian sense. A paradigm is the general framework upon which theories are developed and can only be replaced by a scientific revolution, which occurs, by gradually replacing the former paradigm. See Kuhn, T. S (1970), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago), University of Chicago Press. According to Michael Nicholson the key test as to whether a new paradigm has evolved is the commensurability and incommunsurability of the existing Paradigms. See his (1992), 'Imaginary Paradigms: A Sceptical View of the Inter-Paradigm Debate in International Relations' in *Kent Papers in Politics and International Relations*, Series 1, (7)

and therefore no Civilisation. Consequently, all identifiable elements and aspects of Civilisations found in the continent are deemed foreign-led and or, influenced. While sympathetic African scholars since the second half of the 20th century, have focused their research on deconstructing the 'Racist paradigm' of the 19th century, the debate on African historiography has, however, remained stagnant within the 'Racist paradigm'. In this chapter, I shall be evaluating the prevailing Africanist paradigm - sympathetic African scholarship since the Mid-20th century to identify the problems associated with it and the implications of its continual usage as the basis of explaining African socio-political relations. The chapter therefore argues that while the prevailing Africanist paradigm is sympathetic, it falls short of providing a sound basis of Understanding Africans' socio-cultural and religio-political relations. Hence, it does not help our Understanding of the African ontology (Being) and ability to understand the conflicts and wars of Africa which; we have identified in chapter 2 as based on the quest for security, welfare and identity. Also, it fails to explain or indeed outline how to proceed in the search for solutions. The prevailing Africanist paradigm can only be seen as 'defensive and explanatory' without adequately enhancing our Understanding of the causal factors associated with the African problem.

AFRICAN CIVILISATION

'Africa', according to Mortimer Wheeler, 'may well be the home of man himself, Asia is the undisputed homeland of Civilisation'. 'Egypt', he continued, should be grouped with Africa for geographical and not racial reasons; moreover, 'Egyptian Civilisation is

secondary to Mesopotamia – Asia'. This, in essence, 'raises the question as to whether the Garden of Eden or its scientific equivalent is located in Africa and not in Asia?'[2] To conclude his thesis of classifying African people by racial designation, Wheeler further asserts: 'There is very little knowledge of the Negro – black, where did he come from and how?' 'The biggest and most interesting problem remains of tracing the origin of the Negroes', he continued. 'Did they originate from Southern Europe, in India, in South-western Asia or in Africa itself?' In answering these questions, he asserts; 'the fact is that we simply do not know the racial history of the Negro. Hence, he has remained an "enigma"'.[3]

For Wheeler, 'Africans' are classified as follows:

a)   'Aboriginal' – Bushmen of the Kalahari, Hettentots of the Southwest, the Pygmies of the Congo Forest.

b)   'True Negroes' of West Africa

c)   'Bantu Negroes' who occupy most of Africa south of the equator

d)   'Hamitic Negroes' of North-eastern and East-central Africa

e)   'Non – Negroid' inhabitants of North Africa, including the Hamites and Arabs.[4]

Since Wheeler uses the term 'Africa' in a geographical and not racial sense and asserts, 'because Africa is an amalgam of races and languages, there is no such thing as 'the' African.[5] We can also take the discourse at that level of analysis.

[2] Wheeler, M (1961), 'First Light' in *The Dawn of African History*, edited by Roland Oliver, (London), Oxford University Press, p1
[3] *Ibid.*, pp1-5.
[4] *Ibid.*, p4

Classical Arabs and Romans used the term 'Africa' in relation to the racial description of the Continent and its people. The term, 'Africa', is therefore used in reference to the black race inhabiting the continent - as noted by Osman Sid Ahmed Ismail. Ismail notes that 'Ifiriqiya' the medieval Muslim word for Africa was used in description of the land of the Negroes in the Southern part of the continent. While the Muslims used the word 'Africa' in that restricted sense, it was the Romans who introduced the term 'Africa' in relation to the whole continent after the destruction of Carthage.[6] Thus, the word 'Africa' was used in describing and identifying Wheeler's 'Negroes'. In essence, people of the racial category classified as black. It would appear that the Romans extended the restricted use of 'Ifiriqiya' – land of the black by the Arabs to include the Arabs themselves. Hence, for the Romans, the Arabs migrants racial classification did not constitute the basis of the definition, but the geographical space. And by adopting 'Africa' - 'the land of the blacks', Africa was therefore made the continent of the blacks. Hence, any further distinction of the peoples of Africa (inhabitants of the geographical *space* classified as the habitat of the blacks) into different 'shade' of blackness is purely for anthropological purposes, but also, absurd. If 'Africa', like 'Europe', 'Asia', and 'the Americas' implies the land inhabited by people of the same, or similar racial and cultural classifications - in this case, black people, there can be no further distinction on the basis of 'another degree' of racial categorisation as Wheeler, other European historians/politicians and Africanist do, with exception only when describing the particularity of Africans. The basis for further division of Africans by Wheeler and contemporary Africanists and the search for the origin of the 'Negroes' – the

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[5] *Ibid.*,
[6] Ismail, O. S. A, (1968), 'The Historiographical Tradition of African Islam' in *Emerging Themes of African History* edited by Terence Ranger, (Nairobi, Kenya), East African Publishing House, p7

Spanish word for blacks - in Africa (the land of the blacks) is redundant and called into question.

A. J Arkell, another scholar writing in the tradition of the 19th century, in his attempt to deny Africans a place in the evolution of the Civilisations in their continent, started by asserting that in '3000 BC a conqueror from Asia – Asian origin united upper Egypt to the Delta and set up the kingdom that lasted 3000 years spreading its influence southward of Africa'. In 1500 BC Egypt colonised Cush – Kush (Upper Egypt – including Ethiopia and present Sudan) only to lose it five centuries later to a ruler from Kush in 700 BC who sought to 'bring back the religion and customs it has practised a thousand or more years earlier'. But, with the help of Assyrians, Greeks and Carin Mercenaries the Kushite 'Reformation' was overturned in 591 BC, sacking the capital Napata and forcing it to relocate to Meroe further south.[7] Arkell has cleverly manipulated history to contrive a 'Hamitic' Origin thesis, but fails to answer some basic questions. Arkell failed to explain how the unifier of Upper Egypt (region including Ethiopia, Sudan and et cetera) and Lower Egypt (region including present Egypt) - Aha or Narmer (Herodotus' Menes or Min)[8] - a very African name, could be of Asian origin. Moreover, at Aha's appearance on the scene, there were people already inhabiting the regions as noted by Arkell's own thesis. Hence, this 'conqueror' did not discover a land devoid of people, the fact that he 'unified' the 'Upper and Lower' indicate that he meet some form of order, hence a unification and not a construction. Cheikh Anta Diop has recorded the works of an obscure French Egyptologist

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[7] Arkell, A. J (1961), 'The Valley of the Nile' in Roland Oliver (ed.) *The Dawn of ... Op cit.*, pp7-10.
[8] See ben-Jochannan, Y. A. A (1989), *Black Man of the Nile and His Family*, (Baltimore), Black Classic Press, p115; Chiekh Anta Diop (1974), *The African Origin of Civilisation: Myth or Reality?* edited and

Abbe Emile Amelineau (1850-1916) who discovered a royal necropolis at Om El'Gaab, near Abydos containing the names of Kings who were probably more ancient than Aha (Menes). Of the sixteen names, the tombs of Kings Ka, Den, Djet (the serpent King whose stela is at the Louvre) and a fourth King whose identity is yet to be deciphered[9] were identified. Amelineau's report on the meeting of Egyptologists to agree on the dates for the monarchs reign in a historical period reads: 'At the meeting of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belle-Lettres, Mr Maspero tried to place these kings in the Twelfth Dynasty ... then ... he attributed them to the Eighteenth ... next to the Fifth ... then to the Fourth'.[10] Refuting his detractors, Amelineau concludes: 'Those are reasons which seem to me not to deserve scorn, but rather to merit serious consideration by scholars of good will, for the others do not count in my opinion'.[11] Since these four Kings were ancient to Aha, identifying their historical period will help in the understanding of the origin of Aha – his ancestry as far as his emergence as the unifier of Upper and Lower Egypt is concerned. It was the same Amelineau who discovered the tomb of Osiris and his sister Isis at Abydos. Thus, removing the ascription of a mythical hero image and placing them in a historical context. For Amelineau, Osiris and Isis were black people. He wrote:

> From various Egyptian legends, I have been able to conclude that the population settled in the Nile Valley were Negroes, since the goddess Isis was said to have been a reddish-black woman. In other words, as I have explained, her complexion is *café au lait* (coffee with milk), the same as

translated by Mercer Cook, (Chicago), Lawrence Hill Books; and Martin Bernal (1987), *Black Anthena- The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation*, (New Jersey), Rugers University Press, p64.
[9] Diop, *The African Origin... Ibid.*, p75
[10] Amelineau, Abbe, E (1899), *Nouvelles Fouilles d'Abydos*, (Paris), Ed. Leroux, p248

that of certain other Blacks whose skin seems to cast metallic reflections of copper.[12]

Amelineau designated the first Black race to occupy Egypt by the term *Anu*, which came slowly down the Nile (from Upper Egypt) and founded the cities of Esneh, Erment, Qouch, and Heliopolis. He states:

All those cities have the characteristic symbol, which serves to denote the name *Anu* [Hieroglyph: an arrow with two feathers or reeds]. It is also in an ethnic sense that we must read the term *Anu* applied to Osiris. As a matter of fact, in a chapter introducing hymns in honour of Ra and containing Chapter XV of *The Book of the Dead*, we read: 'Hail to thee, O God Ani in the mountainous land of Antem! O great God, falcon of the double solar mountain'. If Osiris was of Nubian [Nuba] origin, although born at Thebes, it would be easy to understand why the struggle between Set and Horus took place in Nubia. In any case, it is striking that the goddess Isis, according to the legend, has precisely the same skin colour that Nubians always have, and that the god Osiris has what seems to me an ethnic epithet indicating his Nubian origin. Apparently this observation has never before been made.[13]

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[11] *Ibid*, p271
[12] --- (1916), *Prolegomenes a l'etude de la religion egyptienne*, (Paris), Ed. Leroux, part 2, p124
[13] Amelineau, *Prolegomenes... Op cit*, pp124-5

Amelineau's work not only discredits the exclusion of Africans from the Civilisation of ancient Egypt, but also calls into questions Arkell's and similar theses. Arkell's thesis in particular, becomes problematic when in the 700 Before Common Era – BCE (BC) Piankhi the King of Sudan – ancient Nuba – in Upper Egypt (who became Pharaoh of the 25th Dynasty) and later, his youngest son Taharqa (the Biblical Tirhakah – Pharaoh of the 26th Dynasty)[14] brought Egypt 'back to the ancient religion and customs'. It will be absurd to try to restore a foreign religion and culture which, according to Arkell's thesis, is older than the period of colonisation of Kush – Upper Egypt of 1500 BCE itself? – Considering that the ancient religion and customs of Upper Egypt has been in existence for over 1000 years as at 700 (8th century) BCE.[15] As if Arkell's contradictions are not apparent, G. W. B Huntingford, another foreign-led African Civilisation proponent, in the same book,[16] asserts that around '7th century (600) BCE waves of immigrants from the already comparatively civilised Semitic people of the Yemen began to settle in the Ethiopian [Upper Egypt] highlands where perhaps two to three centuries [later] they established a centre of a place called Axum [Aksum – Ethiopia in Upper Egypt]. From this nucleus they (Semites from Yemen) eventually developed the Kingdom of Ethiopia'. These Semites from Yemen according to Huntingford, were called 'Habashat' and 'they found the place occupied by a people of 'Hamitic stock'. And 'not content with their Kingdom in Africa', 'they made attempts to regain control of their old homeland in Yemen'. That, according to Huntingford explains why these 'returnees' from Ethiopia – Upper Egypt were found in Western Yemen in the 1st century BCE making 'alliances with various local tribes in an

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[14] Diop, *The African Origin... Ibid,* pp219-220; also, --- (1991), *Civilisation or Barbarism: An Authentic Anthropology,* (Chicago), Lawrence, Hill Books, pp153, 331; and ben-Jachonnan, *Black Man of The Nile... Ibid,* pp241, 257, 360.
[15] Arkell, 'The Valley of the Nile' in Oliver (ed.), *The Dawn of... Op cit.,*

attempt to regain their ascendance in Arabia'. They continued the invasion of their ancestral homeland until early Mid-3rd century – in the Common Era – CE (AD) according to Huntingford. Thus, 'by the end of the 3rd century [CE], King Aphilas of [Aksum] invade Arabia [his ancestral home?]'. To sum up his foreign-led and influenced African Civilisation thesis, Huntingford concluded that 'the mixture with the Hamitic population by the Semites from Yemen produced an Africanised Semitic type which, while without any Negro characteristics, differed greatly in most respect from its Arabian ancestors'.[17] Obviously, these scholars have attempted to manipulate history to establish a foreign-led and influenced African Civilisations theory. But they have either shown a total ignorance of what constitutes Upper and Lower Egypt, or revealed their sense of superiority over the inferior blacks – Africans, hence, their scholarship can only be understood within the 'Racist paradigm' of 19th century.

Another Mid-20th century African historian who wrote within the 'Racist paradigm' is Kenneth Ingam.[18] In spite of Ingam's citation of works from scholars like Al Masudi, Al Idirisi and Dimashqui who clearly described the inhabitants of East Africa as blacks, somehow, ends up with classifying them on the basis of racial categories. Thus, claiming that the Africans that have lighter shades of blackness and, or other features that are not considered 'Negroid'; are of 'Hemitic' origin, hence, not blacks - by implications therefore, not Africans. Obviously, all these scholars writing within the 'Racist paradigm' of 19th century have made futile attempts to justify their theses on a foreign-led, or

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[16] Huntingford, G. W. B (1961), 'The Kingdom of Axum' in Oliver (ed.), *The Dawn of ... Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.,* pp22-28

influenced Civilisation in Africa. What they have succeeded in doing however, is to raise more questions due to the obvious contradiction of their narration of history, the description of geographical locations and apparent misapplication of the term Africa. If 'Africa' is the term describing the geographical *space* inhabited by black people - their place of origin, it is not possible therefore, to further 'dissect' Africans - black people into 'racial' categories, except in the justification of the sense of superiority of the non-African (in the African context, not Political designation), hence, a 'Racist paradigm'.

Although the term 'Africanism' made it first appearance in English in 1641 it was used in a scriptural sense by the early church Fathers. The scriptural exegesis usage of the term continued until the 19th century. Moreover, European travellers, prior to the 19th century used the term widely, but rarely, to label African cultural features.[19] They use it in a descriptive sense – identifying the land of the blacks. Hagel's famous lecture at Jena in 1830 in which he assert the claim that 'the Negro... exhibits the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state... for [Africa] is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit, and still involved in the conditions of mere nature'[20] precisely at the time when France was invading Algeria – the period when Europeans began large-scale dispossessing Africans of their land[21] - set the trend for the emergence of the 'Racist paradigm' of the 19th century. Philip D. Curtin notes that although Europeans have been in contact with Africa and engage in slavery since the 15th century, it was only in the 18th century (1780s) that they began to take a new look the

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[18] Ingam, K (1963), *A History of East Africa*, (London), Longman. Ingam's work contain very worrying contradictions and cleverly contrived 'differences' of African people, even when he has noted the 'sameness' in cultures, languages and socio-political institutions.
[19] Davidson, B (1994), *The Search for Africa*, (London), James Currey, p79.

continent, mainly in response to the attack on slavery. They needed to create the prospects of an African – European relations with 'legitimate' trade replacing the slave trade.[22] The emergence of the 'Racist paradigm' can be seen from Edward Long's work. Long was living in Jamaica and had never been to Africa, yet, asserted that Africans are biologically inferior and associated them with animals.[23] Also, in the works of Immanuel Kant, Voltaire and Rousseau, we find views based on African inferiority conclusions.[24] On his part, President Thomas Jefferson held a very strong view of the inferiority of Africans. He wrote,

> [W]hatever be their degree of talents, it is no measure of their rights. I advance it, therefore, as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstance, are inferior to the Whites in the endowment both of body and of mind.[25]

President Benjamin Franklin on the other hand, although was sympathetic to the native Americans, preferred the exclusion of the sons of Africa in the United States. He said:

> And while we are, as I may call it, scouring our planet, by clearing America of woods, and making this side of our globe reflect a brighter light to the

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[20] *Ibid.,* p80, 320
[21] *Ibid.,* p80.
[22] Curtin, P. D (1964), *The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Actions 1780 – 1850, Vol. 1,* (Madison: Wisconsin), The University of Wisconsin Press.
[23] Long, E (1774), *History of Jamaica,* 3 Vols., 11, pp373-4
[24] See Lovejoy, A. O (1959), 'Kant and Evolution' in B. Glass et al, *Forerunners of Darwin,* 1745 –1859, (Baltimore), pp186-7; And Cook, M (1936), 'Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Negro', *Journal of Negro History,* XXI, pp294-303.
[25] Quoted in Gosset, T. F (1965), *Race, the history of an idea in America,* (New York), Schocken Books

eyes of inhabitants in Mars and Venus, why should we ... darken its people? Why increase the sons of Africa, by planting them in America, where we have so fair an opportunity, by excluding all blacks and tawneys, of increasing the lovely white and red [native Americans]?[26]

On his part, President Abraham Lincoln, although impressed by blacks soldiers in the Union army, on race, he asked, 'Negro equality! Fudge! How long in the Government of a God great enough to make and rule the Universe shall there continue knaves to vend, and fools to quip, so low a piece of demagogism as this?'[27]   Georges Cuvier, one of the pioneers of Geology, Palaeontology and modern Comparative Anatomy on his part, referred to Africans as 'the most degraded of human races, whose form approaches that of the beast and whose intelligence is nowhere great enough to arrive at regular government'.[28]   And Charles Lyell, a conventional founder of modern Geology, also held similar views.[29]   Moreover, Charles Darwin supported the biological inferiority thesis.[30] Also, David Hume, on his part, states:

I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all the other species of men ... to be naturally inferior to Whites. There never was a civilise nation of any other complexion than White, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenuous manufacturers amongst them, no arts,

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[26] Franklin, B (1751), *Observations concerning the increase of Mankind*, cited in Gould, S. J (1981), *The Mismeasure of Man*, (London), Penguin Books, p31
[27] Lincoln cited Sinkler, G (1972), *The Racial attitude of American Presidents from Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt*, (New York), Doubleday Anchor Books, p47.
[28] Cuvier, G (1812), *Recherches sur les assemens fossiles, Vol. 1*, (Paris), Deterville
[29] Cited in Wilson, L. G (1970), *Sir Charles Lyell's Scientific Journals on the Species Questions*, (New Haven), Yale University Press, p374.

no sciences … there are Negroes slave disperse all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity, tho' low people without education will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession…[31]

Even defenders of equality and cultural relativists such as J. F. Blumenbach, believe in the superiority of the White race. Thus, he states, 'the Caucasian must, on every physiological principle, be considered as the primary or intermediate of these five principal races. The two extremes into which it has deviated, are on the one hand the Mongolian, on the other the Ethiopian [African]'.[32] In more recent times, Arnold Toynbee wrote, 'when we classify mankind by colour, the only one of the primary races, given by this classification, which has not made a creative contribution to any of our twenty-one civilisations is the black race'.[33] Trevor-Roper on his part dismissed African history as 'no more than barbarous tribal gyrations'.[34]

Although the 'Racist paradigm' began its emergence in the 18th century, however, Davidson notes that it became the framework in the 19th century. He states that since Hegel's lecture in 1830,

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[30] Darwin, C (1871), *Descent of Man*, (London), John Murray
[31] Quoted in Popkin, R. H (1974), 'The philosophical basis of modern racism' in *Philosophy and the Civilising Arts*, ed., C. Walton and J. P Anton, p143
[32] Blumenbach, J. F (1825), *A Manual of the elements of Natural history*, (London), W. Simpkin and R. Marshall, p37
[33] Quoted in Newby, I. A (1969), *Challenge to the Court. Social scientists and the defence of Segregation, 1954-1966*, (Baton Rouge), Louisiana State University, p217
[34] Quote in Brown, M (1995), *Africa's Choices: After Thirty Years of the World Bank*, (London), Penguin Books.

One grove academic after another, one ... explorer after another returning to the plaudits of a Grateful Nation, went on duly to explain that Africans had no history because Africans were insufficiently human. They were grown-up children who had failed to develop into adulthood. They might seem to copy but could not invent, and even their copying was a masquerade, such stereotypes filled book after book. ... To make good the racism, after 1830s, ancient Egypt ceased to be seen as part of Africa and Pharaonic Civilisation ceased to be an aspect of Africa's development and initiative. ... The ancient Egyptians, the builders of the pyramids and of the greatest Civilisation of higher Antiquity, ... were steadily reduced to the status of a rather feeble bunch of mystics and magicians.[35]

This 'Racist paradigm' justified the invasion of Africa and the dispossession of its inhabitants by developing a thesis of an 'African inferiority', hence, not fully human. Consequently, no Civilisation could be credited to them.[36] Therefore, until 1830, previous scholarship on 'the land of the blacks' – Africa which included the Civilisation of Pharaonic Egypt was widely accepted as African. Herodotus writing in ca 450 (8th century) BCE states: 'the names of nearly all the gods come to Greece from Egypt'.[37] 'The rise of imperialist ideologies of racist hierarchy within which the blacks were reduced to a low and even sub-human level of capacity'[38] – hence, 'Racist paradigm' displaced the pre-19th century African scholarship. Hugh E. Egarton wrote; 'what had happened [is that the

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[35] *Ibid*, pp320-321.
[36] *Ibid.*, p81.
[37] Quoted in *Ibid.*,
[38] Davidson, *Ibid.*,

coming of Europeans introduced] order into blank, uninteresting, brutal barbarisms'.[39] Another eminent scholar, Reginald Coupland held similar views on Africa. Thus, he states; 'the main body of the Africans... had stayed, for untold centuries, sunk in barbarism... stagnant, neither going forward nor going back'.[40] It is therefore within this 'Racist paradigm' that M. Wheeler; A. J Arkell; G. W. B. Huntingford and K. Ingam were writing in the second half of the 20th century.

While scholars like Basil Davidson and Roland Oliver have done extensive work on Africa deconstructing the 'Racist paradigm', they have however been caught unwittingly in the debate of the 'origin of man' and whether or not 'Africa is the cradle of Civilisations'. Their works failed to explain why, if, the ancient Civilisations found in Africa are African, have modern Africans failed to be 'constructive and imaginative' like their forebears to solve the African problem? Oliver asserts empathetically: 'it seems that we all belong, ultimately to Africa. Almost certainly, the Garden of Eden, is which our ancestors grew gradually apart from their nearest relatives in the animal kingdom, lay in the highland interior of East Africa'.[41] Also, 'there is no doubt that, physically, the Egyptians were Africans, in the sense that their Afro-Asiatic stock had been present in Africa for at least 10,000 years [BCE]'. Oliver further asserts: 'it is clear that dynastic Egypt had an African culture and a sense of value quite different from anything found in the eastern European

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[39] Quoted in Williams, E (1964), *British Historians and the Caribbean*, (Port-of-Spain), p131.
[40] Coupland, R (1928), *Kirk on the Zimbezi*, (Oxford), p3.
[41] Oliver, R (1991), *The African Experience*, (London), Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p1.

and western Asian Bronze Age world to the north'.[42]   And on the Great Zimbabwe, he holds the view that Africans built it.[43]

Like Oliver, Basil Davidson not only asserts his claim of African origin of Pharaonic Civilisation; he cites ancient Greeks and Arab scholars and travellers to establish his argument. According to Davidson, the Greek word for black people is *aithiope* – Ethiopia. He asserts that Ethiopia – the land of the blacks was the place from which the Egyptian originates. In essence, the Egyptians were black – or, *aithiope*. Herodotus, Diodorus of Sicily and other classical Greeks knew this and recorded it in their works, Davidson maintained.[44]   He also appealed to classical Greek to substantiate his posits: 'Homer had said before Herodotus who lived in 450 [BCE]', he quoted; 'was it not to the lands in Africa south of Egypt that the gods of Greece flew once a year to feast with the older gods of inland Africa?'[45] Davidson therefore concludes that the myth of a Hamitic presence in Africa and the claim that their origin as well as the Negroes (blacks) is not known is all guesswork.[46] He notes that 'although Egyptian records provides a host of dates useful for early Africa history, scholars (Western) however, deliberately leave ancient Egypt out of the history of Africa and defend their action by reference to the racial hierarchies of 19th century thought'. Western scholars argue that the 'Egyptians of the Pharaonic Age were not Negroes', hence, not Africans. Therefore, 'their [Egyptian] Civilisation, no matter how firmly and enduringly planted on the soil of Africa, should be left outside the African context' they argue. 'Current evidence' however, Davidson concludes, 'shows that the

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[42] *Ibid.*, p4.
[43] Oliver, R (1961), 'The Riddle of Zimbabwe' in *The Dawn of ... Op cit*, pp53-58.
[44] Davidson, *The Search for Africa... Op cit.*, pp20-21.
[45] Cited in *Ibid.*, p20.

vast majority of pre-dynastic Egyptian were of continental African stock, and even of Central-West Sahara origins'. Therefore, 'to argue that the vast majority of the inhabitant of old Egypt, not being Negro, were therefore not Africa is as little tenable as to argue the same about the Berbers and the Ethiopians, whom nobody has yet proposed to erase from the list of African peoples' he concludes. Davidson argues further, that the old racial categories of 'white' and 'black' could indeed make little sense in this or perhaps any other connection. Thus, the Berbers have often been referred to as a 'white' race'. He therefore maintains that 'whatever their pigmentation or physical appearance, the Egyptians of Pharaonic times may be safely assigned to African history'.[47]

While Oliver and Davidson elegantly deconstructed the African scholarship of the 19th century, which was based on racial categorisation, they imply that such categorisation was based on the notion of the superiority of the 'white' race over the inferior 'black' race. Therefore, we can safely conclude that 19th century African scholarship was based on a Racist paradigm. Thus, Davidson, Oliver and other Africa scholars who emerged in the Mid-20th century have remained the proponent of the prevailing Africanist paradigm – placing Africa in her rightful position as the cradle of humanity and ascribing the Pharaonic Civilisation, the Great Zimbabwe and other Civilisations to Africans – black people. The prevailing Africanist paradigm however has failed to explain why modern Africans remain unable to redeem their continent and are seemingly stagnant in time, thus, unwittingly justifying the 19th century 'Racist paradigm' and the proponent of a foreign-led and influenced Civilisation in Africa. In the next sections I shall look at how the

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[46] Davidson, B (1964), *Old Africa Rediscovered*, (London), Victor Gollancz Ltd, p30.
[47] -- (1968), *Africa in History: Themes and Outcomes*, (London), Weidenfeld and Nicolson, pp21-22.

prevailing Africanist paradigm has influence our Understanding of modern Africa, the problems associated with a micro unit analysis of African people based on linguistic or 'racial' classification and the African ontology as the basis of ancient African Civilisations.

PROBLEMS WITH MICRO UNIT ANALYSIS OF AFRICANS

The prevailing Africanist paradigm proponents approach their analysis of Africa either from a continental basis (Basil Davidson) or regional basis (Roland Oliver), but maintain a common feature in their work - apart from the sympathetic and elegant narration of African history - their analysis is understandingly, conducted within European reductionism which classifies Africans on a purely linguistic and regional location. Thus, while sympathetic, the prevailing Africanist paradigm remained inadequate in enhancing our Understanding of Africa and her people, and African social/political science ability to espouse and develop solution oriented models/approaches within the paradigm. This is primarily due to its focus on deconstructing the Racist paradigm and explaining, without a rigorous attempt to locate the concepts of 'people' and 'nation' in African socio-linguistic, hence, presenting a paradigm capable of guiding research in an African context.

Also, Negritude philosophy as propounded by French speaking Africans which emerged as an articulated philosophy in African scholarship became constrained in the deconstruction of the Racist paradigm. Negritude emerged as an attempt to define the African Other. Thus, was aimed at expressing the pride of Africans. Its origin can be traced to the 1930s through the activities of Aime Cesaire, Leon Damas and Leopold Sedar Senghor in Paris,

who used poetry to explore and speak about their difference as blacks.[48] However, J. P. Sarte's *Black Orpheus* first written as an essay - an introduction to Senghor's 'Anthology of New Negro and Malagasy Poetry' in 1948, coupled with the 5th Pan-African Conference of 1945 in Manchester, England, transformed Negritude into a major political event and a philosophical criticism of colonialism.[49] The Pan-African Conference strengthened the Negritude movement and the creation of Presence Africaine, which later played a key role in the development of the philosophy. African literature from the 1940s to the 1970s showed the originality of the spirit of Negritude philosophy, albeit with different degrees of emphasis. Generally, the Africans were challenging the wickedness of the West and also trying to gain recognition as a Subject of history, paradoxically, demanding the attention of a world which has become more curious about the destiny of the African. It was a period of aggressive 'self-expression' after having long been an object of exchange or instrument in the hands of foreigners. The African was defining his right to secession and dedicating himself to a possible new beginning.[50] Claude Wautheir in his description of the era classified it as the period of the African event led by African intellectuals.[51] According to Brunschwig, the era of Negritude was in reaction to the negative image Europeans have written about Africa. Africans, according to Europeans:

> For thousands of years, in effect, did not seem to have taken any initiatives; neither in antiquity, when they were nevertheless in contact with the civilisations of the Middle East and the Far East; nor during the Middle

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[48] See Blair, D (1976), *African Literature in French*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press; and Kesteloot, L (1965), *Les Ecrivians noirs de langue francaise: Naissance d'une litterature*, (Brussels), Institute de Sociologie

[49] See Sarte, J. P (1976), *Black Orpheus*, (Paris), Presence Africaine

Ages when they provided slaves, gold, and incense to Arab merchants living on the coast of Mozambique and Somalia, and where the message of Islam had reached them from North Africa across the Sahara; nor in the modern era, when Europeans had encircled the African coasts with forts and frontiers.[52]

Thus, up to the 1950s, students of African affairs were still concerned with the question of African humanity, intellectual capabilities and moral evolution.[53] According to Senghor, Negritude is 'the whole complex of civilised values – cultural, economic, social and political – which characterised the black peoples, or more precisely the Negro-African world'. He added, 'Negritude emerged as a reaction from French assimilation. Negro-Africans had to seek their collective soul. It was an effort to correct the history written about Africa by European scholars'.[54] In essence, Negritude scholars worked within the same framework focusing mainly on deconstructing without developing a different paradigm for Understanding Africans and their social relations.

Between the 1960s to 1970s however, African scholars who have been domesticated intellectually, after the era of Negritude, rather than reinforcing in a normative manner, their own competence, began to question the relevance of an orthodox manner within the

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[50] See Balandier, G (1957), *Afrique ambique,* (Paris), Plan

[51] Wautheir, C (1964), *L'Afrique des Africains. Inventaire de la negritude*, (Paris), Seuil

[52] Brunschwig, H (1963), *L'Avenements de l'Afrique noire du XIX siecle a nos jours*, (Paris), Colin, p7

[53] See Griaule, M (1950), 'Philosophie et Religion des Noire', *Presence Afriaine* 8-9: 307-12; Also his (1952), 'Le Savoir des Dogon', Journal *de la Societe' des africanistes* 22, 27-42. See also Guernier, E (1952), *L'Apport de l'Afrique a la pensee humaine*, (Paris), Payot; Ombredane, A (1969), *L'Explration de la mentalite des noirs*, (Paris), Presses universitaires de France; and Van Caenegham, R (1956), *La notion de Dieu chez les Balubas du Kasai,* (Brussels), Academie Royal des Sciences Colonialses

consecrated field of normative discourse, sophisticated intelligence and scientific textuality. They began to question its significance, hence, interrogating the credibility of their own disciplines and challenging the evaluative scale of both scientific processes of examination and ideological presuppositions of task in social sciences.[55] In that spirit Eboussi-Boulaga advises the *Ntu* – African, to realise for himself and learn to produce, imitate, according to his capacity.[56] Eboussi-Boulaga was suggesting the need for Africans to break away from orthodoxy by engaging in a self - realisation scholarship. In essence he realised that the discourse on Africans and African historiography in the social sciences has been reduced to the usage of terms and concepts, which are of European origin or constructs, but fail to adequately express or explain the issues from an African Understanding, usage and application. We can conclude therefore that the Negritude movement and philosophy was conducted within the prevailing Africanist paradigm which was and still is, restricted within a Eurocentric conception of the concepts of 'identity' and

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[54] Senghor, L. S (1963), 'Negritude and African socialism' in Kenneth, K (ed.) *St Antony's Papers. No. XV: African Affairs, No.2,* (London), Chatto and Windus, pp10-11

[55] See Abraham, W. E (1966), *The Mind of Africa,* (Chicago), The University of Chicago Press; Bimwenyi, O (1968), 'Le Muntu a la Lumiere de ses croyances en l'au-dela' in *Cahiers des religions africaines* 8: 137-51 and --- (1971), 9: 59-112; Eboussi-Boulaga, F (1968), 'le Bantu Problematique' *Presence Africaine,* No. 66: 4-40; and --- (1977), *La Crise du Muntu. Authenticite africaine et philosophie,* (Paris), Presence Africaine. Also see Hountondji, P. J (1970), 'Remarques sur la philosopie africaine contemporaine' *Diogne,* No. 71 and --- (1983), *African philosophy: Myth and Reality,* (Bloomington), Indiana University Press; and Mveng, E (1965), *L'Art d'Afrique noire. Litrugie et langage religiousx,* (Paris), Mame and --- (1972), *Les Sources grecques de l'histoire negro – afrcaine,* (Paris), Presence Africaine; and Ngindu, A. M (1973 and 1978), *Le Probleme de la connaissance religiouse d'apres Lucien la berthonniere,* (Kinshasa), Faulte de Theologie Catholique; Obenga, T (1973), *L'Afrique dans l'antiquite,* (Paris), Presence Africaine; and --- (1980), *Pour une nouvelle histoire,* (Paris), Presence Africaine. See also Okere, T (1971), *Can there be an African Philosophy? A Hermeneutical Investigation with special reference to Igbo culture,* (Thesis), Louvain University and --- (1983), *African Philosophy,* (Washington, D.C.) University Press of America; and Sodipo, J. O (1975), 'Philosophy in Africa Today' *T though and Practice,* 2 (2) and --- (1983) 'Philosophy, Science, Technology and Traditional African thought' in *Philosophy and Cultures* edited by H. O. Oruka, (Nairobi), Bookwise Ltd. And Sow, I. E. B (1978), *Les Structure anthropologiques de la folie en Afrique noire,* (Paris), Payot; Towa, M (1971a), *Leopold Sedar Senghor: negritude ou Servitude,* (Yaounde), Cle and --- (1971b), *Essai sur la probematique philosphique dans l'Afrique actuelle,* (Yaounde), Cle; and Wiredu, J. E (1973), 'Logic and Ontology' *Second Order* 2 (1-2) and --- (1977), 'How Not to Compare African Though with western Thought' in *African Philosophy: An Introduction* edited by Wright, R (Washington), University Press of America

[56] Eboussi-Boulaga, *La crise du Muntu... Op cit,* p95

'nation' in a Westphalian state system sense, and not based on the African sense of kinship.

Mwalimu Nyerere warned in 1968 (at the emergence of sympathetic African historiography) of the problems associated with attempts to explain Africa without first Understanding it from the African perspective by stating:

> [As] different as the lives of modern Africans from those of our grandparents [is], still we and our ancestors are linked together indissoluble... Our present day attitude and reactions cannot be properly understood without reference to the economy, social organisations and religions basis of the society of fifty years ago; and so on back through time.[57]

The Mwalimu was basically suggesting that African historiography and social science can only became a useful instrument in the quest to develop Africa when, and only when, it is based on the concept of *Ntu*.[58] African people (regardless of the regional location or linguistic difference conceive life on the basis of *Ntu*. *Ntu (Muntu or Mutum)*[59] has been recognised by Africans as the central concept in the African ontology - in comprehending their social-organisation, religion and economy which is linked to 'the dead, the living, and

[57] Nyerere, J (1968) 'Introduction' to *Emerging Themes of African History. Op cit*, p1
[58] Mbiti, J. S (1971), *African Religions and Philosophy*, (London), Heinemann. Also, --- (1970), *The Concepts of God in Africa*, (London) and Chiekh Anta Diop (1987), *Precolonial Black Africa*, translated by Harold Salemson, (Chicago), Lawrence Hill Books.
[59] Mbiti, *African Religion and ...* and *The African Concepts of ... Ibid.*, See also, Jahn, J (1961), *Muntu*, (London) and Diop, *Precolonial Black Africa... Ibid.* This concept is universal and central in the continent with slight variations in the pronunciation, but not the meaning.

the yet unborn'[60] or 'the continuous application of the past to matters of everyday life'.[61] The link between the 'living generation regards itself as essentially the link between the dead ancestors and those yet unborn'.[62] Little attention however, has been paid to the concept of *Ntu* by African historiographers and social scientists. In essence 'the universal concept of African philosophy… the ideological foundations of which Africans may stand in claiming to posses a common culture of the general status and influence as other 'world systems'' has been removed from African historiography and social science, consequently, Africa has been reduced to European reductionism which treats Africans and their continent as non-entity.[63] *Ntu* as conceived by Eurocentric Africanists is understood in relation to Religion. Thus, Davidson holds that it is equivalent to other beliefs such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism uniting otherwise a disunited people.[64] While the concept of *Ntu* unites the people, the unity is in relation to the ancestors, the living and yet unborn. It is not an ideology based on revelation as in the case of revealed religions, but, an ontological philosophy, which goes beyond Humanism. *Ntu* is the total expression of African ontology. It is through it that the African 'interacts' with the physical, material and spiritual world.[65] Davidson quoted a group of Africans' contribution to the debate on the evolution of African historiography and social science in 1962 - who express the concept of *Ntu* and disassociated themselves from the anthropological classification of Africans, thus:

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[60] Davidson, B, (1967), *Which Way Africa?*, (London), Penguin Books, p78. Also, Mbiti, *African Religions… Ibid.*, and Jahn, *Muntu… Op cit.*,
[61] Wilks, I (1970), 'African Historiographical Traditions, Old and New' in J. D. Fage edited *Africa Discover Her Past*, (London), Oxford University Press, p10.
[62] *Ibid.*,
[63] Diouf, M and Mbongi, M (1992), 'The Shadow of Chiekh Anta Diop' in V. Y. Mudimbe edited *The Surreptitious Speech: Presence Africaine and the Politics of Otherness – 1947-1987*, (Chicago), University of Chicago Press, p125.
[64] Davidson, *Which Way Africa… Op cit.*, p78.

To us what is important is not the way the imperialists have classified us; rather it is our common attitude towards life, culture, and heritage. In choosing the name *Ntu*, we have taken it to represent a philosophy that runs throughout Africa... Most of the ideas which reflects the African way of life are embodied in the philosophy of *Ntu*... We would like to divorce ourselves from the European method of demographic classification of Africans into Negro, Bantu, Hamites, Nilotes, etc. As far as we are concerned, these divisions are of little significance, because they are not based on any deep and thorough analysis of African philosophy... [But] we do not intend to revive the past as it was... We want to integrate into modern life only what seems valuable from the past. Our goal is neither the traditional Africa nor the black European, but modern Africa.[66]

The concept of *Ntu*, therefore, links Africans to one another. It is a concept based on the distinction of the Other, hence, is neither Humanism, nor defined in a religious or societal relations' sense, but in an ontological sense. Thus, we can say to Wheeler and other proponents of the Racist paradigm that there is 'the' African as much as there is 'the' European, or 'the' Slavic. While *Ntu* provides the basis of a universal Understanding of the African, the prevailing Africanist Paradigm however, following the Eurocentric reductionism tradition has failed to conceive African ontology *sui generis*. Consequently, the paradigm remained constrained in Eurocentric tradition and unwittingly perpetuates its inadequacy in Understanding Africans. But, how can we Understand Africa without

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[65] Mbiti, *African Religions... Op cit.*, and *The Concepts of God... Op cit.*,
[66] *Ibid.*, p79.

resorting back to Eurocentric reductionism? Could Eurocentric reductionism be responsible for the modern African inability to redeem his continent and thus, banish the Racist paradigm from social science in general? I shall seek to answer these questions by looking at the negative impact of Eurocentric concept of political identity and the African concept of 'identities' ('*nationhood*' on the basis of lineage, genealogy and kinship – conceived in the *Ntu* philosophy).

MICRO UNIT CONCEPTION OF 'IDENTITIES'

John Iliffe summed up the African problem elegantly, thus:

> The liberation [political liberation] of their continent has made the second half of the 20th century a triumphant period for the peoples of Africa, but at the end of the century triumph has turned to disillusionment with the fruits of independence. It is a time for [sympathetic] understanding, for reflection on the place of contemporary problems in the continent's long history. …
> Africans have been and are the frontiersmen who have colonised an especially hostile region of the world on behalf of the entire human race. …
> It is why they deserve admiration, support, and careful study.[67]

Basil Davidson on the other hand, asked, 'what explains [the] degration … of newly regained independence [of Africa]? How has this come about? Where did the liberators go astray?' Then he goes on to explain, 'while human blunder and corruption can supply

some answers… these are not the only causal factors. They do not reveal the roots of the matter'. 'The roots of these failures' he continued, 'are found in the social and political institutions within which decolonised Africans [modern Africans] have lived and tried to survive'. 'Primarily', he concluded, 'this is a crisis of institutions'.[68]

Although both Iliffe and Davidson have asked the right questions with Davidson clearly identifying a crucial element – the institutional or structural dimensions of the causal factor of the African problem, he failed to make any attempt to Understand the African ontology without which, the African is lost. Mbiti clearly states:

> To remove Africans by force from their land is an act of such great injustice that no foreigner can fathom it. Even when people voluntarily leave their home [land - in a geographical *space* sense] in the countryside and go to live or work in the cities, there is a fundamental severing of ties which cannot be repaired and which often creates psychological problems with which urban life cannot as yet cope. … [Also,] to be human is to belong to the whole community, and to do so involves participating in the beliefs, ceremonies, rituals and festivals of the community. A person cannot detach himself from the religion of his group, for to do so is to be severed from his roots, his foundation, his context of security, his kinship and the entire

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[67] Iliffe, J (1995), *The Africans: The History of a Continent*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p1
[68] Davidson, B (1992), *The Black Man's Burden*, (Oxford), James Currey, pp9-10.

group of those who make him aware of his own existence. To be without one of these corporate elements of life is to be out of the whole picture.[69]

From Mbiti, we can understand that the African problem is beyond 'the crisis of institutions'. It is centered on the African ontology. In essence, the prevailing Africanist paradigm is not rigorous enough to provide an adequate Understanding and hence, form a basis of explaining the African problem. The African ontology does not allow a reductionist approach in Understanding Africa and why modern Africans have failed to redeem their continent.

The methodological problems associate with the classification of Africans on linguistic or anthropological basis has been identified by Denis-Constant Martin. Martin notes:

> The methodological discretion of Africanist political scientist is remarkable paradoxical ... [On] the one hand, they insist on the specific characteristics, on what distinguishes one African society from another, while on the other hand, either they do not explain how they work [conducted their research] there or they content themselves with applying prescriptions used and revised elsewhere sometime with baffling results! ... In confronting one single country after only twenty or twenty-five years of sovereignty, the foreigner already has difficulty enough in keeping his bearing to produce

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[69] Mbiti, *African Religion... Op cit.,* p2

some monograph after a certain amount of time spent working. How then could he come to terms with the whole of the continent?[70]

In explaining how European researchers work, Martin mockingly employed an irony:

Teams of investigators crashed down upon the African societies, armed with finely honed questionnaires, without having given the least preliminary thought to the place of the spoken word [oral tradition], its hierarchies, its functions, its techniques, to that which is provoked by the creation of a querying situation. They returned from their quest with only a meager harvest![71]

He then observed:

While Political Studies are more and more interested in popular behaviour and movements (in the 'grassroots'...), while the moral, aesthetic, and symbolic dimensions of social political practices are the objects of more systematic studies. ... [It] would be more convincing if it were explained on what investigations these developments were based and how those investigations were conducted. It would also be good if it were clarified in which language the materials use had been formulated. For one of the essential givens, regularly forgotten by political scientists, is the fact that

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[70] Martin, D-M (1992), 'Out of Africa! Should We Be Done with Africanism?' in Mudimbe, *The Surreptitious Speech... Op cit.*, p47.

the majority of citizens of the African states *lived and think* politics in a language that is neither French nor English, Portuguese nor Spanish.[72]

Martin had identified the problems associated with African historiography, social/political science conceived in Eurocentric reductionist traditions - which constitutes the hub of the prevailing Africanist paradigm. For a proper Understanding of Africa, African philosophy and concepts must be employed. In this regard, I will use the idea of *nation* (see chapter 4) in defining African conception of 'identity' at the micro level of analysis. The Eurocentric constructed 'ethnicity' or the abusive and pejorative term – 'tribe'[73] has no relevance in the African ontology.

According to G. W. B. Huntingford, 'A tribe… is a group united by a common name in which the member takes a pride, by a common language, by a common territory, and by a feeling that all who do not share this name are outsiders, "enemies" in fact'.[74] Huntingford's usage of the term 'tribe' is based on the notion of superiority as noted by Seton-Watson. According to Seton-Watson, 'the usage of the 'tribe' instead of nation is in reference to the superiority of the user (more often) of the word, that they themselves belong to a higher culture and are looking at persons of a lower culture'.[75] Looking at Huntingford's characteristics of the 'tribe', one sees a description of the European nation.

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[71] *Ibid.,* p49.

[72] *Ibid.,* emphasis in italics are mine.

[73] Oliver, R (1991), *The African Experience… Op cit.,* p148 and Davidson (1967), *Which Way Africa… Op cit.,* 20.

[74] Huntingford, G. W. B, (1963), 'The peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants' in *History of East Africa* edited by Roland Oliver and G. Matthew, (Oxford), p66.

[75] Seton-Watson, H (1977), *An Enquiry into the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism,* (Boulder, Colo.), Westview Press.

Thus, Davidson questioned 'Why then is a 'tribe' different from a 'nation'?[76] (See chapter 8 for discussion on the self-imagination of political communities). It is obvious therefore, that the term 'tribe', though used in a negative sense, bears the same characteristic as the European nation. Ethnicity on the other hand is mainly cultural defined, hence limited in usage, except in the construction, rather than the distinction of the Other. Citing the problem associated with the use of ethnicity in Africa, Davidson pointed out that 'socio-political institutions [are] based on kinship interactions either through matrilineal and patrimonial lives. Thus, uniting the various families or clans. Hence, the idea of ethnicity for African societies is worrying'.[77] For Africans, their identity – *nation* is not derived from the physical location – territory only, but the location of the *Ntu*. Physical location – territory (land) is conceived as resources for the *Ntu's* socio-economic activities. The geographical *space* (not physical) forms the basis of self-definition while physical geography (land –territory) is held in custody for the *Ntu*. Therefore, the African concept of land and hence, its inhabitants, is that it 'belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living, the countless members are unborn'[78] – *Ntu*. According to T. O. Elias, 'the universality of this concept [is seen] throughout both Sudanese and Bantu Africa. [It] has been confirmed again and again wherever indigenous societies have been studied'.[79] Since African ontology is linked to the dead, the existing and the unborn, their sense of identity therefore is inseparable from the *land* (both in a spiritual, material and physical sense).[80] In essence, the idea of identifying the individual on the basis of pigmentation or

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[76] Davidson, (1967), *Which Way Africa? ... Op cit.*, p21.

[77] Davidson, B, (1969), *The Africans*, (London), Longman, pp73-74. Also, see Mbiti, *African Religions... Op cit.*, and Radcliffe-Brown, A. R and Forde, D (1967),*African Systems of kinship and Marriage*, (London), Oxford University Press.

[78] *Ibid.,* p31.

[79] Elias, T. O (1956), *The Nature of African Customary Law*, (Manchester), p162.

[80] Mbiti, *African Philosophy ... Op cit.,*

physical characteristic, in isolation of the *Ntu* is contradictory to the African sense of identity.

It is ironic that in spite of Davidson extensive work in Africa, he posits: 'so far, it must be said, new terms to describe the specific social and political systems of Africa are largely lacking, and we are obliged, for want of better, to make do with what we have from other lands'.[81] What becomes worrying is the fact that he has rightly questioned the failure of European scholars to use the term 'nation' for Africans in place of the pejorative 'tribe' or the culturally defined 'ethnicity'. Moreover, he had been privileged to some understanding of the concept of *Ntu*. One's conclusion is that Davidson is constrained to 'thinking', 'living' and 'writing' as a European, thus, failing to see the relationship between the *Ntu* and the sense of identities among African people. The African sense of identity is linked to the *land* and his removal or dislocation disturbs the harmonious relationship he has with the *Ntu*. The African sense of identity is therefore, not conceived in terms of geographical location, pigmentation or cultural differences, but, genealogy and kinship.

The African notion of identity, while genealogical, is based on the relationship with the *Ntu*. Hence, the lineage, kinship and geographical *space* conceived in ancient Egyptian spirituality as the *Ka* - Spirit in space – the higher state that the *Ba* – Spirit human can attain (see chapter 4). These two concepts form the *Ntu*. Chiekh Anta Diop explained these concepts and their relationship to the Being – *Ntu*, stating that 'the *Ba* represents 'the body' – corporeal soul (the 'double' of the body) throughout black Africa – the Being Shadow'. 'The *Ka* is the 'immortal principle that rejoins the divinity in heaven after

death'. This, he continued, 'was founded on the ontological level, the Being's immortality. Each person possesses a portion of the divinity that fills the Cosmos and renders it intelligible to the spirit'.[82] The *Ka* is the essential Being, the ontological part of the individual, which exists in the Sky.[83] For the ancient Egyptians (Africans) the *Ka* is the essence of a Being who lives in the heavens.[84] In other words, while the *Ba* may cease to exist (when the human *Spirit* goes out of the corporeal soul) in the temporal world, it becomes the *Ka* and lives forever to be remembered by the living and the yet unborn – *Ntu*.[85] Therefore any attempt to explain the African problem without Understanding the African ontology will only lead to frustration and a form of 'redundant' scholarship. In essence, Eurocentric reductionism is not capable of explaining the African ontology. Although the concept of the *Ba* and *Ntu* has found their way in Eurocentric scholarships, however, these two concepts *Ba'Ntu* – Spirit Being has been translated - even by the prevailing Africanist paradigm proponents - as 'Bantu', constituting a linguistic category.[86]

The *Ba'Ntu* (Africans in their ontological sense) state system before its destruction and replacement with the Westphalia state system, was not based on territorial claim or the assertion of superiority. The various states evolved on purely administrative and spiritual reasons. Oliver notes:

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[81] Davidson, *Which way Africa... Op cit.,* p21.

[82] Diop, *Civilisation or Barbarism... Op cit.,* p312

[83] ---, *Precolonial Black Africa... Op cit.,* p220.

[84] ---, *African Origin of Civilisation... Op cit.,* p191.

[85] Mbiti, *African Religion... Op cit.,* and Diop, *Civilisation or Barbarism... Op cit.,* also, the *Ntu* editorial, 3 Collingham Gardens, London, SW5, January, 1962 cited in Davidson, *Which Way Africa... Op cit.,*

[86] See Guthrie, M (1967-70), *Comparative Bantu* (4 Vols.), Farnborough quoted in Oliver, R, *The African Experience... Op cit.,* p48.

The emergence of states in the Eastern Part of Africa as well as the Southern part seems to have followed similar pattern as in West Africa. This consisted of the decision of local lineage heads to recognised one of their members as Sovereign. The chosen dynast normally institutionalised his position by taking a wife from each of the participating lineage and by allotting ceremonial offices to each of the lineage heads, so that one would run his household and another supervise his war captives... etc. The formation was often a collective process as in West Africa, then sweeping across a whole area at about the same time. The spread could be to accommodate migrants as in the case of Buganda and Busoga, or for land due to increase in population or their herds.[87]

Basically, the African state evolved and expanded on a utilitarian basis and not for the claim of territorial sovereignty. In this sense, the African state system differed from the Westphalian system. All Africans whether they are considered to have formed states or not[88] organised their socio-economic and politico-cultural relations on the basis of kinship with *Ntu* as the central philosophy and ideology. In explaining the impact of the dislocation of Africans and the Westphalia state system, Edem Kodjo states 'Africa may have space, people, natural resources... but Africa is nothing. Does nothing, nor can do anything. ... As for the sacred frontiers of this nation-statism, the people trample them underfoot...'[89] Davidson in his observation of the negative impact noted: 'there may be a few African frontiers today, certainly in West Africa, across which, day by day or night by

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[87] Oliver, *The African Experience... Op cit.*, p105.
[88] *Ibid.*, p145

night, people do not take themselves and their goods in more or less complete defiance of the Constitutional law'.[90] It seems therefore that the constraining of African people within territorial defined Westphalian states is contrary to their ontology and hence, their ability to redeem themselves from the African problem. Roland Oliver observed the African strive to maintain the African state system thus:

> It is certain that even at the very end of the precolonial period, the vast majority of African states, encompassing between them perhaps half the total population of the continent were still of this order of magnitude. It was normal for such states to form in clusters of twenty or thirty, each cluster representing a common language and culture. These common features probably indicated the long residence of a nuclear population within a common environment, together with a significant degree of intermarriage between the neighbouring units in a cluster.[91]

The African state system on the other hand, was stable and effective precisely because it was based on the concept of kinship and rationally integrative on utilitarian basis guided by the philosophy of *Ntu*, and not the indiscriminate amalgamation of different lineage/kinship groups and the ideology of dominance – the features of the imposed Westphalia state system in modern Africa. It holds therefore that a new paradigm, which

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[89] Kodjo, E (1988), *L'Occident du Declin au Defi*, (Paris), Stock, p230.
[90] Davidson, B (1987), *African Nationalism and the Problems of Nation-Building*, (Lagos), Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, p19.
[91] *Ibid.*, p148.

will incorporate the utilitarian nature of African state system in harmony with the philosophy of *Ntu*, is required (see part Four).

In the next chapter, I shall turn to the uses of social anthropological historiography as a basis for a holistic Understanding of the African ontology and problem.

CHAPTER 4

THE USES OF SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL HISTORY

Having outlined the inadequacies and contrived nature of the prevailing Africanist paradigm, this chapter seeks to separate the 'Africa' created by the Other – Outsiders, from what the Autochthons - Indigenous people of the continent have come to define as 'Africa'. I will argue against the commonly held notion that Africans' traditions hence; institutions and structures were invented by anthropologists or Outsiders. Thus, concluding that the structures and institutions of Africa evolved, as a result of the development of traditions and Spirituality central to the autochthonous world-view hence not imposed. To achieve this aim, I will discuss the epistemological basis for the claim of the invention of 'Africa' as based on clearly defined objectives of the colonisers to exploit the continent, rather than intellectual development. Therefore, I will be separating the 'Africa' conceived by Outsiders, and discuss the commonly held notion of 'a blank-slate Africa' upon which institutions and structures were introduced, from 'Africa', as seen and represented from an autochthonous view. Thus, bringing to understanding the relevance of the kinship system and the impact of colonialism, which gives rise to the creation of new, but inadequate concepts and terminologies – 'tribe' and 'ethnic group' in the attempt to explain 'Africa'. My argument will rest on the concept of *Ntu* as central to the African personality; consequently, the development of African political institutions and structures.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY: *DOXA* OR *GNOSIS*?

V. Y. Mudimbe has argued that the notion of 'Africa' is an invention by the Other. Mudimbe however, is not of the School that argues of the existence of 'a blank-slate Africa' before the coming of the coloniser. Instead, he locates his argument on three fundamental concepts in the Greek language, which forms the basis for the *knowledge* we claim. For Mudimbe, 'Africa' became the creation of the colonisers based on their claim to exclusive knowledge. Thus, they invented the image of 'Africa' without understanding the 'Africa' they met. The colonisers he argued, substitute *doxa* – 'opinion' for *gnosis* – 'seeking to know, inquiry, methods of knowing and investigation' and ends up presenting *doxa* as *gnosis*. Thus, rather than understanding Africa from an epistemological level, which is understood as both science and general intellectual configuration, they presented an archaeological level of knowledge, which does not 'seek to know' as in *gnosis*, but is based on *doxa* – 'opinion'. The colonial archaeologists and anthropologists – social scientists replaced *doxa* with *gnosis* and classified it ('opinion') as *episteme* – epistemology. In essence, the 'Africa' invented by the Outsider, is a product of archaeological *doxa* rather than *gnosis*, hence, cannot be considered a scientific basis of knowledge, or epistemologically sound.[1] Mudimbe therefore concludes that the colonial scholar and to some extent, some contemporary Africanists, 'speak about neither Africa nor Africans, but rather, justify the process of inventing and conquering a continent and naming its "primitiveness" or "disorder" as well as the subsequent means of its exploitation and methods for its "regeneration"'.[2]

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[1] Mudimbe, V. Y (1988), *The Invention of Africa*, (London), James Currey, p1.
[2] *Ibid*, p20

Perhaps to understand the rationale of the use of *doxa* instead of *gnosis* by the colonial scholar, we need to refer to Foucault. In his *The Order of Things*[3] Foucault argued that in the European Classical Age, the centre of knowledge was archaeology. Archaeology as the epistemological landscape, was inclusive of three major systems: 1) General Grammar, - 'the study of verbal order in its relation to the simultaneity that it is its task to represent'. 'The task of Classical "discourse"' he posits, 'is to ascribe a name to things and in that name to name their being'. 2) Natural history or the theory of nature understood as the characterisation, ordering and naming of the visible. Its project is to 'establish a general and complete table of species, genera and classes'. 3) A theory of Wealth rather than a political economy, analysing 'value in terms of the exchange of objects of need' or 'in terms of the formation and origin of objects whose exchange will later define their value in terms of nature's prolixity'.[4] Foucault summarised the Classical Age *episteme* as only one, and posits that it 'defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge whether expressed in a theory or silently vested in practice'. However, by the last years of the 18th century, this *episteme* has disappeared, he observed.[5] In essence he argues that Classical Age archaeology took the 'psychological individual, who, from the depths of his own history, or on the basis of the relation handed on to him, is trying to know' into consideration. The epistemology that later evolved to replace the Classical Age *episteme*, however, was opposite in its approach.[6] We can therefore, argue that the epistemology based on *doxa* used by the colonial scholars was different from the *episteme – gnosis*, Foucault identified as the Classical epistemology. While *gnosis* includes the uses of Language, Natural

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[3] Foucault, M (1973), *The Order of Things*, (New York), Pantheon
[4] *Ibid*, pp97-211
[5] *Ibid*, p240
[6] *Ibid*,

history, or the understanding of Nature in relation to its uses and the theory of Wealth in terms of values of items in relations to 'exchange of the objects of need', a crude archaeological epistemology which is based on *doxa* does not include these three central major systems. Thus, the colonial scholar invented the notion of 'Africa' based on *doxa* and not *gnosis*. But what could have been the driving force behind such subjective scholarship?

G. Williams, in explaining the expansion of Europe in the 18th century, gives us an insight to the answer to the question raised. He puts it thus: 'colonies were … of value only insofar as they brought material benefits to the mother country'.[7] If we locate Williams' posits with Foucault's explanation of the Classical Age *episteme* and its demise in the last years of the 18th century, we observe that the colonial scholar was primarily concerned with the theory of Wealth as its relates to the mother country and not the colony. Hence the creation of the 'savages' image as proposed by Enlightenment social scientists as observed by M. Duchet.[8] 'From this point' notes Mudimbe, 'various schools of anthropology developed models and techniques to describe the "primitive" in accordance with changing trends'.[9] Sebag and Diamond have also observed that the basic concern of anthropology is not so much the description of "primitive" achievements and societies, as the question of its own motives, and the history of the epistemological fields that makes it possible and in which it has flourished as retrospectives or perspectives philosophical

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[7] Williams, G (1967), *The Expansion of Europe in the 18th Century. Overseas Rivalry. Discovery and Exploitation,* (New York), Walker and Company, pp17-30
[8] Duchet, M (1971), *Anthropologie et histoire au siecle des Lumieres,* (Paris), Maspera, *passim.*
[9] Mudimbe, *Op Cit*, p17

discourse.[10] For Malinowski, 'anthropology ... [is] the study of beings and things retarded, gradual and backward'.[11] In essence the epistemological field of anthropology used in Africa was based on the *doxa* that Africans are sub-human, rather than on the intellectual quest to *understand,* based on *gnosis.* R. Wagner sum up the impact of *doxa* as epistemology by asserting: 'we might actually say that an anthropologist "invents" the culture he believe himself to be studying, that the relations is more "real" for being his particular acts and experience than the things it relates'.[12] Wagner is in agreement with Mudimbe, that the 'Africa' presented by the Outsider is an 'invention', hence, does not represent an objective image based on *gnosis.* It is also in this context that what became the defining parameter of 'Africans' as perceived by the Other became known as 'tribes' and in more recent times, 'ethnic groups', – terms that not only fail to capture the *essence* of the African personality but misrepresents African institutions and structures. In the next section, I shall discuss the invention of the 'tribe' and its modern alternative, 'ethnic group' in the Europeans attempt to explain the concept of *Ntu* they found in the African continent.

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[10] Sebag, L (1964), *Marxisme et Struturalisme,* (Paris), Payot. See also Diamond, S (1974), *In Search of the Primitive: A Critique of Civilisation,* (New Brunswick).

[11] Malinowski, B; et al (1938), *Methods of Study of Culture Contact in Africa,* (Oxford), Oxford University Press, p. vii

[12] Wagner, R (1981), *The Invention of Culture,* (Chicago), University of Chicago Press, p4

'TRIBES' AND 'ETHNIC GROUPS': AN INVENTION OF THE OUTSIDER

The anthropological theory of the concept of 'tribe' can be traced back to the early parts of the 20th century. In 1924, Radcliffe-Brown's work[13] set the early sketches upon which social anthropologists reduced African societies to 'tribes'. Peter Ekeh observes that the notion of 'tribe' was adopted as a heuristic category for the convenience of analysis, with only intuitive meanings attached to it. The term was continually in use without any major effort to define it well into the 1950s. Ekeh argues that it was the 'itchings and irritations of African nationalist reactions' that compelled clearer attention to the definition of the 1950s and 1960s.[14] The consequence of the demand for a rigorous definition led to its rejection in usage; instead, Morton H. Fried and I. M. Lewis suggested the use of 'tribal society' on the grounds that it was the nearest term that could be accommodated within the discipline.[15] However, another scholar, Southall, on his part, argue that 'tribes' and 'tribal societies' are controversial terms, hence, not appropriate in usage, thus, should be abandoned.[16] Based on the controversy in defining the 'tribe' or 'tribal society' as it relates to Africa, a new term 'ethnic group' was invented. The debate on definition of the term 'tribe', as it relates to Africa, was not based on the essence of African socio-cultural and politico-spiritual institutions. While the definition attempts to include the notion of kinship, it failed to accurately describe the kinship system in Africa. Lucy Mair notes that

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[13] Radcliffe-Brown, A. R (1924), 'The Mother's brother in South Africa' in *South African Journal of Science*, 21, 542-5 and reprinted in *Structure and Function in Primitive Society. Essays and Addresses*, (New York), The Free Press

[14] Ekeh, P (1990), 'Social Anthropology and Two Contrasting Uses of Tribalism in Africa' in *Comparative Study of Society and History*, Vol. 32, 4, p664

[15] Freid, M. H (1967), *The Evolution of Political Society*, (New York), Random House and, Lewis, I. M (1968), 'Tribal Society', Vol. 16,146-51 of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by David Sills, (New York), Macmillan and Free Press.

[16] See Southall , A (1970) 'the Illusion of Tribe' in Gutkind, P. C. W (edited), *The Passing of Tribal Man in Africa*, (Leiden), E. J. Brill, pp28-50.

the word 'tribe' has generally been used as a term of abuse and not necessarily a technical term.[17]

If research on Africa had been based on the *episteme* of the Classical Age, the search for a new terminology would become unnecessary, since the characteristics of the 'tribe' as given by Huntingford are the same as those used in defining the *nation*[18] (also, see chapter 3). Thus, the use of the terms 'tribe' and 'ethnic group' are based on reductionism rather, than on attempts to understand Africans and their social structures. Mafeje has argued that unlike the terms, 'clan', 'nation' and lineage, 'tribe' and indeed, 'ethnic group' have no equivalent translations in indigenous African languages. Africans only use those terms when they speak a foreign language, he asserts. Mafeje also argues further, that 'in many instances the colonial authorities helped to create [sic] the things call tribes, in the sense of political communities'. 'This process' he concluded, 'coincided with and was helped along by the anthropologists' preoccupation with 'tribes'. Thus, the institutionalisation of the idea of tribalism in Africa is based on the language of the colonisers and the anthropologists.[19] Leroy Vail argues on his part, that 'tribalism' and 'ethnicity' are often used synonymously, depending on whether one approves of it or is less judgmental.[20] Ekeh also made similar observation, arguing that the avoiding of the use of the term 'tribe' has rendered the language of social anthropology more polite and less offensive to the view of the African scholar.[21] Locating Mafeje's linguistic argument with Foucault's first system in Classical Age epistemology – General Grammar - Language, we will reject the use of

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[17] Mair, L (1962), *Primitive Government*, (London), p15

[18] Huntingford, G. W. B (1963), 'The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa by its Modern Inhabitants' in Oliver, R and Matthew, G, edited, *History of East Africa*, (Oxford), p66

[19] Mafeje, A (1971), 'The ideology of Tribalism', in *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.9, 2, pp253-61.

the terms 'tribe' and 'ethnicity' in the description of African people, precisely because such terms fail in the General Grammar rule. These terms hold no meaning in relation to how people define and describe themselves. However the concepts of *nation*, clan and lineage have meaning when used in the respective African languages. In essence, the term *nation*, is not only available in African languages, but expresses the *essence* of the people as they defined themselves, hence, forms the basis of their socio-political organisation. Therefore, if we are to Understand Africa, we *must* identify the essence of the group we are referring to. Thus, 'tribe' and 'ethnic group' as terms are inadequate because they do not define the *essence* of the people. Taking Mafeje's pertinent linguistic observation on the absence of any equivalent words to 'tribe' and 'ethnic group', we will not only reject the terms 'tribe' and 'ethnic' group, but conclude that these terms were created by Outsiders in an attempt to classify Africans. In essence, we must define Africans based on their *essence* on the basis of the rule of General Grammar. Although the terms – 'tribe' and 'ethnic' categorisation have become common in usage within the continent itself, they however convey different meanings, as we shall see in a later section of the chapter and in chapter 8.

Leroy Vail has argued that ethnic consciousness is an ideology, and like all ideologies, it is created over time. Thus, since the 1890s in Southern Africa in particular, 'ethnic groups' began to emerge in response to the disruption due to ecological disasters of the 1890s and early 1900s and the impact of the colonisers 'scramble for labour'. The alienation of Africans from their land by the colonisers led to the transformation of the gender division of labour and the erosion of previous political relationships. These disrupted and

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[20] Vail, 'Introduction ...' in *The Creation of.. Op Cit*, p10
[21] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, p683

weakened the fabric of African societies. Therefore, he states, 'rapid social economic change eroded earlier political relationships based on lineage ... This erosion in turn opened the way for new forms of consciousness throughout the region'.[22] He concludes:

> One of the most far-reaching and importance of these new forms of consciousness was a new ethnic or tribal – consciousness that could and did encapsulate other forms of consciousness. Ethnicity could co-exit with other types of consciousness without apparent unease because it was cultural and hence based on involuntary ascription, not as personal choice ... Ethnic identity could inhere in both petty bourgeois and worker in both peasant farmer and striving politician.[23]

Vail seems to explain the concern of Ekeh as to why ethnic consciousness is growing and indeed, addresses these same concerns that he has also raised. While his argument as noted by Ranger, gives the impression that, though, ethnicity is a colonial invention, it could rapidly appear natural and even immemorial,[24] he fail to make a link between the *Ntu* often express as kinship in explaining the continuation of 'ethnic' consciousness. In essence, he has partly addressed the issues and has based his arguments on similar lines as Sollors; Chitepo; Nnoli; Mamdani, Okot p'Bitek and Mafeje, who all agree that 'ethnicity' or 'tribalism' is an invention of the colonisers but also acknowledges it as the new evil

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[22] Vail, 'Introduction ...' in *The Creation of .. Op Cit*, p10
[23] *Ibid.,*
[24] Ranger, T (1993), 'The Invention of Tradition revisited: A case of Colonial Africa' in Ranger, T and Hobsbawn, edited *Legitimacy and State in 20th century Africa*, (London), Macmillan, p70.

plaguing the continent in terms of growth and usage as a basis of classification.[25] These scholars however, both failed to fully explain the attraction of Africans to the invented concept and term. Ranger agrees with Vail to a certain extent, but seems to take sides with Ekeh on the colonial impact on the consciousness of 'ethnicity' as the uniting factor. Ekeh has argued that the continual usage of the terms 'tribalism' and 'ethnicity' is not only entrenched but has to be understood from the kinship relations of African societies. Thus, while the colonisers have greatly influenced the negative usage of the notion of kinship in the form of 'tribalism' and 'ethnicity', Africans use these terms differently.[26] Ranger, like Ekeh, holds that while the terms ('tribalism' and 'ethnicity') have been invented, and the concept of kinship upon which they have been 'created' is perennial to Africans, the claim that both the concept and terms have been 'created', or the argument that Africans by 'nature' are 'tribal', is a refusal to accept the continuity of customs in Africa in their evolution.[27] This refusal seems to have guided the works of colonial anthropologists who were more concerned with the future rather than reconstructing the African past. Forte and Evans-Pritchard aver:

> We do not consider that the origin of primitive institution can be discovered and therefore, we do not think that it is worthwhile seeking for them. We speak for anthropologists when we say that a scientific study of political institutions must be inductive and aim solely at establishing and explaining

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[25] See Sollors, W (1989), *The Invention of Ethnicity,* (Oxford), Oxford University Press; Chitepo, H ((1970), 'The Passing of Tribal Man: A Rhodesian View' in Gutkind, *The Passing of ... Op cit.*; Nnoli, O, (1978), *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria,* (Enugu), Fourth Dimension Publishers; Mamdani, M (1976), *Politics and Class Formation in Uganda,* (New York), Monthly Review Press; Okot p'Bitek (1970), *African Religions in Western Scholarship,* (Nairobi), East African Literature Bureau and Mafeje, *Op Cit.*

[26] Ekeh, *Op Cit, passim.*

[27] Ranger, 'The Invention of ... ' in *Op Cit*, p63

the uniformities found among them and their interdependence with other features of social organisation.[28]

A decade later, Radcliffe-Brown maintained a similar view as Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, thus:

> For European countries we can trace the development of social institutions over several centuries. For most African societies the records from which we can obtain authentic history are extremely scanty or in some instances entirely lacking except for a very short period of immediate past. We cannot have a history of African institutions.[29]

Both Ranger and Ekeh hold the view that not only were the anthropologists more concerned with the colonial structure of government, ignoring the African past, they assume that the traditions of Africans are constant.[30] They ignore the rich literature available on African Kingdoms and Empire which existed prior to slavery (chapter 3) neither did they make attempt to locate the impact of slavery and colonialism on the African societies they chose to study (chapter 5). In essence, the epistemology and aim of their research was based on the material benefits that can be derived from such colonies. The colonial anthropologist accepted any existing institutions in society as given. Thus, 'the rampant kinship system … [they] encountered everywhere in Africa was not probed

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[28] Fortes, M and Evans-Pritchard, E. E (eds) (1940), *African Political systems*, (London), Oxford University Press,p5
[29] Radcliffe-Brown, A. R (1950), 'Introduction' in Radcliffe-Brown, A. R and Forde, D edited, *African Systems of Kinship and Marriage*, (London), Oxford University Press, p2.

with respect to how long it has been in existence, why it was so dominant in Africa, or whether it was related to the slave trade that ravaged Africa before European colonisation'.[31] Until the political 'independence' of Africa in the late 1950s to the 1960s, the authority and view of Radcliffe-Brown and other coeditors *of African Political Systems* and *African Systems of kinship and Marriage,*[32] observed Carter and O'Meara, provided the general guidelines for the conduct of social anthropology in colonised Africa.[33] Therefore, while the colonial social anthropologists found the kinship system in the African continent, they failed to study it, but accepted it as a constant given, thus, 'inventing' a concept of a given 'tribal' ('ethnic') institutions in line with their created image of 'Africa'. In these respects, 'ethnicity', 'tribalism' and 'Africa' as perceived by the Outsider has been invented. In the next section, I shall be discussing the attempt by African scholars to explain the kinship system in relation to 'ethnic' consciousness.

'AFRICA' OF THE AUTOCHTHONS

While the concept of kinship is central to the invention of the 'tribe' and 'ethnic group' by the Other, it seems however, that kinship defined in a non-African language connotes only an aspect of the concept of *Ntu* (chapter 5), from which the kinship system in Africa is derived. Whereas kinship is conceived in relation to the direct ancestral stock or family, usually defined *specifically* in relation to lineage or blood ties, the concept of *Ntu,* however, incorporates both lineage and kinship per se, and also extends to include the

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[30] Ranger, *Op Cit, passim* and Ekeh Op Cit, *passim.*
[31] Ekeh, *Ibid,* p669
[32] See Fortes and Evans-Pritchard *Op Cit* and Radcliffe-Brown and Forde *Op Cit,*

'living dead'[34] – ancestors, who may not be of direct lineage or indeed kin, but are seen as part of the 'living dead' of the particular African society. Hence, the *Ntu* is conceived in a wider context, thus, it includes the neighbouring societies, who are often a branch of the same people,[35] but not necessarily of direct lineage or blood ties. In discussing the Autochthons' efforts in countering the colonial image of Africa by emphasising kinship ties, I will be locating my argument on the claim of *Ntu*, as the basis upon which kinship itself is based and be suggesting that *Ntu* provides the understanding to the strength of African *nations'* (not 'ethnic groups' or 'tribes') consciousness.

In his justification for the conceptualisation of African history from an autochthonous perspective, Jahn states:

> The Africa presented by the ethnologist is a legend in which we used to believe. The African tradition as it appears in the light of neo-African culture may also be a legend – but it is the legend in which African intelligence believes. And it is their perfect right to declare authentic, correct and true those components of their past which they believe to be so. [Moreover] the present and the future ... will be determined by the

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[33] Carter, G. M and O'Meara (eds) (1985), *African Independence: The First Twenty-Five Years*, (Bloomington) Indiana University Press

[34] While the use of the term, 'ancestors' implies that they are in the 'past', in non-African languages, the 'ancestors' ('living dead') in the African sense, are both in the past and *in* the future. Thus, although they are physically dead, they are however alive in another dimension of life, thus, they are 'living', but not in our dimension of life. While in another dimension, they await their children – the living and the many generations yet to be born to join them in the future dimension of life. In essence, they are 'living dead'. See Mbiti, J. S (1971), *African Religions and Philosophy*, (London), Heinemann. Also, --- (1970), *The Concepts of God in Africa*, (London).

[35] See Greenberg, J. H (1966), *The Languages of Africa*, (Bloomington), Indiana University Press and Zaslavsky, C (1973), *Africa Counts*, (Massachusetts), Prindle, Weber and Schmidts for the origin of African

conception that *African* intelligence forms the African past. Neo-African culture appears as an unbroken extension, as the legitimate heir of tradition. Only where man feels himself to be heir and successor to the past has he the strength for a beginning.[36]

Following the same line of reasoning, Eboussi-Boulaga asserts:

It remains for the Muntu to realise for himself what is already in himself. To realise for oneself, for one's profits, by going to a good school, getting help or learning to produce, imitate, according to his capacity. His truth being realised outside of himself, he has no resources excepts to apply, imitate, turn to intermediaries.[37]

While both Jahn and Eboussi-Boulaga calls upon the Autochthons to return to their roots and rediscover, recreate and interpret their history, Hountondji desires a total rejection of 'Africanity' and the mystification inherited from the 'inventors' of 'Africa' and the current culture. He asserts:

Therefore it was necessary to begin by the *demythifying* the concept of Africanity reducing it to a status of a *phenomenon* – the simple phenomenon which *per se* is perfectly neutral, of belonging to Africa – by

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people and the similarity in both numerals, words and meaning, and the classification of the languages into Four main linguistic families, hence Four nations from pre-slavery times.

[36] Jahn, J (1961), *Muntu: An Outline of the New African Culture*, (New York), Grove Press, pp17-8, italic in the original.

dissipating the mystical halo of values arbitrarily grafted on this phenomenon by the ideologues of identity. It was necessary, in order to think of the complexity of our history, to bring the theatre of this history back to its basic simplicity. In order to think of the richness of Africa, *to rid it* of all its ethical, religious, philosophical, political connotation, etc., with which a long anthropological tradition had over-loaded it and the most visible effects was to close the horizon, to prematurely close history.[38]

Hountondji is not only calling for a rewriting of African history, but also seeks the impoverishing and weakening of the very notion of 'Africa' – a radical break in African anthropology and history as well as ideology. However, he failed to give a new term, thus, by implication, agreeing with Davidson's assertions on the usage of foreign terminologies in Africa. Mudimbe notes that:

Although most Western anthropologists have continued … to argue about the best models to account for primitive societies … since the 1960s, Africans have been destroying the classical frame of anthropology. By emphasising the importance of the unconscious and questioning the validity of a universal subjects as the centre of signification, they simultaneously demand a new understanding of the strange objects of the human sciences

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[37] Eboussi-Boulaga, F (19770, *La Crise du Muntu. Authenticite africaine et philosophie,* (Paris), Presence Africaine, p95
[38] Hountondji, P (1981), 'Que Pent la Philosophie' *Presence Africaine,* N0. 119, p52

and a redefinition of at least three fields, anthropology, history and psychoanalysis, as leading disciplines of self-criticism.[39]

While the West is beginning 'to agree with us ... that the way to Truth passes by numerous paths, other than Aristotelian, Thomestic logic or Hegelian dialectic' noted Mveng, the 'social and human sciences themselves must be decolonised' he concluded.[40] These scholars all agree on the need to deconstruct the invented 'Africa' and hence, 'tribalism' and 'ethnicity' however, they all seem to have failed to provide new terms and concepts, but relied on the 'rejected concepts in defining the concept of *nations* in relation to African societies or and the 'Africa' continent *per se*, in a geographical context. Thus, they remain constrained within the 'Africanity' paradigm they have all rejected in their attempt to deconstruct 'Africa'.

Ekeh sought to do precisely that. He argues that while the term 'tribe' had been replaced by 'ethnic group' in African scholarship, no precise relationship has been established between the two terms, moreover, the use of 'ethnicity' in the continent is paradoxical to the call for a deconstruction of the 'tribe' as conceived by the colonisers. Thus, he proposed an understanding of the usage of the term 'tribalism' in the context of Africa which has a basis on the social origins of kinship behaviour in pre-colonial Africa. He argues that the social origin of kinship can only be located in their significance to the private and public realm in Africa due to the weaknesses of the African states, which was unable to provide protection for the individual against the ravages of the slave trade. Thus,

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[39] Mudimbe, *Op Cit*, p37

he argues that kinship assumed the role of state surrogate during the centuries of the slave trade. Therefore, 'ethnic groups' arose under colonialism as substantial and notional expansions of kinship system and kinship ideology entranced in the slave trade era before colonial rule.[41] Kenneth Dike and J. F Ade Ajayi in their claim for an African approach in the studying of Africa, have argued in 1968, that the *hub* of the African thought, hence, history rests on:

> A belief in the continuity of life, a life after death, and the community of interest between the living and the dead, and the generations yet unborn is fundamental to all African religious, social, and political life. Thus, although the serious writing of African history has only just begun, a sense of history and tradition has always been part of the African way of life.[42]

Dike and Ajayi not only identify the centrality of *Ntu* in the writing of African history, but also as the central belief system, which constitutes the African politico-spiritual and socio-cultural wellbeing, hence, the African world view. But since the *Ntu* has mainly been narrated through oral tradition, there is a need to include oral tradition as part of the African historiography. Dike and Ajayi based their claims on the works of Vansina[43] as the basis for the inclusion of oral tradition as legitimate materials for African historiography. They also argue in line with their contemporary African scholars, that

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[40] Mveng, E (1983), 'Recent developpements de la theologie Africaine', *Bulletin of African Theology*, 5, 9, p141.
[41] Ekeh, *Op Cit*,
[42] Dike, K O and Ajayi, J. F. Ade (1968), 'African Historiography', Vol.6, 394-99, of Sail, D, edited *International Encyclopedia of the Social sciences*, (New York), Macmillan and Free Press.

since the 19th century, European scholars and Christian missionaries have reduced African historiography to 'nothing more than a justification for European imperialism' also, 'their primary concern was to describe the quaintness and the peculiarities of tribes, to justify as well as to facilitate the imposition of colonial rule'.[44]   Thus, they rejected the notion commonly held among British social historians and social anthropologists up to the 1960s, that historical material and sources must be written to be valid.   The Ibadan School of History in line with Hountondji, Eboussi-Boulaga and Jahn's argument in favour of Africans writing their history, set, as their objective; to exorcise African studies of the ugly image thus foisted on it by colonial historians whose works set out to 'cut the African adrift from his historical experience and in effect to undermine his basic humanity'.   These scholars' efforts are to rehabilitate African history and re-establish the relevance of the African historical experience;[45] hence, they focussed on countering the negative images presented in European colonial scholars' works.   Thus, the works of Dike; Biobaku; and Ajayi[46] with some European scholars who began to write in the same manner (e.g. Jones; Omer-Cooper; Kaberry; Lewis; Smith; Ryder and Lloyd, with the exception of M. G. Smith whose work was earlier).[47]   Both the African social historian and their European

[43] Vansina, J (1960), 'Recording of Oral History of the Bakura', *Journal of African History*, 1:1, 45-53; --- ([1961] 1965), *Oral Tradition: A Study of Historical Methodology*, (Chicago), Aldine; and --- (1971), 'Once Upon Time: Oral Traditions as History in Africa', *Daedalus*, 100:2 (spring), 442-68

[44] Dike and Ajayi, *Op Cit*, pp397-8.

[45] Ajayi, J. F. Ade and Alagoa, E. J (1974), 'Black Africa: The Historian's perspective', *Daedalus*, 103:2 (Spring), 125-34

[46] Dike, K. O (1956), *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press; Biobaku, S. O (1957), *The Egba and Their Neighbours 1842-1872*, (Oxford), Clarendon Press and Ajayi, J. F. Ade (1961), 'The Place of African History and Culture in the Process of Nation-Building in Africa South of the Sahara', *Journal of Negro Education*, 30:3, 206-13.

[47] Smith, M. G (1950), *Government in Zazzau: 1800-1950*, (London), Oxford University Press; Jones, G. I (1963), *The Trading States of the Oil Rivers*, (London), Oxford University Press; Forde, D and Kaberry, P. M (eds), (1967), *West African Kingdoms in the Nineteenth Century*, (London), Oxford University Press; Lewis, I. M (ed) (1968), *History and Social Anthropology*, (London), Tavistock; Omer-Cooper, J. D (1966), *The Zulu Aftermath*, (Evanston, Ill), Northwestern University Press; Smith, R (1969), *Kingdoms of the Yoruba*, (London), Methuen; Ryder, A. F. C (1969), *Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1897*, (New York), Humanities

counterparts failed to take issues with identifying *Ntu* and how it relates to the kinship system upon which colonial historians centre their works. Ekeh notes that the African social historians in their reaction to colonial social anthropologists, 'landed in the era of the evils of the slave trade, ... [but] were not principally interested in its socio-economic consequences for Africa'. Instead, they 'showed no hesitation in dubbing slave trade chieftains as heroes, provided they were not passive and supine in dealing with European traders',[48] thus, the works of Akinjobin and Ikime.[49] Dike and Ajayi in particular, showed hostility to any emphasis on the slave trade, dismissing it as a 'myth [which] regards the influence of the Atlantic slave trade as so all pervasive that it can explain all major trends in African history since the nineteenth century'.[50] Therefore, both the African social historians and European social anthropologists have avoided the explanation and analysis of common issues and themes in Africa, like the predominance of the kinship system and the concept of *Ntu*. In essence, their scholarship has remained within the same paradigm, utilising different theories to explain common issues, - the representation of Africa and Africans, and not necessarily the Understanding of Africans and their institutions/structures.

While African social historians have shown some interest in the slave trade era, but failed to make the link with the kinship system, social anthropologists on the other hand, excluded the slave era from their discourse, instead, focused, on the kinship system. Ekeh notes that 'social anthropology apparently assumed kinship to be so natural to Africa that it

Press; and Lloyd, P (1971), *The Political Development of Yoruba Kingdoms in the 19th and 20th Century*, (London), Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.
[48] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, p672

saw no need to trace its sociological origins in other institutions or in previous historical epochs, nor to account for its persistence in the African historical landscape'.[51]   He however, argues that the slave trade era starting from the Arab side of the trade involving trans-Saharan and trans-Indian Ocean routes spanning between 950 – 1850 CE, and the European side between 1450-1850 CE forms the basis upon which the evolution of kinship system and it persistence can be traced.[52]   Cheikh Anta Diop has earlier argued, along similar lines. He maintained that African people were detribalised before the incursion of the slave trade, which created the 'tribes' in Africa.[53] J. D. Fage, while sharply rebuking Walter Rodney's attempt to connect the slave era with the tribalisation of Africa,[54] by emphasising on the economics of the slave trade era,[55] inadvertently, agreed with the proposition that the slave era formed the basis of the creation of kinship system in Africa. Fage states: 'not to belong to a kin or one of his feudatories, was to be dangerously exposed'.[56]   His admittance of the important role the slave era played in the quest of security by belonging to 'a kin or one of his feudatories' gives credence to Ekeh's, Rodney's, and Diop's claims. We can conclude with Ekeh therefore, that the kinship system and groups ensured that the individual escaped the fate of becoming subjects and

[49] Akinjobin, L. A (1967), Dahomey and Its Neighbours 1708-1818, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press; Ikime, O (1968), *Merchants Prince of the Niger Delta*, (London), Heinemann Educational Books.
[50] See Dike and Ajayi, 'African Historiography', *Op Cit* p398.
[51] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, p673.
[52] *Ibid,*
[53] Diop, C. Anta (1987), *Precolonial Black Africa* with translation by Harold Salemson, (Chicago), Lawrence Hill Books.
[54] Rodney, W (1966), 'African Slavery and Other Forms of Social Oppression in the Context of the Atlantic Slave-Trade', *Journal of African History*, 7:3, 431-43.
[55] Fage, J. D (1969a), *A History of West Africa*, 4th ed., (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press; and ... (1969b), 'Slavery and the Slave Trade in the context of West African History', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 10, 393-404 and ... (1974), *States and Subjects in Sub-Saharan African History*, (Johannesburg), Witwastersand University Press.
[56] Fage, *States and Subjects ...*, *Ibid*, p14

'broken men' who had to belong to a King for their own sake and protection.[57] They found security through that kin, from whence the kinship system evolved. While the case has been made with respect to the slave era's impact on the development of the kinship system, Ekeh made no attempt however, to identify the primordial origin of the *idea* of kinship upon which the kinship system found recourse during the slave era. It will appear that rather than 'inventing' or 'creating' the kinship system, during the slave and colonial era, Africans reverted, 'created', or adapted a primordial belief system to become the socio-political institutions/structures, which has remained, reshaping and reinventing itself up to the present day. I shall attempt in the next section, to identify the primordial origin of the kinship/lineage system arguing that it can rightly be found in the concept of *Ntu* as identified by Dike and Ajayi.

TRADITIONS AS INVENTORS OF STRUCTURES

Ranger has summed up colonial scholars and African social historians arguments as resting on 'the rise of romantic nationalism, the rituals of mass industrial politics, the interactions of imperialism and "scientific" classification, the production of "neo-traditional" cadre to serve the imperial states, and the counter-inventions of anti-imperial and socialist movements'.[58] He argues that 'before colonialism, Africa was characterised by pluralism, flexibility, multiple identity', after it, he notes, 'African identities of "tribe", gender and

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[57] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, p675.
[58] Ranger, 'The Inventions of Traditions…' *Op Cit*, p63

generation were all bounded by the rigidities of invented traditions'.[59] Vansina has also made a similar observation, thus:

> The past of equatorial Africa exemplified the workings of a powerful endogenous process, a cultural tradition that had its roots some 4000 – 5000 years ago, and that maintained itself by perennial rejuvenation, until it withered as a result of the colonial conquest … Historians and anthropologists have, on the whole, shunned the study of such phenomena that stretch over thousands of years and span vast regions. … [Yet] the main outline of the past in equatorial Africa is a story about traditions'.[60]

Using Vansina's posits, Ranger concludes that the 'perennial rejuvenation' of Equatorial Africa, appear a case of 'invention *by* tradition' rather than the invention of traditions.[61] In essence, his argument is that African primordial traditions were responsible for the invention of the kinship system. However, he did not attempt to identify the *hub* of the tradition from which traditions of very similar patterns all over Africa evolved, which he has earlier described as 'characterised by pluralism, flexibility [and] multiple identities'. What tradition is so central to the Africans upon which they have adapted or 'created' institutions consistent with their pluralism yet, remain very similar in the vast of the continent? Perhaps Ranger's failure to identity the *Ntu*, of which he is familiar with in his various works (chapter 5), rests on his assertion that the 'colonial conquest of Equatorial

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[59] *Ibid,*
[60] Vansina, J (1990), *Paths in the Rainforest. Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa,* (London), James Currey, pp100,193, 236.
[61] Ranger, *Op Cit*, p76. Italic is mine.

Africa took only 40 years to "destroy the equatorial traditions" by imposing its own constructs'[62] citing Vansina to substantiate his point.[63] Indeed, the colonial period saw to the spread of the ideology of 'tribes', it is however, by no means the period that African traditions became destroyed. Instead, 'the slave trade led to invigoration of'[64] the kinship system, an invigoration which could only have began based on a primordial tradition that warrants the adaptability and growth of kinship system. In essence while agreeing with both Ranger, Vail and Ekeh, my point of departure is on the primordial origin of the kinship system and hence the new structures that have been 'invented' by African tradition due to their flexibility to fit the historical situation from the time of slavery to modern Africa in an attempt to retain their physiological security - Security that is inclusive of the pursuit of Welfare, Spirituality, History, Cultures/Traditions and the sense of Identity. While the kinship system allows the achievement of these, it embodied the *Ntu* belief system, which permeates the African being – *ontology*. Modern African 'ethnicity' is much the same as European nationalism (chapter 8), hence, a consciously crafted ideological creation, which in the case of Africa, evolved from the pursuit of physiological security from the slave trade era, but has the same attributes as European nations.[65]

David Lan has captured the process of the evolution of traditions in Africa with particular reference to the Zimbabwean wars of independence[66] based on the concept of the *Ntu*. The *Mhondoro* (royal ancestor) spirit, - the Spirit of the 'living dead', is central to the *Ntu*

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[62] *Ibid,*
[63] See Vansina, *Paths in the Rainforest... Op Cit,* pp239, 247.
[64] Ekeh, *Op Cit,* p679.
[65] See Illife, J (1979), *A Modern History of Tanganyika,* (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press; and Moore, B (1967), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lords and Peasants in the Making of the Modern World,* (Harmondsworth), Penguin.
[66] Lan, D (1985), *Guns and Rain: Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe,* (London), James Currey.

concept. It is the 'givers' of the land – defined as territorial space and is expressed in the concept of the Ka (chapter 5). The *Ntu* consist of the 'living dead', the living and the many generations yet to be born, and is the Maker of Rain (fertility of the physical land, livestock, humans etc) – Welfare and Security, hence, development. Thus, the Africans in Zimbabwe built the guerrilla war structure on the basis of *Ntu*, which easily incorporated the various African kin. The *Chimurenga* songs (songs of the war of liberation) sang by both guerrillas and peasants celebrated the role of the ancestors. Thus:

> We and our ancestors
>
> worked together
>
> here in the war.[67]

Lan notes that as a code of practice, the combatants adopted the practice of not having sexual intercourse, not killing wild animals in the forest and not eating certain foods, - rituals imposed by the spirit mediums who have been carriers of such rituals for hundred of years.[68] In essence, while the code of conduct imposed on the combatants is new to them, hence could easily be regarded as 'invented', in reality, the spirit mediums – who carry the Spirit of the *Mhondoro*, have lived their lives observing those rituals, - a case of a primordial origin, but adapted to fit the given historical situation. The spirit mediums are experts on ritual and 'hate all European things' and they gave assurance that as long as these rituals were observed the combatants will be safe and the war will be won.[69] The involvement of spirit mediums in the wars of resistance and independence in Zimbabwe

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[67] *Ibid*, 'Introduction' of *Op Cit*, p. xvi
[68] *Ibid*,

could be traced back to the 1896 rebellion against colonial imposition. Although the rebellion failed, Charwa who was then the spirit medium to the Spirit of Nehanda (royal ancestor) was the last to be captured. Charwa refused to be converted to Christianity, refused the scaffold in preparing her for hanging and made a prophecy that 'my bones will rise' to win back freedom from the European. Charwa's story was told in oral tradition from that period. During the guerrilla war that led to the independence of Zimbabwe, the Nehanda Spirit was carried by a spirit medium by the name of Kunzaruwa who was generally called Nehanda. Another royal ancestor (*Mhondoro*) who rivals Nehanda was Chaminuka who was seen as the brother of Nehanda. These brother and sister characterised the original founders of the Shona nation,[70] hence, the 'living dead'- *Mhondoro*, the giver of the land and provider of Rain, have their domain in earlier royal ancestral Spirits. In essence, their origin can be traced back in time, hence a claim of a primordial origin. Nehanda's tradition has been central in Shona literature and history, such that the Rhodesian Front Government bans *Feso;* a Novel by Solomon Mutswairo first published in 1957 in which he queried:

Where is our freedom Nehanda?

Won't you come down to help us?

Our old men are treated like children

In the land you gave them, merciful creator [sic].[71]

[69] *Ibid*, p4
[70] *Ibid*, p6
[71] Mutswairo, S (1974), *Zimbabwe*, (Washington, DC), The Continent Press, p66

Here, Nehanda is seen as the Creator, the concept of 'God' to which Nehanda is associated.

Although Nehanda is referred to as Creator, the royal ancestral Spirit is not God, but is a

part of God the Creator by the virtue of the Ka. The concept of the Ka was first discovered

by Nestor L'Hote, and published in his *Letters* in 1840. According to E. A. Wallis Budge,

the first Egyptologist to undertake any serious work to decipher the meaning of the Ka was

Dr. Birch.[72] Since then, Egyptologists have been working on the meaning of the Ka

without an agreement,[73] but strongly associate it with the Coptic *Kw* – genius, double,

character, disposition and mental attribute. Budge cited Dr. Steindorff, who, in 1910,

concluded that the Ka was a genius and not a 'double' as in the Coptic *Kw*. However,

Maspero, the scholar who had earlier suggested the connection between the Ka and the

Coptic *Kw* to establish the meaning of the word, traversed Steindorff view. Maspero

argued that rather than weaken his arguments, Steindorff's proposition has in fact

strengthened it. Another scholar, Breasted, thinks that the Ka was a 'superior genius

intended to guide the fortunes of the individual in the *hereafter*'. Budge concludes

therefore that:

> The true solution of the mystery may be found on the lines of [Breasted
>
> idea][74] and by comparing the views about the 'double' held by African
>
> peoples throughout the Sudan. The Funeral offerings of meat, cakes, ale,
>
> wine, unguents, etc., were intended for the KA [a common practise in the
>
> burial ceremonies of traditional Africa]. The KA dwelt in the man's statue

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[72] Birch (1858), *Memoire sur une Patere Egyptienne du Musee du Louve*, (Paris), p59 ff.
[73] See Budge, E. A. W (1960), *The Book of the Death*, (New York), Gramercy Books, p73, note 1 and p74 for a list of the literature on the debate of the meaning of the KA.
[74] See Breasted (1903), *Recuil*, p182, cited in Budge, *Op Cit*, p74

just as the KA of a god inhabited the statue of the god [a symbolic expression found in what has been reduced to 'African Arts' found in European Museums all over Europe and America]. In the remotest times the tomb had special chambers wherein the KA was worshipped and received offering. The priesthood numbered among its body an order of men who bore the name of 'priests of the KA' and who performed services in honour of the KA in the 'KA chapel'.[75]

Budge further explains that when a person dies, the deceased is said to be 'happy with his Ka' in the next world and his Ka is joined unto his body in the 'great dwelling', his body having been buried in the lowest chamber, 'his Ka cometh forth to him'. The Ka also could eat food, hence it was necessary to provide food for it,[76] – a practice found in traditional Africa, placing food in the burial chamber of the deceased usually within his household or the specially designated or built burial chamber. When the dead person has been buried,

> to the deceased Horus [Asaru, a royal ancestor] gives his own KA and also drives away the KA's of the enemies of the deceased from him, and hamstrings his foes'. 'By the divine power thus given to the deceased he brings into subjection the KA's of the gods and other KA's, and he lays his yoke upon the KA's of the triple company of gods. ... The place of the deceased in heaven is by the side of God in the most holy place and he

[75] Budge, *Ibid*,
[76] Budge, *Ibid*, p75.

becomes God [sic] and an angel of God; he himself is a speaker of the truth, and his KA is triumphant. He sits on a great throne by the side of God. [77]

Budge therefore concludes that:

> The Egyptians, like the peoples of Africa in later times, were well contented to admit the existence of a great, almighty God who created the universe and all in it, but they seem to have thought, also like modern African peoples, that he was too great and too remote to concern himself with the affairs of man, and that he had committed the management of this world, and of all in it, to a series of 'gods' and spirits, good and evil, whom it was necessary for them to worship or propitiate as the case might be.[78]

The Africans' conception of the relationship between their ancestors and the High God is ironically, similar to early Christian - Gnosticism, which was banned and persecuted by the established church. The Christian Gnostics believed that the *demiurge* – the progenitor; ancestor of the Jewish nation – Abraham was the Earth's local god. Therefore, the *demiurge* was central to the worship of God - a belief strongly opposed by the established church, hence their persecution and banning of the Gnostics and their teaching. Instead of the worship of God through the *demiurge*, the establish church insist on the man Jesus, who became the Christ – *Anointed* through whom only, access to God must be sought. For

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[77] Budge, *Ibid*, pp86-7

the Christian Gnostics however, the *demiurge* is to be propitiated in the worship of God for 'He' revealed himself through the *demiurge* ('Abraham') who, has become a god overseeing the affairs of his children.[79] Similar views about the relationship between the African ancestors and the High God have been expressed in literature on African Religions, Philosophy and traditions (chapter 5) and forms the *hub* of the concept of *Ntu* from which the kinship system in Africa evolved and, therefore, gives us an understanding of the persistence of 'ethnicity' in modern Africa. Thus in agreement with Ekeh, instead of the slave trade era, and later colonisation bringing about the attenuation of the kinship system in Africa, it actually reinvigorated it.[80] The more the Africans become marginalised, the more they dig deep into oral tradition to rediscover the source of strength in the *Ntu*, contrary to Frantz Fanon's view, that faced with the forces of colonialism;

> the youth of the colonised country, growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horse with two heads, the dead who rise again and the djinns who rush into your body while you yawn.[81]

Fanon, like most African scholars of his time, was focussed on the liberation of Africa and not on the primordial source of the institutions and structure that emerged in Africa as a result of slavery and colonialism. Moreover, he was writing from an Arab context, hence,

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[78] Budge, *Ibid*, pp114-5.
[79] See Pagels, E. H (1973), *The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis: Heracleon's Commentary on John*, (New York), Abingdon Press. Also --- (1975), *The Gnostic Paul: Gnostic Exegesis of the Pauline Letters*, (Philadelphia), Fortress Press; and --- (1988), *Adam, Eve and the Serpent*, (London), Penguin Books; --- (1995), *The Origin of Satan*, (London), Penguin Press
[80] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, 679
[81] Fanon, F (1967), *The Wretched of the Earth*, (Harmondsworth), Penguin, p45

should be read so. Lan concludes, that far from pouring scorn on 'their ancestors', the youth of Zimbabwe who have lived with 'gun in hand ... face to face with ... the forces of colonialism' and have grown up in 'an atmosphere of shot and fire', seem to believe in their ancestors as strongly as their fathers and their fathers before them.[82]

The connection between the adaptation of the *Ntu* based on the notion of the Ka into the kinship can also be seen in the *Soko Risina Musoro*, a poem, by Herbert Chitepo in which he bemoans the destruction of the Shona nation. Thus:

> The Sun of the Kingship is setting,
>
> the rising wind is screaming
>
> a tale of death. The rivers have dried up;
>
> leaving only pools filled with corpses of the dead.
>
> Where is Chaminuka and Nehanda?
>
> Where are our tribal Spirits?
>
> Our complaining and our prayers,
>
> have they failed to come where you are?[83]

This poem appeals to the primordial Spirit of the royal ancestor in the Ka expressed as 'tribal Spirit' or in recent times 'ethnic Spirit'. In essence, it reveals the deep rooted nature of the primordial link between the modern African with the royal ancestors who have by themselves become gods, and angels of God, charge with the responsibility of overseeing

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[82] Lan, *Op Cit*, p. xvi.
[83] Quoted in *Ibid*, p269

the land, watching over it, and making Rain for its fertility for the living and the many generations to be born.

A Portuguese colonialist in 1609, Joao dos Santos recorded an account of *Mhondoro's* possession cited by Lan, thus:

> Every year in the month of September, when the new moon appears, Quiteve ascends a very high mountain situated near the city called Zimbaoe, in which he dwells, on the summit of which he performs grand obsequies for the King, his predecessors, who are all buried there … When the King has feasted for eight days, he begins his lamentation for the dead … until the devil enters into one of the Kaffirs of the assembly, saying that he is the Soul of the dead King, father of him who is engaged in these ceremonies, come to converse with his son … He begins to cough and speak like the dead King who he represents, in such a manner that it means the Kaffirs recognise that the Soul of the dead King has come as they expected … Then all withdraw, leaving the King alone with the demoniac, with whom he converse amicably as if with his dead father, asking him if there will be war, and if he will triumph over his enemies, and if there will be famine or misfortunes in his Kingdom, and everything else which he wishes to know.[84]

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[84] Theal, G. McG (1898-1903), *Records of South Eastern Africa*, (Cape Town), Government Printers, (9 Vols.), Vol. III, p197.

This observation by Joao dos Santos shows the process of consultation of the royal ancestors by the King in the process of governance. There is no indication that the attendance to such ceremonies was limited to 'kin' or 'tribal people' but instead, it seems to have been inclusive of the citizens of the nation. It was, instead, a national ceremony associated with the appearance of the new moon (a common practice all over Africa of which all inhabitants of the society regardless of their lineage take part). Lan observes that it was the King, rather than the spirit medium that the people turn to for Rain.[85] The King in turn propitiates his ancestors for Rain. It will appear that the spirit medium roles had not yet become institutionalised in the 17th century, hence, the sharp distinction found in the late 20th century Zimbabwe, which, has institutionalised the role of the royal ancestor and spirit mediums. While the spirit medium serve the Kings who reign over nations and not 'tribes' or 'ethnic groups' (chapter 5), in the pre-institutionalisation period, the opposite is the case, since the institutionalisation. The role of the spirit mediums therefore, is primordial. David Livingstone in 1860 also recorded his encounter with the spirit medium.[86] While in pre-colonial Africa, the King derived his Power and legitimacy directly from the *Mhondoro*, he however, needed the spirit medium to be able to govern effectively. Thus, the *Mhondoro* sits at the very centre of the existence of the nation and it preservation. The King, although a direct descendant of the royal ancestor, could not communicate directly with his ancestor, he needed the spirit medium who served as the high priest and also had overriding power over the King during the performance of the priestly functions. In essence, there were checks and balances in the politico-spiritual and socio-cultural interaction of the African nations. Individuals could propitiate their lineage

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[85] Lan, *Op Cit*, p44

through the same spirit medium the Kings used. However, the impact of slavery and colonialism led to the narrowing of the territorial space of influence of the spirit mediums and the creation of new Kingships as a result of migration to new lands either due to ecological reasons or flight in the process of escaping from the slavers. Thus, individuals needed the kinship bond as noted by Fage[87] to guarantee their safety. This quest for security led to the institutionalisation of the kinship bond into a system, a case of tradition inventing new structure in the pursuit of physiological security. The creation of 'Warrant' chiefs by the colonial administrators in the 20th century, led to the bastardisation of the relationship between the Kings, the *Mhondoro* and the spirit mediums, thus, in the case of Zimbabwe as in most modern African societies, the Kings lost their power to make Rain, hence, their weakness in modern Africa. The spirit mediums on the other hand, continued with their function of preserving the tradition of the people, since they maintain a direct link with the *Mhondoro*. Thus, a new system evolves, based on the notion that 'he whose ancestors bring the rain owns the land'.[88] Consequently, the autochthonous claim of particular territories by African peoples.

According to Lan, although opposed to each other, the guerrillas and the government of Rhodesia were united in the seriousness with which they regard the ancestors and their mediums. So much that the government tried to deceive the people into believing that they represent the best interests of the Africans and has been given a message by the *Mhondoro*

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[86] Livingston, D (1956), *The Zambezi Expedition of David Livingstone 1858-1863*, (London), Chatto and Windus, (2Vols.), Central African Archives, Oppenheimer Series, No. 9, Vol. I, p168 and Vol. II, p254.
[87] Fage, *Op Cit*,
[88] Lan, *Op Cit*, p197

to tell the Africans so.[89]   In another instance, Ranger cited the case of the Oppressors attempting to deceive the people by claiming to have a link with the *Mhondoro*.   He records the following incident:

One day the District Commissioner [DC] gathered all the people in the Village [Makoni District] and among them was a ZANU comrade. The DC said, 'we need to talk about these terrorists. A terrorist is a bad person' … The comrade stood up, the child of the soil and began to question: 'what does this terrorist say he wants?' 'He wants the land' … 'O.K., Oppressor, listen to what I have to say. I have some questions to ask'. The comrade goes and stands beside the *msasa* tree and ask: 'Are not the trees and I similar in appearance?' The Oppressor answers 'Yes'. Then the Comrade stretches himself out in the grass, under the *mutondo* and *mupfuti* trees, and again they are similar. 'O. K., Oppressor, I ask you to do exactly what I have done'. The Oppressor goes and stands against the tree and the contrast is obvious. Therefore the answer is 'No – you do not belong to this land as we do'.[90]

The claim to the ownership of a territorial space in Africa has become linked to ability to prove such ownership not by the deed of purchase or some legal documents but to bring Rain and hence fertility – development. The implication of the connection between Rain (fertility) - development and ownership is deep rooted in the relationship between the

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[89] Lan, *Ibid*, p7

African and his royal ancestor, and the structure of politico-spiritual and socio-cultural interactions. Perhaps then, we can begin to understand the failure of the colonial administration and the modern state system, based on the Westphalian model in modern Africa.

Ekeh notes that the colonial state emerged from two processes: Firstly, the dissolution of the authority of the existing pre-colonial state system and its subjection to an alien European control; Secondly, imposition of some of the elements of the European model of state on Africa in the colonial setting. The parts of the model of the European state imported into Africa, Ekeh observed,

> were mainly coercive aspects needed in the course of its conquest and colonisation. Thus the military, police force, and bureaucracy were prominent. However, the construction of the new colonial state avoided as much as possible controls by societal constraints, including legislative processes. Consequently, the colonial state in Africa was in general separated from the values and morality of both the European societies from which these elements of the state were imported, and the African societies on which they were imposed.[91]

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[90] Ranger, T. O (1985), *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe*, (London), James Currey, p170.
[91] Ekeh, *Op Cit*, p683

Because of the separation of the Africans from the source of their physiological security, instead of the decline of the kinship system in Africa, Plotnicov, observed, pointing to the heart of the matter, that:

> Within the process of modernisation in the West, the features of intensive urbanisation, extensive migration, and geographical and social mobility have been associated with a concomitant decline in the importance of wide kinship ties ... By contrast, in Africa strong and extensive kinship ties ... have altered little. Ethnic associations have not only persisted, in many cases they have increased in importance in the new towns and cities.[92]

Plotnicov's observation has remained valid and will remain so well into the 21st century. Primarily because African people resort to their deep rooted kinship in the search for physiological security thereby perpetuating and reinforcing ethnicity as a political-cultural institution within the Westphalian state system, which has failed. However, with a new epistemology for African social sciences based on Understanding, the link between the interaction of African societal relations in the modern era and the role of royal ancestors, upon whom ethnicity is founded and propitiating for Rain is sought will be clarified. A rigorous Paradigm centred on the *Ntu* will see Africa once again detribalised and the kinship system gradually reverting back to its initial role of recording lineage, rather than political institutions that it has become, as result of the impact of the slave era, colonialism, and the inappropriate Westphalian state system.

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[92] Plotnicov, L (1970), 'Rural-Urban Communications in Contemporary Nigeria: The Persistence of Traditional Social Institutions', in Gutkind, *Op Cit*, pp66-7.

In the next chapter I shall be focussing on the use of oral tradition as source of African historiography, elaborating more on the concept of *Ntu* and the link between African Religions and resistance movements.

CHAPTER 5

AFRICAN HISTORY AS POPULAR RESISTANCE

This chapter discusses the uses of oral tradition as a source of African history. I will be arguing that for African people, oral tradition forms the locus of historiography and means of resistance. The chapter will be arguing in line with the previous chapter, that African traditions, 'creates', 'invents' and adapts themselves in consistence with the historical realities of the time, hence, are dynamic; and flexible and not static or deeply conservative and inflexible. To achieve this aim, I shall be locating my discussion on the roles of Rain-makers; Priests and spirit mediums as Historians, Chroniclers of Kings and Cult figures in Resistance movements. The chapter will also discuss the uses of Songs, Poems and Dance as sources of social relations, historical narratives and instruments of popular resistance. Although the examples will be drawn mainly from Southern, Eastern and Central regions of the continent, due to the revival of the uses of oral traditions as historical narratives and resistance, I will be reflecting on the similar uses of these institutions in the Western region of the continent. Considering the entrenched Arab cultures in the Northern region, I am in this chapter, implying the use of these institutions by the Autochthons (chapter 4), before and during slavery and colonial periods.

ORAL TRADITIONS AS AFRICAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The writing of African history by the Professionals (Western trained historiographers) according to Arnold Temu and Bonaventure Swai has been based on the same principles as the writing of European history. Consequently, it has been based on empiricism that deals with the history of Kings, the colonisers and their institutions, while ignoring the 'story' – history of African people.[1] This method of writing African history has been justified by R. E Robinson and J. Gallagher who argued that the 'African factor' – Africans inability to make their own history due to their 'oppressive and tradition bound' institutions which, does not allow individual's enterprise without which the making of history is impossible.[2] Moreover, the Professional historians see African metaphysics, which stresses the unity of the living, the dead and the unborn – *Ntu* (chapter 4), Temu and Swai observed, as an idea, which is against the notion of social change.[3] In countering these assumptions, Terrance Ranger argues that although Africa might not have possessed as many historical personalities as Europe, individuals imbued with entrepreneurial sense were a reality of the African past,[4] consequently, African history cannot be classed in the same category as European history. Moreover, Dike and Ajayi have argued that the emphasis on the *Ntu* is evidence of the continuity and historical consciousness of Africans.[5] The African past therefore, has personalities around whom the making of history revolved, and this past was as dynamic as European history, the models which Africanist historians have assiduously

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[1] Temu, A and Swai, B (1981), *Historians and Africanist History: A Critique,* (London), Zed Books.
[2] Robinson, R. E and Gallagher, J (1962), *Africa and the Victorians,* (New York).
[3] Temu, *Op Cit*, p18.
[4] Ranger, T (1965), A lecture given to African History Teachers' Seminar, Dar es Salaam, 31st December, mimeo, cited in Temu, *Ibid.*
[5] Dike, K. O and Ajayi, J. F. Ade (1967), African Historiography' in Shils, D. L (ed), *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* (New York), Macmillan and Free Press.

tried to emulate.[6] Temu and Swai on their part, argued that 'African history did not commence with the arrival of European proconsuls whom imperial historians raised to the level of deities, neither did the colonial period constitutes the golden age of African history'.[7] Therefore, the arrival of Europeans and the colonial period – the predominant mode of thinking of the so-called African historiographical revolution, is not the beginning of African history. John Iliffe also, outlined the role of Africans in the masking of their history. He states that contrary to general conclusions, Africans were not passive during the invasion and later colonisation of their continent. They resisted thereby influencing the colonial policies that later evolved to some extent. Moreover, there is no truth in the assumption that Africa was 'set on the path to destruction through tribal wars and slave raiding – a path from which only European intervention could save it'.[8] Therefore, the data of African historiography must include both earlier and contemporary experiences of African people. The birth of the popularisation of postcolonial Africanist historiography, Temu and Swai argued, constituted an ideological response to its colonial predecessor, thus, declaring imperial and colonial history racist.[9]

Anthony Sampson notes that, Europeans, writing from a Racist perspective, pictured the African 'as a primitive, helpless person, incapable of civilised behaviour'.[10] Thus, J. F Schofield, writing from that paradigm, asserts that African societies were not innovative. He concluded that African women in particular, stifled development for they 'shared the inherent conservatism of the sex'. Since women were the potters in African societies, he

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[6] Temu, *Op Cit*, p18.
[7] Temu, *Ibid*, p19.
[8] Iliffe, J (1969), *Tanganyika under German Rule*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, pp3-5. Also, -- - (1983), *The Emergence of African Capitalism*, (London), Macmillan

maintained, 'therefore changes in pottery must reflect influences from outside'.[11] Considering the European Racist writings on Africa which was aimed at defending slavery and the Atlantic slave trade (chapter 3), an African philosopher, Anthony William Amoo, teaching at the Universities of Wittenbeg, Jena and Halle, in the early 18th century, defended Africa. In his philosophical treaties *On the Nature of the Human*, Amoo wrote:

> Great once was the dignity of Africa, whether one considers natural talents of mind or the study of letters, or the very institutions for safeguarding religion. For she gave birth to several men of the greatest pre-eminence by whose talents and efforts the whole of human knowledge, no less than divine knowledge, has been built up ... though in our times, indeed, that part of the world is reported to be more prolific in other things than learning.[12]

Amoo attacked the theoretical justification of slavery, arguing that the problem was one of false consciousness. Amoo's work however, focussed more on the metaphysic, hence failing to deal with the history of Africans at home and in the Diaspora. Nevertheless, he was able to argue against the notion of a 'primitive', 'unlettered' and 'uncivilised' Africa. The slave trade era and colonialism led to the destruction of scripts, written in *Ajami;* Coptic; Arabic and other forms of writing in the continent. The rich material available in

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[9] Temu, *Ibid,*

[10] Sampson, A (1960), *Commonsense about Africa*, Gollancz, p29.

[11] Schofield, J. F (1948), *Primitive Pottery*, (Cape Town), South African Archaeological Society, *passim.*

[12] Quoted by Uwala, R. U (1978), 'Anthony William Amoo of Ghana on the Mind-Body problem', *Presence Afriaciane*, 108, p159.

the ancient Egyptian scripts, and works done by the earlier Europeans (chapter 3) pertaining to the continent, led to Cheikh Anta Diop's conclusion:

> It remains true that ... [Egypt] was essentially Negro, and that all Africans can draw the same moral advantage that Westerners draw from Graeco-Latin civilisation ... if Plato, Eudore and Pythagoras remained in Egypt for thirteen to twenty years, it was not only to learn recipes. ... [The] European scholar could continue to quote Plato as long as he remembered that he was inspired by Africa. Egypt was the 'great initiator of the Mediterranean World' in the field of Philosophy, Science and aesthetics.[13]

We can conclude that contrary to the Racist assumptions that Africa was 'primitive', 'unlettered', hence, 'uncivilised', Africa did not only play a major part in human development, but has also maintained its history, albeit, in oral tradition form. Thus, the writing of African history must include oral tradition as its sources of data, as argued by Dike and Ajayi.[14]

However, Jack Goody has rightly observed the problem of the measurement of time' associated with oral tradition.[15] But, from his recitation of the Bagre of the LoDagaa of Ghana, we can see that the concern of the narrative rested on the continuity of the story

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[13] Diop, C. Anta (1956), 'The Cultural Contributions and Prospects of Africa', *Presence Africaine*, 8-9, p348. For a similar view see Rodney, W (1982), *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (Washington, DC), Howard University Press, p42.

[14] Dike and Ajayi, *Op Cit*,

[15] Goody, J (1987), *The interface between the written and the oral*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, pp132-38

been told and retold. Hence, the recitation of Bagre makes allowance for different versions. A version emphasising the continuity of the tradition quoted in his Book reads:

> If there' a small boy among you who has some sense and goes to someone's Bagre and sits, it's not for food you go. You will go and sit and look and listen how it is they perform. Bagre is *all one*; nevertheless the way it's performed is different. If you hear people reciting Bagre, you'll adopt their way and one day, when you recite the Bagre, you'll include this. When you recite, you include that in your Bagre. You do so then greet their elders and their distant ancestors. You will greet them, greet their guardians, greet their Earth shrines, then recite Bagre. If you leave the Bagre room, you will go outside and pray to the Earth shrines and return. You'll find you are able to speak.[16]

Goody had made a distinction between the 'sacred' poem as in the case of the Bagre which 'seem to have a loose link with acephalous societies (which are also the purely oral ones)' and epics sang by *griots* 'found mainly in centralised societies influenced by a written religion'.[17] While the distinction between the 'sacred' Poems and the narration of historical event by the *griots* in Africa is so, however a clear-cut definition of function is difficult. This is due to the role of *griots* in traditional African societies as carriers of both

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[16] --- (1972), *The Myth of the Bagre*, (Oxford), pp186-7. Emphasis is mine.
[17] Goody, *The interface between ... op cit*, pp104-5. Also see --- (1968), *Literacy in Traditional societies*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press

public and sacred historical records.[18]   The rendition of the events may differ, thus presenting different versions, nevertheless, the central focus is often on the occurrence of the event which, the *griot* narrates or the poet recites.   Davenport had made similar observation in the narration of the origin of the *mfecane*. While it is agreed that the event occurred in the 19th century, there are however different versions of its origin.[19] This is a problem avoidable when historical events are recorded in written form.   Nevertheless, written records have their problems since the codified information are generally accepted as 'fact' even when the wrong information has been recorded.[20]

AFRICAN RELIGIONS AS SOURCES OF ORAL TRADITIONS

In 1973, M. D. D. Newitt in his book, asserts that the religious systems and cultures of Africans in the north and south of the Zambezi river had 'influential rain-making and ancestor cults, which functioned independent of politics, and which flourish today, though they still remain largely hidden from the profane gaze of white historians'.[21] Commenting on Newitt's assertions, Terrence Ranger argued that while work in territorial cults is in progress, however, scholars like Martinus Daneel and George Mwanza have already established that the priests in African religious and cultural systems are valuable source of

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[18] Chinweizu (1988), *Voices from Twentieth century Africa: Griots and Towncriers*, London), Faber and Faber

[19] Davenport, T. R. H (1991), *South Africa: A Modern History*, 4th edition, (London), Macmillan, p12

[20] Goody, J (1962), *Death, Property and the Ancestors*, (London), Tavistock Publication. This problem is clearly revealed in the terms and concepts use in describing the people of the continent called 'Africa'. While in oral tradition the focus is on the people and how they defined themselves in relation to their geographical *space*, the codification of terms, albeit wrongly, are accepted as fact because they are written. Any attempt to correct or introduce any change is often challenged on the grounds of the lack of written evidence of proof. On the other hand, there is often no such written evidence to justify the acceptance of the codified 'facts'. I strongly object to the writing of 'Africa' with the alphabet 'c' instead of a 'k, due to the need for meaning associated with African names and the rule of grammar in African languages.

oral history.[22] Criticising the concept of territorial cults in relation to studying African Religions due to it restriction to a particular land area, Ranger first elaborated the common definition as:

> An institution of spirit veneration which relates to a land area, or territory, rather than to kinship or lineage groupings. Its main function is to ensure the moral and material well-being of the population of that land area, and [is] … especially concerned with rain-making or the control of floods, with the fertility of the soil for agriculture or with the success of fishing or hunting[23]. … Although a territorial cult is concerned with the total community of a land area, it is normally controlled by a limited elite of priest and functionaries. In this way a territorial cult can be distinguished from ancestral or clan veneration on the one hand and from movements of widespread and uncontrolled spirit possession on the other.[24]

He further classified the various territorial cults in Central and Southern Africa, thus:

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[21] Newitt, M. D. D (1973), *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi. Exploration, Land Tenure and Colonial Rule in East Africa*, (London), pp30-1.

[22] Daneel, M. L (1970), *The God of the Matopo Hills – An Essay on the Mwari Cult in Rhodesia*, (Leisden), Africa Study Centre Communication; --- (1971), *Old and New in Southern Shona Independent Churches*, I (The Hague). See also Mwanza, G (1972), 'Mwari: the God of the Karanga', (Lusaka), 1 September.

[23] See Werner, D (1972), 'Aspects of History in the *Miao* spirit system of the Southern Lake Tanganyika Region: the case of Kapembwa', (Lusaka), 2 September, on the *Miao* spirit shrines. '*Miao* spirits are responsible for the wealth of the land. They control the rain and the locusts, the fertility of the seeds and the soil, and the strength of the winds and the waves, which, endanger the fishermen on the lake. These attributes are common to all *miao* spirits, and from their control of these phenomenon comes the respect of those who live within their territories'. Cited and quoted by Ranger, T (1973), 'Territorial Cults in the History of Central Africa' *Journal of African History*, XIV, 4, p582, note 4.

[24] Ranger, *Ibid*,

some of them venerate a manifestation of the High God, like the Mwari cult

of Rhodesia or the Chisumphi cult of the Chewa; some ... venerate nature

spirits like the *miao* spirits shrines of Lake Tanganyika; yet others venerate

divinised human beings, like the M'bona cult of southern Malawi or the

Mhondoro spirit medium of the Korekore.   Some are centralised in

organisation, with dependent shrines under the authority of a senior shrine;

others, like the *Mhondoro* system, are organised on a hierarchical basis, in

others, like the *miao* system, there are overlapping rather than hierarchical

jurisdictions; while in yet others the cult system consists of a scattering of

shrines, each independent of the others, but all devoted to the same spirit.

In some cults the ritual elite and the political elite have been independent of

each other; in others the ritual group has been distinct from the political

rules but controlled by them; in yet others the ritual has been itself derived

from the ruling lineage.[25]

The works of Leroy Vail; Ian Linden and J. M. Schoffelers,[26] when put together, Ranger

observed, suggest that in early agricultural times, a common religious culture and

territorial cult concept existed in the areas of Malawi and Eastern Zambia. The people in

the region shared a notion of the High God, his spirit intermediaries and their human

assistants, noting that these can still be found in modern Africa but modified in some forms

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[25] Ranger, *Ibid,*
[26] Vail, L (1972), 'Religion, Language and the Tribal Myth: the Tumbuka and Chewa of Malawi', (Lusaka),
31 August; Linden, I (1972), 'The shrines of the Karongas at Mankhamba: some problems in the religious
history of Central Malawi', (Lusaka), 31 August; and Schoffelers, J. M (1972), 'The Chisumphi and M'bona
cults in Malawi: a comparative history', 31 August.

due to subsequent events.[27]   He, however, contested Vail's conclusion that the proto-Chewa and the proto-Tumbuka are 'representatives of the original Bantu [*Ba'Ntu*] layer in this area' and that their territorial cults in this early stage were cults characteristic of this original *Ba'Ntu* layer.   Ranger holds that Vail's conclusion is an oversimplification arguing that the conclusion ignores the contribution made by late Stone Age or hunting-gathering cults in the development of the proto-Chewa and proto-Tumbuka religion. He therefore assets, that in the later period, the earlier uniformity gave way to a clear distinction between northern Tumbuka and southern Tumbuka religion and between Chewa religion.[28]

While Ranger is not rejecting the notion of an 'original *Ba'Ntu* layer', his complaint is the definition of territorial cults. He argues that due to the historical changes over time as a result of shaping, reshaping of the traditions by new cultures and institutions, territorial cults should be defined in terms of historical process rather than logical exclusions. David Lan on his part, while linking the role of the spirit mediums in the Zimbabwean war to specific territories acknowledged the incorporation of Africans from other territories as sons of the soil.[29] However, Norma Kriger on her part sought to separate African peasant from the guerrillas, consequently, the spirit mediums. Kriger emphasised the punishment the guerrillas meted out on 'spies' or collaborators with the 'enemy' as the basis of the separation.[30] This separation has, however, been rejected by Manungo who insist on the

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[27] Ranger, *Op Cit*, p584
[28] Ranger, *Ibid*, p585
[29] Lan, D (1985), *Guns and Rain: Guerrilla and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe*, (London), James Currey. P172
[30] Kriger, N (1992), *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant voices*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press

inextricability of the peasant and the guerrillas in the *peoples' war*.[31]   While rejecting Kriger's separation between African peasants and guerrillas, Manungo agrees with both Lan and Ranger on the description of the war as *a people's* war, hence, not restricted to a particular territory.

Ranger notes however, that 'at some *periods* in territorial cult history there has been a much sharper distinction between the cult and the phenomenon of mass possession than at other periods'.[32]   Elsewhere, he has argued in a similar line, outlining the impact of historical developments in understanding African Religions and history.   He asserts that 'the Mutapa's power was partly economic, partly spiritual'. 'Everything points', he notes, 'to the power of the Shona and Rozwi Chiefs having been based on their intermediary powers or on their control of the powerful *Mhondoro* upon whose message to *Mwari* depended the fortune of the community'.[33]   Arguing further that in spite of the degradation of the Mutapa's influence in the 17th century and its eventual destruction by the 19th century as outlined by Roland Oliver,[34] 'the spirit of the Mutapa's have, remained influential through the *Mhondoros*'.[35]   Ranger seem to be arguing that because 'the system of the spirit mediums expresses the common African idea of the increased power of the dead, of their ability to communicate more freely with the divine, and of their role as protector of the land and the people',[36] the definition of African Religions as territorial cults limited to particular land areas, is too restrictive. Taylor, who expresses the position

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[31] Manungo, K. D (1991), 'The Peasantry in Zimbabwe: A Vehicle for Change' in Preben Kaarsholm edited *Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern Africa*, (Harare), Boabab Books, p118
[32] Ranger, *Ibid*, p595. Italic in the original.
[33] Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, Op Cit*, p7
[34] See Oliver, R (1963), 'Exploring the History of Africa', *Encounter*, March,
[35] Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, *Op Cit*, p8
[36] Ranger, *Ibid*, p18

of African ancestors as thus, has given Ranger's position: 'in ancient days all things were there. For there it was that heaven and earth were wont to meet. Every year we used to gather there, we the creature of the earth, and they the elders who led the way over the river between, which divides the Creator from his creatures'.[37] Also, in Chotepo's Poem, the last days of Mutapa has been described, using the Court Drummer, Curu, to speak on African tradition (history) to the people, thus;

> [To the people, Curu says, referring to the King] He who stands here is the Night-Walker, whom you know, he it was who led us here and gave us the blessing of a Country. We know him – that he had the heart of a Lion. All men were astonished to see him, they turned to look upon him, twice, trice, and yet a fourth time. All men feared him and numbered his blessings. They knew that even God had made choice of him. ... [To the King he addressed] In the years gone by, the earth trembled when trodden by the foot of King Mutassa [Mutapa], and the Crops of the earth came out to greet you and to satisfy your family. The voice of your prayers was carried by the wind and was followed by the rain clouds. You are the Lion; you are the foe of the Land, you are the Bull in his own kraal. You are the one who has the power to pray to those who are ahead in the nameless place. We are your children, O King, we are the fruit of the Stem of the Great tree, the Tree of the Lion. ... [The King response, thus:] When I sat upon the throne governing all the land [Empire] I ruled, but I ruled with the power that comes from my Fore-fathers, the power without beginning, which I thought

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[37] Taylor, J (1963), *The Primal Vision*, (London), quoted in Ranger *Ibid,*

was endless. We fought battles and were victorious and returned home with gold and riches.[38]

In this narrative, we find the Court Drummer playing the role of the African bard, narrating the deed of the King. The spirit mediums also perform the function. In Ghana, the Priest-Diviner plays the role of spirit mediums, while the King also utilises the use of Court Musicians and Drummer (chapter 4). Writing on the tradition and roles of African Religions Priests as carriers of history, Ogot asserts:

> For the Luo, no political Superstructure, such as a federation or a con-federation existed. But many of the famous prophets, who acted as counsellors to the Chiefs, and whose main functions was to look after the Spiritual well-being of the tribe, and to prescribe moral standards against which the policies of individual Chiefs had to be judged, were known and consulted all over Luo-land. This tended to emphasise the unity of the Luo as a group.[39]

Following the same line of argument as Ogot, Ranger states that in pre-colonial times, 'a Chief's legitimacy [was] largely derived from relationship with the environment'. Therefore, the 'oral traditions of Chiefs dynasties emphasised [that] their founders had introduced fire, cultivation and settle village society'. Consequently, 'the Spirit of the founders [ancestors] were believed to be incarnated in spirit mediums, with whom the

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[38] Chitepo, H (1958), *Soko Risina Musoro*, (Oxford), pp15-16.

living chiefs worked to ensure fertility, rain and good hunting'. In essence, 'the mediums summoned the people through the Chiefs to make offering to the Spirits just before the planting season and at the feast of the First fruits'. The medium therefore, laid down rules as to 'when the planting might commence, of what crops [and] which days should be observed as rest days in honour of the Spirits'. Through their participation in the system he concludes, 'Chiefs ensured a flow of tribute; each planting season began with the cultivation of Special gardens, the produce of which was sent to the Chiefs'. Ranger therefore summed up his argument by stating that 'mediums had been responsible for the relationship of the people with the Land in Pre-colonial era'.[40] While this narrative is limited to the case of the Makoni District in Zimbabwe, Ranger has elsewhere argued that the concept of the High God exists in African Spirituality. Thus,

The Mwari is spiritual owner of the earth and Creator of Mankind. He intervenes actively in human affairs … He is not a remote ancestor … and is not concerned with purely personal affairs but only with matters of tribal importance; he punishes acts, such as incest, which are considered contrary to nature and the perpetuation of the tribe, with pestilence and famine. He manifests himself in such great natural phenomena as volcanic eruptions and lightening. Mwari is an invisible Supreme Being.[41]

[39] Ogot, B. A (1963), 'British Administration in the Central Nyanza District of Kenya, 1900-60', *Journal of African History*, Vol. IV, No.2, quoted in Ranger, *Rebellion in Southern Rhodesia, Op Cit*,
[40] Ranger, T (1983), 'Tradition and Travesty: Chiefs and the Administration in Makoni District, Zimbabwe, 1960-80', in Peel, J. D. Y and Ranger, T (eds), *Past and Present Zimbabwe*, (Manchester), Manchester University Press, pp23-25.
[41] Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, Op Cit*, p21.

Ranger is arguing that Africans Religions and their Priests uphold the history of African nations, hence, they are carriers of traditions. Consequently, African history must be located in the Spiritual/historian role of the Priests and the spirit mediums as well as in the traditional forms of social relations. African Religions therefore, must not be defined in the restrictive sense of territorial cults.

SONGS, POEMS AND DANCE AS HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RESISTENCE

Songs, Poems and Dance have been central to the social relations of African people since the beginning of their history and also serve as a form of historical narrative. Co-wives chide and mock one another through songs and poems while communities perform songs, poems and dance to celebrate their victories against other communities, defiance, ridicule and mockery of their enemies. Fran Boas, writing from that perspectives concluded that to understand the so-called 'primitives', requires situating them in their actual historical and material environment. 'Above all', he asserts; 'one had to avoid shaping one's account of them to fit the demands of a preconceived model of a hierarchy of cultures assumed to be determined by the natural laws of evolutionist developments'.[42] Boas has since, the earlier part of the 20th century understood what Ranger was arguing in the second part of the 20th century; primarily, that Africans must be understood from their historical realities, and not through the attempt of Western scholars to force them into some 'acceptable' models. Leroy Vail and Landeg White also concluded that 'seeing the African in their own terms is crucial for understanding them'.[43] 'Songs performed in dance by Africans could be

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[42] Boas, F (1911), *The Mind of the Primitive*, (New York).
[43] Vail, L and White, L (1991), *Power and the Praise Poem*, (London), James Currey, p10.

regarded by the community as the narrative of their history. It is a "map" of the people's experiences, [which] pass from generation to generations', Vail and White concluded.[44] Evans-Pritchard, writing from what I have described as a Racist perspectives, not only failed to understand Africans in their own terms, but eager to categorise them into an 'acceptable' model of interpretation, accounted for the obscenities in the Songs of the Dinka by arguing that the freedom the Dinka's had in chanting obscenities in their Songs, made manual labour appealing. He further explained the relaxation of restriction by the colonialists as helping to get labourious tasks done efficiently.[45] Vail and White note that the colonial anthropologists, although 'highly selective and crudely reductive ... did have the merit of focussing on the content of the African songs – and what the performers were actually singing – in a manner that literary scholars avoided'.[46] They concluded:

> Most missionaries and travellers reflected the social-evolutionists assumptions of the later half of the 19th century and were preoccupied by what they saw as the arbitrary powers exercised by "savage" African Potentates. Thus, they were unable to make sense of the performance they witnessed except in terms of noisy glorification of the chiefs and the abject sycophancy of the performers.[47]

It was based on these premises that Evans-Pritchard made his remark. Evans-Pritchard, with other colonial anthropologists, failed to realise that oral poetry in Africa was part of

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[44] Vail *Ibid,*

[45] Evans-Pritchard, E. E (1965), Some Collective Expressions of Obscenity in Africa' in his edited *The Position of Women in Primitive Societies and Other Essays in Social Anthropology,* (Oxford), pp79-101.

[46] Vail and White, *Op Cit,* p44.

the social code. All the colonialists recognised, was the obscenities in the songs and the freedom with which the performers sang their songs. It is within this context of freedom that the African bard performs his official functions also. Thus, the African bard is not a Praise singer. He is not to eulogise but, 'interprets public opinion and to organise it', Vail and White observed.[48] Mafeje outlined the role and function of the African bard thus:

> The method of the ... African bard in carrying his duties is not unlike that of the European bard. Like them, he celebrates the victories of the nations, he sings songs of praise, chants the Laws and Customs of the nation, he recites the genealogies of the royal families, and in addition, he criticises the Chiefs for perverting the Laws and Customs of the nation and laments their abuse of power and neglect of their responsibilities and obligations to the people. ... In summary it may be stated that; 1) both the European and the ... African bards came from the Commoner ranks; 2) their positions depended on their general acceptance by the people; 3) the roles of both types are characterised by some measures of freedom to criticise, whether subtly or openly, those in authority, i.e. Kings and Chiefs. In contemporary Western societies this role seems to have been taken over by the newspaper cartoonist. The significance of all these public "critics" (the European bard, the medieval Court jester, the ... African bard, and the newspaper

[47] *Ibid,*
[48] *Ibid,* p52.

Cartoonist) is considerable, since they serve as a check against abuse of power by those in authority; they represent the opinions of the ruled.[49]

In essence, the bard assumes the role of people's Spokesperson when the King/Chief fails the nation and mediation impossible. In his summation of the role of the African bard, Mzamane concluded that he (the bard) is 'the conscience of the nation. He cannot be censured. Not even an all-powerful king like Shaka the great did'.[50] While Vail and White have been sympathetic in their understanding of the African bard, they have contested Mafaje's comparison with the European bard on the grounds that it is the *performance*, not the office holder that holds the freedom of expression as in the case of the Europeans.[51] Vail and White's conclusion however, appears to be the consequence of their total reliance on Songs, Poem and Dance performed in social relations and resistance to colonial rule in interpreting the role of the African bard. They failed to separate the 'daily' social code of behaviour by the performance of Songs, Poems and Dance by the people from the role and functions of the bard, whose service is to the nation, the King and his ancestors.

In the Hausa states, the King (Emir) appoints an Official to the position of the bard who accompanies him always doing the Emir's *Kirari* (relating the deeds of the nation, the Emir and his Officers in an entertaining way). Thus, the bard could renounce the Emir by stating deeds he has failed to perform or has fallen short, in comparison with his ancestors.

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[49] Mafeje, A (1967), 'The Role of the Bard in a contemporary African Community' in *Journal of African Language*, 6, No. 3, pp195-96
[50] See Mxamane, M. V (1984), 'The Uses of Traditional Oral Forms in Black South African Literature' in *Literature and Society in Southern Africa*, edited by White, L and Couzens, T (Harlow, Essex), pp147-8

The bard also invites the Emir through the *Kirari* to follow the path of his ancestors. This bard, although a Courts Official, is however, not a member of the group of the Court Musicians, who also praise and denounce/renounce the King's deeds, when necessary, usually, at state functions before the nation, through Songs and Dance. Thus, Mafeje's description of the role and function of the African bard, can in reality, be compared with the European bard. Indeed as both Vail and White have observed, the oral poetry of Africa, although expressed in a different language, is linked by a common aesthetic, a shared set of assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of poetry, hence, the performers have poetic licence. However, they failed to realise that the poetic licence is not limited to the *performance* or the performers, but is a social code of behaviour in African societies. This social code was later adapted during the colonial period, as in the case of the Yoruba *Oriki*,[52] the Basotho migrants Songs[53] and the Bashi Songs.[54] While Vail and White have recorded the changing nature of the Songs, Poems and Dance performed by Africans as part of their resistance, to the colonial rule, they seem to have equated the adaptation of Songs, Poems and Dance as form of resistance to the role and function of the African bard.

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[51] Vail and White *Op Cit*, p57.

[52] See Berber, K (1981), 'Documenting Social and Ideological Change through Yoruba *Oriki*: A Stylistic Analysis', *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 10, No.4,

[53] Coplan, D (1987), 'The Power of Oral Poetry: Narrative Songs of the Basotho Migrants', *Research in African Literature*, 18.

[54] Merriam, A. P (1954), 'Song Texts of the Bashi', *African Music Society Journal*, 1. See Ranger, T (1975), *Dance and Society in Eastern Africa, 1980-1970: The Beni Ngoma*, (Nairobi), and ---(1970), *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1930*, (London) for more on the influence of the colonial rule in the development of African Songs, Poems and Dance.

In their analysis of the 'Paiva' songs, sung in the cane fields of colonial Mozambique from the 1890s to the 1950s,[55] Vail and White observe, rightly, how Africans use Songs, Poems and Dance to record their complaint and denunciation of the colonisers. The *Machila* (hammock) bearer of the *Achunha* (White man) expresses their experiences and complaints against the injustice of the White man in a satirical, entertaining and mimicking way, concluding with a protest. Thus:

> You weep; you sleep stiffly, when you are old
>
> O – o
>
> You weep, you sleep stiffly, when you are old
>
> O – o
>
> Pick it up quickly,
>
> Come quickly,
>
> The *Machila* must be carried along fast.
>
> You'll be helped now, you will,
>
> You'll be helped in just a moment.
>
> Here now, you'll be helped.
>
> Servants! Where are you, you servants?
>
> Tell the bearers!
>
> This group must go to help the others.
>
> You, hurry up there!
>
> *(Well drop it!)*

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[55] Vail, L and White, L (1983), 'Forms of Resistance: songs and Perceptions of Power in Colonial Mozambique', *Rhode university of Social and Economic Research, South African Seminar*, No.4

White people have come to be worked for!

(Heavy white men, people have to work for them that's true)

Come quickly, Come quickly!

Sweep the yard! That one! Sweep the yard!

Those White men are coming here today.

Bearer,

Keep your backbone steady

Run!

At midday we'll arrive at Mochema

At Mochema at Mochema

(Hurry! I'm going to drop it)[56]

Another song, which expressed the need for fairness, is *Masamanga*. The song records the degradation the colonisers have meted out on the Africa woman, thus, a complaint and denunciation of the Europeans dealings. Thus:

Masamanga Masamanga

Oy-e

Masamanga Masamanga

Oy-e

She buys flour with her Cunt!

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[56] Quoted in Vail and White, *Op Cit*, p175. Emphases in italics are mine to indicate the protest. The original contains the brackets.

Vail and White rightly observed that these songs evolved from a tradition started during the singing of the 'Paiva' songs at the onset of the colonising period in the cane field. They assert that while the later versions of the 'Paiva' songs were performed entirely by women, the original 'Paiva' was sang by men only. The experiences of the men in the cane field as described by the women in the later versions, were paralleled to the women's own experiences in the Cotton gardens. 'While the men were being overworked in the cane field and badly paid, with little regard to their welfare even when accidents occur, the women were being compelled by the administration to grow the Company's cotton, with all the consequent brutality and the hardship of famine'. Thus, the song and performance presents a complete picture of life under Portuguese rule, they conclude.[57] Nevertheless, Vail and White failed to relate the songs to the social code of African people in Pre-colonial times. Instead, they draw their conclusion from the adaptation of the social code as a form of resistance against the colonisers.

A group Oral Testimony (interview) of *Piriri* Village states the development of the 'Paiva' song and how it reached the village, thus:

> [They] used to get excited when Paiva was coming to the field, because Paiva used to go on a Motor trolley to the field. When they saw he was coming they would all start singing … From there it went to the Village. And when they used to sing their dance, *Paiva* had to be sung, to show it to

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[57] Vail and White, *Ibid,* p343

the women and children. To say that this was the song we sang for Paiva at the cane fields.[58]

Hugh Tracey has recorded another song of complaint and resistance. Thus:

It is time to pay taxes to the Portuguese,

The Portuguese who eats eggs

And Chicken!

Change that English Pound![59]

The central complaint is that the Portuguese eats both Chicken and the Eggs – a reference to their lack of consideration for the future. As a renunciation, the Africans appeal to the English Pound – the Portuguese hates the English – an act of insult and mockery. These songs although performed with freedom by the African societies however, are different from the role and function of the African bard. While songs of this nature are common in social relations, they are different from the poetic licence of the bard associated with states functions. Kimani Gecau observed that 'popular music was utilised in post-independent Kenya to comment on the situation' and concluded that 'popular songs have been a chronicle of the changing social situation and the relations thereof'[60] in African societies. Noting that while Singers have, in pre-colonial times commented on popular subject, sacred, including love and sex, 'for obvious reasons, overtly "political" songs have not

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[58] Oral Testimony, Group interview, Piriri Village, Luabo, 25/10/76, cited in Vail and White, *Ibid,*

[59] Tracey, H (1948), *Chopi Musician*, (London). Italic registers the central complaint and insult.

[60] Gecau, K (1991), 'Culture and the Tasks of Development in Africa Lessons from the Kenyan Experiences' in Kaarsholm, P (ed), *Cultural Struggle and Development in Southern Africa,* (Harare), Boabab Books, p83.

been many [in modern Africa], unless one takes into account the propagandistic ones which are sung in praise of one thing or another that a government … has done'.[61] While Gecau is decrying the negative impact on the freedom of expression in African societies in modern times, on their part, Vail and White, in failing to recognise the distinction between the freedom of African people to express and comment on issues in their societies from the poetic licence, of the bard as the Chronicler of events and Historians of the nations and deeds of Kings, lumped the Songs, Poems and Dance which emerge as forms of resistance against Oppression and the recording of the social history of the people as one and the same.

RELIGIOUS AND GUERRILLA GROUPS AS RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

Ranger notes that:

> while many African peasantries *have* been difficult to mobilise and lacked a consciousness of the mechanism of their exploitation and have had their land expropriated without any rent or have offered labour services to landlord without encountering overt state violence or compulsion … [they] offered 'primary resistance to Colonial occupation and much 'secondary' resistance to colonial administration without ever being in a position to

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[61] Gecau, *Ibid*, p86.

develop peasant consciousness despite their objective existence as a peasantry.[62]

Ranger is trying to make a link between 'primary' (initial resistance against the establishment of colonial administration in the various African *nations*) and 'secondary' (guerrilla struggles aimed at obtaining political independence from the established colonial or foreign governments in the African *nations*) resistance movements by marrying the resistance of the Africans in Southern Africa and the development of a *national* consciousness. The Zimbabwean peasantry he argued,

> had struggled to develop a certain level of consciousness in order to *become* peasants in the first place. Therefore, they developed another level of consciousness as they saw only too clearly with their own eyes the expropriation of land, the uses of state violence and the establishment by the state of discriminatory price mechanisms.[63]

Land became a central issue in the rise of African movements. The struggle was centred on taking the land back and also on freeing the Africans from the imposed value system of the Europeans. According to Buijtenhuijs, 'the key to the people's life' was land.[64] In essence the Guerrilla struggles was centred on the issue of land. While agreeing with Ranger's conclusion that the war in Zimbabwe was a People's war, Manungo refused to

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[62]Ranger, T (1985), Peasant Consciousness and Guerilla War in Zimbabwe, (London), James Currey, p20; and also, Geschiere, P (1982), *Village Communities and the State, Changing Relations among the Maka of southeastern Cameroon since the Colonial Conquest*, (London), Kegan Paul International.
[63] Ranger, *Ibid*, p21

make a distinction between the guerrillas and the peasantry. He concluded that the role of the guerrillas in the Makoni District approximate the realities found in the Murewa and Chiweshe Areas. The guerrillas were an extension of the peasant resistance to the colonial rule. 'While the guerrillas were based in Zambia and Mozambique, the peasants however viewed them as their "children" who have come to help them in removing the burden of Colonialism'. Thus, the words '*vakomana*' or '*vana vedu*' ('boys' or 'our children') were terms of endearment, due to the feeling of being one with the guerrillas by the peasantry. 'Guerrillas were themselves peasants coming back to confront the Settler with newly acquired technology: the gun', he concluded.[65] Frederikse, on his part, in narrating his experience, agrees with Manungo, asserting that:

> The land question was our major political weapon. The people responded to it … Since the olden days of our ancestors our people used to work communally and live communally, which was almost the same as Socialism. People did not understand all that political jargon. What we had to do, in fact, was to tell them of the hard realities of life. People should get the message. That was the important thing. The simplest way was to learn their grievances. This was what was important, to get the people's ideas about their own grievances and what they thought about solutions to these grievances. How to approach them was what mattered. You don't talk about the Capitalist state or the Socialist state to them. What mattered to them was how to do away with their grievance at the present time … That

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[64] Buijtenhuijs, R (1982), *Essays on Mau Mau. Contribution to Mau Mau Historiography*, (Leiden), African Studies Centre, Research Report, No. 17, p207.

political jargon is left to documents and other things. When you are dealing with the masses you have to talk about relevant issues on the ground.[66]

In line with his critique of the concept of territorial cults in reference to African Religions, the role of oral tradition and the exclusiveness of the definition, his earlier work on the 1896-7 revolt in Southern African gave credence to Manungo and Frederiskse's version of the linked between the peasantry and the guerrillas - 'primary' and 'secondary' resistance movements. Ranger took time to explain the link between 'Shona' and the Ndebele in the revolt, noting that:

The word 'Shona' does not carry with it any precise tribal or ethnic connotation; nor does it relate only to the peoples who live in the area now known as Mashonaland'. 'It is a linguistic term used to described a group of dialects spoken throughout what is now [Zimbabwe] and in parts of adjacent territories. The dialects – Kalanga, Karanga, Zezuru, Korekore, Manyika, Ndau – do not have precise ethnic connotation either. ... By Shona people, it is meant 'all those who spoke dialects of Shona over this wide area [.][67]

[65] Manungo, *Op cit,* pp117-8
[66] Frederiskse, J (1982), *None But Ourselves. Masses versus Media in the Making of Zimbabwe,* (Johannesburg), Raven, pp60-61
[67] Ranger, T (1979), *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-7,* (London), Heinemann Books Ltd., p4

'So defined', he concludes, 'Shona people were involved in the so-called Ndebele rising in the province of Ndebele.[68] Hilda Kuper had also argued that the distinction between Ndebeleland and Mashonaland did not exist before the 19th century. The Ndebele did not live throughout Ndebeleland but occupied only a central district of it, while the Shona on the hand, live in wide areas outside Mashonaland.[69] In essence the distinction between the Mashonas and Ndeleles as between the guerrillas and the peasantry is contrived. The Africans as a collective, regardless of whether classified as Shonas, Ndebeles, Guerrillas or Peasants, fought in unity against the Settlers and oppression. The struggle started with the primary resistance movements led by African Religions Priests and spirit mediums.

Ranger therefore, argues that the guerrilla movements often claim previous Religious movement of pre-colonial times as the origin of the struggle. This assertion has been justified by Audrey Wipper's work on the Mumbo cult in Nyanza province of Kenya. The Mumbo claim to have their influence from 'Zakawa, the great prophet, Bogonko, the mighty chief, and Maraa, the *laibon* responsible for the 1908 rebellion', thus, its becomes the Mumbo 'symbols, infusing into the living a courage and strength of past heroes' and the 'leaders bolstered up their own legitimacy by claiming to be the mouth-piece of these deceased prophets'.[70] Ogot on his part maintained that 'the history of nationalism in Africa must be traced back to its emergence'.[71] In essence, to 'primary' resistance. J. D Welime cited the example of Dini Ya Msambwa cult that called for a wider African unity, on the grounds that 'since they [Africans] have similar traditional religions they must unite

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[68] Ranger, *Ibid*,

[69] Kuper, H (1955), 'The Shona' in Kuper, H et al *The Shona and Ndebele of Southern Rhodesia*, (London).

in Dini Ya Msambwa'. Elija Masinde, the leader of the cult, according to Welime took some of his followers to Chetambe.

> In September 1947 he led about 5,000 followers to Chetambe's where in 1895 many Bukusu died in their campaign against Hobley. He wanted his followers to remember the dead in their prayers. One interesting thing about this meeting is that they dressed as in readiness for the 1895 war. At this meeting it is alleged that he unearthed a skull in which a bullet was found buried in the mouth ... The crowd became very emotional and destructive.[72]

Another example of the link between 'secondary' with 'primary' resistance is the Church of the White Bird founded by Matthew Zwimba which claim the memory of the 1896-7 rising (chapter 4) by regarding those who died during the war as the saints and martyrs of the church.[73] Again we find a linkage between the 1896-7 with the guerrillas of the twentieth century Zimbabwe. On his return home in 1962, Shamuyarira narrates that 'George Nyandoro, grandson of a rebel leader killed in the 1897 and nephew of a chief deposed for opposition to rural regulation in the 1930 ... met [Joshua Nkomo] at the airport ... [and] presented him with a spirit axe as a symbol of the apostolic succession of

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[70] Wipper, A (1966), 'The cult of Mumbo', East African Institute Conference paper, January, cited in Ranger, T (1968), 'Connexions between "Primary resistance Movements and Modern mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: II', *Journal of African History*, IX, 4

[71] Ogot, B. A Op Cit,

[72] Welime, J. D (1965), Dini ya Msambwa', Research Seminar Paper, Dar es Salaam. Cited in Ranger, 'Connexion ...' *Op Cit*,

[73] Sundkler, B. G. M (1961), *Bantu Prophets in South Africa*, (London). See also Ranger, T (1964), 'The early history of independence in Southern Rhodesia', in Montgomery Watt, W (ed), *Religion in Africa*, (Edinburgh), pp54-7.

resistance'.[74] Julius Nyerere making a connection between the Tanzanian African National Union – TANU and the Maji Maji addressing the Fourth Committee of the United nation in December 1956, states:

> The people fought because they did not believe in the white man's right to govern and civilise the black. They rose in a great rebellion, not through fear of a terrorist movement or a superstitious oat, but in response to a natural call, a call of the spirit, ringing in the hearts of all men, and of all times, educated and uneducated, to rebel against foreign domination. It is important to bear this in mind in order to understand the nature of nationalist movement like mine. Its function is not to create the spirit of rebellion but to articulate it and show it a new technique.[75]

TANU therefore claims that the Tanzanian state was founded on the ashes of Maji Maji.[76] The narrative of the Maji Maji revolt as outlined in oral tradition, seem to give credence to Ranger's conclusion on the link between Priests and guerrillas and the inclusive nature of the movements (chapter 4). In 1897 when the Matumbis of southern Tanganyika got tired of the German's imposed system of collecting taxes, resisted by refusing to pay. The Germans resorted to punitive expeditions by introducing forced labour to build public works and cotton growing. These grievances of the people, contributed to the

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[74] Shamuyarira, N. S (1965), *Crisis in Rhodesia*, (London), pp68-9.
[75] Speech by Nyerere, J. K (1956), to the 578th meeting of the Fourth Committee of the United Nation, 20th December.
[76] Editorial comment, *The Nationalist*, 18 September, 1967

circumstances which caused the Maji Maji rebellion in 1905.[77] The revolt was precipitated by a diviner call Kinjitikile who claimed to be possessed by the Spirit of Kolelo, a religious cult dominating the region. Kinjitikile preached a unifying message, that 'Africans were one and that … his medicine – the *Maji* – was stronger than Europeans weapons'. For Kinjitikile, the Africans were defeated from their former revolts against the Germans due to their disunity. His Maji will enable the Africans to unite, hence, defeat the Germans. Indeed, while the Africans remain united, Kinjitikile's *Maji* gave them victory but, 'once the element of kinship and 'tribal' affiliation sets in, the Maji Maji rising crumbled, Temu and Swai notes. Iliffe has argued that, as with other colonial rebellion, the Maji Maji was confronted with 'the central historical problems between the ideology of revolt and economic, political and cultural realities'[78]- a distinction that did not exist in the African state system as noted by Ranger.[79]

L. Cliffe notes that even during the colonial period, taxes did not constitute a weapon powerful enough to force peasants' households to part with their surplus labour.[80] Thus, the Kamba people among other ethnic communities refused to do the imposed work required of them by the Settlers. Instead, they were prepared to sell their goats and cattle to pay the colonial taxes, rather than leave their reserves to work in the Settlers' farms. Once they got tired of the *Kiboko* (beatings with whip made of hide), they reacted by staging all sorts of resistance, including the *Ndonye-wa Kauti* Movement.[81] Temu has

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[77] See Gwassa, G. C. K and Iliffe, J (ed) (1968), *Records of the Maji Maji Rising*, (Nairobi).
[78] Iliffe, J (1967), 'The Organisation of the Maji Maji rebellion' *Journal of African History*, VIII; and ---
(1979), *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, (Cambridge).
[79] Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, Op Cit,*
[80] Cliffe, L (1977), 'Rural Class formation in East Africa', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 4
[81] See Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S (1971), 'Some reflections on African initiatives in early Colonial Kenya', *East African Journal*, 8.

also recorded the resistance of the Girima people. In 1912 during the famine in Girima country, the people refused to take work outside the reserve. They would not work in the plantations; instead, they worked for other communities, usually for short periods, rather than the plantations. When the colonial government introduced Poll tax, the Girima, like the Kambas, sold their remaining domestic animals, which had survived the drought to pay, rather than work as migrant labourers. Further coercion by the Settler led to the Girima war in 1914.[82] Also, between 1890 to 1907 the Africans in Tanganyika resisted the Germans. Chief Siki tried to drive them out of Tabora District in 1889 and 1894 but was defeated. Another Chief, Sinna of the Kibosho conducted a campaign against them between 1894 and 1898. Kilwa also rebelled in 1894 while between 1891 and 1898, Mkwawa fought against them in their resistance to the Settlers.[83] These failures, according to Kinjitikile, were due to lack of Africans' unity, hence, his *Maji* was the medicine for the problem – disunity.

We can therefore conclude with Ranger that while African 'secondary' resistance looked back to the past for inspiration and to the future for living, the rejection of a claim of modern ideological bound nationalism 'is not a rejection of modern goods and advantages, but rather an attempt to obtain them on a 'just' basis and within a 'good' society defined in African communalist terms. The aspiration is to put Africa in modernity from an African context. In essence, the social history of Africans and the history of resistance cannot be separated from the Religions and social code of behaviour. Thus, to Understand Africa requires the understanding of Africa's oral tradition expressed in Songs, Poems and Dance

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[82] Temu, A. J (1970), 'The Girima War 1914-1915', Dar se Salaam, mimeo.

as well as from the role and functions of the Priests, spirit mediums and African bards – prior to colonisation, during the colonial period and the wars of independence as well as the nature of the current struggles in modern Africa, and not in the ideological developments of the wars of independence or post-colonial historiography.

In part Three (chapters 6-8), I shall be focusing on three essays from slightly different perspectives aimed at the identification of what constitutes universal human needs and desires, the Functional theory of political action and the basis of the creation of Political Communities. The chapters will identify the basis of my proposal in favour of the creation of a continental Political Community for Africa in the attempt to rid it of the problem of war and reclaim its place in international relations, and as a global player.

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[83] See Lubertsky, R (1972), 'Sectoral development and stratification in Tanganyika 1890-1914', Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, mimeo.

CHAPTER 6

ARGUING BURTON AND NEEDS

In this chapter, I intend to look at the concept of human nature and how it has been presented as a basis for the World Society approach in understanding International Relations. The purpose of the chapter is to argue that ontological needs can and should form the basis of analysis in International Relations. This position is based on the assumption of a notion of universality in human need. Thus, the individual in his relationship with the environment in the pursuit of these needs should form the unit of analysis rather than the state.

Although in International Relations, John Burton has been credited with the World Society approach, the starting point in understanding human nature will be to draw from psychology and sociology. These disciplines deal with individuals, groups and societies. Therefore, I will be drawing from them in relation to the World Society approach in discussing the ontological needs of the human species.

NEEDS AND WANTS

Abraham Maslow posited that the individual is an integrated, organised whole.[1] Thus, when motivated, it is as a *whole unit* rather than parts of a unit that he is motivated. In other words, there is only one unit – the individual that is capable of being motivated. Thus, if the individual is hungry, he needs food to satisfy the hunger. The food does not only fill the stomach but also, satisfies the totality of his/her condition - *hunger*. If the individual has different flavours or types of food to chose from, s/he does not select a flavour or type just to satisfy his/her appetite (desire) or stomach wants (emptiness), but food that will satisfy his hunger. Thus, the choice of flavour or type of food will be based on whether it will satisfy the hunger and not the preferences of the stomach or the taste buds. From this, we gather that the need of the individual is food to sustain the *whole unit* – the individual, and not the wants or desire of his/her stomach or taste. Therefore, *needs* are different from wants. Maslow further distinguished *needs* from desires. The desire for self-esteem will differ from one society to another depending on the culture of the society. While in one society, self-esteem may be obtained by being a good hunter, in another; it may be by being a good medicine man.[2] The means in pursuing the desire will be determined by the culture of the individual or people involved. From these two examples, it holds that the need for *food* and desire for *self-esteem* are universal. The means (roads) of achieving these universal ends may however, differ from one culture to another and from one group to another.[3] Although needs and desires are different, both can be considered in the nature of being for the human species - ontological. Needs are not

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[1] Maslow, A. H (1954), *Motivation and Personality*, (New York), Harper and Brothers, p63
[2] *Ibid.,* p67

influenced by the values attached to the means of achieving them, but their actual fulfilment. Desires on the other hand, are influenced by the values associated to, or the condition/position individuals seek in the society or culture. Both: *food* and *self-esteem* are universal ends of the human species, but one is more basic. Therefore, the need for food is innate while self-esteem, although a universal end, falls under the category of wants.[4]

Fromm and Atkinson, proponents of the cognitive school in Human Motivation theory,[5] argue that humans have inborn structured response patterns. Unlike animals, human structures are cognitive rather than instinctual. Thus, certain goals are inherently more important than others regardless of any socialisation mechanism. In their argument, as in Maslow's universal end thesis, humans have innate needs and can consciously plan strategies (means or roads) to attain those needs, regardless of the societal values associated with their act.[6] In other words, humans have universal needs that must be satisfied regardless of the societal values associated with the means that they have taken to achieve their innate needs. The satisfaction of these innate needs supersede the value attached to the means used in pursuing their satisfaction. Innate needs are therefore different from desires.[7] Peretz's universal wants approach on the other hand, while dealing with the individual as the unit of analysis, is concerned with the degree of individual's wants satisfaction. While it may appear that both the universal end and universal wants approaches is the same, there is a distinction between needs and wants. To

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[3] *Ibid.,*
[4] *Ibid.,* p67
[5] See Fromm, E (1941), *Escape from Freedom,* (New York), Farvar and Rinehart and Atkinson, J. W, (1964), *Introduction to Motivation,* (Princeton), Van Nostrand.
[6] Peretz, P (1978), 'Universal Wants: A Deductive Framework for Comparative Policy Analysis' in Ashford, D. A, *Comparing Public Policies: New Concepts and Methods,* (London), Sage, p118.
[7] Maslow, *Op cit* in 3, p67.

Maslow, Fromm and Atkinson, the total satisfaction of the innate need is the ultimate objective. In other words, there is no degree of satisfaction. The satisfaction is total for the specific need of the whole being. The universal want approach however, is based on degrees of satisfaction.[8] Thus, the universal want approach seems to deal with the desires of the individual rather than his/her innate needs. In essence, Maslow's universal end approach is focussed on the physiological needs of the human species as the human innate needs, while Peretz's universal wants are valued determined.

BASIC HUMAN NEEDS

According to Burton and Vayrynen, the satisfaction of human needs is the starting point in the analysis of International Relations. Although human needs can be classified into basic needs and higher valued needs, the higher valued needs are to a large degree, rarely satisfied.[9] Moreover, the satisfaction of the higher valued needs is not in direct competition with nationalism. In other words, they do not constitute those needs that the human species will pursue to their satisfaction regardless of the effects on him/her or the society. Higher valued needs are negotiable and can be bargained over, altered or traded, unlike basic needs, which are non-negotiable. Basic needs therefore, are not for trading for 'no power, no bargaining, no judicial processes, no mediation, no negotiation technique can alter the importance attached to these needs'.[10] Burton also, had earlier identified the

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[8] Peretz in Ashford, *Op cit.* in 6, p123.
[9] Burton, J and Vayrynen, T (1994), 'The End of International Relations?' in Groom, AJR and Light, M edited, *Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory*, (London), Pinter, p 74
[10] *Ibid.,*

innate needs of the human species in another essay.[11] He argued that the need for food and water are basic to the human species because of its need for growth and development to survive. Thus, the need for growth and development are as basic as the need for food and water.[12] These needs exemplify the 'basic' needs of the individual. Although other higher valued needs of the individual are as basic as the 'basic' need, they are however, value determined. In essence, what Burton and Vayrynen meant by higher valued needs and basic needs is analogous to Maslow's desire and universal ends[13] and Peretz's universal wants.[14] Therefore we can conclude that Burton and Vayrynen have clearly identified and distinguished those needs that fall under the category of physiological needs from other higher valued needs in their hierarchy. For Burton, the innate needs are those that the human species *will* and *must* pursue regardless of the constraints or societal disapproval of the means and methods use in pursuing their satisfaction. The individual will pursue his/her needs either alone or in association with others, regardless of the consequences to self or society. These needs include both the personal and social needs of the human species and the are needs for Stimulus, Security, Identity, Recognition and Distributive Justice.[15]

While I agree with the classification and distinction between basic needs and higher value needs or between universal ends and universal wants, I find Burton's grouping of the need for Distributive Justice and Recognition in the same category with the need for Stimulus,

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[11] Burton, J (1985), 'World Society and Human Needs' in Groom, AJR and Light, M, *International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory,* (London), Pinter
[12] *Ibid*, pp 46-59
[13] Maslow, *Op cit.* in 7, p63
[14] Peretz, *Op cit* in 8, p123
[15] Burton, J (1984), *Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis*, (England), Wheatsealf Books, p39

Security and Identity contradictory. While the individual needs for Identity, Stimulus and Security is, in Maslow's conception, the needs of the individual as an integrated whole, Recognition and Distributive Justice, one can argue, are value determined. They are within the ambit of what Maslow classified as desires and Peretz's universal wants. Human needs that falls within the category of desires or wants, although they may be basic, are not physiological needs, hence, cannot be equated with the need for food, water, growth and development. These physiological needs require Stimulus, Security and Identity (as will be seen in this chapter and in chapter 9) to be achieved. My conclusion therefore, is that Burton has failed to make a clear distinction between innate needs and wants or desires. Although he has identified and distinguished physiological needs from other higher valued (non-physiological) needs, nevertheless, he seems to have classified the concept of 'needs', 'wants' and 'desires' as equal and interchangeable universal ends in themselves.

Another scholar upon whom Burton seems to have drawn is Paul Sites. Sites has outlined the need for Response, Security, Distributive Justice, Meaning, Rationality, and to be seen to be Rational and to Control as basic needs.[16] It seems to me that while both Sites and Burton have attempted to locate the basic needs of man as the innate needs of the human species, they have included social goals, and defined them as innate needs which constitutes the nature of being. An individual who has the need for food, or water will not be interested in the perception of others as to whether s/he is rational or not. For such an individual, it is 'rational' to seek and acquire food or water even if others do not consider the means used in achieving the objectives (goals) Just or Rational. To be in control of the hunger will make more sense that the observance of law or social values. In this case, the

innate need, food is the factor influencing the behaviour of the individual and his/her judgement of what is Just or Unjust, Rational or Irrational. Thus, the categorisation of Rationality, Distributive Justice, Control and Recognition as innate needs is questionable. These are not innate needs but value determined wants. Burton and Sites' classification of social goals and individual preferences with innate needs of the human species led to Olson and Groom's conclusion that 'basic needs may not be universal'. Their conclusion is based on the role of the social environment in human development. Since social environment plays its part in the nurturing of humans, thereby influencing their needs, they argued, 'basic needs may therefore be mediated by culture – different culture'.[17] Olson and Groom's critique is based on the failure of Burton and Sites to distinguish innate needs from societal goals or human desires/wants, which are value determined.

Johan Galtung, on the other hand, identified the need for the integrity of the human body (health), Nourishment (food, water, air), Stimuli (pleasant environment), Output of waste (excretion), Shelter (humidity, temperature), Quietness (sleep, rest), Movement (space), Sex (privacy) and Procreation (reproduction) as the constituents of the basic human needs. Thus, they are physiological needs of the human species.[18] He however classified 'Identity' and 'Freedom', as spiritual needs.[19] It seems to me that, not only has Galtung identified the basic needs of the human species, but he also separated them into innate and spiritual needs, all necessary for the individual's development as an integrated whole (a

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[16] Sites, P (1973), *Control: The Basis of Social Order*, (New York), Dunellen Publishing, p140
[17] Olson, W. C, and Groom, AJR (1991), *International Relations Then and Now*, (London), Harper-Collins, p214
[18] Galtung, J (1996), *Peace by Peaceful Means*, (London), Sage, p127
[19] *Ibid*, p129

point Burton emphasised in his description of the human species[20]). Therefore, Burton's basic need, Maslow's universal ends and Fromm and Atkinson's innate needs are all neatly reflected in Galtung's typology. The question however, is whether or not 'desires' and 'societal goals' are ontological needs? I shall answer this question by looking at the relationship between values and interest in the next section.

VALUE AND INTEREST

Burton's failure to identify and distinguish innate needs from universal wants and desires stems from his usage of the concepts of value and interest. Granted, these concepts have many nuances, however, since the argument is on the innate needs of the human species that are universal, the conception of 'value' and 'interest' should have been made clear and specific. Rightly, Burton noted the difference between the basic needs derived from cultural values and personal interest[21] and clarified that 'values and interests relate to those goals of individuals, parties and cultures that are specific';[22] he nevertheless, classified them as innate needs. In essence, 'values' and 'interests' form part of the physiological needs of the human species and are universal.

By contrast, to make a clear distinction and help our understanding of what constitutes innate needs against universal wants or desires, we need to recognise more specifically than Burton, that values and interests are goals specific to individuals and or groups. Values and interests as defined by each particular individual may not only be different

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[20] Burton, J. W (1983), *Dear Survivor*, (London), Frances Pinter, p216
[21] Burton, *Global Conflict Op cit* in 15, p140

from one individual to another, but also, differ from one culture to another, one society to another and one political system to another. And since the issue in consideration is not the universality of the concepts of 'value' and 'interest' but the universality of human needs, then the subjectivity involved in defining and interpreting these concepts disqualifies them as innate needs. However, *all humans* have values and interests whether as individual or in-groups, but such are pursued or ranked differently by societies, cultures, individuals and political systems. These concepts by themselves are not innate needs based on Maslow's conception of universal end and Fromm and Atkinson's innate needs of the human species.[23] This is a point Burton himself has recognised by stating that 'ontological aspects of behaviour that are predictable, are certain features of behaviour that are not influenced by subjective judgements and cannot be controlled'.[24] Unfortunately, in his work on human nature he seems to have included both variables that are value or interest determined as ontological needs. Burton has done exactly what Smelser has accused social scientists of doing when it comes to defining values. That is, they 'simply identify values as things, which are given in nature'.[25] Rather, he should have recognised the limitation of values to social systems or to 'sets' and 'systems'. Values in general terms, are both desirable end states, and guides to human endeavour. However, they do not contain any specific norms or organisation facilities, which are required to realise these ends. A typical example is the value of Democracy. While it has common features; principles of representation, electoral systems, majority rule, etc, these features do not constitutes a

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[22] *Ibid,* p145

[23] See Maslow, *Op cit* in 13, and Fromm and Atkinson *Op cit* in 5

[24] Burton, *Global Conflict, Op cit* in 22, p17

[25] Smelser, N. J (1962), *Theory of Collective Behaviour,* (London), Routledge and Kegan Paul, p26

specific institutional arrangement.[26] Thus, while Democracy may be a universal value, its practice however, is value determined. Therefore, Distributive Justice, Recognition and Control, as with Democracy, although they may be universal values, they are limited by the values attached to such concepts by the individual or society. In essence, 'values' are not human innate needs in themselves, but societal or culturally defined concepts.

Karl Deutsch attempted to identify the nature of the pursuit of 'interest' in discussing the notion of group interest. According to his definition of a group, it is 'a collection of persons who are linked by shared relevant common characteristics and fulfil some interlocking roles'. For Deutsch, the members of a group resemble one another sufficiently to be recognised as members of such a group, but in other respects, they act in sufficient difference but interlocking ways so as to be able to co-operate and act as a group. On interest, he merely asserted that 'interest in individuals and groups means a distribution of attention and an expectation of rewards'.[27] From Deutsch's definition of a group and the notion of interest, we can identify a value element. While the individual remains an integrated whole in the group with his/her innate needs, such an individual may have to work in co-operation with a group in pursuit of his/her interest. The interest is not the ontological need but the *end* result, which necessitates co-operation. Thus, if the individual is unable to have his/her need satisfied, s/he may become disloyal to the group. An individual's interest therefore, could shift from one group to another in the pursuit of his/her innate needs. We can imply that the degree of co-operation with the group is determined by the value associated with the role of groups in the individual's fulfilment of

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[26] *Ibid.*, p25
[27] Deutsch, K, W (1968), *Analysis of International Relations*, (New Jersey), Prentice-Hall, p50

his/her innate needs. Thus, we can assert that group membership is influenced by human ontological needs, but the degree of co-operation or involvement with the group is determined by the value or interest associated with the group. In essence, conformity with the group's values or interest is dependent on whether there is a convergence between the individual's innate needs and the group's goals (interest, objectives). The goal of the group is to pursue the 'common good' of its members.[28] In conclusion therefore, 'interests' and 'values' are not ontological needs in themselves, but individual concepts articulated and achieved through social and culturally determined concepts. Thus, their interpretation will vary from one individual to another, from one society to another and from one culture to another. Although the general form of the concepts are universal they are however, not universal ends in themselves.

NOTION OF 'COMMON GOOD'

The need for security and identity are universal according to Burton, therefore they constitutes the *hub* of the notion of 'common good'. These needs by nature, he argued, 'are not subject to change like other temporary or cultural values and interest, nor are they necessarily in scarce supply'.[29] However, social institutions tend to define the notion of 'common good' to reflect class and not necessarily common interest.[30] This is because the individual in classical view of society and political theory is seen as a malleable unit, subject to the socialisation process managed by the state. Thus, the goals of the state have become the centre of focus, and not the common good of the human species. The state, in

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[28] Burton, *Global Conflict, Op cit* in 24, pp35-41
[29] *Ibid,* p145

the pursuits of its interest, has invented a new 'man' to fit in with the theories and models of social organisation. It created the 'economic man', the 'legal man' as well as the psychological 'man' and expects him/her to conform to the expectation of institutions. Failure to conform renders him/her a deviant. Consequently, societal interest and individual interest are seen as identical. Hence, societal values and interest may be imposed by a particular class, which have the 'right' to govern and coerce others to obedience.[31] Burton therefore is arguing that the present state system and the importance accorded to it, is at the expense of the ontological needs of man. But because the pursuit of state's or societal interest is not necessarily the interest that may satisfy these needs of the individual, s/he may break the conventions, or disregard the societal values in pursuit of his/her innate needs.

It seems to me that the notion of 'common good', security and identity, as defined by Burton is consistent with the innate needs of the individual that may require him/her to become disloyal or break societal conventions in the pursuit of their satisfaction. Burton also clearly distinguished values and interest from ontological needs. The problem, however, is in identifying what constitutes the ontological needs of man upon which Burton's 'common good' can be pursued by groups. He noted that 'once the needs of individuals which require satisfaction within social system are recognised, it will be possible to generalise and explain and predict the behaviour of the individual'. He then concluded that 'it is possible to develop a theory of behaviour from which it is possible to

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[30] *Ibid*, p20
[31] *Ibid*, p18

arrive at conclusions about behaviour even in the absence of empirical evidence'.[32] Sites has also argued the merely relative importance of empirical evidence in establishing the existence of ontological needs for the development of theories. Sites argued that in using the need concept, the analyst must ever be conscious that "we are operating at an abstract conceptual level and that ... the actual basis of the need is tied up with certain psycho-physiological processes which are in interactions with the environment'. He further argued that 'the fact that these processes are not directly observable, however, should not prevent us from working with the need concept if it allows us better to understand and to explain human activity'. To substantiate his position on the relative importance of empirical evidence to justify the use of the need concept, he pointed out that 'the atom was conceptualised long before it was 'observed''. Thus:

> if we observe certain kinds of activity (or lack of activity) in behaviour which we need to account for, and can do so with the use of certain concepts which do not do violence to other things we know and ... are consistent with other data which cause us to think in the same direction, there is no reason why we should not do so'.[33]

Paul Sites like Burton, does not see the determining nature of empirical evidence to justify the use of a needs approach in the pursuit of common good. Both scholars are convinced that human behaviour by itself has provided the evidence required in justification of the use of a needs concept approach. According to Burton, humans have genetic drives to

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[32] *Ibid*, p20
[33] Sites, *Control: The Basis ... Op cit* in 16, pp66-67

pursue their ontological needs such as 'stimulus, identity, consistency of response and the need for control by the person of his/her environment as a means of pursing these needs'.[34] While I am in agreement with both Sites and Burton on the relative importance of empirical evidence for the same reason that they have outlined, I am however, uncertain with Burton's conclusion that the 'individual's most fundamental drive is to attempt to control his environment in order to meet his needs'.[35] The 'fundamental drive to control' the environment by the human species is not the ontological need, but the *means* of achieving the basic needs. While a particular society or state, may consider 'the control of its environment' to meet its defined objectives or goals, such goals or objectives may not be consistent with the ontological needs of the sum of the individuals within it. Although the reasons for such objectives or goals will be in the pursuit of a 'common good', it however will not necessarily satisfy the ontological needs of the citizens of the state or members of the society.

Thus, I find Galtung's categorisation of Health, Nourishment, Stimuli, need to Excrete, Shelter, Rest, Movement and Reproduction incorporates *all aspects* of the basic needs and therefore, forms the ontological needs of the human species. These basic needs are all within the ambit of physiological needs, but a broader grouping will include Burton's *Security, Identity, Stimulus*, and Galtung's' *Health, Nourishment and Procreation*. In my summation therefore, I conclude that *Welfare* (inclusive of health, excretion and nourishment), *Security* (inclusive of stimuli, rest and movement) and *Identity* (inclusive of procreation and spirituality) constitutes the sum of the human species' innate needs. These

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[34] Burton, *Dear Survivors, Op cit* in 20, p16
[35] *Ibid*, p35

three: *Welfare*, *Security* and *Identity* incorporate both the physiological needs and other higher valued needs of the individual – namely, procreation and spirituality, (the *Security* need of the individual). These needs or quest, I will argue, include *all aspects* of the ontological needs of the human species and can be summed up under the concept of 'physiological security'. Physiological security because they include all aspects of the physiological (basic) needs of man but also includes his/her quest for recognition, mastery of his/her environment, spirituality and continuity – the security dimension. The concept of 'Security' can be defined both in 'objective' and 'subjective' terms. Objective security is 'the relative absence of danger'. If an individual (or a society) is more secure the lower the possibility that s/he (or society) will suffer damage or harm to vital interest.[36] Subjective security on the other hand, is basic and surface security. It means 'the relative absence of anxiety and fear'.[37] Therefore, the concept of security used in relation to the physiological need of the human species deals with the pursuit of both interest and values and the absence of anxiety and fear. In essence, the ontological needs of man includes the provision of the physiological needs of the human species and the absence of anxiety and fear due to the perception of a threat to the individual's (or group's) interest and values. This concept provides a definition of the notion of the 'common good' which public policy should seek to satisfy in order to meet the innate needs of the human species.[38] It also provides the basis of the individual centred analysis. In the next section, I shall relate the notion of 'common good' with the system approach as the unit of analysis in International Relations.

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[36] Bay, C (1958), *The Structure of Freedom*, (Stanford), Stanford University Press, p74
[37] *Ibid.*, p67

SYSTEMS AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS

'States are the resultant of the interacting behaviour of systems. But they are not systems by themselves' according to Burton.[39] His system approach is a departure from states as systems in the Eastonian analysis. When applied to politics, it uniformly describes 'administrative systems' as systems, structured with definite input and support.[40] The World Society system however, is not this kind of system 'and the assumption that they are so would seem to be a carry-over from traditional thinking that regarded states as entities, and moreover, the only actors in World Society'. While states are significant in World Society Burton argued, 'their role and range of activities while increased, it is in relation to systems'. In World Society analysis he concluded, systems comes first and the role of states comes later.[41] For Burton therefore, the World Society approach comprises *sets* of relationships with some at the local, regional, continental and universal levels.

Sets have common features that enable particular relationships within it. However, they affect other non-members of the set in due course.[42] Relationships in *sets* imply communications, transactions and exchanges between units. Thus, while a *set* will have common membership and function, it however, needs to exchange, communicate or interact with other units of the *set*.[43] The states system is a *set* in this regard. It has different units interacting, communicating and exchanging within the system.[44]

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[38] Burton, *Dear Survivors, Op cit.* in 35, p216
[39] Burton, J W (1968), *Systems, States, Diplomacy and Rules*, (Cambridge) Cambridge University Press, p10.
[40] Easton, D (1965), *A Framework for Political Analysis*, (New Jersey), Prentice-Hall
[41] *Ibid.*,
[42] *Ibid.*, pp4-6
[43] *Ibid.*, 6
[44] Burton, J W, (1972), *World Society,* (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p36

International society however, is made up of many systems of which the states system is one. Ethnic groups and nations constitute one system competing with the states system for the loyalty of its members or citizens. Also, there are economic systems and environmental systems, which pose a challenge to ethnic groups, nations and states in obtaining the loyalty of the individual. All systems have values, goals, interests and rules, which may conflict with other systems. Nevertheless, these values, interest and goals constitute the reasons for the existence of the systems. Thus, members of the systems will seek to achieve their goals, interests and objectives or to enforce their values on other systems. 'International society is an intricate network of systems acting upon each other and therefore affecting the units that comprise each'. A system approach in International Relations, Burton asserts, is one that involves 'a progression from the relatively simple – features common to all systems – to the very complex features common to particular types of highly developed system'.[45] It is a study of World Society without borders since systems have no such boundaries but are functionally linked.[46]

It seems that the notion of 'common good' and human ontological needs are the *hub* of Burton's proposition. He stated that 'people have a psychological need to identify with others; first from childhood with the family and kin group, then wider social groups, then the nation and state'. Also, 'each people are influenced by its own material circumstances including climate, geographical position, available resources and living standards, and by

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[45] Burton, *Op cit.* in 39, p6
[46] *Ibid.*, p8

its traditions and culture. Each has it own fears, envies, hope and ambitions'.[47] He posited that:

> if there were to be discovered a definite set of human needs on the basis of which societies could be harmonious, major methodological problems in behavioural science and in policy-making would be avoided. If there were agreement as to human needs then there would be a logical starting point of behavioural analysis for there would be a scientific basis for determining goals.[48]

Burton has argued along with Sites elsewhere[49] on the relative importance of empirical evidence to prove the existence of universal needs of the human species. It holds therefore, that Burton believes that the acceptance of the individual as the unit of analysis in behavioural science will enable the formulation of effective public policy and remove the methodological problems associated with policy making.

The failure of public policy makers to focus on the pursuit of 'common good' based on the ontological needs of the human species is due to the differences in values and interests as conceived by individuals, societies and states. Paul Sites has argued that the individual usually acts through an identity group, which has effective power over him. It is this identity group to which the individual responds and not other authorities.[50] In other words,

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[47] *Ibid.,* p33

[48] Burton, J. W (1979), *Deviance, Terrorism and War*, (Oxford), Martin Robertson, p63

[49] See Burton, *Op cit.* in 32, p20 and Sites, *Op cit.* in 33, pp66-67

[50] Sites, *Op cit.* in 16

the individual loyalty is to the values the identity represents and will therefore pursue its interests, objectives and goals. While this may be so, such values, interests, goals and objectives must have resonance to the individuals. Although Sites did not clarify whether he included the innate needs of the human species in the pursuit of goals, and values of the identity group, he implied that humans find meaning and fulfilment (satisfaction) by acting through *identity* groups. Burton also, in asserting that 'the individual does not owe his allegiance to the nation-state but to an ethnic group with which he identifies'[51] implied that the individual has some aspects of his ontological needs fulfilled by belonging to an ethnic group. It seems to me that both Sites and Burton dwell much on the security dimension of human ontological needs. While, membership of ethnic or identity groups may provide a sense of security, thus giving meaning and recognition to the individual, such security does not fulfil his/her physiological needs.

In Karl Deutsch's description of the relationship between individuals and interest groups (nation, kin-group, a people), he argued that such relationship is based on many rewards, values, solidarity et cetera the memberships offers.[52] In other words, the nation, kin-group et cetera is a centre of identity for the individual based on his/her pursuit of individual as well as collective needs. Deutsch seems to relate the need for ethnic/national identity to the pursuit of physiological security need. Box on the other hand, in his explanation of deviant behaviour of individuals, asserts that 'a person's behaviour deviant or otherwise, lay not within him, but in his surrounding circumstances'.[53] He further explained that

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[51] See Burton, *Systems, States... Op cit.* in 47, p25 and 'World Society and Human Needs' in Groom and Light (ed.), *International relations: a Current theory ... Op cit.* in 12, p46
[52] Deutsch, *Op cit* in 27, p67
[53] Box, S (1971), *Deviance, Reality and Society*, (London), Holt, Rinehart and Winston Ltd., p5

subscribers to one culture normally attempt to have its major principles *legalised*, thus, transforming their culture into the dominant culture. However, they do often fail to succeed because substantial sections of the population may prefer or even demand to behave according to their own cultural standard. Thus, they withhold their consent to the legal code, or at least part of it. 'The issues of legitimisation' he concluded, ' is therefore one of the sources of tension in society...'[54] Box like Burton and Sites seems to dwell on values, rather than the physiological needs of the individual. Although Johan Galtung dwelled on values also, he made a distinction between Western and Eastern (non-western Society). According to Galtung, the Occidental (Western) culture sees society as individualistic and vertical with the strong male on top. It sees human nature as based on conflict, hence, conflict are 'natural/normal' in human beings. The Oriental (Eastern) culture on the other hand, sees human nature as co-operative, hence, co-operation is 'natural/normal' in human beings, because human spirituality, rather than beastly attitudes are on the surface. The Oriental is the opposite of the Occidental.[55] They however, all dealt with the security/identity dimension of human ontological needs without any direct reference to the physiological needs. It seems to me that they have taken the availability of food and water and all other physiological needs in Western societies for granted.

However, all the scholars seem to agree on the role of identity group as providing succour to the individual, hence, a source of his/her security; however, because they are value determined, they represent a source of conflict. In essence, the causal factors to conflict are not the pursuit of physiological needs but the need for security. If the policy makers

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[54] *Ibid.*, p7
[55] Galtung, *Peace by ... Op cit.* in 19, pp80-120

will seek to provide physiological needs without creating insecurity, they would have succeeded in satisfying the common good for all. Burton has however explained the reasons for the failure to achieve the common good based on the ontological needs of the human species. He argued that, because elites will seek to pursue their interest within existing institutions and structures, they enforce their interest against the common good of the population, thus, causing conflicts.[56] The 'common good' he argued, does not stem from a compromise between the social good as defined by interest groups that exercise political power on the interest of the individual'.[57] For him therefore, the common good can only be achieved on the basis of the ontological needs of man and he suggested a Zonal functional system as the most appropriate approach. A 'new structure must be formed on the basis of what is in existence for any attempt to introduce structure that does not include what is in existence will fail' he advised. Matters that are of common concerns are to be negotiated on a functional basis, that is, by officials who act as specialist in respects of particular administrative areas'.[58] Galtung seems to hold similar views. He proposed that an 'associated or horizontal integration: joining nations together by the principle of affinity because they have some kind of similarity' should be introduced. 'This is *Functionalism*' he asserts, 'and [it will] lead to an intergovernmental governmental organisation, an IGO. Thus, a super-IGO can evolve from the functional integration' he concluded.[59] Both Burton and Galtung seem to agree on the solution of policy making to circumvent conflicts based on the pursuits of values and interests to be found in a Functional approach.

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[56] Burton, *Global Conflict, Op cit.* in 32, p35
[57] *Ibid.,* p41
[58] *Ibid.,* pp92, 96-97
[59] Galtung, *Peace by... Op cit.* in 55, pp375- 9

In conclusion, it seems that both Burton and Galtung recognised the limitation of the Western political system and the negative impact of its imposition of values, conceived and presented as *universal* in the pursuit of common good. They also agree that the ontological needs of the human species should be the basis of systems interactions. The problem however, is how to deal with the interests of political elites and the interest of states as they seek to impose a hierarchy of power based on their attempt to monopolise power.

In the next chapter, I shall be evaluating the Mitranian Functional theory of political action as a framework for political organisation.

CHAPTER 7

ARGUING MITRANY AND FUNCTIONALISM

The Functional approach to politics as propounded by David Mitrany, is generally described by the terms Functionalism and International Functionalism – which Mitrany himself did not use in describing his work. Critics of Mitrany have found fault with his assumptions, assertions and failure to argue convincingly, the role of human contingencies in his propositions. While the focus of this chapter is not to hold court for Mitrany, I will however be drawing from scholars who have done so. I shall be arguing that while the Functional approach certainly has its discrepancies, the bulk of the criticisms are based on a generalised assumption that the approach is a theory of integration. This generalised assumption has led to the measuring of Mitrany's works against integration programmes, thus, perpetuating the criticisms. In this chapter, I shall make a distinction between Mitrany's Functional approach as a theory of politics or political action and Ernest Haas' Functionalism as a theory of integration. To achieve the objective of the chapter, I shall evaluate Mitrany's Functional approach and Haas' Functionalism. The chapter will also be arguing that, far from presenting a limited theory of integration, the Functional approach remains a theory of political action which, - (in agreement with Dorothy Anderson's appreciation of the Life of David Mitrany[1]), - remains very relevant in its attempt to include the individual in politics at the point of his/her interest in a globalising world.

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[1] Anderson, D (1998), 'David Mitrany (1888-1975): An Appreciation of his life and work', *Review of International Studies,* Volume 24, No. 4, October.

THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

In her evaluation of Mitrany's Functional approach and responding to the general critique that the Approach is based on utopian ideals, Cornelia Navari asserts that the Functional approach is primarily a theory of political action, but also, a contribution to integration theories and International Relations. She summed up her conviction thus:

> If by idealist, we mean Carr's 'Utopia' – belief in a rational and evolutionary social process, entailing a necessary quotient of international co-operation: and belief in the possibility of a developing harmony between societies which could be rationally comprehended and planned for – then, yes, Mitrany is undoubtedly an idealist. Otherwise, he was a realist in the sense of the word.[2]

Navari's assertion understandably, is a reaction to the general dismissal of the Mitranian approach as idealist. Diligent student's of Mitrany's works will come to the conclusion that far from idealism, the Functional approach remains a relevant theory of political action based on the assumption of rationality and the evolutionary process of human development. In evaluating the difference between the Mitranian approach and Haas' Functionalism, David Long and Lucian M. Ashworth assert, 'there is ... yet an important distinction; between the functional approach created by Mitrany and the later portrayals of functionalism that were attributed to Mitrany'. Mitrany himself, they argued, never used the term functionalism to

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[2] Navari, C (1995), 'International Functionalism' in Long, D and Wilson, P (eds.) *Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis*, (Oxford), Clarendon, p236

describe his own ideas. Rather, it was in response to Haas' attempt to critique his work that he used the term.[3] Mitrany objected the ascription of Haas' version of functionalism to him. He maintained that Haas' views were significantly different in intent and context from his own work.[4] In essence, what is now described as Functionalism was to a great extent, defined by Haas. It was Haas who conceived what was, and to some extent is still being, considered Mitranian Functional approach. Haas did not only critique his conception of what he has attributed to Mitrany, but also, pressed further to produced an alternative version of Functionalism - Neofunctionalist. Long and Ashworth conclude that in trying to sum up Mitrany's ideas as part of his formulation of an alternative, he created 'a systematised form of functions distinct from Mitrany's approach'.[5]

Mitrany's pragmatic ideas on political action can be traced back to his personal life experiences. Although born in Romania, his Jewish heritage became a stumbling block in his quest for personal fulfilment. His education was restricted due to the discrimination against his Jewish heritage, so also was his ambition to become an Officer during his compulsory military service as a Romanian citizen. Consequently, he had to find alternative ways to pursue his interest. To this regard, he studied as a mature student at the Kolonial Institute in Hamburg while 'gathering a little money in a business office'. After 'gathering' enough money, he left for England and registered to do Sociology and Economics at the LSE while working as a Social Worker.[6] Combining Sociology, Economics, Social Work and

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[3] Long, D and Ashworth, L. M (1999), 'Working for Peace: the Functional Approach, Functionalism and Beyond' in *New Perspectives on International Functionalism*, (London), Macmillan, edited by Long, D and Ashworth, L. M, p3

[4] See Mitrany, D (14/2/63) 'Note for Ernest Haas', Unpublished paper from the Mitrany's Collection at the London School of Economics Library (henceforth referred to as *Mitrany Papers*).

[5] Long, and Ashworth, *Op Cit*, p3

[6] Anderson, D *Op Cit*, p577.

Journalistic experience prepared him for the later development of his life and hence, his ideas. His Functional approach can be seen as the sum of his life experience. He had observed events in different countries; the problems associated with sanctions; minorities' rights; nationalism; land disputes; agrarian reforms and the increasingly close relationship between politics and economics.[7] Anderson notes that Mitrany's life long creed was expressed in a private letter to Felix Frankfurter in May 1925. 'But I have never suffered from dogmatism. My interest is to see some development in the organisation of peace, and I care little how it is done and by whom it is done as long as it takes us towards that end', Mitrany wrote.[8] Long and Ashworth note that Mitrany described his work as 'functional approach' or 'functional theory' precisely to avoid being tied down to an implied ideological dogma which, he considered was inflexible. He holds the view that when ideas are presented as a set of 'isms' or dogma they lose their ability to change.[9] Judging from his private letter to Felix Frankfurter and his dislike of ideological dogma, we can understand why he avoided the use of the term 'functionalism' for his approach, but rather, described it as an 'approach' and later upgraded it to 'a theory of politics', thus avoiding the use of 'ism'.[10] We can therefore conclude that Haas' functionalism was quite different from the Mitranian approach since it was focused on deriving a systematic 'theory of international integration'. Long and Ashworth conclude that Haas modified the functional approach to this end, hence, his Neofunctionalism differs fundamentally from the original formulation of the Mitranian approach.[11] A. J. R. Groom had also made a similar observation. He argued that most critics

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[7] See *Ibid,* for a comprehensive bibliography of Mitrany's works, which include his writing on these issues. His works can be found at the London School of Economics.

[8] Quoted in *Ibid,*

[9] Long and Ashworth, *Op Cit,* p7

[10] See Mitrany, D (1975), *The Functional Theory of Politics,* (London), Martin Roberts for the presentation of his approach as 'a theory of politics'.

[11] Long and Ashworth, *Op Cit,*

of Functionalism are in essence, critiquing Neofunctionalism and not the Mitranian approach.[12]

The Functional approach stems from Mitrany's concern with the peasants, land tenure and agrarian reforms.[13] This led to his desire to develop a simple and pragmatic theory of politics to work with, and for people. A theory which focuses on co-operation and matters that unite rather than divide. To look for solutions by functions and not form; to consider people's common interests whatever their country, nationality and religion; and to work on what can be done practically, step by step in preference to rigid solutions which required legality and constitutions and political agreement. The Functional approach is a theory of politics based on compassion and tolerance. Due to his conviction of the relationship between economics and politics, and belief that there was very little to separate between the two, because decisions on one aspects would be dominated by the policies of the other, he accepted the Uniliver appointment as an adviser on International Affairs.[14] The Functional theory of politics, for Mitrany, represents an anxiety, a *mode* of thinking rooted in the concerns with social and economic changes as they affect the world.[15] It is an approach he argued, of which, time and period are relative as long as the concerns prompting the anxiety remains unresolved. To resolve the anxiety, a framework based on co-operation in the areas of economic and social interactions of people is required. His emphasis on economic and social interaction was based on the belief that politics is the cause of conflicts and wars due to its

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[12] Groom, AJR (1994), 'Neofunctionalism: A case of Mistaken identity' in Nelsen, B. F and Stubb, A. C-G (eds.), *The European Union* (London), Lynne Rienner, p112

[13] See Mitrany, D (1951), *Marx Against the Peasants*, (London), George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. Mitrany considered this work as a very important contribution.

[14] See Anderson, *Op Cit*, pp580-82

[15] Mitrany, D (1948), "The Functional Approach to World Organisation" in *International Affairs*, XXIV July, p350

divisive nature. Therefore, a framework, which allows the balancing of benefits and mutual interest through co-operation rather than the traditional balance of power system, is the only effective way to circumvent the problems of conflicts and wars in the world.[16] Conflicts and wars are the consequences of the creation of territories, he argued, unfortunately, recreating or *uniting* them by constitutional means will not provide the unity required.[17] Mitrany also argued that functional developments are already in existence and only needed articulating. The articulation did not constitute the creation of new systems but merely highlighting the human habitual search for a unified formal order and the rationalising of what was already in existence.[18] Since social activities were cut off arbitrarily by the pursuit of political interest, they could be linked again to similar activities across political boundaries he argued. In allowing their linkage, the catalyst of conflicts would have been removed or rendered of little impact.[19]

The Functional theory of politics was therefore, not initially related to the questions of regional integration unless in application to it. This is different from Haas' Functionalism.[20] The Functional theory is concerned with the conditions for general peace and avoidance of war in international relations.[21] As Paul Taylor noted, Mitrany presented his work as advice to National governments on how best to guarantee peace at the conclusion of the war.[22] In

[16]Mitrany, D (1975), *The Functional Theory of Politics*, (London), Martin Roberts, p20

[17]*Ibid*, p115

[18]*Ibid*, p118

[19]Mitrany, D (1946), *A Working Peace System* 4ed, (London), National Peace Council, p50

[20] Haas, E. B (1968), *Beyond the Nation-State*, (Stanford), Stanford University Press, p26 in particular.
[21] Harrison, R. J (1974), *Europe in Question*, (London), George Allen and Unwin Ltd., p27
[22] Taylor, P (1990) 'Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany' in Groom, AJR and Taylor, P (eds.),

essence, he was more concerned with the conditions for preserving general peace and avoiding war in international relations. R. J Harrison summed up Mitrany's view of the world as, 'a world broken up into self-identifying, self-centred communities whose jealous rivalry erupts occasionally into violence'. To prevent the eruption of violence and ensure peaceful integration, it is necessary to create the element of international community.[23] Navari on the other hand, argues that Mitrany's aim was to develop the scheme into a general theory of political action.[24] The Functional approach, she concludes, was not a wartime product. In her assessment, the ideas of the approach were already in the Briand Plan of 1930 and were first handed out in Mitrany's third Dodge lecture at Yale in 1932. His ideas, Navari argues, were linked to the English pluralist school, which was strongly anti-state.

The English pluralists were in favour of some degree of 'functional representation'. They considered representation by groups, churches, trade unions, and voluntary associations et cetera as necessary to supplement or even replace the Centralist state with its plenitude of sovereign powers. The 'English pluralist doctrine' Navari asserted, 'became Mitrany's theoretical life blood'. So much that he continued with the doctrine even when it has past its time in England.[25] While holding firm to the pluralist doctrine, Mitrany added to it, his special concern - peasant movements and parties. Mitrany, according to Navari, developed ideas about the state that was not entirely shared by the English pluralists concerning the relative autonomy of the state and the important role of social ideology in affecting political

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Frameworks for International Co-operation, (New York), St Martins Press, p130
[23] Harrison, *Op Cit.*
[24] Navari, *Op Cit*, p217
[25] *Ibid*, p218

development. Thus, he parted ways with them.[26]   For Mitrany, the revolutions in Eastern Europe and Asia during the early twentieth century was essentially peasant based/led and not Marxist.[27]   Navari therefore asserted that Mitrany saw both the Marxist and the Liberals as 'not having any much sympathy for the peasants'.[28]   Concluding from these assertions, the Mitranian approach can be seen as not only a response to specific wartime peace requirement, but rather, an attempt to create a political theory, which includes peasant movements and parties in the domestic realm of politics and also, at the international sphere. In essence, it is not a theory of integration but political action.[29]

Mitrany's proposition is based on the developments of social life since the 19th century, which was structured as highly integrated units with, the political outlook bound to the mosaic of separate national units. This, he argued, was a legacy of the Middle ages when social life consisted of small and largely independent self-sufficient local units. Therefore, while the 19th century introduced modernity, it also introduced two separate opposite lines of interaction: politically, the rise of the state based on the principles of self-determination,[30] and the growth in the doctrine of division of labour to achieve economic self-sufficiency. These two opposite lines, Mitrany argued, destroyed the ability of individuals and groups to develop communication through the natural process. People become increasingly bound together due to the forces of the state.[31] The problem is, how to reconcile and satisfy the deep rooted

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[26] Navari, *Op Cit*, p219

[27] Mitrany, *Marx Against ...Op Cit.*

[28] Navari, *Op Cit*, p219

[29] *Ibid*, p216

[30] The Paris Conference in 1919 encoded the principles of self-determination as a right for groups of people who consider themselves separate and distinct from others to seek a state of their own and form a government. Thus, the Conference accorded the principle of recognition as a basis for National self-determination.

[31] Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* 4ed, *Op Cit* in ..., pp5-6

loyalties of individuals (social, economic, cultural and genealogical) to groups in their search for material efficiency and social betterment within the state system.

The Functional approach therefore, seeks to reconcile these human quests by the organisation of interactions and transactions: 'to link authority to a specific activity, [thereby breaking] away from the traditional link between authority and a definite territory (perpetuated by either an association or federation of nations)'.[32] Mitrany believed that: 'A world society [is] more likely to grow through doing things together in workshops and market places rather than by signing pacts in chancelleries.[33] The state system is the cultural side of Western civilisation, while the development of the economic system represents its material side.[34] These two systems not only remain paramount in the development of the political system, but also, operate in the same way at both national and international levels. And from these two systems, emerges two distinct needs clearly visible in the process of global development: 1) the need of national self-governments; and 2) the need for radical social change to encompass the problems of global society. These two needs although, distinctive, are inextricably linked[35] regardless of what form they take in the different parts of the world he argued. Consequently, functional arrangements will link them, he posited.

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[32]*Ibid,*

[33]*Ibid,* p5

[34]*Ibid,* p6

[35]Mitrany, 'The Functional Approach to World Organisation', *Op Cit.*

FUNCTIONALISM REDEFINED[36] - NEOFUNCTIONALISM

Haas undertook to show the incomprehensiveness and impracticality of what he conceived as the Mitranian Functional theory.[37]   As a follow-up to his critique, he proposed the Neofunctionalist theory as a redefinition of Functionalism using the European experience as case study.[38] Haas' Neofunctionalism is seen as an empirical framework, which, unlike the Mitranian Functional approach (which is systemic with the individual as the unit of analysis) took the state as its unit of analysis.   While the Mitranian approach is a theory of political action, Neofunctionalism on the other hand, is a theory of integration.   Groom has reiterated that although, Haas' work is conceptualised and dubbed Neofunctionalism, 'it is in both spirit and fact, far from the tenets of Functionalism'.[39] Haas considered Functionalism as a theory of integration to have 'been cut down to size' due to its linkage to the notion of community. 'If integration is held to be linked to the notion of 'community' in the *Gemeinschaft* sense and functional co-operation is confined to commonly perceived interest that produce *ad hoc* and asymmetrical relations' he argued, 'then Functionalism is merely the international application of *Gessellschaft*'.   Therefore, functional activities, he concluded, need not be related to community building, thus, rendering functional ideology irrelevant.[40]   For Haas, the Mitranian approach as a theory of integration deprives the analyst 'the possibility of viewing international relations in evolutionary terms and condemns us to a conceptual and empirical straitjacket'. The only remedy to this problem is to employ functional biology in showing

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[36] Haas, E. B, *Op Cit*, p26 in particular.
[37] Haas, *Beyond ... Op Cit,*
[38] Haas, *The Uniting ... Op Cit.*
[39] Groom, AJR, (1994), 'Neofunctionalism: A case of Mistaken identity' in Nelsen, B. F and Stubb, A. C-G (eds.), *The European Union* (London), Lynne Rienner, p112
[40] Haas, *Beyond ...* p26

how *Gessellschaft* can develop into *Gemeinschaft*[41] he asserts. While Haas considers the notion of 'community' as central to the theory of integration, his point of departure from Mitrany is in its definition and evolutionary nature. Whereas, Haas has defined 'community' in relation to the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gessellschaft*, Mitrany also defined 'community' in those two senses, however, the usage of the terms differs. For Mitrany, the first notion of community is in the sense of an ethnic and national community. This is *Gemeinschaft* by nature, due to genealogical factors. A second notion could be defined as the sum of functions performed, by its members. It is this second notion of 'community' that the sense of a *Gessellschaft*[42] can be seen. Thus the Mitranian conception of 'community' entails 1) an exiting *Gemeinschaft* and 2) a *Gessellschaft* seeking to become a *Gemeinschaft*.[43] This is different from Haas' definition. Haas' 'community' is essentially *Gessellschaft*, which will evolve to become a *Gemeinschaft*.[44] Thus, while both scholars have 'community' as central to their theories, they differ in their understanding and its definition. Whereas Mitrany has taken ethnic and national identities in consideration as well as the nature of the state, Haas on the other hand, was only concerned with the nature of the state, thereby excluding ethnic and national identities. For Haas, therefore, the 'community' is the sum of functions within the state. In essence, ethnic or national identities have no room in the evolution from the *Gessellschaft* to *Gemeinschaft*.

Groom explained that Haas' dismissal of the Mitranian approach due to its linkage to community is due to his conception of the idea of integration in the context of the United

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[41] *Ibid,*
[42] Mitrany, *Functional theory ... Op Cit,* pp139-145
[43] *Ibid,*
[44] Haas, *Beyond ... Op Cit.*

States political system.[45] Haas' Neofunctionalism theory followed this line of argument. It was aimed at describing what is happening in the European experience and to prescribe what should be done to further the process of integration.[46] The logic of Neofunctionalism is that functions should be transferred to a new central authority in relatively painless instalments without frightening any one. The transfer should be such that in each instance, it will not be enough to destroy the foundation of states' sovereignties. The transfer of such competence, it is argued will facilitate further transfers of other competencies in a pragmatic way so that such competencies go together and cannot be properly managed apart. The successful achievement of such transfers would enhance the acceptability of further transfers – the 'functional imperative',[47] according to Neofunctionalist theory. Groom asserted that Haas and his fellow American scholars saw "functionalism" (Neofunctionalism) as having the merit of being compatible with American experience and of been sufficiently flexible and applicable to the context of the European experience. Groom, concluded that in essence, "functionalism" became anti-Functionalism and not *Neo*-functionalism as conceived by Haas. The only area that bears a resemblance to the Mitranian Functional approach was the learning process. But even that, Groom argued, remained a controversial area.[48]

Whereas the Mitranian Functional approach did not specify conditions required for integration to occur (apart from the organisation of activities based on their functions, with functions determining the form of structures), Neofunctionalist success is dependant on the satisfaction of certain conditions. A degree of homogeneity at both levels of development

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[45] Groom, in Stubb, *Op Cit,* p112
[46] *Ibid,* p113
[47] Haas, *Uniting of... Op Cit.*
[48] Groom, in Stubb, *Ibid, p113*

(social, economic and political) and basic values; a network of transactions, which gives rise to mutual knowledge and sense of mutual relevance, compatibility, decision-making processes, compatible expectation especially and a belief that future problems can be met in as mutually acceptable a manner as possible is required.[49] The fulfilment of these conditions will lead to the creation of a new supranational authority within a defined geographical area, which can be characterised as *Gessellschaft* integration. This *Gessellschaft* will give way to *Gemeinschaft* first at the elite level and later at the mass level.[50] Mitranian Functional approach on the other hand, de-emphasises the role of territorial boundaries. Instead of sectoral transfers by political decision, it encourages co-operation (integration) through transactions and interactions through the pursuits of functional interest. Whereas the Mitranian approach is a theory of political action, aimed at replacing the state system, Neofunctionalism on the other hand is 'merely a stratagem to give a new lease of life to the state system, not a device for its demise'.[51] Thus, Neofunctionalism 'owes far more to its "federal" goal than it does to its "Functionalist" means, Groom concluded.[52]

ARGUING THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH

The most ardent critics of the Mitranian approach are mainly scholars from America.[53] Theirs, and other critics arguments can be grouped into three main categories: 1) state system

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[49] Haas, *Uniting ... Op Cit.*
[50] Haas, *Beyond ... Op Cit,* p26
[51] Groom, in Stubb, *Op Cit,* p115
[52] Groom, *Ibid,* p123
[53] See Haas, E. B, (1968), *The Uniting ... Op Cit,* Lindberg, L (1963), *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration,* (Stanford), Stanford University Press; Etzioni, A (1965), *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces,* (New York), Holt, Rinehart and Winston; Sewell, J. P (1966), *Functionalism and World Politics: A Study based on UN Programmes Financing Economic Development,* (Princeton), Princeton University Press and Claude, I. L (1971), *Swords into Ploughshares: the Problem of*

and the question of sovereignty; 2) transfer of loyalties from states to functional authorities and; 3) the method of organising and structuring of functional activities to ensure separation of welfare issues from politics. I shall discuss these categories in relation to Mitrany's conception of the issues raised.

THE STATE SYSTEM AND SOVEREIGNTY

Mitrany cited M. J Petot (a French scholar) who has argued that 'a number of Specialised authorities could never build a complete state'. Therefore, Functionalism cannot replace the state.[54] This criticism and similar valid arguments presented, according to Navari, stems from Mitrany's failure to indicate what the end product of functional arrangements will be. Will functional arrangement lead to the creation of an alternative to the state system (a federation or an economic integration)? Thus, she argued that he failed to provide any full social or political theory to underpin his theory. Thereby failing to provide 'much more in the way of analytical tools' with which to measure and analyse 'spillover', 'transfer of loyalties', and 'supranational competencies' from the process of integration. In this respect, Navari agrees with Neofunctionalist criticism and postulates.[55] While acknowledging the criticism, Long and Ashworth relate the misconception to Haas. They argued that while Haas' conception of functionalism entails an ultimate replacement of the state by regional and global international organisations, the Mitranian approach however, does not entail the replacement of the state by any general-purpose regional or global international organisation. Rather, it is precisely to

International Organisation, (New York), Random

[54] Mitrany, D (1965), 'The prospect of European Integration' in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, December, p145

avoid formal, constitutionally based political organs at the international level that the functional approach emphasises the primacy of functional arrangements.[56] While Haas conceives Mitrany as advocating government by experts,[57] his conclusion can only be related to the impression Mitrany himself often gives in his latter works in the praise of International Functional Organisation such as the UN agencies. In spite of such praise, Mitrany remains deeply concerned with the need for representation and democracy, Long and Ashworth concludes.[58] Moreover, the notion of 'experts' did not appear in his *A Working Peace System* although the idea of effective management as opposed to formal democratic notions of equal representation does.[59] Charles Pentland, however, holds the view that the Mitranian approach is based on a functionally organised world with overlapping, non-congruent international functional organisation, which also includes territorial states.[60] In essence, it is not about replacing the state. Therefore, M. J Petot and other critics based their arguments on Haas' Functionalism.

Justin D. Cooper has argued that Mitrany marries the liberal tradition of inter-nationalism and the English pluralists' challenge to the ascendancy of the state, thereby, extending both. *The Progress of International Government* was derived from the English pluralists desire to transcend the individualism of politics and the practice of liberalism by recognising the role of social structures as intermediaries between the states and the individuals, he maintained. Mitrany therefore critiqued the form of 'state fixation' which, tends to exclude the individual, and calls for a legitimate political authority which will involve individuals as key partners in

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[55] Navari, *Op Cit*, p234
[56] Long and Ashworth, *Op Cit*, p9 and also, Mitrany, *A Working Peace System ... Op Cit*, pp211-12.
[57] Haas, *Beyond the Nation State ... Op Cit*, p21
[58] Long and Ashworth, *Op Cit*, p9
[59] Mitrany, A Working Peace ... *Op Cit*,
[60] Pentland, C (1993), *International Theory and European Integration*, (London), Faber and Faber, p64.

political developments.[61] While other pluralists worked primarily in a national context in their conception, thus, perpetuating the increasing differentiating of global society, Mitrany was arguing that certain associations and social activities were becoming increasingly international in scope. The development raises the prospect and need to reshape political authority not only at the sectoral devolution sought by the pluralists, but also, at a level of sectoral integration at the international level. In essence, he moved beyond the liberal bias against politics and the pluralist drive to limit the state. Instead, he envisioned functional international organisations as a structural alternative to the state.[62] For Mitrany, the state has outlived its usefulness since it fails to make its members happy. A new arrangement that will enable the individual participation and thus, happiness (chapter 6) is required.[63]

Although Mitrany was not a World Society theorist, his theory had the resonance of a single global community feature.[64] Thus, while opposing the organisation of politics on the basis of the parliamentary system, he failed 'to say what would replace the state system, which he opposed and consider as being divisive'.[65] Looking at the arguments Mitrany presented in support of his theory, one gets the impression that his focus was not primarily on the international dimension of his ideas. Rather, he was attempting to build a new political theory based on functional interest. Thus, his theory could be applicable to both the domestic, regional and international dimension of politics.[66] Therefore, since the argument was based on the arrangement of functions without totally dismissing the role of politics, it is difficult to

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[61] Cooper, J. D (1999), 'Organising for Peace: Science, Politics and Conflict in the Functional Approach' in Long and Ashworth edited, *New Perspectives on ... Op Cit*, p28
[62] *Ibid*, p29
[63] Mitrany, D (1933), *The Progress of International Government*, (London), Allen and Unwin, p19
[64] Mitrany, *A Working Peace ... Op Cit*.
[65] Navari, *Op Cit*, p231
[66] Mitrany, *Functional Theory ... Op Cit,* pp145-215

provide any clearly defined alternative to the state. The state was to be reduced to an administrative role from its executive role. In essence, Mitrany was not suggesting a replacement of the state system, but a different theory of political action. He considered the parliamentary system as part of the problem of political administration. Navari noted that Mitrany considered the 'classic answer or the "form of government" as part of the problem' hence, his suggestion of a functional "devolution and evolution" where problems could be devolved [*downwards*] to different regions, within the state or [*upward*] to International Organisation'. This pattern of devolution, Navari stated, was defined generally by the virtue and scope of the problem being addressed. If the problem were considered to be national, then a segment of national administration is employed. On the other hand, if it is regional or global, then the appropriate authority will be employed.[67] Mitrany's theory therefore, is based on the notion of representation by 'specialism'. This, he argued will bring the citizen into the process of government on his/her own specialist level and capacity as an elector.[68] We can conclude that Mitrany was neither against the state system nor its replacement. His aim was to provide a theory of political action centred on functional activities in the pursuit of socio-economic and cultural benefits.

TRANSFER OF LOYALTIES

Juliet Lodge finds the tenets of Functionalism on the shifting nature of the loyalty of individuals from states' sentiments (nationalism and territorial sovereignty) to functional authorities, which satisfies their needs for welfare interest disturbing. Lodge understood the

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[67] Navari, *Op Cit*, p225
[68] Mitrany, D (1975), 'A Political Theory for a New Society' in *Functionalism: Theory and Practice* edited by

Functionalist conception of transfer or 'change' in loyalty of individuals to imply that loyalty is indivisible and can only be transferred or 'change' on a zero-sum basis. Consequently, a contradiction to the concept of individuals' ability to identify and participate in the various functions which serves their interest. Lodge also finds the Functional theory wanting in its ability to distinguish between the provision of private and public socio-economic goods by supranational agencies. Such separation, she argued, will create a dichotomy between the pursuance of 'common good' on the one hand, and the satisfaction of *individuals'* socio-economic needs. Her conclusion, is that while Functionalists adhered to the notion of loyalty transfer being predicated upon a rational utilitarian exchange relationship; they overlook the fact that loyalties were rarely, if ever, owed to abstract ideas or impersonal institutions.[69] Lodge is not the only critic of Functionalism. Navari has pointed out that most critics of Functionalism actually subsume Neofunctionalist arguments for the Mitranian Functional theory.[70] Haas on his part sees only two ways of understanding the Functional approach's view on interest representation. It could either be through a mechanical derivation or a utopian approach. By that, Haas implies that interest representation can either be achieve simply by delegation through the narrow collective interest of the members or, through the decision of a select group of experts who somehow represent the interest of the greater whole.[71] Mitrany however, did not share Haas' view upon which much of the criticism to his ideas and Lodge's discontent has been based. For him, the two goals of functional organisation were to rescue democratic government and facilitate international co-operation.[72]

Groom, AJR and Taylor, P (London), University of London Press, p31
[69] Lodge, J (1978), 'Loyalty and the EEC: The limit of the Functional Approach' in *Political Studies,* Vol. XXVI No. 2, p234

[70] Navari, *Op Cit.*
[71] Haas, Beyond the Nation ... *Op Cit*, p30
[72] Mitrany, Mitrany Papers, *Op Cit,*

In his defence of Functionalism, Groom argued that Neofunctionalism (often referred to as Functionalism) has more in common with Federalism than Functionalism itself. Therefore, most critics of Functionalism are in essence, critiquing Neofunctionalism.[73] Ashworth notes that Mitrany recognised the power of nationalism (which he disliked), hence he sought to diminish its power in people's lives by attempting to circumscribe its role so that it could not clash with liberal world-order goals. Consequently, his emphasis was on human needs - discussed in chapter 6. If the fulfilment of human needs is placed above the needs of states, culture will be pushed back into its proper place – local levels and the private sphere. State-based solutions are flawed precisely because they attempt to solve problems of interdependence through an organisation that stresses cultural separateness. While culture is a social fact (chapter 6), it can be by-passed and restrained, but ideology, a political imposition should be avoided.[74] To circumscribe nationalism and circumvent the issue of cultures (discussed in chapters 8, 9 and 10), which impinge on the ability to meets human needs, a functional organisation of the world will serve as a vehicle for International planning, albeit planning in function-specific organisations. Functional associations often pursue their collective good as represented in that association. Hence, while society-wide common good is integral to the functional organisation, it is to be attained through the organisation of associations to attain narrower collective goods - through the performance of functions and service provision of individual and collective welfare,[75] as we shall see in chapter 11.

Mitrany considered Functionalism a 'specie of federalism' and termed it 'federal functionalism' (different from Functional federation in chapter 11), and 'semi-functionalism'

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[73] Groom, *Op Cit,* in Stubb.
[74] Ashworth, 'Bringing the Nation ...' *Op Cit,* p75
[75] Long and Ashworth, 'Working for Peace ...'*Op Cit,* p9

to denote the Neofunctionalist concern with transfer of loyalties and the creation of a new political community.[76] Navari noted that Mitrany's dislike for Neofunctionalism was extended to the EEC (EU), which he saw as 'an aspiration to a unitary aim whose integration formula centred on the transfer of functions to central authority'.[77] His Functional approach however, is concerned with the satisfaction of *individuals'* socio-economic needs regardless of the borders within which they are entrapped. The arrangement and organisation of issues on the basis of functions enables *individuals* to participate across various functional authorities concerned with their needs. Functionalism is about co-operation at every stage of activity rather than competition.[78] Groom viewed the satisfaction of the needs of individuals and groups to be possible according to the Mitranian logic, due to the transfer of "sovereign right" by the political elites on certain issues to functional agencies.[79] Therefore, the issue of wholesale transfer of loyalty by individuals (citizens) to functional authorities does not arise. Mitrany argued that:

> [The] Functional concept... generates a unified political theory not bound to any ideology of dogma, but to the living realities of the new service society... [It] does not offend the national attachments and attractions of nationality, nor links of religion and race or even ideology, because it answers truly and fully the old call for a League of Peoples, not of governments as foundation's that all have in common and all can understand (even the illiterate), and which at all times can be tested in

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[76] Mitrany, *Functional Theory ...Op Cit.*
[77] Navari, *Op Cit,* p233
[78] Mitrany, *Functional Theory ...Op Cit.*
[79]Groom, AJR (1975), 'The Functionalist Approach and East/West Co-operation in Europe' in *Journal of*

action for all to see as to its value in performance and its fairness in services.[80]

The shifting of loyalties is 'critical', and more likely to be achieved through a gradual process as people begin to benefit from functional arrangements which have more impact on them directly, than the states to which they belong. Consequently, *loyalty* is not an indivisible lump that is either won or lost as a whole. It is rather, the identification with particular arrangements that actually satisfies peoples' most basic and important needs in life.

THE SEPARATION OF ISSUES

In general, the argument against Functionalism is that it failed to provide a blueprint on which functional authorities could be organised, thereby not showing how welfare issues could be separated from politics. Sewell has argued that Mitrany failed to properly and adequately separate politics from economic interest. While Functionalists emphasise the quest for welfare interest, he argued, they failed to discuss the relationship between welfare and politics in detail. Also, Mitrany failed to provide a sufficient foundation for building political communities in his approach which, does not deal with the basis of obligation and the reality of sacrifice, he argued.[81] Sewell's uneasiness with the Mitranian approach can be summed up

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Common Market Studies, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1&2, p33

[80]Mitrany, D; 'A Political theory for a New Society' in *Functionalism* ... edited by Groom and Taylor, *Op Cit*, p22

[81]Sewell, J. P; *Functionalism and World Politics ... Op Cit*, pp37-43 and see also, Claude, I. L. Jr.; *Swords into Ploughshares, Op Cit*, p384

in the concern on *how* functions will be 'organised' and, or, 'structured'. The Functional approach failed to give enough attention to presumably the successor to the 'static' and 'uncreative' state system in a global order by not outlining specifically the pattern of functional organisation and structures. Thus, rendering the theory incomplete,[82] Sewell argues. Functionalism also failed to address what can be categorised as 'external' and 'internal' problems. The Functionalists, he concluded, while emphasising the importance of the material aspects of problems and their solutions, soft pedal on the human aspects involved – politics.[83] Therefore, Functionalists have failed to consider the nature and operation of politics in great details.[84] Indeed, Mitrany posited that through functional arrangements, 'a world society is more likely to grow through doing things together in workshops and market places rather than by signing Pacts in chancelleries,'[85] but he failed to show how economic issues could be separated from political decision. The reason for such deliberate side-stepping of the issue, rather than failure to discuss, or consider it, can be attributed to his belief in conducting activities through functions, using the principles of 'expertise' and 'representation'. Thus,

> no fixed rule is needed and no rigid pattern (structure) is desirable for the
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> organisation of the functional strata... [Each sector is to be arranged]
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> according to its nature to the conditions under which it has to operate and
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> to the need of the moment, ...[to allow] practical variations in the

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[82]Sewell, *Op Cit*, p43

[83]*Ibid*, p37

[84]*Ibid*, pp43-45

[85]Mitrany, D; *A Working Peace ... Op Cit*, p5

organisation of the several functions... [Not] only is therefore, ... no need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power, prescribed in advance, but also anything beyond the most general formal rules would embarrass the working of these arrangements.[86]

Navari is sympathetic with this criticism on the question of separation of issues. She argued that Mitrany neglected the political consensus required in defining welfare functions and establishing technical competencies as well as the role of national elites in both promoting and impeding integration. The idea that by nature certain matters are non-political and 'technical' she argued, is a rather hopeful liberal ideal. Such a view, she added, represented the idealism in Mitrany's thoughts. Moreover, he failed to adequately support his 'disdain for constitutional clarity' with subsequent experience.[87] Although Navari has chided Mitrany on his failure to consider the role of politics, she however agreed with him that political issues are administrative matters.[88]

Although John H. Eastby on his part, critiqued Mitrany's disregard for the essential moral dimension of human and political reality in his approach. He notes however, that Mitrany was urging the social scientist to think first and foremost, as a humanist. For Mitrany, the great issue for political science is to address the question of human ends – happiness – material wellbeing and satisfying essentially private spiritual (cultural and/or religious) life. Social scientific data should not be assessed independently of those criteria but precisely in

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[86]Mitrany, *A Working Peace System ... Op Cit*, pp41-43

[87] Navari, *Op Cit*, p234

[88] *Ibid,*

light of them. For Mitrany, science is about the means to an end and not the end in itself.[89]

Therefore, the 'forms following function' principles begin with the end as the centre of reference and measuring standard. The pursuit of the end goal by diligently pursing the aims and objectives of the process should be the primary concerns of social scientists. To know what works, the social scientist must know the human end first. Once the end is in view, moves as to what can be done to achieve that end under given conditions can be envisaged. Individuals will only listen to the social scientist once they can relate something important in achieving their happiness.[90] Lucian M. Ashworth concludes that because Mitrany believed that functional links would concentrate on needs, this would leave culture to be practised unhindered at local levels. Therefore, through functional organisations, human needs would be fulfilled. Also, the ethnic problem that collective security has been powerless to deal with, will be resolved, since the nationalism which cause the emergence of ethnic problems *within* and between states will have been reduced due to the satisfaction of peoples needs. Needs are basic to humans while cultures are secondary to the satisfaction of physiological needs.[91] Based on a similar understanding, Claude defined Functionalism as 'that part of the mass of organised international activities which relates directly to economic, social, technical, and humanitarian matters - that is, to problems which may be tentatively described as non-political'. Functional activities he noted, are concerned with prosperity, welfare, social justice and the 'good life', not the prevention of wars, or the elimination of national insecurity.[92] They are only a means to an end - peace and security, hence, Functionalists emphasise the

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[89] Eastby, J. H (1999), 'Functionalism and Modernity in International Relations' in Long and Ashworth edited New Perspectives ... *Op Cit*, pp53-56
[90] Mitrany, *Functional Theory of ... Op Cit*, p17
[91] Ashworth, L. M (1999), 'Bringing the Nation Back In? Mitrany and the Enjoyment of Nationalism' in Long and Ashworth edited, *New Perspective ... Op Cit*, p75.
[92] Claude, I. L. Jr.; *Swords into Ploughshares... Op Cit*, p378

development of international economic and social co-operation, as prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and the elimination of conflicts and wars.

From Claude's observation, Functionalism asserts that the pattern of functional organisation and structuring is based on the points of natural conflicts indirectly. He argued that this shifts attention away from the vertical division of human society which is symbolised by sovereignty of states toward the various strata of social needs cutting across national dividing lines. Peace, Claude objected, can only be achieved through the principles of national coactivity, rather than national coexistence.[93] He summed up his uneasiness with the Functional theory by asking:

> "Is it... possible to segregate a group of problems and subject them to treatment in an international workshop where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves it the co-operative use of the tools of mutual interest?" and what things are more non-political that the Functionalist would insist would be first? Can states be induced to join hands in functional endeavour before they have to settle the outstanding Political and Security issues, which divided them? And at what stage would individual's allegiance shift?[94]

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[93]*Ibid,* pp379-380

[94]*Ibid,* pp388-389

Thus, he concluded that Functionalism as a temperament and mentality is of a negative attitude towards nationalism, the state and power politics. The anti-state bias of Functionalism may render its attempt to provide a replacement to the state system more difficult, he warned:

> If the preference to non-political focus degenerates into a distinctly apolitical attitude, it may promote feckless efforts to evade, rather than sensible efforts to deal with the political problems that are not made less real and pressing by their being deplored or ignored.[95]

Although Claude has rightly observed the aim of Functionalism - a solution to the effects of both 'excessive primitiveness of developing regions and the excessive intricacy of economic and social relationship of the intensely industrialised parts of the world',[96] he failed to base his critique on that. Rather, he focussed on the method or means of achieving the goal. Therefore, his criticism like others, is on the methodology, rather than the aims or objectives of the theory. The 'form following functions' principles will enable the 'excessive primitive developing regions' to develop programmes of political action in pursuance of their socio-economic goals without being constrained by politics. Mitrany has argued that the people of India, Africa et cetera should be allowed to develop their pattern of government, while they gradually develop to the standard of the developed World. They should not be provided with

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[95]*Ibid*, p391

[96]*Ibid*, p381

a rigid structure and pattern for the administration of their welfare needs he advised.[97] But this is precisely what the introduction of the Westphalian state system has done in Africa. Harrison on his part, argued that Mitrany's deliberate neglect, ignoring and discounting of the importance of the political frameworks in the development of his theory,[98] is in keeping with his belief that the function of government is summed up in national and societal security. This is what governments are concerned with in their national planning process. Hence, for Mitrany, the goal of social democracy is to control government and not the other way round.[99]

While Functionalists emphasise the on-going process for achieving the goals of social democracy, political government, Mitrany argued, tends to obstruct the development of social democracy, which aims to satisfy the social needs of people.[100] The immediate impact of social democratic planning he concluded, should be concerned with social welfare and rights of people.[101] Therefore, the laying down of rules in advance in some formal structure, outlining the stages or steps in the development is not consistent with the doctrines of the Mitranian approach. Rather, the stages and structures will 'have to come about functionally'.[102] While Harrison, is sympathetic to the Mitranian approach, he decries the simple utilitarian view Mitrany adopted of political decision making, because it ignores the value-based character of political issues.[103] This is a view held by Sewell also.[104] Mitrany's

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[97] Mitrany, *Functional Theory ... Op Cit*, p214
[98] Harrison, R. J; 'Testing Functionalism' in Groom and Taylor, *Functionalism ... Op Cit,*, p115

[99] Mitrany, D; 'A Political Theory for a New Society', *Op Cit*, pp27, 31

[100] Mitrany, 'Prospect of Integration', *Op Cit.*, p66

[101] *Ibid,*
[102] *Ibid,* pp28-31

[103] Harrison, *Europe in Question ... Op Cit*, pp28,33

focus on the end as a justification of the means, led to Pentland's conclusion that the Mitranian approach places science and technology as central in its argument. This undue emphasis he argued, has led to a number of distortions. Mitrany has made unwarranted rationalistic assumptions that people's loyalty will be directed to those institutions which best met their basic needs.[105] On his part, George Weiss took issues with Mitrany's failure to take into consideration, and to discuss the capacity of functional organisation to 'behave like self-aggrandising and democratic unresponsive bureaucracies'.[106] In essence, the criticism is based on the failure to discuss the nature of structures, a purely methodological concern which Mitrany has clearly and deliberately avoided in keeping with his 'form following function' principle.

Long and Ashworth notes that while Haas' conceived the Mitranian approach as making a distinction between technical and political issues, thus, critiquing the notion, in reality, Mitrany did not make such distinction. Rather, his distinction is between federal-style government structures that involve political bargaining between geographically specific units and those that do not.[107] Mitrany did not make a distinction between technical and political issues as Haas has implied. Also, Haas' conception of functional organisations as basically 'voluntary' bodies akin to interest groups, hence, his disagreement seems to have led to most of the criticism directed against the Mitranian approach. Mitrany however, did not define any particular organisation in keeping with his concern with the end objective – the satisfaction of human needs, rather than the structure upon which such ends could be achieved. He did not

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[104] Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics* ... p38
[105] Pentland, ... *Op Cit,* p85
[106] Weiss, G (1975), *International Bureaucracy, An analysis of the operation of Functional and Global Secretariats,* (London), Lexington Book, pp22-23
[107] Mitrany, D (1947) 'International Consequence of National Planning', *Yale Review,* XXXVII, No.1, September, p26

really concern himself with methodological issues arguing that the beneficiaries are the best judges of the method for achieving their happiness - human needs. His examples of existing functional organisation are non-voluntary state or quasi-state organisation. Long and Ashworth concludes that it is such organisations that have been described by Keohane and Nye as Transgovernmental relations.[108] In essence, Haas' conception of functional organisations is not the same with the Mitranian usage of the term. It would appear that the Mitranian conception of functional organisation can be conceived in terms of Keohane and Nye's Transnational relations which entails the relations between governments' departments responsible for areas of domestic policies such as agriculture and justice – which are technical areas. Based on the 'forms following functions' principles, if the Mitranian functional organisation is to be conceived in terms of Transnational relations, then, the EU experience shows that transnational linkages to date tend to cluster at the regional rather than the global level but not necessarily in the form of super-states which Mitrany disliked, but Haas prescribed.[109]

In essence, Mitrany's vision of the continual existence of the state - with less emphasis on territorial sovereignty in the pursuit of human needs could be achieved through his Functional theory. Whereas, Haas' super-state structure, from the EU example, is more likely to be problematic due to its emphasis on structural change which entails the removal of political power from domestic to the regional institutions. The Functional approach is based on the argument of the satisfaction of basic human needs. Thus, human agency can only be located

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[108] Long and Ashworth, 'Working for Peace...' *Op Cit*, p8. Also see Keohane, R. O and Nye, J. S (1972), 'Introduction' in their edited *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, (Cambridge, MA), Harvard University Press.
[109] Taylor, P (1993), *International Organisation in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process*,

at the point at which individuals' needs are met, and not through forms of structural political institutions whether at the domestic, regional, continental or global level, if such structural institutions did not evolve in response to the functions they fulfil in the individuals' quest for happiness. Based on the 'forms following function' principles, functional dimensions will determine themselves and the functions determined their own organs.[110] Therefore, the Functional approach is a *method* not the vision of an end result. It includes all the levels of analysis – the individual, state and international system in moving towards the goal of a Working peace system. Thus, the Mitranian approach remains a flexible holistic theory of political actions very relevant to the globalising world.

In chapter 8, I shall revisit the 'self imagination' of Political Communities in an attempt to understand how they evolve, or are created.

(London), Frances Pinter, pp7, 21, 40-2.
[110] Mitrany, *A Working Peace ... Op Cit*, p72

CHAPTER 8

REVISITING THE SELF IMAGINATION OF A POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Since the Enlightenment, nationalism in its contemporary guise remained an ideology, doctrine and instrument for the 'self imagination' of Political Communities. As a powerful ideology, it is utilised in the 'creation' and shaping of Political Communities – states (nations). The concepts of 'nation', ethnicity and the sentiment of nationality, on the other hand, despite having played a role in the Enlightenment period, remains secondary in the explanation of the phenomenon - nationalism. It has since the Enlightenment, been conceived as the sentiment for the 'creation' of the sense of belonging, identity and as the instrument for the formation of Political Communities. This chapter seeks to identify the relevance of 'nations' and 'ethnic groups' – forms of identity and sources of security in the evolution of nationalism – in the creation and sustenance of Political Communities during the late 20th century. The chapter seeks to identify whether kinship-based aggregations plays a part in the 'creation' of a sense of *national* identity and nationality. Can we explain conflicts in the 21st century in relation to nationalism or the quest for ethnic or *national* identity in a seemingly evolving globalisation of cultures? If the 'nation' is an imagined community in an Andersonian sense, with nationalism as the instrument for its creation in a Gellnerian sense, what role do kinship-based aggregations play in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities? The chapter will argue that while nationalism plays an important and influencing role in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities, the quest for ethnic and national identities on the basis of distinctiveness and particularistic

cultures and values is likely to dominate human development and evolution in the 21st century. Kinship-based aggregations are becoming increasingly the source of nationalism – the instrument for the 'self imagination' of Political Communities - states.

ANDERSONIAN IMAGINED COMMUNITIES THESIS

Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities* summarises the basis for the assumptions that Political Communities – states (nations) are imagined through nationalism. Anderson's conclusions are based on the following premises:

1) The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, but will nevertheless in their minds, live the image of their communities.

2) The imagination of the nation is *limited* because, even the largest of nations encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings has finite, if elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. Moreover, 'no nation imagines itself conterminous with mankind'.

3) The concept of *sovereignty* is also imagined because it 'was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm'.

4)   As a *community*, the nation is imagined because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, it is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.[1]

To substantiate his thesis, Anderson draws from Seton-Watson. "All that I can say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one".[2] Anderson quotes Seton-Watson and concludes by suggesting a translation from 'consider themselves' to 'imagine themselves'.[3] While the semantic is not my concern, however, it is worth noting that the acts of 'self consideration to being' and the 'self imagination of being' are two different words and connote two different meaning. While Seton-Watson's 'self consideration' is deeply rooted in the *belief and conviction of a reality* by the individual, of a sense of identity and security associated with membership of kinship aggregations – upon which the *reality* is based. Anderson's 'self imagination' translation on the other hand, is based on *an assumption – an assumed 'reality'*, of being which may or may not be rooted in any kinship aggregation. In making a distinction between nations and states, Seton-Watson defined the nation as 'a community of people whose membership are bound together by a sense of solidarity of common culture, a national consciousness'. The state on the other hand, is 'a legal and political organisation with the power to require obedience and loyalty from it citizens'.[4] From Seton-Watson's distinction between the nation and state, we can establish that the *national* gives his/her loyalty to the *nation* without any constraint by law.

[1] Anderson, B (1991), *Imagined Communities*, (London), Verso.
[2] See Seton-Watson, H (1977), *An Enquiry into the Origin of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*, (Boulder, Colo.), Westview Press, p5 quoted in Anderson *Ibid.*
[3] Anderson, *Op cit.*, p6

For the citizen however, the state must obtain that loyalty through the use of law and sanction. In essence, the *national* is part of the *nation* by his/her personal *belief and conviction* of its *reality* as an extension of his *being*. The citizen on the other hand, is co-opted by legislation. Hence, the citizen can only *assume* its membership and is also capable of renouncing/changing it for another. This is however not the case with the member of a *nation*. The *national* cannot change/renounce his *being – nation*.

For Seton-Watson, the nation is based on the sense of 'Community of people', 'bound together' by 'a sense of solidarity', 'a common culture' and 'a national consciousness'. The state on the other hand, is only 'a legal and political organisation'. He asserts that 'a nation exists when significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one'. When a significant group hold this belief, it possessed 'national consciousness'.[5] The nation therefore is contingent on the 'belief' and 'conviction' of a national consciousness. Hence, the *nationals 'consider themselves'* to be. The state however, imposes a legal constraint to force the *sense and assumption* of a single culture. In essence, the state is based on *imagination* and not *conviction*. For Seton-Watson therefore, it is the state that is *imagined* and not the nation. He concludes, 'the state can exist without the nation, or with several nations among their subjects, and a nation can be conterminous with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or between several states'.[6] It is interesting to note that Seton-Watson not only acknowledges the distinctiveness of the nation from the state, but also states the sense of solidarity, common culture and national consciousness as necessary

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[4] Seton-Watson, *Op cit.*, p1
[5] *Ibid*, p5

conditions for the sense of nationhood. The main difference between the nation and tribe, he clarifies, is based on the notion of superiority of culture. Thus, the nation is a superior culture while the tribe has a lower culture; both are the same and differ from the state.[7]

Anderson on the other hand, conceives the nation as a product of *imagination* based on the *assumption of an image*, particular to the Community. Thus, the state (nation) evolves due to its members' solidarity and assumed sovereignty. Anderson seems to have grouped both the nation and state together without any distinction under the concept of a Political Community.[8] In essence, he seems to be saying that the nation and state are one entity and a political construct, hence, *an imagined* Political Community. This seems to me, a failure to acknowledge the attribute of kinship – often mistakenly defined as ethnic groups or tribes (chapter 4). Although Anderson has implicitly attempted to distinguish between the nation and state by stating that 'no nation imagines itself conterminous with mankind' and that the idea of 'sovereignty' is *imagined*, thus, 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciousness [found in kinship aggregations – *nations, or*] held by political ideology [nationalism], but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which it come into being'.[9] He failed to explain the possibility, if it were, of the *nation* – based on kinship claims and the nation based on ideology can evolve as Political Communities or indeed, how the kinship aggregate can be extended through *nationalism* – ideology, to construct an *imagined* Political Community –

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[6] *Ibid.*, p1
[7] *Ibid.*, pp4-5
[8] Anderson, *Op cit.*, p5
[9] *Ibid*, p12

state. The link or relationship between the *nation* and ethnic group or tribe – 'web of kinship' is missing in the Andersonian thesis.

While 'self-imagination' is necessary in the creation of Political Communities it is however, *belief* – 'self conviction' that is required in the evolution of the 'nation'. Anderson therefore, fails to define what the 'nation' is, but assumes the Political Community - state to be synonymous to the nation. Genealogical, lineage and kinship based community – tribal and clan - did not feature in the Andersonian thesis. The evolution of nationalism as the ideology of Political Communities from the Andersonian thesis is seen as the origin of nations as well as states. Hence, Anderson concludes that 'nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, not with self consciously held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which – as well as against which it came into being'.[10] The two relevant cultural systems that exist based on the thesis, before the emergence of nationalism in the Enlightenment are *Religious Communities* and *Dynastic Realms*.[11] Beside these, no other cultural community exist as a Politcal Community. In essence, all Political Communities were either Religious or Dynasties before the emergence of the nation or state – a modernist approach, hence the notion of the 'self imagination' of Political Communities due to the influence of nationalism as far as Anderson is concerned, is conclusive.

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[10] *Ibid.*, p12
[11] *Ibid,*

GELLNER'S CULTURAL ARGUMENT

In Ernest Gellner's argument on the 'naturalness' of nations and nationality, while disputing a notion of universal ontology, he recognises the emergence of the claim of 'nationhood', 'nationality' and 'nation' in human development. Thus, the notion of an individual having a nation and nationality has become seemingly universal, but it is not an inherent attribute of humanity he argues. Gellner also notes that the state and nations are not the same,[12] a distinction Anderson fails to make. Nationalism as a political principle, according to Gellner, holds that the political and national units should be congruent. It is a sentiment, but also, a movement. Nationalism can be aroused by the violation of the principle of the feeling of satisfaction and is then actuated by the quest for the fulfillment thus, creating a movement,[13] he explained. Hence, the nationalist principle can be violated by the failure of the political boundary of a given state to include all the members of the appropriate 'nation', or when it includes some foreigner. Therefore, nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones. Ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle, he asserts, should not separate the power-holders from the rest. That is, the political unit should not belong to another nation (foreigners).[14] Thus, as a doctrine, he concludes, nationalism supports the preserving cultural diversity of pluralistic international

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[12] Gellner, E (1983), *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford), Basil Blackwell,
[13] *Ibid.,*
[14] *Ibid.,*

political systems and the diminution of internal strains within states.[15] For the nationalist, Gellner adds, the nation is an exclusive concept.[16]

The central mistake committed by friends and foes of nationalism alike, Gellner noted, is the supposition that it is *natural*. It is taken as given that 'a man has a "nationality" just as he has a height, weight, sex, name, blood-group etc'. Also, the supposition that 'this is so in the nature of things is embodied in countless questionnaires which inquire after nationality as they do after name marital state et cetera', he observes. Man, Gellner notes, is generally assumed to have this thing 'called nationality' and will generally wish to be in the same political unit as those sharing that nationality. Moreover, s/he in particular will be anxious that those wielding power in the political unit are of the same 'nationality' as s/he is.[17] 'There is nothing natural or universal about possessing a "nationality"; and the supposition that a valid political criterion can only be set up in terms of it, far from being a natural or universal one, is historically an oddity',[18] he posits. Nationalism therefore, is logically and sociologically contingent. Nationalism neither has any of the naturalness attributed to it, nor does it evolve from some universal or necessary roots.[19] In essence, it is neither natural nor functional. For Gellner therefore, two men, he explains, are of the same nation if and only if, they *share* the same culture, where culture means a system of ideas, signs, associations and ways of behaving and communicating. Two men are of the same nation if and only if, they *recognise* each other as belonging to the same nation. In

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[15] *Ibid*, p6
[16] *Ibid.,*
[17] Gellner, E (1964), *Thought and Change*, (London), Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p150.
[18] *Ibid.,*
[19] *Ibid.,* p151

other words, "nation maketh man",[20] he argues. Because 'any culture on earth can be assimilated and internalised by an infant of any given "racial" group, just as any infant can acquire any language', cultures, therefore, are the determining factors of the nationality of individuals assimilated.[21] Culture is defined as a distinct way of doing things, which characterises a given community and is not dictated by the genetic makeup of its members. Cultures are systems of conceptions or ideas, which guides our thoughts and conduct.[22] Therefore, nations are the artifacts of men's convictions and loyalties, solidarities. A category of person (occupants of a territory and speakers of a given language) becomes a nation if, and when the members of the category firmly recognise certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it.[23] Gellner therefore argues that it is the *recognition* of each other as fellows of this kind, which turns them into a nation and not other shared attributes, whatever they may be, which separates that category from non-members.[24] Gellner's conception of the 'self imagination' of Political Communities is based on the *recognition* of *shared* culture. The nation therefore is a political construct. This differs from Seton-Watson definition of nations and the evolution of Political Communities.

While Anderson has sought to utilise Seton-Watson definition and the evolutionary explanation of Political Communities, he ignored the difference between the Political Community evolved in a *Gemeinschaften* (a relationship of kindred – genealogically and

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[20] Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism, op cit.*, p6
[21] *Ibid.*,
[22] Gellner, E (1988), *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structures of Human History*, (Chicago), University of Chicago Press, p14.
[23] Gellner, *Nation and Nationalism, op cit.* p6
[24] Anderson, *Op cit.*, p7

lineage – blood defined) and *Gesellschaften* (artificial construction of an aggregation of human beings, essentially separate in spite of all uniting factors)[25] principles. Both Anderson and Gellner assumptions of the imposition of homogeneity due to the 'self imagination' of a Political Community is based on a *Gesellschaften* principle. On his part, Kedourie holds that language is the criterion for determining whether a group is a nation or not. He states; 'a group speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state. Such a group will cease to be a nation if it does not constitute a state'.[26] 'Any political frontier separating the members of such a group [nation], are arbitrary, unnatural, unjust' he concludes. For Kedourie, the 'separation must be done by nature through a common language and common national characteristics'. Thus, 'nationalism can be seen as a new tribalism. Like the tribe, the nation excludes and is intolerable of outsiders. ... A tribesman is what he is by virtue of his birth, not by virtue of self-determination'.[27] He concludes therefore, that neither nationalism and tribalism are interchangeable terms nor do they describe related phenomenon. Kedourie's conception of nationalism is based on the 19th century European doctrine of nationalism. The doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations and that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government.[28] Therefore, Seton-Watson conception of nationalism as Elie Kedourie, while placing emphasis on its role in the creation of Political Communities based on the notion of sovereignty and legitimacy of government, asserts their

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[25] See also Waever, O (1993), 'Societal Security: The concept' in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* edited by Waever, O et al (London), Pinter
[26] Kedourie, E (1960), *Nationalism*, (London), Hutchinson, p68
[27] *Ibid*, pp74-5
[28] *Ibid*, p9

'naturalness' and posits the need for the human specie to belong to one.[29] Both Gellner

and Anderson on the other hand, agree on the 'unnaturalness' of the nation and on

nationalism being an instrument for the 'self-imagination' of Political Communities.

Nationalism is neither the homogenising factor nor the awakening of an old, latent,

dormant force (nation) Gellner asserts. It is consequences of a new form of social

organisation based on deeply internalised education highly protected by it own state,[30] he

argues. Nationalism uses some of the pre-existent cultures transforming them in the

process into a Political Community, hence, sees itself as 'the natural and universal ordering

of the political life of mankind, only obscured by the long persistent and mysterious

somnolence'.[31]

Whereas Anderson did not recognise the *nation* in the dialectics of the evolution of

Political Communities, Gellner acknowledges it, but insist that it play no role in the 'self-

imagination' of Political Communities. Far from the *nation* being a homogenising factor,

it is nationalism, which engenders it (*nation*) on the basis of a *Gesellschaften* Political

Community and not the other way round.[32] Nationalism, Gellner argues gives rise to the

evolution of the nationalists' sentiment, which is developed and perpetuated as an

ideology, a doctrine and a movement. It is within this role nationalist movements of post-

colonial Africa and other postcolonial states can be explained.[33] The Westphalian state

system in Africa and elsewhere seeks to impose a homogeneity based on the basis of

colonial frontiers, which are not based on shared lineage, history and culture or recognise

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[29] *Ibid*, p68
[30] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism, Op cit.*, p48.
[31] *Ibid.*,
[32] *Ibid.*, pp55-81

by the *nations* within it. This imposition of a *Gesellschaft* Political Community (nationalism) threatens the *Gemeinschaft* nation, thus giving rise to the evolution of nationalist movement and nationalism.[34] Although Gellner has convincingly argued his case, however, he failed to explain the quest for Political Community on the basis of *Gemeinschaften* community – define as 'ethnic or tribal' conflict in Africa but nationalist struggles in the West.

Although both Anderson and Gellner have identified the role of nationalism in the creation of Political Communities, they both failed to discuss the origin of the *nation* and its role in the 'self-imagination' of Political Communities. Their conceptions of both nationalism and nation are based purely on Western standards, hence excluding the Eastern or non-Western conception of the nation and nationalism.[35] Both Gellner and Anderson's nation is a *Gesellschaften* aggregation. The 'nation' therefore is a Political Community of shared cultures, histories, values and norms only made possible through nationalism.

SMITH'S ETHNIC BASIS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY POSIT

In Anthony Smith posits, he acknowledges the modernity of the 'nation' in its present definition, but argues that its roots are to be found in the ancient world. Ancient people, he noted, looked upon other people not from their cultures differently, hence the separateness of the different people from time. Thus, the idea of differences is inherent in the human

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[33]*Ibid.*,
[34] *Ibid.*,
[35] See Plamenatz, J (1976), 'Two Types of Nationalism' in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea -2nd edition* edited by Kamenka, E (London), Edward Arnold, .pp23-24.

psychic and history, therefore, not modern.[36] Nations are closely related to ethnic communities often, 'growing out' of them being 'constructed' from ethnic materials.[37] Smith's postulate is that, the origin of the nation is rooted in the ethnic group. While the nation is defined as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members',[38] ethnicity has a primordial quality. It is a given aspect of human existence, which exist both in nature and outside time.[39] The nation is constituted by the sense of continuity, shared memory and collective identity.[40] Since the term's 'ethnic group' and 'ethnic community' are not unclumsily available in the English language, Smith notes, the term 'people' is used instead, but often, it carries a connotation quite foreign to those of an ethnic community. In the Greek language, the term ethnic community is often used in reference to different people but conceived in terms of a 'band of comrades', 'a tribe', 'caste', 'sex', 'race' or 'nation'. It was the New Testament writers and Church Fathers who first introduce the use of the term *ethnos* in application to Gentiles – *ta ethne*.[41] Thus, any national group with the exception of Christians and Jews were referred to as *ta ethne*.[42] Smith's conclusion is that the usage of the term *ethne* appeared to be in reference to a number of people or animals living together and acting together, though not necessarily belonging to the same clan or tribe. Tribes (*genos*) are seen as sub-divisions of *ethnos*, but *genos* is also used to signify 'a people' or 'nation' or 'race' or even

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[36] Smith, A. D (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford), Basil Blackwell
[37] --- (1981), *The Ethnic Revival*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p85
[38] --- (1991), *National Identity*, (London), Penguin Books, p14
[39] *Ibid.*, p20
[40] *Ibid.*, p25
[41] Smith, *Ethnic Origins .. Op cit.* p21

a breed of animal. Thus, the Greeks, it seems he concluded, did not distinguished between tribes and nations or between bands and races. However, the term *genos* appears to have been reserved for kinship-based groups more that *ethnos,* whose range and connotations are correspondingly broader and less obviously related on any kinship basis, Smith observed.

For Smith therefore, *ethnos* appears to be more suited to cultural rather than biological or kinship differences. The similarity of cultural attributes in a group therefore, attracts the term *ethnos.*[43] In modern Western languages, the nearest to the common denominator (*ethnos*) is the French *ethnie* – ethnic community. The term, *ethnie* unites on emphasis upon cultural differences with the sense of an historical community. There are however, two senses in which ethnic descent can be interpreted: a) based on cultural and ideological communities and b), genealogical and biological communities.[44] Smith argues that the myths that cite genealogical ancestry are different from those which, traces ideological descent. The genealogical myth is based on a claim of a 'biological' link while the ideological myth is based on a 'cultural-ideology'. 'Chroniclers and poets', he asserts, 'trace generational lineage and rest their claim for high status and power on a presumed biological link with a hero, a founder or even a deity'. This claim of a biological lineage ensures a high degree of solidarity, since the community is viewed as a network of inter-

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[42] *Ibid.* also see Liddell, H. G and Scott, R (1869), *A Greek – English Lexicon,* 6th ed., (Oxford), Clarendon Press. Under '*ethnos*'; cf. Herodotus 1, 101 also 1, 56 and Plato Republic 290c for the use of the term in reference to caste or tribe.
[43] *Ibid.* See also Lewis, C. T and Short, C (1879), *A Latin Dictionary,* 1st ed., in print in of 1955, (Oxford), Clarendon Press. And Herodotus 1, 101 for *genos* as a sub-division of *ethnos*; for *genos* as a clan, see Herodotus 1, 125 and as a stock or family, Homer *Iliad* 13, 354.
[44] Smith, A. D (1984), 'National Identity and Myth of Ethnic Descent' in *Research in Social Movement, Conflict and Change,* Vol,7, p100

related kin groups claiming a common ancestor, thereby marking them off from those who are unable to make such claim. 'The alleged ties of 'blood' forms the basis for a strictly 'primordialist' sense of belonging and identity' he concludes. The 'cultural-ideology' myth on the other hand, bases its claim on 'a cultural affinity and ideological [link] with the presume ancestors'. 'What counts here', for them, 'is not the blood ties, real or alleged, but a spiritual kinship, proclaimed in ideals that are allegedly derived from some ancient exemplars in remote eras'.[45] In essence while both myths can proceed to form imagined Political Communities, they are however, different forms of myths. The genealogical (biological) myth entails the formation of communities – *nations* based on the claim of kinship ties – the claim of African *nations*. The cultural-ideological myth on the other hand, is based on the claim of ideals. For this myth, the communities – *nations* are based on ideals/values – as in Western nations. In essence there is a Western and non-Western conception of the term.[46] The sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality differentiate populations from each other and endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes as in the eyes of outsiders. Men and women interpret and express their collective experience (including their conflicts) within any grouping or population thrown together by circumstances which are crystallised over time and handed onto the next generation who modify them according to their own experiences and interactions.[47] Thus, Smith concludes,

> certain ethnic features are formed out of these shared interpretations and
> expressions, which in turn limit and condition the interaction and perception

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[45] *Ibid*, p96
[46] Smith, *National Identity, Op cit.,*

of succeeding generations through temporal and spatial configurations of collectivity and through the shared meanings which inform and guide the activities of its members. Consequently, the features of any *ethnie*, whatever its distant origins takes on a binding, exterior quality for any members of generations independent of their perceptions and will. They possess a quality of historicity that itself becomes an integral part of subsequent ethnic interpretation and expression.[48]

The ethnic community therefore is a 'named human population with shared ancestry, myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity'[49] – the same definition with the nation.[50] While the modernist asserts the modernity of nations and nationalism dating from the Enlightenment in Europe and describes pre-modern eras as essentially agrarian – the nature of cultures, the structure of power, the nexus of economic ties, as constrained in the emergence of nations and hence, nationalism, Smith holds the view that in reality, the 'ethnic' is the nation, ethnicity is nationality and ethnicism is nationalism.[51] The *ethnie*, he argued, existed within or alongside various polities and were quite often divorced from politics of the state or, in becoming politicised, acquired dominion over many other *ethnies*. It therefore constituted culturally diverse enclaves within the large empires of antiquities, persisting independently

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[47] Smith, 'National Identity and Myth...' p1 00
[48] Smith, *Ethnic Origins... Op cit.*, p22
[49] *Ibid.*, p32
[50] Smith, *Nation and Nationalism*, op cit. p20
[51] Smith, *Ethnic Origins... Op cit.*, pp69-89

of any congruent state formation.[52] It is from the *ethnie* that the nation evolved. Smith asserts that:

> For the *ethnie* to attain independence, it must become politicised: enter and remain in the political arena. It must begin to move towards nationhood, even if it has no intention of becoming full nations. [It] is forced to forsake the former isolationist passivity and cultural accommodations it holds, and become activist, mobilised and dynamic politically. [It] must take some of the attributes of nationhood and adopt a civic model in order to survive. It must take on rational political centralisation; mass literacy and social mobilisation (features of *Gesellschaften*).[53]

In essence Smith holds that the *nation* exist in the *ethnie* and only becomes a Political Community – nation or state only and *only* after it has been politicised. The process of politicisation is through nationalism.[54] Nationalism is 'an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance for self-government and independence on behalf of a group some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' like others'.[55] Therefore, while the Political Community is a product of 'self imagination' however, that 'self imagination' can be built on an existing nation as well as the cultural community–*ethnie*. The Political Community therefore must be understood as a further development from the nation as well as a community of cultures in the Gellnerian sense.

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[52] *Ibid.*, p89
[53] *Ibid.*, pp156-57
[54] Smith, A. D (1983), *Theories of Nationalism*, (London), Duckworth, p22.
[55] *Ibid.*, p171

Nationalism from Smith, is primarily an ideology and an instrument of achieving self-government and independence. It does not create nations but Political Communities – states. This differs from both Anderson and Gellner's postulates but failed to explain the relationship between nations and kinship-based communities found in Africa and non-Western Europe.

ETHNICITY AND *NATIONALITY:* INSTRUMENTS OF 'SELF IMAGINATION'

Although the three theorists have agreed on the nature of the evolution of Political Communities – based on 'self imagination', only Smith has actually taken the kinship-based (tribes/clans) communities into consideration. While Anderson has totally ignored the role of the *ethnie*, let alone the consideration of tribes and clans and dwells on the evolution of the state – a purely political construct, Gellner on his part, lays emphasis on the development of an intellegensia as promoters of high cultures from which the Political Community is imagined into being. Smith however, took both the nation and the community of cultures into consideration but fell short of discussing the nature of the *genos* (tribe) or *strip* (clan) in the evolution and mobilisation to Political Communities even though he identified the Western and non-Western conceptions of ethnicity. Smith's thesis is somehow constrained by the cultural definition of the *ethnie* – ethnic community and not paying much attention to the question of genealogy and lineage. Thus, these theorists fail to offer any understanding or explanation of the quest for self-determination on the basis of tribal/clan – now considered pejorative[56] - often classified as ethnic

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[56] Tonkin, E et al 'History of Ethnicity' in Hutchinson, J and Smith, A. D edited (1996), *Ethnicity*, (Oxford), Oxford University Press, p22

particularity, rampant to some extent, in non-Western societies (Africa in this case). Is ethnicity therefore, the only aggregation from which the self 'imagination' of Political Communities (since both theorists seem to hold this view) could take place? Could the sense of *nationality* (on the basis of genealogical and biological linkage) also be considered a relevant aggregation, or is it possible for both to constitutes the aggregations for the 'self imagination' of Political Communities? I shall attempt to answer these questions in this section. 'Man', according to Immanuel Kant,

> has an inclination to *associate* himself, because in such a state he feels himself more like a man capable of developing his natural faculties'. ... [He also] has a marked propensity to *isolate* himself, because he finds in himself the asocial quality to want to arrange everything according to his own ideas.[57]

Human nature therefore, from this Kantian postulate, innately pulls the individual towards the centrifugal – genealogical and biologically – kinship aggregate from which he finds his *being*. But he is also capable of pulling away from the kinship aggregate in pursuit of his individuality. While *associating* himself with 'his' kin in order to develop his natural faculties, he also *isolates* himself at the same time in order to pursue his/her individuality. In other words, while *associating* himself for a sense of identity (whether based on genealogical/biological or cultural-ideological claims), he also seeks to *disassociate* himself from the collective in order to establish his own individual identity. Thus,

individuals *associate* for a collective sense of being conceived as 'national consciousness' which could be by a *conviction and belief of being* part of the aggregation or due to an *assumption of similar cultures* hence values. They also *resist domination* of their individuality. In kinship aggregation, the individual is an extension of the *nation*. In the *imagined* 'nation' however, he has no innate pull towards the 'nation', hence, is not oblige to submit his/loyalty, except as a consequence of the threat of sanctions that may be imposed by the legal and political organisation – state.

In his interpretation of the Kantian postulate, Patterson holds that without the group (the ethnic) ' we cease to exist not only as human beings but also as specie. Through it we achieve the basic necessities of body and soul'.[58] 'Also', Patterson observed that 'through its interdependence we insure safety, magnify our comforts and mollify the dreadful loneliness to which our humanity, unchecked, pulls us. But our nature is part of the condition of our humanity; it is not itself our humanity nor can any conformity with it ever become the criterion for our happiness'.[59] And concludes that 'the most important social contacts and activities are determined not by one's spatial location but by one's social location in the "web of kinship'. 'The name of the tribe is very often translated to mean the same thing among most primitive people, namely, the word "people"'. Therefore the tribe is a segment of humanity in general and does not need segregation or demarcation, for

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[57] See Immanuel Kant's 'idea for a Universal history with Cosmopolitan Intent', (1784), *The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant's Moral and Political Writings* edited and translated by Carl J. Friedrich (1949), The Modern Library, p120. Emphasis in the original.
[58] Patterson, O (1977), *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse*, (New York), Stain and Day, p14...
[59] *Ibid.,*

that has been done by nature itself.[60] In conclusion, Patterson asserts that 'an ethnic group therefore is not a cultural group. A cultural group is simply any group of people who share an identifiable complex of meaning, symbols, values and norms' and does not require 'any conscious awareness of belonging to a group on the part of the members. Indeed, no such conscious group identity exit'. The meaning, symbols, values and norms a cultural group share can be anthropologically observed, regardless of the ideological statement or expressed opinions of the members about their tradition or relation to it. Hence it is 'an objectively verifiable social phenomenon' he asserts. A cultural group or segments of it may become an ethnic group only when the conditions of ethnicity are met. This does not mean that all cultural groups do so, he warns.[61]

Patterson has made an attempt to explain how cultural groups are linked to ethnic groups, but seems to have difficulty with the term, tribe (*genos*) and consequently, the clan (*stirp*), which he implies are only found in primitive societies. Ernest Gellner also holds this view and describes this form of aggregation as very simple societies.[62] The contradiction however, is the usage of the term 'people', which is synonymous to the name of the tribe. Most of the names of the *nations* (not states) in Africa are translated 'people' (chapter 4). This translation is also the practice with the South Slavs for whom *narod* (people) is translated nation.[63] It seems then that the name of a 'people' is synonymous to the *nation* – 'a web of kinship' - in this case the tribe or clan – a view held by Seton-Watson and

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[60] *Ibid.*, pp35-42
[61] *Ibid.*, pp101-105
[62] Gellner, *Thought and Change, op cit.*, p155
[63] See Nada, D, et al (1974), *Nations and Nationalism of Yugoslavia*, (Beograd), Medjunarodna Politika; and Ramet, P (1984), *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1963-1983*, (Bloomington), Indiana University Press.

Kedourie.[64] Connor warns that although the nation, arguably is a social group which is not formed due to genetic or blood bond, in conceiving it, however, what really matters is *what the people believe* it is – an aspect of 'self conviction' in a Seton-Watson sense and not the 'self imagination' of Anderson. Hence, since the people believe the nation to be a collective of *kinship group*, it will be futile to try and convince them otherwise. The *subconscious* belief of the group's separate origin and evolution is an important ingredient of national psychology and hence, the development of the sentiment of an ideology – nationalism. Nationalism therefore, is an ideology and sentiment of the nation and not the state.[65] Horowitz expressing a similar view to Connor, he also defined the ethnic group (*nation*) in terms of genealogy.[66] He states that ethnicity (*nationality*) is often connected to birth and blood upon which, individual origins are based. This identity is relatively difficult for an individual to change he asserts.[67] Based on these assertions, we can conclude that while *nation* is defined as *Gemeinschaften*, the ethnic group/community is *Gesellschaften*. Therefore, contrary to the Andersonian thesis, the Political Community can be 'self imagined' on the basis of lineage and genealogy (kinship) of the "people" – *nation*. Just as it can also be 'self imagined' based on the development of an intelligentsia and high culture of the nation, and not necessarily from a community of cultures based on the Gellnerian posits. However, both Patterson and Smith, while holding the same view on the 'naturalness' of the nation and its pre-existence before the Enlightenment, they, like Seton-Watson and Kedourie, failed to explain the association of the name of a 'people' in

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[64] See Seton-Watson, *Op cit.*, and Kedourie, *Op cit.*,
[65] Connor, W (1978), 'A nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic group is a...' in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1. pp380, 383.
[66] Horowitz, D (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflicts*, (Berkeley), University of California Press. p51
[67] *Ibid.*, p52

relation to their 'self imagination' as Political Communities albeit, not in the sense of the modern nation.

We can conclude therefore that while ethnicity (culturally defined) is an instrument in the 'self imagination' of Political Communities, the *nation* (genealogically and biologically define) can be politicised and become an instrument in the 'self imagination' of the Political Community. There is thus, an Occidental and Oriental conception of the 'nation' and 'nationalism'.[68] If we accept the 'web of kinship' as an instrument of 'self imagination' of Political Communities (chapter 4), we will be able to understand the conflicts rooted on the basis of the claims of particularity based on genealogical and lineage difference in Africa. The conception also enables us to understand the re-emergence of nationalist claims for self-determination on the basis of distinctiveness and particularity conceived in terms of genealogy, biology, lineage as well as cultural difference in the era of globalisation. The threat, represented by globalisation seems to re-awaken the deeply rooted sense of nationality of various 'webs of kinship' not only in Africa but even in Western Europe and elsewhere.[69] Thus, nationalism is not the instrument for the 'self-imagination' of *nations* but abstract Political Communities – states.

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[68] See Smith, *National Identity Op cit.* and Plamenatz 'Two Type of Nationalism' in Kamenka, *Op cit.*

[69] For more detailed discussion on this subject see Smith, A. D (1993), 'The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism' in *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring, pp. 48-62. Also see Smith, A. D (1990), 'Towards a Global Culture?' in *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 7, Nos. 2-3, June, pp171-191 for discussion on the prospects of creating a global culture.

CONCLUSION OF PARTS ONE TO THREE

From chapters 1 – 8, I have rejected the Positivist epistemology of International Relations - IR with empiricism as its general methodology in favour of Understanding - a Rationalist epistemology and storytelling as methodology, albeit, telling a holistic story from the beginning as the basis for the development of what I referred to as African social science. As source of data for the holistic story of Africa, not only have I rejected the prevailing Africanist paradigm due to it reductionist, 'explanatory' and defensive nature, but, identified Social anthropology and the role of African Religious priest, spirit Mediums, Bards, Songs, Poems and Dance as source of data for the telling of African stories. I have therefore argued on the centrality of the concept of *Ntu* as the basis of understanding the African ontology upon which African wars and socio-economic problems can be Understood. Consequently, I have establish the need to distinguished between basic human needs and universal desires, while classifying both by a new term - physiological security due to the inextricability of the pursuit of security, welfare and identity with the Spirituality of the human species. I have also argued against the notion of the creation of Political Communities based on legal and political constructs, suggesting the possibility of Political Communities evolving from genealogical and kinship defined *nations*. Since, however, politics is about administering resources for the benefit of the members of the polity, I have argued in favour of a Mitranian Functional approach as a theory of political action for the organisation of a continental Political Community in Africa, thus, circumventing the Westphalian state system in the continent. The process to achieving this goal is the focus of part Four.

INTRODUCTION TO PART FOUR

In this concluding part of the thesis, I shall be marrying the discussion from parts One to Three, in an attempt to suggest a paradigm for the Understanding of the political and social relations of Africans' Political Communities. This, I will do, by revisiting the argument on human nature, locating the concept of self-determination and its politicisation and transition into the assertion of national self-determination claims, aimed at the creation of Political Communities - states. My argument is centred on the concept of physiological security - a term, which incorporate the human quest for security, welfare and identity whether pursued on individualistic basis or within a collective group. While security, welfare and identity are separate concepts; they are however, inextricably linked. Thus, the quest for socio-economic and political interests, while separate, are however linked, due to human innate needs and desires, which entails welfare pursuits by the individual and the need to retain his identity within a collective group – an aspect of spiritual location. To outline the paradigm, I will, in chapter 9, be looking at self-determination, arguing the centrality of the physiological security need of the individual and the politicisation of the ethnic or collective group – *nation* to which, he belongs. In chapter 10, my argument will expand to evaluate the politicised *nation* and its transformation into a Political Community. Thus, I will be looking at how the pursuit of political sovereignty, territoriality and the pursuit of economic interest - the central issues in macro IR, and the pursuit of physiological security interests of individuals within collective groups – micro historical sociologies serve as conflict variables leading to conflicts and wars in the continent. Therefore, chapter 10 will be explaining the connection between the quest for

physiological security interests and the emergence of conflicts and wars in the African continent.

Chapter 11 contains my summation of the paradigm, which, I argue, is primarily centred on Understanding the stories of wars in Africa from a holistic conception. This suggestion is based on the marriage of macro IR approaches and micro historical sociologies linked to the Mitranian Functional theory of political action and the Andersonian conception of Political Communities. Thus, I will be suggesting the possibility of imagining a continental African Political Community based on the idea of the African Economic Community (AEC) – Abuja Treaty of 1991, as the structure of a Functional federation. Since the pursuit of physiological security interest is the central issue to individuals and collective groups in Africa, a Mitranian Functional theory of political action is a plausible strategy for political action in the ambition of creating a continental Political Community for Africa, thus, circumventing the Westphalian state system in the continent. The need to circumvent the Westphalian state system in Africa is based on its decreasing relevance in international relations and the evolution of Regional trading and economic blocks as key actors. Also, the experience of the EU provides a model for the creation of Political Communities at regional or continental levels. Moreover, the Westphalian state system has not been successful in the African continent due to internal wars waged by collective groups in the pursuit of physiological security – defined as self-determination.

CHAPTER 9

TOWARDS A RIGOROUS EDGE FOR THE PARADIGM

SELF-DETERMINATION: THE CONCEPT

The quest for self-determination at its core, according to Dov Ronen, is not a quest for a national or any other group aspiration; instead, it is an aspiration of the individual human being for the unique notion of 'freedom' and the 'good life'.[1] The emphasis on the pursuit of 'freedom' and the 'good life' is rooted in Maslow's physiological – basic human needs, which are innate, and the universal desires of the human specie, which are also ontological. These needs and desires – wants, can also be seen in Fromm and Atkinson's universal needs and Peretz's universal wants posit. It is these innate needs and desires that John Burton has articulated as the need for *Security, Identity* and *Stimulus* and Johan Galtung conceive as *Health, Nourishment* and *Procreation*, which, in my summation, I have defined as *Welfare* (inclusive of health, excretion and nourishment), *Security* (inclusive of stimuli, rest and movement) and *Identity* (inclusive of procreation and spirituality). These constitute what I have called physiological security needs of the human specie (chapter 6) - aspects of human nature as suggested by Suganami in chapter 2. We can locate Ronen's definition of self-determination on these quests. Also, we have seen these quests of physiological security in the stories of Africans outlined in chapters 4 and 5.

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[1] Ronen, D (1982), *The Quest for Self-determination*, (New Haven), Yale University, pp7-8

Bloom, another scholar also made a similar conclusion on the nature of self-determination as Ronen. For him,

> Individuals [will] actively seek to identify in order to achieve psychological security, and they [will] actively seek to maintain, protect and bolster [the notion of] identity in order to maintain and enhance this psychological security which is a *sine quo non* of [their] personality stability and emotional wellbeing.[2]

Therefore, Ronen, Maslow, Fromm and Atkinson, Peretz, Burton, Galtung, Suganami and Bloom seem to agree on the innate nature of certain quest of the human specie, hence, they are ontological. And from Ronen and Bloom we gather that individuals who share similar features, characteristics or attributes will act 'in concert' in order to protect or enhance the shared *identity*. Anthony D. Smith on his part, in discussing the process of *identity* formation, posits that the question of individuals' identity is always in relation to the social and spiritual locations. His argument is that human desire for individuality and uniqueness lies in the search for *security*, which in turn, is dependent on the social and spiritual location of the individuals themselves,[3] as we have seen in chapter 4. De Vos on the other hand, articulated the quest for *identity* by individuals by asserting that 'identity [is] the absolute uniqueness of [an] individual'.[4] He further argued that the emblems of a

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[2] Bloom, W (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p53. Italics in the original
[3] Smith, A. D (1984), 'National identity and Myths of Ethnic descent' in *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 7, p97
[4] De Vos, G (1983), 'Ethnic pluralism: Conflict and Recommendation' in De Vos, G and Romanucci-Ross, L (eds), *Ethnic Identity: Cultural Communities and Change*, (Chicago), University of Chicago Press, p42

collective identity are necessary for securing individuals' sense of social self,[5] discussed in chapters 4 and 5 on the concept of *Ntu*. Both Smith and De Vos, agrees with Ronen and Bloom on the individual need for identity. While individuals will act 'in concert', utilising the *basis* of their similarity for the formation of identity, Smith and De Vos hold that the need for meaning leads to the formation of collective identity. Thus, collective identity is a spiritual quest, but also, is based on the physical attributes available for the creation of such identity. While I agree with these postulates, their limitations however seems to rest on the assumption that individuals are generally separate from their spirituality, hence, individuals' search for meaning through identifying with others in order to secure or achieve spirituality. I disagree with this assumption primarily because it excludes the spirituality, which is the primary bond between individuals in African *nations,* or kinship defined collective groups (see chapters 4 and 5). Consequently, the concept of *Ntu*, which defines the African ontology, central to African spirituality, is excluded in their explanation of *identity* formation and the quest for self-determination.

In his *Idols of the Tribe*, Isaac outlined the stages of identity formation from the birth of a child thus: When the baby is born into a family (spiritual location) sharing the physical characteristics of the family, hence, is identifiable and associated to the family through features and characteristics. As the child grows, s/he acknowledges the place of birth (physical location). This acknowledgement of the physical location is followed by an individual *identity* for the child – a name, which not only depicts the individuality of the child, but the family's conceived *essence* of that child (in the African naming traditions) and the association to the family – spirituality which links the child to the *Ntu*. The child is

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[5] *Ibid*, p4

then tutored to understand the symbols of a given language (spoken by the family – not necessarily the language of the spiritual location) spoken in the physical location. Then, lessons in history and the origin of the family (the story of the *Ntu*, which, in the African traditional sense incorporates lesson on Religion and *Nationality*) follows. This process, according to Isaac, forms the idols of the tribe upon which the child is born.[6] In essence, the child develops a sense of attachment to both the physical and spiritual locations of the family's habitation. Hence, the child's identity become inextricably linked with the two location (*Ntu* – spiritual location) and the physical location (the place of birth). While Ronen, Bloom, Smith and De Vos' conception of the need for spirituality as the basis of identity formation, is applicable to collective groups whose identity is not based on kinship, lineage or genealogy is acceptable, this however, is not the case with the African, whose identity rests on *Ntu* - the link between the dead, the living and the many generations to be born. The process of acculturation and socialisation of the child into the physical location of birth could either re-enforce the child's identity with the family link – in the case of the African child – with the *Ntu*, to which the family belong as members of the society – nation, or to its physical location where the link with the spiritual location is weak or non existent (mostly found in Diasporic communities) the basis upon which the four scholars based their conclusions.

Francis Bacon, cited by Isaac, summed up the linked between the identity of the child and the spirituality, upon which the child is born, thus: 'the idols of the tribe have their foundation in human nature itself, and in the tribe or the race of men. All perceptions as

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[6] Isaac, H (1975), *Idols of the Tribe: Group identity and Political Change*, (New York), Harper and Row, pp38-9

well as the sense of the mind are according to the measure of the individual and not according to the measure of the universe'.[7] From Isaac's narration of the process of identity formation from childhood, and Bacon's conclusion on the nature of identity formation as natural to the human specie, we can conclude that while individual's identity, consequently self-determination, is only possible in conjunction with the society to which the individual belongs, the sense of a unique identity is developed on the basis of the society's perceptions, values and ways of interpreting issues or nature of things, which becomes part of the process of identity formation and indeed, the sense of identity in itself. Thus, the society invents and propagates claims of particularity, though, in a subjective manner; however, it is conceived as given, hence, a natural process. Therefore, we can argue that human evolution from the family/clan to the formation of larger collective groups is a process of identity formation either based on the claim of a spirituality as in the conception of the *Ntu*, or in the pursuit of socio-economic interest based on the physical location. It is within the socio-economic interest pursuits that these theorists have explained the process of identity formation. It is also on that basis that Rousseau conceived equality and inequality in his discourses on Social Contract.

Rousseau had conceived 'equality' as entailing the freedom by *all* to conduct their lives (functions) without any obligation by others.[8] For him, equality is the condition or state where *all humans* have the freedom to conduct their affairs without any obligation to others. In essence, equality, based on Rousseau's conception, is in relation to the free will of the human specie. Thus, humans are born with the ability to define themselves or to

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[7] Cited in Isaac, *Op cit*, p38

exercise their free will. However, the need to become accountable to others, or, systems, creates the condition of inequality. Hence, inequality, although a construct, is natural, since it exist from birth. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between the inequality, which stem from birth – natural (physical) and moral (political) inequality. While natural – physical inequality is established by nature and manifested in the differences in age, health, bodily physique, strength as well as the quality of the mind or soul, moral – political inequality on the other hand, depends on conventions which are established or authorised by the consent of man. These conventions create the different privileges enjoyed by some to the prejudice of others. Thus, some people are richer, more honoured and powerful and are in better position to exact obedience from other.[9] Thus, while inequality may be considered natural in the physical sense, it is however man-made in the political sense. Human are therefore responsible for the creation of political inequalities through the creation and establishment of conventions which allows the existence of inequality in society. What Rousseau is arguing is that although human are by nature born with particular identities through their physical features, characteristic and attributes (spiritual location), however, inequality which is manifested in the pursuit of socio-economic interest are a product of political convention – political administration (physical location), which also serve as the origin of conflicts and wars.[10] In essence, while the human specie is born with natural attributes, which differentiate one individual from another and one group from another, thus, a natural phenomenon, the pursuit of socio-economic interest – *welfare*, introduces conflict and consequently, wars in human interactions.

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[8] Rousseau, J (1947), *The Social Contract* (New York), Hafner, Press and --- (1952), *The Social Contract and Discourses*, (New York), Every man edition
[9] *Ibid, The Social Contract and Discourses*, p44
[10] *Ibid,* p76

My observation of Western thought and theorists, is their failure to link the individual and his lineage, kinship or genealogy in the attempt to identify the source of insecurity and the individual's conception of security, welfare and identity. While this may be acceptable in explaining the quest for the same factors in Western societies, the same argument does not hold in relation to Africa. If we are to tell the stories of wars in Africa with the aim of identifying causality and hence, finding solution, the stories must be told in a holistic manner, locating not only the basis of the political inequality – the pursuit of *welfare* interest, but also, the quest for *identity* – a spiritual quest as far as the concept of *Ntu* is concerned. Since the pursuit of socio-economic interest is intertwined with the claims of politico-cultural interest of the collective groups in Africa, we cannot therefore, tell the stories in isolation of the quest of *identity* and the pursuit of *security* of the collective group or *nation*. In essence, the pursuit of security, welfare and identity are inextricably linked in the stories of African wars. Thus, the various collective groups and *nations* seek physiological security, based on their pursuit of physiological needs and the need to maintain the Religio-cultural value systems and institutions of the *nation*, conceive in the *Ntu*. We can therefore conclude that the quest for physiological security is inclusive of the continuity of the *Ntu* - the basis of African *nations* and collective groups' spirituality.

Thus, the rise of self-determination on the basis of collective groups' identity is a manifestation of the continual evolution and development of human interaction naturally. This however poses a problem to the Westphalian state system, due to its static and inflexible nature and conception, purely on socio-economic interest pursuits basis. Collective self-determination, tend towards fulfilling the interest of its members as *the*

centre, hence, is centrifugal, consequently, seeking the disintegration of the Westphalian state – a centripetal aggregation. Collective self-determination by its emphasis on the centrifugal, disunites the political construct - state, rather that unites the various groups within the state entity. Also, it tends towards smaller aggregations rather than the larger state structure. Ronen observed that while this development presents a threat to the Westphalian state system, no alternative form of organisation has been found. The ideas of self-rule, federation, decentralisation, devolution are not adequate terms to explain the nature of the developments in form of collective self-determination quest, because they only connote administrative measure. People seeking self-determination he argues, are willing to accept less autonomy with more flags, but not vice versa.[11] Although Ronen has made a valuable observation and summation of the problem associated with the pursuit of collective self-determination, he failed to answer the fundamental question of why the human specie activates one of his many available identities against the political framework of which he is part of, by legislation and political construction? My summation and answer to this question is based on what I have described as the quest for physiological security expressed in the pursuit of security, welfare and identity interest to ensure the continuity of the group's identity – an aspect of human quest for spirituality, discussed further in the next section. However, I agree with Ronen's observation, that the human being needs to interact to exist, hence he aggregates on a functional basis, thus, asserting the claim of self-determination. Also, I am in agreement with Ronen's conclusion that it will be dangerous to assume that the articulation of individual interest is only applicable to 'primitive' societies, because these features are apparent in the most modern setting of

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[11] Ronen, Op cit, pp22-25

today's world,[12] hence, is innate to the human specie. In the functional – collective aggregation, the individual is *objectively* subservient to customs, religion, mores, and rules of his/her society, often living in poor material conditions; yet, s/he claims self-determination, *subjectively* because s/he willingly associates to such customs, religion, mores and rules. Thus, we can assert:

> Man is 'free' in functional [collective] aggregation because he *subjectively* believes that he can freely use a language, can freely express his opinions, can freely practice his religion, can freely behave according to his customs. He does not know, or … care, that *objectivity* for him … is only one language, one religion, one opinion, one set of customs …[even] if he knows about them, [they] are irrelevant for him.[13]

For the individual, self-determination enables him to 'rule himself' and to 'control his own life' without being obligated to another person or group, to which, he does not identify himself as being part of. Therefore, the quest for individuals' self-determination is an aspiration for achievement of physiological security to enable the continuity of his *subjective* belief *within* his unique group. And since language, religion and customs are functional; the individual will use them as *means* of achieving his/her pursuits. Thus, the human specie will 'naturally' activate the identities that are more fundamental – language, religion, pigmentation, common customs – simply because they are available,[14] but, also, because they form the basis of his self identification – the continuity of his spirituality.

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[12] *Ibid*, pp54-5
[13] *Ibid*,

Western thought however, in defining non-Western *nations* and collective aggregations as ethnic groups or tribes, failed to take the spiritual quest of the individual in identity formation into consideration, but rest their arguments mainly on cultural and socio-economic variables. However, as we have seen, the spirituality of the individual informs his/her willingness to sacrifice his individuality for the benefit – continuity of the collective group from which s/he draws his/her being.

In the next section, I shall be identifying the elements of physiological security – central to the quest of self-determination in the conception of ethnicity and its transformation into nations (political aggregations) based on Western conception of the idea of the nation. I shall be taking Anthony D. Smith's conception of the ethnic group and its relations/transition to the nation.

PHYSIOLOGICAL SECURITY: SECURITY, WELFARE AND IDENTITY

De Vos has described ethnicity as 'the attribute of membership ... [of] a group set by racial, territorial, economic, religious, aesthetic, or linguistic uniqueness'.[15] While this definition is anthropological and encompasses the factors involved in the quest for physiological security, there is however, a problem with the conception when relating to the collective group defined as ethnic group in Africa, as we have seen in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Since the collective groups in Africa are linked through lineage and kinship, their classification as 'ethnic groups' on the basis of the uniqueness of religion, cultures,

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[14] *Ibid*, p56
[15] De Vos *op cit*, p118

aesthetic and language is questionable. Also the idea of racial division of the *aithoipe* –
black as discussed in chapter 3, into a further division of blackness on the basis of the level
of melanin, negates the rule of lineage and kinship upon which, the concept of *Ntu* is
based. Thus, the claim of racial uniqueness is also unacceptable.

While the question of territory is central to the African sense of identity, it is however, not
conceived as property to be exploited. Rather, it is a communal *space* kept in trust for the
benefit of the *Ntu*. Consequently, while a claim of territorial uniqueness is central, it is
however, not based on individual ownership, but the *Ntu*, thus, we can accept the claim of
territorial uniqueness as the basis of asserting an ethnic particularity, however, only to a
limited degree. This is because, the territory – geographical *space* is conceived as a
frontier (to be discussed in chapter 10) and not boundaries as defined by the Westphalian
state system. Thus, the ownership of the geographical *space*, while belonging to the
'ethnic group' is actually made available for the benefit of *all* resident (including
foreigners) within the frontier, not on the basis of citizenship, but based on the
understanding that while the foreigner is free to reside and pursue his socio-economic
interest, he must recognise the ownership of the land as belonging to the *Ntu* - the
Autochthon, as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5. In essence, the claim of territorial
ownership is central to the *identity* of the people as well as their cultural, religious,
aesthetic and linguistic uniqueness. The claim of economic uniqueness, however, is
indeed, a central claim of particularity, not necessarily because of the different methods in
the pursuit of economic activities, but in the nature of the pursuit of *welfare* and hence
security for the continuity of the 'ethnic group's' *spirituality*, conceived in their *identity*.

The claim for economic uniqueness, from our discussion in chapters 1-8, revels that it is a human need quest – innate, hence, ontological to the human specie. Thus, it forms the basis for the claim of socio-economic self-determination – a universal quest of the human specie whether as individuals or collective groups. Therefore, while the economic – *welfare* basis of the claim of self-determination is ontological to the human specie, the claim of self-determination on the assertion of 'ethnic' particularity, centred on the uniqueness of Spirituality, is a subjective claim of self-determination, nevertheless, is central to the attainment of the sense of *identity* and *security* of the 'ethnic group'. Although a universal *desire*, it is central to the human quest for self-determination as much as his physiological needs – basic *needs*.

According to Enloe, ethnicity has both a communal and personal dimension since it refers to a peculiar bond among persons. This bond, she argues, causes the collective group to identify itself as a group distinct from others.[16] For Enloe, the common bond of the 'ethnic group' evolved from a shared culture, which in turn, forms the group's pattern of fundamental belief and values by which they differentiate 'right' from 'wrong', define the rules for interaction, sets priorities, expectation and goals. Thus, it is the cultural bond, which grows out of the recognition of the distinctiveness of members' own standard of behaviour, and the prizing of those standards to the extent that they feel most comfortable and secure among person sharing such values.[17] Enloe conception of the ethnic group is based on the claim of cultural evolution, which totally ignores kinship and lineage basis of 'ethnicity'. While I accept that cultures do in fact influence and perpetuate the 'ethnic'

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[16] Enloe, C (1973), *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*, (Boston), Little Brown, p15
[17] *Ibid*, p24

bond, I however disagree with the implication that 'ethnicity' itself evolved primarily due to cultural evolutions. My disagreement is based on the nature of the African *nations* as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5. However, taking the individual as the centre of her argument, helps our understanding of the relationship between the individual's quest for physiological security and his role in the reinforcement and perpetuation of the idea of a collective uniqueness. Her argument rest on the claim that since the individual plays an influential role in the articulation of the ethnic group, a collective group can only achieve a distinctive and unique identity when its individual members' 'own standard of behaviour and the prizing of those standard [converge with others] to the extent that they feel most comfortable and secure' within the group. In essence, the individual quest for *security, welfare* and *identity* is central in the articulating of the collective group as an 'ethnic group', which in turns, equips the members with a sense of belonging – spirituality in a given society. For Enloe therefore, the individual quest for identity must be grasped in terms of the nature of social relations, which are complex and impersonal. Individual's uses 'ethnicity' as a 'reassuring anchor in a climate of turbulence and uncertainty'.[18] We can conclude from Enloe's postulate that the individual can actually choose to identify or not to identify with a particular collective group, depending on the satisfaction s/he may achieve from such identification. The summation of this claim is found in her assertion that while '[all] men are cultural being; not all men however, consider themselves members of an ethnic group' mainly due to:

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[18] *Ibid,*

1)   The dependence of ethnicity on self identification of individuals. While ethnicity is not an objective categorisation, individuals however, often define themselves on the basis of how other people perceive them.

2)   Ethnic groups share a cluster of belief and values, which are idiosyncratic to individuals. Individuals are only able to remain or identify with the group because their idiosyncratic particularity are *similar*, or are *common* within the group. Hence, ethnic institutions perform functions exclusively within the power of states. Consequently, the ethnic group, as a collective group, poses an explicit and intolerable challenge to the authority of the government of states.[19]

To sum up, Enloe described the function of the ethnic group as 'to bind individuals together as a group. It informs a person where [s/he] belongs and whom [s/he] can trust. Its foundation is a sense of common manners, rituals, values and the limit of that commonness set boundaries for group interaction'.[20] In other words, 'ethnic groups' evolve through sentiments, customs and familiarity, rather than on the basis of a common lineage, kinship or genealogy.

While I agree with the function of ethnic groups in relation to states, in their collective act to pursue physiological security, I reject the assertion that the ethnic group evolved out of cultural and traditionally evolved values, rituals, customs and common manners. Enloe's assertions exclude the collective groups in Africa whose sense of 'ethnicity' is based on the claim to a common lineage, genealogy and kinship conceived in the *Ntu*. Therefore,

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[19] *Ibid*, pp16-18
[20] *Ibid*, p39

the posits do not account for what Isaac called the 'soft' facts of life – physical characteristics, name, language, history, origin and religion. These 'soft' fact, according to Isaac, sums the group's identity and 'more and more in recent times [forms] the basis for politics ... [and] world politics'.[21] For Isaac, the 'nature of politics in the new emerging world is based on the quest to remain, maintain, become, re-establish, discover or rediscover who and what a particular people are, and to get, have and hold enough power to sustain themselves in that identity'.[22] Keen observers of contemporary developments will come to the same conclusion with Isaac. The 'soft' facts, conceived as the basis of ethnic group formation and the claim for self-determination have become common in every sphere of life and at every level – global, regional, national and local and are also intertwine with the 'hard' or 'large' affairs of power struggle – territorial claims, resources and the distribution of wealth central to the function of the Westphalian states system (to be discussed in chapter 10). These 'large' affairs of states are at the core of the pursuit of 'ethnic' or collective group's claim of self-determination. Hence, they utilise the 'soft' fact to achieve their goals. Although Enloe has recognised the inextricability of the pursuit of self-determination with the fulfillment of the functions of states, she failed to establish the basis of the group's sense of particularity beyond a culture-centred argument. In essence, she ignores the kinship basis of the formation of identities, thus, exclude the 'ethnic' groups of Africa in her analysis, but dwells mainly on the process of identity formation among minority migrant communities (non-Autochthons) groups in foreign countries. Her postulate does not help our Understanding of the stories of wars in the African continent.

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[21] Isaac, H (1979), *Power and Identity: Tribalism in World Politics*, (New York), Foreign Policy Association, p9

While sharing some of Enloe's conclusion on the conception of the ethnic group, Bush on his part, disagrees with the cultural premise of Enloe's argument. In his general definition of the concept, he classified 'ethnic groups' as having 'a membership, which identifies itself, and is, identified by others as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same other'.[23] The general attributes of the collective group – 'ethnic group', common in usage and in formal social science codification based on the assumption of a distinction between collective groups on the basis of unique properties, he asserts, are:

1) **Biological** properties from which the members of the group draws from a common genetic pool, which perpetuates over time, thus, the members of the group share certain physical characteristics.

2) **Cultural** values upon which the group do things differently, making specific choices of what things they chose to include in their values systems and also, how they interact with non members of their group.

3) **Linguistic** classification with which the members of the group communicate more easily among themselves and think different thoughts from non-members. Thus, they can become 'mutually unintelligible' to non-members.

4) **Structural** institutions based on which they organise their society differently from others. Consequently, they have different social roles and values based on their structural arrangement different from other groups.[24]

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[22] *Ibid,*
[23] Bush, P. A (1974), *Legitimacy and Ethnicity,* (Massachusetts), Lexington, p4
[24] *Ibid,*

Bush has recognised the relevance of kinship and lineage in the evolution of the sense of 'ethnicity' in the assertion of the claim of self-determination and the pursuit of physiological security. De Vos, on the other hand, while agreeing with both Enloe and Bush on the pursuance of a 'common cause' as the binding force of ethnicity, insists that while 'common cause' is of great importance in uniting the human specie into self-defining groups, their 'ethnicity' is commonly connected to birth and blood.[25] Horowitz, on his part, while agreeing with Bush and De Vos, observes that not all ethnic groups are linked by blood.[26] In essence, there are 'ethnic groups', which evolved from a claim of common kinship, lineage or genealogy – *nations* found in Africa and other ethnic groups that evolved out of cultural aggregation as in Enloe's postulate. Thus, the analysis of the collective groups – *nations* in Africa, on the basis of a cultural premise ignores the central link of the claim of a common heritage, hence the pursuit of a common cause for the benefit of the *Ntu*. Therefore, the loyalty of Africans is often to the *nation* and not to the Westphalian state. This is primarily so, because the institutions of the *nations* are often seen as having direct relevance to the people and constitute part of their being, whereas the state is seen as the 'enemy' of the *nations*. Thus, individuals' loyalty is to their respective *nations* and not the state. However, if 'common cause' is the central pursuit of the collective group, how does the group transform itself from an ethnic or collective aggregation to a political aggregation – a nation, in the pursuit of a common cause – the physiological security for its members, hence, self-determination? In the next section, I shall be looking at the process of this transition.

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[25] De Vos, *Op cit*, p5
[26] Horowitz, D. L (1971), 'Three Dimension of Ethnic politics' in *World Politics*, XXIII, p52.

THE NATION: A POLITICISED COLLECTIVE GROUP

The word 'nation' is a modern coinage rooted in the ancient world according to Anthony D. Smith. The word conveys the inherent differences in people, which creates the divide between 'other people' not from 'our city-state'.[27] G. Zernatto, in his evaluation of the history of the word – nation, asserted that 'nation' is derived from the Latin word *natio*, which, in turn, has its roots from *natus*. Both *natio* and *natus* have their origin in the Latin word for 'I am born' – *nascor*. To the Romans, *natio* was used in reference to something born and in ordinary speech, was used to define a group of people who *belong* together due to their similarities of birth. Hence, members of the *natio* were born in the same city or track of land. *Natio* was therefore conceived as 'a number of foreign people, who were bound together by similarity of origin'.[28] Smith in his narration of the evolution of the concept and term, nation, argues that the word 'nation' is rooted in the concept of 'ethnic group' or 'ethnic community'. In the Greek, he asserts, the concept of ethnic community had different meanings, but generally connotes 'difference' as compared to another group. The Greek '*ethnos*' – ethnic, is used in reference to the Other. *Ethnos* became central in the development of Christendom and was use in reference to groups that were neither Christians nor Jews. Thus, Christendom made a distinction between Christians/Jews and the Other – non-Christians/Jews.[29] While Christendom made this distinction during its development, and the Islamic *Umma*[30] also distinguishes between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, social scientist have failed to investigate the concept of *Ntu* which distinguishes

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[27] Smith, A. D (1991), *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, (Massachusetts), Basil Blackwell, p11
[28] Zernatto, G (1994), 'Nation: The history of a Word' in *Review of Politics*, 6, pp351-2
[29] Smith, *Op cit*, p21

the Autochthonous African from the non-Autochthon as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5. While the idea of 'nation' has developed into the conception of nationhood - in Western thought from which, citizenship is associated, and the acceptance of the concept of *Umma* as the expression of a transnational citizenship incorporating the Muslim world, the concept of *Ntu*, although central to African self definition, hence *identity*, on the other hand, has remained an unexplored concept in the social sciences, consequently, the failure to develop it as a basis of an African conception of citizenship – albeit, a transnational citizenship.

While the Greeks and Christian defined the Other as *ethnos*, the only modern language that have a word that convey a similar meaning, is the French *ethnie* (ethnic community) which is essentially social and cultural in definition.[31] It is based on this conception that Enloe conceive the process of the evolution of ethnicity. Therefore, both the *ethnos –ethnie* and *natio* are collective aggregation and defines Outsiders, non-citizens. Both concepts however, have similar characteristic, thus:

1)   **A Collective Name** which convey or identifies the 'essence' of the people.[32] The name evokes an atmosphere and drama that has power and meaning for its members, but means nothing to Outsiders, except that it categorises a community. In the mind of the members of the named community, the name summons up images of distinctive traits and characteristics of its members. Although the images

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[30] Mayall, J (1990), *Nationalism and International Society*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p14. See also Chan, S (1999), 'Andrew Linklater and the New Rhetoric in International Relations' *in Global Society*, Vol., 13, 3, p373
[31] Smith, *Op cit*, p22

and imagination of members of the community will differ, but because the name summons their consciousness as a collective aggregation, individuals' differences become less noticeable.[33] We have come across this process in chapters 4 and 5.

2) **A Shared History** upon which the community builds its shared memories through successful generations adding to the catalogue of shared memories their 'own' set of experiences.[34] Thus, their 'own' experiences with past shared memories becomes part of the history of the community and provides forms upon which meanings are associated in relation to the actions of Outsiders towards the community (as discussed in chapters 4 and 5). It is this perception of the intentions and actions of Outsiders, which reinforces the unity and acknowledgement of a 'common cause' of the nation.

3) **A Myth of Common Descent** provides answer to the questions of similarities in physical feature and attributes, but also the Spirituality of the nation. The members belong to one origin – kinship, lineage or genealogy. While African *nations* and collective groups are able to trace their genealogy, hence lineage and kinship to a certain extent, culturally defined ethnic groups, although may claim a common descent, but are unable to explain the basis of their claim, remaining content with just believing the claim.[35]

4) **A Common Boundary** which include only those conscious of *belonging* to the *nation* or collective group, hence, the Autochthons of the geographical *space* of their habitation, their *homeland* to which, all sons of the soil in Diaspora can return

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[32] *Ibid*, p53
[33] *Ibid*,
[34] *Ibid*, p25
[35] *Ibid*, pp24-26

to.[36] The sense of the sacredness of the *homeland* and the pursuit of a common cause strengthens the sense of solidarity of the members of the *nation* or collective group, hence, the loyalty of its members to the cause of self-determination and the pursuit of physiological security.

These attributes and characteristics, although conceived in relation to the *ethnos – ethnie* and *natio*, are however, the same in defining the nation and nationality. Thus, nationality is pertaining to culture, history, geography, language and religion, which identifies a given people and links them to a common history, culture and tradition. While these attributes plays a major role in the definition of nationality, all do not however, need to be present in order to defined nationality. For the sense of nationality to exist, there must be a *self-consciousness* of the combined effects of the attributes in a Seton-Watson sense (see chapter 7). This is different from the Andersonian 'self imagination' posit. Therefore the *self consciousness* of the attributes is central to the conception of the nation and nationality and precisely for this reason, allegiance and loyalty of the *nationals* often transcend the Westphalian state. While citizens of a state can belong to different nationalities, hence, their loyalty is divisible, this is not the case with the nation and its nationals based on Seton-Watson's conception. This conclusion is based on the nature of citizenship, which acknowledges the rights of nations and ethnic groups within the state, since citizenship is accorded on a legal basis, binding the citizens through a political process. Thus, while the nation evolved from a *self conscious* state of mind or awareness and feeling, the state on the other hand, is *self imagined* based on a legal and political bond in the Andersonian

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[36] *Ibid*, pp26-29

sense (discussed in chapter 7). In essence, while the nation is primordial, the state is a political construct.

From these arguments, I have implied that nationality and ethnicity are synonymous. W. Connor defined the nation as 'a self conscious ethnic group' and explained further, that an ethnic group may be 'readily discerned by the outside observer, but, until the members are themselves aware of the group's uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation'.[37] Connor is arguing that both the ethnic group and the nation are one and the same, except that the ethnic group is defined by the Other while the nation is self defined. Articulating a similar line of reasoning, although based on a cultural-centred definition, Gellner asserts that:

> 'Ethnicity' or 'Nationality' is the simple name given to conditions which prevails when many factors converge and overlap, so that the boundaries of conversation, easy commensality, shared pastimes ... are the same, and when the community of people delimited by these boundaries is endowed with an ethnonym, and is suffused with powerful feelings.[38]

Both Connor and Gellner seem to be saying that ethnicity/nationality are not political by nature, but only become so, when the collective group become self-defined or become loyal to their ethnonym, due to a perceived threat. A view also held by Smith.[39] Connor, Gellner and Smith agree on the synonymity of ethnicity and nationality - the ethnic and the

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[37] Connor, W (1973), 'The politics of Ethno-nationalsim' in *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, p3
[38] Gellner, E (1983), *Nations and Nationalism*, (Oxford), Basil Blackwell, p38

nations. Therefore, nationality is primarily concerned with the feeling of belonging to a nation which has a sacred *homeland* – of which the members of the nation are Autochthons - with a distinctive boundary separating its nationals from non nationals. It is based on this definition that the nation, being 'a great solidarity founded on the consciousness of sacrifices made in the past and on willingness to make further more in the future',[40] that we can Understand the stories of wars in Africa in the pursuit of physiological security conceived as self-determination.

However, while the idea of the nation is central to the quest for self-determination and appears to be the goal of the collective group, a closer examination will reveal that this is not the case. The continuity of the nation, hence its members sense of identity, is its central concern, and not the entity called the nation *per se*. The satisfaction of its members' physiological security will ensure their continuity, hence the continuity of the entity called nation. Thus, while institutions make people, people on the other hand, give life to the institution; hence, the individual and the nation are inextricably linked as we have seen in chapter 2. Hertz has rightly summarised this relationship by asserting that 'a nation is a community of fate, to a large extent brought together and mounded by historical events and natural factors and the *individual* has practically little opportunity of choosing his nationality or changing its fundamental traits.[41] From Hertz, we can conclude that the individual, while being constrained to the membership of the nation due to spiritual and

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[39] Smith, *Ethnic Origin...*, *Op cit*, p55
[40] Hertz, F (1944), *Nationality in History and Politics*, (London), Routledge and Kegan Paul, p12
[41] *Ibid*, p13, the emphasis is mine to establish the centrality of the individual in the identity of the nation as will as the nations quest for self-determination.

physical locations,[42] is however, the centre of the quest for nations' self – determination, hence, his physiological security. Based on Hertz, it will appear that to the *nation*, the idea of self-determination implies the criteria for determining nationality, the means of forming and expressing the national will, and the purpose and limit of national will.[43] Therefore, I share Patterson's conception of ethnicity/nationality as a form of commitment, an ideology, or more properly a faith that is often secular, but, also frequently a secular faith layered on a more profound religious faith, which embodies the concept and role of nationality to individuals and the nation.[44] For the nation to achieve its objective – common goal of obtaining physiological security for its nationals, the sense of nationality of the members must be transformed into a strategy of action; hence, ethnicity/nationality develops into nationalism and asserts a claim of national self-determination. This transition from the politicised ethnic or collective group – *nation* to a claim of statehood – national self-determination in the quest to fulfil the physiological security needs of the nationals, is the focus of chapter 10.

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[42] *Ibid*, p146

[43] *Ibid*, p240

[44] Patterson, O (1977), *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse*, (New York), Stein and Day, p10

CHAPTER 10

THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN MACRO IR APPROACH AND MICRO HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGIES

NATIONALISM (POLITICAL) INTEREST

Since the 'ethnic' group when politicised, is considered *self defined* and assumes a new term - nation with nationals whose loyalty is total to it, as a Political Community, the claim of political sovereignty, a 'right' expressed in the principles of national self-determination, becomes its goal. The process of achieving political sovereignty is made possible by the ideology of nationalism – a strategy of action, which evolves from its members' (nationals') *consciousness* of their distinctiveness and particularity. This *consciousness* is translated into a sense of *nationality* and further transforms into the ideology of *nationalism* with the goal of claiming the *right* to constitute a Political Community - state. Thus, nationalism evolves from the politicisation of the ethnic or collective group as we have seen in chapters 8 and 9. According to Cobban, the principle of self-determination is 'the belief that each nation (collective group) has a right to constitute an independent state and determines its own government'. The history of self-determination, he argues, 'is the history of the making of nations and the breaking of states.[1] In essence, the ideology of nationalism upon which the right to create Political Communities – *Gemeinschaften* nations, leads to the breaking of the *Gesellschaften* states. James Mayall described self-determination as the product of *historical* evolution of the *consciousness* of the 'people' of

being a nation. This *consciousness*, he asserts, was eventually codified over a long period, into the principle of popular sovereignty[2] – the claim of national self-determination, the right to form a new Political Community. Mayall's conclusion is similar to Ortega y Gasset's historical evaluation of the rise of nationalism and the claim of sovereignty. In his *The Revolt of the Masses*, Gasset outline his argument thus:

> In the 18th Century certain minority groups discovered that every human being, by the mere fact of birth, and without requiring any special qualification whatsoever, possessed certain fundamental political rights, the so-called rights of man and the citizens; and further that, strictly speaking, these rights, common to all, are the only ones that exist ... This was at first a mere theory, the idea of a few men; then those few began to put the idea into practice, to impose it and insist upon it. Nevertheless, during the whole of the 19th Century, the mass, while gradually becoming enthusiastic to these rights as an ideal, did not feel them as rights, ... the 'people' ... had learned that it was sovereign but did not believe it. Today the ideal has been changed into a reality; not only in legislation, which is the mere framework of public life, but in the heart of every individual, whatever his ideas may be, and even if he be a reactionary in his ideas, *that is to say even*

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[1] Cobban, A (1970), *The nation-state and National self-determination*, (New York), Apollo edition, pp39, 43
[2] Mayall, J (1990), *Nationalism and International Society*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p38

when he attacks and castigates institutions by which those rights are sanctioned.[3]

What Gasset has described as a 'discovery' of the spiritual location of the individual, from which they obtain sovereign right by *merely* being born, is what the Africans *know* and express through the concept of *Ntu* (discussed in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 9). It is the sense of particularity and distinctiveness based upon kinship, lineage or genealogy with an autochthonous geographical *space* called *homeland.* However, *Ntu* is not translated into the notion of sovereignty in the political sense. The link between the dead, the living and the many generations to be born – *Ntu's* ownership of the land connotes its *sovereignty* over it members (*nationals*). Consequently, the *Ntu* defines itself in relationship to the geographical *space* – its rightful *homeland* constituting its frontier (boundary). While Gasset and Mayall have rightly outlined the process of the transition from nationhood, with the 'nation' (people) as sovereign, they however, seem to imply that the idea of *belonging* to the nation in the first place, had to be *discovered.* This runs contrary to the processes of acquisition of identity and the notion of the particularity of Africans, based on the *Ntu*, and the process of socialisation and acculturation of the child described by Isaac as we have discussed in chapter 9. Both Gasset and Mayall ignored the link of individuals to their spiritual location – blood ties, express through kinship, lineage and genealogy as part of the individual's and *their* collective group's identity, consequently, they conceived the claim of the *right* of national self-determination – a right to be legally recognised as a sovereign Political Community, as a demand based on the pursuit of political and social

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[3] See Gasset, J. O. y (1932), *The Revolt of the Masses.* Authorised translation from the Spanish (London), Allen and Unwin, pp224-5, cited and quoted from Mayall, *Op cit.* Italics in the original.

rights of man. This conception of the *consciousness* of identity may not be applicable to Africans, since they define their *essence* and *being* through the *Ntu*, which is also *sovereign*. Africans' primary concern, however, seems to rest in the pursuit of socio-economic - *welfare* interest and the preservation of the *identity*, - therefore the security of the 'people' - *Ntu, or nation*. Although both Gasset and Mayall acknowledges the primordial nature of *nations*, they seem to have conceived these *nations* as mere collective groups who have no consciousness of their uniqueness, or right, derived from their spiritual location, until it was first 'discovered'. While this argument may hold true, if we are tracing the stages in the evolution of the human species, it is however, inadequate in explaining the evolution of *nationalism* or the *consciousness* of the idea of the 'nation' since the 18th century. The posits ignores societies, like the African societies whose sense of identity and uniqueness rests on the spiritual location, and not the pursuit of material wealth, - aspect of humans' physical location - what Rousseau has defined as moral or political inequality as we have seen in chapter 9. Since the term 'nation' is modern, and evolved from primordial concepts (the modern 'ethnic' term), and also, the rise of nationalism in the 18th century a modern phenomenon, we cannot confine the concept of 'people', from which the names of many African *nations* – *Ntu* and the South Slav – *narod*, is derived, to the rise of 18th century nationalism.

The *consciousness* of the 'people' is primordial, and has been in existence before the introduction of the term 'nation' and nationalism as we have argued in chapters 8 and 9. In essence, the 'people' are what we described pejoratively as 'tribes' or by the cultural term, 'ethnic' group. The 'people' know who they are, based on their name and their spirituality

– the African *Ntu*, but, may not necessarily claim a right of national self-determination, as a right to sovereignty, since, *sovereignty* is located in the *Ntu - nation*. Both Gasset and Mayall's concept of 'nation' seem to rest on the modernist definition and is seen as synonymous with the 'state', rather than the *conscious* collective group linked by the claim to common myth of descent, history, spirituality and homeland. This misconception is the root of Mayall's problem with deciding 'who' should be defined as the 'people' especially in Africa, due to the heterogeneous nature of the Westphalian state, which he seems to imply is the nation. However, Mayall, like Gasset, rightly sees the rise of 'nationalism' in Africa, as a specific case of the assertion of freedom from colonial rule, rather than the quest for national self-determination due to the problem of defining the 'nation'[4] in the modernist sense.

Indeed, we can argue that the liberation struggles and demands for freedom from colonial rule and imposition, was erroneouly classified 'nationalism'. As argued in chapter 9, there is a difference between the quest for self-determination – freedom for the pursuit of individuals' physiological security interests and the national quest for the self-determination on the basis of the assertion of political particularity - political sovereignty. In essence, while the quest for freedom by African people was indeed a quest for 'national' self-determination, it was however; not based on the concept of the African *nation – Ntu*, but the need to redress the inequality and exploitative relationship imposed by the colonial rule. The quest for collective groups' physiological security interest, is however, not necessarily the motive of the development, or indeed, evolution of nationalism. Since the goal of nationalism is the creation of a Political Community – state with political

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[4]Mayall, *op cit*, pp42, 48

sovereignty. However, *nationalism* in itself, is the extension of the nation's (the politicised ethnic group) pursuit of physiological security interest for its members – *nationals* as we have established in chapters 8 and 9. Connor has observed that the most fundamental error involved in scholarly approaches to *nationalism* has been a tendency to equate it with a feeling of loyalty to the state, rather than the nation. This error he argues, has led to the conception of *nationalism* as functional to the state, rather than dysfunctional and defeatist.[5] Nationalism is therefore an ideology of the nation and not the state. Based on Connor's conception of *nationalism*, we can argue that African *nations – Ntu* do not necessarily transform their *nationality* (commonly described as ethnicity) into nationalism in the claim of the right to form a legally and politically recognised Political Community separate from the existing one, although 'ethnic' sentiment is the same as the 'nations'. While the *Ntu* seek the satisfaction of its members physiological security interest, other politicised 'ethnic' groups, mostly outside the African continent, seem to place the legal and political claim of sovereignty as central to their claim of self-determination, hence, national self-determination. Connor's conception on the other hand, implies that *nationalism* is the process of transforming the politicised 'ethnic' group – nation into a Political Community and not the preservation of the politically constructed abstract – state, or transforming a legally constructed Political Community – the Westphalian state system in Africa into nations as Mayall seems to imply. Also, Gellner and Anderson hold similar views on the idea of the nation (see chapter 8). Again, the experience of the collective groups in Africa does not hold true to this conception of nationalism. 'Ethnic' groups in the African continent, seem to emphasise the pursuit of socio-economic interests and the

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[5] Connor, W (1978), 'A Nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is…' in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 1, p378

need to preserve their lineage and kinship groups' identity, rather than the claim of the right to be legally and politically recognised as Political Communities – states.

'Nationalism', we can argue, begins to manifest, when the *belief* of the *nation* in its uniqueness – *self conviction/conception* gives its members - *nationals*, the impetus to pursue the common cause, defined as *national* interest. Hence, the submission of individual's loyalty to the nation in the pursuit of the common cause, or goal of political sovereignty. Since the central element in the development of the nationalist sentiment is the *belief* in the uniqueness of the *nation*, it is therefore, also possible to *'self imagine'* a uniqueness within the state, conceived as a 'nation' to which, loyalty of the citizens can be submitted as Anderson has argued. This is the nature of the Westphalian state system in Africa. In other words, while it is possible to *'self imagine'* the idea of a 'nation' as synonymous to the state, this is however, not the only process of conceiving or creating Political Communities. The *Ntu,* when politicised, can also become a Political Community, based on *'self conviction/conception',* rather than the conception of the nation as synonymous with the state. When people *know* unquestionably that their origin evolves from a myth of a single descent, as in the *Ntu*, that knowledge becomes a matter of attitude. However, even where the claim of the myth of single descent is a matter of intuitive knowledge, rather than based on clearly identifiable kinship, lineage or genealogy – spiritual location, such a claim becomes a form of *conviction* that cannot be disturbed by any other evidence, no matter how rational and factual that may be, as long as such facts or evidence are contrary to the intuitive belief.[6] While the *Ntu* is spiritual and links the dead, the living and the many generations yet to be born, with the *land* as we have seen in

chapters 4 and 5, other ethnic groups as in Diasporic communities, base their sense of 'nationhood', on emotions or cultural aggregates. Thus, the *'self conviction/conception'* of the *nation* is based on thinking with the heart (or blood), while the *'self imagination'* of the state as a 'nation', on the other hand, is based on cultural and emotional claims. However, both the spiritual and cultural claims require the emotions of the individual members for *nationalism* to evolve. Thus, nationalism, as a phenomenon, is emotive and therefore irrational. It is based on intuitive association and emotions or psychological/spiritual attachments.[7] De Bertier de Sauvigny asserts that since the emergence of the word, nationalism, in 1798 and its common usage in the late 19th century and early 20th century, it was associated with nations, not states.[8] We can therefore conclude that the *self consciousness* of 'ethnic' groups as nations gave rise to the evolution of nationalism as the ideology of the manifestation of the idea and spirit of the *nation*. Berker has argued in a similar line with De Bertier de Sauvigny that the *'self consciousness'* of nation *is* a product of the 19th century. He maintains that, 'nations were already there; they had indeed been there for centuries'. 'But', he notes, 'it is not the things, which are there for centuries that matters in human life'. 'What really and finally matters', he concludes; 'is the thing, which is appreciated as an idea, and an idea is vested with emotions until it becomes a cause and a spring for action'. 'In the world of action', he continues, 'apprehended ideas are alone electrical; and a nation must be an idea as well as a fact before it can become a dynamic force'.[9] The *nation*, as an idea, is therefore, an extension of the *self* – individual's

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[6] *Ibid*, p381
[7] *Ibid*, p383
[8] De Bertier de Sauvigny, G (1970), 'Liberalism, Nationalism and Socialism: The Birth of three Words' in *Review of Politics*, Vol. 32, April, pp155-61. Also, see Kamilamen, A (1964), *Nationalism: Problems concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification*, (Yuaskyla), Kustantajat Publishers for similar argument
[9] Berker, E (1927), *National Character and the Factors in its Formation*, (London), Matheun, p173

spiritual location. Nationalism on the other hand, is the extension of the *nation,* and expresses itself through the concept of *nationality,* a claim of uniqueness, based upon which, the quest for sovereignty - the claim of the right of *national* self-determination is made.

W. B. Pillsbury has defined the 'nation' as a group of individuals that feels one, in readiness within limit, to sacrifice the individual for the group's advantage. Members rejoice with the advancement as well as suffer with the losses of the group. Hence, 'nationality' is a mental state or community behaviour.[10] On his part, while conceiving nationalism in relation to states, H. Kohn described 'nationality' as 'an affair of the mind or spirit, or ... of physical relationships', and concludes: 'the only way to decide whether an individual belongs to one nation rather than another, is to ask him'.[11] Therefore, we can also argue, in agreement with Pillsbury and Kohn that *nationality* exists due to the inextricability of the individual's '*self conviction/conception*' of his spiritual link to the 'ethnic' group - *nation,* as in the African *Ntu,* or his '*self imagined*' identity based on other factors, not necessarily spiritual, as in the legal and cultural bond or identity and political process which creates 'nations' out of states. It is the sense of *nationality,* based on the '*self conviction/conception*' of individuals, which is transformed into an ideology of action – *nationalism* in the pursuit of statehood. Hence, nationalism is primarily an ideology of the nation; it is a strategy for achieving statehood and not an ideology of the state for building a 'nation'. This explains the failure of the Westphalian state system in Africa to transform its citizens into *nationals* with patriotism and ultimate loyalty to the state.

[10] Pillsbury, W. B (1919), *The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism,* (New York), Appleton.
[11] Kohn, H (1967), *The idea of Nationalism,* (New York), Collier Macmillan, p12

Instead, individuals' loyalty is to the institutions and groups, which enable the satisfaction of physiological security interest (including the Westphalian state system), ensuring the continuity of the *Ntu*. And because the common cause to preserve the *Ntu* is central, individuals' appeal to their kinship, lineage and genealogy as means of achieving the defined needs and desires. *Nationalism* therefore, forms the basis of the *nation's* claim of the right to administer the economic resources and to control its *homeland* – issues of political sovereignty. The *Ntu's* nationalism, however, is not the assertion of the claim to political recognition as a distinctive Political Community with legal right and recognition – the right of national self-determination, as the European nations, during their formative years and transition into sovereignties.

According to Kedourie, National self-determination is a determination of the will of a collective group described by the collective noun 'nation'.[12] If the term 'nation' is used in describing a group of individuals who inhabit a territory and are linked by similar variables, which they *see and believe* to be the source of their particularity as a people, then, the *Ntu* expresses the sense of nationhood in Africa. Being a distinctive collective group, the nation believes that its peculiarities, idiosyncrasies and members are different from other people. These peculiarities are sacred and must be fostered and preserved.[13] Hence, in its efforts to establish and uphold its uniqueness, the *Ntu* demands from its 'children' the cultivation of those peculiarities, harnessing them for the pursuit of its *sovereignty*, to enable its members to achieve their physiological security interests. Therefore, *national* self-determination is a determination of the *will* of the nation to create

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[12] Kedourie, E (1960), *Nationalism*, (London), p81
[13] *Ibid*, p62

a political identity, secure its territory and conduct socio-economic activities for the benefits of its 'children'. Connor has articulated the quest for 'national' self-determination as; 'the right of a group of people who consider themselves separate and distinct from others to determine for themselves the state which they will live and the form of government it will have.[14] Consequently, the distinct collective group – nation, asserts its *right* to determine its *will* under the principle of national self-determination. In distinguishing between the nation as a collective group, and the state as a political construct, Cobban elaborates the attempt, in 1918 to find a world order after World War I, based on the principle of the state. The attempt led to the endowment of rights of equality and independent sovereignty to states, 'rights', he argued, that were new to the states. He then concludes that the granting of such rights could as well have been the reasons for the failure of the state system.[15] Cobban has rightly identified the primordial nature of the nation and its separateness from the state, a similar position held by both Gasset and Mayall in their historical narrative of the rise of nationalism. E. B. Haas, on his part, in his conception of the state, defines it as 'a political entity whose inhabitants consider themselves a single nation and wish to remain one'. The nation, on the other hand, he defined as 'a socially mobilised body of individuals, believing themselves to be united by some set of characteristics that differentiate them (in their own minds) from outsiders, striving to create or maintain their own state'.[16] Haas, like Cobban, has recognised and distinguished between the state and the 'nation,' and summed up the evolution of nationalism thus: 'a nation is a group of people who wish to practise self-determination'.

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[14] Connor, W (1973), 'The Politics of Ethno-nationalism' in *Journal of International Affairs*, 27, p1

[15] Cobban, *op cit*, pp39-43

[16] Haas, E. B (1993), 'Nationalism: An instrumental Social Construction' in *Millennium*, Vol. 22, No. 3, p508

Nationalism therefore, is 'a belief held by a group of people that they ought to constitute a nation, or that they already are one.[17] While Haas has rightly distinguished between the state – 'a political entity', and the 'nation' – a socially mobilised and politicised group whose 'most common building blocks of national identity are language, religion and race', noting 'nationalism' as 'a wish' of the nation to become a state. However, I argue that the act of '*self conviction*' is based on 'a belief', rather than 'a wish' - an act of '*self imagination*' based on Anderson's conception. Taking a primordial conception of the nation, Seton-Watson asserts that nationalism connotes two things: a doctrine about the character, interest, rights and duties of nations, and an organised political movement, designed to further the alleged aims and interest of nations. Hence, the most generally sought aims of nations are:

1)   Independence – the creation of a sovereign state, which gives the nation legal rights over its territory, resources and members.

2)   National unity – the incorporation within its frontiers, all groups which are considered by themselves, or their representatives as part of the nation.

Therefore, 'states can exist without a nation, or with several nations among their subjects [citizens]; and a nation can be coterminous with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several state'[18] as in African legal and political boundaries.

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[17] *Ibid*,
[18] Seton-Watson, G. H. N (1977), *Nation and States*, (London), Macmillan, pp1, 3

In his conception of nationalism, Akzin states that the consciousness of belonging to a nation, with an active urge to perpetuate and strengthen the 'national' bond by various means (including political), is a state of mind, which has developed into a powerful ideology vaguely described as *national – mindedness, or nationalism*.[19]   In essence, nationalism is the ideology of the *nation*, which utilises its attributes in the assertion of the claim of the right to be politically and legally self-determining – national self-determination. These attributes are:

1)   **TERRITORY** – the frontier separating the nation from others, based upon which, its members derive their identity – their *homeland*.

2)   **LEGALITY** – the right to conduct its affairs within it territory without obligation to another entity asserting legal claim over its frontier, resources and nationals.

3)   **COMMON CULTURE** – based upon which, the nationals of the nation conduct their functional interactions, which forms the basis of their solidarity in pursuit of a common cause – physiological security interest.[20]

Although Western thought and scholars have made the distinction between the state and nation, however, there has been a failure to identify the link between the evolution of *nationalism* and the assertion of the right of *national* self-determination as *nations*' quest for recognition as Political Communities. Based on this failure, Plamenatz has rightly classified nationalism into two types: the Western and Eastern conceptions. While the Western conception is centred on the idea of statehood, the Eastern conception, found among the Slavs, Africans and Asians as well as in South America, is 'the desire to

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[19] Akzin, B (1964), *State and Nations*, (London), Hutchinson, p46
[20] Smith, A. D (1991), *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, (Massachusetts), Basil Blackwell, pp135-6, 167

preserve or enhance a people's national or cultural identity when that identity is threatened or, the desire to transform or even create such, where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking'.[21] The Eastern conception gives a better understanding of the nature of the *consciousness* of identity, hence, *nationality – Ntu*, in Africa, which does not seek to create a new Political Community, but the satisfaction of its members' physiological security interests thereby ensuring its continuity. Eugene Kamenka notes that because nations arose by historical accident, hence people and races have formed nations under specific geographical and social conditions, it is therefore, impossible to lay down conditions under which nationhood should arise in advance. However, from our discussion, it seems that the Western conception of nationalism has sought to do that, precisely.[22] Consequently, Western thought and scholars have created an undue complexity in understanding nationalism as a phenomenon. The sense of '*nationality*' of a people is not constructed. That, however, is precisely what the Westphalian state system in Africa, has sought to do. Rather, '*nationality*' arises out of the *consciousness* of the members of the *nation* of their uniqueness, based on the concept of the *Ntu*. Therefore, conflicts and wars in Africa are not based on the claim of statehood, but the pursuit of physiological security interests. Nationalism on the other hand, is built on the *national consciousness* of a people, serving as a strategy of action in the pursuit of the goals and objectives of the nation – creating a new Political Community - state.

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[21] Plamenatz, J (1976), 'Two types of Nationalism' in *Nationalism: The nature and evolution of an Idea*, 2nd edition, edited by Kamenka, E , (London), Edward Arnold, pp23-4

[22] Kamenka, E (ed), (1976), *Nationalism: The nature and evolution of an Idea*, 2nd edition, (London), Edward Arnold, p12

In explaining the rise of national consciousness, Kamilamen summed the goals of the assertion of national self-determination as entailing the following:

1)   The striving for unity, comprising political, economic, social, religious and cultural identity – (collective physiological security interest).

2)   The striving for freedom – Independence and claim of sovereignty - as in the African liberation struggles and the quest for freedom, often erroneously defined as 'nationalism' (collective physiological security interest).

3)   The striving for individuality – identity and uniqueness (individuals' physiological security interests).

4)   The striving for prestige – position and power - recognition and respect[23] (individuals' physiological security interests).

It is the strategy to achieve these goals that is called nationalism. Hence, nationalism as a phenomenon, is the strategy of the nation in its pursuit of physiological security interests for its members conceived as national self-determination. In other words, nationalism needs the idea of political *sovereignty* to evolve. It is a conviction based on *'self consciousness'* of a historical renovation which seek to rediscover the communal past, a state of true collective individuality and to recall the spirit and values of that distant 'golden age'. And summons the claims of common descent, history, culture territory and spirituality as means of pursuing a common cause for its nationals. Its goal is to fulfil the physiological security interests of its members through the formation of a sovereign state, politically, legally and economically. While this is a description of the *Ntu,* however, the claimed political and legal sovereignty as in the case of the European conception of nation,

is not the common cause or goal of the *Ntu*. The *Ntu* does not assert its distinctiveness or particularity as a basis for the claim of the right to constitute a Political Community - state. Instead, it seeks the recognition of its ownership of the geographical *space* – its *homeland* in preserving its collective identity by ensuring the continuity of the lineage and kinship. Thus, the pursuit of both individuals' and the *Ntu's* goal of preservation and continuity becomes the common cause or goal which the *nationals* seek to achieve.

TERRITORIAL (BOUNDARY) INTEREST

Although the Western conception of the relationship between the 'nation' and nationalism is valid and provides an understanding of the claim of political sovereignty, based on the assertion of national self-determination, it is however, different from the Eastern conception from which the sense of 'nationalism' in Africa can be located. While the European nation seeks a political goal – territorial sovereignty, the *Ntu* on the other hand, asserts a claim of uniqueness and distinctiveness, with its *sovereignty* – ownership of its geographical *space – land.*[24] Hence, the *Ntu* does not assert a claim of legal sovereignty or political recognition as a distictive Political Community based on legal and political recognition. But asserts its right to the *homeland,* from which it derives its uniqueness and particularity within the existing *Gesellschaft* Political Community - state. Thus, the *Ntu* seeks the ability to pursue its members' physiological (basic) needs and spiritual identity as

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[23] Kamilamen, *op cit*, p17
[24] See Mbiti, J. S (1971), *African Religions and Philosophy*, (London), Heinemann and … (1970), *The Concepts of God in Africa*, (London). See also, Elias, T. O (1956), *The nature of African Customary Law*, (Manchester)

noted by Oliver[25] and discussed in chapter 3. The *Ntu's* claim of the right to the ownership of the geographical *space* is primarily in relation to its claim of being the Autochthons of the territory, hence, their *homeland*. This claim of ownership however, is not based on the assertion of the right of national self-determination as in the Western conception of nationalism, because the members of the *Ntu* are already *conscious* of their *being*. Therefore, their demand is for the security of *their* identity – the *continuity* of the *Ntu*. In essence, the African assertion of the right of territorial ownership is not politically motivated, but is based on the pursuit of physiological security interest. While the African is *conscious* of the *Ntu*, as the basis of *nationality*, he is more concerned with the pursuit of *welfare* interest, which will ensure the continuity of the lineage or kinship - the *Ntu*. Therefore, the claim of the right of political sovereignty is not ontological, since his sense of *being* and *identity* is conceived in the *Ntu*, which is located in a *homeland*. The *Ntu* is *sovereign* over him. While the nation seeks to assert the right of national self-determination, the *Ntu* seeks to utilise its resources for the benefit of its 'children' without making a claim of political sovereignty. In essence, the *Ntu* does not seek to create a new Political Community defined as state out of the existing Westphalian state system, however, it claims ownership of the geographical *space* - its *homeland* and the resources found in it. Hence, it will seek to change the existing system and institutions in the pursuit of its members' physiological security interest through the change of institutions or government, but not to create new Political Communities – states.

Since the emergence of the Westphalian state system in Africa, granting the colonial territories political and legal sovereignty, the occurrences of wars between African states

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[25] Oliver, R (1991), *The African Experience*, (London), Weidenfeld and Nicolson

has been almost non-existent. Thus, we can argue that there had been no 'national' wars in the European sense, conceived as the pursuit of states (national) interest or security in macro IR. Therefore, as far as macro IR stories of war is concerned, the Westphalian state system in the African continent has been successful in preventing wars (a case of Order in an Anarchical system) due to territorial claims or claim over the resources of nation (state). In a sense, the Westphalian state system and the OAU acceptance of the colonial boundary and observation of the non-interference clause of its charter, can be regarded as the success of the Westphalian state system in African international relations. However, at the micro level of historical sociologies, *national* conflicts and wars, have remained one of the major problems of the Westphalian state system (a case of Disorder in an Orderly system) in the continent. African 'domestic' conflicts and wars can therefore be compared to the period of the transition – the 'discovery' of 'nationhood' in Europe. Thus, while at the macro level of state interaction, the continent had been at Peace and Orderly, in the anarchical system, - the goals of International Relations approaches, ironically, conflict and wars within the Orderly state system has been the stories of the defined 'sovereign' states, which constitutes nations in the Westphalian states' system sense. The claim of IR that there is a tendency for conflicts and wars in the International System due to the lack of a Central authority, hence, the domestic analogy argument, seems to have been proved wrong as far as the Westphalian state system, as an Orderly 'domestic' institution within an Anarchical International System is concerned. On the other hand, however, the claim that there will be Order within the 'domestic' institution due to the centrality of authority has also been proved wrong in the African continent. Thus, the attempt to Understand the stories of conflicts and wars in the African continent on the basis of the assumptions of macro IR

approaches exclusively, is inadequate. A proper Understanding of the stories of conflicts and wars in Africa must be inclusive of the concerns of micro historical sociologies as contributory factors to the causality of wars and conflicts in the continent. Thus, the stories of wars in Africa must be Understood in ways more than the narratives of wars between nations in the Westphalian state system sense. The stories must begin at the *Ntu*.

The wars and conflicts in Africa therefore, must be seen as the quest for self-determination, but not national self-determination in the European sense of the word. Because these wars and conflicts are not motivated by the claim of political goals based on *national* particularity claiming territorial or political sovereignty. Instead, the wars and conflict *within* the sovereign states (as in the Nigerian Biafran war of 1967, the Rwandan genocide, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and similar cases), or *across* sovereign states (DRC/Rwanda/Uganda; Liberia/Sierra Leone and similar cases) are similar to the European wars of the *consciousness* of nationhood, hence, nationalism. The similarity however, ends at the *recognition* of uniqueness and particularity of the *Ntu*, but does not extend to the claim of political sovereignty - statehood. With the exception of the Biafran war and the declaration of political independence for Somaliland, conflicts in Africa are either a residue of the colonial boundary – the definition of the legal and political boundary as in the Western Sahara and Eritrea, or, based on the quest for physiological security interest. In essence, the nature of African conflicts and wars, while rooted in the pursuit of material wealth – *welfare* interest, also, has a deep rooted spirituality link, expressed in the claim of ownership of a defined geographical *space* as the Autochthonous *homeland*. Based on this claim of ownership of the *land*, the *Ntu* assert its rights to the economic

resources found on the *land.*   The claim of Ogoni-*land* by the 'people' inhabiting the Delta region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, utilising the sensitivity of the international community to the politics of Environmental and Human Right issues is the most recent 'internationalised' example. However, there are other similar cases all over the continent. The claim of the Ogoni's, like similar claims, are economic but also, to ensure the continuity of the lineage and kinship.   Therefore, while Africans go to war for the satisfaction of their physiological security interests, political goals (as in the Ogoni's claim of autonomy implying *national* self-determination – ownership of the geographical *space* and it resources) are seen only as *means* to an end, and not the *end* – the ultimate goal. Political claims are *means* of achieving the common cause or goal of the *Ntu.* We can therefore assert that the inextricable link between the concerns of macro IR with territorial sovereignty, boundary and economic sovereignty/authority over material resources found within the *Ntu's* boundaries and the concerns of micro historical sociologies with the pursuit of basic needs, the satisfaction of the human spiritual quest for identity and meaning and the continuity of the collective group as Autochthonous to the define *homeland,* provides a better way of telling the stories of wars and conflict, hence, Understanding Africa.

Therefore, while the concept of *Ntu* constitutes an assertion of uniqueness and particularity, with the claim of territorial ownership, it does not transform itself into a claim of national self-determination. Thus, the *Ntu,* like the European conception of nation, uses the claim of territorial ownership of the geographical *space* in the pursuit of its members physiological interest and not in asserting the claim of political sovereignty in the

pursuit of the national's interest or security. We can conclude therefore that the rise of 'ethnic' claims, based on kinship as we have concluded with Ekeh in chapter 4, is not based on the pursuit of political or legal *desires*, but, the physiological security interests of individuals, hence, the continuity of the *Ntu*. Therefore the failure of government to satisfy the *Ntu's* physiological security interest leads to dissatisfaction, which in turn, influences the *desire* for autonomy or the rise of rebel groups/movements. Thus, the quest for political sovereignty a political *desire* seems to be rarely the reason or motive of African conflicts or wars. Instead, it is the physiological (basic) needs and spiritual desires – the preservation and continuity of the *Ntu* in its geographical *space* that are the *reasons* and *motives* for the rise of conflicts and wars. Territorial ownership for Africans, is not defined in terms of its material benefits, but, based on it *meaning* and *purpose* as the *homeland* of the *Ntu*, hence, the individual source of *identity* as we have established in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 9.

This conception of territorial ownership – the boundary, differs from the European conception, defined in material and economic terms, hence, the claim of political sovereignty over the defined territory. While the European conception of territory is defined in terms of boundaries, the Africans defined the geographical *space* in terms of frontiers. Also, while the European boundary is defined in terms of legal and political demarcation, the African frontier is based on the *Ntu*. In essence, it is not based on political or legal construction of the physical location, but on the spiritual location of the *Ntu*. The assertion of territorial ownership by Africans therefore, although ontological to their *being*, is however, rarely, if ever, politicised to the level of a claim of national self-

determination. The resorting to the *Ntu*, or kinship basis of identity as a political means, only occurs when the existing institutions (governments) fail to satisfy the physiological security interest of the *Ntu*. Therefore, the relationship between the claim of *Ntu* over its geographical *space* and the quest for physiological security interests, explains why rebel groups/movements emerged, seeking the control of the government or taking control of economically viable regions of the existing states in their pursuit of socio-economic interest without declaring a claim of political sovereignty – the creation of new Political Communities. Telling the stories of wars in Africa therefore must be centred on Understanding the quest for basic (physiological) needs of the individuals and their desires for identity - continuity of the *Ntu*, and not the political or legal claims. African conflict and wars, while *internal* to, or *across* states, are however, based on the claim of the *Ntu's* *sovereignty* over its *homeland* and its resources. Thus, in telling the stories of African conflicts and wars, we must Understand the causal factor as the quest for physiological security interests, rather than the claim of political and legal sovereignty, conceived as nationalism. It is the individuals' quest for the satisfaction of physiological security interests, which gives rise to the politicisation of the *Ntu*. Therefore, while the rise of nationalism and the claim of territorial sovereignty, evolve as a result of the *consciousness* of the *nation* in Europe, in Africa however, the 'people' are already *conscious* of the *Ntu* – *nation*. It is the pursuit of physiological security interests of the *nationals* of the *Ntu*, which constitutes the common cause for the *Ntu's* collective action or assertion of ownership - its *homeland* and *its* resources.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC (WELFARE) INTEREST

The *Ntu's* common cause constitutes the *motive* and *reason* influencing its politicisation in pursuing the individual physiological security interests. Therefore the pursuit of socio-economic interest becomes central in articulating the disappointed individuals' *needs* and *desires* giving rise to the need for a change of institutions/systems, or the taking over of government. While individuals' quest for *identity* and *security* conceived in the *Ntu*, are important, however, the satisfaction of *welfare* needs – physiological (basic) needs, which also provides material security, is central and influences their loyalty to the Political Community. Hence, the satisfaction of *welfare* needs becomes the criteria for measuring individuals' loyalty, since satisfaction of the physiological (basic) needs gives the sense of *security* and *identity*. The freedom to pursue or conduct socio-economic activities freely either within the state or at the transnational level, become a very important element in the individuals' sense of freedom, hence, *security*. In essence, in the individual's pursuit of socio-economic interest, his loyalty could be located with the state as long as it enables him to satisfy the physiological security interests. This is because basic needs are not negotiable. They must be satisfied; even if, at the expense of other desired values as we have seen in chapter 6. But, since the Westphalian state system in Africa, has failed in ensuring the satisfaction of the individual's *welfare* needs, hence, ensuring his *security*, he resorts to the claim of kinship, lineage or even genealogy as the basis for the pursuit of his socio-economic interest. He resorts to his spiritual location - *identity* in the pursuit of physiological security interest. Therefore, we can identify the satisfaction of the individual's socio-economic needs as a central determining factor in the submission of his

loyalty to a particular Political Community, be it the nation, state or any other institution/system. Hence, we can Understand individuals' behaviour based on the pursuit of physiological security interests. Individuals' appeal to the spiritual location in their attempt to satisfy socio-economic interest, thus, redressing the political inequality introduced by the Westphalian state system. We can therefore, conclude that the failure of the Westphalian state system in Africa has led to the emergence of 'ethnic' conflicts and wars, but, not the claim of political sovereignty concerned with the basis of the claim of particularistic identity. Therefore, in telling the story of wars, in Africa, while the spiritual dimension – *Ntu* is seen as the obvious reasons, in reality, it is the failure of the Westphalian state system to satisfy the physiological security interests of the individuals, and the collective – *Ntu,* which in turns, gives credence to the rise of rebel groups/movements.

People who have lived as members of the *Ntu* without asserting a claim of uniqueness, or, of the consciousness of distinctiveness, could suddenly become *nationalistic*, once they have discovered that the mode of production and distribution of resources which they are accustomed to, has been changed, or, replaced by another system, entirely new to them,[26] which infringes their ability to satisfy physiological security interests. The threat to their *welfare* needs, is the common cause upon which they take action. In essence, the ultimate loyalty of the individual is not the *Ntu per se,* but the satisfaction of physiological needs, hence, the centrality of *welfare* interest in their pursuit. This explains why African conflict and wars are based on the pursuit of socio-economic interest and not political or territorial sovereignty. While kinship roots, have a strong hold on individuals in relation to their

spiritual location; it is the pursuit of socio-economic interest that determines their loyalty. Thus, the pursuit of physiological security interest is the central causal factor in Understanding the stories of wars in Africa and not the claims of nationalism or political sovereignty.

In discussing the allegiance and loyalty of individuals to collective groups, Hobsbawn states:

> Men and women did not choose collective identification as they choose shoes, knowing that one could only put on one pair at a time. They had, and still have several attachments and loyalties simultaneously, including nationality, and are simultaneously concerned with various aspects of their life, any of which may at any one time be foremost in their minds as occasion suggest.[27]

Hobsbawn seem to be saying that as far as the individual is concerned, loyalty and allegiance are divisible, hence, a person can be loyal to different causes and ally with different collective groups, or identities. In essence, the *interest* of individuals is the primary cause for loyalty and allegiance. And since *welfare* interest is the central pursuit of the individual, as we have argued in chapter 6, he will ally with the collective group or Political Community, which will enable the achievement of his primary interest – physiological security interest. However, while the satisfaction of *welfare* needs may

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[26] Smith, *Ethnic Origin... op cit*, p55

ensures his loyalty to the Political Community, a threat to his spirituality – *identity*, would present conflicts of interest and loyalty. For the African, therefore, it is not enough to provide the physiological needs, the sense of identity linked with *Ntu*, and the claim of ownership of the *land* must be recognised as we have seen in chapters 4, 5 and 9. Thus, individuals' pursuit of *welfare* and *identity* interests – issues of Micro Historical-sociologies is entwined with the claim of self-determination of the *Ntu*, as a Political Community. Therefore, the pursuit of socio-economic and Religio-cultural interests are linked with the claims of geographical boundaries, resources, distribution of wealth and political sovereignty - issues central to macro IR approaches.[28] These 'soft' matters, – pursuit of individuals' *welfare* and *identity* interests influences the administration of the 'large' matters of Political Communities - states. The effective government or state, is one that will do for individuals and their communities whatever they need done but are unable to do by themselves in their separate and individual capacities,[29] thus, enabling them to fulfil their *welfare* and *identity* interest. But the failure of governments to satisfy these two crucial interest, on the other hand, leads to the emergence of rebel groups/movements who seek rights to form government by claiming to be better able to satisfy the physiological security interests of the citizens. The claim of self-determination is therefore, based on the pursuit of physiological security interests, and not the claim of political sovereignty over the *homeland* and its resources.

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[27] Hobsbawn, E. J (1990), *Nations without Nationalism since 1790*, (Cambridge), Cambridge University Press, p123

[28] Isaac, H. R (1979), *Power and Identity: Tribalism in World Politics*, (New York), Foreign Policy Association, p9

[29] For this conception of government, see Schuman, F. L (1952), *The Commonwealth of Man: an Inquiry into Power and World Government*, (New York), Alfred A. Knopt, p296

In essence the marriage between micro historical sociologies - (centrifugal interest) and macro IR - (centripetal interest), is a convergence of interest between the pursuit of individuals' *welfare, security* and *identity* and the claim of territorial security, sovereignty and national interest of the Political Community – Westphalian state system. While the Political Community sees its primary objective as pursuing policies aimed at the satisfaction of the physiological security interests of individuals, the political elites, administering the affairs of the Political Community, however, have their personal political interest as individual. These personal political interests influence the policies they pursue while in government, hence, the emphasis on the sanctity of borders to the detriment of the pursuit of individual physiological security interests of the individuals. However, since the individual, whether a peasant, or political elite, have *welfare, security* and *identity* as personal interest, it is possible to create institutions – functional in nature, as suggested by Burton, Galtung and Mitrany in chapters 6 and 7, which will allow the elites pursuit of political interest, satisfying the individual's physiological security interests, while enabling the achievement of the objective of the Political Community - *Ntu*. We can also conclude that the emphasis on the sanctity of geographical *space* in Africa can be maintained in the Religio-cultural sense, which recognised the *Ntu*, thereby allowing the freedom of the pursuit of *welfare* and *identity* interests. This will ensure the security and continuity of the particularity of the *Ntu* within the continent, since; it is a central concept in the expression of the African ontology and is universally conceived and expressed as the basis of *identity*. Thus, it could be seen as the idea of Afrikan[30] *nationhood* and *nationality*. A Functional arrangement, argued in chapter 11, will provide the basis of a continental political sovereignty, hence, a continental Political Community with the concept of *Ba'Ntu* as the

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[30] See my objection to the use of the letter 'c' in the writing of 'Africa'

basis of continental *nationality*, based on the Autochthonous claim of the geographical *space* as homeland.

Therefore, I shall be arguing in favour of the plausibility of domestic analogy of macro IR for application in the African continent using the Mitranian Functional theory of political action, thus, circumventing the restrictiveness of the Westphalian state system. The Functional federation proposal will be based on the ideal of the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The proposal will seek to incorporate the concerns of elites' political interest and the satisfaction of individuals' physiological security interests, and the preservation of the *Ntu* system, while harnessing development commensurate with the modern global system.

CHAPTER 11

UNDERSTANDING AFRICA IN MORE THAN STORIES

CONTINENTAL SOVEREIGNTY

I have argued that *sovereignty*, as a concept is central to Africans' claim of ownership of the particular geographical *space* they called *homeland*. Consequently, their quest is for *welfare, security* and *identity* for the members of the *Ntu*, to ensure its continuity – their source of identity. Thus, while political, legal and territorial sovereignty becomes the ultimate demand and claim of nationalist groups, based on the conception of popular nationalism; the same is not the case with African *nations*, whose assertion of rights over their territories and its resources implies the claim of *sovereignty*. While not asserting the *sovereignty* of their territories in the sense of popular nationalism, they nevertheless pursue the same goal through the transforming of their *nationalists'* feelings into the sentiment of *nationalism* – patriotism for the *nation – Ntu*. Thus, territorial, as well as legal, but not political *sovereignty*, becomes the aspiration of the *nation*. This conception of *sovereignty* becomes central to the assertion of Autochthonous claims over the geographical *space* – their *homeland*. We can conclude therefore, that *sovereignty* is both individuals' and groups' assertions of *subjective* freedom and self-determination. While the acquisition of political sovereignty is the legitimacy required by nations in the Westphalian state system sense, to ensure their rights among states, based on the principle of recognition by the United Nations Charter, African *nations* do not seek political legitimacy, but, the legal

recognition of their Autochthonous claims of ownership of the *homeland*. The exclusion of African nations' as *sovereign* over their *homelands*, is based on the definition of sovereignty by the 1945 UN Charter, conceived in the European sense, and an extension of the definition of nations and states – a Westphalian conception, in the League of Nations Charter of 1918. Although nations seeks, the 'right' of *national* self-determination, however, as we have seen in chapters 9 and 10, the purpose of these pursuits, is the pursuance of the members' – *nationals'* physiological security interests. Thus, the concept of *sovereignty*, while primarily conceived in relations to states, is, in reality, centred on individuals' quest. According to the *International Relations Dictionary*, the concept of sovereignty:

> Holds that the people of a political unit or society posses supreme authority, that they establish a government and delegate power to public officials through a social construct or Constitution and, that the government so created, remain accountable to the people who retain the supreme authority. The principle gives the people the right to alter, abolish, and create new forms of government.[1]

The *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, on the other hand, identifies the core of sovereignty as 'the possession of ultimate legal authority'.[2] Both Dictionaries locates sovereignty as the right of the people. The *people* have the right to a government of their

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[1] Plano, J. C and Olton, R. O (editors), (1982), *The International Relations Dictionary*, 4th edition, (England), ABC-Clio, p88
[2] Bullock, A et al (1989), *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, 2nd edition, (London), Fontana Press, p799

own choice either through altering the *existing* legal contract (Constitution), relationship, abolishing the existing government and, or, creating a new one. The implication of sovereignty therefore, makes the claims of the politicised groups – nations' legitimate, but also, creates problems for the existing state. In the case of the Westphalian state system in Africa, while the idea of 'nationality' is commonly accredited and professed by citizens of the state, in reality, the commitment to the idea of 'nationality' and the patriotism expected of citizens - ultimate loyalty is often lacking. Nevertheless, the sense of 'nationality' and patriotism associated with the pursuit of a particular 'ethnic' claim seems, in most cases, total. The African, therefore, conceives the *nation* as the *sovereign* over him, while the Westphalian state system is treated with indifference. The pre-colonial African Politico-cultural Communities were built on the link between the spiritual location's basis of identity - the Ancestral Spirits - Givers of the Land, the political Authority (Kings/Chiefs) – Custodians of the land, and the Mediums/Religious Priests – Protectors of the land as represented in Figure 1. This relationship constitutes a harmonious circle of interactions, guiding the *Ntu,* and ensuring the satisfaction of the *welfare, security* and *identity* needs of individuals, while ensuring the continuity of the *Ntu* itself. However, during the colonial period, the circle linking the *Ntu,* through the relationship of the Ancestral Spirits, the political Authority and the Medium/Religious priest was severed, leaving only the individual's link with the Protectors of the land (Mediums/Priest). However, the rights of ownership of the land was taken away by removing or politicising the Custodians of the land (Kings/chiefs), or, replacing them with colonial appointed 'chiefs' who have no direct link with the Ancestral Spirits. In essence, the tradition of Rain-making – fruitfulness, development, good harvest et cetera as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5, - central to the

sense of the *Ntu's* continuity, was disturbed and the responsibility of the Custodians of the land to the people, being guided by the Protectors who represent the Ancestral Spirits was taken away from the *people* as represented in Figure 2. The *sovereignty* of the people over their *homeland* and its resources was taken away, so also was their ability to question the authority of the appointed 'chiefs' and the colonial administrator over the land and its resources. But since the Protectors of the land were still in direct link with the Ancestral Spirits and the people, also, their responsibility in the circle is to protect the land, they became the leaders of the primary resistance against colonialism as we have seen in chapter 5, drawing their supports from the disenchanted *people* who have been excluded from the governing of their land and the management of its resources.

FIGURE 1

PRE-COLONIAL AFRICAN POLITICO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES' STRUCTURES

ANCESTRAL SPIRITS (*Givers of the Land*) –
Basis of Autochthonous claim to land ownership

Legitimacy Of Office - Descent

Possession - Communication

Choice - Freedom to accept or reject Spiritual Counsel

ROYAL KINGS/CHIEFS
(*Custodians of the Land*) –
Political Leaders

MEDIUMS/TRADITIONAL RELIGIONS' PRIESTS
(*Protectors of the Land*) –
Spiritual leaders

Source: Original diagram is from David Lan (1985). Labelling and modifications are mine

NOTE:

a) Bold/Capital represent Institutions and Duties of Agents.
b) Italics represent the nature/basis/method of interactions or authority.
c) The Ancestral spirits are the 'living dead' who oversee the wellbeing of the Land.
d) Royal Kings/Chiefs are direct descendants of their progenitors who have once held those positions but are now part of the Ancestral Spirits. Their role is spiritual, political and cultural. However, the spiritual role in some cases is limited. Hence, they rely on Mediums/Priests for spiritual Counsel.
e) Any 'commoner' could become a Medium/Priest upon receiving the 'call' or being 'chosen' by the Ancestral Spirits. Their duties are to protect the land through the performance of religious and spiritual duties necessary to keep harmony between the 'living dead', the living and the many generations yet to be born. They therefore advise Royal Kings/Chiefs on such matters.

FIGURE 2

COLONIAL AFRICAN POLITICO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES' STRUCTURES

NOTE:

a) Royal Kings/Chiefs were in most cases replaced by colonial appointed 'Warrant' chiefs who had no legitimacy through descent. Consequently, had no spiritual, political or cultural authority. The people did not therefore see them as the Custodians of the land.

b) The communication/interaction between the Mediums/Priests – Protectors and the Custodians of the land was severed.

c) The communication/interaction between the Medium/Priests and the Ancestral Spirits was also affected. The Mediums/Priests were driven underground or sanctioned, thus, discouraging the practising of African Religions in most cases. These Mediums/Priests later emerge as the Leaders of the Primary resistance against colonialism.

It was based on the severed link between the *people* and the *Ntu*, that the Westphalian state system was created in the continent. Also, decolonisation introduced another institution – established religion, which seeks to capture the minds of Africans in search of spirituality. Thus, Christianity and Islam become dominant sources of spiritual fulfillment for the individual and collective groups. As represented in Figure 3, the loyalty of Africans becomes divided between the Westphalian state system, established religions and the Ancestral Spirits. And since the only legitimate claim of political authority, based on the Westphalian state system is the ascendance to power, African political elites, drawing from the examples of the colonial administrators' relationship with established religions and the use of force to establish political authorities, courted the religious institutions, who, in the pursuit of their institutional interests, acknowledge the new system of politics. Thus, African political elites (civil or military) began using established religion and appointed 'chiefs' for the legitimacy of their authority. However, since the deep-rooted sense of identity of Africans is linked to the Autochthonous claim of ownership of the land and its resources, the challenge to the authority of political elites over the land and its resources, became the source of conflicts and wars. Consequently, the 'ethnic' group became the *means* of asserting such claims as we have concluded in chapters 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10. In essence, while the Westphalian state system and established religions compete for Africans' loyalty, the *Ntu*, although driven underground by the new institutions, has remained central to their pursuit of physiological security interests, since it forms the basis of their *nationality - identity*. A strategy that will re-link the *Ntu's* pursuit of socio-economic interests within the context of current realities is required, if the Africans will

transform their spiritual basis of *nationality* into patriotic sentiments and loyalty to Political Communities.

FIGURE 3

POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN POLITICO-CULTURAL COMMUNITIES' STRUCTURES

NOTE:

a) The link between the people and Ancestral Spirits has structurally been replaced.

b) The new Political elites – Politicians have no direct link with the 'Givers of the land', hence, no legitimacy and accountability as Custodians of the land.

c) The new Spiritual leaders – Clergy's spiritual authority is not obtained from the 'Givers of the land', hence, they fail to protect it and ensure the availability of Rain.

d) The people are iN spiritual vacuum hence, they return to the Mediums/Priest who have been driven underground, or, become members of establish religions in search of spiritual fulfilment.

e) The tradition of Rainmaking – fertility, development, good harvest, health et cetera has been removed and the circle of life – the link between the 'living dead', the living and the many generation yet to be born has been broken.

f) Due to the severing of the *Ntu's* structure, 'ethnicity' has evolved to fill the vacuum in people's search for identity on the basis of their spiritual location and the ownership of the land.

And since the Political Community can only win the loyalty of individuals through satisfying their physiological needs, while enabling them to retain the spiritual location's identity, the Westphalian state system has failed the African, since it does not recognise his spiritual location's identity. It has also excluded him from the governing and management of the resources of his *homeland*. Consequently, it finds itself competing with the *nations* and established religions for his loyalty and patriotism. Moreover, the emphasis of the Westphalian state system on the concepts of citizenship and nationality, based on a Political recognition is seen as not inclusive of individuals, but mainly a system which belongs to the political elites, and not the citizens or nationals. Consequently, the loyalty of individuals is often located with a particular political elite (personality politics), be it a Military dictator, corrupt Politician, or even a Rebel leader with whom the individuals can identify a spiritual location's *identity* and the promise of the satisfaction of his physiological needs – *welfare*, thereby ensuring his continuity - *security*. Since the spiritual location's identity forms the basis of the individual's *nationality*, his loyalty is therefore given to either the institutions or elites, which represent the ability to satisfy both physiological needs and maintain spiritual location's identity. This matrix is what social scientists termed patrimonial politics in Africa.

Therefore, while the Westphalian state system may claim political and legal sovereignty over the individual African as citizenship and national, his loyalty however, is to his *nation*, rather than the state, thus, negating the state's claim of right and obligation over him. According to Rousseau, in *The Social Contract*, states do not hold sovereignty over people, for sovereignty in itself, rest with the people. However, states holds *power* over

people, which indeed, should be given to the state by the individual to make it legitimate.[3]

This ideal, as outlined by Rousseau, while having being successfully implemented to a certain degree in European nations (states) and other parts of the world, whose conception of *nationhood* has not been disturbed by the creation of the Westphalian state system, the same cannot be said of Africa, where its introduction has created boundaries within a single *nation*. Two classical cases, although the same story is found almost all over the continent, is the division of the Somali *nation* between the Westphalian states defined as Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Also, the division of the *Balundi nation* into WaTutsi and BaHutu 'ethnic' groups and divided into the Westphalian states defined as Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. Consequently, the *power* acquired by the Westphalian state system over the 'people', without their *free* submission of such authority over to the state, is illegitimate, hence, an infringement of their right of self-determination. Since the *free* submission of loyalty of individuals, is central to the right of power or sovereignty over them, by the Westphalian state system, then, the *nation* indeed, has the right to assert a claim of *sovereignty* over its *nationals* who *freely* submitted their loyalty in the pursuit of individuals' goals as well as the collective common cause or gaol of the *nation* – its continuity. In essence the individual is central to the *nation* to which, he is loyal without questioning. On the other hand, the Westphalian state system does not enjoys his loyalty. Instead, the individual seek the fulfilment of his physiological security interest from institutions or groups that purports or represent the satisfaction of those needs and desires. It is this search that Rousseau has identified as the *motive or common cause* which induce men to unite and to assume the responsibility of seeking to protect the property, life and liberty of each member of the nation, for, in

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[3] Rousseau, J. J (1947), *The Social Contract*, (London), Collier Macmillan

protecting each, member, they protect all.[4] This *motive or common cause* ensures the continuity of the *nation per se,* but not necessarily the Westphalian state system as a Political Community.

While the individual African's loyalty to the Westphalian state system is not guaranteed, however, he seem to have a general sense of being 'African', and finds it easy and, with pride, to assert this continental defined identity. This readiness to be identified and recognised as an African is an aspect of the spiritual location's identity. As 'African', the individual is asserting an Autochthonous claim to the ownership of the geographical *space* and its resources, albeit, this claim, while broad in the continental sense, is however, limited to the frontier to which his kinship identity is located – his *homeland.* His Autochthonous claim over the continent, is based on the similarity of values, cultures, linguistic similarities, aesthetics, common history and a myth of common descent. In essence, while some of the basis of the claims is based on factual knowledge received from oral traditions as we have seen in chapters 3, 4 and 5, some of the claims, however, are based on accepted myth, which may or may not be factual. Nevertheless, the people *believe* it, thus forming the basis of their Autochthonous claims of distinctiveness as 'Africans'. Therefore individual Africans, we can say, in Anderson's posits, have '*self imagined*' a sense of '*Africaness*', rather than a sense of nationality of the Westphalian state system. On this basis of '*self imagination*', a continental sovereignty can be created both politically, legally and territorially with *nationals* having a sense of direct link to the land as *Ba'Ntu,* whose Ancestral Spirits 'gave' the geographical *space.* While the sense of '*Africaness*' is inclusive, it does not threaten the link between individuals, the collective

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[4] --- (1952), *The Social Contract and Discourse,* (New York), Everyman edition, p28

groups and the claim of ownership of the land. A continental conception of *nationality* therefore, does not threaten their spiritual identity, as the Westphalian state system has. The Westphalian state system seeks to remove individuals' spiritual identity and replace it with a political identity, but as we have seen from previous chapters, the spiritual identity is central to the identity of the African, thus, the failure of the Westphalian state system to transform the African citizen into a national with patriotism for the state. Instead, each collective group seeks to take control of government in attempt to preserve it continuity. We can safely argue that while the sanctity of borders of the Westphalian state system has not been challenged, except in very limited cases as we have noted in chapter 10, however, the individual African does not necessarily accept the political and legal definition of borders in the continent. The exacerbation of 'domestic' conflicts renders the Westphalian state system Anarchical in the continent, while the continental recognition by individuals and collective groups presents a case of Order at the continental level. Herein lies the need to revisit the Domestic Analogy argument in relation to the continent of Africa.

Since the creation of the League of Nations was based on the presumptive assumption that there is a similarity between the domestic and international structure of societies in the pursuit of Order in the International System, based on the European conception of nations and their socio-political relations as we have seen in chapters 1 and 2, we can employ the same argument as the basis of the creating of a continental system based on African conception of *nations* and their socio-political relations. Based on the nature of the creation of the League of Nations and the nature of interactions between Political Communities in the contemporary International System, we can assert that the conception

of international relations and its practice, necessitates the transference of the understanding of socio-political relations from the African conception of *nations*, to a continental level. However, since the nature of socio-political interactions within the African continent, while similar within it, but is however, dissimilar at the international level, except on the basis of the Westphalian state system, the domestic analogy argument can only be applicable to Africa *sui generis*. Therefore, we must first conceive a continental Political Community built on the similarities of African *nations* to represent the interest of the *Ba'Ntu* at the International level of political interactions. Africa must pursue similar arguments on the unification of the continent based on the domestic analogy assumptions as the Europeans have argued, in the evolution and conception of their Political Communities during the process of their discovery of the 'nation', 'nationality' and 'nationalism'. The evolutionary nature of the domestic analogy assumptions is now manifested in the creation of a Regional Economic and Political bloc as in the formation of the EU. Therefore, based on our discussion of the evolution of the 'domestic analogy' idea and the concerns of IR for Peace and Order at the International level, as we have established in chapters 1 and 2, we conclude that the structure and institutions of the continental - what Suganami defines as 'Cosmopolitanist' system, should be organised on the basis of the domestic analogy assumptions. The continental approach as we have shown, will 'bring back' the individual to the centre of politics based on his politico-cultural institutions, thus retaining his conception of *nationality* link to both his frontier defined geographical *space*, and his Autochthonous claim to the continent as a larger extension of the geographical *space*. This will enable the claim of African *nations'* over the ownership of their *homeland* to be fulfilled while creating a sense of patriotism over

the continent as a geographical *space* and its resources. Thus, circumventing the failed Westphalian state system in the continent.

A continental structure will also ensure the fulfilment of the spiritual location's claim, thereby returning the right of *sovereignty* over the *homeland* to the people, to whom their political elites will be responsible. Thus, governments whether at the Local, Provincial, State, Regional or Continental (discussed further in the chapter) will be responsible and accountable to the *people* and not the abstract entity – state, which excludes the African individual. The continental argument holds that it will be possible to organise functional institution responsible for law and order within the continental society and also provides institutions which will enable the pursuit and fulfilment of the physiological needs of the individual while representing his desires of spiritual location's identity. This convergence of socio-economic and politico-cultural interactions will give him impetus to commit his loyalty to the achieving of higher standard of living and the advancement of the continent. In essence, Africans need to do what Europeans did in the 18th and 19th century. The Europeans' domestic analogy debate led to the preservation of Europe, from which, the idea of a Unified Europe as in the EU is gradually becoming a reality. Politics in Africa, should be about *administering* the resources belonging to the *people* for the benefit of the continental collective - *Ba'Ntu*, and not for the satisfaction of a few, as is the case with the present Westphalian state system. The articulation of the sense of a continental *nationality* – *Ba'Ntu* to whom the ownership of the continent belongs, hence, it resources and responsibility to transform such resources into wealth, is necessary for the solution of the African problem – war and poverty.

Therefore, the marriage between macro IR and micro historical sociologies, as we have shown, is based on the convergence of interest between a Political Community's claim of political and legal authority over a defined territory and the resources found within it for the benefit of its citizens, and individuals' claim for the same factors to fulfil their physiological needs and spiritual location's identity, - *Ntu*. Thus, both Political Communities and individuals, pursue the same *common cause and goal*. The quest for *welfare, security* and *identity* – physiological security interests, therefore, leads to the formation or articulation of identity groups or institutions, which aim to satisfy its members' *common cause and goal* by creating a boundary between *nationals* and *non-nationals*. The individual, locating his spiritual identity to the collective group on the basis of kinship, lineage or genealogical claims and recognising the members of the *Ntu* as pursuing the same physiological needs as well as spiritual desires, will considers themselves as *nationals* of the *Ntu*. These *nationals* will *willingly* give their loyalty and allegiance to the *Ntu* as the *recognised* Political Community. Therefore, since the identity of Africans is located in their spiritual location, the sense of *nationality* is based on the Autochthonous claim of the *homeland*, hence, 'Africa' as a geographical *space*, is seen as Autochthonous to the *Ba'Ntu*, thus, they have *sovereign* right over it. While this claim is easily asserted and accepted, and also makes sense to the peoples of the continent, the idea of 'nationality' defined in the Westphalian state system sense - the product of imperial definition, is treated with ambivalence. In essence, the political claim of political and legal sovereignty is weaker compared to the Autochthonous claim of ownership of the geographical *space*. Thus, we can argue that an Autochthons basis of *nationality* is more likely to be transformed into a form of *nationalism*, translating the African *nationals* to

citizens whose ultimate loyalty and patriotism is to the continent, since it allows the *nationals* to lay claim over their defined *homeland*, harnessing their patriotism as citizens of Africa. In essence, the conception of a continental *nationality – Ba'Ntu* and citizenship will circumvent the Westphalian state system in the continent and enable a collective approach to meet the challenges of globalisation and the advancement of technologies where state borders and national economies are gradually been Regionalised and Internationalised.

Although we have established the basis of the claim of a *common cause and goal*, and how it relates to the claim of a continental identity which will satisfy the spiritual location's identity and ensures the renaissance of the Rain-making traditions (see chapters 3, 4 and 5) upon which the ancient civilisations of Africa was first built and sustained. However, the willingness of the presiding political elites over the Westphalian state system to find a lasting solution to the African problem, thereby creating an avenue for the continent's achieving its potentials through the harnessing of its human and material resources as well as meeting the challenges of the globalisation of economies and technologies is required.

FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVE

At the 36th Summit of the OAU held at Libya in 1999, the OAU made a declaration of the desire to create an African United States, with the intention of holding the first Pan-African Parliament sitting in Addis Ababa in the year 2000. This impromptu declaration and statement of political desire, while not unusual among African Heads of States and

Governments, appears to have a sense of urgency and the need to transcend the political interests hindering the achievement of the desire to create a continental union. Since the failure of Kwame Nkrumah to persuade African political elites to create a Union Government, these elites have since 1968, being making declarations of intentions without the political will to implement the noble ideal. However, as discussed by Bakut,[5] the realities associated with the globalisation of the economies of the world, technological advancement and the decreases in the relevance of territorial sovereignty and the creation of Regional Economic blocs, has forced the Africans to re-evaluate their hold on the political and legal sovereignty they acquired at declonisation. Thus, while the pronouncement of the political elites, is impromptu in nature, it is consistent with the ideal of the Abuja Treaty of 1991 aimed at creating an African Economic Community - AEC within 40 years. The Treaty divided the continent into 5 regions: North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa, and envisage the achievement of the goal of creating an AEC through the process of integration at the Regional level first, and culminating at the creation of a continental Community with the following institutions at the continental level:

1   Assembly of the Heads of States and Governments

2   Council of Ministers

3   Pan-African Parliament

4   Economic and Social Commission

5   Court of Justice

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[5] Bakut, t. B (Summer 2000), 'The Afrikan Economic Community (AEC): A step towards achieving the Pan-Afrikan Ideal' in *Africa at the Millennium: An Agenda for Mature Development*, edited by Bakut, t. B

6   General Secretariat

7   Specialised Technical Committee as will be provided by the Treaty

The Treaty however, did not outline an intention of Political Union, however, as argued by Bakut, the provision of a Pan-African Parliament presupposes the prospect of a Political Union. This observation seems to have been justified by the declaration of the desire to create an African United States. Since African political elites have now declared their political ambition, to transcend the limit of the AEC Treaty by transforming the continent to a single Political Community, the domestic analogy assumptions, centred on the concept of *Ntu*, becomes very relevant for the achievement of the ideals of an African United States on the basis of a Functional federation - a compromise between a Federal system and an Economic integration. However, before outlining the Functional alternative as a strategy for political action to achieve the ideal of an African United States – Functional federation, we must first consider the relevance of the Mitranian Functional theory's argument to the African continent.

Therefore, we shall consider the possibility of creating or forming Functional agencies/institutions to which the *Ntu* will submit their loyalties, since such agencies and institutions will not only satisfy their physiological needs, but will also, fulfil their spiritual desires. As we have argued in chapter 7, the Functional theory of politics is about the satisfaction of the *welfare* needs of individuals in a dynamic way, thus, enabling changes and adaptation as the system evolves and matures. In essence, the Functional alternative is centred on the dynamic nature of science and technology and the need to incorporate both

and Dutt, S, (London), Macmillan

in the provision of individual welfare, thus, removing the catalyst of conflicts and wars. While the Mitranian approach failed to take into consideration the spiritual location's basis of identity as a causal element or factor to conflicts and wars, it nevertheless, recognised the centrality of the pursuit of physiological needs of the human in igniting the torch of conflicts and wars. And contrary to AJR Groom, who has argued that Functionalism is essentially a developed world concept, as such could not be applicable the developing regions of the world,[6] hence, African, I find Claude's summation of the goal of the Mitranian Functional theory as discussed in chapter 7, justified. Claude has summarised the Mitranian Functional theory of political action as an attempt to grapple with the effects of both the excessive primitiveness of the developing regions of the world – in our context, Africa, and the excessive intricacy of economic and social relations in the intensely industrialise part of the world. Claude therefore, seems to be saying that the 'excessive backwardness'[7] of Africa, is central to the Functionalist theory's concern. The Mitranian approach, based on its nature as a theory of political action, not integration, the basis of Groom's conclusion, can evolve on the principles of 'forms following functions'. Thus, it can evolve and introduce a new system of political administration consistent with the common cause and goals of the developing regions as long as such common causes are identified. Africa needs to translate the loyalty of its people into a sense of nationality, which will evolve into patriotic sentiments to work towards satisfying the physiological security interests of the people and their collective groups. The achievement of such objective will ensure the reduction, if not the elimination of conflicts and wars over the

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[6] Groom. A. J. R (1990), 'Functionalism in World Society' in Groom, A. J. R and Taylor, P edited, *Functionalism: Theory and Practice*, (London), University of London Press, p106
[7] Claude, I. L (1971), *Swords into Ploughshare: The Problems and Progress of International Organisation*, (New York), Random, p381

sovereignty of *homeland* and ensures the utilisation of the continental resources for the *Ba'Ntu*. This is the common cause and goal, which hinges on the satisfaction of *welfare* needs of individuals and satisfy their spiritual desires. Thus, the Functionalist theory can be utilised as a basis of the satisfaction of these physiological needs, but not the integration of the existing Westphalian state system, which, as we have argued, is not the basis of identity formation of Africans.[8]

The principles of Mitranian Functional theory entail that the arrangement or formation of Functional Agencies (FAs) and Institutions (FIs) should be based on the function of activities in the society, aimed at the satisfaction of socio-economic – *welfare* interests. In essence, the approach seeks to circumvent nationalism as an ideology or any ideology that will hinder the achievement of individuals *welfare* interests. Functional Agencies and Institutions will enable the quest for the satisfaction of physiological needs without impinging or threatening the ideological or spiritual claims of individuals and groups. While the role of government is the administration of economic resources for the benefit of its nationals, the pursuit of political interests and ideology often impinge on the ability of government to fulfil its function. However, a Functional approach based on the allocation of specific task and responsibility to institutions managed by directly elected representatives by the beneficiaries of the functions, will ensure accountability and the circumventing of political/religious ideologies, thus, fulfiling the function of government. In essence, the Functional alternative of government will enable individuals and groups to satisfy their physiological security interests, while allowing the political elites to fulfil their political desires through the electoral box, based on the function to which they identify

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[8] Bakut, *Op cit*

with, rather than an ideological claim. A Mitranian Functional approach applied as a theory of political action, which it is, rather than as integration theory, which it is not, will enable the circumventing of the variables, which exacerbate wars. Since Functional institutions will have local agencies, it is directly accessible to the people, and also, they are able to elect their 'sons' or 'daughter' to represent their interest, who should account to them. In this sense, a true democratic process of 'the government of the people by the people' can evolve, since, the *acts* of government will incorporate the concerns of the Autochthon's claims of *sovereignty* over their *homeland* and its resources. In essence, a Functional approach will encourage the communal and co-operative nature of African cultures and values, while harnessing their genius for development within the context of their spiritual locations. African politics cannot be separated from the quest for physiological security interests, but that is precisely what the Westphalian state system and the development of politics in African. It has removed the power of the 'people' to elect, and hold their 'sons' and 'daughter' accountable for the continuity of the *Ntu*, and placed it in the hands of 'professional' politicians whose interests are not the continuity of the *Ntu*, for they do not represent any, but their individual political interests, under the claim of political and legal sovereignty. We can argue that the conception of politics in Africa based on the Westphalian state system excludes the very people politics is supposed to serve, consequently, we have patrimony in the guise of politics. A Functional approach however, will return politics to the people, making the African politician accountable to his electorate as represented in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4

FUNCTIONAL FEDERATION POLITICAL COMMUNITY STRUCTURE

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        ┌─────────────────────────────────┐
        │ ANCESTRAL SPIRITS – Autochthons of │
        │ the geographical space - Africa   │
        └─────────────────────────────────┘
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Legitimacy - Authority   *Ownership of the Land*

Selection/Election

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┌─────────────────────┐          ┌─────────────────────────┐
│ POLITICAL ELITES    │          │ FUNCTIONAL              │
│                     │          │ AGENCIES/INSTITUTIONS   │
└─────────────────────┘          └─────────────────────────┘
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
NOTE:

a) The Autochthonous claim of the continent as the spiritual location of the *Ba'Ntu* forms the basis of the peoples' claim to specific geographical *space*.

b) Functional Agencies/Institutions selected or appointed Political elites represent the people and their functional interests.

c) The Political elites are responsible and accountable to the Agencies/Institutions, which are located at the grassroots.

d) Each governmental level will be accountable to the Agencies/Institutions responsible for electing or appointing it. Thus, the members of the Agencies/Institutions will supervise the effectiveness of their Political elites and the implementation of functional programmes.

The Functional federation approach I am proposing based on the Functional theory of political action, is aimed at providing a framework upon which the concerns of micro historical sociologies can be structured in line with the concerns of macro IR – issues of political sovereignty, economic resources and territorial integrity. It is a marriage of the pursuit of physiological needs and political desires within the context of Africa in line with the demand of modernity, the globalisation of economies and the advancement of science and technology. It seeks to circumvent ideology and emphasise the satisfaction of physiological security interests through authentic Functional arrangements. This will be achieved through FAs and FIs on the basis of needs and desires aimed at fulfilling specific functions. Thus, the forms of Institutions will be organised on a 3-broad sectoral basis from which Functional (political) Parties should evolved. Therefore, the evolution of Functional Parties (FPs) will be based on their link to broad sectors; hence, they will be focus on fulfilling a sectoral function. In essence, their *ideology* is not based on abstract concepts, but on sectoral function which permeates the daily pursuits of the electorates. At the lower strata of society ('grass roots') level, the people will congregate based on the functions they identified with, to form Functional Agencies (FAs) from which wider and broader Functional Institutions (FIs), will be created. And the political associations - Functional Parties (FPs) will emerge from both Institutions. Therefore, the creation of FAs and the formation of FIs will culminate into the formation of FPs based on sectoral interests. Thus, each particular level of aggregation, FAs/FIs will have clearly defined mandates and the FPs that will emerge from these levels of aggregation will have distinctive aims and philosophies upon which they will pursue the sectoral Functional interests they represent. Hence, the 3-F model will be introducing a new politics of

responsibility and accountability to the electorate in African societies. The Functional Agencies will feed into the broader Functional Institutions, ensuring that only representatives with direct interest in the functions of the particular sector, are duly elected/appointed/nominated as members to Functional Institutional – FIs, or, to gain political office based on the sectoral aims and philosophies. The members from FIs will therefore, represent the interests of their FIs at the appropriate assemblies from which government can be formed at the various strata of society. The Functional alternative, will therefore, ensure the involvement of individuals and their collective groups from the 'bottom' to the 'top' strata of society, thus, satisfying the physiological security interests pursuits of individuals while meeting the need for modernisation in a globalising and technologically advancing world.

Consequently, the art of African politics will be linked to the satisfaction of the *Ba'Ntus'* physiological security interests, while harnessing the resources of the continent, thereby, reducing the incidences of conflicts and wars over the claim of *sovereignty* over *homelands*. This strategy will not only be democratic, representative and inclusive in the true sense of these words, but also, integrate the spiritual location's basis of identity and the Autochthonous claim to the geographical *space*, without disturbing the concerns of macro IR. It will also enable societies to develop according to their development pace within the global economy and the advancement of technological, while making the political elite responsible and accountable for their political decisions to the sectors. Therefore, Functional Agencies and Institutions will provide the forums or association in which individuals can be aggregated and pursue common sectoral ideologies through the

Functional Parties. This strategy will focus the loyalties of individuals and collective groups to the pursuit of physiological security interests. And since the forms of the Institutions will be determined by the nature of the functional interests, it will ensure the preservation and the continuation of the democratic principle based on the spirituality of the people, while de-emphasising the role of political boundaries as created by the Westphalian states system.

3F (FUNCTIONS) MODEL

Since the tenets of the Mitranian Functional theory is aimed at reducing the incidences of conflicts and wars through the arrangement of political administration on the basis of socio-economic activities with the recognition of the politico-cultural co-operation of individuals and groups, thus, circumventing the Westphalian state system, the goal of the AEC which is similar, can only be achieved by commencing from the grass roots – local levels of the societies. The rationale of the 3-F model is to ensure that the peasants and the poor, who constitutes the larger population of the continent are involved in politics at the level of their specialist interests which, is directly affected by political decisions and government policies. Hence, the evolution of political associations - FPs will be based on socio-economic and Religio-cultural interests, which constitutes the peoples' quest for physiological security interests. Functional Parties formed on the basis of functional activities of the people, will ensure their participation in the political system, based on their understanding of the issues and the objectives of their participation – pursuit of economic and social betterment. Also, it will strengthen the concept of democracy and its practice

based on the socio-cultural values of the African people. In essence the 3F model will ensure genuine democratic participation, establish the principle of accountability thereby reducing the degree of ineffectiveness, nepotism, opportunism and corruption in the political system, while at the same time, returning *sovereignty* to the people and reconnecting them back to their Autochthonous claim of the ownership of the land and hence, their spirituality. The 3F model will reduce the significance of territorial boundary, while re-introducing the frontier basis of territorial claims. A strategy of achieving this goal could be pursued through the following arrangement.

SECTORAL DIVISION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

The socio-economic activities - both rural and urban, can be categorised into 3-broad sectors as follows:

Agriculture

Business

Public Service

Based on the Mitranian approach, the starting point of the 3F model will commence with individuals and collective groups' identification with a particular sector in the socio-economic activities of society. The society on the other hand, can be classified into 6 hierarchical structures on a 'bottom up' approach as follows:

SOCIETAL CLASSIFICATION

	LEVELS	COMPOSITION
1.	Rural	Villages/clans' collective aggregation
2.	Provincial	Groups of Rural constituencies in a defined geographical area
3.	States	Groups of Provincial areas in a territorial frontier (boundary)
4.	Regional	Groups of States' frontiers defined on a regional basis
5.	Continental	Regional areas in the African continent
6.	Global	African continental union in relation to global political institutions

In the current Westphalian state system, African societies are territorially organised as Federal or Unitary States. Taking a Federation system, as an example to explain the societal classification, the Local government is located at the rural level, while states' government at the provincial level, and the Federal government at the state (national) level. Unitary states also have similar levels of government. Based on the 3F model, there is no change required or necessary in the classification of state' governments' frontiers. Thus, the introduction of the 3F model will not require any physical or territorial changes. Rather, the change in the conception of boundaries and the de-emphasis on territorial relevance will occur through a change in peoples' attitudes and the method of political administration.[9]   And since the AEC Treaty of 1991 divided the continent into 5 main

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[9] Mitrany, D (1975), 'A Political Theory for a New Society' in Groom, AJR and Taylor, P edited *Functionalism: Theory and Practice*, (London), University of London Press, p22. Also,--- (1946), *A Working Peace System 4th edition*, (London), National Peace Council, pp35-36

regions, regional grouping will be based on this classification.[10] Therefore, no new region is required, since these are already working towards a continental Economic and Political Union.[11] In essence, the structure of African territorial arrangement will remain the same while state boundaries gradually decrease in relevance.[12]

The main change will be in the attitude of people (especially politicians) whose orientation and political institutions are based on Western system of political administration. The introduction of Functional politics in Africa will remove the conception of political association on the basis of political parties, replacing it with Functional Institutions and Functional Parties. Hence, political office holders and members of governments at all levels of political administration will be directly linked to a particular sector from which they obtain their support and are ideologically bound. Functional Institutions – broad-based, with Functional Agencies – narrow-based, will obtain political authority to pursue their functional interest based on the ideology and philosophy of the sectoral category they are associated with. Thus, Functional Institutions will form the central association upon which the collective interests of particular Functional Agencies will converge in the pursuit of their socio-economic interests in the sector and the various levels of government. The system will evolve as follows:

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[10] See Abuja Treaty of 1991. See also Abdul-Raheem, T edited (1996), *Pan-Africanism*, ((London), Pluto Press
[11] Bakut, *Op cit*

SECTORAL CATEGORISATION

SECTOR	FUNCT. INST. BROAD-BASED (State level)	FUNCT. AGENCIES NARROW-BASED (Rural/Provincial levels)
Agriculture	Nomadic farming	Nomadic groups from rural levels
	Cultivatery farming	Cultivatery groups from rural levels
	Women Affairs	Women groups from rural levels
Business	Manufacturing	Manufacturing groups at all levels
	Trading	Trading groups at all levels
	Transport	Transporters groups at all levels
Public Service	Educational	Educational institutions at all levels
	Civil Service	Civil Service at all levels
	Private Service	Private Service at all levels

Since the greater population of Africans live in rural areas and are engaged in rudimentary/subsistence farming practices, to encourage their participation in politics and empower them, it is necessary that they are involved on the basis of their functional interests and mutual needs at the levels of their 'specialist' interests. Thus, they should be

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[12] Mitrany, D 'A Political Theory for A New Society...' *Op Cit*, p22 and --- (1975), *The Functional Theory of Politics*, (London), Martin Robert, p115

able to elect representatives from their narrow-based Agencies to the broad-based Institutions, which will represent their interests and be accountable to them at their rural constituencies. The constitution of, and the formation of political association, election of representatives, the principle of democracy and the formation of government at all levels should follow the sectoral categorisation, thus, the core of political association and the election of political leaders will emerge from FAs and FIs to which, all aspiring political office holders will have to be associated with, and be accountable to. Moreover, the system will ensure the involvement of all members of the society in the political process integrating all lines of 'ethnic' and religious divide, while enabling the unification of regional and continental Functional Parties since there will be only 3-Main ideologies tendering towards; agricultural development; the enhancement and development of businesses and industries and; the provision of public services. Functional Parties will therefore evolve based on the 3F model, based on the 3-Main ideological orientation and philosophies. The elected representatives from FAs will congregate at the FIs levels to develop political manifestos and contest election on the basis of their Functional broad-based interests, drawing their membership and support from the FAs membership. At the state level, the following Functional Institutions should form the broad-based political association:

FUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS   **FUNCTIONAL PARTY**

Nomadic farmers from rural levels   Agriculture oriented

Cultivatery farmers from rural levels

Women groups from rural levels

Manufacturing groups at all levels   Industry oriented

Trading groups at all levels

Transporters groups at all levels

Educational institutions at all levels   Welfare oriented

Civil Service at all levels

Private Service at all levels

Based on this schema, at the local (rural) government level, political office holders will be elected from Functional Agencies. The membership of FAs will constitute the general membership of FIs, with the position of leadership and key positions of representation of the FAs, at the broad-based FIs, fill through election from the FAs constituencies accordingly. At the provincial and states' levels on the other hand, office holders will be elected/selected through the Functional Parties, which have evolved from the congregation of FIs at sectoral categorisation. Thus, aspiring political office holders at both provincial and states' levels will seek political support and mandate from all levels based on their Sectoral/Functional ideologies and philosophies. In other words, it will not be sufficient to

present mere statements as political manifestos, which have no ideological or philosophical base. Functional manifestos must be based on specific ideological and philosophical commitments, taking into consideration the development requirement of other sectors and Functional Institutions to obtain the mandate to administer policies and govern. A system of politics, based on FIs will ensure effective opposition and provide a good basis for the evaluation of Functional Parties achievements and the fulfilment of political manifestos. Functional politics will therefore, eliminate political opportunism, replacing it with Functional politicians whose achievement of electoral successes will be dependent on their effectiveness, not the size of their 'ethnic' support or ability to influence the electorate with money or religious influences.

At regional and continental levels, election will be based on the co-ordination of sectoral ideological Parties and Functional Institutions. Thus, the electorate will have their physiological security interests satisfied due to the focus of Parties to fulfil Functional interests while integrating the spiritual location's basis of identities, hence the claim to the ownership of the frontier defined geographical *space – homeland*. Whereas elections to the Local (rural) government level will be primarily conducted at the rural strata of society, the elections to other strata (from provincial to the continental), would be based on Functional Parties on the basis of sectoral orientation. Thus, Functional Institutions will congregate to form Parties based on specific sectoral orientations and participating in elections from provincial to continental assemblies. This electoral system will ensure that traditional African societies' cultural values and institutions are maintained, but also integrated with the process of modernisation, globalisation and technological advancement.

In essence, it will ensure the achievement of a continental economic and political union based on the principle of democracy and the freedom of political association, while ensuring development and modernisation as envisaged by the AEC Treaty.

3F: MODEL FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE

FUNCTIONAL AGENCIES	FUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS	ACTORS	GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL
Nomadic	Nomadic	FAs/FIs	Rural/Provincial
Cultivatery	Cultivatery	FAs/FIs	
Women Affairs	Women Affairs		
Manufacturing	Manufacturing	FPs/FIs	Provincial/
Trading	Trading	RFPs/CFIs	States/Regional
Transport	Transport		
Educational	Educational	RFPs/CFIs	Provincial/Sates/
Civil Service	Civil Service	CFIs	Regional/Continental
Private Service	Private Service		

KEY:

FAs	Functional Agencies
FIs	Functional Institutions
FPs	Functional Parties
RFPs	Regional coalition of Functional Parties
CFIs	Continental Functional Institutions

POSTSCRIPT

The proposed framework should be seen as a heuristic device for further research, based on the existing institutions in the African continent, the provisions of the AEC Treaty and the Mitranian approach principles of 'forms following functions'. Further research and development on the ramifications of the proposal is required. Hence, the proposed 3-F model represents an agenda for further research to Understanding African in better ways than storytelling.

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
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