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*The Fortress, the 'Siege', and the Haven.*

*The British politics of mobility control within  
colonial-capitalism and globalisation*

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of  
the Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy

November 2005

## Abstract

This dissertation analyses the politics of British immigration policy formation by drawing upon the disciplines of migration theory, political theory, cultural studies, international political economy, history, and postcolonial theory. Employing a Foucauldian and Gramscian methodology, it presents an analysis of British migration policy in the development of colonial capitalism as a framework for its analysis of the contemporary dynamics of mobility control under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation. While focussing on the movement of persons, it examines the articulation of different forms of mobility control – those over the movements of people, labour, finance, trade, services, in relation to the sphere of political discourse and policy formation. The thesis seeks to examine the development of ‘political’ and ‘economic’ migration regimes in these periods. It offers a *longue duree* analysis of the manner in which they have been articulated under liberal and neo-liberal constellations of governance, governmentality and discourse fields. The thesis thus seeks to investigate the manner in which regimes based in colonial, liberal, and racialised ideologies relates to the contemporary paradigm of ‘managed migration’ pertaining to conditions of globalisation, neo-liberalism, and a corresponding communitarianism. Finally, it seeks to analyse the manner in which these articulated mobility regimes have been necessary to British practices of statecraft.

### *Statement of Originality*

*The work in this dissertation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original, except as acknowledgement in the text. The material has not been submitted, in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other university.*

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## Acknowledgements

The writing of this thesis has been a deeply enriching experience and I have been fortunate in the support I have received. I am grateful to the British Vice-Chancellor's Committee and to the Department of Human Geography for their funding support throughout the thesis, and to Eleonore Kofman, Roger Bromley, Bob Ashley, and Patrick Williams for finding me teaching and research work over the last few years.

I would like to express my gratitude to my Director of Studies, Eleonore Kofman, for I could not have asked for better supervision. Eleonore's clear-sighted criticisms and academic direction helped me sharpen the focus of the thesis, and often prompted me to re-think my theoretical paradigms. I would like to thank her for the practical support that she has offered throughout the writing period, for the conditions of writing a thesis have often been as important as the writing itself. I would also like to thank her for providing me with a good example of what it means to be an actively committed, ethical and political academic. I would also like to offer great thanks to my supervisor, Couze Venn, with whom I have enjoyed many hours of stimulating conversation. I thank Couze for his friendship and great personal support. I would also thank him for the inspiring example he gives in his postcolonial academic work and in his tireless commitment.

I would like to thank my senior colleagues at Nottingham Trent, and especially those who have provided an ethical environment for academic work. In this vein I would offer thanks to Pavarti Raghuram, Richard Johnson, Joost van Loon, Chris Farrands, and Heikki Patomaki.. I would also like to thank Roger Bromley and Patrick Williams, both for their many kindnesses and for the stimulating insights they have provided.

I owe great debts to many of my colleagues and friends throughout the last four years. I would like to thank the great Dane, Anders Hansen, my favourite 'schmuck' Segal Gooldin, Gulshan Khan (the 'strong'), the Anglophiliac Ana Maria Groake, the 'Portuguese princess' Sonia Melo, the 'English fox' Mick O'Reilly, the lovely Paula Raposa, the Unitarian Inga Scharf, the cinematic Laura Smith, the liberal Mark Wenman, Andreas Wittel - the Deutsch Dude - and that very nice and articulate fellow, Owen Worth.

I wish to say to my family, Roz, Terry and Carol, Claire and Drewsta that I hope to thank them in my actions. For the love, slapstick, and bullying, I thank Sunshine, my pretty yet dwarfish wife. She may be little, but she's really not so fierce.

## Introduction

In the nineteenth century the location of the 'dark heart' of colonisation was to be found in the words of Conrad's narrator Marlow – an economic migrant of sorts – who told the story of Belgian colonial violence in the African Congo from the mid-ship of a cargo boat on London's River Thames.<sup>1</sup> When, for the European colonial imagination, the world's dark heart seemed to lie in Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Americas, and the Antipodes – its rhythm could also be heard in the uneven footfall of the *mobile vulgate* (the vulgar mob) that roamed the streets that ran like tributaries from the Thames. As Marlow says of the colonial metropolis, '... this also ... has been one of the dark places of the earth'.<sup>2</sup> In the period of British colonial and capitalist domination (from the 1750's onwards), the truth regimes of modernity and 'progress' were constructed as being threatened from without and within, and the threat from within was, in various forms, relayed through that which was thought to have arisen from without. Here, the poor, whether in the form of the masses of displaced persons flooding the British metropolis or in the form, for example, of the Bengali peasant who resisted her or his impoverishment, could be represented as an 'antinomy of Progress'.<sup>3</sup> The British 'pauper', like the colonial subject, could thus be represented as an uncivilised Other, as 'foreign' to the national community, on whom new forms of discipline or subjugation could legitimately be imposed.

Virginie Guiraudon has observed that in the post-Cold War context, the ideas that framed European intergovernmental co-operation on asylum and immigration 'hinged on linking migration and crime and considering that they constituted the dark side of 'globalisation' requiring a supranational response'.<sup>4</sup> The phrase 'the dark side of globalisation' belongs to a G7 statement on 'south to north' migrant trafficking, which is linked to other forms of international crime.<sup>5</sup> The logic of this statement pertains to the contemporary British policy regime of 'managed migration', where globalisation has been seen, from the point of view of elite policy makers and communitarian sectors of the media, to incur the risk of 'illegal' immigration from the 'South'.<sup>6</sup> Here, for example, the UK Home Office White Paper of 1998 titled *Fairer, Faster and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum* and the subsequent *Immigration and Asylum Act* (1999) set out the government's approach to

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness*, London, Penguin, 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Conrad, *ibid.*, p 29.

<sup>3</sup> John Marriott, *The Other Empire: Metropolis, India and Progress in the Colonial Imagination*, Manchester University Press, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Virginie Guiraudon, 'The constitution of a European immigration policy domain: A political sociology approach', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 2003; See also, Sharone Backers, Commentary, 'Refugees: 'The dark side of globalisation': the criminalisation of refugees', *Race and Class*, Vol. 43, No. 1, January, 2002

<sup>5</sup> Morrison and Crossland, *The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees: The End Game in European Asylum Policy?* UNHCR Working Paper No. 39, April 2001.

<sup>6</sup> The 1998 UK Home Office White Paper *Fairer, Faster, and Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum* and the *Immigration and Asylum Act* of 1999 begins to set out the globalisation-as-risk thesis.

immigration and asylum in terms of the risks, as well as the benefits, of globalisation. In this primarily utilitarian approach, globalisation's 'dark side' is located in the instability of the 'South' (and the 'East'), and in the 'criminal' border-crossings that have seen that instability migrate to the North (in the processes of trafficking, 'bogus' migration, and the growth of the 'black' economy). The 'southern' location of instability is situated in the discursive space of European modernity, wherein, for example, global IMF regulations have become a form of neo-colonial governance seeking to discipline 'southern' nations.<sup>7</sup> This neo-colonialist ideology governs the flows of finance, trade, workers and people between north and south, functioning as the broader paradigm in which the 'bogus' asylum seeker figures as an embodiment of the risks of globalisation.

Western European governments have thus come to problematise asylum-based immigration, on the basis that economic migrants are making inappropriate use of the limited access to refuge provided to political refugees. These 'people flows' are sometimes represented as a flood of threatening difference, particularly in the tabloid media where they figure in the scenario of a 'siege' waged against the 'haven' of British liberal society, a 'haven' constructed in the midst of global conflicts and insecurities.<sup>8</sup> This sense of the need for 'securitisation' is addressed and promoted in the Home Office White Paper titled *Secure Haven, Safe Borders: Integration with Diversity in Modern Europe* (2002).<sup>9</sup> The securitisation of the community imagined as a haven takes the form of a process of enfortressment that works as a series of strategies designed to facilitate and manage flows and stasis of finance, trade, and people in the interests of the globalised and globalising 'West'. It is within the realms of this neo-liberal and communitarian process that we should more properly locate globalisation's 'dark heart'.

Linda Colley makes the general point that 'the history of Britain and the histories of its various overseas adventures cannot be adequately approached separately.'<sup>10</sup> I follow this approach in arguing that a correlation should be drawn between the *production* of colonial 'others' - those British and foreign subjects whose mobility was found to be threatening in the period of colonial-capitalism, and 'global 'others' - those 'foreign' persons who are framed as threatening the British nation in their 'economic' or 'political' migrations. The relationship between the migration regimes of British

<sup>7</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, 'Global formations: IMF conditionality and the South as a legal subject', in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt, *Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London and New York, Zed Books, 2001

<sup>8</sup> Open Democracy, 'People Flow: Migration in Europe', <http://opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/issue.jsp>, accessed October 28<sup>th</sup>, 2005; For an analysis of media representations of asylum seekers see R. Kaye, 'Redefining the Refugee: The UK media portrayal of Asylum seekers', in Khalid Koser and Helma Lutz, (eds.), *The New Migration in Europe: Social constructions and Social Realities*; Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998

<sup>9</sup> Jeff Huysmans, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2000; Adam Edwards, 'The Politics of Transnational Organised Crime: Discourse, Reflexivity, and the Narration of Threat'; Both authors taken a Foucauldian approach to the construction of securitisation as a 'political rationality or governmentality' (Edwards, p 1) that works through a governmental 'problematization' of perceived threats (Huysmans, pp., 756-7.)

<sup>10</sup> Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600 - 1850*, Jonathon Cape, London, 2002, p 345.

colonial-capitalism and British globalisation should be contextualised within a framework that recognises that colonisation was central to the rise of the British capitalist state in the world system, and that the infra-national and extra-national control of mobilities, including those of people, finance, goods, and politics, was essential to that development.<sup>11</sup> Correspondingly, while British neo-liberalism takes the form of national-globalisation and a securitising communitarianism, the extension of British neo-liberalism constitutes a form of neo-colonial capitalism in which the control of mobilities is once again essential to the dominant position of the neo-liberal state-society complex.<sup>12</sup>

In this *longue duree* approach the forced migration and stasis (immobility) of asylum and refugee regimes are analysed in relation to a series of colonial regimes including those of pauperised British, Irish and Indian subjects, as well as the forced migration and stasis of African slaves. A central focus here is on the relationship between the criminalisation and pauperisation of British migrants, and on the extent to which the British poor in the period of colonial capitalism should be considered to have been what migration analysts refer to as internally displaced persons and forced and coerced migrants. The displacements and stasis of the British poor are correlated to those of colonised subjects throughout the regions of British colonial endeavour. Herein I seek to analyse the regimes governing the migration and stasis of these populations in relation to the contested incorporation of their labour power within the developing discourse and governmentalities of liberal progress and colonial capitalism. The thesis thus investigates the degree to which a biopolitical governmentality emerges to produce, legitimate and maintain the hegemonic dominance of the British state-society complex. Migration, furthermore, is *one form* of mobility that needs to be thought of in relation to commercial and financial mobility regimes. My *primary* focus, however, is to analyse the production of regimes governing the movement and stasis of persons, and to contextualise these by reference to the flows of finance and goods and services with which they are articulated. This approach assists the analysis of the historical relationships between economic and political liberalism (and thus imperialism, pauperisation, and peripheralisation), and the contemporary relations between neo-liberalism, north-south relations, and 'development' as frameworks governing the construction of migratory regimes.

While the *longue duree* analysis of British mobility regimes demonstrates the neo-colonial character of neo-liberal mobility regimes, the dissertation takes the problematisation of refugee and asylum-based immigration as its touchstone, and focuses on the contemporary form of the re-construction of the

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<sup>11</sup> I develop this argument in the first chapter.

<sup>12</sup> I am drawing, in part, on the central insights of Immanuel Wallerstein, *Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, Vol. 1, London, Academic Press, 1976b; *Modern World System: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750*, Vol. 2, London, Academic Press, 1980; *The Modern World System: The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World Economy, 1730-1840's*, Vol. 3, London, Academic Press, 1989



refugee as a 'genuinely political' migrant whose political persecution distinguishes him from the self-interested and rationally acting 'economic' migrant.<sup>13</sup> Conversely, the thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the 'disguised economic' migration identified in governmental discourse consists of the movement of people from pauperised and conflict-ridden countries is a product of previous colonial-liberal and contemporary neo-liberal practices and ideologies. The effect of these practices requires one form of recognition of the political character of the so-called 'economic' migrant. The bogus asylum seeker is a political subject whose migration constitutes a resistant act of exodus from the conditions of his (and their) subjection.<sup>14</sup> The migrant here resists the imposition of stasis (immobility). Simultaneously, as a self-interested economic actor, he is the paradigmatic rational and autonomous subject of liberal discourse. Thus the 'bogus-migrant' occupies a liminal sphere and his presence is manifest not just in the form of an undesirable other but as an *unheimlich* form of the liberal self.<sup>15</sup> The presence of this litigious other-self, it will be argued, troubles the dominant form of government-as-policing by threatening the sovereign and disciplinary constitution of the well-ordered population.<sup>16</sup>

## S e c t i o n   O n e :   ' R a c e ' ,   C l a s s ,   a n d '

### C o m p a r a t i v e   a n d   G l o b a l i s e d   M o d e s   o f   A n a l y s i s .

The approach of the thesis draws upon and yet differs from some of the major critical and historical accounts of British migration policy formation in several aspects.<sup>17</sup> Because it seeks to problematise the liberal border constructed between 'political' and 'economic' forms of migration, the thesis draws upon a broad range of historical sources that enable the construction of a *longue duree* approach. Thus, whilst drawing upon Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox's admirable twentieth century social history of

<sup>13</sup> Following Robin Cohen, I trace the originating moment of this reconstruction to Douglas Hurd's deployment of the term 'disguised economic migrant' in 1985. *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, Longman, New York and London, 1994, p 82

<sup>14</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp 212-4. Hardt and Negri write that 'mobility and mass worker nomadism always express a refusal and a search for liberation: the resistance against the horrible conditions of exploitation and the search for freedom and new conditions of life', p 212; See also Amblavaner Sivanandan's argument that the 'economic migrant is the political refugee'. A. Sivanandan, 'Refugees from Globalism', CARF, No. 57, August-September, 2000

<sup>15</sup> Freud's term the 'unheimlich' is often translated as 'uncanny', but that definition needs to be supplemented with the sense of being at home and yet not at home that Freud intends.

<sup>16</sup> Michel Foucault, '*Sécurité, territoire et population*', Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978. Paris, Gallimard/Seuil

<sup>17</sup> Firstly, much of the important historical work on British political discourse and migration policy formation has focussed on the post-1948 period of 'New Commonwealth' immigration and subsequent restrictions in terms of 'race', class, or liberalism. For examples of accounts that privilege the category of 'race', see Zig Layton-Henry, *The Politics of Immigration, 'Race' and 'Race' Relations in Post-War Britain*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992; Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Post-war Era*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997; Examples of the class-based approach link analysis of racial and class-based discrimination include Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, London, Oxford University Press, 1973. Robert Miles gives a broad (Marxist) historical perspective. See Robert Miles, *Racism and Migrant Labour*, London, Routledge, 1982; Examples of accounts of the state's liberalism in this period include Randall Hansen, *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-War Britain*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000

the local, national and global dynamics of refugees in Britain, the postcolonial Foucauldian and Gramscian approach employed requires a different constellation of historical sources, and a broader range of historical subjects.<sup>18</sup> Kushner and Knox are concerned with the neglected domain of the local histories of refugees and the communities in which they settled, and in addressing this neglect produce a history that provides an effective critique of restrictive policy formation and discriminatory media in relation to refugees.

By way of contrast, I seek to draw out some of the correlations that exist between colonial forms of political-and-economic migration, and to provide a critique of the colonial and liberal political frameworks that governed particular mobility regimes. I am concerned to draw out the relationships between, for example, colonial slavery, the coolie system, and the transportation system with the modern regimes of managed migration. In this sense, whilst drawing upon a range of histories that focus on specific or broadly conceived periods of immigration and refugee policy formation such as Louise London's *Whitehall and the Jews*, or Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol's *Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others*, the historical approach differs from accounts that are more directly focussed on immigration and refugees per se.

A wide range of historical sources are drawn upon for the archaeological account of the relationship between the political form of the English and subsequently British state-society complex, political and economic liberalism, and several indicative colonial migration regimes. Several of these texts are primarily histories of the development of liberal and colonial ideologies. Thus, for example, the works of Bernard Semmel and David Armitage<sup>19</sup> enables an understanding of the centrality of imperialism to the development of British political liberalism. The development of this relationship is further pursued by drawing upon critical postcolonial histories, as well as histories of the theories and practices of economic liberalism. In the first instance, I draw upon the work of Uday Singh Mehta and Gyan Prakash to examine the inclusive and exclusive dynamics of political liberalism in relation to the incorporation of colonial subjects as 'free' or 'unfree' labour in the imperial economy.<sup>20</sup> The postcolonial critiques of the construction of 'freedom' within liberal imperialism is used in conjunction with the continuum set out by the labour historian David Etlis that works between the negative pole of 'unfree' labour

<sup>18</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century*, London and Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass, 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 1993; David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

<sup>20</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study of Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999; Gyan Prakash, 'Introduction: the discourse of freedom', in *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labour Servitude in Colonial India*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002



migration and 'free' labour migration.<sup>21</sup> The thesis also draws upon some of the key insights of the historian of world labour migration, Lydia Potts, and of the world-systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein.<sup>22</sup> The frameworks provided by these authors enables an analysis of colonial labour migration within the emergent and changing global division of labour between the core, periphery, and semi-periphery. This global perspective facilitates a problematisation of the binary opposition between 'voluntary' or 'free' and 'forced' or 'unfree' migrations, insofar as both of these have been subject to incorporation within the world economy. Understanding the role of the British economy as a locomotive of the world economy helps to provide the analysis of the relationship between 'economic' and 'political' migrations within colonial liberalism and, subsequently, neo-liberal globalisation.

The account of economic liberalism and imperialism employs a wide range of sources. Bernard Semmel's *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism* provides a useful account of the relationship between the theory of classical political economy and its use in political discourse and policy formation. The works of P. J. Cain and Anthony Hopkins, H.V. Bowen, and Linda Colley all help to analyse the rise of a capitalist state-society complex via formal and militant and informal (*laissez faire*) imperialism, and to account for the importance of financial flows and the financial service sector in the socio-political dominance of British elites.<sup>23</sup> These works also help to establish the importance of colonialism for British capitalism and the rise of the British nation-state to the status of a global hegemon. The concept of 'gentlemanly capitalism' given in the Cain and Hopkins' work is the subject of ongoing historical debate, particularly in relation to the relative importance of industrialisation, and the relative importance of colonial (rather than metropolitan) dynamics in the development of British capitalism. While I recognise the merit of these reservations, the critical engagement offered in the first chapter seeks to suggest that these criticisms do not substantially revoke the inter-relationships between colonialism, the financial service sector, and the aristocracy that Cain and Hopkins demonstrate. The thesis is thus situated amongst the *longue duree* historical works that address imperialism and colonisation as central aspects of the development of the British liberal and capitalist state, and brings together a range of diverse historical material in order to support its arguments in regards to the articulation of mobility flows (of people, commerce, and finance) with the political form of the British state-society complex.

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<sup>21</sup> David Etlis, 'Labour and Coercion in the English Atlantic World from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Century', in Michael Twaddle: *The Wages of Slavery: From Chattel Slavery to Wage Labour in Africa, the Caribbean, and England*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p 207.

<sup>22</sup> Lydia Potts, *The World Labour Market: A History of Migration*, trans. Terry Bond, London, Zed Books, 1990; Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*.

<sup>23</sup> P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914*, Longman, London, 1993a; H.V. Bowen, *Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688-1775*, London, Palgrave Macmillan; Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992

Beyond the historical focus, an important approach to the politics of migration has been the comparative focus on migration policy formation in the context of the differing political frameworks of Western democratic nation-states, in terms of the issues of 'control, security, and integration'.<sup>24</sup> This approach overlaps, at points, with a focus on the 'problem' of immigration for Britain and other Western nation-states in the context of an analysis of regionalisation and globalisation. These approaches to the politics of immigration have given rise to a series of problematisations and debates in contemporary migration theory and policy formation. Amongst these, I will address those that revolve around the validity (or lack thereof) of the 'race relations paradigm' and the use of 'race and class' as categories of analysis; the 'problem' of maintaining Western democratic states' sovereignty<sup>25</sup> (or, as Doty argues, the problem of changing practices of statecraft)<sup>26</sup> in the face of an immigration 'crisis'<sup>27</sup>; the problematisation of migration policy formation as either a 'liberal paradox'<sup>28</sup> between the conflicting requirements of economic and political liberalism, or as a reconfiguration of the balance between liberalism and illiberalism; the constitution and legitimation of a regime of 'managed migration' appropriate to the qualitatively distinct migrations of the period of globalisation, and consequently, a utilitarian problematisation of both the rights-based 'northern regime'<sup>29</sup> of asylum migration and settlement, and of so-called 'economic migration'; the corresponding securitisation and re-borderments of globalised migration;<sup>30</sup> and the re-elaboration of 'migration-development nexus' in terms of regimes of forced migration.<sup>31</sup>

Whilst seeking to engage with these contemporary approaches and the related debates and problematisations (see below), my approach is situated within an analysis of British migration regimes whose origins lie in the seventeenth century development of the hegemonic articulation of colonialism,

<sup>24</sup> James Hollifield, 'The politics of international migration: How can we 'bring the state back in'? in Caroline B. Brettell and James F. Hollifield, (eds.), *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, New York and London, Routledge, 2000. See for example, Christian Joppke, (ed.), *Challenge to the Nation-State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998; Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999

<sup>25</sup> See, for example, Wayne Cornelius, Phillip Martin and James Hollifield, *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1994; James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1992

<sup>26</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies: Statecraft, Desire, and the Politics of Exclusion*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003

<sup>27</sup> Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis, Challenges to States and to Human Rights*, 1995

<sup>28</sup> James Hollifield, 'Migration and International relations: the 'liberal paradox'', *Royal Society of British Geographers*, draft copy, January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Charles Keely, 'The international refugee regime(s): the end of the Cold War matters', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2000, pp., 303-314.

<sup>30</sup> Ole Wæver, B. Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and P. Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993; Jeff Huysmans, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2000; Adam Edwards, 'The Politics of Transnational Organised Crime: Discourse, Reflexivity, and the Narration of Threat'

<sup>31</sup> Amongst a growing literature, see Stephen Castles et al., 'Developing DFID's Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Vols. I&II, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, February 2005.

capitalism, and liberalism, and whose contemporary 'end-point' lies in the articulation of globalisation, neo-liberalism, and communitarianism. The critique of the contemporary British politics of migration proceeds by examining the place of mobility regimes within the rise of Britain within the colonial global order, and to map the development of the political governmentalities that constituted disciplined populations of national citizen-subjects and colonial subjects in the process of the incorporating extension of liberal capitalism.

This archaeological approach focuses on the forms of power constituting the production of forced and coerced mobility regimes. Where critical and historical accounts of the politics of immigration policy formation have focussed on the refugee and asylum-migration, the dissertation focuses on the forced and coerced production of political-and-economic migration regimes as means of engaging with the politics of asylum and immigration policy formation.<sup>32</sup> Here my approach is in accordance with the recent broadening of academic and policy-based research that seeks to analyse refugee and asylum-based immigration within an understanding of the production and management of the larger field of forced migration, as well as with the contemporary focus on analysis of utilitarian regimes of 'managed migration' that manifest an 'economic' stratification of migration categories.<sup>33</sup>

Several of these issues have been addressed in the recent works of the 'comparativist' school of the politics of migration. Adrian Favell cites the emergence of issues of national identity, sovereignty and politics, regional geopolitics, transnationalism and globalization within the field of the politics of migration. Favell describes the development of a school of comparative Europeanists in the post 70's period.<sup>34</sup> These comparativist theorists can be broadly placed within Randall Hansen's description of 'schools' concerned with institutional realism, or within 'schools' whose major focus is upon the effects of globalization on migration.<sup>35</sup> Situated within the realist vein, the recent works of Freeman,

<sup>32</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *Refugees in an Age of Genocide: Global, National and Local Perspectives during the Twentieth Century*, London and Portland, Oregon, Frank Cass, 2001; Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and the lessons of history', *Race and Class*, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2000, pp., 40-56

<sup>33</sup> See, for example, the approach to forced migration set out in Stephen Castles and Nicholas Van Hear, et al., 'Developing DFID's Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons', Vols. I and II, Oxford, Oxford University, Refugees Studies Centre, *Compas*, February 2005; For useful accounts of British 'managed migration' policies, see Sarah Spencer, (ed.), *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict, and Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2003; Bill Jordan, *Migration: The Boundaries of Equality and Justice*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2003; Heaven Crawley, 'Managing migration: current entry routes into the UK labour market', London, Institute of Public Policy Research, 2002; Stephen Castles, 'Why migration policies fail', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2004; Don Flynn, 'New borders, new management: the dilemmas of modern immigration policies', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, May 2005; Don Flynn, 'Tough as old boots? Asylum and immigration and the paradox of New Labour', Discussion paper, *Immigration Rights Project*, London, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, November 2003.

<sup>34</sup> Favell identifies the foremost amongst them as Rogers Brubaker, Gary Freeman, Peter Hall, James Hollifield, Martin Schain, Sydney Tarrow, and Yasemin Soysal. Others working within or against this 'new paradigm' include Virginie Guiraudon, Matthew Gibney, Randall Hansen, James Joppke, and Liza Schuster.

<sup>35</sup> Randall Hansen, 'Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrant's to Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*. Vol. 35, No 3, April 2002, p 259-283.

Hollifield and Joppke have forwarded major new directions in migration research. Hollifield's work has produced the 'gap' thesis, which accounts for the gap between the rhetoric of control and the actual, albeit relative, liberalization of immigration into the EU in the contemporary (global) period.<sup>36</sup> Hollifield argues that nation states have evolved into trading states and that under the new conditions of global trading competition are caught within the liberal paradox, where 'open' economic and 'closed' political liberalism produce conflicting effects on migration regimes. Hollifield's 'gap thesis' points to the importance of tensions between the market and the state. While his state-centred argument intervenes in the sovereignty debate in pointing to the importance of the domestic and international political structures that operate within 'globalisation', Gary Freeman, working from an embedded realist institutionalist approach, argues that immigration policies in the contemporary liberal Western states amounts to a 'modest expansiveness' produced by the 'domestic political processes' which marginally favour pro-migration interest groups.<sup>37</sup> Freeman's account of interest groups includes the state desire for sovereignty and anti-migrant tendencies amongst the weaker social forces (those that bear the brunt of the detrimental effects of immigration). While Freeman argues that these forces lose out to the domestic coalition of anti-racist and pro-labour business groups, it remains important to note that the primary 'interest' group is that of migrants themselves, whilst the informal and service sectors of the British economy should be considered as producing a major 'pull effect'. In addition, the trafficking and smuggling 'industries' should be considered as a major 'interest group' that, whilst acting as a brake on the state's sovereignty, does not fit the model of Freeman's politics of recognition. Joppke's analysis of processes of 'limited sovereignty' furthered the emphasis on domestic factors, arguing that the courts' use of international jurisprudence and domestic constitutional jurisprudence strengthened the rights of immigrants, subsequently making it extremely difficult for states to pursue policies of expulsion or to produce substantial disincentives for guest workers and migrants seeking to remain.<sup>38</sup> These authors, whilst generalising their theories from the examination of German and French situations, also acknowledge limits to their theories' breadth; Britain in particular is commonly noted as an exceptional case. This is particularly true in terms of the domestic influence of the judiciary, and similarly due to the lack of a rights-ensuring constitution.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Hollifield introduced the 'gap' thesis in James Hollifield, 'Immigration Policy in France and Germany: Outputs versus Outcomes', *Annals*, 485, p 113-128, 1986.

<sup>37</sup> Gary Freeman, 'Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States', *International Migration Review*, 29(4), pp., 881-902, 1995; 'The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration in Liberal States', in Christian Joppke, (ed), *Challenges to the Nation-State*, pp 86-108, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<sup>38</sup> Christian Joppke, 'Why liberal states accept unwanted immigration', *World Politics*, 50, 266-293, 1998; *Immigration and the Nation-State*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, Gary Freeman, 'Britain, the deviant Case', in W.A. Cornelius, P.L. Martin, and J.F. Hollifield, (eds.), *Controlling Immigration*, pp 297-300, Stanford California, Stanford University Press, 1994; Hansen (2000), Christian Joppke, 'Asylum and State Sovereignty: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Britain', in Christian Joppke, (Ed.), *Challenges to the Nation State*, pp 109-152, Oxford University Press.

Each of the above theorists shares the belief that neither globalisation nor the subsequent growth in market-driven immigration has caused the (normatively conceived) state to be supplanted by a system of post-nationalism. The second stream of theory identified by Favell and Hansen as the 'globalisation thesis' problematises the normative conception of the sovereign state. Yasemin Soysal, Saskia Sassen and Virginie Guiraudon have all produced important new directions in migration research. While Sassen, in Hansen's reckoning, is the chief protagonist in the making of the globalisation thesis, Soysal is largely responsible for the 'post-national' thesis, and Guiraudon provides evidence of important limitations to the post-national thesis. Soysal's main argument is that new regional, international and supranational developments in law and institutions have bolstered the rights of migrants and third country nationals at the expense of nation-state sovereignty. Unlike James Hollifield, who focuses on the national sphere of rights creation and acknowledges that international norms only hold validity when ratified at the national level, Soysal sees the embedding of a new range of rights as the emergence of a new form of citizenship – one given at the European level. Regional citizenship, for Soysal, points to the emergence of a post-national system based on the supranational institution of Human Rights legislation. Virginie Guiraudon, on the other hand, uses a genealogical analysis of legal developments in the European Union to describe how the rhetoric of rights-based norms is checked by the strength of the intergovernmental structure of policy formation. In Guiraudon's analysis, the security bias of the EU's Third Pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) successfully restricts the more liberal tendencies of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice.<sup>40</sup> Within the political structure of the developing European Union it seems that dominant nation states have managed to maintain a large degree of control over migration policy formation. In preferring the executive security focussed structures of the Third Pillar to the democratic or judicial venues of the EU, the dominant EU states have managed to inoculate the process of migration policy formation from post-nationalism.

Saskia Sassen's work on the transnational circuits of migration is more market-focussed than the legal and institutional approach of Soysal or Guiraudon. In Sassen's analysis of globalisation as the workings of integrated international capital and the growth of service markets, the normatively-conceived state's control of immigration has become redundant.<sup>41</sup> Hansen describes Sassen's argument as being based on a combination of rights-based supranationalism, the uptake of international rights based norms by domestic legislation and its subsequent use by domestic judiciary, and 'a sort of unstable tension between the increasingly free movement of services, capital, and goods, on the one

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<sup>40</sup> Virginie Guiraudon, 'International Human Rights Norms and their Incorporation: The Protection of Aliens in Europe', European University Institute Working paper EUF No. 98/4, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico, Italy, 1998.

<sup>41</sup> Saskia Sassen, 'The *de facto* transnationalizing of immigration policy', in Christian Joppke, (ed.), *ibid*, 1998

hand, and the maintenance of limits on the movements of labourers on the other'.<sup>42</sup> While the limits that Guiraudon finds in institutional resistance to supranationalism apply to Sassen's argument as well as Soysal's, Sassen is right to point to the judicial uptake of nationally ratified internal norms and conventions. Reading Guiraudon and Sassen together, it seems the developments of supranationalism and national uptake take the form of a reciprocity in which the extra-national effects the infranational while the infranational effects the extra-national policy formation. Subsequently, their articulation represents elements belonging to the regional process of globalisation rather than post-nationalism.

One of Sassen's major theoretical contributions is the study of transnational processes that has led her to argue for 'the declining significance of the national economy as a unitary category' and to be critical of 'economic globalisation' to the extent to which it has been 'represented in terms of the duality of national-global where the global gains power and advantages at the expense of the national'.<sup>43</sup> For Sassen, 'immigration is one major process through which a transnational political economy is being based'.<sup>44</sup> Here Sassen argues that globalisation produces the rise of a global-city informal economy into which third world migrants are inevitably drawn. Governments gearing their economies to transnational processes thus create the conditions for the need for formal and informal immigration, particularly to their global cities. Taken together, the three elements of Sassen's argument demonstrate that insofar as the state has participated in the implementation of many of these new arrangements, the state itself has been transformed, and so has the interstate system. Globalised migration has therefore been a productive element in the changes that neo-Gramscians describe as the *transformismo* of the state and interstate system.<sup>45</sup>

Subsequently, Sassen's account demonstrates substantial drawbacks in the realist analysis of institutional pathways operating within liberal democratic restraints. The first of these is the role of the state in the production of the important correspondence that Sassen draws between formal and informal economies. If, as Sassen argues, informal economies can be correlated with irregular immigration, then there is more to market liberalisation of mobility than state facilitation of self-selecting high-skill labour. Secondly, despite Hansen's conflation of the 'globalisation thesis' with a form of post-nationalism, her research bears comparison with the position adopted by Favell and Hansen (2002) calling for liberal and Marxist readings of the 'market' as the dominating factor in the politics of

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<sup>42</sup> Randall Hansen, 'Globalization, Embedded Realism, and Path Dependence: The Other Immigrant's to Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No 3, April 2002, p 262. Hansen bases this interpretation on Saskia Sassen, *Losing Control: The Decline of Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1996.

<sup>43</sup> Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*, The New Press, New York, 1998, p xix.

<sup>44</sup> Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 1998, p xxi.

<sup>45</sup> Robert Cox, 'Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method', in Stephen Gill, *Gramsci, Historical Materialism, and International Relations*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p 55



contemporary European immigration.<sup>46</sup> Thirdly, in attending to the trans-nationalisation of the state Sassen's approach is a *critical* theory of globalisation, just as Guiraudon's work brings a *critical* approach to regionalisation. Each of these approaches helps to deconstruct the realist approach with its attendant separation of market and 'politics' and subsequent normative depiction of the sovereign state.

Advocating the 'wide range of mainstream comparative and theoretical research agendas, especially work in a new institutionalist vein,'<sup>47</sup> Favell has argued that

*In the past, the accumulation of knowledge on the subject was often hampered by nationally bounded, context-specific perspectives, and an ignorance of the comparative subtleties of other countries. Debates were also distorted by the activist involvement of many academics writing about race or ethnicity, who used academic research (inappropriately) as a vehicle for denouncing racism in government policies on immigration or the treatment of ethnic minorities.*<sup>48</sup>

Explicit in Favell's argument is a rejection of a 'redundant' focus on the discourse of race in migration policy for an examination of the institutional framework of policy formation such as that of Randal Hansen's path-dependency methodology.<sup>49</sup> The British-based school of 'race-and-class' based analysis that Favell rejects would include works by migration theorists such as Sivanandan, Fekete, Foot, Layton-Henry, Miles, and Paul.<sup>50</sup> These authors have shared a focus on the linkages between institutional and cultural racism. Hansen also rejects the 'race-school' approach, and cites the work of Carter, Harris and Joshi as providing a precedent setting example of the racialisation thesis in the context of post second world war immigration. Carter *et al.*, have argued that the presence of black immigrants was used by the state in the creation of the 'race problem' which subsequently worked to justify the necessary exclusion of 'unassimilable' forms of immigration.<sup>51</sup> Their arguments place the state at the centre of the creation of racism, rather than as democratically responding to popular racism, or attempting to depoliticise the 'problem' as it affected health, housing, welfare, and employment. For Hansen, the general position adopted by the 'race and class' school finds its concise expression in

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<sup>46</sup> Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen, 'Markets against politics: EU enlargement and the idea of Europe', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4, October, 2002, pp., 581-601.

<sup>47</sup> Adrian Favell, 'Introduction: Immigration Politics in Europe,' Special Issue of ECPR news, Vol. 11, No. 2, Spring 2000.

<sup>48</sup> Adrian Favell, *op cit*.

<sup>49</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000.

<sup>50</sup> Paul Foot, *ibid*, 1965; Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *ibid*; Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982; Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, 1992; A. Sivanandan, *A Different Hunger, Writings on Black Resistance*, London, Pluto Press, 1982; Kathleen Paul, *Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997

<sup>51</sup> B Carter, C. Harris, and S. Joshi, 'The 1951-1955 Conservative Government and the Racialisation of Black Immigration', *Immigrants and Minorities*, 6, No. 3, 1987, 335-47; B. Carter, 'Immigration Policy and the Racialisation of Migrant Labour: The Construction of National Identities in the USA and Britain', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19, No 1, 1996, 135-57.

Kathleen Paul's formulation regarding the government's policies of the 1950's. Paul writes that the governments created

*a variety of administrative devices to control migration and an educative campaign designed to inoculate among the resident UK public the dangers of uncontrolled inward colonial migration. There were no formal directives or official offerings of hate literature. Rather, the campaign revolved around the reconstruction of British subjects as immigrants, the transformation of immigrants into 'coloureds', and the problematisation of 'coloured' immigration.<sup>52</sup>*

Other accounts that engage with the racialisation of 'New Commonwealth' immigration situate immigration policy within the political economy, examining the interaction of race and class. The Marxist works of Robert Miles and Stephen Castles were concerned to analyse the place of migrant labour in England and Europe in the 1960's and 1970's. For Miles, the racialisation of labouring migrants was dependent on ideological, economic, and political relations. In his formulation,

*The process of racial categorisation or racialisation is simultaneously the historical consequence and the site of subsequent struggles between classes and of the formation and reproduction of class fractions. The ideology of racism and the practice of racial discrimination are central components of this process of racialisation which had determinate effects on ideological, political, and social relations.<sup>53</sup>*

If, in Miles' formulation, state racialisation of migrant labour serves to cement ideological class relations within the host community, while these, in turn, form the contingent precondition for racialisation, Castles' and Kosak's study of migrant labour in Europe showed how capitalist labour relations were being managed in the 1970's through a dual process. The dual labour theory was largely based on the example of the German guestworker system and demonstrated the manner in which capitalist expansion required the production of new working class labour; under conditions of full or high employment the disappearance of an industrial workforce saw governments turning to immigrant labour. Castles and Kosak argued that

*The problems experienced by all immigrants to Europe and their impact on society are very similar to those of coloured immigrants in Britain. If that is the case, race and racialisation cannot be regarded*

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<sup>52</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 13; Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p xiii.

<sup>53</sup> Robert Miles, *Racism and Migrant Labour*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982 p 184.

as the determinants of immigrants' social position. Instead ... the basic determinant is the function which immigrants have in the socio-economic structure.<sup>54</sup>

For Castles and Kosak, a Marxist understanding of class stratification was a more appropriate mode of analysis than approaches based on an analysis of ethnic, social, and cultural differences.<sup>55</sup> While Castle's and Kosak's emphasis on the position of the post-war labour immigrant within the reconfigured international division of labour is a useful approach, their dismissal of the significance of the 'cultural' categories of 'race' or 'ethnicity' is overdrawn in the service of an economic determinism. Adrian Favell is equally critical of the focus of 'race' in academic discourse surrounding the politics of immigration. In Favell's argument, the 'race' standpoint tends to produce work that focuses on discourse and ideology to the detriment of 'actual' institutional practice, while also neglecting to make valid comparisons with European and other Western counterparts. These claims are linked, as research based on the examples of Germany and France show factors others than racism to be at work in European immigration policy formation. As I will discuss in further detail below, a key example of the first of these criticisms would be arguments of the 'rivers of blood' type. Here, critics working within the racialisation thesis are supposed to have given undue weight to the racist rhetoric of figures such as Enoch Powell, conflating Powellite political discourse with the formation of immigration policy. Instead, as Hansen argues, figures such as Powell were peripheral to the structures and politics of policy formation. Thus, the restriction of the early 1960s were actually based in the *realpolitik* of changing Commonwealth relations including the declining British hegemony and the repositioning of the British state after the post-second world war emergence of the United States as the world's western 'superpower'. Subsequently, while the liberal British state might have to make policy in a context of popular and political racism, the formation of policy has been made on the basis of strategic choices considered necessary to the health of the national economy. Racism, where it does affect policy, does so in the form of a popular racism which states have to respond to in the degree to which the pursuit of the national good seems to discriminate against the host community. The 'race school' is therefore either reductive or simply erroneous in describing governmental policies as the site of the production of racism.

Of these two criticisms, it is the dichotomies presented between institutional practice and popular or public discourse on which Favell and Hansen largely rely for legitimacy. To reject the 'race school's' focus on discourse, which allows the argument linking immigration policy to issues of race-and-class in the manner put forward by Hansen is to operate under the framework of a false dichotomy between

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<sup>54</sup> Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *ibid*, p 2.

<sup>55</sup> Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *ibid*, p 5. The authors go on to argue that while prejudice becomes entrenched (in policy as well as attitudes), it serves as a defence of economic and social interests. (p 430)

governmentality and discourse and to misapprehend the political relationship between these categories. Here, I mean to suggest that institutional pathways can be thought of as forms of governmentality (Foucault's combination of the concept of governance and mentality), and need to be examined as governing mentalities that have been articulated with fields of discourse such as (neo)liberalism, ethnicity, and race.<sup>56</sup>

In order to understand the problems created by the realist misapprehension of the relationship between governmentality and discourse, we need to look at Hansen's key arguments set out in *Citizenship and Immigration in Post-war Britain*. Hansen argues against the dominant position of the 'race school', where new developments in immigration policy are to be simply added to the existing framing of policy making frameworks as structured by institutional racism. The governmentality of immigration in the 'race school' discourse that Hansen critiques is represented as having been grounded in an elite and governmental racism; in a nutshell, the state problematises immigration as a matter of 'race'.<sup>57</sup> Hansen seeks to reverse this formula, arguing that liberal politicians and administrators worked to mitigate the effects of a dominant popular national racism, citing the production of a 'multicultural' Britain in the post-war period as proof of benign liberal governance. Hansen argues that the race school is guilty of selective reading, of over-emphasizing the effects of the racist discourse of figures such as Enoch Powell who were marginal to the decision making process, and of underplaying the anti-racist or pro-migrant elements amongst elite policy makers; in doing so they disregard the concrete evidence of the institutional pathways that his work traces.

Hansen marks the post war admittance of New commonwealth migrants as the beginning of 'multicultural' Britain and claims that the fact that

*a nation of 50,000,000 would indefinitely keep its doors open to 600,000,000 individuals from developing countries was always incredible; it was doubly so in light of the manifest opposition of British public opinion and the 1945-50 Labour government's explicit rejection of Commonwealth migration as a solution to post-war labour shortages.*<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Randall Hansen, 'Introduction', *ibid*, 2000. This is one of the problems with Hansen's analysis. The 'unpolitical' methodology leads this text to a conclusion of state liberality, a negation of the 'consensus' regarding the racism of the state in regard to immigration in this period. These problems will be addressed in the dissertation. Nonetheless, Hansen's method produces a finely detailed institutional history of the period.

<sup>57</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, p 1; Hansen writes that according to the 'race school', British politicians and civil servants, unanimous in their hostility to black immigration, undertook the task of reconstructing conceptions of British nationality and belonging on racist lines, and then used this 'racialisation' conception of Britishness as the pretence for unnecessary immigration controls that they sought from the start'.

<sup>58</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, p 5.

This would indeed have been remarkable if true, but as his own analysis shows, it was only ever *formerly* the case, and substantially false. Hansen argues that the timing of the 1948 British Nationality Act shows that it occurred under conditions in which the British government had no reason to suspect that it would result in large-scale New Commonwealth immigration, that only the logic of British ties to the Old Commonwealth effectively legitimized the opening to Commonwealth immigration that followed the 1948 British Nationality Act, and that once the waves of independence occurred along with the unexpected size of New Commonwealth immigration then the only surprising thing about the following restrictions was that they didn't happen sooner. This belatedness is in turn, a matter of the particular political structure – or of the relationship of politics to the political – of the British system: under a managerial system lacking democratic accountability governmental departments and their ministers pursued a course of unofficial or 'informal' restrictions on black immigration. Their collective miscalculation was based on the failure to adjust for the waning sphere of influence the Commonwealth Office had over New Commonwealth governments and subjects; thus while they failed to gain the acquiescence necessary for successful informal control the period 1948-62 represents the time it took British governmental processes to adjust to this relative loss of international 'administrative' influence. Policy oversight and gaps between differing policy agendas, rather than deliberative multiculturalism, was the instigation for the opening of post-war immigration policy, and industrial and service sectors used the gap to fill labour market needs in the absence of any coherent pro-migrant policy direction.

When making comparisons between British and other liberal states' immigration regimes the general consensus has been and remains that British policy formation owns an exceptional degree of restrictiveness. In Hansen's argument however, British exceptionalism is here explained away in an argument that sees Britain to be exceptional primarily in terms of its failure to have defined citizenship until 1981. The reason that the period of openness lasted as long as it did (1948-62) is given to have been the innate liberalism of the political elite (as opposed to the popular national illiberalism) and the late remaining influence of the Commonwealth Office. Rather than being generative of racist policy formation, officials and politicians were caught in the 'democratic dilemma', 'trapped, much to their discomfort, between liberal impulses and an illiberal public'.<sup>59</sup>

While, for Hansen, racism belonged to the illiberal public, for policy makers, a degree of New Commonwealth immigration was accepted as the price to be paid for the relationship with the Old Commonwealth. In Hansen's nuanced argument the opening of immigration to New Commonwealth subjects was only incidentally related to race; it was primarily an effect of the attempt to maintain open

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<sup>59</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, p vi.

migration and British allegiance amongst Old Commonwealth subjects. This argument falls short where it doesn't recognize that this institutional policy, along with the reluctance to look to European migration for post-war labour, was already part of a racist episteme, just as he overlooks the significance of the visa scheme introduced in 1961, which was overtly colour-blind and simultaneously racist in effect. That is to say that the privileging of the Old Commonwealth was both racist and geopolitical, and the economic and political fall-out of New British colonialism is given as something exterior to questions of liberalism of the political variety in policy formation. Similarly Hansen sees in the postcolonial independence of the post-war era a severing of ties of allegiance to the British monarch. Under such conditions, he argues, the British government would have been absurd to have continued in offering the rights of residential subjects to post-subjective aliens. Hansen fails to read the articulation of colonial suppression, racial and classed suppression, with the normative popular national imaginary and the policy formations in which it was grounded. Because of this, he fails to read the attention that policy makers gave to rendering racist policies presentably colour-blind, and to inquire sufficiently into their reasons for doing so. Policy makers were able to shift the burden of racism onto the populace and legitimize their own position by reference to national cohesion and social security: this could only be achieved with a Hobbesian view of the populace in which the lines between race and class were all too mixed and in need of representational separation. A more appropriate analysis of these developments would therefore make use of Miles' insights into the articulation of ideological, political, and economics relations. In this vein, the elite liberalism that Hansen values for the resistance it has provided to the illiberal tendencies held at the 'popular democratic' level of immigration politics demonstrates, by analogy, the false dichotomy of the argument regarding the tradition of liberal tolerance: Historical analysis of the emergence of welfare and immigration policies through the forced emigration of British penal labour in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, in the complex development of poor laws around the problem of 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century British and Irish labour immigration, and in the reaction to the immigration of Polish and East-Russian Jews at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (culminating in the 1905 Aliens Act) show the extent to which popular and governmental race and class prejudice and oppression have been co-dependant. Thus, to suggest that the race-and-class school focuses on discourse over institutional matters is, at best, a misapprehension. To suggest that the liberal governmental position has been one of 'tolerance' is to misread the discourse of elite politicians, as Van Dijk and Wodak's recent discourse analysis clearly demonstrates.<sup>60</sup>

The focus of recent writing on immigration from the 'materialist' position also seems to generally emphasize regional, global, and local issues. This is particularly true of the Institute of Race Relations school (Sivanandan and Fekete) which Favell elsewhere describes as the epitome of the faults he finds

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<sup>60</sup> Ruth Wodak and T.A. Van Dijk, *Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourse on Ethnic Relations in Three European States, Klagenfurt, Austria*, Drava Verlag, 2000.

in the 'old school' linking of Marxism, race, nation, and immigration.<sup>61</sup> One of the strengths of the approach taken by the Institute of Race Relations has been its ability to make sense of the changing place of racism in the changing historical conditions under which immigration policy is produced. Fekete has made use of the recognition of the development of new forms of racism which focus on cultural *and* economic rather than biological differences in formulating the concept of xeno-racism. While it is difficult to accept the difference that 'new racism'<sup>62</sup> marks between biological and cultural racism if only because these forms of discrimination have always worked in articulation, Fekete rightly points out that the construction of undesirable others in immigration policy formation and political discourse in the contemporary period of enfortressment is a contingent matter that 'responds' to the perception of demands made on invisibly coloured (white) host communities, and that this processing of othering is not *necessarily* dependent on skin colour as a sign of undesirability. Thus, 'white' coloured Roma or Eastern Europeans are just as valid targets of scape-goating as 'bogus' asylum seekers as are 'black' coloured Somalians. What signifies their undesirability is the 'unwarranted' demand they would place on 'our' national common wealth. The universal assumption of (Hobbesian) economic selves renders these immigrants with the newly discoloured discourse and governance of xeno-racism. 'Race' thus remains a useful framing concept, given that theorists attend to the historically contingent forms within which it is said to be or have been working.

Xeno-racism is the Western response to the changing world order after the demise of the Cold War threat of communism. The sheer scale of the approximately 125 million displaced people, living either temporarily or permanently outside their country of origin, is said to constitute a threat to the constitution of a stable new world order. The potentially hostile threat posed by this degree of unstable mobility constitutes a threat grounded in poverty rather than bipolar ideology. The synechdocal figure representing this threat is the (illegitimate) asylum seeker or 'economic migrant', for which a new array of governance amounting to an *ad hoc* system of global migration management has been arraigned. Fekete formulates this emergence in the following terms:

*As western security agencies, supranational global bodies, intergovernmental agencies and national governments mobilise against migratory movements from 'over-populated' and 'socially insecure countries with weaker economies', a whole new anti-refugee discourse has emerged in popular culture.*<sup>63</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Adrian Favell, 'Multi-Ethnic Britain: an Exception in Europe?' *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2001, pp., 35-59; Liz Fekete, 'Inside Racist Europe', in T. Bunyan, (ed.), *Statewatching the New Europe: A Handbook on the European State*, Nottingham, Statewatch, 1993; Institute of Race Relations, *Race and Class*, Special Issue: The Three Faces of British Racism, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2001.

<sup>62</sup> Martin Barker, *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*, London, Junction Books, 1981

<sup>63</sup> Liz Fekete, *The Emergence of Xeno-Racism*, Vol. 43, No. 2, October-November, 2001, p 23.



While Fekete elaborates the concept of xeno-racism from the work of Amblavaner Sivanandan, who demonstrates the utility of the categories of race and class in linking colonial practices of racism to globalised practices of xeno-racism. For Sivanandan, the new form of racist practice is

*racism that is not just directed at those with darker skins from the former colonial territories, but at the newer categories of the displaced, the dispossessed and the uprooted, who are beating at western Europe's doors, the Europe that helped displace them in the first place. It is a racism, that is, that cannot be colour-coded, directed as it is at poor whites as well, and therefore passed off as xenophobia, a 'natural' fear of strangers. But in the way it denigrates and reifies people before segregating and/or expelling them, it is a xenophobia that bears all the marks of the old racism. It is racism in substance, but 'xeno' in form. It is a racism that is meted out to impoverished strangers, even if they are white. It is 'xeno-racism'.<sup>64</sup>*

Sivanandan makes good use of theories of colonisation and globalisation in describing the artificiality of the separation of asylum seekers into political and economic categories. Sivanandan's approach takes the *longue duree* perspective on colonisation and globalisation, in which globalisation began with the onset of colonisation, and the effects of European colonisation have given structure to the contemporary form of what Wallerstein argues is a world-system.

While Favell<sup>65</sup> and Hansen have criticized the (1980's)<sup>66</sup> 'race school' framing of British immigration policy for its particular and contingent standpoint - that of post-war 'black' immigrants to Britain - the importance of the colonial heritage is nonetheless evident where Favell writes that

*the key thing ... in identifying the specificities of, say, the British solution to its post-war immigration - and in pinpointing the internal pathologies that cause it to respond poorly to present-day policy dilemmas, is to search for 'most similar cases' against which to compare it. What we are looking for, in other words, are old, established, postcolonial nations of a certain size, with a certain migratory history and a certain pattern of ethnic minority settlement, that have dealt with their own ethnic dilemmas at a similar moment in history. Clearly, from this perspective, other old European nation-*

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<sup>64</sup> Amblavaner Sivanandan quoted in Liz Fekete, *ibid*, p 24.

<sup>65</sup> Adrian Favell, *ibid*, 2001.

<sup>66</sup> The racist approach is given as a 1980's phenomenon by Hansen, as the Home Office documentation from the 1950's then became available under the 30 years rule for the release of government papers said to be sensitive for reasons of security. (Randall Hansen, 2000, p 1).



states are the nearest in kind to the British experience. In my work, it is France that has provided the most similar case. 67

France and Britain, according to Favell, 'simply internalized ... tried and tested - albeit peculiar - colonial methods for managing the 'natives', methods which are 'proving highly anachronistic in the modern world'.<sup>68</sup> In *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Ideal of Citizenship in France and Britain*, Favell studies the actually existing systems of liberalism in each nation, and argues that both systems are caught within colonial 'pathologies'. While the French system emphasises 'the universalist idea of integration, of transforming immigrants into full French *citoyens*, Britain sees integration as a question of managing public order and relations between majority and minority populations, and allowing ethnic cultures and practices to moderate the process'.<sup>69</sup> Favell's path dependent approach leads him to argue that the British approach seeking to depoliticise race relations, based on its history of having sought to honour the colonial legacy is anachronistic. This 'pathology', according to Favell, limits the state's ability to deal with immigration issues that fall outside of the race/colonial legacy paradigm. These issues include the dominant factor of non-coloured asylum seekers and refugees, and the supplementary problem of culturally (rather than racially) different Muslim immigration.

Favell shares with Fekete and Sivanandan the observation that asylum and refugee immigration has changed the dynamics of immigration policy formation in as much as restrictions and inclusions are no longer solely based on the question of colour. However, where the Institute of Race Relations approach establishes a re-elaboration of colonial processes in globalisation as a paradigm within which immigration issues should be placed, Favell argues that the colonial-race paradigm is redundant and restrictive both for migration theorists and policy makers. The British colonial pathology, according to Favell, limits the extent to which the state and migration research can usefully engage with the developments of universal rights and processes at the European level. Subsequently, while one strand of this argument is that racism is an erroneous paradigm for approaching immigration, particularly the sort of 'colourless' immigration presenting as seeking asylum, a further implication is that the governmental logic of integration predicated on exclusion is wrong to the extent that it relies on the colonial-race paradigm.

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<sup>67</sup> Adrian Favell, 'Multi-ethnic Britain: an exception in Europe?' *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January, 2001, p 50.

<sup>68</sup> Adrian Favell, *op cit*.

<sup>69</sup> Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Ideal of Citizenship in France and Britain*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000, p 4.

This thesis argues that the 'race relations paradigm's' problematisation of immigration is, indeed, redundant. Paul Gilroy's argues that 'the fascination with the figure of the migrant must be made part of Europe's history rather than its contemporary geography'.<sup>70</sup> Gilroy goes on to state that 'if there has to be one single concept, a solitary unifying idea around which the history of postcolonial settlement in twentieth century Europe should revolve, that place of glory should be given not to migrancy, but to racism'.<sup>71</sup> Following Gilroy's lead, I argue that a useful mode of analysis can be based on the unearthing the archaeology of the articulations of the categories of 'race', class, nation, and colonisation in order to understanding the neo-racist framing of contemporary migrancy in Britain.

Where Favell's object of criticism is the limits he sees in cultural studies' new ethnicities approach, colonial-race approaches and the multicultural nationalism these are framed both against and within, the antidote he offers a turn to comparative studies of immigration in European cases in terms of institutional histories of citizenship and nationhood. This dissertation accepts the argument for the need for a comparative European approach while arguing that particular studies of British migration policy such as that given in this thesis can problematise or supplement the realist assumptions made in comparative studies. The thesis argues that critical globalisation theory as given in Sassen's work provides a useful contribution towards understanding the role of the trans-nationalising of the state in the production of immigration, and the re-elaboration of racial and colonial processes as given in the Institute of Race Relations' work on helps to make sense of the re-nationalisation of global processes. In order to be able to offer a critical account of the dynamics of colonisation and globalisation in the production of British migration regimes, the dissertation employs an interdisciplinary approach, and it is to that approach that the introduction now turns.

## **Section Two. Theory and Method: an interdisciplinary approach to the Politics of Immigration.**

Several contemporary migration theorists have observed that the study of migration within conditions of globalisation calls for an increasingly cross-disciplinary or 'syncretic' approach.<sup>72</sup> When discussing the study of the contemporary rise of forced migration and refugees within a global dis/order, Stephen

<sup>70</sup> Paul Gilroy, *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* Routledge, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2004, p 165

<sup>71</sup> Paul Gilroy, *op cit.*

<sup>72</sup> Brettell, B, and Hollifield, J, *Migration Theory: Talking Across Disciplines*, London, Routledge, 2000; Stephen Castles, Towards a sociology of forced migration and social transformation, *Sociology*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003. Other theorists also argue for a 'syncretic' or inter-disciplinary approach. See, for example, Michael Samers, 'Invisible Capitalism: Political Economy and the Regulation of Undocumented Immigration in France', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 4, November 2003; Alexander Betts, 'The International Relations of the 'New' Extra-territorial Approach to Refugee Protection: Explaining the Policy Initiatives of the UK Government and UNHCR', 2004; Saskia Sassen, 'Globalisation or De-nationalisation', *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003.

Castles suggests that an analysis of the dynamics of forced migration and the social transformations that are inherent to globalisation requires the use of an assemblage of different methodologico-theoretical approaches.<sup>73</sup> I discuss British immigration policy and discourse and the production of forced mobilities and stasis in terms of the articulation of the cultural, material, political and social realms. This approach requires an examination of the articulation of different categories of mobilities and stasis and bears a correspondence to Appadurai's conceptualisation of different 'scapes' – ethno-scapes, finance-scapes, media-scapes, techno-scapes, and culture-scapes.<sup>74</sup> This framework for the cultural dynamics of the global economy corresponds to this thesis's use of the concept of mobilities – the flows and stasis of persons, finance, goods, and politics. However, where Appadurai uses his framework to reject the neo-Marxist model of the core, periphery, and semi-periphery, the mobility framework allows the thesis to account for the production of re-borderments and the operation of circuits instead of viewing globalisation as purely de-territorialising.<sup>75</sup>

A particular form of inter-disciplinary approach is required in order to construct an archaeology of the development of migration policy and the control of mobility. The thesis recognizes two broad phases of policy development, that belonging to the period of colonial modernity, and that belonging to the period of globalisation following the post-war demise of the Keynesian welfare state (in Britain). In making this demarcation I draw upon work done in the fields of postcolonial cultural studies, history, international relations and political economy, political geography, poststructuralist political theory and migration theory. Each of these fields is valuable in developing an argument regarding the relationship between 'core' and 'periphery' in the framing of national policy formation. These phases are regarded as being both qualitatively distinct and overlapping.

'Globalisation' is a contested concept both in terms of its qualities and also in terms of its actual existence.<sup>76</sup> Postcolonial cultural and historical studies tend to frame globalisation within a *longue duree* conception, drawing out its affinities with the period of colonisation, and, in stronger terms, analysing it as a process of re-colonisation.<sup>77</sup> The discipline of International Relations is divided over

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<sup>73</sup> Castles, *ibid*, pp., 22-3. Castles gives an indicative list that includes varying combinations of several of the following: history, anthropology, demography, political economy, economics, political science, law, psychology, cultural studies, and social policy studies.

<sup>74</sup> A. Appadurai, 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy', in Simon During (ed.), *The Cultural Studies Reader*, Routledge, London, 1993, pp., 220-230

<sup>75</sup> A. Appadurai, *ibid*, 1993, p 220.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996.

<sup>77</sup> Linebaugh and Rediker, for example, work within the *long duree* approach in *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*, Beacon Press, Boston, 2000.



the existence of globalisation;<sup>78</sup> sceptics such as Hirst argue that nothing substantial has changed and that international trade exchange hasn't increased proportionally in relation to its levels at the turn of the last century. Neo-Gramscian theorists position it within the post Keynesian changes that occurred between 1968 and 1975, identifying it as a qualitative shift in modes of production (by which they refer to neo-liberal cultural and material modes of production, and developments described as post-Fordism).<sup>79</sup> This approach broadens the definition of globalisation from the scale and diversity of exchange in which Hirst's measurement works, and allows for an analysis of the shift from regimes of liberal capitalism in the nineteenth century, to regimes of neo-liberal capitalism in the post-war period. Apparatuses established in the post-war period to regulate and manage the economy and geo-political interests internationally, such as the World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, various United Nations bodies and Global NGOs, all operate within the imaginary of the global as well as participate in constituting the global; they are part of the new regimes.

Political geographers focus on the spatialisation of globalisation and are divided over the degree to which it is considered useful to draw on theories in which globalisation is thought to manifest de-territorialisations, re-territorialisations, and de- and re-borderments.<sup>80</sup> This set of problems is closely related to the questions surrounding the degree to which the sovereignty of the state can be said to be threatened by globalisation and the forms in which it is manifest, including that of widespread politico-economic immigration into Western states.<sup>81</sup> In addition, as Saskia Sassen (amongst others) observes, the discipline of geography has been responsible for the important idea that the dynamics of any articulation of the national and globalisation requires a critical level of analysis that attends to the historicity of their operation across different scales and amongst diverse institutional venues.<sup>82</sup>

<sup>78</sup> David Held, D. McGrew, A. Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (eds.), *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999

<sup>79</sup> Robert Cox, 'Political economy and world order: problems of power and knowledge at the turn of the millennium', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, (eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Ontario, Oxford University Press, 2000, p 26; Stephen Gill, 'Knowledge, politics, and neo-liberal political economy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill, *ibid.*, pp., 49-57.

<sup>80</sup> Eleonore Kofman, 'Political Geography and Globalisation as we enter the Twenty-first Century', in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (eds.), *Globalisation: Theory and Practice*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, Continuum, London and New York, 2003: Hyper-globalisers include Castells (1996), Ohmae (1995) and O'Brien (1992). Kofman notes that more critical and radical strains of political geography draw on the work of Henri Lefebvre (1991), including works by Agnew (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995), Brenner (1997, 1999a, 199b), Harvey (1989), and Smith (1984). Lefebvre's key contribution contains the notion that space and scale are produced in strategic forms; space is simultaneously hierarchical, fragmented, and homogenised.

<sup>81</sup> Stephen Castles, 'Globalization and Citizenship: an Australian Dilemma', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 35, No. 1, January 2001, p 96. See Chapter 5, *fn.*, 27.

<sup>82</sup> Saskia Sassen, 'Globalisation or De-nationalisation', *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003, p 2; A. Amin, 'Spatialities of globalisation', *Environment and Planning*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2002, pp., 358-99; Kevin Howitt, 'A world in a grain of sand: towards a reconceptualisation of geographical scale', *Australian Geographer*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp., 1993, pp., 33-44; Kevin Cox, (ed.), *Spaces of Globalisation: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, New York, Guilford, 1998

I have already observed that migration theorists take a variety of positions on the relationship between globalisation and migration.<sup>83</sup> This thesis, as I have stated, is concerned with the production of forced and coerced migrations and stasis, and the manner in which these can be considered to be political and economic. In this context, whilst extending the proposition to an analysis of stasis as well as movement, I want to refer to Stephen Castles' statement that

*Understanding that forced migration is not the result of a string of unconnected emergencies, but rather an integral part of North-South relationships makes it necessary to theorise forced migration and link it to economic migration. They are closely related and indeed often indistinguishable) forms of expression of global inequality and societal crises, which have gained in volume and importance since the superseding of the bipolar world order.*<sup>84</sup>

In this vein, several migration theorists have focussed on the global political economy and on the structured inequality of North-South relationships as an appropriate framework for theorising the politics of globalised migration, and, in particular, forced migration.<sup>85</sup> The thesis works within the paradigms set out in these positions, mapping the development of the role of the British nation-state from colonization to globalization as a re-elaboration of the state's facilitation of capitalism rather than as a shift to a post-national system. As Robert Cox notes, 'states make the framework for globalization, just as Karl Polanyi pointed out that states made the framework for the self-regulating market in the nineteenth century'.<sup>86</sup> In Foucault's terms this describes the shift from liberalism to neo-liberalism. Where neo-liberalism redefines the social domain in economic terms, government becomes 'a sort of enterprise whose task it is to universalise competition, and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups, and institutions'.<sup>87</sup> Thus while 'classical liberalism had called on government to respect the form of the market, in the neo-liberal approach the market is no longer the principle of self-

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<sup>83</sup> I refer to several of the dominant schools of thought above, in section 2 of this introduction.

<sup>84</sup> Stephen Castles, *ibid*, 2003, p 17. Castles elsewhere emphasises the increasingly important phenomenon of internal displacement (at 25 million, the figure for internal displacement greatly exceeds the current global number of international refugees). Internal displacement, I will argue, often involves forms of long-term encampment that are contemporary correlates of previous forms of enforced stasis. See Stephen Castles and Nicholas Van Hear *et al.*, 'Developing DFID's policy approach to refugees and internally displaced persons', Vol. 1, Consultancy Report and Policy Recommendations, Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, February 2005, pp., 11-16.

<sup>85</sup> See, for example, B.S. Chimni, 'The Geo-politics of refugee studies: a view from the South', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp., 350-74; Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*, London and New York, Zed Books, 2001; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity, 2001; A. Sivanandan, 'Refugees from Globalism', *CARF*, No. 57, August-September, 2000; Aristide Zolberg, 'Introduction: beyond the crisis', in Aristide Zolberg and Peter Benda, *Global Migrants, Global Refugees: Problems and Solutions*, New York and Oxford, Berghahn, 2001, pp., 1-16.

<sup>86</sup> Robert Cox, *ibid*, 2000, p 25.

<sup>87</sup> Thomas Lemke, 'The birth of biopolitics': Michel Foucault's lecture at the College de France on neo-liberal governmentality', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p 196; Michel Foucault, 'The birth of biopolitics', in Paul Rabinow, (ed.), *Michel Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth*, New York, The New Press, 1997, 78-9.

limitation, but instead the principle against which it rubs'.<sup>88</sup> Subsequently, I argue that the politics of immigration needs to be contextualised within an understanding of national-globalisation wherein borderment and de-borderment and territorialisation and de-territorialisation have worked within a liberal and (subsequently) neo-liberal ideology.

Analysing the relationship between colonial and globalised migration regimes also requires an analysis of the discursive and material interaction of 'race', nation and class. British cultural studies developed in a manner that allowed the articulation of issues of 'race' and class and produced a strong vein of postcolonial cultural studies that grew alongside postcolonial literary studies. While in the work of one of the foremost cultural studies practitioners – Stuart Hall – the material and the cultural elements of the articulation of race and class were both privileged, postcolonial cultural studies has tended to emphasize the cultural aspects of politics in general, and of the migratory developments this thesis maps. Theorists such as Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and Paul Gilroy take a primarily textual approach, mobilising theoretically useful concepts such as Orientalism, hybridity, cultural transnationalism and post-imperial melancholia. Each of these concepts has explanatory power in relation to its correlate material practice; Orientalism accounts for the European episteme supporting colonisation;<sup>89</sup> hybridity describes the 'in-betweenness' experienced in the postcolonial world by subjects of colonies and colonisers,<sup>90</sup> and notions of cultural transnationalism and diaspora describe the hybrid processes that worked in the building of the Atlantic economy essential to British imperialism.<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, Gilroy's conception of the projection of colonial and racialised perspectives onto the 'new threat' of globalised immigration helps to explain the contemporary problematisation of immigration in terms of a post-imperial nostalgia.<sup>92</sup> Each foregrounds the discursive elements that work to legitimate constructions of the national and its others, while opening up the suppressed narratives that offer more complex alternatives to the binary construction of self and non-self, and community and non-community. In their works, the figure of 'the migrant' is fore-grounded; by drawing upon their theories the thesis is able to support the construction of the migrant as other to the national imagined community, and as a site of 'inbetweenness' that problematises this binary division.

Operating at a primarily discursive and subjective level, they also help to conceptualise the place of the colonial past in the postcolonial present. Here, they also draw upon Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and discourse, genealogy and epistemes. In these senses, their theories point towards a means of mapping the development of the governmental discourse of the control of immigration as it

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<sup>88</sup> Thomas Lemke, *ibid*, p 197; Michel Foucault, 'The birth of biopolitics', Lecture 21, College d France, 1979

<sup>89</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London, Penguin, 1995.

<sup>90</sup> Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, Routledge, London and New York, 1994.

<sup>91</sup> Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, Verso, London and New York, 1993.

<sup>92</sup> Paul Gilroy, *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* Routledge, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, 2004.

has shifted from an overtly racist use of the discourse and apparatus of 'assimilation' and 'apartheid' in the colonial period through to the neo-racist mobilisation of the key terms 'integration' and 'exclusion'. In mapping the dynamics of these paradigmatic shifts the thesis also draws upon the work of the political theorist Etienne Balibar, whose political analysis works to demonstrate the manner in which Western racist and neo-racist discourses and practices have been manifest in the extension and intension of universal forms of liberalism, and in the borderments of what Wallerstein calls the world-system. Here too, we see the point at which a Foucauldian approach can work in tandem with a Gramscian approach, for as Foucault puts it, discourses 'form a practice which is articulated upon other practices', while a Gramscian approach reads social practices as articulated with and against each other.<sup>93</sup>

The thesis thus employs both Gramscian and Foucauldian frameworks in seeking to relate discursive elements to their corresponding governmentalities. Foucault describes governmentality as 'the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security'.<sup>94</sup> A Foucauldian approach enables an analysis of the constitution of mobility regimes within the governmental direction whose end is a particular social order.

The politics of migration, however, exceeds its governmentality. The fact that policy formation requires the articulation of discourse fields, institutional frameworks, social groups and material practice, requires the thesis to use an approach that is sensitive to historical contingency. Where it refers to the state it recognizes that the state is manifest in policies that are part of an ongoing and contested process. In the Gramscian approach, the state is one aspect of social relations and the apparent separation between politics and economics is problematic. The Gramscian notion of the state-society complex can be employed for thinking about the relation between state and society. This complex consists of both political and civil society. Political society refers to the coercive apparatus of the state including ministries and other state apparatus. Civil society is made up of political parties, unions, employer's associations, churches, etc, representing the realm of cultural institutions and practices in which the hegemony of a class may be constructed or challenged.<sup>95</sup> In addition to the

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<sup>93</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Politics and the Study of Discourse', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p 70.

<sup>94</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, p 102. Foucault further refers to the 'sovereignty-discipline-government' triangle, 'which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism the apparatuses of security'.

<sup>95</sup> Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 27.

crucial role of the media we can further add that intergovernmental and non-governmental institutions and practices are also part of civil society in relation to hegemonic constructions and their contestations, and form an increasingly important part under conditions of globalisation and regionalisation. Taken together these assemblages refer to the concept of the state-society complex that I will use throughout the thesis. In Gramsci's conception, the private (civil) and the public (state) are integrated in the formation of a historical bloc. The historical bloc is the term applied to 'the particular framework configuration of social classes and ideology that gives rise to a historical state',<sup>96</sup> and which may, under historically contingent conditions of an open ended struggle, become hegemonic, at infra, inter, and transnational levels.

While the major focus of my account is given to the role of the state in policy formation, I seek to situate that role in its wider political context. As Stuart Hall indicates, this approach enables the conceptualisation of the realm of ideologies, common sense, and the national popular, with the direction of social forces and material practice. Foucauldian theories provide a necessary supplement to the Gramscian approach, in that the archaeological approach allows a mapping of the development of changing epistemes, discourse fields, disciplines and governmentalities. These tools enable the thesis to articulate institutional developments with the construction of subjectivities; thus, for example, the production and maintenance of the problematisation, or rather, series of problematisations that figures as the migration-security nexus with the evolution of the citizen-subject. For Foucault, problematisation is 'the totality of discursive and non-discursive practices that introduce something into the play of true and false and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether in the form of moral reflection, scientific analysis, political analysis, etc)'.<sup>97</sup> The work of the practice of problematisation is transformative, as it acts upon and establishes the ground or conditions within which a problem is to be defined, and – in a supplementary relationship to the contextualising discourse, institutionalises the practices that address the 'problem' that has been 'identified'.

An understanding of this level of articulation is, in turn, necessary to the analysis of the relationship between core and periphery, which structures both immigration control and the control of mobility. Here, I develop a *postcolonial* Foucauldian approach, by examining the different forms of the governmental and discursive constitution of national, colonial, postcolonial and global subjects and populations as elements of a shifting bio-politics belonging to liberalism and neo-liberalism. Although migration regimes are analysed in terms of the operation of the mechanisms of regulation, formation

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<sup>96</sup> Robert Cox, *Production Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (Political Economy of International Change)*, Columbia University Press, 1987, p 409.

<sup>97</sup> Michel Foucault, 'The Political Technology of Individuals', in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, (eds.), *Technologies of the Self*, Amherst, University of Massachusetts, 1998, p 258.



and disciplining of categories of people that operationalise governmentalities, the thesis recognises that the politics of migration is also the result of historically specific agonistic contests and forces. The way these forces have shaped policy and strategies of control regarding the movement of people, capital, and goods is analysed in terms of an economic and political history. Thus the Foucauldian political analysis is supplemented by the use of a Gramscian approach to analyse the historically contingent and unstable political formation of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discursive formations in the construction of mobility regimes. The Foucauldian *and* Gramscian methodology is employed to investigate the political dynamics of mobility within colonial capitalism and globalisation, and to excavate the relationship between the two.

The dissertation takes the problematisation of refugee and asylum-based immigration as its touchstone, and focuses on the contemporary form of the re-construction of the refugee as a 'genuinely political' migrant whose political persecution distinguishes him from the self-interested and rationally acting 'economic' migrant.<sup>98</sup> Conversely, the thesis seeks to demonstrate the extent to which the 'disguised economic' migration identified in governmental discourse consists of the movement of people from pauperised and conflict-ridden countries is a product of previous colonial-liberal and contemporary neo-liberal practices and ideologies. The effect of these practices requires one form of recognition of the political character of the so-called 'economic' migrant. The bogus asylum seeker is a political subject whose migration constitutes a resistant act of exodus from the conditions of his (and their) subjection.<sup>99</sup> The migrant here resists the imposition of stasis (immobility). Simultaneously, as a self-interested economic actor, he is the paradigmatic rational and autonomous subject of liberal discourse. Thus the 'bogus-migrant' occupies a liminal sphere and his presence is manifest not just in the form of an undesirable other but as an *unheimlich* form of the liberal self.<sup>100</sup> The presence of this litigious other-self, it will be argued, troubles the dominant form of government-as-policing by threatening the sovereign and disciplinary constitution of the population.<sup>101</sup>

In this context I want to briefly refer to Hannah Arendt's famous description of the stateless person's lack of the 'right to have rights' which consists of a minimum 'framework' in which 'one is judged by

<sup>98</sup> Following Robin Cohen, I trace the originating moment of this reconstruction to Douglas Hurd's deployment of the term 'disguised economic migrant' in 1985. *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, Longman, New York and London, 1994, p 82

<sup>99</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2001, pp 212-4. Hardt and Negri write that 'mobility and mass worker nomadism always express a refusal and a search for liberation: the resistance against the horrible conditions of exploitation and the search for freedom and new conditions of life', p 212; See also Arjun Sivanandan's argument that the 'economic migrant is the political refugee'. A. Sivanandan, 'Refugees from Globalism', CARF, No. 57, August-September, 2000

<sup>100</sup> Freud's term the 'unheimlich' is often translated as 'uncanny', but that definition needs to be supplemented with the sense of being at home and yet not at home that Freud intends.

<sup>101</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Sécurité, territoire et population', Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978. Paris, Gallimard/Seuil

one's actions and opinions'.<sup>102</sup> In the British governments' increasingly restrictive policies regarding asylum-based entry, application and settlement we have the constitution of the asylum seeker as a subject who, increasingly lacking the 'right to *claim* rights', is re-constituted as an *illegitimate* migrant. The narrative on the basis of which he seeks to present his claim becomes subject to the discourse and governmentality of policing whose rationale is the restriction, derogation, and deterrence of pauperised immigration.<sup>103</sup> In this act of 'rough translation' from the discursive space of human rights the act of claiming asylum is criminalised, and the litigation of the applicant is de-politicised.<sup>104</sup>

The thesis argues that British political rationalities, governmentalities, technologies and strategies together work to construct and isolate so-called 'disguised economic migration', 'bogus' and 'illegal' immigration from the legitimate realm of a pure victimhood that, in as much as it is void of the rational pursuit of self interest, and requires the recognition of the universal aspect of liberal values, belongs to subjects constituted as 'genuine refugees'.<sup>105</sup> Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau broadly define politics as consisting of the contest over the definition of what can, and what cannot be included as a matter of *legitimate* political consideration. Mouffe further distinguishes *politics* - the sphere of parliamentary debate and policy formation - from *the political*, the discursive conditions in which the discourse of politics is framed.<sup>106</sup> In the case of the formation of regimes governing asylum and immigration, policy and legislation belong to both the realms of politics and to the broader realm of the political. The regime of managed migration that legislates and executes the asylum seeker as 'illegitimate' is both constituted by and constitutive of a constellation of political discursive formations.

This construction of illegitimacy works at the intersection of several contemporary and historical governmental truth regimes that the thesis will examine. In the first place, the asylum migration is constituted within the paradigm set out by the discourse of human rights recognised in the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and the subsequent Protocol of 1967. The second regime lies in the discursive formation and political institutions and technologies of 'securitisation' that (collectively) work to problematise the asylum seeker as a threat to the national community in terms of both welfare

<sup>102</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Harvest Books, San Diego, New York, London, 1994, p 296-7.

<sup>103</sup> Patricia Tuitt gives an exemplary analysis of the mis-translation of an immigrant's narrative in the asylum process in Phil Cohen and Stuart Hall, (eds.), *New Ethnicities, Old Racisms*, London, Zed Books, 1999, pp., ; The concept of government as policing belongs to Michel Foucault, and subsequently, Jacques Ranciere. See Michel Foucault, 'Omnes et singulatum: vers une critique de la raison politique', *Dits et Ecrits*, Vol. IV, pp. 134-161. Jacques Ranciere, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, trans. Julie Rose, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, pp., 28-42. .

<sup>104</sup> The phrase 'rough translation' belongs to Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Realist prose and the problem of difference: the rational and the magical in subaltern history', in *The Unworking of History*, forthcoming.

<sup>105</sup> Slavoj Zizek, 'Human Rights and its Discontents', *Bard College Lecture, Human Rights Project*, November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1999; <http://www.bard.edu/hrp/zizektranscript.htm>. Accessed January 2nd, 2001.

<sup>106</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political*, Routledge, London and New York, 2005, pp., 8-9,

provision and identity.<sup>107</sup> The third regime lies in the 'third way' articulation of neo-liberalism and communitarianism which constitutes a utilitarian and securitising approach to the management of globalised migrations. The fourth truth regime lies in the contemporary neo-liberal and neo-Orientalist reinvention of Britain's role in the world as the enactment of 'civilising mission', which legitimates a bifurcation between northern and southern regimes governing not just refugee migration, but economic migration in general. The thesis thus seeks to trace the emergence of these articulated discursive formations in the prior articulation of liberalism, colonial-capitalism, 'race', class, and the constitution of the national citizen-subject within a politics of resentment.

The thesis analyses the manner in which a globalised and globalising British state-society complex works within a neo-liberal episteme that governs the production and segregation of 'political' and 'economic' migrations towards both a securitisation of the core (trans)national elite, and towards a *virtual* securitisation of the national 'community' of 'citizen-subjects'.<sup>108</sup> In both the colonial and global periods, the thesis seeks to examine the relationship between the production of forms of national, imperial and globalised subjection and 'citizenship'. The thesis thus seeks to argue that the (neo)liberal form of the control of mobilities is and has been necessary to the 'core's' dominance of the periphery, but that the relationship between a 'core' and 'periphery' can not be directly mapped in terms of geography, but needs to be considered in its temporal and social dimensions. The European 'core' is thus thought of in terms of its partial peripheralisation, and a corresponding neo-colonial imaginary, and that peripheralisation is analysed in terms of the production of a politics of resentment that underpins the production of contemporary migration regimes. This argument can then be used to problematise the political and economic 'liberal' paradigms in which the regime of managed migration is represented.

In addition to these approaches, an analysis of the politics of the control of mobility requires a specific focus on the political economy. The period of policy formation that the second section of this thesis examines occurs within the context of the evolution of globalisation. In James Hollifield's conception the effects of globalisation are referred to in terms of the nation – state and sovereignty, where an increase in trade, finance, and migration threatens states with a diminution of their territorial

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<sup>107</sup> Jeff Huysmans, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2000; pp., 751-2; the centrality of the place of security in asylum and immigration policy formation is evident in the Home Secretary David Blunkett's 'preface' to the White Paper, *Secure Haven, Safe Borders: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, 2002; the British government's involvement in European intergovernmental approaches to immigration as a problem of security can be traced to the mid 1980s, when it brought immigration within the remit of the security-focussed Trevi process.

<sup>108</sup> I draw from Michael Samers's use of Daniel Miller's concept of virtualism, which bears a close correspondence to Foucault's concept of 'problematization'. See Michael Samers, 'Invisible capitalism: political economy and the regulation of undocumented immigration in France', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 4, November 2003, p 576. Cf. Daniel Miller, 'Conclusion: a theory of virtualism', in Daniel Miller and J. Carrier, (eds.), *Virtualism: A New Political Economy*, Oxford, Berghahn, 1998.

sovereignty.<sup>109</sup> According to Hollifield, globalisation was produced through the rise of the United States in the post-war era, while its ascendancy over Britain after the end of the Second World War ushered in a new phase of liberalisation. In the neo-Gramscian account of Andreas Bieler and Adam Morton, globalisation is defined as the transnationalisation of production and finance at the material level and the shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism at the ideological level.<sup>110</sup>

According to Pellerin and Overbeek globalisation involves the following: the commodification of social relations through the expansion of market practices; their coherent and purposeful guidance through the neo-liberal concept of control; and 'changes in the spatial structuration of capitalist production and reproduction affecting territorially defined social relations'.<sup>111</sup> These aspects are interrelated insofar as the ascendancy of commodification proceeded through the geographical and social expansion of capitalist social relations, which was made possible through the spatial reconfiguring of social forces around transnational historic blocs'.<sup>112</sup>

Pellerin and Overbeek argue that within neo-liberalism, 'migration controls constitute a series of mechanisms through which particular state forms and processes of economic structuring are imposed on countries that originate migrants,' and form 'integral components of neo-liberal regional integration projects'.<sup>113</sup> The first of these is the fact that migration control is an element of globalisation involving a process of regionalisation of economic and political activity. Secondly, regionalised migration policies are articulated with neo-liberalism. Thirdly, migration is a form of controlled mobility, along with others that are being restructured within the regional level. Fourthly, mobility control has to be correlated with fixity.<sup>114</sup> Mobility in this sense is a broader term than migration, referring to movements of finance, capital, information, and people. 'When attributed to persons, mobility refers to both a movement in space and time across sectors and social strata, without necessarily involving a change in residence.'<sup>115</sup> Within this framework Pellerin and Overbeek elaborate an argument about the tight connection between emerging migration control frameworks and measures for labour market restructuring, economic re-localisation and the logic of capital expansion that characterise neo-liberal

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<sup>109</sup> James Hollifield, *ibid*, 2001, p 2. For the purposes of this article, Hollifield refers to globalisation as 'simply increasing levels of international exchange'.

<sup>110</sup> Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, 'Neo-Gramscian Perspectives: IPE and European Integration,' in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy*. Palgrave, London, 2001, p 5.

<sup>111</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, 'Neo-Liberal Regionalism and the Management of People's Mobility,' in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, (Eds.), *ibid*, 2001. P 138.

<sup>112</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *op cit*.

<sup>113</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *op cit*.

<sup>114</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *ibid*, p 137.

<sup>115</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *op cit*.

regional integration processes,<sup>116</sup> concluding that 'these frameworks serve, on the one hand, to project the standards, regimes and specific state-civil society configurations of hegemonic formations into the circuits of metropolitan capital; on the other hand, such frameworks redraw and fortify boundaries, beyond capitalist hegemonic formations and the outlining peripheries.'<sup>117</sup>

British mobility regimes should be situated within a critique of the neo-liberal framework, and considered as a hegemonic response to and production of global regionalisation. Mobility should be thought of in the broader terms outlined by Pellerin and Overbeek, referring to the control of stasis as well as movement, and migration as one element amongst other controlled movements, including finance, capital, culture, information, labour, and politics itself. Different but comparable regimes of mobility control belong to the colonial and post-colonial periods of governance and discourse, the former being governed by the controlling idea of liberalism, and the latter being governed by the controlling idea of neo-liberalism. Stasis, in the former, can be thought of as having been primarily controlled within the institutions of slavery, and at the secondary level, within infranational and international structures of control such as the Poor Laws and transportation. In the latter, its predominant form occurs within the managed relationship between core and peripheral labour forces, while those categories – both the core and the periphery cannot be simply reduced to their most obvious geographical designations – the binary division of inside and outside. In both cases, an analysis of policy formation should be broadened to consider the integral state, that is, the historically contingent articulations of civil and political society, and the material and symbolic levels at which control has been and is exercised.

The Neo-Gramscian approach of International Political Economy allows this thesis to return to the cultural politics of immigration via a historically contingent description of the material and political aspects of mobility control, and to discuss the model of politics that is appropriate to this cultural and materialist understanding. The thesis will criticise the paradigm in which the politics of migration figures as a 'problem' or series of problems that recur on the political level via figures such as Enoch Powell and movements such as the British National Party, demonstrating a nationalist popular illiberalism.<sup>118</sup> Here, the threat of immigration is represented as lying in the potential rise of the far right, and the possible resurgence of ethnic-nationalism. The thesis will argue that the error in this model lies in the manner in which it conflates the dominant articulation of representative and administrative politics with the broader sphere of the political, reifying a process so that the democratic liberalism of the 'popular masses' is in need of limitation by the elite liberalism of elected and non-

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<sup>116</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *ibid*, p 137.

<sup>117</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *ibid*, p 138.

<sup>118</sup> David Blunkett, 'The far right is the enemy', *The Guardian*, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2002



elected politicians.<sup>119</sup> Having described the politics of mobility control via neo-Gramscian and Foucauldian approaches, the thesis will demonstrate that the model of enfortressment gives a more adequate explanation of the politics of migration control, and, therefore, a substantial critique of the governmentality and discourse of 'integration' guaranteed by 'exclusion' that follows the precedent set out in the 1960s 'race relations paradigm'. In pursuing the dissertation's arguments and analysis, I will position the role of legislation/law as part of the mechanisms of governance, and as authorising and legitimating devices.

### **S e c t i o n   T h r e e .   S t r u c t u r e   o f   T h e s i s**

.The first (historical) chapters of the thesis focuses on the manner in which the forced movement and stasis of persons was essential to the development of colonial-capitalism and the dominant position of the British state in the world-system. In providing a postcolonial and structuralist account of the relationship between political and economic forms of migration and immobility (stasis) in these periods, the thesis relates these movements to the production and maintenance of the fiscal-military state of the liberal and imperial period. These chapters map the development of the militant-fiscal state-society complex in British colonial capitalism (chapter one), and seek to correlate the contest over infra-national mobilities with the contests played out in the 'peripheral' Atlantic, Asian, and Antipodean regions where Britain competed with and eventually defeated its European rivals (chapter two).<sup>120</sup> In the first chapter I first seek to argue that the rise of the British capitalist elite was, in part, both productive of and dependent on the forced stasis and mobility of infra-national pauperised subjects. Secondly, I argue that the landed and commercial elites of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were *transnational* in nature; the capitalist state society complex of this period was involved in transnational flows of finance, goods, and persons. Thirdly, I argue that that the militant economic-political process of British colonial-capitalism was dependent on Liberal and Utilitarian regimes governing the mobility and stasis of colonial subjects, and their social, economic, and political structures.<sup>121</sup>

In the second chapter the thesis analyses the manner in which the application of mercantilist-free trade principles from the late eighteenth century onwards came to be articulated to developing

<sup>119</sup> Randal Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, p 5.

<sup>120</sup> John Brewer, *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, Unwin Hyman, London, 1989; H.V. Bowen, *Elites, Enterprise, and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688-1775*, Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 1996, pp., 13-16.

<sup>121</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A study in 19<sup>th</sup> century British Liberal Thought*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1999; Uday Singh Mehta, 'Bentham's Legacy in Imperial India', *Bentham 250: A dialogue*, Conference paper presented at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, February 16<sup>th</sup>, 1998; Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians in India*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959.

governmentalities that were primarily directed towards subjects and non-subjects who had been pauperised through the expropriary developments of the capitalist system (see chapter one). I argue that the infranational *mobile vulgate* subsequently became the subject of the late-Hanoverian governmentalities that Foucault cites as marking the passing of the '*ancien regime*', including, in particular, strategies of incarceration and 'excorporations'.<sup>122</sup> The systems of the poor laws, the workhouse, the factory, and the late-Georgian disciplinary laws surrounding the Transportation Act developed in Britain as supplements to the forced or voluntary migration of colonial and foreign subjects, where mercantilist-free trade worked through the production of expropriation and the forced stasis and mobility of colonial and foreign persons, goods, and finances. In describing the *ad hoc* assemblage of legislation constructing the pauperisation of the mobile poor which is correlated with the forced movements of colonial subjects and 'aliens' throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, I will seek to demonstrate that the control of British financial flows and the (trans)national elite's dominance of the British political system were dependent on the of suppressive control of the movement of persons, goods and finances in the national, Asian, Atlantic, and Antipodean colonial-capitalist societies within the British system of colonial-capitalism.<sup>123</sup>

The third chapter provides an analysis of the developments of nationality in relation to the categories of 'race' and class in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Here I am concerned to develop an analytic framework in terms of a dialectics of colonial modernity. This chapter thus develops an account of the conflictual hybridities that governed the development of liberal colonial-and-national subjectivities, and traces the process of dis/identification that worked between the oppositions of freedom and unfreedom, subjection and 'citizenship', and 'race' and class. The chapter traces the emergence of the hegemonic governmentality of 'national imperialism' in relation to a politics of resentment in the mid to late nineteenth century.

The fourth chapter begins by giving a critical account of the liberal 'tradition of tolerance' in which the state's engagement with refugee migration has come to be placed. In contrast to this reinvention I trace the institutional and governmental origins of modern regimes of mobility control. Here I locate these origins within the police-focussed organs of the state in the late eighteenth century, and seek to establish the trans and infra-national mobility that the state-society complex seeks to govern in the development of nascent forms of immigration control. I subsequently provide an account of the British response to the Jewish refugee crisis in the lead-up to the Second World War, and argue that the history

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<sup>122</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, Penguin, London, 1991.

<sup>123</sup> In doing so, I draw upon the works of several historians, including Robin Blackburn P. J. Cain, Linda Colley, David Brion Davis, David Ellis, Catherine Gallagher, Catherine Hall; Anthony Hopkins Peter Linebaugh, Marcus Rediker, William Quigley, Eric Williams.

of this engagement demonstrates that it represents a continuation and transformation of the emergent liberal governmentality of colonial capitalism.

The British response to the Jewish refugee crisis provides a precedent for the gradual emergence of the 'race relations paradigm' in the post-war period of the 1960s. In chapter five I trace the development of this governmentality in the context of the post-war government's strategies of neo-imperial regeneration and, subsequently, decline. Here again I seek to draw out some of the major continuities and transformations from the liberal governmentality of colonial capitalism and the modern (post-war) period. The chapter subjects the liberal construction of the emergent paradigm to a geo-political Foucauldian and Gramscian critique, and draws out the underlying affinity that lies between the liberal integrative and conservative assimilative framings of 'coloured' immigration.

In chapter six I discuss the emergence of a neo-liberal and neo-imperial governmentality in the period of the Thatcherite opening to globalisation in the late 1970s and 1980s. The first part of the chapter gives an account of the restrictive discourse and policy developments targeting New Commonwealth immigrants and immigrant populations. The second section of the chapter gives a comparatively theoretical account of the development of utilitarian and neo-colonial forms of borderment and deborderment that have targeted 'South' to 'North' migration under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation from the mid-1980s onwards.

Chapter seven maps the emergence and development of a restrictive asylum-immigration regime under the Conservative and (then) New Labour governments. Here I examine the problematisation of political-and-economic South to North immigration under the Conservative government from the mid-1980s onwards. The chapter gives a theoretical account of the Labour government's approach to globalisation, and critiques the neo-liberal and 'liberal imperialism' of this approach. The chapter's account the period of Third Way governmentality leads to a consideration of the problematising depoliticisation of the New Labour's regime of 'managed migration', and considers the manner in which that approach has led to further forms of re- and de-bordering neo-colonialism.



## **Chapter 1: British Colonial Capitalism.**

This chapter will describe several features of the development of British colonial capitalism and political liberalism in order to provide a context for the following chapter's account of the articulation of the control of flows and stasis of persons with those of finance and trade.<sup>124</sup> In doing so, it is intended to provide a mirror for the second section of chapter 6, which provides a contextualising discussion of globalisation and neo-liberalism for the contemporary section of this thesis' analysis of mobility regimes. The first section of the chapter (1.1) describes the emergence and development of a colonial-capitalist state society complex and the second section (1.2) examines the relationship between imperialism and liberalism in the example of British India in order to establish the political character of colonial mobility regimes. The third section of the chapter (1.3) describes the importance of colonial-capitalism and the redirection of mobility (primarily, that of trade and finance) for the rise of the British state as a world power. The first three sections of this chapter thus provide a contextualising account of the articulation of colonial capitalism and liberalism. The final section (1.4) offers a theoretical basis for the incorporation of labour-power within colonial capitalist regimes of migration and stasis.

This chapter provides a context in terms of the hegemonic discourse fields, politics and political economy involved in the process of British colonial capitalism. The following chapter begins to make use of the framework established herein in terms of the mobility of people. Chapter two consists of four case studies, which will map several of the colonial and capitalist networks through which mobility and stasis were either coerced or forced in infra- and extra-national spheres.

### **Section 1.1. The Colonial Capitalist State-Society Complex**

At the onset of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, England had been a 'marginal island kingdom competing for survival against both the Catholic empires of Portugal, France, and Spain, and the commercial Calvinism of Holland'.<sup>125</sup> The key to England's ascendancy in inter-European rivalry was the development of a new and centralised form of capitalist and colonial state-society structure – the political form of which was to coalesce in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) has commonly been defined as the precedent for the modern nation state system, it was the political

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<sup>124</sup> This colonial chapter performs an equivalent role to chapter six, which provides a context for the latter chapters on globalised migration

<sup>125</sup> Nick Robins, 'Loot: in search of the East India Company, the world's first transnational company', *Environment and Urbanization*, Vol. 14, No 1, April 2002, p 81.

form of the English state society system that had a defining influence on the rise of the British state in the world system.<sup>126</sup> Specifically,

*after the establishment of a capitalist agrarian property regime and the transformation of the old English militarised and land-holding feudal nobility into a capitalist landed class enjoying full and exclusive property rights in land, the nature of political authority in late 17<sup>th</sup> century England came to be redefined in terms of parliamentary sovereignty.*

The Glorious Revolution initiated the political framework allowing the development of private enterprise employing wage labour. Parallel to this development was the restructuring of overseas commercial and financial links into 'circuits of capital' connected to an industrial pivot'.<sup>127</sup> The flexible legal structure that emerged was structured in a manner that allowed it to be responsive to social developments. It thus enabled a balance between the emergent civil society – the 'society of property-owning individuals free to arrange their mutual relations legally and within certain limits, autonomously' – and the executive privilege of the state.<sup>128</sup>

Kees van der Pijl locates the roots of a particularly British state-society complex in what we might call the 'invented tradition' surrounding ideas about the birthright of Englishmen and the institutions deemed capable of, or necessary to the fulfilment of that right.<sup>129</sup> The term 'invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past'. Originally defined as the Englishman's right to autonomy from the absolutism of the state, this imagined right was to be appropriated as a normative ideal belonging to a hegemonic discourse by various political groups competing for inclusion within and influence of the political sphere over the two centuries following the Glorious Revolution. Thus, as E.P. Thompson observed, both radicals and patricians in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and early 19<sup>th</sup> century employed the discourse of the 'free-born Englishman' in the pursuit of their political causes.<sup>130</sup> These and other groups employing this discourse, felt themselves to be defending the Revolution Settlement of 1688, embodied in the Constitution of Kings, Lords, and Commons. The birthright's promise in terms of liberties and independence was embodied in a constellation of ad hoc rights and principles: if security

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<sup>126</sup> Benno Teschke, 'Theorizing the Westphalian System of States: International Relations from Absolutism to Capitalism', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002, p 8.

<sup>127</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, p 65.

<sup>128</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *op cit*.

<sup>129</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 66. These 'roots' are traced back as far as the Norman conquest and the Magna Carta; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 'Introduction', in Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.

<sup>130</sup> E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, London, Penguin, 1980, p 85.

of property was the first and last of these. As E.P Thompson notes, the list of 'birthrights' included freedom from foreign domination and from absolutism, as well as

*Freedom from arbitrary arrest, trial by jury, equality before the law, the freedom of the home from arbitrary entrance and search, some limited freedom of thought, of speech and of conscious, the vicarious participation in liberty (or in its semblance) afforded by the right of parliamentary opposition and by elections and election tumults (although the people had no vote they had the right to parade, huzza and jeer on the hustings), as well as the freedom to travel, trade, and sell one's labour.*<sup>131</sup>

Where Thomson is concerned to map the way in which the legacy of the 1688 Settlement was appropriated by the contesting political and subpolitical forces that formed the political identity and practices of the English 'working class', Pijl seeks to demonstrate its subsumption within the interests of the hegemonic capitalist classes. For Pijl, the tradition of English birthright emerged in the practice of local autonomy consisting of the self-rule of the aristocracy within the 'body politic' of the feudal system, and was consolidated in the emergence of civil society given in the 1688 Settlement.<sup>132</sup> The Settlement represented a victory for the ascendant capitalist class of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and thereafter, which consisted of the new commercial bourgeoisie and the aristocracy shifting to commercial sources of income. The victory consisted of the state's shaping of the institutions needed to permit the 'liberal' state's withdrawal from the sphere of wealth creation. The legal guarantees of private property and contract as well as the infrastructure for their legal vindication granted the property owning classes both autonomy and liberty. In combination with the renewed support of the state for aggressive foreign policy – given, for example, in the Navigation Act of 1651 – the now-enfranchised liberal and capitalist state-society complex enjoyed a renewed ability to pursue the freedom of exploitation within and without the kingdom.<sup>133</sup> As Pijl elaborates, this state-society complex was both Lockean and transnational in character. It was Lockean inasmuch as it took the form of a contractual liberalism that found philosophical expression in John Locke's *Two Treatise of Government*. The 'Lockean state-society complex' was national in nature as the Glorious Revolution was a victory for the project of parliamentary capitalist aristocracy in England. It was transnational in the sense that the rise of the leading families was dependent upon an alliance with both the emergence of effective self-government in the American colonies, and the developing interests of the East Indian merchant leadership.<sup>134</sup> We can say then, that the Lockean state-society complex that Pijl describes was not just an emergent

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<sup>131</sup> E.P. Thompson, *ibid*, p 86.

<sup>132</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, pp., 66-7.

<sup>133</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 67.

<sup>134</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, pp., 67-8.

capitalist class whose freedom was guaranteed by the political Settlement of 1688, but that this complex was intrinsic to the development of colonial capitalism.

The political compromise between public (centralised state power) and private interests achieved in the processes coalescing around the Glorious Revolution gave England a great advantage over the European dynastic states, which were to remain absolutist states until the revolutions of the eighteenth century. Teschke notes that for the absolutist state operating under non-capitalist agrarian property relations, 'the strategies for expanded economic reproduction of the ruling classes remained tied to the logic of political accumulation'. Political accumulation operated through the articulation of internal and external strategies. The internal strategies consisted of, firstly, the arbitrary and punitive taxation of the peasantry by the king, and secondly, the sale of offices to a landless *noblesse de robe* in competition with a de-feudalised *noblesse d'epee*. The corresponding external strategies included 'geopolitical accumulation through war and dynastic marriage policies', and 'politically maintained and enforced unequal exchange through mercantilist monopoly mechanisms by royal sales of trading charters and privileged merchants'.<sup>135</sup> Subsequently, the imperative to warfare was focussed on the issues of dynastic territorial proprietary claims, and on commercial monopolies and the establishment and maintenance of exclusive trading routes.

Political society in the absolutist states was dependent on the economic well being of the king, who, in the absence of sustained internal economic growth, was driven to pursue the external strategies of geopolitical accumulation. The pursuit of these strategies allowed the monarch to satisfy elite territorial ambitions, to repay debts, and to fulfil the aspirations of the socially mobile military elite. Thus geopolitical accumulation was necessary for the expanded personal reproduction of the ruling elites that revolved around the monarch. In the age of absolutism – which extended well beyond Westphalia – the logic of political accumulation 'translated into a series of state-constituting, state-selecting and state-consolidating wars, that explain the frequency and intensity of armed conflict'.<sup>136</sup> Moreover, the strategies of political accumulation, in prioritising investment in the means of violence, were dependent on the tax-rate and the level of war revenues. They were thus dependent on the balance of ruling class forces between productive and non-productive classes, and thus on the state of intra-ruling class conflicts.

The competition between the major European dynastic states was also of an absolutist nature, wherein non-monarchical and lesser states were forced to comply with the zero-sum game of the absolutist powers drive towards geopolitical expansion; each power competed for absolute control over the others

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<sup>135</sup> Benno Teschke, *ibid.*, p 11.

<sup>136</sup> Benno Teschke, *ibid.*, p 12

and any 'balance of power' achieved by treaty or warfare was always a contingent moment in an ongoing rivalry that was increasingly played out in the competition for the territories and resources of the New World.

In Britain, the transition from a feudal to a capitalist system involved a 'shift from a regime of political accumulation based on a feudal rent regime, to a regime of economic accumulation based on a capitalist wage regime'.<sup>137</sup> Herein, ruling class power came to reside in private ownership and control over the means of production. Correspondingly, the central function of the state became a commitment to the internal maintenance and external defence of a private property regime, whereby 'political power and, especially, the monopoly over the means of violence, come now to be pooled in a de-privatised public state over and above society and economy'.<sup>138</sup>

Under the constitutional monarchy established in the Glorious Revolution of 1688, British sovereignty had come to lie with the Parliament rather than the king. British foreign policy, subsequently, was 'increasingly conducted on the basis of 'national interest', as formulated by the propertied classes self-organised in parliament', and the 'decisive new regulator of Britain's readiness to go to war was, next to the excise duty, the land tax, through which the landed and commercial classes taxed themselves'.<sup>139</sup> The first geo-political test of the new state-society complex of constitutional monarchy came in the Nine Years War (1688-1697), fought against the absolutist French. 'Britain's ability to sustain the war ... was predicated on the Parliament backed creation of the first modern financial system by setting up the National Debt (1693) and the Bank of England (1694).' Thus, the onset of the fiscal militant state was articulated to the political form of the capitalist state-society complex.<sup>140</sup> What was instigated therein was a reliable credit system, which worked to unify the propertied classes behind the direction of policy set in Parliament. It also worked to bring the landed classes and the financial service classes (most-often based in the City of London) into greater degrees of co-operation, whilst the flow of currency on which this new historical bloc was based was derived, to a strong degree, from the financial flows from the regions of colonial endeavour to the metropolis.

These socio-political developments allowed England (Britain after 1707) to withdraw from direct territorial claims on the continent whilst continuing to pursue its aggressive mercantilist policies in the overseas 'New World' regions. Thus a policy of containment could be directed towards a French state that was in a near constant state of military conflict on the continent, whilst British naval superiority

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<sup>137</sup> Benno Teschke, *ibid*, p 31

<sup>138</sup> Benno Teschke, *op cit*.

<sup>139</sup> Benno Teschke, *op cit*.

<sup>140</sup> I describe the fiscal militant state in more detail below.

could be employed towards the defeat of French interests overseas. Thus differences in state-society structures between Britain and the major European states came to play an over-determining role, as these states competed on a militant-economic basis towards each other's demise.

Competition between European states was played out in the New Worlds of the Americas, Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean. The Portuguese and Spanish were dominant in the 16<sup>th</sup> century world of Afro-Mediterranean exploitation, and the Dutch powerful global players in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, combining a sophisticated financial system with maritime success and the trading power of the Dutch East Indies Company. By the mid seventeenth century, England's maritime power and the financial strength of the City of London had begun to bear fruits in the New Worlds. One pivotal measure of England's maritime, financial, and industrial-based ascendancy was to come in the English seizing of Jamaica from the Spanish in 1655, and in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), in which Spain ceded the rights to slave trading in the Caribbean to British interests (which had ceased to be purely 'English' after the Act of Union of 1707).

Britain faced competition from the French and Spanish in the Caribbean throughout the eighteenth century, but won control by the century's end. Essential to the English ascendancy was the form of articulation of private financial and state interests. The major national financial institutions of the colonial period and the largest private colonial interest emerged in the City of London. *Lloyds*, *Barings*, and the *Bank of England* were all built upon profits derived from the slave trade and colonial endeavours, and each became an essential institution in the new form of national debt finance that gave England a great advantage over its European rivals.

Both the metropolitan financial institutions and the colonial trading companies from which they derived their liquidity were new hegemonic groups that began to augment the landed aristocracy's definition and direction of politics and policy in England. The constellation of social groups that Cain and Hopkins refer to in the process of 'gentlemanly capitalism' held greater influence over elite British political processes than the emergent industrialists. Thus, from a very early period, the state – society complex in England included private 'multinational' interests that influenced the direction of national and international policy formation; in combination with the financial institutions of the City of London, these structures had a strong influence over the control of mobility at the national and international level.

The British East India Company was one such multinational institution with close relationships to the emergent financial powers. Formed in 1600, the Company was known as the Governor and Company of Merchants of London, and spawned the first colonial slaving enterprise, the Virginia Company



(1606), which was also divided into the London Company and the unsuccessful Plymouth Company, as well as subsequent companies including the Royal Adventurers into Africa (1660), and the Royal African Company (1672). Between them, these companies established much of the direction of English colonial endeavours – eastwards to the East Indies, India, and then China, and westwards, to the west coast of Africa, the Caribbean, and to the Americas. All of these companies were based in London, and board members of the financial institutions were often also shareholders in the new trading companies. The Virginia Company was set up as a joint stock company and its development demonstrated both the politics of the early colonial endeavour and some of the conflicts dividing the hegemonic ruling class of that period.

The company had to lobby for capital support. To start the process of colonisation at all, would-be adventurers had to justify the enterprise to the elite groups that controlled British society in the early seventeenth century – the British landed gentry, the monarchy, and the emergent financial sector of the City of London (the banks, brokers, and other lenders of capital). To these groups, colonial enterprise had to appear to be politically, financially, and morally legitimate; without these forms of legitimacy, the first colonial endeavours would not have received the financial, naval, and military backing they required.

The advocates of the Virginia Company engaged in a broad public campaign to rally support and marshalled several arguments to explain why their private capitalist endeavour was good for the nation and therefore worthy of support.<sup>141</sup> In the first place they presented an argument based on the necessity of a ‘civilising mission’. The adventurers and investors argued that as a good Protestant nation England had an obligation to convert the ‘heathen savages’ in America. In the charter for the Virginia Company, the Lord Chief Justice wrote that all ‘infidels’ – by which he meant non-Protestant non-Europeans, should be regarded with an attitude of ‘perpetual hostility’; this meant that it would be legally legitimate to wage war against the populations of the territories that the adventurers hoped to conquer because their existence as non-Christian savages threatened the spread of Protestant civilisation.<sup>142</sup>

The other half of the argument for a civilising mission involved the idea of a nation’s duty to defeat the Catholic enemies abroad, several of whom were already successfully involved in colonial endeavours. Thus the conquest of England’s enemies would come to be fought out over the rights to colonial conquests and territories: defeating the French, for example, would come to mean fighting and

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<sup>141</sup> Nick Robins, *op cit.*

<sup>142</sup> The Lord Chief Justice, Sir Edwin Coke, who had adjudicated Calvin's Case in 1608, and Sir John Popham, had written the charter for the Virginia Company.

conquering them in the West Indies, the Americas, and in the Indian sub-continent. And, to put the matter the other way around, the conquest and domination of native populations would mean the conquest of England's European enemies and the glorious pursuit of English dominion.

The second argument they pursued was to convince the monarchy and landed interests that investing in the Companies would result in a profitable return, and to demonstrate this they had to show that the great risks involved in colonial endeavours would return a sustainable profit. For this argument they pointed to the success of their European rivals, and to the great profits that had already been derived in England from colonial commodities such as tobacco and sugar. The advantages that the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch had gained from their trades in slaves, sugar, gold and other 'commodities' showed that England needed to pursue colonial commerce in order to compete in the European commercial and military competition.

Thirdly, the Company presented the argument that colonial endeavours were necessary in order to sustain the domination of the English poor, who were seen as becoming increasingly mobile and, correspondingly, socially and politically dangerous. The Company thus presented its endeavours as providing the ruling classes with the ability to remove 'the swarme of idle persons' from English national territory, and in doing so, to make profitable use of them. Sailors, lower-ranked soldiers, free-settlers, transported convicts, and servants, were predominantly drawn from the lower spectrum of British society that was thought to be threateningly volatile, and closer in nature to the 'alien infidel' than to the English gentlemen who ruled English society. The English poor would thus provide some of the labour necessary for profitable colonial endeavour, while their removal from English territory would help to protect the English elites from the political threat given in the large-scale phenomenon of the masses of English poor that had been displaced from traditional feudal forms of agriculture. The adventurers appealed to the fact that the English elites thus needed colonialism to sustain their own national hegemony, and proposed the use of a regime of forced migrant-labour as the means of achieving the flows of finance and trade that they believed would accrue from a programme of colonial exploitation.

Private companies, the royal court, the legal fraternity, municipal bodies and the nascent financial institutions were all involved in the emergent and articulated control of mobilities in the early modern period. The form of political and financial hegemony was to follow the interests of the combination of merchants, financial and landed gentry, in which the extra national sphere helped to centralise the place of this alliance. The Royal family, for example, added to their colonial exploits in North America by instigating the African companies that dealt in slaves and gold. The historian Eric Williams recounts that (during the eighteenth century) there were 'few, if any noble houses in England ... without a West

Indian strain,<sup>143</sup> while the London stock exchange which was an essential institution in what Habermas has described as the emergent public sphere, dealt in the trading of slaves.<sup>144</sup> Seymour, Daniels and Watkins note that 'by the 1750s landed and monied interests had drawn closer than ever before and larger landowners frequently made investments in public funds, trading companies, and government bonds'.<sup>145</sup>

The East India Company provides a useful example of the articulation of colonial, financial and political power in the metropolis. Nick Robins writes that the East India Company was a 'pivot that changed the course of economic history'; 'reversing the flow of wealth from West to East', and putting in place 'a new system of exchange and exploitation'.<sup>146</sup> Royal Charter gave the Company monopolistic control over the trade with the East, enabling the company to manipulate the prices paid by British consumers for its goods, and to exclude competitors from the Indian market. As Robins notes, when periodic pressure mounted from other merchants and cities the Company responded by exerting pressure in both court and parliament, and, in fact, the lines between governance and commercial enterprise were often blurred. Thus, Robins writes that 'for thirty years after Robert Clive's victory at Plassey, East India House lay at the heart of both the economy and governance of Britain; a monstrous combination of trader, banker, conqueror, and power broker', the commercial-colonial element of English (and subsequently British) politics was a dominant faction within the state-society complex.<sup>147</sup>

In the broader historical perspective we can observe that the rise of the British state as a world power from the early seventeenth century competition with the Mediterranean and Dutch powers through to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century culmination in the *Pax Britannia* can be thought of in terms of overlapping phases of British imperial expansion, in terms of the articulated developments of the British political, fiscal, military structures, and in terms of the articulation of British colonialism and capitalism. The traditional historical distinction has been made between the 'first' (or 'Old colonial system') and 'second' British empires.<sup>148</sup> In this approach, the first British Empire, which started with the

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<sup>143</sup> Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, p 94-5.

<sup>144</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeoisie Society*, London, Polity Press, 1989

<sup>145</sup> Susanne Seymour, Stephen Daniels, and Charles Watkins, 'Estate and empire: Sir George Cornwall's management of Moccas, Herefordshire, and La Taste, Grenada, 1771-1819', *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1998, p 314

<sup>146</sup> Nick Robins, *ibid*, p 80.

<sup>147</sup> Nick Robins, *ibid*, p 83.

<sup>148</sup> P.J. Marshall, 'The First British Empire', in Robin W. Winks, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V: Historiography*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; C.A. Bayly, 'The Second British Empire, in Robin W. Winks, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V: Historiography*, Oxford University Press, Oxford; P.J. Marshall, (ed.), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, Cambridge, 1996; V.T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793, Vols. I & II*, London, 1952 & 1964; G.L. Beer, *The Origins of the British Colonial System 1578-1660*, London, 1908.

Elizabethan colonial endeavours in the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, encompassed North America, the West Indies, and Ireland,<sup>149</sup> and was thought of as 'a maritime empire, an oceanic empire of trade and settlement, not an empire of conquest; an empire defended by ships, not troops'.<sup>150</sup> This mercantilist, maritime, and extra-national process of colonial endeavour was thought to have met its demise in the events of the American Revolution, wherein the colonies assertion of independence was thought to have demonstrated the limits of liberal imperialism.

By the time of the British victory in the Seven Years War (1756-63), what has become known as the 'pacific view' was important for contemporary perspectives of British imperialism, as British elites sought to represent the first empire as having been the 'beneficent creation of a liberty-loving and commercial people, and thus quite different from the Roman and Spanish empires, bloodily and insecurely raised on conquest'.<sup>151</sup>

Subsequently, with its roots set in Clive's victory at Plassey in 1756 which opened the wealth of Bengal to the East India Company, and in the Peace of Paris of 1763 which saw the defeat of French imperial endeavours in the Americas and South Asia, the 'Second British Empire' was thought to have commenced in the Peace of Paris of 1783. Here, in the ashes of the recognition of American independence, arose 'a newly configured British Atlantic Empire', which included the Caribbean and remaining American settlements, and corresponded to 'the British Empire's decisive 'swing to the East' into the Indian and Pacific oceans'.<sup>152</sup>

The 'Second British Empire' has traditionally been viewed as being 'founded on military conquest, racial subjection, economic exploitation and territorial expansion', thus rendering it 'incompatible with metropolitan norms of liberty, equality and the rule of law' that were thought to belong to Britain itself and its first empire.<sup>153</sup> For Imperial historians, these characteristics have meant that the British Empire was generally thought of in its second form, and that it was viewed as a discrete site of historical investigation, one that was at odds with the concurrent internal history of Britain that narrated the development of the expansion of the liberal sphere.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Robin W. Winks, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume V: Historiography*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p viii; David Armitage, *ibid*, p 7.

<sup>150</sup> Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj, The New Cambridge History of India*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p 4; See also P. J. Marshall, 'The First British Empire', in Robin W. Winks, *ibid*, pp., 43-53; Marshall notes that historians disagree over the period in which the 'first empire' can be said to have originated, placing the point of origin somewhere between the activities of the Tudor seamen, and the mid-seventeenth century or later (p. 45).

<sup>151</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1992, p 103

<sup>152</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 2.

<sup>153</sup> David Armitage, *op cit*.

<sup>154</sup> David Armitage, *op cit*. In recent times historians of the British empire have sought to locate their histories squarely within British history; Linda Colley's two recent volumes, *Britons*, and *Captives* are examples, and Bill Schwarz gives a critical

British history, as Bill Schwarz observes, has traditionally been divided between expansionist celebrations of the British Empire and accounts of an insular 'England' that celebrate the 'true home of well-regulated liberty'.<sup>155</sup> Schwarz cites Sir John Seeley's *The Expansion of England* wherein he states that 'the history of England is not in England, but in America and Asia', as the classical example of the celebratory Imperial vein. On the other hand, J.R. Green's *Short History of the English People* stands in as a canonical example of the insular turn in British historiography. Green's history passes over 'the detail of foreign wars and diplomacies' in order to 'dwell at length on the incidents of that constitutional, intellectual and social advance in which we read the history of the nation itself'.<sup>156</sup> What mediates the difference between Seeley's 'exteriority' and Green's insularity is the racial composition of Britishness that both authors draw on. For Seeley, the liberal colonisers prove their Britishness in the encounter with the 'uncivilised' world and the project of colonialism is the boundless expansion of 'Britishness'; for Green, liberal Britishness is the inheritance, achievement and on-going project of an island 'race'. Thus the particularly bound and territorial character of Britishness – it is innately liberal *and* racialised – is also the guarantee of its boundlessness as it meets its instantiation on the 'proving ground' of the colonial worlds. The historical bifurcation, in turn, brings a political (and politico-theoretical) form of liberal paradox into play, wherein the 'universality of freedom and derivative political institutions identified within the provenance of liberalism is denied in the protracted history with which liberalism is similarly linked'.<sup>157</sup>

Historians of the two distinct empires variety have also tended to separate the concurrent Atlantic colonial world (the 'Old Colonial System') from the endeavours of the East India Company as the generator of the 'Eastern' colonial process. In this perspective, the Company's endeavours have been viewed as a mere prelude to the Imperial history of British dominion after 1858.<sup>158</sup> The pacific historical account was allied to the internal development history anchored in the discourse of the central importance of the Industrial Revolution and the extension of liberalism. These approaches subsequently result in an inadequate perspective on the relationship between Imperial endeavour and British liberalism. Correspondingly, neglecting the earlier role of the commercial colonisation of India and the corresponding exclusion of Indian subjects from the sphere of liberal inclusion in order to privilege a cosmopolitan liberalism contributes to both an inadequate conceptualisation of the

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historiographical account. See Bill Schwarz, 'Introduction: the expansion and contraction of England', in Bill Schwarz, (ed.), *The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity, and Cultural History*, London, Routledge, 1996

<sup>155</sup> Bill Schwarz, *op cit*, 1996.

<sup>156</sup> Bill Schwarz, *ibid*, p 5.

<sup>157</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study of Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999, p 46.

<sup>158</sup> K. N. Chaudhuri, *The Trading World of Asia and the English East India Company, 1660-1760*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.

mercantilist, liberal, and militant political ideologies that sustained colonialism, and an inadequate perspective on the nature of the British state-society complex's dependence on colonialism. In the following account, therefore, I seek to draw out the relationship between liberalism and imperialism by focussing, initially, on the place of India within British liberalism, and then, in the following section, on the evolving importance of colonisation for the rise of Britain within the emergent world system.

## **Section 1.2. Liberal Imperialism: The example of Britain and India**

Uday Singh Mehta wrote that 'the world we live in is substantially moulded by the triumph of liberalism with its rationalistic certainties'.<sup>159</sup> As we shall see in the chapter on globalisation and Britain (chapter six), many of the key assumptions of classical political philosophy and political economy are present in the neo-classical economic and 'third way' political philosophy within which mobility, and migration in particular are framed in British policy formation. In the latter chapters of the thesis (six and seven), I will argue that these neo-liberal assumptions tend to be articulated with a neo-colonial ideology in the contemporary period. In order to be able to account for the ideological ground of the control of mobility in the colonial and contemporary period, I want then to first account for the articulation of imperialism and liberalism in the period of colonial capitalism.

For contemporary commentators at the height of the British Empire, rule over India came to be thought of in terms of a progressive and benevolent tutelage that was the expression of innate British liberalism.<sup>160</sup> Singh Mehta notes that it is 'well known that India was of crucial significance to the economic and political ambitions of Imperial Britain', but that what is not so well recognised is the way in which 'India played a sustained and extensive role in the theoretical imagination and exertion of most nineteenth century British political thinkers'.<sup>161</sup> Moreover, it was

*Liberal and progressive thinkers such as Bentham, both the Mills, and Macaulay, who, notwithstanding – indeed, on account of their reforming schemes, endorsed the empire as a legitimate form of political and commercial governance; who justify and accept its largely undemocratic and non-representative structure; who invoke as politically relevant categories such as history, ethnicity,*

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<sup>159</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 45, and *passim*; In draw upon Sigh Mehta's account of liberalism and imperialism throughout this section

<sup>160</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, 'Liberalism and colonialism: a critique of Locke and Mill', in Jan Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds.), *The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power*, London, 1995, pp., 92-96. This is not to deny that there were contemporary critics of British imperialism, but merely to draw out some of the early liberal paradoxes surrounding the mobility and stasis of colonial subjects.

<sup>161</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 64.



*civilizational hierarchies, and occasionally race and blood ties; and who fashion arguments for the empire's at least temporary necessity and foreseeable prolongation.*<sup>162</sup>

John Marriott also makes the point that with the establishment of the nineteenth century Raj, India became 'the laboratory for the Enlightenment project' and the 'test bed for methods of domestic government'.<sup>163</sup> A form of reciprocity ensued, in which 'colonial culture reached back to the metropolis, to emerge in and inform domestic concerns'. Marriott argues that Indian subjects became subject to the 'knowledgeable gaze of the British state' with the paradigm of civilised 'Progress'.<sup>164</sup> The conflictual reciprocity between liberalism as it applies to colonial subjects in India and British subjects as they are incorporated into the capitalist system of social reproduction is useful, therefore, in providing a contextual ground for the following examination of the production of forced and coerced migrations and stasis in Britain and the colonies (chapter two), as well as for the later flows of Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi migration to Britain after the Second World War (chapter five).

The ideology of Progress was ascendant in the context of Britain's rise as a world power via industrialisation and lucrative imperial expansion. From the 1730s onwards, British national identity came to coalesce around the 'mutual interdependence of commerce, Protestantism, maritime power and liberty', the latter perceived to have been 'enshrined in the invented tradition of an ancient English constitution manifest in a system of laws that guaranteed rights for all its subjects'.<sup>165</sup> It was at this point that the traditional belief in the linearity of Christian progress met the new humanist doctrines of the Enlightenment. In Britain, rather than resulting in a conflict between religion and the new sciences, an accommodation was found that brought together the belief in spiritual progress with the scientific body of knowledge surrounding the conditions, course and requirements of material progress. Thus Providentialism and Calvinism paved the way for the development of the new theories of moral philosophy and political economy in which poverty, or at least the poverty of the 'undeserving' poor, came to form both an antinomy of Progress and thus, the object of the new technologies, discourse fields, and governmentalities of Utilitarian 'improvement'.

At the same time, as John Marriott observes, within the 'age of imperial modernity race came to define the boundaries of Progress, as subject peoples were perceived increasingly in terms of rigidified racial hierarchies'.<sup>166</sup> Indian subjects were incorporated into the European hierarchy as 'primitive' within the new episteme, governmentalities, discourse fields and technologies of power-and-knowledge. For the

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<sup>162</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 3.

<sup>163</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 1.

<sup>164</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 6.

<sup>165</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 20, fn 38.

<sup>166</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, pp., 6-7.

subject peoples ranked within the idiom of Progress, the differences from the imagined metropolitan norm depended on the extent to which particular groups were viewed as existing in a 'prelapsarian state of innocence', or as 'having fallen into a state of degeneration'. In each case, such groups were thought to have needed to become subject to the laws of Progress in which they might find their improvement. This ideology justified not just the exploitation of colonial subjects, black slaves, and the 'degenerate' or 'undeserving' British poor, but also the emancipation of slaves by bringing them within the orbit of civil society.<sup>167</sup> All of these groups were thus subject to the application of the project of Progress whose liberal inheritance could lead to seemingly paradoxical ends.

By the 18<sup>th</sup> century, democracy was held to be a central tenet of Britishness, whilst Britishness was thought of in terms of the internal and external extension of liberal modernity. Following Locke, 'there was a broad consensus that linked the exercise of political power with the rights of citizens', and a belief that the state should be 'limited and checked by the separation of the branches of government'.<sup>168</sup> Yet, as Hume observed, 'free government has been commonly the most happy fore those who partake of their freedom; yet they are most ruinous and oppressive to their provinces'.<sup>169</sup> Hume's observation certainly applies to the British rule in India, where the combined regimes of the East India Company and then the British Raj resulted in mass pauperisation and, in Mike Davis's terms, rather than resulting in 'development', actually formed the makings of (one portion of) the Third World.<sup>170</sup>

British Imperialism was thought of within a paternalist and infantilising ambivalence. Marx and Engels saw the East India Company's dominance of India as a form of feudal aggression, where mercantilism gave lie to the rhetoric of liberalism, but also wrote of a *mission civilisatrice* in the 19<sup>th</sup> century capitalist transformation of Indian society.<sup>171</sup> Macaulay wrote that the British rule of India required the injunction, 'Be the father and the oppressor of the people; be just and unjust, moderate and rapacious'.<sup>172</sup> Yet, as Singh Mehta argues, the gap between liberalism 'at home' and despotism in the colonies does not so much point to an abdication of the pursuit of liberalism in the empire, but rather to the fact that the 'urge to imperialism' was a process that should be located as having been interior to liberalism.

<sup>167</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 6; Christopher A. Bayly, *Imperial Meridian. The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830*, London, Longman, 1989, p 7.

<sup>168</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 7.

<sup>169</sup> David Hume, 'Politics a Science', in *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 1985, 18-19.

<sup>170</sup> Mike Davis, Chapter 9, 'The origins of the third world', in *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World*, London, Verso, 2002

<sup>171</sup> This is the position given in the authors *Tribune* articles, particularly Marx's article of 1853. According to Bernard Semmel, Marx's earlier writing on British India placed British rule within a progressive liberalism that freed India from its pre-modern feudalism. His later writings saw the workings of finance capitalism as intensely mercantilist. I offer a critique of this reading later in the chapter. See Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, pp., 137-41.

<sup>172</sup> T.B. Macaulay, 'Warren Hastings', in *Critical and Historical Essays*, London, Methuen, 1903, pp., 85-6.

For Singh, liberalism's distinctiveness is its claims of the ability to engage with difference by articulating socio-political norms of tolerance and comity, yet the liberalism of Mills, Bentham and Macaulay only goes so far as to conceptualise the different in terms of a 'familiar structure of generality' couched in terms of the 'reasonable, the useful, the knowledgeable, and the progressive' and their antithesis's.<sup>173</sup> The result, here, is a failure of recognition, the liberal inability to recognise the alternative 'modes of experience' that are only re-captured in 'rough translations': in the case of the 'Indian', the 'archaic', the religious', the 'pre-modern'. Similarly, in the case of the British metropolitan poor who also became subject to 'improving' Utilitarian governmentalities, their metropolitan street language is also subject to a 'rough translation' in which it figures as regressive and 'criminal' mode of speaking – a form of 'fugitive cant'.<sup>174</sup> As Singh argues in the contemporary context,

*to contain those differences or to mediate them through a prior settlement that fixes on reason, freedom, ethics, internationalism, multiculturalism, the universality of rights, or even democracy, is to deny 'the occult', 'the parochial', 'the traditional', in short the unfamiliar, the very possibility of articulating the meaning and agentiality of its own experiences.*<sup>175</sup>

For 19<sup>th</sup> century liberals such as J.S. Mill, the abstract starting point of universality or commonality from which judgement is subsequent is underwritten by a specific ideal of human progress. The liberal recourse to the 'already-known' results, in terms of the articulation of power-and-knowledge, in representations of the other's inferior, lower, and backwards: 'India', as well as the metropolitan poor, thus figure as the 'antinomies of Progress'.<sup>176</sup>

Within the temporality of Progress, 'imperial power is simply the instrument required to align a deviant and recalcitrant history with the appropriate future'.<sup>177</sup> The colonial subjects who embody regressive history fail to qualify as rational subjects and thus are excluded from the sphere of consent underpinning the legitimacy of political authority; they can, and should be governed without their

<sup>173</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 21.

<sup>174</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, 'Realist prose and the problem of difference: the rational and the magical in subaltern history', in *The Unworking of History*, forthcoming; See also Uday Mehta Singh, *The Anxiety of Freedom: Imagination and Individuality in Locke's Political Thought*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 192, chap. 3, on Locke's belief in the illegitimate nature of Indian 'superstitions'; the reference here to the criminalisation of the language of the metropolitan poor ('fugitive cant') is taken from Peter Linebaugh, *The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century*, London, Verso, 2003, p 429. Linebaugh writes that 'Dr Johnson noted that the diction of the labouring class was casual and mutable, and he called it 'fugitive cant', thus performing a semantic criminalization'.

<sup>175</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 23.

<sup>176</sup> John Marriott, Chapter One, 'The antinomies of Progress', *ibid*. 2003.

<sup>177</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, 'Superior people: the narrowness of liberalism from Mill to Rawls', *Times Literary Supplement*, February 25<sup>th</sup>, 1994, pp., 11-13.

consent.<sup>178</sup> Liberal paternalism is thus used to justify the array of imperial interdictions that deny the Indian deviant/child the rights that pertain to the assumed citizenship of the liberal sphere. Herein the horizon of possible progress redeems those acts in a never-quite-obtained future that Dipesh Chakrabarty describes as a state of 'not yet-ness'.<sup>179</sup> What remains is a necessary process – a paternal imperialism – whose temporality is indefinitely pinned to the constancy of the other's infantilism.<sup>180</sup> Because this process occurs 'outside of the internal restraints on the use of power of the (liberal) political, the instruments that can be used for the reform of the deviant are often harsher and more unrestricted', and 19<sup>th</sup> century liberals therefore felt justified in calling for the 'rationalisation of India, even if that requires endorsing an imperial despotism'<sup>181</sup>. The despotic rule of the Raj had, at times of subsistence crisis, near-genocidal effects in regions of British India. As Mike Davis observes, 'British India under Viceroys like Lytton, Elgin, and Curzon, where Smithian dogma and cold imperialist self-interest allowed huge grain exports to England in the midst of horrendous starvation ... Millions were murdered 'by the theological application of the sacred principles of Smith, Bentham, and Mill'.<sup>182</sup> Correspondingly, in political terms,

*In the empire, the epistemological commitments of liberalism to rationality and the progress that it was deemed to imply constantly trumped its commitments to democracy, consensual government, limitations on the legitimate power of the state, and even toleration.*<sup>183</sup>

Thus, a seeming paradox exists between the universality and inclusionary nature of liberalism, and the 'systematic and sustained exclusions' of various groups and 'types' of people'. The history of political exclusion does not contradict, but rather elaborates the truth and ambivalence of the liberal profession of universality.<sup>184</sup> The profession of universality is based in claims tending towards the 'transhistorical, transcultural, and ... transracial': as Singh Mehta puts the matter,

*the declared and ostensible reference of liberal principles is quite literally a constituency with no delimiting boundary: that of all humankind', [moreover], 'the political rights that it articulates and defends, the institutions such as laws, representation, contract all have their justification in a*

<sup>178</sup> John Locke, section 60, *The Second Treatise on Toleration, and a Letter Concerning Toleration*, New York, Mineola, and Dover Publications, 2002.

<sup>179</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2000, p 8. Chakrabarty cites, for example, J.S. Mill's essays 'On Liberty' and 'On Responsible Government' in *Three Essays*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1975.

<sup>180</sup> Infantilism, 'irrationality' and 'inscrutability' are constant features of British colonial representations of the 'Indian'; see Singh Mehta, Chap. 2, *ibid*, and John Marriott, *ibid*, *passim*.

<sup>181</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 33.

<sup>182</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 11.

<sup>183</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 36.

<sup>184</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 46; for the positive account of liberalism see Harold Laski, *The Rise of European Liberalism*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1966

*characterisation of human being that eschews names, social status, ethnic background, gender and race.*<sup>185</sup>

Within this borderless universality, liberalism's ambivalence can be found in the distance between the anthropological capacities deemed necessary for liberal agency, and the political conditions deemed necessary for their actualisation.<sup>186</sup> Liberalism is grounded in an 'anthropological minimum - an ideal of human nature wherein it is assumed and required that individuals be born free, equal, and rational.<sup>187</sup> The precondition of autonomous (and therefore 'free'), individual rationality allows the liberal demarcation between inclusion and exclusion. Thus, for example, the discrimination of those who are deemed to be insufficiently 'rational' and cannot, therefore, yet be trusted with the rights and obligations of the liberal sphere and its corresponding institutions, is intrinsic to the 'particular' application of universal liberalism. The limit of 'irrationality' moreover, corresponds to the class differential in rights' identified in Locke's political philosophy by C.B. Macpherson.<sup>188</sup> For Locke, the space of substantive and imagined citizenship is formally universal, yet a hierarchy of cultural norms including categories that begin with 'English gentry', 'breeding', 'gentleman', and 'honour', and end with 'servant' forms the thick set of cultural credentials that inform the universal with its particular standpoint.<sup>189</sup> Locke's assumption that only persons of the propertied class have access to the 'breeding' that enables rational judgement and discrimination places those that belong to the poorer sections of pre-modern societies beyond the pale of the liberal sphere. Thus, in the perspective of classical political philosophy, the 'non-modern' Indian peasant is thought of as being 'pre-political', and her acts of resistance or intransigence cannot, thereafter, be translated in the language of political action.<sup>190</sup>

The liberal ambivalence present in the abstract theoretical writing of Locke becomes 'defiantly and self-confidently explicit in the application of Utilitarian principles in 19<sup>th</sup> century India.<sup>191</sup> Here, a plethora of anthropological differences are brought to bear on the 'manifest' incompetence of the Indian. This was particularly true of the Indian peasant who was not only described in terms of the innate inertia of Indian society, and the corresponding proclivity to 'idleness' that was similarly

<sup>185</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 51.

<sup>186</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 47; Singh Mehta refers to Locke's *Second Treatise of Government*.

<sup>187</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 52; In Locke's terms from the *Second Treatise*, *To understand political power right, and to derive it from its treatise, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man*; John Locke, *Two Treatise of Government*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p 4.

<sup>188</sup> C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964.

<sup>189</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, p 63.

<sup>190</sup> Ranajit Guha, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983, p 6.

<sup>191</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, pp 47-8.

identified in the 'undeserving British poor, but also in terms of his pre-modern 'childishness'. The radical exclusion of the Indian poor from the liberal sphere of agency, and the requisite attempt to coerce and force them within its bounds, can be seen in the application of Utilitarian, *laissez faire* and Malthusian principles.

This liberal exclusion can be seen, for example, in the severity of the punitive disciplines directed at the Indian peasantry in relief camps and workhouses throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century during periods of sustained and drastic subsistence crisis.<sup>192</sup> Throughout the subsistence-famines of 1877-8 and 1899-1901 millions of heavily taxed and indebted Indian peasants starved, and millions more were alienated from their land. Simultaneously, the Raj continued to facilitate the massive export of cash crop grain for the profitable supply of British and European consumers, and to impose an onerous rate of taxation on agricultural producers.<sup>193</sup> In the late 1870s, Sir Richard Temple was charged with the task of making relief as 'repugnant and ineffective as possible', in order to discourage the 'undeserving' from the 'organised shirking' they were claimed to prefer.<sup>194</sup> Temple introduced a system of 'indoor' relief that was subject to rigid poverty tests, wherein applicants must prove themselves to be lacking any means of subsistence, and thus have divested themselves of any usable assets. Furthermore, in the corresponding distance tests, applicants for the Temple Wage must prove that they have relinquished village and land-based residence by agreeing to migrate long distances to the camps. Henceforth, British relief in India, like the relief given in the Irish famine, was used by policy-makers to further the alienation of small-holder peasants from their land.

Thus, as Kate Currie observes, whilst the possibility of an Indian Poor Law was rejected by British policy makers, nonetheless, 'most of the apparatus of the Poor Law of 1834 was imported into India, except, under normal conditions, there was no commitment to the maintenance of the deserving poor'.<sup>195</sup> Currie's point is that *only* the punitive policies that were directed at the British 'undeserving' poor would come to be applied in India. In fact, as Davis observes of the infamous Temple Wage, the amount of relief supplied in return for hard labour in the British 'relief camps' was less than the amount of sustenance provided to victims of the Nazi's concentration camps such as Buchenwald.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> See Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians in India*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959; Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World*, London, Verso, 2002; and the following chapter, section 2.

<sup>193</sup> For example, in Gujarat during the famine of 1899-1901, British officials declared that 'the revenue must at all costs be gathered in', whilst farmers who resisted onerous tax increases 'simply had their lands confiscated'. Quoted in Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 172. Moreover, during the famine years of 1877-8, 6.4 million cwt. of grain was exported to Britain (B. Bhatia, *Famines in India, 1850-1945*, Bombay, 1963, table 5, p 38.)

<sup>194</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid.*, p 37.

<sup>195</sup> Kate Currie, 'British colonial policy and famines: some effects and implications of 'Free Trade' in the Bombay, Bengal and Madras Presidencies, 1860-1990', *South Asia*, 14:2, 1991, p. 43; John Marriott describes the application of the 1834 Poor Amendment Act as the 'damnation' of the 19<sup>th</sup> century poor. See John Marriott, *ibid*, p 14

<sup>196</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 38



The Utilitarian governing logic being applied was, in large part, a combination of Smithian, Malthusian and social Darwinian principles. Adam Smith's principle of non-interference in the workings of the market was used to justify the reluctance to control prices in India towards subsistence levels, justified the lack of substantial relief provided by the Raj, and justified the continued incorporation of Indian agriculture into the cash-crop system of maximum extraction that had contributed to the peasant's pauperisation in the first place. Smithian principles were combined with the Malthusian thesis of 'over-population', in which Indian's (so-called) innate proclivity to over-breeding was held to be a cause of subsistence poverty amongst the poor. On this basis, it was argued, providing relief to the poor (and thus ensuring a minimal level of subsistence) would only lead to more poverty, and further subsistence crisis.<sup>197</sup> Indian peasants were also held to account for their poverty on account of anthropological characteristics. Thus, for example, in the context of the Utilitarian aversion to 'idleness' we can note that the Gujarati peasant was held to be a 'soft man':

*The Gujarati is ... unused to privation, accustomed to earn his good food easily; In the hot weather he seldom worked at all and at no time did he form the habit of continuous labour: Large classes are believed by close observers to be constitutionally incapable of it. Very many even amongst the poorest have never taken a tool in hand in their lives. They live by watching cattle and crops, by sitting in the fields to weed, by picking cotton, grain and fruit, and ... by pilfering'.<sup>198</sup>*

The official's statement seeks to defend the government from accusations of neglect in the face of extremely high mortality rates in the 1899 famines. Similarly, in the late 1870s, Temple responded to reports of mass mortality in the relief camps by blaming the Indian poor for their idleness, aversion to the coerced migration from village to relief camp, and ingrained disobedience; in disparaging what he saw as the 'humanitarian hysterics' of British sympathy for the India poor, Temple stated that 'no one will be inclined to grieve much for the fate which they brought upon themselves, and which terminated lives of idleness and too often of crime'.<sup>199</sup> Thus, the British ideology of Progress in India finds fault with the 'backwardness' and 'criminality' of Indian society, and where the progressive incorporation of the Indian socio-economy into the 'laissez faire' exploitation of India wreaks havoc in terms of lives and livelihoods, finds that the blame lies not with the colonial state, but with the inadequacies of Indian culture. Thus a problematisation is constructed at the intersection of exploitation, 'race' and poverty, in which the answer is found within the already existing paradigms of liberal philosophy in the form of the need for an intensification of the governmentalities and strategies of Progress.

<sup>197</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 32

<sup>198</sup> *Bombay Famine Report*, cited in Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 172.

<sup>199</sup> Richard Temple, 'The Indian Famine: How Dealt with in Western India', p 153.

It is this historicising problematisation that forms the subject of Prakash's discussion of British colonial modernity's framing of 'freedom' and 'unfreedom' in relation to labour and social relations.<sup>200</sup> Prakash states that 19<sup>th</sup> century colonial officials encountered slavery and bondage all over India.<sup>201</sup> The extended case study that Prakash elaborates is the Kamia-Malik relationship of the Bihar district. The Kamias were agricultural labourers who worked for the same landlord (the Malik) over the course of their lives. Kamias received wages for the days they worked, and assistance when needed. The Kamias wives were also obliged to work in the fields, and the patrimonial system meant that the Kamia was granted a sum of money, some grain, and a small holding on the marriage of his son. Money given to the Kamia was treated as an advanced loan, which required labour servitude until the debt was fulfilled. For the Colonial administrators, the Kamia seemed to be subject to a series of restrictions over their movement, labour, and persons. These arrangements were seen as a feudal form of debt bondage, which, whilst representing an advance on the condition of slavery, were nonetheless the continuation of a state of 'unfreedom', a state of 'suspended rights'.<sup>202</sup>

Prakash critiques the colonial discourse, governance and governmentality in which history – or the historicism brought to India by the British – positions Indian social relations as an unfree pre-modern state that is being brought into the realms of liberal freedom. For the British colonialists, 'debt bondage' represents the naturalisation of free labour in as much as it figures as the suspension of 'natural' rights to freedom. For the capitalist framing of labour-power as an exchangeable commodity, 'slavery' comes to represent the opposite of that free exchange. As Prakash correctly observes, the naturalisation of free labour that occurs through the recognition of its Other(s) – slavery, servitude, bondage – works to position 'free labour' outside of the realms of power.<sup>203</sup> It is thus a realm of 'innocence', devoid of coercion and force. The concept of power being employed here is that which Foucault describes as 'repressive power'; power is a thing 'that only has the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of producing limits'.<sup>204</sup> Power then, only becomes visible in its juridical form, 'as a system of restraints and restrictions': subsequently, the role of power in 'producing and constituting free individuals [is rendered] invisible'.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>200</sup> Gyan Prakash, 'Introduction: the discourse of freedom', in *Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labour Servitude in Colonial India*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002

<sup>201</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, p 1.

<sup>202</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, pp., 1-2.

<sup>203</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, p 6

<sup>204</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Vol. 1, An Introduction*, New York, 1980, p 85.

<sup>205</sup> Gyan Prakash, *op cit*.

For the British colonialists, this repressive power is located amongst the evolutionary ranking of civilisations.<sup>206</sup> In this context, from the early 19<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the practice of traditional Indian customs and social relations represents the intrusion of the pre-modern despotic into the contemporary path of Progress.<sup>207</sup> In another act of 'rough translation', the Kamia-Malik relation then, appears on the historical and progressive continuum running from slavery, serfdom, debt-bondage, to free labour as an anachronistic medievalism, as something akin to 'ancient slavery'.<sup>208</sup>

In the discursive construction of this Indian form of social reproduction as the antithesis of freedom, one part of what is lost in translation is the productive power of kinship and social networks, and the sustainability and spirituality of patrimonial social arrangements. Arguably, these contained a degree of agency that the Kamia struggle to maintain in conditions into which Indian labourers were brought, through their incorporation into the world commodity market and the sphere of individual liberal freedom. The other loss consists of a refusal to see the repressive nature of the constitution of 'free' individuals, a form of despotic colonial rule that is all too apparent in the chronic indebtedness, subsistence crisis, land alienation and subsequent coerced and forced migrations to which Indian labourers became subject.<sup>209</sup>

What is also an obvious, yet crucial point here, is that those very despotic imperial processes are justified in the name of the Other, who is thereby granted the 'gift' of inclusion within the liberal market and the rule of law whilst being excluded from the sphere of its agency. Thus, colonial subjects, in their racial difference, in their poverty, and in the potential profitability of their labour-power, form for the imagined and substantive sphere of British liberal ideology, a sphere of non-citizenship. Correspondingly they represent a pre-modernity that requires both the 'legitimate violence' of the state and the application of Utilitarian governmentalities that will, *in the virtual future*, bring about the borderless extension of the realm of liberal social relationships, but in the historical present, already guarantee that validity of the ongoing progress of imperialism.

In Marxist terminology, we can say that what is legitimated herein, is the validity of treating the Indian subject *purely* as a unit of 'abstract' labour, and correspondingly, a complete disregard for the differences that comprise the Indian's 'real labour', because the difference, the real conditions of the labourer's production, 'precede' the sphere of liberal recognition.<sup>210</sup> Thus, in the case of the colonial

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<sup>206</sup> Bernard McGrane, *Beyond Anthropology. Society and the Other*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989, p 94.

<sup>207</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, p 8.

<sup>208</sup> Gyan Prakash, *op cit*.

<sup>209</sup> See the account in the following chapter, section 2.

<sup>210</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, Chap. 2, 'Two histories of capital', in *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2000,

subject, the freedom inherent to the concept of the abstract universal subject of liberalism is deflated to the 'free' movement of commodities within the market, to the extent that imperial interests remain 'free' to direct this mobility. In turn, this free mobility is subject to the disciplines and governmentalities directed at the 'resistance' of the Indian poor, to the extent that their labour-power exceeds (or 'precedes') the exigencies of the extraction of its 'surplus-value'. Thus, as we will see in the following chapter, even as it is represented as a form of liberal progressive development, the mobility of the Indian poor in the period of British colonialism tends towards the 'unfree' end of the spectrum of labour migration.<sup>211</sup>

### 1.3. The Centrality of the Peripheries.

The previous section has examined the consequences of the articulation of imperialism and liberalism in the example of British India in terms of the 'unfree' mobility of the 'free' labour of the Indian poor. In this section I want to discuss the relationship between the outside (the colonial peripheries) and the inside (the metropolitan core) as it led to the dominance of the British state-society complex in the 19<sup>th</sup> century world system of nation-states. This discussion seeks to establish the importance of the control of colonial mobility (primarily in terms of trade and finance) for the hegemonic position of the British state-society complex. Together with the following section's discussion of colonial labour-mobility, it forms a further basis for the following chapter's discussion of regimes of mobility in terms of the movements and stasis of colonial-capitalist subjects.

Eighteenth century political commentators were in no doubt about the importance of colonial trade and conquest to the position of European nations in the hierarchy of power: As Armitage observes,

*the logic of political economy compelled every nation to strive for the profits of a colonial empire; equally, that ruthless logic determined that some nations would remain, or at worst become, colonies, in so far as they and their populations were subordinated to the overmastering and unchallengeable economic interests of other nations.*<sup>212</sup>

The argument that the rise of the British state as a world power was dependant on colonialism and other overseas endeavours has been the subject of considerable historical debate.<sup>213</sup> Cain and Hopkins write, for example, of the 'large number of scholars who deny the existence of a close relationship

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<sup>211</sup> David Etlis, (ed.), *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002

<sup>212</sup> David Armitage, *ibid.*, p 161.

<sup>213</sup> Robin W. Winks, 'Future of imperial history', in Robin W. Winks, (ed.), *ibid.*, pp., 654-655; Winks notes that despite the vast array of post-1960's publications addressing this question, there is no general agreement.

between the development of the home economy and imperialist forms of expansion'.<sup>214</sup> The postcolonial theorist Couze Venn notes that writers such as Jalee, Hilton, Hobsbawm, and Williams have pointed to 'the essential contribution of colonial enterprise and slavery to the success of capitalism', while on the other hand, historians such as C. A. Bayly have argued that 'there was a net debit to the British economy arising from the cost of empire'.<sup>215</sup> This thesis agrees, in the first place, with Venn, when he argues that the 'deficit' argument operates within a sort of 'limited accountancy'. As Venn argues, such approaches

*do not seem able to calculate the dynamic effects on the metropolitan economies of demand and trade directly affected by the requirements of colonialism and imperial expansion, or the effects of a relatively permanent war economy, that is, the contribution due to the vast increase in manufacturing and supply and demand arising from new resources and objects of consumption, military procurements – say regarding the ship building industry - the permanent mobilisation of a vast personnel for war and colonial administration, as well as the technological pay-offs arising from the introduction of new raw materials and their processing, and the armaments industry (for example, developments in navigation, steel making, explosives).*<sup>216</sup>

The ascendancy of Britain as a world power in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries has been described in terms of industrialisation, empire, maritime and technological advancement, and the emergent liberal fiscal, military, and political systems.<sup>217</sup> If we focus on the relationship between colonial endeavours and industrialisation, we can observe with Kenneth Morgan that 'no historian would argue that trade and empire had a minimal impact on the emergence of industrialisation'.<sup>218</sup> Pijl defines the industrial revolution as consisting of a constellation of articulated processes including the agricultural revolution, and the growth of the market economy, merchant capital and international finance.<sup>219</sup> Colonial trade and finance (1600 onwards) overlapped with the industrial revolution (1750-1830), yet the emergent overseas markets, sites of production, and the centrality of the metropolis as the centre of international finance cannot be – in a direct causal sense – be given as the sole genesis of the industrial revolution. Nonetheless, as each developed, they did so in a mutually reinforcing manner; notwithstanding the periodic conflict of interests that emerged between the two each served the

<sup>214</sup> P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, 1993a, p 3.

<sup>215</sup> Couze Venn, 'Towards a postcolonial political economy', in *Critical Postcolonial Studies*, London, Sage, forthcoming.

<sup>216</sup> Couze Venn, *op cit*.

<sup>217</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day*, London, Penguin, 1999.

<sup>218</sup> Kenneth Morgan, 'Trade and the British Empire', BBC History Online, p 4,

[http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/state/empire/trade\\_empire\\_04.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/state/empire/trade_empire_04.shtml); accessed January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2005.

<sup>219</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 89.

interests of the British capitalist state-society complex as it achieved a dominant position in what Immanuel Wallerstein calls the 'world-system'.<sup>220</sup>

In this vein, we could initially consider H.V. Bowen's example of the relationship between the expansion of the East India Companies activities in Bengal, and the process of British industrialisation. Bowen states that while the process of industrialisation had no effect on the Company's seizure of Bengal in the 1760's, nonetheless, it was the Company's links with an industrialising metropolis that allowed it to 'wage sustained large-scale warfare on the subcontinent'.<sup>221</sup> To take a later example, in the late Victorian period of Direct Rule (after 1858), British imposed tariffs (on Indian exports) and taxes (on Indian landholders) ensured that British consumers had avail of cheap imports and subsequently that English exports (primarily of cheap manufactured goods) came to have a captured market of Indian consumers.<sup>222</sup> Even so, by the first decades of the twentieth century, the Manchester lobby struggled to influence the direction of British Indian financial policies in its own interests, as the Colonial Office and Treasury were more concerned with the flows of finance produced by the exploitation of the Indian economy than with the health of British manufacturing.<sup>223</sup> In each of these instances we can see that while there were ways in which the relationship between industrialisation and colonisation was symbiotic, the manner and degree to which this was the case was historically contingent on interests and dynamics that were broader than those immediately involved in specific colonial endeavours or industrial productions such as the East India Company or the Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

By the end of the eighteenth century Britain had settlements scattered throughout North America, the Caribbean, and India.<sup>224</sup> From the beginnings of the century, British trade had expanded and shifted from its primary engagement with European markets to follow the developing trade routes that had begun to be established in the Atlantic and Asian economies in the previous century. Linda Colley records that at the outset of the Seven Years War (1756), Continental Europe remained Britain's most important market, absorbing some four-fifths of its domestic exports and re-exports, and supplying most of its imports.<sup>225</sup> Nonetheless, Colley argues that commerce with the 'imperial sector' achieved a

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<sup>220</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, (ed.), *World Inequality: Origins and Perspectives on the World System*, Black Rose, 1976a; *ibid*, 1976b; *ibid*, 1980; *ibid*, 1989.

<sup>221</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid*, p 37.

<sup>222</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, pp., 298-230, 312-317.

<sup>223</sup> P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, *British imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction: 1914-1990*, Harlow, Essex, Longman, 1993b, p 173.

<sup>224</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid*., p 22.

<sup>225</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, p 68; Colley bases her analysis on P.K. O'Brien and S.L. Engerman, 'Exports and the growth of the British economy from the Glorious Revolution to the Peace of Amiens', in B. Solow and S.L. Engerman (eds.), *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System*, Cambridge, 1991.



dominant significance in the eighteenth century for three reasons.<sup>226</sup> The first of these lies in the rate of growth of imperial commerce. As Colley notes, '95 per cent of *the increase* in Britain's commodity exports that occurred in the six decades after the Act of Union was sold to captive and colonial markets outside of Europe'. In fact, by 1800, in part because of continental protectionism, 80 per cent of British exports went to 'other parts of the world'.<sup>227</sup> Secondly, 'colonial imports into Britain came to play an increasingly important part in its balance of payments as far as European trade was concerned. By the 1750's, re-exports of colonial goods made up almost 40 per cent of total British exports'.<sup>228</sup> Thirdly, the British domestic market absorbed large quantities of colonial goods, and many of these that had previously been exotic luxury imports - such as silk, rice, dyestuffs, coffee, tobacco, tea and sugar - became staple consumer commodities for many, if not the poorest sections of the British people.<sup>229</sup>

If colonial enterprise was crucial for the state of the nation's flows of trade, what do we know about its relationship to the financial and political processes of the state-society complex over the duration of colonial-capitalism? We can start by noting that colonial endeavours, from the time of their origin in the endeavours of the East India Company (1600) were promoted by and favoured the British landed gentry and the commercial classes.<sup>230</sup> Bowen writes that

*All forms of power and authority in eighteenth century Britain were based upon, and determined by, property and propriety rights. Although the developments of a commercial society had multiplied and diversified the forms of property that could be held by an individual, land ownership still formed the cornerstone of the social and political system*<sup>231</sup>.

Between 1688 and 1801/2, a small elite of between 1.2 and 1.4 per cent of all families were variously assigned the category of 'High titles and gentlemen', and earned between 13.9 per cent and 17.9 per cent of the total income generated in England and Wales. The landed elite owned between 70 and 85 per cent of British land in 1790<sup>232</sup> and dominated parliamentary politics and matters of state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.<sup>233</sup> As Bowen observes, by 1770 any 'open-ness' or upward social mobility within British society in general had not yet disturbed or recast the upper ranks of the

<sup>226</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit.*

<sup>227</sup> Bernard Semmel, *The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism: Classical Political Economy, The Empire of Free Trade and Imperialism 1750-1850*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p 58.

<sup>228</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 1992, p 69.

<sup>229</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit.*

<sup>230</sup> Nick Robins, *ibid.*, p 80.

<sup>231</sup> H. V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 49.

<sup>232</sup> G.E. Mingay, *English Landed Society in the Eighteenth Century*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, pp., 3-26

<sup>233</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 1992, p 61; Colley notes that members of the landed elite made up over 75 per cent of the Common's membership as late as 1867; H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 51; Bowen notes that throughout the eighteenth century, the landed wealth qualification for membership of the House of Commons restricted socio-political upward mobility to those who had the means the make large-scale property purchases.

social tables'.<sup>234</sup> Nonetheless, the social status of those involved in mercantile finance strengthened from the 17<sup>th</sup> to eighteenth centuries,<sup>235</sup> and by the 1790 emergent mercantile and financial elites represented one sixth of all MPs<sup>236</sup>. As Cain and Hopkins note in their theory of the development of 'gentlemanly capitalism', the ascendancy of the financial elite outstripped the stagnancy of the social status of the developing industrial class for cultural, political, and economic reasons. The landed elite was able to absorb the financial elite into the rank of gentleman, in part, because of the *invisible* form of wealth creation belonging to the service economy; the coalface of colonial enterprise was relatively 'safely' – from the point of view of British class conflicts – overseas. Industrialists, on the other hand, worked at the coalface of the emerging British class conflict, and were associated with the ungentlemanly pursuit of work and wealth.<sup>237</sup> At the same time, the agrarian and overseas-based economies of the landed gentry saw them come into frequent conflict with the industrial class, who were to threaten the status quo of the ruling hegemony.<sup>238</sup>

H.V. Bowen cites the sociological tradition, which explained the rise of the British Empire as having been produced through the co-operation of the landed aristocracy and the newly emergent capitalist class.<sup>239</sup> The recent work of Cain and Hopkins (amongst others) has revisited this tradition in order to show the centrality of colonial endeavours and the service economy to the rise of the British capitalist class while focussing on the period between 1688 and 1850.<sup>240</sup> In describing the operation of 'gentlemanly capitalism' in this period Cain and Hopkins have sought to emphasise the central place of the metropolitan financiers and landed gentry over the process of British industrialisation in accounting for the expansion of the British Empire.<sup>241</sup> Bowen has argued that this 'home based' approach neglects the differences between the various interest groups of the Hanoverian period, as well as the role of external factors, including 'indigenous politics or power struggles, the strategic ambitions of local military commanders, (and) the expansive pressures exerted by expatriate or settler communities'.<sup>242</sup> Nonetheless, Cain and Hopkins' argument does not need to be read in a manner that seeks to find a cohesive coalition of interested parties, for while the politics of colonial finance were always a matter of political contest, they were nonetheless marked by the dominance of a (trans)national elite network

<sup>234</sup> H. V. Bowen, *ibid.*

<sup>235</sup> P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid.*, 1993a, p 30.

<sup>236</sup> Paul Langford, *Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689-1798*, Oxford, 1991, pp., 289-94

<sup>237</sup> P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkin, *ibid.*, 1993a, pp., 33-4.

<sup>238</sup> P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkin, *ibid.*, 1993a, p 25.

<sup>239</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 17. This tradition included the approaches of writers as diverse as Cobden, Bright, Spencer, Hobson, Veblen, Marx, Kautsky, and Lenin. Rosa Luxemburg's work seems a strange occlusion in this context. See also Bernard Semmel, *The Liberal Ideal and the Demons of Empire: Theories of Imperialism from Adam Smith to Lenin*, Baltimore and London, John Hopkins University Press, 2003.

<sup>240</sup> P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid.*, 1993a: The authors draw on Lenin, Hobson, and Veblen in particular. See pp., 3-16.

<sup>241</sup> P.J. Cain, and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid.*, 1993a, pp., 42-6.

<sup>242</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 18.

whose nodal point was the City of London.<sup>243</sup> Thus, whilst the relative autonomy of the dynamics in the colonies (the 'peripheral argument') was a key determinant in the many forms that the expansion of the British empire took, the role of the credit-providing financiers was central to the developing form of the British state-society complex, and to the 'free trade' ideology that was to come to wreak profitable havoc in the Atlantic and Asian colonial economies.<sup>244</sup>

Throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the 'alliance of mutual benefit' that was formed between the landed, mercantile, and financial elite, an elite whose activities tended to centralise in the public and private spheres of the metropolis, produced a process that worked to extend British overseas development, and in doing so, brought a new 'powerful socio-political concordant into being'.<sup>245</sup> The boundary between the elite groups (the landed elite and the business community) that formed an integral part of the hegemonic state-society complex overlapped with that of the formal sphere of governance: as Cain and Hopkins observe, 'it is impossible to separate the world of 'acceptable' business from that of elite politicians and from their perceptions of national interest'.<sup>246</sup>

The point here is not just that the metropolitan service economy formed the financial engine of British colonial endeavours, but that overseas enterprise came to form the backbone of the British financial and socio-political institutions that continued to be dominated by the combination of landed and financial elites until the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>247</sup> This point is important in relation to the post-1688 structure of the British state-society complex, for, as H.V. Bowen observes,

*At the very heart of the processes which transformed England, and then Britain, into a relatively powerful state, were the fiscal and government funding arrangements constituting the core of what is commonly referred to as the 'financial revolution'.*<sup>248</sup>

The financial revolution consisted of the English and British appropriation of, and subsequent improvisation on the techniques of Italian banking and the Dutch principles of funded debt.<sup>249</sup> As we noted above, these developments in national finance were consolidated in the establishment of the

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<sup>243</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2005, p 64; P.J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *ibid*; The authors state that unity does not mean unanimity: 'disagreements of priority and perspective were not only possible, but also common, both between the City and Whitehall and among banking and government departments. The point to emphasise, however, is that disputes occurred within the family. Disagreements were expressed freely because the values underlying them were not in question and because both sides were aware that they were arguing about the precise route to be taken and not about the general direction of policy', pp., 27-28.

<sup>244</sup> Mike Davis, 'The origins of the third world', in Mike Davis, *ibid*.

<sup>245</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 1992, p 64; H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, 1996, p 49.

<sup>246</sup> P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid.*, 1993a, p 13.

<sup>247</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, pp., 63-6, 61

<sup>248</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, 1996, p 14.

<sup>249</sup> Sidney Homer, *A History of Interest Rates*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1963, p 122.

National Debt and the Bank of England, which both served to express the fact that money was borrowed on the basis of the political constitution of 1688, rather than in the name of the monarch. By the 1720's global money capital had come to be anchored within the British state.<sup>250</sup>

Correspondingly, Britain's commercial strengths lay, along with the co-development of industrialisation and overseas commerce, in the extent to which it was a nation of creditors.<sup>251</sup> Linda Colley writes that the most substantial creditors for successive governments were the 'great trading companies like the East India Company, the Levant Company and the Russia Company, together with London's mercantile community in general'.<sup>252</sup> Rather than the landed gentry whose financial liquidity may have been limited, 'merchant, financiers, businessmen and women, and even minor shopkeepers and traders' were responsible for the 'wartime loans that funded on average some 30 percent of wartime expenditure after 1688'.<sup>253</sup>

The English (prior to the 1707 Act of Union) and British governments generally took a facilitating role in the trading activities of overseas endeavours. From the Navigation Act of 1651 through to the substantial tariff restrictions of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the liberal state provided the framework of law and order that allowed it to function as the 'sovereign party to international commercial exchanges and as a repository of the 'comparative advantages' on which they flourished'.<sup>254</sup> Crucially, the mercantile (and after 1785, 'laissez faire'<sup>255</sup>) politico-financial technologies were articulated to British practices of naval supremacy and warfare. As Bowen observes,

*Between 1688 and 1775, England or Britain fought four major wars: the Nine Years' War, 1689-97; the War of Spanish Succession (which was known as Queen Anne's War in the colonies), 1702-13; the Wars of Jenkins Ear and Austrian Succession, 1739-48; and the Seven Years' War (or French and Indian War as it was referred to in North America), 1756-63.*<sup>256</sup>

Bowen notes that warfare and armed conflict were 'the most important dynamics serving to expand the British empire from 1700 onwards, and that while 'warfare ... acted as an important catalyst of change within Britain itself, most notably in the realm of government organisation and finance', the chief benefits were 'those presented in the form of newly won territory, possessions, and untapped sources of

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<sup>250</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 71.

<sup>251</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, pp., 64-67.

<sup>252</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, p 64.

<sup>253</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, pp., 64-65.

<sup>254</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 70.

<sup>255</sup> The government of William Pitt (the Younger) first sought to apply free trade principles to the Anglo-Irish political economy in 1785. See Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, pp., 32-28.

<sup>256</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 23.

wealth'.<sup>257</sup> Moreover, 'peacetime advancement and consolidation were based on force or the threatened use of force'.<sup>258</sup>

Private enterprises such as the East India Company also expanded their trade through the use of force and territorial gains: as Bowen notes, the 'East India Company's trade was an armed trade', and in India from 1750 onwards, 'every aspect of the Company's activities was defined and reinforced by military activity of one sort or another'.<sup>259</sup> The British government generally supported British commercial enterprises (such as the Manchester Chamber of Commerce) in a variety of facilitating processes that were ultimately or directly backed by the use of force. As Bowen observes,

*Governmental intervention often came in the form of legislation to establish monopolies, proprietary colonies or systems of trade such as those embodied in the Navigation Acts, for which in return the state often received payment, long-term loans and increased income from customs revenue.*<sup>260</sup>

Along with the imperative need to compete against the continental European powers in the context of what Linda Colley calls an 'extremely aggressive world-system', British colonial militancy served the interests of commerce.<sup>261</sup> The articulation of militancy and commerce and European rivalry can be seen in the Anglo-French competition following the end of the Spanish War of Succession in 1714. Here, the expansion of French trade exceeded that of any other nation, including Britain.<sup>262</sup> Britain lost ground to French interests in the following decades in several colonial and European contexts. French re-exports of coffee and sugar won the European market, while French cloth made inroads into Persia and India at the expense of the East India Company.<sup>263</sup> In Turkey, French successes undermined the position of the British Levant Company, and French mercantile and military interests challenged those of Britain in the West Indies and North America.<sup>264</sup> British commercial interests and the ruling elite, with the obvious exception of the Jacobites, saw the defeat of French colonial and commercial interests as integral to their own success.<sup>265</sup> It was not until the success of British forces in the Seven Years War that British interests gained the upper hand, and that the constant series of threats posed by the French state to British security appeared, for several decades at least, to have receded.

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<sup>257</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, 1996, p 27.

<sup>258</sup> H.V. Bowen, *op cit.*

<sup>259</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, p 29.

<sup>260</sup> H.V. Bowen, *ibid.*, 1996, p 24.

<sup>261</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 71.

<sup>262</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 79.

<sup>263</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit.*

<sup>264</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit.*

<sup>265</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit.*

After the watershed mark of the Treaty of Paris (1783), in which the British government had recognised American independence, British politicians began to draw upon liberal free trade theories in their framing of overseas trade, as the mercantile system was seen to have failed in the face of American resistance to British taxes and trade restrictions, and, in part, because the British commercial dominance of global commerce meant that work of 'liberal' political-economists such as Smith, Ricardo, and Tucker could be used to advance British interests by enabling politicians to make arguments for the free operation of market laws.<sup>266</sup>

Bernard Seeley thus notes that in the debate over Pitt's 1785 Bill aimed toward the relinquishment of the old commercial system in which the Irish had been suppressed as the 'mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, to their neighbours'<sup>267</sup> for free trade relations with Ireland, various interest groups including the West Indian planters and Lancashire cotton manufacturers had voiced their opposition.<sup>268</sup> However, by 1787, when parliament debated a treaty on trade with France, the opinions of those with vested interests had changed.<sup>269</sup> Seeley observes,

*It seems likely that the increasing awareness of the accelerated expansion of British industry, which was placing Britain in a position in which she had little to fear from a freer trade, and possibly much to gain, was responsible for the change of attitude on the part of the manufacturers in 1788.*<sup>270</sup>

The crucial point in the new *laissez faire* framing of international commerce was not just that 'free trade' would produce a situation of reciprocal growth (as Adam Smith argued)<sup>271</sup>, but that under a situation in which British industry and commerce had achieved dominance then free trade conditions would favour the growth of the British economy over those – such as the French – with which the Tories argued it should engage in a new spirit of recipricocity.<sup>272</sup> As Semmel argues, this meant that the new *laissez faire* ideology was to be governed by the extent to which it served mercantile criteria, and colonial endeavours were to remain a major route for flows of 'super-abundant capital'.<sup>273</sup> In practice, the *laissez faire* approach came to be utilised only to the extent that it served British dominance, and the practice of recipricocity was narrowly limited in application until famine in England and Ireland and socio-political unrest provoked the changes made by the Peel government, including the repeal of

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<sup>266</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, pp., 1-13; Turgot's work in France was also influential.

<sup>267</sup> William Eden, *Four Letters to the Earl of Carlisle*, London, 1978, p 88.

<sup>268</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, pp., 32-38.

<sup>269</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, p 38; Semmel points out that the Bill passed with little opposition because there were no vested interests which could have been adversely affected.

<sup>270</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, p 39.

<sup>271</sup> Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993.

<sup>272</sup> Pitt's trade liberalism was defeated by the events of the French Revolution and subsequent wars with France.

<sup>273</sup> Henry Brougham, *An Inquiry into Colonial Policy*, I, pp., 217-218; Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, pp., 38-47.



the Corn Laws (1846), in the 1840s.<sup>274</sup> Here, policy makers acted on the basis of the new science of political economy, and developed policies on the basis of the belief that trade restrictionism hampered Britain's industrial predominance. The Corn Laws were thus repealed because they 'raised the price of British manufactures, thus stimulating foreign industrial rivals, and because, by blocking the exports of industrial countries, they limited the market for British manufactures abroad.'<sup>275</sup> Here, as Christine Kinealy points out, 'if it suited the interests of government, *laissez faire* could be raised to the status of a dogma; on the other hand, in the case of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Acts, it could be discarded when convenient'.<sup>276</sup> As Brinley Thomas argues, the repeal of the Corn Laws, whilst representing the symbol of the policy of free trade, was not intended to 'weaken the hold that which England had over her overseas possessions'.<sup>277</sup> In this context, Thomas observes that Earl Grey made the British government's understanding of the relationship between political power and economic policy clear: the government 'did not abdicate the duty and power of regulating the commercial policy not only of the United Kingdom but of the British Empire'.<sup>278</sup> Subsequently, where British foreign investment increased from £300 million at the beginning of the 1850s to £1,300 million by 1875, two fifths of this increase consisted of investment within the Empire. The development of Britain at the centre of the expansion of a *laissez faire* world economy was possible because it was anchored in the security of imperial and foreign advantages in the terms of trade and finance.

Thus, while a liberal Cobdenite vision of a cosmopolitan world economy garnered much support throughout the 1830s and 1840s, it was the vision of Britain as the 'workshop of the world' that guided the decisions of policy makers.<sup>279</sup> In fact, the radical cosmopolitan vision of reciprocal free trade was even brought to bear on the forceful pursuit of British colonial and foreign interests, as occurred in the Opium War (1839), and the Punjab War (1849).<sup>280</sup> Thus at the height of the industrial revolution while London was already the financial capital of the world, the British political classes became convinced of the 'necessity of a continually expanding foreign trade and of colonization to a developing industrialism'.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> Popular protests, the Chartists and the Anti-Corn Law League troubled the government in the 1830s and 1840's. See, E. P. Thompson, *ibid.*, pp., 253-255.

<sup>275</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 1970, p 146.

<sup>276</sup> Christine Kinealy, *The Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845-52*, Gill and Macmillan, 1994, p 8.

<sup>277</sup> Brinley Thomas, *Migration and Economic Growth: A Study of Great Britain and the Atlantic Economy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, p 12.

<sup>278</sup> Quoted in Brinley Thomas, *op cit.* Thomas's source is H.J. Habakkuk, 'Free Trade and Commercial Expansion, 1853-1870', *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. II, 1940, p 753.

<sup>279</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, p 157.

<sup>280</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, pp., 152-154

<sup>281</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 2004, p 158.

Subsequently, while the emergent strength and 'Lockean' political structure of the American colonies meant that they would become able to take advantage of the reciprocity that the ideology of free trade promised, this was not true for the colonial societies that functioned as a peripheral 'prize zone' for the competing British, European and American powers.<sup>282</sup> In these societies the mobility of persons, goods and finance continued to be directed by the logic of British commercial expansion, at the behest of the capitalist-state society complex, whose composition, by the mid-eighteenth century, had expanded to include the interests of the industry-driven middle class.<sup>283</sup>

#### **Section 1.4. Formal and Informal Colonial Capitalism and Regimes of Migrant Mobility**

The rise of the British state-society complex to its position as the dominant world power in the nineteenth century developed through the employment of the twinned strategies of formal and informal imperialism consisting of Britain's 'empire building and extensive investment outside its empire'.<sup>284</sup> British dominance was dependent on the articulated processes of colonialism, industrialisation, and political and economic liberalism; this progressive development was built upon the success of earlier mercantilist strategies that did not simply disappear with the emergence of *laissez faire* policies and ideologies. This constellation of evolving processes allowed and was dependent on the British redirection of flows of trade and finance as 'peripheral' and 'core' regions were incorporated within a capitalist world economy.<sup>285</sup> These politico-economic processes of incorporation involved the incorporation of labour-power as a commodity, and thus depended on the development of mobility regimes governing the movement and stasis of persons.

For classical political economy, key starting points for theorising the infra and international mobility of labour-power were given in the works of Smith, Say and Ricardo, and developed in the ideas of Malthus, Torrens, Wakefield, and J.S. Mill. These ideas were in turn subject to the critiques of Marx and Engels, and further developed in liberal, Marxist and neo-Marxist accounts of imperialism and development. Subsequently, post-war migration theorists have drawn upon different elements of these theories in their critical accounts of the dynamic processes of historical and contemporary migration. The 1970s and 1980s saw the field of migration studies dominated by an opposition between

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<sup>282</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 89

<sup>283</sup> Michael Havinden and David Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960*, Routledge, London, 1993.

<sup>284</sup> Paul Knox and John Agnew, *The Geography of the World Economy, 2nd Edition*, Edward Arnold, London and New York, 1994, p 115.

<sup>285</sup> Whilst using Wallerstein's and (thereafter) Amin's terms here, I reject a pure binary opposition between a geopolitical core and a subordinate periphery. Sectors of the core economy were also subject to 'peripheralisation', and hierarchies of power established in colonies and foreign regions tended to create intensified segmentation. The dominant 'core' and the subordinate 'periphery' are and were not purely territorial processes.

structuralist and voluntarist accounts.<sup>286</sup> Here accounts of the exploitation of migrant labour were often strongly correlated to dependence theory's assumption of relations of dominance and subordination between territorially defined centres and peripheries.<sup>287</sup> Simultaneously there developed a renewed focus on socio-cultural dynamics, including accounts seeking to emphasize dynamics of 'race' and class.<sup>288</sup> In the contemporary period, we find approaches that seek to go beyond the binary opposition of structure versus agency that reworked the underlying opposition of freedom versus slavery (free labour *or* forced migration) informing both liberal and Marxist approaches.<sup>289</sup> For our present purposes however, I wish to elaborate some of the key features of the structuralist accounts as these pertain to colonial capitalism.

*The Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith's classic text on the efficiency of the division of labour and the free market, was published in 1776, the year of the American independence. Smith's critique of mercantilism was qualified by its acknowledgement of the value of the 'inexhaustible markets' that the colonies provided for British surplus production. These markets both increased the revenue and wealth accruing to Britain, and in enabling international divisions of labour thereby increased its productive power. In Britain, mercantilist monopolies had created surplus capital and thereby caused market distortions producing an excess of labour (unemployment). The new produce and capital created in the colonial market, however, supported the use of more labour in Britain than was lost through monopolistic market distortions. The legacy of the mercantilist system that Smith wished to retain, therefore, were the reciprocal relations of free trade that might be created between Britain and the colonies granted independence. Free trade would increase the mutual benefits of the greater productivity of land that colonisation had wrought, and thus the more productive employment of labour. For Adam Smith, moreover, the most productive combination of land and labour was held to be the use of free labour rather than slave labour, for persons free to labour in the pursuit of their own interests would be more productive than those compelled to labour without the prospect of freedom or property.<sup>290</sup>

<sup>286</sup> Nikos Papastergiadis, *The Turbulence of Migration: Globalization, Deterritorialization and Hybridity*, Cambridge and Oxford, Polity Press, 2000, p 24. Papastergiadis describes this as an 'unhelpful' phase pertaining to the social sciences in general.

<sup>287</sup> Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a Grand Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, trans. Brian Pearce, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974; *Imperialism and Uneven Development*, Harvester Press, 1978; Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*, 1976b, 1980, 1989.

<sup>288</sup> For example, accounts that privilege the category of class include John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, *Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis*, Routledge, 1979; Robert Miles, *Racism and Migrant Labour*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982

<sup>289</sup> Nikos Papastergiadis, *ibid*, p 35

<sup>290</sup> Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill and London, University of North Carolina Press, 1994, pp., 4-6.

Josiah Tucker subsequently qualified the laissez faire argument by pointing to the fact that free trade would be beneficial to Britain because it held advantages in finance, commerce, and industry. This meant, for example, that under conditions of free trade, a relatively small quantity of British manufactures could be exchanged for a relatively large quantity of American agricultural produce. The exchange led to greater profits for British industry. Whilst beneficial to Britain in the context of the existing imperial advantages, Smith's theory of free trade seemed to present the problem of producing colonial intransigence: why would colonies or foreign countries engage in a system of exchange that did not offer any protection for the value of their produce? Under conditions of free trade, it seemed that agricultural producers might then seek to exchange their produce where it might hold a greater value. If this happened, then Britain might suffer from a glut of manufactures and capital, and subsequently further labour redundancy.

Several of these problems were (theoretically) resolved, at first in the application of Say's Law, and subsequently in the privileging of capital accumulation and the law of comparative advantage. The French economist J.B Say held that a manufacturing glut was not possible, as any growth in industrial production would be matched by an increase in the market for its consumption. In Ricardo's formulation, the validity of Say's Law depended on the maintenance of correct proportions of labour in relation to capital.<sup>291</sup> Applied to the field of emigration, this 'law' required that capital and wages should migrate in equal proportions if wages were to remain constant in Britain. A greater proportion of capital mobilised for overseas endeavours would result in a relative reduction in the demand for labour in Britain. Domestic wages and demand would consequentially fall, damaging the wealth of the nation for the advantage of the mercantilist colonial elites.

If Say's Law was invalid, and a glut in capital still likely, then, as both Smith and Turgot argued, this was to be viewed as beneficial as the accumulation of capital was necessary for the wealth of the nation. David Ricardo subsequently developed the law of comparative advantage, stating that where countries exchanged the produce of their different national specialities, the benefits that accrued were mutual. For Britain, this meant that the profits accruing from the sale of manufactures overseas could provide the funds for the purchase of more foodstuffs than could otherwise have been grown domestically. Conversely, the nation exchanging agricultural produce for British manufactures would be able to afford a greater quantity of manufactures than it could otherwise have produced domestically. Free trade, it was argued, produced a mutually beneficial internal and international division of labour. In the first half of the nineteenth century political economy's promise to enhance the

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<sup>291</sup> David Ricardo, *Principles of Political Economy*, Gonner's ed.; London, Bell, 1913, pp., 273-4. Cited in Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 3.

universal prospect of prosperity and progress emerged as a dominant discourse within the British liberal ideology.

For Smith, Turgot and Ricardo, a glut of capital was not a problem as such, but the accumulation providing the foundation of national wealth. Malthus rejected Say's law and argued that an excess of redundant capital would tend to produce falling prices and profits and therefore a decline in the effective demand for goods. Ricardo, on the other hand, employing the law of diminishing returns, located falling demand in the inability of land to support an increasing population. Malthus, who was later to argue against the repeal of the Corn Laws, thus observed that the glut of capital could usefully be employed in the larger territory of colonial possessions, and that a necessary balance could be struck between the domestic production of agriculture, and the profitable but less secure field of industrial endeavour. Ricardo, alternatively, saw the free exchange of manufactures for foreign agriculture as the solution for the problem of diminishing returns: Britain's future lay in becoming 'a great manufacturing country'. The cost of the pursuit of this future, given the tendency of wages towards subsistence levels, was the production of a class struggle between capitalists, workers, and landlords.

Strident in their arguments for the benefits of free trade based on the value of accumulated capital rather than the extent of (colonial) markets, the classical political economists yet displayed ambivalence when it came to the question of the merits of colonisation. In 1793, Jeremy Bentham argued that the profitable trade with the United States proved that profitable international commerce was not dependent on colonial governance. Colonies represented a loss to the people that accrued as a benefit to the 'ruling few'. Yet, in 1801, Bentham also wrote that colonies provided a 'necessary relief' for the 'efflux of hands and mouths' and the 'efflux of capital', and in 1804 argued that 'a severe sense of general poverty and distress' would have occurred in Britain without the benefit of past colonization.<sup>292</sup> James Mill attacked colonisation as a 'grand source of wars' and a means of support for the aristocracy and wealthy mercantile classes. Yet Mill

*presented colonisation as a means of overcoming both the pressure of population on the land and the declining returns from agriculture, forces that would undermine civilisation in advanced countries like Britain and produce 'reduced wages, and a poor and starving people' unless colonists went overseas to cultivate fresh lands 'yielding a greater return to their labour'.*<sup>293</sup>

The productive strategy of expropriation – the removal of excess labour from the national social body to be redeployed overseas had been proposed from the earliest days of British colonial endeavour at the

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<sup>292</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 26.

<sup>293</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 27.

beginning of the seventeenth century (see chapter two). By the second half of the seventeenth century 'the prevailing view was that the nation's interests were best served by encouraging the growth of numbers', and 'with certain exceptions, emigration was regarded as harmful'.<sup>294</sup> Those certain exceptions included persons whose employment in the colonies provided for a sufficiently high level of profitability: for the seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilists, overseas profitability had to be balanced by population needs at home. The government, therefore, was expected to regulate migration.<sup>295</sup> By the latter eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century industrialisation and the capital accumulation of mercantilist colonization produced an arena of socio-political conflict that Malthus was to address as a problem of 'overpopulation' and 'idleness', and that Ricardo recognised as a class conflict (see chapter two). The health of the domestic economy, moreover, was held to be dependent or subject to improvement, variously, on the growth of foreign markets and the exchange of British manufactures for raw materials produced overseas, and the continuing expansion of colonial territories that required the productive use of more land, and thus a consequent supply of labour. As Bernard Semmel observes, it seemed to the political economists that

*by establishing an informal trade empire that would include agrarian states overseas, as Torrens had urged, as well as by planting colonies, as Malthus and James Mill suggested, Great Britain might overcome the destructive contradictions inherent in the new commercial and industrial system and avoid a disastrous social revolution.*<sup>296</sup>

Adam Smith, as we have seen, argued that the new land gained in colonial territories would be most profitably employed by the application of free labour rather than slavery. Edmund Wakefield was to further elaborate the relationship between free labour and colonial profitability. In theorising the relationship between wages and profits, Wakefield argued that these were dependent on the various proportions amongst land, capital, and population. In Britain, disproportion had led to crisis: capital bore a 'small proportion to labour and great proportion to the field of production'.<sup>297</sup> Bengal, on the other hand, provided an example of a more profitable relationship between the variables. Here, where 'capital bore a small proportion to both labour and the field of production', wages were low and profits were high. The United States, alternatively, showed that the proportion of wages to capital did not necessarily have to have an inverse relationship in order to achieve a high level of profit, for the advantage was to be had in the low ration of capital to the field of production. Subsequently, while wages were high in terms of both share and amount, profits, although low in share, were high in

<sup>294</sup> Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 1.

<sup>295</sup> Brinley Thomas, *op cit*.

<sup>296</sup> Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

<sup>297</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, pp., 85-6; Edmund Wakefield, *Notes upon Wealth of Nations*, 1834



amount.<sup>298</sup> In short, Wakefield proposed that the disproportionate relations of production in Britain where the growth of the population and the accumulation of capital exceeded the field of production could be ameliorated by the export of redundant labour and capital to colonies where the ratio between the variables provided a greater return. Imperial expansion, he argued, was in the interests of the working and middle classes. As owners of labour in an overstocked labour market, the British working class were only capable of realising wages 'which will barely supply the labourer with the necessaries according to his estimate of what is necessary'.<sup>299</sup> For the labouring classes, the prospects of migrant labour in the colonies presented, according to Wakefield, the better prospects of higher wages and, eventually, the possibility of property ownership. Wakefield referred to the middle class consisting of tradesmen and professionals as the 'uneasy class'. This class bore the burden of the glut of capital to a greater degree than the larger capitalist as the prevailing conditions of low profits meant that they faced a constant fear of ruin. A proportion of this class would benefit, therefore, from investing in the colonies where the greater proportion of the field of production to capital promised correspondingly greater security and profits. Correspondingly, middle class investment could be used to underwrite colonialism.

In *England and America* written in the wake of the parliamentary reforms of 1832, Wakefield argued that the class conflict in Britain threatened to result in the poorer classes seeking a 'revolution of property', and that the political strategy that ought to be employed to remove the threat of universal suffrage was for parliament to legislate 'as if it had been elected by universal suffrage'.<sup>300</sup> The means to this end was to be achieved by the repeal of the Corn Laws and the extension of colonial enterprise. The extension of an informal imperialism predicated on the benefits that would accrue to Britain through the incorporation of cost-effective agricultural fields of production into the *laissez faire* sphere of exchange would result in an increase in the real value of wages in Britain. For Wakefield the informal imperialism that should be pursued via free trade with former colonies and foreign countries complemented the formal imperialism that should be pursued in order to open up greater tracts of overseas land via the application of surplus capital and labour. The success of this enterprise depended on the relationship between the factors of production. Previous forms of colonisation had failed, argued Wakefield, because wages had been set at too high a rate in relation to capital and land. The result was that free migrant labourers tended to desert the fields of capitalist production as soon as their savings allowed them to set up as independent small holders. In this instance, British surplus labour was wasted by being employed towards small-scale subsistence agriculture instead of being profitably employed in large-scale capitalist agriculture. The solution that Wakefield proposed was to set the rates of land

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<sup>298</sup> Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

<sup>299</sup> Edmund Wakefield, *England and America*, 1833, p 47; cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 87.

<sup>300</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, pp., 88-9.

value at a 'sufficient price' in order to exceed the potential savings of the labourer's wages.<sup>301</sup> By violating the principle of non-interference in the workings of the market, capital investment would be attracted to the colonies by the prospect of a constant supply of affordable labour. This strategy, moreover, should be extended to the United States. Here, the use of market regulation to bind 'pauper labourers' to productive farming would provide an alternative to the use of slave labour, and result in the greater exchange of cheaper corn for British manufactures. In the colonies, Wakefield argued, the working class could be rendered as 'comfortable, satisfied, and wise at least, as the working class in America'.<sup>302</sup> Yet it was the tendency of the American working class to disperse from the site of capitalist production that the author wanted to overcome by raising the price of land. Wakefield sought, therefore, to modernise overseas agricultural production by pointing it in the profitable direction that he saw given in the relations of production of colonial Bengal where accumulated capital could be employed in a greater territory of production on the basis of a constant supply of cheap labour. In extending the bondage of labour to a longer period of capital-intensive production, Wakefield's proposals can thus be seen to be closer to a regime of indentured labour than free labour migration, as the policy was intended to coerce the labour-migrants into a form of stasis. As such, these proposals matched the spirit of the times, for as David Etlis notes, whilst more than half of the migration to the American colonies had been involuntary, the great majority of that migration was made under conditions of indenture of other forms of relative 'unfreedom'.<sup>303</sup>

Removing British paupers from the national social body was a strategy of expropriation promising a pacification of class conflict (see chapter two, sections one and three). Simultaneously, the political strategy of raising wages via colonial expansion and laissez faire commerce that worked through the virtualism of representative democracy amounted to a depoliticisation of the class conflict that threatened the prospect of a universal franchise.<sup>304</sup> Thus Wakefield's proposals demonstrate the degree to which those invested in the dominance of the British state-society complex could seek to maintain its position by informal and formal strategies of imperialism.

Wakefield's views on the mobility of labour and capital made a strong impression on the political classes in the mid-nineteenth century, influencing both the direction of policy formation and the

<sup>301</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 27-8.

<sup>302</sup> Edmund Wakefield, *England and America*, pp., 120-1; cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, p 89

<sup>303</sup> David Etlis, 'Free and Coerced Migrations: The Atlantic in Global Perspective', paper presented at Oslo University, Norway, February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2000; <http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/m1b/m1b-eltis.pdf>, pp., 1-2. Etlis writes that 'of those who were not forced, a very large number travelled under obligations to others that meant the migrant effectively abandoned some basic freedoms for several years after arrival'.

<sup>304</sup> Michael Samers, 'Invisible capitalism: political economy and the regulation of undocumented immigration in France', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 4, November 2003, p 576; Daniel Miller, 'Conclusion: a theory of virtualism', in J. Carrier and D. Miller, (eds.), *Virtualism: A New Political Economy*, Oxford, Berg. 1998.

theoretical writing of political economists. Representing the Benthamite radicals in parliament, Molesworth framed his arguments for the repeal of the Corn Laws in terms of the need to use colonisation as a means of averting class conflict. Where James Mill had approved of the use of emigration as a vent for the problem of surplus population, he had also worried that the loss of capital might be more damaging than the benefits of the 'diminution of numbers'.<sup>305</sup> J.S. Mill drew upon Wakefield's ideas in his *Principles of Political Economy*. Drawing upon Wakefield's analysis of the imbalance between the proportions of the factors of production in Britain, Mill argued that parliament should promote 'a greater return to savings ... by access to the produce of more fertile land in other parts of the globe'.<sup>306</sup> J.S. Mill observed that the 'perpetual outflow of capital' into colonies and foreign countries had 'been for many years one of the principle causes by which the decline of profits in England had been arrested'.<sup>307</sup> Mill argued furthermore that the colonial settlement of British emigrants was 'the best affair of business in which the capital of an old and wealthy country can engage'.<sup>308</sup> As Brinley Thomas observes,

*Mill was an enthusiastic believer in Wakefield's idea of 'the sufficient price' of land. He wanted to create and maintain in the colonies the system of 'non-competing groups' that prevailed at home; the emigrant labourers must be prevented from becoming peasant proprietors.*<sup>309</sup>

J.S. Mill departed from Wakefield's proposals, however, in arguing that the British government, rather than private interests, should regulate the flows and relative proportions of the flows of capital and migrant-labour to the colonies. Mill suggested that voluntary contributions be drawn from parishes in order 'to clear off the existing unemployed population, but not to raise the wages of the employed'.<sup>310</sup> As Bernard Semmel observes, Thomas Chalmers had similarly suggested that a 'great national experiment' might be conducted in which emigration would be substituted as a moral equivalent for the poor laws.<sup>311</sup> George Poulett Scrope subsequently pushed this idea in a more extreme direction, in urging the government to refuse poor relief to 'all who declined to be transported to the colonies'.<sup>312</sup> This position differed, to an extent, from that of Robert Wilmot-Horton, who with J.S. Mill and Wakefield laid the plans for British colonialism in Canada. Thorton's plans, submitted to a

<sup>305</sup> James Mill, 'Colony', *Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1821, p 33; Cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 95. Semmel points out that James Mill was later to be convinced by his son's positive views of Wakefield's 'systematic colonisation'.

<sup>306</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 31.

<sup>307</sup> J.S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, in J.S. Mill, *Collected Works*, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965, p 753-4; cited in Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

<sup>308</sup> J.S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., bk. V, ch. xi. p 586; Cited in Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 6.

<sup>309</sup> Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 7.

<sup>310</sup> J.S. Mill, *Principles of Political Economy*, p 272; cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 96.

<sup>311</sup> Thomas Chalmers, *Political Economy*, London, 1832, pp., 239-44. cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 81.

<sup>312</sup> George Poulett Scrope, *Principles of Political Economy*, London, 1833, p336; Cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 97.

parliamentary committee in 1823, 'saw parishes securing loans from the government, by mortgaging their poor rates, to finance the emigration and settlement of paupers as peasant proprietors in Canada'.<sup>313</sup> Wakefield's various schemes had all contained an argument for the relative autonomy of the colonialists, or at least, for the middle class capitalist investing in settlement, and Wilmot Thorton had visualised a degree of migrant agency in the shift from (British) pauperism to (colonial) proprietorship. Mill argued, however, that the *laissez-faire* principle had limits in the case of colonisation.<sup>314</sup> Government regulation, therefore, was necessary to ensure the expropriation of surplus labour in Britain and the bondage of labour to the most profitable forms of colonial agricultural production.

For the nineteenth century liberal political theorists and political economists the settler colonies would, eventually, be bound by political and racial allegiance, within the imperial world economy whose operation, governed by laissez-faire principles, would bring reciprocal benefits to the metropolis and its commercial partners. The critique of political economy given by Marx and Engels contained, at various points, a critique of the capitalist dependency on its expansion to external markets via the process of colonisation.<sup>315</sup>

Writing in 1844, Engels argued that Adam Smith's arguments had dishonestly depicted trade as advantageous to all parties in a transaction and as a bond of international friendship, and that the institution of a cosmopolitan world market via the 'liberal economic system' acted to 'universalise enmity'. For Engels, the political economists construction of an opposition between 'free competition' and the mercantilist system of monopolisation was fallacious; the extension of competition freed from constrain served only to allow the universalising of the tendency towards monopolies and thus intensify the social conflict between socialism and capitalism. Reviewing his position in 1892, Engels wrote that 'Capitalist production *cannot* stop', but 'must go on increasing and expanding or die'.<sup>316</sup> The subtext of Engel's latter view was the necessity of foreign and colonial expansion to the success of British capitalism.

Marx, writing in *Capital* in 1867, elaborated a theory of necessary capitalist expansion and stated that

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<sup>313</sup> Robert Wilmot-Thorton cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1970, p 104.

<sup>314</sup> J.S. Mill, 'Of the Grounds and Limits of the *Laissez-faire* or Non-interference Principle', in *Principles of Political Economy, Collected Works*, ed. J.M. Robson, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965.

<sup>315</sup> Lydia Potts, *The World Labour Market*, p 176; Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 171. Potts makes the point that Luxemburg, like Marx, assumes that external markets are indispensable. Semmel accounts for Marx's positive account of British colonialism in India in terms of Marx's historicism; the incorporation of Indian society within capitalist production represents, for Marx, a shift from feudal relations towards the capitalist relations in which resides the emergence of the revolutionary proletariat.

<sup>316</sup> Frederic Engels, 'Introduction', *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, English ed. Cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 134.

*The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production.*<sup>317</sup>

As Lydia Potts points out, Marx here emphasises both the importance of the colonies in the process of primitive accumulation and the connection between the 'world market for labour power and the world market for commodities'.<sup>318</sup> Marx goes on to observe that the accumulation of capital in Britain was dependent on securing and monopolising colonial markets in order to redirect the flow of commodities and finance. Potts again notes that the measurement of colonial exploitation in Marx's account cannot be reduced to the imbalance of trade between the metropolis and its colonies: In the example of British India Marx finds that 'a process of bleeding' occurs that amounts to an annual income in excess of that of India's 'sixty million agricultural and industrial workers'. This income consists of

*[w]hat the English receive each year in the form of interest, dividends for railways which are no use at all to the Hindus, military and service pensions, what they take from the country for the Afghan and other wars etc. etc., what they receive without giving anything in return, and ... what they expropriate each year inside of India – I am speaking then only of the value of goods that India is forced to send to England each year free of charge.*<sup>319</sup>

Underpinning the financial and commercial exploitation of the Indian economy is the advantageous proportionality between the factors of production that Wakefield observed in the example of Bengal. In Rosa Luxemburg's later account, India formed a typical case of imperialism as its subordination consisted of the heavy taxation of the peasantry and their subsequent indebtedness, the appropriation of their lands and the subsequent coercion of the labour-power.<sup>320</sup> In fact, in Marx's account, it is not just that capital reproduces in a relatively small proportion to labour power and land, but that colonial taxation and fiscal policy has ensured that India itself provides the capital 'free of charge'.

Marx and Engels shared a historicist sense of progress that saw social reproduction develop from feudal to mercantile, and then from capitalist to communist forms. This historicism led Marx, at points, to mix criticism with a partial tendency to celebrate the achievements of British colonialism. This

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<sup>317</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, p 703.

<sup>318</sup> Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 173.

<sup>319</sup> MEW, Vol., 35, p 157, cited in Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 175.

<sup>320</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 151.

tendency was apparent in Marx's account of British rule in India. Marx wrote that the eighteenth century colonisation of India was 'as hideous as the slave trade'.<sup>321</sup> Mapping the developments of colonisation, he continued to observe that where 'the aristocracy wanted to conquer India, the 'moneyocracy' sought to plunder it, and the 'millocracy' sought to 'undersell it'.<sup>322</sup> Yet Marx did not, as Semmel observes, propose that India should adopt a protectionist system, as he had done in the context of the colonial exploitation of Ireland.<sup>323</sup> The reason for the different perspectives on the different colonial contexts lay in the extent to which the capitalist 'improvements' in India – the irrigation and transport system that increased the supply of raw materials to Britain – also appeared to hasten the shift from feudalism to industrialisation, and thus provided to context in which class conflict and thereafter communism could arise. Bernard Semmel notes that what he describes as 'ambivalence' in Marx's thoughts on colonialism disappeared in the context of the rise of finance capitalism in the 1870s. Here, Mike Davis notes that the damaging effects of British fiscal policy in India had become fully apparent and overturned the benefits that Marx had seen in the 'railway revolution' and other forms of modernisation'.<sup>324</sup>

Marx and Engels 'stressed the role of capitalism as a system of colonial as well as domestic exploitation and saw in this the seeds of the self-destruction of the liberal ideal'.<sup>325</sup> For Marx, colonial exploitation was not just advantageous to the accumulation of British capital, but necessary because of the internal (national) dynamics of the world market. Basing his argument on the necessary production of surplus capital and labour within the process of capitalist industrialisation, Marx argued that the surplus pertaining to any one industry cannot find equilibrium in the domestic market as the same process occurs in each of the other industries. In terms of the production of surplus labour, Marx observes that

*It is an inherent contradiction of the movement of capital that the natural increase in the working masses is inadequate to satisfy the requirements of the accumulation of capital, and yet is always in excess of those requirements. Capital needs growing quantities of young male workers and diminishing quantities of adult male workers. This contradiction is not a more glaring one than the contradiction that there should be a complete lack of hands at the very time when thousands are unemployed because the division of labour has chained them to some specific branch of industry.*<sup>326</sup>

<sup>321</sup> Karl Marx, 'Parliamentary Debate on India', *The New York Tribune*, June 25<sup>th</sup>, 1853

<sup>322</sup> Karl Marx, *op cit*.

<sup>323</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 138.

<sup>324</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 27.

<sup>325</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, p 171; Semmel incorrectly argues that this focus did not fully eventuate until the 1870s on the basis of the overemphasis he places on the historicism.

<sup>326</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp., 708-9; cited in Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 7.



These inherent 'contradictions' represent the creation of floating labour, those workers whose position 'floats' between the ebb and flow of industrial cycles. Floating labour is the first of Marx's three categories of surplus labour. The second of these is the latent surplus, which refers to those labourers rendered redundant in the process of agricultural modernisation.<sup>327</sup> Latent labour forms the backbone of rural to urban migration, providing a new pool of commodified labour-power for urban industrialisation. These persons are often those who are displaced within the shift between feudal and capitalist agricultural production; they may have been 'de-peasantised', and were likely to have been pauperised.<sup>328</sup> The third form of surplus labour is referred to as 'stagnant labour'.<sup>329</sup> Stagnant labour, consisting of paupers, vagrants, the elderly, the infirm and the criminal, refers to persons whose labour-power is most resistant to commodification. This stratum of labour forms a 'self-reproducing and self-perpetuating element of the working class'. Together, the three categories of surplus labour supplies a 'reserve army of labour' that can be re-deployed within the changing requirements and divisions of the economy, but presents a political and economic cost as long as it remains unemployed.

Marx's definition of the capitalist solution for problems of under-production and consumption caused by surplus capital and labour echoes that of the classical political economists; a domestic glut requires a foreign market allowing the employment of profitably proportioned capital, goods, and labour. Marx had argued that capitalism had been dependent on slavery as a means of exploiting labour power:

*Direct slavery is just as pivotal to our industry today as machinery, credit, and so on. Without slavery, no cotton; without cotton, no modern industry. It was slavery which first gave the colonies a value, it was the colonies which first created international trade, and international trade is a vital prerequisite for large-scale mechanised industry.*<sup>330</sup>

Marx differentiates the 'veiled slavery' of wage labour from the 'direct' slavery of the colonial plantations. The former is given as being dependent on the latter, as 'the veiled slavery of wage-workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world'.<sup>331</sup> Marx further theorises the relationship between slavery and the re-incorporation of surplus labour in the process of colonial capitalism. Here Marx critiqued the 'modern theory of colonization' that he saw as having been built upon the theories of Wakefield.<sup>332</sup> Marx observed that where the dependence of labour on

<sup>327</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp., 711; cited in Brinley Thomas, *op cit.*

<sup>328</sup> Teodor Shanin, *Defining Peasants: Essays Concerning Rural Societies, Expolary Economies and Learning from Them in the Contemporary World*, London, Routledge, 1990.

<sup>329</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp., 711; cited in Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 7.

<sup>330</sup> Karl Marx, *MEW*, vol. 27, p 458; cited in Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 177.

<sup>331</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1, p 711; cited in Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 177.

<sup>332</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Chapter XXXIII; H.O. Pappé, 'Wakefield and Marx', *Economic History Review*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, IV, No. 1, 1951, pp., 88-97

capitalism in the ancient civilized countries occurred by 'law of nature', the dependence of labour on capitalist production in the colonies must be 'created by artificial means'.<sup>333</sup> Those artificial means, as we noted above, included the regulation of property value at a rate that placed it beyond the potential savings of the free migrant labourer. For Marx, the strategy of the colonial redeployment of surplus labour in this manner represented proof of the fact that 'capitalist production and private property based on the producer's own labour are mutually exclusive'.<sup>334</sup> Here then, the re-incorporation of surplus labour-power into the world market is dependent upon the subordination of migrant-labour.

For Wakefield, the process of systematic colonization was 'designed so that 'free' labour could play the economic role which slave labour had played in the plantations of the old colonial system', whilst also providing a further market for British manufactures.<sup>335</sup> Wakefield referred to this colonial process as one of 'natural slavery'.<sup>336</sup> For Wakefield, slave labour had been necessary in those parts of the earth where 'land is superabundant', as the proportion of labour to land was insufficient for efficient production. Systematic colonization, constituting the only 'practical means of ultimately abolishing slavery throughout the world', was predicated on 'natural slavery', the 'natural subordination in which the greater parts of mankind always have been, and probably *always will be*'.<sup>337</sup> Here the liberal paradox identified by Marx can be correlated to the manner in which the logic of colonial-capitalism appears to contain a trace of the 'not yet-ness' that Chakrabarty sees in the application of the liberal ideology of Progress to the colonial subject.<sup>338</sup> The British migrant *qua* colonial subject is also the free labourer who, according to Adam Smith, provides the most productive form of labour because he is free to labour in the pursuit of his own interests. This liberal subject is free to pursue upwards-financial mobility, and thus an improvement in his social status. At the same time, the agency inherent to that 'liberal citizenship' is withheld in the bondage that systematic colonialism seeks to impose. The justification for that infinite deferral is the implicit 'natural' moral equivalence of the British pauper (whose 'idleness' requires excorporation) to the colonial slave. This is the point at which, to refer again to the argument presented by John Marriott, that 'race' intersects with class in the process of colonial capitalism, as both the metropolitan pauper and the colonial subject (the African slave; the Indian peasant) represent limits to the pursuit of Progress. Once excorporated to the colonial field of production, moreover, the *colonial* status of the British subject becomes apparent.

<sup>333</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1928, pp., 854; cited in Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 9.

<sup>334</sup> Brinley Thomas, *ibid*, p 10.

<sup>335</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 110-11.

<sup>336</sup> Edmund Wakefield, *Second Report from the Committee on South Australia*, 1841, iv, p 238 (2696). The emphasis belongs to Wakefield, as Wakefield used the term 'natural' to differentiate his system from the charge that he intended to keep the emigrant 'in a state which you term one of natural slavery'.

<sup>337</sup> Edmund Wakefield, *op cit*. The emphasis here is mine.

<sup>338</sup> See the discussion in section 1.2; Dipesh Chakrabarty, *ibid*, p 8.

In Marxist terminology, we might say that their labour-power was a latent potential that required disciplinary strategies for productivity and commodification, but we can also state, in Foucault's terms, that it formed the bio-political site of their 'empowerment' as 'docile bodies'. For Marx, the necessary extension of the capitalist mode of production is dependent upon the transformation of the 'primitive' limits that are simultaneously internal and external to capitalism:

*The tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. Every limit appears as a barrier to be overcome. Initially, to subjugate every moment of production itself to exchange and to suspend the production of direct use values not entering into exchange, i.e. precisely to posit production based on capital in place of earlier modes of production, which appear primitive from its standpoint.*<sup>339</sup>

While Marx's view that the extension of the capitalist mode of production necessarily leads to international proletarianization has been superseded, Samir Amin was essentially correct to argue that the European core acts, in the process of colonisation, to make the periphery dependent upon it, and to block the peripheries' path to development.<sup>340</sup> Yet, the abstraction of labour-power in the process of colonial capitalism constitutes a 'prize' that cannot *solely* be mapped onto an exploited periphery (a 'prize area') that upholds a dominant core.<sup>341</sup> That the production of an 'idle' reserve army of labour requires a strategy of expropriation is one measure of the fact that the 'primitive' resistance to incorporation within the world labour market was a continuing British phenomenon, as well as a colonial one. The need to regulate the proportionality between labour, land and capital in the process of settler-colonisation in order to ensure a 'natural' replacement for slavery demonstrates a point at which capital, at different moments, seeks to incorporate its limits on the 'primitive' axis of 'race' and class. Primitive accumulation here works as an appropriation of non-capitalist or pre-capitalist modes of social reproduction. Peripheralisation, as such, is a process whose axis was both spatial and temporal. Where the British colonial-and-national poor were subject to the not yet-ness of the liberal horizon of freedom, they were subject to the process of peripheralisation consisting of their pauperisation, criminalisation, expropriation, and the range of subsequent political technologies that took the form of disciplinary governmentalities.<sup>342</sup>

In this context, the appropriation of the discourse of liberal rights given in the imagined tradition of the 'free-born Englishman' was a claim for recognition made against a resistance to an imagined

<sup>339</sup> Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, p 408; cited in Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 174.

<sup>340</sup> Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a Grand Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment*, trans. Brian Pearce, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1974

<sup>341</sup> The term 'prize area' comes from Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 89

<sup>342</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *ibid*, 2000, p 8; Michel Foucault, *ibid*, 1991

equivalence with the colonial slave (see chapter three). On the other hand, the very existence of this possible horizon forms the difference between chattel slavery and wage-slavery: the social death given in the impossibility of the state of freedom was, precisely, the definition of the state of racialised slavery.<sup>343</sup> The slave is here a pure form of 'labour-power commodity' whose circulation, as a commodity, lies entirely outside of the contractual basis of wage-labour.<sup>344</sup> Yet here, also, the transported convict was subject to an 'excorporating' form of social death, and the labour-power provided in convict labour forms a pre-capitalist form of productivity whose produce was incorporated within the circuits of capitalist exchange.<sup>345</sup> There is a correspondence between the slave and the convict where, for example, the prison, the transportation ship and the plantation represent material symbols of the circuits of forced mobility and stasis. Convict labour, as we will discuss in the following chapter, was considered as a 'natural' alternative to slavery. The social death involved in these processes does not so much amount to a new form of 'human community' in Arendt's sense of the minimal belonging achieved through subservient labour, but a radical state of alienated unbelonging.<sup>346</sup> Subsequently, from the standpoint of the African slave or the transported convict the struggle for emancipation or 'excarceration' was a struggle for the recognition of a 'right to have rights' that mirrors that of the latter category of stateless persons.<sup>347</sup>

The peripheralisation of the non-settler colonial societies involves a postponement of their inclusion within the linear path of liberal progress. The racially constructed interval of that postponement allows their exploitation. As Rosa Luxemburg wrote,

*[c]apital needs other races to exploit territories where the white man cannot work. It must be able to mobilise world labour power without restriction in order to utilise all productive forces of the globe – up to the limits imposed by a system of producing surplus value.*<sup>348</sup>

In Luxemburg's works, as Lydia Potts has recently made clear, there is a clear-sighted analysis of the relationship between imperialism and the incorporation of labour-power within European capitalism.<sup>349</sup> For Luxemburg, the coercive 'liberation' of labour power was necessary to primitive accumulation.<sup>350</sup> This process was integral to the process of capitalism in Europe and in the regions that later theorists

<sup>343</sup> Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982.

<sup>344</sup> Karl Marx, *MEW*, vol. 24, p 475.

<sup>345</sup> The convict's labour power, in itself, was not always the object of commodification; colonial convict labour was often employed on public works, or on tasks designed purely within a regime of punishment

<sup>346</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, San Diego, Harcourt, 1994, p, 297

<sup>347</sup> Hannah Arendt, *ibid*, pp., 296-7.

<sup>348</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, *The Accumulation of Capital*, 1913, p 362

<sup>349</sup> Lydia Potts, *ibid*, pp., 181-7

<sup>350</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, *ibid*, p 369

have referred to as the peripheries, where the exploitation of foreign labour-power accompanies 'particularly high levels of profitability'.<sup>351</sup> Moreover, the incorporation and re-incorporation of labour-power pertained to all, rather than just the initial stages of capitalist production.<sup>352</sup> The coercion involved in 'liberating' the commodity labour-power involved strategies that range from 'gentle compulsion' (primarily applied to European subjects) to the use of force (primarily applied to colonial subjects).<sup>353</sup> To a strong extent, the different intensities of these strategies are correlates of the continuum of labour-migration that David Etlis describes as working between states of freedom and unfreedom.<sup>354</sup>

This chapter has provided a contextual account of colonial capitalism, elaborating the interdependency of the state society complex in the form of a liberal and fiscal-militant structure and the production of flows of finance and trade from the colonies. We have also discussed the construction of imperialism as a form of liberalism that legitimated colonial oppression in terms of the deferred horizon of liberal inclusion that was dependent on the construction of anthropological differences, and suggested that this horizon was also a feature of domestic liberalism where the axis of 'race' meets that of class in the 'pre-modern' limits to progress manifest in the socio-political problematisation of the poor.

Subsequently, we have surveyed several of the classical liberal and Marxist approaches to colonisation and labour-migration in order to establish the importance of migrant mobility and stasis for liberal imperialism. In this context, I wish to suggest that just as colonial-capitalism was a process whose dynamics worked both within and without the British nation, it was not just the labouring and non-labouring poor of the colonies whose mobility and stasis was subject to the emergent disciplines of capitalism, but also the British poor whose subjection to the disciplinary sphere of modern governmentality and capitalist wage relations often rendered them as an 'unfree' antinomy of colonial and liberal Progress. In the following chapter we will examine the manner in which several of the most important British mobility regimes operated at the intersection of the developments of British liberalism, imperialism, and capitalism to produce migration flows that were both political-and-economic. The incorporation of colonial labour within the process of British capitalism served to articulate the lower and higher circuits of colonial and national finance and commerce. It is this complex and contested constellation of articulated mobility regimes that forms the subject of the following chapter.

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<sup>351</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, *ibid*, p 365

<sup>352</sup> Lydia Potts points out that Luxemburg's theory does not posit a Marxist 'catastrophe' thesis, but offers an analysis of capitalist imperialism as a on-going dialectic process

<sup>353</sup> Rosa Luxemburg, *ibid*, p 362

<sup>354</sup> David Etlis, 'Labour and Coercion in the English Atlantic World from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Century', in Michael Twaddle: *The Wages of Slavery: From Chattel Slavery to Wage Labour in Africa, the Caribbean, and England*, London, Frank Cass, 1993, p 207.



## Chapter 2. 'Progressive' Mobility

The foregoing contextual account of the development of colonial capitalism has focussed on the relationship between the hegemonic position of the colonial-capitalist state society complex and the place of colonial mobility, primarily that of trade, finance and labour, in the emergence and maintenance of relations of dominance between the 'metropolitan core' and the 'colonial periphery'. The process of peripheralisation occurred in the colonial prize areas and temporalities, and in Britain itself: consequently, there was an extent to which British subjects were also *colonial* subjects, and the 'periphery' was not purely exterior to the nation. In addition, the discussion of the relationship between liberalism and imperialism has served to place the concrete material relations of colonialism within the context of the hegemonic discourse of liberalism. This chapter will build on these perspectives in order to develop a subsequent analysis of colonial migration regimes.

The first section of this chapter (2.1) will describe the production of pauperised migration and stasis within the English and British nation-state, and section 2.2 will examine the colonisation of the Irish economy and the production of pauperised Irish migrants. In the following sections I will pursue two case studies in order to establish the relevance of pauperised mobility and stasis beyond the bounds of the British nation. In section 2.3 I will describe the dynamics of the transatlantic trade operating between Africa, the West Indies, and Britain in terms of the forced movement and stasis of British and African persons, and the appropriation of emancipation within the domestic political order. Section 2.4 will describe the importance of the Anglo-Indian colonial process for the stability of the hegemonic form of the British political economy. Here, I will also describe the pauperisation of the 'Indian' economy, and the subsequent production of mobile and immobilised paupers. These case studies are intended to establish a basis for approaching migration and mobility regimes as political *and* economic processes.<sup>355</sup> In section 2.5 I will describe the articulation of the different forms of mobility controls as an element of the apparatuses establishing the hegemony of the British capitalist elite. Thus, this chapter focuses on the link between the political economy and ideologies of British colonial capitalism and the production of forced migrations and stasis. The chapter that follows will address the British construction of 'citizens, subjects, aliens, and others' in primarily socio-political terms. Together with the first, contextualising chapters, these two chapters will provide a suggestive colonial-capitalist genealogy of mobility regimes as a framework for the development of the modern national migration regimes that I will begin to discuss in chapter three.

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<sup>355</sup> It is not my intention to establish a *comprehensive* account of British mobility regimes in the colonial period, but merely to make use of several indicative case studies that elaborate forms of colonial capitalist migration regimes that are both political and economic.



## Section 2.1. Colonial-Capitalism and the Regimes of Pauperised and Criminalised Migrations and Stasis

Having outlined the relationship between the development of the capitalist British state-society complex, liberalism, and the political economy of colonial capitalism, I want to examine the relationship of these dynamic processes to the mobility regimes in Britain. The historians Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh write that capitalism originated in

*a series of interrelated social and economic changes in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century England including the shift in agriculture from arable subsistence to commercial pastorage; the increase of wage labour; the growth of urban populations; the expansion of the domestic system of handicraft or putting-out; the growth of world trade; the institutionalization of markets; and the establishment of a colonial system.*<sup>356</sup>

Linebaugh and Rediker emphasise the degree to which colonial-capitalism depended upon strategies of expropriation and displacement, and, as I will argue below, the correlate of these strategies of mobility were forms of forced stasis. These were interdependent forms of mobility control, which created new flows and stasis in culture, goods, labour, finance, and services. Expropriation was both the 'source of the original accumulation of capital' and 'the force that transformed land and labour into commodities': in England, within the process of expropriation, large-scale landowners of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries responded to new national and international market opportunities by radically changing 'agricultural practices by enclosing arable lands, evicting smallholders, and displacing rural tenants, thus throwing thousands of men and women off the land and denying them access to the commons'.<sup>357</sup> Consequentially, the numbers of propertyless people increased twelve fold from the end of the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth centuries.<sup>358</sup>

The changing socio-economic practices including those of expropriation in this period produced a large growth in destitution, and subsequently saw a sharp rise in the number of workers and non-workers utilizing migration whilst begging and seeking work. A new class of mobile poor had been produced, and the authorities addressed this situation in the form of the problem of vagrancy. The manner in which the 'problem' was addressed was itself a further cause of destitution and thus of the internal displacement of poor people.

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<sup>356</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*, p 16.

<sup>357</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*, pp., 16-7.

<sup>358</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *op cit*. These changes were correlative to the abandonment of feudal retinues, and the abolishment of medieval system of charity.

English and, subsequently British capitalism made a quantum leap with the onset of colonialism and the productive use of international forced migrations and labour.<sup>359</sup> The growth in finance and consumption produced by colonization fed into the industrial revolution which in turn fed back into the growth and development of colonization (see chapter one). The emergence of English capitalism, however, predated colonialism and the control of mobilities initiated under nascent capitalism in the fourteenth century developed in the form of a conflict, when feudal agrarian relationships began to give way to national governmentality and the wage labour system. In the initial loosening of feudal ties, lords released many workers from villeinage in order to free up land for larger scale grazing. Subsequently labour-power produced new forms of mobility, including migration, casual wage work, and the relative redirection of agricultural and other forms of income towards the poor. Many labourers sought to travel for work in order to hire themselves out for well paid short term contracts, and to use the free time gained to work on the small plots that they either owned or appropriated from the commons. As part of the hegemonic response, labour, wages, and migrant-mobility were regulated and the agency of the poor criminalized from the end of the feudal system and the beginnings of capitalism in England. In terms of movement, the ruling classes sought to enforce the stasis that they deemed necessary for the expansion of new agricultural practices (chiefly, the grazing of sheep for the growing market in wool products).

We can trace the process of articulation between expropriation and labour and migrant mobility in the development of England's Poor Laws, for which the Act of 1349-50 gave a precedent. In the discourse and governance set out in the Acts of 1349-50, both migrant-workers and migrant-beggars were referred to as 'vagabonds'; these groups were conflated to the degree that they both resisted the bonded wage-labour system introduced in place of feudalism. William P. Quigley describes the practice of this conflation:

*The laws of 1349-50 and those following them treated labourers, vagrants and beggars similarly; workers and servants were considered only a step away from being vagrants and beggars; thus they must be compelled to work, compelled to stay at work, compelled to accept low wages, compelled to*

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<sup>359</sup> Following H.V. Bowen, I refer to English capitalism prior to the 1707 Act of Union, and British capitalism thereafter. In addition, I retain the terms 'England' and 'English' after 1707 when seeking to distinguish between different nationalities and national interests. In doing so, I am following Catherine Hall's critique of the universal particular construction of English identities in the 1830s and 1840s. Hall argues, correctly, that Englishness stands in for a universal conception in a way that other British ethnicities – the Welsh – cannot, for these are given as distinctly particular. This argument remains valid for the use of the term 'British' where the intention is to invoke a collective or universal identity in the service of particularly English interests. See Catherine Hall, *White, Male, and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History*, London, Polity Press, 1992, pp., 205-6.

*stay where they can be put to work, and imprisoned if they disobey. Consequently, vagrants and beggars were compelled into joining the working classes.*<sup>360</sup>

Conflation, however, was only one element of the articulation between the regulation of the working and non-working poor as the symbolic and material regulation of the non-working poor was mobilized in order to discipline the working poor and place pressure upon the poor in general which would force them to accept the conditions of wage labour as these were set by the ruling classes. A new wave of legislation occurred in the middle of the sixteenth century as several factors combined to produce another great increase in pauperized mobility. The ongoing effects of the enclosure movement and urban industrialization continued to produce rural to urban migration, while a mid-century famine exacerbated the poverty of migrants. These developments took place in a new political context marked by the Reformation's centralizing and secularizing tendencies.

The Acts of Poor Relief in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which centralised and localized poor relief, while continuing the *ad hoc* policies differentiating the 'worthy' from the 'worthless' poor. The first of these statutes addressing the 'punishment of beggars and vagabonds,' preceded the closing of the monasteries (in 1536 and 1539), which had borne the prime responsibility for alms giving in the medieval period. The preamble to the 1531 statute stated that 'in all places throughout this realm, vagabonds and beggars have of long time increased, and daily do increase in great and excessive numbers, by the occasion of idleness, mother and root of all vices'.<sup>361</sup> This act defined vagabondage as the act of idleness or of being 'out of place' while being poor, capable of work, and yet unemployed.

Begging while being 'idle' and out of place and the giving of alms to such were criminalized while the begging of the impotent (those deemed incapable of work) was to be confined to strictly defined localities. Thus, although it replicated the thinking behind ruling class attitudes to the problem of vagrancy since the fourteenth century, this statute represented the first comprehensive legislative act directed at distinguishing between the 'idle' and worthy poor. The Act of 1536 established local (parish) responsibility for the gathering and provision of alms as well as for the employment of the idle. Thus, through national legislation, the stigmatised condition of unemployment was recognized as a supplement to the punitive measures designed to redirect the Poor's mobility from idleness to regulated wage labour. The articulation of material and symbolic strategies of control can be seen in the Act of 1547, which allowed the branding of idle vagrants with the letter 'V' and provided for their enslavement to 'any person who shall demand him' while that economic slave was to be fed on a diet

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<sup>360</sup> William P Quigley, 'Five hundred years of English poor laws, 1349-1843: regulating the working and non-working poor', *Akron Law Review*, Fall, 1996; I draw on Quigley's account throughout this section.

<sup>361</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 10.

of bread and water for the following two years.<sup>362</sup> Punishment for vagrancy worked as a form of public spectacle, and ranged from whipping and the cutting off of an ear through to execution for repeat offences.

The Statute of Artificers and Compulsory Assessment of 1563 brought together the *ad hoc* legislations addressing labouring migrants' mobility and wage and labour regulation, while essentially reinstating and refitting the ideas governing the Statute of Labourers of 1349-50 for the conditions of the sixteenth century, including population growth and a great increase in rural to urban and metropolitan migration. Labourers were confined to their own parishes and required written authorization if they were to move to another locality for work. An employer had to provide local authorities with a statement of release from any labourer's previous employer, and workers were required to stay with their employers for yearly periods, being paid at a nationally regulated rate and being required to work hours that were similarly set. Thus, by the 1570's, the position of the non-labouring poor came to be defined as vagabondage, the meaning of which was now redefined as the refusal of work for reasonable wages.<sup>363</sup>

While the 1563 Statute set the 'central legal position' for labourers for the following 250 years, the Poor Law of 1601 together with the Poor Relief Act of 1662, often referred to as the Act of Settlement, did the same for the non-labouring poor up until 1951.<sup>364</sup> The Poor Law left many of the *ad hoc* provisions in place, and set out three primary principles; that of local responsibility; that of 'primary family responsibility', and in the amendment of 1662, that of settlement and removal.<sup>365</sup> Paul Slack notes that the 'original statute of 1662 was essentially an Act for Removal'.<sup>366</sup> In the duty of relief for the poor, the local parish was now enabled by a process of annual assessment upon goods traded and persons, by which it was allowed to raise funds, or if these were insufficient, to apply to other parishes in the immediate locale for assistance. Taxation thus constituted the basis of a nationally legislated system of local relief. On the basis of the second principle all members of any given family were held as co-responsible for taking any actions necessary to keep them off the public purse. Subsequently, non-working children could be removed from their families and required to take apprenticeships for which they received no wage.

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<sup>362</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 12, fn., 134.

<sup>363</sup> David Etlis, *op cit*.

<sup>364</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 13.

<sup>365</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 10.

<sup>366</sup> Paul Slack, *The English Poor Law, 1531-1782*, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 1990, p 36

The Poor Relief Act's principle of settlement and removal most directly addressed the problem of pauperized migratory-mobility.<sup>367</sup> That the interests of the authorities of the City of London and Westminster primarily motivated the writing of the statute demonstrated the increasingly centralised and metropolitan control over policy formation across the range of mobilities (economic and migratory). The Act furnished parishes with the right of removal over any person who had entered the parish within the previous forty days and appeared likely to request relief. Once removed, migrants were required to settle in the parish to which they had been returned. In its substance the Act of Settlement merely reflected prevailing practices; the changes it effected were to nationalize them, and to give rise to a burgeoning field of inter-parish litigation over removals and settlements. The preamble of the 1662 Act stated that

*By reason of some defect in the law, poor people are not restrained from going from one parish to another, and therefore do attempt to settle themselves where there is the best stock, the largest commons or wastes to build cottages, and the most woods for them to burn and destroy, and when they have consumed it, then to another parish, and at last become rogues and vagabonds, to the great discouragement of the parishes to provide stocks, where it is liable to be devoured by strangers.*<sup>368</sup>

For what it can tell us about the contestation working through the site of mobility, the 1662 Preamble bears comparison with the passage from the Statute of 1349-50, which, written at the initial stage of the shift to agricultural capitalism, states that workmen and servants, having seen 'the necessity of masters, and a great scarcity of servants, will not serve unless they may receive excessive wages, and some rather willing to beg in idleness, than by their labour get their living'.<sup>369</sup> Rather than serve masters for wages that, having been insufficient in relation to the price of corn became increasingly so after they were pegged back, the newly emancipated 'masterless' men sought to use conditions of labour-scarcity towards some degree of relative autonomy in casual labour, mobility, and small plot farming. Each of these three elements – the use of agency in the choice of when, where, and how to labour – were essential to the development of the labourers' relative freedom.

By the mid-seventeenth century the contest over the control of mobilities had come to centre on the issues of expropriation, migrant mobility, and the subsequent rise of socio-political conflicts, many of which were centred in the metropolis. From 1550 to 1700, the population of London grew sevenfold, while the population of England merely doubled.<sup>370</sup> Migrants swelled the population of the nation's

<sup>367</sup> Paul Slack, *ibid*, p 38. Slack states that 'the poor migrant ... found it more difficult to earn a new settlement (and hence entitlement to relief), ... than to move to a new residence; and that was the main purpose of the law'.

<sup>368</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 15.

<sup>369</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 6.

<sup>370</sup> Francis Sheppard, *London: A History*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, p 126.

capital – often in search for the possibilities that the regular and irregular urban economy offered in the context of the forced removal from the commons that large-scale agricultural practice demanded. Such internal displacement was to some extent forced and to some extent a resistant act of agency; migrants refused the stasis legislated in the Act of Settlement, and the conditions of bondage imposed under the Poor Laws and the process of enclosure.

The modifying Act for Supplying Some Defects in the Law for the Relief of the Poor (1697) placed particular emphasis on the symbolic element of regulating the non-labouring poor. All recipients of relief were required to wear the letter 'P' stitched in red or blue to the outside of their garments. The justification for this act of symbolic violence was given as an attempt to ensure that 'idle' beggars were not encouraged to attempt to rely on public relief and that only the impotent were to be relieved.<sup>371</sup> This logic was, however, something of an obfuscation, re-writing the resistance of the poor into the structural production of poverty in a process of pauperization. Pauperisation necessitated placing the poor within a moral discourse and governmentality that both conflated and divided the 'idle' and 'worthy' poor within the category of the 'pauper'. Poverty, in the discourse and governance of the poor, was shown to be a matter of individual moral failing, and 'idleness' and 'vice' described the characteristics that belonged to the poor *en masse*. Here, as Procacci observes, 'pauperism is mobility' – it is the threatening mobility of the disorderly poor.<sup>372</sup> Poverty refigured as mobile pauperism (the *mobile vulgate*) 'personifies the residue of a more fluid, elusive sociality, impossible either to control or to utilize'.<sup>373</sup>

While the Poor Laws stigmatized poverty and enforced stasis upon the mobility of the poor, mercantile and metropolitan interests realized that the migration of the poor was essential to their labour requirements.<sup>374</sup> Legislation requiring stasis protected local authorities from being over-burdened by requests for relief from 'foreigners'. Yet the same legislation caused employers great difficulty as it restricted the labour-supply that their enterprise required. At the same time it was recognized that the strategy of pauperization – the stigmatizing and criminalizing of the idle poor in order to confine the poor to labour at the place and under the conditions set out by the authorities was insufficient for its purposes. This strategy failed to distribute the demand for relief evenly between parishes and the metropolitan parish authorities were able to argue that they were increasingly over-burdened. While the Act of Settlement did successfully confine many labourers to their parishes and remove many poor

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<sup>371</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 17. The Act was not repealed until 1810.

<sup>372</sup> Giovanna Procacci, 'Social economy and the government of poverty', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, With Two Lectures and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p 161.

<sup>373</sup> Giovanna Procacci, *op cit*.

<sup>374</sup> William P Quigley, *op cit*: See also Paul Slack, *ibid*, pp., 37-8. The preamble to the Act of Settlement recognised the conflict between the need for a mobile industrial workforce while insisting on the need to limit the migration of the poor.



migrants from their 'host parishes', the strategy of pauperization ultimately failed to stop the growth of 'idle' migration, as the conditions under which stasis was enforced continued to fail to meet the poor's requirements for subsistence. Subsequently, while 'geographical imprisonment' was enforced and yet metropolitan migration continued to grow, this did not mean that industrial and mercantile employers' labour needs were being met, and, in fact, industrial and mercantile growth in this period functioned as a pull factor for Irish labour and familial immigration.<sup>375</sup>

Two of the infranational compromise strategies adopted reflected a conflict within the hegemonic social groups over the best means to ensure productivity while not releasing the hold that the punitive approach had on the ideology governing the regulation of labour and mobility. The first of these was given in the Poor Relief Act of 1772, which allowed parishes to provide workhouses for the idle poor. This act nationalized a practice that was already widespread amongst the parishes, a third of which were using workhouses by the time they were rescinded in 1782. Under this legislation, applicants for relief were required to inhabit the workhouse, where they would labour for the parish. Infranational migration could theoretically be allowed for under this scheme as any surplus migration by the poor could allow for their labour-power being turned to productive use. The symbolic and material work done by the workhouse was to be both evidently punitive and substantially productive. In the former sense, workhouses were a precursor of both the detention centre and the prison, confining the 'idle' to public imprisonment. As such it directly answered the problem of the agency involved in the migration of the poor by restricting their mobility to the stasis of a symbolically charged space. In the latter sense, the workhouse was supposed to relieve the burden of assessment and the provision of relief by deterring the poor from applying for relief, and failing that, by making them work for the parish. Gilbert's Act of 1782 repealed the Poor Relief Act of 1772 after acknowledgement of the fact that the expense inherent to their running exceeded the benefit provided in their labour, and widespread revulsion for the deplorable conditions in which the workhouses operated. Yet, this Act did not represent a release of the symbolic or material control of the Poor's mobility as 'idleness' was subsequently to be dealt with by the criminalizing use of houses of correction rather than workhouses.

The combination of the effects of the enclosure process, runaway inflation, and the restrictions placed on labour supply by settlement and removals realized the conditions in which the second compromise strategy was formulated. Quigley continues to write that while small holdings and even commons shares were used by the poor for subsistence, the late 18<sup>th</sup> century saw the defeat of this form of subsistence practice when an additional three million acres were enclosed by act of parliament.<sup>376</sup> During the same period, the war with France caused a government deficit that, when combined with

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<sup>375</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 17.

<sup>376</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 20.

the effects of the poor harvest of 1794, resulted in runaway inflation. In these conditions the price of corn – the contemporary measure for the consumer price index – doubled while wages remained static. The poor were motivated to seek migration and yet confined to their parishes; they desired a means out of poverty but the means of their subsistence had been enclosed and wages were insufficient. The employers sought labour but found it immobile and therefore unavailable, and were unwilling to offer a level of wages that would have provided for subsistence. Subsequently, the Poor Relief Act of 1795 supplemented the parishes' responsibility for hiring out by making them responsible for making up the shortfall in any labourer's income falling short of a rate fixed to the price of corn.

The compromise reached between those who wished to continue the restriction of the Poor's mobility and those who needed their labour continued until 1834 when it was once again resolved by a return to a system utilizing the workhouse test. The 1832-4 Royal Commission on Poor Laws was strongly influenced by the theories of political economists Smith, Bentham, and Malthus. Its findings, therefore, suggested that all poor relief was demoralising. This belief drew upon Smithian concepts of individual responsibility, Malthusian ideas about the relationship between over-population and poverty, and Benthamite strategies of discipline. The Commission concluded that any form of relief given to the poor led to a state of reliance. Reliance, in turn, led to the reproduction of the state of idleness and over-breeding that produced the state of pauperisation. On this basis, it was argued, the only legitimate form of relief was the workhouse, as its function was not so much the provision of relief but the punitive provision of the disincentive to seek relief.<sup>377</sup>

This moment represents a crucial point in the strategic shift that subsumes the relationship between the economy and the poor within moralist discursive formations and governmentalities. Giovanni Procacci notes that the classical political economists addressed poverty as 'a counterpart to abundance, in the sense that it serves as the backcloth against which the discourse of wealth is developed, and also as a reservoir tapped for its energies, motives, and propulsive forces'.<sup>378</sup> In the classical approach, poverty is framed in terms of a contradiction, inasmuch as it is simultaneously the natural engine of wealth and a site of resistance to the free workings of the market. In the approach of the social economists (Malthus, Sismondi, Bentham, etc.), poverty is a problem of disorderly population that manifests itself in the phenomenon of pauperism (the location of resistance). For the social economists, pauperism is 'perceived as anti-social in the sense of being a 'hyper-natural', primitive mode of life'; it is *alien* to the well ordered society of political economy.<sup>379</sup> The discourse of pauperism is not aimed at a problem of inequality, for poverty is still considered in the productive manner of the classical political

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<sup>377</sup> Christine Kinealy, *The Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845-52*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1994, pp., 13-15.

<sup>378</sup> Giovanni Procacci, *ibid*, p 154.

<sup>379</sup> Giovanni Procacci, *ibid*, pp., 159-60.

economists. Rather its object is difference, or, more precisely, those 'different forms of conduct which are not amenable to the project of socialization' belonging to the liberal capitalist social order.<sup>380</sup> The discourse of pauperism, therefore, brings together political economic and social economic approaches to the ambivalence of poverty as a site of intransigence and productivity. It circumvents the inherent contradiction between the capitalist production of surplus and redundant classes and their resistant lifeworlds and the mirage of free-labour independence by problematising poverty as a moral problem requiring a range of strategic interventions.

The Poor Law Amendment Act (1834) worked to instantiate the political economy as a moral economy in the form of a hierarchy of poverty along the axis of employed/unemployed. The effect of the Act (1834) defeated its stated purposes of providing sufficient welfare for workers' productivity, as it imposed a vast increase in the tax burden and was used by employers as a means of continuing to supply insufficient wages.<sup>381</sup> In the period of its validity, conflict amongst the hegemonic social forces continued, and conflict between the ruling class of citizens and the class of pauperised subjects intensified. The series of events that both complicated and from the point of view of the aristocratic and mercantile classes, to some extent resolved this conflict were the articulated intensification of British industrialization and labour regulation, along with the centralization of financial institutions, and the strengthening place of colonialism as the other major force in the production of British capitalism.

In general terms, the colonial-capitalist English and subsequently British state-society complex of the 17<sup>th</sup> and early eighteenth centuries dealt with the problems of internal displacement, including the exponential growth of pauperised metropolitan migration, through a combination of strategies that were both feudal and modern. Charitable action, parish based Poor Laws, Vagrancy Laws, and the Act of Settlement were arrangements that grew out of the engagement of a social image of a relatively static and face-to-face social environment as it encountered the 'amazing mobility' of the 'vagrant class' that emerged in the Elizabethan period.<sup>382</sup> Subsequently, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the developments of political economy and social economy combined to constitute labour market discipline as a problem of moral economy within the overall governmental project of the well ordered population. In addition to these infranational policies that were aimed, in part, at the production of a disciplined labour force, were the international strategies and processes that addressed the threatening mobility of the British poor.

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<sup>380</sup> Giovanni Procacci, *ibid*, p 160.

<sup>381</sup> William P Quigley, *ibid*, p 21.

<sup>382</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 212

The ruling class of 'citizens' viewed the uncontrolled mobility of the poor both as a source of labour-power to be harnessed and regulated, as a politically threatening *mobile vulgate*, a 'swarm of idle masses' whose strategies of subsistence appropriation transgressed the developing rules of property law and wage-labour regulation. In exceeding the related sphere of wage labour, the 'undeserving' poor were therefore problematised as a form of criminality, and thereby as a form of human waste. The idleness and vice of the poor was used to justify a strategy of 'excorporation', which first emerged in the charter of the Virginia Company at the beginning of the seventeenth century, as it sought the commercial and political support for its new colonial enterprise.<sup>383</sup> The first large-scale transportation of convicted felons occurred in 1618-19 when the Corporation of the City of London transported several dozen young men from the Bridewell to Virginia. The Corporation took this action because the vast increase in metropolitan immigration and property crime (the figures for which fluctuated with those for the cost of living) meant that the Bridewell was no longer able to fulfil its role of judging and punishing 'wandering' immigrants, out of work journeymen, apprentices and servants.<sup>384</sup> One hundred years later, a member acting on behalf of the City of London presented the Transportation Act of 1719 to parliament, thereby regularising the supply of convict labour to the colonies. The same year also saw the government legislate to ban the emigration of skilled workers, covering all of the industries that were intrinsic to Britain's industrial revolution.<sup>385</sup>

As the American and West Indian colonies developed their systems of agricultural industry, the push factor of pauperised criminality was met by the pull factors of the growing demand for colonial labour. After the loss of the American colonies in 1776, the British authorities needed to find another destination for the 'waste-produce' of the system of criminalisation-and-incarceration. The potentially productive use of convict-labour in the West Indian plantation colonies was rejected on several grounds.<sup>386</sup> In the first place, the plantation interests were satisfied with African slave labour, which they felt was particularly suited to plantation work, and was particularly cheap during the mid to late seventeenth century, the period in which the plantation system developed.<sup>387</sup> In addition, convict or indentured British labour could only be bound to the plantation system for a contractual period, after which they would be free to exchange their labour in the marketplace, and thus exert a pressure on the

<sup>383</sup> Excorporation refers to the removal of persons from the social body; transportation was often experienced as a form of 'social death', and to the extent that it involved excorporation, forced migration, and then the forced stasis of colonial convict labour, this process bears a strong correspondence to slavery.

<sup>384</sup> E.P. Thompson, *ibid*, p 68.

<sup>385</sup> David S. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus – Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969, p 148.

<sup>386</sup> David Etlis makes the point that 'there is simply no purely economic explanation as to why European prisoners were never sentenced to a *lifetime* of servitude in the plantations' (emphasis mine), and that the underlying explanation lies in European racism. See David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 218-9

<sup>387</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 218.

price of labour that chattel slaves could not.<sup>388</sup> Secondly, a parliamentary debate concluded that the possibility of transporting convicts to the African West Coast's slaving ports would be too dangerous, as the combination of Britain's criminal classes and the stocks of enslaved 'Negroes' would be likely to produce a dangerous alliance.<sup>389</sup> Thirdly, and conversely, the domestic political risks involved in sending 'freeborn Englishmen' to serve in the plantation system of slavery exceeded the value that may have been gained through supplying the colonies with a further source of cheap labour. Finally, the Transportation Act of 1787 settled the matter. Convicts were to be transported to the other side of the world to establish a penal colony at Botany Bay.<sup>390</sup> This solution represented a compromise strategy: it had the advantage of allowing the continuation of the strategy of excorporation, but did not seem, to contemporaries of the period, to represent the possibility of providing a productive use of convict labour-power. In overall terms, the phase of productive (American) and punitive (Antipodean) transportation-migration from the early seventeenth century to its cessation in the 1860's produced a form of forced migration from Britain. Britain sent some 50,000 convicts to the American mainland between 1718 and 1775, and another 160,000 to the Australian colonies between 1787 and 1868. In addition, Britain sent 9,000 convicts to Bermuda between 1824 and 1863, and a further 8,000 to Gibraltar between 1842 and 1875.<sup>391</sup>

Colin Forster argues that what distinguished transportation from other forms of migration was 'the desire of the mother country to rid itself of criminals'.<sup>392</sup> For Forster, transported convicts differed from free migrants in that

*they had been convicted of a criminal offence and were forced to leave their homeland; their destination was chosen by their government; they arrived in the colonies bearing the stain of their criminal conviction; their freedom and activities after arrival were severely circumscribed by law for the period of their sentence; and their ability to return home was often restricted.*<sup>393</sup>

Beyond these differences between the mobility of 'free labour' and that of persons subject to the transportation system lies the criminalisation of the poor in the eighteenth century, as part of the development of modern strategies and political techniques seeking to coerce the poor into the

<sup>388</sup> David Ellis makes this point in relation to British indentured labour, but it applies to convicts too, inasmuch as ticket-of-leave convicts were freemen. See David Ellis *ibid*, 1993, p 213.

<sup>389</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, pp., 362-3. Linebaugh cites the debate as occurring in the 1780's, but doesn't give specific details.

<sup>390</sup> David Neal, *The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991.

<sup>391</sup> Colin Foster, 'Convicts: unwilling migrants from Britain and France, in David Ellis, (ed.), *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, pp., 259, 414.

<sup>392</sup> Colin Foster, *ibid*, pp., 259-60.

<sup>393</sup> Colin Foster, *ibid*, p 260. Foster makes the point that these characteristics overlapped with those of indentured labourers and slaves.

disciplines of the wage-labour system. Transportation thus came to work as a new form of spectacular violence belonging to the dominant state-society complex. By the early eighteenth century, so-called 'voluntary' emigration, military impressments and the criminalisation of the displaced poor combined with a series of repressive legislations that, in addition to the Transportation Act (1719), including the Riot Act (1715), the Combination Act (1721), the Workhouse Act (1723), the Black Act (1723), and other social and labour legislation to address the problem of domestic mass unrest that the pauperised infranational diaspora produced. This assemblage of legislation represented a new disciplinary complex in which the emergence of new governmental apparatuses and strategies of disciplining the population were articulated with the emergent discourse of political economy. Similar developments, at the level of governmentality and political economy, and the management of population as a tool of government were appearing in Europe at the same time.<sup>394</sup> The articulation of political economy with governmentality and the role of population and its disciplining and management constitutes an emergent liberal and colonial-capitalist biopolitics that prefigures the biopolitics of contemporary neo-liberal globalisation (see chapters six and seven).<sup>395</sup>

The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the regulation of relations of production become more pervasive whilst resistance became increasingly a matter of the 're-appropriation' of property and labour-power that the authorities labelled 'criminal'. During the period in which the criminal code and the courts were the central instruments of state policy, London was the site in which the criminalization of the mobility of the poor was centred, for several reasons. Firstly, London, as the national capital, was the centre of the nation's legal and political institutions, and consequentially the site of many of the nation's political contests, ranging from the 'political dynamics of street-based popular agitation, theatre, and song, the governmental use of urban space as the site of spectacular punishment, the financial heartland of the city's 'square mile', through to the parliamentary debates of Westminster. Secondly, with an influx of some 500,000 migrants between 1700 and 1750, and a migrant population that constituted more than half the total population by 1851, the metropolis experienced the intense and large-scale forms of infranational migration that constituted what Marriott has analysed as a key factor in the development of urban modernisation.<sup>396</sup> The presence of large numbers of internally displaced persons in the nation's largest urban centre and the fact that many of these were pauperised produced a

<sup>394</sup> Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Paulo Pasquino, 'Theatrum Politicum: the genealogy of capital-police and the state of prosperity', *Ideology and Consciousness*, No. 4, 1978; Giovanni Procacci, 'Governing poverty: sources of the social question in nineteenth century France' in Jan Goldstein (ed.), *Foucault and the Writing of History*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994.

<sup>395</sup> Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, *ibid*, pp., 21-41

<sup>396</sup> Population figure cited in Francis Sheppard, *ibid*, pp., 206, 300; John Marriott, 'Sensations of the abyss: the urban poor and modernity', in Mica Nava and A. Oshea, (eds.), *Modern Times: Reflections on a Century of English Modernity*, Routledge, London, 1996, pp., 77-100



site of conflict between the political classes and the labouring and non labouring poor over the form of their incorporation into the colonial-capitalist economy.

Peter Linebaugh notes that the 'Thames was the jugular vein of the British Empire ... that embraced the workshops of Bengal, the plantations of the Caribbean, the 'factories' of West Africa and the forests of North America'.<sup>397</sup> The dockworkers of the river Thames unloaded sugar, tea, coffee and tobacco from the colonial fleets, and the ships of those fleets departed bearing 'soldiers, marines, convicts, migrants, gunpowder, cannon, bibles and sharp edged tools'.<sup>398</sup> London was a nodal point for this mobile exchange of goods and people connecting Britain with the colonial sites of production. To some extent, the role of London in facilitating these colonial circuits overlapped with those of other British trading ports, such as Bristol, Liverpool, and Manchester. London differed qualitatively from the powerful industrial cities that, like Liverpool, occupied a central position in the national and colonial circuits of trade and production. Although a crucial site of international trade, London wasn't a productive centre in the sense that the northern cities were. The wealth of London primarily consisted of income derived from 'rent, banking, and commerce', reflecting the importance of the colonial metropolis as a port, a capital market, and a centre of conspicuous consumption.<sup>399</sup>

For much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the obvious productive sites of the world economy were harbours, plantations, factories, and mines. The profitable flows of goods and persons between these were dependent, in large part, on effective shipping and finance, and the militant force of colonial powers. The productive sites of the British colonial networks were linked through the centrifugal and centripetal role of the City of London. In the contemporary context of globalisation, financial flows have come to be more evidently powerful and valuable than those of trade. In Saskia Sassen's analysis, the flows of de-territorialized finance fundamental to globalisation are anchored in the nodal points of global cities. The flows of finance are facilitated by the services sector, based in financial markets, advanced corporate service firms, banks, and the head quarters of transnational corporations. These service sectors are supported by armies of immigrant workers labouring in the lower and often 'informal' sectors of the global city's economy, often for wages and conditions below those deemed acceptable to the city's host community.<sup>400</sup>

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<sup>397</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, pp., 409-10.

<sup>398</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *op cit*.

<sup>399</sup> Gareth Stedman Jones, *Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society*, p 239; Francis Sheppard, *ibid*, pp., 237-8, 314. Sheppard observes that from the nineteenth century onwards London's invisible earnings held a greater value than industrial exports in relation to balance of trade figures.

<sup>400</sup> Saskia Sassen, Chapters 7 and 8, *Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money*, New York, The New Press, 1998.

Sassen's analysis of contemporary London as a global city, a nodal point facilitating transnational flows of finance, enables us to make several points about the relationship between the criminalisation of pauperised metropolitan migrants and the commercial, financial and political structures that facilitated the flow of wealth from the productive sites of the colonies to the British colonial-capitalist sector. The first of these is to note that the historical binary between colonial trade and globalised finance can be supplemented by a recognition of the role of the financial sector of the city in the process of colonial capitalism. Major financial institutions of the City of London, including the Bank of England, Lloyds, and Barings were built upon wealth derived from colonial endeavours in the West Indies and India. The funds drawn from the subcontinent by the East India Company – the world's first transnational corporation – were redirected towards the financing of the national debt. The financial institutions and arrangements of the fiscal-military state provided the government with the finance for the successful wars waged against rival European powers on the continent and in the colonial 'prize areas'.<sup>401</sup> The imperial management of monetary policy in the colonies, such as that of the Bank of India, Australia, and China allowed Britain to re-employ the financial flows drawn from the colonies in the European sphere, and to maintain London's position as the financial centre of the world economy. Thus the flows of goods and people between the colonial sites of production and the transnational flows of colonial-national finance were interdependent processes.

For Sassen, while the lower circuits of globalised finance are supported by the migrant labour working in the global city's formal and informal service sector, the formal and informal sectors of the transnational economy are mutually dependent. Thereafter, the migrant that the political classes frame as 'illegal' is a product of their strategy of facilitating the free flow of transnational finance. Following the arguments set out by Peter Linebaugh, we can draw out an analogy between the articulation of mobility flows and stasis in globalisation and colonisation.<sup>402</sup>

In the late eighteenth century some 500,000 persons, representing approximately one third of the adult metropolitan labour force, were involved in the river trade that linked the colonial sites of production with the British consumer market.<sup>403</sup> The network of Londoners directly and indirectly involved in metropolitan service was subject to the incorporation of their labour-power within the circuits of the imperial-national economy. This process involved a shift from customary means and relations of production to the capitalist regime of wage-relations, and correspondingly, a shift from regimes of authorised terror (thanocracy) to the strategies and techniques of modern governmentality. In this

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<sup>401</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 89.

<sup>402</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*. See, in particular, chapters 11 and 12.

<sup>403</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 417.

context the City of London was the key site of the political contest that emerged between the poor and the colonial-capitalist elites in Britain and throughout the colonies.

The infra-national diaspora inhabited an urban economy that was both a form of resistance to, and an accommodation with the political economy of colonial capitalism. Linebaugh observes that 'for most workers in the eighteenth century the payments were not made in money, or, when they were, such payments were only one of several forms'.<sup>404</sup> The urban economy of the London poor was based on a tradition of customary remuneration that took place within non-monetary relations between employers and employees. This urban economy of the poor was thus based in the sphere of necessary and tolerated illegalities; as Foucault observed, the poor 'benefited, within the margins of what was imposed upon them by law and custom, from a space of tolerance, gained by force or obstinacy; and this space was for them so indispensable a condition that they were often ready to rise up to defend it'.<sup>405</sup>

For the poor, this form of exchange was based on the rights claimed to make use of the excess and wastage of the material circuits of production, and the London poor found this waste in the abundance of colonial commerce. The excessive waste or by-produce of production thus came to provide a form of commons from which sustenance could be drawn where monetary payment was absent or insufficient for subsistence, and every trade came to have its customary perquisites which often constituted the real value of labour. Once appropriated moreover, waste produce such as sugar, tea, coffee, cloth and wood entered the complex network of exchange that constituted the informal urban economy.

Customary appropriation constituted a subsistence strategy, the manifestation of the rights of freeborn Englishmen, and a means of resistance to the pauperising process of the appropriation of their labour-power. Beyond its material elements, appropriation belonged to a political culture in which they sought a degree of relative agency from the coercion and force employed to restrict their mobility to the patterns established by the colonial-capitalist state-society complex. The poor resisted the appropriation of their time in the intensification of the means of production, and the appropriation of their agent mobility in impressments, indenture, incarceration, the workhouse, transportation, the gallows, and other forms of forced and coerced mobility and stasis. In all of these contests, the urban poor resisted a process of enclosure that mirrored the dynamics of agricultural enclosure that had precipitated the production of large-scale internal displacement and pauperisation. Thus as Foucault observed, in the bourgeois separation of rights from property, 'the illegality of rights, which often

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<sup>404</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 374.

<sup>405</sup> Michel Foucault, *ibid*, 1991, p 82.

meant the survival of the most deprived, tended, with the new status of property, to become an illegality of property' that was subsequently subject to punishment.<sup>406</sup> In the sphere of the customary appropriations of the peasantry, landed property became absolute property:

*All the tolerated 'rights' that the peasants had acquired or preserved (the abandonment of old obligations or the consolidation of irregular practices: the rights of free pasture, wood collecting, etc.), were now rejected by the new owners who regarded them quite simply as theft.*<sup>407</sup>

For the propertied classes of the eighteenth century the system of customary appropriation was gradually redefined as one of *misappropriation*. The conflict surrounding the political economy of rights was at its most intense where the flows of colonial commerce and finance met the urban economy of the metropolitan poor. Here, in making his arguments for the establishment of a comprehensive system of policing, Colquhoun estimated that £500,000 worth of produce was stolen in the port of London each year, and a further £700,000 throughout the city.<sup>408</sup> The urban economy of the poor was regarded as a 'monstrous system of Depredation' and 'General System of Pillage' whose participants were 'disciplined in acts of Criminal Warfare'.<sup>409</sup> Customary appropriation, whether material, spatial or temporal, was reconstructed as property crime, the sin of 'idleness', and the vagrancy of 'masterless men' whose 'idle' resistance was to be measured in terms of the 'losses' of the West Indian merchants'.<sup>410</sup> In terms of the discourse of the propertied classes of the eighteenth century, the mobile poor were thus reconstituted as an 'uncivilised' people presenting a threatening limit to the course of liberal progress.<sup>411</sup>

Methods of terror that might best be employed by the state were studied and published by political theorists and moral philosophers throughout the eighteenth century.<sup>412</sup> In London, public hangings and the processions of the condemned were forms of spectacular violence designed to inspire awe in the populace, and thereby respect for the state and the property relations it sought to protect. By the 1780s the methods of state terror and criminalisation were proving to be insufficient to the task of class warfare. The freeing of prisoners, most of whom were incarcerated for property offences from Newgate and many of the smaller prisons in the Gordon Riots of 1780 caused the judiciary to disperse the

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<sup>406</sup> Michel Foucault, *ibid*, 1991, p 85

<sup>407</sup> Michel Foucault, *op cit*.

<sup>408</sup> Patrick Colquhoun, *Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis*, 1795-7.

<sup>409</sup> Patrick Colquhoun, *The State of Indigence*, 1799.

<sup>410</sup> For an account of the spatio-temporal resistance of the casualised labouring class in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, see John Marriott, *ibid*, 1995, pp., 83-86

<sup>411</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 15

<sup>412</sup> Linebaugh cites Bernard Mandeville, *An Inquiry Into the Causes of Frequent Executions at Tyburn*, 1725; Henry Fielding, *An Inquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 1751; Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, 1759; Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767; Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, fn. 40, p 280.

system of public hangings at Tyburn to sites throughout the city, and to perform capital punishment in the private space of prisons, rather than as a spectacular form of public punishment.<sup>413</sup> Here the London poor had re-appropriated the symbolic violence that bound the relationship between state and civil society towards a politics couched in terms of customary rights; the hegemonic power embodied in the Bloody code had failed as a strategy of discipline via terror.

The contest between customary and capitalist appropriation resulted in a flurry of legislation in the 1790s aimed at protecting the material circuits of capitalist production and the development of new political technologies aimed at disciplining the relations of production.<sup>414</sup> As Foucault has argued, the late eighteenth century thus marks the point at which new legal and penal reforms constituted the emergence of modern policies towards the '*tolerated illegalities*' of the *Ancien Regime*.<sup>415</sup> In this context the wage system became 'the fulcrum of class relations, functioning as both an indicator of class relations and a dynamic variable of exploitation'.<sup>416</sup> The broader criminalisation of customs and the greater range of punishments that now ranged from fines imposed for idleness to transportation ordered for property theft combined with the disciplines of the wage-system. These, via the abstraction of labour as set out in the philosophies and strategies of the Utilitarians and political economists, defined the lengthening of the working day, the intensification of labour by speed-up and invigilation, the creation of competition within labour markets and the creation of a new moral and political stratification of the labouring poor.<sup>417</sup>

The shift from custom to wage-labour was accomplished by the combination of the geographical mobility of capital as it flowed within the circuits of colonial capitalism, the changes in the material relations of production that were accomplished by a more closely studied allocation of wages and the mechanisation of labour, the newly established systems of surveillance and force constituting the formalisation and extension of policing to wage-relations, and the ascendance of wage-labour, 'respectability' and 'accountability' as a hegemonic discourse governing the sphere of liberalism and its accompanying 'rights'.<sup>418</sup>

Here then, the institution of transportation as a form of forced mobility mirrors the institution of the prison as a form of forced stasis as each work to achieve the universalising of the state-society complex's power over the agency and mobility of the nation's subjects. Each works to constitute the

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<sup>413</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 363.

<sup>414</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 404.

<sup>415</sup> Michel Foucault, *ibid*, 1991, pp., 82-3.

<sup>416</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 327.

<sup>417</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *op cit*.

<sup>418</sup> William Godwin described 'accountability' as the essence of the wage system; see Godwin, *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice*, London, 1793

'criminal' subject in the state of social death that forms the antithesis of the liberal sphere of 'free' labour, just as the production and incorporation of pauperised labour-power – the poverty upon which wealth is attendant – is disciplined within the form and relations of colonial capitalist production.

The sentence of transportation was typically imposed upon persons committing property crimes and consisted of excorporation from the national body. The symbolic violence of transportation was an effective political technology in part because, as the liberal ideology of rights and responsibilities came to be anchored in the system of wage-labour, this ideology was articulated to the sphere of national belonging. Here then, the limit between capitalist and customary appropriation becomes defined in terms of national belonging and unbelonging, and the particular-universal form of that national liberalism was embodied in the figure of the national-worker.<sup>419</sup>

Transportation was, then, a symbolic device that replaced the spectacular violence of the state as part of the governmentality defining the modern liberal subject as a national worker. Simultaneously, transportation was a form of forced migration that was also, but only in its earlier American form, a form of labour migration. Convict labour was an essential component of the penal economy in New South Wales, but the migration was designed purely as a form of excorporation, rather than as part of a strategy of productive settlement. Yet in relation to other forms of colonial capitalist displacement, transportation was both exceptional *and* iconic. As an exception, it represented the antithesis of the emerging discourse of 'free' labour, and free labour migration.<sup>420</sup> Yet, as an icon it was closely correlated to the 'voluntary' migrations, impressments, and indentured services that formed the backbone of pauperised migrant labour servicing colonial settlement and exploitation. Here, transportation bears a strong correspondence to David Etlis' observation that the majority of European migration to the Americas between 1630 and 1830 was coerced or debt-bonded migration.<sup>421</sup>

The decades of the 1820s and 1830s saw the development of further schemes seeking to rid the national body of paupers liable for relief by charging councils for the sum of their assisted passage to

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<sup>419</sup> The phrase 'national worker' is drawn from Etienne Balibar, 'Citizenship without pre-existing Community', Lecture given to Bard College, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001. I elaborate this concept further in the following chapter.

<sup>420</sup> Robert J. Steinfeld, *The Invention of Free Labour: The Employment Relation in the English and American Law and Culture, 1350-1870*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1991, and 'Changing Legal conceptions of Free Labour,' in Stanley L. Engerman, (ed.), *Terms of Labour*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, pp., 137-67. Steinfeld argues that 'free labour' came into existence by the mid-nineteenth century. Linebaugh, alternatively, sees the discourse of liberty and rights articulated to wage-labour in the eighteenth century. I therefore refer to 'free labour' as an *emerging* discourse in the eighteenth century, in which free labour migration refers to 'individuals who travelled without the obligation to labour for others'. For this last point, see David Etlis, 'Free and Coerced Migrations from the Old World to the New', in David Etlis, (ed.), *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p 61.

<sup>421</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 2002, p 36.



British colonies where their surplus labour-power might profitably be employed.<sup>422</sup> While these emigration schemes were not designed in terms of criminalized migration, the iconic status of transportation consisted of the underlying pauperisation whose outer limit was the criminalisation to which were subject all persons within the lower material, service and political circuits of colonial capitalism. Thus transportation represented the ambivalent point at which the discourse of freedom and progress brought together the national worker and the colonial subject, positioning the lower class national within both the sphere of liberal belonging and the sphere of the uncivilised alien other.

This was an ambivalence that seemed to resist the point of conflation; the transgressor of property rights was subject to expropriation, but yet could not be employed to fill the labour needs of the plantation system, for the act of rendering British subjects as slaves would have threatened the 'contractual arrangements of most economic relations' in Britain.<sup>423</sup> Yet, the free-labour systems of colonial emigration that were designed and popularised by Edward Wakefield in the 1830s and 1840's were based on an assumption of 'natural slavery'.<sup>424</sup>

The successful control of the poor's mobility was essential to the formation of the national historical bloc formed between sovereignty, the landed aristocracy, and the emergent financial and mercantile classes. The mobility of the poor formed a site of conflict in which the mobile poor's resistance and agency produced the infra-national flows of migration that provided the motor for metropolitan and industrial growth, and subsequently the rise of the colonial-capitalist state-society complex. The success of this transformation was dependent on the infranational and international control of mobility, in which the mobility of British, Irish, African, West Indian and Indian poor was harnessed to a transnational system of capitalism, which came to define the form of the imperial world economy. It is to the extra-national regimes of colonial-capitalist mobility that we now turn.

## 2.2. The Production of Irish Colonial Paupers.

While the infranational and *ad hoc* regime of 'problematizing' migration policy had the governance of pauperised migrants as its object, an additional regime was marked by the creation and criminalisation of an *international* class of immigrant paupers. From the late eighteenth century the Irish had been the largest immigrant group in Britain. Between 1780 and 1845, 600, 000 Irish immigrated to England, and 400,000 of these settled. After 1845 this migratory movement increased rapidly. This large-scale

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<sup>422</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, pp., 104-108.

<sup>423</sup> David Ellis, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 41-42.

<sup>424</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, pp., 111-2.

migration was part of an overall increase in immigration to England during this period that resulted from the expansion of Britain's global economic empire and industrialisation.<sup>425</sup> The nature of the Irish migration differed before and after 1845. Prior to 1845 Irish migration primarily consisted of seasonal agricultural workers and skilled Protestant male workers. After 1845 Irish immigration became part of the development of a world system, in which London, the world's most prosperous and important city, figured as a global hub, and a magnet for infra and international migration. Irish immigration in this period worked as part of the emergent globalising process in which a relatively unskilled workforce from the peripheries encountered "modern" modes of economic production.<sup>426</sup>

This "encounter" was mobilised by the displacement of Irish workers through the effects of the global market. Ireland, although putatively a British State from the time of the Act of Union (1801), actually occupied, and had occupied an ambiguous position within the English (and subsequently British) empire. From the point of the Restoration (1660) onwards, English policy recognised Ireland as a 'kingdom with its own legislature', yet regarded Ireland as a colonial dependency in economic terms.<sup>427</sup> Bernard Semmel notes that 'while England and Scotland had been one economic unit since 1701, Ireland, with her own parliament under the British crown, was the target of highly restrictive British trade legislation'.<sup>428</sup> The process of economic colonisation occurred over a long duration. Throughout the seventeenth century, 'dictates of economic reason of state ensured that the English Parliament judged Ireland's commercial expansion to be a threat to England's prosperity'.<sup>429</sup> Throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century Ireland was subject to English legislation designed to curtail its ability to compete. For example, in 1663 an amendment to the 1660 Navigation Act prohibited all Irish exports to the colonies. The English Parliament's Cattle Acts of 1663 and 1667 'restricted one of the most vibrant areas of Ireland's economy and thereby depleted the supplies of bullion that might have fuelled the economy'.<sup>430</sup> Moreover, in 1671, the Staple Act 'effectively ended the direct legal flow of sugar and tobacco to Ireland'.<sup>431</sup> When that Act lapsed between 1680 and 1685, its reinstatement was the result of pressure from English traders who argued that Ireland should be treated as 'a potential competitor with England, especially in the Atlantic staple trade to the sugar

<sup>425</sup> Gearoid O Tuathaigh, *Ireland before the Famine, 1789-1848*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1990, p 141.

<sup>426</sup> Patty Seleski, 'Identity, Immigration, and the State: Irish Immigrants and English Settlement in London,' in *Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture*, George K. Behlmer and Fred M. Leventhal, (eds.), Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2000, p 15. Seleski refers to the analysis of world cities given in Anthony D. King, "The world economy is everywhere: Urban History and the World system", *Urban History Yearbook*, Leicester, 1983, p 7.

<sup>427</sup> David Armitage, *The Ideological Origins of the British Empire*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp., 148-9

<sup>428</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, p 32.

<sup>429</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 150.

<sup>430</sup> David Armitage, *op cit*.

<sup>431</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 151.

islands of the Caribbean.<sup>432</sup> During the 1690s, English political scientists believed that Ireland needed be subjected to strict economic regulation in case Scottish success in its planned colonial plantations led it to open up the Irish economy as a primary market.<sup>433</sup> The Irish Woollen Prohibition Act of 1699 placed drastic excise duties on some woollen exports, and confined the export of all woollens to English ports.<sup>434</sup> English (and subsequently British) imperialism and industrialisation was able to achieve its rapid rate of growth partly through discriminating practices aimed at Indian and Irish textile industries. In 1700, for example, the English government made the importation of manufactured textile products from both of these countries illegal.<sup>435</sup>

Patrick Kelly argues that the Anglo-Scottish Union (1707) reinforced the pre-existing 'tendency to think of Ireland as merely the first of England's colonies'.<sup>436</sup> By the latter half of the eighteenth century, British perceptions of the place of Ireland were being framed in terms of the new 'science' of political economy. As David Armitage observes,

*the logic of political economy compelled every nation to strive for the profits of a colonial empire; equally that ruthless logic determined that some nations would remain, or at worst become, colonies, in so far as they and their population were subordinated to the overmastering and unchallengeable economic interests of other nations.*<sup>437</sup>

This underlying logic remained one basis of British policy towards Ireland in decades leading up to the Act of Union, while the potential threat perceived had changed from an imagined colonial and industrial rivalry to the problems that Irish poverty might pose to British interests. The defeat of the potential threat of Irish competition combined with the political liberalism that was believed to underpin the British imperialism of the 'first Empire' produced a context in which arguments for *laissez faire* relations with Ireland might be pursued.<sup>438</sup> Writing in 1779, Adam Smith was able to state that Ireland had 'neither the skill, nor the stock which could enable her to rival England, and tho' both may be acquired in time, to acquire them compleatly will require the operation of little less than a

<sup>432</sup> David Armitage, *op cit*; Armitage's source is Thomas M. Truxes, *Irish-American Trade, 1660-1783*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp., 1-16.

<sup>433</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 163.

<sup>434</sup> Patrick Kelly, 'The Irish Woollen Export Prohibition Act of 1699: Kearney Revisited', *Irish Economic and Social History*, Vol. 7, 1980, pp., 22-44.

<sup>435</sup> George Monbiot, 'The Flight to India: The Jobs Britain Stole from the Asian Subcontinent 200 Years Ago are Now Being Returned', *The Guardian*, October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2003.

<sup>436</sup> Patrick Kelly, 'Ireland and the Glorious Revolution', in Andrew Beddard, (ed.), *The Revolutions of 1688*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991, p 188

<sup>437</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 161

<sup>438</sup> See Chapter One, pages ...

Century'.<sup>439</sup> Speaking to the House of Commons in 1785, William Pitt criticised the policy of 'debarring Ireland from the enjoyment and use of her own resources' for the purpose of making that 'kingdom completely subservient to the interests and opulence of this country': Pitt proposed, instead, a 'community of benefits' that 'without tending to aggrandize the one or depress the other, should seek the aggregate interests of the empire'.<sup>440</sup> In defending the 'old commercial system' during this parliamentary debate, Charles James Fox countered that Ireland 'cannot make a single acquisition but to the proportionate loss of England'.<sup>441</sup>

Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century following the Act of Union, the British government's perspective on the 'problem' of the Irish economy was being framed in terms of the diagnosis and prescriptions of political economy.<sup>442</sup> In Christine Kinealy's analysis, the populist models of political economy drawn upon by British politicians resulted in a diagnosis of Ireland as a 'Malthusian model of a society in crisis'.<sup>443</sup> From the perspective of the political economists, notwithstanding the modernising industrial north surrounding Belfast, Ireland was seen as an overpopulated country where the subdivision of land and dependence on the potato lent itself to 'idleness' amongst both peasants and landlords. At a time when the export of Irish grain to England meant that it was acknowledged to be the 'granary of the United Kingdom', the Malthusian thesis of poverty produced by overpopulation and indolence made the subsistence strategies of Irish peasants and the small holding tenure system the object of a British programme of (what we now know as) structural adjustment. The prescription, thereafter, was to seek 'a break-up of the system of easy existence through a diversification of economic activity, an end to sub-division, a reduction in the role of the potato, and the introduction of men of energy and capital to the country'.<sup>444</sup>

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, whilst the English economy was experiencing a period of Imperial and industrial growth, in Ireland industrialisation was in decline and agriculture was increasing in relative importance. In the opposite conditions of the English economy, the demand for agricultural produce exceeded supply. Subsequently, imports of colonial produce became essential to the English consumer market. In this context it was important that Ireland produced a significant surplus of foodstuffs that could be exported to the English consumer market. Simultaneously, while the gross domestic product of Ireland increased within this period, the average income pertaining to the

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<sup>439</sup> Quoted in Oscar Browning, 'Adam Smith and free trade for Ireland', *English Historical Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1886, p 309.

<sup>440</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 2004, p 33. The 'empire' that Pitt refers to includes England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and the North American colonies.

<sup>441</sup> Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

<sup>442</sup> Christine Kinealy, *The Great Calamity: The Irish Famine, 1845-52*, Dublin, Gill and Macmillan, 1994, p 1.

<sup>443</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 9.

<sup>444</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 1.

lower third of the labour force actually decreased, and a British inquiry into Irish poverty concluded that approximately thirty per cent of the population of Ireland was in need of subsistence relief.<sup>445</sup>

In the decades following the Union of 1801, Ireland's poverty was seen as posing a threat to British economic development, and a spate of inquiries were commissioned into the 'condition of Ireland'. The proximity of masses of Irish paupers prompted fears that the higher wages offered in Britain would promote large-scale Irish immigration and that the subsequent wage depression would cause the British population to be reduced to the state of poverty experienced in Ireland.<sup>446</sup> Characterised as innately poor and backward, Ireland was represented as a pre-modern limit to Progress. In seeking to promote the modernisation of the Irish relations and means of production along the lines of the developments pursued in Britain, the pursuit of *laissez faire* principles was employed to justify not just the non-intervention in the grain markets in periods of subsistence scarcity, but also interventionist strategies of adjustment.<sup>447</sup> In short, the 'pre-modernity' of Irish relations of production justified harsh forms of intervention to the extent that these threatened to limit the 'free play' of British market forces through either the tax burden that would be suffered in providing relief, or through the diminution of English wages that might occur were the English labour market to be inundated with pauperised Irish migrants. Thus (English) national self-interest was the 'greater good' that provided the justification for the departure from principles of non-intervention, even as the intervention was couched in terms of the extension of liberal benevolence that have come to form, for example, one of the dominant interpretations of Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1845.<sup>448</sup>

The ambiguous or even paradoxical doctrines of political economy gave structure to the British debates surrounding the extension of the Poor Law to Ireland. Malthusian ideas informed the *laissez faire* approach, as it was argued that 'poor relief, by providing a safety net for the poor (and implicitly, profligate people) only helped facilitate further unnecessary population growth': on this basis it was argued that 'state intervention in the relief of poverty was therefore both futile and counterproductive'.<sup>449</sup> The moralising approach thus correlated with the prevailing economic theory where it was believed that the problem of pauperism should be addressed by allowing the free play of market forces, and thus the solution of capitalist wage-labour employment.

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<sup>445</sup> This figure comes from the 1833 Royal Commission. See Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 18.

<sup>446</sup> R.D.C. Black, *Economic Thought and the Irish Question*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp., 89-90; Friedrich Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*, London, 1892, pp., 196-8; Brian Inglis, *Poverty and the Industrial Revolution*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1971.

<sup>447</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, pp., 3, 9.

<sup>448</sup> Peel's role in the repeal has been framed in terms of a concern for the stress and hardship experienced by the English and Irish poor, as a means of alleviating class conflict, and as part of the prevalent free trade agenda seeking to further Britain's industrial export advantages.

<sup>449</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 12

Debates on the introduction of Irish Poor Laws were influenced by developments in Britain, where the so-called 'overly liberal' Speenhamland System – the antithesis of the theories of political economy – had been rejected for the deterrent approach of the Poor Law of 1834. Here it is important to critique the *quality* of the poverty and system of production that was being problematised. Irish agricultural labourers fell behind their European counterparts in terms of income and standards of housing, yet had a relative advantage in terms of health, longevity, and literacy. Potato farming had increased the volume of cultivatable land by relying on a crop that could be grown in poor quality, marginal land, and was generally accompanied by the farming of commercial, primarily export crops, such as corn. Subsistence farming based on the potato crop allowed the degree of relative autonomy that came with land ownership – even in its smaller scale, and a degree of resistance to their incorporation within modernised systems of agricultural production. Measured in terms of the standards of health and autonomy, the potato croppers can be said to have faced the prospect of a relative state of unfreedom in the process of their incorporation into the Imperial market economy as free labour.

Once introduced in 1838, the object of the Irish Poor Law was the protection of British interests from the effects of Irish poverty, including the costs of the provision of relief itself, which was to be funded on the basis of a system of localised taxation. The means to this end were framed not so much in terms of the provision of subsistence relief, but rather in terms of the disciplines that could be imposed towards the defeat of Irish 'idleness'. The framing of the Irish Poor law thus demonstrates that Anglo-Irish relations were being conceived as a problematisation defined within the paradigms of the theories of political economy. Within the problem of Ireland's supposedly innate backwardness there was little room for reflection on the role of British domination of the Irish economy, beyond the criticisms made of the absentee landlords. Instead, the victim was blamed and the programme set out for rehabilitation allowed for the eventual failure to present itself as a matter of Irish responsibility. The subsistence crises leading to calls for relief were thus brought within the paradigm of a political strategy. The aim of this strategy was to overcome the limits that subsistence agriculture posed to the more intensive system of capitalist agriculture requiring the shift to large-scale systems of land tenure and the provision of a ready supply of wage-labourers, and thus to increase the profitability of English interests.

In his correspondence with Ricardo, Malthus famously stated that 'the land in Ireland is infinitely more peopled than in England, and to give full effect to the natural resources of the country, a great part of



the population should be swept from the soil'.<sup>450</sup> The costs that could be countenanced within the British strategy included the loss of the 'surplus' population, whether through mortality, or emigration.<sup>451</sup> The latter strategy of emigration as a balm to Malthusian poverty was also countenanced by the Royal Commission into Irish poverty of 1833, whose authors argued that assisted emigration could be used as a supplement to developmental schemes, including land reclamation and the encouragement of Irish fisheries.<sup>452</sup> These recommendations were subject to criticism on the basis that they constituted too great a degree of (expensive) state intervention, had inappropriately broadened the remit of the inquiry beyond the limited problem of the destitute classes, and correspondingly neglected to address the degree of individual responsibility required for Ireland to climb out of the state of indolent poverty.<sup>453</sup> The relatively unconditional form of relief was discordant with the views of the political economists, and the disciplinary strategies that formed the backbone of the English Poor Law. It was suggested that

*Instead of tending to increase the population and attach it more firmly to the soil, a properly designed Poor Law could be made to facilitate the transition from a cottier economy to capitalist farming by giving the cottier another alternative besides land or starvation.*

The alternative being put forward as a condition of relief was the introduction a substantially more stringent version of the English workhouse system in the Irish Poor Law of 1838. The Irish workhouse system had an estimated capacity to support one per cent of the Irish population. It was designed to deter all but the most destitute from applying for relief, and under the Act the provision of outdoor relief was deemed illegal. The problem perceived in the granting of outdoor relief was that it allowed the cottiers to continue with their smallholding subsistence strategies, and correspondingly allowed the local propertied classes to avoid the responsibility for 'improving' their estates by clearing them of small plot tenures.

The blight that visited the potato crops in 1845 caused initially widespread food shortages, and led to famine conditions from 1846 to 1852. Neither the blight nor the food shortages were limited to Ireland, although the subsistence dependency on the potato crop in parts of Ireland, particularly the west coast, meant that its effect was most devastating in Ireland. The British potato crop was also severely damaged, and food shortages occurred throughout Great Britain and Europe on the back of the blight

<sup>450</sup> Malthus cited in Joel Mokyr, *Why Ireland Starved: A Quantitative and Analytical History of the Irish Economy, 1800-50*, London, Harper Collins, 1985, p 83.

<sup>451</sup> In a statement to the Parliamentary Committee on Emigration from Britain (1826), Malthus advocated an Irish emigration programme. See Brian Inglis, *ibid*, p 235.

<sup>452</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 19.

<sup>453</sup> Proponents of these views included the political economist Nassau Senior, the English Poor Law Commissioner George Cornwall Lewis, and the Home Secretary Lord John Russell.

and other poor harvests. Several of the European nations that had supplied Britain with foodstuffs, including grains, acted quickly to prohibit exports. Subsequently the food shortages experienced in Britain increased in severity, and the colonial export markets increased in importance.

As I noted in the first chapter, this crisis presented an opportune moment for the British free trade lobby, which had been seeking the repeal of the Corn Laws.<sup>454</sup> These laws 'restricted the importation of corn into the United Kingdom until the price of corn had reached a fixed price', and had therefore benefited the Irish corn trade as it was able to export corn to England without facing competition from non-British growers.<sup>455</sup> The British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 did not take effect until 1849. Thus, throughout the first four years of the famine, Irish and Anglo-Irish corn traders were able to continue their supply of the British export market, rather than being required to retain corn in the domestic market in order to supply the needs of famine victims. Moreover, while in the context of severe food scarcity, the traders were able to sell corn in the domestic market at the relatively higher prices on the basis of the authority of the free operation of market forces; the degree to which they could force a rise in prices was limited by the British importation of Indian corn. Subsequently, in order to be able to compete, Irish traders also began importing corn from India and other sources, and the 'consumer market' switched from export reliance to import reliance.<sup>456</sup>

The potato blight and famine that appeared in 1845-6 presented the British government with an opportunity that could not have arisen without the severity of the subsistence crisis and widespread impoverishment.<sup>457</sup> Charles Trevelyan stated,

*that indirect permanent advantages will accrue to Ireland from the scarcity, and the measures taken for its relief, I entertain no doubt ...if a firm stand is not made against the prevailing disposition to take advantage of this crisis to break down all barriers, the true permanent interests of the country will, I am convinced, suffer in a manner which will be irreparable in our time.*<sup>458</sup>

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<sup>454</sup> See Chapter One

<sup>455</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 36.

<sup>456</sup> Cormac O Grada, *Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations in Economic History, 1800-1925*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1993, pp., 108-9.

<sup>457</sup> These dynamics bear a strong correspondence to the strategies of the British Raj in relation to the famines of the latter half of the nineteenth century. See section 2.4.

<sup>458</sup> Letter from Trevelyan to Randolph Routh, February 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1846, in *Correspondence explanatory of the measures adopted by Her Majesty's government for the relief of distress arising from the failure of the potato crop in Ireland, 1846*, [736] xxxvii, p 77. Trevelyan was the Permanent Secretary at the Treasury. Cf. Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 41.

The British government was subsequently able to begin, by 1846, to force economic change in Ireland, including the capitalisation of the Irish agricultural sector'.<sup>459</sup> The British policies sought to enforce local responsibility for relief by making each county liable for the collection of the relief taxes that were payable on all property valued at £4 and over. This duty was designed to put pressure on landlords whose estates consisted of unprofitable smallholdings. The desired effect was that the landlords would subsequently prefer to enact the improvements and clearances that were necessary for a capitalist system of agriculture. The other side of this strategy of eviction was the workhouse system that imposed tests of destitution, rather than hardship, on those seeking relief. The combination of the strategies aimed at the higher and lower circuits of production were designed to result in widespread land alienation. In the ideal, abstract terms of the theories of political economists, the horizon of liberal Progress hereby visualised included the production of a free labour market.<sup>460</sup> In contemporary terms, this strategy represented a structural adjustment programme, where relief has been proffered on the basis of a series of liberalising conditions. The costs of adjustment, in this case, included land alienation, indebtedness, pauperisation and high mortality rates amongst the Irish poor.

In order to supply the British market, and under the pressure of the application of cash wages and modern forms of land tenure, Irish agriculture experienced a rapid transformation throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth century, a transformation that was intensified in the adjustments of the famine years. Additionally, the tendency of Irish vulnerability to English and British economic power increased as Irish industries failure to match English growth saw the decline of its major sectors, including the collapse of the textile sector.<sup>461</sup> Ireland thus retained its status a 'cash-crop' source of cheap agricultural produce, and, simultaneously, a market for English (and subsequently British) goods. In this politico-economic climate, the subsistence crisis's that emerged from the 1790's through to the 1840's and beyond produced a large scale and ongoing culture of emigration that was both economic and political. Within this process, it was often not the poorest of the poor who migrated, but rather those whom, whilst suffering hardship, were able to raise the funds required for migration. In addition to this economic factor, the cultural fact of resistance and a sense of belonging with the land explain the fact that many of those who came from the poorest sector of the Irish economy – the potato farmers of the West, chose to retain their smallholdings where possible.<sup>462</sup>

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<sup>459</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 73.

<sup>460</sup> See Chapter One, section 1.2 for a discussion of the ideology of liberal Progress.

<sup>461</sup> Lynn Hollen Lees, *Exiles of Erin: Irish Migrants in Victorian London*, Cornell University Press, 1979, pp., 22-31.

<sup>462</sup> S.H. Cousens, 'Emigration and demographic change in Ireland, 1851-1861', *Economic History Review*, Vol. 14, 196-2, p 288. Cousens states that the poor quality of the west country land left it relatively free from the improvements undertaken in this period; thus there was a lower rate of land alienation.

Throughout the eighteenth century, more than 250,000 persons had migrated from Ireland to the American colonies. Irish migration to America was largely comprised of families groups from Ulster who sought the better opportunities they hoped to find in the colonies.<sup>463</sup> Large numbers of Irish labourers had also engaged in seasonal agricultural labour in England and Scotland, and the numbers of persons migrating in this manner began to rise rapidly in the 1790s.<sup>464</sup> This phase of circular migration was often 'voluntary', and comprised part of the subsistence strategy of farmers who were able to find work in the labour intensive modernising British agricultural sector, where underemployment had arisen through the rural to urban migration of indigenous labourers shifting to the industrial sector.<sup>465</sup>

The last decades of the eighteenth century saw a quantitative and qualitative shift in Irish emigration. Where, by 1780, there were approximately 40,000 Irish persons living in the British mainland, by 1831 this figure had risen to 580,000 – a figure which represented some five per cent of the work force.<sup>466</sup> Thus while the size of the emigrant population increased rapidly, so did the tendency for emigration to become permanent rather than circular. In total, one million persons had emigrated before the eventuation of the famine in 1845.<sup>467</sup> During the years of the famine itself, a figure of between one million and one and a half million persons left Ireland, and whilst from 1851 to 1871, a further two million persons emigrated; by 1911 this figure had reached six million.<sup>468</sup>

Permanent migration to Britain, as Linebaugh notes in the case of migration to the spheres of the London labouring poor, tended to be comprised of skilled urban craftsmen and apprentices as well as persons drawn from the rural peasantry into 'unskilled' metropolitan labour.<sup>469</sup> The second politico-economic wave was both primarily *forced* and more likely to produce migrants desiring settlement. Seasonal migration became more intensely subsistence based, and because of the unsustainable nature of pauperised living conditions migrants returned in fewer numbers. While skilled Protestant artisans continued to migrate to the northern English cities, migration to the south, and London in particular, became increasingly Catholic, female and single, familial, and unskilled. The result was a large body of pauperised and unskilled Irish migrants living in London and other large English towns.

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<sup>463</sup> Marianne S. Wokeck, 'Irish and German Migration to Eighteenth-Century North America, in David Ellis, (ed.), *Coerced and Free Migration: Global Perspectives*, Stanford, Stanford University press, 2002, p 155.

<sup>464</sup> Robert Miles, *Racism and Migrant Labour*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, p 126.

<sup>465</sup> Patty Seleski, *ibid*, pp., 16-7. Seleski understands this first wave as *primarily* voluntary and seasonal, but the history of British colonialism in Ireland in the eighteenth century suggests that many of those seasonal labourers used migration as a *necessary* subsistence strategy.

<sup>466</sup> Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2005, p 329.

<sup>467</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 297.

<sup>468</sup> Christine Kinealy, *op cit*.

<sup>469</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, pp., 93-5.

Whilst the 'push-factors' involved in producing large-scale Irish emigration were subject to the mercantilist and, subsequently, laissez faire and disciplinary incorporation of the Irish economy within the circuits of metropolitan production, the 'pull-factors' included the growing labour demands of the United States, the British American colonies, and Britain itself. The demand for Irish immigration in Britain occurred as part of the conflict between industrial and capitalist/aristocratic landed factions within the prevailing historical block. Industrialists seeking the availability of a mobile and casual pool of working labour had their access restricted by the controls placed on pauperised mobility by the Acts of poor relief and settlement that favoured the landed interests desire for labour-stasis. With a reduced English workforce to turn to this sector was grateful for the inflow of Irish immigrants. Capitalist interests were divided over the issue, tending to favour the restrictions on labour movement while requiring its often-criminalised form for their colonial endeavours. Whilst metropolitan financial interests provided the capital for much of the growth of regional industrialisation, their members tended to form political alliances with the landed gentry that, similarly, had a definite interest in the supply of colonial migrant labour.

The British mobility regime during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century can thus be seen to have been a complex of both intensive and extensive practices whose borders were national, and then nationalist at the infra and international levels. At the nationalist infra-national level, parishes bore and sought to ameliorate the burden of pauperised immigrants, and Irish immigrants in particular. The Poor laws required them to support "genuinely" destitute residents from Parish funds. Vagrancy Acts allowed parishes to arrest those deemed unwilling to support themselves, and the Act of Settlement allowed parishes to return vagrants to their "home" parish at that parish's expense. Neither the Vagrancy nor Settlement Acts helped parishes in dealing with Irish paupers, for the first required the maintenance of imprisonment, while the latter could not be used as Ireland did not yet have a Poor Law of its own, and despite the Union, English law didn't extend to Irish parishes.

The recession following the Napoleonic wars saw the problem of vagrancy increase drastically, as did the pressure for the reform of the Poor Laws. By the late eighteenth century parishes that felt themselves particularly burdened sought to have the burden of Irish "vagrancy" borne at the county level. Reform became a matter of contestation, for too liberal a reform could have created a situation in which the parishes' ability to exclude migrants from the rights of settlement would have been reneged. The vestrymen of the parish of St. Giles took a lead in opposing liberal amendments to the Laws of Settlement, and in encouraging moves to facilitate the removal of Irish immigrants. Their success was manifest in the provisions of Geo. III, cap. 12 (1828), which allowed that immigrants could be repatriated without conviction on charges of vagrancy, and that removals would be enacted at the expense of the county.

The removal of the burden of immigrant pauperisation from the parish to the council level broadened the level of attention given to the intensifying problem. By the 1830's, when politicians had begun to discuss the possibility of an Irish Poor Law, or of the extension of England's new Poor Law to Ireland, a political consensus evolved around an analogy between the burden that had been placed on the parishes and the burden that would be placed upon the nation. The effect of this consensus was that, despite the existence of the Union, there could be no question of dealing with Irish poverty as if it were a national problem: The Irish were British subjects, but did not own the substantive rights of English "citizens." The introduction of an Irish Poor Law in 1838 was riven by contradiction, and did little to alleviate the crisis, and its extension in 1847 made assistance (in the form of famine relief) available to peasant farmer only on the condition that they relinquish their tenures. The support offered was substantially weak (and abusive) when compared to the opportunities that emigration continued to provide, and it made no provision for immigrant settlement in England.

As a result of the broader frame of British policies towards Ireland including the management of the inter-relationship of the different flows of mobilities, while Irish immigrant poverty continued to be pauperised, and immigrants continued to be regarded as a morally inferior "race," the level of migration continued unabated and Irish labour continued to supply a cheap supplement to the needs of British industry and commerce.<sup>470</sup> Self-sufficient Irish immigrants were incorporated into the British labour market, where, in the northern cities at least, their 'ability' to undercut the local labour force resulted in anti-Irish agitations.<sup>471</sup> Immigrants who had become pauperised as a result of colonisation and modernisation were subjected to a form of apartheid, in which the British sought to return them to unsustainable communities. Thus, for example, from the time of the 1846-51 famine, the Laws of Settlement were 'abused' in such a way that 'paupers removed from Britain to Ireland were not returned to their own Union, but were unceremoniously dumped at the nearest port of entry in Ireland'.<sup>472</sup> John Archer Jackson notes that 'the existence of a large pool of cheap labour at a time of national expansion proved an essential ingredient to the rapid industrial advance'.<sup>473</sup> Colonial Irish migration supplied a reserve labour army that facilitated, at the lower circuits of production, the growth of British agriculture and industry, whilst those migrants that exceeded the requirements of colonial-capitalism were disposed of as a form of social waste. Politico-economic migration was thus mobilised

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<sup>470</sup> Robert Miles notes that the majority of the nineteenth century immigrants worked in semi-skilled and unskilled labour categories, including bricklaying, roadmaking, canal-cutting, railway construction, harbour construction and dock labour', as well as cotton loom weaving, clothing manufacture, transport, food, and hospitality services. See Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982, p 129.

<sup>471</sup> Jeffrey Williamson, 'The impact of the Irish on British labour markets during the Industrial Revolution', in Roger Swift and Sheridan Gilley, (eds.), *The Irish in Britain, 1815-1939*, London, Pinter, 1989

<sup>472</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, p 26.

<sup>473</sup> John Archer Jackson, *The Irish in Britain*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p 82.



by a colonising state-society structure that subsequently divided the consequent immigration into its 'legal' and 'illegal' forms.

In these processes the Irish subjects who became emigrants were racialised. It was the articulation of the pauperisation of Irish and British subjects and the racial coding of national identity that facilitated the construction of Irish persons as 'white negroes' in elite and popular cultural discourse of the eighteen thirties and beyond.<sup>474</sup> John Marriott finds that as the Irish were visible as both colonial subjects and urban poor, they presented a more extreme disruption to the social order 'by forcing the conjunction of a culturally constituted whiteness with its own metaphor of difference'.<sup>475</sup> From as early as the 1730s, the tension surrounding the issue of belonging had been exacerbated by the indigenous perception of having their wages undercut by cheaper immigrant labour.<sup>476</sup> Thus in the context of the impoverishment of the British workforce in the first half of the nineteenth century, 'white' Irish immigrants came to be represented as a form of 'blackness', and between 1840 and 1890 social Darwinian assumptions were brought to bare on the representations of Irish persons as simian, particularly at historical junctures where Irish political resistance seemed to threaten the metropolis.<sup>477</sup>

In the context of these processes of pauperisation and racialisation we can observe several of the ambiguous features of the formation of British liberalism in this period. As Patty Seleski notes, Linda Colley's argument that the developing importance of Protestantism in the construction of British national identity from its anti-French and anti-Catholic moorings in the aftermath of Britain's victory in the Napoleonic Wars had consequences for the re-construction of Irish identities in Britain fails to take account of the rise in anti-Irish sentiments that occurred after 1829.<sup>478</sup> Colley cites the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829 as a point at which the emergent political, rather than 'racial' formation of British national identity began to appear, as Britishness had proved to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate the granting of civil rights to propertied Catholics.<sup>479</sup> Seleski refers our attention, instead, to Mary Poovey's argument that anti-Catholicism was transformed into anti-Irishness in the period following the Emancipation Act.<sup>480</sup> Poovey here instances the invention of an Irishness that encoded

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<sup>474</sup> The representation of Irish persons as 'white negroes' comes from Thomas Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, 1833-4; cited in John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 165.

<sup>475</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 165; Marriott draws upon David Lloyd, 'Race under representation', *Oxford Literary Review*, no. 13, 1991, pp., 62-94.

<sup>476</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 296

<sup>477</sup> John Marriott, *op cit*.

<sup>478</sup> Patty Seleski, *ibid*, p 12; Seleski is here making a useful intervention into Linda Colley's account of the development of a liberal national identity. Colley addresses Irish immigration and the Catholic Emancipation Act (1829); See Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2005, pp., 329-30. Paul Gilroy makes an analogous intervention into the imperial apologetics of Colley's recent history of British Imperial 'captives'. See Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2003, and Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2004, pp., 103, 115.

<sup>479</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit*.

<sup>480</sup> Mary Poovey, 'Curing the social body' in 1832: James Phillip Kay and the Irish in Manchester', *Gender and History*, no. 5, 1993, pp., 196-211.

fears of both Catholicism and the general social disorder that poor Irish persons were held to represent. The consolidation of Britishness as Protestant and middle class allowed Britons to celebrate their own tolerance and the expansion of British political liberalism whilst simultaneously justifying the exclusion of the Irish from the imagined national social body.<sup>481</sup>

Thus, where British liberalism can be seen to have been in effect during this period it was primarily governed by the dictates of *economic* liberalism, even as the openness to Irish immigration has subsequently been placed within the discourse of political tolerance. Moreover, if political liberalism had grounded this regime of mobility control then we might expect that the question of the Irish poverty caused through colonial practice would have been redressed. As it happened, far from operating within a paradoxical form, economic and political liberalism in this period were articulated forms; their operation was mutually reinforcing because their articulation was relayed through the figure of the pauperised colonial other.

### Section 2.3. Transatlantic mobility and stasis.

Over the entire period of the Atlantic slave trade, some 12 million African persons were shipped to West Indies and Americas, often to work on the large-scale plantation system. British interest were responsible for the shipping of 3.4 million of these, and a further 500,000 Indian indentured labourers to the West Indies after emancipation.<sup>482</sup> The British slave trade was immensely profitable. Hilary Beckles has recently estimated that were repatriation to be made for the unjust enrichment made in the British slave trade, then the debt would amount to £7.5 trillion.<sup>483</sup> The slave trade provided the labour power for British West Indian and American plantation economies, and formed an intrinsic element of the global circulation of colonial produce between metropolitan sites of consumption and colonial sites of production. These commodity flows, the lower circuits of colonial exchange, provided a major support for the metropolitan accumulation of capital that facilitated Britain's financial and industrial advantages.

The origins of the British slave trade lie in the Mediterranean slavery and plantation systems that had involved a shift from the use of European slaves to a trade with Africa states, and dates back as far as the twelfth century.<sup>484</sup> In 12<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup> centuries, Islamic Africans and other dominant African communities had acquired African slaves and sold them onto other Africans for profit, or removed

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<sup>481</sup> Mary Poovey, *ibid*, p 209; Patty Seleski's presentation of Poovey's argument is essentially similar. See Seleski, *ibid*, p 13.

<sup>482</sup> I address Indian indentured migration in the following section

<sup>483</sup> Hilary Beckles, *Sugar*, BBC4, August 2005.

<sup>484</sup> David Brion Davies, *Slavery and Human Progress*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1984., pp., 56-7.

them to distant regions where there was a demand for labour. Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and the other European traders that followed came to the west coast of Africa for the purpose of expanding their trade. By the early 1500's it was apparent to the Europeans that Africa yielded wealth in the form of gold, ivory, wax, hides, sugar, pepper. Following the African trade, the Portuguese, Spanish and other Europeans were to develop the habit of turning to the African west coast for enslaved African labour.

By 1600 the Portuguese had established an effective monopoly over the African slave trade, and by the middle of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese had shipped some 200,000 African slaves to the Brazilian sugar plantations. This evident profitability was recognised by the other European powers that joined the slave and plantation system, and also came to prefer African labour to indigenous forms of labour. The Spanish, who established a vast empire in South America, transported a further 268,000 African slaves to the Americas, and when the Spanish and Portuguese Crowns were united in 1580, the scale of this empire became even greater. The trade of African slaves to the Spanish Americas between 1521 and 1591 consisted of the passage and labour of some 73,000 Africans, and a further 151, 205 were transported between 1595 and 1639.<sup>485</sup> Brion Davies notes that there was a strong correlation between regions of Spanish American prosperity and the use of black slaves, the foremost amongst these being the sugar producing regions: yet, by the seventeenth century, 'the Spanish Caribbean had fallen into poverty and decay', and this moment marked both 'the temporary 'failure' of black slavery to become part of a sustained, secure, and prosperous plantation system', and, to a strong extent, the institutional origins of the latter British system.<sup>486</sup>

By the 1620s, 'the connection between slaves, plunder, and wealth were even better understood by the Dutch West India Company, which won naval hegemony throughout the Caribbean'.<sup>487</sup> As Brion Davis observes,

*The Hollanders' eagerness to retain control of the Atlantic slave trade, even after they had been expelled from Brazil in the mid-seventeenth century, underscores the pre-eminence of sugar and slaves in the struggles for mercantilist power. Black slavery took root in the Americas in a slow, spasmodic, and seemingly haphazard way, but even the last three-quarters of the sixteenth century gave ample and cumulative evidence that the fortunes of the New World depended on Africa.*<sup>488</sup>

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<sup>485</sup> Colin A. Palmer, *Slaves of the White God*, Chapel Hill, NC, 1975

<sup>486</sup> David Brion Davies, *ibid*, p 68-9.

<sup>487</sup> David Brion Davies, *op cit*.

<sup>488</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 64

Throughout the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had challenged and then overtaken the Mediterranean empire in Africa, South America and Southeast India, but were unable to establish the successful settlements that the former powers maintained. Although it was the Dutch who were initially the most successful, the help they gave the English (as the English and Dutch were Protestant allies) and the speed and efficiency of British ships meant that English privateers and pirates were increasingly able to make incursions into the Portuguese dominance of the African commerce, and in particular, to make substantial inroads into the slave trade and plantation-settlement system by the 1620s, which, prior to the successful establishment of the English as a colonial power, had shipped some 630,000 slaves from Africa.

The British Atlantic colonial economy was built on the labour power of both European and African workers. In describing the regimes of transatlantic migration David Etlis observes the 'huge (and before 1850, majority) presence of either unwilling migrants, or migrants who arrived under impersonal and long-term obligation to others'.<sup>489</sup> Etlis differentiates between the overlapping categories of bound and coerced migrants. Bound migrants included indentured servants, contract labourers, slaves, convicts and prisoners, whilst coerced migrants included only slaves, prisoners, and convicts.<sup>490</sup> The 'transatlantic indentured servitude arrangement was a direct outgrowth' of the English institution of servitude that had, since the mid-fourteenth century, 'forced all persons not in a recognised occupation to serve in husbandry'.<sup>491</sup> By the end of the sixteenth century some forty per cent of the English population existed in a state of servitude, and the further substantial population of vagrants existed in an extreme state of pauperism that has been recently theorised as constituting a lack of the negative liberty requisite to the state of freedom.<sup>492</sup> Masters, like slaveholders, held great powers over their servants, and used physical punishment and a system of testimonials requiring good behaviour from servants to discipline their labour and circulation.<sup>493</sup> In the latter aspect the significant feature was the ability of the master to withhold the testimonial, thus binding the labourer to the employment he or she sought to leave. Indentured servants signed contracts 'binding them to service for a stipulated time in return for their passage', typically for a period of four years.<sup>494</sup> While contract labourers were not subject to the debt bondage of indenture, slaves, who were regarded as commodified labour-power, had none of the prospects of freedom promised to European migrant labourers. Prisoners and convicts, on the other hand, had more in common with other European migrants serving periods of indenture, inasmuch they had the prospect of entering the colonial labour

<sup>489</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 1-2.

<sup>490</sup> David Etlis, *op cit*.

<sup>491</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 206

<sup>492</sup> Gregory King, and David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 210, fn, 18.

<sup>493</sup> David Etlis, *op cit*.

<sup>494</sup> Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*, Chapel Hill and London, University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p 9; David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 212

market as free labour if they were able to obtain their ticket-of-leave. We might add the significant categories of military service and impressments to these categories, and note that indentured service can be taken to include those serving in similar forms of debt-bondage, such as the 'redemptionists' who obtained free passage in return for subsequent repayment to the ship's captain, and were to be sold at auction on failure of repayment.<sup>495</sup>

It's important to note that the definition of coercion and bondage that Etlis operates with rests on the operation or absence of contractual consent. The coerced bondage of colonial service migration did not approach the relatively absolute state of unfreedom given in chattel slavery. Nonetheless, as Etlis also argues, 'the differences between propertied classes and their potential workers were much less pronounced in the seventeenth century than they were to become even though chattel slavery was always seen as something separate'.<sup>496</sup> Moreover, as we will show that there was a great deal of coercion involved in the contractual bondage of colonial migration and service, we can argue that for many of the European migrants the distinction between coercion and bondage was practically invalid.

Both Eric Williams and David Etlis have observed that early colonial endeavour in the British Americas and the Caribbean was based on the use of indentured British migrant labour rather than the African slavery that replaced it in the plantation system by the end of the seventeenth century.<sup>497</sup> The necessity for an increasingly coercive system of labour supply and regulation, and the subsequent shift to the use of African labour in the plantation system was the result of a particular constellation of political, economic, and social factors in England and the colonies.

From the first years of their endeavours in the early seventeenth century, colonialists saw the use of British labour in the colonies as consisting of a strategy of expropriation and as a means of ensuring a constant and cheap supply of labour for colonial settlement and production. Where the elite discourse centred on the political and economic advantages, the discourse directed at the English poor represented colonial service in terms of idyllic opportunities. Thus, for example, Virginia was represented as 'Earth's only paradise', and a Virginia Company advocate promised recruits that the 'sappe of their bodies' would not 'be spent for other mens profite'.<sup>498</sup> In contrast to the utopian promises that included, as this quote suggests, a promise of a measure of liberty, conditions of service in the nascent colony were extremely harsh and dangerous. Of the 535 settlers who arrived in 1609, for example, only 55 were still alive some two years later, and the settlers who had accidentally been

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<sup>495</sup> Eric Williams, *op cit.*

<sup>496</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 205.

<sup>497</sup> Eric Williams, Chapter 1, *ibid*, 1994; David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 213.

<sup>498</sup> Michael Drayton, 'Ode to the Virginian Voyage', 1606; cited in Alexander Brown, (ed.), *Genesis of the United States*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1890, p 86; Robert Rich, *Newes From Virginia: The Lost Flocke Triumphant*, London, 1610

sequestered in Bermuda mutinied rather than face the prospect of service in the Virginian colony.<sup>499</sup> These conditions prevailed up until the 1840s, during which period it took nearly two immigrants to add one settler to the resident population.<sup>500</sup>

Until the 1650's, the prevailing belief amongst the English propertied classes was that the colonies 'formed a desirable outlet for England's surplus population'. For a temporary but significant interval, from the 1660's at least until the early eighteenth century, by which time the use of slave labour had become integral, this position was ameliorated. The first factor in this relative slow-down consisted of the fact that the combination of a significant decline in the rate of population growth in England and the rise of emigration to the colonies produced a demographic decline in England. The size of the population in the England of 1656, for example, was not reached again until 1721. Correlated to the perceptions of a demographic deficit was the corresponding perception of a problematic rise in wages in the second half of the seventeenth century. Contemporary commentators in this period typically viewed labour in terms of a backward-bending supply curve. Here the assumption was that as the labouring classes were naturally inclined to 'idleness', higher wages encouraged their proclivity for subsistence levels of labour. Consequently, as labourers were thought to be inclined to seek employment only to the degree that wages provided subsistence, conditions of underemployment prevailed, and the competition for labour placed an upward pressure on wages. Higher wages occurred at a time of increased manufacturing productivity, and a reliance on highly competitive European export markets. In the context of the increasingly coercive domestic labour regulations directed at the English poor, there was a strong extent to which the export of labour was regarded as a domestic risk.<sup>501</sup> Rather than eventuating in a cessation of convict labour and other forms of impressments, the tension between those invested in the ad hoc regime of coerced migration and those that wished to see a formalised system in which the procedures of transportation were regularised was resolved in the favour of the former.<sup>502</sup> By the early decades of the eighteenth century, when Britain had begun the regularized large-scale convict labour migration that might have supplied the colonies, the demographic and political dynamics had changed, but by then the slave system had been successfully established.<sup>503</sup>

These national dynamics occurred at the time of the shift to the plantation system, and the expansion of agricultural production in the colonies that occurred between 1640 and 1700. The agricultural industry of sugar production in the British Caribbean first began to take off in Barbados in the 1840s. Here, it

<sup>499</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*, 2000, pp., 12-14.

<sup>500</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 66

<sup>501</sup> David Ellis, *ibid*, 1993, p 218. Ellis cites, for example, the Poor Laws of 1662, 1683, 1697.

<sup>502</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 14.

<sup>503</sup> Some 50,000 convicts were transported to the American colonies from 1717 to 1775. See also section 1.1.



seems likely that the use of British servants, convicts, and political prisoners remained important throughout the decade. During the same decade, however, the large-scale use of slave labour on the plantations began. Beyond the servitude-labour deficit, the use of slave labour was stimulated by the reduction in the price of newly arrived Africans in the Americas that began in 1645 and remained fairly constant until 1685. The cheap price of African slaves in this period was partly due to productivity gains in English slave shipping, but primarily due to the low price of sugar. Thus, to an extent, the socio-political and economic costs of the loss of domestic (English) labour combined with the initially cheap price of African slaves and the plenitude of productive land in the colonies to facilitate the shift to the use of the slavery-plantation system.

David Brion Davis observes that 'white workers began to avoid the West Indies and freed servants began an exodus to the North American mainland, only after the islands were becoming wholly transformed by sugar and black slaves'.<sup>504</sup> One major factor contributing to the shift was the volatility of labour relations between servants and their masters in the British American and Caribbean colonies. In 1676, the Lords of Trade and Plantations had 'opposed the use of the word 'servitude' as a mark of bondage and slavery, and suggested 'service' instead'.<sup>505</sup> This declaration can be taken as a defensive measure of the extent to which bondage and slavery were accurate terms for the conditions of servitude in the colonies. Williams notes that 'servants were regarded as 'white trash' and were bracketed with the Negroes as labourers. In Maryland, servitude developed into an institution approaching in some respects chattel slavery'.<sup>506</sup> In Pennsylvania, regardless of the 'voluntary' nature of indentured contracts, 'as a class and when once bound, indentured servants were temporarily chattels'.<sup>507</sup> In the colonial plantations using both white servants and black slaves, the temporary indenture of the servant could lead to comparatively harsh treatment. As Williams observed, 'since they were bound for a limited period, the planter had less in their welfare than that of the Negroes who were perpetual servants and therefore 'the most useful appurtenances' of a plantation'.<sup>508</sup> Under these conditions, white plantation workers were eager to escape the plantations at the end of their indenture, and sought, where possible, to establish themselves as yeomen farmers in both the Caribbean and the American mainland; moreover, as the use of plantation agriculture in the Caribbean increased the scale and the price of the land under production, the small holders on the islands were gradually priced out of the islands.

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<sup>504</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, 1984, p 66.

<sup>505</sup> *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, IX*, 394, May 30<sup>th</sup>, 1676, Cited in Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 17.

<sup>506</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 16.

<sup>507</sup> C. A. Herrick, *White Servitude in Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, 1926, p 3; cited in Eric Williams, *op cit*.

<sup>508</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 17; G. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the United States, 1765-1860*, New York, 1909, p 48.

The British colonialists suffered from an inability to incorporate domestic sources of labour-power at a price and in a quantity sufficient to the requirements of the plantation system; this inability consisted of a failure to successfully channel the mobility of the labouring poor into the stasis of long-term servitude on the plantations. The application of a greater degree of force in the colonies could have been used to ensure a more constant supply, but would have had negative effects on the struggle to coerce the domestic poor into wage-labour in Britain where, in the mid-seventeenth century, the nascent discourse of liberal rights was developing and being appropriated, in different contexts, by all classes. Subsequently, the use of slavery became indispensable to 'not only for the regions capable of producing agricultural staples, but also for the port cities and neighbouring commercial farms and livestock areas from Newport to Buenos Aires'.<sup>509</sup> By 'the eve of the American Revolution, the most productive and wealthiest regions of British America ... were the staple-producing economies dependent on slave labour'.<sup>510</sup>

As Eric Williams and Ulrich Phillips argued, the system of white servitude formed one basis for the subsequent development of the African slavery-plantation system.<sup>511</sup> Williams goes on to argue that the latter system was the result, not of racism, but of the underlying economic rationale of colonial production, and that racism developed from the plantation system itself. In this context we can observe the general tendency of imperialism to incorporate pre-capitalist modes of production and the associated life-worlds within its system of exchange applies as much to labour-power as to other factors of production. In this sense there was a degree of equivalence between the enslavement of African persons, and the servitude of English paupers, correlated to the socio-political and cultural framing of each of these populations as belonging to a mode of society that figured as a pre-modern limit to capitalism and to the emergent ideology of liberal progress. Yet chattel slavery was qualitatively different to contractual forms of bondage. As Eric Williams argued,

*[t]he servant's loss of liberty was of limited duration, the Negro was slave for life. The servant's status could not descend to his offspring. Negro children took the status of the mother. The master at no time had absolute control over the person and liberty of his servant as he had over his slave. The servant had rights, limited but recognised by law, and in a contract. He enjoyed, for instance, a limited right to property. In actual law the conception of the servant as a piece of property never went beyond that of personal estate and never reached the stage of a chattel or real estate. The laws in the colonies maintained this rigid distinction and visited cohabitation between the races with severe penalties.*<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>509</sup> David Brion Davis, p 76.

<sup>510</sup> David Brion Davis, p 77.

<sup>511</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 19; Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, *Life and Labour in the Old South*, Boston, 1929, p 25.

<sup>512</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 18.

At the period of the development of the colonial plantation system, European persons were subject to the emergent Enlightenment discourse that 'revealed liberty as the essence of humanity'.<sup>513</sup> The contractual character of labour-bondage that applied to a Eurocentric understanding of humanity did not extend to people whose anthropological differences rendered them as 'pre-modern' and 'sub-human'.<sup>514</sup> As Etlis notes, 'for slaves, 'wages slavery was no doubt preferable to their own situation. For the seventeenth century English, the distinction was sufficiently clear that ... they never imposed such status on members of their own community'.<sup>515</sup> Subsequently, when by the late eighteenth century Britain had seen the emergence of a 'free labour ideology', the bio-political techniques and strategies that gradually come to be applied towards the construction of a disciplined national workforce were distinct from the political economy of racialised slavery. Here the techniques of spectacular violence (manifest in the iconic symbol of the lash) remained the prevalent form of coercion used for the extraction of non-white labour-power in the interests of 'mercantilist and imperial 'progress''.<sup>516</sup> Moreover, as we shall see when discussing the emancipation of the British West Indian slaves, a cultural form of racism underlay the very granting of freedom that was to be presented as a hallmark of Britain's liberalism.

The trans-Atlantic 'triangular trade' began in 1640 and continued until the 1807. Within the triangular trade, Britain exported its manufactured product to Africa, the British West Indies, and to North America, used these commodities for the purchase of slaves from the West African coasts, used the Africans forced employment in the manufacture of sugar in the British Caribbean, shipped the sugar, along with other produce, to Britain and her North American colonies, and then used a part of the profits to buy more manufactured goods to trade in Africa for more slaves.<sup>517</sup> Thus the triangular trade was an enormously profitable system for the planters whose slaves produced the sugar, the merchant capitalists who sold them the slaves, the industrial capitalists who supplied the manufactured goods with which the slaves were brought, and the bankers and commission agents who lent money to all of them. In addition, as James Walvin argued, this triangular flow of goods, finance, and people form the basis for the linkages between diverse sectors of the global economy.<sup>518</sup>

The West Indian based 'sugar industry' was the most obvious product of the triangular trade; whilst seventy five per cent of the sugar produced passed through London, sugar consumption in England

<sup>513</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, 1990, p 5.

<sup>514</sup> See the discussion in chapter one, section 1.2.

<sup>515</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 211.

<sup>516</sup> David Etlis, *ibid*, 1993, p 212; David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 67.

<sup>517</sup> Don D Marshall, 'From the triangular Trade to (N)AFTA: a neostructuralist insight into missed Caribbean opportunities; *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No 3, 1996, p 434.

<sup>518</sup> James Walvin, *Britain's Slave Trade*, Stroud, Gloucestershire, Tempus, 2000, p 30.

increased fourfold between 1660 and 1700, and twenty fold between 1663 and 1775. The western triangle overlapped with the East Indian Company's interests; this was true at the level of the ruling class as many of the same merchants, shareholders and institutions were involved in both endeavours and as Indian cottons were used in the purchase of slaves from the west coast of Africa. Key financial institutions such as Barings Bank, Lloyds, and the Bank of England all had stakes in the eastern and western colonial trades, and provided the finance necessary to the furthering of colonial pursuits, the profits from which re-cemented their place in the public-private construction of the English political state-society complex.

By the late 17th century the British had become the major slavers in the Atlantic; from 1660 to 1700 they shipped 329,600 African persons, compared to the Portuguese who shipped 263,700 over the same period. British slavery was tied to the plantation system and to sugar production in particular; by 1740, there were 100,000 slaves working on the Caribbean plantations, but these numbers increased rapidly over the following years, and over the entire period of slavery 3.4 million Africans were transported from Africa to various destinations by the British (12 million were transported in all). The benefits of the British slave trade outlived the period of direct British involvement, as Britain was later to rely on cheaply produced American cotton from the Southern states' plantation systems. The Atlantic economy provided English industrialisation with substantial finance, directly nourishing several important industries and indirectly supporting many others. In the opinion of the historian Eric Williams, the triangular trade, a mercantilist system protected by the Navigation Acts, provided English capitalism with a 'money machine', an endless chain between sugar, manufacturing and slavery for which the latter was the essential link.<sup>519</sup> Whilst, as we discussed in chapter one, the relationship between industrialisation and colonial-capitalism has been the subject of historical debate, we can say that in the case of the transatlantic economy the entire system was built upon the use of coerced servitude and then slave labour, which consisted of the forced migration of African people, and the subsequent enforcement of their stasis within the plantation system.

The African slave trade, and, in particular, the triangular trade shows how the mobility of goods, finance, and cultures were dependent upon the flows of forced migrations and the enforced stasis of migrant labour in the colonial period. These controlled flows all served the elites of the European colonisers. Similarly, the coerced migrations of poor persons from British territory in this period served the interests of the British elite, as they provided the engine of colonial endeavour, and their migration lessened the socio-political unrest that marked European societies in this period. By the late eighteenth

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<sup>519</sup> Eric Williams, *ibid*, chapter three; Williams stated that 'the profits obtained provided one of the main streams of that accumulation of capital in England which financed the industrial revolution', p 52. The reference here is specifically to English, rather than to British interests.

century, however, the plantation-slavery system began to come under the intense pressure of local (colonial) resistance whose extreme threat was manifest, for example, in insurrections of the 1730s and 1740's, including, in particular, the Maroon rebellions in Jamaica, the Jamaican slave rebellions of 1776, the Haitian revolution of 1791, the 'Bussa' rebellion in Barbados of 1816, and the Jamaican rebellion of 1832.<sup>520</sup> In addition the system was subject to pressure from the popular (primarily middle class) British emancipation movement, the laissez faire advocates that, following the lead set by Adam Smith, endorsed the use of free labour as a necessary component of the free market, and the shifting requirements of material and ideological interstate rivalry.<sup>521</sup> Balanced against these forces were the representatives of the West Indian interests in Britain, conservative sectors of the political classes and media, and the working class movements that sought to critique the emancipation movement by seeking to privilege the 'white slavery' of the industrial revolution over the issue of colonial slavery.<sup>522</sup>

From the earliest years of settlement, English Caribbean colonialists strove to establish and maintain the legitimacy of their rule and thus the basis of claims made upon the metropolis in terms of the legacy of liberalism and commercialism that was believed to have been 'fostered and defined by the unique English system of law and government'.<sup>523</sup> Colonialists sought refuge in the systems of parliament and judiciary – the 'two grand Pillars of *English Liberty*' that had rendered the 'birthright' that promised that Englishmen would remain 'more free and happy than any other People in the world'.<sup>524</sup> Between 1660 and 1760, the West Indian colonialists continued to defend their interests in terms of the right to the 'same fundamental rights, privileges, and liberties' as the 'people of England'.<sup>525</sup> On this basis they argued that any transgression of those rights represented as loss of their status as 'freeborn Englishmen', and in so doing so, rendered English subjects as slaves.<sup>526</sup>

By the 1770's the colonialists felt sufficiently threatened to respond to metropolitan criticism that had become prevalent from the 1750s onwards. The rhetorical strategy of defining metropolitan interference as a form of enslaving British subjects functioned as a deconstruction of the anti-slavery

<sup>520</sup> Linebaugh and Rediker, *ibid*, pp., 193-5, 241, 302;

<sup>521</sup> Adam Smith's critique of slavery as an economically and morally faulted system was set out in *The Wealth of Nations*. The place of British emancipation shifted in relation to contingent historical developments; thus, to give one example, James Stephens sought to use the advantages that could be gained from attacking both French and neutral slaving routes throughout the Napoleonic Wars as a means of articulation emancipation to the national interest. By the 1830's, on the other hand, it was often acknowledged that British emancipation would strengthen other European forms of plantation-slavery. See David Brion Davis, *ibid*, pp., 172-3

<sup>522</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, chapter 9; Catherine Gallagher, pp., 3-35.

<sup>523</sup> Jack P. Greene, 'Liberty, slavery, and the transformation of British identity in the eighteenth-century West Indies', *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2000, p 1.

<sup>524</sup> Sir Edward Coke, *Institutes, Part Two*, London, 1797, Ch. 29, p 55; Henry Care, *English Liberties*, 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Boston, 1721, p 27; cited in Jack P. Greene, *ibid*, p 3.

<sup>525</sup> Nicholas Bourke, *Privileges of the Island of Jamaica Vindicated*, p 28; cited in Jack P. Greene, *ibid*, p 6.

<sup>526</sup> Nicholas Bourke, *ibid*, pp., 44-5, 57, 66; cited in Jack P. Greene, *ibid*, pp., 11-2.

critiques that focussed on the paradox of the enslavement of Africans under the *auspices* of self-proclaimed 'freeborn Englishmen'. The colonialists drew upon English jurisprudential and socio-political traditions that had developed the construction of 'categorical legal distinctions among various classes of people in the same society'.<sup>527</sup> In addition to pointing to the metropolitan recognition of the slave as a commodity, colonialists sought to draw a correlation between the place of the slave in the developing plantation economy, and the place of the 'villeins' in the medieval economy. Edward Long and Samuel Estwick, for example, observed that the rights that had been drawn from the *Magna Carta* and thereafter reiterated and conformed applied solely to freemen, and not, therefore, to villeins, who remained the property of their masters.<sup>528</sup> Africans, moreover, could not be granted a greater degree of liberty than European villeins, as they belonged to a society that had failed to demonstrate any signs of civilised progress over the previous 2000 years. As Jack P. Greene observed, Estwick drew upon David Hume's arguments regarding natural capacities and incapacities to show that Africans lacked the 'moral sense' identified by the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson as the essence of humanity'.<sup>529</sup> Where the restricted rights and liberties of the villein had enabled the shift from feudal forms of agricultural production in Europe, it was argued, the plantation system enabled both labour and land to be utilised for colonial settlement. Colonial slavery represented a form of liberation for its labourers, inasmuch as it freed Africans from their pre-existing 'feudal' ties, and thus furthered the commercial and political strength of England.<sup>530</sup>

In defending plantation slavery the colonial spokesmen sought to attack what they represented as the hypocrisy of British emancipationists by drawing further correlations between local and metropolitan conditions and relations of production. This strategy relied on comparisons made between the state of the English poor and colonial slaves where the claim was made that the English poor were 'slaves of necessity' whose conditions were worse than those enjoyed under the benevolence of the plantation masters.<sup>531</sup> In this view, colonial paternalism was portrayed as being more progressive than metropolitan liberalism. In as much, the colonial spokesmen were employing a 'discursive formation' that, having evolved in the fifteenth century European incursions into Africa, had reached the limits of its dominance with the arrival of the reconceptualised ideas of progress and British identity in the mid-

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<sup>527</sup> Jack P. Greene, *op cit.*

<sup>528</sup> Edmund Long, *Candid Reflections Upon the Judgement lately awarded by The Court of King's Bench in Westminster-Hall, on what is commonly called the Negroe-Cause*, London, 1772; *History of Jamaica*, London, 1774; Samuel Estwick, *Considerations of the Negroe Cause Commonly So Called. Addressed to the Right Honourable Lord Mansfield, Lord Chief Justice of the Court of the King's Bench*, London, 1772

<sup>529</sup> Jack P. Greene, *ibid*, p 20.

<sup>530</sup> In addition to the works by Long and Estwick, see Samuel Martin, Sr., *A Short Treatise on the Slavery of Negroes in the British Colonies*, Antigua, 1775

<sup>531</sup> I will return to this comparison in the context of the following chapter's discussion of race, class, and national identity.



eighteenth century that were concurrent with the apparent passing of the militant mercantilism of the 'first British empire' towards Palmerston's 'free trade' imperialism.<sup>532</sup>

From the last quarter of the eighteenth century onwards, the emergent ideology of liberal progress increasingly 'compelled influential sections of religious, manufacturing, and political opinion to press for the abolition of the [slave] trade and emancipation of slaves'.<sup>533</sup> As British identity came to be framed in terms of the nation's role as the commercial-and-liberal centre of the world, this emergent discursive space allowed for the promotion of domestic and foreign political and economic freedom as the manifestation of that centrality. Here the Mansfield judgement of 1772 which declared that any slave became a freeman once he had entered British territory formed a precedent for the cessation of the British slave trade in 1807, and the Emancipation Act of 1833.<sup>534</sup> Correspondingly, this latter Act was taken as a validification of the parliamentary reforms of 1832, as it was represented as demonstrating the new-found strength of the innately liberal middle class.<sup>535</sup> In this context, colonial emancipation served to legitimate the status of the British middle class as it furthered the status of Britain in the world, that Palmerston, some fifteen years later, was to describe as standing 'at the head of moral, social, and political civilization'.<sup>536</sup> As Catherine Hall observed, the British progress that the anti-slavery movement, and, in particular, the missionary groups sought was to be manifest in the form of a 'free' Jamaica, a 'Christian, civilised, capitalist, free-labour economy with democratic institutions'. It was therefore, a vision of 'a country based on their own version of the British model'.<sup>537</sup>

The abolition movement was built upon a contradiction that was to produce results that failed to match the most optimistic or, after 1833, celebratory emancipatory visions. This contradiction belonged to the Christian civilising mission's own cultural racism. Here, the tendency to regard the African slaves as naturally equal was contradicted by their corresponding view of African society as backwards. The abolitionists worked within a staged developmental view of African potential.<sup>538</sup> Up until 1830, this tendency left itself open to the colonialists' arguments for amelioration rather than absolute emancipation, as Africans would benefit from the gradual introduction of the moral education that was

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<sup>532</sup> The concept of a discursive formation belongs to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed. London, Verso, 2001, pp., 105-6, 136; See John Marriott, *ibid*, p 29; David Brion Davis, *ibid* ; Eric Williams, *ibid*, p 136; Martin Lynn gives a concise account of the emergent 'open door' policies of Palmerston, see Martin Lynn, 'Policy, trade, and informal empire', in Andrew Porter, (ed.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp., 101-21

<sup>533</sup> John Marriott, *op cit*.

<sup>534</sup> For a detailed account of the emergence of these Acts, see David Brion Davis, *ibid*, chapters five and six.

<sup>535</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 208

<sup>536</sup> W. Baring Pemberton, *Lord Palmerston*, London, 1954, p 141.

<sup>537</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 211

<sup>538</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 30

necessary for well-ordered free labour.<sup>539</sup> Subsequently, despite the abolitionists' criticism of the apprenticeship system as having been introduced as a means of extending the labour-bondage of the freed slaves, the prevalent cultural racism had opened a discursive space of 'not yet-ness' in which the government could claim that it had sought to meet the competing claims of both the plantation owners and the abolitionists.<sup>540</sup>

The British government took effective measures to restrict the flows of African slave labour to the newly gained British frontiers that were the result of territories ceded in the Napoleonic wars.<sup>541</sup> The government's subsequent efforts to persuade the West Indian interests that humanitarianism was compatible with material progress, and that 'they did not need a continuing supply of African labour in order to keep pace with their foreign rivals' failed to carry the day in the colonies.<sup>542</sup> From 1812 to 1827, while the administration of Lord Liverpool sought 'to avoid any infringements on the internal affairs of the chartered colonies', the abolitionist faction within the Colonial Office pursued a strategy of making the increasing colonial debts and mortgages conditional on the registration of slaves which, it was hoped, would contribute to a renewal of public pressure over slavery by making the rates of mortality a matter of public record. By the 1830's, in the context of the continuing intransigence of the plantation interests, James Stephens sought to persuade the abolitionists that only parliamentary legislation for emancipation could prevent the continuation of piecemeal reforms that 'could only delude the British public and strengthen the slave system'.<sup>543</sup>

David Brion Davis analyses the political strategy of the emancipation movement in terms of a bifurcation between the formal, and predominantly religious 'act or command' demanding that Britain 'free the people', and the practical regulations needed to give that command effect.<sup>544</sup> Rather than merely representing a strategic combination of ideals and pragmatism, Brion Davis sees that the British accommodation was a combination of the influence of the new improving social sciences and redemptive theology. Emancipation was overdetermined by a particularly British combination of modernity and tradition that allowed the presentation of 'radical social change' as a 'preservation or restoration of social order'. The further implication that we can draw from this account was that the preservation of a hegemonic social order was, correspondingly, able to adapt itself appropriating the discourse of emancipation-as-liberal that was represented as a popular achievement of radical social change.

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<sup>539</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 169

<sup>540</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 211

<sup>541</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, pp., 173-4

<sup>542</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 176

<sup>543</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 177

<sup>544</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, pp., 177-8

The state society complex of the 1790s through to the 1830s was manifest in a combination of the aristocracy which still dominated parliament, and the financial and colonial elites. This socio-political formation experienced intense socio-political contest from the working and middle classes, and feared the domestic influence of continental and American republicanism. Throughout the 1820s the influence of the West Indies interests was stronger in both houses of parliament than in had been in the century's first decade, and up until 1833, the absentee-planter interests were able to rely on sufficient support from the English aristocracy which felt a strong degree of empathy for the colonialists battles with lower class and racially inferior opponents.<sup>545</sup>

James Cropper, a Liverpool-based sugar merchant and devout Quaker was an exemplary representative of the middle class abolitionist movement's accommodation between religion and the improving social sciences. Cropper was highly influenced by Adam Smith's desire to 'remove those artificial restrictions and practices that hampered the free play of the market and hence of the realisation of individual self interest.'<sup>546</sup> In drawing upon Smith's views, Cropper argued that

*Free labour and free trade in 'legitimate' commodities were the divinely appointed engines of moral progress; the British slave system had always depended on the protection of discriminatory duties on sugar imports and bounties on sugar exports, which constituted an annual subsidy of some 1.2 million paid by British consumers; slave labour was thus a moral and economic anachronism that could be abolished most effectively by free-market forces – specifically, by the competition with free labour that would result from equalizing duties on East and West Indian sugar.*<sup>547</sup>

If, in the short term, Cropper was unable to persuade the abolitionist movement of the necessity of articulating emancipation to free trade, by the 1840's this position had approached the status of an official doctrine. Prior to the emancipation act, Cropper typically assumed that the laws of economics would soon replace laws requiring physical coercion, and that the West Indies would soon enjoy normative conditions in which the fear of starvation and the desire for superfluities would induce freedmen to increase their output of agricultural staples.<sup>548</sup>

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<sup>545</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, pp., 178-9.

<sup>546</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 34.

<sup>547</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 181; Brion Davis' summary is drawn from James Cropper, *Letters addressed to William Wilberforce Recommending the Encouragement of the Cultivation of Sugar in Our Colonies in the East Indies as the Natural and Certain Means of Effecting the Total and General Abolition of the Slave Trade*, Liverpool, 1822; *Letter Addressed to the Liverpool Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery ...* Liverpool, 1823; *Relief for West Indies Distress ...* London, 1823; *The Correspondence between John Gladstone, Esq., M.P., and James Cropper Esq. ...* Liverpool, 1824.

<sup>548</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 189.

Like Wakefield's proposals for schemes of systematic colonisation, the proposals of policy makers and abolitionists tended to seek a maintenance of the 'liberal' independence of the colonies, thus leaving the West Indian colonialists to the task of devising regulations that would work to coerce freedmen into the 'free labour market' and thus back into the plantation system of production. It was also believed that colonial compliance with emancipation required a due regard for the losses that the colonies would incur initially at least, in shifting to a free labour system whilst competing with foreign slave-produced staples. The results of the political negotiations included a compensation payment of 20 million pounds, and an acceptance of the doctrine of 'gradualism', which allowed the plantation owners to bind 'freedmen' to the plantations for a further five to seven years. The colonies also enacted restrictive regulations including vagrancy laws and tenure and taxation systems that were designed to 'prevent freedmen from lapsing into subsistence agriculture on land of their own.'<sup>549</sup> The liberating incorporation of freedmen into the competitive sphere of the free labour market was thus subject to strict regulations that, like Wakefield's systematic colonisation, were designed to ensure the maintenance of cheap and constant labour. Apprenticeship and the new forms of labour-bondage and taxation were, moreover, designed to make the freedmen pay for their own emancipation. None of these measures were sufficient, however, to prevent freed slaves from dispersing to small holding agricultural produce, particularly in Jamaica, Trinidad and Guiana, where there was sufficient land for subsistence settlement. Once free of the plantation-slavery system and further forms of bondage, wherein, as Bernard Semmel notes, 'their former masters were offering pittance', the freed slaves 'increased and prospered' in diversified forms of small scale agriculture.<sup>550</sup> The British government, however,

*preferred to think of this development not a healthy adjustment to the decaying Jamaica sugar economy, not as a natural reaction to the existence of large areas of unoccupied land. Rather, they bemoaned the fact that the lazy Quashee preferred to grow his own food rather than work for the low, irregular, and uncertain wages of the frequently absentee estate owners.*<sup>551</sup>

In Britain and amongst the colonial administrators, the alternative productivity of the freed settlers was quickly taken as having proved the stereotype of natural 'idleness' to have belonged to the African 'race' rather than the system of slavery itself. Post-emancipation resistance sought to contest the colonial regime of coerced labour-stasis, just as the emancipation movement had sought, primarily, to defeat the regime of unfree labour mobility. Their resistance to renewed bondage within the colonial

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<sup>549</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 190.

<sup>550</sup> Bernard Semmel, *Jamaican Blood and Victorian Conscience: The Governor Eyre Controversy*, Cambridge, Riverside Press, 1963, p 33.

<sup>551</sup> Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

capitalist labour market was represented as having contributed to the economic decline of the West Indian colonies in the decades following emancipation. Thus, in the case of Jamaica, which had been regarded as the 'jewel' in the crown of the British West Indian colonies, the depression that had set in by the 1860's was ascribed by Governor Eyre to the laziness and untrustworthiness of the black.<sup>552</sup> Irreversibly committed to the plantation system's requirements for cheap and constant labour, the agency of the freedmen was re-inscribed as the cause of the labour-deficit that saw colonialists look to further sources of foreign labour for the plantation system.

The shift from slavery to coerced free labour was, in part, a result of the struggles of the British elite to maintain their hegemonic position over British society. In Britain, the government had

*[e]ssentially disarmed its opponents by endorsing and absorbing two ideologies – the abolitionist ideology, which called for a wholly new dispensation attuned to moral principles revealed by the collective voice of the Christian public, and the proprietor ideology, which insisted on gradual change, minimum interference with local self-government, and compensation for pecuniary losses.*<sup>553</sup>

The anti-slavery movement provided the ascendant middle class with a political cause in which they could affirm their status as an integral component of the public sphere. In the Emancipation Act of 1833 and the apprenticeship system that lasted until 1839, there was, in part, a hegemonic appropriation of political dissent manifest as a national popular formation. That appropriation worked to perpetuate the hold of the aristocratic and mercantile classes over the definition of the new form of the direction of British liberalism, which, from the 1840s onwards, located 'free labour' and the free market at the heart of liberal national-and-imperial humanitarianism (see chapter three, section 3.3).

As the age of the 'second British empire' dawned in the nineteenth century, the locus of colonial productivity shifted to from the West Indies to 'the east' where, as Pease observed in the example of Bengal, the cost of labour was five and one half times cheaper than the cost of maintaining slave labour for sugar production in Cuba and Brazil.<sup>554</sup> The influence of the triangular trade and gradually gave way to commercial and financial flows operating in the more laissez faire 'global' environment, wherein, initially, flows of British investment were redirected towards 'the more profitable slave systems of France, Cuba, Brazil, and the United States'.<sup>555</sup> The cotton textile industry, the 'central engine of the British industrial economy', continued to be heavily dependent on cotton from the

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<sup>552</sup> Governor Eyre's letter to Edward Cardwell, Secretary of State for the Colonies, January, 1865; summarised in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1973, p 43.

<sup>553</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 207.

<sup>554</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, pp., 190-1.

<sup>555</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 179

southern American slave states. The growth of the British Empire in India provided an extension of agricultural production that caused massive dispossession and displacement amongst the peasant labouring castes as they were incorporated into the imperial economy as 'free labour'. The later flows of indentured labourers to the West Indies resulted, in large part, from the internal displacements, as well as from the post-emancipation labour requirements of the plantation colonies. It is to these 'eastern' dynamics that we will now turn.

#### **Section 2.4. Anglo-Indian Colonial Mobility and Stasis: the forced movement of goods and finance, and the forced displacement and pauperisation of Indian persons.**

The British colonisation of India began and was consolidated, in the form of territorial control and the imposition of British systems of taxation and land tenure, with the profit-driven endeavours of the East India Company, and then continued under the Raj. Spokesmen for the Raj would come to claim that the British had rescued India from timeless hunger, despotic rule and barbarity.<sup>556</sup> In reality, the Indian economy and socio-political sphere that the British trading company engaged with was powerful, sophisticated, and in relative terms, humane. As Linda Colley observes, the initial aims of the East India Company were limited to 'making the English effective bit players in one of the richest, most advanced, and most competitive commercial sectors in the world'.<sup>557</sup> The powerful commercial position of India can be seen in its eighteenth century wealth and productivity. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, India produced 23.1 per cent of the world's gross domestic product, and at the mid-point of the century, India was responsible for the production of one quarter of the world's manufactures.<sup>558</sup> In addition, Indian wealth provided a greater security of livelihood for its lower caste work force. For example, as Prassannan Parthasarathi has observed, 'Southern Indian labourers had higher earnings than their British counterparts in the eighteenth century and lived lives of greater financial security'.<sup>559</sup> Indian agricultural labourers and artisans benefited not just from the great fertility of their farming lands, but also from having superior rights of contract and greater economic power (when compared to British workers).<sup>560</sup>

The East India Company began to make inroads into Indian commerce when it won a base in Madras in 1640, another in Bombay in 1661, and in 1690, a further base in Calcutta, which was in Bengal, the

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<sup>556</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid.*, pp., 285, 287

<sup>557</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 246

<sup>558</sup> B.R. Tomlinson, 'Economics: The periphery', in Andrew Porter (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford University Press, 1990, p 69, table 3.8.

<sup>559</sup> Prassannan Parthasarathi, 'Rethinking wages and competitiveness in Eighteenth century Britain and South India', *Past and Present*, 158, February 1998, p 82 (check).

<sup>560</sup> Prassannan Parthasarathi, *ibid.*, pp., 105-106.



richest region in India, whose wealth was derived, in part from the textiles and trade along the Ganges and Jumna rivers.<sup>561</sup> It was, as Colley writes,

*by way of this magic triangle – Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta – (that) the East India Company gradually became Britain's single biggest commercial enterprise, and secured a greater share of India's export business than the rival Dutch, Danish, Portuguese and French trading companies.*<sup>562</sup>

The flow of currency from East to West increased dramatically after the Company began to pursue territorial ambitions in Bengal from 1750, and to exert control from the time of Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757, from which point began the 'non-requested' trade in which Indian wealth was extracted in order to finance the ongoing westward flow of goods. With territorial control and the accompanying right to extract taxes, the Company was able to enact changes to the governance of India in the pursuit of profit. The major governing developments were the changing of the land tenure system and the subsequent extension of an unsustainable system of taxation. With the changes culminating in the Act of Permanent Settlement (1794), the Company changed the system of tenure to the English system. Subsequently, the Company was able to tax the peasantry directly, which they did at an onerous rate. Smallholders in the mid to late 18<sup>th</sup> century paid two thirds of their produce in taxation to the Company.

While enriching the metropolitan multinational class, the import of Indian textiles had undercut the more expensively produced cotton garments of the English manufacturing industry.<sup>563</sup> In 1813, British manufacturers won their battle to have the Company's monopoly over trade with India dissolved. This change allowed the manufacturers access to the Indian consumer market at a time when the tariff protection of their own industry had enabled them to pursue industrial policies resulting in the eventual production of competitive export goods. Subsequently, between 1814 and 1835, manufactured goods exported to India from Britain grew by 51:1, while the export of Indian textile to the British market decreased by seventy five per cent.<sup>564</sup> The effect was to 'shatter both the village economy based on an integration of agriculture and domestic spinning, and the great textile capitals of Bengal'.<sup>565</sup>

The pauperisation and exploitation of the Indian society continued unabated after the East India Company was compelled to hand-over control to the British government in 1857. Under the influence of utilitarian and laissez faire political philosophy, British administrators continued to enforce the

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<sup>561</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 247.

<sup>562</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 247-8.

<sup>563</sup> Nick Robins, *ibid*, p 84.

<sup>564</sup> Nick Robins, *op cit*.

<sup>565</sup> Nick Robins, *op cit*.

incorporation of Indian production and social relations within the sphere of the world economy via Imperial interests. The incorporation of the Indian economy was a crucial contributing factor in the development, and subsequently, the maintenance of British hegemony in the late Victorian period. Ralph Davies has argued that the spoils of Plassey contributed decisively to the stability of the Georgian order in an age of revolution, and that 'Indian wealth supplied the funds that bought the national debt back from the Dutch and others, first temporarily in the interval of peace between 1763 and 1774, and finally after 1783, leaving Britain nearly free from indebtedness when it came to face the French wars from 1793'.<sup>566</sup> It was, however, not until the height of *Pax Britannica* that Indian wealth came to fulfil a crucial role in British hegemony. Mike Davis cites 1870-1914 as the phase in which Indian labour and products were being conscripted into the London-centred world economy.<sup>567</sup> As Cain and Hopkins argue, the wealth coerced from India and China was not essential to the rise of British hegemony, but they were necessary in postponing Imperial decline in the late Victorian period.<sup>568</sup>

Throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 'the large surplus in the Indian balance of payments became the pivot of the enlarged reproduction of Britain's world-scale processes of capital accumulation, and of the City's mastery of world finance'.<sup>569</sup> Britain earned huge annual surpluses in her transactions with India and China that allowed her to sustain equally large deficits with the US, German, and the white Dominions: in addition, invisible earnings from shipping, insurance, banking, and foreign investment, which guaranteed 73 per cent of British trade credit in 1910. Anthony Latham argues that without the financial flows derived from Asia, Britain 'presumably would have been forced to abandon free trade', while her trading partners would have been forced to slow their own rates of industrialisation'.<sup>570</sup> Hence, without the surpluses which Britain was able to earn there, the whole pattern of international development would have been severely constrained'.<sup>571</sup>

India rose from the third to first place among consumers of British exports in the quarter century after 1870 and was forced to absorb Britain's surplus of increasingly obsolescent and non-competitive industrial exports.<sup>572</sup> Britain therefore avoided 'having to restructure her industry and was able to invest her capital in the countries where it had the highest return'.<sup>573</sup> Thanks to India 'British financiers were

<sup>566</sup> Ralph Davies, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade*, Leicester, 1979, pp 55-62

<sup>567</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 96.

<sup>568</sup> Cain and Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993a.

<sup>569</sup> Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times*, London, Verso, 1994, p 263

<sup>570</sup> Anthony Latham, *The International Economy and the Underdeveloped World, 1865-1914*, London, Croom, 1978, p 70

<sup>571</sup> Anthony Latham, *op cit*

<sup>572</sup> Robin Moore, 'Imperial India, 1858-1914', in Andrew Porter, (ed), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, 1999, p 441.

<sup>573</sup> Marcello de Cecco, *The International Gold Standard: Money and Empire*, New York, 1984, p 30.

not compelled to 'tie' their loans to British exports because the Imperial outlet was available to British exports'.<sup>574</sup>

Mike Davis observes that India was victimised by the new international monetary system established in the 1870s.<sup>575</sup> The London-based Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, which financed much of the Indian trade, 'had the same kind of quasi-state influence over Indian monetary policy as the Manchester Chamber of Commerce enjoyed over Indian agriculture'. Keeping the rupee tied to silver had obvious advantages for Britain, since the value of its exports (denominated in gold) increased in value while its imports (denominated in silver) declined in value. The Gold Standard removed twenty five percent of the purchasing power of the silver savings of the Indian population.<sup>576</sup> Indian reserves provided the British financial sector with a cheap supply of credit, helping to prevent inflation in Britain, whilst 'inflation greatly abetted the British campaign to recruit peasants to the production of export crops like wheat, indigo, opium and jute that helped balance the Empire's accounts. The management of credit facilitated the extraction of cash crops. By absorbing silver and exporting wheat at the lowest possible price India served as the buffer at the base of the world economy of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century'.<sup>577</sup> The burden of the 'structural adjustment' in the late Victorian world economy was shifted from Europe and North America to agriculturalists in newly minted 'peripheries': forcibly imposed trade deficits, export drives that diminished food security, over taxation and predatory merchant capital, foreign control of key revenues and development resources, chronic imperial and civil warfare, (and) a Gold standard that depleted the value of savings of Indian peasants. Josh estimated that fully half of the net savings of India was confiscated as revenue.<sup>578</sup>

Writing in 1828, Josiah Condor described British rule as having 'performed a splendid act of justice, policy, and humanity, which fairly entitles it to be regarded as a conservative and beneficent power, whose supremacy has been the deliverance of the people'.<sup>579</sup> By the late nineteenth century, British claims to have brought Progress to India, and to have reformed a backwards and lethargic society and economy were based, in part, on the thousands of miles of railroad track and canals built, and in part on the great export booms that transformed the subcontinent's agriculture in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>580</sup> British governmental discourse made constant reference to the emergence of

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<sup>574</sup> Marcello de Cecco, *ibid*, pp., 37-8

<sup>575</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 303.

<sup>576</sup> Vaughan Nash, *The Great Famine and its Causes*, London, 1900, p 88; cited in Mike Davis, *op cit*.

<sup>577</sup> Dieter Rothermund, 'The Monetary Policy of British Imperialism', *IESHR*, No, 7, 1970, pp., 98-9; cited in Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 304.

<sup>578</sup> Bipan Chandra, 'Colonial India: British versus Indian Views of Development', *Review*, 14:1, Winter 1991, p 102

<sup>579</sup> Josiah Condor, *The Modern Traveller. A Popular Description. Geographical, Historical, and Topographical, of the Various Countries of the Globe, Vol. III*, London, Duncan, 1828, p 11.

<sup>580</sup> Karl Marx, as we noted above, had praised these features of British colonialism in India.

Indian peasant capitalism, and, according to the precepts of British political economy, 'integration into the world market should have resulted in significant local increases in agricultural productivity and profitability', as 'most export production – opium, wheat, rice, and cotton – remained in native hands under a regime of modern property rights'.<sup>581</sup>

Agricultural productivity was accompanied by increased inequality and pauperisation. While there was no increase in India's per capita income from 1757 to 1947, in the last half of the nineteenth century income probably declined by more than 50 percent.<sup>582</sup> Colonial 'modernization' and commercialisation were accompanied by the pauperisation of the Indian peasantry and the destruction of their traditional networks of social reproduction. This can be seen in terms of the difference between traditional and British systems of land tenure and taxation. In the Marathi system, for example, occupancy rights had not been tied to revenue payments, and taxes on produce were pegged to the level of the actual harvest. In Berar, British administrators re-organised social reproduction along the lines of the '*khatedari*' system, which was represented as means of producing Indian versions of the (imagined) sturdy British yeomanry, and thus as the basis of an emergent Indian capitalism. However, as Davis argues, the reality was that 'the government became the supreme landlord with peasant tenure, unlike Tudor England, strictly conditional upon punctual payment of revenue'.<sup>583</sup> The new system gave way to brutal and unilateral relations of exploitation:

*the collection of taxes as well as the local marketing of the cotton crop ended up in the hands of the moneylender/grain merchants who became the crucial intermediaries controlling almost all transactions between the village world, Calcutta, and Manchester... (whilst) ... punitive taxes on local woven goods and a flood of cheap English imports ... destroyed domestic manufacture and forced ruined artisans into the fields as propertyless labourers.*<sup>584</sup>

Peasant and farm labourer vulnerability increased after 1850; as their local economies were violently incorporated into the world markets. Household vulnerability magnified via 'simultaneous restructuring of household and village linkages to regional production systems, world commodity markets and the colonial (or dependent) state. Davis identifies a constellation of social relations 'that have failed to stimulate or have actually prevented the development of the productive forces that might have lessened their vulnerability' in the form of decisive points of articulation with larger socio-economic structures. Thus

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<sup>581</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, pp., 311-12

<sup>582</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 311-3; See also Irfan Habib, 'Studying a colonial economy – without perceiving colonialism', *Modern Asian Studies*, 19:3, 1985, pp., 368-74.

<sup>583</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 313

<sup>584</sup> Mike Davis, *op cit*.

*The forcible incorporation of smallholder production into commodity and financial circuits, controlled from overseas tended to undermine food security; subsistence adversity: high taxes, chronic indebtedness, inadequate acreage, loss of subsidiary employment opportunities, enclosure of common resources, dissolution of patrimonial obligations, not entrepreneurial opportunity, that promoted the turn to cash-crop cultivation.*<sup>585</sup>

British rule in India led to sustained periods of subsistence crisis. Famines, rare in the pre-British rule of the Mugal state, were rampant throughout the periods of the East India Company's dominance, and the British Raj.<sup>586</sup> For Mike Davis, the famines of 1876 and 1899 showed that millions were murdered 'by the theological application of the sacred principles of Smith, Bentham, and Mill', wherein the 'the famines were forcing houses and accelerators of the very socio-economic forces that ensured their occurrence in the first place'.<sup>587</sup> The theoretical framework of Smithian political economy followed with devotion by the East India Company and the Raj was supplemented by an application of policy that was profoundly Hobbesian.<sup>588</sup>

The pauperisation of colonial India was the direct result of the application of British colonial liberalism to the subcontinent's society and economy; as Lydia Potts observes, by the 19<sup>th</sup> century, 'British rule had virtually bankrupted India's economy', assigning, in the process, 'the role of supplier to the world market of raw materials'.<sup>589</sup> As a result, 'by the beginnings of the nineteenth century', and increasingly thereafter, 'there were millions of Indian workers who no longer had access to the means of production'.<sup>590</sup>

In correlation to sustained periods of high mortality rates, pauperisation, and the re-direction of flows of produce and finance within the circuits laid down by British interests, the consequences of British colonialism in India included the forced displacement, internally, and internationally, of Indian peasants and artisans. As Gail Omvedt has observed, the colonial state deprived rural workers of subsistence levels of income, and thus forced them to migrate into urban wage-slavery and rural share-

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<sup>585</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 289

<sup>586</sup> Lydia Potts states that 'famines raged in 1770, 1784, 1804, 1837, and 1861 in Bengal and Northern India, and in 1877, 1878, 1889, 1892, and 1897 until 1900 in other parts of India'. Lydia Potts, *The World Labour Market: A History of Migration*, trans. Terry Bond, London, Zed Books, 1990, p 66.

<sup>587</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, pp., 9, 15

<sup>588</sup> David Hardiman, 'Well irrigation in Gujarat: systems of use: hierarchies of control', *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 20<sup>th</sup>, 1998, p 1541.

<sup>589</sup> Lydia Potts, *op cit*.

<sup>590</sup> Lydia Potts, *op cit*.

cropping.<sup>591</sup> Robert Miles' neo-Marxist perspective on labour migration is relevant to the case of colonial India.<sup>592</sup> Miles' argument that labour mobility is unfree under conditions of capitalist labour relations is held to be particularly true for economies being integrated into the world economy, (in historicist terms, countries making the shift from 'pre-capitalist' to capitalist social relations). The flows of labour mobility, in the light of the above-given argument about the relationship between liberalism and imperialism, are 'free' to the extent that they follow the unimpeded course of the British interests, interest that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century are presumed to work within the 'borderless' *laissez faire* conditions of the global market. This perspective coincides with Miles' view that the control of labour, and subsequently the restriction of mobility by direct coercion and the use of indentured and other forms of contract is necessary to capitalism; thus British colonial capitalism in India requires the use of forced and coerced forms of labour, as well as it produces forms of displacement, internally and internationally, as forms of capitalist 'waste'. 'Waste' migration, to take one example, seems a fair description of the deportation of famine-refugees from British India's neighbouring states in 1900, where the Viceroy Curzon took the decision in light of the knowledge that deportation was a virtual death sentence for the refugees.<sup>593</sup>

British India performed a supplementary role in the provision of slaves to European colonies throughout the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and became the key supplier of British colonial labour in the wake of the emancipation of slaves in the British colonies after 1833. The drop in agricultural commodity prices further perpetuated the system in the free trade period of the 1840s onwards, when the relative loss of imperial preferences via tariff advantages adversely affected the colonial economies trading in sugar, coffee, and other crops.<sup>594</sup> From 1830 to 1920, some five million Indians migrated to the British colonial plantations under the 'coolie' system, whilst a total of more than 30 million migrated under the coolie system between 1830 and 1930, most of these migrating to work on European colonial plantations.<sup>595</sup> Moreover, these figures do not include those who migrated as 'coolies' within British India and to the tea plantations of Assam, where between 700,000 and 750,000 migrated between 1870 and 1900.<sup>596</sup>

The term 'coolie' has complex and contested etymological origins, but, by the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, had become common currency for Indian labourers using mobility to promote their services.

<sup>591</sup> Gail Omvedt, *Land, Caste and Politics in Indian States*, South Asia Books, 1983

<sup>592</sup> Robert Miles, *Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity?* London, Tavistock, 1987

<sup>593</sup> Ira Klein, 'Plague, Policy, and Popular Unrest in British India', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, p 752.

<sup>594</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 25.

<sup>595</sup> Lydia Potts, *ibid*, pp., 69-70.

<sup>596</sup> Hugh Tinker, *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920*, London, Hansib Publishing, 1993, p 50.

'Coolieism' consisted of indentured labour, the *kangany* system, and the *maistry* system.<sup>597</sup> Most of the plantation colonies, including those of Mauritius, the Caribbean, Fiji, and Natal, employed the indentured labour system. Under indenture,

*a worker was typically committed to work for a period of five years and during this time was not entitled to change employer or place of work. Employers recruited labour units, not families. They bore the cost of recruitment and of the crossing, and paid a fixed wage.*<sup>598</sup>

Malaya and Ceylon relied upon the *kangany* system. This system was built upon older indigenous systems of labour migration. The *kangany* was an India foreman, who was responsible for recruiting potential migrants from India, and acted as a middleman between the plantation management and the coolies. The Ceylonese process relied upon familial structures wherein the *kangany* would typically recruit amongst family members. In both cases (Malaya and Ceylon), the *kangany* was typically responsible for a gang of 25 to 30 coolies. The *maistry* system was largely confined to Burma. Like the *kangany* system, the *maistry* system relied on the incentive of advances in order to bind the coolie in indebtedness. The *maistry* system differed, however, in the extent to which it relied on an extensive hierarchy resulting in regular wage cuts and other repressive measures being imposed upon the migrant labourers.<sup>599</sup>

Historians have been divided over the question of whether the coolie system should be seen as having been the expression of a process of voluntary or coerced migration. The 'coercion' argument, as I will elaborate below, quite properly forms the basis of Hugh Tinker's view that the British colonial production of coolie labour was effectively a systematic form of slavery.<sup>600</sup> For the majority of Indians, 'emigration was not accepted as a natural process'.<sup>601</sup> Indians did migrate within regions, but these were primarily circular migrations such as seasonal agricultural migration, and did not, therefore, involve the loss of home and familial and social networks.<sup>602</sup> The British Consular Agent at Karikal wrote that 'the native of India is not naturally inclined to emigrate ... Even under the most desperate

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<sup>597</sup> Chenchal Kondapi, *Indians Overseas, 1838-1949*, Indian Council of World Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1951

<sup>598</sup> Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 79.

<sup>599</sup> Chenchal Kondapi, *ibid*.

<sup>600</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit*; For 'voluntarist' perspectives using a marginalist theoretical base to describing the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century migrations, see P.C. Emmer, 'The great escape: the migration of female indentured servants from British India to Surinam, 1873-1916', in D. Richardson, *Abolition and its Aftermath: The Historical Context, 1760-1916*, London, 1986; B.V. Lal, 'Approaches to the Study of Indian indentured emigration with special reference to Fiji', *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. Xv., No's 1-2, 1980; Guy Standing, 'Migration and modes of exploitation', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 1981; Anand Yang, *The Limited Raj: Agrarian Relations in Colonial India, Saran district, 1793-1920*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1989.

<sup>601</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 118.

<sup>602</sup> Haraprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Internal Migration in India: A Case Study of Bengal*, Calcutta, K.P. Bagchi, 1987.



circumstances, he always leaves his land with an idea of returning to it'.<sup>603</sup> The British, French and other plantation colonies' need for post-abolition supplies of cheap and malleable labour 'pulled' Indians into the plantation economy system. Yet, as emigration was not a positively desired form of labour mobility, the indentured emigration and associated schemes relied 'mainly on push factors; the need of people to obtain relief from a situation that was no longer tolerable'.<sup>604</sup>

The intolerable conditions that pushed the emigration schemes were those that we have outlined above in the account of the pauperisation of British India. Tinker observes that 'the emigrants came mainly from overcrowded agricultural districts of India, where crop failure could plunge sections of the village community into near-starvation', and Crispin Bates observes a 'gradual process of immiseration' leading peasants and tribals to utilise migration as a strategy of resistance.<sup>605</sup> While emigration figures tended to bottom out in years when good harvests produced sufficient subsistence, periods of subsistence crisis, harvest failure and famine bore a strong correlation with the peaks in the flows of emigration.<sup>606</sup> The 1860-1 famine in the North Western Provinces produced a 'high departure rate from Calcutta (17,899 in 1860 and 22,600 in 1861)'. Famine in Orissa and Bihar in 1865-6 produced 19,963 migrants, whilst acute scarcity in Bihar, Oudh, and the North Western Provinces in 1873-5 saw 'two further high years of emigration from Calcutta (24,571, and 20,109). Similar dynamics pertained to the southern regions of British India where, for example, in the famine of 1874-8, Madras received an inundation of some 100,000 subsistence-refugees, whilst emigration from the City's harbour also 'climbed steeply'.<sup>607</sup>

In the famine of 1874-8 the Raj put forward the 'support' of distance and poverty tested relief camps. When recorded deaths reached a figure of 1.5 million, the Viceroy Lytton claimed that the high rates of mortality were more the result of 'the unwillingness of the people to leave their homes than by any want of forethought on the part of the local government in providing works where they might be relieved'.<sup>608</sup> While the rhetoric of Indian indolence and the proclivity to stasis helped to justify the strategies of the colonial state, the relief of famine refugee in colonial India was actually provided on the basis of the Utilitarian logic of providing disincentives to the very application for relief, and the distance test was designed to produce further land alienation amongst the rural poor. In fact, the

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<sup>603</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit.*

<sup>604</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit.*

<sup>605</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 119; Crispin Bates, 'Coerced and Migrant Labour in India: The Colonial Experience', *Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies*, no. 13, 2000 p 32.

<sup>606</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit.*

<sup>607</sup> William Digby, *The Famine Campaign in Southern India, 1876-1878, Vol. II*, London, p. 148. Digby gives the figure for refugees in Madras; Hugh Tinker, *op cit.*

<sup>608</sup> Lt-Col. R. Osborne, 'India under Lord Lytton', *Contemporary Review*, Dec. 1879; sourced in Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 53.

refugee camps provided by the colonial state contributed to the high mortality rates, where the deaths were often the result of a social order that was enforced by means of terror.<sup>609</sup>

In the context of the process of colonial pauperisation, it is clear that neither good harvests nor the absence of problems of 'over-population' were sufficient, in and of themselves, to produce the conditions in which emigration appeared to be a viable choice to pauperised Indians, as the exploitative tenure, taxation and cash-cropping systems imposed under British rule meant that subsistence crisis occurred even in the absence of drought. Subsistence crisis caused by the dynamics of the colonial political economy thus resulted in coerced migration. The political character of the coerced migration involved in the coolie system can be seen in the example of the effects of the India Mutiny of 1857 (see also, chapter three). The aftermath of the Mutiny included further land alienation, the loss of livelihoods, fugitive mobility based on the fear of punishment, and consequentially, massive internal displacement. The combination of these factors and increasing labour-demands from the colonies led to the emigration peak of 1858-9.<sup>610</sup>

Recruiting agents represented the coolie system as a golden opportunity for potential migrants to escape the poverty of unproductive agricultural regions and urban unemployment, and towards the end of the life of the system the British Indian government was critical of such practice of deception.<sup>611</sup> The coolie system was established, regulated, and modified in the political sphere of sometimes conflicting and sometimes-complementary strategies and interests of Whitehall and the Colonial Office, the Raj, and the plantation colonies. While in 1844, controlled emigration under the indenture system was restricted to migration between Calcutta and Mauritius, emigration to Ceylon continued under an unregulated *kangany* system, despite the banning of this traffic in 1839.<sup>612</sup> Throughout the 1840s and 1850's, the terms and scale of emigration were modified under pressure from the sugar interests. Thus by 1842, regulated Indian labourers were leaving from several Indian ports for plantation work in twelve British colonies, whilst unregulated (illegal) flows continued to the French colonies.<sup>613</sup>

The administrators of the Raj sought, in the post-abolition context, to supervise the coolie system on the basis of the privileging of free labour as an agent of Progress.<sup>614</sup> Towards this end, the Raj sought

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<sup>609</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, p 46.

<sup>610</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 95.

<sup>611</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 116; Crispin Bates notes that rather than a general system of deception, some recruiters employed specific deceptions, such as statements about promised rates of pay. See Crispin Bates, *ibid*, p 19.

<sup>612</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 92.

<sup>613</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit*. Migration to the French colonies was sanctioned in 1861, with the proviso that suspension would be enacted for inadequate treatment.

<sup>614</sup> Colonial discourse was grounded in Adam Smith's views on free labour. See Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, London, 1972, pp., 344-46.

the right to wrest the appointment of the office of the Protectorate from the plantation colonies, and in 1856 passed the India Act XIX. This legislation gave the British Indian Governor General the right to suspend emigration to any colony where conditions for Indian labourers were deemed to be unsatisfactory, as was the case in the suspension of emigration to Mauritius in 1856-7.<sup>615</sup> In 1864, Henry Maine was appointed to oversee the general consistency of the coolie system, ensuring, for example, that conditions in the French colonies met the standards required of the British. Maine's job was to seek to regulate the coolie system on behalf of the Indian labourers. He was empowered, therefore, to promote their protection from abuse in the recruitment, passage, plantation, commutation, and return stages of the process. Licensing and surveillance systems were thus introduced, and agents were henceforth paid a salary, rather than working on the commission-basis which had led to abuses.<sup>616</sup>

From the late 1850s onwards, the sugar colonies went about the revision of their labour laws to the disadvantage of the Indian immigrants. The corrective system of managed migration took, in part, its impetus from the desire to mark the historic break from the system of slavery and the progressive nature of British Indian rule in promoting labour mobility as 'free' labour, and thus from a recognition that the system had tended to operate as a replication of slavery. Yet throughout the 1860s to 1880's, 'the tendency for the initiative to pass from the government of India to the Colonial Office and the sugar colonies continued'.<sup>617</sup> Where the Colonial Office was concerned to ensure the financial viability of British colonial enterprise, and thus accede to the sugar lobby's interests, the sugar-based colonies themselves tended to attempt to reproduce the plantation system of agricultural industry on the basis of the use of slave labour.<sup>618</sup> Plantation owners, for example, in seeking commitments of double indenture for coolie labourers, were seeking the commitment of 10 years labour in the confines of the plantation that had traditionally been provided in the average useful labouring lifespan of the (disposable) African slave. In Mauritius for example, being assured of their markets within the imperial system, the plantation interests sought to overcome the 'problem' of abolition by securing further supplies of cheap and abundant labour-power, rather than investment in technological advancement that would have reduced the labour-intensity of their production methods.<sup>619</sup> Moreover, with the waning of the influence of critical bodies such as the anti-slavery abolition coalition in Britain in the 1840s, neither the Raj nor the British government experienced sustained metropolitan pressure to reform the coolie system. Subsequently, the term 'protection' in the context of the governance of the coolie system was marked by ambivalence. Thus, for example, Dr. J.G. Grant, who was the Acting Protector (Bengal) from 1869

<sup>615</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 91.

<sup>616</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 105.

<sup>617</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 101.

<sup>618</sup> There were exceptions in various colonies at specific historic junctures: Mauritius sought to offer post-indenture labourers forms of citizenship as an inducement to settlement in 1851, and Trinidad offered bounties and land grants for the same purpose in the late 1860s.

<sup>619</sup> Marina. D. Carter, *Servants, Sidars, and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834-74*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press.

to 1889, was more inclined to become the protector of the importing colonies than of the departing emigrants'.<sup>620</sup> Crispin Bates notes that, 'far from being a benevolent neutrality ... government intervention was aimed at striking a balance between the competing demands of British, Indian, and overseas capitalists'.<sup>621</sup> In overall terms then, Tinker's conclusion seems valid:

*an uneasy balance had been evolved between the Indian government, Whitehall, and the various importing colonies, in which lip-service was paid to the interests of the Indian coolie, while plantation industry was able to draw upon a pool of cheap labour with the minimum of restrictions and the maximum of leverage against its workers.*<sup>622</sup>

Lydia Potts, like Tinker, sees the coolie system as similar to slavery. Potts notes that conditions of transportation for coolies mirrored those of slaves in terms of the high mortality rates en route. Coolies labouring within the confines of the plantation system were also denied the right to family life (including both marriage and reproduction).<sup>623</sup> Coolie accommodation was, in relative terms, more spacious than the colonial system of slave-packing. On the other hand, where slaves were exchanged as commodities, coolies worked under contract and were often required to pay for their own passage. Like slaves, coolies were not permitted to leave plantations. In Mauritius, for example, coolies were subject to a passbook system restricting their mobility to the sphere of the plantation itself; coolies apprehended outside of the plantation and without a contract of employment were categorised as vagrants and subject to punishment. Thus, where the official discourse of the Indian Government sought to establish the protection of coolies as labourers free to exchange their services on the market, in practice they were subject to systems designed to enforce their stasis. This enforced stasis mirrors that of the plantation slavery system, and as Tinker points out, policies such as the passbook laws were only otherwise applied to ticket-of-leave convicts within the colonial system.<sup>624</sup> Colonial governmentality, however, now directed the disciplining of migrant labour, increasingly sought to enact its punishments in terms of fines rather than in the corporeal forms of discipline that had been used within the slave system.

Potts argues that coolies were similar to slaves in that both groups were paid 'extremely low wages', but this point requires further elaboration.<sup>625</sup> Whilst colonial plantation systems throughout the British Empire, may have furthered the progress of their position within the world economy by trading in and

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<sup>620</sup> Hugh Tinker, *op cit*.

<sup>621</sup> Crispin Bates, *ibid*, p 18.

<sup>622</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 115.

<sup>623</sup> There were, however exceptions prior to the 1870's; the plantation system of Ceylon encouraged family migration. Moreover, after the 1870's, the British Indian government legislated to encourage a gender balance via a quota system.

<sup>624</sup> Hugh Tinker, *ibid*, p 107.

<sup>625</sup> Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 78.

making use of slave labour as a commodity, slaves themselves were not able to exchange their labour-power for its abstract value on the market.<sup>626</sup> Coolie labour, on the other hand, was formally free in the sense that each labourer was 'free' to exchange his labour for wages, or for wages that as Potts points out, were extremely low. The difference here, however, doesn't mean that we should regard coolie labour as having been free, but rather as primarily having been a form of chattel slavery whose possibility arose, in the first place, through the exploitative incorporation of India within the British political economy. Moreover, in the typology of labour migration given by David Etlis, indentured labour occupies an intermediate zone between free and coerced migration and labour. Etlis writes of indentured labour that 'because they entered into a contract more or less voluntarily, they were like free migrants, and because they could be bought and sold and did not have much control over this process or the work they were required to perform during the indenture, they were like slaves'.<sup>627</sup> This hybrid categorisation makes sense in the case of migrants subject to the coolie system, but has to be placed in the context of the process of pauperisation described above, wherein the decision to migrate cannot, generally, be described as having been 'free', but is closer to having been coerced.

Within the confines of this general system of coercion, migrants constructed networks that facilitated varied forms of agency at home, and overseas. The major actors in the migrant networks were the *sadars*, return migrants employed to recruit further migrant labour from amongst their own communities. Crispin Bates observes that 'so many *sadars* or gang-leaders were willing to commit themselves to the interests of their employers ... because for them the experience of migration had been largely positive, and a genuine path to prosperity'.<sup>628</sup> The most successful *sadars* were those 'who had managed to save, to buy lands, to repatriate income, and to support their kith and kin at home and abroad'.<sup>629</sup> They thus provided valuable channels of information, giving potential immigrants a degree of control over the destination and conditions of labour to which they might commit: as Bates observes, in this development, 'we often see migrants, for the first time, acquiring a controlling voice in the process of migration'.<sup>630</sup>

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<sup>626</sup> Potts implicitly recognises this point where she writes that the 'form of acquisition, at least, is clearly a capitalist form, since the labour-power acquired becomes a commodity'. See Lydia Potts, *ibid*, p 177.

<sup>627</sup> David Etlis, 'Free and coerced migration: the Atlantic in global perspective', 2000, p 2-3. Etlis addresses this question in a footnote to the article, stating that he recognises that indentured migrants may need to choose migration as one of a selection of possible options given adverse living situations. This phenomenon he distinguishes from slavery, which involves a *direct* use of force. See fn. 1, p 19. The analysis of the pauperisation of colonial India leads me to maintain the position given above. One might question, in addition, the range of possible 'choices' starving persons deprived of any means of production might have realistically contemplated as strategies providing the possibility of subsistence for self and family.

<sup>628</sup> Crispin Bates, *ibid*, p 24.

<sup>629</sup> Crispin Bates, *op cit*.

<sup>630</sup> Crispin Bates, *op cit*.

Notwithstanding the agency that migrants utilised under conditions that were not of their own making, the production of the system of coolie labour should properly be recognised as having been forms of coerced and forced migration.<sup>631</sup> I want to argue therefore, that the pauperised Indian people who provided a ready-made labour market for the coolie system were *already* what migration theorists refer to in contemporary terms as 'internally displaced persons'. Furthermore, to draw the analogy a little further, we can say that in the correspondence they bore to today's refugees, displaced persons in British colonial India were not, effectively, akin to 'environmental' refugees fleeing natural disasters (such as drought and famine), but were closer, in terms of cause and effect, to what is normatively referred to as the category of political refugees.<sup>632</sup> That is to say, while it was the political and economic exploitation of Indian society that was the root cause of coerced and forced displacement, Indian migrants subject to the coolie system were thus political-and-economic migrants. Moreover, insofar as the coolie system was a system of managed migration, the management of the labour migration was structured by the ideology their inclusion within the sphere of liberal Progress and freedom, whilst this inclusive-exploitation primarily functioned to serve the financial and commercial interests of the British colonial system. That large numbers of the diaspora that developed on the basis of this system were able to settle and prosper was the result of their efforts despite the systematic exploitation they were subject to, rather than because of the 'liberation' of their labour-power.<sup>633</sup>

## 2.5. Articulated Colonial Mobilities.

British colonial capitalism was dependent on a series of mobility regimes that governed the incorporation of labour-power, finance, and commerce within the world economy. We can situate these articulated processes within Robin Blackburn's thesis, which resonates with the historical framework set out by Wallerstein and Linebaugh and Rediker. Blackburn states that

*English colonialism was orchestrated by an inverted mercantilism – that is to say, not by financiers and merchants serving raison d'état but by the state serving capitalist purposes ... The colonial and Atlantic regime of extended primitive accumulation allowed metropolitan accumulation to break out of its agrarian and national limits and discover an industrial and global destiny.*<sup>634</sup>

<sup>631</sup> As Crispin Bates points out, potential migrants sought to make the best use of migration-networks, seeking to make use of return migrants operating as recruiting agents in their own rural localities, rather than the depot-based agents working in the ports. Crispin Bates, *ibid*, pp., 22-23.

<sup>632</sup> Following Richard Black, I would argue that the category of the 'environmental' refugee is not useful; See, Richard Black, *Refugees, Environment, and Development*, London, Longman, 1998. Black's main point on this is that an emphasis on environmental factors often serves to displace the central issues of development, inequality, and conflict.

<sup>633</sup> Crispin Bates, *ibid*, p 32.

<sup>634</sup> Robin Blackburn, *The Making of New World Slavery*, London, Verso, 1998, p 515.

For the historians Linebaugh and Rediker, Blackburn, and Williams, the Atlantic transactions including the trade in slaves and sugar was necessary for the developments of European industrialisation and state formation.<sup>635</sup> In addition, as we have sought to show, the incorporation of Ireland and India within the imperial economy played a vital role in supporting British dominance. This approach has transnationalised the view of British modernity and industrialisation by reading the historical processes of that period from the outside in, as well as from the inside out. While throughout the 17<sup>th</sup> century, at least up until the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the rivalry between ruling socio-political groups prevented the development of a stable hegemonic structure, the form of the latter revolution gave England a comparative advantage over its European rivals that it was only to eventually cede in the *Pax Americana* of the early twentieth century. That revolution was part of the emergence of a new form of global political economy that saw development of the capitalist-colonial state-society complex that was to come to define the form of the modern world system under the 'liberal' rule of *Pax Britannica*.

Neither the series of resolutions by inter-class compromise that became the hallmark of British politics nor the emergence of a British hegemony can be explained by internal mechanisms alone.<sup>636</sup> The gradual extension of the liberal 'rights of the free born Englishman' could only have developed in the political form that they did through the fulcrum of the creation of realms of unfreedom. The development of British capitalist social relations required the existence of a 'verge' – an extra-territorial arena in which the conflict between the mobile poor and the ruling classes could be displaced, even as the complex interaction between the core culture and its peripheries produced a series of crises in class relations. These realms included processes of expropriation that sometimes followed territorial annexation as occurred in Bengal and throughout India under the jurisdiction of the East India Company. They sometimes involved the forced migration of persons and their subsequent use in systems of forced labour as in the West Indian system of plantation slavery (in which 500,000 slaves had been forced to work in the islands by the year of the Maroon revolution in 1791)<sup>637</sup> and later in the use of Indian indentured labour. They generally involved the destruction of indigenous social systems and economies, and the reinsertion of those societies into the world system under conditions of devastating comparative disadvantage. These were articulated processes; for example, the destruction of the Bengalese weaving economy forced the production of both internal displacement and

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<sup>635</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*, 2000; Robin Blackburn, *ibid*; Eric Williams, *ibid*, 1994; We should also keep in mind that Paul Gilroy's argument that the cultural hybridity of the 'black Atlantic' needs to be recognised in order to deconstruct the prevailing Eurocentric construction of modernity points to the socio-cultural, intellectual and political contribution of Africans involved in the Atlantic economy. See Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, London, Verso, 1999.

<sup>636</sup> See the discussion in the introduction.

<sup>637</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century*, London, Verso, 2003, p 411.



subsequently created the need that saw the displaced positioned as labourers who would accept indentured labour in the Caribbean.

In each case they involved the institutionalisation of mechanisms of control over the major forms of mobility: finance was redirected from East to West, migration was forced between Africa, the Caribbean, the North American colonies and between India and the Caribbean islands, and labour-power was confined to the stasis of the colonial sites of production which enabled the flow of goods from the colonies to the metropolis. The colonial-capitalist state produced systems of control over both movement and stasis that were relayed through developments in the metropolis. London, by 1800, was the nation's capital containing nearly one million residents; it was the centre of an empire that 'embraced the workshops of Bengal, the 'factories' of West Africa and the forests of North America'.<sup>638</sup> Much of the trade centring London in was involved in the Thames-based colonial commerce, and approximately one third of the population was either directly or indirectly involved in the trade.

The history of colonial trade shows the flow of finance to have been relayed, to a significant extent, through the credit facilities of The City of London. We can observe some of the crucial centre-periphery relationships between, for example, the Bank of England situated within the boundaries of the Corporation of the City of London, and the plantation sites of the West India interests. Peter Linebaugh identifies the West India interest as an international drug and slave cartel that worked as a dominant partner in the Bank of England and enjoyed a powerful influence over the national parliament.<sup>639</sup> Here, in the institutions that were integral to the state-society complex, we have an uncanny mirror for the contemporary discourse of 'trafficking' in persons and commodities that is represented as the 'dark side of globalisation'. Capital derived from London's West and East India interests underwrote a large proportion of the river trade in which a significant proportion of the metropolitan population worked during the Georgian and Victorian periods.<sup>640</sup> In these dynamics we have another correspondence for the articulation of mobility flows in the contemporary global city, in as much as this metropolitan migrant labour-force constituted the 'informal service economy' that supports the higher circuits of transnational commerce and finance. The accumulation of colony-derived wealth was intrinsically linked to the criminalisation of the metropolitan colonial poor.

As Marx and Luxemburg argued, the forceful process of colonial capitalism that culminated in the Pax Britannica constructed a world economy that required the peripheralisation of 'other' societies. In the

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<sup>638</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 410.

<sup>639</sup> Peter Linebaugh. *Ibid*, p 416.

<sup>640</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, p 418.

foregoing case studies I have suggested that colonial capitalism involved the incorporation of English, Irish, African and Indian persons within the lower circuits of colonial commerce and finance. The extension of capitalism involved the colonisation and pauperisation of the pre-existing and re-invented lifeworlds of national and extra-national subjects. This incorporation of labour power in metropolitan and colonial sites of production involved forms of mobility and stasis that, variously, involved the use of force, coercion, and disciplinary governmentalities. These political-and-economic processes were articulated to formations of power and knowledge within a developing ideology of liberal progress that had become dominant by the mid-eighteenth century.<sup>641</sup> By the mid-nineteenth century the ideology of liberal progress required the constitution of subjects at the intersection of the discourse of natural rights which embedded freedom as essential to humanity, and the bourgeois social relations in which labour power became manifest as an exchangeable commodity.<sup>642</sup> Conversely, where the state of liberal freedom was manifest in the figure of the wage labourer, this construction, the 'liberation' of labour-power from its 'pre'-modern subsistence, involved the transcendence of limits that were manifest in material and symbolic registers as the states of unfreedom given in servitude and slavery. The ideological progress from 'unfreedom' to 'freedom' worked through the articulation of class-based and racialised discursive formations. Thus where slavery as a form of commodified labour represented the negative pole of the continuum from unfreedom to freedom, it also represented the 'uncivilised' state of 'blackness' within the theory of progressive evolution that finds its latter expression in social Darwinism.

Prior to the emancipation movements of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 'blackness' represented a limit to progress legitimating the forced incorporation of African labour power, and hence that incorporation was represented as constituting the initial inclusion of African persons within the developmental sphere of civil society. At the same time the state of servitude embodied in the figure of the African slave constituted a state of 'abjection', which designated 'a degraded or cast out status within the terms of sociality'.<sup>643</sup> Here the abjection manifest in the forced stasis of plantation labour bears a material and symbolic correspondence to the enforced stasis of the workhouse, the prison, the factory, the state of colonial bonded labour, and, as we shall see in the latter chapters of this thesis, the modern 'detention centre' and refugee camp. The existence of slavery and servitude as the space of abjection forms a discursive basis for the political claims of the subordinated: the 'rights' pursued by 'Englishmen' are framed in terms of a binary opposition between the freeborn and the

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<sup>641</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 9.

<sup>642</sup> Gyan Prakash, *ibid*, p 6-7.

<sup>643</sup> Judith Butler, *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, New York, Routledge, 1993, p 243. For Butler, the abject are 'those 'unlivable' and 'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the status of the 'unlivable' is required to circumscribe the defining limit of the subject's domain'. (p 3.)

abject other. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the state of subordination and the contest for liberty within Britain during the period of colonial capitalism comes to appear to be framed by an elite conflation of the poor with the contaminating figure of a racially constituted other, and by the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 'national-popular' comes to be constructed around a renewed national imperialism that is represented as an extension of liberalism to the wider world.<sup>644</sup>

The 'free' flows of colonial commercial and financial mobility were essential to the dominance of the colonial-capitalist hegemony. In the following chapter, I will examine how the construction of the abject colonial other, the regularisation of the wage-form and the criminalisation of the mobile poor facilitated the incorporation of the 'national worker' as the 'deserving' subject owning the particular universal rights of liberal citizenship, who is nonetheless caught between an ambivalent construction of citizenship and/or subjection. The militant use of force and discipline that had been brought to bear on the lower circuits of colonial mobility and the emergent incorporation of the labouring classes within the liberal public sphere culminated in a hegemonic discourse defining the national inside against the international outside. In addition to the account we have provided of the construction of mobility regimes as a process of the incorporation of labour-power within the lower circuits of the imperial economy, we will see that the contested terrain of belonging, colonial subjecthood and national citizenship provides a further context for the emergence of the statist borderment of the modern mobility regimes that we shall examine in the subsequent chapter.

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<sup>644</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 209. Hall describes a shift from a coded cultural racism in the 1840s to an overt biological racism in the 1860s.

### **Chapter 3: Colonial-Capitalist Citizenship and Subjectivity.**

In the first and second chapters I have sought to position British migration regimes within an account of the political and economic dynamics of colonial capitalism. These chapters have drawn out the dependence of the rise of the liberal-and-capitalist state-society complex on the pauperisation of colonial and domestic populations, and the subsequent displacement, mobilisation and stasis of forced, coerced, and 'free' forms of labour. The chapters have established the inter-dependency of the higher circuits of colonial finance on the lower circuits of trade and labour, and the importance of the fiscal-militancy of British imperialism for the dominance of British political and financial elites. In the accounts of the mobility regimes governing the incorporation of labour into the circuits of the colonial world economy I have drawn out some of the correlations between internal (national) developments and external (colonial) developments to argue that colonial capitalism was a transnational process that involved the incorporation and excorporation of domestic labourers as colonial subjects.

The co-articulation of modern governmentality and political economy as they were emerging from the 18<sup>th</sup> century took the form of strategies based on the formation and regulation of populations; thus population itself became central as a tactic of power.<sup>645</sup> This biopower has its colonial dimension, neglected in Foucault, and I will go on to suggest that biopolitical colonial-capitalism has implications for contemporary policy governing migrancy and the displacement of people inside and between nation-states. In the preceding chapters I have argued that colonial subjects (both exterior and interior) were incorporated within an ideology of liberal progress whose negative pole was pre-modern or 'primitive' resistance, and whose positive pole was the horizon of liberal subjectivity represented by the sphere of free labour. In this context we identified a liberal and utilitarian discursive formation that manifested a conflation between anthropological and class-based difference as forms of pre-modernity. Here, as John Marriott has argued, the British poor came to represent a limit to progress that bore an equivalence to the limits provided in racial otherness.

As I observed in the previous chapter, the control of British migrant mobility was directed at the enforcement of both stasis and of movement: the use of poor laws and excorporation were political strategies aimed at the incorporation of labour-power within the circuits of colonial capitalism and industrialisation. In this context I want to argue that the distinction between the right to the freedom of

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<sup>645</sup> Michel Foucault, *ibid*, 1991c.

movement, a form of substantive citizenship, and the state of subjecthood in which one lacked agency over one's mobility or stasis rested upon the right, or the lack of that right, to own property. Class stratifications thus governed relations of belonging to the nation in as much as membership in the elite political classes granted a degree of substantive citizenship that was denied to working class subjects. Working class subjects, conversely, framed their resistance to the oppressive forms of their incorporation within the 'free' labour market in terms of rights that were drawn from the articulation of nation, liberalism, and imperialism. Here, if national liberalism drew upon the legacy that we have previously identified in terms of the discourse of the 'rights of the freeborn Englishman', then the antinomy of that discursive formation was metonymically represented in the form of the 'Negro' slave. It is this intersection of the axis of 'race' and class that this chapter seeks to develop. In doing so, I wish to further develop the basis for the following chapter's accounts of modern British immigration regimes, and to set that basis in terms of an analysis of the articulation of national identity and belonging, class stratification, and racialisation. In the first section of the chapter (section 3.1) I will briefly examine the manner in which dynamics of 'race' and class developed in relation to national identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the second section (3.2) I will draw upon the work of Linda Colley to discuss an example of the problematisation of the British poor within a logic of racialisation. In the third section (3.3) I will outline the manner in which these developments led to a hegemonic discursive field in the form of national-imperialism, the construction of the citizen-subject as the racialised worker, and a subsequent politics of resentment. These dynamics provide a context for the politics of British immigration regimes of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries that form the subject of the following chapter.

### Section 3.1 Negative Nationality

In narrating the historical development of a British national identity during the eighteenth and first four decades of the nineteenth centuries, Linda Colley describes the manner in which the emergence of a British imagined community, the form of which was both shared and contested, developed between positive and negative poles of identification. Catherine Hall similarly notes that national identity is based on the construction of a position in which members 'recognise themselves in relation to others'.<sup>646</sup> For Colley, the positive poles of the development of an imagined British community included Protestantism, commerce, and the developing (political) culture of liberalism (see chapter one).<sup>647</sup> For Hall, the culture of liberalism as a symbol of 'Englishness' was articulated to particular

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<sup>646</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 208.

<sup>647</sup> See also David Armitage, *ibid*, p 8, and E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, Penguin, London, 1991, pp., 85-87.

claims made in terms of gendered, racial, and class-based interests.<sup>648</sup> These articulated developments formed the discursive space in which various interests framed their claims for rights and belonging within the hegemonic discourse of the 'freeborn Englishman'. For Colley, the flip side of the positive identifications that enabled a patriotic national identity was the development of forms of negative identification in relation to a historically contingent perception of its 'hostile Other'.<sup>649</sup> Here, the frequent engagement of British persons in warfare against European rivals, and, in particular, the French, was a defining influence of the development of a shared sense of trans-national<sup>650</sup> belonging: English, Scots, Welsh and Irish persons were involved in the (often conflictual) process of becoming-British, and each group sought to further their own interests by way of an appeal to the developing hegemonic discourse-field of an imagined British community. 'British' persons

*defined themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world's foremost Catholic power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree. And, increasingly, as the wars went on, they defined themselves in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples who were manifestly alien in terms of culture, religion, and colour.*<sup>651</sup>

Britishness came to be constructed, in part, through a series of historically contingent binary oppositions. In the context of the history of Anglo-French relations, an individual professing Britishness could be taken to refer to Protestantism, the possession of liberal rights, and a share in the nation's legitimately gained commercial and military prowess. These positive identifications took their value, in part, from what they were not: they were not French, and subsequently Catholic, absolutist or republican, commercially stagnant or illegitimately aggressive. Beyond the identity forged through the negative relationship to the French, which was formed, in part, through military conflict, and subsequently through the political threat posed by the French revolution, claims made towards the right to define the constitution of Britishness were also frequently made by way of explicit or implicit reference to a whole series of extra- and infranational others.

The field of discourses and social practices constituting patriotism were open to political contest and could be mobilised to different ends by competing interests seeking either particular outcomes, or more ambitiously, particular-universal outcomes, wherein the re-invention of a tradition of Britishness could lead to a corresponding change in the national social structure. Thus as we noted above, both patricians

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<sup>648</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*; see in particular chapters 9-10.

<sup>649</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, pp., 5, 164.

<sup>650</sup> The term 'trans-national' here refers to the transcending of prior ethno-national identities.

<sup>651</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992, p 5.

and radicals in the late eighteenth century could appeal to 'liberty' as the symbol of their competing versions of the national social order.<sup>652</sup> In the nineteenth century the glorious precedent of the Emancipation Act (1833) functioned within the discourse of 'liberty' to allow the middle classes to confirm their ascendancy over external (colonial) and therefore national forms of 'old corruption'.<sup>653</sup> The particular articulation of beliefs and social practices that came to define British identity throughout the period of colonial capitalism can be said to have maintained a certain hegemonic consistency: the chain of associations between meta-discourses including those belonging to the categories of 'Progress', 'Liberalism', 'English Stock' or the 'English Race', and 'Civilisation' display this sort of consistency, even as their use was open to the instability of differing appropriations and re-inventions.<sup>654</sup>

The articulation of power-and-knowledge and the political constitution of British society as subject to the interests and values of the colonial-capitalist state-society complex meant that the interests of the political classes often came to be mobilised *as* the national interest. As Pijl observes in relation to the strategies employed for dealing with class conflict,

*[i]deally, challenges were to be met by deflecting popular aspirations into a synthetic, 'social imperialist', moral internationalism, in which the export and overseas investment ambitions of capital imperceptibly merged with a missionary concept of democracy, human rights, and other 'universalist' aspects of Lockean doctrine.*<sup>655</sup>

As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, British Imperialism could thus be mobilised as a hegemonic discourse cementing national 'social cohesion' by identifying 'another' realm in which Britishness could and should become manifest. Moreover, in the mobilisation of imperialist patriotism, the situated extension of universally conceived Britishness *qua* the extension of political liberalism met and was vitiated by the meeting of limits that were both internal to, and external of the national. Subsequently, when, in the period of colonial capitalism notions of selves and others were racially produced, they were also produced along the axis of class.<sup>656</sup> On the one hand, the class relations of persons in the dynamics of the British Empire had a strong influence on the formation of 'Britishness',

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<sup>652</sup> See Chapter 1, section 1.1.

<sup>653</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 209

<sup>654</sup> Writing in the year 2000, George Behlmer makes an analogous point in writing that 'much of what is assumed to be characteristically British was the product of continuous creation throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries'. See George K. Behlmer, 'Introduction', in George K. Behlmer and Fred M. Leventhal, (eds.), *Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000, p 3.

<sup>655</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, p 69.

<sup>656</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, pp., 207-209.



both in terms of metropolitan and colonial processes.<sup>657</sup> On the other hand, the limits provided in the engagement with colonial subjects had a similarly strong influence on the constitution of national identity.

From the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards, the process of British colonial-capitalism involved the incorporation of British and colonial subjects as diversely situated forms of labour-power serving the establishment and, subsequently, the maintenance of an imperial world market. A measure of their resistance to this globalising process was the degree to which this incorporation involved forms of coerced and forced mobility and stasis. From the point of view of the hegemonic construction of British national identity, we can say that the 'Other' in the period of colonial-capitalism was, at times, the African slave or the Indian peasant, but also the Irish or English pauper. John Marriott makes this point by locating a series of others – the colonial subject, the black slave, the urban poor – as different representations of the antinomy of Progress in the nineteenth century; each, that is, represents a form of 'pre-modern' resistance to the necessary pursuit of Progress.<sup>658</sup> Each therefore, presents itself as an exception to the sphere of liberal civilisation, and is therefore subject to varying degrees of forceful inclusion or exclusion, and each is presented as an obstacle to the development of liberal capitalism.

The nature of this othering shifts according to historic contingencies that include the conflictual domain of identity construction and the points at which this formation is fragile. These points of fragility often occur at the interstices of cultural material axis; fragility occurs, for example, where identity is 'tainted' by the intersection of 'race', class, and agency, such as occurred at various points of crisis or conflict over national identity during the events of industrialisation and colonisation. Here, we could look at the renegotiations of identities that several recent historians have identified as having occurred in response to historically contingent events and processes. Linda Colley, for example, deconstructs the overly unified correlation between a cohesive dominant Britishness and the process of empire building by narrating the (historically contingent) insecurities that marked the expansion of empire.<sup>659</sup> Catherine Hall maps the oscillation between an emancipatory but cultural-racist ideology and an overtly racist ideology in the emergent strength of the British middle class, and discusses their gendered, class and racial politics by looking at the British emancipation movement and divergent responses to the Trial of Governor Eyre in the 1830s and 1840s.<sup>660</sup> The historians Marcus Rediker and Peter Linebaugh, to take a further example, examine the resistant and revolutionary capacity of the

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<sup>657</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 1992; Catherine Hall, *ibid*, 1992. .

<sup>658</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003, p 6. .

<sup>659</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002.

<sup>660</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, pp., 205 – 295.

pauperised populations subject to colonial capitalism, and analyse the importance of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) for changing British (and other) socio-political identities.<sup>661</sup>

The different realms of negatively constructed identity often overlapped, and often did so in a conflicting manner. Thus, to take the example of a certain form of colonial forced migrant labour, an impressed naval seaman might have figured as an Englishman in both the discourse of the ruling class and in the popular culture to which he belonged.<sup>662</sup> This patriotic identification by self and ascription may have been particularly homogenous during times of war, when the Other was, for example, French. At the same time, such a sailor might have taken his self-identification from his transatlantic maritime affiliations, perceiving himself to be more a part of a specific grouping of the hybrid constellation of resistant identities that Linebaugh and Rediker call the 'motley crew'.<sup>663</sup> His version of being a 'free born Englishman' might have taken a political form, providing the subject with access to the hegemonic discourse of constitutional liberalism<sup>664</sup>, and providing such a subject with a means of contesting the dominance of the capitalist classes who owned what we could call the 'substantive sense of citizenship' belonging to members of the propertied class.

Conversely, the identity ascribed to such a person by the British elite often positioned him as something akin to the sub-human category of the 'savage native'.<sup>665</sup> The ruling classes may have seen such a person as both British and not-quite-British depending on the degree to which that sailor's actions marked him as belonging to the mobile poor, who in the collectively volatile form of the 'mob' – the '*mobile vulgate*' – were mobilized in ruling discourse and governmentality as the other within. From the perspective of the ruling elite, such a person differed only slightly from the criminal poor transported in great numbers and over a long period to the Americas and Antipodes. The ascribed and self-identification of the sailor extended to identification with the subjugated others of British colonial endeavours – the slaves used for colonial labour, or the natives of the territories being colonized.<sup>666</sup> At times, this type of hybrid identification was a dominant trope amongst the mobile British poor. At other times, pauperised Britons working the seams of colonialism were placed in direct conflict with the colonized. This, to take but one example, was the fate of the poor conscripted into the military during the Haitian revolution, whereupon the hatred of metropolitan poor for the Maroon rebels who

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<sup>661</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid.*

<sup>662</sup> Isaac Land, 'Customs of the sea: flogging, empire, and the 'True British Seaman', 1770-1870", *Interventions*, Vol. 3 (2), Routledge, London, 2001.

<sup>663</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid.*, pp., 143-173

<sup>664</sup> E. P. Thompson, *op cit*; Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid.*, p 157.

<sup>665</sup> Isaac Land, *ibid.*, p 170-1

<sup>666</sup> Isaac Land, *op cit*

slaughtered them in sporadic battles was celebrated in the popular street theatre of the Punch & Judy Show.<sup>667</sup>

The relationship between the colonized and the colonial pauper class was, in part, played out within the contest between the 'respectable' ruling class and their labouring subjects, while these subjects gradually became interpellated within the moralising discourse of rational and moral improvement, respectability and its antithesis, criminality, irrationality, immorality and disease. Such subjects, feeling their treatment or position to be inferior to the situation of the native, would draw conflictual analogies between race-based and class-based subjugation, often violently rejecting the implied correlation between their position and that of the colonized.<sup>668</sup> Subsequently, when British working class identity came to coalesce at the national level around the discourse of the rights of the 'free-born Englishman' it did so, after the Indian Mutiny (1857-8) and the Morant Bay Rebellion (1865), in contrast to the idea of the savage 'Nigger'.<sup>669</sup> In Britain, pauperised 'non-subjects' resisted and adopted conflictual positions on colonialism and slavery before performing a form of self-racialisation in which a discourse of the 'rights of the freeborn Englishmen' was privileged. Colonial resistance provided the domestic lower classes with a discourse in which to resist their ascribed subordinate racialisation by positioning themselves as other to the 'barbaric' colonials. The Haitian revolution, to take an earlier example, marked a point at which narratives of resistance, that had found hybrid communal and transnational forms along the axis of race and class, diverged, and the construction of the national worker as a citizen-subject emerged. The revolution began in 1791, when the Haitian slaves working on the sugar plantations demanded 'a system of *trois jours* (three days for the master and three days for themselves)'.<sup>670</sup> Throughout the thirteen years of the conflict, sugar production fell to 20 per cent of its pre-war levels. In addition, the British army and navy suffered 50,000 fatalities, many of those being members of the urban poor who, having been convicted, were consigned to serve in the West Indies military. The Crimp House Riots of August 1794 saw thousands of Londoners assemble to liberate the young men who were being held in the crimping house before being transported for service. Punch & Judy, the popular metropolitan street theatre, represented the pauperised Englishman in the form of the puppet Punch, who used his stick and his wit against the host of enemies arrayed before him: the infant and wife demanding the care he could not provide, the hangman and judge promising punishment he didn't deserve, and the black man promising his death if he was forced to serve in the West Indies. In this context, as Linebaugh and Rediker have shown, the alliances that had been built in

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<sup>667</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, 2003

<sup>668</sup> Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, pp., 3-35.

<sup>669</sup> Carlyle's 'Occasional discourse on the Negro question' (1849) was re-published as an 'Occasional discourse on the Nigger question', and served to introduce the term into the British public sphere. News of the India Mutiny provided the occasion for its popularisation.

<sup>670</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, 2003, p 411.

the Atlantic networks of sailors, slaves, and soldiers were disunited in Britain, where William Blake, the London Corresponding Society, and other lower class groups seeking resistance in the form of freedoms expressed in terms of race *and* class began to sever the link, and turn their revolutionary desires towards an insular focus on the affairs of Britain. By the time of the height of the British Empire, after the success of the extension of government-as-policing, the pauperised class had become the national working class, and its negative identification had begun to work in the form of an oscillating movement between a class based politics of resentment and an ethno-national identification.

### 3.2. The racialised white colonial subject

To take an initial example in detail, we could look at Linda Colley's account of the dynamic interaction of race and class in the British military in India in the first half of the nineteenth century. At this time, the lower ranks of the East India Company's military presence in India were comprised of lower class British subjects. Some 40 per cent of these were Irish by the 1830's, and until the Irish famine saw emigration flows from Ireland redirected towards America, the Irish had supplied approximately one half of the British overseas military labour force.<sup>671</sup> Thus, the British colonisation of Ireland supplied British imperial endeavours with a cheap source of migrant labour that was, to a strong extent, forced, in the sense that it was an economic-and-political form of labour migration produced through colonial suppression (see chapter two).

Colley describes the white, working class subjects who made up the lower ranks of the Company's army as 'the worker bees of the British empire' that were, 'after a fashion, captives of their own state, captives in uniform'.<sup>672</sup> In terms of David Etlis' typology of colonial labour and British labour which describes the position of individuals along an axis which begins at one end with 'unfreedom', and at the other end with the state of 'freedom', we could describe the position of these working class captives as tending toward the state of unfreedom.<sup>673</sup> These 'captives' laboured at the military security and expansion of the Company's endeavours 'under a substantial degree of discipline, and with very little say over whether they would return'. As Colley notes, the 'gulf between the growing numbers of British soldiers stationed overseas ... and white and non-white colonial elites was a very wide one ... in some respects these soldiers shared levels of unfreedom with black slaves'.<sup>674</sup> Soldiers enlisting in overseas regiments were often impelled to do so because of their pauperised situation at 'home', or were forcibly impressed into service; they were therefore subject to one of the prevalent forms of

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<sup>671</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 310.

<sup>672</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 311

<sup>673</sup> David Etlis, *ibid.*, 1993.

<sup>674</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, pp., 311, 314.

forced migration and labour, and were, to some extent, in a comparable situation to the transported convict. In fact, both the political and military elite and the lower ranked soldiers serving in India came to see transportation to the Antipodean colonies as a comparably soft option,<sup>675</sup> and one could argue that while the convict labouring in a penal settlement had the (eventual) prospect of earning his freedom and becoming a free settler, the same was not true of the lower ranked soldiers who were emphatically not allowed to settle or form families in India.<sup>676</sup>

Colley describes the 'captivity' of these overseas British subjects in the following terms:

*They were shipped abroad, often in foul conditions and sometimes against their will. They could be separated from their families, womenfolk, and culture of origins for decades, often for ever. If judged disobedient or rebellious, they were likely to be flogged. If they tried to run away, they could be executed; and if they stayed and obeyed orders, they were likely to die prematurely anyway.*<sup>677</sup>

Working-class subjects transported overseas for military service were subject to the intensity of disciplinary and punitive measures that the Georgian regime brought to bear on its lesser subjects at home, who were becoming and threatened to become even more politically resistant to their suppression at the hands of the British elite.<sup>678</sup> The resistant political strategies employed by the English and Irish working class at home included entering combinations, administering secret oaths, and collecting illicit weapons.<sup>679</sup> While these strategies were also employed and punished in a similar fashion in India, they were supplemented by practices of desertion, by the phenomenon of white soldiers turning renegade, and by general insubordination and drunkenness.<sup>680</sup>

For the Company and the British state (prior to 1857), these working class subjects were less valuable than the force of Indian 'sepoys' who outnumbered them by five to one.<sup>681</sup> Moreover, the strategic need to maintain the loyalty of the sepoys (without raising their level of pay to the standard British rate) required that they would 'have to be treated more gently than was customary for the brutalised Europeans who ended up in the Company's service, (and) with due regard for their religious beliefs'.<sup>682</sup> In consequence, 'in times of pressure, it was the sepoys who most demanded consideration and

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<sup>675</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 333-334.

<sup>676</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 336-339.

<sup>677</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 314.

<sup>678</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 324.

<sup>679</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 335.

<sup>680</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 334.

<sup>681</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 316. The term 'sepoy' is derived from the Persian term, 'sipahi', meaning soldier.

<sup>682</sup> G. J. Bryant, 'Indigenous mercenaries in the service of European imperialists: The case of the Sepoys in the Early British Indian Army', *War in History*, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2000, p 6.

conciliation, not their own working-class soldiery'.<sup>683</sup> Working class British soldiers thus 'perceived themselves as the lowest of the low', and believed that they were viewed and treated as such by their betters.<sup>684</sup> As Douglas Peers observes, British officers tended to view the lower orders as being from impoverished urban origins, and as being dissolute, unteachable, and godless; British lower-ranked soldiers were drawn from the ranks of the urban *mobile vulgate* – the vast ranks of the infra-national migrant paupers who were held to be congenitally idle.<sup>685</sup> Where they were acknowledged to be courageous, their bravery was held to lie in their reckless and dangerous nature.<sup>686</sup> In these terms, the British soldier, like the British sailor, was viewed as being akin to the black slave in his natural idleness or viciousness. Sepoys, on the other hand, and especially those viewed as high-caste rural peasants, were viewed as zealous, trustworthy, of good physique, and most importantly of all, as being obedient.<sup>687</sup> The white class-oppressed subjects were more likely to project their resentment onto the 'natives' with whom they sought both identification (in that this would provoke a recognition of their class based oppression), and dis-identification (in that they believed that their 'whiteness' was compromised).<sup>688</sup> Such perceptions worked at the intersection of race and class-based figurations of that which formed the 'other' to the British social body.

Here, for a time in India and elsewhere throughout the regions of Britain's overseas endeavours, pauperised British subjects were regulated and represented as being as or even more 'alien' than the 'natives' that the colonial endeavour became reliant on.<sup>689</sup> Following Seymour Drescher's analysis, Colley observes that

*one of the consequences of growing agitation over black slavery after 1770 was that discussion of the treatment of working people became globalised in a new way. Growing awareness of the suffering of enslaved blacks in Britain's colonies worked to illuminate the plight of its own white multitudes, and not least the plight of its common soldiers and sailors.*<sup>690</sup>

The flogging of slaves was often defended as a spectacular terrorism for inspiring discipline. The frequent recourse to military flogging, to which British sailors and soldiers alike were subject, was

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<sup>683</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit*.

<sup>684</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 316.

<sup>685</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid.*, 1993

<sup>686</sup> Douglas M. Peers, "The habitual nobility of being": British Officers and the social construction of the Bengal army in the early nineteenth century', *Modern Asian Studies*, 25, 1991, pp., 545-69.

<sup>687</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, pp., 174, 334.

<sup>688</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, pp., 334, 343.

<sup>689</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 340.

<sup>690</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 2002, p 332; Seymour Drescher, 'Free Labor vs. Slave Labor: The British and Caribbean Cases', in Seymour Drescher, *From Slavery to Freedom: Comparative Studies in the Rise and Fall of Atlantic Slavery*, New York University Press, New York, 1999.

justified on the same basis.<sup>691</sup> Elite political and military discourse surrounding the use of military flogging was split therefore, between the re-assertion of the fact that ‘the two cases of flogging soldiers and flogging black men’ bore nothing in common, statements defending the necessity of the use of punitive discipline on the lower ranks, and arguments which relied upon the harsh treatment of British serving men to legitimate the harsher treatment of slaves.<sup>692</sup> Grounding this spectacular form of discipline was both the socio-political context in which working class revolt threatened the political order, and the assumption that slaves and the lower classes shared limitations of worth and mentality.<sup>693</sup>

Yet the regulations and, especially ‘at home’, the representations that complicated the ‘othering’ of colonial subjects were not historically fixed; they shifted with a series of contingent factors. Thus when the ideology of British imperialism became dominant, as it did from the 1850’s onwards when Britain’s economic dominance became increasingly apparent, the (British) public sympathy for the lower ranks stationed overseas increased. As one indicative consequence, Colley cites the eventual withdrawal of public flogging as a punishment used to discipline soldiers.<sup>694</sup> Moreover, after the India Mutiny of 1857, British soldiers in India came to be viewed as figures of national identification, as men whose ‘well-intentioned and courageous actions’ were a matter of British and imperial pride, while the once-valorised sepoys came to be viewed as ‘devious and cruel’: these beliefs, in turn, sanctioned further atrocities against the Indian population under the Victorian liberal and utilitarian system of British colonial India.<sup>695</sup> Yet again, the *form* of these atrocities – the Utilitarian system of the social disciplining of pauperised subjects through moralistic and punitive measures combined with the enactment of economic policy under the principles of liberal free trade, were those that had been sharpened by their prior application to the British poor.

### 3.3. Race, Class, and Resentment: The Spectre of ‘White Slavery’

*Rule Britannia*  
*Britannia Rules the Waves,*  
*Britons Never, Never, Never,*  
*Will Be Slaves*<sup>696</sup>

<sup>691</sup> Isaac Land, *ibid*, pp., 169-185.

<sup>692</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 328-333; Isaac Land, *ibid*, p 174.

<sup>693</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2002, p 232.

<sup>694</sup> Linda Colley, *op cit*.

<sup>695</sup> Mike Davis, *ibid*, 2002.

<sup>696</sup> James Thompson, (lyrics), Thomas Augustine Arne, (score), 1740.



The latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed a crisis in confidence in relation to Britain's 'first empire'. The British victory in the Seven Years War marked a high point for the success of the militant-fiscal state-society complex, whereupon Britain's dominance in global markets, and in the service industries of shipping, insurance, banking and distribution had been established.<sup>697</sup> Nonetheless, the victory that marked Britain's ascendancy contained a series of troubling legacies. In John Marriott's account, the first of these was the need to recoup the losses of expenditure from the Seven Years war. In seeking to tax the American colonies in order to pay for wartime debts, the British encouraged the resistance of the American colonies, which led to the American Independence. The mismanagement and corruption of the East India Company, and the rise of anti-colonial resistance threatened the British Indian empire. In addition, the French had begun to reassert their influence over the Caribbean slave trade, and the Irish colony continued to provoke anxiety in the form of nationalist agitation.<sup>698</sup>

In this context the notion of *Imperium* – 'the limited but absolute authority of a single individual over a territory embracing more than one political community' – became subject to criticism. Here,

*The experience of Spanish, French and British overseas expansion, it was argued, demonstrated that every settler community eventually came to demand political autonomy and economic self-sufficiency, and that the exploitation of forced labour – either indigenous or imported slave – was economically inefficient, not least because it was massively destructive of human life.*<sup>699</sup>

From the 1730s onwards imperial ideology began to shift from its moorings in the aristocratic principles of conquest, militancy and centralised authority. Subsequently, under the influence of moral philosophers and political economists, imperial ideology began to emphasise the mutual interdependence of Protestantism, commercialism, maritime power, and liberalism. As David Armitage observes,

*Protestantism, oceanic commerce and mastery over the seas provided bastions to protect the freedom of inhabitants of the British Empire. That freedom found its institutional expression in Parliament, the law, property and rights, all of which were exported throughout the British Atlantic world. Such*

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<sup>697</sup> John Brewer, *Sinews of Power; War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989; Patrick O'Brien, 'Inseparable Connections: trade, economy, fiscal state, and the expansion of empire, 1688-1815', in P.J. Marshall, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Vol. II. The Eighteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998

<sup>698</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, p 19.

<sup>699</sup> John Marriott, *op cit*; Anthony Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain, and France, c.1500-c.1800*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995, p 6.

*freedom allowed the British, uniquely, to combine the classically incompatible ideals of liberty and empire.*<sup>700</sup>

In this formula imperialism is represented as an extension of liberalism, the *mare liberum*.<sup>701</sup> That extension, in turn, is predicated on the national legacy of liberalism's long history of development within Britain, and the particular (national) qualities of British liberalism is used to legitimate its universal extension. This newly pacific imperialism can be thought of in relation to Etienne Balibar's analysis of the expansive side of universalism. Here, Balibar refers to the secularised Enlightenment discourse that 'gave the European nations individually and collectively the mission of bringing their universalistic idea of Man, Freedom, the State, Culture etc. to the rest of mankind'.<sup>702</sup> With the Republican tradition of colonisation in mind, Balibar notes that the extension of universalism meets an intrinsic contradiction that lies between cultural assimilation and political subjection.<sup>703</sup> Similarly, the British liberal legacy is compromised by the forceful exclusion of colonial subjects from the sphere of liberal rights even as the incorporation of colonial subjects into the imperial labour market grants the 'gift' of liberal 'responsibilities'. In this context the transformation of exclusionary limits to the progress of liberalism becomes a site of geopolitical and ideological contest. Here the British emancipation movement receives an appropriated political value, as it becomes a means of promoting the particular (national) vision of a liberal world order over those of the competing French and American models. Correspondingly, this world order comes to be articulated to British nationalism.<sup>704</sup> John Marriott observes that 'just as the invention of European civilisation demanded a temporalisation of non-European others, so its future was to be secured by identification – and hence control – of the most potent threats to its progress'.<sup>705</sup> Within the ideology of Progress, both the resistance of the indigenous poor and the use of non-European labour power became subject to strategies of liberal 'improvement'. Non-European societies, apprehended as both a threatening site of 'pre-modern' resistance to colonial capitalism, and a source of labour-power, were framed within the new theological appropriation of the Christian concept of the Great Chain of Being. As Marriott notes, this was an ambivalent appropriation: the native was subject to 'a double movement of exclusion and incorporation, the savage was subordinated to the European as an ignorant and un-civilised non-Christian, but one capable of conversion'.<sup>706</sup>

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<sup>700</sup> David Armitage, *ibid*, p 8.

<sup>701</sup> David Armitage, *op cit*.

<sup>702</sup> Etienne Balibar, *ibid*, 2001, p 6

<sup>703</sup> Etienne Balibar, *op cit*.

<sup>704</sup> Anthony Pagden, *ibid*, p 9.

<sup>705</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, p 29.

<sup>706</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, p 28.

The 'civilising mission' functioned, in part, to legitimate a variety of competing definitions of British and colonial progress. The political contests that developed in the late eighteenth century over the legitimacy or illegitimacy of colonial plantation slavery converged with the international debates over the legitimacy of competing political orders, national debates surrounding industrialisation and the socio-political order. Enlightenment thought and aspirations, expressed in terms of the demand for equality and liberty and the claim of fraternity amongst all human beings, informed many of the debates, feeding into both radical and liberal discourses about the conditions of the poor. From the 1770s onwards the West India interests had drawn comparisons between the conditions of English labourers and the plantation slaves, and by the 1790s it had become 'a commonplace in the defence of slavery to point to the allegedly greater poverty and oppression of British workers'.<sup>707</sup> The colonialist's defensive critique consisted of the argument that as the agency of workers was circumscribed by utter poverty, they were effectively slaves to necessity. Thus the rhetorical strategy of the West India interests was to problematise the 'enlightened' concept of freedom that had become normative in Britain following Adam Smith's arguments in *The Wealth of Nations*, by arguing that the paternal benevolence of the existing social order granted colonial slaves better conditions than the 'freedom' imposed on workers.

The predominantly middle class British abolitionists fought to situate emancipation as a central issue in British politics in a period in which working class movements sought to overcome economic and political oppression whilst the elite political class sought to maintain its dominance in the face of a series of international and nation threats to the social order that often drew upon French and American republicanism. From the 1790's through to the 1840's, whilst middle class abolitionists were able to draw upon working class support, the issue of emancipation allowed both groups to pursue competing domestic political campaigns that often resulted in a relationship of antagonism. From the 1790's onwards, social commentators and politicians concerned with the labouring conditions of the working class began to draw upon the colonialist's use of the slave/worker metaphor. Critics of industrial capitalism drew upon the metaphor in arguments that presented the middle class drive for abolition as a hypocritical negligence of the conditions of the British working class. In its more extreme form, this critical position sometimes converged with pro-slavery arguments. Thus, writing a year before the abolition of slavery in Britain in 1807, William Cobbett articulated a pro-slavery position to his defence of the British working class, stating that 'so often as they agitate this question, with all its cant, for the relief of 500,000 blacks; so often will remind them of the 1,200,000 white paupers of England and Wales'.<sup>708</sup> Cobbett drew upon prevalent contemporary notions of racial difference to privilege the

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<sup>707</sup> Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, p 6

<sup>708</sup> William Cobbett cited in Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, p 8.

rights of white British workers. In advocating the repeal of the Combination Acts, he appropriated the colonialist's critique of the rhetoric of freedom:

*[a]way with all your trash about 'free British labourers ... You seem to question in one place, whether the Blacks be 'as yet fit for the enjoyment of British freedom ... But surely, they may be fit to be shut up in their huts from sunset to sunrise. A part of these free British labourers are so shut up. ...you never so much as insinuate that the Blacks perish or even suffer for want of food. But it is notorious that great numbers of your 'free British labourers' have actually died from starvation.*

By the late 1810's, the critics of industrialisation who were generally opposed to slavery in the colonies, drew upon the abolitionist discourse to describe the situation of factory hands as a form of 'white slavery' that required its own form of 'abolition', as well as the anti-abolitionist discourse that provided a basis for the critique of 'free labour' as slavery to necessity. Thus Owen, in arguing for the 10 Hours Movement, stated that free labour consisted of 'the liberty of starving'.<sup>709</sup> Other commentators described the factory system as producing the labourer as an 'animal-machine', describing 'the sub humanity of the factory worker who is stunted in his intellect and hence deprived of his status as a free human being, an 'accountable agent'.<sup>710</sup> Throughout the 1820s and 1830s, middle class abolitionists were subject to virulent critiques in working class newspapers and journals whose articles sought to privilege the suffering of British labourers over those of black slaves.<sup>711</sup> Many of the key targets of this criticism were those who were seen to have inhibited the development of the political and economic working class rights. Thus, in 1818, Wilberforce was castigated as a 'canting' hypocrite for his role in suppressing the working class, as were the Malthusian abolitionists who supported the Poor Law of 1834.<sup>712</sup> These criticisms intensified in the wake of the failure of the 1832 Reform Act to extend the franchise to universal manhood and the subsequent proof of that failure in the articulation of the legislation for colonial emancipation in 1833 and domestic suppression in, for example the rejection of the 10 Hours Bill, the anti-trade union legislation, and the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act.<sup>713</sup> The Emancipation Act providing working class advocates with the opportunity to charge the government with the criticism that it put the interests of black workers above those of white workers, and that, furthermore, the compensation granted the colonialists showed that it was prepared to make white workers pay for the emancipation of black slaves.<sup>714</sup> As Betty Fladeland observes, the

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<sup>709</sup> Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, p 14.

<sup>710</sup> Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, p 25.

<sup>711</sup> Betty Fladeland, "Our cause being one and the same": Abolitionists and Chartism', in James Walvin, (ed.), *Slavery and British Society, 1776-1846*, London, Macmillan, 1982, p 69

<sup>712</sup>; Betty Fladeland, *ibid*, p 73.

<sup>713</sup> Catherine Gallagher makes this point in relation to the 1832 Reform Act; *ibid*, p 31; see also E. P. Thompson, *ibid*, 1991, p 904

<sup>714</sup> Betty Fladeland, *ibid*, p 77.

Poor Law of 1834 provided a 'rallying point' for the Chartist movement, as it provided a basis for arguing that 'the working poor were indeed slaves and were no better off in physical or psychological terms than black chattels in the West Indies or the United States'.<sup>715</sup> Subsequently, throughout the 1830s and 1840s, the Chartists seeking political emancipation continued to pressure the abolitionists towards a fight for a universal emancipation that would further their particular political and economic claims.<sup>716</sup>

As Brion Davis observed, the emancipation of British colonial slaves in 1833 was a 'response of a conservative government, representing a defensive aristocracy, to the competing claims that reformers and planters voiced against a backdrop of economic crisis and potential revolution'.<sup>717</sup> Correspondingly, the enfranchisement of property owning members of the middle class in 1832 had represented a form of passive revolution in which the incorporation of the bourgeoisie constructed a socio-political alliance that allowed the continued exclusion of the poor.<sup>718</sup>

For the middle class, the parliamentary Reform Act of 1832 and the Emancipation Act of 1833 proved a nodal point for the composition of a contested construction of national belonging. Herein, 'the dominant definition of Englishness included the gratifying element of liberator of enslaved Africans'.<sup>719</sup> Catherine Hall observes that for the British middle class emancipationists seeking to stamp their authority on the discourse of liberal tolerance over the 'Old Corruption' of aristocratic and colonial privilege, the dominant discursive formation of the 1830s and 1840s was built upon 'a belief in the civilizational equality of the 'Negro', the potential of the 'Negro' to be raised from the state of savagery, through childhood to manhood, which characterised the cultural racism of the anti-slavery movement'.<sup>720</sup> Using the example of the Baptist missionaries who were at the frontline of the emancipation movement, Hall makes the argument that, for them, emancipation represented entry into 'manhood' for the freed slaves, as masculinity 'meant freedom from dependence on the will of another', and conversely 'to be subject meant a loss of male identity'.<sup>721</sup> Moreover, the ideology of individual freedom that the emancipationists drew upon contained a further definition of freedom that drew more directly on relations of power within the domestic social order. The sphere of liberal nationality was circumscribed by the emphasis that the middle classes placed on the dignity of work, as

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<sup>715</sup> Betty Fladeland, *ibid*, p 71.

<sup>716</sup> Betty Fladeland, *op cit*

<sup>717</sup> David Brion Davis, *ibid*, p 222

<sup>718</sup> See E. P. Thompson, *ibid*, 1991, pp., 887-915. Thompson describes the political contest between different radical and reformist, Whig and conservative elements in the accommodation of the 1832 Reform Bill as one that was, in Shelley's terms (1822), fought between 'blood and gold', where 'blood compromised with gold to keep out the claims of *egalite*'. (p 902)

<sup>719</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 208.

<sup>720</sup> Catherine Hall, *op cit*.

<sup>721</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 237

opposed to the aristocratic framing of negative liberty and status as the freedom from the necessity to labour.<sup>722</sup> This view was strongly influenced by the laissez-faire theories of the political economists, in which free labour would produce moral improvement in the context of a free market. The British landed elites drew upon classical notions of the slave-citizen division in framing their own conception of freedom of action in the public sphere. The middle class perspective contained an implicit trace of the liberal construction of aristocratic privilege, for to be a free individual meant not just freedom from subjection, but also a sense of mastery: the freedom to subject the will of others to one's own. The 'Negro character' that the middle class emancipationists projected was 'full of tokens of their capacity to become, when free, a well-ordered, industrious and prosperous community'.<sup>723</sup> Here the black man was imagined as the (potentially) rational self interested free labourer who could, thereafter, be entrusted with the responsibilities of entering into the liberal social contract. This projection of the other as a form of self contained an implicit desire for the paternalist privilege of the benevolent ordering of this moral improvement. This paternalist coding of the state of liberty and servitude was articulated to a particular constellation of discursive formations where domestic arguments concerning equality within the political sphere met an imperialist and universalist discourse regarding the transcendence of limits to the sphere of natural rights. Here then, there was a middle class appropriation of the discourse of the rights of the 'freeborn Englishman' that sought its legitimacy in the proof of colonial emancipation.

By the late 1840's, the optimism of the middle class emancipation movement had dissipated, as the colonialist had succeeded in winning approval for the apprenticeship system, had enforced harshly restrictive regulations on the labour mobility of freedmen. Falling sugar prices and production from the late 1830s onwards, and the large-scale abandonment of plantations between the mid 1840s and mid 1850s seemed to demonstrate the fallacy of the advantages of free labour over slave labour. Subsequently, the British banks and other metropolitan financial investors who bought out the foreclosed plantations were to turn to newly won sources of migrant labour bondage in the coolie system. Perhaps more importantly, the form of resistance of the freedman and woman had disappointed middle class beliefs in their ability to recreate the 'negro' as an object of moral disciplined improvement; this was because the autonomy claims of the freed slaves tended towards independent small holding farming and creolisation rather than re-incorporation in the white colonial plantation system and submission to white Christian cultural authority. As Hall has demonstrated in the case of the Baptist missionaries in Jamaica, claims made in terms of the benevolent white granting of the

<sup>722</sup> H. V. Bowen, *ibid*, pp 119-29; Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 257.

<sup>723</sup> Joseph Sturge and Thomas Harvey, *The West Indies in 1837 being the journal of a visit to Antigua, Montserrat, Dominica, St Lucia, Barbados, and Jamaica; undertaken for the purpose of ascertaining the actual condition of the negro population of those islands*, Hamilton Adams & Co., 1838, p 346; cited in Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 238.

recognition of equality tended to disappear in the context of the freed slaves determination to demonstrate both his or her independence, and the dependence of the white population on his labour. This dynamic produced the threat of a reversal of the roles of subservience and mastery and thus upset the terms on which 'equality' was proffered.

Liberal 'benevolence' defined Britain's role in the world in the mid-nineteenth century, and that global role defined, in turn, the dominant discursive formations of British domestic politics. In the mid-nineteenth century both the conservative politicians, such as Palmerston advocating militant expansionism, and the liberal reformists, such as Richard Cobden advocating a laissez faire cosmopolitan world economy, were able to represent the pursuit of expansionist British interests in terms of an extension of benevolent British liberalism into the wider world. The Cobdenite vision was based, as Ha-Joon Chang observes, on the knowledge that the comparative advantages enjoyed through protectionist and mercantilist imperialism were now, at mid-century, best protected and furthered by tying foreign and colonial colonies into the free trade system.<sup>724</sup> Yet the laissez faire philosophy allowed Britain to take advantage of its position as the 'workshop of the world' whilst obliging foreign parties to meet the standards of liberalism and 'mutual benefit' set by Britain. A Commons Select Committee of 1837 on Aborigines stated that the British Empire provided the people of the world with 'the opportunity of becoming partakers of that civilization, that innocent commerce, that knowledge and that faith with which it has pleased a gracious Providence to bless our own country'.<sup>725</sup> As Martin Lynn observes, the incorporation of colonial and foreign economies into the British centred free trade economy was similarly represented in terms of the extension of capitalism as a moralising force 'allowing economically 'backward' nations to develop their resources and throw off outdated elites while encouraging the development of capitalist classes through the moral dimension of industry and capitalist accumulation'.<sup>726</sup> Here, the pursuit of British interests was correlated to a concept of overseas development. Lynn points to the role of Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary (1830-4, 1835-41, 1846-51) and Prime Minister (1855-58, 1859-65) in defining the pragmatic direction of British foreign policy. Semmel observes that Palmerston provided a focal point for a popular patriotism and a point of resistance for radical cosmopolitanism. In drawing upon free trade discourse as a legitimisation for expansion, Palmerston married the mercantilist and laissez faire ideologies in the form of a popular British imperialism.<sup>727</sup> Palmerston expressed a 'universalistic notion of progress based on British cultural norms, applicable to all societies across the globe, and that was tied to the need to hasten the

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<sup>724</sup> Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*, London, Anthem Press, 2005, p 23

<sup>725</sup> *Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements), Parliamentary Papers*, 1837, (425), VII, p. 76.

<sup>726</sup> Martin Lynn, 'Policy, trade, and informal empire', in Andrew Porter, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p 103.

<sup>727</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 54.



march of civilization – defined by the principles of enterprise, capital accumulation, and individual property ownership – through the judicious use of force'.<sup>728</sup> From the perspective of the wider world, 'Palmerstonianism' represented 'a policy of expanding British interests overseas by force wherever necessary, justified by appeals at home to moral imperatives'.<sup>729</sup> Thus a contradiction existed between the call for slave trade treaties encouraging foreign producers of sugar and cotton to switch to the use of free labour in a mutually beneficial free market, and the perspectives of foreign producers who were aware that their productive advantages lay in the use of slave labour after Britain's colonial emancipation.

At the same time that it addressed Britain's role overseas, the political framing of Britain's role in the world addressed domestic politics and social order during a period when the Conservative party and the landed elites resisted the rise of the industrial classes in the contest for socio-political and economic dominance. The 'hungry forties' had witnessed the demise of Chartism that, as a republican political force, had represented exclusion from the parliamentary franchise as a form of 'slavery'.<sup>730</sup> The ability of the republican strain of working class politics to gain counter-hegemonic status tended to dissipate in the wake of the repeal of the Corn Laws (1846), in the comparative improvement of domestic economic conditions in the 1850s, and in Palmerston's opposition to the reform movement. In this period, as Audrey Fische observes, 'by 1850, the 'slavery of the working class' had become the dominant term around which the plight of the working class was debated'.<sup>731</sup> Moreover, the African-American abolitionist campaign, heightened in terms of its intensity in Britain following the passage of the Fugitive Slave Law in the United States in 1850, helped to keep the issue of the slavery/worker metaphor alive within the British public sphere until the demise of the Southern States at the end of the American Civil War in 1865.

Throughout the 1850s and 1860s the oppressive conditions of the industrialised working class and the Utilitarian's 'moral' problematisation of poverty remained a site of ongoing socio-political contest, and, until 1865, the dominance of Palmerston's conservative government, with middle class support, ensured that the cause of electoral reform remained hopeless. Semmel describes these decades as the period in which many members of the middle class became 'increasingly frightened at the prospect of

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<sup>728</sup> Martin Lynn, *ibid*, p 106.

<sup>729</sup> R. J. Gavin, 'Palmerston's Policy Towards East and West Africa, 1830-65', unpublished PhD. Thesis, Cambridge, 1959, p 1; cited in Martin Lynn, *op cit*.

<sup>730</sup> Chartists drew upon Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man* in constructing the slavery/franchise opposition. For this point, see Catherine Gallagher, *ibid*, pp., 29-30.

<sup>731</sup> Audrey Fische, *American Slaves in Victorian England: Abolitionist Politics in Popular Literature and Culture*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p 50; Fische critiques novels of this period that sought to redirect sympathy for African slaves back to a sympathy for English workers. See Coatsworth's *Slavery in England*, Rymer's *The White Slave*, and the anonymous *Uncle Tom in England* (1852).

universal suffrage' and, from 1857 onwards, began to vote for the more conservative Liberals and Tories rather than the radical liberals.<sup>732</sup> The strike movements of 1859-61 heightened these fears, as they seemed to demonstrate the growing strength of an increasingly united working class and the prospect of democratic revolution. This movement towards unification threatened to give to the diverse distress and revolt of the 1860s – evidenced, for example in the collapse of industrial industry in East London and the resulting production of a residuum prone to rioting over the price of bread – a counter-hegemonic structure that threatened the passive revolution of the nineteenth century state-society complex.

The phenomenon of a united and organised working class movement threatened to harness the 'irrational passions' of the poor, who were thought to be marked by 'the five great divisions ... of poverty, ignorance, dirt, immorality, and crime'.<sup>733</sup> At the turn of the nineteenth century, Patrick Colquhoun had set the stage for the criminalising and moralising discourse and governmentalities of Utilitarian improvement, having established the problematisation in which the poor were represented in terms of forms of militant, criminal organisation. The mid-century coalescence of diverse pauperised groups into a unified working class represented a dangerous reformation of the previous forms of organised militancy. For the Utilitarian discourse of nineteenth century social reformers, poverty was the result of the latter articulated categories (ignorance, dirt, immorality and crime), and in the optimistic visions of progress it was believed that it could be alleviated through work, education, sanitation, moral reformation, surveillance and policing. The moralising and criminalising categorisations served to divide the poor into the undeserving and deserving within a theory of staged development. Bernard Semmel observes that the poor were regarded as 'thoroughly undisciplined, with a tendency to revert to bestial behaviour, consequentially requiring to be kept in order by force, and by occasional but severe flashes of violence; vicious and sly, incapable of telling the truth, naturally lazy and unwilling to work unless under compulsion'.<sup>734</sup> Here Semmel describes the latent innate nature of the poor, the *a priori* status that precedes their incorporation within the disciplines and governmentalities of improvement. As John Marriott observes, this 'poor' represents the antithesis of the bourgeois imaginary; their presence threatens the contagious spread of moral defilement and impurity, constituting the abject other for the bourgeois project of self-making. The 'dirt' of the undeserving poor is not the 'grease, sweat, oil, dust and grime' of honest manufacture, but an unproductive 'filth' manifest as sewage, swamp, slime, and putrefaction'; it is the 'grotesque' and 'faecal' dirt of bodily and social disintegration.<sup>735</sup>

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<sup>732</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 1963, pp., 58-9.

<sup>733</sup> John Hollingshead, *Ragged in London in 1861*, London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1861, p 8.

<sup>734</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid.*, 1963, p 135.

<sup>735</sup> John Marriott, *ibid.*, pp., 162-3.

At a time when liberal elite and middle class approaches to the problem of the British Poor centred on the disciplines providing for their potential moral improvement, British labouring subjects were thought to lack the rationality and self-discipline necessary to responsible action in the public sphere. A premature granting of a universal franchise threatened the chaos of 'mob rule'. Here, when not simply confined to the innate pre-modernity given in the perspectives of conservatives like Carlyle, the British poor were subject to the infantilising 'not-yetness' of the rational liberal sphere. Poor British subjects approached the status of the colonial other whose presence was more threatening for being interior to the nation, both British and not-quite British.<sup>736</sup>

The 1850's and 1860s witnessed a gradual swing in public opinion from the cultural racism of the 1830s towards a more overt 'biological' racism that revolved around bourgeois anxieties domestic social disorder and imperial decline. The hegemonic status of the emancipation movement had drawn its strength, in part, from the status of the 'Negro' as equal-but-not-quite-equal – as subject to the improving influence of British liberal civilization. At this juncture, a constellation of colonial and foreign forms of resistance, the popular patriotism of Palmerstonianism, and the rise of newly 'scientific' theories of 'racial' difference combined with domestic anxieties about the working class threat to the social order to produce a sense of crisis that was both imperial *and* national. The key 'colonial' events in the shift towards a racialised discursive formation were the India Mutiny (1857-9), the American Civil War (1861-65), the Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica (1865), and the subsequent controversy over the trial of Governor Eyre.

The India Mutiny was one of a long series of localised revolts and disturbances against British rule in India. The causes and course of the rebellion have been and remain an area of historical debate. As John Marriott observes, it can be regarded as a complex constellation of previously fragmentary forms of resistance: it was, thus, 'the first war of independence, a regressive struggle waged by neo-feudal landed magnates, a peasant uprising against oppressive taxation and loss of customary rights over land, and a civil war between collaborators and colonial fighters'.<sup>737</sup> Some anticipation of rebellion might have been taken from the warnings of the missionaries who, in 1856, criticised the British system of

<sup>736</sup> Their indeterminate presence gives rise to what Zygmunt Bauman describes as the phenomenon of 'proteophobia'.

<sup>737</sup> See C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. The new Cambridge History of India*, Vol. II.I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999; Thomas R. Metcalf, *The Aftermath of the Revolt: India, 1857-70*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964; J. A. Palmer, *The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut in 1857*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966; Eric Stokes, *The Peasant and the Raj: Studies in Agrarian Society and Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978, chaps. 3-5.

land tenures and the abusive power of zemindars and planters.<sup>738</sup> Nonetheless, the 'novelty' of the Mutiny lay in the degree to which it surprised the British belief in colonial gratitude for imperial 'benevolence', as well as the manner in which it brought together previously fragmentary and uncoordinated struggles, in a scale and intensity that had not previously occurred.

A key factor in the British reaction of horror and hatred of the Indian rebellions was the perception of the betrayal of British rule by the sepoys who had been considered to be both brave and trustworthy.<sup>739</sup> A typical reaction was given in John Stevenson's sermon:

*Sons and daughters of England, unoffending missionaries, women and children, have been barbarously tortured and murdered, with a refinement of cruelty that can be paralleled only to the infernal demons. All the tortures we read of in the Roman inquisition and persecutions, or the torments inflicted by American savages upon their captives, had comparatively a touch of mercy.*<sup>740</sup>

The metropolitan reaction to the reports of the massacre and rape of innocent British colonial subjects involved the racialisation of Indian subjects, and the Mutiny marks the point at which the term 'nigger' came into popular use in Britain.<sup>741</sup> If one of the key results of the Mutiny was the re-militarization of the British empire in India, another was the increasing legitimization, at home, of a militant colonial expansion tied to a renewed sense of racial supremacy, for the Mutiny showed that the 'backward' were intrinsically barbaric and thus incapable of the rational trust necessary to incorporation with the liberal sphere.<sup>742</sup>

The anxieties that developed around the India Mutiny were exacerbated by a series of colonial and domestic developments. Throughout the 1860s domestic tensions over the issue of universal franchise and the 'militant' tactics and strategies adopted by the working class movements had reached an

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<sup>738</sup> *Petition of the Calcutta Missionaries, for a Royal Commission to Enquire into the Condition of the People of Bengal*, London, Sanders, Cones and Co., 1856, p. 16; cited in John Marriott, *ibid*, pp., 194-5.

<sup>739</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2003, p 372.

<sup>740</sup> Rev. John Stevenson, *A Sermon, for the Benefit of the Sufferers in India, on the Goodness and Severity of God. Preached at Tinwell, Rutland, 20 September 1857*, Stamford, Langley, 1857, p 6.

<sup>741</sup> George Dangerfield, *Bengal Mutiny: The Story of the Sepoy Rebellion*, London, Hutchinson, 1933; Victor G. Kiernan, *The Lords of Human Kind: European Attitudes to the Outside World in the Imperial Age*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, pp., 48-9

<sup>742</sup> D. A. Washbrook, 'India, 1818-1860', in Andrew Porter, (ed.), *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p 419. Washbrook writes that 'the security problem revealed by the Mutiny created racial divisions and suspicions which were to last ever after. India was to sacrifice the prospects of both more rapid economic growth and political reform in order to be preserved as the British Empire's military barracks'; John Stevenson, *ibid*, p 11. Dangerfield continued his sermon, stating that it was now necessary to 're-establish that empire of opinion; - that conviction of our supremacy, and of the irresistible superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, on which the rule of the British in India depended'.

intensity that was heightened by the victory of the democratic Northern American states in 1865.<sup>743</sup> By the end of that year, news had begun to filter back to Britain of a riot and subsequent reprisals in the Jamaican port at Morant Bay. The slaves freed from the plantation system and apprenticeship in the 1830s had migrated en masse to the Jamaican hills, and by 1860 there were some 50,000 small holdings being farmed by freedmen and women.<sup>744</sup> During the 1850s and 1860s, the state of the colony's sugar economy had declined in the face of competition from the sugar producers in Brazil and Cuba. The planters and the British government regarded the exodus of the freedmen from the plantations as a betrayal and a return to the state of 'idleness' marking the African 'race'. Neither was prepared to extend measures of support to the diversified small holding agriculture of the freed slaves, nor to extend any alleviation of the onerous system of taxation.<sup>745</sup> The political and economic structure of Jamaica was marked by radical inequality, and by a rejection of the degree of agency demonstrated in the freed slaves' migration away from the stasis of the plantation system.

Edward Eyre became (acting) Governor of Jamaica in 1862, and quickly found himself in conflict with George William Gordon, the leader of the left-wing of the Town party. Serving as a spokesman for the settlers in the hill country and the pauperised Afro-Jamaicans in the towns and sugar estates, Gordon, the son of a white planter and enslaved woman, was a reformer who sought to improve the conditions of the Jamaican poor. These efforts and the consequent public position they earned him made Gordon a target for the Jamaican governing elites.

Rebellion broke out in a series of incidents in Morant Bay, whereupon a report was sent to Governor Eyre, claiming that the 'blacks' were in a state of insurrection, and were proceeding to attack both property and white civilians. The violence of the rioters was described in terms of shockingly barbaric acts, and was compared to the outrage of the India Mutiny.<sup>746</sup> The administration's initial response was to send out reconnoitering parties, who assuming that any 'black' found not to have fled was a rebel, proceeded to flog or hang all they found. In addition, martial courts were initiated to try captured prisoners, who were summarily found guilty and hanged. In November Eyre issued a warrant for Gordon's arrest, claiming that Gordon, although not directly involved in the riots, was 'ultimately the chief cause and origin of the whole rebellion' inasmuch as his political agitation had raised the ignorant blacks to a state of violent insurrection. Eyre then had Gordon removed to Morant Bay, where he was

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<sup>743</sup> The issue of the American Civil War, and changing British perceptions of slavery, emancipation, 'race' and class is another relevant area of discussion. However, for the purposes of this chapter the examples of the India Mutiny and the Morant Bay Rebellion are sufficient.

<sup>744</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 33.

<sup>745</sup> The Colonial Office explicitly rejected such measures in 1865; see Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, pp., 42-4.

<sup>746</sup> The reference to the India Mutiny was contained in Eyre's report to the Colonial Secretary. See Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 49.

tried under martial law. Gordon, who was prevented from presenting a defense, was found guilty, and was hanged two days after the judgment.<sup>747</sup>

In Jamaica, the immediate result of the rebellion and suppression was the end of self-government, as Eyre, arguing against the impending threat of black suffrage, successfully petitioned the Colonial Office to make Jamaica a Crown Colony. In Britain, the reaction to Eyre's suppression of the rebellion was initially positive, as it was assumed that he had taken effective action to restore law and order. Yet controversy soon surrounded the issue of military and judicial irregularities, and, in particular, the summary trial and execution of Gordon. Liberal pressure groups soon succeeded in persuading the government to establish a Royal Commission. The Commission's findings were critical of the prolonged extension of martial law and noted the unwarranted violence of the Jamaican forces, which had been excessively punitive and needlessly cruel, yet also found that the rebellion had been a real threat and that Eyre had been correct to take vigorous action.

Led by J.S. Mill and consisting primarily of anti-slavery groups, the Jamaica Committee which had formed to coordinate criticism of the events in Jamaica pressed the government to pursue the prosecution of Governor Eyre. For Mill, colonial 'blacks' were alike women and the working class in as much as they shared a potential for equality that could be furthered via education and equal treatment before the law. The issue at stake in the Jamaican crisis for Mill was not only the militant oppression of the colonial subjects that had been recently freed from slavery, but what the legitimacy of that militancy signified for British liberalism in the colonies and at home. Mill wrote that 'the question was whether the British dependencies, and eventually, perhaps, Great Britain itself, were to be under the government of law, or military license'.<sup>748</sup> The chief object of the Jamaica Committee's criticism was the illegitimacy of the 'trial' and execution of Gordon under martial law. The Committee thus described Eyre's invocation of martial law as a form of terrorism wherein 'persons were punished not because they had committed a crime but in order to discourage others'.<sup>749</sup> A system of colonial terrorism undermined the legitimacy of the system of British liberalism that extended the separation of executive, legislature and judiciary throughout the empire.<sup>750</sup> Inasmuch as it had been applied to a British subject, then the acceptance of executive privilege as a legitimate form of government set a regressive precedent for domestic as well as colonial governance; it may, thereafter, have been legitimately applied to British trade unions or riotous crowds with equal impunity. This regression confounded the pursuit of liberal progress by threatening to return British governance to the state of

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<sup>747</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 52.

<sup>748</sup> Mill cited in Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 128.

<sup>749</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 131.

<sup>750</sup> These views were given by Frederick Harrison, the Jamaica Committee's spokesman on the constitutional elements of the Eyre controversy. See Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, pp., 128-30.

militancy that had belonged to aristocratic privilege and mercantilism. Consequently, the Jamaica Committee sought to bring the sphere of colonial governance back within the realms of British law by prosecuting Eyre for the murder of Gordon.

The Committee's pursuit of Eyre provoked a backlash amongst growing public sympathy for Eyre. In the views of Carlyle and the other members of the group that formed to coordinate Eyre's defense, the Governor was seen as an honorable man who, having 'saved the beleaguered whites', was being dishonorably wronged by the radical liberals.<sup>751</sup> Eyre's supporters, like the Jamaica Committee, saw Eyre's suppression as having been conducted under a 'state of exception', but countered the criticisms made of the imposition of martial law by assigning 'to it a semi-mystical position, a code above and anterior to all other law'.<sup>752</sup> Here the legitimacy of the exceptional imposition of martial law was justified as a counter to the dangers of the 'nigger principle'. The defense of the 'nigger principle' was the charge that Eyre's supporters laid against the Jamaica Committee, encapsulating the belief that it was unacceptable for Englishmen to claim the rights of white Englishmen on behalf of Jamaican blacks. As Semmel observes,

*The stories of the atrocities committed by the Indian mutineers of 1857 and by Jamaican rebels had convinced much of the public that only by weighty force, crushingly exercised, would it be possible to maintain control over the semi-educated, barbarous, coloured races of the Empire.*<sup>753</sup>

Many middle and upper class supporters of Eyre believed that the Empire was valuable and necessary, and could only be defended by militant force against people of inferior races. The radical liberal privileging of the defense of barbaric others before the protection of British subjects appeared, in this light, to be treasonous. For Ruskin, the Jamaica Committee was not just guilty of a lack of sufficient patriotism, but was guilty of hypocrisy.<sup>754</sup> There could be no extension of the realms of free trade without the incorporation of colonial subjects as free labour. The result of the shift to free labour in Jamaica had been the economic and social crisis that led to rebellion. Thus, Ruskin insightfully pointed to the fact that the radical liberal's philosophy of political science required the exceptional use of violence that they sought to criminalize in the actions of Governor Eyre. The chimera of Cobden's cosmopolitanism and the nascent liberal-imperialist *laissez faire* economy required, in practice, the militancy of Palmerston's 'open door' policies. For liberal imperialists, moreover, colonization and the

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<sup>751</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 277.

<sup>752</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 2005, p 4; Bernard Semmel, *op cit*.

<sup>753</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 131

<sup>754</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 133.



informal *laissez faire* empire were necessary for sufficient domestic industry and employment and, thereby, for the avoidance of class warfare.

Semmel notes that by the end of 1866 it was apparent that the critics of Eyre consisted of only 'a small minority of the educated and articulate classes of Great Britain, supported by the leaders of a part of the organized working classes'.<sup>755</sup> The years of 1886-7 saw widespread massive working class demonstrations seeking a Reform Bill for universal franchise, as well as bread riots in London. The metropolitan and colonial anxieties surrounding the Indian and Jamaican rebellions worked to articulate the problem of racial insurrection with the domestic problem of the working class reform movement, as both were seen to have shown the need for the forceful defense of a legitimate social order that now belonged to the entirety of the propertied classes. In this context, the middle and upper classes united to defend Eyre's use of the 'Royal' prerogative in defeating colonial rebellion, as domestic unrest suggested that a rise of revolutionary violence might threaten the British constitution and require the application of judicious violence. In addition, Fenian rebellion in Ireland and Britain had served to raise the importance of defending Eyre, for it seemed likely that militant intervention would become necessary if Britain were to keep the Irish colony. The Indian, Jamaican, and Irish rebellions had served to cement public opinion around the axis of racial difference. British subjects were here increasingly demarcated on the basis of 'race'. The concept of the colonies as subject, in a *de facto* manner, to martial law, extended to a normative and indefinite extension of 'exceptionality'.

In Britain, the Tory government's Reform Bill of 1867 extended the franchise to 'household suffrage' – a system of universal manhood suffrage in the boroughs. In the 1790s Colquhoun had described the laboring class as a militant organization that must be checked by surveillance, policing, and the disciplines of the wage labour system. By the 1860's, the political organization of the working class was perceived as presenting a threat that required political accommodation beyond the disciplinary techniques of Utilitarianism. The extension of liberal democracy to British subjects provided the political elites with a means of maintaining their hegemonic hold on British politics without resorting to the state of exception that had become legitimate and normative in the colonies. The demarcation between those who were merely subject to British law and those who were, by virtue of the franchise, to be granted membership in the citizenship of the liberal political sphere was grounded in racial difference. Disraeli, who was to reward Carlyle with the Royal Cross of Bath and a yearly income, described the borough franchise as 'a leap in the dark', whilst also stating that in extending the franchise, 'England is safe in the race of men who inhabit her'.<sup>756</sup>

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<sup>755</sup> Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 132.

<sup>756</sup> Catherine Hall, *ibid*, p 288; Bernard Semmel, *ibid*, 1963, p 137; Benjamin Disraeli, *Third Reading of the Reform Bill (1867)*, cited in Antionette Burton, (ed.), *Politics and Empire in Victorian Britain: A Reader*, Houndsmeills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001,

Disraeli, in the Third Reading of the Reform Bill, spoke of the extended franchise as offering the 'chance of touching the popular heart, of evoking the national sentiment by embracing the great body of those men who occupy houses and fulfill the duties of citizenship by the payment of rates'.<sup>757</sup> Here Disraeli presents the national-worker, who in fulfilling his responsibilities (rate paying and the steady work that entails) maintains his part of the social contract between sovereign power and subject and achieves recognition as the citizen within the public sphere of representative politics. Disraeli's construction of a national-popular discursive formation is supplemented by an appeal to national-imperialism. As Prime Minister Disraeli seeks to define a British 'Conservatism' that means that

*[t]he people of England, are proud of belonging to a great country, and wish to maintain its greatness – they are proud of belonging to an Imperial country, and are resolved to maintain, if they can, their empire – that they believe, on the whole, that the greatness and the empire of England are to be attributed to the ancient institutions of the land ...*<sup>758</sup>

Here the national popular discourse which unites the 'two nations' of Britain by incorporating the worker as citizen is supplemented by an imperialist nationalism which seeks to define an excluded outside (the sphere of foreign aliens and colonial subjects) from the national inside (the sphere of British subjects *qua* citizens).<sup>759</sup> It is a 'settlement' that produces the 'one nation' principle of enlightened liberalism; it is a principle consistent also with Foucault's idea of pastoral power and Utilitarian goals of maximizing 'happiness' and security. Etienne Balibar credits Disraeli with having indicated 'the path which might be taken by the dominant classes when confronted with the progressive organisation of the class struggle'.<sup>760</sup> This political strategy consisted, in part, of dividing the 'poor' into the peasantry and 'traditional' artisans, and allocating to these categories the virtues of 'national authenticity, sound health, morality and racial integrity against the pathologies of the 'dangerous' industrial classes'.<sup>761</sup> Subsequently, the second step of this strategy is the progressive displacement of 'the markers of dangerousness and heredity onto foreigners, and in particular immigrants and colonial subjects'. This displacement occurs just as the introduction of universal suffrage shifts the 'boundary lines between 'citizens' and 'subjects' to the frontiers of nationality'.

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p 121. To elaborate on a point raised by Hall, there is a strong analogy between Disraeli's validification of Carlyle and Thatcher's use of the refrain of a threatening flood of otherness set out by Powell a little more than a century later. I pursue this correlation in chapter five, pp.,

<sup>757</sup> Benjamin Disraeli, *Third Reading of the Reform Bill (1867)*, in Antoinette Burton, *ibid*, p 120.

<sup>758</sup> Benjamin Disraeli, 'Conservative and Liberal Principles', (1872), in Antoinette Burton, *ibid*, p 131.

<sup>759</sup> Benjamin Disraeli, *Sybil, or, the Two Nations*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998.

<sup>760</sup> Etienne Balibar, 'Class Racism', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, trans. Chris Turner, London, Verso, 1991, p 210

<sup>761</sup> Etienne Balibar, *op cit*.

The national-imperialist discourse is marked by an ambivalence, for as it works to incorporate the working class in the civilizing mission and thus elevate them as citizens against the figure of the racialised colonial or immigrant other, it is a discourse built upon the prior racialisation of the 'dark' and 'dangerous' classes whose republicanism – the mark of continental disorder, threatens the maintenance of England's traditional institutions and social order. Balibar observes that the rise of European theories of 'race' in the first half of the nineteenth century were a product of aristocratic insecurity, as elite groups sought forms of legitimation in the face of revolt from below. Marriott observes that for most Victorians 'race' described 'social rather than colour distinctions until the 1850s'.<sup>762</sup> In Britain, Huxley's social Darwinism was concurrent with the colonial rebellions in India and the West Indies that provided the moments for an intensification of the discursive formation of scientific racialism that privileged the 'supremacy' of the Anglo-Saxon race over the 'black' or 'nigger' races.<sup>763</sup> Yet, in the moment of the elites' extension of the franchise to the national worker there is an insufficient demarcation between this figure of good English stock and the contagiously backward and dangerous poor. In the discourse of national imperialism 'he' is valorized as white and yet this 'whiteness' is insecure as the lifeworld of the poor is socially reconstructed as 'black'.<sup>764</sup>

The status of the citizen-subject is fundamentally insecure as it is marked by a dangerous racialised hybridity that threatens the 'national' social body with the 'degeneracy' that is the antithesis of Progress. Where, within the discursive space of social Darwinism, the colonial subject is characterized by its degeneration from the ideal white race, the 'pathological condition' of the poor is thought of in terms of 'degeneration from the imperial race', and the poor, as an internal and invisible enemy, seem to pose the greater threat.<sup>765</sup> Yet, as the national citizen-worker, the 'docile body' that accepts its incorporation as 'free' labour, the status of this subject is valorized, as we have seen, within the national-imperialist discursive formation. This ambivalence tends to produce the 'self-racialisation of the working class', which is based, in turn, in the 'desire to escape from the condition of exploitation and the rejection of the contempt to which it is subject'. Here, manifest as xenophobia, when the working class 'project onto foreigners their fears and resentment, despair and defiance, it is not only that they are fighting competition; in addition, and much more profoundly, they are trying to escape their own exploitation'.<sup>766</sup> I want to suggest that the form of this disavowal revolves around the rejection of the hybrid status of the British subject *qua* colonial subject, as subject, that is to colonial

<sup>762</sup> Etienne Balibar, *ibid*, pp., 208-9; John Marriott, *ibid*, p 164.

<sup>763</sup> John Marriott, *op cit*.

<sup>764</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, p 165.

<sup>765</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, p 167; Kenan Malik, *The Meaning of Race: Race, History, and Culture in Western Society*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1996, p 111.

<sup>766</sup> Etienne Balibar, *ibid*, p 214

capitalism and thereby equivalent, or no better than the 'nigger'. As Balibar argues, what is being shown in the xenophobia of the working class is 'hatred of themselves, as proletarians – insofar as they are in danger of being drawn back into the mill of proletarianization'.<sup>767</sup> This fearful projection of class-based anxiety, moreover, animates the moralism of the lower middle class, which struggles to maintain its respectable escape from the working class condition.

The household franchise of 1867 represents, then, a moment of incorporation and depoliticization; the laboring subject is included within the sphere of liberal individualism in order to establish a 'one nation' strategy that works to depoliticize the revolutionary potential of working class resistance. The liberal subject *qua* free labour is constructed as autonomous, rational, and responsible. Free to pursue his own interests, and responsible for his part of the social contract as a citizen, he is also constructed as being responsible for his own 'failings'.<sup>768</sup> Poverty, when taken as a measure of that subject's failure, was represented as immorality, idleness, vice, and criminality within the pauperizing processes of industrialization and colonial capitalism. Situated between the liberal responsibility for his own self-making and the structural difficulty or impossibility of that achievement, the British colonial-capitalist subject is prone to anxieties, resentments, and rebellions. The national-popular discourse of national imperialism thus works to suture the citizen-subject within the ideology of Progress by drawing upon the ambiguous position of that subject at the borders of the axis of race-and-class, a dangerously hybrid location between 'whiteness' and 'blackness', 'citizenship' and subjection, recognition and abjection. National imperialism serves to displace the citizen-subject's anxieties and resentments onto the figure of its colonial or foreign other – the 'nigger' – which comes to represent the manifestation of the citizen's subjection. This 'dialectics of colonial modernity' forms the socio-political discursive terrain upon which the immigration regimes of the modern period were constructed, at times in relation to a politics of resentment, and it is to those constructions that we turn to in the following chapters.

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<sup>767</sup> Etienne Balibar, *op cit.*

<sup>768</sup> Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1995



## Chapter Four: Assimilation, Apartheid, and the 'Tradition of Tolerance'.

In the first three chapters this thesis mapped the emergent forms of the control and contestation of mobilities, and migration in particular, from the development of the articulated process of colonial-capitalism in the early seventeenth century.<sup>769</sup> In this period the emergence of the disciplinary governmentality, criminalising and racialising moral discourse directed at the nations' poor grew alongside the emergence of the colonial state-society complex. The international development of the British Empire was a process that was articulated to the modernisation of British society in the form of a dialectics of colonial-modernity. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century the successful form of the sovereign nation-state system was most evident in the British state-society structure and the form of its emergent public sphere and political institutions were dependent on the control – relative or absolute – granted to the capitalist classes over all of the major flows of mobility, including those of migration.

The British state-society complex's control of mobility was articulated around the privileged construction of a national citizen-subject, while this articulation was, in turn, dependent upon the construction, control, and disciplining of a range of subjects and non-citizens that were both internal and external to the nation. The success of the emergence of the liberal nation state as the dominant political form of the world system was dependant on the successful management of this liminal border space defining the citizen-subject and its others – those resistant populations, communities and movements that Linebaugh and Rediker refer to as the 'many-headed hydra'.<sup>770</sup> Here, within what the labour historian David Etlis describes as a sliding scale of subjectivities ranging from freedom at one end of the continuum to slavery at the other, hybrid resistant formations emerged seeking a measure of agency relative to the control of mobilities – those that were financial, temporal, territorial, and political - against the territorializing formation of modern governmentality and the project of making the good citizen-subject.

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<sup>769</sup> In chapter two, I gave an account of the pre-history of British internal displacement (from the 14<sup>th</sup> century). However, general the framework used throughout the thesis takes the early seventeenth century as the origins of colonial-capitalism.

<sup>770</sup> Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*, 2000.

This and the following chapter further the thesis's framework for the politics of contemporary immigration policy by mapping the formation of British immigration policy from the early period of colonial modernity, starting with the Aliens Act of 1793 through to the final 1981 restrictions on 'New Commonwealth' immigration and the instigation of formal British citizenship. The period under consideration is framed at the outset by the articulation of emergent forms of disciplining governmentality directed at pauperised mobility with the instigation of modern forms of national immigration legislation.<sup>771</sup> I argue, therefore, that the period during which the first Aliens Act was issued is crucial, in as much as it comes at the time of the shift from the *ancien regime* to new forms of discipline and governmentality described by Foucault, wherein the construction of what Etienne Balibar has described as the national worker<sup>772</sup> proceeded via the institutionalisation of national mobility regimes (including those of wage labour and its others – criminalisation and transportation from the social body) as well a new discourse of morality interpellating the good subject. This disciplined construction of the national citizen-subject occurred in tandem with the institutionalisation of the 'alien' as the other to the national subject, and cemented the place of the state as the policing body responsible for the maintenance of the border between alienage and subjecthood/citizenship.

The chapter's mapping of the development of immigration policy structures from the late eighteenth century is made in terms of the production of forms of assimilation and apartheid, where these terms are used to describe the dominant trope in which ethnicity and mobility, as well as territory and community, came to be thought of in Europe during the period described, both in terms of the episteme established, and in terms of the new forms of de-politicising governmentality. In this manner, the chapter will describe how the idea of liberal humanist tolerance was employed for the institution of a flexible regime in which the production of others took a bifocal form, viewing the constructed alien as either assimilable or as irrevocably alien and requiring measures of protection for the endangered social body.

In addition, the chapter will describe how the liberal episteme manifest in the strategies of assimilation and apartheid also structured the production of the institutional depoliticisation of its own *raison d'être*. The argument framed in these terms is supported by an account of the phases in which immigration and immigrants have been mobilised as a "problem." The chapter extends the paradigm set out in chapter two by situating immigration policy formation within a concept of the control of mobility and within a bordering that is simultaneously infra, inter, and transnational. In doing so it

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<sup>771</sup> This articulation is dealt with in chapter two.

<sup>772</sup> Etienne Balibar, 'Citizenship without Pre-existing Community', Public lecture given at Bard College on March 19<sup>th</sup> 2001, available at [www.bard.edu/hrp/citizencommunitybalibar2001.htm](http://www.bard.edu/hrp/citizencommunitybalibar2001.htm)

highlights the institutionalisation - the structures of control that were built, maintained, and contested - the social groups involved, and the discourse fields that control came to be articulated with.

#### **Section 4.1. The 'tolerant' construction of the British national community.**

Immigration is often cited as a threat to perceived communities, those that are or have been imagined, constructed, and inhabited at the local, national, and regional levels. Recourse to the imagined threat to local communities and the national community has been a cultural and political tendency throughout the period of colonial-modernity, one that has been heightened in Britain and throughout Europe after the end of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War, and recently under the forms of globalisation that encourage increased mobility. Drawing from the framework of the politics of migration that I have been elaborating from the work of Balibar (whose work draws upon that of Wallerstein), Foucault and Gramsci, I want in this chapter and the following chapter to present a brief genealogy of modern British immigration policy formation, focussing on the key periods in which immigration has been framed as a national "problem."

Before I begin to present an account that commences in the late eighteenth century I will briefly refer to the manner in which the history of Britain's modern immigration policy has been framed in terms of political discourse. There is a tradition, or rather a series of discontinuous traditions of tolerance in Britain towards those seeking refuge, or the right of entry and settlement, that has often been drawn upon in political and parliamentary discourse. The discourse of tolerance has served as an element of the governmental legitimisation of the British state as the embodiment of liberalism – the practice of statecraft that we have discussed in terms of British colonialism and the biopolitical constitution of proper and improper populations (those subject populations constituted as capable of self-governance, and those requiring disciplinary, bio-political and sovereign techniques of liberal governance). This discursive formation has been particularly evident in political discourse relating to immigration and asylum from the late 1980's onwards, and has often been invoked as a means of prefacing arguments made for immigration restrictions. Politicians frequently refer to the 'United Kingdom's honourable tradition in providing a safe haven for those fleeing persecution'.<sup>773</sup> The political discourse that constructs a tradition of British hospitality is sometimes drawn in the manner of a *longue duree* framework, and sometimes refers more specifically to the terms of the post-war 'race-relations paradigm' (see following chapter). In the first of these, politicians refer to a continuum of British

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<sup>773</sup> Michael Howard, Hansard, HC, Col. 542, February 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1996. See also similar parliamentary statements by members of the Labour, Conservative, and Liberal Democrat parties, Hansard HC, Cols., 699, 758, 763, 765, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995; Hansard HC Cols., 426, 434, 463, April 12<sup>th</sup>, 2000; Hansard HC, Col. 407, April 24<sup>th</sup>, 2002; Hansard HC, Col. 1671, December 13<sup>th</sup>, 2003.



hospitality, as did the Conservative member James Couchman, when he referred to 'this country's generous welcome to people who have come to the United Kingdom to escape persecution--from the Huguenots to the Jews and the Ugandan Asians.'<sup>774</sup> In the second case, politicians sometimes frame their terms of address in relation to an assumed popular fear of immigrants, as did David Lammy in stating that 'while responding in a way that does not dismiss such fears as ignorant or racist, we must remain true to the principles of fairness and tolerance for which this country is famous'.<sup>775</sup>

This account will differ from the predominantly political discourse that draws upon the 'tradition of liberal tolerance' in British migration policy, chiefly because it frames policy formation within a broader conception of the legacy of the liberal *and* colonial capitalist control of mobility.<sup>776</sup> Governmental and political discourse has drawn upon the tradition of liberalism to legitimate practices of statecraft and, in particular, the state's immigration policies,<sup>777</sup> and the present Labour government uses it as a context in which to place its own 'firm but fair' approach to asylum seekers.<sup>778</sup> The tradition of tolerance is based upon the idea that British society has had an intrinsic tendency towards hospitality, and that tolerant hospitality found its best expression in the rise of liberalism in Britain, rather than in the political systems of European or American political systems.<sup>779</sup> These claims, as we shall see, were prevalent in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. In the twentieth as in the preceding centuries, the idea of British tolerance has been articulated to the idea of the liberal role of Britain in the world. Margaret Thatcher's much-quoted statement of 1978 is relevant here in terms of the liberal legacy that the Conservative leader sought to invoke. Thatcher stated that 'the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react, and be rather hostile to those coming in'.<sup>780</sup> In constructing a British threshold of tolerance, Thatcher represents the history of Britain's role in the world as an extension of law and democracy, two of the key tenets of liberalism, in as much as law (and particularly property law) provides the negative liberty that grounds the democratic sphere of civil society, wherein the paradigm of tolerance comes into play (see chapter six). Without repeating the arguments given in the previous chapters, it's useful to reiterate, at this point, that the extension of British liberalism in terms of the combination of mercantilist, militant, and *laissez faire* regimes of

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<sup>774</sup> James Callaghan, Hansard, HC, Col. 763, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995.

<sup>775</sup> David Lammy, Hansard, HC, Col. 407, April 24<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

<sup>776</sup> Liza Schuster observes that the tolerant image of Britain has been frequently refuted in (predominantly) legal and historical accounts relating to refugees. See Liza Schuster, *The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany*, London, Frank Cass, 2003, p 174.

<sup>777</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies: Statecraft, Desire, and the Politics of Exclusion*, Routledge, London, 2003, pp 54-57.

<sup>778</sup> See, for example, Home Office White Paper, *Fairer, Faster, and Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum*, 1998

<sup>779</sup> See below.

<sup>780</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *World in Action*, interview, January 30<sup>th</sup>, 1978.

formal and informal colonial capitalism produced forms of pauperisation and the forced and coerced mobility and stasis of Irish, Indian, African, and poor British subjects. In doing so, these processes constituted an abject sphere of proletarianization along the axis of race-and-class. The citizen-subject as national worker came to be constituted as both 'good British stock' and as the autonomous liberal subject to the degree that his disciplined docility enabled the colonial capitalist regimes of mobility (those of finance, commerce, and labour). Thus the toleration extended to 'others' was prefigured by the degree to which tolerance was already defined by the limits set by the dynamics of colonial capitalism.

As a *liberal* tolerance it is understood that the extent to which tolerance can or should be extended must be framed by an understanding of the liberal paradox where political liberalism is found to conflict with economic liberalism. Political liberalism, *qua* the tendency towards tolerance is understood to be limited by the possibilities of the liberal economy. Economic liberalism, including the tendency towards freedom of mobility, is understood, on the other hand, to be limited by the 'realities' of liberal politics. In the first case hospitality might be desirable but its provision may exceed the costs valued as affordable to the national community. This may occur where welfare benefits belonging to the community of citizens are seen to be 'overstretched' by being extended to 'foreigners'. In the second case, sufficient provisions for the supply of hospitality may exist but their provision be viewed as a deprivation of the rights of the socio-political community. This may occur where immigration is perceived to contribute to wage depression, and thus disenfranchise the host community of national workers (or segments thereof). In practice, as we shall see in the following account of the policy formation in the twentieth century the two liberal limitations tended to coalesce around the idea of a homogenous national community (an 'imagined community' beyond resistance), and the openness and closures of political and economic liberalism are better thought of as working in terms of a continuum, rather than in the form of a paradox.

The 'tolerant' tradition reaching back to the welcome extended to the Huguenot *refugies* in the seventeenth century<sup>781</sup> (giving, from the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes the first truly mass refugee event in Europe<sup>782</sup>), is supposed to have reached its full height in the *laissez faire* period of British liberal industrial supremacy in the nineteenth century before it met its disjunctive break in the

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<sup>781</sup> Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and the Lessons of History', *Race and Class*, Vol. 44(2), 2002, p45. Schuster notes that 'the benefits derived from granting asylum to the Huguenots have proved lasting, since this event is still cited as proof of Britain's liberal asylum tradition'.

<sup>782</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft*, London and Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p 59. Soguk continues to write that 'what differentiated the Huguenot case from earlier experiences of displacement, some of which were called refugee events as well, was that it came to be associated with the introduction of the term *refugee* into the English vernacular, a development that traditionally marks the beginning of the recorded history of the refugee phenomenon in European histories.'

modern shift to restriction beginning with the 1905 Aliens Act. As Dallal Stevens has noted, the 19<sup>th</sup> century period saw the diminished use and then revocation of Aliens legislation as well as the granting of asylum and the (positively-framed) politicisation of that grant to (relatively) small numbers of refugees throughout that century.<sup>783</sup> In describing the socio-political climate of the 19<sup>th</sup> century liberal asylum policies, Stevens cites the words of the Russian refugee, Alexander Herzen, who wrote in his autobiography that 'the Englishman has no special love for foreigners, still less for exiles, whom he regards as guilty of poverty, a vice he does not forgive – but he clings to his right of asylum', while 'England' was a country 'that did not conceal that it maintained its right of asylum for the sake of its own self-respect, and not for the sake of those who sought it'.<sup>784</sup>

The 'Orsini Affair'<sup>785</sup> was to demonstrate the importance of the tolerant self that had been constructed in the *laissez faire* period of the British state-society complex. On January 14<sup>th</sup>, 1858, the conspirators Orsini and Pierri had attempted to take the life of Napoleon III, and the explosion of the bomb they had set off in the Rue Lepelletier had killed or maimed a number of Parisians.<sup>786</sup> Prior to the attempted assassination, Orsini and Pierri had resided in Britain, having assembled their bomb in Birmingham. The French government, which had resisted, up until this point, the pressure that Austria and Prussia had brought to bear towards a direct (and probably military) confrontation with the British whose protection of political refugees threatened their states, laid their vehement protest before the British government.<sup>787</sup> In this conflict a political contest began in Britain, between those parties who saw a need to placate the French, and those who saw any such conciliation as a transgression of the policy of *non-refoulement* and an abrogation of the British reputation for liberal tolerance. The political contest produced by the Orsini affair revolved around the compromise that the government attempted in the Conspiracy to Murder Bill (1858), which – in increasing the sentence that could be imposed for conspiracy - had the appearance of responding to the French demand for action without, as Palmerston was keen to point out, providing for expulsion and therefore constituting a new Aliens Bill.<sup>788</sup> Subsequently, in supporting an opposition amendment to the Bill, 135 members of the government crossed the floor, and the government was propelled into resignation.<sup>789</sup>

<sup>783</sup> Dallal Stevens, *UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Thompson, Sweet, and Maxwell, 2004, pp., 23-32.

<sup>784</sup> Alexander Herzen, *My Past and Thoughts – The Memoirs of Alexander Herzon*, Vol. III, Chatto and Windus, London, pp., 1112, 1052. In Dallal Stevens, *op cit.*, pp., 26-27.

<sup>785</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, pp., 28-30. I follow Stevens' historical account throughout.

<sup>786</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, p 28.

<sup>787</sup> Dallal Stevens, *op cit.*

<sup>788</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, p 29.

<sup>789</sup> Dallal Stevens, *op cit.*

If, during the height of liberalism, the right to offer asylum could cause the collapse of the government of the day (even if it were contingently dependent on Anglo-European *realpolitik*), later, the positive image of the British self given in the granting of asylum came to be invoked by drawing upon the refuge given to Jewish children from the Holocaust in the form of the *Kindertransport* (1938-40), citing the welcome given to the Caribbean immigrants of the Empire Windrush (1948), or by taking pride in the rescue of Commonwealth subjects in the Ugandan Asian's Crisis (1972). *In and of themselves* each of these events speaks, to an extent, of a liberal spirit of hospitality and, generally speaking, the tradition of tolerance is sometimes claimed to be (ultimately) responsible for the multicultural state of Britain today. However, it should be emphasised that the high-point of the period of British tolerance falls, in historical terms, *between* the 'Huguenot episode' which Michael Marrus described as 'the last mass displacements in the form of Absolutist European ethnic cleansing' and the contemporary state-structured and ethno-national refugee flows of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries'.<sup>790</sup> Thus despite the heavy symbolic weight of the fall of Palmerston's government, and later, the *Kindertransport* and other such humanitarian acts, tolerant hospitality has thus been most evident in periods when the demand for refuge was in relative abeyance, or in the leniency with which the restrictions of the various Aliens Acts came to be practiced.<sup>791</sup>

The constitutional historian Erskine May summarised the tradition of tolerance where he wrote that:

*It had been a proud tradition for England to afford an inviolable asylum to men of every rank and condition, seeking refuge on her shores, from persecution and danger in their own lands ... Through civil wars and revolutions, a disputed succession and treasonable plots against the State, no foreigner has been disturbed. If guilty of crimes they were punished: but otherwise enjoyed the full protection of the law.*<sup>792</sup>

The tradition of tolerance attempts the reconciliation of economic and political liberalism so that it appears that there is and has been no contradiction between the practice of national self-interest and humanitarian concern for the other. The general sense of tolerance being invoked as a continuous tradition might also encompass the large scale 'laissez faire' Irish immigration of this period, as well as the asylum granted individual, predominately bourgeois political refugees (including Karl Marx, Giuseppe Mazzini, and Sun Yat Sen). There are problems with any uncritical use of the idea of tolerance, and more specifically, the idea of liberal tolerance as the framing for the reception of Irish

<sup>790</sup> Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p 51. See Chapters 1 and 2.

<sup>791</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, 1999, pp 92-94.

<sup>792</sup> Paul Foot, *Immigration and Race in British Politics*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1965.

immigrants and asylum seekers during this period. The actual tradition of the British state's treatment and reception of refugees, like the treatment of the pauperised colonial subject was more securely rooted in *realpolitik* than what was to become known as humanitarian concern.

The extent to which the early history of British asylum policy formation has been marked by political expediency is clear in Liza Schuster's summary of British practice:

*By the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Britain's asylum practice was a source of irritation to other states. Its reluctance to co-operate with foreign states seeking to extradite criminals, especially those accused of 'political' crimes, and to concern itself solely with what occurred on its territory, was seen as undermining the authority of those states within their territories. The guiding principle of English law was, and remains territoriality ... 'territorial' asylum continued to bring in new and valuable additions, in particular to the merchant and artisan classes. There was no authority that could force England to extradite a fugitive, and its island status rendered it separate physically as well as politically from other states. It had nothing to gain by expending time, effort or money hunting down foreigners for crimes they had not committed against English subjects or the Crown. It was of no concern what those persons had done in other territories.*<sup>793</sup>

Quick to make the claim that its non-prosecution of immigrants seeking asylum from European countries was liberal, the British state, on the other hand, was quick to protest against the violation of its own security when asylum was offered to any political (or 'criminal' in British terms) refugee in Europe. Thus, for example, I would argue that just as mid-nineteenth century continental powers came to suspect that the British state was prepared to use the protection of asylum as a means of liberalising Europe (and thus dethroning them), the British government enacted, in 1848, an Aliens Act whose *raison d'être* was, like the later Act of 1871, the threat of revolution in Britain. In the period following the cessation of the Anglo-French conflicts that had followed on from the French Revolution, Britain gave asylum to refugees from European countries including Italy, France, Germany, Poland and Spain. In doing so it was able to portray the virtue of its own liberalism and to characterise its European rivals as despotic, just as members of the Western European and United States alliance were to do in the ideological battle mobilising refugee law in the Cold War.

The ideological work performed by the British advocacy of the 'universal' protection offered to refugees in asylum was to articulate the idea of free trade and movement considered to be essential to economic liberalism, to the rights-based humanism that had developed, in Britain, in the form of the

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<sup>793</sup> Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and the Lessons of History', *Race and Class*, Vol. 44(2), 2002, p 46.

freedom of the individual belonging to political liberalism. The incipient asylum regime thus came to serve the capitalist form of the British state-society structure,<sup>794</sup> just as the first and subsequent Aliens Acts had been enacted to protect a particular socio-political structure in the name of the nation. The ideological use made of the rights-based discourse became harder to maintain after the 1848 Revolutions for Britain joined the other European states that perceived themselves to be at threat in demanding the repatriation of its own political criminals (those immigrants seeking asylum as political refugees), while at the same time it became apparent that the category of the 'refugee' had really only ever been extended to those immigrants considered to be politically persecuted rather than to those considered to have had a claim to asylum based upon their humanity.

The idea that the use of asylum was motivated by interests of state whilst being presented as the manifestation of liberal tolerance should be used to inform the way in which the British reception of Irish immigrants required – at least until the 1890's – as a supply of industrial labour augmenting the colonial and transported outflows. The idea of tolerance offered to Irish immigrants can be problematised by referring to the colonial context in which the immigration took place so that the liberalism of such tolerance looks somewhat tarnished once the *forced* and *coerced* nature of the migration becomes apparent (see chapter two). Irish immigrants may have been tolerated in Britain to the degree to which their labour was welcome, but their poverty was criminalised during this period, and their welcome extended only as far as they were considered to be assimilable (that, is to say, to the extent to which they left behind their 'Irishness', when any tendency towards poverty or resistance was treated as evidence of an immigrant's ethnicity).<sup>795</sup>

If the treatment of Irish immigrants is related to the tradition of liberal tolerance, then the articulation of ethnicity and poverty enacted in the pauperisation of immigrants (including the colonising pauperisation of Irish subjects prior to their becoming forced politico-economic emigrants) needs to be included in the definition of that tradition which seeks to invisibly privilege the 'benevolent' position of the imaginary host. Within this privileging, the idea of tolerance being used in this 'tradition' constructs a 'we' that *owns the right* to the extension of, or the withdrawal of hospitality.<sup>796</sup> Liberal tolerance casts the nation and the national people as the benevolent property holder extending charity to the misfallen. The benevolent paternalism that marked the extension of British liberal tolerance served to reinforce notions of European racial superiority that helped to define British national identity

<sup>794</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2002, p 49.

<sup>795</sup> See for example, the discursive framing of Irish immigrants given in Patty Sedelski's analysis, *ibid*.

<sup>796</sup> See Ghassah Hage's reading of Locke's concept of tolerance; Ghassan Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society*, Annandale, N.S.W, Australia, Pluto Press, and West Wickham, Kent, Comerford and Miller, 1998, p 86; cf., John Locke, 'A letter concerning toleration', *Letters on Toleration*, Byculla, Education Society Press, 1689 (1687 ed.)

in the nineteenth century. At the same time, that ethno-national liberalism was overdetermined by the class hierarchies of the British capitalist state-society complex. Irish immigrants, like British subjects, were apprehended through the discourse of pauperisation, and the mobilisation of this discourse at the borders of the nation-state redirects the episteme governing the construction of citizenship towards the status of subjectivity, and away from its grounding in the discourse of civil liberties and rights. Pauperism, like racial difference, presented a limit to the threshold of tolerance.

Similarly, where the tradition of tolerance has been based on the nineteenth century *laissez faire* period in which gentlemen and ladies were not required to carry passports for travel, the abdication of the bureaucratic inconvenience of 'papers' was only ever a privilege extended to the upper and emergent middle classes while colonial subjects such as the Indian workers brought in to work in British-controlled Egypt were subject to heavily disciplined forms of mobility control.<sup>797</sup> Immigrants seeking asylum tended to be welcomed on the basis of their being of the proper class and under conditions in which they did not arrive in significant numbers. As the account below will indicate in terms of the British state's immigration policies throughout the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, the claim to the tradition of tolerance can only be achieved by isolating it from other forms of mobility control within this period, by mistaking the colonial, modernising and geopolitical practices leading to immigration for the discourse of liberalism in which the tradition was couched, and finally, by mistaking violence for benevolence and the right to provide charity.

## **Section 4.2. The emergence of modern forms of institutional control.**

The institutionalisation of immigration controls started from a point far removed from the tradition of tolerance, in the occurrence of two events of great precedence. In the first of these the Home Office was founded in 1782; eleven years prior to Parliament's passing of the second initiating event, the first Aliens Act, which was formed as a reaction to revolutionary developments in France, and sanctioned expulsion and capital punishment for returning expellees. This Aliens Act of 1793<sup>798</sup> 'invested the government with the authority to prevent further entry into England and/or to expel any alien from England',<sup>799</sup> and should be regarded as an initial precedent for modern immigration policy formation, even though the precedents given in the later Act of 1905 were broader and more substantial.

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<sup>797</sup> Mark B. Salter, *Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp., 22-3.

<sup>798</sup> The Aliens Act (1793) was titled 'An Act for Establishing Regulations respecting Arriving in This Kingdom, or Residents Therein in Certain Cases'.

<sup>799</sup> Bernard Porter, *The Refugee Question in Mid-Victorian Britain*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p3, and Panikos Panyani, *Immigration, Ethnicity, and Racism in Britain, 1815-1945*, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1994, p 21.



The first sense in which the Act of 1793 was precedent-forming lies in the manner in which it emerged as part of the new institutional structures of British state governance. The Home Office began its life as an institution designed to maintain the state's security, internally initially, and then externally in so far as the external realm affected domestic interests. The role of the Home Office was one of both bordering and policing the expansion of that state of citizen's subjecthood that Balibar describes in the French context as the intensive universalism that was to become a hallmark of the emergent welfare-state of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Its corollaries were the Commonwealth Department and the Foreign Office, whose regimes, working in combination with the offices of international entities such as the East India Company and financial institutions such as the Bank of England, covered the governance of extensive universalism beyond the borders of the nation-state.

Immigration policy formation developed, in part, out of a concern for state security at the international and infra national level. That these extra-and-infra-national conflicts were linked in the eyes of the ruling elite throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century can be seen in the attitude of William Pitt the Younger towards war with France: as Linda Colley notes, for Pitt, war with France 'represented a desperate struggle to defend rank, and above all, property against the 'example of successful pillage' set by the revolutionaries of 1789'.<sup>800</sup> The Aliens Act of 1793 was passed in order to restrict the entry of foreigners who might collude with revolutionary British subjects, and was enacted at the same time as a raft of measures designed to 'restrict the liberties of subjects in various ways'.<sup>801</sup> The milieu of inter-state conflict – in particular, the Napoleonic Wars with France (1793-1815) – and civil conflict, guaranteed that the executive in general and the Home Office in particular developed a jurisdiction over immigration policy. This new state institution developed at a time when the role of the executive was growing increasingly important, having had its franchise on governmentality increased during the war, while generally maintaining the new powers vested in it after the initial *raison d'être* of national security lost its apparent extensive necessity.

Migration policy in the period of colonial modernity and the development, expansion, and maintenance of the British Empire consisted of the management of controlled migrations that were infra and international. While pauperised, ethnicised and politicized migrations were controlled within or at the borders of the British nation state, colonization involved the forced movements of 'non-subjects' throughout the British Empire. Different governmentalities and discourses were directed at the movements of subjects and 'non-subjects', yet the demarcations or borders between the

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<sup>800</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid.*, 1992, p 150.

<sup>801</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1990, p 83.

governmentalities and discourses were uncomfortably hybrid. As I argued in the previous chapters, the infranational diaspora threatened the imagined community of the British state, and was held to hold many of the threatening qualities that belonged to colonial non-subjects; class subjects were positioned as being similar to colonial others and subsequently developed or resisted the construction of 'self-racialisation',<sup>802</sup> while the movements of labour worked on a spectrum from 'free labour' to slavery. Indentured or militarised free labour, like criminalised convict labour, was part of the forced migration of people, just as the more oppressive regime of slavery was a form of forced migration.

Having been institutionalised under a regime governed by the *raison d'être* of hegemonic security, British migration policy can be seen to have kept in step with the construction of a hegemonic national identity, which contained the articulation of being white, male, middle-class, and Protestant. British national identity formation, as I observed in the previous chapter, has worked through a process of negativity, being defined by its construction of a series of others that came to fill the place of *the other* through contingent historical processes. Thus, for example, the intensive rights of the "free-born Briton" and the corresponding emergence of a national public sphere with its delineation of the 'political' positioning of Whig and Tory emerged against both intensive and extensive tendencies of othering. In this first phase, while for immigration policy formation the extensive "other" was French, Catholic, or revolutionary, the conditions of that unrest were to be found in the global conflict with Britain that "undermined the French state and thrust the country into a series of unmanageable crises."<sup>803</sup> The Aliens Acts of 1793 and 1803, as well as the Removal of Aliens Act of 1848 falling after the French Revolution and the events of the Paris Commune were all aimed at restricting the mobility of this other. As Colin Gordon writes of the latter period, '1848 and 1871 made spectacularly evident to an anxious bourgeoisie the danger represented by the indiscipline, the asocial autonomy, of the pauperised urban masses'.<sup>804</sup> This extensive other threatened the British social body with the contagion of mass discontent in the form of the internal other, the *mobile vulgate*. The *raison d'être* of this series of legislative acts should be considered to have been intensive before being extensive, its real object being domestic, as the migration it sought protection from was more political than actual.

The "problem" that the Aliens Act of 1793 sought to address was, above and beyond the presence in Britain of an émigré 'Fifth Column', the political threat posed to the state by the *mobility* of its own infranational, pauperised diaspora, and it did so amongst the array of new domestic forms of discipline and governance that worked to wrest the control of mobilities away from their locus in labour-power.

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<sup>802</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 2003. ,

<sup>803</sup> "French History: A Drama, Not a Balance Sheet". Review, *The Economist*. Nov 2<sup>nd</sup>. 2002.

<sup>804</sup> Colin Gordon, 'Governmental Rationality: an Introduction', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.

Bringing immigration within the jurisdiction of the newly created 'Home' Office worked to create a new articulation of the foreigner as threat and the subject-as-foreigner, in which 'foreign-ness' alienated or necessitated the alienation of British subjects. Infranational resistance amongst the British diaspora could thus be framed as threatening a potentially foreign treason to the national social body and the logic of transporting felons (who had, predominantly, transgressed the property code) fitted this logic that sought to create and locate the (alien) other against which the proper British self – the citizen-subject could see itself to have been made.

The precedent set out in the 1793 Aliens Act can be thought of in terms of the institutionalisation of a particular form of legitimating practice. In his study of the place of the figure of the refugee in the formation and reformation of modern states, Nevzat Soguk refers to the problematisation of the refugee as an essential tool of modern statecraft.<sup>805</sup> As I observed in the introduction, the work of the practice of problematisation is transformative, as it acts upon and establishes the ground or conditions within which a problem is to be defined, and – in a supplementary relationship to the contextualising discourse, institutionalises the practices that address the 'problem' that has been 'identified'. Problematising refugees, according to Soguk, renders the refugee an 'affirmative resource for statist practice'.<sup>806</sup> In the Foucaultian analysis that Soguk employs, refugee problematisations working as strategies of statecraft occur in activities that (a) *incite* a popular and institutional discourse on refugees, (b) *statize*, that is inscribe and represent the refugee event as a specific problem of and before the sovereign state, and (c) *regiment*, namely, *formulate* and *channel* imaginable statist solutions to the refugee problem in reply. Because, here, the relationship between the discursive field established, and the assemblage of policies or regulations amounting to a governmentality come to work in reciprocity, it cannot validly be claimed, thereafter, that the one is the cause of the other.

Following Soguk's analysis of the modern figuring of the refugee, we can say that the problematisation evident in the Aliens Act of 1793 fixing the citizen-subject against its internal and external others works as an instance of modern statecraft utilising techniques combining discourse, governmentality and the bio-political disciplining of subjects by institutionalising the boundaries of its otherness. The institutional framework for this and subsequent problematisations of what Ranciere calls matters of 'policing' was given in the structure of the *Home Office*.<sup>807</sup> Taken together then, we can say that the Aliens Act and the instigation of the Home Office in the last decade of the eighteenth century represented a consolidation of the state in the form of its capacity for policing the boundaries of the

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<sup>805</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, pp 16-18 and *passim*.

<sup>806</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *op cit*, p 16.

<sup>807</sup> Jacques Ranciere, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*, trans. Julie Rose, Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press, 1999; see chp 2.

(national) social body, and for depoliticising resistances in the form of the politicising of national ethnicity, even as the Act reacted to the dangers implicit in the articulation of citizenship to nationality and the nation-state in France.<sup>808</sup>

### Section 4.3. The Assimilation of Colonial Paupers.

While the first phase of 'problematising' immigration policy had the governance of pauperised *infranational* migrants as its object, the second phase was marked by the creation and criminalisation of an *international* class of immigrant paupers. As I established in chapter two, a colonising and modernising Britain dealt with the problems of internal displacement, including the exponential growth of pauperised metropolitan migration, through a combination of strategies that were both feudal and modern, *infra* and *international*. Charitable action, parish based Poor Laws, Vagrancy laws, and the Act of Settlement were pre-modern arrangements that grew out of a relatively static and face-to-face social environment. Voluntary emigration, military impressments and the criminalisation of the displaced poor combined with the Georgian Riot Act (1715), Transportation Act (1719), Combination Act (1721), Workhouse and Black Acts (1723), and other social and labour legislation to address the problem of domestic mass unrest that the pauperised *infranational* diaspora produced.<sup>809</sup>

The demand for Irish immigration occurred as part of the conflict between industrial and capitalist/aristocratic landed factions within the prevailing historical block. Industrialists seeking the availability of a mobile and casual pool of working labour had their access restricted by the controls placed on pauperised mobility by the acts of poor relief and settlement that favoured the landed interests desire for labour-stasis. With a reduced British workforce to turn to this sector was grateful for the inflow of pauperised Irish immigrants. Capitalist interests were divided over the issue, tending to favour the restrictions on labour movement while requiring its often-criminalised form for their colonial endeavours. Whilst metropolitan financial interests provided the capital for much of the growth of regional industrialisation, their members tended to form political alliances with the landed gentry that, similarly, had a definite interest in colonial endeavour.

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<sup>808</sup> Nevzat Soguk refers to Rogers Brubaker's argument in which he links the invention of the nation state to the institution of national citizenship through the French Revolution. Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 71, Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992. The process of defining the national 'inside' via the foreign outside proceeded somewhat differently in France. Soguk writes that while, in 1790, during the universalist-cosmopolitan period of the Revolution, the revolutionaries abolished altogether the already vitiated, ineffectual foreigner law, contending that the law of the foreigner was against the principle of fraternity uniting all men and that ... foreigners ... should 'be placed in a position of equality with the national community', 'when the Revolution turned more particularist in 1792 at the climax of the émigré movement, the foreigners ...came to signify ... the 'others' who might be the enemy within, perhaps in collusion with the enemy without', p 79.

<sup>809</sup> Peter Linebaugh, *ibid*, pp., 17-19

Governmentality during this period can thus be seen to have been a complex of both intensive and extensive practices whose borders were national, and then nationalist at the infra and international levels. At the nationalist infra-national level, parishes bore and sought to ameliorate the burden of pauperised immigrants, and Irish immigrants in particular. The Poor Laws required them to support "genuinely" destitute residents from Parish funds. Vagrancy Acts allowed parishes to arrest those deemed unwilling to support themselves, and the Act of Settlement allowed parishes to return vagrants to their "home" parish at that parish's expense. Neither the Vagrancy nor Settlement Acts helped parishes in dealing with Irish paupers, for the first required the maintenance of imprisonment, while the latter could not be used as Ireland did not yet have a Poor Law of its own, and despite the Union, English law didn't extend to Irish parishes.

The recession following the Napoleonic wars saw the problem of vagrancy increase drastically, as did the pressure for the reform of the Poor Laws. By the late eighteenth century parishes that felt themselves particularly burdened sought to have the burden of Irish "vagrancy" borne at the county level. Reform became a matter of contestation, for too liberal a reform could have created a situation in which the parishes' ability to exclude migrants from the rights of settlement would have been reneged. The vestrymen of the parish of St. Giles took a lead in opposing liberal amendments to the Laws of Settlement, and in encouraging moves to facilitate the removal of Irish immigrants. Their success was manifest in the provisions of Geo. III, cap. 12 (1828), which legislated that immigrants could be repatriated without the conviction on charges of vagrancy, and that removals would be enacted at the expense of the county.

The removal of the burden of immigrant pauperisation from the parish to the council level broadened the level of attention given to the intensifying problem. By the 1830's politicians had begun to address the problem of Irish poverty, and to discuss the possibility of an Irish Poor Law, or of the extension of England's new Poor Law to Ireland. A political consensus evolved around an analogy between the burden that had been placed on the parishes and the burden that would be placed upon the nation. The effect of this consensus was that, despite the existence of the Union, there could be no question of dealing with Irish poverty as if it were a national problem: The Irish were British subjects, but did not own the substantive rights of English "citizens." The introduction of an Irish Poor Law in 1838 was riven by contradiction, and did little to alleviate the crisis, and its extension in 1847 made assistance (in the form of famine relief) available to peasant farmer only on the condition that they relinquish their tenures. The support offered was substantially weak (and abusive) when compared to the opportunities that emigration continued to provide, and it made no provision for immigrant settlement in England.

As a result of the broader frame of English policies towards Ireland including the management of the inter-relationship of the different flows of mobilities, while Irish immigrant poverty continued to be criminalized, and immigrants continued to be regarded as a morally inferior "race," the level of migration continued unabated and Irish labour continued to supply a cheap supplement to the needs of English industry and commerce. Self-sufficient Irish immigrants were assimilated into English society, while the immigrants who had become pauperised as a result of colonisation and modernisation were submitted to a form of apartheid, in which the English sought to return them to unsustainable communities.<sup>810</sup> In these processes both Irish immigrants and Ireland itself was criminalized and ethnicised. Thus, as I noted in chapter two (section 2.2), where British liberalism can be seen to have been in effect during this period, economic and political liberalism were articulated forms whose operation was relayed through the figure of the 'criminally' ethnic other.

#### Section 4.4. Criminalising the 'Non-assimilatable Jew'.

The third phase of problematising immigration policy formation in the modern period saw the institution of a regime governing categories of 'undesirable' immigration, and the events of this period further diminish the legitimacy of the tolerant tradition of offering asylum to political refugees. Russian and other Eastern European Jewish immigrants fleeing pogroms arrived at rates of between 2,500 and 7,000 immigrants per year from 1880 until after 1900. Steve Cohen estimates that seven hundred thousand Jews may have fled the organised anti-Semitism in Russia, with the major movement occurring after the May Laws of 1882 which confined Jews to the Pale of Settlement, while in overall terms Marrus writes that 2.5 million Jews were displaced from Russia and Eastern Europe from the beginning of the 1880s until the First World War.<sup>811</sup> These new immigrants differed from the established Jewish presence in Britain, and London in particular and also differed from previous refugee flows in that they migrated to a country that was, from 1880 onwards, experiencing a period of relative industrial decline. In comparison to the previous and ongoing flow of Irish immigrants, the Eastern European flow occurred in a period in which there was less demand for unskilled or low-skilled labour.

Throughout the last decades of the nineteenth century, British trade unions capitulated to growing public anti-Semitism, and helped to legitimate the discourse of the threatening immigrant. The official trade union movement repeatedly blamed immigrant workers for the growing levels of unemployment within the British economy and from 1892 onwards the Trade Union Council called for a complete halt

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<sup>810</sup> Christine Kinealy, *ibid*, pp., 336-41.

<sup>811</sup> Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

to immigration. Meanwhile in London Ben Tillett, the Dockers' leader told migrant workers, 'Yes, you are our brothers, and we will do our duty by you. But we wish you had not come'.<sup>10</sup>

The predominantly middle class Anglo-Jewish resident population of this period had adopted an assimilationist position, both as a strategy deflecting racism, and as the internalisation of the racist belief in the superiority of European over Eastern culture. The new immigrants differed from the relatively wealthy and assimilated Anglo - Jews in that they were both pauperised and presented as "Asiatic." Their presence was mobilised as a doubling of the racist figure of the Jew as a diasporic threat to the nation; in addition to the figure of "Shylock", the representative of the transnational capitalist class that appeared to disfigure the rights of the ordinary national worker, there now emerged a (revolutionary) class of expropriators from below.<sup>812</sup> Both figures were visible in their religio-ethnic "criminality."

The British middle class toleration of Anglo-Jews had depended on their willingness to conform to liberal standards.<sup>813</sup> The new and pauperised refugee immigration presented the Anglo-Jews with a crisis. Accordingly, they de-emphasised their religious observances, and sought to contain the poverty associated with the new Eastern European immigrants. To a significant extent they came to blame the new immigrants' failure to assimilate as the cause for the rising intolerance towards Jews and, where possible, they assisted the transfer of refugees to the United States and other countries.

The actions of the anti-Semitic British Brothers' League, sections of the press, trade unionists, and members of Parliament representing working class constituencies transformed the immigration of this period into a public concern over the issues of over-crowded housing (and sanitation), and wage and employment competition. While a parliamentary select committee had been appointed as early as 1888 as a response to a sustained public criticism of the new immigration, it was primarily the agitation of the British Brother's League that led, in the xenophobic aftermath of the Boer War (1898-1902), to the government's acquiescence to a Royal Commission on Aliens.<sup>814</sup> The majority of testimonial evidence presented to the commission focussed on conditions in the East End slums to which many immigrants had gravitated and "supported the view that immigrants were particularly criminal practitioners of vice

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<sup>812</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 99. Dummett and Nicol write 'Jews came to be associated simultaneously with international capitalism and international revolution'. Robin Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, Longman, London and New York, 1994. Cohen writes that 'According to the *Manchester City News* (2 April 1887), 'Jews (were) advanced socialists who sympathise with the Paris Commune and Chicago martyrs'. On the other hand, English trade unionists and socialists frequently represented all Jews as wicked capitalists (S. Cohen 1987: 7), p 41.

<sup>813</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, 2004, p 36; Benard Gainer, *The Alien Invasion - the Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905*, Heinemann, London, 1972, p 24.

<sup>814</sup> Steve Cohen, 'The local state of immigration controls', *Critical Social Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2002. Cohen notes that according to Garrard (1971:39) the League's rally at the people's Palace in Mile End forced the government into holding the Commission, p 522.



who lived in overcrowded housing, menaced the public health, and threatened to compromise the strength of the Anglo-Saxon race.”<sup>815</sup> Publishing its results in 1903, the Commission found that these fears about alien immigration were largely ill founded and that, in particular, the claims of the negative effect of pauperised immigration on the public purse and the domestic labour market to be unsubstantiated. Gainer, in his catalogue of the misconception surrounding the new immigrants and their effects on the host community, observed that ‘the most pernicious misconception of all was that sweating amongst aliens injured British partisans’, while exports had actually increased throughout the 1880’s.<sup>816</sup> Nonetheless, finding an ‘evil’ reluctance towards assimilation, and therefore having found a way of stating that the immigrant’s difference should not exist, the Commission recommended that new measures of control be implemented.

Thus, rather than address the erroneous basis of the fears that had prompted the instigation of the Commission, and instead of addressing the underlying causes for poor housing and health in the working class areas to which the new migrants were drawn, the executive-parliamentary coalition formed in commission used the new sphere of difference as a means to advocate the moralising discourse and criminalising governmentality that had already been institutionalised with regard to the English (and Irish) poor. It was able to do so, moreover, because the episteme created through three hundred years of colonial and European conflict had worked to displace the abject fear of the national self represented in the figure of the pauperised criminalised English poor onto the figure of the alien while the process of colonisation (that Linebaugh and Rediker describe as expropriation) had created relationships of enmity with each colonial region, and few European states had not figured as the alien enemy over the same period (where the colonial verge was the site of contest between European powers).

The recommendations of the Commission addressed the fears that had prompted its own instigation, while the effect of the Commission itself was a marked increase in public awareness and partisanship over immigration issues. Thus while we should conclude that its rationale was partially determined by public perceptions, and the supposed effect of these in the political sphere, it is more important to understand the extent to which the new forms of governance established an interpellating dialogue between state and citizen in which each found their relationship privileged by virtue of the exclusion that enabled inclusion. In line with the emergence of a ‘tradition’ of British liberal tolerance, the commission framed its findings in a language that explicitly constructed the “alien” as its subject,

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<sup>815</sup> James Bronstein, ‘Rethinking the “Readmission”: Anglo-Jewish History and the Immigration Crisis’. In *Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture*. George K. Behlemer and Fred M. Leventhal, (eds.), Stanford University Press. Stanford, California, 2000, p 39.

<sup>816</sup> Bernard Gainer, *ibid.*

while implicitly addressing the subject of the immigration of pauperised Eastern European Jews. Furthermore, the Act of 1905 explicitly protected the rights of any immigrant 'who proves that he is seeking admission to this country solely to avoid prosecution for an offence of a political character', regardless of whether that immigrant could demonstrate that he had the wherewithal for his own support.<sup>817</sup> The Commission recommended the establishment of an immigration department, which would have the power of exclusion over persons who were likely to become a drain on the public purse, as well as the criminal and the insane. As well as recommending the creation of a new institution to deal with the control of immigration (the Immigration Service), the Commission also recommended that the Home Secretary be granted the power to 'ban the further settlement of aliens in areas considered overcrowded.'<sup>818</sup>

The legal historians Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol recount that

*Up until 1905 the Home Office had been responsible for naturalisation and extradition, had implemented entry controls and powers of deportation during the Napoleonic wars, and was the department to which the factory inspectorate was answerable – a relevant point because of the concern the 1903 Commission had expressed about 'sweated' labour among immigrants.'*<sup>819</sup>

The Board of Trade had also held responsibilities for immigration up until the 1905 Aliens Act, collating the shipping companies' records of immigrants, and had been the major department represented during the Commission of 1903.<sup>820</sup> Dummett and Nicol surmise that the Home Office's responsibility for public order, its responsibility for policing, prisons, and the sale of alcohol and its conservative nature and secretive processes may account for the choice of venue formation given 'the mood of the time'.<sup>821</sup> The xenophobic social context undoubtedly formed the ground for the location of the institution given responsibility for Aliens legislation. In addition, the role of the Home Office as the institution governing the bordering, health and policing of the national social body was a central factor in the choice of venue location; the articulation that was seen between the definition of alienage in the 1793 Aliens Act as both political and territorial and the development of the bio-political governmentality manifest in the creation of the Home Office in 1782 had ripened, by the beginning of the twentieth century, into the national form defined by the articulation of sovereign territoriality and

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<sup>817</sup> Aliens Bill 1905 (Bill 187), s.1(3), in Dallal Stephens, *ibid*, p 37.

<sup>818</sup> Andrew Dummett and Andrew Nicol. *Subjects, Citizens, and Others: Nationality and Immigration Law*. George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd. London. 1990. p 102.

<sup>819</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*.

<sup>820</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*, Llewelyn Smith, the Deputy Controller of the Board's Commercial, Labour, and Statistics Department, was the principal government witness to the commission.

<sup>821</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 149.

the production and maintenance of the citizen-subject through intensive and extensive forms of bordering.

The subsequent Aliens Act of 1905 established an Aliens Inspectorate, which was given the power of expulsion over immigrants that it decided were 'undesirable'. The inspectorate was staffed by ex-customs officials trained in techniques of contraband search before being staffed by ex-military servicemen until the 1960's when it began to employ graduates. Women and aliens were not employed. Inspectors had a substantial degree of autonomy in pursuing their cause; as Dummett and Nicol record, they could, 'without referring up, and subject only to an appeal to the immigration boards', define an immigrant as an undesirable alien and refuse entry.<sup>822</sup> The Aliens inspectors were regarded as experts in their field which was perhaps regarded in the manner in which a specialised branch of the police force may have been viewed and the Aliens Inspectorate itself was allowed to be the genesis of policy decisions.

The precedent-forming category of 'undesirable' immigrants was to be defined in terms that largely followed the recommendations of the 1903 Royal Commission, and while the politically persecuted refugee was exempt from this category of exclusion, the Liberal Member of Parliament Sir Charles Dilk was able to observe that the bill did not guarantee the protection of persons migrating from religious and political persecution.<sup>823</sup> Writing in 1925, the Permanent Secretary for the Home Office Sir Edward Troup recounted how the department had been able to oversee the exclusion of hundreds of thousands of 'undesirable' immigrants from Russia and Central Europe from the date of the 1905 Act until the commencement of the First World War.<sup>824</sup> The Act also established an Immigration Appeals Board that in providing a check for both immigrants and the shipping companies liable for their return, also set a precedent in becoming a site of resistance whose existence the executive found to be problematic. Troup's statement on this matter can be taken to be axiomatic:

*Even when Alien officers found good reason to refuse leave to land, their decisions were constantly overridden by the Statutory appeals boards in a way that made effective enforcement of the restrictions almost impossible.*<sup>825</sup>

Despite the appeals process (which overturned approximately one third of the inspectorates' refusals) and Gladstone's instructions for the liberal treatment of immigrants claiming persecution or hardship in

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<sup>822</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 150.

<sup>823</sup> Sir Charles Dilk, House of Commons Debate, Vol. 145, May 2, 1905, col. 699, in Dallal Stephens, *ibid.*, p 38.

<sup>824</sup> Sir Edward Troup, *The Home Office*, Putnam, London, 1925, pp 143, 145, in Dummett and Nicol, *op cit*.

<sup>825</sup> Sir Edward Troup, *op cit*.

general, the inspectors allowed a very small number of immigrants to enter as refugees. In the first five years of its operation the inspectorate allowed only 613 refugee entries, and 505 of those were allowed in the first year of operation.<sup>826</sup> Dummett and Nicol write that the Act was most effective in relation to the destitute immigrant, and that it was an administrative milestone, for 'it established a mechanism of control which was capable of enlargement' for 'once that mechanism was in place, demand for greater control increased rather than diminished.'<sup>827</sup>

The fact that the Liberal government succeeding the Tory government in 1906 failed to abolish the Act gave a precedent for the governmental consensus on immigration that was to continue between parties of the right and left when in power. The Labour Party has been typically critical of restrictive policies when in opposition and in 1919 was to oppose the amendments proposed in the act of that year on the basis of the articulation of racism and class prejudice given in them.<sup>828</sup> Throughout the first two decades of the new century the Labour Party privately held an internationalist perspective on migration as the boundary of the state system, yet the publication of such views caused the Party to disavow such views and when they eventually regained power in 1929 the Labour Home Secretary John Clynes was quick to demonstrate the government's allegiance to restrictions.<sup>829</sup> A further political and institutional precedent had been established in the promotion of W. Haldane Porter as the Immigration Service's first chief inspector, as Haldane was 'a close associate' of the far-right politician Major Evans-Gordon', and subsequently the culture of the immigration service had tended towards right-wing ethno-nationalist communitarianism.<sup>830</sup>

The control of immigration initiated in the 1905-1906 legislation was articulated with new welfare measures: 'the major welfare legislation passed by the 1906 government made eligibility for benefit dependent on immigration status'.<sup>831</sup> The Liberal government which had opposed the articulation of national welfare and international exclusion adopted the Conservative position once in power. Thus the 20<sup>th</sup> century's cross-party consensus on the logic of exclusion guaranteeing internal social security developed from this period. Politicians appealed to a politics of resentment in framing the new policies: The Tory MP William Evans Gordon was a 'major advocate of control' who argued in Parliament that '... the rates are burdened with the education of thousands of children of foreign parents ... The Working classes know that new buildings are erected not for them but for strangers from abroad'.<sup>832</sup>

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<sup>826</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*, p 151.

<sup>827</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol. *ibid*, p 104.

<sup>828</sup> Teresa Hayter, *Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls*, p 40.

<sup>829</sup> Paul Foot, *ibid*, 1965.

<sup>830</sup> Teresa Hayter. *ibid*, p 39.

<sup>831</sup> Steve Cohen, 'Anti-Semitism, Immigration Controls, and the Welfare State', in D. Taylor, *Critical Social Policy: A Reader*, 1996.

<sup>832</sup> Steve Cohen, *ibid*, 1996, p 74. Quoting Hansard, Jan 29<sup>th</sup>, 1902.

Cohen interprets this passage by arguing that the appeal to the working classes and their material interests was necessary to the defeat of Jewish immigration.<sup>833</sup> Immigration controls were introduced at the same time that 'industrial unionism and socialist organisation' developed.<sup>834</sup> Within this system resident Jews thus became ineligible for several of the new welfare provisions that were to be extended to the working classes, including the pension and unemployment benefits. In creating the beginnings of the political framework that became the welfare state, the Liberal government articulated both immigration controls and welfare entitlements to the exclusion of foreigners. In doing so it began to create the institutional architecture that would both regulate the citizen-subject as a national worker and define the 'alien' as the ethno-national other giving substance to the national worker's interpellation within the British social body that colonial subjects were wont to refer to as the 'mother country'.

#### Section 4.5. Mobilising the 'enemy' alien'.

The First World War defined the heightening of a period of European conflict that, beginning with the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and not ending until the early 1920's, saw the displacement of more than 20 million European persons.<sup>835</sup> In Britain, the period leading up to the European wars and that of the First World War saw the institution of a phase of martial policy formation, with immigration being subsumed within a discourse and governmentality of security'. In 1909 the counter-espionage organisation that was to become MI5 was established, and in the following year, the powers of the Alien Inspectorate were increased in response to the perceived threat of alien terrorist activity. In the same year the Home Secretary Winston Churchill secretly approved the 'preparation of a register of aliens from probable enemy powers' and Parliament enacted the Official Secrets Act which protected, and continues to protect the Home Office from scrutiny regarding its decision making process in relation to immigration decisions. The use of the Secrets Act reaffirmed the governance of immigration within the discourse of security.

With reference to the 1803 Aliens Act's grant of large executive powers to bar and deport immigrants, a subcommittee of the Committee of Imperial defence was also formed in 1910. Immediately after the declaration of war in 1914 the Aliens Restriction Act took the form of a simple enablement under which more elaborate Orders in Council could be made. Thus the executive was further invested in its power over immigration decisions, because the simple structure of this Act ensured that parliamentary and committee debates were to be kept to a minimum. The powers for Orders of Council were defined as applicable to any aliens, rather than to enemy aliens as such.

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<sup>833</sup> Steve Cohen, *ibid*, 1996, p 74.

<sup>834</sup> Steve Cohen, *ibid*. 1996, p 75.

<sup>835</sup> Michael Marrus, *op cit*. 1985.

Under this wartime Act the Home Secretary was granted powers over the refusal of entry, and the deportation of any person considered undesirable, and these powers were granted on a basis that excluded the possibility of Home Office decisions being checked by juridical or parliamentary processes. This legislation was martial, and the intention to limit the provisions to the period of conflict was clear in the Act's wording. Nonetheless, a 1919 Amendment to the Aliens Restriction Act was passed without parliamentary discussion and allowed the continuation of the martial provisions, subject to the yearly review process of the Expiring Laws Continuance Act. The Aliens Restrictions Act of 1919 allowed the refusal of entry to any alien by an immigration officer and limited the period of entry to a general principle of three months in lack of evidence of self sufficiency or the granting of a work permit. Furthermore, the Home Secretary and the courts were granted the power of deportation against any alien whose presence was deemed to threaten the public good.<sup>836</sup> The possibility of Alien or Jewish immigration was further restricted in the Aliens Restriction Amendments Act which removed the previously existing appeals procedures.

In describing the formation of these policies in terms of the development of mechanisms of internal control, Steve Cohen writes that

*[s]imultaneously, other regulations made under the 1919 Act imposed almost a state of siege on the Jewish community (see particularly The Aliens Order of 1920). Jewish Aliens were obliged to carry identity cards, to notify the authorities if they were absent from their homes for two weeks, to keep out of designated 'protected areas', and to fill in a special register if they stayed overnight at a hotel. At the same time the police were given the power to close clubs and restaurants 'frequented by aliens'. A Jewish Chronicle editorial correctly described this combination of external and internal control as amounting to a 'War on Aliens'.<sup>837</sup>*

The apprehension given in the use of the term 'war' was apt. The 1919 amendments given in the Aliens Restrictions Act had dropped the key phrase from the 1914 Aliens Act which stated that 'at any time when a state of war exists between His Majesty and any foreign power, or when it appears that an occasion of imminent national danger or great emergency has arisen'.<sup>838</sup> Given the xenophobic popular and elite discourse of the period, as well as the general direction of British foreign policy in the interwar period, it would seem fairer to assume that the omission of this phrase from the amended Act

<sup>836</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, the account of the 1919 Act follows Hayter, p 40.

<sup>837</sup> Steve Cohen, *ibid*, 1996, p 86; *The Jewish Chronicle*, June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1919.

<sup>838</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 107.

represented a generalisation of the statement's assumptions of threat, emergency, and inter-state hostility, rather than the disappearance of these grounding assumptions under conditions of peace.

Under the precedent-creating legislation of 1914-1919, the state ensured its extension of intensive universalism (the sphere of rights belonging to the national-worker) was to be policed and bordered by the sphere of the nation-state. The political episteme on which such decision making was based was both Hobbesian and Hegelian: inter-state relations were to be governed by the assumption of a "war of all against all" in which states competed on the basis of their own interests, while the state – because of its expressed duty to protect the public interest – was above the sphere of individual morality. That state's policies transgressed individual rights was an acknowledged political fact. The Home Secretary, Mr. Shortt stated that '[w]here it is a choice between our own safety and the safety of our people and the infliction of hardship upon an alien, then that hardship becomes necessary and ceases to be unjust'.<sup>839</sup> The sort of individual migrant from which the state sought to protect its subjects was the exterior ethno-criminal, but his 'criminality' was predicated on the latent immorality thought to have belonged to the British poor and the economic individual; here again another precedent was set for the contemporary period of asylum control for it was assumed that the 'economic' immigrant could not be afforded political protection.

Thus the state could enact the Lockean social democratic policies that became manifest in the form of the national - social state, while behaving in a Hobbesian totalitarian manner to those who were external to the state's interests.<sup>840</sup> In Britain, this was possible, in part, because the form of politics only allowed a restricted check on executive power. No British Bill of Rights protected the individual from the state, and the powers of the judiciary were limited given Parliament's desire to empower the executive. Subjecthood rather than citizenship governed the relationship between government and individual, while this relationship was, in turn, mediated by a smaller base of property holding individuals than the French social system comprising a larger proportion of smallholders.

The process of defining inclusion via exclusion was further enabled by the combination of a racist and xenophobic socio-political climate, and in the limitations of liberal tolerance, which imagined, represented and governmentalised the right of benevolence towards the "alien" rather than the alien's rightful demands upon the state. Within these paradigm, it was further imagined that assimilation was the reasonable form that benevolent tolerance should take, while tolerance was to be limited to the

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<sup>839</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 108; *cf.*, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 114, col. 2746.

<sup>840</sup> Kees van der Pijl, *ibid*, 1998. Van der Pijl distinguishes between states belonging to the 'Lockean' heartland and those belonging to the Hobbesian verge; Britain belongs to the former category (see chapter one). In the use to which the thesis puts this framing, the British state society structure tends towards a Lockean social contract structure, but relates to the verge in a Hobbesian manner.



degree that immigrants presented as unassimilable. The unassimilable were to be treated in the manner of apartheid; that is to say they were to be contained or sent back to the region that was imagined to articulate ethnicity to territory.

In summing up the effects of the changes wrought during the First World War, Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol argue that it was 'the great turning point in the history of immigration control', for

*[i]t established a lasting system of general controls over all entrants and alien residents, which was in the hands of the executive branch of government and of officials who between them made policy. Scrutiny by Parliament and the courts was minimal, while the role of the police and of intelligence services working with or under the War Office was greatly enlarged.*<sup>841</sup>

The inter-war years were marked by a comparative lack of immigration due, in part, to the lack of demand caused by the widespread economic downturn, and after the policy changes of 1905 and 1914-9 there was little remaining of the legal avenue for the alien and refugee immigration that had grounded the British self-belief in a tradition of tolerance. Refugees and economic migrants whose cause for mobility had been forced by conflict chose to migrate to the European nations, such as France, that were willing to use their labour and to tolerate their residence. The belief in tolerant liberal openness towards immigration occurred largely on the basis of a period in which differential demands were not placed on the state. The policies of the early twentieth century show the beginnings of a pattern in which tolerant openness exists until the point at which immigrant demand appears to have become 'excessive' or 'problematic'. Immigration continued to play a decisive role in party politics, with the Labour-Liberal government continuing to follow a pro-migrant policy while in opposition during the early 1920's, and subsequently matching or eclipsing the restrictiveness of the Tories when in office (as they were briefly in the year 1924). In power in 1929, the Labour government made political gain out of the fact that Acts such as the introduction of a naturalisation fee demonstrated their commitment to the exclusion of aliens. Moreover, welfare and other forms of social control were further extended to migrant communities.

An intense flurry of institutional activity producing new state and intergovernmental practices and structures marked the interwar period. The two new directions in policy formations relative to the control of peoples' mobility were the development of the passport and the process of *ad hoc* intergovernmentalism manifest in the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and its

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<sup>841</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 112.

descendents. Both of these developments worked alongside the European struggle for the creation and maintenance of ethnically homogenous and territorially distinct nation-states.

The modern passport began its life in the First World War but its complicated lineage reaches back to the initial legitimation of the sovereign which, as the sole agent of violence held the right of offering safe passage to the (predominantly mercantile) traveller.<sup>842</sup> By the eighteenth century safe conduct tickets and letters of *marque* allowed both safe passage through international territory and - after the insistent pursuit of the control of maritime violence by the trade-dependent British state - the appropriation of the violent economics of privateers within the ambit of the state. By the nineteenth century the passport had come to be structured on the basis of colonial and class-based distinctions whereby 'civilised' national and European territory was deemed safe against the imagined 'barbaric' anarchy of international colonial space, whilst these designations were considered to be matters of import for the upper class traveller. On the basis of these assumptions few European countries had passport laws and those that did were recalcitrant in their use. The French Revolution instigated the linkage of identity papers and the passport with their correlates -citizenship and alienage while these new governmentalities were made at the behest of the Republican state's need to retain the legitimation of monopolised violence through the document control of a mobile military population. It was the militant-state that eventually oversaw the extension of an international passport system during the First World War; both of these new regimes - that of citizenship and that of the devastating European interstate conflict - were implemented as a means of controlling the mobility of lower-classed subjects, both in terms of their movements and in terms of the restoration and maintenance of the ethno-territorial political regimes thought to guarantee stable class structures.

It would be a mistake to overlook the fact that the First World War's regime of identity papers and passports was part of the mass regulation and *mobilisation* of persons at the behest of the militant economic state; to overlook, in other words, the fact that modern warfare was a particular form of mass mobility in which new forms of governance and discipline were wrought towards the regulation of subjects and citizens. In Britain, the Home Office and MI5 'had been increasingly concerned about industrial unrest'.<sup>843</sup> As Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol (1990) recount,

*Major strikes in the last months of the war, and an unprecedented strike by the Metropolitan Police in 1919, accompanied by the enormous shock of the successful Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, in 1917,*

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<sup>842</sup> Mark B. Salter, *Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations*, Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2003, p 39.

<sup>843</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 109.

*persuaded the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, that the state was in serious danger from a combination of British and alien subversion.*<sup>844</sup>

Lloyd George feared the revolutionary potential of the soon-to-be demobilised forces, and the political elite feared the political mobility of resident aliens in as much as they may have incited revolt amongst demobilised soldiers. The 1919 Act thus contained penalties for the promotion of sedition or disaffection amongst the military or civilians by aliens, as well as penalties upon the same for the promotion of industrial unrest.<sup>845</sup> These measures were supplementary to the imposition of passport and documents of identification during the war, which were the result of both the 'bureaucratic governmental need to track combatants and verify deserters', as well as the need to distinguish between aliens and nationals.<sup>846</sup>

Because of the apprehensions of politicians and members of the executive in which the occurrence of low wages and labour unrest was seen in the light of the dangers of the Communist Revolution, the Ministry of Labour was given a large measure of jurisdiction over immigration. As the Home Office records state, 'by means (of coordination between the ministry of labour and the Aliens Dept.) a very strict control has been maintained over the employment of aliens in every kind of occupation in this country since the end of the war'.<sup>847</sup>

The mobilisation of the (male) labour force for military service overseas during the First World War had opened up new avenues of mobility for those employed, or for those who were to become employed in the labour force 'at home'. Men, women and immigrants all enjoyed greater class mobility through the existence of labour scarcity during the war, while at the end of the war, armistice seemed to provide a threat of its own in terms of the 'flood' of men who were expected to return to the British labour force. Renationalising and re-gendering the labour force at the war's end through the imposition of passport and work permit controls were seen as a way of restoring 'social stability' in as much as these measures restrained the tendency to upward and hybrid forms of mobility that the war's labour regime had promised.<sup>848</sup>

The war time measures given in the Aliens Acts, work permit restrictions, and welfare controls mark the development of a cohesive, yet *ad hoc*, governmentality aimed at enforcing the borders of national citizenship and at reproducing the socio-political hierarchy of the British state-society complex. If

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<sup>844</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 110.

<sup>845</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*.

<sup>846</sup> Mark B. Salter, *op cit*, p 78.

<sup>847</sup> HO 213 331, quoted in Mark B. Salter, *op cit*, p 83.

<sup>848</sup> Mark B. Salter, *ibid*, p 83.

these were largely national governmentalities that worked to fix a regime of un/desirability in terms of the control of people's mobility, then the British state's actions regarding passports and refugees extended the reach of the new forms of governance into the international, or, more accurately, the inter-governmental realm.

Mark Salter writes of the continental mobility regime that emerged after the First and Second World Wars. After the First World War European attitudes to mobility (including that of persons) were marked by a paradox between the desire to see the reintegration of national economies, (a liberal belief that held that integration held the promise of peaceful relations), and the desire of nation-states to use passport and visa regimes as macro-economic tools for the regulation of the size and form of the labour market. While continental nations made use of foreign and displaced persons in the rebuilding of their reintegrating economies, Britain, with its ongoing Commonwealth network and trade and financial links with the United States, was less held by the apparent paradox and sought closure as a means of labour management.

In pursuit of the open flow of mobilities the newly created League of Nations (1920) sought to facilitate bilateral arrangements between nations that were prepared to disarm their borders, rescinding visa and passport controls. If we could describe the result of this facilitation and the compliance of the nations that were either economically secure or depended on economic interchange with their neighbours' as a partial process of disarmament, then Salter points out that this result predicated the contemporary 'bifurcation' of mobility regimes (between the wealthy 'North' and the poor 'South'). Even amongst the coalition of the willing (which did not include Britain) passports were nonetheless seen as a tool for the restrictive control of the movements of refugees.

When the League of Nations established the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees, the British government offered its own version of documentation for the identification of refugees in the form of emergency certificates and thus began a careful statist strategy of avoiding commitment to supranational structures or processes above and beyond the limits of nation-statist sovereignty.<sup>849</sup> In the 1914 Aliens Act, Gladstone's liberalism had been evident in the clause citing exemption for those immigrants claiming to have migrated for reasons of persecution, whether that persecution be religious or political. Five years later the amended Act which was to be renewed annually until its redundancy in the 1971 Nationality Act, declared that such exemptions were no longer valid and that no appeals would be entered into. Aliens thus lost any right they may have had to enter British territory and refugees were not regarded as a distinct category from aliens in general. While these policies ensured

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<sup>849</sup> Louise London, *Whitehall and the Jews*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp., 33-57.

that any refugee entries into British territory would be made on an *ex gratia* basis, they were articulated with the initiation of the process of displacing state responsibilities onto the private sphere. This process began with the involvement of Jewish leaders in the Aliens and Nationality Joint Standing Committee which had been set up to address the 'problem' of the post-war presence of alien Jews.<sup>850</sup> *Ex gratia* asylum came to be offered, from this time, on the basis of the degree to which the Jewish community was able to support residence or onward migration.

These national policies were supplemented by the state's intergovernmentalism which tended to act (as it has continued to do) as a break on any form of multilateralism that would appear to incur (or threaten the occurrence of) an expense to the state. The intergovernmental approach that led to the creation of the League of Nation's High Commission for Refugees (LNHCR) came into being as a broader response supplementing those of the individual nation states to the presence of millions of displaced Jews, Russians, Armenians, Germans and Serbian refugees throughout Europe in the postwar period. Different states took vastly different positions on refugees during this period. France had lost 1.5 million men during the war and saw refugee flows as a means of augmenting its labour shortages. The French nation subsequently accepted approximately 400,000 Russian refugees at this time, as well as one million 'other' Europeans on the proviso that they were prepared to perform 'menial labour'. The United States also viewed the 'refugee problem' as a source of labour and when the LNHCR created the Nansen passport system, many of these documents were used to aid the transit of passengers from Europe to America.

The development of intergovernmental refugee regimes needs to be situated within an understanding of the developments of European nationalism during this period. Following some of the key historians recounting this period of European nation-building, Nevzat Soguk argues that throughout the 1920's Europe experienced a phase of ethno-nationalism in which the imperial-dynastic systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were swept away in the violent scramble for the articulation of ethnicity with sovereign state territoriality.<sup>851</sup> Millions of persons were displaced in the resulting revision of social structures within ethno-national territories as forming or reforming states including Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Poland, Finland and Czechoslovakia sought to 'exchange' or expel 'those populations they considered to be 'foreign' or 'external'.<sup>852</sup> In this context the British state can be seen to have shared the European 'nationalist' episteme of the 1920's as its restrictionist 'aliens' legislation and panoply of *ad hoc* measures show, resulting in a new governmentality of

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<sup>850</sup> The ANJSC grew out of the Jew's Temporary Shelter which Anglo-Jewish leader's had established in London's East End in the 1880s. See Louise London, p 23.

<sup>851</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, pp., 114-116.

<sup>852</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 115.

immigration approached the communitarianism elsewhere seen in the more violent forms of ethnic cleansing.

#### Section 4.6. The Production of Statelessness.

In a series of processes that reflected the dynamics of the mass displacements of colonial modernity, state-making in interwar Europe produced a realm of statelessness and a floating population of 'undesirable' people numbering in their millions as one state's national people-making became the (often adjoining) state's 'excess' population. At the same time the supra-national processes emerging in the League of Nations tended towards deterritorialisation. Soguk writes that 'the nineteenth-century freedom-of-movement regime was applauded at the beginning of every League meeting until 1926' and that while it was recognised that this ideal state was not going to be possible in the contemporary context the League encouraged member states towards the bilateral removal of passport, visa, and border controls.<sup>853</sup>

The strategic British use of newly formed intergovernmental processes during this period is evident in the extent to which the passport was used as a means of restricting refugee flows and rights in a manner that conflicted with the ideals of the League of Nations even as it appeared to reinforce the symbolic value of British liberalism. The British representative to the 1926 Conference argued that rescinding the passport system would only become a possibility when all member states agreed to their removal and that it only took one nation to require passports for the system to be necessary in sum. The passport was therefore necessary and as Britain had argued in 1925, gave states the added advantage of increased control over criminal persons who could now be identified in their movements.<sup>854</sup> The Foreign Office preparatory minutes for the 1926 Conference reveal a *realpolitik* agenda based on the mobilisation of the communitarian ethno-national ideological framework. The first concern of the Foreign Office was the passport's usefulness in terms of the identification of foreigners and aliens in Britain. A secondary consideration was the ability the passport granted the state in the control of the movements of its nationals overseas.<sup>855</sup> By insisting – in the liberalising international public sphere – on the ideal of multilateral disarmament the British government was able to pursue its nationalist agenda at the intergovernmental and domestic levels.

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<sup>853</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 79.

<sup>854</sup> Mark B. Salter, *ibid*, p 84.

<sup>855</sup> H.S. Martin, 'Refusal of Passports', FO 612 355, 1926, in Mark B. Salter, *op cit*, fn 8. .

The passport system was seen by nationalising states as a means of restricting the movements of undesirable non-citizens and the intergovernmental and international process that arose in response to their presence became a site of conflict in the battle over the form of statecraft being established in postwar Europe. In Soguk's analysis of the place of the emergence of an international (albeit *ad hoc*) regime for the control of the mobility of undesirable persons, the problem that the emergent processes addressed was 'one of 'rearticulating' the sovereign state into the shifting socio-political terrain in which ... displaced people were a powerful transversal, deterritorialising force', so as to effect a strategic positioning of the state in which the problem of displaced persons could be rendered as 'a fund, force, technique, or knowledge useful for statecraft in the midst of a sea of changes'.<sup>856</sup>

Soguk writes that the emergence of the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and the succession of League of Nations organisations worked to form the establishment and maintenance of the intergovernmental field of refugee activity as a regimented field of statecraft in which

*[t]he events of human displacement were problematised in state-oriented terms, that is, they were rearticulated (reinscribed) as a specific refugee problem characterised in terms of images, identities, and subjectivities that support the sovereign state.*<sup>857</sup>

The refugee was thus constructed and appropriated vis-à-vis the posited relations and institutions of the state via 'procedures of exclusion' and therefore through normalised procedures of inclusion defining both the poor and dangerous refugee and the statecraft necessary to address the problem that the new threat posed to citizens and their national community. The intergovernmental process thus established

*[a] process of disciplinary action aimed at inscribing and continually restoring a specific 'normal' relation between the refugee and the citizen, a hierarchy in which the refugee was always defined negatively vis-à-vis the citizen-subject, as someone who lacked the citizen's ties to the state.*<sup>858</sup>

By the 1920's the international community in Europe had achieved the infrastructure – the processes, policies, institutions and hegemonic discourse fields – embodied in the distinctive features of the nation-state that Anthony Giddens recognises in 'the coupling of direct and indirect surveillance (customs officials and frontier guards, plus the central organisation of passport information).'<sup>859</sup> One of

<sup>856</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 118.

<sup>857</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 119.

<sup>858</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 120. Soguk draws upon Giovanna Procacci, 'Governing Poverty: Sources of the Social Question in Nineteenth Century France' in Jan Goldstein (ed.), *Foucault and the Writing of History*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, p 212.

<sup>859</sup> Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: the Nation-State and Violence*, Vol. 2, London, Polity Press, 1985, p 120, in Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and the Lessons of History', *Race & Class*, Vol. 44(2), 2002, p 52.



the key events in the construction of this infrastructure was the League of Nations Conference of Paris in 1921. This conference can be seen to have been the commencement of the process of intergovernmentalism relating the recently constructed field of refugee problems, or, more specifically, as the point at which an incipient civil supranationalism was appropriated by the state-led process of intergovernmentalism. We can see this tension in the Conference's major creation, the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees, where, as Soguk observes, 'the League members failed to support the high commissioner consistently, in spite of the fact that the commissioner's office was their own creation', while 'many observers and practitioners ... spoke of the ubiquitous efforts to undermine the work of the high commissioner throughout its tenure'.<sup>860</sup> The British state was at the forefront of these efforts aimed at limiting the jurisdiction of international refugee obligations through the direction of the very structures of the refugee process.

The demand for emigration from the European regions of ethno-national (anti-Semitic) conflict began to increase from the late 1920's in the form of Jewish refugees seeking asylum, but Britain's tightly restrictive aliens' policies meant that from the time of the 1919 Aliens Act and generally, despite the partial exception given to Jewish refugee children in the *Kindertransport* of 1938-40, 'only a person of substantial means, whose opinions aroused no suspicion, stood much chance of finding refuge in Britain'.<sup>861</sup> Under these conditions 'political fugitives during the 1920s tended to try other countries before Britain'.<sup>862</sup> By 1933 a consensus emerged around resistance to the granting of asylum and by 1939 only ten per cent of refugee applicants had been successful.<sup>863</sup> New institutional and civil developments accompanied the growth of Jewish refugee migration in the period leading up to, throughout, and after the Second World War. The British response to the plight of Jewish refugees – including the *Kindertransport* and the eventual creation of the modern international instruments and institutions for the protection of refugees – has been instanced as a furthering of the exceptional British tradition of tolerance towards immigrants.

Louise London argues that Britain was not an exception to the global resistance to alleviating the refugee crisis. Like other Western nations, 'it opted for caution and pragmatism, subordinating humanitarianism to Britain's national interest,' while this national interest was defined in terms of the maintenance of restrictions on alien immigration.<sup>864</sup> The circularity of this logic is evident in the fact that the first major piece of 20<sup>th</sup>. Century immigration legislation – the 1905 Aliens Act – had been

<sup>860</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, p 122.

<sup>861</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 146.

<sup>862</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 147.

<sup>863</sup> Louise London, *ibid*, *passim*. Teresa Hayter writes that 11,000 were allowed entry between the years 1933 to 1938. Teresa Hayter. *Ibid*, p 42.

<sup>864</sup> Louise London, *ibid*, 2000, p 1.

framed in response to pauperised Jewish migration: Refugees seeking entry needed to qualify under the legislations discussed above, which explicitly excluded the desirability of alien settlement. Effectively, this left the refugee in the position of being dependent upon the discretion of the Home Office and its limited definition of humanitarian obligation.

Early in 1933 Parliament was asked whether the government would 'be prepared to consider the granting of asylum to German-Jews on a self-supporting basis'.<sup>865</sup> The Home secretary Sir John Gilmour drafted a response, which was subsequently published as a Cabinet policy Statement in April of 1933. The key section of the policy stated that

*[t]he interests of this country must predominate over all other considerations, but subject to this guiding principle each case will be carefully considered on its individual merits ... (I)n accordance with the time honoured tradition of this country no unnecessary principles are placed in the way of foreigners seeking admission.*<sup>866</sup>

The Home Secretary's statement set out the basic premise of policies directed at the problem of Jewish refugees. Britain's Anglo-Jewish community were able to obtain only limited influence on British policy towards refugees as the government sought to displace any of the costs accruing to refuge and resettlement. Anglo-Jewish organisations furthered the precedent in the relationship between governmental and civil responses to immigration that had been set at the turn of the century, by becoming the primary source of funding and administration of the pre-war admission of Jews. Like the regime introduced in 1905, a class element was dominant, as the number of refugees in Britain was not allowed to exceed the available (private) support.

The leverage that the Anglo-Jewish community could obtain was restricted by the assimilationist and apartheid tendencies of British governmentality, as the successive Home Secretaries were able to argue that high levels of Jewish immigration and settlement would lead to public anti-Semitism. Moreover, the extreme anti-Semitic racism on the continent could be used as a proof of the success of the British strategy of tolerant exclusion. Thus the intensive logic of liberal tolerance was used for the purpose of extensive exclusion: assimilation at home sanctioned the apartheid of abandoning refugees abroad.<sup>867</sup> Up until the period following the *Anschluss* of 1938, the Home Office and the Anglo-Jewish

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<sup>865</sup> Robert J. Beck, 'Britain and the 1933 Refugee Convention: Nationality or State Sovereignty?' *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Volume 11, No 4, Oxford University Press, 1999, p 1. Beck's source is A.J. Sherman, *Island Refuge: Britain and Refugees from the Third Reich 1933-39*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1973, p 33.

<sup>866</sup> Robert J. Beck, *ibid*, p 1. Beck's source is A.J. Sherman, *ibid*, p 32.

<sup>867</sup> This development bears an obvious correlation with the emergence of the race relations paradigm in the 1960s (see chapter five).

community worked together to accommodate immigration within the existing means of control. After the *Anschluss* and the vast increase it produced in the need for refuge, the government enacted visa requirements from Austria and Germany, which had both severely restrictive criteria for admission, and mandated pre-selection from abroad.<sup>868</sup>

Throughout the war the British government resisted pressure to use refuge as a solution to the Nazi persecution of European Jews, arguing, in the first place, that it would harm the effects of the economic sanctions on Germany, and then that it would harm the war effort in general. When the government did, belatedly make modest efforts towards rescue and refuge, it was acting in response to increasing public pressure, a fact that emphatically negates the politics of assimilation and apartheid – dependent as this was on a preconceived notion of the national limits of public tolerance.<sup>869</sup> Public support for the British provision of refuge extended throughout civil society, and many members of the public offered their own homes and resources as a form of hospitality, yet while the government was prepared to use Jewish community support as a means to limit the offer of protection to the amount of refugees that the Jewish organisation were prepared to fund, it was not prepared to extend this policy to the general population when the effect would have been an extension rather than limitation of the provision of sanctuary.

Western responses to the refugee crisis differed in terms of national self – definition: Britain, as one of the countries that was avowedly not an immigrant nation, was determined to offer limited temporary refuge rather than settlement: the logic of the resistance to Jewish settlement had a European international basis that was shared by British policy makers, and grounded in the European nationalising of ethnicities that began to occur in the 1920's. The prevalent belief was that the closer the match between ethnicity and nationality, the less the likelihood of national and international conflict. Thus, while on this basis, the logical opposition to the Nazi's aspiration towards national purity was based not on this aspiration as such, but on the methods used to obtain it, the opposition to Jewish immigration was also based on the imagined threat that the diaspora posed to national communitarian homogeneity.

The government's post-war willingness and, perhaps, ability to pursue extensive refugee resettlement was also limited. Its participation with the United States in the instigation of new international bodies, such as the Intergovernmental Committee, designed to deal with the problem of refugees functioned – like the domestic decision to avoid policy formation – as part of a strategy of deflecting humanitarian

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<sup>868</sup> Louise London, *ibid*, p 110.

<sup>869</sup> A Gallup poll of 1943 showed 78 per cent in favour of admission. Louise London, *ibid*, p 15.

pressure away from itself,<sup>870</sup> and as a furtherance of the process of problematising the refugee within structures defined by intergovernmental power and supranational symbolic effect. This, and the geopolitics of the emergent cold-war era, explains, in part, the government's eventual acquiescence to the formation of the UNHCR, the IOM, and the ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention after its initial resistance and strategies of delay.

The IOM began its life as the ICEM (Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration) and was responsible for the postwar movement of refugees. It was also a political response to the instigation of the UNHCR, an American initiative which functioned partly in terms of Cold War ideological strategy. If, reductively speaking, the UNHCR was an overtly humanitarian structure, the ICEM was more obviously geo-political, yet the British support for the UNHCR rather than the ICEM was also basically a matter of geopolitical rivalry. Both new institutions instigated supranational processes whose remit specifically dealing with refugees actually had a larger effect upon the institutionalisation of migration management at the supranational level as they established *ad hoc* and formal intergovernmental mechanisms and fora for the management of migration and immigration. Yet these developments were not so much changes as the continuance of strategies and processes that had emerged with the creation of the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The restrictive British engagement with the politics of statelessness that emerged in the 1930s demonstrates the effective limits of the liberal 'tradition of tolerance' that I critiqued in the first section of this chapter. Tensions that emerged in the interwar period between a need to maintain the symbolic expression of liberalism through acts of hospitality such as the kindertransport programme and the tendency to restrict ethno-pauperised (Jewish) immigration on the basis of a logic of assimilation. This liberal paradigm combining immigration restriction with a concern for a racialised form of social harmony provides a precedent for the post-war development of the 'race relations' approach to New Commonwealth ('coloured') immigration that I will examine in the following chapter. In addition, this chapter has demonstrated that the institutional origins of the modern British immigration regimes should be traced to the late eighteenth century, when the assemblage of the domestic (Home Office) and colonial-orientated institutional structures began to give form to the British governmentality of the mobility of colonial, national and 'alien' subjects. In the following chapter I will map the manner in which these developments were both transformed and continued in the postcolonial moment of the post-war period.

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<sup>870</sup> Louise London, *ibid*, p 5.



## **Chapter Five: The Anglo-Liberal Bordering of the Nation.**

This chapter provides a critical account of the politics of 'New Commonwealth' immigration in the decades following the Second World War, and positions the liberal governmentality of New Commonwealth immigration within the broader geopolitical shift from a strategy of neo-imperial regeneration to a form of post-imperial decline in the second half of the 1960s. This shift will be described in terms of the 'ideological vent' provided by the problematisation of the immigration that Stuart Hall describes as the 'return of the (colonial) oppressed'.<sup>871</sup> Here, I will argue that the politics of immigration policy formation that worked from the end of the Second World War until the 1962 restrictions on New Commonwealth immigration can be seen to have transferred the imperial boundaries of the British imagined community towards borders that appeared to lie within, rather than without, the nation-state. This post-war phenomenon was a 'new' development in a historically contingent sense. As I have argued in the previous chapters, the bordering of the British national community has been constructed against the threatening hybridity of the primitive colonial 'outside' (an outside that is located temporally and spatially), and the purity of the progressive civilised 'inside'. In the nineteenth century, for example, one site of that dangerous hybridity was the lifeworld of the British poor, wherein pauperism was framed as a 'primitive and backward' limit to the development of Progress within the moralism drawn from political economy, thus constituting the British 'pauper' as a colonial-capitalist subject (see chapters two and three). That hybridity of race-and-class situated the 'freeborn Englishman's' struggle against proletarianization within an ambiguous process of dis/identification in relation to the colonial other (the 'slave', the 'negro'). By the second half of the

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<sup>871</sup> I draw the concept of the 'ideological vent' from Michael Samer's concept of the 'spatial vent'. Where Samer's refers to the repatriation of surplus/redundant migrant labour as a capitalist strategy belonging to the sovereignty of the globalised nation state, I want to redeploy this concept of excorporation in terms of the construction of the boundaries of a national community within the nation. See Michael Samer, "Globalization, the geopolitical economy of migration and the 'spatial vent'", *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 6, No. 2, Summer 1999, pp., 166-199.

nineteenth century the depoliticisation of that threat and the corresponding constitution of a (sufficiently) 'docile' working class took the form of the hegemonic discourse and governmentality of national imperialism. In the context of the post-war strategy of neo-imperial regeneration, I propose that the biopolitics of liberality governmentality found its resolution in the development of the 'race relations paradigm'.

In the first section I give a brief account of the emergence and decline of the post-war neo-imperialist strategy in which policy makers sought to re-centre the British economy and London, and to redirect flows of finance, commerce and Labour within a neo-mercantilist Commonwealth and Sterling Area. In the second section I address the post-war schemes to alleviate labour shortages through the use of certain categories of European displaced persons. In this section I critique the idea that these schemes were designed to alleviate the post-war refugee problem, and describe the extent to which a concern for problems of assimilation gave structure to the incorporation of European migrant labour. In the third section I briefly consider the manner in which the history of colonization and uneven development gave structure to the form of post-war New Commonwealth immigration, and emphasise both the structural conditions of those migrations, and the degree of agency that they involved. The fourth section offers an account of the British politics of immigration in the period between the Second World War and 1965. Here I argue that the development of the 'race relations paradigm' should be thought of in terms of a paradox belonging to liberal governmentality that has formed the basis of subsequent immigration policy formation. In the final section I will argue that immigration policy formation in the 1970s and 1980s developed on the basis of anxieties revolving around British post-imperial decline. This section provides a context for the following chapter's account of the policies of the 1980s, wherein the Thatcherite articulation of neo-liberal de-borderment was interdependent with a renewed post-imperial and racialised re-borderment of the national community.

## Section 5.1. Neo-imperial regeneration and decline

P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins observe that in the interwar period, the British economy had suffered a relative decline in its position as a global power, *Pax Britannica* ceding to *Pax Americana* by 1939.<sup>872</sup> Britain's invisible trade and export trade in manufactures were 'badly affected' by the costs of the First World War, the 'succeeding depression of 1929-33', and by the subsequent 'protectionism which characterised the 1930's'.<sup>873</sup> Subsequently, net import levels (including those of manufactured goods)

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<sup>872</sup> P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 94.

<sup>873</sup> P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 31. The value of invisibles declined by 54 per cent over the period 1913-1937; see C. H. Feinstein, *Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1856-1965*, Cambridge, 1972, table 38.

rose in correspondence to the relative decline of British exports.<sup>874</sup> Whilst maintaining its relative position against those of the French and German economies, the international strength and centrality of the British economy declined in relation to that of the US, and New York gradually developed its ascendancy as the major centre of international finance.<sup>875</sup> Given its diminishing ability to retain the position of global dominance, throughout the 1930s, the City of London sought to strengthen its position as the centre of the Sterling Area, which remained the 'largest commercial and financial bloc in the world'.<sup>876</sup> Thus while industry had become dependent on protection and imperial markets, financial interests also re-centred themselves along the lines of imperial networks (particularly those between the UK and the Dominions). Thus the 'positive' flows of trade and finance became increasingly Imperial (rather than 'global') in the interwar period, while the negative flows became increasingly 'global'.<sup>877</sup>

With the major aim of strengthening the stability of sterling, the interwar governments and financial institutions facilitated the Dominion's export industries by maintaining a British import market, and accepted what were often less-than-advantageous conditions for its export market throughout the Sterling area. The major benefit accruing to the British economy was the facilitation of the Dominions' debt repayments, the continued flow of invisibles from the Dominions and other Sterling Area countries to the UK economy, and the eventual possibility of stronger (and preferential) export markets once the Dominions and other Sterling Area members had achieved substantial economic development. For the dominant British financial and political elites, these developments offered the eventual possibility of a return to a world in which Sterling would become the 'Top', rather than merely a 'Master' currency, and thus a return to the City of London's pre-eminence as the global financial centre.<sup>878</sup> Henceforth, as Cain and Hopkins argue, the imperial strategy of the 1920s and 1930s should be seen as a strategic retreat from the cosmopolitan economic order of the pre-war period, to which the British elite envisioned an eventual return once the threat of US global ascendancy had been answered, if not entirely mastered.

Throughout this period Britain allowed its export industries to suffer in order to achieve a stable and strong currency area; correspondingly, conditions of high unemployment in the 1920s in Britain remained prevalent throughout the 1930s. In the interwar period, Britain also continued to produce

<sup>874</sup> For example, the ratio of exports and re-exports of manufactures to imports fell from 2.27:1 in 1913 to 1.56:1 in 1937. See N.F.R. Crafts and M. Thomas, 'Comparative advantage in UK manufacturing trade, 1910-35', *Economic Journal*, 1986, p 96.

<sup>875</sup> For example, Britain's share of world manufactures fell from 26 per cent in 1913 to 21 per cent in 1929, while the US share rose from 11 to 18 per cent and Germany's declined from 23 to 19 per cent. See W. Arthur Lewis, 'International Competition in Manufactures', *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*, XLVII, 1957, p 579.

<sup>876</sup> P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *op cit*.

<sup>877</sup> P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 32.

<sup>878</sup> Susan Strange, *Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International Currency in Decline*, Oxford, 1971.



large-scale exports of labour and British 'stock', chiefly to the Dominions. After the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, more than 2 million persons emigrated from the UK in the interwar period in search of better prospects in the British Commonwealth (primarily the Old Commonwealth) and in the United States.<sup>879</sup> These migrants supplied a substantial labour force for the growth of the 'settler' economies (including Australia and Canada), and while emigration was consistently strong in the interwar and post-war period, the benefits of the expanded (and expanding) labour markets was to become more apparent in the post-war period. The substantial flows of emigration from the United Kingdom had been perceived by contemporary politicians as one means of developing and maintaining Britain's position as a world power through the increase in British settlement throughout the Dominions of the Empire, and through the accompanying increase in ties of allegiance between colonial subjects of British 'stock' and Britain itself (as, for example, the 'motherland').<sup>880</sup> An underlying assumption amongst policy makers was that supplying the dominions with increased labour-power would promote the economic strength of the Commonwealth as a whole, and thus re-cement Britain's position as a global power. Yet, in the context of post-war labour shortages, the emigration of 'good British stock' was also seen as a regrettable loss to the British economy.<sup>881</sup> For the emigrants themselves, the faster growing economies of the British Dominions represented the hope, at least, of prospects of employment and advancement that had been largely unavailable in the depressed conditions of the interwar British economy.

Britain emerged from the Second World War as the world's largest debtor.<sup>882</sup> For Britain's financial and political elites, two of the most significant effects of the Second World War included the ceding of economic dominance to the US and a state of further indebtedness to US financial interests, and the significant losses of manpower brought about by War-time casualties. At the end of the Second World War the substantial outflow of British migrants to 'Old Commonwealth' countries began to return to the levels at which it had tailed off in the event of the war, just as 'Old' and 'New' Commonwealth countries alike sought measures of independence from the 'motherland'.<sup>883</sup> From 1914 onwards, the British state had sought to maintain a universal concept of British subjecthood throughout the dominions and colonies by allowing all subjects the *formal* right to freedom of movement within British territory, even as these rights were substantially restricted on the basis of gender, class, and

<sup>879</sup> For example, 500,000 of these migrated to Australia; see Michael Roe, *Australia, Britain, and Migration: A Study of Desperate Hopes, 1915-1940*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

<sup>880</sup> Large numbers of child migrants were sent to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand in order to increase the 'Anglo' stock of these Commonwealth countries..

<sup>881</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 47.

<sup>882</sup> P. J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 312

<sup>883</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 9. Layton Henry notes that 2 million people emigrated from the UK in the period 1919-1930. More than 1 million migrated from Britain to Australia in the post war years 1945-1970.

race.<sup>884</sup> In addition, as we noted above, the interwar years had seen the British governments consistently pursue a policy of seeking to supply its dominions with substantial flows of 'British stock', even throughout the depression years of the late 1920s and early 1930s.<sup>885</sup> As India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma all gained independence in the late 1940s, and the dominions began to demonstrate their economic and political autonomy, the British government responded to the Canadian government's (1946) introduction of national citizenship legislation by enacting the British Nationality Act of 1948. In this Act, the British government created a new political entity, the United Kingdom and Colonies, wherein all members of the British Commonwealth and Colonies were recognised as having the rights and obligations of British citizens under the formal umbrella definition of 'citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies'. The primary purpose of the Act was the symbolic weight it attached to the concept of a community of allegiance. As the Lord Chancellor William Jowitt told the House of Lords,

*[t]he concept of an all-pervading common status or nationality is not primarily, not mainly, important because of its material advantages. It is, if you like, rather mystical. But none of us, I suggest, is any worse for a little mysticism in our life. It is the mark which differentiates the family from mere friends.*<sup>886</sup>

The material advantages that Jowitt referred to include the benefits of British subject status, such as the right of freedom of entry into Britain, and the right to vote in elections. The British Nationality Act allowed the British state to maintain imperial allegiance even as dominions and colonies sought to define citizenship in terms of their own nationalities, and furthermore changed the definition of allegiance from subjecthood to citizenship in response to Indian and Pakistani criticisms of the concept of subjecthood as representing an overly deferential form of allegiance to the British Empire. The concept of Commonwealth citizenship thus also formally worked to represent a more equal relationship between member states. Nonetheless, while a degree of equality was inherent in the new Act, the Colonial Office saw the new form of allegiance as a 'symbol of *common loyalty* and equal status',<sup>887</sup> and the allegiance of dominion populations were valued over those of the 'New' Commonwealth members in accordance with a racial hierarchy that had white British subjects at its top and 'coloured' colonial subjects at its bottom. In addition, whilst formal political allegiance amongst the members of

<sup>884</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, Chapter one.

<sup>885</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, pp., 25-30.

<sup>886</sup> Lord Chancellor William Jowitt, *Parliamentary Debates (Lords)*, vol. 155, col. 762, May 11<sup>th</sup>, 1948, cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 53.

<sup>887</sup> HO213/202 Colonial Office Memorandum, British Nationality Proposals for Change in the Law, July 5<sup>th</sup>, 1946, in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 18. (*Italics mine*). The Colonial Office initially met stiff opposition from the Home Office, which saw the UKC proposal as a threat to sovereign (British) territoriality, before the Home Office's Permanent Undersecretary Alexander Maxwell's arguments for the Colonial Office's position gained the support of the interdepartmental working party.

the British Commonwealth was expanded in the 1948 Act in an attempt to incorporate measures of autonomy within the sphere of British Commonwealth influence,<sup>888</sup> the bonds of financial flows and trade were newly invigorated in what John Darwin referred to as the 'second colonial occupation'.<sup>889</sup> In the immediate post-war period, Britain sought to pursue post-war growth through the continued reliance on the Commonwealth countries as suppliers of cheap raw materials and as the means of maintaining the sterling currency system and London as a global financial centre.<sup>890</sup>

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, this ideological renewal occurred just as the government 'faced the task of post-war construction in a situation of virtual bankruptcy, heavy dependence on European loans, severe labour shortages and what was seen as a population crisis'.<sup>891</sup> The strategy of the post-war Labour government set a precedent in the pursuit of full employment, the welfare state, neo-Keynesian economic management, and nationalisation.<sup>892</sup> This assemblage of policy directions set a social democratic consensus that lasted until the 'oil crisis' of 1973-4, the Callaghan government's conversion to orthodox monetarism under the imposition of IMF discipline, and, subsequently, the Thatcherite turn to neo-liberalism in the late 1970s.<sup>893</sup>

The politics of emigration and migration in the immediate post war period was, therefore, played out within a renewed — albeit somewhat anxious — ideology of British imperialism.<sup>894</sup> At the same time, the remaining colonies moved towards autonomy and independence and the US began to demonstrate its position as a global superpower rivalled only by the Soviet Union in the emergent Cold War. What followed was a 'period of rapid withdrawal from extensive imperial commitments overseas and a realisation by British leaders and people of declining world status',<sup>895</sup> a paradigmatic shift that was painfully prefigured by the debacle of the Suez crisis (1956).

The fading vision of imperial greatness was bolstered briefly, in the late 1950s, by the Commonwealth ideal — a 'vision of a multi-racial partnership co-operating on terms of equality in political, economic,

<sup>888</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 9. Paul writes that the 1984 BNA 'became a means of securing Britain's role at the centre of the empire/commonwealth and securing the continuing dependence of parts of that empire'.

<sup>889</sup> John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 198, p 139.

<sup>890</sup> P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 77.

<sup>891</sup> Wendy Webster, 'Defining Boundaries: European Volunteer Worker women in Britain and narratives of community', *Women's History Review*, Volume 9, No. 2, 2000, p 260.

<sup>892</sup> Martin Jacques, 'Thatcherism — breaking out of the impasse', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, (eds.), *The Politics of Thatcherism*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990, p 40.

<sup>893</sup> Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, 'Introduction', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, (eds.), *The Politics of Thatcherism*, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1990, pp., 8-9; Stuart Hall, 'The Great moving right show', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 20.

<sup>894</sup> Ted Bromund, 'Loosing Faith: The end of the Imperial economy, 1945-1963', paper presented to the Post-Imperial Britain Conference, at the Institute of Contemporary British History, University of London, July 8<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

<sup>895</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 29.

and cultural matters'.<sup>896</sup> By the 1960s, however, there was a strategic turn away from the system of colonial preferences and a reorientation towards the world economy (given its dominant structure by US hegemony), and, more specifically, towards Europe. While the British economy had recovered from the crisis of the immediate post-war era and experienced sustained economic growth, the growth of its European, American and Japanese competitors was greater.<sup>897</sup> The turn to Europe and the global economy of the 1960s was concurrent with a growing sense of economic crisis that resulted, by the mid-1970's, in the privileging of transnational finance and foreign investment (the service sector) over domestic manufacturing. The consequent restructuring of the British economy and state society complex saw the demise of the influence of the manufacturing sector and the Trade Unions, as well as the Commonwealth-oriented Colonial Office. These shifts were accompanied by a new form of ethno-nationalism, defined, this time, by the abject loss of the sense of Imperial greatness.<sup>898</sup>

## Section 5.2. Anglo-European dynamics

As I mentioned above, much of the large-scale emigration of British persons to the white dominions in the post-war period (1.5 million had emigrated by 1960) was part of the attempt to re-centralise Britishness within the ('Old') Commonwealth. One effect of the British emigration flows was to add to the labour shortages that, having occurred, in part, through the loss of working age males in the Second World War, were a feature of the recovering British economy in the immediate post-war period. The labour shortages were more than matched a growing demand for migration to Britain in Europe. Dummett and Nicol have observed that there was a 'desperate demand in Europe to come to Britain',<sup>899</sup> a demand that was a consequence of the mass displacements caused by the war. At the end of 1945 there were 1.8 million refugees living in 262 Displace Persons camps run by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and by 1947 these numbers had been swelled by large flows of Eastern European Jews, so much so that the UNRRA had become responsible for an additional 500 camps. Anti-Semitic conflict, homelessness and poverty were the major 'push' factors for many of the millions of post-war Europeans caught in the 'no man's' land of refugee camps or geopolitical homelessness, many of whom would have accepted the chance to re-settle and work in Britain.

In addition to this *potential* source of large-scale European immigration was the possible source of foreign labour that already existed in Britain, as the war effort had already resulted in a substantial

<sup>896</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 33.

<sup>897</sup> See Angus Maddison, *Phases of Capitalist Development*, Chapters 3, 5, and 6, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982.

<sup>898</sup> I elaborate this idea further throughout this section, while drawing on Paul Gilroy's concept of post-colonial melancholia; See Paul Gilroy, 'Introduction: Race is Ordinary', *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, (3<sup>rd</sup>. Edition.), London, Routledge, 2002, and chapters 3 and 4 of *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?*, Routledge, 2004.

<sup>899</sup> Dummett and Nicol, *ibid*, p 176.

presence of 'aliens' and colonial subjects in British territory. There was a war-time population of 250,000 'aliens' in Britain, including 110,000 'non-resident aliens', 60,000 of whom were refugees that the Home Office predicted were likely to apply to settle at the end of the war.<sup>900</sup> The potential use of these European displaced persons became a site of conflict amongst competing departments of the British government, with the Foreign Labour Committee and the Ministry of Labour seeking to recruit workers to augment the labour force, whilst the Home Office tended to resist immigration flows and settlement that it perceived as a risk to social harmony.<sup>901</sup> Jewish European refugees were seen as the major threat in terms of problems of assimilation. Henceforth, throughout the war and in the immediate post war period British ministers resisted the possibility of settling any substantial proportion of the large numbers of post-war Jewish refugees in Britain or in British colonial territories (including Palestine), arguing that further Jewish immigration was likely to cause public hostility, while neglecting to acknowledge that such hostility would be the result of heightened unemployment and overcrowded housing conditions.<sup>902</sup>

The tension between the post war government's initial policy of full employment and the exclusionary assumptions of the restrictive Aliens Act and the need to promote the recovery and growth of British industry and agriculture developed in the form of an anxiety about the insufficient size of the British population, and an accompanying recognition of the need to address the problem of labour shortage. The Political and Economic Planning (PEP) report of 1948 addressed the issue of population and immigration, as did the Royal Commission on Population (1949).<sup>903</sup> The PEP and the Ministry of Labour concluded that there was a need for a guest-worker scheme of up-to 1 million workers.

Having lost the labour of those Italian and German prisoners of war who returned to the continent by 1947, the government actively sought to retain *some* of the potential labour force of European persons resident in Britain, by encouraging, for example, members of the Polish government and Armed Forces in Exile to stay and work in Britain.<sup>904</sup> As early as 1946, the government had also sought to augment these workers with further recruitments of Polish soldiers who did not wish to return to Poland, and persons from the displaced persons camps in Germany and Italy, and in 1947, the Polish Resettlement Act provided state funding for the integration of the post-war Polish communities. 115,000 Poles who

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<sup>900</sup> Louise London, *ibid.*, 252-3, 260.

<sup>901</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid.*, pp., 71-72.

<sup>902</sup> Louise London, *op cit.* London shows that Home Office officials unsuccessfully attempted to persuade ministers that substantial Jewish resettlement should be encouraged; See also Robert Miles and John Solomos, 'Migration and the state in Britain', in C. Husband, (ed.), *'Race' in Britain: Continuity and Change*, London, Hutchinson, 1987, pp., 82-3.

<sup>903</sup> *PEP Population Policy in Great Britain*, London, Political and Economic Planning, 1948; Royal Commission Population Papers, London, HMSO, 1949, 1950.

<sup>904</sup> Dummett and Nichol, *ibid.*, p 176. These numbered some 30,050 at the time of their entry in 1940. See Robert Miles and John Solomos, 'Migration and the state in Britain', in C. Husband, (ed.), *'Race' in Britain: Continuity and Change*, London, Hutchinson, 1987, p 86.

had fought for the British in France and Italy were resettled under these schemes in Britain, and a further 29,400 Poles settled in Britain under the European Voluntary Workers Scheme (EVWS).<sup>905</sup> The post-war Polish migrants were recruited to fill gaps in the labour market in agriculture, brick-making, coal-mining, engineering, hospitality, metal production, and textiles.<sup>906</sup>

In addition to the Polish 'resettlement' programmes', the EVWS brought in 90,000 migrants (chiefly Poles, Italians, and others housed in displaced persons camps) to fill labour gaps in mining, agriculture, textiles and hospitals. Miles and Solomos note that the EVWS 'anticipated the contract migrant labour system set up by a number of Western European states in the 1950s and 1960s', inasmuch as the British state undertook 'to meet all the costs of recruitment, transport and repatriation on behalf of those capitalists short of labour power'.<sup>907</sup> Work permits were issued to a further 100,000 Europeans in this period, primarily for domestic service and catering. In overall terms, the organised recruitment of European labour migration between 1946 and 1951 brought in a total of 460,000 European migrants.<sup>908</sup>

Supplementary to the organised recruitment of European workers was the net inflow of 350,000 Irish workers from 1946 to 1959, which augmented the 70,000 who had migrated during the war years.<sup>909</sup> While their entry was unrestricted and their status as Irish citizens granted British subjecthood, Irish men and women formed a significant segment of migrant labour in this period, particularly in the construction and services sectors. Irish workers provided a much needed source of labour, whilst meeting the criteria of assimilation by virtue of their colour and long history of adaptation to British culture through successive waves of immigration and through the British colonial and post-colonial influence over Ireland. Yet, to write that Irish immigrants were entirely welcome would be to guild the lily, as 'Irishness' had long carried connotations of primitivism, barbarism, filth, poverty, and idleness in British political, media, and popular discourse.<sup>910</sup> The British history of viewing Irish persons as members of a pre-modern society had been used to justify the enactment of the utilitarian precepts of classical political economy in the nineteenth century in order to force the modernisation of the Irish economy and to lay the blame for Irish poverty on the Irish themselves (see chapter two). Although in its third decade of independence at the end of the war in which it had remained neutral, Ireland had not yet recovered from its traditional dependency and subservience to the British economy, and remittances formed an essential flow of finance for the Irish economy which continued to function

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<sup>905</sup> Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *ibid.* p 29; Jerzy Zubrycki, *Polish Immigrants in Britain: A Study of Adjustment etc.* Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1956, p 62.

<sup>906</sup> Jerzy Zubrycki, *ibid.* p 66.

<sup>907</sup> Miles and Solomos, *ibid.* p 87; The authors derive this note from the ILO, 1949, pp., 438-40.

<sup>908</sup> Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *op cit.*

<sup>909</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid.* p 16.

<sup>910</sup> See John Marriott, *ibid.* 2003, p 165; L. P. Curtis, *Apes and Angels: The Irishman in Victorian Caricature*, Washington, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997; Christine Kinealy, *ibid.* pp., 329-31.

primarily as a supplier of raw agricultural product for its industrialised neighbour.<sup>911</sup> As Kathleen Paul observes, something of a political trade-off was managed by the Irish and British governments: by 'relying on the employment of Irish labour in foreign markets', the Irish government freed 'itself of the obligation to provide employment at home', while the United Kingdom 'acquired a labour source more vulnerable to direction and more likely to take up work in manual and casual trades'.<sup>912</sup> The colonial traditions of ethno-pauperisation left a legacy that meant that Irish immigrants still faced discrimination in Britain in the period after the Second World War, even as they were valued as an auxiliary labour force. Thus by 1961, when the Conservative Macmillan government was tabling its proposed restriction of labour immigration, and particularly New Commonwealth immigration, it was only after much debate that Irish migrant labour was to be excluded from the restrictions that were enacted in 1962.<sup>913</sup>

Popular xenophobia directed at non-British persons was even stronger when faced with the inflow of European migrants. Dummett and Nicol observe that there was opposition amongst the National Union of Miners to the Polish and Italian workers who worked in the coal mines, and Layton Henry adds that there was general opposition amongst the unions to the European Voluntary Workers who were absorbed into the labour market, and that the EVWS was operated under harsh conditions in order to mollify trade union interests.<sup>914</sup> The conditions included compulsory assignation to sectors experiencing serious labour shortages, requirements to seek permission for changing jobs, the necessity of the migrants belonging to a trade union, the requirement placed on employers to promote native workers over migrants and to lay off migrants before native workers, and the right of the government to deport those migrants that became unemployed, injured, or disabled.<sup>915</sup> In a similar manner to the later continental guestworker systems, most EVWS arrangements did not originally allow for migrants to bring their dependents with them, yet most of those who settled in Britain were able to bring their families at a later stage.<sup>916</sup> A significant proportion of the voluntary workers chose to on-migrate to the United States rather than stay in the United Kingdom.

The above figures represent a relatively significant proportion of the pool of labour available amongst European displaced persons, or amongst those European persons prepared to migrate in search of work because of the destruction of their home economies. These refugees and labour migrants were regarded, from a utilitarian perspective, as a cheap and flexible form of labour, which presented an

<sup>911</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 97; see also chapter two, section 2.2.

<sup>912</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 99.

<sup>913</sup> Dennis Dean, 'The Conservative government and the 1961 Immigration Act: the inside story', *Race and Class*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1993, pp., 68-9

<sup>914</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 177; Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 19.

<sup>915</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *op cit*.

<sup>916</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *op cit*.



acceptable degree of potential assimilation into British society.<sup>917</sup> In the latter regard, the government sought to provide European workers with conditions matching those of British workers, and the negotiations with unions and employers that sought to protect the privileges of British workers can also be seen as an attempt to ease their integration into the labour force.<sup>918</sup> In this vein it should be noted that the Trade Union Council did not, in fact, act upon any of the restrictions that had been agreed upon in terms of the restrictions and limitations placed on the migrant workers vis-à-vis British workers.<sup>919</sup>

In comparison, the majority of the displaced persons gained work in France and Germany, and further afield in the US, Australia, and Canada, where those governments actively sought economic growth through an expanded migrant-labour pool. In the former cases we should also consider that there were established pathways of refugee and labour migration formed through the upheavals of the first decades of the century and, in France at least, nineteenth century concerns about low levels of population growth.<sup>920</sup> Many others chose to migrate to the United States, Canada, and Australia.

Given that the Polish Resettlement, the relatively small-scale British EVWS, and the additional various labour recruitment schemes of the Foreign Labour Committee (FLO) were initiated at a time when the Geneva Convention and international instruments for the management of European displaced persons were being formulated it is worth noting that the conscription of European labour was not initiated on the basis of the state's desire to alleviate the 'humanitarian' refugee problem.<sup>921</sup> There was a separation of interests divided between the Foreign Office's responsibility for providing funding to the UNRRA in order to meet international humanitarian commitments, the Ministry of Labour's and FLO's responsibilities for labour flows from Britain to the Dominions, and from Europe to the British labour market, and the Home Office's concerns over possible burdens on the state's purse. These diverse interests had both utilitarian and racialised underpinnings that produced a form of ethnic discrimination. As Kathleen Paul observes, the principal parliamentary debates on foreign labour government representatives spoke of the 'benefits that come from the assimilation of virile, active and industrious people into our stock'.<sup>922</sup> That appears disturbing in the light of the events and effects of the Holocaust: Tony Kushner observes that 'the British state placed Jewish survivors in the displaced persons camps at the bottom of its desirability lists at a time when it was recruiting labour from this

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<sup>917</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 79; the Ministry of Labour discriminated on the basis of ethnicity, health, age, and gender; each discrimination was based in the combination of the underlying logic of utility and assimilation.

<sup>918</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, pp., 80-81.

<sup>919</sup> TUC Papers, MSS103.28/2 Foreign Labour in Great Britain, 1947-51, Reply to Erith Trade Council, July 1949, in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 82.

<sup>920</sup> Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, London, Sage, 2003, p 53; Gerard Noiriel, *The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1996

<sup>921</sup> Miles and Solomos, *ibid*, 1987, p 87; the authors note that the Polish resettlement schemes were not based on humanitarian concerns, but on the basis of addressing the problem of labour shortages.

<sup>922</sup> *Parliamentary Debates (Commons)*, 5<sup>th</sup> ser., [1947], v. 433, C. 387, in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 84.

source on a massive scale', while Louise London records that political refugees from Eastern Europe (including significant numbers of those who had a fascist involvement) were preferred over Jewish persons, and that the schemes' administrators explicitly rejected the selection of Jewish immigrants.<sup>923</sup> This response can be compared to that of the United States, which set a quota for 400,000 post-war refugees, while nonetheless restricting entry on the basis of proof of support. Like the British war-time policy of visa-restrictions and entry limited to those who were either sponsored or self-supporting, this US policy was onerous for the large numbers of pauperised displaced persons who lacked sponsorship, yet unlike the British policy it effectively had the virtue of enabling the extension of large-scale asylum for post-war Jewish refugees.

Right from the time of the rise of fascism in Germany in the early 1930s through to the post-war period of European immigrant labour recruitment, British politicians based the informal policies of Jewish exclusion on the perception that a significant inflow of Jewish migrants would result in a rise of popular anti-Semitism. It may have seemed to contemporaries that the widespread anti-Jewish riots of August of 1947 following the anti-British violence of the Irgun and other Zionist groups in Palestine bore out the Home Office Minister Morrison's argument that 'there will be trouble if all possible refugees &c do not go after the war'.<sup>924</sup> Yet public sympathy for Jewish Europeans during the war and in the immediate post-war period was also strong. In 1945, for example, the *Sunday Express* received thousands of letters from families offering to take in the young men and women who remained in the Nazi concentration camp at Belsen.<sup>925</sup>

Thus, it was by no means a political certainty that popular opinion would have required the exclusion of Jewish persons from the post-war migrant-labour schemes. In fact, even before we consider the dynamics of the 'New Commonwealth' immigration of this period, it seems that the war-time and immediate post-war period represented a missed opportunity for the expansion of the politics of immigration and national identity in a more liberal and hospitable direction. Here, the dominant status of governmental discourse and policy would have been crucial. A positive extension of hospitality and recognition of the usefulness to the British economy and society of European and, particularly, Jewish refugee migrants may have helped to redress the ethno-national and 'tolerant liberal' discursive fields of belonging and 'unbelonging' into which the 'New' Commonwealth immigrants were soon to enter. It might have done so by redefining the traditional relationship between the British nation and ethno-

<sup>923</sup> Tony Kushner, 'Remembering to Forget: Racism and anti-racism in post-war Britain', in Brian Cheyette and Laura Marcus, (eds.), *Modernity, Culture, and 'the Jew'*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, p 233; Louise London, *ibid*, p 269-71.

<sup>924</sup> Herbert Morrison, Correspondence to Peake and Maxwell, March 6<sup>th</sup>, 1942; 338 Britons were killed in anti-British violence in Palestine between 1945-1948; There was widespread revulsion in Britain at the Irgun's bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946.

<sup>925</sup> Louise London, *ibid*, p 269. The offer, generally, was made by families seeking to employ the refugees as domestic servants.

pauperised displaced persons beyond the tradition of racialisation and 'liberal tolerance', and, beyond the logic of assimilation, by drawing continental European cultures and communities further into the post-war reconstruction of Britishness.

### Section 5.3. Migratory Dynamics in the 'New Commonwealth'

In his analysis of the politics of post war 'New Commonwealth' immigration, Zig Layton-Henry argues that the new pull factors of the post-war British society, including, primarily, the need to expand the labour market in order to meet the needs of the expanding economy, were more 'decisive' than the already-existing push factors occurring in the colonial peripheries.<sup>926</sup> Layton-Henry identifies unemployment, population growth, and the cutting of alternative outlets for migration as the push factors, and the job opportunities and better opportunities and prospects in Britain as the pull factors.<sup>927</sup> In his argument, the former are necessary factors in any explanation of the immigration to Britain, but only become sufficient when combined with the existence of the increased levels of British labour market demands.<sup>928</sup> In addition, the context of the imperial legacy that Layton Henry offers makes it clear that the particular pathways followed by the New Commonwealth migrants was influenced by the strong cultural, political and economic relations of dominance that existed between the imperial metropolis and the British colonies and dependencies.<sup>929</sup>

The imperial legacy for the colonial (and then post-colonial) countries that originated the migration flows in this period had involved the racialisation and pauperisation of substantial segments of those 'New Commonwealth' (British Caribbean and Asian) populations (see chapter two). As Sivanadan observed,

*Colonialism had already under-developed these countries and thrown up a reserve army of labour which ... waited in readiness to serve the needs of the metropolitan economy.... Colonialism perverts the economy of the colonies to its own ends, drains their wealth into the coffers of the metropolitan country and leaves them at independence with a large labour force and no capital with which to make that labour productive.*<sup>930</sup>

Under colonial conditions, colonial subjects had been subject to forms of exploitation that resulted in or depended on their coerced mobility and stasis. I would argue that, in the post-war period, the extent

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<sup>926</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 17.

<sup>927</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *op cit*.

<sup>928</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *op cit*.

<sup>929</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, Chapter one, 'The Imperial Legacy'.

<sup>930</sup> A. Sivanadan, *ibid*, 1991, p 102.

to which the New Commonwealth migration flows can be considered to have been 'free' depends on the extent to which the imperial context is underplayed; for example, only by depoliticising the suffering of West Indian subjects in the first half of the century can we arrive at a formula in which their post-war migration appears as purely voluntary in the sense of the rational actor model of classic liberal economics and migration theory. Giving appropriate weight to the imperial context shows that many of these 'voluntary' migrants were making choices but 'not in conditions chosen by themselves'; that is to say that the majority these migrants were also relatively unfree.<sup>931</sup> In this context, Robert Miles's observation that the major flows of New Commonwealth migration to Britain were primarily forms of labour migration, as opposed, for example, to the migration of political refugees from Kenya in 1968 and Uganda in 1972 seems relevant.<sup>932</sup> I want to emphasise, however, that insofar as the major New Commonwealth flows were economic migrations, they were also political migrations, and that a significant element of the factor of force that necessitated these migratory flows was the colonial and postcolonial politics of Britain and the US.

Recent analysis of the causes of forced migration have emphasised the fact that it is the *combination* of poverty and conflict that leads to forced migration.<sup>933</sup> In the post-war period, different degrees and combinations of the combined 'push' factors of poverty and conflict were influential in the 'New Commonwealth' regions of the British West Indies and Asia, and contributed towards the migration of increasing numbers of people to the country that they had been historically encouraged to view as colonial 'motherland', and particularly in recent years through their incorporation into the British war effort. From the late 1940s onwards, Indian and 'Pakistani' persons emigrated to escape the colonial legacy of forms of conflict and poverty, and large numbers did so after the conflicts caused by the form of British colonial withdrawal and the partition of 1947. Subsequently, there were particularly large flows from the predominantly Sikh communities of the Punjab districts of Jullundur and Hoshiapur, and from the 'borderland' region of the East Punjab where they had been driven by the annexation of 'West Pakistan'. Here, 15 million people were displaced in the events of the partition.<sup>934</sup> Subsequently, Bangladeshi migrants followed in the 1950s.

The vast majority of the population of the British Caribbean were descendents of the subjects of the colonial systems of forced or unfree migration and stasis — the African slaves and Indian indentured workers who had laboured in the plantation system (see chapter 2). The economies of the British

<sup>931</sup> Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', *Surveys from Exile*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973, p 146.

<sup>932</sup> Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982, p 151

<sup>933</sup> Castles, S, Crawley, H, and Loughna, S, *States of Conflict: Causes and Patterns of Forced Migration to the EU and Policy Responses*, London, Institute of Public Policy Research, 2003.

<sup>934</sup> S.W. Keller, *Uprooting and Social Change; The Role of Refugees in Development*, Delhi, Manohar Book Service, 1975

Caribbean stagnated in the first half of the twentieth century; having been distorted by their dependence on the demand of the Western nations for cheap and mono-cultural agricultural produce and starved of investment in the interwar period. Colonies were not valued beyond the extent to which they were considered to be useful sources of profit, and the introduction of free trade policies was accompanied by neglect of the colonies as societies in and of themselves, particularly up until the industrialisation strategies that emerged with the onset of the Second World War.<sup>935</sup> In the Caribbean, these dynamics combined with the strong competition in the sugar industry given by the US-funded Cuban plantations to the plantation system to produce a state of recession in the British Caribbean. As the US poured vast amounts of investment into the sugar cane industry, West Indian became dependent on remittances sent home from those who migrated to labour in throughout the Caribbean cane plantations; Jamaicans, for example, laboured in the Cuban plantations, and sent home an average of 600,000 (USD) per annum in the 1930s.<sup>936</sup>

Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the collapse of international sugar prices and the increasing restrictions on immigration in Britain and elsewhere throughout the 'Old Commonwealth' led to intense downwards pressure on wages and employment throughout the British Caribbean. The effects of the Great Depression that began in the US was to cause drastic reductions in the market value of sugar, and thus the destruction of the lucrative flow of migrant remittances from the profitable US sectors of the plantation system. Throughout the British Caribbean, there were no systems of social security, and islanders were deprived of the social safety valve and flow of remittances that further labour emigration might have provided.<sup>937</sup>

Trade Unions and independence movements emerged in the early 1930s to protest against low wages, unemployment and underemployment, and the racism of the colonial administrators and employers. The socio-political unrest of this period reached its climax in the years 1935 to 1938; in 1935 St Kitts experienced a sugar strike, there was a revolt against customs duties in St. Vincent, a coal strike in St. Lucia, and oil strikes in Trinidad and Tobago. Barbados suffered urban riots in 1937, and Jamaica was suffering from widespread social unrest by 1938.<sup>938</sup> Jamaica, Britain's most important Caribbean colony, was subject to modernising policies aimed at shifting the Jamaican economy from an

<sup>935</sup> Randolph B. Persaud, *Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica*, New York, State University of New York, 2001, p 75. In the case of Jamaica, the British government 'saw industrialization as a strategy of political cooption of the nationalist movement and simultaneously the containment of popular pressure from below (especially in the wake of the 1938 Caribbean labour rebellions on account of widespread unemployment)'.

<sup>936</sup> Michelle Harrison, *King Sugar: Jamaica, the Caribbean, and the World Sugar Industry*, New York, New York University Press, 2001, p 123.

<sup>937</sup> Peter Fryer, *Staying Power: The History of Black People in Britain*, Pluto Press, 1984, p 363

<sup>938</sup> Rafael Cox-Alomar, 'Revisiting the transatlantic triangle: the decolonisation of the British Caribbean in light of the Anglo-American special relationship', *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, vol. 15, 2004, p 353.

agricultural to an industrial base throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. Modernisation resulted in processes of depeasantisation that, in forcing small holders from the land, produced a residual (surplus) labour force that viewed emigration as a subsistence strategy.<sup>939</sup> All of these events demonstrate a refusal of colonial suppression that was to find its eventual outlet in political independence, and in the further spread and diversification of the Caribbean diasporas.

In the Caribbean, post-war international migratory pathways followed the trajectories set out by the dynamics of colonisation and the North American regional hegemony. While British colonial policies in the Caribbean were a major contributing cause of the depression and unemployment in the islands that led to the desire of many to migrate, the British restrictions on immigration in the interwar period and the increasing influence of the US over the Caribbean meant that most Caribbean migrants had turned to the more accessible United States as a destination prior to the Second World War. Subsequently, while the revolts of the 1930s contributed to and was appropriated by the independence movements in the islands, the events of the Second World War saw a temporary freeing of migratory flows that set a precedent for the non-military flows of Caribbean migrants to Britain in the post-war period.

#### **Section 5.4. The emergence of the 'Race Relations Paradox'.**

Throughout the war years the British government had maintained the use of the interwar 'aliens' legislation restricting immigration to Britain, whilst allowing the exceptional recruitment of migrants for particular sectors of the war economy. In addition to the 70,000 'spontaneous' Irish war-time labour-migrants whose entry was not, in any case, restricted under the aliens legislation, and the 300,000 Dutch and Belgian citizens whose resettlement in Britain was arranged after the invasion of the lowlands, British industries had recruited Black colonial workers for the war effort.<sup>940</sup> Whilst colonial subjects (as opposed to aliens) had had the legal right to reside and work in Britain from the time of the legislation of 1914, in practice informal governmental measures and popular and institutional racism had rendered those non-white subjects who did so as unwelcome as if they had, in fact, been aliens.

Whilst a 'colour bar' existed in the British military forces in Britain,<sup>941</sup> labour shortages forced the government to recruit West Indians to support the war effort in several key sectors; 1,200 British Hondurans were recruited to work in the Scottish highlands felling timber; 1,000 West Indians were

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<sup>939</sup> Randolph B. Persaud, *ibid*, pp.,76-7.

<sup>940</sup> Miles and Solomos, *ibid*, p 83.

<sup>941</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 363

recruited to work in the Merseyside and Lancashire war factories; 10,000 West Indians were recruited to work as ground crews for the Air Force, and thousands of colonial seamen were recruited or enlisted to work in the merchant navy.<sup>942</sup>

The exceptional circumstances of the war effort meant that, in comparison to the racist reception given to 'coloured' merchant seamen in the interwar period, these colonial immigrants were offered a measure of welcome by British people, and that much of the 'colour bar' operating in housing and employment was temporarily lifted. In addition, the American forces stationed into British territories brought their own Afro-American contingents, which were subject to the US military's strict rules of racialised segregation. There was some popular British sympathy for the racialised Black US troops, especially amongst the working class, but this sympathy was mixed with British racist views (such as the fear of 'miscegenation'), and the government's accommodation of the US policies indicated the racist attitudes that lay behind and beyond the war-time camaraderie.<sup>943</sup>

After the war, 'coloured' immigrants were subject to popular and formal discrimination in housing, employment and welfare. Ceri Peach observed that the prejudice of landlords and landladies made it difficult for 'coloured' immigrants to obtain housing, and that, correspondingly, the housing that immigrants could obtain tended to be 'overcrowded'. The overcrowding of immigrant housing, in turn, increased 'their image of undesirability'.<sup>944</sup> As the wealthier segments of white British communities tended to leave these areas throughout the 1950s, this 'undesirability' came to define the urban spaces that the immigrant communities inhabited as 'abject' spaces for the white communities that remained.<sup>945</sup> Sivanandan notes, moreover, that the *forced* concentration of immigrants in the deprived and decaying areas of the big cities high-lighted (and re-enforced) existing social deprivation', and thereafter the ideology of racism served to define the 'coloured' immigrants as the cause of urban deprivation and degeneration.<sup>946</sup> In many industries white trade unionists resisted the employment of black workers, sometimes insisting on a quota system in which black workers would provide no more than 5% of the workforce.<sup>947</sup> In this context Learie Constantine observed that

*[a]lmost the entire population of Britain really expect the coloured man to live in an inferior area ... devoted to coloured people ... Most British people would be unwilling for a black man to enter their*

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<sup>942</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, 1992, p 19.

<sup>943</sup> Racist attitudes strengthened throughout the 1950's. For example, a Gallup 'Social Surveys' Poll showed that by 1958, 71 per cent of British people were opposed to mixed marriages.

<sup>944</sup> Ceri Peach, *West Indian Migration to Britain: A Social Geography*, London, Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1969

<sup>945</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 34

<sup>946</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'Race, Class, and the State', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 124.

<sup>947</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 376



*homes, nor would they wish to work with one as a colleague, nor to stand shoulder to shoulder at a factory bench.*<sup>948</sup>

By the late 1950's there were riots throughout the country (the largest being in Nottingham and London), as well as frequent isolated incidents of racist violence. Throughout 1956-58 there was a gradual escalation in the number of violent attacks on 'coloured' people, and in the Nottingham riots of 1958 white people took to the streets in their thousands shouting things like 'let's get the blacks' and 'let's lynch them'. The Nottingham and Notting Hill riots were reported in the local and national media as a problem of 'law and order'. The object of journalistic concern was not, typically, a problem of 'race relations', but the working class white youths who were thought to have instigated the violence, and the influence of Fascist groups on those youths.<sup>949</sup> As Gilroy, writing in 1987, noted, 'the images of criminal public disorder, so central to today's ideology, were confined ... to the representation of the whites who had set out in pursuit of black victims'.<sup>950</sup> 'In the aftermath of the Nottingham riots saw the two local MPs (one Conservative and one Labour) argue that black immigration should be stopped and that new deportation orders should be issued.'<sup>951</sup> Dummett and Nicol observe that British civil servants took the events of the riots in London and Nottingham as an opportunity to promote the idea that government would have to respond to the British public's desire for immigration controls.<sup>952</sup> In addition, black people subject to these white riots complained that the police were biased against them.<sup>953</sup> As we shall see when we discuss the politics of New Commonwealth immigration, such incidents of popular racism and xenophobia were mobilised by the British governments towards a problematisation of 'coloured' immigration, and was articulated to a correlative problematisation of 'race relations'.

The post-war recruitment of European migrant labour contributed to the recovery of the British economy by providing a cheap and immediate source of labour for the under-resourced sectors of British industry, agriculture, and service. This need was increased, in the immediate post-war environment, because the redeployment of women from the war-time work force back into the domestic sphere of the home, and the skills gap that emerged as a problem in the re-integration of ex-servicemen back into the work force. In addition to the Polish Resettlement and EVW schemes, the spontaneous arrival and recruitment of (initially) small numbers of colonial subjects served to bolster the labour force. These flows were legally possible because of the contingent eventuality of legislation

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<sup>948</sup> Learie Constantine, *Colour Bar*, London, S. Paul, 1954, p 71.

<sup>949</sup> Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire, Routledge, 2002, pp., 98-100.

<sup>950</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 99-100.

<sup>951</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 377.

<sup>952</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 181.

<sup>953</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 378.

designed to cement a concept of Commonwealth citizenship just as the post-war environment lent itself to fragmentation and independence amongst the former British empire. The 1948 British Nationality Act confirmed the legal right of entry into and settlement within British territory to the British subjects and citizens of the United Kingdom-and-Colonies throughout the globe.<sup>954</sup> From the late 1940s onwards, West Indians began to emigrate to escape the chronic unemployment, poverty, and frequently violent levels of socio-political unrest in the Caribbean. West Indians migrated to the US, within the Caribbean itself, and to Canada and Britain. In Britain, these colonial citizen-subjects were to constitute a substantial labour force in key sectors, and thus contributed to the growth of the British economy throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.

The initial flows of migrants to the UK in this period predominantly consisted of spontaneous arrivals, many of whom were well-versed in the labour requirements of the British labour market through the employment sections of British newspapers that were read in the West Indies.<sup>955</sup> In addition, sectors of the British economy that were struggling to compete for indigenous labour soon began recruiting in the West Indies. Thus the fluctuations in the numbers of migrants to Britain tended to follow the fluctuations of the British labour market.<sup>956</sup> Throughout the 1950s and early 1960's expansion of the British economy, the textile, metal manufacture, health, hospitality, communication and transport sectors – each of which offered its potential employees the relatively low pay, long hours and shift work that native workers found unattractive – looked to the Caribbean market for some of their labour requirements.<sup>957</sup> In return for accepting labour in the lower sectors of British industry and services, the new migrants were able to earn and save enough money to alleviate conditions 'at home'. The remittances that migrants sent home during this period rapidly became a dominant form of GNP in the Caribbean nations; it was, for example, the second highest component for Jamaica over the period 1948-1951.<sup>958</sup> These dynamics furthered the pattern of inter-war dependence on remittances, and the West Indies has subsequently become structurally reliant on the remittances sent home by the Caribbean diaspora.<sup>959</sup>

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<sup>954</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 262.

<sup>955</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, p 31. The authors state that the Commonwealth immigration had been entirely voluntary until 1962, with the exception of London Transport's recruitment of a few thousand workers from Barbados. A. Sivanandan notes that the British Hotels and Restaurants Association also recruited in Barbados from 1956. See A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 102; British public and private recruitment in the New Commonwealth was more extensive in the 1960s. See Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 373.

<sup>956</sup> Ceri Peach, *ibid*, 1969.

<sup>957</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 24. Peter Fryer notes that in the late 1950s, more than half of the West Indian males working in London had jobs which were below their skill levels. See Fryer, *ibid*, p 374.

<sup>958</sup> Author's interview with Jerry Thomas, PhD. on the Banana Wars at Nottingham University; May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2003.

<sup>959</sup> Michelle Harrison, *ibid*, 2001; Keith Nurse, 'Migration and Development in the Caribbean', *Focal Point: Spotlight on the Americas, Special Edition*, March 2004. For example, by 1990, 1 million Jamaicans lived overseas, comprising 40% of the Jamaican population. They remitted 29% of the GNP, and remittances were the fastest growing foreign exchange inflow. By 2002, an estimated \$5 billion (US) worth of remittances was poured into the Caribbean.

As the table below indicates, the actual numbers of New Commonwealth persons who availed themselves of the opportunity of migrating to Britain was relatively small when compared to the numbers of Commonwealth persons who had the right to migrate under the 1948 legislation.<sup>960</sup>

**Net Immigration from the New Commonwealth 1953-1961<sup>961</sup>**

Year	West Indies	India	Pakistan	Others	Total
1953	2,000	2,000	N/a	N/a	4,000
1954	11,000	11,000	N/a	N/a	22,000
1955	27,500	5,800	1,850	7,500	42,650
1956	29,800	5,600	2,050	9,350	46,800
1957	23,000	6,600	5,200	7,600	42,400
1958	15,000	6,200	4,700	3,950	29,850
1959	16,400	2,950	850	1,400	21,600
1960	49,650	5,900	2,500	-350	57,700
1961	66,300	23,750	25,100	21,250	136,400

The figures given in the table indicate the two jumps that occurred in response to restrictive immigration legislation. The first of these was the American McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, which, while overtly protecting US immigration policy from racialisation, nonetheless limited Caribbean immigration to the US to a quota of about 800 a year.<sup>962</sup> After the relatively stable figures of the mid to late 1950s, the numbers of immigrants jumped again in anticipation of the impending restrictions promised in the legislation of 1962. Throughout the entire period between the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA) and the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (CIA), the numbers of Caribbean immigrants exceeded those from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, until the 'beat the ban' migration of 1961. The table also indicates a gradual increase towards substantial and ongoing levels of immigration, and this trend was borne out by the records of the numbers of work voucher applications from the Indian subcontinent, as these rose to 284,000 in 1962-3.<sup>963</sup> These potential figures didn't eventuate, as the application of the 1962 CIA limited immigration to around 50,000 a year. Moreover, the substantial ongoing emigration from Britain to the settler (post)colonies meant that the net change in the size of

<sup>960</sup> 600,000,000 Commonwealth subjects had that right.

<sup>961</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 13; Figures taken from the 1976 House of Commons library research paper.

<sup>962</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 142

<sup>963</sup> Henry Brooke, Conservative Government Home Secretary, *Hansard*, 27 November, 1963; cited in Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 56.

the British population remained minimal in the 1950s, before becoming substantially negative throughout the 'crisis' decades of the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>964</sup>

By 1962, 150,000 New Commonwealth migrants had settled in Britain, and in doing so had laid down the routes and roots for the long period of familial immigration throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In the period from 1948 until 1962, British immigration policy shifted from an apparent tolerant openness to a regime of harsh, if incompletely effective, restriction. The politics of this phase of post-war immigration has been and continues to be the subject of much debate. Much of that debate has revolved around the relevance of the 'race relations paradigm', and, more specifically, the differences between theorists who see the actions of politicians and bureaucrats in this period as part of a racialising strategy which seeks political legitimisation by problematising post-war immigration as a 'racial' issue, and, on the other hand, those analysts who view the elite liberal politicians of this period as having resisted the popular xenophobia or racism that resulted from 'inassimilable' immigration.<sup>965</sup>

The focus on the politics of New Commonwealth immigration in relation to popular or governmental racism has tended to relativise the importance of the political economy as a means of analysing the formation of immigration policy. In addition to the racialisation approach, however, the politics of New Commonwealth post-war immigration has also been usefully theorised in terms of the class position of the new immigrants within a national and international division of labour. Several of the major framings of migration, race, and class in this period come from the works of A. Sivanandan, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, and Robert Miles.<sup>966</sup> Sivanandan's (1976) thesis that the post-war governmental framing of immigration as a race relations problem served to institutionalise racism, and shift it from its private laissez faire standing to the common sense status of governmental legitimacy has been highly influential. In his article for *Race and Class*, Sivanandan argued that the British state first, created a colonial reserve labour army through colonial capitalist exploitation, and secondly, in the post-war context of British labour shortages, facilitated the (laissez faire) movement of that surplus labour from the periphery to fulfil the needs of the British core in the regeneration of British industries

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<sup>964</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, pp., 42, 25. The net migration figures for 1951-61 were + 12,000; for 1961-71, - 320,000, and for 1971-1981, - 306,000.

<sup>965</sup> For earlier accounts in the former vein see B. Carter, C. Harris, and S. Joshi, *ibid*, 1987; Paul Foot, *ibid*, Ann Dummett and Michael Dummett, 'The role of government in Britain's racial crisis', in C. Husband, (ed.), 'Race' in Britain: *Continuity and Change*, London, Hutchinson, 1982, and Eliot J. B. Rose *et al*, *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969; contemporary accounts in this vein include Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, and Ian. R.G. Spencer, *British immigration Policy since 1939: the Making of a Multiracial Britain*, London, Routledge, 1997. The earlier liberal apologists included D.T. Studlar, 'British public opinion, colour issues, and Enoch Powell: A longitudinal analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 178, pp., 371-81, and latterly Randall Hansen, *ibid*.

<sup>966</sup> See, for example, Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, London, Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1973; Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982; Robert Miles and Annie Phizacklea, *Labour and Racism*, London, Routledge, 1980; A. Sivanandan, 'Race, class, and the state: the black experience in Britain', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, pp., 101-126

and services.<sup>967</sup> Sivanandan then explains the turn to restrictionism in the late 1950's in terms of the articulation of racism and the changing labour requirements of British capital. In the first case, he explains the racism that develops in relation to the association of the exploited living conditions of urban migrants (including the problem of overcrowded housing) with public prejudice about the cultural difference of the new communities.<sup>968</sup> In the second case, he argues that the racialisation and subsequent restriction of 'coloured' immigration was in accordance with the interests of capital as the expression of 'national interest', as the economy had, by the late 1950s, absorbed sufficient levels of surplus labour.<sup>969</sup> Correspondingly, Sivanandan presents a Marxist thesis on the development of (restrictive) nationality laws in terms of a construction of migrants as 'contract' and thereby permanently surplus labour that corresponds with the shift in the direction of the British economy from the Commonwealth system of preferences to a deeper engagement with Europe.<sup>970</sup>

Sivanandan's analysis of the political economy of post-war immigration focuses on the assumed statist-facilitation of the needs of British capital leads him to propose that the British government (initially) had 'no wish to change the nationality laws in order to stop 'coloured' immigration'.<sup>971</sup> Subsequently, however, the changing requirements of capitalism led to the utility of racialisation. Sivanandan argues that racialisation came to support capitalism because it served to divide the working class on a racial basis and thus prevent 'the horizontal conflict of class through the vertical integration of race', thereby exploiting 'both race and class at once'.<sup>972</sup> Liberal capitalism, in the ideological process of incorporating Asian and West Indian communities within a pluralistic 'race relations' paradigm, served to depoliticise the potential resistance given in the potential coalition of a postcolonial-and-working class resistance. Here the process of pluralist incorporation served to divide the New Commonwealth immigrant community into a (culturally) assimilated West Indian sub-proletariat and a (economically) assimilated Asian bourgeoisie.<sup>973</sup>

Castles and Kosak's Marxist study of post-war European labour immigration also analysed the British (and European) immigration in terms of the political economy of migration. Writing in 1973, these authors sought to position their study as an intervention into the framing of the politics of immigration in terms of 'race relations'. Using an orthodox Marxist interpretation of immigrant labour as an

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<sup>967</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 106

<sup>968</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 104-5.

<sup>969</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 105.

<sup>970</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 106-7

<sup>971</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 113

<sup>972</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 104

<sup>973</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 121.

'industrial reserve army', Castles and Kosak sought to overturn the overly-culturalist framing of the 'race relations' approach.<sup>974</sup>

Castles and Kosak situate their analysis within a historical context, arguing that the period of continuous economic expansion in the decades after 1945 produced an imbalance in the ration of labour to capital and land that resulted in a sustained period of workers' wage rises.<sup>975</sup> At the same time, like Miles and Sivanadan, they emphasize that an analysis of post-war labour immigration should start with a recognition of the history of uneven development caused by the international capitalist system that had created labour reserves in regions that had been subject to European colonisation.<sup>976</sup> Thus, the authors argue that Western European capital, in drawing upon international labour reserves in the post-war reconstructions, was engaged in a process of appropriating 'development aid' from the countries and regions it had formerly pauperised.<sup>977</sup> The limitation of this argument, as I will outline below, lies in the lack of historical evidence demonstrating a sustained and state-led plan to support capital by drawing upon New Commonwealth labour reserves for post-war reconstruction. To point to that hesitation is not, however, to deny the colonial-capitalist structuring of uneven development, nor the relationship between core and peripheral modes of production given in world-systems analysis, but merely to state that the role of the state in facilitating those labour migrations was complex and contested within the different sectors of the state-society complex, and worked through the axis of race as well as that of class.

For Castles and Kosak, the race relations problematic of the accommodation between a 'homogenous and peaceful host society' and immigrants marked by their racial 'strangeness' is a reductively apolitical approach to the analysis of post-war immigration (or, rather, the political economy of immigration). The authors' view of the society into which the labour immigrants are incorporated is overdetermined by structural inequality and conflict. Thus,

*Western European Societies are class societies based on the ownership and control of the means of production by a small minority, and on the concomitant domination and exploitation of the masses. Social relationships are marked not by harmony and free will but by conflict and coercion. Immigrants do not have to adapt to universally accepted norms and customs. Rather they are assigned a place in*

<sup>974</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, pp, 2,377.

<sup>975</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, p 377.

<sup>976</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, pp., 7-8. The authors include the 'backward areas of Europe' in the history of uneven development ; Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982, p 156; A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 102

<sup>977</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, p 8. The authors also note that this process constitutes a 'hindrance to development' for the 'regions from which the migrants come', however this approach seems to overlook the value of remittances to the originating societies, and therefore, the degree of agency being utilised by migrants

*the non-egalitarian social order. Their relationships are not with society as a whole, but with specific social groups within it: employers, landlords, fellow workers, and so on.*<sup>978</sup>

Through the subordinate status of the occupations the immigrants take up, they come to form a substratum of the European nation's working class whose members tend to perceive them as an illegitimate form of labour competition. Incorporating migrant labour into the national economy thus produces a conflictual division of the working class, and a corresponding tendency for indigenous workers to unite as nationals against a perceived 'alien' threat. Rather than directly reflecting the cultural problem of racial difference, hostile reactions to new inflows of substratum labour are based in the insecurity of the position of the indigenous work force in the 'prevailing socio-economic conditions'. At the same time, the constitution of the immigrant labour force as the substratum allows the indigenous working class to progress within and identify with the national hierarchy rather than with the new sub-proletariat.<sup>979</sup> Thus, national class conflict is depoliticised and the capitalist hegemony maintained, at this particular historical juncture, through the racialised incorporation of 'alien' labour.

Castles and Kosak's intervention has been criticised for the economic reductionism of their orthodox Marxist approach.<sup>980</sup> Later historians of the post-war New Commonwealth immigration have sought to redress the reduction of an analysis of immigration and racism to the problematic of class conflict.<sup>981</sup> On this basis, Nikos Papastergiadis argues that the recent historical accounts emphasizing the importance of 'racial anxieties' in the formation of post-war immigration policy negates the structuralist approach by showing that differential practices in 'labour recruitment implied that there was a colour code on the reserve army thesis'.<sup>982</sup>

Papastergiadis lists amongst those governmental anxieties fears of miscegenation, excessive sexuality and criminality, and correspondingly, the 'racial' attributes of 'idleness and mental inferiority'.<sup>983</sup> On this basis he states that 'the government's perception of black immigrants was not as a new category of proletarians, but as, in the words of one spokesman, the 'dark strangers' that posed a threat to public and national culture'.<sup>984</sup> Papastergiadis draws upon Sheila Patterson's study of the interaction of the

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<sup>978</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, p 6

<sup>979</sup> Stephen Castles and Godula Kosak, *ibid*, p 7.

<sup>980</sup> For example, Robert Miles, *ibid*, 1982, p 153

<sup>981</sup>; Bob Carter, C. Harris, and S. Joshi, *ibid*, 1987. More generally, the structuralist approach has been criticised for neglecting the cultural aspects of migration. See Nikos Papastergiadis, *ibid*, pp., 32-9.

<sup>982</sup> Nikos Papastergiadis, *ibid*, p 36.

<sup>983</sup> Nikos Papastergiadis, *op cit*.

<sup>984</sup> Nikos Paperstergiadis, *op cit*; cf., Sheila Patterson, *Dark Strangers: A Study of West Indians in London*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1963.



West Indian immigrant community in Brixton in the post-war era. Patterson describes the British perception of the coloured immigrant's 'visible strangeness' as evincing his or her status as 'the supreme and ultimate stranger': this visible strangeness is 'accentuated by a whole series of preoccupations associating dark pigmentation with alien cultural traits and with the lowest social order'.<sup>985</sup> In the penultimate moment before the Conservative government enacted restrictions based, in large part, on these anxieties the strangeness of the immigrant was strongly associated with a more familiar strangeness. Thus as one Cabinet member of the Macmillan government put the matter, 'the immigrants are not being assimilated and tend to be associated with the lowest class of the population'.<sup>986</sup> Without wanting to push this point too far at this stage, it seems fair to argue that this Conservative view also constitutes the British 'lowest class' as category of population that is resistant to assimilation within a properly ordered social body.

These anxieties of race-and-class reflect, and that draw upon, those of nineteenth century British colonial capitalism, both in terms of the elite fears of degeneration that had as its objects the British poor and colonial subject, and in terms of the insecurities of the working and middle class subjects whose fear of proletarianization was relayed through a dynamic dis/identification with the 'pre-modern' colonial other. In this context I would like to suggest, initially, that instead of privileging the 'cultural' category of 'race' or the 'structuralist' category of class, we view the relationship between the categories, in the first place, as working through processes of ambiguous identification and dis-identification. From this perspective, Castles and Kosak's analysis brings us to the point of a historical correlation. The dialectic that the authors indicate in the form of overdetermined class racism mirrors that of the nineteenth century governmentality of 'one nation' imperialism, inasmuch as it involves an indigenous resistance to proletarianization via the projection of that state of abjection onto the colonial 'other'.<sup>987</sup> The difference between the two dialectics might be regarded in terms of the intensity and intimacy of the ambiguous dis/identifications that come with the presence of the colonial subject within (rather than without) the bounds of the national community. Here the resistance to proletarianization that figured as a racial national belonging in the nineteenth century is reworked, in the mid twentieth century, in terms of a resistance to the abject sphere of Commonwealth subject-hood, and thus a re-borderment of the sphere of national citizenship.

The correlation between the 19<sup>th</sup> century dialectics of national imperialism and 20<sup>th</sup> century dialectics of 'race-and-class relations' can be framed in terms of the biopolitical management of a well-ordered

<sup>985</sup> Sheila Patterson, *ibid*, p 209. Patterson lists 'primitiveness, savagery, violence, sexuality, general lack of control, irresponsibility' as features of the British perception of coloured 'alienness' derived from nineteenth century colonialist attitudes (pp., 210, 212).

<sup>986</sup> PRO CAB 134/1469, February 7<sup>th</sup>, 1961; cited in Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 73

<sup>987</sup> See chapter 3, ...

social body.<sup>988</sup> Employing a Foucauldian approach to the politics of New Commonwealth immigration, Ali Rattansi has sought to demonstrate the discontinuity of the discursive formations and political technologies that work through the categories of 'race' and 'class' in the governmentality of post-war immigration. Papastergiadis, in reflecting upon Rattansi's analysis, argues that this approach demonstrates that 'government policies which sought to manage the process of social and cultural interaction according to racialised categories did not privilege class considerations'.<sup>989</sup> The following account and analysis of the governmental constitution of the 'race relations paradigm' will also draw upon the Foucauldian approach, but seeks to engage with rather than reject the structuralist approach. On this basis, rather than following the tendency to de-emphasise the relevance of political economy and the category of class, I argue that it would be more accurate to consider the manner in which the liberal governmentality of the post-war era sought to manage the ambiguities of race-and-class. In doing so, my approach accords with Rattansi's argument regarding the necessity of theorising the 'complexity, variability, and *constant* interrelationship between various forces'.<sup>990</sup>

Having sketched the manner in which I seek to approach the interaction between the categories of 'race' and class, I now want to pursue this section's account of the politics of New Commonwealth immigration policy by returning to the 'racialisation' debates. Layton-Henry's account of the politics of post-war immigration lies between the extremes of the positions taken on the 'racialisation' debates: Layton-Henry gives a muted criticism of the Labour Party's refusal to pursue a positive multicultural politics in the immediate post-war period, and argues that it failed to adopt a 'realistic' restrictionist stance in the late 1950s.<sup>991</sup> His observation that what remains surprising is the length of time it took policy makers to introduce restrictions is not based on the position of Randall Hansen, who argues that elite liberalism protected the open regime of immigration from the illiberal public for as long as was feasibly possible, but on the geopolitical constraints on the restrictionist tendencies of the Labour and Conservative government's of the 1950s.<sup>992</sup> Whilst Layton-Henry's geo-political argument provides a useful contribution to an analysis of the politics of New Commonwealth immigration, Hansen's thesis is substantially wrong. In order to understand the politics of immigration in this period, and to appreciate why it matters that Hansen's thesis is erroneous, it's important to qualify the nature of the 'openness' that was extended in the 1948 legislation and lasted until the 1962 Commonwealth

<sup>988</sup> Ali Rattansi, 'Race, class, and the state: from Marxism to postmodernism', *Labour History Review*, Vol. 60, No. 3, Winter 1995, p 23.

<sup>989</sup> Nikos Papastergiadis, *ibid*, p 37.

<sup>990</sup> Ali Rattansi, *ibid*, p 27.

<sup>991</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, pp., 29, 51; Layton Henry writes that 'what is surprising is that the Labour Cabinet did not believe that this [public] prejudice could be overcome by a positive programme of public education, legislation, or administrative action (Cabinet Papers, 1950, para. 12, iv.).

<sup>992</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, pp., 39-40

Immigration Act, and to understand the degree to which Hansen's argument depoliticises the concept of popular racism.<sup>993</sup>

It has been argued that the 1948 Act had seemed to open the door to a *laissez faire* form of Commonwealth migration.<sup>994</sup> The idea that Britain had, in 1948, intentionally opened its doors to the free flow of immigrants, indiscriminately of whether these were New Commonwealth, Dominion, European or other, has to be regarded as incorrect on several grounds.<sup>995</sup> In the first place, the British Nationality Act of 1948 merely opened a 'loophole' in the laws governing immigration and nationality. Why refer to this development as the opening of a 'loophole' rather than focus on the fact that some New Commonwealth migration was the result of active state recruitment? The short answer is that to do the latter is to enable the mistaken impression that the openness of this period was, in a substantial sense, part of a deliberate governmental policy. Layton-Henry, for example, observes that the inflows of New Commonwealth immigration was neither planned nor anticipated by the policy makers who framed the 1948 Act.<sup>996</sup> The government was, he argues, quick to seek informal measures to stem the inflow, and *only* hesitated over formal measures out of concern for the *realpolitik* realities of the effort to revitalise the metropolitan centre amongst the post-imperial Commonwealth.<sup>997</sup>

The British Nationality Act of 1914 and its variants up until the 1948 BNA formed a series of renegotiations of British hegemony over the Commonwealth. The traditional gap between the definition of a colonial subject and a Commonwealth citizen given in these renegotiations became exploitable in the post-war context. The British Nationality Act of 1948 was framed as a reaction to the 1946 Canadian Immigration Act, which conferred the right to grant citizenship on the Canadian state. The effect of this movement towards dominion sovereignty was to cause a reluctance to restrict the Commonwealth franchise of citizenship amongst British policy makers, for the fears of the loss of the Commonwealth influence that formed the basis of the neo-imperial strategy of British regeneration. The Commonwealth countries that formed the basis of this planned regeneration were, primarily, the nations of the 'Old' Commonwealth whose growing economies and labour markets were crucial to the British neo-mercantilist strategies. Yet the post-war governments of the 1950s were also concerned to

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<sup>993</sup> See also my discussion of Hansen's thesis in the introduction.

<sup>994</sup> A. Sivanandan, for example, assumes that the British governments initially supported a capitalist *laissez faire* regime of labour migration; A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 101, and *passim*; Randall Hansen similarly argues that the 1948 Act opened a *laissez faire* era. See Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, pp., 5, 16. Hansen writes 'that a nation of 50,000,000 would indefinitely open its doors to 600,000,000 from developing countries was always incredible' (p 5), and describes the period of openness from 1948-62 as one of post-war liberality (p 16)

<sup>995</sup> See also Christian Joppke, *Immigration and the Nation State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999.

<sup>996</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 22.

<sup>997</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *op cit*. Layton-Henry ascribes a reluctance to intervene to 'relations with colonial and Commonwealth governments'; See also Carter, Harris, and Joshi, *ibid*, 1987.

maintain British influence over the New Commonwealth countries that would form the majority bloc in the Commonwealth,<sup>998</sup> and to re-assert British influence against the growing dominance of the United States. The colonial (and postcolonial) consent required for neo-imperial hegemony required an ongoing reinvention of the tradition of Britain's (global) role as the bastion of liberalism. This concern was important, albeit in different forms, to both the Labour and Conservative governments and parties. The Labour party tended towards a vision of a multi-racial Commonwealth of equitable relations, even as colonial and postcolonial colonies were ranked in terms of their capacities for citizenship and responsible government in terms of a racialised stage-theory of development.<sup>999</sup> In its stronger forms, Labour support for the Commonwealth ideal consisted of the Atlee government's post-war plan to combine the areas of Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Dominions under British leadership. This project of British led 'Third World Power' would, it was hoped, challenge the emergent dominance of the bipolar world order.<sup>1000</sup> Later, in the debates over the Conservative government's introduction of restrictions in 1962, the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell emphasised the irrevocable loss of Commonwealth and global influence that the restrictions entailed.<sup>1001</sup> Yet, throughout the late 1950s, the Conservatives had denied any plan for restrictions in similar terms. The major Conservative resistance to immigration restrictions in the late 1950s and early 1960s revolved around regret for imperial decline, and an opposition to the joining of the EEC which seemed to represent an admission of the corresponding loss of Britain's global role.<sup>1002</sup> In this context, Conservatives also valued the vision of a multi-racist Commonwealth. Thus, for example, the Conservative M.P. David Renton stated that

*[t]his country is proud to be the centre of an inter-racial Commonwealth, which ... is the greatest assortment of peoples of all races, creeds, and colours the world has ever seen. As a result of that we have always allowed any of the people in what was the empire and is now the Commonwealth to come to this country and go from it as they please.*<sup>1003</sup>

From the perspective of the Colonial Office the re-assertion of Commonwealth hegemony required an avoidance of the appearance of an immigration policy that discriminated on racist grounds. Thus, until the demise of its influence in the early 1960's post-colonial context, the Commonwealth Office

<sup>998</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 33

<sup>999</sup> See Caroline Knowles, *Race, Discourse, and Labourism*, London, Routledge, 1992.

<sup>1000</sup> John Kent, Review article, 'British Government Policy and Decolonisation, 1945-63, by Frank Heinlen, London, Frank Cass, 2002', Institute of Historical Research, <http://www.history.ac.uk/ihr/Focus/Empire/reviews/kent.html>; accessed July 5<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The point is derived from Kent's review, rather than Heinlen's book.

<sup>1001</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 71.

<sup>1002</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 35.

<sup>1003</sup> David Renton, *Hansard*, December 5<sup>th</sup>, 1958, cols. 1579-80, cited in Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 32.

consistently argued that any restrictions on New Commonwealth immigration should be obtained by informal means, rather than through nationality or immigration legislation.<sup>1004</sup>

In addition to the geopolitical rationale for delaying restrictions, it seems that liberal ideology restrained the post-war governments' ability to move towards restrictions in the domestic realm as well. In correlation to the neo-imperial rationale, a major domestic reason for the delay in the enactment of restrictions was that the constitution of restrictions as a democratically legitimate and liberal policy required the gradual construction of discursive formations and political technologies that effected the problematisation of the immigrant population as a threat to the social body. While I elaborate this development further below, I wish for the moment to point out that even if we assume a popular xenophobia and opposition to 'coloured' immigration from as early as 1948 that does not mean that we can assume, therefore, that politicians would have been free to frame democratically legitimate restrictive legislation. The major reason here is that restrictive legislation would require, at the same time, a *liberal* rather than a *racist* (albeit 'democratic') framing, and therefore was subject to the period of ideological work necessary for the conversion from a basis in popular xenophobia and racism to a grounding within a liberal framework. Thus, while the dominant liberal discourse on immigration throughout the 1950s took an anti-racist anti-restrictionism, it was not until the late 1950s that a counter-hegemonic discursive formation (taking the form of 'antiracist' restrictionism) could effectively challenge the dominant discourse.

Regardless of the intentions of the British policy framers, many colonial subjects *took* the opportunity given at face value – that is to say – as the formal recognition of a historically valid right of belonging that they had been encouraged to believe in and give allegiance to.<sup>1005</sup> Stuart Hall captures some of the ambiguities of this postcolonial resistance when he writes that

*In the very moment when finally Britain convinced itself that it had to decolonise, it had to get rid of them, we all came back home. As they hauled down the flag (in the colonies), we got on the banana boat and sailed right into London ... (T)hey had ruled the world for 300 years and, at last, when they had made up their minds to climb out of the role, at least the others ought to have stayed out there in the rim, behaved themselves, gone somewhere else, or found some other client state. But no, they had always said that this (London) was really home, the streets were paved with gold, and bloody hell, we just came to check out whether this was so or not.*<sup>1006</sup>

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<sup>1004</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 58, 61

<sup>1007</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 11.

<sup>1006</sup> Stuart Hall, 'The local and the global', in Anthony D. King, (ed.), *Culture, Globalization, and the World System: Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989, p 24.

Hall's indication of a colonial/imperial hybridity captures the ambiguous status of the colonial subject in the context of the 1948 BNA. These hybrid subjects were caught within the paradox of their formal status as Commonwealth citizens owning the rights of a universally-conceived liberalism, and their actual status as 'docile subjects' owning nothing more than the right of allegiance to the Crown. In acting on the formal rights given in the BNA, the New Commonwealth immigrants, particularly those who were self-presenting voluntary migrants, replicated the transgression of liberal governmentality that had seen the West Indian freed slaves desert the plantation system in the aftermath of emancipation in 1833, rather than enduring their reincorporation into colonial capitalism as 'free' labour within the stasis of the plantation system.

The migrations encouraged by the BNA grew after the combination of the post-war eruption of postcolonial independence movements, the recessive and conflictual effects of colonial policies, and the labour requirements of the recovering British economy. Jamaican and other West Indian emigrants turned to Britain in increasing numbers after the United States enacted restrictions in the early 1950's,<sup>1007</sup> and may have done so with some regret as the Caribbean diaspora in the US had and was to continue to prove to be a significantly successful diaspora and segment of black US socio-economic and political dynamics. In geopolitical terms, this development mirrored the surge in the numbers of Jewish refugees fleeing to Britain in the 1890's. In that earlier case, it had also been the enactment of the first American restrictions on pauperised immigration that had caused destitute potential migrants to look to Britain as alternative destination.<sup>1008</sup> Caught within the twin traps of poverty and conflict, each of these historically and geographically different groups – the Russian Jews of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the West Indians of the post-Second World War period – found their options directed by the internal and external concerns of powerful Western states.

While the legal loophole of the 1948 British Nationality Act existed it enabled, to an extent, a 'return of the repressed' in as much as it loosened the British (informal) control of mobility that had been exercised over the Caribbean;<sup>1009</sup> the migration of Caribbean people and the remuneration they sent home demonstrates the agency that repressed people will utilise once free of the repressive control of their mobility, and it is here that we should locate a major contributing factor to the persistence of New Commonwealth immigration in the face of governmental and political desires for closure. Conversely,

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<sup>1007</sup> Annie Phizacklea, 'Migration and Globalization: A Feminist Perspective', in Khalid Koser and Helma Lutz, (eds.), *The New Migration in Europe: Social Constructions and Social Realities*, Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 1998, p 25.

<sup>1008</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nichol, *ibid*, p 93.

<sup>1009</sup> Although subject to the BNA of 1914, and therefore formally able to migrate to and reside in Britain, such migration was discouraged in the interwar period, and New Commonwealth subjects were effectively regarded as equivalent to other 'aliens'. (e.g. 1925 Alien Seaman's Act)

service and industrial sectors in Britain were also able to take advantage of this loophole, as did the public transport sector, as well as 'the newly created National Health Service, the textile industry, and the car industry'.<sup>1010</sup> Ali Rattansi argues that the New Commonwealth direct-recruitment policies of public bodies such as London Transport and British Rail should be seen as having been distinct projects that contributed to debates within the state regarding the labour requirements of the regenerating economy, rather than as parts of a cohesive state-supported scheme.<sup>1011</sup> British service and industrial interests combined with the interests of shipping companies and the agency of the immigrants themselves to produce a constellation that, on the basis of their divergent interests, challenged the dominant ethno-national form of the British state-society structure in Britain.<sup>1012</sup> On a *prima facie* basis, the divergence of interests between the British sectors of private industry and public services that utilised New Commonwealth migrant labour, on the one hand, and the restrictive sectors of government (such as the Home Office) on the other, validates the critiques that have been made of the structuralist conflation of the state and capitalist interests.<sup>1013</sup> Yet, as I will argue below, that critique, in turn, rests upon an inadequate understanding of the politics of migration as it operates via the changing and contestable form of hegemony manifest in liberal governmentality.

Much of the governmental discourse of the immediate post-war period sets the precedent for the following problematisation of immigration and 'race' and subsequent restrictive policies. The interdepartmental working committee set up in 1947 had concluded that immigration controls would be necessary because of the risk of the creation of an 'inassimilable minority' in Britain.<sup>1014</sup> The 1948 inter-party committee recommended against significant levels of coloured immigration, and the Prime Minister Clement Atlee sent a letter to Labour MPs stating that any large scale flows of 'undesirable' immigrants would require 'a reconsideration of Britain's 'open door' policy'.<sup>1015</sup> By 1950, the Labour party, in addressing the problem of public prejudice, had come to the opinion that it could not be successfully challenged by 'a positive programme of public education, legislation, or administrative action'.<sup>1016</sup> The 1949 the Royal Commission on Population addressed the perceived problem of the under-population of Britain, and shows that the extent to which unrestricted immigration was being considered was limited by racial and welfare-chauvinist assumptions. Rejecting the liberal notion of

<sup>1010</sup> Andrew Geddes, *The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*, Sage, London, 2003, p 32.

<sup>1011</sup> Ali Rattansi, *ibid*, p 31; 'By the early 60s, modernizers' argued that the modernisation (automation) of industry was being stalled through an excessive (unskilled) labour supply Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 67.

<sup>1012</sup> I am not attempting to ascribe intentionality (in the sense of a resistance) to all of these different actors, but to signal the disruptive effect of this constellation of interests.

<sup>1013</sup> See, for example, Ali Rattansi's critique of Sivanandan's Marxist framing of the capitalist state. Ali Rattansi, *ibid*, pp., 24-6. cf. A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991.

<sup>1014</sup> Nicholas Deakin, *The Immigration Issue in British Politics*, unpublished D.Phil, dissertation, University of Sussex, 1972.

<sup>1015</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, p 29; D. Dean, 'Coping with Colonial Immigration, the Cold War and Colonial Policy: The Labour party and black communities in Great Britain 1945-51', *Immigrants and Minorities*, Vol. 6, 1987, p 317

<sup>1016</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, p 29. Layton-Henry is summarising the views expressed in the Labour Cabinet, (Cabinet Papers, 1950, para. 12, iv).



the free movement of people, the Royal Commission had asserted: 'free and unrestricted immigration belongs to a *laissez-faire* order of ideas which have passed away, and cannot easily be reconciled with the trend towards systematic measures of collective provision of social security'.<sup>1017</sup> The Commission, which considered the problems of both British labour shortages and Jamaican unemployment, concluded that 'a systematic immigration policy could only be welcomed without reserve if the migrants were of good human stock, and not prevented by religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged with it'.<sup>1018</sup> The tensions between concerns for the provision of welfare, a coded concern for the racial reproduction of British society, and the pursuit of economic growth which might require immigrant labour can be seen in this policy document, which set much of the stage for the formation of immigration policy in this period.

In reaction to the post-war loosening of control, the British Labour and Conservative governments followed two strategies. The first of these was the relatively unsuccessful attempt to stem New Commonwealth immigration through non-legislative and less formal channels before a restrictive consensus could be built in the public sphere.<sup>1019</sup> In response to the impending Empire Windrush arrival in June, 1948, Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary, stated that 'every possible step has been taken by the Colonial Office and the Jamaican Government to discourage these influxes'.<sup>1020</sup> Measures of deterrence included the use of Colonial Office officials in pressuring West Indian and Indian Governors and other officials to discourage potential migrants and to place procedural difficulties in the way of those who had decided on emigration.<sup>1021</sup> The government also laid plans to discourage further migrants by making those that had arrived feel unwelcome, and discussed the possibility of dispersing them, either to work in East Africa, or, at least, away from the urban areas where the British black communities already congregated.<sup>1022</sup> In addition, measures were taken to restrict the employment of New Commonwealth migrants to the lower levels of the civil service and the NHS,<sup>1023</sup> and to restrict access to any publicly funded measures of integration on the basis of the argument that welfare benefits were acting as a pull factor.<sup>1024</sup> The informal approach to restriction remained the dominant approach throughout the 1950s, and when in 1959 the numbers of persons migrating from the

<sup>1017</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 174.

<sup>1018</sup> Royal Commission on Population, 1949, pp., 226-27.

<sup>1019</sup> See Bob Carter and Shirley Joshi, 'The role of Labour in creating a racist Britain', *Race and Class*, Vol. 25, Winter 1984, pp., 53-70; Bob Carter *et al.*, *ibid*, 1987, p 3-4; Dennis Dean, 'The Conservative government and the 1961 Commonwealth Immigration Act: The inside story', *Race and Class*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1993, pp., 57-74; Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 180; Randall Hansen, *ibid*, pp., 58-59; Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 138; Ali Rattansi, *ibid*, pp., 27-8

<sup>1020</sup> Creech Jones, *PRO, CAB 129/28, CP (48) 154*, 'Arrival in the United Kingdom by Jamaican unemployed: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the colonies, June 18<sup>th</sup>, 1948. Cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, pp., 57.

<sup>1021</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 58

<sup>1022</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1987, p 318

<sup>1023</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1987, p 326.

<sup>1024</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 59.

Indian subcontinent dropped this decrease was attributed to the success of the administrative approach.<sup>1025</sup>

Kathleen Paul dates the Churchill government's decision to 'construct immigration itself (*sic.*) as a problem' to the Prime Minister's meeting of May, 12<sup>th</sup>, 1944.<sup>1026</sup> Subsequently, over the next ten years, the governmental problematisation of 'coloured' immigration proceeded, in part, through five investigations into the status of New Commonwealth immigrants in Britain.<sup>1027</sup> The first of these was a Home Office meeting which discussed and recommended the re-instating of pre-war forms of documentation for persons travelling as British nationals, and was aimed at reducing the numbers of stowaways entering Britain from the West Indies by repatriating persons found travelling without papers.<sup>1028</sup> The second was a meeting of Labour Cabinet ministers in March of 1950 that met to discuss the problem of finding employment for 'coloured' immigrants and canvassed means of discouraging immigration.<sup>1029</sup> The third investigation discussed the merits of legislative and administrative measures, and concluded in favour of the latter.<sup>1030</sup> In 1952, the fourth investigation belonging to the new Conservative government surveyed the employment of coloured persons in the Post Office, and came to the conclusion that labour restrictions could not be enacted on the basis of colour in Britain and that, therefore, further means of preventing coloured persons from seeking employment in the UK should be canvassed.<sup>1031</sup> The fifth year-long interdepartmental investigation focussed on the means in which "coloured people" could be prevented from seeking employment in the UK'.<sup>1032</sup> The rationale employed in the working committee's report on the need to restrict 'coloured' immigration because of their 'unsuitability for settlement' was highly racialised. The working party cites coloured workers' 'low output ... high rate of turnover ... irresponsibility, quarrelsomeness and lack of discipline'. In gendered terms, 'coloured women' were described as 'slow mentally', and 'coloured men' as temperamental, violent, lacking in stamina, and generally sub-standard. In addition, the report referred to the 'primitive, squalid, and deplorable' conditions of the 'coloured community' in Britain.<sup>1033</sup> In general terms then, the 1952 report worked to construct the immigrant in terms of a racialising discourse that instantiates a temporal border between the (civilised) British host community, and the inassimilable (primitive) interloper. New Commonwealth immigration thus became a 'race' problem

<sup>1025</sup> Dennis Dean, *op cit*. This position was maintained by the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretaries.

<sup>1026</sup> PREM4/421 Prime Minister's Meeting, May 12<sup>th</sup>, 1944, cited in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, fn 15, p 135

<sup>1027</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, pp., 133-4, fn. 8-12.

<sup>1028</sup> CAB 129/40 CP (50)113, May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1950, cited in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 133

<sup>1029</sup> CAB 128/17 CM13(50), March 20<sup>th</sup>, 1950, cited in Kathleen Paul, *op cit*

<sup>1030</sup> CAB 128/19 CM15(51), February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1951, cited in Kathleen Paul, *op cit*

<sup>1031</sup> PREM11/824 Post Office, Employment of Coloured Workers: Memorandum by the Postmaster General, December 16<sup>th</sup>, 1952, and CAB 128/25 CM106(52), December 18<sup>th</sup>, 1952, cited in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, pp., 133-4

<sup>1032</sup> CO1032/119 Report of the Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1953, cited in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 134.

<sup>1033</sup> CO1032/119 Report of the Working Party on Coloured People Seeking Employment in the United Kingdom, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1953, cited in Kathleen Paul, *op cit*

requiring spatial re-borderment. Yet, the politicization of immigration in terms of 'race' would have transgressed the limits of avowedly anti-racist liberal governmentality.

Paul cites the Cabinet Secretary Sir Norman Brook's request for a formal review of colonial immigration (March, 1954) as the point at which 'the first signs of a deliberative campaign to sway public opinion in favour of control' appeared.<sup>1034</sup> The following month, 'a confidential meeting of ministers took place at the Colonial Office to consider gathering evidence which would demonstrate that black immigration posed insoluble problems and thus make a case for legislative control'.<sup>1035</sup> Thus, while the government went on to announce that no action was to be taken on immigration policy in November of 1955,<sup>1036</sup> from 1954 onwards the governmental problematisation of immigration as a social problem was directed towards the point at which restrictive legislation could be framed as a response to 'legitimate' public concerns.

As Carter, Joshi, and Harris observed, the need for 'empirical demonstration' decided upon in March of 1954 required that the widespread surveillance of Black communities by the police be extended to the surveillance of 'the Ministry of Labour, the National Assistance Board, the Welfare Department of the Colonial Office, the Home Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Department of Health and Transport, as well as voluntary organisations'.<sup>1037</sup> By constructing immigration as an object of surveillance in terms of articulated problems of 'unemployment and National Assistance, 'numbers', housing, health, criminality, and miscegenation', the government sought to constitute 'black' immigration in terms of 'insoluble problems of social, economic, and political assimilation'.<sup>1038</sup>

These biopolitical measures of problematising surveillance constituted an assemblage of power-knowledge formations that target the 'black' population as a disorderly threat to the British social body, as a category of subjects whose members were (racially) constituted as unwilling or incapable of governing their own freedom. Herein, this abnormal population is subject to legitimate sovereign and disciplinary power, insofar as the sovereign power of immigration policy could act on the 'problem' of excessive numbers of disorderly subjects, and the disciplinary techniques of public welfare bodies could act to ameliorate the disorderly conduct of immigrant communities. Within the sphere of liberal governmentality these subjects were ambiguously constituted between their status as a 'permanently delinquent' or 'barbaric' population requiring exclusion from the social body, and a corresponding 'developmental status' wherein they are subject to the not-yetness of the promise of liberal inclusion

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<sup>1034</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p.

<sup>1035</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 179.

<sup>1036</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 33; *cf.*, Rose, *et al*, 1969, p 209.

<sup>1037</sup> Bob Carter *et al.*, *ibid*, 1987, p 5.

<sup>1038</sup> Bob Carter *et al.*, *ibid*, 1987, p 4

once sufficient measures of rational self-discipline are evident.<sup>1039</sup> This ambiguity corresponds to that which we noted above, in the immigrants hybrid status as a subject/citizen. British nationality is correspondingly normalised as a well-disciplined sphere of good order, rather than as a hierarchical structure in which subject-positions are stratified along the axis of class whilst subject to corresponding degrees of sovereign and disciplinary power. Here the (covert) re-bordering of the national community along the axis of race-and-class worked to depoliticise the ambiguous dis/identifications of the indigenous population with its post/colonial other.

Rather than appear as a form of racist discrimination, immigration restrictions could reappear, in this context, as a solution to a specific assemblage of social tensions and problems including unemployment, poor housing, contagion, crime, and cultural difference that belong to the presence of an improper element of the population. In addressing this range of 'intractable problems,' restrictions could be presented as if they were to be enacted on behalf of both the indigenous and 'coloured' British populations. Normalised within the governmentality of (problems of) assimilation was, therefore, a form of ethno-liberalism that instantiated a qualitative and quantitative threshold of tolerance for the common good.

While New Commonwealth immigration was subject to a deliberative process of governmental problematisation from the mid-1950s, the political debate that evolved over the 'problem' of coloured immigration had two major components. The first, the issue of Commonwealth hegemony, became harder to maintain as the economic and political importance of Commonwealth trade and influence lessened. The shift to restrictive policy formation in the late 1950's and early 1960's represented a shift in venue formation within the state structure. The use of work visa control as a means of migration control had been advocated by the Home Office and the Ministry of Labour and opposed by the Colonial Office. As Randall Hansen records, the Colonial Office 'opposed both the discretion of the Ministry of Labour, in issuing vouchers, and the discretion of immigration officials at the ports, in deciding on the admission of immigrants who arrive without entry certificates'.<sup>1040</sup> By this stage, the Colonial Office's influence in Cabinet had begun to give way to the Cabinet's perceived need to solve the immigration 'problem' by formal rather than the prevailing informal means. A last impediment was offered in the form of the Colonial Secretary Iain McLeod's argument that formal immigration controls should wait upon the possible formation of a West Indian Federation, as it was believed that immigration restrictions would lead to Jamaican resistance to the Federation, and thus damage British

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<sup>1039</sup> Mitchell Dean, 'Liberal governmentality and authoritarianism', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1, p 48

<sup>1040</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 105.

influence in the West Indies.<sup>1041</sup> Once the Jamaican electorate had voted against federation, the Cabinet and Home Office no longer had any viable opposition. Thereafter, although the Colonial Office was able to produce some mitigation of the new policy direction it was not able to influence a change in that direction. This weakening influence reflected the onset of the decline of the neo-imperial strategy of national regeneration.

The second major debate – the issue of ‘racial integration’ – increased with the waning of the first. The length of time it took the Conservative government to impose restrictions wasn’t primarily due to the exigencies of the public and party political debate and the Conservative government wasn’t swayed by the Labour leader Gaitskell’s anti-racist opposition, nor by claims that the position and values of the liberal and British-led Commonwealth would be threatened. More indicative of the government’s reasoning was the letter written by the Commonwealth Relations Office’s Lord Swinton in response to Lord Salisbury’s call for immigration controls in which he argued: ‘If we legislate on immigration, though we can draft it in non-discriminatory terms, we cannot conceal the obvious fact that the object is to keep coloured people out.’<sup>1042</sup>

By the late 1950s, however, it was possible for politicians to argue that restrictions were in the interests of ‘coloured’, as well as ‘white’ British citizens. As Dennis Dean observed, the ‘disturbances in August 1958 in Nottingham and Notting Hill have been seen as a turning point in securing the passage of legislation’.<sup>1043</sup> An inter-departmental committee stated that, *until August of 1958*, ‘relations of the island population here with other people gave rise to no particular concern’, and the then Prime Minister Macmillan later stated that no governmental action was taken until ‘the matter was brought forcefully to public attention by the so-called race riots’.<sup>1044</sup> By 1961, when presenting the case for legislative restrictions to the Conservative Cabinet, the Home Secretary Rab Butler framed his reasoning in terms that were drawn from the views of the Home Office. Butler stated that controls were necessary because of ‘the strain imposed on housing resources of certain local authorities and the dangers of social tension inherent in the existence of large unassimilated coloured communities’.<sup>1045</sup> If addressing the problems of socio-political and economic ‘assimilation’, the Conservative strategy was

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<sup>1041</sup> PRO, CO 1032/304, ‘Political Repercussions in West Indies, undated, ‘Working Party to report on the social and economic problems arising from the growing influx into the United Kingdom of coloured workers from other Commonwealth Countries’, Minutes of a Meeting held at the Home Office, 10<sup>th</sup> May, 1961; ‘C.C.M. (16) 8. Commonwealth Migrants Committee: Further Report by the Inter-Departmental Working Party’ (Brief for the Secretary of State), 16<sup>th</sup> May, 1961; cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 107.

<sup>1042</sup> I.R.G. Spencer, *ibid*. Joshi and Carter, *ibid*, 1984, pp., 53-70, and Carter, Harris, and Joshi, *ibid*, 1987, pp., 335-347. These authors observe that the Cabinet papers of the first two post world war governments explicitly show a desire to exclude ‘coloured people’.

<sup>1043</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 64.

<sup>1044</sup> PRO CAB 134/1466, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 1958, and Harold Macmillan, *Memoirs*, Vol. 6, London, 1973, p 74, cited in Dennis Dean, *op cit*

<sup>1045</sup> Home Secretary Rab Butler, PRO CAB 129/107 CP153 October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1961, cited in Dennis Dean, *op cit*.

nonetheless to present its policies in terms of the changing labour needs of the British economy, which by the early 1960s were beginning to be discussed in terms of a greater need for skilled labour and a correspondingly lesser need for low-skilled or unskilled labour. Yet in the interdepartmental discussions of the impending legislation, the Treasury officials argued against restrictions, stating that the expansion of UK economy required young migrants for their flexibility.<sup>1046</sup> Referring to the labour voucher scheme that formed the basis of the 1962 restrictions, the Home Butler stated that

*[t]he great merit of this scheme is that it can be presented as making no distinctions on the basis of race or colour, although in practice all would-be immigrants from the old Commonwealth countries would almost certainly be able to obtain entry under category (a) or (b), and continued to state that we must recognise that, although the scheme purports to relate solely to employment and to be non-discriminatory, its aim is primarily social and its restrictive effect is intended, and would, in fact, operate on coloured people almost exclusively.*<sup>1047</sup>

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act that legislated the restriction of New Commonwealth labour immigration was comprised of two major sections. The first established that *Commonwealth* citizens, including those who had migrated before 1962, were to be free from migration controls. Section 1 (2) of the Act established the work voucher scheme, which allowed for slightly more than 30,000 vouchers per year. This scheme was divided into three categories: category A was established for migrants entering the UK for a specified job and employer; category B was for skilled migrants and category C was established for the unskilled. The last category, which promised 10,000 places per year depending on the employment situation in the UK, and gave no preference for any particular Commonwealth country, had become 'a dead letter by 1964'.<sup>1048</sup>

The form of the 1962 restrictions fitted the governmental requirement that they should restrict coloured immigration while being able to maintain that the legislation was not drafted on a racist basis. Steve Cohen writes that the 1962 Act was based on a combination of eugenics and national efficiency, fitting the pre-war articulation of nationality, welfare, and immigration controls.<sup>1049</sup> The CIA of 1962 got around the problem of appearing to be racist by grounding the right to entry in a work visa scheme that discriminated on the basis of skill, the assumption being that 'New' Commonwealth workers could be restricted as they were primarily unskilled. That many of the New Commonwealth immigrants who arrived between 1948 and 1962 had been skilled tradesmen or professionals (in, for example, the

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<sup>1046</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 164.

<sup>1047</sup> Home Secretary Rab Butler, PRO CAB 129/107 CP153, October 6<sup>th</sup>, 1961, cited in Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993, p 68.

<sup>1048</sup> A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 108.

<sup>1049</sup> Steve Cohen, *op cit*, p 88.

education and health sectors),<sup>1050</sup> did little to alleviate the class-based discrimination that the covertly racist policy enacted. The British colour bar operating in the labour market ensured that most of the immigrants were relegated to the lower levels of the services and industrial sectors, regardless of their skills levels on entry, and the new legislation relegated the category of unskilled or lower skilled immigration to 10,000 a year until this form of entry was abandoned in 1964.

Immigration and labour market discrimination, thereafter, was legitimated in institutional form. Whilst covertly racist, the policies enacted by the Conservative government and endorsed by the subsequent Labour government were soon to become 'integrationist' in the sense set out by the emergent 'race relations paradigm', a paradigm, that followed the logic of the problematisation of immigration in terms of the problems of assimilation set out by the Conservative government in the mid-1950s. The restrictions imposed under the legislation of 1962 were soon followed by proposals to tighten the controls, as the Home Office advisors had convinced the Home Secretary Frank Soskice that substantial numbers of New Commonwealth immigrants were continuing to enter Britain illegally.<sup>1051</sup> Using the governmental assumption that the 1962 controls had failed to work, the Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated in March of 1965 that the problem of control must be freshly examined and an attempt made to enact controls in the source Commonwealth countries. In order to placate those M.P.s who 'were angered by tighter controls being imposed, he announced that he would introduce a Bill to deal with racial discrimination in public places and with the evil of incitement to racial hatred'.<sup>1052</sup> The subsequent 1965 Race Relations Act outlawed incitement to racial hatred and discrimination in 'places of public resort' by requiring those convicted to enter into a conciliation process, but did not address institutional discrimination in employment, housing, policing, in the provision of goods and services, or in the framing of immigration and nationality legislation.

Taking the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and the 1965 White Paper and Race Relation Act together, we can see that exclusion continued to be the ground for the construction of a national sphere of liberal tolerance, while this national sphere – thought of in terms of the public good – necessitated the exclusion and discrimination that the Home Secretary Shortt had long since defined as an offence against the individual rights grounding liberalism (see chapter four). As Virginie Guiraudon comments:

*The underlying trade-off that underpins British race relations centres on a trade-off between the 'control' of immigration and the 'integration' of immigrant newcomers. This underlying axiom can be*

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<sup>1050</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 374. Fryer states, for example, that 'in the late 1950s, more than half the male West Indians in London had lower status jobs than their skill and experience fitted them for'.

<sup>1051</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 193

<sup>1052</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*.



*stated as follows: strict control of those forms of migration defined as unwanted (mainly by people classed by the colour of their skin as an immigration problem) should be combined with measures to tackle discrimination against people on the basis of their race and ethnic origin. The maintenance of social harmony required strict measures to control the entry to the state territory of those groups deemed to be a threat to social harmony because of apprehensions of the social consequences of their perceived social characteristics and the hostility their presence could provoke, or so the argument went: Either way, immigrants were perceived as a particular social and political problem and their status was problematised in terms of race and culture.*<sup>1053</sup>

Guiraudon's account describes the precedent-forming problematisation that took the form of the 'race relations paradigm'. This problematisation was given succinct expression prior to the 1965 Race Relations Act by Roy Hattersley in his phrase 'integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is unthinkable'.<sup>1054</sup>

Robert Miles emphasises the covertly racist character of the restrictions, noting that

*none of the post-1945 British Immigration Acts employs an explicitly racist discourse; they do not make explicit reference to 'black' people and they contain no statement of intent to exclude people defined as a distinct 'race' (unlike, for example, the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) order of 1925). Nevertheless, when the political context in which the legislation was passed is examined, we find that a racist ideology was present and that the legislation was introduced in order to realise racist objectives.*<sup>1055</sup>

While Miles correctly identifies the racist character of the immigration restrictions, Guiraudon makes it clear that the 'race relations paradigm' was formally anti-racist. Here we should observe the form of the paradigm's ambiguity, inasmuch as it has set a precedent in which the control of 'numbers' is perceived as a prerequisite to 'good race relations'. The race relations paradigm thus establishes a (qualitative) threshold of tolerance that is measurable (quantifiable) in terms of the scale of difference that is deemed as excessive to the limits of liberal tolerance. This paradigm can thus be thought of as a problematising strategy of statecraft. Representing 'coloured' immigration as a quantifiable and qualitative problem of tolerance worked to incite a popular and institutional discourse on New Commonwealth immigration. Thus, rather than responding to and thereby limiting popular racism by

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<sup>1053</sup> Virginie Guiraudon, source incomplete.

<sup>1054</sup> Roy Hattersley cited in Elliot J.B. Rose, et al., *Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations*, Oxford, Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1969, p 229.

<sup>1055</sup> Robert Miles, *Racism*, p 85.

securing the social body from the intrusion of excessive 'coloured' immigration, the governmentality of control served to 'create the anxieties it was intended to calm'.<sup>1056</sup> Public and governmental discourse and legislation served, after the strategy of informal restrictions of the 1950s, to render the racialised immigrant as an 'affirmative resource for statist practice' within the 'race relations paradigm'.<sup>1057</sup> The paradigm articulating integration to exclusion has subsequently 'required' the regimentation of statist solutions to the constructed immigration 'problem', which has, in turn, served to institutionalise, and thereby legitimate racial exclusion in the name of anti-racist integration. Herein, the liberal 'race relations paradigm' has taken the form of a race relations *paradox*. This now-embedded paradox has established what Paul Statham elsewhere describes as an 'entrenched political pathology' that has served to encourage anti-immigrant policy and discourse from the time of its inception in the 1960s up until the present period of anti-asylum sentiment.<sup>1058</sup>

Although expressed in terms of *integration*, it should be noted that the policies enacted in the 1960's were restrictive and *assimilationist* in substance and form: the threshold of tolerance that is perceived to have been transgressed in an 'excessive' quantity of coloured immigration is based on the culturally racist assumption that the migrants are culturally inassimilable. Hence, the restrictions on coloured immigration worked within the forms of racism that Martin Barker later identifies as the elite political 'new racism' of Thatcherism, and that Etienne Balibar describes as a form of neo-racism.<sup>1059</sup> These theorists describe forms of racism that work covertly, emphasising problems of cultural difference rather than biological (racial) difference, and, as Balibar notes, are ambiguously positioned in relation to anti-racist discourse.

As I observed in chapter three, both cultural and biological racism had been articulated to the nineteenth century construction of a national community, and employed as a practice of statecraft towards the depoliticisation of domestic (class conflict). If the nineteenth century governmentality directed towards the constitution of a well ordered population forms one precedent for the form of the 'race relations paradigm, the 1905 Aliens Act provides another. Formally, the 1960's policies echoed those enacted in 1905 in that the key determinants of decision-making (the problems of 'racial' or 'ethnic' difference) were restricted from entering the public sphere. In 1905 the governmental and

<sup>1056</sup> Elliott J. B. Rose, *et al.*, *ibid*, p 228; See also Shamit Saggat, in J. Benyon, (ed.), *Race and Politics in Britain*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, p 175. Saggat states that immigration controls 'did not so much follow public sentiment as actually precede and create it'; A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 109. Sivanandan argues that immigration controls served to institutionalise and legitimate racism. Paul Statham gives a similar argument in terms of the effect of governmental discourse and practice on public views of asylum seekers. See Paul Statham, 'Understanding anti-asylum rhetoric: restrictive politics or racist publics?', in Sarah Spencer, *ibid*, pp., 163-177.

<sup>1057</sup> I am drawing upon Nevzat Soguk's application of Foucault's concept of problematisation to refugees. See Nevzat Soguk, *ibid*, pp., 16-18. This (first) stage is one of incitement.

<sup>1058</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, p 175

<sup>1059</sup> Martin Barker, *ibid*; Etienne Balibar, 'Is there a neo-racism', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*., pp., 17-28.

administrative process discussing the exclusion of the ethnic category of Jews only entered the public sphere in the form of a discussion of 'aliens': the Aliens Act wasn't to be proposed as the 'Jewish Immigrants Act'. Governmental committees finding no substantive cause for alien restriction based their recommendations on prejudicial cultural assumptions, while giving the public impression that substantive issues had been addressed (see chapter four).<sup>1060</sup> In effect, the decision making process worked in articulation with a politics of *ressentiment*, where a self-racialised lower class politics of resentment was mobilised for the ruling classes' hegemonic purpose. Anti-racist resistance to the Act was thus exculpated – or assimilated – in that the symbolic form of the Act wasn't allowed to signify as racist; the political elite could thus enact exclusionary policies that problematised Jewish immigrants as a threat to the national community without transgressing the liberal code of (elite) British values. A similar dynamic pertained to the 1962 restrictions. As Michael and Ann Dummett observed, 'the crypto-racists could back the demands for immigration control without having to pretend to themselves that they were endorsing a racialist policy'.<sup>1061</sup>

In addition to the redeployment of a politics of resentment caught between the rock of racism and the hard place of class-relations, the governmental approach to the introduction of the 1962 Act was couched in secrecy. From the first parliamentary immigration debates in February of 1961 onwards, the government maintained that it had 'no plans to introduce legislation bringing immigration from any country to a halt'.<sup>1062</sup> The Home Office had accepted the need for control in February of 1961, but the parliamentary debates throughout 1961 gave no indication of a change to the government's policy position. As Randall Hansen's analysis of cabinet and ministerial papers makes clear, up until the introduction of the Act the government maintained a public policy that indicated that there would be no change to immigration policy and that no Commonwealth regions were being targeted for restrictions despite the fact that it had already decided to pursue the restrictionist stance.<sup>1063</sup> The delay in the move from informal and discrete administrative restriction and formal public restrictions allowed the common sense discourse of immigration as a 'racial problem' to develop. Subsequently, policy makers could claim the legitimacy of responding to 'public pressure', despite the fact that the major Trade

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<sup>1060</sup> Dummett and Nichol note, for example, that the 1903 Royal Commission 'after taking voluminous evidence, was not convinced that aliens were a significant threat to British workers', and that while the Commission concluded that fears about aliens were largely ill-founded, it nonetheless recommended controls. Dummett and Nichol, *ibid*, pp., 101-2. Whilst Dummett and Nichol note that this 'evidently illogical' conclusion was similar to that reached in the 1965 White Paper, we can add that the same 'contradictory' logic can be found in the 2002 NIA. On this point, see chapter seven.

<sup>1061</sup> Michael and Ann Dummett, 'The role of government in Britain's racial crisis', in Charles Husband, (ed.), *'Race' in Britain: Continuity and Change*, London, Hutchinson, 1982, p 116.

<sup>1062</sup> Iain McLeod, *Hansard*, 1961, cited in Hansen, *ibid*, p 101; the precise location is not specified.

<sup>1063</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, 2000, p 103. Hansen had access to government documents that had recently been released. Dummett and Nichol also emphasise the secrecy of policy formation in this period; see Dummett and Nichol, *ibid*, chapter 10, 'Secrecy and Discretion'.

Union bodies representing working class interests – the most ‘vulnerable’ section of the social body – had not supported immigration restrictions throughout the late 1950s to early 1960s.<sup>1064</sup>

The relationship between the governmental working parties and key political figures in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s provides an analogous example to the political processes that had led to the Aliens Act in 1905. In 1959 an interdepartmental working party was set up by the Conservative government in order to perform periodic reviews on the need for controls. Like the Royal Commission of 1903, the working party, examining substantive issues including the effects of immigration on employment, housing, and welfare, rejected the negative claims being made about these effects. Again, like the earlier commission, the working party tended to make recommendations for control and based their recommendations on the problem of assimilation. Arguing that recommendations based on ‘the exclusion of stocks deemed to be inferior is presentationally impossible,’ the working party advocated the use of the work voucher scheme in the pursuit of its un-presentable recommendations.<sup>1065</sup> In as much, the suggestions followed the political logic of presenting a bill designed to exclude Jewish persons in the oblique terms of the ‘Aliens’ Act, without referring to colour or ethnicity.<sup>1066</sup>

That the determination of the criteria for decision-making in post-war policy formation was kept from the public sphere is evident at the inter-party level, at the informal level evidenced by private correspondence between key figures, and in ministerial accounts. The venues for decision making in this process shifted away from parliament, the courts, and those departments such as the Commonwealth Office that were (relatively) inclined towards ‘New’ Commonwealth Immigration. The events of both the 1905 Aliens Act and the restrictions of the ‘New Commonwealth’ migrants demonstrate a form of depoliticisation that had the control of mobility as its object.

The Gallop poll citing public approval of the restrictions placed on New Commonwealth migrants in 1962 at between 62 and 67 per cent might seem, on a prima facie basis, to legitimate the democratic enactment of the government’s restrictions.<sup>1067</sup> Hansen’s argument that a cross – party consensus on the need for controls developed during this period is correct,<sup>1068</sup> despite the strong parliamentary

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<sup>1064</sup> LPA, *Race Relations and Discrimination*, ‘Commonwealth Sub-Committee of the National Executive Committee: Final Draft Statement on Racial Prejudice’, September 1958, *TUC*, 805.91(1)1; ‘Trade Union Congress: Commonwealth Economic Development’, January 4<sup>th</sup>, 1959, cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 7. Hansen notes that the latter ‘criticizes migration controls as ineffective and damaging to the Commonwealth, and calls for further British support for economic development in the colonies’.

<sup>1065</sup> Ian Spencer; *op cit*.

<sup>1066</sup> Dummett and Nichol, *ibid*, p 100. The authors write that ‘British anti-Semitism was of a curious, self-denying kind. Almost like a ritual incantation the restrictions would emphasize their opposition to *aliens* and disavow a hatred for Jews as such’.

<sup>1067</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 119.

<sup>1068</sup> Ali Rattansi notes the ‘broad similarities of response’ to New Commonwealth immigration of the Labour (1945-51) and Conservative governments (1951-55). See Ali Rattansi, *ibid*, p 27; The consensus that developed around the race relations

opposition that the Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell gave to the proposed Commonwealth Immigrants Act, as even Gaitskell seems likely to have considered restrictions when Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1951.<sup>1069</sup> Hansen writes that the principle of free entry that was found in the 1948 Act was premised on flows of Old Commonwealth migrants and several of the major accounts of this period of substantial Commonwealth immigration make a point of the fact that large-scale New Commonwealth immigration was neither intended nor expected. Thus, for Hansen, when New Commonwealth/colonial migration had become visibly significant then the British Nationality Act of 1948 had in effect legitimised 'unintended and unwanted mass migration'.<sup>1070</sup> Thereafter, he argues, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was necessary in order to address the problems of 'social problems in the inner cities' and public hostility to New Commonwealth immigration.<sup>1071</sup>

In contrast to Hansen's construction of an opposition between an elite liberalism and a popular illiberalism, I have argued that the turn to restrictive immigration policy should be seen as a strategy of statecraft wherein the governmentality of the 'race relations paradigm' was built upon the problematisation of immigration in terms of a neo-racialising discursive formation. Here, the racialised problematisation of 'coloured' immigrants as a disorderly threat to the social body has worked within the biopolitical direction of the population towards the good order and discipline necessary to liberal capitalism. Rather than seeing these developments as an example of an elite liberal brake on popular racism, or as an example of illiberal statist racism, the paradigm of 'integration' guaranteed by 'control' can be seen as a modern correlative of the ideological vent that has historically served to depoliticise domestic class-based conflict and colonial exploitation. To make this conclusion is not to deny the presence of popular anti-immigrant sentiments, but to locate their positive conditions of possibility in the (national and colonial) liberal governmentality and political economy that gives structure to those ambiguous dis/identifications. The biopolitical governmentality of the post-war immigration regime should thus be seen as integral to the articulated form of political liberalism and neo-mercantilism in the context of post-war regeneration and neo-imperialism.

The problematisation of New Commonwealth immigration occurred in the context of sustained economic growth and the renewal of attempts to secure Britain's position through a reliance on the Commonwealth dominions, colonies, and post-colonies. It is the realm of neo-imperial regeneration, rather than in the reserve labour thesis of the Marxist critics of the 1970s and 1980s, that I would locate

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paradigm became visible (in the public sphere) at a slightly later date, with the onset of the race relations legislation in the mid 1960s. Its genesis, however, occurred in the mid-point of the early sixties.

<sup>1069</sup> Zig Layton-Henry also makes a point of emphasising the strategic and symbolic use that Gaitskell found in opposing the Conservative Government over its 'racist' immigration policies.

<sup>1070</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 121.

<sup>1071</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 117.

the political economy of post-war New Commonwealth immigration. Here, the ideological work of the discourse of a multi-racist Commonwealth supported the project of British capitalist hegemony in seeking the consent of the member nations of British colonial and post-colonial influence. This project did seek to establish a political and economic framework in which the cheaper and more flexible labour of the colonies could be used towards British regeneration, but this neo-imperialism did not involve *necessarily* require that the state should facilitate the movement of surplus post/colonial labour from the periphery to the core, even in a period when the British economy suffered sustained levels of labour shortages.<sup>1072</sup> Here then, there is a correlation with the British regimes of mobility within colonial-capitalism that I discussed in previous chapters, for those regimes were often concerned to coerce or force not just the mobile incorporation of labour, but also the stasis of labour within locations and systems (such as the West Indian plantation system) on the basis of colonial-capitalist hierarchies of race-and-class. For the period of 1948 to 1962, the neo-imperial project was sufficiently compatible with the liberal biopolitical management of the British population in the terms set out in the developing problematisation of immigration, the emergent race relations paradox, and the re-stocking of post-colonial dominions with 'good British stock'.

By the first half of the 1960s, the domestic British economy faced the modernisation of its modes of production and the direction of regeneration pursued in this period, combined with the onset of industrial decline, meant that labour market would have less need for surplus supplies. In the following section I describe productive limits of the race relations paradox in the moment of the decline of the post-war strategy of postcolonial renewal. Here, I position the emergence of Powellite racism as a development that was intrinsic to, rather than exterior to the post-war liberal governmentality.

### **Section 5.5. The productive limits of the 'Race Relations Paradox.'**

The British post-war strategy of neo-imperialist regeneration corresponded to the international migrant labour that was drawn from the colonies and to the dominions. The New Commonwealth immigrants had come and worked in the (primarily) lower sectors of the British economy in the context of a period of growth throughout the 1950s and early 1960s that, although substantial when compared to the pre-war performance of the British economy, yet lagged behind the greater growth of the economies of Western Europe, the United States, and Japan. From the period of the Atlee government to the Conservative and then Labour government's of the early 1960's the neo-mercantilist strategy of 'making Britain great again' involved a system of Commonwealth preferences, including a reliance on the supply of raw materials and financial flows from the New and Old Commonwealth countries, and

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<sup>1072</sup> Post-war labour shortages lasted until the mid-1960s. For example, the Labour Government of 1965 framed in restrictive White Paper whilst acknowledging that Britain still suffered from Shortages.

the use of Commonwealth markets for the export of British manufactures. In addition, this period saw a British strategy of re-centring the City of London as the financial capital of the Sterling Area, and a rhetorical if not substantial commitment on behalf of the Labour governments to a form of international welfarism. The prevalence of the Commonwealth strategy lasted until the mid-1960s. As Wilson's (1964) ten point plan for the revival of the British economy shows, the Keynesian national strategy was linked to an underpinning reliance on the (post)colonial empire: Wilson's economic advisor Thomas Balogh, for example, was both the greatest advocate of Keynesian policies in the first Wilson government, and a key Commonwealth idealist.<sup>1073</sup> K. Morgan observes that Labour, in this period, saw the Commonwealth as 'an international laboratory of experiment for a broad programme of economic advance, technological improvement and educational change to raise the skills of the Third World'.<sup>1074</sup> One important manifestation of this programme was the institution of the Overseas Development Ministry, which signalled the seriousness of the Labour government's postcolonial welfarism.

From the context of these postcolonial productive strategies the British state-society complex was to experience a shift to an acceptance of the new financial and industry-related architecture of the post-Fordist American system of production: this shift was portrayed both as a form of Commonwealth decline, and, in more positive terms, as an acceptance of 'international liberalisation'. By the time of the 1962 Kennedy Round of international discussions of the process that was to become the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, key sectors of the British government had come, amongst a great deal of contention, to believe that the productive intensity of the ascendant world-wide trade regions took precedence over previously held Commonwealth ties.<sup>1075</sup> Correspondingly, Britain's pattern of trade shifted from the Commonwealth, with which it had conducted about half of its foreign trade in the late 1940s, to Western Europe, with which its proportion of foreign trade rose from approximately one quarter to one half by the early 1970s.<sup>1076</sup> This withdrawal from the strategy of postcolonial renewal corresponded to the introduction of restrictions on New Commonwealth labour migration in 1962, and in the overtures towards Britain's entry in the EEC.

The agency of postcolonial nations in the changing global market conditions also meant that, in economic and political terms, much of the former colonial empire had turned to the more productive motor of the United States or to a sometimes swinging allegiance to either of the Super-power systems

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<sup>1073</sup> Jim Tomlinson, *ibid*, p 209; Thomas Balogh, *Unequal Partners*, Vol. II, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963.

<sup>1074</sup> K. Morgan, 'Imperialism at bay: British Labour and decolonization', Vol. 27, 1990, p 242.

<sup>1075</sup> Jim Tomlinson, 'The Decline of the British Empire and Economy', *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol., 14, No. 3, 2003, p. 212.

<sup>1076</sup> Sidney Pollard, *The Development of the British Economy*, London, Hodder Arnold, 1992, pp., 352-65.



of production in the emerging Cold War world economy.<sup>1077</sup> In Britain, although the battle between the European regionalists and the supporters of Commonwealth renewal was not resolved until later in the decade, Britain gradually released itself from most of the trade agreements that benefited primary producers in under-developed Commonwealth countries, and relegated its Commonwealth-based strategy down to a form of strategic bilateralism.<sup>1078</sup>

From 1962 until 1964, the Conservative government swung towards an increasingly restrictionist immigration stance, whilst the levels of New Commonwealth immigration settled at a rate of 50,000 per year, a rate that was to remain constant throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Labour party, in this period, had also moved away from Gaitskell's strong criticisms of the 1962 restrictions, and had come to accept the 'necessity' of measures of control. Whilst immigration was not a major feature of the political campaigns for the 1964 election, the elections did involve significant moments for the politics of immigration. The racialising campaign of Peter Griffiths in Smethwick won a 7.5 per cent swing to the Conservatives against a national average 3.2 per cent swing to Labour.<sup>1079</sup> In addition, a block of anti-immigrant Conservative MPs were elected in Birmingham, from seats in which 'race relations had become an issue. Layton-Henry observes that the Smethwick result 'appeared to confirm the worst suspicions of those who believed that the general public was deeply prejudiced and that if the issue was exploited by unscrupulous politicians it could evoke a massive popular response'.<sup>1080</sup> After Hugh Gaitskell's death in 1963, the Labour party led by Harold Wilson proposed amendments to the 1962 CIA. Labour proposed that the unilateral policies of the 1962 CIA be replaced with a system of bilateral negotiations with Commonwealth countries, but did not oppose the general principle of control.<sup>1081</sup>

Subsequently, with a slender majority of five seats, Wilson's Labour government issued the White Paper *Immigration from the Commonwealth* (1965) calling for much tighter quota restrictions,<sup>1082</sup> and then enacted the 1965 Race Relations Act. This moment represented, as we saw in the previous section,

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<sup>1077</sup> Both 'Old' and 'New' Commonwealth countries adjusted their economies to the influence of the US and USSR. Former Dominions like Australia turned to the US and Japan. See Cain and Hopkins, *ibid*, 1993b, p 282; Ethiopia and Somalia were both post-colonial states with swinging Cold War tendencies. See Jennifer Hyndman, 'Border Crossings', *Antipode*, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp., 164-5. Moreover, much of the remnants of the former empire and areas of British influence gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. (Sudan, Egypt and Iran, 1956; Malaya, the Gold Coast, 1957; Nigeria, 1960; Jamaica, 1962; Kenya, 1963)

<sup>1078</sup> Jim Tomlinson, *ibid*, pp., 213-215.

<sup>1079</sup> Griffiths's campaigners distributed leaflets with the slogan 'if you want a Nigger Neighbour vote Labour'; cited in Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 177

<sup>1080</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 43.

<sup>1081</sup> Harold Wilson, *Hansard*, November 27<sup>th</sup>, 1963, cols. 365-8, cited in Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 56. In 1965 the Labour government dispatched Lord Mountbatten to negotiate bilateral arrangements with Commonwealth countries. The mission was a failure.

<sup>1082</sup> The White Paper proposed to reduce vouchers to 8,500 per year, and to abolish category C.

the instantiation of the Race Relations paradigm. It also represented the consolidation of the cross-party consensus on the restrictive direction of immigration policy, and for the incumbent Labour government this consensus represented the possibility of depoliticising the immigration issue and thus shoring up support from traditional Labour supporters who might be tempted to vote Conservative if Labour appeared inadequately restrictive. Richard Crossman later observed of the Labour strategy, 'we have become illiberal and lowered the quotas at a time when we have an acute labour shortage', and that 'we felt we had to out-trump the Tories by doing what they would have done and so transforming their policy into a bi-partisan policy'.<sup>1083</sup> As a result, by the time of the 1966 election and Labour's re-election, voters found little to choose between in terms of the major party's immigration policies. The bi-partisanship extended not just to an agreement on the need for measures of control, but also to the need for measures of integration. Thus the Conservative Shadow Cabinet stated that,

*(a) society must have new entrants, but entry must be sensibly controlled if the entrants and the country to which they come are to benefit. The Conservative Party stands firm on a two-fold policy for immigrants: (i) positive steps must be taken to fit into our community the immigrants already there; (ii) firm control must be established for the entry of new immigrants, and for the conditions under which they enter.*<sup>1084</sup>

The period of the mid-1960s to early 1970s saw the emergence of apparently conflicting tendencies in the politics of immigration and race relations, yet these conflicts remained within the paradigms set out by the post-war race relations paradox.<sup>1085</sup> One tendency was represented by Roy Jenkin's tenure as Labour Home Secretary (1966-8). Jenkin's was largely responsible for driving through the 1968 Race Relations Act, which attempted to redress several of the 1965 Race Relations Act's inadequacies. In a speech to the National Council for Commonwealth Immigrants in 1967, Jenkins stated that he saw integration 'not as a flattening process of assimilation, but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance'.<sup>1086</sup> Here, the stress on mutuality represented a significant departure from the assimilatory tendency of the dominant paradigm (even as Jenkins shared the dominant emphasis on control). Jenkins instigated two studies into racial discrimination, the first of which was to be conducted by the PEP and focussed on conditions in Britain, and the second of which (the Street Report) focussed on anti-discrimination legislation in an international context, and

<sup>1083</sup> Richard Crossman, *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister*, 1975, p 299. Crossman was Labour Minister of Housing and Local Government in the Wilson government. See Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 63; Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 151; Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 177

<sup>1084</sup> CPA, LCC 65/42, 'Policy document: Breakthrough for Britain', September 9<sup>th</sup>, 1965, cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 152

<sup>1085</sup> Indicatively, Zig-Layton Henry titles his chapter on this period 'Appeasement in government: Labour 1964-1970', and Kathleen Paul's chapter on the period after 1962 is titled 'Still the same old story'. Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, pp., 52-74; Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 170-190

<sup>1086</sup> Roy Jenkins, *Essays and Speeches*, London, Collins, 1967, pp. 267.

particularly sought to draw lessons from the US. The PEP report concluded that Britain had much higher rates of racial discrimination than had been previously assumed, and the Street Report concluded that the 1965 RRA needed to be amended as the measures of conciliation were ineffective: what were required, instead, were legal sanctions.<sup>1087</sup> In contrast the Conservatives, who in 1954 had used an evidence-based approach to gain public support for the problem that 'coloured' immigration presented in terms of assimilation, Jenkins sought to use an evidence-based approach to further problematise the state of 'race relations' in Britain in order to be able to present a case for the strengthening of race relations legislation, and in so doing, won the support of the majority of the British press. As it had in 1965, the government faced opposition from the Trades Union Council, which, although formally opposed to racial discrimination, saw race relations legislation as an interference with free collective bargaining.<sup>1088</sup> Nonetheless, at the Labour Party Conference of 1967, the party passed a resolution calling for the extension of race relations legislation to cover employment, housing, insurance, and other services, and called for the provision of additional support for integration in terms of increased aid for education and housing in immigrant areas.<sup>1089</sup>

This tendency towards the consolidation of the race relations paradigm was complicated by the events of the Asian Kenyan Crisis in 1967, and, correspondingly, an intensification of popular and political anti-immigrant sentiments. In the late nineteenth century, British Indian subjects had been encouraged to migrate to Kenya to 'help establish a colonial infrastructure designed to serve the 'mother country'.<sup>1090</sup> Thousands of Indian subjects were brought in to work on railway projects at the turn of the century, and were followed by labourers, tradesmen, and businesspeople in the following decades. As Kathleen Paul observes that 'the Kenyan government's implementation of an Africanisation campaign upon independence in 1963 prompted many to migrate to Britain rather than face continued discrimination'.<sup>1091</sup> Robert Miles, as I noted above, took that discrimination as a means of differentiating this migration flow (from other New Commonwealth immigration) as a form of refugee migration. The Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta's Africanisation programme involved the granting of employment in Kenya on the basis of the possession of Kenyan citizenship, and thereby, the renunciation of British citizenship. In the 1967 Kenya Immigration Act, the Kenyan government decreed that 'all employees who were not Kenyan citizens were liable to have to obtain work permits; then a Trade Licensing Act limited the areas in the country in which non-citizens could carry on

<sup>1087</sup> PEP, April, 1967; Street *et al.*, 1967. Cited in Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 66.

<sup>1088</sup> Stephen Castles and Gosulda Kosak, *ibid*, p 141-2.

<sup>1089</sup> Labour Party, *Annual Conference Report*, 1967, p 312, cited in Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 67.

<sup>1090</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 179.

<sup>1091</sup> Kathleen Paul, *op cit*.

trade'.<sup>1092</sup> As a result, 'Asians who had retained British citizenship were losing their jobs and were being forced to close their businesses'.<sup>1093</sup>

Correspondingly, the Kenyan Indian's possession of British citizenship was crucial to the immigrants' ability to claim the right of entry into Britain, as their status as British passport holders (rather than merely as Citizens of the United Kingdom and Commonwealth) was the basis of their exemption from the application of the 1962 CIA to non-white Commonwealth subjects. British Kenyans' claims of British citizenship also rested on the residual rights given in the Kenyan Independence Act of 1963, and the British Nationality Act of 1964, which granted those subjects of former British colonies CUKC citizenship. Whilst the former pertained to subjects who had not acquired Kenyan citizenship, the latter guaranteed CUKC status to subjects who could not become or remain a citizen of an independent Commonwealth country without renouncing the former status, and allowed British settlers (in effect, white Britons) to reclaim British citizenship.<sup>1094</sup> Thereafter, any move to restrict the immigration of the 'Kenyan Asians' would require new immigration legislation that would contravene the promise that the Conservative government made to settlers in British colonies against the eventuation of African (Kenyan) post-colonial hostility.<sup>1095</sup> Whether this promise was *intended* to include Asian as well as white British citizens has been a matter of debate: Dummett and Nicol cite the Conservative M.P. Duncan Sandys as the politician responsible for the extension of this guarantee to the Kenyan Asians, whilst Randall Hansen argues that the promise was only ever extended to white settlers.<sup>1096</sup> Yet, as subsequent criticisms from Conservative and Labour MP's as well as the majority of the press and civil organisations makes clear in the aftermath of restrictions, the common contemporary understanding was that a promise had been given.<sup>1097</sup>

In a sense, the 1967-8 crisis represents another '1948' moment wherein the 'universal' extension of British liberalism was confronted by its inherent anthropological limits. Both 'Asian Kenyan' and white Kenyan subjects looked to their British citizenship as a means of protection from discrimination, for that belief in the protection of the 'mother country' was doubtlessly encouraged in the 1963 Kenya Independence Act, and, more generally, in the governmentality of the British Empire and

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<sup>1092</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 199.

<sup>1093</sup> Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 67.

<sup>1094</sup> Kenya Independence Act, 1963, Section 2 (1); British Nationality Act, 1964, Section 1 (1) (a) and (b), cited in Randall Hansen, pp., 167-8.

<sup>1095</sup> Ian Mcleod made the claim regarding a guarantee to settlers in the context of impending restrictions in 1968. Randall Hansen argues that the parliamentary evidence (primarily the Second Reading of the Kenya Independence Bill) shows that the concern was for white kith and kin. See *Parliamentary Debates Commons*, (684), cols. 1329-400, November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1963; Randall Hansen, pp., 167-9. As usual, Hansen seeks to make a liberal defence where the consensus of opinion perceives illiberalism.

<sup>1096</sup> See Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 201; For Hansen's position see *fn. 1132 (above)*; See also Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 67. Layton-Henry supports the view of Dummett and Nicol.

<sup>1097</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 202.

Commonwealth in Kenya, as elsewhere. Moreover, the fact that new legislation was required to restrict their immigration meant that a legally binding guarantee of protection had been given, even if the Conservative legislators had only understood that protection in terms of its racialised extension.

The summer of 1967 saw a rise in the numbers of Asian immigration from Kenya, and by the end of the year 13,600 'Kenyan Asians' had arrived in Britain. Duncan Sandys and Enoch Powell used the 1967 Conservative Party Conference to express alarm about the Asian's arrival. Dummett and Nicol record that

*[i]n January and February 1968, the picture which earlier debate and propaganda had been creating since the late 1950s, of massed hordes of non-Europeans struggling to enter Britain, was suddenly made actual in the pictures shown on television news. Night after night, British viewers watched crowds of British Asians, pushing for tickets and documentation in Kenya, and filing in long lines down the steps from aeroplanes in Britain. A strong visual impression was given of an unending stream of Asians entering the country.<sup>1098</sup>*

Whilst an impression was rapidly created of the 'hordes' of 'Kenyan Asians' that might seek refuge in Britain, the potential numbers were subject to some debate. In a speech on February the 12<sup>th</sup>, 1968, Powell spoke of the '200,000' Indians in Kenya alone', a figure that had also been used in the Labour Cabinet's discussion of the problem in October of 1967: *The Times* noted that between 49,000 and 69,000 of these had Kenyan citizenship, and thus could not claim British citizenship and the right to enter Britain.<sup>1099</sup> The Conservatives used the potential size of the immigration to dramatise the 'necessity' of their calls for restrictions. On the same day that Powell spoke of the 200,000 Indians that might migrate, Sandys tabled a motion calling for the government to take immediate action, whilst the Labour Cabinet, meeting the following day, decided on immediate and expedient measures of restriction as their course of action. Callaghan, now Home Secretary, presented his argument for restrictions in terms of the race relations paradigm, and argued that the passage of the government's new race relations legislation would meet less public resistance if controls were enacted now, on the 'Kenyan Asians'.<sup>1100</sup>

The new Commonwealth Immigrants Act was enacted on the first of March, 1968. The Bill required those British citizens exempt from the 1962 CIA to demonstrate a 'qualifying connection' to the UK.

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<sup>1098</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 200.

<sup>1099</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, pp., 199-200, *cf.*, Richard Crossland, *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. II*, London, Hamish Hamilton and Jonathon Cape, 1976, p 526.

<sup>1100</sup> PRO CAB 129/135, Home Secretary's memorandum C(68) 34, February 12<sup>th</sup>, 1968, cited in Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 162.

This meant that 'only individuals, or their children or grandchildren, born, naturalised, or adopted in the UK could enter the country'.<sup>1101</sup> Effectively, the act served to divide the status of British citizenship along racial lines, and beyond the tokenish quota system offered in amelioration, prevented the Kenyan Indians from entering the UK.<sup>1102</sup> In so doing, the act rendered the 'Kenyan Asians' as stateless non-citizens. As Dummett and Nicol observe,

*this became painfully as they tried to migrate to, or through, other countries: nowhere could they easily establish admission, even temporarily, since their passports did not show them to be 'returnable' anywhere. Those who arrived in the United Kingdom without quota vouchers were refused admission even though there was no other country bound to admit them. They were shuttled back and forth, refused entry in the countries to which the British authorities tried to send them, and sent back to Britain, where they were refused and put on planes again. Eventually, some of these unfortunates were admitted to Britain and promptly placed in prison. In the long run they had to be released and allowed to remain, but this policy of 'shuttlecocking' and subsequent imprisonment was deliberately used to discourage others from coming.*<sup>1103</sup>

Whilst the British government had invested heavily in the protection and compensation of white Kenyan British citizen,<sup>1104</sup> the postcolonial re-bordering of nationality given in the 1968 CIA consolidated an assemblage of (post-war) governmental discursive formations and techniques. The 1968 CIA and its application represented a culmination of the post-war postcolonial British mobility regimes: rather than newly racialising British immigration policy, it makes the covert racialisation of the already existing policies overt. It combines the problematisation of the race relations paradigm with political technologies of prevention and deterrence given in the policies of detention and removal enacted on those who sought to transgress the Act's racial restrictions.

The postcolonial foundations of the 1968 Act can be seen as having contributed to the discursive and institutional basis for the British 'southern'<sup>1105</sup> (south to north) refugee regime of the post Cold War era (discussed in the following chapter) that relies on administrative and legislative restrictions whilst utilising techniques of deterrence and prevention. Zig Layton-Henry observes that the Act 'finally

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<sup>1101</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 163.

<sup>1102</sup> The quota was set at 1,500 per year. See Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 202.

<sup>1103</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 203.

<sup>1104</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 198. Dummett and Nicol write that the British government looked after the European population in many ways, with special compensation for Europeans in the Kenyan civil service, a 50 million land purchase fund to enable white settlers to sell out, if they wished, at high prices, and with the British Nationality Act (no. 1) 1964.

<sup>1105</sup> C.B. Keely, 'The international refugee regime(s): the end of the Cold War matters', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp., 303-14

buried the ideals of *Civis Britannicus sum* and showed that Britain wished to rid herself of the obligations of Empire and Commonwealth'.<sup>1106</sup> It can also, however, be regarded as the epitome of British post-war neo-imperialism, as an iconic instance that became evident as it met the limits of African anti-colonialism. In order to briefly elaborate this point, it's necessary to correlate the 'Kenyan Asian' crisis, with the concurrent 'Kenyan Somalian' crisis of the early years of Kenyan independence.

The 'Kenyan Somalian' crisis of the 1960s was one product of the 'scramble for Africa' in which European powers marked borders on African soil with little regard for 'indigenous settlement patterns, class relations, or pre-colonial politics in mind'.<sup>1107</sup> Consequentially, the Somalian regional diaspora has come to be spread across territory within Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia itself. Crucial to the future instability of the region was the competition for sovereign territorial presence in the Horn between Britain, Italy, and France. At the turn of the twentieth century the British administration established the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Northern Kenya. This 'Special District' was established as a buffer zone, designed to protect the white-dominated territory and migrant-built railways of British-run Kenya from the Italian-governed Somaliland and Ethiopia. From 1909 Kenyan Somalis were confined to this north-eastern region and were not allowed to cross the Somalia-Galla line dividing the district from Kenya proper. The subsequent creation of the region as a 'special district' and the confinement of Kenyan Somalis therein provided the territorial and political precedent to the strategies of subsequent Kenyan governments seeking to 'curtail the mobility of Somali Kenyans in relation to other Kenyan nationals'.<sup>1108</sup> From the 1926 renaming of the north-eastern region of Kenya as a special district, Somalian Kenyans were required to carry authorised passes for entry into other districts. Somalian Kenyan's resisted the British administration's attempted ethnic cleansing and the 1926 intensification of controls was a direct response to their political strength. The British and subsequent post-colonial Kenyan administrations augmented strategies of segregation with policies aimed at weakening the socio-economic position of the 'special district' (or, at least, with policies determined by a will to see the region remain politically weak).

The sequestering British colonial policies in the Horn of Africa encouraged a reactionary ethno-national politicisation of Somalian society.<sup>1109</sup> The independent Somali Republic was formed when British Somaliland (northwest Somalia) and the Italian-administrated United Nations Trust Territory of Somalia merged in 1960. After the independence of Somalia in 1960, pan-Somalian adherents formed strong presences in both the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and the Kenyan Northern Frontier District. In

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<sup>1106</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 69.

<sup>1107</sup> Jennifer Hyndman, 'Border Crossings,' *Antipode*, 29:2, 1997, p 161.

<sup>1108</sup> Jennifer Hyndman, *ibid*, 1997, p 161.

<sup>1109</sup> Jennifer Hyndman, *ibid*, 1997, pp., 161-164.



the post-independence context (of Somalia) the Somalian Kenyan's drive for self-determination provided enough political pressure to persuade the British to employ the United Nations framework for the consultation of the Somalian population. The subsequent United Nations Commission found that Kenyan Somalians strongly preferred unification with Somalia to their status within the Kenyan state. Instead of following through on the promise to honour the recommendations that it had sought from the United Nations, the British colonial administration decided to placate the Kenyan government-to-be by issuing a 'Report of the Regional Boundaries Committee' which endorsed Kenyatta's desire for a post-independence Kenyan Somaliland within the Kenyan state.

In the 'Shifta' (bandit) Wars following the decision based on the report of the Boundaries committee, Kenyan Somalians pursued pan-Somalian territorial ambitions while the British administration attempted to deligitimise their politics as a form of militant criminality. Both the British administration and Kenyatta's government declared the NFD to be in a state of emergency and following its independence in 1963 the Kenyan government held Somalia to be responsible for 'rebel activity' in its territory. In the following three decades the conflict over the territorial status of the northern province has continued despite the Somalian repudiation of territorial claims in 1967. Subsequently 'the surveillance and expulsion of Somalis – Kenyan or Somalian – by the Kenyan government remains (the) current practice' directed at the 'Somali problem'.<sup>1110</sup> The colonial bordering of the Horn of Africa thus led to an ethno-national conflict – the 'Shifta wars' of the 1960s – whose result has been the long standing population of internally displaced persons in the Kenyan Northern Frontier District. Correspondingly, from a *longue duree* perspective, the production of 'Kenyan Asian' stateless persons can be seen as one result of the British-Indian colonial migrant-labour regime, wherein Kenyatta's Africanisation programme represents an anti-colonial resistance to the pauperisation of African Kenyans within the British colonial hierarchy operative along the axis of race-and-class.<sup>1111</sup> The 'Kenyan Asian' crisis and the Kenyan 'Shifta' crisis of the post-colonial moment represent not just the British withdrawal from a 'Commonwealth ideal' in the context of Britain's reorientation towards Europe and the US in the mid-1960s, but also manifestations of the ethno-liberal governmentality belonging to British neo/imperialism.

In Britain, the 1968 CIA gained a great degree of popular support, and, in contrast to the idea that tighter restrictions would led to greater public support for measures of integration, gave added impetus

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<sup>1110</sup> Jennifer Hyndman, *ibid*, 1997, p 164.

<sup>1111</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, pp., 197-8. Dummett and Nicol describe Kenyan society at this time as 'stratified and segregated'. The colonial hierarchy stretched from the powerful Europeans, through to the prosperous Asians, and then the Kenyan Africans (by 'far the least privileged group). Kenyan 'Asians' held ambiguous dis/identifications. Some were complicit with the colonial colour bar, some were themselves targets of European discrimination, and some 'made common cause with Africans in nationalist movements' (p 198).

to the intensification of the racialisation of immigration that occurred from the late 1960s onwards. Powell, famously, took the opportunity of the impending Race Relations Act to critique the integrative (mutually tolerant) aspect of the race relations paradigm. In his speech of April, 1968, Powell argued that the proper role of government was to reduce the excessive size of the immigrant population by legislating for their 're-immigration' (repatriating 'coloured' persons to their countries of origin). In this regard Powell stated that

*[w]e must be mad, literally mad, as a nation, to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaging with its own funeral pyre.*<sup>1112</sup>

Having couched his argument in terms of the quantitative problem of 'numbers', he directed his critique towards the qualitative problem of 'unassimilable' coloured settlement. As I observed above, in the form of the problematisation belonging to the race relations paradox, each of these tropes works to instantiate a threshold of tolerance that is being transgressed. Powell attacked the RRA, arguing that the 'coloured' immigration that (he claimed) it empowered in Britain, worked to dis-empower indigenous British people. In making this argument, Powell invoked a British postcolonial dystopia by inverting the colonial image of the master-slave relationship in his claim that 'in fifteen or twenty years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man'.<sup>1113</sup> The future that Powell invokes refers to the cumulative effect of race relations legislation. Powell continued to construct the Race Relation Act's dangerous facilitation of an 'alien wedge' in the following terms:

*For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of showing that the immigrant communities can organised to consolidate their members to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'.*<sup>1114</sup>

Powell's projection of a racialised postcolonial invasion is made at the moment of apparent imperial decline, when Britain is suffering a loss of industrial competitiveness, and has witnessed the colonial independence movements and dominion's re-alignment with the new global order that has fractured its

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<sup>1112</sup> Enoch Powell, April, 1968, cited in Zig Layton Henry, *ibid*, p 71.

<sup>1113</sup> Enoch Powell, April, 1968, cited in Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*, London, Routledge, 2003, p 105

<sup>1114</sup> Enoch Powell, April, 1968, cited in Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 71; the phrase 'alien wedge' comes from Powell's speech of 1976, cited in Paul Gilroy, *op cit*.

former imperial strength. The post-war strategy of recovery via the Commonwealth colonial system has failed, and the US has demonstrated its pre-eminence. Domestically there is inflation and high rates of unemployment, and the social democratic welfare state assumptions of full employment and state support are being threatened. Britain is in a state of crisis, and that crisis is thought of as the decline of an imperial power. The racism that Powell invokes is a form of post-imperial crisis racism.

The vision of the threatened nation that Powell invokes, was, as Gilroy explains, given in the anonymous letter that Powell used as the centre-piece of his speech. The letter describes how 'the old woman's house 'in the 'once quiet street which has become a place of noise and confusion' is beset by 'two negroes who want to use the phone to contact their employer.'<sup>1115</sup> The old woman is then verbally abused by the 'negroes', despite the fact that 'she would have refused any stranger at that hour', and fears that the 'negroes' may attack her. Subsequently, the white tenants of the once respectable street are forced to flee the black takeover, and the woman, refusing to take in black tenants, is left impoverished. Now an isolated and vulnerable white woman in a blackened area, she refuses a 'paltry sum' from the 'negroes' who seek to buy her out. The woman's refusal provokes a campaign of violence and harassment. The children used in this campaign of terrorism 'cannot speak English', except to chant the word 'racialist'. The 'letter writer' concludes, says Powell, by wondering whether, under the proposed race relations legislation, the old woman is right to fear that the result will be that she may go to prison. Here the tolerant 'old white woman, trapped and alone in the inner-city', figures as a postcolonial 'Britannia', threatened by British laws that promise to facilitate an 'anarchic' war of 'black settlement'.

Powell's discourse presents a re-invented tradition, re-invoking a (lost) naturalized racial and imperial national destiny as a defence of an emasculated 'Britishness'. As Kathleen Paul observes, Powell saw himself as protecting 'the domestic community of Britishness from the presumed social impurities carried by subjects of colour'.<sup>1116</sup> Powell claims that the nation was now faced with an inversion in which, it was feared, Britons may indeed become slaves of the non-imperial world. The postcolonial British subject figures as the manifestation of the degeneration of the British 'race'. This is, in part, the significance of Powell's inversion of the colonial master-slave relationship. Britain, which at the height of imperial enthusiasm in the 19<sup>th</sup> century celebrated, *Rule Britannia, Britannia Rules the Waves, Britons Never, Never, Never, Will Be Slaves*,<sup>1117</sup> is about to make its own subjects slaves to a liberal decadence that promises that the frontiers of violent colonial conflict will be brought within the nation. The 'whip' that the black hand holds over an enfeebled Britannia is the power of the British law;

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<sup>1115</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2003, p 107; cf., Enoch Powell, April, 1968

<sup>1116</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, p 178.

<sup>1117</sup> James Thompson, (lyrics), Thomas Augustine Arne, (score), 1740.

correspondingly, that weapon has been handed to the black man by the 'ignorant and ill-informed' members of the Labour government, insofar as they were responsible for the newly-strengthened race relations legislation.

In order to begin to demonstrate how Powell's racialisation of immigration demonstrates not so much an illiberal exceptionality, but the dominant form of liberal governmentality that has been developed and maintained from the post-war period onwards, I wish to draw a correlation between the post-imperial politics of immigration given in Powell's discourse of the late 1960s, and the politics of the post-emancipatory moment given in the Governor Eyre controversy in the late 1960s (see chapter three). The conflict over the appropriate use of British law in relation to the position of colonial subjects in Jamaica was pre-figured by the exodus of freed slaves from the plantation system in Jamaica to the relative autonomy of the small holding system in the Jamaican hills. This exodus worked within an ambiguous moment of British liberal governmentality. The freed slaves, after the emancipation of 1833, gained the status of free labour that formed one of the foundations of liberal political and moral economy. Yet metropolitan and colonial governmentality was directed at the re-incorporation (whether by indenture or other means of coercion) of that 'freedom' as labour-power within the plantation system, rather than towards the facilitation of the diversification of agricultural production and enterprise sought by the freed men and women in the small holding system. This tension between the status of freedmen and colonial subjection was resolved in the not-yetness of the extension of the liberal sphere to colonial subjects; coercion (towards incorporation as free labour in the plantation system) takes the form of education and moral improvement through the disciplined work that facilitates the 'free' workings of the (international) political economy, and it is only 'after' this process of discipline that the colonial subject is free, in the sense of the freedom belonging to the rational, autonomous individual. The colonial subjects' refusal of the liberal form of that 'freedom' took the form of a resistance, both in terms of an exodus, and in terms of a resistance to the socio-economic and political conditions suffered under the colonial-capitalist regime. This then was the basis of the conflict between Gordon, the spokesman of the freed men and women, and Governor Eyre, in which Eyre had Gordon tried and executed under martial law.

In Britain, as I recounted, the Governor Eyre controversy was pre-figured by the events of the India Mutiny (1856), wherein the 'barbaric' nature of Indian 'niggers' was rediscovered, and their unsuitability for re-incorporation within the liberal sphere re-deployed in a heightened militant racism. In the context of a general sense of imperial crisis, J.S. Mill and other liberals sought to subject Governor Eyre to criminal prosecution on behalf of the 'half-caste' Gordon, and thereby on behalf on the emancipated colonial subjects he represented. The attempted prosecution of Eyre represented a litigious claim made on behalf of colonial subjects for recognition as equal members within the liberal

sphere, who should, therefore, be free from the despotic regime given in Eyre's invocation of martial (rather than civil) law. For Robert Carlyle, and other conservatives who came to Eyre's defence, the attack on Eyre represented an abuse of the purpose of British law, in the inversion of that law to the meet the requirements of what Carlyle called the 'nigger principle'. The 'nigger principle' described the illegitimate inversion of the use of British law, wherein British liberals sought to use that law against a British official who had acted to protect white British subjects from the potential violence of the Jamaican 'negroes'. In the context of domestic fears of social disorder in the late 1860s, it was Carlyle's views on the proper social order and the 'legitimate' use of violence that won the support of the British public (the middle and upper classes).

We can draw some correlations, at this point, between the nineteenth century discourse of Carlyle and Mills, and the liberal governmentality of colonial subjects, and the twentieth century discourse of Powell, Jenkins, and the liberal governmentality of post-colonial immigrants. First, each of these political conflicts occurred in a moment of crisis – a crisis of the threat of resistance to the imperial and domestic hierarchy of race-and-class in the 1860s, and the 1960s crisis of the failure of neo-imperial regeneration that was leading to the prospect of domestic conflicts of race-and-class. Mill, like Jenkins, initially won support for a liberal discourse and governmentality that aimed to criminalise racial discrimination. Carlyle, like Powell, won popular support for his argument that privileging the interests of the 'nigger' over and against the interests of white British subjects constituted an inversion of the 'natural' racial hierarchy. In each case, the polemicist drew upon the figure of absolute vulnerability (given in the white women of Morant Bay, and the 'old white woman' of the British inner city) surrounded by a milieu of barbaric anarchy. In the span of a century, the agent mobility of the peripheralised subject moved the borderline of that conflicted governmentality from the colonial periphery to the postcolonial core. In the nineteenth century, the patriarchal racialisation of Carlyle's discourse set the stage for the national-imperialism of Palmerston and Disraeli. Powell's racialisation of immigration set the stage for the postcolonial nostalgia that had, as its lost origin, the state of a properly ordered racial hierarchy.

To draw these correlations is not, however, to construct a false opposition between a racialised illiberalism and a mode of liberal anti-racist inclusion, for despotism was, in both centuries, intrinsic to, rather than exterior to liberal governmentality. In the discussion of the politics of the post-emancipatory moment in the 1860's in chapter three, I noted that Ruskin's critique of the 'liberal' position of Mill's Jamaica Committee shed light on an apparent contradiction. The liberal political economy informing Mill's anti-racism required the re-incorporation of the newly free Jamaican labour in the stasis of the plantation system (thereby facilitating the free mobility of colonial commerce), thus positioning the freed slave ambiguously between the status of subjection and liberal agency, on the axis

of race-and-class. That liberal subjection required the degree of measures of discipline, coercion, and deterrence that were sufficient to meet the intensity of the colonial subjects' 'irrational' resistance to their reincorporation. In this context then, Eyre figures as the disavowed 'good despot' in Mill's pursuit of the legality of the liberal sphere, and the post-emancipatory moment of anti-racism figures as the depoliticising disavowal of the violence inherent to liberal governmentality.

Kathleen Paul notes that Powell

*merely sought to do in 1968 what Atlee, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan, Home, Wilson and their Cabinet colleagues had been trying to do since 1948: protect the domestic community of Britishness from the presumed social impurities carried by subjects of colour. ... Heath followed in the same tradition, accompanying his dismissal of Powell with the assurance that it was the policy of the Conservative party that 'immigration must be more stringently limited and that immigrants wanting to return to their own countries should be helped financially to do so'.<sup>1118</sup>*

Rather than seeing Powell's vision of a postcolonial dystopia and inverted social order as, merely, a critique of Jenkin's philosophy of mutual tolerance, I am arguing that there is a consistency between the race relation paradox's trade-off between 'control' and 'assimilation', and Powell's attempt to re-border the sphere of the national community along the axis of racialised and colonial categories. In comparison to Mill's depoliticisation of the colonial social order, Jenkin's strengthening of measures of integration can be seen to work as a depoliticisation of the racialised boundaries of immigration restriction. The liberal disavowal of Powell's overt racism worked to 'disappear' the problematisation of immigration as an issue of racial difference, and to disavow the dependence of Britain's lost imperial dominance on the oppressive incorporation of colonial subjects within the imperial economy. While Powell's discourse seems to represent the exterior limit of the race relations paradox insofar as his argument rejects the trade-off between control and assimilation in favour of repatriation, that limit was actually interior to the liberal governmentality of postcolonial immigration. That is because the problematisation of immigration that is interior to the race relations paradigm works to incite the racialisation whose logical outcome is the rejection of 'alien' settlement. Powell's discourse thus serves to render the covert racialisation of liberal governmentality overt. In transgressing the liberal discursive formation in which the paradigm was framed, Powellite racism served as the precedent for subsequent framings of restrictive immigration policy. Policy makers would, thereafter, be able to point to the public predisposition to the racialisation of 'coloured settlement' as the cost of the failure to restrict 'coloured' immigration, in spite of the fact that the problematisation manifest in the

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<sup>1118</sup> Kathleen Paul, *ibid*, pp., 178-9; Edward Heath cited in Anthony Messina, *Race and Party Competition in Britain*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p 40.



discourse and governmentality of control was the precondition for that racialisation. On this basis, the subsequent racialised immigration and nationality legislation of 1971 and 1981 should be seen as being logical outcomes of the race relations paradox, and as further expressions of post-imperial anxiety. Subsequently, as we shall see in the following chapter, the problematising strategies of liberal governmentality have proved sufficiently malleable to be redeployed to the post Cold War context of globalised immigration and the politics of new forms of 'undesirable' immigration.

## **Chapter Six: Neo-Liberal De/Borderment.**

In the following chapter I argue that the politics and liberal governmentality of immigration policy shifted from its basis in the race relations paradox in the mid-1960s to the development of utilitarian and neo-colonial forms of borderment that have targeted 'South' to 'North' migration under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation from the mid-1980s onwards. In this chapter I provide the context for that shift, and develop the argument that the transition point of the British turn to Europe and the decline of Commonwealth regeneration represented not so much the abeyance of neo-imperialist governmentality and the race relations paradox, but the conditions of their transformed redeployment in the neo-liberal global order. Here, I develop the argument that the fulcrum of this shift occurred in the hegemonic Thatcherite governmentality consisting of an articulation of a neo-liberal programme with a re-invented form of national imperialism. This neo-liberal neo-colonialism provided the grounds for the shift that occurred from the mid 1980s onwards, wherein the problematisation of immigration shifted from the racialising of 'immigrant' populations to a targeting of populations of political-and-economic migrants.

In the first section of this chapter I offer an account of the intensification of the race relations paradox through the period of socio-economic crisis in Britain that emerged from the late 1960s and developed in the crisis years of the 1970s. In the second section I offer an account of the neo-liberal and neo-colonial governmentality of North-South relationships that developed from the 1970s onwards. This section gives a primarily theoretical account of the re-bordering and de-bordering processes of neo-liberal governmentality, and demonstrates the manner in which neo-liberalism functions in terms of the management of flows and networks even as it works to instantiate territorial re-borderment. In providing this theoretical context I seek to establish the grounds for the argument that this governmentality has exacerbated the poverty and conflict that produces flows of forced migration and stasis, even as that governmentality has been framed in terms of the extension of liberal values, institutions, and capabilities.

### **Section 6.1 Postcolonial Globalization**



In 1968 the Commonwealth Immigrants Act had re-defined immigration and nationality on the basis of patriality. The subsequent Immigration Act (1971) extended the principle of patriality, and served to re-orient immigration policy away from the neo-imperialism of Commonwealth regeneration, and towards a combination of a more overtly utilitarian framing based on the requirements of the domestic labour market, and the 'need' for control set out in the race relations paradigm. This shift had bipartisan support. While the Conservatives set the pace in intensifying the racialisation of immigration and nationality throughout the 1970's, Labour's lack of a comprehensive alternative was due, in large part, to their subscription to the restrictive logic of the race relations paradigm. Thus, although the Labour party was to later regret the shift to patriality, Jenkins approved of the ability of the legislation of 1971 to secure 'limited and low figures' of immigration.<sup>1119</sup> Subsequently, the 1981 British Nationality Act represented the culmination of this redirection of immigration policy formation, and was enacted in the context of the changing dynamics of the British economy and labour market, and the intensification of the racialisation of settled immigrant communities wherein Britishness was re-invented in terms of a homogeneous racial belonging defined against the presence of an 'alien wedge'. Here, while the mode of migrant labour incorporation began to shift from a basis in industry, to a mode of transnationalism with a basis in services, the racialised problematisation of immigration continue to define post-imperial policy formation.<sup>1120</sup>

From the end of the Second World War until the mid-1960s, British governments pursued domestic welfare and Keynesian pump-priming strategies aiming to create full employment within the social democratic consensus. This strategy was pursued in the context of the cushion provided by the fact that the domestic manufacturing industry didn't have to face substantial international competition in the period up until the mid 1960's.<sup>1121</sup> While the 1960s were marked by 'oscillations between recession and recovery, with a steady underlying deterioration', by the end of the 1960s 'the economy had dipped into full-scale recession'.<sup>1122</sup> Throughout the 1960s it was apparent that Britain's regeneration was not matching the growth of its European, US, and Japanese competitors, and the neo-imperial strategy was thrown into doubt. One of the main reasons that British industry and manufacturing had become uncompetitive was the rise of US-initiated processes of off-shore and post-Fordist production, and the subsequent growth of developing regions where labour, plant and production sites could be operated below cost. A partial consequence was the tendency of British firms to increase their

<sup>1119</sup> Caroline Knowles, *ibid*, p 103; Roy Jenkins, 'Speech on immigration and race relations', *Parliamentary Debates: Official Report* 865, 1973, p 1487.

<sup>1120</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1983, pp., 223, 240, 249-51; Martin Barker, *ibid*, pp., 12-29

<sup>1121</sup> Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, 'Globalization in one Country? The Peculiarities of the British', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 3, August 2000, p 340.

<sup>1122</sup> Stuart Hall, 'The great moving right show', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, (eds.), *The Politics of Thatcherism*, London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1990, p 24.

investments in the manufacturing zones of the New Industrial Countries (NICs), and to correspondingly reduce their investment in British manufacturing. Thus an ILO report that surveyed 118 major British firms showed that they had added 150,000 employees to their foreign sites of production, compared to only 80,000 to their domestic sites over the years 1971-5.<sup>1123</sup> In this context, the automatism of industrial and agricultural production tended to reduce the requirements of these sectors for low-skilled labour. Conservatives had, from the early 1960s, called for greater education and training to meet the changing requirements of industry, and used this argument to de-legitimise 'low-skilled' labour immigration.<sup>1124</sup>

The Wilson Labour government (1964-70) undertook a programme of modernisation. This strategy consisted of the rationalisation of public services and state support and creation of national manufacturing entities including British Leyland and GEC-AEI; an 'incomes policy' designed to restrain wage increases and thereby increase the profitability of British industry; a consensual approach to industrial relations involved a compact between big business, the state, and the unions; and a turn to the European Economic Community as 'the new international framework for British capitalism'.<sup>1125</sup> By the late 1960s it was apparent that Labour's modernisation programme was not succeeding. Martin Jacques attributes the continuation of British decline to the Labour government's failure to tackle the alliance of the financial sector with the 'externally oriented interests of sections of big industrial capital'.<sup>1126</sup> The Wilson government's compliance with the interests of international finance and industry led to an intensification of labour regulation, and an erosion of trade union and working class support. The late 1960s represented the onset of a crisis of British decline in terms of the loss of Britain's neo-imperial strategy which had promised to reposition Britain at the head of a Commonwealth and Sterling-based international order. As we saw in the last chapter, one expression of this crisis was the intensification of the racialisation of nationalism given in the problematisation of 'coloured' immigration and settlement. This renewal of racialised nationalism corresponded to the growing conflict between an increasingly disciplinary form of labour regulation, and trade union and working class militancy, middle and upper class disenchantment with the failures of state planned modernisation, the challenges of the emergence of increasingly liberal social values amongst women and students, and the racial problematisation of immigrant communities in urban conurbations.

The Conservative party came to power in 1970 under the leadership of Edward Heath, who committed his government to a continuation of familial immigration for settled Commonwealth immigrants, yet

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<sup>1123</sup> International Labour Organisation, *Employment Effects of Multinational Enterprises in Industrialised Companies*, Geneva, ILO, 1981, p 82.

<sup>1124</sup> Dennis Dean, *ibid*, 1993.

<sup>1125</sup> Martin Jacques, 'Thatcherism: breaking out of the impasse', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 42.

<sup>1126</sup> Martin Jacques, *op cit*.

also indicated that further work-permit immigration would not carry the associated rights of permanent settlement for the holder and his dependents. Throughout the election campaign Heath had sought to distance the Conservative platform from Enoch Powell's campaign, which was based on the racialisation of immigration that he had promoted in the late 1960s. Despite Heath's disavowal of Powell's divisive rhetoric, Powell's campaign worked to further associate the Conservative party with opposition to immigration, and thus helped to win the Conservative party a substantial swing, particularly in the West Midlands.<sup>1127</sup> Powell appeared to carry enough popular support to have been the obvious contender for the Conservative leadership should Heath have failed to gain victory in 1970. The enactment of the 1971 Immigration Act fulfilled the election pledges made on patriality and the restriction on further Commonwealth family immigration.<sup>1128</sup> The Act served to equate the legal status of non-UK Commonwealth citizens with that of aliens, and to instantiate the category of 'persons with a qualifying connection to the UK' as the basis of British citizenship.<sup>1129</sup> After the passage of the Act Powell's continued anti-immigration stance served to isolate him within the Conservative party as an agitator of racial strife rather than as a potential leader.<sup>1130</sup> While the rise and fall of Powell's political fortunes should be seen to reinforce the conclusion that the racialised restriction of immigration had become intrinsically tied to the liberal legitimacy of the race relations paradigm, Powellism continued as an influential socio-political force throughout the 1970s.

In 1972 the 'Ugandan Asian' crisis provided a situation that was, from the British point of view, 'legally identical' to the Kenyan Asian crisis (see chapter five).<sup>1131</sup> On August 4<sup>th</sup> the Ugandan President Idi Amin announced the expulsion of all Asians from Uganda, and that the expulsions were to take effect within the period of three months. 50,000 of the Ugandan Asians were British passport holders, and as had been the case in 1968, the press was soon full of reports of a massive influx of Asians into Britain. The British government initially stated that no deviation would be possible from the quota system enacted for the Kenyan Asians and proceeded, without success, to use the threat of sanctions and other measures to persuade Amin to reverse his decision. Subsequently however, despite the opposition of Powell and other anti-immigrant politicians as well as widespread public dissent, the Heath government announced that Britain would accept the refugees, whilst seeking the aid of other countries that might be persuaded to accept some of the refugees. In the event, the evacuation of the Ugandan Asians was achieved before the November 8<sup>th</sup> deadline, and Britain accepted 28,000, the remainder being accepted by India, Canada, and other countries.

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<sup>1127</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, pp., 78-9

<sup>1128</sup> John Solomos, *Race and Racism in Britain*, London, Routledge, 2003, p 57; Solomos states that the Conservatives had pledged that there would 'be no further large-scale immigration'.

<sup>1129</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, pp., 203-5.

<sup>1130</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, p 81

<sup>1131</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 205.

Several factors help to explain the difference between the actions of the Labour government in the event of the Kenyan Asians crisis of 1968 and the response of the Conservative government in 1972. First, the Conservative party was viewed as more securely restrictionist in terms of 'coloured' immigration, and had just passed the restrictive 1971 Immigration Act. Secondly, Heath wanted to distance the party from the overt racialisation of Powell, the Monday Club, and other Conservative interests arguing for harsher restrictions and racial nationality.<sup>1132</sup> Thirdly, the Ugandan crisis presented an international opportunity for Britain to take the lead in protecting refugees from an evidently brutal form of ethnic cleansing.<sup>1133</sup> Fourthly, the numbers of Ugandan Asians were relatively small compared to the threatened Kenyan Asian 'influx', and more than half of the potential migrants were accommodated by other nations. And finally, the Ugandan Asians were generally highly skilled and well educated; they did not threaten to become a burden for national welfare and their settlement could be presented as an asset.

Almost immediately after the Ugandan crisis the government attempted to pass a Bill designed to further define the limitations on labour immigration, and to give effect to the Treaty of Rome's provisions on the free movement of European workers.<sup>1134</sup> The Bill was defeated by a cross party coalition that opposed the extension of immigration rights to Europeans at the moment of their restriction to members of the (primarily Old) Commonwealth. For much of the abstaining Conservative backbench, the prospect of defeating their own party on the immigration issue also represented a protest against the failure of Heath's economic policies. Yet the Bill represented the reality of the British turn to Europe, and a slightly amended Bill was passed on January the 25<sup>th</sup>, 1973.

Britain's accession to the EEC in 1973 formed a key element of the Conservative's liberalisation of economic and industrial policy, and a recognition of the shift in trading patterns from the dominions and post/colonies to Europe. Heath's government sought to overturn the social democratic consensus of the post-war era, reducing the role of the state, tightening labour market regulations, and introducing an authoritarian emphasis on law and order. The Industrial Relations Act (1971) and policies designed to facilitate wage-dampening led to a militant and widespread trade union backlash that was largely responsible for the government's retreat to the corporatist model and conciliatory approach of previous post-war governments. Sivanandan notes, moreover, that the effect of the Industrial Relations Act, when combined with the racial incitement given in the 1971 Immigration Act, served to subject black workers to the increasing racism of white workers and trade unions under siege', and thus 'threatened

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<sup>1132</sup> Zig Layton-Henry, *ibid*, pp., 81-2

<sup>1133</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 199

<sup>1134</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*, p 202.

to lock the black working class into the position of a permanent under-class'.<sup>1135</sup> Labour struggles thus became a key area of black resistance to racism throughout the 1970s, a struggle that was fought not just against exploitative employers, but also against the trade unions that were often recalcitrant in extending support for 'immigrant workers' perceived to be threatening the interests of the indigenous work force.

By the early 1970s the British economy was caught between the effects of the global recession and the underlying domestic structural problems. The 'crisis state' of the British economy throughout the 1970's was marked by rising inflation, economic stagnation, major payment imbalances and repeated sterling crises, as well as large public sector deficits, and a declining manufacturing sector. One of the key elements of the shift to monetarism was the deregulation of the money markets. Given the failure of reflationary strategies, domestic industrial capital and labour interests began to find it difficult to extract Keynesian concessions from the government. At the same time the financial markets were able to gain an obverse leverage. Consequently, Heath's Conservative government began to pursue monetarist policies including interest rate rises and cuts to public expenditure. In 1972 the Chancellor of the Exchequer had floated the British pound as a response to the markets' perception of over-valuation. In combination with the emergence of the 'Eurodollar' allowing greater ease in currency transactions the effect of the float was to encourage downwards speculation on the value of the pound. The abdication of the fixed exchange rate and the deregulation of international capital mobility helped to create a domestic context in which conservative policy makers and politicians were able to gain some purchase in their criticism of the Keynesian approach, in their argument for the need for monetary discipline, for tax cuts, for restrictions on trade unions and for an end to the support for uncompetitive nationalized industries. One major effect of this shift to monetarism was the growth of the financial services sector, and the development of a larger services labour market in London which was to become of key site of immigrant labour employment.

The Wilson Labour government came to power in 1974 with a small majority in the wake of the global recession that had taken effect in the 'oil crisis' of 1972-3, and on the basis of a socialist manifesto that was, in part, a response to increasing trade union militancy. Like the Conservative government that it had succeeded, the Labour government was unable to obtain a substantial degree of hegemonic consent for its programmes throughout the mid to late 1970s. Martin Jacques points to this period as one of a widening social fragmentation, erosion, and realignment in which the conflicts surrounding issues of immigration and 'race', law and order, nationality, women, morality, and labour relations further developed, and culminated in an intense sense of national crisis, a 'new kind of popular rightism' and,

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<sup>1135</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 28

with the election of Margaret Thatcher to the leadership, a corresponding shift to the right in the Conservative party.<sup>1136</sup> In the first year of its administration, the government sought to overturn the Industrial Relations Act and other measures of coercive labour regulation, and overturned the immigration restrictions imposed to prevent husbands from joining wives domiciled in the UK.<sup>1137</sup> Despite the strength of the left wing of the Labour party and the trade union movement, Labour's overall strategy in this period was a return to the modernisation programme of the first Wilson government, and the 'social contract' enacted to secure 'working class acquiescence to cuts in real wages and public expenditure together with rising unemployment'.<sup>1138</sup> The fact that these austerity measures were introduced by a Labour government facilitated the fragmentation of working class solidarity.

The Labour government's intention to enact further nationality and immigration legislation on coming to power in 1974 was not actively pursued in the first years of office, yet the racialisation of settled immigrant communities increased throughout this period, contributing to pressures that, for Dummett and Nicol, saw 1976 become 'a turning point in the politics of immigration'.<sup>1139</sup> Despite the Race Relations legislation of the 1960s, black British citizens were subject to discrimination in housing, education, employment, immigration surveillance, and policing.<sup>1140</sup> Between 1969 and 1971, Black community and political organisations had become increasingly occupied with the problem of police brutality and fascist violence'.<sup>1141</sup> Sivanandan noted that in May of 1970,

*[o]ver 2,000 Pakistanis, Indians and West Indians marched from Hyde Park to Downing Street demanding police protection from skin head attacks. In the summer of 1970 police attacks on blacks – abuse, harassment, assaults, raids, arrests on 'Sus' etc., in London, Manchester, Bristol, Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, etc. – put whole black communities under siege.*

The occupational culture of the police force in the early 1970s was violently racist,<sup>1142</sup> yet the surveillance of 'coloured' communities and their subjection to frequent stop and search tactics of policing represented, in itself, a criminalising practice that had yet to gain governmental legitimacy. As had been the case in the aftermath of the riots of the late 1950's the reports and governmental

<sup>1136</sup> Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 48

<sup>1137</sup> Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 49; Anne Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 263.

<sup>1138</sup> Martin Jacques, *ibid*, pp., 49-50; The 'social contract' consisted of a series of statutory safeguards (Employment Protection Act 1975; Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 and 1976; Sex Discrimination Act 1975; Health and Safety at Work Act 1974; Equal Pay Act 1975) that were given in return for the abandonment of collective bargaining. See A. Sivanandan, 'Grunwick', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 129.

<sup>1139</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 237

<sup>1140</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 387-395

<sup>1141</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 31.

<sup>1142</sup> Maureen Cain, *Society and the Policeman's Role*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp., 117-9

investigations into 'race relations', crime and policing in the early 1970's did not provide a basis for the criminalisation of racialised immigrants. In 1971-2, the Home Affairs Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration conducted an inquiry into 'Police/Immigrant Relations.'<sup>1143</sup> The report described relations between police and black youths as 'difficult and explosive' and drew upon the testimony of witnesses who referred to the immigrant communities' fears of police racism and violence.<sup>1144</sup> The Metropolitan Police Federation's response to the criticisms denied a serious problem in the relationship between immigrants and police, but went onto add that improved education and employment prospects for immigrants were necessary to avoid the strengthening of "vociferous militants in the black communities".<sup>1145</sup> In fact, the economic crisis of the early 1970s bore most heavily on young black workers, and between 1973 and 1976 the unemployment rate for black workers rose at twice the rate that it did for white workers.<sup>1146</sup> The Metropolitan Police evidence for the Select Committee endorsed the views of John Lambert on the environmental conditions of criminal activity. In 1970, Lambert's investigation into crime, policing, and race relations had found that 'there was not so much a problem of immigrant crime as one of crime in overcrowded areas where immigrants tended to live'.<sup>1147</sup> In general the Committee concluded that blacks were either no more than, or less criminal than the white population, and that West Indians were 'British in way of life, language, and laws: only their culture and colour (are) different'.<sup>1148</sup> Similarly, while illegal immigration and its associated crimes were considered to be a minor but significant problem of policing Asian communities, it was believed that those communities were generally just as opposed to these crimes as the host (Anglo) community, and that there was no link between an Asian way of life and criminality.<sup>1149</sup> As Gilroy notes, the government's response to the Select Committee's report agreed with its findings, and suggested that the truculence and disorderly behaviour of black youths might originate in their frustration at not being 'accepted on the same terms as others regardless of colour.'<sup>1150</sup> Yet here, the evident 'tolerance' expressed towards disorderly reactions to racism was balanced by a refusal to accept the validity of the testimonials of the Select Committee witnesses who had described the racist

<sup>1143</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005 a, p 109; cf., HMSO, Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, *Police/Immigrant Relations Vol. 1*, 471-1, 1972

<sup>1144</sup> Paul Gilroy, *op cit*; cf., HMSO, Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, *Police/Immigrant Relations Vol. 1*, 471-1, 1972

<sup>1145</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005 a, p 110; cf., HMSO, Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, *Police/Immigrant Relations Vol. 1*, 471-1, 1972

<sup>1146</sup> Harry Golbourne, 'Black workers in Britain', *African Review* (Dar el Salaam), Vol.II, No.2, 1977, p 67

<sup>1147</sup> John Lambert, *Crime, Police, and Race Relations*, London, Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1970, p?

<sup>1148</sup> Paul Gilroy, *op cit*; cf., HMSO, Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, *Police/Immigrant Relations Vol. 1*, 471-1, 1972

<sup>1149</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005 a, p 113; cf., HMSO, Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, *Police/Immigrant Relations Vol. 1*, 471-1, 1972

<sup>1150</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005 a, p 114; cf., HMSO, *Police Immigrant Relations in England and Wales: Observations on the Report of the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration*, Cmnd. 5834, 1973



violence of the police.<sup>1151</sup> This assumption tended to legitimise, in the following years, the idea that the conflicts between the police and black communities were a product of black criminality, rather than acts of resistance to racist targeting.

The early 1970s marked the emergence to the criminalisation of settled immigrant communities. It was a period of an intensification of the politicisation of black communities and organisations.<sup>1152</sup> It was this increasing political and cultural 'militancy' that the Metropolitan Police Federation had targeted as the potentially dangerous development in their evidence to the Select Committee, and that was to become a major site of conflict between black resistance and policing in the coming years.<sup>1153</sup> While in 1971-2, the police and government officially found immigrant communities to be law abiding, 1972 was also the point at which 'black youths' began to be identified with the crime of 'mugging' in police and media reports.<sup>1154</sup> A year later, the government's White Paper on Police-Immigrant Relations legitimated the idea of black urban youths as potentially violent criminals, drawing a correlation between the urban violence of American and British cities.<sup>1155</sup>

The Labour government's renewal of the race relations paradigm emerged throughout 1975-6. The White Paper of September 1975 announced the introduction of new race relations legislation and stated that the 'resilience, initiative, and vigour' of 'racial minority groups' should not be allowed 'to lie unused or be deflected into negative protest on account of arbitrary and unfair discriminatory practices'.<sup>1156</sup> The subsequent Race Relations Act (1976) outlawed indirect discrimination in employment, housing, education, provision of goods, facilities or services and housing. In addition the Act moved away from the conciliatory approach of the previous Acts, and towards measures of enforcement that were to be the responsibility of the newly established Commission for Racial Equality. The Act also specified a duty to 'promote equality of opportunity as well as good race relations'. Despite representing a substantial extension and strengthening of previous race relations legislation, the Act effectively exempted crucial areas of governance from its regulations, including 'the administration of justice, police action in the course of their operational duties, the operation of much of the criminal justice system and immigration procedures.'<sup>1157</sup> The Act thereby exempted several of the major institutions responsible for the governmentality of 'racial' populations from its field of regulation. This exemption constituted a depoliticisation of the operations of the institutions in

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<sup>1151</sup> Peter Fryer, *ibid*, p 392; cf., Parliamentary Papers, 1971-2, XXXIV. 72.

<sup>1152</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, pp., 31-2.

<sup>1153</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, pp., 32-4; Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005a, pp., 115-6

<sup>1154</sup> Stuart Hall *et al.*, *Policing the Crisis*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1978

<sup>1155</sup> Stuart Hall *ibid*, 1978

<sup>1156</sup> HMSO, Secretary of State for the Home Office, *Racial Discrimination*, Cmnd. 6234, 1975

<sup>1157</sup> Anthony Lester, 'Legislation to integration: the Race Relations Act', in Tessa Blackstone, Bhikhu Parekh, and Peter Sanders, (eds.), *Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda*, London, Routledge, 1999, p 25.

which 'coloured persons' were to be increasingly problematised as representing a (criminal) threat to social order. Another important element of this depoliticisation given in the new race relations programme was, as Sivanandan argued, the de-legitimation of those organisations and methods of political and cultural association that formed 'the breeding grounds of resistance'.<sup>1158</sup>

The first few months of 1976 saw an intense period of racialisation and further anti-immigration arguments in political and media discourse, which predominantly served to link an imagined influx of massive proportions with problems of social conflict resulting from the settlement of coloured immigrants.<sup>1159</sup> Enoch Powell made a series of speeches in which he linked the imagined threat of further influxes of coloured immigration with warnings of impending black violence, and sought to reinforce the emergent discourse in which 'mugging' was seen as a racial crime.<sup>1160</sup> In the same year the Anti-Nazi League was formed to counter the virulence of the National Front's racism, and a growing number of Conservative politicians moved to a Powellite position on immigration and 'race'.<sup>1161</sup> The Notting Hill Carnival Riot in March of 1976 represented a pivotal moment in the conflict between West Indian communities and the police, and in the criminalisation of British 'coloured' populations.<sup>1162</sup> The discursive governmentality that followed the riot was pre-figured by the Metropolitan Police force's treatment of the Spaghetti House siege of September 1975. Here, Sivanandan describes the manner in which three West Indian youths held up the restaurant in order to obtain funds for non-collaborative black political groups.<sup>1163</sup> The Metropolitan Police Commissioner Robert Mark stated that 'this was simply an armed robbery that had gone wrong ... any attempts ... to represent it as a political act were received with the derision which they rightly deserved'.<sup>1164</sup> Gilroy observes that 'Mark had tried, in his own words, to engage the police service in 'the moulding of public opinion and legislation''.<sup>1165</sup> The Notting Hill Carnival Riots were marked by a massive police presence and violent clashes between the revellers and police that resulted in the retreat of the police from the conflict. Subsequent statements from the Metropolitan police suggested that the 'Calypso mob' had wrongly come to the defence of the criminals that the police had attempted to arrest from the Carnival crowd. As Gilroy argued, the series of subsequent police statements served 'to render the attacks on police as being 'expressive of black culture''.<sup>1166</sup> In the aftermath of the riots the police gathered an array of 'statistical proof' to support a revision of the thesis of 1972. Rather than being no

<sup>1158</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 38; Sivanandan's explicit point is that funding was to be directed towards 'a class of collaborators'.

<sup>1159</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 236.

<sup>1160</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *op cit*.

<sup>1161</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, pp., 236-7

<sup>1162</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005a, p 117

<sup>1163</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'From resistance to rebellion', in A. Sivanandan, *ibid*, 1991, p 39.

<sup>1164</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005a, p 119; cf., Robert Mark, *In the Office of Constable*, London, Fontana, 1978.

<sup>1165</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005a, p 120; cf., T.A. Critchley, *A History of Police in England and Wales*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1978

<sup>1166</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2004, p 118

more or less criminal than the white population, the Metropolitan police now stated that blacks were more criminal than whites, and thereby legitimated not just its own practices, but the political and media racialisation of immigrant communities.

Towards the end of 1976 the government released the Hawley Report on Immigration from the Indian Subcontinent, and the political and media debates that addressed the report suggested that immigration from the subcontinent was still a problem of 'massive' numbers of potentially dangerous immigrants, despite the evident effectiveness of the existing restrictions.<sup>1167</sup> The government sought to 'balance' the integrative measures of the race relations legislation with the announcement that new measures of immigration restriction were to be canvassed in a Green Paper on Nationality.<sup>1168</sup> Published in 1977, the Green Paper proposed that patrial CUKC's should be renamed 'British citizens', and that non-patrials should be consigned to the category of 'British Overseas Citizenship' which 'conferred no right of abode anywhere in the world and would eventually die out with its first holders'.<sup>1169</sup> In addition the government enacted a series of restrictive amendments, including new controls on the admission of husbands, fee increases for overseas students (in order to discourage their immigration), and tighter administrative controls on dependents. In 1978 the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration report on Immigration canvassed further possible restrictions, and the White Paper of 1978 responded by proposing the recommendations.<sup>1170</sup> These measures and proposals were introduced in order to stem the potential loss of Labour supporters who might be tempted to vote for the National Front in the next election. As Miles and Solomos argue, the Labour party in this period sought to frame further immigration restrictions in reaction to the perceived fears of a (volatile) electorate, rather than seeking to emphasise the severity of the restrictions that had already been enacted.<sup>1171</sup> These developments serve to demonstrate the snowballing effect of the race relations paradox, as, particularly in the context of a socio-economic national crisis, every additional restrictive act of discourse or governmentality served to intensify the problematisation of new immigrants and settled communities, and thus to intensify their racialisation. Moreover, the intensification of the race relations paradox thereby played into the hands of the right-wing of the Conservative party, whose politicians were more prepared to employ national-racism as means of constructing hegemonic consent.

The years of the Labour government had witnessed a swing to the right in the Conservative party. The two strands of the new right consisted of a return to the philosophy of liberal political economy seeking the abandonment of Keynesianism and the 'interventionist' state, and a populist focus on issues like

<sup>1167</sup> Robert Miles and John Solomos, *ibid*, p 100.

<sup>1168</sup> HMSO, *British Nationality Law: Discussion of Possible Changes*, Cmnd. 6795, 1977.

<sup>1169</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 241

<sup>1170</sup> Robert Miles and Jon Solomos, *op cit*; Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, pp., 240-1

<sup>1171</sup> Robert Miles and Jon Solomos, *ibid*, pp., 99-100

'immigration, crime and punishment, strikes, social security abuse, taxation and bureaucracy'.<sup>1172</sup> The lead up to the 1979 election witnessed a Conservative redeployment of the problematisation of immigration. What was radical about the emergence of a Thatcherite use of national racism was not so much the fact that the leader of one of the major parties was prepared to take an overtly Powellite stance on 'race', nationality, and immigration.<sup>1173</sup> The willingness of the Thatcherite wing to adopt this strategy was evident from the emergent authoritarian discourse offering reassurance to those who felt that the 'English' culture and 'way of life' was threatened by the 'alien' culture of 'coloured' immigrants.<sup>1174</sup> In the famous 'swamping' speech of January 1978 (see below), Thatcher made clear her intention to provide just such reassurance, stating that the Conservatives 'would never be afraid to tackle something which people are worried about. We are not in politics to ignore people's worries, we are in politics to deal with them'.<sup>1175</sup> In both the discourse of nationality and immigration and the redefinition of citizenship given in the 1981 British Nationality Act the Thatcher government offered just such a reassurance. Once enacted, the 1981 BNA provided a slightly ameliorated version of the recommendations set out in the White Paper of 1980, which had 'adopted every means at hand to limit the future acquisition of a right to abode'.<sup>1176</sup> The 1981 Act abolished the category of CUKC, and replaced it with the categories of British Citizenship, Citizenship of the British Dependent Territories, and British Overseas Citizens. Of these, only the first category offered the right of abode in Britain, and that right was qualified by the requirement that 'any child born in the United Kingdom on or after commencement day (January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1983) would be a British citizen only if it had a parent who was either a British citizen or 'settled in the terms of the Act'.<sup>1177</sup> This qualification was designed to prevent the future immigration of dependents of persons not recognised as citizens. The Act left the right of abode of Citizens of British Dependent Territories to the discretion of the immigration laws of the dependencies, and in the category of Overseas British citizens absolved the British government of any responsibility for CUKC's residing in nations that did not recognise their residence as a qualification for the right of abode. This meant that Britain should remain free of the types of responsibilities that had arisen in the Kenyan and Ugandan Asians crises. The 1981 BNA did not, in and of itself, represent a radical departure from the approach of the Wilson/Callaghan Labour government, for its measures were broadly similar, if tighter in particular areas, to the recommendations laid out in the Green Paper of 1978. Where the Conservative government's policy on immigration, 'race' and nationality was radical however, was in the manner in which a reinvented form of national imperialism was articulated to the Thatcherite programme of neo-liberalism.

<sup>1172</sup> Andrew Gamble, 'Thatcherism and Conservative Politics', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 113.

<sup>1173</sup> Hugo Young, *One of Us*, London, Pan Books, 1993, p 233

<sup>1174</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, pp., 238-9; cf., Roger Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, London, Macmillan, 1984, pp., 19, 34, 37, 68

<sup>1175</sup> Margaret Thatcher, *World in Action*, interview, January 30<sup>th</sup>, 1978.

<sup>1176</sup> Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 244; cf., HMSO, *British Nationality Law*, Cmnd. 7987, 1980

<sup>1177</sup> HMSO, *British Nationality Act*, 1981, cited in Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, *ibid*, p 244.

The Thatcher government came to power in the aftermath of the 'winter of discontent' of 1978-9, and in the wake of the failure amongst British governments employing corporatist strategies of crisis management and containment to reverse Britain's economic decline. That this failure seemed a particularly *British* problem, as it had occurred within the general context of a global recovery after the slump of 1974, reinforced the sense of post-imperial decline that followed the failure of Commonwealth-led regeneration.<sup>1178</sup> The severity and longevity of the British crisis created the political opportunity in which the 'drys' within the Conservative party were able to claim a mandate for a programme of radical socio-economic reform. The changing dynamics of the world economy in the early 1970's has been identified as a fulcrum for the shift towards a neo-liberal system of global production. Thus, the broader context in which Thatcher took power involved the epoch-changing shifts of globalisation. As Stuart Hall notes, these changes included 'the new post-industrial society, the struggle by capital to restore its 'right to manage', the 'globalisation' of the international political economy (which was its way out of that impasse), the technological revolution and the rise of a new individualism and the hegemony of neo-liberal free-market ideas'.<sup>1179</sup> In Robert Cox's analysis, the Western state, up until the 1970's, had acted as a mediator between the interests of capital and labour, and between the objectives of national welfare and those of the global order. In the post 1970s internationalisation of the state, the state began to act as a 'transmission belt' for the global order, working as an 'agency for adjusting national policies and practices to the perceived exigencies of the global order' (see section 6.2).<sup>1180</sup>

Given the failure of the previous Conservative and Labour governments' strategies of renewal within the constraining paradigm of the 'social consensus,' the severity of the economic crisis presented an opportunity for a right wing intervention. The Thatcherite strategy was to submit Britain to the harsh medicine of immersion in the global free market, and to roll back the post-war construction of Keynesian welfare-state social democracy and protectionist nationalism. The government's abolition of foreign exchange controls in 1979 and the deregulation of financial services in 1986 worked to further the integration of the British economy into the global circuits of capital.<sup>1181</sup> Thatcher's policies facilitated the competitiveness of the financial centre and the multinational sector of big business

<sup>1178</sup> Stuart Hall, 'The great moving right show', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 24.

<sup>1179</sup> Stuart Hall, 'New Labour's double-shuffle', *Soundings*, p 11.

<sup>1180</sup> Robert Cox, 'Global Perestroika', in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch, *The New World Order? The Socialist Register*, 1992, London, Merlin Press, p 30. The world economic order involves a constellation of elite transnational fora, including the 'Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg Conferences, official institutions such as the IMF/World Bank, OECD, and central state agencies, notably treasuries and central banks'

<sup>1181</sup> Andrew Baker, 'Nebuleuse and the 'Internationalization of the State' in the UK: The Case of HM Treasury and the Bank of England', *Review of Political Economy*, 6:1, Spring, 1999, p 81.

which were internationally orientated, whilst sectors confined to the domestic economy tended to become uncompetitive.<sup>1182</sup>

In the domestic realm, Bob Rowthorn described the new Hayekian measures of labour and business discipline in the following terms:<sup>1183</sup> crisis was to enable the coercion of intense competition between firms and workers. For firms, support was to be denied to the inefficient, driving them out of business and forcing those that survived to change their methods in order to remain competitive. The threat of unemployment and redundancy were considered as measures of labour coercion that could be used to produce a docile workforce prepared to accept wage suppression and to co-operate more fully with employers. The coercion of sufficient labour docility thus required 'legal measures to reduce the ability of trade unions to defend their members', and the cutting back of 'social welfare measures so individual workers are forced to make private provision for themselves and their dependents'.<sup>1184</sup> These measures should serve to 'atomise the workforce and to strip workers of their collective protection, thereby making them more vulnerable to economic pressure and less able to resist their employers'.<sup>1185</sup> These strategies of neo-liberal governmentality sought to discipline, render flexible, and lower the price of domestic labour in order to open the economy to the new global order and multinational investment.

In the short term the neo-liberal disciplinarity served to further the intensity of the crisis of the British economy; the reduction in manufacturing output of 15 per cent in 1979-80 compared unfavourably with the disastrous slump of 6.9 per cent in 1931; the first three years of Thatcher's government saw employment drop by 12 per cent; and the growth in profits accruing to industry and commerce fell from 6 per cent in 1977 to 2 per cent in 1982.<sup>1186</sup> Yet in the long term the Thatcherite vision prevailed. Thus, by 1997 the Conservative Shadow Home Secretary was able to draw upon the Thatcherite legacy when he claimed that foreign multinationals were drawn to invest in Britain 'because we have a flexible labour market, excellent industrial relations and low overheads, Britain's firms have been able to take on and beat the competition'.<sup>1187</sup>

While subject to increasingly fractured forms of consent and dissent, the neo-liberal governmentality of Thatcherite Conservatism won and maintained hegemonic consent. One measure of the hegemonic status of the shift from the social democratic consensus has been the manner in which the

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<sup>1182</sup> Andrew Gamble, 'Thatcherism and Conservative politics', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 123.

<sup>1183</sup> Bob Rowthorn, 'The past strikes back', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 72; cf., Friedrich von Hayek.

<sup>1184</sup> Bob Rowthorn, *op cit*.

<sup>1185</sup> Bob Rowthorn, *op cit*.

<sup>1186</sup> Bob Rowthorn, *ibid*, pp., 73-4.

<sup>1187</sup> Michael Howard, *Hansard*, December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1997, column 416

contemporary Labour government has redeployed neo-liberalism and 'social market values' in its 'Third Way' (neither 'left' nor 'right') governmentality (see chapter seven).<sup>1188</sup> In this context, the Prime Minister Tony Blair's positioning of Britain in relation to the forces of globalisation is indicative:

*the temptation is to use government to try to protect ourselves against the onslaught of globalization by shutting it out, to think we protect a workforce by regulation, a company by government subsidy, an industry by tariffs. It doesn't work today, because the dam holding back the global economy burst years ago. The competition can't be shut out — it can only be beaten. And the greatest error progressive politics can make is to think that somehow this more open and liberal world makes our values redundant, that the choice is either to cling onto the European social model of the past, or be helpless, swept along by the flow.*<sup>1189</sup>

Blair's retrogressive Europe is the social democratic model that Thatcherism defeated in Britain in the 1980s. The degree of hegemonic consent that Thatcherism obtained relied on a combination of reinvented elements drawn from classic political liberalism, utilitarian disciplinary techniques and 'moral improvements', and the ideological vent provided in the One Nation Toryism of the second half of the nineteenth century (see chapter three). In governmental formations of the first of these elements, the project of 'making Britain great again' was pursued via a renewal of the values of competition and profitability that Linda Colley identified as historically intrinsic elements of the 'making of the nation'.<sup>1190</sup> Within Thatcherite neo-liberalism the British citizen was redefined within the logical parameters of competitive individualism. Here, as Stuart Hall argued, 'the essence of the British people was identified with self-reliance and personal responsibility, as against the image of the over-taxed individual, enervated by welfare state 'coddling', his or her moral fibre irrevocably tapped by 'state handouts.''<sup>1191</sup> Consequentially, the 'new' poverty of the 1980s took the form of a renewed pauperisation wherein the dole queue represented the symbolic and material space of abjection that had been given in the workhouse in the nineteenth century (see chapter three). Crucially, within the moralising idiom of neo-utilitarian labour discipline, 'society' is no longer to blame: the citizen is subject to the anxiety of being responsible for his own success or failure. This liberal configuration of competitive citizenship instantiates a border between the undeserving poor — the epitome of which is the 'welfare scrounger — and the responsibly competitive individual. Success, here, is the manifestation of the moral virtue of autonomous self-discipline.

<sup>1188</sup> Stuart Hall, 'New Labour's double-shuffle', *Soundings*, Vol. 24, No. 1, July 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003

<sup>1189</sup> Tony Blair, *Speech to the Labour Party Conference*, Brighton, September 27<sup>th</sup>, 2005

<sup>1190</sup> Linda Colley, *ibid*, 2005, p

<sup>1191</sup> Stuart Hall, 'The great moving right show', in Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques, *ibid*, p 29



I noted above that from the moment of the election campaign of 1978-9, Thatcher indicated that her Conservative government intended to reassure public anxieties revolving around the threat that the 'alien wedge' posed to their 'way of life'.<sup>1192</sup> Thatcher set out the parameters of that reassurance in the speech of January, 1978. Here the Conservative leader stated that

*[i]f we went on as we are, then by the end of the century there would be four million people of the New Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now that is rather an awful lot and I think it means that people are rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture. And, you know, the British character has done so much for democracy, for law, and done so much throughout the world, that if there is a fear that it might be swamped, people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming in.*<sup>1193</sup>

Martin Barker began his analysis of this speech by noting that the 'highly colourful idea about the impact of British imperialism is rather beside the point'.<sup>1194</sup> The opposite is the case, however, for one essential element of the discursive formation here is the manner in which it re-invokes the racialised borders of liberal national imperialism. In the last chapter, I argued that the moment of post-war 'New Commonwealth' immigration represented the movement of the borderline of the conflicted governmentality of British colonial-capitalism from the colonial periphery to the postcolonial core. Here, in the first place, we should note a correlation with Gilroy's argument that the authoritarian intensification of the criminalised racialisation of 'black' British subjects given in the Brixton riots of 1981 represents the transformation of the 'thin red line' of colonial rule into the 'thin blue line' of metropolitan policing.<sup>1195</sup> The biopolitical bordering of postcolonial subjects reinstates the anthropological limits of liberalism, and legitimates the constitution of a disorderly population subject to sovereign, rather than disciplinary power.<sup>1196</sup>

In the 'swamping' speech, Thatcher re-presents British colonial capitalism as the benevolent global extension of the political structures and values of liberalism. She roots that liberal universalism in the particular 'character' of Britishness. The converse assumption in this instance is the colonial sphere of pre-modernity, the populations of a 'different culture' that lacked and required the 'gift' of liberal

<sup>1192</sup> In a speech in 1976 Powell had stated that 'the nation has been and is still being hollowed out from within by the implantation of unassimilated and unassimilable populations ... alien wedges in the heartland of the state'

<sup>1193</sup> Margaret Thatcher, cited in the *Daily Mail*, January 31<sup>st</sup>, 1978

<sup>1194</sup> Martin Barker, *ibid*, p 15.

<sup>1195</sup> Paul Gilroy, *ibid*, 2005a, p 141; Gilroy states that 'the 'thin red line' of troops in the colonial front line, standing between us and them, between black and white, has been translated into the 'thin blue line' of police personifying the law. Black transgressions of it become further evidence of their alien culture, and their distance from the substantive, historical forms of Britishness which are the property of white culture'.

<sup>1196</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *ibid*, pp 47-8; Mitchell Dean, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 47-9

government. Thatcher thus instantiated a temporal equivalence between the anthropologically limited colonial subject that precedes the rationality of the autonomous liberal subject capable of law and self-governance, and the 'excessive' presence of that difference that threatens the democratic and lawful constitution of the population.

It is because of that equivalence that the contemporary British 'people' are 'legitimately' hostile. Here, prior to the patriot adventure of the Falklands war, Thatcher's discourse correlates with the national imperialism of Palmerston and Disraeli in the second half of the nineteenth century in seeking to invoke the racialised hierarchy between British citizens and colonial subjects at a time of authoritarian (neo)liberal discipline. In chapter three I argued that the incorporation of British and colonial subjects into the circuits of colonial capitalism resulted in a form of conflictual hybridity amongst British subjects. The liberal governmentality of the nineteenth century worked to reassure British people against the anxieties of 'race-and-class belonging to their subjection to colonial-capitalist discipline. In the movement from Carlyle's dystopian 'nigger principle' to Disraeli's One Nation strategy, Britain's 'free-born Englishmen' were re-assured that they 'never will be slaves'. In the moment of colonial-capitalist authoritarianism the freedom of British citizens was defined by the fact that it was not the unfreedom of colonial subjects. Analogously, where Powell's racialisation of immigration and settlement demonstrated the inherent limits belonging to the liberal governmentality of the race relations paradox, Thatcher's promise works to reassure the 'people' that the postcolonial moment of globalised discipline does not, and will not, establish an equivalence between postcolonial subjects and (white) British citizens.

That promise was born out in the racialised demarcations of the British Nationality Act of 1981, and in the reassuring national imperialism of the Falklands war. Here, the Conservative government demonstrated the limits that Britain was prepared to go to in maintaining the borderment of a liberal 'island race' in the context of a changing global order. In the popular afterglow of the victory in 1982 Thatcher stated that

*[w]hen we started out, there were waverers and the fainthearts, the people who thought that Britain could no longer seize the initiative for herself ... that Britain was no longer the nation that had built an Empire and ruled a quarter of the world. Well they were wrong. The lesson of the Falklands is that this nation still has those stirring qualities which shine through our history.*<sup>1197</sup>

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<sup>1197</sup> Margaret Thatcher, 1982

Yet while the borderment of British citizenship, the defence of the geopolitical sphere of the British 'way of life', and the policing of the domestic threshold of tolerance (see chapter five) demonstrate a neo-colonial orientation, those re-borderments were articulated to the production of a new sphere of pauperisation that formed an internal limit to the neo-liberalism intension of the forces of globalisation. Here then, a resistance to the status of being subject to the processes of globalisation was given. That resistance was given an ideological vent in the form of the racism that worked through a further dis/identification with and against the segments of population that 'we' are reassured are still subject to colonial governmentality.

Within the sphere of neo-liberal governmentality, both the globalised British population and the neo-colonial migrant population are organised in relation to the figure of the rational liberal subject whose agency is dependent on his capacities for autonomy. In Mitchell Dean's reading of biopolitical governmentality, this liberal norm 'is a figure carved out of the substantive forms of life that are only known through ... exceptions'.<sup>1198</sup> The exceptions that Dean, following Foucault, indicates include the fluid categories of those who (a) need assistance to maintain capacities for autonomy as is the case of the social citizen under Marshall's version of the welfare state; (b) those who are potentially capable of exercising liberal autonomy but who are yet to be trained in the habits and capacities to do so; (c) those who having reached maturity of age, are for one reason or another not yet or no longer able to exercise their own autonomy or act in their own best interests; and (d) those who are permanently criminally delinquent or dedicated to the destruction of the state.<sup>1199</sup> Ranked from nearly autonomous to deliberately incapable, each of these categories is subject to different degrees of sovereign and/or disciplinary power. It is these exceptions that give the normative liberal subject its autonomous value.

In the neo-liberal governmentality of Thatcherism then, we can see that the promise of reassurance given in the neo-colonial discourse indicates a particular relationship between the categories of a well ordered population. After the abjuration of the welfare state, British citizens are to be subject to the discipline of competition as economic actors within the global market. For these globalised subjects, the neo-utilitarian political technologies (the threat of unemployment and the dismantling of welfare and union protection) necessary to the redefined common good involve a shift in the hierarchy of autonomy from category (a) to category (b). In this movement of policing lies the Thatcherite promise to 'free the people' from the restraints of 'welfare coddling', and to facilitate their self-disciplined autonomy as economic citizens within the free workings of the market. Here there is a latent correspondence between the exceptional norm of the liberal subject and the latent capability of the disciplined subject who becomes already-autonomous in the exercise of self-discipline.

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<sup>1198</sup> Mitchell Dean, *ibid*, p 51

<sup>1199</sup> Mitchell Dean, *ibid*, p 50

Yet the governmental categories and the identifications they corresponded to were fluid and marked by hybridities of race-and-class. Here, as Chakrabarty observed, the not-yetness of the promise of inclusion within the liberal sphere belongs to the (anthropologically limited) colonial subject.<sup>1200</sup> In the postcolonial moment this assumption of latent capabilities that are to be drawn out through the employment of disciplinary political technologies instantiates an equivalence between the indigenous and immigrant populations. As I will argue in the following chapter, that equivalence begins, with Thatcherism, to work through the increasingly utilitarian framing of immigration restrictions. For the moment, however, I wish to observe that the Thatcherite neo-colonial reassurance thus works to re-instate the exceptional liberal autonomy of the British citizen. This imagined community of autonomy developed in the re-invention of Britishness as the expression of the capacity for law and it's the political sphere of its operation ('democracy'), and thus to re-categorise the immigrant population as the abject 'delinquent' other to that sphere of freedom.

## Section 6.2 The re-bordering and de-bordering of *Neo-Liberal* Globalisation.

Thatcherism represented the passive revolution of the British state-society complex as it re-aligned itself in accordance with the emergent order of neo-liberal globalisation. As Stephen Castles points out in his elaboration of David Held's categories of globalisation, between the hyper-global position heralding an entirely new global era (wherein, for example, space-time compression is thought to have resulted in an immediacy that supersedes the sovereign territorial imagination), and the global sceptics who see the international activity at the turn of the twentieth century as having been every bit as 'global' as the current level of world activity, lies the transformative position that 'argues that globalisation is the consequence of interlinked and mutually reinforcing processes of change in the area of technology, economic activity, governance, communications, the environment and so on.'<sup>1201</sup> In the following account of the political-and-economic elements of these transformations, I wish to draw out a correspondence between the shifts from liberalism to neo-liberalism, and colonialism to neo-

<sup>1200</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *ibid*, 2000, p 8

<sup>1201</sup> Stephen Castles, 'Globalization and Citizenship: an Australian Dilemma', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol. 35 (No 1), January 2001, p 96. Castles cites David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999, p 2. Transformationalist works include Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998, Manuel Castells, *Rise of the Network Society*, Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, Polity Press 1990, Ankie Hoogvelt, *Globalisation and the Postcolonial World*, Basingstoke and London, Macmillan, 1997, and Roland Robertson, *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*, London, Newbury Park, CA, and New Delhi, Sage, 1992. In a similar vein Jan Aart Scholte (2000) has argued that globalisation 'has brought shifts within replacements of underlying social structures', and that 'there is little sign that expanding supraterritoriality is in the foreseeable future taking us toward a post-capitalist, post-bureaucratic, post-communitarian, post-rationalist social order'.

colonialism in order to present an account of the manner in which neo-liberal globalisation functions as a form of re-borderment-and-de-borderment.

Economic liberalism contains a universalising tendency. While Jacqueline Rose observes that 'liberal economic relations ... tend to impose universal market logic – to marketise all aspects of social and political life',<sup>1202</sup> I have argued that the development of the liberal form of the British state society complex and British colonial-capitalism were interdependent forms of national-and-international governmentality (see chapter one). Etienne Balibar has described the universalising tendencies of colonial political liberalism as working intensively (within the nation state) and extensively (throughout the colonies). Thus, while neo-liberalism 'builds on the convictions of classical liberalism that market forces will bring prosperity, liberty, democracy and peace to the *whole* of humankind,' the re-development of that universalising tendency also belongs to the shift from colonial-capitalism (which had its 'Indian summer' in the neo-imperialism of the post-war decades) to neo-liberal globalisation in the period of Thatcherite governmentality.<sup>1203</sup> In this context, Foucault's conception of the shift from liberalism to neo-liberalism appears relevant. As I noted in the introduction, in Foucault's view neo-liberalism redefines the social domain in economic terms, so that government becomes 'a sort of enterprise whose task it is to universalise competition, and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups, and institutions'.<sup>1204</sup> Thus while 'classical liberalism had called on government to respect the form of the market, in the neo-liberal approach the market is no longer the principle of self-limitation, but instead the principle against which it rubs'.<sup>1205</sup> Thus, while from the crisis years of the 1970s onwards, the role of the state increasingly shifts towards the facilitation of flows of transnational finance, the governmental stratification of 'transnational migration' has become increasingly utilitarian.<sup>1206</sup>

For Stephen Gill, the episteme of neo-liberalism – built, as it is, on the competitively individualistic political philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, JS Mill, and Jeremy Bentham – is manifest in a 'new constitutionalism' whose architecture lies in the supranational structures of, for example, the

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<sup>1202</sup> Jacqueline Best, 'From the Top-Down: The New Financial Architecture and the Re-embedding of Global Finance', *New Political Economy*, Vol. 8, No. 3, November 2003; David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Social Change*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1989. The extent to which Harvey emphasises capital's need for the development of fixed infrastructure is sometimes overlooked. See Neil Brenner, 'Globalization as Re-territorialisation: The re-scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', *Urban Studies*, Vol. 36, No 3, Carfax, Taylor and Francis, 1999, pp., 431-451

<sup>1203</sup> Etienne Balibar, 'Citizenship without a pre-existing community', Bard College Lecture, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001; Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke and London, 2000, p 34. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>1204</sup> Thomas Lemke, 'The birth of biopolitics': Michel Foucault's lecture at the College de France on neo-liberal governmentality', *Economy and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2, p 196; Michel Foucault, 'The birth of biopolitics', in Paul Rabinow, (ed.), *Michel Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth*, New York, The New Press, 1997, 78-9.

<sup>1205</sup> Thomas Lemke, *ibid*, p 197; Michel Foucault, 'The birth of biopolitics', Lecture 21, College d France, 1979

<sup>1206</sup> Robin Cohen, *The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour*, Aldershot, Hants. Gower, 1987, p 251;

International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation, or in the financial integration of the European Union evident in the process of Economic and Monetary Union. In Gill's argument, the 'key objectives of the new constitutionalism are to keep 'politics' out of economic policy making and, constitutionally and legally, to secure private property rights and investor freedoms (including free capital mobility) on a world scale'.<sup>1207</sup> Neo-liberalism thus requires the construction and maintenance of national, regional and supra-national policy structures that work to de-politicise the space and temporality of the market, including the labour and migrant labour markets.<sup>1208</sup>

The operation of neo-liberalist regulatory institutions serves the interests of the powerful Western states that constitute the basis of an 'international community' in fora such as the G7/8, and the OECD. It is on their behalf that 'the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank demand efforts at democratisation and formal appearances of the rule of law as conditions for their aid'.<sup>1209</sup> In a legalist form of 'postmodern colonialism', as Susan Silbey observes,

*[w]ithout buying the property of other nations, without occupying the territory, and without investing its own capital in the social and economic developments of other nations, the West is able to shape the culture and economies by offering the legal form through which exchange takes place.*<sup>1210</sup>

Concerned to regulate states for the efficient functioning of the market, neo-liberalism has become both 'policy orthodoxy' amongst political and academic elites, a 'commonsense knowledge', and a basis for 'reflexive' forms of subjectivity; neo-liberalism thus holds hegemonic legitimacy.<sup>1211</sup> A key feature of neo-liberalism is its visualisation of a borderless world, in which it borrows from the earlier tenets of liberalism advocating the removal of state barriers in order to promote the most 'efficient allocation of resources in the world economy'.<sup>1212</sup> Borderlessness here functions as an imagined horizon (or norm) to which states *should* move, and it is these depoliticising states rather than markets which have come to be regulated in the embedded form of neo-liberalism that has become a structuring dynamic – at the

<sup>1207</sup> Stephen Gill, 'Knowledge, Politics, and Neo-Liberal Political Economy', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, Oxford University Press, 2000, p 56.

<sup>1208</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *ibid.*

<sup>1209</sup> Susan S. Silbey, "Let them eat cake": globalization, postmodern colonialism, and the possibilities of justice", *Law and Society Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1997, p 221.

<sup>1210</sup> Susan S. Silbey, *op cit.*

<sup>1211</sup> Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalization: Contending Visions of a New World Order*, London, Routledge, 2000. The construction of hegemony involves an ongoing process of political contest.

<sup>1212</sup> Jan Aart Scholte, *ibid.*, p 35. The 'business globalisation theorist' Kenichi Ohmae describes borderlessness in positive terms. See Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy*, Harper Collins, London, 1990. Other social theorists who have developed positivist versions of borderlessness or de-territorialisation include Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford, Blackwells, 1996, and Richard O'Brien, *Global Financial Integration: the End of Geography*, London, Pinter, 1992.

material, cultural, and political levels – of both the *relatively* borderless world of globalization and of the imperative to move towards the horizon itself.

In the same vein Frank Duvell and Bill Jordan cite the period of the Washington Consensus (roughly 1980-1999) as the location of the shift amongst the international regulatory institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and WTO, from a focus on the regulation of the market to the regulation of governments in favour of financial market mobility.<sup>1213</sup> The Washington Consensus marked a departure from the Bretton Woods model of international financial regulation. In the post Second World War context, the Bretton Woods process arose as a reaction to the volatility of short term capital flows which had, in the pre-war period, led to economic disaster. In Geoffrey Underwood's terms,

*[p]ublic multilateral institutions – the IMF in the short term and the World Bank in the long term – were therefore to provide a cushion to help states adjust to balance-of-payments and economic development problems. The system, while it placed greater constraints on countries in deficit as opposed to surplus economies, was to permit them to square the maintenance of a stable (fixed rate) monetary exchange mechanism and payments system with the goals of domestic economic development. As this was the dawn of the era of post-war welfare states, domestic socio-political stability was perceived, quite rightly, as a crucial ingredient of international cooperation on monetary and trade issues. Unless states, within certain agreed limits, could pursue their own socio-economic aspirations in keeping with internal democratic (or otherwise) debate, the pressures on international economic interdependence would have an adverse effect on the prospects for co-operation anyway.*<sup>1214</sup>

Within the post-war Keynesian welfare state, aggregate demand had been managed through fiscal and monetary policies in order to achieve full employment. As Andrew Baker argues, an active social policy, including redistributive transfer payments and public services was, in part, facilitated by the restrictive international monetary system and a comprehensive system of national capital control under the Bretton Woods process, whereby the state gained access to the financial resources needed for investment in national infrastructure projects.<sup>1215</sup> The neo-liberal inversion represented by the Washington Consensus was the point at which, as Sundhya Pahuja observes, global IMF regulation became a form of neo-colonial governance that disciplines 'Southern' nations within the discursive space of Eurocentric modernity: correspondingly, the extension of soft power discipline on the socio-

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<sup>1213</sup> Bill Jordan and Franck Duvell, *Migration: The Boundaries of Equality and Justice*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p 32.

<sup>1214</sup> Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, 'Global Issues in Historical Perspective', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, (Eds.), *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, (Second Edition), Oxford University Press, 2000, p 107.

<sup>1215</sup> Andrew Baker, 'Globalization and the British Residual State', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, *ibid*, 2000, p 362.



economies of developing nations has accompanied the 'the diminution of its role in the economies of the industrialised countries'.<sup>1216</sup>

Neo-liberalism is represented in and by these institutions as the motor of positive globalisation, a universal development that will benefit the underdeveloped regions of the world as much as it benefits developed states. While the 'globalist perspective on world development highlights the benefits of mobility through markets', globalism works through a new hierarchical order which makes 'all political authorities accountable to financial markets and – in the case of the debt-laden developing countries – to the international financial agencies as global regulators'.<sup>1217</sup> Here, agencies such as the joint IMF/World Bank International Development Association which seek to discipline developing states through the discourse and governmentality of structural adjustment programmes work to 'integrate these countries, including their most remote communities, into the system of accountability of the new global order'.<sup>1218</sup>

For William Robinson,

*[g]lobal neo-liberalism has involved twin dimensions ... One is worldwide market liberalisation and the construction of a new legal and regulatory superstructure for the global economy: The other is the international restructuring and global integration of each national economy. The combination of these two is intended to create a 'liberal world order', an open global economy and a global policy regime that breaks down all national barriers to the free movement of transnational capital between borders, and the free operation of capital within borders.*<sup>1219</sup>

The multiple (trans)national scales of econo-political spatiality that Robinson's description introduces echoes Sassen's observation that globalisation involves the location of new institutional arrangements and legal rules in the centrifugal and centripetal sites of global cities such as London.<sup>1220</sup> These processes which work to articulate de-territorialisations and re-territorialisations leads to the further qualification of the hegemonic common sense of borderlessness; in practice, the episteme of neo-liberalism is a situated knowledge and ideology whose application is as uneven as its resistance is serrated: it belongs, for example, at the supra-national level of the G8 or to the policy structures of the World Bank and the IMF, while the membership of these organisations are limited to the world's most

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<sup>1216</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, *ibid*, p 162

<sup>1217</sup> Bill Jordan and Franck Duvell, *ibid*, 2005, p, 56.

<sup>1218</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *op cit*.

<sup>1219</sup> William I Robinson, 'Remapping Development in light of globalisation: From a territorial to a social cartography', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 6, p 1056.

<sup>1220</sup> Saskia Sassen, 'Towards a feminist analytics of the global economy' in Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 1998, pp., 81-109; Saskia Sassen, 'Spatialities and temporalities of the global: elements for a theorisation', *Public Culture*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000.

powerful nation-states, and the impact of its strictures has differed in relation to their object's location in the core, semi-periphery, and periphery.<sup>1221</sup>

The de-borderment of the 'South' inherent in the Structural Adjustment Programmes and (later) 'debt-relief' programmes work to re-secure the comparative advantage of the 'North' and their transnational components by, for example, regulations to extend the sphere of Northern multinational business into the sphere of public service provision in 'developing' nations.<sup>1222</sup> As Jordan and Duvell note,

*[t]he recommended model allows these countries to become profitable markets for transnational corporations, which can establish subsidiaries and branches run by local corporations, and invest in large infrastructural projects such as energy and telecommunications. The designs for all other institutional features – law, public finance, and labour markets – are derived from these inbuilt, economically imperialist assumptions.*<sup>1223</sup>

Neo-liberal imperialism has consequences for the stratification of higher and lower circuits of migration mobility. In the Second Reading of the 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act, the Labour M.P. Jeremy Corbyn observed one of the major forms in which that de-bordering has been intrinsically linked to the production of political-and-economic forced migration. Corbyn stated that 'anyone who stands up against a regime that imposes a structural adjustment programme that means cutting education, health, social services and rural development in favour of export-led growth automatically becomes a target for political oppression by that regime and is often forced to seek asylum'.<sup>1224</sup> While it is likely that refugee populations are more often produced through the conflicts fought over the distribution of those scarce resources (rather than as a direct resistance to the persecution of 'liberalizing' states), Corbyn correctly identified the underlying cause of much of the contemporary form of forced displacement. Corbyn further noted the form of disavowal that operated in the restrictive European framing of immigration and asylum policy formation. Citing the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Bill, Corbyn stated that

*[t]he Bill is the product of the xenophobia that surrounds Europe, which knows full well the consequences of the economic policies that it is imposing on many countries but pretends that the*

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<sup>1221</sup> Larry Elliott, 'Europe's stitch-up is an insult to the rest of the world', *The Guardian*, March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2004. Elliott writes, for example, that 'unlike the WTO, which is a one member, one vote organisation, clout at the IMF is decided by voting shares, and these reflect the way the world was 60 years ago, not the way it is now. It adds insult to injury for developing countries to find that they can have any old mediocrity foisted upon them by a system that is a relic of colonialism'.

<sup>1222</sup> Peter Hardstaff, *Treacherous Conditions: How IMF and World Bank Policies tied to Debt Relief are Undermining Development*, World Development Movement, London, 2003.

<sup>1223</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *ibid*, 2005, p 40.

<sup>1224</sup> Jeremy Corbyn, *Hansard*, Col. 771, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995

*result has nothing to do with Europe. We are in danger of living in a Europe surrounded by barbed wire, having the most draconian anti-asylum laws in each country as one group after another is hounded out.*<sup>1225</sup>

Corbyn's statement implicitly points to a disavowal belonging to the liberal governmentality of 'Southern' states, wherein political responsibility for the production of flows of political-economic migration is denied. Stephen Castles makes a similar point when he argues that

*[d]espite our restrictive immigration policies, countries like Britain actually do more to cause forced migration and undocumented migration than to stop it. This is because unfair trade policies, exploitative intellectual property policies, and the unfair international trade regime lead to the deterioration of both human rights and economic conditions in the countries of origin.*<sup>1226</sup>

Sivanandan further outlines the role of neo-liberal globalisation in the production of forms of forced political-and-economic migration:

*The nation state, particularly in the third world and the Eastern bloc, is the agent of global capital. It is capital which decides what to produce where, what to grow where, and how. And through its aid and development agencies like the World Bank and the international Monetary Fund and international trade agreements (such as GATT and NAFTA) and institutions like the WTO, it holds the poorer regimes in hock, and then insists that they accept austerity measures, through the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes that dictate drastic cuts in public spending, to pull them back from bankruptcy. The result is massive pauperisation, ... there is no future to look forward to which is not tied up with foreign powers and foreign capital. Hence resistance to economic immiseration is inseparable from resistance to political persecution. The economic migrant is also the political refugee.*<sup>1227</sup>

Rather than as a cause of conflicts, in positive accounts of globalisation, neo-liberal de-borderment is presented as an extension of liberal values and structures. This extension corresponds to the re-borderment of Northern political communities. Here, it is important to note the correspondence of the universalising humanitarian rhetoric used to situate the aid or debt-reduction programmes with the

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<sup>1225</sup> Jeremy Corbyn, *Hansard*, Col. 772, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995

<sup>1226</sup> Stephen Castles, 'A fair migration policy – without open borders', *Open Democracy*, December 29<sup>th</sup>, 2003, p 3, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/content/articles/PDF/1657.pdf>; accessed June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

<sup>1227</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'Refugees from Globalism', *CARF*, No. 57, August/September, 2000; <http://www.carf.demon.co.uk/feat44.html>; accessed July 17<sup>th</sup>, 2005

extensive component of universalising colonialism.<sup>1228</sup> As I argued in the first and second chapters, colonial capitalism involved the core culture's territorial extension of market relations and modernisation throughout the periphery. In the contemporary period, the deregulation of developing nation's economies involves the privatisation of their public social spheres: Here, under conditions of globalisation, a formerly territorial engagement between the core and periphery works in a de-bordering manner (as it acts upon the periphery) to reinforce the relations of dominance, even as its operation is couched in terms of the universal humanism belonging to the discourse of aid, development, and intervention. Correspondingly, the re-bordering of European Union communities against 'South to North' migrations follows from the extension of neo-liberal re-structuring to the 'under-developed' South. 'Southern' states are therefore both de-bordered' through the coerced opening of their societies and economies and 're-bordered' through the restrictions that are imposed on the mobility of their populations.

The imperative towards borderlessness inherent in neo-liberalism, and the rise of the state in which global processes – including those of information technology communication systems and their articulation to Western defence programs – have gained immediacy and moved towards a form of universal applicability. Globalisation has, nonetheless, seen the occurrence of processes of (national) re-borderment such as the prevalence of communitarian forms of securitisation in Northern states. This form of re-borderment – a key process of the assemblage I have referred to as 'enfortressment' (see the introduction) – is an essential component of the move towards an imagined horizon of a world without difference which nonetheless *requires* an unassimilable difference for its legitimation. This globalised dynamic reflects those operating within the world of colonial liberalism, wherein the chaos of 'nature' ('our' Hobbesian competitiveness; 'its/their' primitiveness; 'their' Orientalism) was presumed and projected as the other to the 'civilised' and progressive realms of European modernity.<sup>1229</sup> As I discussed in earlier chapters, this biopolitical projection targeted both the 'resistant' British subject and the 'resistant' colonial subject. Hence, the sphere of the liberal community of rational, self-disciplined (moral) citizens was bordered by the limits presented by pauperised-and-racialised populations.<sup>1230</sup> Such recalcitrant populations were subject to an assemblage of disciplinary and sovereign power. Within the hegemonic governmentality of colonial capitalism in the nineteenth century, the resistance

<sup>1228</sup> Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*; Etienne Balibar, *ibid*, 2001.

<sup>1229</sup> John Marriott, *ibid*, 1996. Marriott argues the role of the working class in the making of English modernity and subjectivity has been neglected, even as the figure of the masses worked as the other to the individualistic process of self making. Postcolonial approaches include Edward Said, *Orientalism*, Penguin, London, 1995, Enrique Dussel, *The Invention of the Americas: Eclipse of the 'Other' in the Myth of Modernity*, Continuum, New York, 1995; Catherine Hall, *ibid*; Gayatri Chakrabarty Spivak, 'Three Women's Texts and a critique of imperialism', in Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, (eds.), *The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism*, pp., 896-912, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1997. .

<sup>1230</sup> See also, Phillip Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, Chapter 9.

of the British poor to their proletarianization led to the introduction of the extended political franchise. That resistance was a resistance to racialisation wherein the British subject differentiated himself from the abject position of the colonial subject, thereby claiming recognition for his 'rights' by virtue of his national and racial belonging. The complex dis/identification with the colonial other made the British subject available for inclusion within the governmentality of national-imperialism that developed in the second half of the nineteenth century (see chapter three). At the same time, within the paradigm of liberalism, an individual who transgressed the norms of labour discipline and thus became a 'pauper' could be compelled to enter the workhouse system of forced labour. This form of stasis constituted, as Duvell and Jordan observe, a loss of the rights of mobility and association, and thus a loss of substantive citizenship and the liberal status of moral equality.<sup>1231</sup> Such disorderly subjects were guilty of transgressing the liberal principle of property rights inasmuch as their poverty represented both a burden upon the 'common wealth' and a refusal of marketised discipline. Correspondingly, within the neo-liberal paradigm the right to free movement and the punishment of stasis depends upon the individual's ability to 'make the required contribution': in the re-bordering governmentality of South to North migration those migrants that represent a cost to the members of the (Northern) political communities 'surrender their moral autonomy as well as their democratic sovereignty'.<sup>1232</sup>

Pauperised South to North migration is subject to the utilitarian logic of a re-bordering liberal exclusion, yet that utilitarianism is pre-figured by post/colonial racism. When represented in Orientalist or Occidental terms in Western states,<sup>1233</sup> the process of globalised re-borderment sounds as if it were *primarily culturalist*: a culturist conception of forced migrations could be represented in the form of the argument that the unleashing of global flows (in the post Cold War era) have resulted in the violent re-assertion of nationality *qua* ethnicity in, for example, the Balkans or in central, sub-Saharan or the Horn of Africa. Here an Orientalist trope positions the forced migration and conflict of, for example, the Balkans (1991-1993) as the manifestation of a 'primitive ethnicity' (resulting in 'Balkanisation'). An ethno-centric policy of restricting the immigration of asylum seekers might register in the idiom of cultural identity – referring, for example, to the immigrant's self-evident 'they-ness', before referring to the infringement upon 'our' rights that their presence represents.<sup>1234</sup> Re-bordering the national community against this global/postcolonial threat works, in part, within the instantiation of thresholds of tolerance established in the race relations paradox (see chapter five). Here, a neo-liberal problematisation is constructed around these global flows of conflicted subjects wherein a quantitative

<sup>1231</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *ibid*, 2005, p 97.

<sup>1232</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *op cit*; cf., T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1950.

<sup>1233</sup> Edward Said, *ibid*; Couze Venn, *Occidentalism*, Sage, London, 2001.

<sup>1234</sup> Christina Boswell, 'European Values and the Asylum System', *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 2, 2000, p 552.

limit is established in order to exclude an intolerable amount of qualitative (pre-modern and 'uncivilised') difference.

Moreover, if the easing of borders within globalisation can be thought of in terms of de-territorialisation, globalised borderment shows that it can also be thought in terms of re-territorialisation. As Neil Brenner argues, globalisation, to the degree that it consists of deterritorialisation – the increase in the intensity of the trans-bordered flows of processes such as capital, information, and communication which lend themselves to immediacy – is premised upon processes of re-territorialisation that facilitate these flows, wherein space is regulated in order to enable these unregulated temporal flows.<sup>1235</sup> These re and de-territorialized spatio-temporalities – for example – those of the privileging (through, for example, the transnational architecture of financial deregulation) of global cities and their concentric maps of production – also work to re-border the global process of production. Subsequently, as Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan observe, the compression of spatio-temporality is matched by its expansion, 'with the result that some cities, countries and regions have become increasingly disassociated and marginalised'.<sup>1236</sup> If these regions are often those that both produce 'undesirable' forms of migration and stasis including flows of international refugees, encampments of internally displaced persons, and urban ghettos, then we can observe, as Bauman does, that the de-bordered freedom of mobility belongs to the realms of the world's 'tourists', while the world's vagabonds suffer stasis and forced or 'unfree' mobilities.<sup>1237</sup> Duvell and Jordan, similarly, write of the new channels of mobility that globalisation demands for the 'global nomads' consisting of 'financial, managerial and technical elites, and a range of highly skilled workers'.<sup>1238</sup> Yet populations which migrate for a mixture of political and economic reasons, either for safety, or as part of a strategy to gain advantage from transnational activity and membership' such as asylum seekers and irregular migrants are also often 'global nomads' (see chapter seven).<sup>1239</sup> Subsequently, regimes of migration management are designed to facilitate the 'proper ordering' of these higher and lower circuits of mobility and stasis. In this context, as Helene Pellerin argues, 'globalisation has affected the management of international migration in the same way that it affected

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<sup>1235</sup> R. Brenner, 'Globalization as Re-territorialisation: The re-scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', *Urban Studies*, Vol. 36, No 3. Carfax, Taylor and Francis, 1999, pp., 431-451

<sup>1236</sup> Vinay Gidwani and Kalayanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, 'Circular Migration and the Spaces of Cultural Assertion', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 93, No. 1, 2003; cf., Anna Tsing, 'Inside the economy of appearances', *Public Culture*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp., 115-14.

<sup>1237</sup> Vinay Gidwani and Kalayanakrishnan Sivaramakrishnan, *ibid*, p 186; Zygmunt Bauman, Chapter 4, 'Tourists and Vagabonds', in *Globalization: The Human Consequences*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, pp., 75-102. Bauman describes the stratifications of postmodern consumer society in terms the freedom, or lack of freedom of mobility (p 86)

<sup>1238</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *ibid*, 2005, p 60.

<sup>1239</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *op cit.*

the expansion of financial capital, namely through a deregulation and re-regulation of spaces of circulation'.<sup>1240</sup>

In several historically recent instances, the articulation of borderlessness and re-borderment – including for example, the Horn of Africa, and the Ex-Yugoslav states of the Balkans, large scale conflicts have produced substantial flows of forced migration, whilst other regions, states, and the stateless populations caused by the recent conflicts have become 'remnants' or 'exceptions' to the global system of global production.<sup>1241</sup> Globalisation then, seems to present a paradox that has been given structure by the 'paradox' that articulated political liberalism to economic liberalism in the period of colonial capitalism. In representing the manifestation of borderlessness, globalisation also represents the 'risky' or 'dangerous' contemporary world that neo-liberalism seeks to manage and restrain as a border, or more precisely, as a resistant *frontier* that must be overcome for the 'free' working of the market. Globalisation thus mirrors the contradictions found between imperialism and liberalism that were resolved in the episteme of 'Progress' in the colonial period.<sup>1242</sup> Like the dangers faced by the 'Herculean' task of capitalism in the period of colonial modernity, the liminal space of global risk presents as a 'many headed hydra'; in, for example, the 'undisciplined' behaviour of 'Southern' states that resist the governmentality of the 'international community', the 'ethno-political' violence of Balkans ethno-religious communities, in the rise of terrorism and the spread of transnational crime, and as a key component of the latter, in the threatening escalation of the unregulated movements of pauperised persons (even as this later feature would seem to contradict one of the basic tenets of liberalism).<sup>1243</sup>

Colonial capitalism, like globalisation, was a dynamic process subject to the management of risk as it is (and has been) the realm of risk from which profit can be extracted. For the neo-Gramscian theorist Van der Pijl, for the world systems theorist Wallerstein and for the postcolonial theorist Amin, the success of the European Western state system was a historically contingent development built upon the 'core's' exploitation of the peripheral realm: as Robinson puts the matter, 'core affluence and the attenuating effects it had on social polarisation were made possible by the core's relation to a spatially

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<sup>1240</sup> Helene Pellerin, 'The politics of migration regulation', in Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs, *ibid*, 2003, p 183.

<sup>1241</sup> Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998; Gregor Noll, 'Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones', Working Paper, Lund University, Department of Law, 2003, p 3; <http://www.iur.lu.se/forsake/Noll.nsf>; accessed February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2004

<sup>1242</sup> James Hollifield, 'Migration and International Relations: The Liberal Paradox'; For a critical legal treatment of the frontier within globalization see J Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. For more on the liberal paradox see the treatments throughout this thesis.

<sup>1243</sup> Adam Smith, for example, envisioned freedom of movement as an integral component of the *laissez faire* philosophy. The use of classical mythology belongs to Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *ibid*.



defined periphery'.<sup>1244</sup> During the period of post Second World War globalisation, the gap between the (territorially defined) 'core' and 'periphery' has greatly increased. While the per capita GDP in the wealthiest 20 countries in 1960 was 18 times greater than that of the poorest 20 countries, by 1995 the divergence had widened to 37:1.<sup>1245</sup> Correspondingly, however, the gap between the wealthy and poor *within* nations – whether these belong to the core, semi-periphery, or the periphery has also grown, and an increasing proportion of global wealth has come to be held in unregulated and 'dislocated' forms.<sup>1246</sup> In the shift from colonial capitalism to globalisation there is an extent to which 'core and periphery (have) come to denote social location rather than geography', while 'affluence in global society is coming to rest on the oppression of peripheral social sectors that are not necessarily spatially concentrated'.<sup>1247</sup>

Yet, at the same time, while 'the concerns of First World governance are increasingly about abstractions (like money) and invisibles (like services) – highly mobile and interchangeable between locations – those of the Third World are about assets and resources that are firmly rooted in territories'.<sup>1248</sup> Subsequently, from the perspective of 'globalisation-from-above', and thus for the social groups owning an interest in the management of the global political economy, the overall effect is the dispersion of the realm of 'risk' between its location 'inside' and 'outside' of the site of its production. This contemporary feature of globalisation reflects the hybridity of risks faced by colonial capitalists in the rise of the European nation-state system. Thus, I argue that the imperative towards borderlessness belonging to 'globalisation-from-above' works as a form of neo-colonialism. This form of colonisation differs from the tradition form in which dominance was secured through the marking of borders articulating territory with sovereign state formation, for instead it seeks to gain the strategic management of the flows and 'scapes' comprising networked global production.<sup>1249</sup>

The historian Eric Hobsbawm has observed that 'the history of the world economy since the Industrial Revolution had been one of accelerating technological progress, of continuous but uneven economic growth, and of 'increasing 'globalization,' that is to say of an increasingly elaborate and intricate worldwide division of labour; an increasingly dense network of flows and exchanges that bound every

<sup>1244</sup> Kees Van der Pijl, *ibid*, 1998, p 89. William I Robinson, *ibid*, p 1062

<sup>1245</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report, 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty*, Washington, DC, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2001, p 51.

<sup>1246</sup> The US and the UK are amongst the highest ranked in terms of inequality amongst developed nations. See World Bank, *ibid*, pp., 53-5.

<sup>1247</sup> William I Robinson, *op cit*; Robinson, like Jordan and Duvell, perceives borderment in terms of social groups in a transnational setting, wherein the 'select integration of social groups into transnational networks, suggest that we may rethink development not as a national process, in which what 'develops' is a nation, but in terms of developed, underdeveloped, and intermediate population groups occupying contradictory or unstable locations in a transnational environment'. See also, Mark Duffield, *ibid*, pp., 5-6

<sup>1248</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *ibid*, 2005, p 43.

<sup>1249</sup> A. Appadurai, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 220-230

part of the world economy to the global system'.<sup>1250</sup> In following some of the recent critiques of 'unfettered' globalisation I have already indicated that this globally hybrid world (a world that is *culturally* and *materially* hybrid)<sup>1251</sup> does not signify an *absolute* spatio-temporal borderlessness.<sup>1252</sup> Similarly, for those concerned with its effect upon the degree of state sovereignty it remains true to say that it has not become a world in which the nation state has been superseded by an idealist rights-based supranationalism nor by a universal and absolute deregulation of all mobility flows.<sup>1253</sup> Moreover, the recouping of these global tendencies works within the transformative state architecture as forms of 'national' globalisation.<sup>1254</sup> Thus, where Harvey has observed that global systems of production and distribution involve the competition of locally-based business and political systems for mobile capital,<sup>1255</sup> it can be seen that the nation state-society complex seeking to anchor capital locally by facilitating its conditions of production (in, for example, the 'disciplinarity' of labour flexibility and access to international flows of highly skilled migrants) also seeks to disperse risk onto the lower circuits of social, economic, and political production.

In the British case, as Anne Costello and Les Levidow argue, 'since the 1980's labour has been newly flexibilised to intensify its exploitation'.<sup>1256</sup> 'Flexploitation' works to impose 'insecurity, indignity and greater discipline', and 'intensifies inequalities along race and gender lines. Ethnic minority workers suffer greater unemployment and greater cyclical fluctuations in employment; they are marginalised into the more insecure, subordinate jobs'.<sup>1257</sup> But socially and territorially immobile sectors of the 'indigenous' population also suffer from 'flexploitation'. Here, there is a tendency for the frustrations of immobilised subjects to be directed towards the government that should provide measures of security against the effects of globalisation. Jordan and Duvell observe that in this situation,

<sup>1250</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (1914-1991)*, Abacus, London, 1995, p 87.

<sup>1251</sup> The term 'hybridity' has migrated from its postcolonial and primarily cultural origins to become a key word in globalisation theory, from, for example, the works of Hommi Bhabha (1994) and Paul Gilroy (1992) to the works of Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2000) and Jan Aart Scholte (2000). Hardt and Negri (2000, pp., 143-146) make a convincing argument for hybridity as an essential component of global capitalism.

<sup>1252</sup> The first adherent of borderlessness may have been Richard O'Brian, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography*, 1992. Human geographical critiques of borderlessness have come from Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, 'Capital, State and Space: Contesting the Borderless World', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp., 291-309; Doreen Massey, 'Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space in A. Brah et al., *Global Futures: Migration, Environment, and Globalization*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, pp., 22-44; Gerard O'Tuathail, 'Borderless Worlds? Problematising Discourses of De-territorialisation in Global Finance and Digital Culture', *Geo-Politics*, 4, 2000, pp., 139-154.

<sup>1253</sup> Contra, for example, Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal's earlier arguments for a postnational framework for analysing immigration. Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994.

<sup>1254</sup> Stephen Castles, *ibid*, 2001, p 96.

<sup>1255</sup> David Harvey, *ibid*.

<sup>1256</sup> Anne Costello and Les Levidow, 'Flexploitation strategies: UK lessons from and for Europe', *Soundings*, p 74

<sup>1257</sup> Anne Costello and Les Levidow, *op cit*.

*settled immigrants (often poorer than those who protest about their presence and their access to collective resources) serve as proxy targets for the subversion of systems of social protection that have been swept away by global market forces, through the programmes of international regimes.*<sup>1258</sup>

Yet, to the extent that they are 'integrated' members of the national community, settled migrant communities are no longer the primary, but the secondary group to be targeted as a proxy for the forces of globalisation. That is to say that the prior racialising 'exteriority' of settled immigrant communities is re-activated in the context of the threat of newly problematised categories of so-called 'bogus' asylum and (potentially 'terrorist') 'Islamic' immigration. The problematisation of asylum immigration as a form of transnational 'welfare fraud' reflects the anxieties revolving around the globalisation of the welfare state. The problematisation of 'Islamic' immigration is grounded in the neo-Orientalist constellation of discursive formations that constructs a 'clash of civilisations' and 'war on terror' and renders members of diversely located nationalities as dangerously 'fundamentalist' immigrants. Here, the iconic instance of the immigrant as the manifestation of the 'dark side of globalization' is the Muslim asylum seeker. These contemporary problematisations of immigration work to re-activate a sense that the 'British' threshold of tolerance is being and has been transgressed, and thus re-constitute the presence of 'integrated' minority communities as 'fundamentally alien'. This retrospective tendency thus serves to re-problematised 'multiculturalism' as a problem that requires a return to a more assimilationist approach to 'race relations', and to make the 'race relations paradox' available for redeployment in a xeno-racist form.<sup>1259</sup>

This displacement also works, in part, in the form of the neo-liberal governmentalities that discipline Southern states towards the transnational privatisation of their public and private sectors in order to open their economies to a 'laissez faire' global order. Here there is a strong correspondence with the nineteenth century British shift towards a global laissez faire economy, as the shift from mercantilism occurred only after Britain had established sufficient commercial and financial dominance. The monetarist disciplining of developing countries prevents the pursuit of protectionist or 'mercantilist' strategies of development that had allowed Britain, in the nineteenth century, to reach the state in which a (partial) laissez faire approach was advantageous.<sup>1260</sup>

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<sup>1258</sup> Bill Jordan and Frank Duvell, *ibid*, 2003a, p 55.

<sup>1259</sup> Liz Fekete, *ibid*, 2001, pp., 23-41

<sup>1260</sup> Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*, London, Anthem Press, 2002.

Globalisation's production of realms of risk is apparent in the work of Fotopoulos.<sup>1261</sup> For Fotopoulos, *neo-liberal* globalisation is manifest in contemporary terms in the form of the new world order and needs to be thought of in its ideological, political-military and economic, political-military components. Fotopoulos identifies a new transnational ideology of limited sovereignty where the protection of human rights and the new 'war on terrorism' are mobilised by the key actors in the 'international community' as justifications for the decrease in political sovereignty that 'complements' the corresponding decrease in economic sovereignty that follows economic globalisation.<sup>1262</sup> Articulated to this neo-liberal ideology is the military-political level of the new world order, 'expressed by the emergence of a new informal political globalisation which secures the concentration of political power in the hands of a newly emerged transnational elite'. Like Joxe, who argues that globalised politics lies in the space 'between the organised form of military violence and the organised form of the economy,' for Fotopoulos the articulation of the ideological and political-military levels works to coerce compliance with the emergence of the present neo-liberal economic globalisation in the form of an internationalised market economy.<sup>1263</sup>

In her account of the contemporary articulation of flows of people and money, Saskia Sassen writes that it is not 'sufficient simply to assert that globalisation has brought with it a declining significance of the state in economic regulation', as 'the state is the necessary institution for economic globalization as we know it today', and in her later work she has been careful to problematise the conceptual frameworks used to differentiate a national inside and a transnational outside.<sup>1264</sup> Stephen Castles similarly finds that globalisation brings with it both de-territorialising and re-territorialising tendencies, and that as 'forced migration has grown dramatically and is a crucial dimension of North-South relationships in the post-cold-war era, contemporary 'forced migration is linked in complex ways to processes of societal change in both the areas of origin and destination of forced migrants'.<sup>1265</sup> The interlinked changes in the mobility of peoples and money under conditions of globalisation has not represented a change to a post-national system in which the state has been supplanted by the freeing – or deregulation – of mobility controls, for while certain forms of mobility have been enabled, others have been correspondingly restricted.

<sup>1261</sup> Takis Fotopoulos, 'The War in the Balkans: The First War of the Internationalised Market Economy', *Democracy and Nature*, 1999, pp., 357-382; Takis Fotopoulos, 'New World Order and NATO's War against Yugoslavia', *New Political Science*, Vol 24, No 1, 2002.

<sup>1262</sup> Stephen Castles, *ibid*, 2003, p 18.

<sup>1263</sup> Alain Joxe, *Empire of Disorder*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, Semiotexte and MIT Press, p 189. Takis Fotopoulos, 'New World Order and NATO's War against Yugoslavia', especially pages 73-76, *New Political Science*, Volume 24, No 1, 2002, p 73. Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 2003, p 3.

<sup>1264</sup> Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 1998, p 6. Sassen draws upon Leo Panitch, 'Rethinking the Role of the State in an Era of Globalization', in James Mittleman, et al, (eds.), *Globalization: Critical Reflections. International Political Economy Yearbook*, vol. 9. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Reinman, 1996, and Robert Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987. The later relevant text is Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 2003.

<sup>1265</sup> Stephen Castles, *ibid*, 2003, pp., 13-24.

The state, in Sassen's account – whilst operating in a manner that is compatible with the Gramscian state-society complex operating in this thesis – is an increasingly hybrid assemblage, traversing both the public-private divide and that which lies between the national and transnational – and yet remains the major site of negotiation for the emergent international human rights regime and for the emergence of the global capital market as a determinant factor.<sup>1266</sup> The hybridity of the globalised state is evident in Sassen's formulation: 'The mix of processes we describe as globalization is ... producing, deep inside the nation state, a very partial but significant form of authority, a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national nor fully global'.<sup>1267</sup> Here, within these hybrid processes, the international human rights regime and the global capital market (including its instrumental institutions) form a contested space within which an (inter)national civil society is being formed and reformed, at the high end of norm definition, at the low ends of 'multicultural' and diversely situated low skilled labour, and at the intermediate level of quasi-institutional and informal processes.<sup>1268</sup>

This 'hybridity of the globalised and globalising state is particularly relevant to the situation of Britain where key political institutions have been, as the previous chapters have sought to show, transnationalised around the centrifugal and centripetal forces of the global City of London from the emergence of colonial capitalism in the early seventeenth century. Nonetheless, while the *long duree* approach has enabled an insight into the place of the centralised and trans-nationalised state in the control of mobilities throughout the history of the British state-society complex, the recent history of neo-liberal globalisation has represented a substantial, if not entirely new, re-orientation, including a heightened articulation – at least when measured against the welfare nationalism of the post war era – of domestic and foreign security processes with the facilitation of the global money market, and a intensification of processes which bring the global *within* the national.

The earlier chapters of this thesis, in focussing on the period of colonial-capitalism, show that the qualification that needed to be made to Zig Layton Henry's observation that 'Britain has traditionally favoured the free movement of capital and labour within the Empire', consisted of the fact that British liberal governmentality had, in actual fact, favoured the mobility of labour to the extent that it facilitated the free movements of capital.<sup>1269</sup> This facilitation, far from universally favouring the

<sup>1266</sup> Saskia Sassen, 'Towards a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy', in Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 1998. For Sassen's account of the state's hybridity, see 'The State and Globalization', *Interventions*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2003, pp., 241-248. In the latter, Sassen's rhetorical question is to ask whether the 'weight of private, often foreign, interests in this specific work of the state become constitutive of that authority and indeed produce a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public?' p 242.

<sup>1267</sup> Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 2003, p 243.

<sup>1268</sup> Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 1998, p 95, and *supra*. The importance of the intermediate levels of global processes is a feature of Sassen's more recent work. See, for example, Saskia Sassen, *ibid*, 2003, pp., 1-22.

<sup>1269</sup> Zig Layton Henry, 1989, p 61.

freedom of movement and the agency that this implies for migrants or residents, actually worked through a continuum of movements that worked – at one pole – in the forced migrations of African slaves to their enforced stasis in the Caribbean plantation system – to the opposite pole in which working class British subjects were encouraged to emigrate to the colonies (although, even here, we are not, predominantly, speaking of a ‘freedom of mobility’). In the context of the nineteenth century’s relinquishment of forced labour mobilities, the British state came to rely on the import of cheap primary products from the economies that had been built from the process of colonisation. Subsequently, throughout the greater part of the twentieth century, the ‘duality’ of the British economy lay, in large part, in its reliance on the offshore components of production (although the services and transport sectors sought to take advantage of the post-war flows of New Commonwealth immigration). Under conditions of globalisation however, this territorialisation of duality has been hybridised so that the borders between the higher and lower circuits of production have been partially deterritorialised (while the intensification of territoriality has correspondingly increased).

This chapter has also begun to show how British neo-liberal governmentality has been framed by economically-militant state strategies, where the globalised territorial state has, as James Hollifield argues, mutated into the ‘trading state’ which, this thesis argues, has pursued its economic and political interests in the form of a militant competitiveness.<sup>1270</sup> Simultaneously, recent works from political sociology and work within the discipline of international political economics have shown that the assemblage of practices amounting to an econo-militancy have been restructured by the transnational processes and interests with which it is aligned in its foreign and domestic policies. Globalisation has thus not resulted in the *replacement* or super cession of the Western nation-state or the ‘world system’ by supra-national rights-based regimes or by the purely deterritorialised flows of transnational capital, information, and culture, but has instead seen the state system repositioned in the neo-liberal governmentality of a ‘policing body’.

Subsequently, the re- and de-territorialisation of neo-liberal globalisation has not signified the super cession of nationalist aggression, but, for the ‘North’ at least, signifies merely the repositioning of (sovereign) violence’s’ legitimacy, often via its displacement onto a discourse of political and economic responsibility, the ‘protection of human rights’, ‘democracy’, the ‘war on terrorism’, the ‘responsibilities’ of active citizens, and more particularly, onto the ‘criminal’ sphere of mobility referred to as the ‘dark side’ of globalisation. Here, the form of economic competition given in neo-liberalism itself leads to conflicts and subsequent mobility flows that are re-presented along the ‘nationalist and ethnic’ lines. Moreover, within the development of post Cold War globalisation,

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<sup>1270</sup> James Hollifield, ‘International Relations and Migration: The Liberal Paradox’, *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*, draft paper, November 12<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

immigration policy works as one form of mobility control, having buttressed the borders of the national welfare and (later) buttressing those of the neo-liberal state-society complex. As Nevzat Soguk has argued, immigration policies and refugee policies in particular have become key tools of borderment in the (re)production of the (post)modern state.<sup>1271</sup>

This chapter has developed the argument that the Thatcherite revolution consisted of the British state's opening to the forces of neo-liberal globalisation. In examining the neo-liberal governmentality of race-and-class, immigration, and nationality, I found that Thatcherism represented a reinvented form of national imperialism, and the adoption of a neo-colonial stance in the midst of the post-colonial moment. Subsequently, I discussed the manner in which the new global order is governed by neo-liberal and neo-colonial assumptions, in which the dominant Northern states seek to discipline the South in order to facilitate the free working of the global market. This neo-liberal governmentality forms the context in which immigration and asylum policy has been made in Britain from the period of the mid-1980's, and it is that policy regime that the thesis engages with in the following chapter.

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<sup>1271</sup> Nevzat Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft*, Minneapolis and London, University of Minnesota Press, 1999.



## Chapter Seven: Re-bordering the British Fortress.

This chapter will trace the development of the British neo-liberal governmentality of South to North immigration. I will argue that as a restrictive regime of asylum migration has been constructed throughout the 1980s and 1990's, policies of 'integration' have come to be used to legitimate a politics of insecurity and the containment of the 'dark side' of globalisation within the third world or periphery. Here, I want to initially note the manner in which South to North immigration is framed within the contemporary governmental approach to globalisation. The focus throughout the chapter is on asylum and immigration policy, but uses the approach set out in the previous chapter's discussion of neo-liberal globalisation, and thus approaches both refugees and so-called 'failed' asylum seekers as political-and-economic migrants. In the first section of this chapter I provide an introductory account of the discursive problematisation of asylum migration in British politics, and trace some of the continuities that have remained in the shift from the Conservative to the Labour government's regimes. The second section traces the initial period of asylum and economic South to North migration restriction from the 1980s to the mid 1990s. In the third section I give an account of the Labour government's 'Third Way' approach to the neo-liberal governmentality of North-South relationships and globalisation. The fourth section recounts the development of immigration and asylum policy under the Labour government from 1997 to 2004.

The focus of this chapter is on the emergence and development of the post Cold War period of immigration policy formation in Britain. William Shawcross has observed that the 'post-Cold War world has exaggerated ethnic hatreds, encouraged the failure of states, exacerbated internal conflicts (or at least prolonged them) and led to more global disorder', while 'rivalries within states and between states and trans-border ethnic, tribal and religious groups' have become more powerful.<sup>1272</sup> The Labour M.P. Jack Straw drew out the connection between the contemporary proliferation of conflict and the rise and fall in asylum applications in Britain, stating that

*[t]he end of the Cold War was of huge importance in reducing the prospect of thermo-nuclear conflict, but since its end, the world has in many ways become a much more dangerous place. Let us look at the areas of internal disruption and civil war, and consider the trend in the figures. Look at Algeria, the Sudan, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and, of course, Nigeria. As conflicts develop, so the number of applications for asylum shoots up ... Let us look at those areas in which some semblance of peace has been restored, and where applications have generally fallen. Applications from the Lebanon have*

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<sup>1272</sup> William Shawcross, *Deliver us from Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in a World of Endless Conflict*, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2000, p 32.

*fallen by 90 per cent. since 1990, and there were half the number of applications from Iran last year as compared with 1986. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees commented: "in our view, the rise in asylum claims may be more rationally seen as a consequence of the unprecedented scale of global conflict which produces refugee flows."*<sup>1273</sup>

The post Cold War global disorder has produced a massive rise in internal and international forced displacements while, in some cases (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, and the Sudan), the new forms of warfare have increasingly targeted civilian populations and the forced displacement of people has become an essential tool of conflict.<sup>1274</sup> Stephen Castles *et al.*, make the important point that one should be careful in viewing the proliferation of post Cold War conflicts as 'ethnic conflicts', as 'ethnicity has often become a label that covers a multitude of underlying divisions in society'. Instead, they argue that a more appropriate term might be 'political conflict that has taken an ethnic form', and that these conflicts are 'indicative of deeper problems in society, connected with fundamental problems of economic development, governance, and human rights'.<sup>1275</sup> Conflict is the prime 'push-factor' contributing refugee flows into Western European states, and is the major cause of forced displacements in general (including the production of internally displaced persons).<sup>1276</sup> In addition, 'people from the conflict zones of the South and the East' are drawn to European Union countries because of their high levels of 'human rights and economic and social development'.<sup>1277</sup> For asylum seekers as for other categories of migrants, the decision and ability to migrate as well as the choice of destination is also influenced by a range of intermediate factors, including the existence of absence of a transnational migrant network that facilitates migration and settlement.<sup>1278</sup> In many cases, the choice of destination is not in the hands of the migrant and his or her community, but is a result of the networks and pathways established by intermediate actors such as smugglers or traffickers.

Western European states have reacted to the corresponding increase in asylum flows by constructing increasingly restrictive asylum regimes. Robin Cohen notes that Western states have traditionally made the decision to grant asylum on the basis of 'political accolades', 'use-value, demographic reasons and ethnic solidarity with communities and their supporters abroad'.<sup>1279</sup> For Patricia Tuitt, the reduction

<sup>1273</sup> Jack Straw, Commons Hansard, 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading of the Immigration and Asylum Act (1996), December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995, col. 717

<sup>1274</sup> Mary Kaldor, *ibid*, 2001

<sup>1275</sup> Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna, *ibid*, pp., 18, 33

<sup>1276</sup> Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna, *ibid*, pp., 17-20; See also T.J Hatton and J.G Williamson, 'Refugees, asylum seekers, and policy in Europe', unpublished paper, Canberra, Australian National University; <http://www.ecocomm.anu.edu.au/people/info/hatton/refugees2.pdf>; Refugee Week Partnership, *Fleeing the Fighting: How Conflict Drives the Search for Asylum – A Report on War and Conflict in Refugee Producing Countries*; [http://www.amnesty.org.uk/images/ul/R/Refugee\\_Week\\_Report.pdf](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/images/ul/R/Refugee_Week_Report.pdf); London, June 2004.

<sup>1277</sup> Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna, *ibid*, p 29

<sup>1278</sup> Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna, *ibid*, pp., 30-2

<sup>1279</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 72.

of the external costs of the refugee-producing phenomenon, rather than the motivating force of humanitarian concerns, was and remains the primary purpose in refugee law formation.<sup>1280</sup> There are four primary categories in which refugee law functions towards this purpose:

*First, by defining the refugee as 'alien', refugee law contains the more vulnerable and thus more costly of refugees within the refugee producing state. Second, refugee law operates to reduce the refugee identity by privileging certain forms of human rights violations above others and thus delegitimising major forms of refugee-producing phenomena; in this way the number of 'legal' 'aliens' is tightly controlled. Third, refugee law ensures that refugees contribute to the attainment of the political goals of Western States, and thus defray external costs. Refugee law has been used to create a subset of ambassadors to the human rights rationales of Western states, particularly during the Cold War period. It is currently utilized as a means to unite Western states in opposition to all forms of migration. Last, but by no means least, refugee law seeks to reduce the costs of refugees by operating as a mechanism within which such costs can be spread.*<sup>1281</sup>

Tuitt is wrong to argue that the operation of refugee law has united Western states in opposition to *all* forms of migration, for many states compete for highly skilled migrant labour. In Britain, for example, since the election of the Labour government in 1997, many aspects of policy concerned with 'the migration of workers and professionals – so-called 'economic' migration ... have been extensively liberalised, with the admission of potentially large numbers of new migrants being facilitated by the new procedures.'<sup>1282</sup> Yet it is true to say that the construction of regional and national asylum regimes have focussed on their ability to facilitate the restriction of asylum migration. Gil Loescher observes that in the post Cold War context, refugees have been 'increasingly observed as burdens, particularly if they made a claim for asylum in the West'.<sup>1283</sup> Charles Keely argues that post Cold War development of restrictive asylum regimes rests on the contradiction between 'Northern' and 'Southern' asylum regimes.<sup>1284</sup> The international refugee regime has its basis in the non-governmental and intergovernmental forms of co-operation that developed under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Nations at the end of the First World War, and then in the post Second World War developments of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its Protocol on the Status of

<sup>1280</sup> Patricia Tuitt, *ibid*, p7; Tuitt cites James Hathaway, 'International refugee law: humanitarian standard or protectionist ploy', in Andrew Nash, (ed.), *Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees Under International Law*, Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Montreal, 1998, p184, and Loescher and Monahan, *Refugees and International Relations*, 1990, p9.

<sup>1281</sup> Patricia Tuitt, *op cit*.

<sup>1282</sup> Don Flynn, *ibid*, 2003, p 1.

<sup>1283</sup> Gil Loescher, *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p 13.

<sup>1284</sup> Charles Keely, 'The international refugee regime(s): the end of the Cold War matters', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2001



Refugees (1967), and the primary agency of the UNHCR (see chapter four). The 'regime's objectives are to provide protection and assistance, and to work towards durable solutions to the refugee's situation': the primary form of solutions pursued include repatriation in safety following changes that allow for return, or, failing that, settlement in the place of refuge, or resettlement in a third country.<sup>1285</sup> In the context of the regime's stated aims, the restrictionist turn of liberal democratic states' asylum policy has led to the charge that it constitutes an 'abrogation of 70 years of humanitarian law and practice'.<sup>1286</sup> Keely argues that that apparent paradox can be explained by observing that the international refugee regime has been operated, from the period of the Cold War onwards, on a 'Northern' and a 'Southern' basis. Keely refers to the Northern regime as having been designed as part of the Western states' strategy of containment. Herein, it was intended that the admission and settlement of those who had escaped communist oppression would work to delegitimise communist and socialist states (and, primarily, the USSR). The strategy worked in combination with other strategies of proxy conflict, including the 'competition to win political allies and forge alliances in the development world, and support for opposing sides in civil wars in the Third World': the goal of this refugee regime 'was not to help restore stability to the international system but to destabilize governments, cause states to fail, and create domestic support for a policy of opposing and weakening communist governments in a constant struggle'.<sup>1287</sup>

The Northern regime was operated on a hospitable basis in regards to the Eastern bloc refugees: 'fairly generous assistance, commensurate with the welfare state policy generally pursued (and probably with a generous pinch of guilt about Holocaust era behaviour), and an adjudication system that provided the benefit of the doubt to the applicant prevailed'.<sup>1288</sup> A key assumption was that the potential size of any refugee flows was likely to be relatively small, and that the regime thus offered the maximum political advantage for the minimum political cost. On occasion, however, the Northern regime states accepted significant numbers of Third World refugees, notably from Indochina and, in the case of the US, from Cuba.

The UNHCR was and remains reliant on the Northern regime states for its primary funding.<sup>1289</sup> While the UNHCR had little role in the operation of the Northern regime, in opening an office in Burundi in 1962 it signalled the beginning of the Southern regime in which the agency took on a primary responsibility for the operation of the international refugee regime in the Third World.<sup>1290</sup> While the

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<sup>1285</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 304.

<sup>1286</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 302.

<sup>1287</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 308.

<sup>1288</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 307

<sup>1289</sup> B.S. Chimni, *ibid*, 1998.

<sup>1290</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, pp., 307, 309

conflicts that the Southern regime responded to were often 'exacerbated by great power involvement in the Cold War', the Southern regime operated in order to 'contain and control the political impacts of civil wars and state failures related to ideological conflict, often combined with an element of ethnic or nationality conflict'.<sup>1291</sup> As Keely argues, 'the objective of the refugee regime in the developing world was to stabilise situations by providing state-like protection and assistance to victims and to repatriate them in safety, although remaining in place or overseas resettlement also took place'.<sup>1292</sup> What has developed in the period from the mid 1980s onwards has been the phenomenon of increasing numbers of self-presenting asylum seekers in Britain and other Western states, and an adaptation of the northern regime to respond to the eruption of displacement hitherto associated with the Southern regime within the territories of the northern states. A key element on this process of adaptation has been the emergence of new forms of problematising discourse that target asylum-based immigration.

### **Section 7.1. The Discursive Problematisation of Political-and-Economic Migrants**

The degree to which migration can be said to be free, coerced, or forced, voluntary or involuntary, and the form of political power that constitutes the context of migration is, and has been a complex issue. In chapter two I noted that the modern binary opposition between free and unfree migration has been subject to critique, and that it was more useful to see migration in terms of the continuum that David Etlis set out from degrees of 'unfreedom' to degrees of freedom, and that the liberal definition of freedom derived from the theories of classical political economy overlooked the (geo)political conditions in which putatively 'voluntary' decision were made. In the context of British colonial capitalism, for example, the 'voluntary' migration of Irish persons to the industrial centres of Britain in the nineteenth century consisted of decisions made in the context of the colonial pauperisation of the Irish economy. Analogously, in chapter five I argued that the 'voluntary' migration of West Indian persons to Britain in the mid-twentieth century should be regarded, similarly, as having been a form of political migration.

This chapter identifies the phase of a new restrictionism aimed at 'refugees', 'asylum seekers', and 'economic' immigrants as beginning in the mid 1980's after the Conservative government began to impose visa restrictions on Sri Lankan visitors after the persecution of Tamils produced a new influx of Sri Lankan refugees to the UK in 1985 (see section 7.2).<sup>1293</sup> I will argue that each of these terms – the 'refugee', the 'asylum seeker', and the 'economic' migrant has become problematic within a neo-utilitarian problematisation of pauperised immigration, where, as I seek to show below, they are

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<sup>1291</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 311.

<sup>1292</sup> Charles Keely, *ibid*, p 311.

<sup>1293</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, pp., 81-88

sometimes conflated and sometimes invoked as binary opposites. For the purposes of this analysis, I will now briefly examine these terms and their usage in governmental, legal, and academic discourse.

Stephen Castles observes that definitions of types of forced migration are 'the product of political negotiations taken by the main actors in the field over the last 60 years'.<sup>1294</sup> Following Patricia Tuitt, we can say that the term 'refugee' differs in its sociological or legal usage, and that, in Castles' sense, its usage is the result of past and ongoing political negotiations. While both the sociological and legal sense of the term 'focuses on the movement of people', from the (broader) sociological perspective, that movement does not necessarily have to be one that includes the crossing of (international) borders.<sup>1295</sup> In the broader approach, internally displaced persons (IDP's) are also referred to as refugees and, on a global level, this growth of this wider category of forced migration and stasis has greatly outstripped the numbers of refugees who have been able to cross international borders. Often, the difference between an international refugee and an internally displaced person is a matter of an individual or household's access to the monetary and social capital necessary for an international journey. Mary Kaldor has argued that the rise in the numbers of IDPs is the result of new forms of conflict that use the targeting of civilians as a tool of warfare.<sup>1296</sup> While the global numbers of (Convention) refugees rose from 2.4 million in 1975 to a high of 17.8 million in 1992 and then fell to 9.4 million in 2004, the numbers of IDP's rose from 1.2 million in 1982 to 14 million in 1986 and then 25 million in 2003.<sup>1297</sup>

While what remains essential to these definitions is the element of power – in that a refugee is a person whose migration has been, in some way, *forced*, in the field of (inter)national legal law what matters most is the fact that the migrant has been forced to cross international borders. Since the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the recognition of forced migration across international borders has been recognised and codified in a manner that regulates the obligations and the limits of those by states to refugees. The 1951 Convention states that a subject is owed protection if

*[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member of a social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing*

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<sup>1294</sup> Stephen Castles, *Developing DFID's Policy Approach to Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Vol. 1, Consultancy Report and Recommendations*, Stephen Castles and Nicholas van Hear, et al., Oxford, Refugees Studies Centre, February 2005, p 11

<sup>1295</sup> Patricia Tuitt, *ibid*, p 5.

<sup>1296</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001

<sup>1297</sup> Stephen Castles, *ibid*, 2005, pp., 16, 24. The figures for Convention refugees come from UNHCR, *Refugees by Numbers*, Website, Geneva, UNHCR, 2004; the figures for IDP's are drawn from R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, *Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement*, Washington D.C., Brookings Institute Press, 1998, and Global IDP Project, *Available Country Profiles and Numbers of IDPs*, Geneva, Global IDP Project, [www.idpproject.org/IDP\\_table.htm](http://www.idpproject.org/IDP_table.htm)

*to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*

The central legal concern of states in relation to refugees is for the concept of alienage, which 'reflects the confines of international law to the protection of legal subjects which still maintains the territorial integrity of all states'.<sup>1298</sup> In the Geneva Convention, signatory states are beholden to uphold the principle of non-refoulement: states are required to abstain from returning asylum seekers to the territories in which they have suffered persecution (as defined above). However, while the Convention requires states to uphold the refugee's right to leave the state of persecution, it only requires states to which migrants make asylum applications to accept them if they meet that state's legal definition of the Geneva Convention's codification of the refugee. Subsequently, although the right to seek the protection of another state by refugees is upheld as a universal human right, much depends on the manner in which the individual states that have ratified the 1951 Convention interpret their obligations.

Asylum seekers are those persons who present the state with an application for the recognition of refugee status. In Britain, this process is governed by the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967, and is applied in UK law through the state's ratification of the Convention. In addition, the Human Rights Act of 2000 ratified the European Convention on Human Rights of 1998, and has had a significant impact on asylum decisions in the UK.<sup>1299</sup> Decisions on asylum applications are made on the basis of the granting or rejection of refugee status as defined by the Geneva Convention. In addition, the British government employed the supplementary humanitarian category of 'exceptional leave to remain' (ELR), until it was changed to the category of 'humanitarian protection' (HP) on April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2003.<sup>1300</sup> The 'humanitarian' category came into play when, for example, an applicant fails the test of the strict criterion of the Geneva Convention, but nonetheless has a claim to make on the basis of the infringement of her or his human rights, but does not carry the right of permanent settlement given in the status of the 'Convention refugee'. The humanitarian supplement an important determinant for applications of this type, where the claim fails to obtain refugee status, but the return of the claimant to the country of origin would constitute serious endangerment. Unlike the individual granted refugee status, the individual granted ELR or HP did and does not have the right to permanent residence in the

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<sup>1298</sup> Patricia Tuitt, *ibid.*, p 12.

<sup>1299</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *Providing Protection in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Refugee Rights at the Heart of Asylum Policy*, Asylum Rights Campaign, Refugee Council, London, 2004, pp., 11-14.

<sup>1300</sup> Both ELR and 'humanitarian protection' offer(ed) temporary residence in the UK. ELR offered 4 years. 'HP' offers 3 years, and does not offer automatic extension of indefinite leave to remain, but subjects extension to the provision of evidence justifying further leave to remain. The provisions offer protection on 'humanitarian' grounds or for 'other compassionate reasons'.



UK, but is expected to return to his or her country of origin when the situation in that country improves.

Governmental discourse on asylum seekers in the UK is not limited to these categories. Firstly, the mid 1970s saw the expansion of the governmental category of the 'illegal entrant'. Until 1975, the term had referred to persons who had entered Britain without passing through immigration control – such persons, for example, that may have used remote coastal locations in order to gain clandestine entry. In 1975, 'the Home Office first expanded the term to include someone who had passed through immigration control but had obtained entry by lying, and the courts upheld this definition'.<sup>1301</sup> By 1980, 'a person who obtained entry when the immigration officer was not aware of all of the relevant facts became an illegal entrant. No deceit was necessary; it was enough not to have volunteered unasked-for information even if the person had no idea that this information might be relevant'.<sup>1302</sup>

A refined categorisation of 'illegal' immigration was introduced by Douglas Hurd, the Conservative Home Secretary who imposed visa restrictions on Sri Lankans in 1985 after the persecution of Tamils produced a substantial increase in the numbers of Sri Lankans migrating to the UK through asylum and other routes. Hurd stated that asylum applicants coming to Britain were not refugees, but 'disguised economic migrants from poor countries'.<sup>1303</sup> Here, in addition to the subterfuge implied in the term 'disguised', Hurd constructed a significant correlation between the concept of the failed asylum applicant and the self-interested economic migrant, and thus an opposition between the *political* migrant and the *economic* migrant. We can see the way this concept has typically come to be used in contemporary governmental discourse in the following passage from the House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs's Second Report on Asylum Removals (2004):

*A proportion of asylum seekers to the UK are not actually fleeing persecution but are seeking economic advantage. According to Home Office estimates, in 2000, only 42% of asylum applications resulted in grants of refugee status, humanitarian leave to remain or allowed appeals. This suggests – even allowing for some further undetected errors in the system – about half of the claimants can justifiably be regarded as 'economic' migrants rather than refugees ... about 50% of asylum seekers were 'in the category of coming here because they are trying to seek work and make a better life for themselves'.<sup>1304</sup>*

<sup>1301</sup> Jacqueline Bhabha and Sue Shutter, *Women's Movement: Women under Immigration, Nationality and Refugee Law*, Stoke on Trent, Trentham Books, 1994, p 177

<sup>1302</sup> Jacqueline Bhabha and Sue Shutter, *op cit*.

<sup>1303</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 82

<sup>1304</sup> House of Commons Select Committee on Home Affairs, *Asylum Removals, Second Report*, January 13<sup>th</sup>, 2004, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/218/21802.htm>, accessed on December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

The language used in this passage indicates that the speaker intends the House to understand that asylum seekers should be thought of as refugees *or* economic migrants. As Douglas Hurd's statement indicates, asylum seekers who are not recognised as refugees have been framed as *disguised* economic migrants in political discourse from the midpoint of the 1980s. Moreover, the parliamentary debate surrounding each of the successive Acts addressing asylum and immigration shows that this paradigm has become dominant, even as it has been contested.<sup>1305</sup>

The figures cited in the Select Committee's report demonstrate that asylum seekers are being placed within a statistical framework where, in this case, the inference would be that at least half of the asylum seekers to the UK in 2002 were not actually refugees, but what Hurd called 'disguised economic migrants'. The use of statistics in the construction of categories such as the refugee and the economic immigrant is sometimes referred to as the 'numbers game', where politicians and the media use statistical data in order to augment ideas that support the idea of an asylum 'problem' that requires a restrictionist policy and rhetoric.<sup>1306</sup> These problematising strategies mirror those employed within the race relations paradox,<sup>1307</sup> depend upon the context within which figures are presented, and involve the choice of the presentation of some figures and the omission of others. For example, as Liza Schuster points out, while the number of asylum seekers coming to the UK 'dropped sharply' in 1992,

*[t]he government was very successful in constructing a problem out of nowhere. It did this by effectively ignoring one set of numbers – those coming – and focussing on another, the number actually granted asylum.*<sup>1308</sup>

If we look at Schuster's example we can see that the Conservative Government employed a strategy of rhetorical displacement by neglecting one narrative – the fall in the number of asylum seekers – for another which addressed the numbers of applicants who were or were not granted refugee or ELR status. This rhetorical technique helped the government to privilege a narrative of the 'threat' and 'abuse' those asylum seekers whom the government defined as 'economic' migrants were deemed as

<sup>1305</sup> See, for example, Commons Hansard, July 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1991, cols. 167-8; November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1992, cols. 21-7; February 15<sup>th</sup>, 1995, col. 964; April 20<sup>th</sup>, 1995, cols. 328-9; May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1995, col. 454; November 20<sup>th</sup>, 1995, cols. 335-348, 554-5; December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995, cols. 699-702, 705, 712, 717, 726, 732-3, 747, 763, 768-9, 773, 779; November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1999, cols. 978-9; February 7<sup>th</sup>, 2002, col. 1028; April 24<sup>th</sup>, 2002, 342-3. Note, the lessening appearance of speeches debating the legitimacy of the terms 'illegal', 'bogus' and 'economic' immigration under the Labour government was due to the bi-partisan agreement on the need for restriction.

<sup>1306</sup> For the use of the numbers game in relation to asylum seekers see Jef Huysmans, *op cit*, and Liza Schuster, *The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and Germany*, Frank Cass, London and Portland, Oregon, 2003, pp., 155-60

<sup>1307</sup> For the use of the numbers game in relation to post-war 'coloured' immigration see Stuart Hall, *It Ain't Half Racist Mum!*, BBC2, 1979

<sup>1308</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, p 155.

posing to the national 'imagined community', and thus to set a problem that its legislation was designed to address.<sup>1309</sup>

At the level of discourse these narratives depend on an assemblage of other assumptions and narratives. First amongst these is the idea that asylum seekers can be divided into those that are 'genuine political refugees' and those that are 'bogus asylum seekers' (the term that came to replace Hurd's phrase 'disguised economic migrants' in governmental and popular discourse). Tuen A. Van Dijk provides an analysis of the division of 'genuine' refugees and 'economic migrants' in the discourse of political elites in the UK parliament. Van Dijk cites the statement given by Tim Renton, the Conservative Home Office Minister of State, to the House of Commons on May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1989. Renton argued that

*[i]f the interests of the people genuinely fleeing from persecution are to be safeguarded, it is vital that the system designed to protect them should not be exploited by those whose main motivation is economic migration.*<sup>1310</sup>

Van Dijk observes that rhetorical contrast working in this statement divides refugees into 'real' and 'fake' categories. The former category is 'reserved for the traditional, pitiful political refugee who has been persecuted', while the latter non-genuine group 'are henceforth categorised as 'criminals: exploiters, scroungers, liars and so on'. Furthermore, Van Dijk notes that

*[t]his rhetorical and cognitive contrast is further enhanced by an argumentative move, namely that economic immigration is not restricted so much because it hurts 'our' interests; on the contrary, it is more persuasive to construct their immigration as a threat to the interests of 'genuine' refugees.*<sup>1311</sup>

This argumentative move works because it draws upon and reaffirms the liberal values in which asylum policies are framed. The Conservative Home Office Secretary Michael Howard introduced the House of Commons's second reading of the 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act in the following terms:

*The United Kingdom fully adheres to its obligations towards genuine refugees. But the number of abusive or otherwise undeserving asylum applications has grown massively since the late 1980s. Currently, nearly 80 per cent of asylum applications are rejected outright, and the great majority of appeals are dismissed. It is not in the interests of genuine asylum seekers for the system to be*

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<sup>1309</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991

<sup>1310</sup> Tuen A. Van Dijk, 'Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments', in Ruth Wodak and Tuen A. Van Dijk, *ibid*, p 44.

<sup>1311</sup> Tuen A. Van Dijk, *op cit*.

*overloaded with applications from people whose real motives have nothing to do with a well-founded fear of persecution ... Our race relations are as good as--if not better than-- those of any other country in Europe. Firm but fair immigration control is a necessary condition for such a society. That is the context in which this Bill should be seen... Britain has a proud record of giving refuge to those fleeing genuine persecution, but we cannot ignore the fact that our procedures are being abused. Only 4 per cent of those claiming asylum are deemed by the Home Office to be genuine refugees and just 4 per cent of appeals are upheld by independent adjudicators.*<sup>1312</sup>

The benchmark of the 'late 1980's' that Howard refers to was a period in which asylum refusals did not, at any point, exceed a rate of twenty two per cent.<sup>1313</sup> In this passage the Home Secretary qualifies his argument for the need for the tightening of the British asylum system by combining the use of statistical 'proof' that most asylum seekers are not genuine refugees by referring to the 'proud record' of the British grant of refuge, and to the (then) contemporary 'full adherence' to national obligations to refugees. The tradition and practice of tolerance being invoked works to strengthen the further arguments that the new legislation seeks to protect both the minority of genuine refugees, and the majority of the British public whose enjoyment of 'good race relations' is positioned as being dependent on the immigration controls that the proposed Act seeks to further. Liberal values are thus invoked in the allusion to the upholding of the Geneva Convention, to a recent history of harmonious race relations, and to the tradition of tolerance with which Britain is remembered as having granted sanctuary to those fleeing persecution (see chapter four).<sup>1314</sup> Each of these, in turn, works to support the rhetorical strategy of dividing asylum seekers into the minority of 'genuine' refugees and the majority of 'disguised' economic migrants.

The discourse of elite political representations of asylum seekers and refugees constructs dominant discourse fields surrounding asylum and immigration and has a strong effect on popular perceptions of asylum seekers.<sup>1315</sup> As Paul Statham's analysis shows, 'government public hostility to asylum seekers simply legitimates xenophobic sentiments. It encourages anti-asylum mobilisation and provides the public with cues for seeing problems in a distorted and exaggerated way'.<sup>1316</sup> In consequence, 'such entrenched political pathologies become difficult to reverse, with the result that it becomes even harder

<sup>1312</sup> Michael Howard, Asylum and Immigration Bill, 2<sup>nd</sup> Reading, UK House of Commons, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995, Hansard, Column 699.

<sup>1313</sup> Home Office Statistics Bulletins, *Refugee Statistics, United Kingdom, 1989*, July 24<sup>th</sup>, 1990, London, HMSO; the refusal rate was 22 per cent in 1987, and fell to 15 per cent in 1988, and 10 per cent in 1989.

<sup>1314</sup> See also the examples cited by Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, p 174; cf., Kenneth Clarke, Hansard, November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1992, col. 21; Patrick Cormack, Hansard, July 15<sup>th</sup>, 1996, col. 861; Iain Duncan-Smith, Hansard, November 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1992, col. 52

<sup>1315</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, pp., 174-6

<sup>1316</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, p 175

for governments to legitimate even subsistence levels of welfare rights for asylum seekers'.<sup>1317</sup> The policies enacted have a direct effect on the lives of asylum seekers, but they also negatively affect the manner in which refugees, asylum seekers, and, more generally, immigrants are likely to be viewed. Together, the discourse and governmentality directed at asylum seekers work to establish and maintain a 'common sense' or 'national popular' view of asylum-based immigration.<sup>1318</sup> This problematisation was developed under the Conservative governments from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, and the further refined under the Labour governments since 1997. As I will go on to discuss in section 7.4, the Labour governments' policy regime that has gradually built a comprehensive 'end-to-end' system of 'managed migration has been directed at restricting flows of asylum-based immigration even as it facilitates the (primarily) higher circuits of labour mobility. One effect of this regime has been to render illegal most of the routes of entry on which asylum-based and South-to-North immigration is dependent. In this manner, the asylum seeker is correlated not just with the category of the 'bogus' economic migrant, but also with the category of the 'illegal' immigrant. Subsequently, despite the fact that these are contested processes, 'communitarian' sections of the popular media tend to relay the symbolic and material terms in which asylum seekers are regulated and represented in legislation and political debate, and political actors, in turn, seek legitimation for their policies on the basis of the 'popular fears' to which they 'democratically' respond.<sup>1319</sup>

The manner in which the 'economic migrant' who is a 'bogus asylum seeker' is framed as 'abusive' and as a 'threat' depends on particular constructions of the state of the British nation in which the national community is said to be threatened, and of the state of the nations or regions that produce refugee flows. The first of these can be represented as having emerged from the race relations paradigm, in which a threshold is imagined as the point at which the national community's tolerance for difference would reach its limit. This paradigm was invoked, to take a historical example, in Margaret Thatcher's pre-election speech of 1979 when, as leader of the Conservative Opposition, stated she that the public were 'really afraid that this country might be swamped by people of a different colour' (see chapter six). It is my argument that once shorn of the biological aspect of racism, this paradigm has been re-invoked within a neo-utilitarian problematisation that employs political representations of 'bogus' and 'threatening' asylum seekers.

The form of the threshold of tolerance has shifted from one defined primarily in terms of racial difference. In the figure of the 'genuine' refugee there is what Žižek defines as a manifestation of 'pure

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<sup>1317</sup> Paul Statham, *op cit*.

<sup>1318</sup> Antonio Gramsci *et al.*, *Prison Notebooks: Selections*, Lawrence and Wishart, 1973

<sup>1319</sup> See Martin Barker for an account of this process in terms of the racialism of 'coloured' immigration under Thatcherism; Martin Barker, *ibid*, pp., 14-16; Robin Cohen gives an account of this process in regards to asylum seekers in the early 1990s. See Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, pp., 90-2; Paul Statham, *ibid*, 2003

victimhood' – the individual subject to the political persecution of another state that is opposed to the figure of a 'disguised' rational, self-interested actor (the 'bogus' asylum seekers).<sup>1320</sup> Crucially, one implication of this constructed opposition (which is in turn, built upon the liberal construction of the Geneva Convention itself), is that the realm of economics is clearly delineated from the realm of politics; the conditions of conflict that are caused by neo-liberal economic factors, or the pauperisation of the South, cannot be regarded as forms of political persecution in their own right. Thus the neo-liberal governmentality of North to South relations is depoliticised in the rejection of the claim presented in the presence of political-economic migrants seeking asylum.

My argument in this chapter draws upon the continuities and differences that work between the neo-imperial racialisation of immigration in the post-war period, and the neo-utilitarian governmentality of mobility under conditions of neo-liberal globalisation that I began to indicate in chapter six. Consequentially, I reject the governmental separation of immigrants and potential immigrants into 'political' and 'economic' categories, reframing the 'economic' migrant as political in his economic need, whilst arguing that the construction of an 'exterior' economic sphere is predicated on the construction of an invalid binary opposition between traditionally conceived exterior (international) and interior (national) realms. The selective targeting of immigrants and potential migrants as 'bogus asylum seekers,' represented as seeking to pursue their 'individual' economic interests through migration presented as necessary due to political persecution does not and will not create a protective sphere for the 'genuine refugee'. I will argue that the discourse and governmentality of tolerance and the setting of its limits supplements economic liberalism and neo-liberalism is relayed through the process of the politics of resentment, and that the concept of embedded neo-liberalism requires a concern for the actual forms that liberalism is and has been practiced within.<sup>1321</sup> Here, I will suggest that political and economic demarcations within embedded liberalism work as supplements to each other, so that the 'asylum' offered to the sphere of politics allows the free play of the economic sphere and thus enforces the 'detention' of the political-economic migrant.

## Section 7.2. Conservative Restrictions: 1985 until 1997.

Nick Cohen observes that 'legal immigration from developing countries to Western Europe slowed to a trickle in the 1980s after the collapse of Keynesian expansion'.<sup>1322</sup> The Conservative Thatcher government had successfully established a postcolonial formalisation of British citizenship and the

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<sup>1320</sup> Slavoj Žižek, 'Human rights and its discontents', Bard College Lecture, November 16<sup>th</sup>, 1999, p 13; <http://www.bard.edu/hrp/zizektranscript.htm>; accessed July 16<sup>th</sup>, 2002; see also Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 82; Cohen describes the governmental construction of the 'morally untouchable category of the deserving political refugee'.

<sup>1321</sup> John Ruggie, *International regimes, transactions and change: embedded liberalism in the post-war economic order*. *International Organisation*, Vol. 36, 1982, p 382. Foucault via ...

<sup>1322</sup> Nick Cohen, 'We made the smugglers rich', *New Statesman*, June 26<sup>th</sup>, 2000,

limits of a restrictive policy in the 1981 British Nationality Act, which built on the series of restrictions that had been enacted from the time of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and in the 1971 Act's effective conversion of New Commonwealth migrants into foreign labour migrants. These were primarily visa restrictions which, whilst aimed at all sources of New Commonwealth economic and familial immigration, were predominantly effective in terms of restricting the ongoing demand from India and Pakistan for labour migration. Labour voucher immigration from the Asian sub-continent consisted of the acceptance of 21,892 persons in 1963, whilst by 1981, labour vouchers granted to members of the New Commonwealth and Pakistan amounted to 2,070 persons, and 4,340 by 1989.<sup>1323</sup> In contrast, labour immigration from non-Commonwealth countries remained relatively stable at 21,860 in 1963 and 18,969 in 1972, before rising to 33,300 by 1989.<sup>1324</sup>

The first years of the Thatcher government witnessed the tightening of restrictions on potential future flows of less or unskilled labour immigration, and thus the further restriction of the lower categories of labour immigration from developing countries. The redirection of immigration policy formation in this period reflected an overall lessening of the importance of the Commonwealth network to the British economy, the turn to the EEC, and the opening of the British economy and society to the forces of neo-liberal globalisation. Thatcher was concerned, moreover, that as a signatory to the Single Europe Act of 1986, Britain was not to have opened a back-door to South-to-North immigration to the UK. Thus, in 1989, she stated that 'we joined Europe to have free movement of goods....I did not join Europe to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal and rabies, and illegal immigrants....How are you going to stop anyone from Bangladesh, from any country, coming for a holiday in Greece, coming right in, right across all borders, no controls, and settling in Britain and we would have no means of finding out.'<sup>1325</sup>

The restrictive regime did not represent an end to all flows of migration or mobility; 'unwanted' flows of familial migration continued despite the state's restrictions; whilst family migration from the New Commonwealth amounted to the settlement and entry of 19,400 persons (excluding children) in 1980, the number of New Commonwealth familial immigrants increased throughout the decade, and reached a figure of 28,170 in 1990 (including children).<sup>1326</sup> The facilitation of the upper circuits of capital flows

<sup>1323</sup> Home Office Statistics Bulletin, *Control of immigration: statistics – fourth quarter and year, 1982*, London, HMSO, March 30<sup>th</sup>, 1983

<sup>1324</sup> Home Office, *Control of Immigration Statistics*, London, HMSO, tables three and four.

<sup>1325</sup> Margeret Thatcher, cited in *The Daily Mail*, May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1989

<sup>1326</sup> See the Home Office Statistic Bulletin, *Control of immigration: statistics – fourth quarter and year, 1983*, London, HMSO, and Home Office Statistics Bulletins, *Control of immigration: statistics – fourth quarter and year, 1990*, London, HMSO. Figures give are composites including the categories of husbands, wives; and fiancés; settlement on entry, entry prior to settlement, and settlement at removal of time limit for the years indicated. Figures for children not given in the 1983 bulletin. The major part of the New Commonwealth immigration was from the Indian subcontinent, including Pakistan.



that was the backbone of British economic policy and the upper circuits of migratory flows were to remain unrestricted. From the time of the push towards the creation of a deregulated 'offshore' financial zone in the City of London in the 1960's, European, Japanese and United States multinational companies and industries involved in financial services were encouraged to base their offices in the capital, 'self-supporting' and 'Old Commonwealth' immigrants continued to be welcome, and from 1986 onwards, migration from the EU was not restricted. Whist Zygmunt Bauman's description of the facilitated travel of 'tourists' and the imposed stasis of 'vagabonds' holds true for policy formation during this period, the racist basis of the discrimination and exclusion of 'black' or 'new' commonwealth immigrants has been followed by cultural and 'xeno' racisms that work through the articulation of 'ethnicities' and pauperisation: thus the skin colour of the global subject was no longer always and necessarily the first demarcation for discriminatory state and cultural practice.<sup>1327</sup>

In this context it is important to note that the opening of the British economy to migrant New Commonwealth labour and its subsequent extension in migrants' use of familial pathways was the result of the gap in the status of Commonwealth citizens and subjects provided by the compromise of 1948 (see chapter five). Subsequently, when over the period of the mid to late 1980's asylum applications had tripled, policy makers were quick to frame legislation and engage in new institutional processes aimed at closing the 'gap' that was to come to seem a feature of globalisation rather than an after-effect of the colonial legacy.<sup>1328</sup> By referring to a 'gap' here I mean, initially, to refer to the difference between the Northern refugee regime and the Southern refugee regime described by Keely.<sup>1329</sup> Here, Western European states had ratified and operated the 'Northern' refugee regime on the basis of the ideological advantage given in the context of the Cold War, secure in the knowledge that the potential size of any flow of asylum seekers was likely to be relatively small. The emergence of the phenomenon of 'disguised economic migrants' and 'bogus asylum seekers' represented, for British policy makers, an illegitimate form of South to North migration that make use of the vehicle of asylum law, rather than the regime of labour immigration wherein entry would usually not be granted to pauperised immigrants from the South.

<sup>1327</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, *ibid*, 1998; Liz Fekete, *ibid*, 2001; A spokesperson for the Hackney Law Centre describing the attitudes of immigration officials said that 'there is the clear issue that they see those people who come from poorer countries as problems, and poorer countries are normally black or Asian countries.' Cited in Franck Duvel and Bill Jordan, 'Immigration control and the management of economic migration in the UK: organisational culture, implementation, enforcement and identity processes in public services', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 29, no. 2, 2003, p 311.

<sup>1328</sup> Home Office Statistics Bulletins, *Refugee Statistics, United Kingdom, 1988*, July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1989, London, HMSO, and Home Office Statistics Bulletins, *Refugee Statistics, United Kingdom, 1989*, July 24<sup>th</sup>, 1990, London, HMSO

<sup>1329</sup> Charles B. Keely, 'The international refugee regime(s): The end of the Cold War matters', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 2001

The Vietnamese 'boat people' crisis that emerged in the aftermath of the communist Vietnamese victory in 1975 provides an indicative example of the British involvement in the Cold War paradigm of the international refugee regimes. Cold War crisis and conflict in South East Asia caused mass exodus from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and the cumulative effect, by 1990, was the resettlement of 1,645,867 South East Asians outside their countries of origin.<sup>1330</sup> As Kushner and Knox observe, in the years 1975-80, much of the exodus from Vietnam went to the neighbouring countries of Thailand, Malaysia, and Hong Kong.<sup>1331</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the change over in power in Vietnam, the US admitted over 130,000 refugees, while France admitted 9,500 refugees in 1975-6, and allowed the 9,000 refugees already resident to remain. Britain admitted 32 Vietnamese refugees in 1975-6, and a further 200 in the following year. Most of the refugees admitted to the United States were members of the South Vietnamese elite and their family members. From late 1976 a new exodus commenced, which embraced 'people from North Vietnam, largely of ethnic Chinese origin, known as Hoa, who escaped overland into China, or by sea into adjacent countries of South-East Asia'.<sup>1332</sup>

Kushner and Knox note that while the Western countries that accepted refugees 'on the basis that their flight was from the communist system,' a survey of Vietnamese refugees in Britain indicated that only four per cent had indicated the communist system as their reason for flight.<sup>1333</sup> As Esther Wong argued, the Vietnamese government's tightening of economic control after the unification in 1975, including the introduction of high taxation and a single currency led to a flight from economic oppression.<sup>1334</sup> Like the Kenyan and Uganda 'Asians' after independence (see chapter six), the Hoa Vietnamese were particularly vulnerable under the new regime in Vietnam, where their professional and economic success became an object of resentment for ethnic Vietnamese. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 heightened these tensions, as the Vietnamese Hoa were subsequently regarded as a Chinese 'Fifth Column', and thereafter as a target of intense governmental and public discrimination.<sup>1335</sup> Thus the intensifying Vietnamese exodus in this period was the result of political and economic factors.

The UNHCR administered the shelter for Vietnamese refugees in camps in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia. By 1980 there were still 2239,339 refugees in these regional camps, and the UNHCR was near bankruptcy. In 1979 these overburdened regional governments and the UNHCR appealed for

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<sup>1330</sup> David Haines, 'Southeast Asian refugees in Western Europe: American reflections on French, British and Dutch experiences', *Migration World*, Vol. 19, Part 4, 1991, p. 16. Haines cited in Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, pp., 306-312.

<sup>1331</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, p. 306

<sup>1332</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, p. 307

<sup>1333</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *op cit*; cf., Felicity Edholm, Helen Roberts and Judith Sayer, *Vietnamese Refugees in Britain*, London, Commission for Racial Equality, 1983, p. 36.

<sup>1334</sup> Esther Wong, 'The exodus', unpublished paper, Ockenden Venture, 1982; cited in Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *op cit*.

<sup>1335</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, p. 308; cf., Esther Wong, *ibid*, p. 41.

assistance from the international community, while throughout 1979 images of the refugee crisis, and particularly the plight of the 'boat people' who had taken to the open seas as their means of escape permeated global, and in Britain, national media. In response the British Labour government agreed to accept 1000 refugees from a population of 67,000 in British Hong Kong, and a further 250 refugees from Malaysia and Thailand respectively.<sup>1336</sup> The counter-response of the ASEAN countries was to announce the expulsion of all refugees from within their shores, unless the international community responded with a significant programme for resettlement.<sup>1337</sup>

We can initially conclude that the parsimony of the initial British response indicated the limited extent to which the Northern regime was to be extended where refugee flows fell under the aegis of the Southern regime. The new Thatcher government proposed an international conference, which was held in Geneva on July 21-2 1979, which resulted in an international commitment to the resettlement of 250,000 refugees, and for further financial aid for the UNHCR Indo-China programme.<sup>1338</sup> The government had reacted on the basis of pressure from the ASEAN proposal and public pressure in Britain. In addition, Britain still held responsibility for Hong Kong, and the Vietnamese refugees clearly fitted to Cold War strategy of destabilising communist regimes. The British commitment included an offer to accept a further 10,000 refugees, and a 5 million pound grant to the UNHCR.<sup>1339</sup> Thatcher's strategy in response to the 'boat people' crisis had the benefit of garnering international kudos whilst the quota policy 'virtually reduced Indo-China refugee resettlement to a single-event – the acceptance of one extended, largely Chinese-Vietnamese contingent'.<sup>1340</sup> The UK accepted 16,638 Indo-Chinese refugees between 1975 and 1990, a figure that represented 1.1 per cent of the South Asian refugees in this period, and 0.3 refugees for every thousand British persons. Whilst only Italy accepted a smaller number of refugees per head of population, the US, Canadian and Australian governments were comparatively generous, accepting 889,974, 133,149, and 128,540 respectively.<sup>1341</sup>

The British engagement with the refugee crisis following the Vietnam War pre-figured the restrictive immigration policy structure that was to develop in the 1980s, as global political-and-economic migrant populations from the under-developed 'South' increasingly sought to apply for refugee status in the Western states where the Northern regime was operative. For the restrictively minded Home Office and Conservative government this emergent phenomenon – manifest in the relatively small numbers of Sri Lankan refugees in the mid to late 1980s, represented a policy gap that would have to

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<sup>1336</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, p 310

<sup>1337</sup> Lesleyanne Hawthorne, *Refugee: The Vietnamese Experience*, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1982, pp., 228-9

<sup>1338</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, p 312.

<sup>1339</sup> Tony Kushner and Katherine Knox, *ibid*, pp., 311-2

<sup>1340</sup> David Haines, *ibid*, p 16.

<sup>1341</sup> David Haines, *ibid*, pp., 16-7

be addressed by constructing a new discursive governmentality and through administrative measures of restriction (see section 7.1 for the new discursive framing). To policy makers it seemed that the gap that opened was triple gated. In the first place it opened in the new use to which the right to asylum began to be put from 1985, and this use of asylum was related to the second 'open gate' which consisted of the ease of travel given in the proliferate availability of airline travel. In the third place this initial opening was widened by developments facilitating free and onward movement within and from the European Community, and thus stimulated the British government's involvement in intergovernmental fora such as the Trevi process which concentrated, in part, on securing the borders of the European Union from 'irregular' South to North migration.<sup>1342</sup> Thus, for the Conservative government, while the increase in asylum immigration suggested the restriction of economic immigration needed refinement as a growing proportion of asylum seekers were concurrently conceived of as 'economic' migrants, the development within the European Economic Community of a sphere of freedom in the mobility of goods, capital and labour seemed to threaten the geographical isolation which had helped protect Britain from Continental and (New) Commonwealth flows of economic migration. Thereafter, it seemed, Europe's openness to newly legalised flows of mobility would threaten to migrate to Britain without the construction of new forms of restriction on the forms of flows that the government deemed undesirable.

We can map the beginnings of the restrictive asylum regime to the mid 1980's. As immigration policy formation became concerned with the articulation of refugee and asylum immigration with economic migration, 1986 was one of the key turning points in British policy direction. Drawing analogously on the structures and processes instituted in the EU enlargement where accession states have been required to meet monetary and fiscal criteria whilst taking on the border duties of the EU territory, I want to argue that the UK had to meet similar criteria in its broader accession under the Single Europe Act of 1986.<sup>1343</sup> To the extent that its political economy was already neo-liberal in structure, the financial criteria presented the monetarist Thatcher government with the security it sought for further integration with the community, and increased the UK's ability to facilitate the spread neo-liberal practice throughout the region and its peripheral relations (see chapter 6). For the Home affairs section of the executive and government, the real 'cost' of the Single Europe Act as perceived was the political burden of an increased share of economic and irregular migration that the opening of the EU's internal borders promised. In its approach to the issues of national and regional (EU) migration borderment, the UK strove to maintain relative autonomy and to influence the regional structure towards a system of

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<sup>1342</sup> See David Waddington, Secretary of State for the Home Department, *Hansard*, Written Answers, Dec 20<sup>th</sup>, 1989, cols. 273-4

<sup>1343</sup> The SEA took effect from 1993.

'remote control' in which its own borders would form the last ditch in the regional defences of enfortressment.<sup>1344</sup>

The British engagement with the contested process of the formation of a European immigration policy began with security focussed forms of intergovernmental activity and the Trevi process in 1985, prior to the government's ratification of the Single Europe Act (1986) recognising the regional freedom of movement of goods, services, and people. These processes worked in tandem with the development of asylum-focussed national immigration policy in Britain. Between 1979 and 1985 the number of asylum applications processed in Britain had more than trebled, and the refugee movements represented a diversification of the sources of immigration from the (predominantly) Southern states.<sup>1345</sup> Of a total of 24,132 applications received in this period, Iran, Sri Lanka, Ghana, and Poland accounted for the majority, whilst a significant number was also received from persons listed under the categories of other countries and stateless persons.<sup>1346</sup> In total, the Home Office received applications from more than twenty two countries in this period, only three of which – Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – were members of the Soviet bloc in Europe. Of the remaining majority, most countries producing refugee flows in this period were countries that had histories of formal or informal colonial exploitation.<sup>1347</sup> These asylum figures (1979-1985) figures exceeded those of entry granted to persons from the New Commonwealth granted labour voucher entry by approximately 10,000 persons, and thus suggest a significant new source of South to North migration that the government had sought to tightly restrict.<sup>1348</sup>

The rate of asylum applications in Britain increased from 1,563 to 5,444 in 1985. The Home Secretary Douglas Hurd first introduced the 'asylum issue' to the political agenda in 1985, by arguing that the increase in the rate of asylum applications was due to 'disguised' economic migration of persons from poor countries.<sup>1349</sup> In the same year the government then began the process of visa restrictions in which visas were required from migrants who travelled from countries producing refugees and other migrants that the IND had refused leave to enter.<sup>1350</sup> As Robin Cohen observed, these administrative measures made a mockery of the distinction between 'genuine refugees' and 'disguised economic migrants' that

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<sup>1344</sup> Andrew Geddes, *ibid*, 2003.

<sup>1345</sup> Home Office Statistics Bulletins, *Refugee Statistics, United Kingdom, 1988*, July 20<sup>th</sup>, 1989, London, HMSO; Asylum applications rose from 1,563 in 1979 to 5,444 in 1985, and then decreased to 3,882 in 1986 before the rapid escalation that began from 1989 (15,530 applications).

<sup>1346</sup> Home Office, *op cit*. Total figure collated by author from tables given herein.

<sup>1347</sup> Home Office, *op cit*; For example, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda

<sup>1348</sup> New Commonwealth and Pakistan entry on work permits in this period amounted to an approximate figure of 14,110 persons. Figures collated from the Home Office *Statistics – Control of Immigration Bulletins*, 1981, 1983, and 1988.

<sup>1349</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 82.

<sup>1350</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*., 1994, pp., 59-60..

Hurd was to successfully politicise, as it formed a blanket restriction on migration from so-called 'pressure to migrate' or 'refugee-producing' regions.<sup>1351</sup> Restrictions were imposed on Sri Lankans in 1985, and again in 1988.<sup>1352</sup> Visa restrictions were imposed on Indians, Bangladeshis, Ghanaians, Nigerians and Pakistanis, before being imposed on Turkey (1989) in response to the Kurdish flight from persecution, and Ugandans in 1991.<sup>1353</sup> In 1988, having been faced with the spontaneous arrival of 800 immigrants fleeing the Sri Lankan conflict, Hurd 'freely admitted that their arrival was an 'immediate spur' to privatise immigration control and blur the differences between legal and illegal immigrants'.<sup>1354</sup>

The issue of asylum as a 'problem' was subsequently constructed in the Conservative Party's election campaign of 1987, when the party used the tackling of 'fraudulent' asylum seekers as one of its main platforms. Thereafter, in 1987 the Conservative government introduced the Immigration (Carrier's Liability) Act, which 'made airlines and shipping companies act in effect as an arm of British immigration control, imposing fines of £1000 (increased to £2000 in 1991) for each passenger carried without the required documentation'.<sup>1355</sup> Nick Cohen observes that this policy was enacted within the governmental restriction of the ability of asylum seekers to gain such documentation: 'if potential migrants from selected countries wanted to fly they had to have a British visa. There was a catch. There was no such thing as a visa for refugees'.<sup>1356</sup> In addition, the Conservative government imposed further visa restrictions on countries which produced, or were expected to produce, asylum applications in Britain. These new laws represented the first part of a strategy that was to evolve in the form of remote control, whose culmination was aimed at giving the National Immigration Service the same degree of offshore control that the work permit and patial systems had given it over New Commonwealth immigrants. They were also intended to have the symbolic effect of further deligitimising asylum-based immigration, and behind that, the immigration of persons from developing regions. Many of those who failed to gain recognition as refugees were given the status of the humanitarian category of Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR). In this context it's useful to note that by 1993 the government sought to deligitimise that category by arguing that ELR was generally granted because of difficulties involved in removing persons whose stay in Britain had become lengthy, rather than out of recognition of the migrants' humanitarian claim.<sup>1357</sup>

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<sup>1351</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 83

<sup>1352</sup> The Carriers Liability Act was, in part, a response to the 'spontaneous arrival of 800 Sri Lankan asylum seekers. See Nick Cohen, *op cit*.

<sup>1353</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, pp., 59-60

<sup>1354</sup> Nick Cohen, *op cit*.

<sup>1355</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 76.

<sup>1356</sup> Nick Cohen, *op cit*

<sup>1357</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, p 145

The Conservative party sought to gain further political advantage from the problematisation of asylum immigration in the lead up to the 1992 general elections.<sup>1358</sup> Following the aborted attempt to introduce restrictive asylum and immigration legislation in 1991 in the face of what seemed to be an impending Labour victory in the 1992 elections, the Conservative government of John Major mooted the concept of 'safe havens' for Gulf War Kurds (1991) and Bosnian Muslims (1992) before enacting the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act of 1993. The concept of safe havens worked as an element of the regionalising strategy that was to become the outer trenches of British enfortressment and had the advantage of giving a humanitarian appearance on the international stage. In both cases the safety of the havens provided was to prove inadequate, as the subsequent massacres in northern Iraq and Kosovo were to demonstrate, and each attempt can be said to suffer from the western government's 'desperate attempts to shore up self-governing zones of hastily fabricated ethnicities and nationalities'.<sup>1359</sup> The Conservative Government's 1993 Bill helped develop the new immigration regime's interior defence by introducing a fast-track procedure for the appeals system, an innovation which was designed, as the subsequent reduction in the numbers of successful appeals showed, to reduce the number of asylum applications that proceeded to the appeals stage: Subsequently, refusals rose from 14 per cent in the six months before the Act to 72 per cent in the following period, while the granting of the right of Exceptional Leave to Remain (ELR) fell from 76 to 22 per cent.<sup>1360</sup> In a partial amelioration, the Act also contained the introduction of an in-country right of appeal, but the two-tiered structure of the appeal process divided between the fast-track process designed to deal with manifestly unfounded claims and the 'standard track' process worked to reinforce the division of asylum applicants into 'genuine' and 'bogus' streams. A large proportion of the decisions utilising the 'fast track' process was based on the safe third country category that was designed to displace the responsibility for refugee processing back through the expanding European Union.<sup>1361</sup> The fast-tracking element of the Act was precedent forming insofar as it was targeted at limiting the powers of the judiciary over the executive in the formulation of immigration policy, and in the degree to which it established a 'factual basis' for the arguments framing asylum seekers as 'disguised' or 'bogus' economic migrants. The value of the symbolic work performed by the government's procedural 'modernisation' or 'tightening' cannot be over-estimated, for the 'factual base' it produces has formed the basis for the common sense discourse in which restrictionist policy and immigration discourse in general has been and continues to be based.<sup>1362</sup>

<sup>1358</sup> See Hansard Commons, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995, col. 723.

<sup>1359</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 94.

<sup>1360</sup> Robin Cohen points out that acceptance and ELR decisions averaged 70 per cent from 1979 to 1986. Robin Cohen, *ibid*, 1994, p 82.

<sup>1361</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, 2004, p, 167.

<sup>1362</sup> Tuen A. Van Dijk, *ibid*, *passim*; Paul Statham, *ibid*, *passim*.



The 1993 Act began the process of discriminating against asylum applicants from 'safe third countries' by introducing the right to appeal, and also constructed the category of 'vexatious or frivolous cases' which were also subject to fast-track procedures and limitations on the appeal process.<sup>1363</sup> This element of the Act initiated the shifting of the asylum burden onto countries and regions that were closer to the region of the immigrants' origination. Fast-tracking required applications to be dealt with in shortened time-spans; for example, applicants whose claims had been judged to be without foundation had two days in which to launch an appeal.<sup>1364</sup> They also required that the appeal process to be limited to the first stage of adjudication where the adjudicator is a Home Office appointee. The refusal rate at this level of the appeals process has generally been given at approximately 90 per cent.<sup>1365</sup> The surveillance of applicants was extended in this Act in the form of the introduction of compulsory finger-printing, while the process of domestic rights infringements was begun in the clause invoking a reduction in access to housing benefits. Generally, the 1987 and 1993 Acts represented the beginnings of the innovations in immigration policy that were to follow over the next 15 years which were all aimed, in large measure, at the *declared intention* of reducing the number of asylum applications, while beginning the process of discrimination between those deemed to be 'genuine' refugees and those deemed to have made 'fraudulent' claims, or to have entered (or attempted to enter) British territory on a 'fraudulent' basis. Teresa Hayter gives an indicative example of the effect of these strategies in the case of the Sri Lankan claims made at the time of the 1993 Act, eight years after the Conservative government had first required visas in response to refugees having fled that country for the United Kingdom. Hayter observes that in 1993, '2,365 Sri Lankans were granted ELR in the six months before the Act, and only 55 in the six months after it, even though the situation in Sri Lanka had not improved'.<sup>1366</sup> In the context of this example it's important to note that while the 1993 Act had asserted the centrality of the 1951 Geneva Convention to the British asylum law that it inaugurated,<sup>1367</sup> the substance of this policy shift has worked to translate the immigrant from having been a refugee seeking protection from persecution to an illegitimate asylum seeker.

Andrew Lansley, then head of research in Conservative Central Office, later stated that 'immigration, an issue which we raised successfully in 1992 . . . played particularly well in the tabloids and has more potential to hurt'.<sup>1368</sup> As Schuster notes, the then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd 'told a meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers in 1992 that Britain would not risk a resurgence of the racial tension and

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<sup>1363</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 76.

<sup>1364</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, p 169.

<sup>1365</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 90.

<sup>1366</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 76.

<sup>1367</sup> Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993 (c. 23); Note 2. of the introductory section states that 'nothing in the immigration rules (within the meaning of the 1971 Act) shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the convention.

<sup>1368</sup> Andrew Lansley's statement cited by Jack Straw, *Hansard*, December 11<sup>th</sup>, 1995, Col. 723

'considerable political and economic dislocation' seen in the 1960s and 1970s'.<sup>1369</sup> The Conservative government's use of the new form of the 'race relations paradigm' that the problematisation of asylum immigration seemed to represent was based, in part, on its electoral appeal. Towards the maintenance of that appeal the government commissioned a review which focussed on the efficiency failures of the 1993 Act, and in particular, looked for the reasons for the Act's failure to have the desired effect on lowering the number of applications and clearing the asylum system's backlog.<sup>1370</sup> In 1996 the Conservative government's Home Secretary Michael Howard introduced an additional Asylum and Immigration Act, which began the attack upon the conditions of welfare provisions for asylum seekers in Britain on the basis of the idea that such 'benefits' acted as a pull factor in the decision making processes of 'disguised economic migrants'. Up until this point, destitute asylum seekers had access to the ad hoc arrangements of Income Support Regulations.<sup>1371</sup> The government's new legislation was designed to restrict the application of support to those asylum seekers who had applied immediately at the point of arrival, as well as to those whose appeals were under initial consideration, and thus to withdraw support and deligitimise the claims of in-country applicants who were subsequently positioned as 'undeserving' immigrants.<sup>1372</sup> Subsequent Home Office figures demonstrate that the validity of an applicant's testimony or claim cannot be determined on the basis of whether his or her application has been made at port or in-country. Alice Bloch, for example, cites the figures for 1997, in which 8 of the 13 per cent of applicants granted refugee status consisted of in-country applications; thus, the idea that asylum seekers who do not declare their claim at the point of entry are likely to be more 'bogus' is demonstrably false.<sup>1373</sup> Here, the workings of an articulation of material and symbolic regulation can be seen in this act of governmentality which sought to deny the immigrant any substantive basis for the agency requisite to citizenship. At the same time, the narrating of the asylum seeker within a criminalising discourse works, like the utilitarian moralism of the emergence of modern forms of subjective discipline in the combination of welfare, labour, and criminal law in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, to make the migrant's poverty appear to be matter of his moral failure (see chapter two).

The result of the 1996 Act was the imposition of the burden of responsibility at the level of the local authorities (as these held the duty for the pursuit of the 1948 Act).<sup>1374</sup> The Act was more 'successful' in

<sup>1369</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid.*, 2003, p 152; cf., Douglas Hurd, cited in *The Times*, September 14<sup>th</sup>, 1992.

<sup>1370</sup> Dallal Stevens, 'The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996: Erosion of the rights to seek Asylum', *Modern Law Review*, 1998.

<sup>1371</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid.*, p 61.

<sup>1372</sup> Alice Bloch, 'Refugee settlement in Britain: the impact of policy on participation', *Journal of Ethnicity and Migration Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, p 76

<sup>1373</sup> Alice Bloch, *op cit.*, Bloch uses the figures for 1997, in which 8 of the 13 per cent of applicants granted refugee status consisted of in-country applications.

<sup>1374</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *op cit.*, p 61. Justice Collins stated that it was 'impossible to believe that parliament intended that an asylum seeker who was lawfully here and who could not lawfully be removed from the country, should be left destitute, starving and at risk of grave illness and even death because he could find no one to provide him with the bare necessities of life'. Collins quoted in Alan Travis, 'Judge of principle shows he's his father's son', *The Guardian*, March 19<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

its furthering of the fast-tracking procedures established in 1993. The first section of the Act gave the Home Secretary powers to create and modify a 'white list' of countries where 'there is in general no serious risk of persecution', and the list of 'safe' countries proposed in the Act included Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, India, Pakistan, Ghana, and Cyprus, while Nigeria was also proposed but rejected before the Act's passing. Subsequently, applications made by asylum seekers from 'white listed' countries would be treated expeditiously. While this section of the Act also contained an exceptional clause for applicants who could prove to have undergone or to be likely to undergo any form of torture if returned, the creation of a 'white list' contravened the 1951 Geneva Convention inasmuch as it failed to establish or enable an application process which judged cases on their individual merits. Amnesty International criticised the creation of the white list, arguing that the white listing of countries was more closely correlated to their production of refugees than to their supposed safety: in addition, several of the countries listed as 'generally safe' were not universally safe, and thus the concept of general safety was an unreliable criterion for the expeditious treatment of claims.<sup>1375</sup>

In addition to the creation of the white list, the first section of the 1996 Act worked to further expand the list of countries from which work visas were required, and thus broadened the restriction of possible economic migration where this intersected with asylum-based immigration. In addition, a new power was enacted in the government's ability to fine employers who were found to be guilty of employing 'illegal immigrants',<sup>1376</sup> although the efficacy of this restriction was initially muted by the government's lack of surveillance machinery, and the non-compliance of business, as well as governmental agencies. Taken together, these developments can be seen to have contributed to the criminalisation of not just forced migrations and refugee flows, but in addition, the re-bordering of the migrants' and would-be migrants' region of origin.

Much of the criticism that has been levelled at the 1996 Act demonstrates the importance of the procedural level in the criminalisation of refugee migration that has been pursued in the contemporary period. The first section of the Act, for example, broadened the range of asylum categories which could be processed under the fast-track system. In addition to the safe third country category this Act created five further manifestly unfounded categories, (which were termed 'vexatious' or 'fraudulent' in the 1993 Act). The safe third country category referred to asylum claims 'in which the applicant has travelled from the country of origin (the first country) to the country in which the asylum application is lodged (the second country) via a third country which is deemed safe and in which it is considered the

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<sup>1375</sup> Amnesty International, *Slamming the Door – the Demolition of the Right to Asylum in the UK*, London, Amnesty International, 1996, p 30.

<sup>1376</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, 1998

applicant should have lodged his or her appeal.’<sup>1377</sup> The further categories included white-listed applications, applications made on the basis of false or absent documents, claims deemed to have been made outside of the paradigm of the Geneva Convention, claims made under circumstances in which the country of origin was deemed to have subsequently become safe, and claims made on the basis of ‘late’ applications. When considered together these expansions meant that the fast-track appeals procedure could, in effect, be applied to almost any claim. In addition to the criticisms already offered in relation to the ‘white list’, it has been noted that there were major faults with the validity of these new procedures. The fast-tracking exclusion of the use of incorrect papers, for example, disregarded the extent to which asylum seekers may need, or believe in the need to travel on false or absent papers in order to be able to make their claims, and skewed the responsibility for falsification away from the direction of smugglers and traffickers (who often issue travelling documents and sometimes advise their disposal) towards the refugee her or himself. Each of these amendments relied on a restrictive interpretation of both the wording of the Geneva Convention and of the legal precedents that had arisen in previous judgements.

The problematising creation of these ‘fraudulent’ or ‘vexatious’ categories further criminalised the very act of seeking refuge for the larger proportion of asylum seekers,<sup>1378</sup> and effectively worked to create an impression of the conflation the category of the refugee with that of the ‘illegal immigrant’. As we noted in the introduction to this chapter, this had been a key element of the Conservative strategy from the period of the initial rise of migration from ‘refugee-producing’ countries. In doing so it achieved a large part of the work of these new pieces of immigration legislation, as once transferred into the public realm, and particularly the communitarian sections of the media, the idea of the illegal immigrant replaced the humanitarian idea of the refugee in need of sanctuary, and was all too easily conflated with the idea of ‘bogus’ immigration. When taken together with the remote control techniques initiated in the Carriers Liability Act of 1987, their substance can be seen to constitute a strategies of refoulement and scape-goating: the new amendments constituted refoulement because each of them constitutes a contravention of the spirit, and in some cases a contravention of the actual legal wording of the Geneva Convention’s principle of not returning refugees to the region of persecution, and they worked to scapegoat the immigrant by conflating their asylum applications with what is represented in governmental discourse as ‘criminal’ acts that constitute modern forms of ‘treason’ – fraud against the welfare system and the ‘transnational crimes’ of clandestine entry and settlement, as well as the migrant’s participation in the informal economy.

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<sup>1377</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, 1998, p 213

<sup>1378</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid*, 2004, p 72. Stevens notes that ‘the majority of asylum applicants were now covered by the ‘fast track’ process. As this process had been originally designed to deal with ‘manifestly unfound’ claims, it can be seen that the governmentality operating had effectively subsumed most applicants within this category.

To cite this paradigm of discrimination alone, however, would be to replicate the governmental discourse in which the 'genuine' refugee ('really' a *forced* migrant) and the 'economic' migrant ('really' a *voluntary* migrant) are positioned. As I argued in the previous chapter, the 'economic' migrant is often a political migrant in the sense that his migration is an act of exodus from a Southern nation that has been conflictually re-bordered and/or de-bordered by the neo-colonial governmentality of neo-liberal globalisation. Herein lies the importance of Sivanandan's concept of xeno-racism, for the liberal governmentality of the globalised immigration regime (and in this instance, the asylum immigration regime in particular) represents a re-development of the race relations paradox in the context of postcolonial globalisation.

This section of the chapter has given a brief account of the emergence of the problematisation of political and economic immigration from the mid 1980s to the end of the period of Conservative government that began with Thatcher's election in 1979. I want to conclude the section by suggesting that the politics of mobility in this period should be thought of in terms of the political economy of neo-liberal globalisation, and that this politics should be situated along what Sundhya Pahuja describes – when looking at the discourse and governmentality of the south by the north in the form of the IMF – as the colonial continuum.<sup>1379</sup> In order to consider the development of this politics in the contemporary period of New Labour government, I will first briefly examine the 'Third Way' approach to globalisation. Here I will draw out the relationship between New Labour's communitarianism and the neo-liberal imperialism in which it frames North-South relationships. These dynamic form an important context for analysing the development of the new immigration-and-asylum regime under the labour government from 1997 onwards.

### 7.3 'Third Way' Globalisation

In preparing the ground for a possible third term of Third Way Labour governance in 2005, Peter Mandelson, one of the key architects of New Labour's regime of modernisation, reflected that the 'politics that social democrats must address today is shaped by the insecurities of globalisation' citing 'the economic insecurities that make people worry about their future,' the 'social insecurities and feelings of unfairness associated with migration that have made asylum the doorstep issue of greatest concern' and 'fear of terrorism.'<sup>1380</sup> This concern to reassure public anxieties that revolve around the transformations wrought by globalisation emerged from the earlier stages of New Labour

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<sup>1379</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, *ibid.*

<sup>1380</sup> Peter Mandelson, 'Insecurity will shape our agenda', *The Guardian*, March 26<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

governance.<sup>1381</sup> Along with the asylum seeker and the terrorist, the other 'other' referred to in this vision of the 'dark side' of globalisation is the global realm that New Labour has identified in its neo-liberal 'New Bretton Woods' strategies (amongst other supranational and intergovernmental structures) as the chaotic 'pre-modern world' which must be disciplined into providing sustainable global economic stability.<sup>1382</sup> Here, neo-liberal policies regulating peripheral states have been couched in terms of economic and (humanitarian) political liberalism; structural adjustment programmes (and their descendents) aimed at opening Third World markets have thus been expressed in terms of the extension of political liberalism. In this context Mark Leonard observes that 'many developing countries have balanced their budgets, cut subsidies, welcomed foreign investment and dropped their tariff barriers and been repaid with poverty, turmoil, and instability'.<sup>1383</sup> Despite the Labour government's positive framing of the globalised extension of liberal values and structures (see below), the free market globalisation policies promoted by Britain and other EU governments have carved a swathe through jobs and living standards throughout those regions, while conflicts for which Britain and its allies share responsibility have become a veritable engine of refugees'. Here, 'migration into Western Europe is the inevitable product of pauperisation and conflict at its periphery'.<sup>1384</sup>

For Britain in the contemporary period where the free flow of financial mobility has determined the regulation via 'soft power' of the state's socio-economic governmentality, the form of 'third way' globalisation being enacted is not quite the accommodation that Anthony Giddens sought to identify as lying between old style welfare socialism and neo-liberalism.<sup>1385</sup> It is rather, as I will argue, a specifically neo-liberal and *neo-utilitarian* form of communitarianism. In this latter aspect, Andrew Geddes notes that 'under New Labour ... the influence of communitarian thinking has allowed greater emphasis on the moral relevance of communities and the rights and responsibilities of individuals within them – in comparison with the emphasis on moral equality that is the basis of the international refugee protection system'.<sup>1386</sup> In fact, insofar as it draws upon the communitarian theories of Amitai Etzioni, the greater emphasis of New Labour's governmentality lays not so much on the *rights* and

<sup>1381</sup> For example, Blair cited crime and asylum as 'touchstone' issues on which it would be advantageous to appear to be reassuringly 'tough'; See Tony Blair, 'Touchstone issues', memorandum, December 1999 and April 2000, cited in *The Times*, July 16<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>, 2000

<sup>1382</sup> Robert Cooper, 'The post-modern state', in Mark Leonard, (ed.), *Re-ordering the World*, London, Foreign Policy Centre, 2002, p 17; See also chapter five, section 5.3.

<sup>1383</sup> Mark Leonard, 'Introduction: the contours of a world community', in Mark Leonard, *ibid*, p xv.

<sup>1384</sup> Seamus Milne, 'Declaration of war on asylum', *The Guardian*, May 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2002.

<sup>1385</sup> Joseph Nye, 'Hard and soft power in a global information age', in Mark Leonard, *ibid*, pp., 5-8; Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1998; New Labour communitarianism draws on the works of Amitai Etzioni. See Amitai Etzioni, *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda*, New York, Crown Press, 1993, and Amitai Etzioni, *New Communitarian Thinking*, Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 1995

<sup>1386</sup> Andrew Geddes, *ibid*, 2003, p 40

responsibilities of members, as on the dependency of any claim of rights or benefits upon the self-disciplined *enactment of responsibilities* within the sphere of civil society.<sup>1387</sup>

New Labour's communitarian facilitation of self-disciplined actors has an international and a domestic aspect. Internationally, Blair has sought to influence the international community towards its consent for a form of 'liberal imperialism' that requires a positive engagement with the geopolitical aims and strategies of the US. In the analysis of Blair's foreign policy advisor Robert Cooper, this is a postmodern imperialism that consists of a 'voluntary imperialism of the global economy', and an 'imperialism of neighbours' that has taken the form of a series of 'humanitarian' interventions.<sup>1388</sup> Liberal imperialism is to operate in, and because of, a new postmodern world order. 'Postmodernity' here refers to the manner in which the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs has broken down; correspondingly there is a transformation in the role of the state as the relevance of tradition (territorial) borderment has decreased, and the development of forms of statecraft that involve 'mutual interference in (traditional) domestic affairs and mutual surveillance'.<sup>1389</sup> At the same time, 'postmodernity' refers to a progressive hierarchy of categories of states. The first (most progressive) category of states consists of those 'postmodern and postimperial' states that 'no longer think of security primarily in terms of conquest', and potentially forms a new 'commonwealth'. This category of 'trading states' includes the nations of the European Union that form a realm of progressive interdependence, but also any of the states that uphold the Western values of political and economic liberalism. The second category consists of 'the traditional 'modern' states that follow Machiavellian principles and *raison d'état*'. Here Cooper provides the examples of 'Pakistan, India, and China'. These states, it should be noted, represent not just a deficit of (postmodern and liberal) governmentality. Although it isn't stated in Cooper's thesis, the latter two examples also represent an emergent locus of global economic and (potentially) political power that cannot easily be subject to neo-liberal discipline and may come to challenge that of the neo-liberal global order. Correspondingly, their forms of statecraft are represented as illegitimately outmoded: they represent an 'anachronistic' form of repressive power that falls short of the (liberal) postmodern power that is represented as 'enabling' and free of coercion.

The final category takes the form of a 'chaotic' and 'pre-modern' zone wherein the (primarily postcolonial) state has failed and a Hobbesian war of all against all exists.<sup>1390</sup> This Hobbesian realm is held to be the source of those threats that I previously identified as representing the 'dark side' of

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<sup>1387</sup> See Amitai Etzioni, *ibid*, 1993, pp., 144-5.

<sup>1388</sup> Robert Cooper, 'The post modern state', in Mark Leonard, *ibid*, pp., 18-9

<sup>1389</sup> Robert Cooper, *ibid*, p 13

<sup>1390</sup> Robert Cooper, *ibid*, p 12



globalisation (such as terrorism and South to North migration). As Blair has stated, 'in this globalised world, once chaos and strife have got a grip on a region or country, trouble is soon exported. Such regions and countries can become centres for trafficking in weapons, drugs and people; havens for criminal organisations and sanctuaries for terrorists'.<sup>1391</sup> That Hobbesian zone is both territorially conceived in the form of the 'chaotic' South, and conceived of in terms of illegitimate transnational networks and their corresponding mobilities. Together with the category of modern, and therefore militantly competitive states, the pre-modern zone is given as representing a threat to the establishment of a postmodern global community. In this formula, an expanded international community is to be pursued in the form of a liberal imperialism that will require the postmodern governance of the modern and pre-modern realms.

For Blair, the events of Al-Qu'ida's bombing of the 'twin towers' representing a crystallizing moment in terms of his problematisation of globalisation as something that both threatens an eruption of chaos and promises the benefits of an expanded political-and-economic liberal international community. In Blair's post 9/11 discourse, it's apparent that liberal imperialism consists of a moral imperative – a new form of 'white man's burden' – to extend liberalism from the core ('postmodern') realm to the peripheral of realm of a violently chaotic pre-modernity. Blair has, for example, declared that 'the state of Africa is a scar on the conscious of the world. But if the world as a community focussed on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier'. Blair then continued the neo-colonial theme, stating that 'the starving, the wretched, the dispossessed, the ignorant, those living in want and squalor from the deserts of northern Africa to the slums of Africa, to the mountain ranges of Afghanistan; they too are our cause'.<sup>1392</sup> The form of 'healing' that is to be offered to the (primarily 'pre-modern') states consists of their subjection to 'voluntary' economic imperialism wherein they must agree to the disciplines imposed by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. This economic form of imperialism is seen as providing 'help to states wishing to find their way back to the virtuous circle of investment and prosperity'.<sup>1393</sup> States and other agents that are recalcitrant and have thereby dissolved into, or are productive of a Hobbesian disorder will be the legitimate target of humanitarian intervention: in terms of the neo-liberal biopolitics that I have employed in the previous chapter they represent a category of delinquent population that is therefore subject to sovereign rather than disciplinary power. In the case of both the soft power exercised towards voluntary compliance and the hard power exercised as humanitarian intervention, these disorderly populations are subject to forms of liberal policing.

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<sup>1391</sup> Tony Blair, 'The power of world community', in Mark Leonard, *ibid*, p 115.

<sup>1392</sup> Tony Blair, speech to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2001

<sup>1393</sup> Robert Cooper, *ibid*,

Liberal imperialism invokes a particular form of global communitarianism. While recognising the global military dominance of the US, Blair has sought to position Britain as a 'beacon nation', a provider of moral education for a global community defined in terms of its capabilities or propensity to share 'our way of life'.<sup>1394</sup> In the aftermath of 9/11, Blair constructs Britain's leading role amongst the international community as a facilitator of economic 'globalisation':

*The issue is not how to stop globalisation. The issue is how we use the power of community to combine it with justice. If globalisation works only for the benefit of the few, then it will fail and will deserve to fail. But if we follow the principles that have served us so well at home - that power, wealth and opportunity must be in the hands of the many, not the few - if we make that our guiding light for the global economy, then it will be a force for good and an international movement that we should take pride in leading.*<sup>1395</sup>

For Blair, the newly globalised community means that 'our self interest and our mutual interest are woven together': accordingly, the new 'power of community will transform domestic as well as international politics, because globalisation shrinks the distance between domestic and international issues'.<sup>1396</sup> These transformations are to be used towards the construction of a 'new international order'.<sup>1397</sup> The 'enabling' form of communitarianism that Blair envisions is both a domestic and international community of communities in which the 'principles that have served us well' are to be extended from the national to the global sphere. Despite their framing within an overall project of 'social democracy', the basis of those principles, however, is the underlying philosophy of neo-liberalism, which 'as the leading position in its political repertoire', signifies the government's 'alignment with the global broad interests and values of corporate capital and power'.<sup>1398</sup> Thus Labour's Third Way approach to globalisation is situated within an *apparent* paradox that lies between the atomising and de-bordering tendencies of neo-liberalism, including the continued opening of the national economy to global competition, and the state's identification and facilitation of the 'webs of social relations that encompass shared meanings and above all shared values'.<sup>1399</sup>

Hall notes that 'New Labour has worked – both domestically, and globally (through the institutions of 'global governance' such as the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank, etc.) – to set the corporate economy free, securing the conditions necessary for its effective operation at home and globally'.<sup>1400</sup> The Blair-

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<sup>1394</sup> Tony Blair, *ibid.*, 2001.

<sup>1395</sup> Tony Blair, *op cit.*

<sup>1396</sup> Tony Blair, 'Preface', in Mark Leonard, (ed.), *ibid*, p viii

<sup>1397</sup> Tony Blair, *ibid*, 2002, p ix.

<sup>1398</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, p 19.

<sup>1399</sup> Amitai Etzioni, *ibid*, 1995, p. 24

<sup>1400</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, p 13.

Brown approach can be described as conservative as it builds upon the traditional globalised structure of the British state society structure.<sup>1401</sup> Despite, or because of the active role of the state in the production of globalised conditions of production, Blair and Brown have been careful to problematise the position of the state as the reactive partner: firstly, globalisation exists and then policy must be framed on that basis.<sup>1402</sup> The realignment of Labour with transnational business, or more specifically, with the currency exchange components of the transnational finance markets, can be seen in the discourse and governmentality created to amend the architecture of international finance. In pursuing a strategy that Blair and Brown have positioned as a movement towards a 'new Bretton Woods', Labour built upon an already existing elite public discourse that, while including the G7 member states, shared a key set of common assumptions. Chief amongst these was the government's belief that 'institutional apparatuses designed for a world of limited capital mobility would appear to be unable to perform regulative tasks suited to a world of increasingly interdependent capital markets'.<sup>1403</sup> In a similar vein, Patricia Hewitt, the economic secretary to the Treasury in 1998, stated that 'today's global economic problems are ones of the modern age. They could not have happened when finance was confined within sheltered and wholly national financial systems. These are new global problems that require new global solutions'.<sup>1404</sup>

A major element of these new global solutions has been the 'New Bretton Woods' strategy for global financial regulation. Labour's 'New Bretton Woods' process stands in an inverse relationship to the formal representations given the original agreement, for where the post-war process was intended to provide a stable financial market in which welfare and public growth policies could be pursued, the latter process is directed towards the regulation of the nation state in order to provide a stable ground for the fluctuations of the international financial markets.<sup>1405</sup> Where, within the original process, instability was thought to have been a function of the operating logic of the financial system, in the

<sup>1401</sup> Susan Watkins, 'A weightless hegemony: New Labour's role in the neo-liberal order', *New Left Review*, Vol. 25, January-February, 2004.

<sup>1402</sup> Mark Wickham-Jones, 'New Labour in the global economy: partisan politics and the social democratic model', *British Journal of politics and International Relations*, Volume 2, No. 1, April 2000, pp., 1-2; Tony Blair, *ibid*, 2002, p viii; speech on globalisation, *The Globalist*, October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2005; <http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=4833>; accessed November 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2005.

<sup>1403</sup> Matthew Watson, 'Sand in the Wheels, or Oiling the Wheels, of International Finance? New Labour's Appeal to a New Bretton Woods', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2002, p 195.

<sup>1404</sup> Patricia Hewitt, Economic Secretary to the Treasury's Speech to the Flemings Seminar, 12<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998, quoted in Matthew Watson, *op cit*, p 197-8.

<sup>1405</sup> Matthew Watson, *ibid*, p 196. Watson refers to Gordon Brown's Chancellor's Statement in the HM Treasury's News Release 179/98 of the 30<sup>th</sup> of October, 1998, in which Brown states that 'at the heart of the weaknesses exposed in [the world's] financial systems is that for fifty years our policies for regulation, supervision, transparency and stability have been devised and developed for a world of relatively sheltered national economies with limited capital markets. A new age requires a new approach ... Ministers agree that in this new interdependent and instantaneous global marketplace we must now create systems for supervision, transparency, regulation and stability that are as sophisticated as the markets they have to work with ... institutional architecture devised in the 1940s for the economies of the 1940s must be reformed and strengthened to meet the challenges of the 1990s and the 21<sup>st</sup> century'.

latter, the government acts on the premise that the misguided policies of national governments are to blame for instability.<sup>1406</sup> In New Labour's approach to international finance, public management of international capital flows, and, in particular, that of currency trading, is to be minimal; while regulation of the capital markets is to be left to the private realm, state restraint is seen as 'the key to the prudent regulation of the international financial environment'.<sup>1407</sup> The Labour government's approach seeks to impose international compliance with 'transparency codes and rules-based governance regimes', using the IMF as a governing and norm-setting framework to pursue 'free market norms within all the world's capital markets'.<sup>1408</sup> Transparency, in this sense, applies to the information *government's* supply to markets, rather than to the information that *markets* might supply to governments, or to supranational bodies such as the IMF. A key assumption of the government's logic here is that shared by other powerful states aligned to the IMF structure. Here the 'international community' assumes that it is the nations of the 'South' that (primarily) need to be regulated and to be made to be compliant in their own surveillance by the IMF on behalf of the 'North' (or, in Wallerstein's terms, the surveillance of the periphery and semi-periphery for the core).<sup>1409</sup>

The transparency sought by the British government would be meaningless without an underlying episteme framing nation states' fiscal policy structures; transparency is motivated by the desire to impose discipline on domestic policy structures within a dominant neo-liberal episteme. Transparent discipline amongst national fiscal policy structures is actively pursued by an Anglo-American alliance, which seeks to legitimate IMF rules and procedures with the sub-textual aim of bringing 'errant' government's into line with the requirements of transnational financial liberalisation. This world systemising role developed from but was not given in the original IMF structure which sought to provide a Bretton Woods designed stability to the industrialised nations' exchange rate structure; for the first two decades of the Bretton Woods structure policy formation occurred within an ambiguous tension that John Ruggie identified as a form of 'embedded realism' where, as Jacqueline Best argues, the supranational processes were occupied with the maintenance of a balance between (global) financial freedom and the (nation-states') proliferation of various forms of liberalism.<sup>1410</sup> This (relatively) non prescriptive, normatively governed and 'objective' regime came to be replaced once

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<sup>1406</sup> Matthew Watson, *ibid*, p 194.

<sup>1407</sup> Matthew Watson, *ibid*, p 197.

<sup>1408</sup> Matthew Watson, *ibid*, p 198.

<sup>1409</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, *op cit*.

<sup>1410</sup> John Ruggie, 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order', *International Organisation*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1982, pp. 379-415. Jacqueline Best, 'From the Top-Down: The New Financial Architecture and the Re-embedding of Global Finance', *New Political Economy*, Carfax (Taylor and Francis), Vol.8, No.3, Nov 2003, p 364.

the IMF began to design, implement and monitor 'adjustment and stabilization programmes in developing countries from the 1970s onwards'.<sup>1411</sup>

The neo-liberalism of the Blair-Brown government's relationship to the international arena (and, in particular, the periphery and semi-periphery) can be examined in the articulation of the development of an 'ethical foreign policy' with the extension of neo-liberal regulation to the world's poorest countries. Gordon Brown defined a paradigmatic re-direction for the 'international community' in a speech given to Oxfam in January of 2000. The notion of sustainable growth given in Brown's speech was based on a 'Third Way' understanding of national globalisation in which moral norms met national interests in the form of an extensive universalism that was framed as a 'global social inclusion'.<sup>1412</sup> The space of global inclusion marks a 'community' wherein global citizens share 'needs, mutual responsibilities, and linked destinies'.<sup>1413</sup> Crucially, Brown's Christian-humanitarian globalism is imagined in the form of the universal extension of market relations, wherein a sustainable global development can be re-worked towards under the reformed leadership of the IMF and the World Bank. Here then, a neo-liberal conception of global citizenship meets British 'Third Way' national-globalisation. This 'ethical' redirection of foreign policy has been framed by the advocacy of modernising government, accountability, liberal internationalism and human rights, wherein the Labour government 'has thus made it clear that it understands the links between the crushing weight of international debt, absolute poverty, spirals of violent conflict, and the denial of human rights for billions of ordinary people'.<sup>1414</sup> In this formulation of liberal imperialism, a 'rights-based' universalism is to operate through the extension of market relations. Here, on a *prima facie* basis, it might (erroneously) appear that 'third way globalisation' involves a recognition of the underlying causes of the contemporary flows of forced and coerced 'South to North' migration.

In outlining his reforming vision, Brown argued that the 'insecurities' and 'challenges' of globalisation required a shift from the paradigm grounding the SAPS process. Britain and the international community generally needed to move beyond the Washington Consensus which assumed that by 'liberalising, deregulating, privatising and getting prices right, private markets would allocate resources efficiently for growth'.<sup>1415</sup> Building on the initiatives made by Kenneth Clark (1996),<sup>1416</sup> Brown recognised the failure of the SAPS approach and proposed a series of 'third way' initiatives that

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<sup>1411</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, *ibid*, p 162.

<sup>1412</sup> Gordon Brown, 'Gilbert Murray Memorial Lecture', Oxfam, Oxford, January 2000, p 3.

<sup>1413</sup> Gordon Brown, *op cit*.

<sup>1414</sup> Rob Dixon and Paul Williams, 'New Labour's Third Way Foreign Policy', *British Journal of Politics and Foreign Policy*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2001, p 155. Dixon and Williams summarise the following White Paper; *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Department of Foreign and International Development, London, 1997.

<sup>1415</sup> Gordon Brown, *ibid*, p 10. Kenneth Clarke was former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer.

<sup>1416</sup> Clarke initiated the Multilateral Debt Initiative in 1996.

called for a more 'democratic' approach to world poverty, and in particular, the debilitating levels of debt born by the countries of the Third World. The paradigmatic change that Brown spoke of was not to be a rejection of the neo-liberalism governing previous policies of aid and development, but a recognition of the role of the state along with private and civil actors in the production of 'sustainable economic growth' under conditions of globalisation. Labour's 'ethical' foreign policy was thus framed as supplementary to the pursuit of neo-liberal national-globalisation, wherein the promise of debt relief has been used to further the global penetration of liberalisation.

In the extension of humanitarian neo-liberalism, the PRSP's required the qualifying developing nations to pursue the privatisation of public utilities, the deregulation of financial institutions, the removal of subsidies, the promotion of exports and foreign investment, and import liberalisation. The significant shift given in the change from SAPS to PRSP's was that the new structure gathered legitimacy by working through a 'consultation process' involving states and civil society actors in both the North and the South. In practice, however, this has meant that the international financial institutions have retained control over the agenda formation whilst being able to argue that the resulting policies were democratically representative of the interests of the nation states being regulated.<sup>1417</sup> The IMF's consultative approach thus arrived at a formula in which 'sustained pro-poor economic growth, based on robust private sector activity and investment', was to be 'the key-stone of the poverty reduction strategy'.<sup>1418</sup> As Peter Hardstaff argues, despite the rhetorical shift towards democratisation,

*the substance of the IMF and World Bank conditions, and their strict adherence to a set standard of free market policies remains unchanged ... despite the growing evidence that many of these policies have not worked, despite the fact that they undermine developing countries in trade negotiations, and despite massive public protest across the developing world.*<sup>1419</sup>

Subsequently, when introducing the British approach to the global management of third world poverty, Gordon Brown sought to persuade the International Financial Institutions and developed nation states to reform the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). This series of policy initiatives saw to address the underlying causes of poverty amongst compliant third world states by addressing the debilitating levels of international debt servicing.<sup>1420</sup> In the Mauritius Mandate (1999), Brown outlined

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<sup>1417</sup> Peter Hardstaff, 'Treacherous Conditions: How IMF and World Bank policies tied to debt relief are undermining development', *World Development Movement*, London, 2003.

<sup>1418</sup> IMF, *The Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) – Operational Issues*, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 1999.

<sup>1419</sup> Peter Hardstaff, *ibid*, p 10.

<sup>1420</sup> Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *The Cologne Debt Initiative*, Focus International, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 1999; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Debt 2000 Initiative: The Mauritius Initiative*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Briefing Note, 1999.

a five point plan which was 'designed to relieve the debt problems experienced by the world's poorest countries and set them on a path to sustainable growth'. While the Cologne (1999) and Mauritius (1999) initiatives each tied debt relief to 'sound and transparent policies' or to policies 'which support productive expenditure and support social recovery and development', exactly what was considered to be sound or supportive in this manner remained within the neo-classical economic paradigm utilised by the international financial institutions' policy makers. Where Brown successfully brought the problem of debt relief onto the supranational agenda of the G7, G8, IMF and the World Bank, the approach remained within the neo-liberal paradigm given in the 'new Bretton Woods' approach. These strategies continue to be pursued despite the fact that unilateral liberalisation policies have failed to enhance development in the third world, and overlook the historical fact that 'most, if not all, of today's industrialised and newly industrialised countries used a wide variety of what would now be considered 'trade distorting' policy interventions during their development process'.<sup>1421</sup> Liberalising forms of development occurred at particular historical junctures where a combination of contingent processes and events allowed, for example, the European nation-state system to gain dominance through the twinned developments of colonial-capitalism (see chapter one). The validity of this historical argument can be seen in the contemporary period where it has become evident the majority of successfully developing countries are precisely those that have operated outside of the regulating liberalisation of the international financial institutions.<sup>1422</sup>

In the domestic sphere, the values that Blair refers to as the basis of the 'power of community' have taken the form, as Stuart Hall argues, of a modernising entrepreneurialism in which the social democratic focus on equality is subordinate to the neo-liberal facilitation of competition. New Labour has 'promoted the image of the 'businessman' and 'the entrepreneur' as *the* principle social role model, spreading the gospel of 'entrepreneurial values' ('efficiency', 'choice', selectivity') through the land'.<sup>1423</sup> Entrepreneurial governmentality involves the re-measurement of the public sector in terms of the paradigm of efficiency drawn from the private sector, in order to provide the 'citizen-consumer' which a greater range of 'choice'.<sup>1424</sup> In this context Blair stated that 'a key challenge of our progressive politics is to use the state as an enabling force, protecting effective communities and voluntary organisations and encouraging their growth to tackle new needs, in partnership as

<sup>1421</sup> Ha-Joon Chang, *ibid*, 2002; Peter Hardstaff, *ibid*, London, 2003, p 14.. See also David Moore, 'Neo-Liberal globalisation and the triple crisis of 'modernisation' in Africa: Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Africa', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 22, No. 6, 2001, pp., 909-929.

<sup>1422</sup> Ha-Joon Chang, *ibid*, 2002, pp., 127-9, 133-4.

<sup>1423</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, p 14.

<sup>1424</sup> John Clarke and Janet Newman, 'What's in a name? New Labour's citizen-consumers and the remaking of public services', conference paper, *Culture and Social Change: Disciplinary Exchanges*, Manchester, Open University, July 12<sup>th</sup>, 2005.



appropriate'.<sup>1425</sup> Here, for example, the state's role in facilitating the partial privatisation of NHS services in 'foundation hospitals' is presented as a means of empowering local communities; communitarianism here *is* the extension of free market principles to the public sector.<sup>1426</sup> The facilitation of the provision of choice is presented as enhancing the 'quality of provision for the poorest, helping to tackle inequalities while it also strengthens middle class commitment to collective provision'.<sup>1427</sup> This shift involving the privatisation and partial privatisation of a diverse range of public services, has meant that public service has been disciplined towards the 'efficiency' that is given as belonging to market actors. Correspondingly, resistance to marketisation is positioned as an inefficient refusal of modernisation. There is, then, a continuity between 'the proposition that markets are the only measure of 'the social good' – advanced by Hayek, (and) adopted by Mrs. Thatcher', and the 'modernising' governmentality of New Labour.<sup>1428</sup>

The Labour government's modernising regulation of the welfare regime has appropriated the Conservative marketisation of social relations whilst attempting to reformulate social democracy for the new form of problematising state formation referred to as globalisation. Labour has sought to extend a 'progressive universalism' in a Third Way approach that can be located in between the contractual and entitlement-based forms of citizenship. The shift from entitlement based 'passivity' to the imperative towards 'activity' works within an assemblage of welfare regulations that seek to reconstruct citizenship and sovereignty in a relationship of reciprocity.<sup>1429</sup> Active citizenship subsequently consists of a mixture of obligations and rights, while the space of social inclusion denoting the community of citizens consists of the labour market as well as the civil sphere of social reproduction.

For Chris Haylett, these new forms of regulation work within the episteme of 'new poverty' wherein the poor at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (regardless of their location within or without the West), are cast within dominant discourses as a cultural problem.<sup>1430</sup> One of the prime objects of New Labour's active welfare to work regime has been the discursive and regulatory construction of an 'underclass' signifying recalcitrant subject persisting in a relationship of 'dependency'. The 'underclass' thus represents the state's identification of a frontier of resistance to the saturation of socio-economic space wherein subjects must make the required socio-economic adjustment to the exigencies of

<sup>1425</sup> Tony Blair, *The Third Way: New Politics for a New Century*, London, The Fabian Society, 1998, p 4.

<sup>1426</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, pp., 12, 14, 23

<sup>1427</sup> Tony Blair, *The Courage of Our Convictions*, London, Fabian Society, 2002, p. 28.

<sup>1428</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, p 16

<sup>1429</sup> Labour Party, *Getting Welfare to Work: A New Vision for Social Security*, London, 1996.

<sup>1430</sup> Chris Haylett, 'Modernization, welfare, and 'third way' politics', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol. 46, 2001, p 46.

globalisation.<sup>1431</sup> At the same time, the production of this stratification has been one result of the fact that the British labour market has been made flexible in order to allow British capital to compete with the cheaper labour markets of the developing regions. Ensuring subjects' compliance with the processes of active citizenship has required the use of governmentalities ranging from the welfare to work programmes through to the therapeutic discourse in which their (virtually) enhanced performance is framed.<sup>1432</sup> In his context Furedi observes that 'social problems that were previously seen as structural problems or questions of social justice are now regarded as questions of self esteem, personal relations, and skills'.<sup>1433</sup> While one aspect of the 'third way' turn to culturalism is the manner in which the concept of social inclusion refers to the extent to which subjects – as consuming producers operating under meritocratic conditions of competition are individually responsible for the extent to which they achieve marketised citizenship, another lies in the manner in which this subjective responsibility forms the basis of the citizen's contract with his sovereign.

As the facilitator of a community of citizens, New Labour is 'modernising' in its refusal of the 'outdated' model of the welfare state's emphasis on the social rights of citizens. At the same time, the government's communitarianism is distanced, in the manner of liberal communitarian theories, from the atomising tendencies of the individualising 'social market' values of Thatcherism.<sup>1434</sup> Here, instead of the withdrawal to the small state, New Labour presents and actively interventionist state, whose aim is the facilitation of 'active' citizens and communities.<sup>1435</sup> New Labour's governmentality involves the biopolitical management of the population within the paradigm of marketisation. This neo-liberal governmentality 'aims to produce all of us in the new position of practicing 'entrepreneurial subjects', by fostering certain capacities while down-grading others, shifting individual behaviour indirectly by altering the environment in which people work, and operationalising *new values* by 'modernising' *old practices*'.<sup>1436</sup> Here, the enabling role of the state is to encourage 'individuals themselves to provide for all their social needs': whilst the capable middle class must, the 'residuum ... must be targeted, means-tested, and kept to minimum of provision lest the burden threaten 'wealth creation'.<sup>1437</sup>

This targeting is enacted under the rubric of 'social inclusion'. New Labour's attack on 'social exclusion' includes measures of indirect taxation and redistribution that have lifted segments of the

<sup>1431</sup> Chris Haylett, *ibid*, p 45.

<sup>1432</sup> Furedi, F. 'The silent ascendancy of therapeutic culture in Britain', *Society*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 2002. (21). Here 19<sup>th</sup> century moralism approaches 21<sup>st</sup> century culturalism. Needs explanation

<sup>1433</sup> Chris Haylett, *ibid*, pp., 46-47.

<sup>1434</sup> See, for example, Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality*, New York, Basic Books, 2004; Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., London, Duckworth, 1995.

<sup>1435</sup> See David Blunkett, *Politics and Progress: Renewing Democracy and a Civil Society*, London, Demos, 2001

<sup>1436</sup> Stuart Hall, *ibid*, 2003, p 18.

<sup>1437</sup> Stuart Hall, *op cit*.

poorest strata of the population from destitution, and measures of labour deregulation and economic growth that have seen the labour participation rate increase significantly in comparison to those of the Conservative government. Here, at the same time, levels of inequality have increased under the Labour government, and the rates of labour participation disguise the fact that only forty per cent of the work force is actually in full time tenured employment.<sup>1438</sup> Labour's 'entrepreneurial culture' thus worked to enable individual's participation, as active citizens, within the 'broader community', whilst increasing and introducing new forms of social stratification. New Labour's communitarianism balances the 'competing concerns for inclusion and a deregulated market in a single vision', wherein the inclusion of the individual is viewed in terms of the degree to which he or she is included 'in the economic marketplace as an empowered, self-responsible economic actor and consumer'.<sup>1439</sup>

There is here an authoritarian form of liberal governmentality that works, as Gideon Calder argues, 'by imposing rather than enabling the regularities of conduct required for the agenda to retain its coherence'.<sup>1440</sup> New Labour's liberal authoritarianism works through a series of problematisations wherein recalcitrant segments of the population are presented as requiring 'necessary responses to threats to 'our' community life, and to the values of 'decency' which make it strong'.<sup>1441</sup> Thus, 'for all the contemporary resonance of notions of 'social inclusion', the manoeuvre here might be taken as a deliberate exclusion of certain groups, in order then to readmit them to the social fold (if at all) on special, punitive terms'.<sup>1442</sup> Here Calder refers to the homeless and asylum seekers as examples of the groups that have been targeted as social problems. These groups are subject to intense forms of disciplinary governmentality. Here then, there is a reinvention of the utilitarian governmentality of the nineteenth century (see chapters two and three) in which a renewed moralising discourse has taken a 'modernising' and meritocratic form. The basis of this neo-utilitarianism is a 'social democratic neo-liberalism whose assumption of competitive individualism is supplemented by forms of communitarian discourse. In this formation economic liberalism is supplemented by (a particular form of) political liberalism.

Hirst and Thompson have argued that 'UK citizens are more directly vulnerable to international shocks felt through the financial system than are others in the G7', and that 'the future of UK citizens' welfare benefits and their living standards generally are more fully mortgaged to the vagaries of the

<sup>1438</sup> John Hills, *Inequality and the State*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; Susan Watkins, *ibid*, p 12.

<sup>1439</sup> Gideon Calder, 'Communitarianism and New Labour', *The Electronic Journal: Social Issues*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2004; <http://www.whb.co.uk/socialissues>; accessed August 16<sup>th</sup>, 2005.

<sup>1440</sup> Gideon Calder, *ibid*. source not paginated.

<sup>1441</sup> Gideon Calder, *ibid*

<sup>1442</sup> Gideon Calder, *ibid*

international economy than are those in the other large advanced economies'.<sup>1443</sup> To write of a 'globalising' British state is to describe formations of social production that work in the form of neo-utilitarian assemblages within and without the state. Globalization has required British workers to adapt to a high degree of labour market flexibility and relatively high levels of household and national debt under conditions of de-regulated financial architectures operating globally. What is required here is that 'entrepreneurial subjects', as active citizens, become self-disciplined actors who are responsible for the 'efficiency' of their own economic management in the context of the changing requirements of globalisation.

Here then lies the significance of Mandelson's recitation of the globalised insecurities that need to be reassured by New Labour's government (see the beginning of this section). These include a chain of equivalences between 'the economic insecurities that make people worry about their future,' the 'social insecurities and feelings of unfairness associated with migration that have made asylum the doorstep issue of greatest concern' and the 'fear of terrorism'.<sup>1444</sup> Each of these refers, albeit in different forms, to the threatening realm of risk involved in the transnational mobilities involved in the opening of British society to the dynamics of globalisation. The first refers to the anxieties provoked by the social immobility that figures as an effect of neo-liberal globalisation. Here, despite the governmental focus on enabling individuals and communities and therefore providing a framework of possibility for upward mobility, most sections of the workforce are subject to increasing degrees of flexibilisation, and the disciplinary regimes that position the benefits of membership in the community of citizens as dependent on the enactment of performative obligation rather than as a set of social rights. New Labour's neo-liberalism has worked to render its own citizen-workers as globalised subjects. These dynamics are some of the de-bordering effects of neo-liberal globalisation, as the British economy is opened to the global market, and re-positioned as a nodal point for the facilitation of transnational financial mobility, and as a site of low-cost and flexible labour in order to attract multinational investment.<sup>1445</sup>

New Labour's strategy of statecraft is to seek to displace the unfairness of neo-liberal de-bordering by re-assuring the community of citizens of the renewal of the sovereign contract. This re-assurance, like that given by Thatcher in the late 1970s, promises a re-borderment of the national community (see chapter six). Unlike the Thatcherite reassurance, however, the re-borderment is no longer promised in terms of racial belonging, but on the basis of a neo-utilitarian biopolitics. New Labour's communitarian 'promise' works through the deligitimising of the 'other' transnational flows belonging

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<sup>1443</sup> Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, *ibid*, August 2000, p 348.

<sup>1444</sup> Peter Mandelson, *op cit*.

<sup>1445</sup> Susan Watkins, *ibid*, p 11.

to globalisation – those of South to North migration that presents a claim based on (human) social rights, and those of the mobility of ‘pre-modern’ chaos as it too seeks to migrate from the South to the North. These tensions between deborderment and reborderment govern the construction of New Labour’s asylum-and-immigration regime, and it is to that development that this chapter now turns.

### Section 7.4 Third Way Enfortressment

The 1996 Act represented the last act of the Conservative immigration regime. After the 1997 general election, migration policy formation was made under the direction of the Blair-Brown ‘New Labour’ Government, with Jack Straw, David Blunkett, and then Charles Clarke acting as Home Secretaries. While in opposition, the Labour Party had criticised the Conservative government’s restrictionist approach. In their document titled ‘Fairer, Faster, Firmer: Labour’s Approach to Asylum and Immigration’, Jack Straw and Doug Henderson quoted *The Economist* of January 9<sup>th</sup>, 1996, which contained the argument that ‘by promoting anti-immigrant policies the government risks encouraging racism and undermining liberty,’ and subsequently argued that the 1996 Act discriminates against genuine asylum seekers to the same degree that it seeks to deter fraudulent claims, threatens race relations, placed a dangerous and impractical burden on employers, inhumanely denied refugees the means to live, created the unprincipled and impractical white list, and removed the right of appeal to third country decisions.<sup>1446</sup> As the 1997 election approached, key segments of the Labour Party at this time gave the clear impression that the party was opposed to the formation of immigration policy that had been made on the basis of integration guaranteed by exclusion, and the subsequent involvement of several of the key NGO and research organisations in the government’s consultation process was made on the basis of this assumption.<sup>1447</sup> On the other hand, Tony Blair had been equally clear, in leading the opposition Labour Party into the election, that a Labour government would reverse the Conservative government’s failure to ‘clamp down’ on ‘illegal’ migration.<sup>1448</sup>

The subsequent 1998 White Paper *Fairer, Faster, and Firmer – A Modern Approach to Immigration and Asylum* outlining the proposed *Immigration and Asylum Act* of 1999 gave a clear indication, despite the government’s stated commitment to base any revisions of asylum policy on the 1951 Convention, that refugee and asylum policy was going to be made on a restrictive basis

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<sup>1446</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 78.

<sup>1447</sup> See, for example, the Refugee Council’s Asylum Rights Campaign’s (2004) review of the 1997 policy recommendations made in conjunction with ILPA and JUSTICE. Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, pp 1-18. ARC, ILPA, and JUSTICE, *Providing Protection – Towards fair and effective asylum procedures*, 1997. Dallal Stevens cites S. Grey & M. Prescott, ‘Straw signals U-turn to ditch tough Tory immigration laws’, *The Sunday Times*, April 13, 1997. Dallal Stevens, *UK Asylum Law and Policy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2004, p 174.

<sup>1448</sup> Tony Blair quoted in *The Sun*, March 1997, cited in Dallal Stevens, *op cit*.

<sup>1449</sup> Despite the progressive policy recommendations set out by Straw and Henderson whilst the Labour party had been in opposition, the title of the White Paper indicates a consistency with the form of British policy formation inaugurated in the 1960's where the 'fair but firm' approach began to 'justify strict immigration policy with reference to the need to integrate migrants into British society'.<sup>1450</sup> In this sense the 1998 White Paper needs to be read with the White Paper of 2002, for while the language of the first stresses the issue of control and the language of the latter places a greater emphasis on the issue of integration, both papers are entirely consistent with the 'liberal consensus' on immigration and 'race relations'. Each White Paper seeks to position the state as the manager of social harmony in its police and bordering role on the basis of the episteme of integration guaranteed by exclusion that was constructed in the race relations paradox (see chapter six).

The explanatory note to the 1999 Act described the 1998 White Paper as having set out

*a range of proposals to modernize and integrate the immigration and asylum system. The overall aim of the planned reforms is to develop a more flexible and streamlined system of immigration control capable of providing an improved quality of service to British citizens and those who qualify to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, as well as strengthening the necessary controls on those who do not.*<sup>1451</sup>

The first stream of New Labour's policy formation presented the introduction of a concern for the issue of globalisation, and an appropriation of the Conservative government's construction of the discrimination between 'valid' and 'invalid' migration based, in large part, on the categorisation of 'genuine refugees' and 'bogus' economic migrants. Here, as Schuster notes, 'like their predecessors, the Labour government had come to the conclusion that the slowness of the system, the low numbers of removals, and the provision of welfare benefits *all encouraged 'bogus' asylum seekers* to come to Britain'<sup>1452</sup> In the 1998 White Paper an argument is made concerning the current need to streamline the governmentality of immigration. In the brief section describing contemporary economic migration the paper states that the 'U.K, along with the rest of Western Europe, the U.S.A, Canada and Australia has seen a substantial increase in the number of economic

<sup>1449</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, p 3. The Home Office White Paper (1998, para.8.5) states that the government seeks to 'protect genuine refugees by scrupulous application of the 1951 Convention'.

<sup>1450</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid*., 2000, p 26.

<sup>1451</sup> United Kingdom *Immigration and Asylum Act 1999*, 'Explanatory note, 3, 'background', London, HMSO, p 1

<sup>1452</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, p 166

migrants seeking a better life for themselves and their families.<sup>1453</sup> This is a new phenomenon because 'modern communications and modern travel have become significant factors in changing the nature and extent of economic migration, facilitating the genuine traveller but also creating opportunities for those who seek to evade migration control.'<sup>1454</sup> The problem that this global ease of movement and information presents to the Home Office is that these (disguised) economic migrants are no longer 'confined to neighbouring countries within reach by more traditional forms of travel.'<sup>1455</sup> Britain, moreover, becomes a victim of its own success in the White paper's logic, as its comprehensive provision of welfare benefits to British citizens is thought to make the country a target for the self-interested migrant who cannot help but have ready access to globalised circuits of information and media.<sup>1456</sup>

Leaving aside, for the moment, the stability of national borders that this and other recent British legislation has addressed because of the 'threat' posed by the ease of movement within the European Union, I want to follow the related point that these new effects of globalisation divide into two sides of the Home Office cost-benefit analysis. On the one hand, this new mobility means that the 'Government welcomes and wishes to encourage' those 'people travelling abroad for legitimate purposes including business, study, and holidays.'<sup>1457</sup> On the other hand the assumption is made that 'the immigration system must be viewed as a whole', recognizing that 'economic migrants will exploit whatever route offers the best chance of entering or remaining in the U.K.'<sup>1458</sup> The paper's statement again frames the migrant – and more specifically – the asylum seeker – as an economically self-interested agent, and subsequently frames her or his migration within the range of possible choices that might be made on the basis of a rational calculation of risk, whilst encouraging the public 'common sense' association of refugees and asylum seekers with the category of 'bogus economic migrants'.<sup>1459</sup> Moreover, in the context of its statement within a paper outlining a new direction in the restriction of immigration, the phrase 'economic migrant' only works in contradistinction to the idea of the humanitarian refugee. Thus the paper works to overturn the criticism made by the Labour Party when in opposition, for in establishing the logic that

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<sup>1453</sup> Chapter One, 'Current immigration trends', section 1.3., 'economic migration', Home Office White Paper, *Fairer, Faster, Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration Control*, London, HMSO, 1998.

<sup>1454</sup> Home Office, *ibid.*, 1998, p 2

<sup>1455</sup> Home Office, *op cit*

<sup>1456</sup> N. Finch, 'The Support and Dispersal of Asylum Seekers', p 17, in ILPA, *Asylum Seekers: A Guide to Recent Legislation*, London, ILPA, 2001, p 17.

<sup>1457</sup> Home Office White Paper, *op cit*.

<sup>1458</sup> Home Office White Paper, *op cit*.

<sup>1459</sup> Vinay Gidwani and K. Sivaramakrishnan, *ibid.*, pp., 186-213. The authors state that there are two dominant approaches to the causes for migration; 'the marginalist and rational choice tradition in economics' and the 'Marxist tradition that explains migration as a response to or consequence of uneven capitalist development and class struggle' (p 188).



stands behind the scapegoat figure of the 'bogus' migrant, it re-enacts a discriminatory paradigm and regulatory framework.

The then Home Secretary Jack Straw made the link between the need for migration control and the dynamics of globalisation in terms of the difference in the context in which the 1951 Geneva Convention operated at the time of its creation, and currently, in globalised time. Straw wrote that the Convention 'designed in the aftermath of the last war to ensure the humane treatment of those who had to flee their country because of a well-founded fear of persecution' did not anticipate 'the speed, relatively low cost and easy availability of international travel and telecommunications.'<sup>1460</sup> Like the Australian Parliamentary Research Paper (2000) that argued that the Geneva Convention had become an anachronism under current conditions of globalisation prior to that country's turn to strategies of detention, resettlement and regionalization, the initial statements and policies of the Labour government can be seen as some of the initial hesitant movements towards the displacement of the rights-based approach to refugee migration.<sup>1461</sup> At an IPPR seminar titled "Modernising Asylum", Straw called for a "revision" of the 1951 Geneva Convention, arguing that the international system of asylum-provision is "no longer working as its framers intended".<sup>1462</sup> As Baldaccini observes, Straw's arguments were designed to promote the idea that 'asylum determination be shifted outside the receiving country, with decision-making responsibility being outsourced to relevant agencies, such as the UNHCR, and that refugees be accepted via quotas agreed by EU countries'.<sup>1463</sup>

An intrinsic component of the rhetorical logic required for the movement towards this displacement is the depoliticisation of asylum-and-immigration policy. Subsequently, one of the things that Straw's statement and the White Paper and its subsequent Act attempt to perform is the separation of contemporary migration from the effects of any broader political conception of globalisation. This normative position decoupled the economic and political realms. Many commentators on refugee and asylum law have noted that it is not simply possible to separate the economic from the political

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<sup>1460</sup> Jack Straw, Preface to the 1998 White Paper, p 3.

<sup>1461</sup> Adrian Millbank, 'The Problem with the 1951 Refugee Convention', Social Policy Group, Parliament of Australia, September 5<sup>th</sup>, 2000.

<sup>1462</sup> Jack Straw, Speech at the 'Modernising Asylum' Seminar Series, Institute of Public Policy Research, London, June, 2000, cited in Julie Hyland, 'Britain calls for revision of Geneva convention', *World Socialist Website*, February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2001, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/feb2001/gen-i23>; See also, Keith Lee, 'British Home Secretary campaigns to overturn Geneva Convention on asylum', *World Socialist Website*, June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2000, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/jun2000/gen-j23>.

<sup>1463</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, p 4. Baldaccini summarises the views expressed by Straw at the Lisbon Conference, 2000. These arguments are consistent with those expressed in Straw's speeches in Britain..

component of any migrant's putative motivation.<sup>1464</sup> In distinction to the paradigm of liberal rational choice-making upon which this distinction rests, we should refer to Sivanandan's framing for the articulation of the political and the economic in terms of the neo-liberal structuring of mobility when he argued that 'the economic migrant is also the political refugee'.<sup>1465</sup> For Straw, as the asylum seeker is primarily assumed to be a self interested actor working within the new conditions of the globalised market, s/he is also, therefore, a form of the liberal citizen-self that points to the hybridity of the construction of the British 'self' for which the asylum figure works as an 'other'. Outside of the 'exceptionality' of the 'genuine' conditions of being a refugee, he or she is assumed to act in the manner defined by the space of (neo)liberal subjectivity. This liberal equivalence works in the context that I described in the previous section, wherein neo-liberal and neo-utilitarian governmentality have worked to render the British citizen a globalised subject. Deligitimising South to North migration based on the assumption of the rights bearing liberal subject thus works to de-politicise neo-liberal governmentality by offering the liberal citizen as a member of the national community the privilege of a re-bordering exclusion.

The Home Office's 1998/9 construction of immigration law pared the economic realm away from the political, but also the historical away from the contemporary in the sense that the colonial relationships between nation states are only ever acknowledged in neo-liberal discourse on the basis of a disjunctive separation wherein the colonised status of the global subject is 'forgotten'. This act of forgetting has a historical and contemporary aspect. In the former sense, the legacy of colonialism cannot achieve recognition as a form of persecution requiring the privilege of any form of asylum. The postcolonial legacy of poverty-and-conflict does not imply a historical responsibility on behalf of (formerly) colonial powers. In the latter aspect, the liberal imperialism that takes the form of the extension of neo-liberalism (see previous section) cannot be recognised as a form of political persecution. Thus, outside of the exceptionality of the Convention refugee, pauperised global subjects only appear in their 'economic' aspect. In order to achieve that separation this neo-liberal discourse takes the form of a problematising categorization of migrants, as being either 'economic,' or as being in some way an exception to this categorization. While legitimate economic migrants and 'genuine' refugees meet the requirements of immigration control the categories of action utilized by 'economic' immigrants are thereafter referred to as being 'fraudulent', 'sham', and in the case of asylum claims, as an 'abuse'. The 'fraud' that the Home Office seeks to establish as a matter of fact and law is that of the act of seeking asylum

<sup>1464</sup> James Hollifield, for example, argues that it is 'impossible to 'implement policies' that rely on a fine distinction between the economic and political motives of migrants'. James Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of Post-War Europe*, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts and London, 1992, p 210.

<sup>1465</sup> A. Sivanandan, 'Refugees from Globalism', London, CARF, No. 57, August-September, 2000; <http://www.carf.demon.co.uk/feat44.html>; accessed July 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2005.

under the Geneva definition of persecution when the actor is retrospectively considered to have migrated on an economic basis. In such cases the very act of an asylum application and any subsequent appeal are illegal and carry the penalty of detention and deportation. Inasmuch, they also carry the symbolic burden of illegitimacy.

For Anneliese Baldaccini, the 1999 Act and the subsequent White Paper (2002) and Act (2003) gave New Labour's 'modernisation' of asylum and immigration policy a clarity that had been somewhat hidden by the government's apparent commitment to the rights-based protection of refugees.<sup>1466</sup> Baldaccini writes that 'the promised 'modernisation' was predicated on a systematic application and extension of external and internal controls'.<sup>1467</sup> On the internal dimension the initial policies had – primarily – worked to create 'an institutionalised and punitive system for the provision of accommodation and support which deprived asylum seekers of the right to live a dignified and independent life'.<sup>1468</sup> The symbolic and material components of deterrence combined in the 1999 Act's replacement of the partial benefit 'system' that had been developed after the courts had rejected the Conservative policy of refusing asylum seekers any benefit. Under the Labour government's first Act, the granting of cash benefits was replaced with the stigmatising system of vouchers.<sup>1469</sup> Hence, for the Labour government an intrinsic element of the regime of managed immigration has been the delegitimisation of the asylum seekers' claim upon this western state. In the terms that the thesis has begun to develop above, the internal dimension was directed at denying immigrants access to both the substantive and imagined status of citizenship, whilst these material and spectacular processes were mobilized towards a politics of resentment. Here, the figure of the asylum seeker as, for example, a transnational 'welfare cheat', stands in as the representative of the de-bordering aspects of globalisation, such as the withdrawal of the benefits of the social-welfare state.<sup>1470</sup> As I noted in the previous chapter, the figure of the welfare cheat worked as the domestic 'other' within the discourse of Thatcherite neoliberalism. This scapegoat-figure, clearly given in his representation in 'communitarian' tabloid media such as *The Daily Mail*, *The Daily Express*, and *The Sun* provides an ideological vent for the frustrations of globalised nationals.<sup>1471</sup> Correspondingly, 'he' provides a positive object of statecraft, inasmuch as his governmental problematisation allows the government to

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<sup>1466</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, pp., 4-5. The gap between the reality and rhetoric of the government's policies were not immediately evident to refugee and migrant organisations. The development of the concept of 'frontloading' in the asylum process is a good example of the manner in which the Home Office and refugee organisations agreed on the pursuance of a policy which later eventuated within the restrictionist rather than the rights-based paradigm.

<sup>1467</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, p 4.

<sup>1468</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *op cit*.

<sup>1469</sup> Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, p 167.

<sup>1470</sup> See, for example, *The News of the World*, 'Handout UK: how many refugees live in Your town? January 21<sup>st</sup>, 2001; *The News of the World*, 'Britain's £1 billion asylum bill', May 19<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

<sup>1471</sup> See Roy Greenslade, *Seeking Scapegoats: the Coverage of Asylum in the UK Press*, Asylum and Immigration Working Paper No. 5, London, IPPR, 2005.

claim legitimacy in its reassuringly restrictive immigration policy. The pursuit of that legitimacy has involved the major British political parties in a 'bidding war' to reassure the public that their measures of restriction promise a greater degree of re-borderment. For the Labour government, this has come to mean that the pursuit of an externalisation of the asylum regime.

The restrictive tendency of the external dimension of migration management that was later to become evident in the government's 'New Vision' (2004) strategies was apparent in the development of policies operating to prevent refugees' arrival to UK ports', and in the strategies adopted by the British representatives in the developing European intergovernmental process (see below).<sup>1472</sup> The further direction of the external element of British policy formation was given a rare public outing in the Home Secretary's Lisbon speech (June 16<sup>th</sup> 2000), where the possibility of regionalization was raised as an alternative to the 'outmoded' reliance on the Convention-based processing of individual claims.<sup>1473</sup> Utilising the grounding Hobbesian conception of globalisation<sup>1474</sup> that entered governmental discourse with the first of Labour's immigration and asylum White Papers, Straw's regional proposal involved the displacement of the asylum process to the regions surrounding the migrants' originating state.

During David Blunkett's tenure as Home Secretary several of the apparent contradictions inherent in the government's policy directions became increasingly apparent. Blunkett, who 'basically brought' the Work Permits UK unit (which seeks to facilitate streamlined business immigration from the department for Education and Employment to the Home Office),<sup>1475</sup> saw asylum in terms of the 'racist public' thesis that had its origins in the construction of the race relations paradigm in the 1960s.<sup>1476</sup> Paul Statham describes this thesis as the belief 'that there are untapped resources of public grievances against asylum seekers, verging in many cases on racism or outright xenophobia, and that their policy proposals must compete for this political territory'.<sup>1477</sup> Blunkett saw asylum as a political issue which has to be rescued from the 'coiled' spring' of society's passions, and the role of the Home Secretary as one of providing the sort of securitising reassurance that tends (and has tended) to be provided by the

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<sup>1472</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid*, p 10

<sup>1473</sup> See *fn. 1513*. Straw stated that 'The Convention gives us the obligation to consider any claims made within our territory ... but no obligation to facilitate the arrival on our territory of those who want to make a claim'.

<sup>1474</sup> See section 7.3. See also Etienne Balibar, 'Preface', in *Politics and the Other Scene*, London, Verso, p xi. Balibar writes that 'the 'global' system, which tends to be pictured in *Hobbesian* terms (as a *war of all against all* based on interests, powers, cultures, etc., requiring a regulation through either law or force, or rather a close combination of the two), is in reality profoundly *anti-Hobbesian*. This is because it is no longer possible to regard the phenomenon of violence within itself as a state of nature, that is, as a structural condition that *precedes institutions (political, civil)*, and which institutions as such would suppress. We have to accept ... that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually 'post-institutional'.

<sup>1475</sup> Franck Duvell and Bill Jordan, *ibid*, 2003, p 304.

<sup>1476</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, pp., 163-7

<sup>1477</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, p 167.

Right.<sup>1478</sup> The consequence of failing to provide this political reassurance, Blunkett argues, would become evident in a historical repetition of the dynamics of the collapse of the Weimer republic, or the role of the failure of Jospin's socialist government to handle immigration.<sup>1479</sup> Thus, in the paradigm presented by Blunkett, the spectre of racist extremism has been mobilised to legitimate the restrictionist regime.<sup>1480</sup> Consequently, the racist public thesis informed policy that has been made on the basis of a renewal of the 'race relations paradigm'. Yet, as Statham's more nuanced analysis shows, public resentment towards asylum seekers is often the result of diffuse anxieties relating to the restricted access to public services and resources, rather than an innate and generalised 'public racism'.<sup>1481</sup>

At the same time that the governmentality of asylum immigration was being framed in terms of social insecurities, the immigration minister Barbara Roche signalled the government's commitment to the national competition for globalised labour in two speeches in 2000.<sup>1482</sup> Blunkett introduced the new directions of policy in a speech to the House of Commons (October 29<sup>th</sup> 2001) where he began to frame economic migration in positive terms whilst outlining an approach to asylum seekers in Britain that both emphasised the necessity of their integration and introduced a further range of punitive and exclusionary measures. In the same year the Home Office published a research paper that Sales has noted represented the first governmental move towards the consideration of migration in relation to other (primarily economic) policy areas.<sup>1483</sup> At the Labour party Conference (2001) the Home Secretary went on to outline a national 'green card' system of possible labour immigration,<sup>1484</sup> whilst emphasising that an expanded labour permit scheme would be 'part of a concerted drive against illegal immigration'.<sup>1485</sup> Subsequently, in the pre-Budget report of 2002 the Chancellor Gordon Brown recognised the value of immigrants with 'lower or intermediate skills' who could 'complement the skills of the domestic population and help raise productivity'.<sup>1486</sup> On a *prima facie* basis it would seem that the state sees itself as working on the basis of the logic set out in James Hollifield's description of the 'liberal paradox' in which Western states are caught between their economic desire to open their

<sup>1478</sup> David Blunkett quoted in John Kampfner, Interview with David Blunkett, *New Statesman*, July 5<sup>th</sup> 2004, pp., 20-21.

<sup>1479</sup> David Blunkett quoted in John Kampfner, *ibid*.

<sup>1480</sup> David Blunkett, 'The Far Right is the Enemy', *The Guardian*, April 11<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

<sup>1481</sup> Paul Statham, *ibid*, p 173

<sup>1482</sup> Barbara Roche, 'UK Migration in a Global Economy', Paper presented to the IPPR Seminar, September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2000. The minister presented an earlier version at an intergovernmental EU meeting in Paris in June of the same year. Duveill and Jordan give a concise summary and analysis. Franck Duveill and Bill Jordan, *ibid*, pp., 302-303.

<sup>1483</sup> Rosemary Sales, 'The Deserving and the undeserving? Refugees, asylum seekers, and welfare in Britain', *Critical Sociology Policy*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2002, p 473. Sales refers to the Glover et al., RDS Occasional Paper, 'Migration: An Economic and Social Analysis', Home Office, London, 2001.

<sup>1484</sup> Ian Black, 'EU green card proposed', *the Guardian*, August 12<sup>th</sup> 2001. Blunkett rejected Antonio Vitorino's call for a harmonised EU green card system, but expressed interest in a national system. (Vitorino was the Portuguese commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs).

<sup>1485</sup> Alan Travis, 'Green Card work permits for useful migrants', *The Guardian*, October 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2001.

<sup>1486</sup> Gordon Brown, HC, 'Pre-budget Speech', November 27<sup>th</sup>, 2002;

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/budget2003/story/0,12656.848961.00.html>; accessed June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2005

societies to all mobilities (including that of labour) whilst being required by their national constituencies to enforce a political closure.<sup>1487</sup> Yet this view assumes the racist public thesis, and ignores the role of the governmental problematisation of immigration in the formation of popular anti-immigration sentiments. In addition, it creates a paradox out of a relationship (between political and economic liberalism that should be more usefully thought of as working in a supplementary fashion: thus, the re-borderment given in the exclusion of pauperised immigrants (or, their inclusion on punitive terms) helps to legitimate, and depoliticise the de-bordering tendencies of economic liberalism.

Duvell and Jordan argued that this period bore witness to a paradigmatic change in the basis of policy formation (from the concern to balance migration policy in terms of 'good race relations'), citing 'a new approach to migration management, focussed on international labour flows under conditions of globalisation', where 'a new open door on labour recruitment' would be added to 'tough enforcement over asylum and – from 2002 – 'illegal work'.<sup>1488</sup> The Home Office White Paper of 2002 'Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain' and the following Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2003) subsequently furthered the bifocal approach (linking internal and external realms of control) to the construction of a national form of enfortressment, while seeking to re-contextualise policy formation within the developing globalisation paradigm. Where the modernising Labour government had initially set out to 'undertake a fundamental review of the whole system of immigration from start to finish, from initial applications overseas through to permanent settlement, citizenship or removal abroad',<sup>1489</sup> Blunkett informed the House of Commons that the White Paper (2002) offered 'an holistic and comprehensive approach to nationality, managed immigration and asylum that recognises the interrelationship of each element of the system'.<sup>1490</sup>

Under the Act proposed by the 2002 White Paper, asylum seekers were to be (re)located within a network of induction centres where they would be processed before being dispersed or removed. Up until this time, asylum seekers had the option of pursuing a 'support only' option in which they could receive only the asylum benefit (amounting to 70 per cent of the rate of the citizen's welfare benefit) if they wished to reside at a location of their own choice (usually with family or friends, and, more often than not, in London or the South-East), and many had chosen to do so at the expense of the loss of the accommodation offered under the dispersal system. Within the suggested legislation, applicants were to be automatically dispersed, regardless of their preferences. The dispersal program requiring the

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<sup>1487</sup> James Hollifield, 'Immigration and International Relations: The Liberal Paradox', *Royal Society of British Geographers*, Draft, January 14<sup>th</sup>, 2001.

<sup>1488</sup> Franck Duvell and Bill Jordan, *ibid*, p 299; Duvell and Jordan cite the Home Office White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, 2002.

<sup>1489</sup> Home Office White Paper, *Fairer, Faster, Firmer: A Modern Approach to Immigration Control*, 1998, para. 4.2.

<sup>1490</sup> House of Commons Debate. Vol. 379, February 7, 2002, col. 1027. Cited in Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, p 193.

applicant's abdication of choice over his living conditions, and often requiring the applicant's separation from the community or networks of support that would go onto facilitate integration, functions as a form of internal displacement or forced migration. This has been particularly true where migrants have been dispersed to run-down localities offering poor service facilities and accommodation rather than to the already-integrating community clusters that the policies have promised.

The White Paper envisioned that the current form of the dispersal system in which the responsibility for accommodation falls upon the regionalised NASS offices, Local Councils and agencies, and finally, on the private sector, will come to be replaced by a network of accommodation centres. Taken together, the plans for the use of induction and accommodation centres form the platform for a comprehensive detention estate, in which the asylum process can be 'seamlessly' managed from end to end.<sup>1491</sup> Despite the White Paper's emphasis of the importance of integration, the model of accommodation centres proposed is based on their self-containment, wherein they are to be situated in 'out-of-town' localities, while all services (including, for example, the education of children and the health requirements of asylum applicants) are to be provided on-site.<sup>1492</sup> Dispersal and detention thus work to inoculate the British social body from the asylum process by isolating asylum seekers within the non-spaces of a seamless institutional system. This internal system of people management works, (or is intended to work) to re-border the deterritorialised dispersal that refugees and their transnational networks have created: By saturating the socio-political space with this form of regulation, the Home office seeks to render British social space a non-space for un-regulated immigration, or at least, to signify that it *should be* so,<sup>1493</sup> and that the penalty for its transgression lies in the symbolic slippage that works between the prison and the detention centre. In this vein it should be noted that both of these have become subject to the privatised management of transnational incarceration providers such as the (transnational) Group 4, whose competitiveness lies in the degree to which they have been prepared to offer the industry of incarceration a highly flexible labour force.

If these elements signify the modernising approach to the internal institutionalisation of asylum management, the discourse of the 2002 White Paper offering a 'safe haven' through the provision of 'secure borders' demonstrates the fact that the Labour government was also re-appropriating the logic of the 'race relations paradigm', when the Race Relations Act was set as a compensating balance to that decade's restrictions on 'New Commonwealth' immigration (see chapter six). The Bill's preface,

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<sup>1491</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid.*, pp., 72-74.

<sup>1492</sup> Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid.*, p 74.

<sup>1493</sup> Franck Duvell and Bill Jordan, *ibid.*, pp., 311-312. Duvell and Jordan note both the lack of institutional machinery directed towards the regulation of illegal work, and the resistance of key public service and trade union sectors to any institutional spread of the Home Office and IND's policing of immigrants.



for example, states that 'without a clear, workable and robust nationality and asylum system we cannot defeat those who would seek to stir up hate, intolerance, and prejudice'.<sup>1494</sup> In addition, the White Paper signals that the amendments to be introduced were to be framed within the Labour government's modernising agenda, and that any *political* framing of a multi-culturalist agenda was to be restrained within the concept of 'integration with diversity'. Given New Labour's commitment to anti-racist policy including the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (RRAA), and the integrative measures proposed in the White Paper, it might be said that homogeneity here refers not so much to ethnicity, and that it is precisely in the spheres of ethnicity, 'race' and nationality that each of these bills seeks to promote 'integration with diversity'. However, as Anne Dummett noted at the time, there is an *aporia* that lies between the direction of the White Paper (and the NIA), and the RRAA.<sup>1495</sup> The RRAA makes the provisions of the 1976 Act applicable to all public bodies, and 'a positive duty on public authorities to promote equality of opportunity'.<sup>1496</sup> Dummett observes that

*the Home Office is bound by these provisions – except in the administration of immigration, asylum, and nationality law. Thus IND's employment policies are covered in the main Act but not its behaviour. Officials may under instructions from a minister or on a minister's personal decision discriminate on grounds of nationality, or ethnic, or national origin.*<sup>1497</sup>

In the House of Lords debate, Lord Lester argued that the exception (RRAA, section 19C) allows a racial discrimination that 'is incompatible with the very principle of non-discrimination which the legislation is intended to secure'.<sup>1498</sup> This contradiction is a particular problem for asylum applications, for it leaves scope for the principle that decisions should be made on the merits of an individual's case to be relegated on the basis of that individual's membership in national or ethnic groupings. At the same time, as Vicki Squire has argued, New Labour's communitarian fostering of diversity has tended to slip towards an essentialist conception of the monocultural nation.<sup>1499</sup> This shift has been pursued through a homogenising process of 'assimilation through segregation' wherein the legitimate immigrant is assimilated as a 'harmless insider', in contrast to the segregation that must be enacted

<sup>1494</sup> Home Office White Paper, *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*, London, HMSO, 2002

<sup>1495</sup> Anne Dummett, Ministerial Statements – the immigration exception in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, London, ILPA, 2000

<sup>1496</sup> Bhikhu Parekh, *The Future of Multicultural Britain: The Parekh Report*, London, Profile Books, 2000, p 264.

<sup>1497</sup> Anne Dummett, *op cit*.

<sup>1498</sup> Lord Lester, House of Lords, December 14<sup>th</sup>, 1999; Lester relies on the definition of discrimination given in Article 1. of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 1966

<sup>1499</sup> Vicki Squire, 'Integration with diversity in modern Britain', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005, p 52; *cf.*, Les Back *et al.*, 'New Labour's white heart: politics, multiculturalism and the return of assimilation', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2002.

towards the illegitimate ('bogus') immigrant.<sup>1500</sup> Squire notes that for New Labour, 'globalisation is conceived as opening up 'to diverse influences' a nation that has been multi-ethnic 'for centuries'.<sup>1501</sup> The latter ('bogus') category, however, exceeds the sphere of integrated diversity and thereby guarantees the purity (homogeneity) of the national sphere. We should note here that under the terms of the RRAA the category 'bogus' may refer to an immigrant from a nationality (or national origin) that is deemed to not have a valid claim to asylum (as has been the case in the enactment of the 'white list'). However, rather than read this latter dynamic primarily as a coded form of ethno-nationalism, it's my contention that the culminating policy directions of this paper situates the immigration of refugees and asylum seekers within the communitarian government's neo-utilitarian agenda.

Here, I would argue that the sort of homogeneity being invoked refers to the disciplined behaviour that belongs to the 'community's' way of life: its 'other' is the sphere of mobile pauperism that belongs to the imagined zones of 'pre-modernity (see the previous section). Consequently, the legal bordering provided against illicit flows of persons is, by re-delineating a sphere of illegitimacy, simultaneously a governmental bordering. Defining pauperised mobility as illegitimate - a zone of non-compliance within the regime of liberal imperialism - works to regulate the complicity of national individuals with the contractual nature of active citizenship within the framework of neo-liberalism. The problematising re-borderment directed against illegitimate ('bogus') networks of migration thus serves to depoliticise the 'Third Way' state in its 'tough love' management of socio-economic flexibility.<sup>1502</sup> Thus, although the assemblage of the RRAA and the White Paper (2002) represent a partial shift in the degree to which they emphasise an anti-racist integration, the change has not been a disjunctive move towards the re-positioning of the state's need to respond to globalisation. Rather, this re-elaboration consists of the manner in which the logic of the race relations paradigm has come to work is supplementary fashion with a neo-utilitarian biopolitics within the context of globalised policy formation.

The subsequent Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (2002) continued the saturation of the state's space of regulatory surveillance and control through the enactment of internal and remote measures; where the latter were most evident in the initiation of the resettlement scheme providing 'legitimate offshore gateways' for refugees, the former, (beyond the enactment of the proposals recorded above) included the foregrounding of the national component of citizenship in the introduction of tests regarding English language and society, as well as an allowance of discretion for the Secretary of State in the refusal or deprivation of citizenship where an individual is deemed to have 'done something

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<sup>1500</sup> Vicki Squire, *ibid*, pp., 52-4.

<sup>1501</sup> Vicki Squire, *ibid*, p 61; cf., Home Office, *ibid*, 2002, p 10.

<sup>1502</sup> Jordan, B. and Jordan, C. *Social Work and the Third Way: Tough Love as Social Policy*, Sage, London, 2000.

seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK or British overseas territory'.<sup>1503</sup> While the Home Office presented the Act's furthering of securitisation in terms of the restatement of the ability of such to guarantee 'good race relations and strong social cohesion',<sup>1504</sup> it also furthered the centring of national-globalisation in the formation of immigration policy by opening new corridors for economic migration in the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme, the regularisation of study-to-work postgraduate integration, and the expansion of the seasonal worker's scheme.<sup>1505</sup>

The political bordering inherent to the White Paper and the subsequent NIA Act are evident in their punitive and criminalising directives. To translate, for a moment, the domestic policies of induction, dispersal, detention, removal, fast-streaming, the limitation of the support offered under the new NASS system, and the proposed abbreviation of the appeals system to a 'one stop' process, into the regulatory spaces of urban governance designed to restrict the homeless from public spaces, it can be seen that the space of the asylum seeker (or, the politico-economic migrant) has been defined as one in which it is impossible to rest or to take a stand: these spaces signify what Hannah Arendt described as the lack of 'the right to have rights'.<sup>1506</sup> The assemblage of internal measures has been supplemented by the external policies of visa restrictions, 'safe third countries', carrier liabilities and the use of airline liaison officers, inter-governmental and supranational arrangements with (EU) border and peripheral (refugee producing) countries, supranational information systems, the criminalisation of clandestine entry, and the 'New Vision' proposals for 'regional' solutions refugees' for resettlement.<sup>1507</sup> Together these measures constitute an extra-territorialisation of the politico-economic migrant, regardless of whether she is situated in the stateless space of an airport, the 'interior' space of a detention centre, or the remote space of a 'safety zone' camp.

As Heaven Crawley argues, the British asylum regime has been caught within a 'circular and self-perpetuating process' in which 'high rates of refusal are interpreted as indicating high rates of abuse when in reality sometimes all they represent is poor quality decision-making and a mean-spirited application of the concept of 'effective protection'.<sup>1508</sup> The consequence of the assemblage of measures constructing the 'borders' of infra-national and 'remote' control, as the government has admitted, has been the fact that it has become impossible for an asylum seeker to enter British territory in a legal manner.<sup>1509</sup> Subsequently, Beth Crossland and John Morrison have observed the direct correlation

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<sup>1503</sup> United Kingdom Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Act 2002, s. 4.

<sup>1504</sup> Home Office Press Release, 'Trust and confidence in our nationality, immigration and asylum system – Bill published', April 12, 2002.

<sup>1505</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, 2004, p 194.

<sup>1506</sup> Hannah Arendt, *On Totalitarianism*, San Diego, Harvest Books, 1994, p 37.

<sup>1507</sup> The 'New Vision' proposals and the state of rightlessness are discussed in thesis's conclusion.

<sup>1508</sup> Heaven Crawley, 'The UK, the EU, and forced migration', in Stephen Castles *et al.*, *ibid.*, 2005, p 38

<sup>1509</sup> Angela Eagle, Standing Committee for the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (May 14<sup>th</sup> 2002), Hansard, col. 227.

between countries of origin for refugees and originating countries for trafficked and smuggled persons;  
<sup>1510</sup> Alice Bloch's research amongst refugees and asylum seekers residing in the London district of Newham shows that approximately two thirds of the migrants researched had felt compelled to use these 'other means' in taking flight and seeking refuge, <sup>1511</sup> and the Home Office's own research shows that the restrictive measures employed throughout the 1990's had forced refugees to go underground. <sup>1512</sup> The transnational organised criminal networks of the trafficking and smuggling 'industries' are the direct result of the construction of an architecture of enforcement. <sup>1513</sup>

The 'virtual fortress' that has thus been built on the pervasive presence of surveillance and regulation has borders that are territorially, socio-politically, and institutionally hybrid. These are borders that, for example, bring together the anti-racist constellation of social services and trade unions on the one hand with the policing and surveillance aspects of the Home Office and IND on the other, in, for example, the request for and refusal of information sharing in regarding to the presence of illegal immigrants. Subsequently, their mobility will continue to escape regulation, even where this means their restriction to the informal spheres of the labour market and society. Here the border that is being transgressed and reinforced is built upon Hattersley's paradigm in which exclusion without integration was 'unthinkable', while integration without exclusion was 'impossible', for the logic that Hattersley expressed was to become manifest in the anti-racist governmentalities of the Race Relations Acts and the creation of bodies such as the Commission for Racial Equality, as well as in the series of immigration restrictions beginning with the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. These ideological and institutional hybridities demonstrate the extent to which borderment facilitates (performative) crossings as well as (pedagogical) closures, for the discourse of integration here meets the logic of exclusion in the refusal of exclusion as well as in the endorsement of the anti-racist ideology. <sup>1514</sup>

The efficiency of the Home Office's modernisation has been evident in the impact that streamlining procedures have had on the backlog of asylum applications, which fell from a figure of more than 140,000 persons waiting at least 18 months in 1999, to a total of 24,500 persons in late 2003, when the

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<sup>1510</sup> Beth Crossland and John Morrison, *ibid.*

<sup>1511</sup> Alice Bloch, *ibid.*, p 82.

<sup>1512</sup> Roger Zetter and David Griffiths, et al., *An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe, 1990-2000*, Home Office Research Study 259, London, 2001.

<sup>1513</sup> Jacqueline Berman, '(Un)Popular Strangers and Crises (Un)Bounded: Discourses of Sex Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Panicked State of the Modern State', Vol. 9, No. 1, Sage, London, 2003, p 42.

<sup>1514</sup> Hommi Bhabha, 'Dissemination: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation', in *The Location of Culture*, London, Routledge, 1994. See also Roxanne Lynn Doty, *ibid.*, 2003, p 29. Where pedagogical policies of exclusion guarantee the community of people, this desire is disrupted by a negotiation with 'flows, flux, and movement'; Doty wants to take these post-structural disruptions towards the Deleuze and Guattarian notion of decoding (and the corresponding notion of 'lines of flight').

average waiting period (for an initial decision) had been reduced to 2 months.<sup>1515</sup> Over the period 2002 to 2004, new asylum applications to Britain dropped by 41 per cent, falling from 103,080 to 61,050: this reduction, moreover, was four times that of the general rate of reduction for this period throughout the European Union (although it was largely a result of external factors rather than British policies).<sup>1516</sup> At the same time, the underemployment of the labour sector saw the 500,000 vacancies advertised in Britain attracted some 200,000 economic migrants in 2003, a figure that doubled that of 2002. The Home Secretary was able to state that the case for multi-level economic migration could now be spoken and heard, because the Labour governments had got to grips with the 'asylum crisis.' The government, moreover, can 'validly' claim – in party political terms – to have addressed a crisis that it had inherited from the Conservative governments, for the application rates and 'backlog' increased radically under the stewardship of the party which first politicized the 'asylum problem' in the discourse belonging to its electoral strategy during the mid-1980's, and institutionalized that politicization by beginning to rebuild the architecture of enfortressment that had begun to slip between the postcolonial and globalised world structures.

The clean lines of the Labour government's radically reduced asylum figures however, have been 'achieved' through a process of creative accounting which has kept not just one, but three sets of false books. The first of these lies in the degree to which the internal and external measures of control have come to operate in a manner than bears little correlation to the validity of the immigrant's need for refuge.<sup>1517</sup> The second lies in the manner in which the architecture of enfortressment has created a culture of illegality driving political immigration further underground, and the third lies in the manner in which the government's 'successful solution' – culminating in an asylum system that cost 2 billion pounds in 2003,<sup>1518</sup> perpetuates the problematising of asylum that the Labour government inherited from the Conservatives. Thus, despite the government's commitment to the Geneva Convention and its positioning of state policies in terms of the protection of migrants from their victimisation by traffickers and smugglers,<sup>1519</sup> what has been achieved in the 'joined-up' policies of modernised migration management is the productive space of *refoulement* belonging to the asylum seeking non-citizen. The strategy of enforcing the *spectacular disappearance* of global subjects who have been

<sup>1515</sup> Home Office RDS, February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1516</sup> <sup>1516</sup> Home Office, *op cit*.

<sup>1517</sup> Kate Allen, Letter to *The Guardian*, April 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2004. Allen writes that 'A staggering number of asylum seekers are initially refused on spurious grounds. The government's own figures show that the Home Office got first decisions wrong in nearly 14,000 cases in 2002, meaning about one in five cases were corrected only after costly appeals. This figure rises to more than a third of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum applications and nearly four in ten cases from Somalia'. Research is beginning to paint a picture of the misuse of the asylum decisions process, to which we would need to add the refouling effect of measures of remote control.

<sup>1518</sup> Alan Travis and Ian Black, 'Asylum: A strategy emerges', February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1519</sup> David Blunkett, Speech to the Refugee Council, (November 15<sup>th</sup> 2001). Blunkett, for example, introduced the government's proposed quota scheme in terms of the protection this would offer refugees from the need to use illegal means of travel and entry.

removed from the agent possibilities of being in the world of the neo-liberal market society has become evident in the government's (2004) proposals to subject asylum seekers to two year prison sentences for arriving in the UK *sans papiers*.<sup>1520</sup>

Thus, from the visa requirements imposed on Sri Lankan immigrants in the mid 1980's through to the quota and resettlement scheme proposed in February 2003 and the subsequent 'New Vision' (2004) policy statements which sought to lessen the obligations of the British state to the rights of refugees under the Geneva Convention, a succession of British governments have imposed a series of restrictions upon so-called 'economic' migration flows involving immigrants presenting as asylum seekers.<sup>1521</sup> This process of enfortressment has been achieved by the use of an assemblage of internal and external measures; the domestic asylum application process has come to render most 'spontaneous' forms of 'in country' asylum application 'illegal', the creation and expansion of a detention estate has worked to restrict the freedom of social mobility inherent to migration, and the visa and (latterly) 'remote control' regimes effectively render irregular routes of migration as the putative traveller's only option.<sup>1522</sup> Advocates of refugees rights who have been critical of the governments' policy direction during this period have described it as a strategy of presumptive *refoulement*<sup>1523</sup> that in conflating the rights of asylum seekers with the 'wrongs' of economic migrants, damages the interests of all those who seek, or may need to seek, the protection of the British state. The Institute of Public Policy Research argues that the government's policy is based on false assumptions about the dynamics of forced and other migrations, and that evidence-based approaches demonstrate that conflicts rather than migrants' 'self interest' are responsible for the contemporary (high) levels of asylum applications,<sup>1524</sup> while the Home Office's own research shows that refugees do not make destination choices on the basis of the supposed benefits of the British welfare regime.<sup>1525</sup> Policy makers, on the other hand, argue that 'disguised' economic migrants seek to abuse the system of protection offered to refugees, and thus they and their traffickers/smugglers damage the rights of both the British citizen and the 'genuinely' political immigrant (see section 7.2).

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<sup>1520</sup> Alan Travis, 'Blunkett toughens rules on asylum', *The Guardian*, October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

<sup>1521</sup> This phrase 'economic migration' is expressed in terms of the government's episteme.

<sup>1522</sup> Rosemary Sales notes that 'controls on the legal entry of immigrants to Europe through European Union and other intergovernmental arrangements (the so-called 'Fortress Europe') have meant that asylum is often the only means of gaining access to Europe'. Rosemary Sales, *ibid*, 2002, p 457. The notion of 'remote control' comes from Aristide Zolberg, 'Matters of State: theorizing immigration policy', in *International migration in the remaking of America*, Russell Sage, New York, 1998.

<sup>1523</sup> John Morrison and Beth Crossland, 'The Trafficking and Smuggling of Refugees; the End Game in European Asylum Policy?', UNHCR Working Paper No. 39, April 2001.

<sup>1524</sup> Stephen Castles, Heaven Crawley, and Sean Loughna, *ibid*, 2003.

<sup>1525</sup> Home Office Research Study, Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Seagrott, 'Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers', *Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate*, July, 2003; See also Alice Bloch and Liza Schuster, 'Asylum and Welfare: Critical Debates', *Critical Social Policy*, 2002.

As the possible avenues of legal immigration were restricted throughout the 1970s and 1980s, migration from the mid 1980s onwards increasingly took the 'irregular' form of spontaneous asylum immigration. These new forms of economic *and* political immigration can be said to have been partly predicated on the basis of a legal gap similar to that used by New Commonwealth immigrants and the manufacturing, services, and transport sectors that sought an expanded labour force (see chapter five). Here, elite politicians sought for informal measures of restriction until the issue of immigration had been successfully politicised by the early 1960s, allowing them to impose the formally restrictive measures of 1962. Thus, even while New Commonwealth immigrants were actively recruited by sectors of the British manufacturing and services, there was a gap between the small numbers that the government would have preferred, and the large numbers it had to admit on the basis of citizenship laws. Where the New Commonwealth immigrant flows of the period 1948 to 1961 made good use of their rights to Commonwealth citizenship, the British government's ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention protecting the rights of refugees provided an analogous legal gap in which some 'economic migrants' could immigrate to Britain on the basis of their right to political protection. This notion of the use of a policy gap shouldn't be confused with the rhetoric of politicians and media interests which seek to portray asylum seekers as exploitative abusers of an international system designed to protect 'genuine' refugees. Rather, I wish to argue that pauperised persons from regions of conflict use asylum migration to an extent that exceeds the levels desired by states whose liberal rights based obligations prevent them from closing the gap between the restrictions they desire and the levels of immigration that these cannot prevent.

The Labour party's historic vacillation in regard to immigration policy has to be considered in the context of the current commitment to social cohesion, and the historical commitment to positive race relations and the protection of the welfare state that differentiates it from the Conservative's historical employment of a racialised nationalism (see chapters five and six). Where, for example, Margaret Thatcher appealed to the British 'people' when speaking of a threatening flood of difference and constructed an imagined tendency towards a form of homogeneity, the Labour governments concern for the protection of the community of the citizen-worker's welfare state has developed within the race relations paradigm, where a necessary measure of exclusion is thought to have guaranteed the possible conditions for successful integration, or at least, the avoidance of race-related conflict. Here the governments' approaches have ranged between tendencies towards assimilation and 'national multiculturalism'. Nonetheless, both parties have operated within a consensus on the exclusion for integration paradigm.

The liberal consensus on the 'race relations paradigm' can only be said to have achieved its aim if the base from which it has been measured consists and consisted of the habitual operation of racism, in



which case, the existence of harmonious race relations would 'prove' the validity of exclusionary policies. The relatively improved state of public race relations guaranteed by the exclusion of asylum – based immigration has yet to appear: as Sarah Spencer notes, a survey of May 1996 found that 59 per cent of black people and 39 per cent of Asians had experienced racism, and more than 20 per cent of them had suffered physical abuse. By 2004, the numbers of persons subject to stop and search procedures remained disproportionately high amongst 'black' and 'Asian' British persons, while in 2001 Jenny Bourne observed that state practices of racism including stop and search, deaths in custody, school exclusions, miscarriages of justice, asylum laws and deportations, continued to contaminate the civil society<sup>1526</sup> – a society in which racist political parties had recently gained a purchase. Practices of statecraft aimed at asylum seekers have incited a popular racism: Thus, we can observe that nearly two decades after the introduction of restrictionist policies aimed at refugees, a government poll found that 50 per cent of its sample voted to reduce immigration to a figure between zero and 10,000 per year, local community coalitions had successfully resisted Home Office moves to build new 'accommodation' centres for asylum seekers in their regions, and Herman Ouseley (2004) has observed that 'the fear, resentment, and anger whipped up by tabloid coverage of asylum and immigration has pushed the issue so far up the political agenda that only health ranks higher among public concerns'.<sup>1527</sup> We can conclude, provisionally, that there remains a substantial gap between the rhetoric of an inclusive 'anti-racist' intention and the articulation of discourse and practices of statecraft that facilitate the perpetuation of racism.

Beyond that initial conclusion however, lies the analysis given by Roxanne Lynn Doty wherein the articulation of exclusion-based inclusion is a form of 'neo-racism'.<sup>1528</sup> The premise of neo-racism is that the (anti-racist) facilitation of incompatible difference leads to the rise of racist practices; 'anti-racist' tendencies towards open borders therefore lead to the rise of racist practices because 'the abolition of ... boundaries or the coexistence of different cultural traditions within boundaries will naturally give rise to aggression and conflict'.<sup>1529</sup> Subsequently, a liberal form of anti-racism that would seek to manage difference in a restrictive manner that prevents the possibility of racial conflict can be presented as if it has a greater claim to the legitimation given in the pro-migration anti-racist position. Shorn of racism's biological essentialism, the neo-racist ideology facilitates the re-

<sup>1526</sup> Jenny Bourne, 'The Life and Times of Institutional Racism', *Race and Class*, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2000, p 20.

<sup>1527</sup> Sarah Spencer, 'The impact of immigration policy on race relations', in Tessa Blackstone, Bikhui Parekh and Peter Sanders, (eds.), *ibid*, p 75; Charlotte Denny and Larry Elliott, 'Migration rhetoric belies the facts', *The Guardian*, April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2004. The authors refer to the YouGov poll taken on the 3-4<sup>th</sup> of April, 2004; Stephanie Bungay, 'RAF Newton asylum bid is rejected', *Nottingham Evening Post*, July 7<sup>th</sup>, 2004. RAF Newton in Nottinghamshire was the latest of the proposed centres to be rejected in July 2004; Herman Ouseley, 'Forget this phoney debate, we need to confront racism: All this chat about multiculturalism's failures is a dangerous diversion', *The Guardian*, April 10<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1528</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *ibid*, p 20; Etienne Balibar, 'Is there a neo-racism?', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*.

<sup>1529</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *op cit*.

appropriation of new forms of assimilation and apartheid. This re-appropriation has been cut to fit the context of socio-economic globalisation: the relationship of neo-racism to racism is similar (and articulated to) to the relationship between neo-liberalism and liberalism, in that each re-appropriates the logic of its predecessor for the contemporary context of globalisation. Neo-racism relies on the logic of cultural racism in order to argue for a reborderment of national-global processes, while neo-liberalism relies (as the last chapter discussed) on liberalism's tendency towards a form of universalising deterritorialisation, even as it produces new extra-territorialities and re-territorialisations. Here then, where liberalism serves to articulate the re-bordering and de-bordering tendencies of globalised statecraft in the form of neo-racism, the reconciliation achieved, as Wallerstein has noted, brings together the ability to lower the (labour) costs of production with the ability to minimise the political costs of production by constructing 'illegitimate' immigration as an ideological vent for a politics of resentment.<sup>1530</sup>

There is some continuity between the Thatcher government's ideology of individualism and its concomitant contractual notion of citizenship and the Third Way meritocracy (which rests on notions of performance and competition) which brings the Labour government's construction of citizenship (and its others) nearer to that of the Conservatives. The Conservative Thatcher government's ethno-nationalism sought to guarantee citizenship in the negative freedom of an (imagined) space of individual autonomy to the host community, and subsequent Conservative governments pursued this securitising agenda as its context followed the shift from postcolonial to globalised contexts.<sup>1531</sup> The Third Way approach of the Blair-Brown government's has sought to reframe citizenship in the context of globalisation by relegating the welfare state model of full employment, the state's corresponding (Keynesian) responsibilities, and the 'dependency' of welfare recipients on the state, to one in favour of a model of social inclusion wherein citizenship *requires* the active participation of national workers.

<sup>1532</sup>

The post-war welfare-state concept of entitlement-based citizenship intended a universal franchise in which membership in the national community entitled any individual to the full range of welfare benefits.<sup>1533</sup> The Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major had redefined citizenship along the contractual basis against the rights-based approach that had been given in Beveridge's contributory national insurance scheme. The basis for citizenship was narrower in the contractual schema, and

<sup>1530</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Ideological tensions of capitalism: Universalism versus racism and sexism', in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *ibid*, p 33.

<sup>1531</sup> Isaiah Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty', in A. Quinton, (ed.), *Political Philosophy*, London, Oxford University Press, 1982.

<sup>1532</sup> In the latter half of the 1990's both the Conservatives and the Labour Party expressed their welfare policies in terms of the shift away from 'dependency'; Conservative Party, *Conservative Party Manifesto*, London, 1997; Labour Party, *Getting Welfare to Work: A New Vision for Social Security*, London, 1996.

<sup>1533</sup> Anthony Crossland, *The Future of Socialism*, London, Jonathon Cape, 1956.

excluded and stigmatised the non-working poor whose 'dependence' on state benefits was derided (see chapter five). Within the discourse of Citizens Charters published by the Conservative government from 1991, Francis Maude was able to state that their aim was not the specification of civil liberties but of the rights that consumers have to a satisfactory service in the public and private sectors.<sup>1534</sup> The Conservative regime's shift towards the marketisation of social space entailed the production of the citizen-as-consumer, and correspondingly, the non-consuming subject as an abject social remnant: citizenship here refers to an achievement rather than an *a priori* status.<sup>1535</sup>

In light of the construction of the sphere of globalised subject-citizens, the Labour government's lack of a 'rooted or ideological opposition to immigrants' also appears questionable once one differentiates between types of immigrants. The claim can be made – as the Home Secretary and Prime Minister have stated themselves – that the Labour government has pursued a 'tough line' on 'asylum fraud', spending 2 billion pounds per annum on the enfortressing 'asylum system'. Any recognition given to Labour's rhetorical focus on diversity, integration, and social inclusion, moreover, has to be balanced by an understanding of the manner in which the communitarian discourse in which Labour has framed its policies has lent credibility to the popular anti-immigrant discourse evident in the tabloid papers, including, most notably, the *Daily Mail*, which has gone as far as soliciting reader's support for its anti-asylum campaigns. While Flynn pointed to the positive aspect of governmental discourse and policy on immigration, he has also provided an incisive critique of the utilitarian basis of 'managed migration'.<sup>1536</sup> We need to remain aware of the extent to which the broadening of the realm of national multiculturalism is driven by the agenda of national globalisation: in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for example, the Home Secretary David Blunkett said that no successful country could afford an anti-immigration policy, noted that legal migrants contributed 10 per cent of the national wealth while composing only 8 per cent of the population, and argued that an effectively managed legal migration policy was vital to the economy and to society as a whole.<sup>1537</sup>

One recent development of this type has been the Home Secretary's (2004) move to offer regularisation to segments of the illegally present migrant communities working in the informal economy.<sup>1538</sup> This latter development, while not demonstrating a governmental amnesty towards irregular or 'clandestine' migrants, has more to do with the surveillance of 'criminal' immigration within the securitising liberal communitarianism that David Blunkett's pursuit of a national identity

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<sup>1534</sup> Francis Maude, *Panorama*, May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1992, in Louse Phillips, 'Hegemony and Political Discourse: The lasting impact of Thatcherism', *Sociology*, Vol. 32, No. 4, 1998, p 863.

<sup>1535</sup> Raymond Plant, 'Citizenship and Social Security', *Fiscal Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2003, p 155.

<sup>1536</sup> Don Flynn, *ibid*, 2003.

<sup>1537</sup> David Blunkett, Speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 2003.

<sup>1538</sup> Alan Travis, 'Illegal Workers may be Allowed to Stay in UK', *The Guardian*, November 14<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

card is aimed, than at a renewed tolerance of immigration amongst the lower or informal circuits of the economy. The developing management of migrant mobility of the last two decades has meant the construction of a system of internal and 'remote' controls aimed at removing the political agency involved in the dynamics of poverty and crisis driven migration. Economic migration is thus only tolerable to the extent that it follows managed routes, and the recent imposition of a £500 entry fee is the latest in a long line of structural developments aimed at disciplining migration flows. The imposition of such a fee would work in both the symbolic and material registers. At the economic level, the fee is described as potentially providing the government with one quarter of the cost of the running of the asylum system (to which the Chancellor was required to grant a 1.5 billion pound 'emergency payment' in March of 2003).<sup>1539</sup> I would argue that such a fee also works as an effective symbolic device, supplementary to the state's criminalising use of detention centres for asylum applicants, in that it demonstrates that immigrants are being given no advantage above and beyond that given to the general population. In as much, South to North 'bogus economic' immigrants are shown to be subject to a stronger form of the discipline of globalised-subjectivity imposed upon residents. Here, they share, and perhaps more importantly, are *seen* to share in the contractual relationship defined in the neo-liberal positioning of actors as economic subjects in the post-welfare-state system wherein access to rights has been defined as being dependent on the performance of marketised obligations (see previous section). This means that the litigious claim for a recognition of liberal rights (including the freedom of mobility) conflicts with the overriding neo-utilitarianism of neoliberalism. In this latter aspect they are positioned as belonging to the 'pre-modern' zone that requires their static subjectification to the disciplinary and sovereign governmentality of liberal imperialism. These globalised subjects are thus seen to be differentiated from national citizens, even as each population is subject to neo-liberal governmentality.

### **7.5 Problematising Depoliticisation.**

The problematising episteme that has come to frame the immigration of asylum seekers and pauperised flows of immigration has become an integral element of the legitimating strategies used towards the process of state formation. The body of restrictive policy making that has accompanied the rise in economic and irregular immigration is rooted in the peculiarities of the British political-state structure, and in the primacy given to the securitising agenda of the Home Office, the Immigration and Nationality Directorate, and its associated bodies. Randall Hansen notes that the British political structure is marked by 'the absence of an affective legislature checking the UK's strong executive. The simple fact is that, under conditions of majority government, a single party commanding strong party

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<sup>1539</sup> Alan Travis, *op cit*.

loyalty and possessing mechanisms to enforce it faces little opposition from the Opposition or its own ranks'.<sup>1540</sup> As a result, 'the UK has consistently adopted migration bills and immigration rules that, though sometimes modified in committee, look broadly the same from beginning to end'.<sup>1541</sup> Successive Home Secretaries of both Conservative and Labour governments have attempted to wrest the control of immigration policy formation away from both the parliament and judiciary leaving the executive to 'get on with the job' in an administrative manner. The ratification of the Dublin Treaty is one such example, as it was presented to Parliament when the House of Commons was not sitting, and the re-introduction of the distinction between the support given to port applicants and the denial of such support to in-country applicants as a late amendment to the 2002 Nationality Asylum and Immigration Act – a political issue as it reversed the government's rejection of the Conservative government's form of this rule in 1997 – was one of many others: Dallal Stevens writes of the passage of the 2002 Act that 'employing the same tactics as in 1999, the government introduced a range of measures during the various Parliamentary stages, some so late in the process that they failed to be subject to adequate debate and scrutiny'.<sup>1542</sup> The frequent use of such political strategies demonstrates a deliberate intention on the part of the government to circumvent the parliamentary process and the public debates to which it gives rise, and the 'racist public' thesis that underlies policy formation and execution.

The emergence of juridical review as a site of conflict for the direction of asylum and immigration policy formation was concurrent with the emergence of restrictionism in the mid-1980s.<sup>1543</sup> While the judiciary has made judgements that limit executive power over immigration policy formation, juridical checks on the executive have been limited by the fact that the judiciary has no power of legislative review (and cannot, therefore, refuse an act of parliament).<sup>1544</sup> Although the courts rule on the construction, interpretation and meaning of Parliamentary Acts, they cannot refuse the laws in themselves.<sup>1545</sup> In the absence of international agreements ratified by Parliament such as the Human Rights Act 1998, the courts can only seek redress through the common law, where, for example, it has made recourse to the Children Act of 1989 in seeking to protect the rights of young asylum seekers to welfare. Where international agreements such as the European Convention for Human Rights are drawn upon by the judiciary, their effect has generally been to mitigate rather than change the direction

<sup>1540</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid.*, 2000. p 27.

<sup>1541</sup> Randall Hansen, *op cit.* .

<sup>1542</sup> Dallal Stevens, *ibid.*, 2004, p 195.

<sup>1543</sup> The Home Office refusal of the en-masse application of 58 Tamils in February of 1987 led to the Carriers Liability Act after the courts (and in particular, Justice McCowan's revocation of the deportation order and Nicholas Blake's successful application for review) contested the deportation. The courts, it should be noted, took action after the Tamil asylum seekers had successfully publicised their appeal.

<sup>1544</sup> Christian Joppke, *ibid.*, 1999 This is thus a limited form of self-limiting sovereignty.

<sup>1545</sup> Randall Hansen, *ibid.*, p, 27

of policy formation and to restrict the autonomy of executive process. Thus for example, the High Court ruling of Justice Collins in February of 2003 stated that the Home Secretary contravened the Human Rights Act in section 55 of the 2002 Immigration and Asylum Act which declared that 'late applicants' (asylum seekers making a claim after the period declared to be 'reasonable' by the Home Office) were to have no access to state support. Not only did this ruling rely on a supranational definition of the rights of asylum seekers, but it also restricted the power of the executive to enact legislation without juridical review. When the Conservative government had enacted similar measures in the 1996 Immigration and Asylum Act the courts had to seek recourse from within the Common Law. That the absence of a Bill of Rights and other inter- and supranational covenants had been a further limit on the power of juridical check on the executive has been best shown in both the ease with which the British government enacted restrictions on familial migration throughout the 1980's, and thereafter in the restrictions barring familial categories of refugee migration, and in the degree to which these rights have been more successfully pursued after feminist interpretations of the Geneva Convention and the ratification of the ECHR (1998) which contains the right to the pursuit of family life.

In the contemporary period of globalisation, the British governments have engaged in articulated processes of problematising, politicising and depoliticising immigration. Here considering the latter process, we can see that successive governments have sought to inoculate the institution of restrictive policy architecture from (contesting) political processes. The juridical appeals process has formed an important element of the political contest over the restrictive policy formation, not least because in bringing the governments' policies before public scrutiny it has helped to create a political climate in which the secrecy of policy formation can be challenged.<sup>1546</sup> In the proposed Treatment of Claimants etc. Bill (2004), the government, (with the support of the newly formed Department for Constitutional Reform), has sought to reduce the Appeals process to a 'one stop' review whilst endorsing the fact that the 'first stop' of the present system is the least independent phase of the process.<sup>1547</sup> Government spokespersons presented the case for this change in terms the interests of 'genuine refugees' who would be protected from the unscrupulous behaviour of profiteering law firms. More forcefully, the government argued that streamlining the review process in this manner would cut the burdensome costs of the asylum system, and prevent the use of repetitive appeals by fraudulent applicants. The depoliticisation that the government has attempted to enact is thus partially dependent on the problematisation of refugee/asylum seekers as genuine or bogus, and on a sort of circular accountancy

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<sup>1546</sup> The Home Office does not, for example, keep public records of the decisions made in asylum cases. Subsequently, public access to the basis upon which decisions have been made has had to rely on those cases that have come before the courts.

<sup>1547</sup> Alan Travis, 'Blunkett toughens rules on asylum', *The Guardian*, October 24<sup>th</sup>, 2003. Travis writes that the Bill describes 'the introduction of new-style 'immigration judges' who will work closely with the high court in the new single-tier immigration and asylum appeals tribunal headed by a president'. These judges are to be appointed from within the IND.

wherein the expense of the processes erected for the 'defence of the realm' against asylum seekers is used to justify the need for the further expense of producing the new streamlined systems. The contests between the courts and the government of the day throughout the restrictive period demonstrates that beyond the fact that politics consists of the struggle to define what it is that counts as political, the political is defined by the structures in which this struggle is allowed to be contested.<sup>1548</sup>

New Labour's 'venue shopping'<sup>1549</sup> de-politicisation has been evident in its policy statements and legislation: Thus, when the Labour Government introduced the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, a major component of the suggested legislation was its intention to protect immigration policy formation from parliamentary, executive, and civil checks. The executive attempts to limit the power of the judiciary have a long history, and have become a major site of political contest under David Blunkett's tenure as Home Secretary. In the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (NIA), Section 55 required the Home Secretary to refuse support to asylum seekers where he is not satisfied that the asylum application has been made as soon as reasonably practicable. During the passage of the NIA, the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights had warned that the proposals belonging to Section 55 could be interpreted as a breach of the European Human Rights Convention (EHRC) that had been ratified by parliament in the Human Rights Act of 1998 (HRA). Subsequently, in ruling on the six test cases brought before the High Court, Mr Justice Collins found the Home Office had, in withdrawing support to all six applicants, breached the commitment to the EHRC given in clause 5 of Section 55 of the NIA. The Home Secretary David Blunkett was subsequently quoted as saying, 'Frankly, I'm fed up with having to deal with a situation where parliament debates issues and judges overturn them'.<sup>1550</sup> Blunkett made a point of referring back to the 1993 decisions overturning the then Home Secretary Michael Howard's policies restricting asylum support in which Justice Collins had also presided. The *Daily Telegraph* reported the Prime Minister as saying that he was 'prepared for a showdown with the judiciary to stop the courts thwarting the government's attempts to curb the record flow of asylum seekers into Britain', and described the Prime Minister as having ordered new legislation to limit the role of judges in the interpretation of international human rights obligations in order to reassert the primacy of parliament.<sup>1551</sup> Given that the judge's decision was based upon parliament's ratification of human rights legislation the conclusion has to been that the agency seeking protection was the executive rather than the parliament. Hence, for the Home Secretary and

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<sup>1548</sup> Lord Chief Justice Woolf has expressed the fear that 'the Constitutional Affairs Department, with the lord chancellor swept away, could become a subsidiary of the Home Office, putting David Blunkett and his successors in a position to dictate the agenda for the courts'.

<sup>1549</sup> On venue shopping see Virginie Guiraudon, 'European Integration and Migration Shopping: Vertical Policy Making as Venue Shopping', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2000, pp., 251-71.

<sup>1550</sup> The Home Secretary, David Blunkett, in *The Daily Telegraph*, February 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2003.

<sup>1551</sup> *The Daily Telegraph*, quoted in Anthony Lester, 'Don't Blame the Judges', *The Guardian*, February 25, 2003.



Prime Minister's argument to be give logical coherence, their objection should rest on Parliament's (democratic) ratification of human rights rather than the subsequent juridical recognition.

By the Spring of 2004 this executive process had come full circle, for, as I have described above, the House of Commons has enacted the Treatment of Claimants Bill in which the government has intended that the entire appeals process should be overthrown for a one level one-stop process in which the executive will select immigrations judges and a presidential head for the process, while the burgeoning 'legal aid industry' (to use the government's formula) is to be similarly castrated.<sup>1552</sup> Thus the changes proposed by the Home Secretary demonstrated the logic of depoliticisation in the specific realm of the Westminster system of checks and balances between the legislature, executive, and judiciary, allowing the British 'rolling' system of ad hoc constitutionality, as these were challenged at the site of the government's restrictionist immigration and asylum policy structure.

That the realm of control that the government seeks extends to civil society has been evident in the recent attempt by the Home Office to stop the public funding of the National Coalition of Anti-Deportations Campaigns.<sup>1553</sup> The N.C.A.D.C was formed in 1995. Its purpose is to 'provide practical help and advice to people facing deportation' on the basis of the argument that 'unjust and inhumane deportations are tearing families apart, forcing asylum seekers back to the countries where they face persecution, (and) denying gay and lesbian couples the right to an appeal'.<sup>1554</sup> In addition to providing help and advice, 'the coalition lobbies to amend law and practice which leads to unjust and inhumane deportations, and assists in mounting campaigns against such legislation'.<sup>1555</sup>

In the late summer of 2002, the N.C.A.D.C. released a press statement which announced that it had been granted 340,000 pounds of Lottery Commission funding. The Community Fund's grant triggered responses from both the tabloid press and the government. The *Daily Mail* began a 'vent your anger' campaign in August of 2002 when it criticised the granting of Lottery Commission funds to an organisation which represents asylum seekers.<sup>1556</sup> In pursuing its campaign, the tabloid sought to highlight the (alleged) link between asylum seekers and terrorists,<sup>1557</sup> and encouraged its readers to write to Lady Brittan, the Chair of the Community Fund. Subsequently, more than 3,000 letters of

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<sup>1552</sup> Alan Travis, 'Blunkett toughens rules on asylum', *The Guardian*, October 28, 2003.

<sup>1553</sup> See also CARF, 'Racism and the market-state: an interview with A. Sivanandan', *Race and Class*, Vol. 44, No. 4, April, 2003, p 75; Note: The author sought an interview with a representative from the NCADC, but the request was declined.

<sup>1554</sup> N.C.A.D.C, 'Profile', <http://www.ncadc.org.uk/about/profile.htm>; accessed on December 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1555</sup> N.C.A.D.C, *op cit*.

<sup>1556</sup> *The Daily Mail*, 'Is this the barmiest lottery handout of them all', August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

<sup>1557</sup> Jo Butler and David Williams, 'Lottery: the farce gets worse', *The Daily Mail*, August 13<sup>th</sup>, 2002.

complaint were received at the Community Fund's London Office, and the Daily Mail recorded that it had been sent 40,000 letters of support for its campaign by the end of October.<sup>1558</sup>

Effectively, the Home Office intervention had generally sought to ensure that public funds could not be used to fund activities or publications which took the form of a 'political' opposition to its policies. Subsequently, the government sought to incorporate the Community Fund into a broader lottery funding framework, where it would have more control over the direction of funding. The government intervention's specific aim of limiting the political effectiveness of the N.C.A.D.C was initially unsuccessful, and the organisation was able to use the Community Fund grant to further its championing of asylum seekers and protecting those at risk of deportation. Yet, in the longer term the organisation has found it difficult to obtain further funding, as funding bodies are reluctant to enter into a partnership with an organisation that has been tainted as an illegitimate political actor. What this episode demonstrates is that politics consists, in part, in the art of defining what actions are considered to be legitimately political. In the arena of asylum legislation the Blair government has sought to exclude critical perspectives on its restrictive regime from the public sphere of politics. This depoliticising strategy works within the particular problematising form of politicisation that the government seeks to establish over asylum and refugee issues that the thesis described in the previous sections of this chapter.

This conflict should be positioned within the context of the general governmental tendency towards the assimilation of non - governmental organisations working within the fields of immigration, refugees, and asylum seekers into the seamless 'end to end' provision of managed migration. Hence, to take a national example, the major refugee non-governmental organisation, the Refugee Council, has previously been constrained to pursue (publicly) a relatively conciliatory strategy in seeking to further the interests of refugees and asylum seekers within the governance of 'fair but firm controls', and therefore to pursue the 'less visible' category of exceptional leave to remain while remaining within the 'common sense' discourse separating 'genuine' and 'bogus' asylum seekers.<sup>1559</sup>

A strategy of depoliticisation is being employed by the government in its relationship to civil society organisations in the asylum and refugee field, wherein the government seeks to assimilate actors within the logic of its own asylum paradigm.<sup>1560</sup> The process of political assimilation (in regard to civil society) can be seen to operate in the governmental use of consultation processes. From 1998, for

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<sup>1558</sup> Jo Butler, 'Anti-deportation group given lottery grant', *The Daily Mail*, October 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2002.

<sup>1559</sup> Teresa Hayter, *ibid*, p 78.

<sup>1560</sup> Blunkett, for example, seeks to present the depoliticising strategy as necessary, given the dangers of right wing (racist) politicisation, yet the most visible and active interest groups as primarily pro-immigrant organisations. See Paul Statham, *ibid*, 2003.

example, the government engaged in a process of discussing the production of country information in the Immigration and Nationality Directorate's decision making process. The consultation process focussed on quality of the information being provided, as well as on the means of that information's production. Amnesty International described the process 'as regarding the possibility of establishing an Independent Documentation Centre with the responsibility for producing country assessments'.<sup>1561</sup> Amnesty's representative noted the consultations resulted in a unanimous recommendation to the then Home Secretary in support of an Independent Documentation Centre, and that the consensus reached had included Home Office officials and the Immigration Appellate. Subsequently, however, the representative observed that 'despite repeated efforts by those involved in the consultation exercise, it has proved impossible to ascertain what has become of the report which was submitted to the Home Secretary in December 1998'.<sup>1562</sup> The Home Office consultation process seemed to have consisted of the government's having heard but not listened, despite the fact that the language used in the consultation exercise's recommendations was framed in terms of the enhanced and comprehensive efficiency that an independent process would achieve, rather than in terms of any political criticism of the process of country information provision.<sup>1563</sup> In a similar vein, when in late 2002 the possibility of the creation of a press office for minority groups was mooted after years of informal discussion on the part of migrant groups, its probable co-option into the existing assimilatory framework seemed to bode ill for any possible discursive shift that might be achieved by a resistant politics.<sup>1564</sup> These forms of civil assimilation have also worked at the supra-national level, where, for example, the UNHCR has often seemed constrained to formulate its advocacy in terms of the criminalising paradigms set out by Britain and the other (funding) nation states.<sup>1565</sup>

If we look back to the origins of the politicisation of asylum, we can see that civil, executive, and parliamentary scrutiny and activity have been enabled to the extent that they support governmental policies and actively disabled when they differ. The ad hoc regime of restricted asylum immigration that seeks to assimilate political opposition within the articulated doctrines of security and integration has been contested without and also *within* the governmental apparatus. The executive body controlling immigration to the UK was and remains the Immigration and Nationality Department of the Home

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<sup>1561</sup> Jan Shaw, Letter to Professor Castles, Chairman of the Advisory Panel on Country Information, Amnesty International United Kingdom (Refugee Affairs), January 9<sup>th</sup> 2004.

<sup>1562</sup> Jan Shaw, *op cit*.

<sup>1563</sup> See, for example, Advisory Panel on Country Information, 'Minutes of 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting', London, Home Office, March 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2004

<sup>1564</sup> Eleonore Kofman *et al.* 'One Europe or Several: Civil Stratification, Exclusion and Migratory Trajectories in Three European States', ESRC, 2001. This point relies on statements made to the author by representatives of refugee and ethnic minority organisations in London throughout 2001.

<sup>1565</sup> UNHCR, *The State of the World's Refugees*, Penguin, New York, 1993. The UNHCR 'recognised' the '*undeniable abuse* of the asylum channel by growing numbers of people who were trying to enter the labour market rather than escape persecution' (p, 36). (The emphasis belongs to this thesis).

Office. The Home Office is and was the executive body whose agenda is the maintenance of law and order and 'internal' security; thus, migration policy formed in this branch of the executive lent itself to the discourse and governance of securitisation. Nonetheless, its agenda has not become policy without the existence of particular political constellations. Hence, for example, when Douglas Hurd first politicised asylum immigration in 1985, he first legitimised his position by drawing upon the views of the Immigration Service Union – the organisation representing the immigration officers who – in having the responsibility for the initial decision of whether to grant leave to enter, have often seen themselves as the 'frontline' of the state's apparatus of immigration controls.<sup>1566</sup> In Robin Cohen's account of the institutional politics of this moment, it's apparent that Hurd's accession to the ISU lobby was a matter of contest within (and beyond) the executive. Hurd, for example, took the union's advice without consulting the Commonwealth countries upon whose resident's visa restrictions were to be imposed, whilst also disregarding the advice of the Foreign Office which opposed the visa restrictions, and the salience of the Race Relations Act (1965).<sup>1567</sup> Within the executive, the SCPS – the umbrella union for the public services was strongly at odds with the immigration officers who went on to form the breakaway ISU over the visa and other race-related matters.<sup>1568</sup>

From the earliest stage of its governance, the Labour government has at times agreed to facilitate consultation processes and funded research that has produced alternative perspectives on asylum and immigration, but has rarely made changes that exceed a procedural amelioration of the restrictive policy direction.<sup>1569</sup> Under the Labour government's the 'policing' aspect of the Labour government's joined-up approach to immigration control has been contested within the trade movement and executive from the beginning and throughout the period of the new restrictionism.<sup>1570</sup> The Labour government's privileging of the securitising segments of executive governance over parliamentary and judicial processes has worked at the both the national and regional level. In the account of regional policy formation given below I describe how the intergovernmental process addressing the control of mobility grew out of the security framework inherent in the Trevi process, where at the instigation of the British government this organisation had turned its attention from terrorism and international crime to immigration in 1986, some three years before the fall of the Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War,

<sup>1566</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid.*, 1994, p 87. Tony Saint's autobiographical novel gives an account of the defensive culture of the IND, in which immigration officers compete for the highest rates of refugee refusals. Tony Saint, *Refusal Shoes*, Serpent's Tail, London, 2003.

<sup>1567</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid.*, 1994, p 88.

<sup>1568</sup> Robin Cohen, *ibid.*, 1994, p 89.

<sup>1569</sup> See, for example, Anneliese Baldaccini, *ibid.* p 3-4; See also Stephen Castles, *ibid.* 2003, p 26. Castles makes the related point that research that follows governmental problematisation has led to poor policy decisions.

<sup>1570</sup> Don Flynn, 'Immigration controls and citizenship in the political rhetoric of New Labour', in Elia Zureik and Mark B. Salter, (eds.), *Global Surveillance and Policing: Borders, Security, Identity*, Cullompton, Devon, Willan, 2005, p 222; Frank Duveill and Bill Jordan, 'Immigration control and the management of economic migration in the UK: organisational culture, implementation, enforcement and identity processes in public services', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2003, p 312.

and at the time of the initial rise in asylum applications to the UK. The intergovernmental process began to develop the migration-security nexus as a response to the opening of EU borders that belonged to the Single European Act of 1986. In the same year the British government also suggested that the Trevi process set up the Ad Hoc Working Group on Immigration (AWGI) whose rationale was to research and propose 'the measures to be taken to reach a common policy to put an end to the abusive use of the right to asylum'. By 1987 AWGI had produced a list of countries whose nationals would require visas for entry into the EU: European structures for social securitisation thus followed fast on the heels of the British example.

The Budapest Process, which emerged as a predominantly German reaction to the 'events leading up to the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union'.<sup>1571</sup> In order to address the increased flow of asylum seekers and irregular migrants, Germany convened a Ministerial conference in Berlin in 1991, at which 'all Ministers of the Interior of the EU member states were invited, plus representatives from Switzerland as well as thirteen member states'.<sup>1572</sup> The conference's purpose was to initiate the discussion of measures aimed at restraining the flow of illegal migration from and through Central and Eastern Europe, and during following meetings a general discourse emerged in which the dominant themes were the criminalising of trafficking and improvement of police forces and border controls; imposition of carrier sanctions on airlines; exchange of information; conclusion of re-admission agreements; and financial assistance to the central and East European countries who were ... the targets of these measures, given their deficit or totally absent legislation and policies.<sup>1573</sup>

In the *Statutory Meeting of the Budapest Group* (December 1993) it was decided that the Group would consist of senior officials from all member states; subsequently the Budapest Process became the 'only pan-European discussion forum for these processes'.<sup>1574</sup> The importance of this informal discussion group to EU and national policy formation can be seen in its shepherding of the process taking all member states into agreement on the issue of visa harmonisation, where the Central and East European states were required to harmonise their policies with the adherence of the EU member states to the

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<sup>1571</sup> Pellerin and Overbeek, *ibid*, 145.

<sup>1572</sup> Pellerin and Overbeek, *ibid*, pp., 145-6.

<sup>1573</sup> Pellerin and Overbeek, *ibid*, p 146.

<sup>1574</sup> Pellerin and Overbeek, *ibid*, p 146, and fn 12, p 156: By 1997 the Group encompassed 36 European States (including among the republics of the former Soviet Union the three Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation), Australia, Canada, the U.S.A, as well as the Central European Initiative, the Council of Europe, the EU Council Initiative, the Council of Europe, the EU Council Secretariat, the European Commission, the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies, the International Centre for Migration and Policy Development (ICMPD), functioning as the Secretariat of the Budapest Group, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Interpol, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and the United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention.

requirements of the Schengen Area (1995). Acting as the Secretariat for the Budapest Group, the International Centre for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD) is another quasi-governmental body important to the establishment of regionalised migration management. Established in 1993, the ICMPD grew out of the Inter-Governmental Consultations on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia. The ICMPD was set up in order to

*co-ordinate refugee and migration policies following the break-up of the former Soviet Union and sees its role as 'advising governments on the prevention of migratory movements from East to West and North to South.'*<sup>1575</sup>

New arrangements between the core and periphery were reflected in the African/Mediterranean and Central/Eastern European region. Previous bilateral arrangements between North African States and Western European states sought to limit migration from South to North, and eventually coalesced in the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* made in Barcelona in 1995. The *Euro-Med* partners agreed to 'undertake specific obligations to diminish the migratory pressures in the region and to combat illegal migration and international crime.' In return for their co-operation, the North African partners (including Morocco and Somalia) were to receive the financial and technical aid necessary to the achievement of this aim.

The 1999 Tampere European Council Summit represented a further development in the regional control of mobility. The policies instituted at Tampere formalised agreements that had previously been *ad hoc*, and shifted the burden of responsibility for the restriction of refugee flows onto the asylum seeker's country of origin. These agreements were underwritten by provisions tying trade and humanitarian aid to 'the prevention of refugee flows and the return of rejected asylum seekers.'<sup>1576</sup> In February of 2000, the Lome Convention was redrawn in order to tie £8.5 billion in aid and trade agreements between the EU, Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific region (ACP) to specific rules guaranteeing the repatriation and expulsion of people deemed to be 'illegal' within the EU.<sup>1577</sup>

The collapse of the socialist regions at the end of the Cold War saw an analogous development in the regional control of mobility. A series of requirements regarding the re-admission of illegal migrants, assistance for the improvement of border controls, and provisions regarding cross-border seasonal labour, short-term labour contracts and job training programmes, and long term labour migration were enacted in bilateral arrangements between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western

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<sup>1575</sup> Liz Fekete, 2001, p 24.

<sup>1576</sup> Liz Fekete, *ibid*, p 28.

<sup>1577</sup> Liz Fekete, *op cit*.

European countries.<sup>1578</sup> Germany, being the major recipient of Eastern migrants, was the main instigator of these arrangements, which were multilateralised in the *Europe Agreements* of 1994.

It was in this context that the Swiss-Austrian derived model of the three circles came to supersede the cross-pillar approach of the Amsterdam Treaty. While the Amsterdam Treaty and Tampere Summit had achieved the cross-pillar approach to JHA, the limits of the 'democratization' of policy formation can be seen in the fact that the next stage in the enfortressment of the European Union came, once again, from the intergovernmental process. The Austrian presidency of the EU launched a 'Strategy Paper on Migration and Asylum Policy' in 1998. The report drew upon the work published in a report made to the Swiss Federal Council on policy relating to aliens and refugees. After condemnation by EU governments, the UNHCR and non-governmental organizations, the paper was withdrawn before a revised version was presented to the Informal Justice and Home Affairs Council (Vienna, October 1998). The paper was revised once more before the JHA ministers stated that the paper would be 'a useful contribution to the work of the cross-pillar taskforce' which had been set up as a Dutch initiative aiming to bring the paper's proposals into a presentable form.<sup>1579</sup>

The model of the three circles grew out of these intergovernmental processes, having originally surfaced as a national Swedish strategy paper. The revised EU paper proposed that 'a model of concentric circles could replace that of 'Fortress Europe,' and elaborated a further distinction in defining a further fourth circle. Divided into four circles, the first was that of the EU states. The second consists of the enlargement states, or of states that are applying for accession to the EU. These states were required to reach an agreed criteria of 'standards' common to EU states. The third circle consisted of the former Soviet Union (CIS), North Africa and Turkey. In return for their compliance they were to benefit from intensified economic cooperation and where compliance was lacking they were to have the economic benefits withdrawn. The states of the second and third circles provide the EU with a buffer onto which they deferred their own defensive borders as well as the inherent costs and responsibilities. The final circle comprises the Middle East, China, and black Africa, where the EU seeks the elimination of migratory 'push' factors. Compliance is sought from these regions in the form of tying development aid to their states' restrictions on emigration to the EU.

The political structure of the EU is riven by the manner in which it has been simultaneously pulled towards social democracy and neo-liberalism, as well as in the manner in which states have sought to by-pass domestic restraints by ensuring restrictionist structures at the supra-national level.<sup>1580</sup> EU regionalisation of mobility control seeks to regulate the relationship between core and periphery

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<sup>1578</sup> Helene Pellerin and Henk Overbeek, *ibid*, p 145.

<sup>1579</sup> Tony Bunyan, 'A brief Introduction to the EU Migration Policies', Nottingham, Statewatch, 200?.

<sup>1580</sup> Andrew Geddes, *ibid*, 2003.



through the provision of new institutional architecture manifest in the model of the concentric circles; these regulations of people flows work in tandem with the regulation of flows of goods and services, such as those given in the Common Agricultural Policies (see chapter seven). Britain's intergovernmental approach to the 'harmonisation' process has been based on the model of securitisation and third way modernisation that the British state enacts in the national context, and to a large extent the legal form of the regional structures reflects the peculiarities of the British political system. While the articulation of these dynamics works to displace the risks of globalisation onto the world's postcolonial verge, the deterritorialising aspects of globalisation complicate this matter somewhat, as the verge, periphery and semi-periphery are also socially located.

## **Section 7.6 The 'New' Global Vision Strategy**

This chapter has so-far sketched the manner in which neo-liberal practices of statecraft have been built upon the enfortressing processes of managed migration. The management of immigration has been produced through a problematising discourse and governmentality that works through an assemblage of material and symbolic measures of internal and external control. In this latter sense, the British state has sought to extend its regulatory architecture through the redirection of regional (European Union) policy structures towards the securitization of 'south' to 'north' migration and, in particular, the prevention and criminalization of asylum-based immigration. EU policies that work to enable the production of the model of concentric circles<sup>1581</sup> have thus been designed to facilitate the state's protection of globally flexible systems of production, seeking to displace the realm of risks outwards and downwards towards the 'hybridly' located periphery.

At the same time, resistance to globally managed migration also has a hybrid location operating, for example, in limitations on sovereignty that are often situated within the judiciary, in the partial extension of transnational forms of citizenship, in the gap between the need for globalised labour immigration and the securitization of the welfare-enhancing state, and in the socio-political hybridity of national and regional epistemes that promote anti-racism and multiculturalism (often in the interstices of the state's and the EU's institutional structure itself). The key practice of resistance lies in the mobile agency of the migrants themselves who seek to participate in an 'exodus' from the state of peripheralisation (regardless of whether this state is imposed on the political axis of gender, ethnicity, 'class' or civil stratification'). In doing so, migrants often appropriate the informal economy that is the (necessary) under or 'dark' side of the formal economy of globalization, and the remittances they send 'home' often provide the building blocks for survival (the survival, for example, of family members

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<sup>1581</sup> The model of the three circles is outlined below; its basis is the policing and bordering of the north-south politico-economic divide.

left in the 'safety' of camps), and for the reconstitution of conflict-damaged civil society. In this latter sense the use of smuggling and trafficking networks represents a radical appropriation of the realm of risk produced by neo-liberal globalization. Here, the asylum seekers who form the object of the criminalizing discourse and governmentality of managed migration are figured as intolerably 'different' on the basis of their ethno-pauperisation and yet demonstrate the reflexive agency that the British state demands of its own 'active' citizens: the gating of the British 'castle' is thus a Kafkaesque experience for the supplicant seeking sanctuary.

This exceptional increase in a form of 'uncontrolled' mobility has allowed the culminating establishment of new national-regional institutional forms of criminalising migration and migration-producing societies in the British government's 'New Vision' strategy. The British Home Office's 'New Vision' policy discussions (initiated in Home Office leaks to the press and international organisations in February of 2003) provide this thesis with a culminating example of the apparent self-contradiction marking immigration policy formation, wherein the openings of economic liberalism are said to be matched by the closures of political liberalism, or, as Balibar puts it, extensive liberalism is matched by its intensification. Here, for example, the restrictive policies directed towards 'bogus asylum seekers' are represented as if they were undertaken on behalf of the 'genuine refugee', whilst the flexibility required of the community of national workers is couched in terms of a welfare liberalism that seeks to present a form of protectionism against the threat of ethno-criminal immigrants (those that are discursively positioned as if they are committing a form of international 'welfare fraud'). At the same time the intensification of economic liberalism requires the presence of immigrant workers to re-address the situation of under-employment. This 'paradox' is merely virtual as the two forms work in a supplementary form towards a practice in which, as Roxanne Lynn Doty puts it, the 'rhetoric is a practise of statecraft'.<sup>1582</sup> Here, I seek to examine the extent to which this 'virtuality'<sup>1583</sup> is under-written by a strategy of state formation which seeks to insure the securitised neo-liberal state-society complex from the risks of globalisation by displacing vulnerability onto the exceptional state of peripherality.

The UK government's 'long term vision of a managed global system' states that the 'new' approach 'is based around the principle of trying to better manage the asylum process globally, breaking the link between immigration and asylum-seeking, providing greater certainty for governments and more equitable protection for the majority of refugees': The 'New Vision' is a 'pro-refugee' but 'anti-asylum

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<sup>1582</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *ibid.*, p 29.

<sup>1583</sup> Michael Samers, *ibid.*, 2003. Samers describes a process of 'virtualism' wherein, 'if undocumented immigration is produced by stricter regulations, then the state is not so much *controlling* it, the popular press not so much *reporting* it, as they are both *creating* it', p 576.

seeking strategy',<sup>1584</sup> which seeks to 'extra-territorialise' the international protection of refugees by establishing an 'offshore' system of 'containment' in transit processing centres and regional protection zones.<sup>1585</sup> A key element of the vision is the ability the state will gain to extend the removal of asylum seekers that already exists in the 1999 IAA from allowing the return of applicants to 'safe third countries' to the removal of applicants to regional processing zones.

The intervention that the British government sought to make in the construction of a 'Common European Asylum System' in the new European Union Treaty with its 'new vision' strategy was represented as 'a rare opportunity for the UK to truly set the global agenda on this issue', where a collective policy which focussed on actions in 'source regions' could be used to overcome the competing agendas of individual nation-states.<sup>1586</sup> The particular-collective policy structure that the British government seeks to establish is the separation of issues of (im)migration from issues of refugee protection; the desired global management of migration will see the freedom of movement extended to highly skilled person balanced by a system extending the 'right to remain' to internationally displaced persons.<sup>1587</sup> Subsequently, it seems reasonable to argue that the governmental intention is that the domestic asylum system will remain a 'residual' structure whose primary function is one of legitimisation.<sup>1588</sup>

The use of this form of extra-territorialisation was given in the proposals for 'transit processing centres' and 'regional protection zones'. In addition, the government sought to develop and promulgate its new strategy through the depoliticised venues of the informal intergovernmental and limited consultative processes.<sup>1589</sup> Together, these policies seek to displace the consequences of forced migration and the dynamics that cause them onto peripheral, semi-peripheral, and 'other' European states. Thus, one consequence of the effect of these policies would be the containment of displaced persons within camps that the British government knows to be unsafe and ongoing rather than 'temporary'. The 'new vision' paper makes explicit reference to the problem of Tanzanian camps run by the UNHCR, where some refugees have remained in exile for two decades. The violence of many camps and safety zones has reached tragic proportions in Bosnia, the Great Lakes, and Somalia. Nonetheless, as Ewen MacAskil and Alan Travis observed in *The Guardian*, (February 25<sup>th</sup>, 2004), the

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<sup>1584</sup> UK Home Office, 'New Vision for Refugees', March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2003.

<sup>1585</sup> Cecile Dubernet, *The International Containment of Displaced Persons*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001.

<sup>1586</sup> UK Home Office, *ibid.*, p 2.

<sup>1587</sup> UK Home Office, *ibid.*, p 21.

<sup>1588</sup> UK Home Office, *ibid.*, pp., 20-1.

<sup>1589</sup> See chapters five and six; Gregor Noll, 'Visions of the Exceptional: Legal and Theoretical Issues raised by Transit Processing Centres and Protection Zones', Working Paper, Lund University, Department of Law, 2003, p 3; <http://www.iur.lu.se/forsake/Noll.nsf>; accessed February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2004; Virginie Guiraudon gives an excellent analysis of the EU developments in 'The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociological Approach', *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 2, April 2003.

attempt to persuade the Tanzanian government (through the promise of a 4 million (GBS) aid deal) to accept a regional processing centre for failed Somalian asylum seekers returned from the UK 'put flesh on a confidential Home Office plan leaked to *The Guardian* last year that outlined ways of slashing the number of refugees, primarily by sending them to a third country'.<sup>1590</sup>

Another feature of the 'new' strategy has been the British pursuit of enhanced forms of 'burden sharing' evident in the degree to which the 'problem' of higher numbers of asylum seekers presenting in the Britain has been matched by the (relatively) lower numbers presenting in Germany and other European states. In this vein the British government has sought a regional solution through the upcoming Constitutional treaty process of the European Union. As Gregor Noll observed, the British government sought to move the common European Asylum System towards processing and protecting in the region of origin rather than within the Union, thus introducing a paradigm shift in EU asylum and migration policies'.<sup>1591</sup> The desired effect was that an overall reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers presenting or being processed within EU territory will also reduce the problem of the perceived 'inequality' in the sharing of responsibilities between member states. In the event, the European Commission rejected the key points of the British strategy, including the suggested creation of regional processing centres, and the abjuration of territorial resettlement for regional containment.<sup>1592</sup> Subsequently, the British government was forced to focus on the possibilities of coercing the UNHCR.

As Alexander Bett's analysis makes clear, a key aspect of the geo-strategic use of this new policy direction has been the manner in which the British government has sought to represent its own strategy as if it were being constructed within the rights-based remit of the UNHCR itself; the 'new vision' strategy paper, for example, states that its 'new approach draws upon the UNHCR's plans for modernisation of the international protection system'.<sup>1593</sup> The UN plans here referred to are those that were given in the ad hoc collection of Convention Plus statements that were in the process of being released at the time of the British government's strategy paper. In its proposed 'three-pronged' model the UNHCR subsequently sought to distance its representation from those of the British government by establishing a distance on the issue of third country protection centres which the British proposal had explicitly based on the model provided by the Australian 'Pacific solution' of processing refugees 'offshore'.<sup>1594</sup> in its proposal to create an IOM-managed processing centre outside the external borders

<sup>1590</sup> The leaked plan was a draft version of the New Vision document referred to throughout this conclusion

<sup>1591</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid*, p 4. Noll notes that three of the six stated EU objectives are directly related to the British 'New Vision' paper.

<sup>1592</sup> Gregor Noll, *op cit*.

<sup>1593</sup> Alexander Betts, 'The international relations of the 'new' extra-territorial approach to refugee protection: Explaining the policy initiatives of the UK government and UNHCR', 2004, p 2; UK Government 'New Vision for Refugees', p 2.

<sup>1594</sup> The Conservative government of John Howard has displaced the asylum system based on the Geneva Convention in favour of a quota system. Its new system relies on third country processing centres in the Pacific Islands of Nauru and Manus.

of the EU.<sup>1595</sup> The proposed centre 'was to be used to screen applicants from the controversial 'white list' of states suspected of having 'unfounded claims' currently already detained and fast-tracked, for example, in the UK's Oakington Reception Centre'.<sup>1596</sup>

Nonetheless, as Amnesty International and other NGO's have observed, the policies that were eventually outlined in the Convention-Plus structure bore a substantial correspondence to those of the British initiative, differing only on matters of legality rather than substantial matters of practice.<sup>1597</sup> As Betts observes, a fundamental difficulty for the UNHCR lies in its very constitution, for it is both responsible for the universal mandate of protection given in the Geneva Convention, and at the same time functions as an intergovernmental organisation whose shareholders comprise the nation-states upon which it is reliant for funding.<sup>1598</sup> The High Commissioner for Refugees has come to present the organisation's policies within the paradigm of problematisation set out by the British and other governments. Lubbers, in stating, for example, that 'there are genuine concerns about the way the system is being managed and about those who misuse the system by falsely portraying themselves as asylum seekers', replicates the restrictive socio-legal framework that 'northern' states use to criminalise immigrants and thus legitimate restrictionism. Yet, as Betts argues, while the UNHCR's Convention Plus seems to 'represent a compromise of UNHCR's mandate in order to meet the interests of restrictionism', its strategy can also be read as the UNHCR's adaptation to 'the *realpolitik* of state demands in order to influence them and fulfil its mandate subject to these constraints'.<sup>1599</sup>

The New Vision strategy paper's explicit statement of the fact that it seeks to 'mould the UNHCR into the sort of organisation we would like it to be',<sup>1600</sup> has to be correlated with the embedded liberalism framing immigration and asylum policy formation. Rights based norms and regulations given in the UN's Geneva Convention (1951) and the EHCR (2000)<sup>1601</sup> limit the degree of sovereignty that the British government brings to bear on refugee policies, for each works to ensure that member states offer domestic protection to asylum seekers. In the European context, the international and regional embedding of these regulative norms forms the basis of the global structure of refugee migration management. Throughout its strategy paper the Home Office constructs a paradigm of dysfunction for

<sup>1595</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 4. Noll writes that the UNHCR's three pronged model (March, 2003) consisted of regional solutions, improved domestic asylum procedures, and the processing of manifestly unfounded cases in EU-operated closed reception centres within EU borders.

<sup>1596</sup> Alexander Betts, *ibid.*, p 2.

<sup>1597</sup> Amnesty International UK: HRW: Refugee Council: Statewatch.

<sup>1598</sup> Alexander Betts, *ibid.*, p 12.

<sup>1599</sup> Alexander Betts, *ibid.*, p 13. Gregor Noll (2003:5) notes that 'Rund Lubber's attempt to wriggle out of Tony Blair's ambivalent embrace by offering the three prongs of compromise and evasion. This model gives into the UK by accepting closed processing camps and the listing of safe countries of origin, but distances itself from the UK project by moving the camps back into EU territories'.

<sup>1600</sup> UK Home Office, 'New Vision for Refugees', p 23.

<sup>1601</sup> The UK ratified to EHCR in 2000. Article Three establishes what amounts to an expanded principle of non-refoulement.

the existing state of (im)migration structures suggests that the form of regulation to which it is party is, itself, the problem (under the 'new' conditions of self-presenting 'jet-age' asylum seeking). The Home Office recognises, however, that withdrawal from these norms would not be a tenable solution, for it would make the co-operative international and supra-national approach to the 'problem' of refugee immigration, that it sees as being essential, impossible. In addition, the British government recognises that the international realm cannot be separated from the domestic realm: at the regional level of the EU for example, the British government could not withdraw from the EHRC without also withdrawing the Human Rights Act, as the judiciary would be likely to continue to enact its role of limiting sovereignty by contesting any such 'dis-embedding'. The paper argues, furthermore, that the history of a domestic embedding of liberal policies on asylum would mean that even if Britain could withdraw from the supra-national and regional conventions, it would still face the problem of judicial and civil limitations on any turn to a more substantially restrictive policy.

Thus, the government seeks to pursue its restrictionist strategy by co-opting the universalist rights-based discourse of the conventions and the legitimacy of the UNHCR towards its neo-liberal geo-strategic policy-formation. This involves, on the one hand, a deconstructive representation of the situation of the UNHCR as the embodiment of the rights-based approach. Thus as one of the core funders of the UN's operations, the government is able to use the funding gap between the UNHCR, which has an annual budget of 900 million (GBS) for its responsibility towards millions of 'genuine' refugees, and the domestic funding of an asylum system that costs approximately half of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate's annual budget of 2 Billion (GBS), where money is said to be spent on both 'genuine' refugees *and* 'bogus' economic immigrants.<sup>1602</sup> Here the government seeks to present the vast amounts that it spends on its 'end-to-end' system of (restrictive) migration management as an indulgence of the relatively small number of asylum seekers who are able to raise sufficient funds for the journey to Britain. The imbalance between the amount spent on an asylum seeker in Britain and the amount spent on a UNHCR 'offshore' refugee is represented as if it were an injustice caused by the trafficking and smuggling industries (including their 'rich and able' clients) to the genuine ('vulnerable') refugee, and to the capacity of the UNHCR itself. In the false binary of this formula, the additional expense of extending the restrictive apparatus to the extra-territorial realm is justified by the discursive mobilisation of the community of refugees whose 'rights to protection' are being infringed. This formula is expressed in the name of a policy whose overt intention – given in the section which makes it explicit that 'resettlement is *not* a right' – is the deligitimation of those rights to protection given in the principles of international asylum and non-refoulement contained in the Geneva Convention and the EHCR.

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<sup>1602</sup> UK Home Office, 'New Vision for Refugees', 2003.

The New Vision paper co-opts the criticisms of Jeff Crisp, the UNHCR's Head of Evaluation and Policy Analysis, who said that current asylum and migration management practices to not address the root causes of movements, restrict access to settlement in the industrialised West to a small minority, are hypocritical because they advocate the Geneva Convention whilst working to restrict entry, and fail to address the gap between 'the vast amounts the West spends on processing claims whilst most refugees receive minimal assistance in their regions of origin'.<sup>1603</sup> These criticisms (that I would read as criticisms of the restrictionist policies of Western states) are nonetheless used to supplement the vision of systematic disfunction that the government appropriated to legitimate the British government's vision of the extension of a form of liberalism that is appropriate to the context of globalization.

The British strategy paper makes clear that it seeks to use the UNHCR in order to influence the individual states and the EU with which it will hope to form an active coalition for the construction of a regional and global migration regime. The government also seeks to use the (latterly) pro-restrictive stance of the IGC, and the support of an initial inter-national coalition (comprising the Danish and Dutch governments) to influence the UNHCR's Convention-Plus process towards the direction of its own strategy. Moreover, as Statewatch has observed, the 'new vision' co-option of the UNHCR regime dovetails with the regimes of remote control developing in the EU structure in the form of the Lome IV (2000) and Cotonou (2007-2020) agreements through the structures of the intergovernmental-supranational informal regime initiated in the Trevi processes and furthered through the workings of the High Level Working Group.<sup>1604</sup> Throughout all of these the British government has pursued a restrictionist stance that seeks inter- and supra-national agreement to the extent that it enhances the material and symbolic sphere of domestic territorial control (see chapter six).

The new extra-territorial regime has been designed to work in combination with an enhanced quota system and the incremental tightening of the legal criteria defining refugee status. This assemblage of policy structures has been designed to maintain a virtual adherence to the Convention-based protection of refugees whilst preventing and deligitimising the use of self-presenting 'onshore' asylum-based immigration. Schuster observes that 'the granting of asylum still serves to legitimate European democracies, enabling such states and their nationals to occupy the moral high ground by claiming to embody principles of tolerance, justice, and liberty'.<sup>1605</sup> For Schuster, 'according to Britain's image of itself, the granting of asylum confirms its image of itself as free and fair, and its political system as a

<sup>1603</sup> United Kingdom Home Office, *ibid.*, pp., 6-7.

<sup>1604</sup> United Kingdom Select Committee on International Development, Memorandum submitted by Statewatch (April, 2004); <http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/uc79-ii/uc7922.htm>; accessed May 5<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1605</sup> Liza Schuster, 'Why do states grant asylum?', *Politics*, 1998, 18 (1), p 15.



proper model for the rest of the world'.<sup>1606</sup> Boswell notes that the quota system and the establishment of systems of extra-territorial containment in countries of origin represent a retreat from the liberal universalist model of extending asylum to refugees, and subsequently challenges the European self-identity in which 'Europe' figures as the proponent of liberal human rights values.<sup>1607</sup> The embedded forms of the values inherent to the asylum system are central to legitimating notions of 'liberal' statehood and citizenship. Here, then, the extent to which the 'numbers' discourse of 'unacceptably' high levels of asylum applications works to reinforce the idea that it is the state-society complex's tolerance that is being 'stretched to breaking point' under conditions of globalised immigration, works to reinforce the episteme of negative liberty embodied in the state's liberal legitimisation.

Thus, immigration policy formation 'addresses' its il/legal subjects (the non-community of asylum seekers) in the form of a performance designed for the audience composed of the 'community' of disciplined citizen-subjects. What is being mobilised here is a politics of resentment wherein, as Darcus Howe has observed, 'you measure yourself only in regard to not falling into the pit'.<sup>1608</sup> This politics produces, as much as it assuages, the insecurities of the community of disciplined citizen-subjects. In the British context, this mobilisation works not so much on the basis of the threat of unemployment that (low-cost) migrant labour invokes,<sup>1609</sup> but on the basis of the regime of neo-liberalism within the state-society complex; globalised systems of production displace economic risks downwards through the flexibilisation of the labour market. It is this intensive form of national-globalisation that makes – in a supplementary fashion to the cultural differences invoked by Kristeva – the national community feel that they have become 'strangers to themselves', as the national citizen is rendered a 'foreigner' in the degree to which he or she is positioned as a globalised subject.<sup>1610</sup> The form of statehood being practised here seeks its legitimation by displacing the subject of the discourse of victim-hood (horizontally) from the 'periphery' to the 'core', even as the form of statehood practised serves the (vertical) dominance of national subjects by the *ad hoc* constellation of the networks of the trans/national elite.<sup>1611</sup>

<sup>1606</sup> Liza Schuster, *op cit*.

<sup>1607</sup> Christina Boswell, *ibid*, p 538.

<sup>1608</sup> Darcus Howe, 'Who you calling a nigger?', BBC 4 Documentary, August 8<sup>th</sup>, 2004.

<sup>1609</sup> The British economy currently has approximately 500,000 'unfilled positions, and thus a large degree of under-employment.

<sup>1610</sup> Slavoj Zizek, *ibid.*, p 12. I follow Zizek's line of reasoning. Zizek states the Kristevan 'poetry' about tolerance and self-acceptance depoliticises matters of 'power, exploitation, and economy'.

<sup>1611</sup> Etienne Balibar makes a similar point in 'What is Border', in Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, Verso, London and New York, 2002, p 82. Balibar writes, 'the state, settled on and constituted by its own borders, has ... played a fundamentally ambivalent role, for on the one side it conceals – and, up to a point, formally limits – differentiation, in order to insist upon the notion of national citizen and, through that notion, a certain primacy of the public authority of public antagonisms. On the other hand, however, the more transnational traffic – whether of people or of capital – intensifies, the more a transnational politico-economic space has formed as a result, and the more states – including, particularly, the most powerful among them – tend to operate in the service of an international class differentiation, and to that end, to use their borders and apparatuses of

We can further understand the particular form of British policy which allows the government to frame its policy as if it were an *extension*,<sup>1612</sup> rather than a contraction, of the space of liberal universalism, if we differentiate the forms of liberalism being extended in the new immigration restrictionism. The form of liberalism being extended is more accurately referred to as neo-liberalism, wherein – as I have described above – political liberalism supplements economic liberalism. We can see how this works in the realm of immigration and asylum policy formation if we attend to the manner in which the comprehensive ‘end-to-end’ approach is framed by the British government.

In the first place, the institutional framework facilitating the new regime of global migration management has been widened (in the ‘domestic’ or ‘sub-national sphere’) to include, along with the IND, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DfID), the Treasury (HMT) and, if necessary, the Ministry of Defence (MOD). This institutional expansion recognises that globalised immigration and asylum policy formation involves not just issues of sovereignty and domestic (social) security, but also diplomacy, development, (inter)national finance and trade, and, where situations of conflict require intervention, military action.

This assemblage of state processes is to be brought together within the holistic approach decoupling protection from migration which focuses, at one end, on the prevention of ‘undesirable’ migratory flows, and at the other, on their containment within the region of their source. Toward these purposes, ‘the establishment of a regional protection area must be coupled with respect for human rights and conflict resolution activity in the region’.<sup>1613</sup> In the government’s formula, the enhancement of (other) states’ adherence to human rights norms is intrinsically related to the action that the international community takes in furthering ‘development’. The fora through which this form of action should be pursued includes the World Bank, as well as ‘the World Trade Organisation and the International Monetary Fund, and wider trade, economic and diplomatic relations between states’.<sup>1614</sup> The strategy paper argues, furthermore, that enhanced military processes should be developed in order to meet Kofi Annan’s request for substantial support for UN ‘interventions’. Gregor Noll, in analysing the draft (Feb, 2004) sketch for the Home Office’s strategy paper, notes that ‘the UK’s attempt to promote its doctrine on ‘humanitarian intervention’ corresponds well to the intent to prevent flight through the use

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control as instruments of discrimination and triage... they attempt to do this while preserving to the utmost the symbolic sources of their popular legitimacy.’

<sup>1612</sup> Etienne Balibar, *ibid*, 2001. Balibar outlines a theory of French colonialism and state formation in terms of the extension and intension of universal liberalism. Although the French Republican and British Liberal political traditions have obvious differences, I seek to appropriate these terms in the context of British colonial and globalisation policies.

<sup>1613</sup> United Kingdom Home Office, *ibid*, p 16.

<sup>1614</sup> United Kingdom Home Office, *op cit*.

of force as stated in the February 2003 draft.<sup>1615</sup> While this latter point may be read as a promising renewal of the substantial basis of international intervention, it is crucial to reiterate Fitzpatrick's point about the subservience of military action to market interests in the British context.<sup>1616</sup>

Humanitarian strategies of containment work within a neo-liberal episteme. The fora through which the government seeks to pursue humanitarian 'development' are the very neo-liberal institutions that we have argued bear a substantial responsibility for the de-structuring of the regions and countries that have produced flows of forced migration in the post-Cold war period, whilst also serving to cement the openness of the South to its (neo-colonial) exploitation by the North (see sections 6.2 and 7.3). Here political liberalism given in the form of the extension of development aid and regulatory structures such as SAPS and its successors takes the form of economic liberalism; thus the universalism being extended from the core to the periphery is neo-liberal, and the de-bordering flows of people, finance and armaments it facilitates prevents the relative stabilisation of peripheral state-society complexes that functions as a supplementary legitimisation for the 'core' states' 'never-completed' practices of statecraft.<sup>1617</sup>

In examining the practicalities of the transit procession zones and regional protection areas, Noll observes the likelihood that many refugees will fail to gain access to the quota regime for resettlement whilst their country of origin remains unsuitable for repatriation. If the socio-political space of their regional protection does not afford possibilities of sustainable integration then these will remain 'in limbo' for as long as the articulated structure of Western European de-borderment and re-bordement remains in place.<sup>1618</sup> The status of these displaced persons will not have to be anything more than a *prima facie* recognition, such as that which has been applied to the Somalian refugees in the UNHCR camps in the North-eastern province of Kenya. Thus their status will remain 'unresolved', and beyond the legal application of rights-based refugee laws. The spatio-temporal compression of the camp is the inverse of the spatio-temporal viscosity in which the stateless person resides in a situation that Balibar refers to as 'a waiting to live, a non-life'<sup>1619</sup>.

Under these conditions, the 'new vision' regime would be open to legal challenges on the basis of the EHCR, and the removal of white-listed or 'manifestly unfound' applicants from British territory to the

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<sup>1615</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 11.

<sup>1616</sup> Peter Fitzpatrick, 'Terminal Legality? Human Rights and Critical Being', in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt, *Critical Beings: Law, Nation, and the Global Subject*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2004.

<sup>1617</sup> Roxanne Lynn Doty, *ibid.*

<sup>1618</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 26.

<sup>1619</sup> Etienne Balibar, *ibid.*, 2002, p 83.

extra-territorial 'safety zones' would become illegal.<sup>1620</sup> In Noll's legal argument derived from the potential application of the anti-discrimination clauses of the EHCR, the 'new vision's' offshore re-territorialisation would be open to challenge on the basis of its appropriateness and proportionality,<sup>1621</sup> where these have been defined in terms of the twin aims of improving the management of migration and bettering the protection of refugees. Here, if one of the results of the envisioned process is likely to be the fact that migrants continue to arrive but failed to register for asylum then the means will have failed to have been appropriate to the ends. Similarly, if the 'new vision' structures prove – as been the case for the Australian regime of extra-territorialisation – to require vast on-going levels of investment, then there is little likelihood that the substantial savings that the strategy paper suggests could be redirected to support refugees in region would materialise. Thus, the new vision's means fails the test of appropriateness of the second element of its aims. On the basis of the requirement for necessity, Noll argues that 'as the proposals are formulated now, refugees are worse off than in territorial processing, while destination states are not better off'.<sup>1622</sup>

The strategy paper explicitly states that its aim is neither to produce a containment of refugees in camps, nor to avoid its obligations for the protection of refugees. Nonetheless, the substance of the proposals and the recent history of the use of safety zones by the 'international community suggests that a state of displaced encampment is likely to be pursued as the desired strategy as long as the 'temporary' crisis of uncontrolled outbursts of forced migration and the subsequent spontaneous arrival of asylum seekers in British territory continues to occur. This new regime, and its articulation to the other measures of internal and external restriction comprising the 'end-to-end-system of migration management virtually guarantee the production of flows of illegal immigration into British territory, with the added proviso that there would be a tendency for immigrants to seek illegal forms of settlement and work within the informal economy rather than presenting themselves as asylum applicants.

The processes culminating in the 'new vision' strategy paper amount to a form of state violence that is conducted in the name of the 'other', whose objectification is, in turn, mobilised in the name of the contract between the citizen-subject as national worker and the sovereign power. These practices render the 'othered' peripheral state and its population to a state of de-politicised victimhood, whilst subjecting them to self-legitimising forms of criminalisation. The articulation of these processes works through the articulation of extensive and intensive forms of the humanitarian neo-liberalism which is

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<sup>1620</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, pp., 26-7.

<sup>1621</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 28; Noll writes that the rule of appropriateness excludes means that are not suitable for the pursuit of a given goal. The rule of necessity lays down the precedence of less intrusive over more intrusive means in pursuit of a legitimate goal. Proportionality refers to the necessity of the strategy being employed in relation to its ends.

<sup>1622</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 29.

the episteme and modus operandi of British-national globalisation. The nodal point for these practices of statecraft lies in the 'camp', regardless of whether these take the form of detention or processing centres located within the sovereign territory of the core state, or in the various forms of safe zones or transit centres located in the peripheral space of exception.

National and regional 'solutions' to the asylum 'problem' involve the relocation of refugees 'beyond the domain of justice'.<sup>1623</sup> Returning asylum seekers to their regions of origin works as a geographic and institutional extra-territorialisation, for these evict the asylum seeker outside of both British sovereign territory and the institutional processes through which the rights-based assessment process works. In this vein, we can note the continuity that exists between the onshore detention or processing centre and the offshore 'safety zone' as 'institutions of forced confinement'.<sup>1624</sup> These extra-territorialisations which work to dis-embed the refugee from the legal framework of liberal universality<sup>1625</sup> find their counterpart in the offshore sites (including the 'square mile of the City of London', the tax havens described by Alan Hudson,<sup>1626</sup> and the Genovese banking system analysed by Jennifer Hyndman,<sup>1627</sup> for these work to dis-embed the flows of (trans)national finance from the workings of state-based regulation. The British state's facilitation of (trans)national flows of finance work in tandem with the Blair-Brown government's 'New Bretton Woods' focus on disciplining the fiscal structures and policies of peripheral and semi-peripheral states. Here, as Pahuja has argued, there operates a form of neo-colonial governance in which the extension of soft power discipline on developing economies is articulated to its retraction from the economic sphere of industrialised countries.<sup>1628</sup> Moreover, in the Christian-Humanitarian discourse of Brown and Blair, the extension of liberal imperialism to the periphery takes the form of market neo-liberalism.

The de-bordering of the neo-liberal freedom of movement of capital has its counterpart in the re-borderment imposed in the enforced stasis of persons whose movements transgress the limited flexibility required by globalised national systems of production. A material and symbolic elaboration of these supplementary dynamics of the freedom of movements of capital and the stasis of persons is given in Robert Miles' description of Schipol airport, where the transit lounge is divided by a glass wall on one side of which the travellers in the Schengen space abjuring immigration control can observe and be observed by those controlled groups on the other side who attempt to travel through

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<sup>1623</sup> Gregor Noll, *ibid.*, p 29.

<sup>1624</sup> Lois Wacquant, 'The new 'peculiar institution': on the prison as surrogate ghetto', *Theoretical Criminology*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 2000.

<sup>1625</sup> Christina Boswell, *ibid.*, *passim*.

<sup>1626</sup> Alan Hudson, 'Offshorenness, globalisation and sovereignty: a post-national geo-political economy?', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, No. 25, 2000.

<sup>1627</sup> Jennifer Hyndman, *ibid.*

<sup>1628</sup> Sundhya Pahuja, *ibid.*

what Miles argues is a space defined by the articulation of neo-liberalism and 19<sup>th</sup> century nationalist theory.<sup>1629</sup>

This chapter has argued that the imagined (but not unreal) threat of globalised loss animates the British government's pursuit of financial liberalisation; the possibility of the vulnerability inherent to the weak position of the British economy when measured in terms of goods and services has meant that it seeks to displace vulnerability offshore, and onto the lower circuits of production (regardless of whether these are on or off shore). Embedded neo-liberalisation, subsequently, is a form of militant-economics wherein competition between nation-states is a matter of the correlation of ethnicity and territory with the enfortressment of a particular arrangement of (trans)national systems of production. Nonetheless, although this neo-liberal system of globalisation or 'Empire' as Hardt and Negri term it is properly postmodern and hybrid, the nation state has not become an anachronism: the imagined realm of territoriality and belonging works as a prime definition of imagined community, but has been to the imaginary space of free mobility representing the substantive agency of citizenship:<sup>1630</sup> This is the symbolic significance of the 'accommodation' or 'reception' centre's location in the extra-urban spaces of the British social body. These sites of detention which are to be situated in rural locations thus signify (to subjects and citizens alike) the non-space that exists outside of the state's facilitation of globalisation. In this, and in the degree to which they are filled with pauperised ethnic persons, they bear, as Perera notes in a comparison of the Australian system of asylum detention and the American racialised prison industrial complex, a strong affinity to the prison system.<sup>1631</sup> While both of the prison and the 'accommodation/reception' centre work within an economy of detention, they each signify their inhabitants loss of the right to mobility, and their invisibility to and removal from the socio-material networks of welfare, work, family, friends, as well as the erasure of those (trans)national and global networks as these exceed the nation's globalised and globalising systems of production.

Moreover, if, as we noted in chapter five the detention centre works as a spectacular material practice which regulates the border between the space of the 'flexibilised' citizen-subject and the non-space that lies beyond, then the 'safety zone' represents a historical and geo-political mirror, for it re-embeds the diasporic South represented by flows of displaced persons securely within the existential non-space of the periphery. The mirror image provided by this political technology is historical and geopolitical in the sense of the perpetuation of the 'world-system' outlined by Wallerstein: the British state's 'new vision' attempts to globalise the 'never-completed' regulatory 'panopticon' comprising the necessary

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<sup>1629</sup> Robert Miles, 'The political economy of migration control', in Avtar Brah, Mary J. Hickman, and Mairtin Mac an Ghaill (eds.), *Global Futures: Migration, environment, and globalization*, Macmillan, Houndsmills, Basingstoke, 1999, pp., 181-82.

<sup>1630</sup> Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *ibid.*

<sup>1631</sup> Suvrendrini Perera, 'Racialised punishment and mandatory sentencing', *Race and Class*, Vol. 42, No. 1, July 2000, p 74.

techniques for the making and differentiating of modern citizens and subjects, just as the (intensive) socio-political technologies of the workhouse, the factory and the prison were mirrored in the (extensive) plantation system, and the slave ship or transportation hulk in the period of colonial-capitalism.



## Conclusion

Phillip Cole has argued that for liberal political theory, the tensions between universalist perspectives based on the fundamental equality of the individual, and the search for liberal justifications for the closure of national borders leads to one of two possible propositions: either one supports universal liberalism and the freedom of mobility that belongs to an 'open borders' position, or one comes to the 'inevitable' Hobbesian conclusion that 'the only ethical obligation that falls upon liberal states is to do what ever is in their interests and the interests of their citizens'.<sup>1632</sup> Underpinning this 'idealist/realist' dichotomy is the belief that the enactment of liberal principles requires the limited membership of the sovereign liberal state, and that the relinquishment of the sovereign power of borderment necessarily leads to the opening of the community of citizens to the catastrophic Hobbesian disorder that lies 'beyond'. Here, the 'realist' (Hobbesian) position is itself based on a idealised construction of the liberal state (or liberal-nationality) wherein 'liberal polities are posed as free and voluntary associations, the product of the consent of their members; or liberal institutions themselves are examples of these free and voluntary associations, which distribute goods to members taken to be free and equal citizens'.<sup>1633</sup> Cole makes the important point that liberal theorisations surrounding citizenship, membership and migration are limited insofar as these various idealisms are ahistorical:

*Too often liberal political philosophy is written against the background of a fictional history in which colonial exploitation never occurred. But once we bring this historical element into our considerations, it has a profound impact upon our ethical reasoning concerning migration. It is therefore inadequate to insert an international dimension into a 'traditional' and therefore ahistorical liberal framework; we have to move forward to a postcolonial perspective, a perspective that recognises that colonial power and exploitation have fundamentally shaped the world.*<sup>1634</sup>

This thesis has sought to provide some grounds for that forward movement in its account of the continuities and transformations that lay between British liberal regimes of mobility control in the period of colonial capitalism, and British neo-liberal regimes of mobility control in the period of globalisation. On that basis, it's my argument that an analysis of the contemporary British politics of immigration and nationality needs to be understood in terms of the history of British colonialism, and that even as the contemporary form of globalised immigration is less directly the result of colonial

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<sup>1632</sup> Phillip Cole, *ibid*, pp., 13, 165-188; see also the discussions surrounding these tensions in relation to the issue of asylum and refugee migration in Matthew Gibney, *Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, and Liza Schuster, *ibid*, 2003, pp., 23-63.

<sup>1633</sup> Phillip Cole, *ibid*, p 174

<sup>1634</sup> Phillip Cole, *ibid*, p 14.

migration-pathways, the liberal-imperial mentality still informs the governmental construction of immigration, and, particularly, South-to-North migration. Thus a key element of the work of this thesis has been to place the contemporary governmentality and politics of immigration with a 'colonial continuum'.

The thesis began by mapping the emergent British politics of mobility in the development of colonial-capitalism and the nation-state system. Here I gave an account of the manner in which that socio-geographic mobility operated through a continuum that stretched from states of unfreedom (such as slavery) to relative states of freedom (such as those that were imagined as rights belonging to the 'true-born Englishman' and the citizen-subject). I argued that the first objects of British mobility control were the British poor, those whose agent appropriation of mobility threatened the feudal and nascent capitalist state-society complex with the political revolutions of the *mobile vulgate*. These infra-national developments were matched, at the colonial end of the spectrum, by the appropriation of the agent mobility of subjects and non-citizens who were subject to forced migrations and stasis; their mobility was governed by the politico-economic dynamics of colonial capitalism.

The dynamics governing the mobility of persons, goods, finance, and politics in the phase of colonial capitalism were both (trans)national *and* national, as the emergence of the British Empire worked through the articulation of metropolitan finance for colonial endeavours (as was the case of the East India Company), the (national) development of modern forms of discipline and governmentality directed at the 'community' of national subjects, and the particular form of the British political system which allowed a form of passive revolution in which the landed aristocracy and the emergent capitalist classes came to coalesce in a state-society complex enabling the public sphere of liberal citizenship. The borders of the liberal-colonial state-society complex were thus infra, inter, and trans-national, and the rise of the dominant British state was dependent on the 'global management' of transnational networks and flows.

In providing an account of the biopolitical governmentality of mobility within liberal colonialism, I sought to analyse the regimes governing the migration and stasis of these populations in relation to the contested incorporation of their labour power within the developing discourse and governmentalities of liberal 'progress' and the 'civilising mission'. Here I found that the inclusion of colonial subjects within the liberal-colonial economy was governed by the interdependence of political and economic liberalism. Where the imperial control of flows of finance, goods, services and people tended to produce pauperisation, and peripheralisation, these dynamics facilitated the forced and coerced migration and stasis of populations of African slaves, Irish and Indian peasantry, and also the British poor. Subject to the governmentality of liberal-colonialism, the resistance of these populations was

problematised along the conflicted and hybrid axis of race-and-class. In Britain, for example, the resistance of the mobile poor to their incorporation as docile subjects was subject to the moralising and criminalising governmentality of an emergent utilitarianism in the eighteenth century onwards. In the nineteenth century the urban poor were increasingly represented in racial terms, occupying a 'pre-modern' position within a progressive social hierarchy, and thus an internal limit to the pursuit of 'progress'. Conversely, emancipated slaves in the British Caribbean sought to resist the renewed imposition of stasis within the colonial plantation system. Here, the liberal recognition extended to a racialised population was limited to the extent that their renewed autonomy exceeded the requirements of colonial capital: to a strong extent the exodus of the Caribbean freedmen from the plantation system represented a resistance to proletarianization. These inherently liberal limits operated on the axis of class-and-race. The agent mobility of each of colonial-capitalist populations was subject, at particular historical moments, to differing degrees of sovereign and disciplinary power, even as their inclusion within the imperial economy was represented as a progressive extension of liberalism.

The liberal-capitalist hegemony of the nineteenth century was dependent on the biopolitical management of colonial and national populations, and the control of mobilities of finance, commerce, and labour. The exploitative incorporation of these populations within the liberal political economy gave rise to conflictual forms of dis/identification amongst the British working class, wherein the claim to inclusion within the liberal sphere took the form of a resistance to the racialisation given in their status as colonial subjects within the nation. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, this conflicted hybridity created the ideological space in which the British elite were able to employ the discursive formation of national-imperialism as a strategy for maintaining a sufficient degree of hegemonic consent.

The dissertation's *longue duree* analysis of British mobility regimes has sought to demonstrate the neo-colonial character of the neo-liberal mobility regimes in the post-war context of globalisation. Thus, throughout the long twentieth century, the governmentality of national imperialism provided the dominant paradigm in which the politics of immigration was enacted. In the post-war context of a strategy of neo-colonial regeneration British governments sought to re-centre the British economy and its financial institutions at the heart of the Commonwealth, and thus to reposition the British state as a leading nation in the US dominated global order. Whilst this strategy involved the facilitation of colonial circuits of finance and trade as a means of competing with the emergent global economy, one unforeseen consequence was the facilitation of post/colonial labour immigration. In the following period of decline the paradigm of national-imperialism found its transformation in the emergent form of the 'race relations paradigm'. Here, in reaction to the agent mobility of post/colonial subjects, the restriction of immigrants on the (formally un-stated) basis of their colour was presented as



a means of ensuring harmonious 'race relations' in Britain. Crucially, the racialising restrictions on New Commonwealth immigration worked here as an expression of liberal values. Subsequently, I have argued that in the Thatcherite turn to neo-liberalism and the opening of the domestic economy to global competition the anthropological limits of this paradigm became fully apparent. In addition, I have contended that the Thatcherite engagement with globalisation represented a reinvention of the trope of national-imperialism in the context of the post-colonial moment.

The contemporary phase of immigration policy formation dates from the mid 1980s when the Conservative government began to problematise new forms of (predominantly) South to North asylum immigration. Here there has been an obvious shift from migration patterns that directly follow pre-established colonial pathways, to a diversification of the source countries of immigrant populations. In examining the politics of this new form of restrictive immigration regime I have made several arguments. The first of these is that the paradox of the race relations paradigm has proved sufficiently malleable to be redeployed in the context of a 'communitarian' immigration 'problem' that does not appear, in the first instance, as a matter of 'race'. Whilst this governmentality plays upon the insecurities of globalised British subjects, the 'secure borders' that it promises are virtual rather than actual: the regime of asylum restriction is more effective in terms of de-legitimation. This is partially an effect of the problematising governmental discourse, and partially an effect of the withdrawal of legitimate means of entry and settlement for pauperised immigrants. Here, the utilitarian borders of the imagined (national) community have been secured, rather than the material borders themselves. Correspondingly, because the borders of the community are defined on a utilitarian basis in the context of globalisation, the realm they seek to protect is the security of well-ordered transnational flows and networks, rather than the modernist 'container-model' of the territorially-bound nation-state.

The second is that we should situate an analysis of this new regime within an understanding of the dynamics of the new global dis/order. More specifically, I argue that it's important to pay attention to the context of the liberal-imperial, neo-liberal, and neo-utilitarian governmentality that has developed throughout the period of New Labour governments. Here, the immigration regime governing South to North, and thus asylum immigration works within the re-framing of the (primarily postcolonial) South as a form of chaotic pre-modernity. This Hobbesian problematisation of the Third World legitimates the extension of disciplinary and sovereign (Northern) power into the Southern countries. At the same time, this neo-liberalism works to promote poverty, inequality, and resource-conflicts that give rise to flows of refugees and IDPs. Here the legacy of liberal political economy and imperialism is present in the 'new' situation of globalisation. Correspondingly, the limits inherent to liberalism that have worked along the axis of race-and-class have not disappeared, but have merely been re-invented.

This 'normalised' and logically infinite violence that belongs to the neo-liberal state-society complex takes its immediate object as the 'illegitimate' immigrant, yet the aim of the strategy of containment is broader. The state that is legitimated in this sense is the economo-militant entity that Gilroy describes as being built on the logic of encampment – this 'state' is always in a stage of preparation for war.<sup>1635</sup> As we observed in the previous chapter, the British state seeks and gains its legitimation from the variety of wars (against trafficking, terrorism, and 'global chaos') which it fights on behalf of the neo-liberal state-society complex which manifests itself in the form of national universal liberalism. The threat posed to the state is all the greater, given the degree to which the 'enemy' is illegitimately present 'within' the sovereign territory. In the system of national globalisation the borders of that 'territory', following the flows and stasis of the neo-liberal system of production, are also de-bordering and extra-territorial. The global threat herein imagined is one that mirrors that which produced the first series of Aliens legislation in Britain in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, for then the danger was deemed to be the further politicisation of the masses that French revolutionary immigrants might have provoked.

These historical reflections should lead us to recognise the depoliticisation inherent in the government's strategy – a depoliticisation that seeks to separate the economic realm from the political, is consistent with the policing of the boundaries of neo-liberalism. Thus, following the appropriation that Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp makes of Foucault's notion, we can say that the exercise of power by imprisonment and detention is the exercise of the right to security as a right to punish, wherein the use of prison and the extension of 'the scope of detention to innocent people is perhaps one step towards the right to wage war against immigrants and other sectors of the population'.<sup>1636</sup> In the form of policing, the new apparatus that emerges here has specific objectives which includes the 'exclusion of some human beings and the transformation of social groups into non-'integratable' rejects, to be eliminated first from society and then from the world'.<sup>1637</sup> Here I am in agreement with Caloz-Tschopp, for whom these developments signal more than (merely) another form of government in which policing has been extended through networks: the fact that they signal the replacement of politics by policing signals a shift to a model of 'defensive' democracy.<sup>1638</sup>

Beyond their re-capture in the nodal point of the camp, and in the architecture of enfortressment for which these points act as sentries, the hybrid and multi-scaled borders at which the British and other core 'members' of the international community meet their peripheral others form a key site of contest

<sup>1635</sup> Paul Gilroy, *Between Camps: Race, Identity and Nationalism at the End of the Colour Line*, London, Allen Lane, Penguin, 2000, pp., 81-96.

<sup>1636</sup> Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, 'On the Detention of Aliens: The Impact on Democratic Rights', Translated by Lindsay Hossack, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997, p 167.

<sup>1637</sup> Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, *op cit*.

<sup>1638</sup> Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, *ibid*, p 166.

for what we should call – in the context of globalisation and, in the British sense, national globalisation – ‘the *political* problem of citizenship and subjection’. The object of the national-global form of policing that we have argued finds a culmination in the British ‘new vision’, is the various manifest forms of the ‘dark side’ of globalisation, one of which is present in the image of the bogus asylum seeker who seeks to render his ‘economic’ non-citizenship into a form of political citizenship. He or she makes the demand of the remnant (and, by proxy, the remnant state) for the ‘right to have rights’. In the British context, this demand provokes the resentment of the citizen-subject (as national worker), who is being disciplined through intensifying techniques promoting flexibility. As an ‘active citizen’ she is offered the ‘right to have obligations’ that she will struggle to meet: Her subjection is presented as her citizenship.

In the neo-liberal imaginary, the political-and-economic demand takes the form of a criminal transgression, for the deregulated sphere of the global economy is assumed – on the basis of neo-classical economic theory – to tend towards a natural state of balance, despite the fact that the deregulated world of transnational finance tends, to the contrary, towards states of radical disequilibrium. This imaginary is in turn based upon a Hobbesian worldview, in which – in the context of globalisation – the state is legitimated by its governance of the pre-existing violent state of ‘nature’ which consisted of the correlation of the risks inherent in the ‘injuries of one another’ and ‘the invasion of Forraigners’.<sup>1639</sup> Here, the lesson of the complex reborderments and deborderments of globalisation is that the chaotic violence of Hobbes’s nature cannot be placed outside the state; instead, in a post-institutional sense, it has to be considered to lie within the *dominant* state-society complex, and its/their politico-economic technologies. In the contemporary context of the British asylum regime, this is becoming increasingly important as more attention is being paid to the root causes of forced migration, and institutional venues such as the DFID are becoming more involved. Here we need to be critical of the possible assimilation of the issue of refugee protection within the pre-existing regime of neo-liberal neo-imperialism. It is this violent realm of the policing of mobilities manifest in the (infra-national and trans-national) governmentality of enfortressment and encampment that requires further analysis and politicisation.

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<sup>1639</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by C.B. Macpherson, London, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968, p 222.

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