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The Impact of Technology on the Cultural Identity of Pakistan

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of
The Nottingham Trent University for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

May 2004

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
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Map of Pakistan



Regional Map of the Sub Continent



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Abstract

The thesis explores the impact of new information technologies on cultural identities in Pakistan. It suggests that there is a confusion in the public perception in Pakistan between 'globalisation' and 'westernisation' in general and the specific content, structure and outcomes of new information and communication technologies in particular. These have had important consequences for the reception of the latter. These consequences are examined through empirical enquiry. The key question is how the new technologies might facilitate or enable development. They clearly offer important opportunities for relatively sustainable forms of development. But these opportunities are being lost, the research suggests, as a result of the process of the reception of new technologies. The challenge of how to balance the potential for human development with the maintenance of cultural identity is a very difficult one to meet, and produces cultural, social and political conflicts which the thesis explores and, as far as possible, explains. One says 'as far as possible' because the challenge and the conflicts are ongoing. But the outcome is clearly critical for the future development of Pakistan's culture and society and its relationships with the rest of the world.

The thesis is grounded in a qualitative approach. The methodology is in turn based upon the critical reading of the relevant literature on globalisation and cultural identity, especially as this affects 'Islamic' societies. The originality of the thesis rests in a significant measure on the interviews which have been carried out and which explore how the challenges, opportunities and threats of new information technology affect Pakistan.

Chapter one outlines the methodology to the study. The chapter scrutinises the literature, offers a comparative approach to the organisation of the study and places the empirical evidence within the context of the research programme. Chapter two examines human development in Pakistan and its limited capacity to draw upon its own intellectual human resources. Chapter three looks at the national investment strategies in education and its impact of the social stratification of human development. The chapter

examines the national indicators for achievement levels and sets out the crisis facing the Pakistani education system under its current investment levels. Chapter four is a critical review of the 'respondent survey'. The survey explores three key themes; what is information and electronic technology? what demands are placed upon the human development programme for its success? and finally, is Pakistan prepared to embrace modernisation? Chapter five explores the debate on globalisation and the cultural dichotomies within it, and consequently how Pakistan faces the desperate need for modernisation. The chapter takes the globalisation debate a step further by placing it within the context of the Muslim world and how it is responding to the impact of globalisation within an international cultural studies framework. Chapter six is drawn from the debate in cultural studies, where culturalism is the main protagonist. The chapter debates the impact of technology on the 'cultural identity of Pakistan' by presupposing a debate about what is meant by the term, identity. Furthermore the chapter explores at some length the clash of identity in Pakistan by offering a social analysis of the social stratification of the nation. Chapter seven examines the political legacies left behind by three prominent and influential leaders of Pakistan. The chapters analyse the sequence of events that challenge the clash of ideologies between secularism, Islamic socialism and Islamic conservatism. Chapter eight covers the international debate on the theory of technology and its implications for Pakistan. The chapter challenges the misconception of development in the context of technology, placing this concept against the myth of an information revolution. The Part II of the chapter undertakes a critical analysis of the government's of its National IT Policy 2000 and scrutinises the policy's implications for the short term future of Pakistan.

The thesis concludes by suggesting that the potential for modernisation in Pakistan offered by new technologies is real and important, but that the potential is being missed, and that the net effect of new technologies is profoundly negative, despite there being some positive elements in Pakistan's experience of new technologies. The reasons for this lie more in the embeddedness of corruption and the nature of patterns of political and cultural power than in 'cultural identity' as such, but the study of the impact of technologies throws light on the ambivalence of cultural identities.

Acknowledgements

A word of thanks needs to be added to all those who have offered their time, support, encouragement and motivation to me and without whom, this thesis would have been completed with extreme difficulty and possibly with enormous stress and anxiety. A special thanks is added to Dr Ali Mohammadi, Director of Studies, who stuck by me during all the times that I felt I was not achieving my full potential and with his direct support and motivating words of encouragement, I was able to achieve my goal. A special thanks is also added to my dear family who have borne the burden of my time during the last few years whilst I have continued to complete my thesis. A family that always believed in me and my determination to complete my thesis.

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Introduction

Men of genius will in this Way enjoy a reward which is worthy of themselves and of you; this reward is the only one which will supply them with the means to give you all the service of which they are capable; it will become the object of the ambition of the most active minds and will deflect them from anything which might disturb your peace of mind.

Claude-Henri Saint-Simon (1803)

Summary

Pakistan has travelled through some turbulent times over the last 50 years. During this period three separate constitutions were promulgated, in 1956, 1962 and 1973. The first general election to its Parliament since its independence was on 4th January 1970 (Wolpert 1993: 135), after the election, the then Eastern Wing of Pakistan (known as East Pakistan) was seceded to become the Independent State of Bangladesh. Pakistan stretches over 1,600 kms north to south and approximately 885 kms broad east to west, covering a total area of 7,96,095 sq kms. The country comprises of four provinces; Balochistan, North West Frontier, the Punjab and Sindh. It is the ninth most populous country in the world. Among the 37 low-income countries, Pakistan is the fourth populous country after Bangladesh, China and India. According to the 1998 census the population stood at 127.5 million in 1981 the population was 83.8 million, in 1972 it was 65.3 million and in 1947, at the time of the creation of Pakistan it was merely 32.5 million.¹ This does not however include the massive influx of refugees into Pakistan from the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, Iran, Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Furthermore, these figures do not include figures from the States of Junagarth and Manavadar, which are under occupation by the Indian government.

A Statement of the Problem

Pakistan has over the last 50 years seen a limited and at times, constrained level of economic and human development. As a consequence, development has stagnated in almost all spheres of growth and in particular in the country's technology sector. To this end, Pakistan's attempts to become a modernised and an economically glowing society have been hampered by the lack of serious investment in technology and in its human development potential. The problem that faces Pakistan is not a lack of credible educational achievements equal to Western standards but rather the availability of appropriately qualified human resources. The idea that the Information Highway will help Pakistan grow in the widest sense is dependent upon five national development strategies reproduced from Pakistan's National IT Policy and Action Plan and are summarised in Box 1:

Five National Development Strategies

BOX 1

1. The introduction of quality English language education at primary school level throughout the country.
2. The application of quality education through real term investment in higher education throughout the country and not just within the three main provisional cities of Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad.
3. Government commitment to financial investment in high specification training in *software* technology development for graduates.
4. Private and public partnership investment in the technology sector.
5. The introduction of government legislative policy on 'Intellectual Property Rights'.

National IT Policy and Action Plan (2000: 45-49)

These strategies have been discussed at length in chapter eight and an overview of their impact on the nation and its technology sector has been debated in the conclusion. However, it is important to note that if the national strategy is maintained to its full intention, Pakistan may at this point have a glimmer of a hope to grow towards inclusion and participation for its technology sector in the globalised market place. But

this in turn raises questions of identity and the coherence, stability or evolution of cultural identity to which the thesis returns at many points in the argument. The study outline draws the reader towards these conceptual themes and its relationship to human development in-order to offer some explanation on how Pakistan will address the challenges for the Twenty First century.

The Aim of the Research Programme

The aim of this research programme was to explore the impact of the spread of new technology in Pakistan and the affects this imposes on political, cultural and religious identity. Much of the study has been centred on socio-cultural theory. The idea was based upon an examination of the social development of its people rather than attempting to parade an encyclopaedia of factual statistical data to the reader. This thesis is not a measurement of development, but rather a reference to cultural changes in development that are taking place across Pakistan as a consequence of the introduction of technology in all its forms.

The Aim of the Investigation

BOX 2

To examine the relationship between the current development of Electronic Technology and the Information Super-highway in Pakistan and how this may have an impact on the social, cultural and political development in Pakistan.

Nottingham Trent University: Registration Document submission (RDIR)

The Result of the Study

The study draws upon a framework, which recognises the importance of human development as both a conceptual theme and practical application of the potential for growth in education, employment and health of the nation and cultural development as the main concept towards modernisation and development in Pakistan. More specifically, the research programme examines a socio-cultural movement which is taking shape amongst Pakistan's urbanites: 'a new generation of educated cultural intermediaries' and what Lazarsfeld & Berelson (1948), refer to as "opinion leaders"

who are beginning to influence a rapid growth of cyber-activism. This encourages the spread of cyber-democracy, social activity and public opinion to challenge the traditions of a 'cultural status quo' in Pakistan. This phenomenon has clearly impacted on the growth of, what Werbner (1996), refers to as a new 'culturally correct' youth attempting to, in the words of Featherstone (1995: 3) "recentre" the direction and relationship of traditional 'cultural norms' of a Muslim society through the usage of electronic communications technology. The thesis is original in four significant respects:

Originality of the Thesis

Box 3

- Firstly, the thesis explores the impact of new global information technologies on Pakistan, and on cultural identity in Pakistan. Although there are studies of information technology in other developing societies, no other study exists looking at the distinctive questions that arise in the Pakistani case.
- Secondly, the thesis draws on a critical reading of the literature on "globalisation and identity". This is not a major part of the claim to originality, but there are particular elements of the reading of the debates, and especially of the interaction between globalisation and identities in Islamic societies, which are a distinctive contribution to these debates.
- Thirdly, and most importantly, the thesis draws on a series of original interviews which form the basis for the conclusions.
- Finally, the thesis serves as a counterweight to what its author believes is the rather uncritical, over optimistic view of many other writers on new technologies and their potential for change in developing societies. Although new communication systems do indeed open opportunities for new forms of cultural and political exchange, including cyber democracy, the prospects for actual transformation both in democratic and cultural practice are much more problematic than this literature has suggested. In particular, optimistic writers on new technologies pay insufficient attention to the central mediating role of corruption, as well as the diversity of cultural identities, which are at issue.

The methodology is thus reflective and critical, but the main focus of originality in the study lies in the empirical work, which draws on this framework. The key concepts, 'globalisation', 'modernisation', 'tradition', 'identity', and 'cultural imperialism', Said (1991, 1994), Sardar and Davis (2002) and Tomlinson (1991, 1999), are well established within this literature. The thesis is original in that no other research study on this topic has been undertaken and that this is the first study of its kind that offers an insight into the cultural patterns of behaviour that are reflected in the key concepts though the usage and consumption of technology.

Review of Literature

The impetus for the idea of this study was based upon a widely held view and at times, an inaccurately influenced perception, that much of the desire for development in technology in Pakistan was the need for consumerism through the progression of global cultural imperialism in general, but to be more specific, the cultural challenges that the United States offered to the developing world through the ‘McDonaldisation’ of culturalism. This topic has been explored by many scholars who have interpreted the theme of cultural imperialism in its widest sense. What this thesis ventures into is another scope of a theoretical concept towards understanding the spread of what Ritzer (2002), refers to as “McDonaldisation” through the exploitation of a poor nation’s aspirations and its unfulfilled dreams. This inevitably leads to the question of, what do we mean, when we refer to “McDonaldisation”? Are we discussing a new brand of culturally correct people wearing Levi jeans, eating Islamically acceptable hamburgers and drinking coca cola? Or do we refer to culturally correct young Pakistani Muslims who watch Hindi films, drink coloured water on the pretence of wine and whiskey, and date young single Muslim girls for their ‘forbidden fruits’ whilst dancing to the tune of modern day ‘Hip Hop’ music in an Islamic society? Most likely we refer to all of these habits, including some newly introduced customs, as a means of modernisation of a young society. Such modernisation arrives not through some accident in development, but through a systematic effort of exported consumerism as an icon (in particular) of North American culturalism. Benjamin R Barber (2002: 191) wrote:

The two axial principles of our age – tribalism and globalism – clash at every point except one: they may both be threatening to democracy.

Benjamin R Barber (2002: 191)

Therefore, the study is partially placed within the context of consumerism and offers to address much of the debate on ‘cultural modernity’ across a broad spectrum of culturally challenging notions for and against modernisation. However before one can begin to address cultural modernity, one has to define what such concepts mean in the context of Pakistan. Therefore, it may be useful to add a few words to the introduction on what culture means, as the term culture is rarely defined that offers a commonly

accepted definition. In the context of this thesis, culture is defined widely to incorporate identity, faith and tradition in the context of an Islamic society as one and the same thing. Further, in the context of Pakistan, Pakistani culture and Indian cultural hegemony have distinct similarities and for this reason, many of the cultural challenges in Pakistani society between the Indian national identity and the Pakistani cultural aspiration are blurred. Raymond Williams (1983: 178) wrote: “culture is one ... of the most complicated words in the English language”. Therefore, attempting to define it is even more complicated as a means of placing it within a single identified society. Kevin Avruch (1998: 6) wrote in his work on conflict resolutions that the works of many scholars have defined culture in 150 different ways. Avruch draws the reader’s attention to the work of two eminent anthropologists Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1957: 37), who defined the concept of culture in a manner first exemplified in Mathew Arnold’s *Culture and Anarchy* (1867), where culture is referred to as a special intellectual or artistic endeavour or product. Today, this is referred to as ‘High Culture’ as opposed to popular culture or ‘folkways’, as it was referred to centuries earlier.

Arnold’s definition triggers a further reaction, when Edward Taylor² (1870) in his writing discusses the concept as a quality possessed by all people in all social groups, which nevertheless could be displayed on the model of a development or evolutionary continuum from savagery, through barbarism to civilisation. Taylor’s definition of culture portrays society as a group and people as individuals, all have culture which they acquire by virtue of a membership to some social grouping or society, including access to knowledge, habits, views, traditions and capabilities. The concept of Taylor’s defining portrayal of ‘cultural’ has influenced much of our own understanding of culture and has become as Avruch (1998) suggests, an accepted description for ‘culture’ in anthropology. Ali Mazrui discusses a slightly different variation to the definition of culture in the form of cultural studies. Mazrui sets out seven different brands of cultural functions in society; First are the lenses of perception, commenting as he goes on “how do people see themselves and the world around them”. The second lies in the motivation for human behaviour, which examines the method by which people behave and how their surroundings and origins influence such behaviour. Thirdly, the “child of culture” suggesting that the criteria of evaluation deems our assessment to its function, such as good, bad, moral, immoral, ugly or beautiful. Evaluation is sometimes based upon the ideological view of a nation and its people

rather than what may appear to be right or wrong. The fourth function of culture provides the basis for identity. Mazrui refers to this as the “ethnic nepotism” which itself is a product of identity. The concept refers to solidarity based upon common identities such as faith, race or a membership to a particular club or activity. Fifthly, culture is a mode of communication. The most elaborate system of communication is language. The sixth function of culture is on the basis of stratification that defines class, rank, caste (Bradri) or social status. These conditions are set out through a combination of cultural variables. For example it may include higher education, political or caste status, religious leaders or wealth. The seventh function of culture lies in the system of production and consumption. Unlike the Marxist school of thought, this ‘function’ by Mazrui suggests the production may influence or shape consumption as much as consumption may lead the process of production. A typical example that immediately comes to mind is that of Pakistan where the mode of consumption for Bollywood music by young Pakistanis influences, although against government wishes, the growth of the Indian music industry in Pakistan.

Mazrui (1990: 8) comments that his “seven functions of culture have relevance for the new international cultural order, what lies in the way is once again the whole problem of dependency in North-South relations”. Therefore, in this context, Pakistan, and much of the Indian sub- continent, culture is promoted as part of a social and regional identity, either through folk law, faith, tradition, artistic knowledge, education, wealth, class, tribalism, casts, bradrism or a combination of one or more of the above.

To continue the debate on culture, one needs to reflect on what defines cultural imperialism in Pakistan. Part of the study addresses this issue through the work of Tomlinson (1991), where Tomlinson sets out a practical and most commonly accepted prospect of culturalism as an imported concept of Western imperialism. Tomlinson admits that cultural imperialism has been generally ignored as a defined term and mostly used in a manner almost assuming the reader acknowledges its meaning to have stemmed largely from Western industrial powers, referring in the main to the United States. The term as Tomlinson (1995: 3) suggests has become a generic concept where almost all parts contribute to a whole through the influence of Western hegemony. I agree that such a broad definition of culturalism applies a generic conceptual theme to which Tomlinson’s (1995: 3) “hybrid nature” is impacted across the developing world.

Therefore, in this context, the study draws upon this propagation of culturalism in its widest sense and attempts to apply the analytical complexities to a masked import of culturalism by the West into Pakistan, recognising the immense influence of the United States in this domain through a variety of channels. One such process of influence is through the foreign policy debate, which is addressed through the might of multinationalism in the consumerism debate. This avenue reminds us of the importance and strength of commitment of present day United States foreign policy, where the most simplistic of events have a significant ramification for developing nations. Herbert Schiller's (1989: 19) contention is the idea that "big business today is the locus of systemic power". Implying that the strength of corporate power undertakes a concentrated effort through its financial, managerial and marketing expertise to influence the future direction of global foreign policy. Within the International Relations debate on globalisation G R Berridge (1992) draws our attention to Paul Sweezy (1946), who a decade earlier anticipated the globalisation debate by suggesting that capitalist states had to acquire colonies even where no economic gain was in sight. This was to ensure that to maintain a monopoly, the colonies may one day have economic and military value in the future, and thus enable an advantage over foreign powers or economic institutions. 'Economic democracy' has many shades, some of those are directly imported into the public domain of a developing society through the semblance of offering consumer choices, imported social and cultural values, and modernisation. Others, as Susan George (1994: 230) argues, are "political, military, economic (and) financial ...". Cultural imperialism in this context offers a Western hegemonic opportunity for a social, cultural and economic interaction led partly by the localised needs for development and modernisation, and partly by an external (Western) need for consumerism and interdependency on cultural products by the developing nations. Therefore, study considers that cultural studies and International Relations to have similar political objectives and patterns of analysis thereby recognising that culture is both a product for consumption and a weapon for global political influence.

The Rationale

The information technology revolution that was taking place in Pakistan during the 1990s offered a unique opportunity to undertake a piece of research that was to open up

a new world of cultural and traditional challenges towards modernisation for Pakistani society. This thesis offers to investigate the beginnings of a new age of technology and how a relatively new nation society will be responding to the development of this new technological change and how such changes will attempt to influence the growth of human development, modernisation and globalisation towards pulling Pakistan out of the global poverty trap which had been left behind as a legacy of the West. Or is this new era of change leading towards another 'colonial empire' for the 21st Century? The introduction of information and electronic technology in Pakistan is a major policy development, which requires enormous financial investment, skilled professionals and targeted human development strategies in social policy. The thesis will show that it will be only when such 'investments' are made by the governing elites in Pakistan that it may then be able to move towards releasing itself from the shackles of economic isolation and political destitution.

Organisation of the Study

Chapter one discusses the methodology, which led to the completion of the research thesis. The study, scrutinises and observes a collection of literature, argumentative debate, comparative analysis, and challenging notions that have been discussed throughout the research programme in order to place the debate into a cultural studies theoretical framework on which the survey of the respondents in chapter four is placed.

The methodology applied in the interviews is somewhat distinguished by identifying the purpose and reason for choosing one method over another for the research style of investigation. Namely, qualitative over quantitative. In the qualitative tradition of investigation, the aim was to explore the detail of both the respondent's cultural influence as well as balancing this against the data evidence that may be available to support the respondent's assumptions and views. The main theme to emerge from the interviews with the respondents was the disillusionment with the lack of progress in social and human development and, as a consequence, the lack of any meaningful investment in technology in Pakistan.

The study commanded numerous visits to Pakistan over a period of five years (1997-2002) to undertake the research programme. The successive visits to Pakistan have offered a valuable insight to the problems, politics and professions that exist in the country and how such functions have influenced and shaped the manner in which the nation and its people live.

Chapter Two examines the Human Development programme in Pakistan and its socio-economic and cultural impact on national growth. The chapter focuses on how the divergence between economic growth and human development offers the potential for up-lifting the human spirit, although it sets out the growing spread of poverty as a powerful interlocking effect which pre-empted most of the gains of development. The chapter analytically examines two of the three 'Five Year Plans', which offer a brief yet enlightening insight to the future prosperity of human development strategies for the country. The first of the two Five Year Plans covers the period 1988-1993, which is commonly known as the Seventh Five Year Plan. This Plan sets out a strategic analysis of population growth and its impact through International economic investment throughout the period on economic and human development in the country. On further examination, the research programme shows that very little progress was ever achieved in Pakistan during this period. Some reasons were identified in the following Eighth Five Year Plan as to the causes for this; economic contraction of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a recession in Pakistan's export markets, the Gulf War, the delay in the settlement of the Afghan issue, political uncertainties on the domestic front, frequent changes in government, civil disturbances in 1989-90, and the floods in 1988-89 and 1992-93 were some of the major issues cited. Growth for this period failed to achieve the expected targets. It was widely considered that the Seventh Five Year Plan followed historical trends. For example, the GDP grew by 5.0% (target 6.5%), Agriculture 3.8% (target 4.7%), and Manufacturing 5.9% (target 8.1%). As a consequence of the deficit, the domestic debt more than doubled during this period.

The chapter continues by examining the demographic challenges in Pakistan with growing concern about a forthcoming population explosion. Within the period 1972 to 1998, the population growth increased by 62.1 million in less than 30 years. Such

figures give serious concerns over Pakistan's planning needs for the next 20 to 30 years. Such changes to the demographic changes in Pakistan will begin to affect the social policy and human development strategies, which the government is struggling to bring under control.

Chapter Three looks at the development of education in Pakistan and its impact on the stratification of human development. The chapter examines the urban and rural divide in education development strategies where the government has claimed to have made significant investments into the education infrastructure however, for a variety of reasons, this objective, the debate shows, had not been achieved to its full potential.

The chapter focuses on a number of key influential educational attainment factors thereby indicating the potential growth of human development through education. The debate on education examines the Government of Pakistan Planning Commission statistics and compares them to an independent analysis which shows serious flaws in the government's own analysis of educational achievement in Pakistan. Although, the analysis recognises the importance of the quality and performance indicators, the debate nevertheless shows how such indicators are tainted by wide-spread corrupt practices within the education system and as a result the government of Pakistan may not offer a true reflection of Pakistan's educational growth patterns to world organisations.

The analysis of education offers to show some interesting comparisons between the different stands in education from primary to mosque to adult educational achievements and investments. The government's approach toward a defragmented education policy has led to strategies causing educational 'blindness' due to an endemically infected corrupt bureaucracy. Therefore the dilemma for Pakistan is fairly basic. Without basic reforms to Pakistan's political, social and economic system, the prospects for Pakistan appear somewhat bleak. Currently, the resistance levels towards change are high, due to the inadequate nature of development and the lack of sustainable services for human development, especially in education and information base institutions.

Chapter Four of the thesis concentrates at some length on the primary data of interviewing a series of respondents who have added valuable insight into the qualitative analysis of the research programme. The theme of the research was aimed at setting out a sequence of contributions from a pre-selected number of respondents who worked in a wide variety of occupations from cybernetics, government think-tanks, journalists, academics, the clergy, business and commerce. Their contributions offered a mixed array of feelings of confidence, disillusionment, apathy and hope towards the development of technology in Pakistan. The spirit of their arguments opened doors and windows into the hidden thoughts and aspirations of the poor, the destitute, professional classes, and academics.

The contents of the chapter focus on a collection of themes, not all necessarily connected, but clearly offering the widest possible opportunity towards capturing a 'snapshot' picture of how Pakistan's most prestigious elites, intellectuals and 'opinion leaders' see the country as a developing nation in the context of technology. The chapter challenges popularly held opinion amongst the 'culture-vultures' that technology is an unwanted addition to its traditions, its culture and its identity as an Islamic nation. But it also exposes a diversity of views about what the cultural identity of Pakistan is, and in doing so deepens our understanding of the fragility, or ambiguity, of that cultural identity.

In the debate in Chapter Five on modernity and globalisation, Pakistan features only in a limited capacity. To associate the debate in this chapter solely with Pakistan may have had some advantages, but overall this would have offered no more than a passing reference to a problem, which is better considered in a global context. Therefore, to gain the wider picture of cultural and traditional challenges to modernisation, the chapter has been placed in the global context and for this particular reason, The Chapter focuses the debate as widely as possible in order to retain the emotive message of globalisation as a challenging precept to the developing world and to Pakistan in general, and to the global Muslim society in particular as a reference point. Consequently, Chapter Five examines the theoretical argument of globalisation in the context of culture, identity and

modernisation in a developing society. This also serves to further develop and focus the brief literature review in this introduction.

The 'ping pong' debate between Akbar S Ahmed (1992, 1994), Edward Said (1995), Mike Featherstone (1995), Srinivas Melkote (1991), Javaid Saeed (1994) offers to explore a range of 'idiosyncratic' perspectives from culture to globalisation within the context of modernisation and how this effects the socio-cultural and socio-economic development of the third world. Ahmed's contention in this debate focuses upon the post-modernist theory directly and 'uniquely' challenging Edward Said's principle thought on Orientalism, where Said, sets out a new benchmark for the debate surrounding the West's distorted view of the Arab and Islamic world. Each of the two debates establishes, although unwittingly, a caricature of the 'Eastern' identity. Therefore throughout the debate, a number of theorists have subjected the argument to some degree of scrutiny by suggesting and challenging the question of, what is meant by modernisation and how does modernisation impact on the developing Muslim world in the context of culture and tradition? Chapter Five continues to set out the argument, covering a range of issues, some of them aired by Javaid Saeed (1994), who constructs the theme that globalisation and modernisation are perceptual arguments which have encouraged the political Western imposition of the neo-liberalist school of thought, by intellectualising the concept of modernisation, which may indeed further distance the relationship between development, culture and modernisation. So that globalisation and modernisation become an 'estranged' concept than that to which Said (1991) draws our attention in his book *Orientalism*.

The chapter concludes on the global Muslim society debate as having to determine the impact of technology on its social norms as a 'local society' and the effects of such an impact on their global identity. Pakistan, in this instance is no different from most other developing nations in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, in how it contends to face such challenges by having to share its cultural fears. Especially when such fears are placed against its economic aspirations whilst having to deal with, what Anita Weiss (1994) refers to as a "super culture" imposed upon the nation's social characteristics. The hegemonic nature of American (USA) culture, Mazrui (1990) further contends is the

“coca colonization” of the world and this freely continues unabated into what Boulding (1985) calls as having a single social system superimposed over the traditions, customs and values of a developing society. Many theories have been applied over time in an attempt to seek the material understanding of such a movement towards modernisation. In this context, Pakistan is no different and shares many of the same concerns that other developing societies have to contend with. Christianity, Islam and ‘capitalism’ are the three singular faiths that have been driven by the ‘split personality’ syndrome when having to inflict causes and concerns on such conceptual arguments. I have attempted here not to use Samuel Huntingdon’s (1996) metaphor ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Although it can be seen to aptly apply at this point, it represents a simplification and mistaken approach which this thesis goes beyond.

It is important to comment at the outset that the study of cultural identity in Chapter Six is drawn from the debate in cultural studies, where culturalism is the main protagonist; it is not a thesis grounded in International Relations, where academic debates of political identity would be the focus for discussion. The debate in Chapter Six on Culture embraces an array of cultural identities. In this context the political and cultural identity of a nation tenders the conceptual notion towards what a nation is able to accept, when compared to what it is?

The chapter debates the impact of technology on the ‘cultural identity of Pakistan’ by pre-supposing a debate about what is meant by the term, identity. Although it is commonly acknowledged that identity have a number of strands, which arguably begins with a sense of cultural identity as a people, then a nationalistic identity as a nation and finally the virtual identity towards modernisation. The chapter explores cultural identity, notwithstanding that the survey in chapter four, discusses at some length the clash of identity in Pakistan through a number of differing strands. Therefore, in Pakistan, the relationship between identity and culture is vague in definition yet at times disguised, in that it offers a cohesive pattern in its relationship for the differing parts of the nation. On the other hand, the relationship between modernisation and cultural identity is far from simple and offers a much greater challenge for the nation to overcome.

The final part of the chapter moves the debate a step further by taking a critical look at the political ideology left behind by the political leadership of Pakistan. The debate deals with the argument between socialism, secularism and religion. The demands which were placed upon the nation as a consequence of the three ideological positions have marked the battle lines from which each of the respective ideologies will now face in whatever form the future political circus takes shape. It is in this context that the Chapter focuses on the question, can modernisation take place in Pakistan and if so, at what cost to the nation and its identity. The 'clash of civilisations' takes place, not between the West and the East, but in this chapter between the modernisers and the traditionalists of Pakistan.

Chapter Seven focuses upon the visionary dream of the state of Pakistan from its inception in 1947 to 1999, seeing through a number of key political leaders each contributing and shaping to some degree the dramatic and influential changes that took place during this period. Three particular leaders have been drawn out of a web from this particularly colourful political period who in my view most likely led the nation through such changes that have had a profound impact on its uniqueness both as a Muslim nation and as an Islamic identity.

The first of the three political characters on which the Chapter draws upon is Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the Great Leader), who acts as the father of the nation driving his own vision for political change through the turbulent times of the British Raj into and beyond independence. Although Jinnah died soon after independence and therefore left little mark on how he saw the future of Pakistan, his legacy as a 'Great Leader' still remains in the minds and hearts of almost every Pakistani, whether Muslim or Christian. Jinnah had represented the path towards equality, justice and unity, bringing together a uniqueness of a Muslim identity that had almost been forgotten since the Mogul empire of India.

The second of the three great 'champions' was General Zia Ul Haq who came to power through a coup d'état (1977) by overthrowing a then 'populist' elected leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Zia's Islamist movement had brokered a sense of belonging, especially after

what had become a free wielding state towards modernisation by the deposed Bhutto. Although Zia's period had brought much hardship to the state and its people, many of the peasant class had felt a sense of belonging and began to establish a collective identity to which much of Pakistan's rural poor had aspired since the times of Jinnah's vision of individuality.

The Chapter closes with the dawning of Bhutto's sudden political rise at the age of 28 and increasing popularity as he became an avid advocate of democracy. Bhutto was a devoted reader of Karl Marx and much of this school of thought had shaped his political philosophy. Although arrogant to the point of rudeness, his aim remained to the end, to bring Pakistan out from the dark ages and into a modern striving and successful regional power both economically and militarily.

Chapter Eight introduces the debate on how the Information Society has become the most challenging conceptual debate for nearly a hundred years. Much of the last century has been concentrated on developing a social, economic and political framework for the massive (global) growth in technology, leading from agricultural, to industrial and finally to the information technology revolution. This revolution some have argued, has only just begun and what we see today is only a microchip of what is about to be unleashed upon the world. The Chapter examines some of these concepts and sets out the primary focus of how technology and 'development' have become intertwined, on the assumption that one is dependent upon the other.

The chapter draws upon a critical analysis of Pakistan's newly introduced Information Technology Policy which was published in 2000. The Policy examines Pakistan's desperate desire to become 'technologicalised', both for domestic consumption and for global integration into the market. The Policy is split into various categories in an attempt to manage its application across the different spheres of governmental influence and economic and educational development stratifications for the state. This was undertaken through the onset of various focus groups which the government refers to as 'working groups', whose intention was to oversee the implementation of the policy and its widest possible promotion and application. The chapter draws the reader's attention

to a number of critics of the policy; such criticism is based upon previous historical experiences within Pakistan rather than examining the impact of the Policy as it stands.

In brief, the link between modernity, culture and identity in Pakistan creates the desire for national development. Development and modernisation form key strategic needs for a nation, both in the sense of challenging traditionalism and promoting modernisation. No culture, no nation and no society can remain static. The question debated in this study is, how fast does Pakistan wish to travel along this journey towards change? Mohammad Saeed Zokaei (1998: 47) wrote: "in our daily decision making we often consider some degree of self interest and plan to achieve our goal." In similar fashion, Pakistan will have to consider its self interest and plan to achieve its goal whilst remaining competitive in the global markets. Without such a self interest Pakistan not only faces a problematic future, but may also continue on the same journey as it has travelled for the last fifty five years. Beyond the question of the speed of development is the question of how far development specifically engendered by new communication technologies challenges, changes or re-informs aspects of cultural identity, which I explore in the subsequent chapters.

A Note on Terminology

Before one begins, it is important to set out the 'rules of engagement' in terminology. I am quite aware that the usage of inappropriate and/or unsuitable terminology may lead the reader to misinterpret or mislead the argumentative debate within the thesis. I have striven, wherever possible, to define descriptive words and terms to relate to the internationally accepted definitions, such as that which is widely known as 'Third World' which has increasingly become unpopular and unacceptable within many circles not to be an accepted term for usage. Susan George (1992) commented upon how, countries that have become defined as Third World, are far too diverse than to be lumped into one singly defined category. Therefore, the expression used in this thesis is applied to mean a shorthand to a much wider descriptive term and has been interchanged with 'Developing Countries' and, on occasion, I have referred to the North-South and West-East concepts irrespective of the geographical location. Many of the descriptive terms have other meanings and some writers have written at length on

what should or should not be used. I have, by and large, selectively interpreted such advice by applying my own definition as I have deemed appropriate for the debate that is to be pursued in this thesis. One cannot expect nor would one assume that any descriptive term is a finite definition, and that such terminology remains like a 'revolving door', open for change and challenge.

The usage of the term America is probably a little simpler to deal with in this context. Latin America has remained concerned with the term America to represent oppressive and brutal financial and economic imperialism. Yet rightly so, the Latin American countries do not wish to be considered lumped into this camp, and demand that such terminology should not be seen to include the whole of the Americas in such a manner. Therefore, I have altered the description from the norm and referred to North America as the United States of America, United States, North America and on occasions the US and USA exclusively, ensuring that North America refrains from including Canada.

Throughout the thesis I have referred to Pakistan as an Islamic state, nation or country. The official name for the country is the 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan'. The country, although a Muslim nation, is not referred to within the officially defined description of an Islamic country or Islamic nation. Such terms when applied are meant to refer to a view held by or applied by the 'brokers' of the government system rather than by the international Muslim leadership within an recognised Islamic context.

Finally, it is important to refer to the conceptual theme used in the thesis 'electronic technology'. This is a widely used term to incorporate the whole network of electronic forms of technology, which are placed within the context of global communications networks such as, for example, mobile phones, the Internet, satellite systems, cinema and extraterrestrial television. Therefore 'electronic communications' and 'electronic technology' have been applied most often in the generic sense, rather than in the specific.

End Notes

¹ The figures were compiled from the Pakistan Handbook 1994-95, the Federal Bureau of Statistics 1995 and the Pakistan Census 1998. There appears to be some discrepancy over the 1981 figure, where the Federal Bureau of Statistics claims that in that year the population stood at 84,253 million. No accurate picture of the population figures has been available since the 1970s census. The government of Pakistan has not held a full census since Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government during the 1970s and even the figures that were available were considered to be highly questionable. The current figures available from the Department of Statistics are loosely based around estimated growth and from the voting patterns. Considering the Pakistan electoral system to be, at best, suspicious, the figures from 1972 to 1998 can not be wholly relied upon as accurate and should be seen as estimated figures which offer a general guideline on the population growth of Pakistan. The 1998 census figures available by the government at present are provisional figures and should be seen as such.


² Edward Taylor (1956: 23) *Primitive Culture*. Reprinted.

Chapter One

Methodology for the Study

Summary

Chapter One looks at the methodology applied throughout the research programme, offering a unique insight to the researcher's personal relationships, discussions and literature reviews that have taken place that form a detailed analysis and shape the originality of the thesis. The uniqueness of the research is placed within its innovation to capture the mood of the nation whilst it still grapples between modernity and traditionalism. Chart 1 shows an overview on how the originality of the thesis is explored debated and challenged throughout the study.



The Poor Man's Burden ...

Pakistan is a country of a wide and diverse culture and politics; it is not so simple as to suggest that it is a poor 'third world' country, lacking in basic amenities, proper sanitation and basic educational standards. Pakistan is a country of extremes. It has high mountains, fertile and barren lands and the juiciest of local fruits. Its villages are strewn across the land like dominoes on a pub table, and its cities are full of noisy cars and frantic people who hustle and bustle their way through their daily routines, giving the unsuspecting traveller his first impression of the chaotic pleasures in a colourful array of daily life. This country of over a 127 million cultural souls is divided unequally between the rich and the poor, the famous and the infamous, the educated and the uneducated, the materialist and the pious, the thief, the servant and the intolerant. The culture shock is certainly most striking and destabilising for the first few days, that is until you have your first brush with the local taxi driver, the village shop keeper or the impoverished rickshaw driver. That is when you come to realise that Pakistan is not just a society but also a nation of 'unequals'. As Dr Naseem Anwar from the Pakistan Science Academy put it:

"it is a country of thieves and sooner or later you have to become part of them in order to carry out your daily chores."

Dr Naseem Anwar¹ (September 1997)

The government of Pakistan which appears to be detached from the daily routine of people's lives is organised in a web of corrupt bureaucratic agencies, where each department or agency is propped up by the corruption of its official bureaucrats for its existence. The police, the civil servant, the bank clerk, the elected politician and the gatekeeper each serve to block the movement of official transactions, which serve the needs of a poor man's daily bread. The rich, the influential and the powerful are the owners, while the labourer is clearly the 'servant of the gods'.

Interesting as it might be to continue to pursue a descriptive analogue of activity in Pakistan, the serious point in the above paragraph serves to show that Pakistan's very nature is a catalogue of extremely diverse and conflicting identities, traditions and

cultures. The commonality amongst them is not the positive image of faith, cultural celebration or the rich communal identity. In fact, these are the very facets that divide the people of Pakistan. It is the corrupt and at times the un-simplistic manners of human behaviour that causes the crisis of identity, and yet offers to be the catalyst for togetherness.

Approach to the Problem

Henwood and Pidgeon (1993) comment on the psychological theorising of quantitative and qualitative research paradigms, suggesting that one of their key contentions is that undertaking qualitative analysis research cannot be simply reduced to a question of gathering, analysing and reporting non-numeric data. It is necessary to take a whole range of epistemological issues into account, as well as wider research practices. Julie Brannen (1992: 5) further explores the conceptual research paradigms of qualitative and quantitative methods and adds that such gathering of information is required to be placed within a humanist perspective for research to be undertaken for 'knowledge' purposes. Peter Reason's (1988: 20) work on the nature of *unintentional co-operative researchers* strives for the same objective through the sorts of issues that Henwood and Pidgeon address within the wider methods of undertaking an epistemological base for a research programme. The study has shown that this was clearly an issue for the type of methodology applied that enabled the research design to focus effectively on the nature and substance of the topic. The respondents were unwilling to engage in a debate of data collection for a whole host of reasons. Again, the primary one being that not enough 'reliable' statistical data was available in Pakistan that would have shown any coherent picture on the true nature of technology development. Other reasons were that the study had set out not to include this type of information in its methodology, but was more concerned with undertaking a non-numeric analysis of information gathering, in order that the widest possible perspective was possible, whilst maintaining confidentiality of the information shared. Due to the lack of credible information sources and limited access to large sections of the professional communities in this field; I became partly dependent on searching many of the daily and monthly English language publications for theoretical debates on information and electronic technology in Pakistan. This information formed part of the framework for debate and influenced discussion in this

area of development with the respondents. Therefore, in this context the study examines, scrutinises and observes a collection of literature. The argumentative comparisons, and challenging notions have been discussed throughout the study in order to place the debate into a cultural studies theoretical framework on which the survey of the respondents in chapter four is placed.

Fieldwork in Pakistan

Undertaking field research in Pakistan made me feel a little like a 'stranger amongst friends'. Pakistan is the country of my parents and my linkage to its culture, its traditions and its identity is no more than an ancestral accident. I found myself surrounded by 'strange', 'alien' and uncommon practices, customs and habits of the people of Pakistan, which I am sure influenced my own perceptions, assumptions and thoughts on the relationships I was about to embark upon, to seek the knowledge and information for my research programme. In theory, the route I was to take would have been a simple engagement of the communication of shared experiences. However, this proved to be naive at best and ill thought out at worst. My knowledge and experience of Pakistan, although simplistically extensive, and much of it based upon the stories told by my parents, uncles and aunts of times gone by, I thought would have sufficiently prepared me for this journey. However, my experiences of what took place enabled a much wider and elaborate focus on not only the intricate aspects of technology development in Pakistan, but also opened a window of new and growing traditions hidden to the normal Western experienced eye. I was a little less than welcomed by the respondents and their friends at first, yet at the same time enthusiastically summoned to share not their knowledge but that of my own. After many weeks of constant telephone calls and writing of letters to almost anyone who was someone in Pakistan, I was eventually taken into confidence by some of the leading members of the government agencies and our discussions began to take shape on the future prosperity of technology in Pakistan.

There were times that I had experienced low motivation, hopelessness and helplessness through frustrations and uncooperative bureaucrats who not only sent me on a wild goose chase across the country but caused numerous difficulties and challenges I faced

during the frequent visits I have made to Pakistan in-order to collect the information that shaped the writing of this PhD. During my visits to Pakistan I was arrested twice and unlawfully detained once whilst being robbed at gun point. And this was by the Police authorities. Had it not been for *Mr Ben*, things might have been worse. *Mr Ben* was a friendly Intelligence officer working in the Pakistan military intelligence who not only saved me from becoming a 'guest' at the notorious Rawalpindi Jail, but was also instrumental in having my personal belongings, my laptop computer and £500 returned to me.

On two separate occasions I was sent to Lahore and once to Karachi by 'senior' government officials only to find when I arrived at the Ministry of Information and Technology that the information I sought not only didn't exist but that the wasted journeys were a direct result of incompetent behaviour by the officials in not admitting that they did not have access to information to which they were claiming their source of knowledge. Although I did have on a few occasions a frustrating and challenging experience in Pakistan, I can not negate that fact that I had thoroughly enjoyed my research and the learning from my experiences will offer a valuable tool for future work that may stem as a result of investigating the impact of technology on the cultural and social patterns of behaviour on Pakistani society.

The methodology applied throughout the research programme has been based upon a number of key influential principles. Which are discussed in some detail below. The interviews were structured through a set of subject headings and questions, which were required to be covered through discussion and debate, and were applied systematically to all of the respondents. Several questionnaires were prepared in anticipation of using both a quantitative and qualitative approach towards gathering information. However, it soon became apparent that the key respondents were unwilling to address a questionnaire but rather preferred an open dialogue. It may be worth noting that the research programme was not undertaken through a single research design, but rather through a number of complementary practices and methodologies, using theoretical material, empirical data, government documents, qualitative (unstructured) interviews and cultural communication channels, and generally informal 'chats' over *tea and*

samosas to achieve the desired results. The respondents, although supportive of this research, were reluctant at first to become too closely associated with the research programme for a number of reasons. The primary one, which was shared with me, by Dr Muzafar Iqbal from the Pakistan Science Academy and Dr Ijaz Galani who is the Chairman of Gallup International at the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, was the fear of becoming misquoted on issues of national security. This, they felt may have serious consequences on their position within their respective organisations or within government circles to which their organisations were responsible to. This is not an uncommon fear in a country like Pakistan. It is often quoted that nepotism, corruption and governmental favours are a key distinguishing feature in employment, promotion and salary grades for civil servants and government agencies. Therefore, in order to establish credibility and confidence amongst the respondents, confidentiality, recommendations and referrals played a large part in accessing the respondents, and gaining their confidence in undertaking the research with their participation in general discussions on technology development in Pakistan. Nearly all of the respondents have viewed the transcript of their interviews when that was requested. It is also worth noting, that I was introduced to two members of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, who soon after meeting, became 'friendly companions' for the duration of my first visit to Pakistan in 1997. I refer to them within the thesis as *Mr Bill* and *Mr Ben*, in order to safeguard their identity (at their request). They had openly identified their profession at the outset. Although I was not hindered by their presence, I was on occasions suspicious of their continued presence at some of the interviews. I was not sure of the purpose of their presence and I assume it was on the instructions of a government department.

A Shared Experience

Interestingly, I read an account of a series of interviews undertaken by Janet Finch (1993) in her essay (Hammersley 1993: 166-180), *Its Great to Have Someone to Talk to?* Finch describes the unstructured style of her qualitative survey used to undertake research with clergymen's wives in England. The methodology used to interview the clergymen's wives outlines, as Finch comments on a more sombre form of interview technique based upon a series of questions which reflected the topics she intended to cover. The purpose of such a style of interviewing was based upon, as she reflects, the

male dominated public domain from which women find it hard to engage in discussions. Although this fact may be true, as much for women as it is for groups of people such as those in Pakistan that I had encountered. I too found that although the respondents were hesitant to participate in the research, they were always extremely hospitable, as much as the clergymen's wives were to Finch. Finch was able to establish a positive and encouraging rapport with her respondents, which was indicative to the types of relationships I was able to form in order to extract the information from my newly formed respondent 'friends'. The familiarity of shared experiences between the researcher and the respondents offered a bond within which information was freely exchanged. It was as Fred Blum (1971: 83) suggests, that you become the 'insider by exchanging shared experiences'. The issues that faced me in my research project were not so much the lack of information and opinions available, it was the hesitation by the respondents not knowing what would happen to this information in its final analysis. Finch's work underlines a style reminiscent to that of a doctor's wife meeting with her husband's patients and discussing the blooming of the flower parade on the local Common, and assuming by this, that you have made major strides into the lives and activities of those women. Whilst the majority of women may stand by and watch as lay observers at the unfolding series of dramatic events led on by their shared experiences, the participants lay themselves even closer to the interviewer in the hope that his/her analysis will draw the attention away from the perceived negativity and shine heroic iodises towards the contribution one had made to share with the world.

Finch's work suggests that by becoming friendly with your respondents and sharing with them the similarities of common shared experiences such as feminism, equality, injustices and other facets of this kind, this would lead the researcher to explore domains which may otherwise be prohibited to those from different backgrounds. Although instinct tells me there are distinct advantages to gaining the respondent's confidence from this type of research technique, this does not always secure acceptability and inclusion into the domain of the respondents from an outsider's point of view. A little later in the chapter, this debate outlines a clear argument where the challenge between, Blum (1971: 83), the 'outsider' and the 'insider' metaphors are set

out for an interesting discussion on this conceptual theme to which Finch draws our attention.

In this manner such conceptual ideals as those to which Finch refers hold some similarities to my own experiences as a researcher in Pakistan. There were times when many of the respondents were reluctant to share common experiences without first assuming that my own knowledge was of an adequate nature to understand the frustrations and concerns that they held on the lack of technology development in Pakistan. A long period of time was spent with some of the respondents, chatting, debating and discussing wider political developments (over cups of tea) in Pakistan and its relationship to the West before I was able to gain their confidence in accessing their patterns of intellectual thought on technology and human development in Pakistan. However, I am yet to be convinced that my sharing of the cups of tea had indeed opened a window to their inner consciousness of the 'self', or indeed the 'other' as Finch so eloquently portrays in her description of the clergymen's wives.

Therefore from this perspective, it is noteworthy that the body of the study draws on the work of Castells (1996), Sardar (1996), Fitch (1996), Akbar S Ahmed (1992, 1994), Featherstone (1995) and Sullivan-Trainor (1994), who have used a range of supportive material to explore the impact of cultural communications and electronic communications on social change. These studies critically support claims made about the potential for 'development' through information communication technology. The study is empirical, but not empiricist, in that it draws upon another's thoughts, theories and aspirations but not upon their findings or outcomes. It draws on the established approaches in setting the research agenda, and on Besser (1995), Davis (1996) and Sardar and Ravetz (1996), to name a few, in establishing a critical framework for analysis. The methodology is thus reflective and critical, but the main focus of originality in the study lies in the empirical work, which draws on this framework. The key concepts, 'globalisation', 'modernisation', 'tradition', 'identity', and 'cultural imperialism', Said (1991, 1994), Sardar and Davis (2002) and Tomlinson (1991, 1999), are well established within this literature.

The thesis develops the argument that while global technologies have the potential to promote modernisation in a traditional 'Third World' 'Islamic' society, evidence suggests that they have profound negative implications. Fjes (1976) stresses that the modernisation of a state takes place when it fully adopts the behaviour of Western institutions in developing its cultural, political and technological mobility from a traditional to a modern society. This view is supported by a number of renown scholars such as Lerner (1958), Maine (1907) and Cooley (1962), all of whom support the bipolar modernisation theory of movement from a rural, mostly agricultural to an urban, mostly technological society. This theory shows that the social and cultural concept of modernity promotes a growth in social inequality and economic imperialism in developing societies. Sardar (1997) refers to this concept as the "Darker Side of the West". In the face of a technological revolution which is taking place throughout the region, Pakistan needs to determine its own interaction, reflecting access to the public sphere, identity and censorship issues which are central to Pakistan's cultural, political and religious identity.

The study builds on the critique of an established modernisation theory, and argues that the dichotomy between 'tradition' and 'modernity' is particularly inappropriate as a starting point to study contemporary 'Islamic' societies. Habermas's notion of the 'public sphere' (Porter: 1997) provides a strong basis for a critique; it explains how the limitation of public access to information through cyberspace curtails the democratic nature of cyber-communications. The argument to strengthen this debate is conceptualised by Said (1991), Tomlinson (1991), Rojek (1995) and Featherstone (1995), who suggest that Western technologies and practices structure interpretations of the subject of imperialism, in ways which must be deconstructed if we are to understand the processes of cultural imperialism. This concern plays an important role in the future of information and electronic technology in Pakistan, which is striving towards maintaining an 'Islamic' identity, alongside developing a certain 'socio-capitalist' and 'secularist' culture.

Responding to the challenges of the Research

As reflected in the above discussion, the interviews in Pakistan were conducted under difficult and sometimes quite stressful conditions. The government of this country had created a political atmosphere in the country, particularly amongst the civil servants and professional classes, conducive to that of General Zia ul Haq's military government over a decade earlier. Many of the respondents were reluctant to be interviewed through a formal quantitative questionnaire, as this could cause, in their opinion, direct implications for the institutions for whom they worked. Others wished for an open dialogue, where several issues could be explored simultaneously and with transparency and openness. Therefore it became apparent, that the best way of establishing both confidence in the process and commonality of process, attempts should be made to explore the cultural interpretation of electronic communication technology of Pakistan through the eyes of the professional classes, rather than relying on the quantitative method of investigation in order to gain the maximum level of participation from the respondents.

The overall objective of the interview process was to develop a strong and positive relationship with the respondents in order to gain their confidence, to open their minds, access their knowledge and acquire an 'insiders' view to their aspirations for a globalised network of technology development and its implications for Pakistan. At times, this was difficult, as the respondents were unable to spend sufficient time to develop a rapport with myself as the researcher and at other times it was difficult, as most of the professionals were reluctant at becoming too close to the research programme. This was one of the many reasons why it was important to visit Pakistan on several occasions to gather information and to capture a broader understanding of the issues that faced that society. Much of this is reflected in Chapter Four. The assistance offered by *Mr Bill* and *Mr Ben* from the Inter-Services Intelligence bureau offered an 'official' sanction by the state by enabling a qualified authority for me to undertake the interviews as set out in Chapter Four.

The location for the interviews took place in all but one case, in Islamabad and the other single interview took place in Lahore. The reasons for choosing the capital city were

simply that it was here that much of the technology development was taking place and most of the key government agencies and departments were located. Many of the figures that were engaged in the debate on technology were centred around the capital city although their permanent residency may well have been elsewhere in the country. The city of Islamabad is a melting pot of community identities. Many of the residents have migrated to the capital in search of building their professional standing or seeking advancement in their career. The Government had introduced financial and professional incentives that added to the attraction. It is unlikely that I would have found such an array of talent elsewhere in the country as I did during my time in Islamabad. The respondents were selected through recommendations and referrals. Although I would have liked to have expanded my area of selections, this proved to be difficult due to the bureaucratic nature of the agencies in Pakistan. Nearly all were engaged in technology usage and most were political scientists in their respective fields. All of the respondents had some understanding of the nature of technology development and its impact on the cultural and social norms of society. Therefore the selection in that context was not only appropriate but proved to be extremely fruitful in gathering the information I needed for the thesis.

The research design was based on the idea that the most effective and valuable information could be obtained through a relatively small group of respondents, by remaining focused on attempting to work with respondents on a one-to-one basis, and occasionally in very small groups. Fred H Blum (1971: 83), wrote of his work with small groups of people who would give information to an outsider by becoming involved in the daily activities of their work and home routines, as the best means of extracting information. This theme was reminiscent of Kvale's (1996: 3-4) "Traveller" metaphor, which is discussed a little later in the Chapter. Blum's (1971: 83) analysis of the research practice developed a very clear and informal system of information gathering techniques which was not that dissimilar to my experiences, which attempted to informalise the relationship to such a manner, that the 'outsider' becomes the 'insider' for greater interaction with the respondents. By becoming part of the system of technological development, one is able not only to share the experience, but also to become part of the experience. However, other than sharing the normal moral issues of

confidentiality, the rest of Blum's style reflected a clear attempt at gaining the confidence and acceptability of the worker to share the details of their stories which were later compared with other stories gained through similar methods.

The main theme which began to emerge from the discussions with the respondents in Pakistan was their disillusionment with the establishment on the lack of progress towards advancing social and human development and, as a consequence of this, the lack of any meaningful government investment in technology in Pakistan. It was also recognised and accepted by the respondents, that Pakistan had a long way to go to build up its knowledge base, which was important for this process to begin. This was the general view held by all of the respondents with whom I had corresponded through interviews, emails, telephone calls and letters from the selected areas of political, scientific and educational spheres.

The research programme promotes the relationship between the current development of electronic technology and the information highway in Pakistan and how this may have an impact on the social, cultural and political development in Pakistan. Therefore the issues facing the project were not only to examine the relationship between development of electronic communications and the socio-economic growth of the state, but also to evaluate critically the theoretical and structural implications of the information highway on the cultural identity of Pakistani society. The disillusionment, shared by many of the respondents, made it extremely difficult to investigate the aim of the research programme, as set out on page six of the study, and caused at times, a difficult terrain to overcome throughout my time in Pakistan.

Limitation of the Research

The organisation of the study will not be looking at the social and political makeup of Pakistan nor will it investigate the political economy of the country, other than what is directly relevant to the research. The research will not address any aspects of the global media communications network to Islamophobia.

Co-operative Research Methods

The issue for me as the researcher, after gaining some degree of confidence from the respondents, was to decide what would be the best and most effective method of extracting information from the respondent and at the same time, to maintain both objectivity and clarity of the subject matter. The fact that emerged from my initial discussions with the respondents was that most of the subjects with whom I had corresponded, irrespective of their professional background, were formally and/or informally exploring the same topic, some with broadly similar aims, who would in the normal course of events be considered as a *co-operative inquiry group*. The respondents were 'unknowingly' working together as 'unintentional' co-researchers, exploring the changing world of cyber technology and its impact on Pakistan as a developing nation. Peter Reason's (1988: 20) work on the nature of unintentional co-operative researchers strives for the same objective, adding the impetus for my thesis to undertake a similar methodology used for the interviews in Pakistan; so as to test out a mixed approach towards collating information from individuals who would normally not be co-operative towards sharing intimate details of their nation's development programme with 'outsiders'. Pakistan, by its very nature, and since its conception in 1947, has been highly suspicious of external elements preying too deeply into the internal affairs of the nation. Much of this type of 'suspicion culture' has been cultivated after years of political and cultural turmoil between the two neighbours, Pakistan and India. This conflict of culture, economics and political identity between the two neighbours has set off a chain reaction of economic and military competitiveness bearing heavily on their defence expenditure. As a consequence of this, Pakistan has to contend with a growing tide of electronic and satellite invasions from its giant neighbour, India. India has been comparably successful in attracting the 'financial investment' in electronic technology and setting up satellite communication technology. Das (2002: 326) comments on the success of the Indian technology market throughout the last decade, where India has become the fastest growing economy between 1994 and 1999, rising 25% a year with a turnover of \$8.5 billion by 1999. Software exports have been growing by 60% over the last five years and exceeded \$5 billion by 2000, and are expected to reach \$50 billion by 2008. Das (2002: 326) went on to state: "Out of 19 top global software companies that had achieved the highest certification for quality, as many as 12 were Indian". India is

indeed taking great strides in technology development in almost all spheres of its economy. Pakistan is at the same time struggling to compete in an ever increasing market of competition for global engagement, and is 'theoretically' challenged by its 'political' competition with India, for its market share, not only in the technology sector but also in its heavy commitment to fighting for equality in national defence expenditure, commercial economics and cultural markets.

The adaptation of Reason's (1988: 18) idea was a 'simple' attempt to undertake, as he remarks: "research with people, rather than on people", and it was with this in mind that I began to explore Reason's (1988: 18), co-operative research theory. In practice, the broad outline of the methodology used in this research thesis was adopted from his work in order to overcome the difficulties that I was facing in extracting the information that I required from my respondents, whilst still maintaining their full co-operation and participation in my work. Reason's work on co-operative research came about after his attempts at exploring an earlier piece of research material that Reason and his co-editor John Rowan had undertaken entitled, *Human Inquiry* (1981), where they had developed a new paradigm, by placing together existing and new articles representing the emerging paradigm of co-operative experiential inquiry: *research that was with and for people rather than on people*. The co-operative style in this research programme of investigation was not used exclusively but rather combined with traditional forms of one-to-one qualitative research methods. The process was combined to ease the 'sociological fixture' of the human mind towards identifying cultural interpretations and norms that associated the individual with 'local' concepts such as identity, nationalism and Islam.

Cultural Influences in the Research

The methodology applied in the interviews is somewhat distinguished by identifying the purpose and reason for choosing one method over another for the research style of investigation. Namely, qualitative over quantitative. In the qualitative tradition of investigation, the aim was to explore the detail of both the respondent's cultural influence as well as balancing this against the data evidence that may be available to support the respondents assumptions and views. Unfortunately, data of the kind that we

have come to expect and on occasions, take for granted in the North, is not so readily available with due accuracy in the South. It was this point that forced the view to explore and include in the methodology alternative methods that would support a general perception of Pakistan's development in cyber technology and thereby theoretically move Pakistan into the world of modern global electronic communication technology. The application of Reason's style and methodology allowed the research outcomes of the interviews in Pakistan to focus beyond traditional forms of quantitative styles of information and data gathering.

Julie Brannen (1992: 5) discusses the various research paradigms of qualitative and quantitative methods in her work of combining both qualitative and quantitative methods, by suggesting that the differences which exist between the two paradigms have profound effects on the conduct and focus of the research material. Brannen (1992: 5-6) debates the two paradigms which associate themselves most clearly to analytical and enumerative induction and suggests the outcome which is drawn from the usage of the two styles of investigative theories, and she aims to gather information from "general or parent population (who) have a particular characteristic which has been found to exist in the sample population". By undertaking qualitative research this enabled the exploration of various concepts and categories and not necessarily their incidence or frequency. McCracken's (1988: 17) analytical description argues that: "qualitative work does not survey the terrain, it mines it". Comparatively, quantitative research methods have been associated with enumerative induction and qualitative methods that have traditionally been associated with analytical induction. It is noteworthy that both forms of induction paradigms have attracted a fair degree of criticism, from a variety of scholarly sources, for not allowing clear objective research material to be sufficiently analytical. However, it follows that the notion stressed by its original advocates Znaniecki (1934) and Lindesmith (1938), that analytic induction was defined in contradiction to enumerative induction and, therefore, that this should be the main methodology for the natural sciences. In the view of Znaniecki and Lindesmith, the main methodology used by the natural sciences, which is assumed to be the quantitative paradigm, is not synonymous with inferential statistics; rather they involve

the methods of analytic induction, where the researcher moves from data collection through to the formulation of a hypothesis to their testing and verification.

In applying the qualitative style of research to the respondents, consideration was given to the possibility that this may invariably lead to some problems and possibly criticisms from elements amongst the respondent groups and individuals, as most of the respondents, were engaged in, and familiar with, alternative research paradigms, namely, the quantitative or enumerative methodology. Therefore for the respondents, a case had to be made for a change from the traditional to an alternative form of research paradigm which would in such cases be a pro-active departure from the respondents' normative tradition.

One comment in particular is worth reflecting upon. Ahsan Abdulla from the National University of Science and Technology, (NUST), and the Author of *Pakistan and the Internet*, said after the completion of the interview, that he would rather have had a list of questions with 'tick box' answers, which he could address himself to. I was informed by *Mr Bill* and *Mr Ben*, that the reason for his fixation on quantitative research was based upon NUST being located on a military university campus with many of its student members from within the military. Using scientific precision was a customary tradition in such an institution, rather than examining the interpretation of social and cultural patterns. Furthermore, I trust that he may have believed that a quantitative questionnaire would have offered some (perceived) protection from misinterpretation and misquoting in the final analysis. Hiding the individual from external criticism and camouflaging the mass number of respondents through applying 'average analysis' applications, the comments of Abdulla, were in fact reminiscent (in the opposite sense), of other professionals who preferred a qualitative style for precisely the same reasons as those assumed by Abdulla, which in fact was, the fear generated from within the governmental establishment of how academics and professionals should conduct themselves whilst sharing information of national importance and of national security.

One may argue that in such cases a multi-method of research paradigms may have been prudent to accommodate such situations. I would however, disagree. What was

required, in addition to a systematic approach, was to enjoy not a statistical analysis of the data, but a cultural and national interpretation of what was happening in Pakistan in technology and how this was impacting on the cultural and national identity of the society as a whole. Furthermore, the shelves of almost every academic library in the world are littered with national statistical data on how national economies and academic institutions were coping with new and informed technology innovations. Using a quantitative paradigm would have had a limited impact in identifying cultural changes and social habits as a direct influence of technological development, thus limiting the overall gains of achieving the desired aim of this study. Hazel Qureshi (1992: 102) discusses some aspects of integrating methods in research, where she makes reference to the work of Abrams (1998), who argues the value of qualitative research, particularly when it lent itself to prove a valuable tool for investigation over quantitative methodology. Abrams argues that the experience of using less structured interviewing techniques resulted in overcoming value-based data analysis and therefore reduced the "taken for granted" assumptions that appear when using a quantitative approach. This approach Qureshi (1985: 1-9 - 1992: 102), goes on to suggest, supports the assertion that when using unstructured methods, this made it possible to "uncover unanticipated responses which led to the creation of a more adequate framework for understanding their participation".

The fundamental reasoning for pursuing the qualitative style of research is placed within the purpose of undertaking this particular paradigm over another. Although this question has been partly addressed, there are some further sociological issues which require some attention in order to place the practice within a particular theory. The object of field research can be easily determined by the quality of the information the researcher gathers. To some degree this gathering of information for qualitative purposes may well determine the researcher to explore a given culture and how that culture may be straining under new dominant discourses. Although to understand a culture from raw data is hard enough a task, not being familiar with the same culture can be an impossible task. Nevertheless, the exercise of gathering qualitative information is an attempt by the researcher to explore and interpret the goal on how

parts of the culture fit together through the behaviour, interpretation and responses of the respondents.

Martha Feldman (1995: 2) comments in the opening pages of her book on the interpretation of field research as: “starting to create an interpretation is like trying to start a jigsaw puzzle that has a million indeterminate pieces”. Her argument focuses on the fact that culture may be seen as a range of miss-fitting pieces, one piece may have many comparable links to other pieces and join many different parts of the same puzzle without showing a true picture for the end solution. To this end, Feldman (1995: 2) points out that ‘*cultural clusters*’ or “clusters of data may stick together.” The goal in such cases is to determine through the researcher’s mind and as the data is gathered, on how to open the boundaries of these clusters and how to enable them to interact together.

Therefore, in the context of the present study the qualitative field research with the respondents was precisely to un-cluster the scientific data from the *cultural clusters* which had become embodied to form a distorted view of a developing society, which was primarily led by the economic and social determination of the global elite. In simple words, the question arises, whose interest would it serve to have a *pretend technology society* where 9/10 of a society have little or no access to basic literacy skills, let alone technology skills? Dr Anis Ahmed from International Islamic University of Pakistan, made a poignant remark when I discussed the concept of borrowed cultures, where he stated:

A nation stands on its own feet; thinks with its own brain; looks with its own eyes and vision. If our vision is borrowed; if our brain is borrowed; If education is borrowed. If the economy is based upon charity given by some world organisations. Then it is futile to talk about technology as it is adding one more aspect to the existing slavery.

Dr Anis Ahmed

In such circumstances, it is worth reflecting upon the idea that *cultural clusters* may become embodied to form a disfigured image of a developing society, but at the very least, that disfigurement is not based upon the values of global economic greed or

cultural *bastardisation* of a developing society by the multi-national corporations, where technology becomes just another form of, in the view of Dr Ahmed, “economic and cultural slavery”.

The overall narcosis of technology has entrapped a clear perception of its true value for development, the battle between accepting technology and rejecting it appears to come from two fronts. The first, concerns how Pakistan should engage in developing economic prosperity, set against the opposition to technology as a system of dependency on the West. This is presented as being yet another form of colonisation. The second approach asks, how technology can be used as a means of ensuring greater competitiveness in a global economic market? Dr Anis Ahmed went on to comment that: “the West offer their message very clearly through their media communication channels, and tell us how they want us to design our economy, our education and our culture in light of so called globalisation”. The chief concern of Dr Ahmed and many scholars of his calibre, is to examine how Western influence on developing nations will begin to challenge the social order of society from a ‘thousand miles’ away, and if Pakistan wishes to remain in the global race for development, it will be forced into accepting changes beyond which Pakistan can economically, traditionally and socially afford.

The Interpretation of Information

Interpretation of the information is based upon a series of assumptions made by the researcher, in that firstly the researcher, before attempting to undertake the investigation must have some degree of in-depth knowledge of the events under investigation and the context under which they are being placed. This knowledge can be gained through various data-gathering techniques, such as participant observation, interviews or other data gathering methods. This assumption further requires the researcher to have collected field notes, interview notes, audio or visual tapes and other forms of hard copy data information appropriate to the research task. This collection of data information reminds the researcher of a host of different episodes and events that took place during

the course of the investigation and would significantly contribute to the overall analysis of the research study.

Experimental Interview Techniques

The collection of this information, both from a visual and material sense, formed the basis from which I was able to fill in the gaps left by the respondents from the interview discussions and to remind myself of forgotten aspects of the cultural interpretation of the respondents' analysis on the specific events under scrutiny. Steinar Kvale (1996: 1) discusses some aspects of this process in his work on interview techniques in qualitative research. Kvale (1996: 1) comments, in the opening page of his book, that qualitative research enables one "to understand the world from the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples experiences, to uncover their 'lived' world prior to scientific explanations". The process by which knowledge is gained for the purpose of interpretation of information, offers various research paradigms for experimental interview techniques. The one that is shared within this thesis, is best illustrated by Kvale (1996: 3-4) with his two contrasting metaphors of the interviewer – *as a 'Miner'* or *as a 'Traveller'*. An extract from his works is set out in Box 4 to illustrate the implications and versions of different theoretical understandings of interview research:

Experimental Interview Techniques

BOX 4.

The Miner

In the *Miner Metaphor*, knowledge is understood as buried metal and the interviewer is a miner who unearths the valuable metal. Some miners seek objective facts to be quantified, others seek nuggets of essential meaning. In both conceptions, the knowledge is waiting in the subjects' interior to be uncovered, uncontaminated by the miner ... the therapeutic interviewer mines the deeper unconscious layers.

The Traveller

The alternative *Traveller Metaphor* understands the interviewer as a traveller on a journey that leads to a tale to be told upon returning home. The interviewer-traveller wanders through the landscape and enters into conversations with people encountered. The traveller explores the many domains of the country, as unknown territory or with maps, roaming freely around the territory. The traveller may also deliberately seek specific sites or topics by following a *method*, with the original Greek meaning of *a route that leads to the goal*. The interviewer wanders along with the local inhabitants, asks questions that lead the subjects to tell their own stories of their 'lived' world and converses with them in the original Latin meaning of *conversation as wandering together with*.

Steinar Kvale (1996: 3-4)

The two metaphors of the interviewer Kvale suggests, that as a miner or as a traveller reflect differing concepts of knowledge formulation. Each of the metaphors represents the interviewer seeking alternative genres of people's own interpretation of their worlds. The miner metaphor offers the interviewer the picture of a common understanding of modern social science of knowledge as given. The traveller metaphor, on the other hand, refers to a postmodernist constructive understanding that requires a conversational approach towards social research.

The techniques applied in Pakistan, whilst travelling on the journey of seeking information to meet the objectives of the programme, brought me as the researcher into human interaction with the respondents at various professional levels. There are of course multiple forms of conversation, to which Kvale (1996: 10) addresses himself, such as everyday life, literature, philosophical and professions and all of these areas that have their own levels of human conversational interactions, such as chatting, exchanging views, news and disputes, or indeed formal presentations and sharing of theoretical knowledge. The interaction with the respondents, fell into two main categories; *casual conversation* i.e. everyday life and a *academic exchange of views*, that is, professions, thereby addressing the theoretical methodology of interaction through the conduction of informal interviews. This engaged each session to lead towards exploring theoretical conceptions of specific themes investigated, as well as examining the nature of the social and cultural worlds within which each concept existed. All contributing towards the production of knowledge.

The means of gathering information for the purpose of knowledge are explored further by Martha Feldman (1995: 8) whose work addresses some of the applied research interpretation techniques, and how they are relevant to the interpretation of data in qualitative research. The respondents, with whom I had interacted, relate very much to some or part of all of the following techniques and set a qualified standard for their own reasoning for the interpretation of technological development in Pakistan as they saw it.

The techniques of analysis are based upon assumptions which the researcher and respondent are prone to make during their time of interaction. The research in this case

has to ensure that such assumptions are appropriately applied to the settings under investigation. Feldman (1995: 4-7) suggests that such assumptions are barely worth mentioning, as the application of the assumptions are broad and may be used in a wide ranging field of study. Nevertheless, she argues that the researcher should be mindful in any event. The qualitative research methods offered opportunities to make assumptions from the evidence that I had gathered that may have influenced my work both negatively and positively. Much of this depended on how the research was gathered the information, from whom it was sought and how it was analysed. Careful choices were made, to avoid this pitfall and much of the information was checked through informal discussions with others who worked in parallel to the respondent's own work, profession or interest. Culturally biased information was the main danger and was at times difficult to avoid or identify due to my own limited knowledge of Pakistani society and from the respondents own cross socio-cultural background. However, again this was overcome through accessing South Asian academic publications, newspapers and magazines where such debates were taking place across the sub-continent and comparatively analysing the material before committing myself to the responses from the respondents. The objective was not only to look at how the information was objectively sought, but how such an objective had gained the credibility for acceptability.

Feldman's (1995: 8) view on ethnomethodology suggests that it is an assumption that people within a culture have procedures for making sense which are culturally influenced. Such procedures are normally verbal, such as telling stories and giving explanations. Other procedures are non-verbal and may be actions such as forming lines at bus stops or ticket counters. This technique consists of cultural habits that lead to giving meaning to actions, rather than consisting of a stable set of things, thereby recognising that this is a primary focus on how norms of a society are developed, maintained and changed rather than attempting to interpret what those norms are. From this perspective, Suchman (1987: 57) argues that: "the outstanding question for social science ... is not whether social facts are objectively grounded, but how that objective grounding is accomplished."

Moreover Harold Garfinkel (1967) undertook to examine the methodology of research by attempting to disrupt common or shared reality. This was done through various channels, where rules or norms were not followed. Common understanding and accepted principles were violated, and people were seeking explanations of well understood statements or questions and so on. Garfinkel's experiment attempted to show the failure of what was ordinarily seen as being matters of everyday life are taken for granted. He found that many people became very disturbed by breeches of actions which were, in the most part, ordinary everyday experiences and led to shared experiences becoming less shared and more a matter of individual interpretation of cultural and social actions. One may well argue, for example, in a simplified form, similar events can be seen to occur in a society such as that in Pakistan, where norms are challenged by questions and practices which sometimes exhibit violent reactions against change. Such as has been displayed, when General Zia challenged Pakistan's modernisation programme under the Bhutto Government by overthrowing him and eventually killing him, in order to preserve 'Islamic values' as Zia saw them. However Bhutto, on the other hand, had attempted to share with the nation everyday global experiences of modernisation, which may have pulled Pakistan from the 'dark ages' into a 'modern regional power'. The clash between the two ideologies led to challenges for 'normality', yet both were, in such cases, right to assume their 'norm' was 'normal'.

Another simple comparative example, was shared with me, when some of the respondents who favoured 'technologicalisation' of Pakistan, stated that with the onset of development of technology in Pakistan, this change will automatically lead to national development and economic growth. A challenge to this conceptual belief triggered both surprise and agitation from the respondent, as though one had sacrilegiously challenged a commonly accepted norm as an accepted guarantee for growth. Such norms are based upon some degree of supportive material, as was the case here and very much supported by Dr Ijaz Gilani (1998: 35) when he commented in his article, that regional economic cooperation can make progress if it situates itself judiciously within a favourable global environment. Thereby, giving legitimacy to the understood norm for development amongst some of the respondents who believed that globalisation was the route towards development for Pakistan.

Successive Visits to Pakistan

The study entailed several visits to Pakistan over a period of five years to undertake the research programme. The first was in 1997 and the final visit was in October 2002, to finalise any developments that may have taken shape since the previous visits. These successive visits to Pakistan have offered a valuable insight to the problems, politics and professions that exist in the country and how such functions have influenced and shaped the manner in which the nation and its people live. Had I not visited the country so many times to seek to extend my knowledge and information for this thesis, I would not have been able to gain the social-cultural awareness of the nation and its people and how such socio-cultural patterns of behaviour have interacted with the political and cultural identity of the country.

End Notes

¹ Dr Naseem Anwar is a senior scientist at the Pakistan Science Academy Islamabad. Although he was not formally interviewed, much of the time that was spent with him was to learn about key developments in the field of science and technology and became one of the main focal points for introductions to key professionals within the field of technology.

Chapter Two

Human Development in Pakistan

Good intentions are useless in the absence of common sense.

Jamil Baharistan

Summary

Chapter Two debates the problems facing Pakistan in Human Development terms. The chapter examines a number of themes that argue the reasons and processes which have caused massive failures in reaching its goal through inept and irresponsible policy decisions, in appropriation of international funds and incompetent bureaucracy. Equally, the chapter looks at the human potential for growth and the willingness of the government to offer selective opportunities within urban areas for human development. The Chapter acknowledges that health and education are significant factors in the potential for human development and this has been recognised as a key central feature for the future. The chapter captures the essence of education as the starting point for development, as the process for a collective vision of the nation. Therefore, in the context of development, it can be simply defined as an improvement in human well-being. In this context, the chapter debates human development in Pakistan as an aspiring nation towards higher living standards, longer lives, fewer health problems, quality education and a potential for higher income per capita.

The Nature of Human Development in Pakistan

The World Bank was the first international monetary institution to refer to the term 'human development' in its World Development Report 1980, where it stated that human resource development, here called human development, to emphasise an end as well as a means of economic progress. The report goes on to suggest that Human Development is much more than the rise and fall of national economies. It is about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accordance with their needs and interests. The interesting challenge that the report throws out is that nations should see people as the wealth of their nation. Development is thus about the expansion of choices in education, health, employment, commerce, economics and politics. It is this context that the human divergence between socio-economic growth and human development is greater in Pakistan than in most other countries. Economic growth has created the potential for uplifting the human spirit, yet widespread poverty prevails because of powerful interlocking feudal-industrial interests, which pre-empt most of the gains of development.

When one examines the human development failure in Pakistan, one cannot but help to conclude that many of the problems facing the nation have been a direct result of inaction on the part of the government. It is not unknown for the Pakistani governing elite to unnecessarily intervene in the country's economic and social development, as a means of fuelling a high level of corruption through government bureaucracy. Had it not been for the creative and dynamic private sector, Pakistan's economic engine would have ground to a halt and at worse collapsed. However, with all the social, economic and cultural contradictions that Pakistan faces, still it seems to stumble through an ever-changing economic climate of social decline and economic deprivation. Appendix 1 shows some startling comparisons on the government's human development strategies; although there are some significant increases here on development, nevertheless the overall position within the country is somewhat disconcerting. Appendix 1 reflects the comparative levels of human advancement potential and the causes for human distress in education, health, demographic balances and poverty and offers a startling picture for Pakistan's future. Under education, although there is an increase of 36% in adult

literacy rates, two thirds of Pakistan's adult population remain illiterate. Equally, over two thirds of the population remain without access to basic health facilities and nearly a quarter of the population live in 'absolute poverty'. In an attempt to reduce the increasing levels of under-development in Pakistan, some policies have been put in place by the government to combat the degradation of development. However, the government endeavours to shade-over some of the more serious inadequacies resulting from poor governance. The overall picture continues to look bleak for Pakistan and unless serious policy initiatives begin to take shape, Pakistan faces a daunting future in the 21st century.

The Census 1998

The Pakistan census was finally published in 1998, after almost 17 years of trepidation. The census had been used as a political machine to maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding the true nature of the population size of Pakistan. The population census has had a troubled history, many believed that it would never take place, and those that thought it would be published were sceptical of its outcome and whether the census information would truly reflect the state of the nation. Idrees Bakhtiar writes in the *Herald* (Nov 1997: 81-84) an interesting article on this very issue which deserves some examination and hopefully concludes an era of political intrigue, fascination and suspicion with its final outcome. With the exception of the 1951 census, all subsequent counts since 1961 have, in varying degrees, been caught up in controversy. Bakhtiar (Nov 1997: 81-84) continues, "in 1961 the population was under represented by up to 15%, as against the accepted standard of four or five per cent". However, the first census that brought the whole issue to a head was under the Z.A. Bhutto's government in 1972, where it was widely believed that the figures had been manipulated to serve the interests of the rural landowning gentry. The government after concluding the census, had hidden the results for over five years. This resulted in mass misinformation of population sizes throughout the country which was intended to, and did work favourably for, the ruling government. When the census results were finally published in 1978, the figures in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh, showed that the population stood at 3.6 million this was at a time when it was widely believed that the population of Karachi stood at seven million. Manzoor Choudhary (1997: 237) remarks:

“Even if this figure was deemed as greatly exaggerated, it should be remembered that by 1972 (at the time of the census count), more than 5.3 million identity cards had been issued in Karachi”. Bakhtiar’s article goes on to suggest that various manipulations of the figures took place under Z.A. Bhutto’s government. For example, Mirza Jawad Baig, the founder of the Pakistan Qaumi Tahreek Party allegedly told the *Herald Magazine* that:

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had ordered that the population figures of the Punjab be decreased by 25%. Meanwhile, in rural Sindh and the smaller urban areas, Bhutto authorised that results be inflated by 200% in the small cities of the province. These charges were later substantiated by a Home Secretary of Bhutto’s first government. Appearing before the courts, Mohammed Khan Junejo admitted that the population figures of Karachi and other urban areas of Sindh had been reduced to almost half on the instructions of Z.A. Bhutto.

Mirza Jawad Baig:
Herald Magazine (Nov.1997: 82)

Despite this ‘mistake’ the figures were never corrected. Such figures allowed some favourably selected parliamentarians to increase the number of seats in their constituencies and others, who were not so favoured, to have them reduced. Naturally, it was those who were either opposition party members or those who were out of favour with the Bhutto government that lost out on the redrawing of the population figures. This manipulation of figures is not an uncommon practice, as neither is the manipulation of resources for the country; corruption of almost every kind has played an influential role within the political framework of Pakistan, creating a now endemically corrupt political system from which to re-adjust or re-direct towards true democracy is an almost impossible task.

The Weekly Herald (November 1997) points out that the constitution of Pakistan states that a national census should be held every ten years. It goes on to comment that the next census to be held after the 1972 fiasco was in 1981; the results of that census have never been published and therefore the true outcome of the census could well be sealed forever. In 1991, the government again attempted to carry out a house to house census, however this census was never completed, but some unofficial preliminary results from the survey showed (the official results were never released) that the census was showing

massively unrealistic figures of population growth in Sindh. The population had swelled from 19.03 million to 51.63 million within the time span of ten years. Hyberabad and Karachi combined rose to an increase of 172% to 112%. Many other towns and cities fared equally in the same survey.

Pakistan Census

Table 1

Town or City (1991)*	% increase (1991)*	Numbers (million) (1998)**	Numbers (million) (1998)***	% discrepancy
Jacobabad	288	3.9	1.66	(58)
Sukkur	265	4.0	6.33	58
Shikarpur	272	2.3	1.13	(51)
Larkana	397	4.6	2.36	(49)
Nawabshah	46	2.4	1.59	(34)
Dadu	357	3.9	1.63	(59)
Hyberabad	135	4.8	3.64	(25)
Badin	77	1.32	1.45	0.9
Sanghar	315	3.83	1.68	(57)
Tharparker	196	4.44	0.90	(80)
Thatta	199	2.27	1.35	(41)
Karachi	89	10.33	8.76	(16)
Naushero	772	3.0	1.29	(57)

*Source: Herald November 1997: 82
 **Source: Population and Housing Census (4) 1998. Sindh (Provisional)
 *** This column indicates the discrepancy percentage between the 1991 and 1998 Figures

Table 1 shows the 1991 figures with an increase of up to 75% in rural Sindh and a decrease of up to 42% in urban Sindh. It is not surprising that the 1991 census had created an uproar and had to be abandoned. The debate in Pakistan over these events covered both sides of the argument, one being that the rural leadership claimed these figures were correct and that previous census population figures of Sindh had been underestimated, and that the 1991 census had corrected a previous wrong. On the other hand, others claimed that the size of the rural population of Sindh had been exaggerated beyond reason. The urban leadership had maintained that the increase had been deliberately manipulated to deprive the urban areas of their true representation in the National and Regional Government Assemblies and in the allocation of resources. However, it can be seen that the final column in Table 1 shows the percentage

discrepancy indicating that large chunks of the population had simply disappeared. This astonishing revelation may not be as 'mind blowing' as it first appears, as there is no firm assurance that these figures have not also been manipulated to serve the interests of the then Sharif government and if previous experience is an indicator towards the future, then one may not be cynical if it is suggested that these figures represent a questionable outcome for the census. Unfortunately, it cannot be proven one way or the other, as no politically independent organisation has been able to verify the current census.

The friction over the 1991 figures has continued to build mistrust within the political circles in the country. This had created enormous burdens upon the people of Pakistan with the reduction of both representation in the political assemblies and the withdrawal or reduction of vital resources. In a country like Pakistan, this would be a major setback for any government initiative, which may heighten the combat against poverty and health related problems. In addition to the Sindh problem, Balochistan is another area where Bakhtiar (Nov 1997) argues, the population figures have gained another twist. In the 1981 figures Balochistan was shown to have increased in population by 7% per annum, or 77.23% in the previous ten years, as against the 3% national growth. The 1998 census-(5), states that the current population of Balochistan is 6.5 million against 4.3 million figure for 1981. This shows an overall percentage increase of 50.3%. The government figures show a reasonably modest increase in the annual growth of 2.42% compared to 2.61% in 1981.

Today the situation in Balochistan has become more complex with the influx of Afghan refugees (Pushtuns) who have taken on Pakistani Identity Cards and become entrenched into the local population figures. This influx of Pushtuns however, does not show to be a comparable figure within the overall population increase according to the 1998 census and therefore, the census may well have excluded refugees from the survey for the purpose of maintaining a stable population growth, and possibly to prevent Pushtuns from gaining any serious political representation. The fear amongst the Balochies is that the balance will tilt in favour of the Pushtuns whose political parties are already arguing for political representation within the government. This would create additional problems for both the government and the indigenous population with regards to

development funds for health, population control, poverty and other social ills, which the national and regional governments are currently battling to control with meagre resources.

The fact remains that the importance of conducting a proper census survey allows a dispassionate approach towards equality of representation and appropriate development funds to be targeted towards the areas where they are most needed. The politicians and landowners of course, would rather manipulate the census figures in order that a more favourable political balance is achieved, which would serve their own political, social and economic interests at the cost of poverty and health disparity throughout the country. This playground of politics within the country serves no one's long term interest and further opens an already unbridgeable divide between the rich landowning classes and the poverty stricken poor, whose voices are denied in order that power and control is maintained through authoritarian abuse of the so-called democratic system.

The Seventh Five Year Plan (1988-1993)

In view of how the population growth in Pakistan has broadened beyond internationally acceptable limits, this may have long term implications on Pakistan's inward investment programme and remaining mindful of the country's international economic investments; a brief overview of the Seventh Five Year Plan 1988-1993 (7th Plan), is set out below and offers a selective account of key issues in order to examine the level of success (and failure) of the Plan.

The 7th Plan was prepared within a socio-economic framework of a fifteen-year prospective (1988-2003). The Plan emphasised efficient growth and to improve the quality of life for its citizens. The overall objectives of the 7th Plan were to address the deficiencies in economic areas such as fiscal and current accounts deficits, inflation and unemployment. However, little real progress was made according to the Eighth Five Year Plan (8th Plan), this was due to a series of problems which had occurred within the country and changes in the global market. Some reasons were outlined in the 8th Plan as to the causes for this: the economic contraction of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, recession in Pakistan's export markets, the Gulf War, the delay in the settlement

of the Afghan issue, the political uncertainties on the domestic front, frequent changes in government, civil disturbances in 1989-90, and the floods in 1988-89 and 1992-93. Nevertheless, (Planning Commission 1994: 44) the 8th Plan, concludes by stating that: “the overall performance was satisfactory”. Some of the key issues that may have contributed to the overall failure of the 7th Plan may also reflect on the massive levels of corruption within the government and the incompetence and total disfigurement of the economic, social and welfare institutions, which have led to the dismissal of the various Pakistani governments on several occasions within the last ten years. This finally ended with a military coup d’état in October 1999, which resulted in the downfall of the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League and his predecessor Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan Peoples Party, would be both charged and tried on charges of gross incompetence and corruption. I would not expect that the government would have wished to add this to its overall strategy review, but nevertheless, such factors are an important part of the overall failure of Pakistan’s economic, social and welfare programmes through previous years.

The growth targets which are set out within the 7th Plan did not achieve the expected level of success. It was therefore, widely considered within pro-government circles that much of the 7th Plan followed historical trends. The following illustrative points which were set out by the Planning Commission in its report offer an indicative picture of Pakistan’s weakening economy:


- | | |
|------------------------|---------------|
| ▪ The GDP grew by 5.0% | [target 6.5%] |
| ▪ Agriculture 3.8% | [target 4.7%] |
| ▪ Manufacturing 5.9% | [target 8.1%] |
| ▪ other sectors 5.3% | [target 6.7%] |

(Planning Commission 1994: 3).

The macro-economic framework for Pakistan was considered to be a failure in that the projections laid out in the 7th Plan did not materialise. The trend in the fiscal deficit has been as follows:

Fiscal Deficit

Chart 2



Planning Commission (1994: 4)

As a consequence of the deficit, the domestic debt more than doubled during the 7th Plan period, rising from Rs.290 billion (£2,826,731,129) in 1987 to Rs.605 (£5,897,872,875) billion in 1992-93. The annual growth in monetary assets at 15.2% was higher than the 7th Plan target of 12.5%, however it was close to the nominal GDP growth of 14.9%. The Planning Commission outlined in the 7th Plan a distinct change in the economic structure, which had been encouraged by a steady growth compared with earlier Plans by suggesting that the industrial sector increased its share of total output, surpassing agriculture for the first time. However, after reading further into the report, this might be due to the fact that agricultural output had gone down from 46.6% to 24.5% during the same period. The issue here was considered from the point of view that Pakistan rejoiced in the belief that industrial output had increased in its final analysis. The decrease in agricultural investment would by default push up the industrial outputs and appear to suggest on paper that real time economic growth was occurring. When in reality, targeted disinvestments by the government was leading only selected targeted growth.

The Eighth Five Year Plan (1993-1999)

Like any responsible government, Pakistan has continued to embark upon a series of Five Year Plans, the latest being the yet unpublished Ninth Five Year Plan 2000-2005. As the full plan is not yet available, it is difficult to see how Pakistan has featured in its long term economic and social planning policies. Therefore, much of the work in this chapter is based upon the previous Eighth Five Year Plan (8th Plan), as a benchmark for growth of its economy and social strata. The 8th Plan was drawn up in the light of major changes to the political and social conditions of Pakistan in early 1990s with the assassination of the then military ruler General Mohammed Zia ul Haq, and after the return to democratic governance within the country. There is however, a government booklet on the Ninth Five Year Plan produced by the Planning Commission 1996, which offers a broad brush approach towards Pakistan's current economic and social thinking, although the information in this booklet is limited to a series of short statements which are mainly directed against the previous government of Benazir Bhutto (December 1988 – August 1990) inability and failure to meet its targets. There is no statistical or empirical data within the booklet, nor does it offer any considered insight into what the government of Pakistan hope to realise over the period of the next Plan. The booklet appears to be mainly a public relations exercise by the government and it serves little use for anything else at this stage.

A few landmark pointers were set out in the 8th Plan which indicated some degree of optimism by the then Bhutto government for its sincerity and commitment to invest in strategic social and economic policy initiatives that would enhance human development plans in the country. This offered some level of hope and balance to the people of Pakistan in the disparity of services which condition the human confidence towards building social and economic equality in an already unequal society. However, the 8th Plan proffers some interesting investment proposals, which illustrate some level of serious thinking about the country's future compared to its predecessor, the 7th Plan. The investment proposals for the period of the 8th plan are set out as follows:

Investment Proposals**Box 5**

<u>Landmarks for the 8th Plan.</u>	<u>Plan Size - 1992-93 Prices:</u>		(Billion Rupees)
	Public Sector	Private Sector	Total
7 th Plan	553	596	1149
8 th Plan	752	949	1701
Acceleration (%) Real Terms.	36	59	48

<u>Public Sector Programme</u>	(Billion Rupees)		
	Budget	Corporate & Market Financed	Total
7 th Plan	457	96	553
8 th Plan	483	296	752

<u>Growth Targets II</u>			
GDP	7.0%	Agriculture	4.9%
Manufacturing	9.9%	Services	6.7%

Although the above figures were approved by the government in 1993, there is not as yet any firm conclusion as to how many of these targets have been met. With the 9th Plan not yet released by the government, one can only assume and possibly predict from the information available, as well as by measuring historical trends of previous Plans and their outcomes, that the government target has not been met. Therefore, where does that leave the country? This should be the first question asked by any social scientist, with the onset of political turmoil in the country's economic, social and democratic governance for the last five years, recognising the endemic corruption and unaccountability of the country's financial system. For example, an allegedly corrupt former Federal Minister for finance, Asif Zardari, with his cohorts had allegedly drained billions of rupees from the government treasury and placed them in alleged bank accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere around the world. (Robert Hurt 1999: 214) Zardari is now under arrest and awaiting trial proceedings in a Pakistani jail for corruption. Zardari coincidentally happens to be the former Prime Minister's husband, and is '*affectionately*' known by his defrauded victims as Mr 10%¹. The Economist

reported in an article dated 15th June 1996, that the *Sunday Express* had caused pandemonium within Pakistan's government circles after reading that Benazir Bhutto and her husband, Asif Zardari had bought a £2.5 million mansion in Surrey. Although the then Prime Minister Bhutto vehemently denied this accusation, and her husband, Zardari publicly stated in the *Sunday Express* (15th June 1996): "how can anyone think of buying a mansion in England when people in Pakistan don't even have a roof over their heads?". It transpired later that in fact they had bought a fairly large property in Surrey. Pakistan's corruption at the time of this revelation was so endemic that Transparency International, a European group which monitors corruption worldwide, had just declared Pakistan as the most corrupt country in the world.

On 28th March 1997, the Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif declared to his own political party, the Pakistan Muslim League, that the Exchequer was losing two billion rupees daily as a result of corruption, nepotism and inefficiency. (*Daily Dawn, Economic and Business Review, 29th December 1997*). The country may not be ready or indeed prepared to explore the outcome of the 8th Plan, until there is a massive change in the political and social conditions of the country and/or until the system demands the publication of the 9th Five Year Plan; until then, little confidence can be placed in the real term outcome of the 8th Plan. Although in *The Dawn, Economic and Business Review* (29th December 1997: Part v.), it is stated that the government's mid-term review on the 21st January 1997 of the 8th Five Year Plan revealed, that: "despite the dismal state of the economy, there had been growth of 5%". *The News Journal* went on to declare that on 21st February 1997, the Pakistani government announced that the manufacturing sector had fallen short of the 8th Plan's targets by over 55% during the first three years of the plan period. This incidentally was the period in which the Sharif government was in opposition. How much credence one can place on government information is yet to be determined. Zia-ul-Islam, a well known academic and author, questioned the misinformation spread by government servants and ministers who attempt not to reveal facts regarding the state system and its machinery. Zia-ul-Islam comments: "who is afraid of disclosing information? Anyone who has something to hide. And who needs to hide things? Anyone who takes decisions which are not correct". (*Daily Dawn* 3rd June 1997). His argument stretches the government's will of

sharing information, when he goes on to point out “the surprising part is, that in spite of these easy methods of checking corruption and wrong doing, and in spite of the nation’s obsession with accountability, there is no movement to ensure easy and smooth access to decision-makers’ files. There is ample talk of transparency, yet government files continue to be thoroughly opaque and their covers as secure as the lead walls of a bank vault.”

The 8th Plan is strategically divided and sub-divided into priority policy initiatives that offer some insight to the government's thinking. The following brief outline offers some selective possibilities for the social and economic challenge the country is facing and whether the government is able to fulfil its promised landmarks. The Planning Commission (1994) sets out the following targets²:

Landmark Targets

Box 6

1. Macro-economic Management

The government hopes to meet the growth targets within a framework of stability and sustainability. To do this, they wish to reduce the overall fiscal deficit to half from 7.9% of the GDP to 4% of the GDP and to also reduce the current account from \$3.7 billion to \$1.84 billion, which refers to a reduction from 7% to 2.4%. On the matter of the long-term external debt, Pakistan wishes it to remain at 36% of the GDP. Monetary expansion below growth of nominal GDP. The proceeds of the privatisation programme are to be used for the reduction of the high cost of its domestic debts. The government is to introduce legislative controls on the budget deficit and to reduce the inflation rate from 9% to 6%. Finally to rise the GDP National savings ratio from 13.6% to 18%. The 7th Plan had created 3.2 million jobs; the 8th Plan in this respect intends to surpass this target by reaching for an ambitious plan of creating 6.2 million jobs.

2. Good Governance

Under the procedures of Good Governance, the government intends to reduce the imbalances of regions, gender and class. To further enhance this, measures will be put into place to alleviate poverty by using the Social Action Programme (SAP), and by creating employment for the long term and short term, the government wishes to use the welfare system of Zakat¹, Baitul Maal¹ and social welfare programmes. Quality education, equal opportunity and access to positive health services have eluded Pakistan for some time, the 8th Plan has re-introduced this for the next period to continue on the work of the previous Plan. Further issues relating to drug cartels and tax defaulters are to be given greater attention by the authorities and the perpetrators brought to account for their crimes against the state on these matters. Finally, privatisation and public partnership and the devolution and decentralisation will be promoted at all levels in-order to continue on the existing government policy.

3. Competitive Markets

There are three main points that the 8th Plan draws attention to on this matter:

- Lower tax rates and broaden the tax base, ensure documentation of economy, improve tax compliance
- Curtailment of special concessions and rent seeking activities
- Lower tariff structures and integration with the world economy

4 Education and Training

The government intends to breakthrough previous primary education targets and aim at:

- Boys from 85% to 95% - Girls from 54% to 82%.
- Increase Literacy rates from 35% to 48%
- Output of technicians to increase by 50% - from 85,000 to 127,000
- Qualitative improvements in the education system

5 Health

The government planned to improve the health service to the rural areas, in this plan they have outlined that this should be done by:

- Engage 33,000 village health workers
- Full immunisation of mother and child
- Wider coverage of preventative services from 80% to 90%
- Life expectancy to rise to 63.5%
- Infant mortality rate to decline from 8.5% to 6.5%
- Control of micro-nutrient deficiencies
- Reduction in low birth babies from 25% to 15%
- Universal access to iodised salt for edible purposes

6 Population

Pakistan has a growing population problem, in order to tackle these problems the 8th Plan sets out the following aims:

- Population planning coverage to increase from 20% to 80% Urban 54% to 100% and Rural 5% to 70%
- Contraceptive usage to be doubled from 14% to 28%
- Population growth rate decline from 2.9% to 2.7%

7 Communications

In this sector, the government has committed itself to clear the pending demand for telephone-line connections by 2.5 million lines, depicting a 125% increase in telephone access.


Planning Commission [1.1 to 1.7] (1994: iii-xii)

Demographic Changes in Pakistan

The subsequent Plans have offered a wider view on how various changes in the country's economic engine have influenced both investment and disinvestments. The seriousness of this can only be seen when put in to the context of the demographic changes that are taking place in Pakistan which is heading towards a population

explosion. There are many factors that may contribute towards this, which raise dire concern for Pakistan's future. In the first half of the 20th century, Pakistan's population has according to Rafique Akhtar (1995): "... doubled, from 16.6 million in 1901 to 32.5 million in 1947." In the period from 1972 to 1998, the population growth had gone up by 62.1 million in less than 30 years. Such figures give serious concerns about Pakistan's planning needs over the next 20 to 30 years. Such massive changes to the demographic balance of such societies can lead to economic and social distortions, where a lack of civil amenities can add severe economic and social hardship to the already frustrated government agencies and non-governmental organisations. In order to try and resolve some of the problems associated to the population explosion, the government of Pakistan had chalked out a policy strategy within its 8th Plan, in an attempt to try and control the upward spiral of its population growth.

Chart 3.



The Rural Population Strategy

The issues surrounding family planning are more prevalent in the rural and tribal areas of Pakistan than in the urban areas. Although Pakistan is currently attempting to make

available a whole range of health related services, which would directly impact on the growing problem of population expansion within the country, this still appears to be very slow and tedious both in the take-up and its outcome. The government stated in their 8th Plan:

The main thrust of family planning services would be in the creation of an infrastructure in rural areas. During the Eighth Plan, family planning coverage will be expanded to over 70% of the rural and 100 per cent of the urban population. The programme will be extended to the entire population by the year 2000.

The Eighth Seven Year Plan

This new infrastructure for the rural areas would come in the form of the provision of family planning workers, trainers and supervisors, who would be employed to work with rural communities. The real concern for the government is how to deal with the spread of the rural infrastructure and its growing lack of access to information. Although the government had indicated a strategic plan to deal with this issue, providing adequate resources to deal with this may prove somewhat difficult when the local officialdom, corrupt as they may be, begin to share such resources between themselves and the local 'powerless' village communities. There are no national government information documents available which can confirm how far the government ministry have managed to imply their targets and how successful they have been in meeting them. The 8th Plan sets out its strategy for the "45,000 villages with a population estimated at 85 million, out of these 13,060 villages have a population of 2000 or more and account for 70% of the population". The initiatives proposed in the Population Action Strategy are as follows:

Population Action Strategy

Box 7

1. The efficacy of the existing 606 welfare centres, which cover 5% of the rural population will be improved by relocation as necessary.
2. The coverage will be increased by effective involvement of rural health centres, reproductive health centres, mother & child health centres and basic health units.
3. The existing 130 mobile service units located in Tehsils will be increased to 251 to provide services to remote areas.
4. The number of traditional birth attendants will be increased from 5000 to 7000. They will provide motivation as well as conventional contraceptives.
5. The strategy adopted in the rural areas is to provide a community based motivator-come-service provider in villages with a population over a 1000. In every village, one suitable educated married woman of 18 to 50 years of age who is a permanent resident would be trained and engaged on contract basis. This scheme in 1,951 villages, on a pilot basis in the 7th Plan and will be expanded to 12,000 villages covering 60-70% of the rural population.

The Eighth Seven Year Plan

In-order to improve Information, Education and Communications (IEC), the following strategy areas were suggested:

Information & Education Communication Strategy

Box 8

1. Improvement of inter-personal communication in scope and quality is being emphasised through a well developed scheme for encouraging interpersonal communication, outreach and follow-up by adequately trained workers.
2. Information on the impact of birth spacing on infant, child and maternal mortality will be disseminated widely through the IEC.
3. Electronic communication media such as radio and television will play an increasing role in disseminating appropriate family planning information.
4. All service outlets, private or public in urban and rural areas will display family planning sign boards to indicate availability of services.
5. Target specific messages would be developed with focus on young couples which would be conveyed through all channels of communications of the IEC.

The Eighth Seven Year Plan

The Urban Population Strategy

Urban population growth is not as alarming as the rural problem. The urgent issues facing the towns and cities are more closely related to the influx of migrant labour that feed the cities by the tens of thousands every year. Poor villagers and destitute refugees enter the cities in search of work, seeking some level of a basic living standard. This creates additional problems to those already brought about by the lack of adequate birth control and human development policies and strategies, such as over population of the cities, urban slums, economic destitution and issues related to crime, health, education and social welfare provision. Therefore the government has set out an (The 8th Plan), 'Urban Strategy' to tackle the growing concern in urban areas:

Urban Population Strategy**Box 9**

- The number of Family Welfare Centres in the urban areas will be increased from 690 to 900; the new centres will be established in Katchi-Abbadis¹, slum areas and areas of low income concentration. The low performance existing centres would be relocated to the areas of large demand.
- The number of Reproductive Health Centres 'A' type will be increased from the existing 70 to 104 which would cover all District Headquarters and selected Tehsils. The New Centres will be established at the remaining district hospitals, which were not covered in the 7th five year plan and in selected Tehsils where necessary support would be available.
- The number of Reproductive Health Centres 'B' type, will be increased by enlisting all the District and Municipal and Town Committees and the Target Group Institution (TGI) hospitals, remaining Tehsils hospitals and private hospitals where operation theatres and related facilities are available.
- The number of health service outlets operating in TGI such as Railways, PIA, Defence Services, KPT, Steel Mills, Fauji Foundation, Agricultural Development Bank and other similar institutions will be increased from the present 174 to 450 in the 8th five year plan.
- All health outlets operating under the departments of Health, Local government and Rural Development, Labour, Social Welfare and Inspectorate General Frontier Constabulary located in the urban vicinity, would be effectively involved in dispensation of family planning services. The medical and paramedical staff will be providing training/orientation and refresher courses in family planning techniques along with necessary equipment, IEC materials and regular supply of contraceptives. The village health workers will also be involved in the inter-personal motivation and service delivery in the rural areas. They will imparted with training in dispensation of family planning services.
- The involvement of NGOs in the programme will be strengthened through training, technical assistance and selected operational inputs to improve service delivery, particularly in urban slums, Katchi-Abbadis and labour colonies.
- All registered medical practitioners operating in the urban areas will be effectively involved to provide clinical and non-clinical methods and as catalysts for motivational roles.
- The Social Marketing of Contraceptives will be expanded during the 8th five year plan to include distribution of oral pills, injectables and IUD's besides condoms. Conventional contraceptives would be made available at all chemist shops, grocery and other shops. The Registered Medical Practitioners, Homeopaths, Hakeems and Traditional Birth Attendants would be provided with conventional and non-conventional contraceptives, IEC material and training through this system.

The Eighth Seven Year Plan

The 8th Plan goes on to set out a detailed management proposal on how the structural management of this strategy would take shape. The plan suggests a region by region coverage, offering a step by step plan on the implementation of the strategy. There are some concerns which appear not to be covered in the urban strategy and fall very much into traditional habits, and thereby may cause the failure of the whole or part of the strategic policy.

Tradition Against Birth Control

With regards to birth control policies it is necessary to recognise that some problems associated with the demographic changes in the rural and tribal areas of Pakistan are more closely associated with religious and cultural rites and customs, rather than acknowledging the practical advantages of a slowing down of the population growth. Sex education in schools for males and females may offer some basic knowledge on contraception, however within the rural and tribal areas the availability of contraceptives is either almost unknown³ or considered as unethical (against Islamic teachings). According to the report published on Human Development in South Asia (Haq, 1997): "60 million people in Pakistan are without access to health services which is estimated at 45% of the population". Therefore health provision or indeed birth control drugs and contraceptives are not easily accessible and most often are not a priority issue for economically poor families. In a rural society, such as Pakistan, young married couples are almost always influenced by the poorly educated and traditionalist in-laws of the wife, on the size of the family and the frequency of birth, and on the number of male births compared to female births. Dr Anis Ahmed commented in an interview on this very subject that: "it is often considered amongst the rural poor that the higher the male birth ratio in the family, the higher the prestige of the family. This leaves little room to negotiate family planning issues and mostly they become matters of discussion when six or more children have already been born". The religious contribution surrounding family planning in this context is served as fear-provoking attributes, describing to young married couples that family planning is against the *god given gift* of re-production and therefore contraceptives of any kind should be avoided. Although some more secular/modern thinking individuals may disagree with this

concept, the images of *Hell-Fire and Eternal Damnation* are clearly visible in the hearts and minds of the already confused and fearful couples.

Nevertheless, the government have strived ahead in the 8th Plan to set out a national birth control strategy of involvement by local people and together with Hakeems and homeopaths, this approach may appear to be a logical step in the right direction of seeking local participation, however, such assistance or promoters to the strategy may cause it to fail as they themselves are steeped in tradition and are not open to a programme of modernisation through the very nature of their work or philosophy. This problem has not been acknowledged in many of the government documents, and possibly could be avoided for obvious reasons. Masood Lohar wrote a lengthy article on rural poverty where he stated:

Despite numerous development programmes, the eradication of poverty and improvement in the quality of life in Pakistan's rural areas...could not materialise. This was so because neither the programmes were properly and sincerely designed, nor were they expected through the participation of the people for whom they were supposed to have been designed.

Masood Lohar: *The Dawn* (14th June 1997)

The Economic Survey 1997-98 is an alternative government document published by the Finance Division of the government and is about as close as we can get to seeing a slightly differing perspective to human development in Pakistan. Therefore, the outcome of this document's analysis is set in the scene of the government's strategy on population control. It should be acknowledged that the *Economic Survey* is another government document and therefore it would be wise to view the document with a critical eye and be cautious about some its contents. For instance, the service delivery infrastructure of the 8th Plan, is one aspect of its implementation towards the promotional activity. To do this they have so far promoted the strategy through a range of multi-media campaign channels comprising of:

... jingles, daily spots, talk shows, drama serials, panel discussions on TV and radio. Close circuit telecasts at airports, railways stations and parlour cars, cinema spots, ads in newspapers, cartoons, hoardings and bill boards at prominent places, bus panels, rock publicity etc

Economic Survey (1997-98: 139)

Inter-personal communication has been promoted through a package of service delivery network group meetings, seminars, exhibitions, stalls, etc and through the distribution of print material. Various colleges and institutions have held debates on the implications and effects of a rapid population explosion and this has helped to spread the information among the intellectual and educated classes. Support of the religious leaders has been solicited by sending groups of religious scholars to Indonesia and Bangladesh to study their programmes and act as focal points for the promotion of small 'family norms'. The training activities held so far have been in the areas of "Clinical (governance) training, including basic training of 581 family welfare workers (18 months), 325 refresher training facilities for family welfare workers counsellors, training of 40 field officers (six months), 450 other training for personnel of provincial line departments and target group institutions as well as 2,215 un-scheduled training were provided till the end of March 1998" (*Economic Survey* 1997-98: 140). The contraceptive programme is set out in the Table HD.2 below and is compared over a two year period 1996-97 and 1997-98.

The harder facts of family planning are primarily linked with poverty, poor education, lack of basic amenities and social stigmas. The middle and elite classes are not so much affected by this, as they are mostly from higher educated backgrounds with greater access to information on family planning matters and its affects on the social fabric of society. The urbanites also appear to be influenced through various social and media channels which imitate western values of smaller family sizes and a greater need for social entertainment and fashionable public opinion, which is almost a reverse of the same principles of the rural communities. It appears that the government is still attempting to invest greater welfare services into the urban areas, rather than the rural areas where the greatest need is. Table 2 offer an illustration of the level of contraceptives taken and its performance markers over two periods. One can see the serious disparities between the 'target' and the 'achievement' outcomes and how this becomes a continual struggle for the government to work at two different levels to achieve its own set targets. The first one being the public relations marketing strategy and the second is the government attempts to make the usage of contraceptives an

acceptable product for birth control in the face of religious, cultural and traditional barriers in Pakistani society.

Contraceptive Performance

Table 2

Method	1996-97			1997-98		
	Target	Achievement		Target	Achievement	
	No/Unit	No/Unit	%	No/Unit	No/Unit	%
Condoms (Units)	137,976	116,252	84.5	145,559	112,647	77.4
Oral Pills (Cycles)	6,014	1,477	24.5	5,529	1,471	26.6
IUD (insertions)	1,078	0.633	58.7	0.876	0.623	71.1
Injectables (Vials)	4,446	1.197	27.0	4,259	1.209	28.4
Contraceptives (Surgery Cases)	0,417	0,097	23.3	0,323	0.079	24.4

(The Figures in Millions)

Source: Economic Survey (1997-98: 141)

It needs to be mentioned here that the disparity clearly raises questions about the government's priority towards the rural and tribal areas of the country and whether the government may believe that urban population control should be considered more important than the unchanging ways of rural backwardness, or that the government recognises the almost impossible task of moving rural and tribal traditions towards modernity against the backdrop of faith, culture, tribal habits and ignorance. Whatever the reasons, the population of Pakistan continues to increase irrespective of the services that have been proposed to resolve the problem. In order to try and capture the overall picture of Pakistan's current position, one needs to examine some comparable figures in the rest of South Asia. It can be noted in Appendix 2 that each country may have differing problems, nevertheless, there are some similarities which cover the boundaries

of difference. Mahbub ul Haq (1997: 142) illustrates the stark differences between the various countries in the region that have comparable poverty and health related problems. Although Pakistan does not feature with a comparably high level of poverty compared to other countries in the chart, the issues concerning health do feature Pakistan with neglect in this area. Mark Nicholson (1997a) wrote in *The Financial Times Political and Economic Survey*, that the poverty situation in Pakistan is a “dismal failure”, he points out that Mahbub ul Haq (1997), who produced the report, *Human Development in South Asia 1997*, blames much of the poverty in Pakistan on endemic corruption and on heavy defence expenditure. There have been some successes, according to the survey, where it reports that life expectancy has risen to 62 years from 43 years in 1960. Nicholson (1997a), goes on to suggest that in Haq’s (1997) report: “the overall post-independence economic performance itself must be viewed as a considerable success. The disappointment being the distribution of the resulting wealth”. Pakistan’s growth, according to Haq’s report has averaged around 6% a year since independence. The overall situation on poverty in Pakistan is not good, as Shahid Javed Burki, a leading economist, argues in Nicholson’s report (1997a), that poverty is in fact increasing incrementally on a yearly basis, Burki goes on to qualify the measurement of poverty by suggesting that those living on \$1 a day in terms of purchasing parity, fell between 1980 and 1990 from 38% to 20%. By this calculation, 39 million of Pakistan’s estimated 127 million population, qualify as being poor. Furthermore, Burki analyses that the main causes for this are stubbornly entrenched in the social and political structures which are skewed against the poorest. Nicholson adds, however, that:

The political dominance of the feudal and landowning class had contributed to uneven landownership and taxation. The political predominance of the elite, including more than half of Pakistan’s elected MPs has directed government spending away from social services, most notably primary education.

Mark Nicholson (1997a)

This gloomy analysis by Nicholson and Burki illustrates the serious nature of Pakistan’s human development problem, but more importantly the questionable commitment by the government of Pakistan gives cause for unsmiling apprehension about any future ‘Five Year’ human development policy strategies that the government may produce for

the social, economic and cultural growth in the country. As I have suggested earlier in the Chapter, it would not be so surprising to find that the government maintains an equilibrium, a status quo, on human development providing no serious drop in numbers occur, and that the World Bank, the IMF and other international institutions are satisfied with a 'reasonable' level of 'competence' shown by government agencies in meeting internationally set targets for growth on most occasions, thereby the projections made by government agencies can by and large remain unaffected. In such cases, it is regrettable that the poor and the needy will become the victims of elitist greed and manipulation of resources, without accountability and responsibility. The nature of human development will most likely remain a *shallow grave* for the rural and urban deprived, and underprivileged society of Pakistan. As a result of this incompetence, the social and human implications of such a strategic catastrophe remain an issue for debate and concern in the country.

A leading author in Pakistan, who is well versed with the nature of bad governance, Ishrat Husain (1999: 201), wrote in his book, the *Economy of the Elitist State*: "the economic costs of feeding, clothing and educating a larger and larger population have been substantial, and the pressures on the infrastructure and scarce resources have exacerbated". Husain (1999: 201) recognises that with the massive growth in population and if Pakistan continues to increase above the 3% (per annum) growth in population, which it has done so far, then poverty at all levels of the social strata will begin to increase with serious and detrimental affects on Pakistan. The repercussions would be quite wide-ranging throughout the economy of the state. Pakistan has to take serious measures to deal with this problem, and unless the government and the civil service together are able to increase their resources and ensure a genuine commitment to the policy, the consequences for Pakistan would be traumatic. Husain does not disguise the enormity of the problem when he states: "The reduction in both current welfare and that of future generations is a factor that has to be taken seriously."

Interestingly, the 7th and 8th Plans concentrate mostly on the demographic nature of Pakistan's rural and urban divide. Although there are many influencing factors that capture the mind of the researcher through this process of analysis, yet little attention is

given by the government within the respective Plans to anything other than controlling the population size of the country. From the discussions held with various key government agencies, it was an astonishing revelation to hear their views which suggested that to control the spiralling upward growth of the population will enable a greater degree of control over other factors relating to the economic, social and cultural decline of the nation. It was implied by this that the single most important factor was to reduce birth control. When this point was put to Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy from the Quaid-e-Azam University, his immediate reaction was that "they are mad if they think that population control will cure the ills of a inept government bent on enriching the wealth of the rich and starving the poor of the natural right to food, clothing and accommodation". This stark response from Hoodbhoy adds thought to the rural and urban divide between the rich and poor as an ever increasing problem in Pakistan. The division between class, tradition and bradri is something that the nation is steeped in, irrespective of the wealth or poverty that faces its people. It is these facets that maintain a strong sense of identity and belonging where thousands of years of division have served to capture a sense of communal relations across the cities and villages of Pakistan. Various political leaders of Pakistan, such as Jinnah, Khan, Bhutto, Zia and Sharif have attempted to breakdown this barrier without success. As much as class, tradition and bradri have served to divide people, it has also offered strength for political power for the rich as much as for the poor in the battle for the national socio-political leadership of Pakistan.

Although, one may undertake a socialist or capitalist critique of the class struggle in Pakistan, the results of such an analysis would offer little in understanding the nature of Pakistan and the Indian sub continent tradition of identity. Classism is by and large a western critique promoted and provided for the consumption of the powerless masses. Capitalism by the same hand is imposed for the indulgence of the rich and powerful internationalist as a playground for power and decadence. Pakistan has been able to combine both the 'power' of the poor with the indulgence of the rich to create its own playground for tradition and identity. This debate is discussed further in chapter six on identity.

End Notes

¹ Asif Zardari was known as Mr 10% because he supported government contracts for private contractors in return for a 10% 'kickback'.

² This is a selective list of main strategy targets which the government hope to realise within the 8th plan period. It is by no means a comprehensive list. It should be noted that after strenuous efforts the accuracy and success of the government targets can not be confirmed.

³ In the tribal areas and regions of Pakistan seeking birth control information is virtually non-existent unless you are able to venture 'anonymously' to the doctor's clinic; the doctor himself may not be a registered and qualified medical practitioner and could, and most often do, prescribe unrelated or outdated drugs for birth control at extortionate fees which the rural peasant communities can ill afford for prolonged periods, or alternatively they could visit the 'family welfare clinics', if they are fortunate to have one within a close proximity of the village or hamlet.

Chapter Three

Investment in Education

The Slogan at the beginning of the 20th century was progress. The cry at the end of the 20th century is survival. The call for the next century is hope.

Muto Ichiyo (1993: 147)

Summary

Chapter Three debate the investment made by the Pakistani government in national educational development opportunities. Although education features as the primary focus in this chapter, Human Development in the wider sense is touched upon as a means of illustrating the argument. In comparative terms to Human Development, which is discussed in the previous chapter, educational investments in Pakistan are the second most influencing factor to growth next to health. This Chapter debates how educational investment in the country is shared both in human and financial terms for the potential in development. The chapter critically assesses, reviews and evaluates the various forms of education policies and their practical applications by the government and how such investments impact in real terms in rural and urban regions of Pakistan. The chapter draws a stark realisation between the rich and poor and between male and female opportunities in accessing education.

The chapter attempts to look past the corruption within the country which has led Pakistan to this situation, however, it is interesting to note that corrupt practices are only a minor hindrance in the overall problem that the country faces.

Education Needs and Comparisons

Under the rural education development strategy of Pakistan's Seventh Five Year Plan (7th Plan), the government had strived to make significant investments into the education infrastructure however, for a variety of reasons, this objective had not been achieved, to its full potential. 9,750 mosques and 18,900 primary schools were constructed against a target of 15,000 mosques and 31,152 primary schools. Furthermore, 3,780 primary schools and 1,950 middle schools were upgraded to middle and high level respectively, against a target of 5,850 primary and 2,775 middle schools. The investment into the education system in the rural areas is still very much behind the expected levels that the government had targeted. No real comparison is yet available within the report on how urban schools compared to this. However, if history is a guide, then it may not be too far from the truth to assume that urban schools probably fared better in the infrastructure investment for educational development. Akhtar (1995: 353) adds his comments to the already alarmingly poor picture of the country's literacy levels, by suggesting that in the early 1990s, "the literacy rate was estimated at 37% (49% for males and 24% for females). The rural literacy rate is estimated at 28% by comparison with 58% in urban areas. The social and human indicators make dismal reading when two thirds of its total adult population and 77% of its total female population are illiterate" (Planning Commission 1994). Combined school enrolment is only 37%. While the overall state of human development is poor, widespread regional disparity makes the situation worse (see Appendix 3). Here one can see the disparities in adult literacy rates which range from 17% in rural Balochistan to 50% in urban Punjab, and 52% in urban Sindh. The female literacy rate in the NWFP is only 5.4% and lower still at 3.2% in rural Balochistan, this compared to 41.3% in urban Sindh. These regional disparities show that the task facing any government of Pakistan is a very difficult one. Haq (1997) believes that overcoming the current problems of illiteracy will require both major investments in accelerating the pace of human development, as well as ensuring a special emphasis on less developed regions, particularly in rural areas. Pakistan has recently under the umbrella of the World Bank (Planning Commission 1994), partaken in a 'Social Action Programme' (SAP), at a cost of "\$7.7 billion in five years." Although this represents some progress, many independent

experts fear that much of this programme may become politicised and the money may go towards offering patronage to political party workers and therefore may never reach the objectives that it was intended for.

The 1998 census offers a further and more up to date perspective on the overall literacy levels in Pakistan. Table 3 illustrates the overall situation in Pakistan which does not appear to offer a brighter or optimistic future, compared to that which has been suggested earlier. Table 3 sets out a provincial chart which shows how each province compares with the other in the overall picture. The years 1981 and 1998 have been used by the census office to offer the comparative growth levels over a 17 year period. This may not be a conventional method of analysis for the long term planning of resources and strategic policy initiatives, however, it is a miracle in itself that Pakistan has been able to finally publish a coherent and analytical set of statistical data between two sets of dates which can be viewed with some seriousness, even if there may be doubts about their authenticity.

Regional Literacy Levels

Table 3

Area	Total			Rural			Urban		
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes	Male	Female
Pakistan	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1998	45.0	56.5	32.6	34.4	47.4	20.8	64.7	72.6	55.6
1981	26.2	35.0	16.0	17.3	26.2	07.3	47.1	55.3	37.3
NWFP									
1998	37.3	52.8	21.1	32.5	48.2	16.7	58.7	72.4	42.7
1981	16.7	25.8	06.5	13.2	21.7	03.8	35.8	47.0	21.9
Punjab									
1998	47.4	58.7	35.3	38.5	51.3	25.1	65.8	73.4	57.2
1981	27.4	36.8	16.8	20.0	29.6	09.4	46.7	55.2	36.7
Sindh									
1998	46.7	56.6	35.4	26.9	39.5	13.11	65.2	72.1	57.1
1981	31.4	39.7	21.6	15.6	24.5	05.2	50.8	57.8	42.2
Balochistan									
1998	26.6	36.5	15.0	18.9	27.8	08.8	50.3	62.4	35.3
1981	10.3	15.2	04.3	06.2	09.8	01.7	32.2	42.4	18.5
Islamabad (Capital)									
1998	69.0	77.9	58.2	56.3	71.0	40.3	75.2	81.1	67.7
1981	51.7	63.1	37.5	33.8	49.6	15.9	63.3	71.3	52.7

Source: Population and Housing Census 1998: iv. (6)

The comparative percentage figures in Table 3 show that between 1981 and 1998 there has been a steady growth in literacy. These figures show the growth from the age of ten years and above. Pakistan's literacy rate grew from 26.2% in March 1981 to 45% by March 1998. This shows an increase of 72%. There are sharp differences between the male and female population, with the female literacy rate showing an overall increase of approximately 100%. The increase in rural female literacy is more pronounced as this has increased almost three fold. Similarly, there are sharp differences in rural and urban literacy rates. The ratio swings from as high as 72.6% for urban males to as low as 20.8% for rural females. There are also differences among the provinces. Punjab is at the top with 47.4% literacy, closely followed by Sindh with a literacy rate of 46.7%. The NWFP and Balochistan are showing literacy ratios at 37.3 and 26.6 respectively. The situation in Islamabad is somewhat different, as the capital city has particular investment for education and human development which are different and particular to the city. Javid Butt a spokesperson from the Ministry for Education wrote an article in the *Pakistan Observer* where he optimistically commented that the reasons for the success in education literacy levels has been possible because of the long term strategic planning by the Ministry for Education. He stated:

these measures included: [the] 'Crash Literacy Programme' especially in Punjab and Islamabad.... Strengthening non-formal education programmes. Focusing on universalisation of primary education through development projects particularly the social action programmes. And community involvement ... through non-government organisations.

Javid Butt
The Pakistan Observer (8th April 1999: 3)

The following Table 4 illustrates the educational attainment achieved in Pakistan, and thereby indicating the potential growth of education within the country. The educational achievement levels in Pakistan have been somewhat sporadic. The 1998 census accounts for over 39 million people who were found to be either currently attending educational institutions or who had done so at an earlier time in their lives. Table 4 shows the level of education attainment at various levels of the educational life cycle:

Educational Attainment		Table 4		
Level of Education	%	Both Sexes	Male	Female
Below Primary		17.9	16.8	20.1
Primary		29.8	28.1	33.1
Middle		21.4	22.7	18.9
Matric		17.8	19.0	15.5
Intermediate		06.5	06.5	06.5
B.A. / B.Sc. & Equivalent		04.3	04.4	04.0
M.A. / M. Sc. & Equivalent or Above		01.5	01.7	01.2
Diploma / Certificate		00.4	00.5	00.2
Other		00.4	00.3	00.5

Source: Source: Population and Housing Census 1998: v. (6)

The indicators in Table 4 show 29.8% have passed the primary education level, 21.4% middle and 17.8% matric. After 'matric' the percentage falls into single figures, intermediate 6.5%, for graduates 4.3% and only 1.5% for post-graduates. Out of the total female population who have passed primary, middle and matric levels, the percentages are 33.1, 18.9 and 15.5 respectively. Amongst the total number graduates and post graduates in Pakistan, only 31.1% are females. (Population and Housing Census 1998.[6]: v).

Table 5 sets out some comparative figures between 1947 and 2001/04 and how they are reflecting the various levels of attainment and its implications on the Country's GNP. Table 5 is based mainly on various published and unpublished sources of information from the Government of Pakistan. It is also interesting to note that all the sources contradict each other. The *Economic Surveys* and *Education Policies* which are considered to be the most authentic government documents, both differ from each other. The table also shows the inconsistency between the *National Education Policy 1998*

and *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper* (2001). Apart from other points, the poor quality of data also reflects the poor quality of national policies and planning which results in overall negligence of the national human developmental process.¹

**Contradictory Statistics on Literacy and Expenditure on Education
1947 to 2004* (see Endnotes)**

Table 5

Year	Literacy rate		Expenditure on education	
	Unpublished	Published	As a % of total	As a % of GNP
1947	..	13.0 ¹² 13.6 ¹⁸
1951	21.4 22.2 13.2 (adjusted) 15.4 (adjusted)	21.8 ¹	23.6 (unpublished)	0.4 (unpublished)
1959-60	24.3 17.1 (adjusted) 18.3 (adjusted)	..	29.3 ²	1.0 ³
1961	16.7 18.4 (adjusted) 19.6 (adjusted)	18.4 ¹	22.2 (unpublished)	1.0 (unpublished)
1969-70	22.2 23.0	21.0 ¹⁵ (1970)	29.3 ²	1.3 ²
1972	21.7 22.8	21.7 ¹	20.1 ²	1.6 ²
1979-80	30.0 34.8	..	25.5 ²	2.0 ³
1981	26.2 28.4	26.2 ¹	19.4 (unpublished)	1.9 (unpublished)
1992-93	32.8 35.0	41.3 ¹ 34.0 ⁴ 31.0 ⁵ 35.4 ⁸	18.2 (unpublished)	2.0 (unpublished)
1996-97	39.0 42.0	38.9 ⁶ 50.0 ¹⁰ 45.0 ⁸ (1996)	19.6 ⁶ 10.1 ⁷	2.6 ⁶ 2.5 ⁷
1997-98	42.2 45.0 38.0	40.0 ⁷ 45.0 ⁸ 39.0 ¹¹ (1997) 41.0 ¹⁷ (1997) 35.0 ¹⁸ (1997)	14.0 ⁷	2.3 ¹⁴ 2.2 ⁷
1998-99	45.3	45.4 ⁹ (1998) 45.0 ¹⁰ (1998) 45.0 ¹⁶ (1999)	8.9 ⁸	2.2 ⁸
2000-2001	..	49 ¹³ 52 ¹²	..	2.3 ¹³
1998-2003 (<i>National Education Policy 1998</i>) ¹¹	..	Targets: 40% (1997-98) to 70% (2010) ¹¹	Proposed allocations: 20.0 (1998-03) ¹¹	Proposed allocations: 2.5 (1998-99) ¹¹ 3.2 (2000-01) ¹¹ 4.0 (2002-03) ¹¹
2001-2004 (<i>Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2000</i>) ¹²	..	Targets: 55 (2001-02) ¹² 58 (2002-03) ¹² 61 (2003-04) ¹²

Muhammad Ahsan (2003)

(Source) An Analytical Review of Pakistan's Education Policies and Plans.

In order to seek some clarity on Pakistan's future, it may be prudent to reflect on the question; what does Pakistan hold for the future? Hoodbhoy's (1998) work "*Education and the State*", is most likely the only credible and reliable source of critical analysis coming out of the Pakistani intellectuals forum, to the extent that it goes some way to address this question. The following passage from the opening pages of Hoodbhoy's book captures the spirit of the question when he states:

It will not escape the readers' attention that every article herein – with notable exception – is critical of the state of public education. Indeed, few Pakistanis doubt that the system fails to deliver. Citizens curse and blame the government, while each government curses and blames the previous one. Stung by criticism, now and then the government in power trots out an education 'policy' – an ill-conceived and infantile wish-list of half-baked, unimplementable, ideas put together at great expense and after uncountable meetings When the government makes its unceremonious exit from power, the 'policy' ends up in the garbage. The subsequent policy makes no reference to the previous one. Nothing was gained. Nothing really moved.

Pervez Hoodbhoy (1998: 1-2)

Hoodbhoy touches upon the reasons for such political incompetence later in this chapter. However, it comes as no surprise that the government bureaucracy, the civil service and Ministers of government are all under scrutiny by the public and the press. S.S.H. Rizvi² wrote an interesting article in *The News International* (19th August 1998), where he said:

Our first failing is that we have not been serious about our education, neither at the grass root level nor at higher level.... The management of education lacks vision, the complex-stricken society has created a sharp divide between Urdu and English medium schools. Worse still is the attraction people have for schools named after some Christian Saints. With particular reference to science education, one finds that science text books used in English medium schools are generally imported.

S.S.H. Rizvi (*News International*: 19th August 1998)

Salahuddin A. Khan published a paper in the *Dawn Magazine* on 13th August 2000 titled 'The Information Technology Puzzle', where he states:

... any country endeavouring to leapfrog into the information age, which is loaded with computer software paraphernalia, must realize how indispensable education is to acquire the knowledge of the information technology and to know how 100 per cent education ensured the First World rapid industrialization.

Salahuddin A. Khan
(*Dawn Magazine* on 13th August 2000)³

The importance of education and technology policy development has become a vital ingredient for economic and social development. The current government of Pakistan has taken account of, and reacted to such concerns by recently releasing details of its comprehensive *National IT Policy and Action Plan 2000* (2000: 34: 8.13.2). The National IT Policy recognises the importance of overcoming the barriers of the English language, if Pakistan is able to compete in the Global IT market. At the same time the document stresses that software development would be enhanced to ensure that Urdu software programmes can be developed to promote the natural language of the nation in information technology. This strategic approach towards balancing educational needs and cultural identity for the pursuance of a National IT Policy, investment and development programmes are 'examined and reflected' upon within the document.

The educational system in Pakistan has faced a great deal of criticism on the inadequacies of its success. Hoodbhoy (1998: 2) gives an insight to the serious failures to such programmes, when he lays out what he terms as the "Crisis of Quantity".


Crisis of Quantity

Table 6

Item	Quality
Children not in School	27.9 million
Illiterate adults (15+)	43.5 million
Means Schooling	1.9 years
Daily Newspapers	15 per 1000 persons
Primary enrolment	57 per cent
Secondary enrolment	22 per cent
Higher education enrolment	1.9 per cent
	Pervez Hoodbhoy (1998: 2)

The scenario that Hoodbhoy (1998: 2) projects in this “Crisis” suggests that the country’s “doom and gloom” education policy creates nothing for the country, but rather “mourns the decent into the ranks of the ignorant and illiterate nations of the world, with babies as the chief item of production”. The World Development Bank (1999: 46) offers an insight into the world illiteracy rate in Chart 4 below. The chart illustrates at a glance the stark disparities in literacy levels between the high income and low income countries. The low income countries identified by the World Development Bank report show that over 65% of its population are below adequate levels of literacy, compared to the high income levels where the figures shown are comparatively negligible. Thus making such revolutions elitist within the developing world itself, and making the developed countries elitist in themselves; denying access to technology and information to the vast majority of the population.⁴ The idea here is that although the information revolution may have been heralded as the new world order for progress and development, reality shares a different meaning when put against the human development barriers which prevent and obstruct the true usage of such technologies in the developing world.

Chart 4



(World Development Bank 1999: 46)

One such process of attempting to measure the reality of development within education among the nations of the developing world, is the process of measuring school enrolments at a national level. This can be done through various channels, from which

this information on national literacy levels can be derived. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to confidently assume that the information available is in fact a true and accurate reflection of the country or indeed its education system. Pakistan is no exception to this criticism. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, (UNESCO) collect, enrolment ratios from the national education authorities; this data is a useful measure by which to examine the educational participation of students. UNESCO admits that the data collected is not always accurate for varying reasons however, the information collected would show, at the beginning of each school year, the number of young people participating in the school system. The UNESCO report for 1998/99 shows that Pakistan had consistently failed to supply adequate information to support any reasonable conclusion to their current status of educational participation. (UNESCO: Statistical Yearbook 1998-99) One possible reason for this is explained by Hoodbhoy when he states:

The well established pattern of examination questions has encouraged the mushrooming of 'coaching centres' which boldly enter into a contractual agreement with the individual student. Wherein a certain level of marks is assured for a certain period of attendance at the coaching centre in return for an agreed sum of money. Pakistani newspapers periodically expose the sale of degrees, certificates and mark sheets, as well as widespread cheating during examinations. Definitive statistics on the extent of such activities are not available. However, because they are common knowledge, students (and parents) feel deeply discouraged in making (or encouraging) efforts towards meaningful accomplishments of learning.

Pervez Hoodbhoy (1991: 43)

The Government of Pakistan Planning Commission has however released figures for 1994 which state that combined school enrolment is at 37%. Education quality and standards in Pakistan have been a cause for concern and much has been debated in education circles without success as failure is a common trend in the country. Therefore, it is important to recognise that quality and performance indicators are going to be tainted by wide-spread corrupt practices within the education system and as a result the government of Pakistan may not offer a true reflection of Pakistan's educational growth patterns to world organisations. Therefore, although UNESCO may not have current or accurate figures for enrolment into education for Pakistan, Pervez Hoodbhoy (1991: 36) sets out some comparable figures for 1986 in Table 7:

Education enrolment for selected countries 1986

Table 7

	(%) Primary		(%) Secondary		(%) Tertiary
	Male	Females	Male	Female	
Bangladesh	69	50	24	11	5
Sudan	59	41	23	17	2
Pakistan	55	32	25	10	5
Indonesia	121	116	45	34	7
Egypt	96	77	77	54	21
Morocco	96	62	39	27	9
Turkey	121	113	56	33	10
Third World	113	92	42	27	3

Note: % of relevant age group enrolled may exceed 100% because pupil age standards vary.

Hoodbhoy's (1991: 36) analysis shows that the above enrolment figures do not reveal dramatic differences between the Muslim and other under developed countries, although one would expect the former to be substantially ahead in view of their greater average per capita GNP. More importantly, the figures show nothing about the quality and objectives of the education systems in the respective countries. Hoodbhoy refers to the World Bank report as his main and principle source of information on the Pakistan education system, from where he made the following quotation which illustrates the dire situation that Pakistan faces, with an even less and bleaker future:

The unusually low educational attainment of Pakistan's rapidly growing population, particularly the female population, will become a serious impediment to the country's long term development...The weak human resources base on which Pakistan's economic development is being built endangers its long term growth prospects and negatively affects the distributional benefits to be derived from such growth.

The World Bank Report (1986)

This comment on Pakistan, made in a Report by the World Bank, is made in the knowledge that seventy five million people out of a population of around 100 million in 1986, could not read or write. The current population of Pakistan stands at 127 million from which the current census figures show that 39 million have attended or currently attend educational institutions in Pakistan. Compared to 1986, this figure is no more

encouraging and remains just over the 30% of the population of the country who may be considered literate, although to a very limited scale.

Social Action Programme (SAP I - 1993-98) (SAP II - 1998-2002)

Within the SAP I programme, primary education constituted two thirds of the entire SAP I budget, with the focus mainly targeted towards female education. Rs.69.1 billion (£673,541,786) (64%) was the total share for primary education. During this period Rs.12.3 billion (£119,892,389) was spent on development and Rs.56.8 billion (£553,649,407) on recurrent was spent against a target of Rs.81.7 billion (£796,358,390) showing a utilisation of 84.6%. As a percentage of the GDP, the expenditure increased from 1.13% in 1992-93 to 1.32% in 1995-96. A notable increase in the expenditure was on non-salary components. The non-salary component as a percentage of current expenditure on basic education increased from 1.62% in 1992-93 to 6.81 in 1995-96 (SAP I. 1993-1998).

The SAP II period 1998-02 sets out a series of key reforms from its earlier sibling SAP I 1993-98 programme. These reforms included specific targets which have been identified through direct involvement of donors and federal and provincial governments by introducing Annual Operational Plans. Although these reforms were initiated through SAP I, they have been further strengthened in SAP II due to the recognition of their failure in the preceding period. In the primary education area of SAP II, key areas were identified to enhance girls' education in terms of quality and elementary education. Also, to further improve the relationship between the private, public, NGOs and community participation, this was expected to generate strict adherence to merit based criteria on both child selection and performance and in the recruitment of teachers. The following Table E.6 illustrates the policy reforms initiated during SAP I and enhanced during SAP II.

Primary Education Policy Reforms (i & ii)

Table 8

Policy	Strategy	Targets
<p>Emphasis on girls education, especially in the rural area, with the introduction of a <u>mixed school policy</u>.</p>	<p>Enhance capacity by creating new seats for students, through establishing new primary/Mosque and non-formal schools, adding new classrooms in existing primary schools, provision of facilities to existing schools and building for shelter less schools having sufficient enrolment.</p> <p>Ensure recruitment and hiring of female teachers through improvements in service conditions.</p> <p>Ensure localised teachers hiring procedures by relaxation of qualifications and age limits (especially rural females with local domicile). Provide additional incentives for female teachers in the shape of higher allowances and other facilities.</p> <p>Introduce multiple textbooks by increasing participation of the private sector in textbook development and publication.</p>	<p>Increase the overall participation rate from 75% in 1997-98 to 95% by 2002.</p> <p>Raise girls' enrolment level from 3.76 million in 1997-98 to 5.39 million by 2001 and boys from 6.57 million in 1997-98 to 8.6 million by 2002. Improve female literacy from 25.3% in 1995-96 to 40% by 2002.</p> <p>Ensure timely availability of quality & cheaper textbooks.</p>
<p>Focus on improving the quality of education through teacher training and curriculum development</p>	<p>Enhance the role of learning co-ordinators, and introduce performance linked incentives.</p> <p>Initiate and implement an extensive teacher training programme.</p> <p>Ensure teachings of the Quran in all primary schools.</p>	<p>Recruit required teachers for schools against all vacant and newly created posts on merit and local basis by 2002.</p>
<p>Institutional strengthening, monitoring and school site verification.</p>	<p>Establish/strengthen primary education and directories in order to cope with the present requirements.</p> <p>Decentralisation of financial and administrative powers down to Tehsil / Taluka levels for efficient management and check absenteeism and ensure better supervision for improving the quality of education.</p> <p>Establish strict adherence to merit based criteria of site selection through monitoring by the AG office and Strengthen the education management information systems (EMISs) and use them for planning and monitoring purposes.</p> <p>Institutionalisation of allocation of funds for non-salary items, their timely release and proper utilisation.</p> <p>Establishment of separate cadre for school management.</p>	<p>Ensure appointment of Quran teachers</p> <p>Design and develop the total policy, strategy for institutional monitoring system in light of EMISs data.</p> <p>Overall monitoring and evaluation systems in a <i>process engineered</i> manner.</p>

Primary Education Policy Reforms (i & ii)

Table 8 cont....

Policy	Strategy	Targets
Consolidation and improvement in basic education	<p>Include secondary, Vocational education and PMS Literacy programme (non-formal Education) in SAP II as new components of basic education.</p> <p>Undertaking of school mapping exercise for every district to identify new sites for schools (primary & Middle) and consolidation of under utilised schools.</p>	<p>Involvement of private sector, NGOs and encouragement of community participation through establishment/strengthening of SMCs down at village level and monitoring of educational activities.</p> <p>Education up to secondary level would include SAP II as basic education in all provinces/areas and institutional mechanisms in place are to be managed.</p> <p>Formulate policy for elimination of under utilisation of schools.</p>

Source: Social Action Programme 1998-02

The Economic Survey report of Pakistan 1997-98, adds further clarity to this debate on the growth of poverty and the need for a strategic policy in education. It recognises the importance of government investments into providing good educational standards which contribute significantly to the country's growth. It states in the report that: "it is considered to be an investment into human capital, as it builds human capabilities which is a vital ingredient for national building. Without wide spread literacy the socio-economic development of the country can not be accelerated". (1997-98: 119).

To this end, the government of Pakistan has recently announced the publication of a National Education Policy 1998-2010 which would address the educational needs for the 21st Century. The salient points of the policy are set out in Appendix 4. The government policy on national education appears to command a good directive in the context of Third World educational development. However, many would question the

sincerity of its implementation and effectiveness when finally put under the spotlight. High level corruption, nepotism and patronage are such common practices in Pakistan, and where education is considered both by the state and by the people as a privilege rather than a basic human right. In my opinion, it would be wishful thinking if the education policy would be anything other than another dust gathering exercise. If on the other hand given the benefit of the doubt, there is sincerity in the education policy approach and the government is able to make available the resources that would be required for its implementation, then one must recognise that the Economic Survey report is the latest in a long line of documents emanating from within the government legislature. For once it may, in such circumstances, offer some positive direction for the development of education within the country.

Professor Khawaja Masud wrote an article in the daily national newspaper *The News* (12 April 1999) on the comments of Jacques Delors, the chairman of the International Commission on Education for the 21st Century, who had written about the problems facing the developing world on the need for education in the 21st century as a central tool for advancement. Delors suggests that the Commission recognise that: "education is essentially a development-activity which is bound to play a principle role in the overall human development during the 21st century". Masud goes on to set out a series of points which he believes are essential for educational advancements and argues:

The global society needs to employ education as a powerful weapon in its strategy for overcoming the diverse tensions of the 21st century. Some of the predominant tensions which confront us are: the tension between modernity and tradition, the tension between the universal and specific, the tension between the global and the national in economic and cultural fields, the tension between the long and short term considerations in the context of immediate educational problems, the tension between the need for competition on the one hand and the concern for equality of opportunity on the other.

Professor Khawaja Masud: *The News* (12 April 1999).

The developing world in general is facing a crisis of 'knowledge suffocation', Masud argues that:

it is vital the third world recognise the speed at which information and knowledge is travelling and it is no longer a prerequisite to memorise information for knowledge but to learn the basic structures on subjects such as mathematics, and the sciences. Sociology and history should be purged of propaganda, lies and distortions if the world is able to balance the concepts of, knowledge, information and development as the main pillars for growth of human development.

Professor Khawaja Masud: *The News* (12 April 1999).

The problem with such noble words is that there is little evidence of any attention paid either by the Commission or in the political structures of the developing world, except that is for noble gestures of 'formula type policies' strewn out like a fast-food outlet on a busy Saturday night, attempting to maintain an image of concern over the problem, rather than offering real resources to cure the root cause of an information poor society? The fact remains that human development can not be seen as a singular issue for development. Much of the development is taking place within a globalised network which Mahmood Monshipouri (2002: 92) refers to as "an all-inclusive process (of) politics, religion, economics and gender roles". In such circumstances, the process to which Monshipouri draws our attention is not isolated to a singular event such as education, technology, modernisation or culture and tradition. It is to all of the aspects, which contribute towards globalisation that affects the nature of development and growth in society. In pursuit of Third World Development a SAP report published in September 1995 outlining some key issues that transpired from the result of a seminar held to discuss the problems of basic education in Pakistan; *Seminar on Basic Education* (1995). In the report it was suggested alongside a number of equally significant areas of debate, that it is important to note and to reiterate that if education in Pakistan is to develop at a pace that will cope with the rising population figures, the country will be required to combat corrupt bureaucrats and offer opportunities to young people to gain knowledge and to pursue life-long learning in order to take up careers that would contribute towards the growth of the nation.

The report strongly comments on a number of essential areas in education, I have identified three key points which need to be particularly highlighted if the country should build the base from which education in Pakistan can be developed and built upon

for future generations. Firstly, the government has to ensure that capital and revenue resources for compulsory education are in place if they are to achieve the aim as suggested in the education policy papers, and as suggested in Table 8 and in Appendix 4. Secondly, that corruption should be dealt with from the root cause, if both pupil and teacher are to benefit from the government's educational reform package; and thirdly that, education has to be removed from the hands of the bureaucrats, so that education policy can be guided with the interests of the recipients rather than the interests of the bureaucrats and politicians.

Mosque Schools

Mosques within the education system serve to provide basic religious tuition; they do not as a rule fall within the formal education system, although they do impact on the cultural, social and religious well-being of the child. The education within the Mosque generally begins from nursery school age and children attend the mosque before going to their respective primary schools in the morning. Although the government may financially contribute towards the structural development of Mosque schools, this financial contribution is fairly insignificant compared to the overall governmental contribution towards formal education. No comparable figures have been made available from the government on the level of financial support given to Mosque schools. The vast majority of Mosque schools are placed within rural villages and are financially supported through voluntary donations either from within the catchment area or region, and occasionally from international donations from expatriates living abroad. The Mosque schools do not provide text material as it is up to the families of the children to provide any educational material that may be required.

Adult Education

The education system in Pakistan makes little provision for adult education, most of the policies and strategies formulated for educational provision have been aimed at the development and growth for primary educational needs. The references within the government documents available, support this notion and give relatively no significant

attention to the development of adult education within the country. The references, so far, within the education policy framework, simply identify the level of adult literacy according to gender. The purpose for this is to measure the history of low achievement in educational standards, whether or not these are due to a lack of resources or inadequate policy reforms by the government has not yet been analysed. The World Summit for Social Development Report (1995), 8th Plan (1994), and the Economic Survey (1997-98), all refer to the disastrous under development of adult literacy levels and yet offer no real solution to bridge the gap between low literacy and the growth in adult literacy within the country. In other words, the government does not consider adult education as a primary concern for a number of reasons, such as cultural bias, lack of available resources, inappropriate policy directives, lack of awareness of adult education strategies and educational blindness due to an endemically infected corrupt bureaucratic ignorance. Therefore, if adults have missed their vocation in educational development at school, they have little or no opportunity to increase their prospects for the future. To be fair in the overall conclusion on adult education in Pakistan, the Allama Iqbal Open University does provide opportunities for adult education. However, due to its fee-paying structure, unless you have a well paid job or your employer is able or willing to sponsor your education, you have little or no hope of pursuing adult education in the pursuit of career development. This effectively rules out large sections of the adult population. The World Summit for Social Development sets out the levels of adult literacy in Pakistan. Table E.7 below, summarises the current adult education status in Pakistan⁵.

Adult Literacy Rates

Table 9

Gender/Region	Public Expenditure on Education %		
Overall	36.8%		
Male	48.9%	Primary & Secondary Expenditure	71%
Female	23.5%	Higher Education	20%
Urban	57.0%		
Rural	27.5%		

(Source: World Summit for Social Development 1995, and The Economic Survey 1997-98)

The present dilemma for Pakistan is fairly basic. Its previous pace of economic growth cannot be sustained without substantial investment in human development, but its ruling elite, divorced from the aspirations of the masses, is tragically indifferent to the provisions of basic welfare and educational services for the people. Without basic reforms in Pakistan's political, social and economic system, the prospects for Pakistan appear somewhat bleak. Yet the question persists as to how and when such fundamental reforms will be engineered and who will engineer them?

The concept of Pakistan developing its educational infrastructure will determine how and when the cultural impact will take place through its modernisation programme. Currently, the resistance levels towards change are high, due to the inadequate nature of development and the lack of sustainable services for human development, especially in education and information base institutions. If and when Pakistan is able to correct its neglect in its investment programme, without its vulnerability to corruption and the distortion of its institutions, then the challenge against change may be reduced. One of the primary issues, which require some attention in the movement on from human development towards information technology growth for Pakistan, is placed within the framework of the measurement of productivity. There is a growing body of literature that suggests that information technology contributes to labour productivity growth. Ishrat Husain (2001) remarks on this topic when he wrote in the Journal; *Human Development Review*, that the international market is increasingly looking upon the developing countries such as Pakistan and India for IT personnel. Therefore, there are good reasons for investment in the IT related sector and in particular IT education. Husain went on to express his disillusionment in the current situation in Pakistan when he stated:

The present [IT] base [in Pakistan] is too small and thus will take several years of dedicated quality work, enterprise and marketing for making Pakistan's IT industry and IT personnel a familiar brand in the US and European markets.

Ishrat Husain (2001: 108)

End Notes

¹ Several cases can be quoted in this regard. For instance, in the *Economic Survey 1996-97*, the figures for development and non-development expenditures on education are Rs.12.7 (£127,791,328) and Rs.51.8 (£504,912,663) billion, respectively (p. 117). However, the same figures in the *Economic Survey 97-98*, are 5.9 and 52.4, respectively (p. 122). Here, the later figures can be considered more reliable as the same were also found in unpublished records of the government.

² S.S.H. Rizvi is the former Director General of PCSIR Labs, Karachi.

³ Khan A Salahuddin (13th August 2000) [The Information Technology Puzzle](http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag9/htm). (<http://www.dawn.com/weekly/dmag/dmag9/htm>)

⁴ Chapter 1. shows the level of human development which currently exists in Pakistan and how the lack of social developments programmes, by their very nature would hinder a participatory function of the nation state in a global information revolution.

⁵ There are some discrepancies on the adult literacy figures governing a few percentage points, this is due to figures being collated through various different sources by different government and non-government agencies. The official 1998 census figures were not available until 1999 and therefore previous calculations were based on estimates.

*** Sources of publication for Table 5:**

- 1) Government of Pakistan, *Social Indicators of Pakistan 1995*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1996: 137.
- 2) Calculated from Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjad, *The Management of Pakistan's Economy 1947-82*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984: 31.
- 3) The World Bank, *World Development Report 1998-99*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998: 201.
- 4) Government of Pakistan, *National Education Policy '92*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1992: 20.
- 5) *Ibid.*, *Literacy Status of Pakistan*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1992: i.
- 6) *Ibid.*, *Economic Survey 1996-97*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1997: 115.
- 7) *Ibid.*, *Economic Survey 1997-98*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1998: 119.
- 8) *Ibid.*, *Economic Survey 1998-99*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1999: 111-114.
- 9) *Ibid.*, *Pakistan 1999 – An Official Hand Book on Statistics*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1999: 256.
- 10) *Ibid.*, *Population and Housing Census 1998*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1999: iv.
- 11) *Ibid.*, *National Education Policy 1998*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1998: 21-129: 133.
- 12) *Ibid.*, *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP)*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, November 2001: 41-42.
- 13) *Ibid.*, *Economic Survey 2000-2001* [<http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/main.html>], 15 July 2001.
- 14) *Ibid.*, *Economic Survey 1999-2000*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2000: 141.
- 15) Mahbub ul Haq and Khadija Haq, *Human Development Report in South Asia 1998*, 1998, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998: 180.
- 16) UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001: 143.
- 17) Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, *Human Development in South Asia 2000*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000: 205.
- 18) Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan 2010: A Vision for Knowledge-Led, Just, Tolerant, Enterprising & Prosperous Society*, (n.d.) p. 7.

Chapter Four

Pakistan Interview Analysis

I believe this new information age may be a challenge or a threat to some in (Pakistani) society, but also, it is a blessing in disguise.

Amjad Islam-Amjad (1997)

Summary

The interviews that follow in this chapter offer a broad reflection of many of the attitudes, thoughts and perceptions on the impact of technology in Pakistan. It was important to cover a wide range of topics and discussion points and therefore it was crucial to ensure that amongst the subjects, faith, culture, identity and youth were prominent in the debates. Some of the respondents covered all of these points and gave interesting and informative accounts of their work and the manifestation of technology that has taken place in the various professions either through direct usage or of their view on its affects on how the fabric of society is influenced towards change. Most of the respondents had offered a welcoming opportunity to discuss many of the issues with which I was concerned. There was some apprehension but mostly this was dispensed with once confidence and trust was established, although I am sure there was some degree of reservation remaining in their minds.

Prologue

My journey to Pakistan to undertake the interviews with a number of well established and prominent members of society caused me some anxiety and apprehension, in that I was unsure what to expect and how I would embark on my task. I had little first hand knowledge of Pakistan and much of what I knew was from friends, family and the British media, none of which was very positive nor encouraging for me to be convinced that this would be an easy task. My own knowledge of the Punjabi, Hindi or Urdu language was limited to the extent of speaking words and sentences in broken or misplaced tenses and my grammar was based upon the stylistic approach of watching Pakistani and Indian films and drama.

When I finally arrived at the Guest House, in central Islamabad, I was pleasantly surprised with the professional welcome I had received. On reflection, paying Rs.1000 (£9.70) per night, this should have presented me with a VIP welcoming party. Nevertheless I was satisfied with a bottle of chilled mineral water, air conditioning and a clean (bug free) bed. My first visit to Pakistan was to last a full month, this was so that I would have an opportunity of not only making contacts with local professionals but would also offer an opportunity to explore some of the cultural patterns of behaviour that would assist me in recognising why Pakistan was country of such intrigue. The images and pictures of Pakistan that had entered my mind during my stay caused me a mixture of emotions. Some were exciting and challenging, viewing Pakistan through the eyes of a stranger, passing through on a journey of adventure and intrigue. Other thoughts were disturbing as much as apprehensive, as I saw how the security forces and the police treated simple people with aggressive contempt. My own experiences in such circumstances led me to being unlawfully detained and deprived of my valuables by the police on the excuse of simply travelling in a car with a woman who was not my wife, mother or daughter. She was in fact a colleague from a local NGO who was accompanying me to a seminar at the Holiday Inn, where I was invited to present a paper on the research work I was undertaking.

My first task after settling in was to find a copy of the Pakistan Yellow Pages, this for most Pakistanis was the bible of communications, not only did this book serve to be the greatest thing since modern communication entered Pakistan, but gave a considerable amount of accurate information and access to the main official establishments from where I was to embark on a journey towards seeking the information I wanted for my project. After making a few telephone calls from my hotel room, I was ready to make my first formal contact with officialdom.

I began to list my potential contacts in order of priority and official status. On occasions this was difficult, due to many of the officials with whom I spoke gave false information, elevating themselves into positions from where they in fact were just minor civil servants. This process had taken up a considerable amount of time of interviewing civil servants who claimed to be of higher status and knowledge than they were. It soon became apparent that I would need to seek the support of a senior official before I could begin to discuss my work with any seriousness.

From the very beginning, my research work was 'cautiously' welcomed, partly because I was from a British university and partly because the subject that I was exploring was the topic of the day. The fact that I spoke fluent English throughout my stay in Islamabad was an added advantage in unlocking some doors that would normally have been firmly shut.

The main thrust of my discussions was shaped through informal chats over *tea and samosas*. I had prepared several formal questionnaire for the interviews however, I quickly realised that most of my respondents were more appreciative about talking on a wide range of topics rather confining themselves to a set of mundane questions which for most part were irrelevant to their work. The fortunate fact was that I was able to record nearly all the interviews that were later transcribed into my jotter and ready for use on a later occasion.

There was a great deal of thought, preparation and advice sought to ensure that the best and/or the most appropriate respondents were chosen. The dilemma facing any researcher is how many respondents should there be? Who should they be? And what should the common themes be amongst them? In this instance I thoroughly discussed these concerns, problems and anxieties with my supervisor, sought advice from other PhD researchers at the university and calculated the length of my Interview chapter and broke down the sections of debates that needed reflection within it. It was this process that gave me a broad framework within which I could choose my respondents and the areas that I should be covering.

Interviews

The respondents had, during the course of the interviews, responded in many different forms, although some common themes did emerge and they are shown in the outline analysis set out below. Dr Anis Ahmed, a professor at the International Islamic University of Pakistan, spoke to me about the affects of technology and its real impact on global Islam. The enthusiasm and passion with which he spoke of technology surprised even me, as I had expected fierce opposition to ‘technologicalisation’ of Pakistan, especially where cyber technology was concerned. However, the moment for sharing such optimistic views had arrived and was clearly in the domain of Dr Ahmed’s realm.

Dr Anis Ahmed, who is the Head of Islamic Studies at the university, portrayed himself as a demure and thinking man. One could not help but think of him as the father figure of Islamic governance in Pakistan. Although in reality this may or may not be true, this matters in fact very little, as the purpose of the exercise was to debate with him the nature of cyber technology and its impact on Islamic thinking and the values that Islam holds for millions of people in Pakistan. Dr Ahmed welcomed the opportunity to share his thoughts, and spoke of the importance of technology as a vehicle to promote Islam on a global scale. His views echoed those of many Islamic scholars from around the world as we have often heard through the news media in recent times. His appreciation of technology growth and indeed his thoughts that he shared during the course of the

interview touched little upon the value of technology as an economic tool for the benefit of Pakistani society, and addressed even less the financial and human development models that would be generated through a global market economy as a consequence. He stated in the opening remarks of his interview: “The use of modern technology must be used to communicate the message of Islam”. The idea of such a powerful communication tool on a single issue is a powerful enough message in itself. However, to examine the nature of why he felt such passion lent itself to the very economy, that he felt opposed everything that was Islamic. He was adamant that neither he nor his university colleagues resisted the introduction of technology into Pakistan, as his views had clear ideals for which this technology should be used.

Dr Ahmed had considered that the conventional methods of communications on a global scale were making little impact on the distribution of information and suggested that, “non conventional” methods had to be found to compete against global Islamophobia, such as using email, the Internet including web sites, mobile phones and satellite (dish) television. In comparison, he went on to say that the West has clear methods of communications and they use electronic communication tools effectively to project the message of their societies and the values which they hold dear to themselves. On the other hand, Islamic societies, comparatively speaking, live in the dark ages and have yet to embrace new forms of communication technologies.

The act of slavery, Dr Anis Ahmed argued, “comes in many forms, from chains to addiction, to dependency. The nation has to learn to shed the shackles of colonialism if it is to become a free nation”. However, he went on to stress that he did not believe in the fear that technology was the only means of colonialism. He said, “People who accept to be colonised can never be liberated”. Setting out his argument that technology in itself wasn’t to be feared, but rather to be aware that becoming dependent on such technology as a means for modernisation for the nation, would not only compromise the free will of the people of Pakistan but would lead to the boundaries of economic and cultural slavery that have become evident upon every developing society. Not least hesitating to draw the West’s own problems of technology dependency as a means

towards its own existence. Dr Ahmed believes that what Pakistan needs to do, as an Islamic nation, is to turn this to the nation's advantage, rather than becoming slaves to the multi-national corporations of the West, referring to the United States, Japan and key European Union states.

Dr Ahmed's theme captured the veracious nature of his ideals by supporting the concept of technology liberalisation yet ensuring that such freedom of communication remains within the boundaries of regional and global Islamic economic, Islamic social and Islamic cultural development, rather than technology becoming used as an instrument to suppress the wider Islamic identity and used as a vehicle by the West to control the growth and influence of a global Islamic movement in all spheres of economics, society and culture. The commercial benefits he felt, of technology were recognised as a valuable asset for Pakistan, although the costs for such an asset, Dr Ahmed stated, were unsustainable in a competing economic market for the developing world. Overall, his objections were not based upon technology being a serious threat to Pakistan but rather what would be the 'commercial' gain for Islam.

Dr Ijaz Shafi Gilani, describes himself as a political scientist and works for the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup Poll, in Islamabad. Dr Gilani's work has included being a political adviser to previous governments on matters of internal socio-political matters and he has played a key role in influencing the government programme of information technology through the various non-government positions he has held. Dr Gilani is a well-known academic, author of many publications and journal articles, and a political contributor to the government think tank policy programmes.

My contact with Dr Gilani came through a recommendation by Dr Muzafar Iqbal from the Pakistan Science Academy Islamabad. We met at the Islamabad Sustainable Development Institute in a small very dimly lit and badly kept room. Almost resembling a store room. The surroundings one would not expect from a research institute. I later understood, that such clandestine surroundings were in line with the nature of our discussion. Suspicion, secrecy and anxiety were key ingredients for the discussions to

follow. Dr Gilani asked me not to record the interview and therefore, in order to maintain as much concentration as possible on the discussion, I chose only to make a few notes, but relied heavily on recalling and recording the details of our discussion later. I was very keen on wanting to understand the flavour of the contents of our discussion, rather than attempting to identify key factual points of reference. The purpose for such secrecy was based upon the fear of the unknown and an anxiety based upon how such information may finally be imparted to the wider community.

Dr Gilani's position on technology was delicately aimed at balancing the need for technology as a tool for development and moving Pakistan from a relatively backward society, towards, and into a progressive and modern society, whilst still maintaining its distinct identity in cultural, traditional and religious spheres of the country's nationhood. Unlike Dr Ahmed, Dr Gilani portrayed himself as a political thinker, who saw technology as a route out of Third World underdevelopment and stagnation, and into a developing and progressive nation led not by Islamic thought. To Dr Gilani, it was important to move forward on policies of social and economic change, development, capitalisation of the economy and modernisation of the nation. This, he felt was only achievable through embracing technology as a tool for development and a move towards nation building.

Dr Gilani remarked that Pakistan needed to increase the quality of its social, economic and political infrastructure and prepare itself for the inevitable introduction of technology. However, he went on to explain that growth in the mass communications market would be the vehicle by which technology would be sustainable in Pakistan. He commented that electronic communications technology has shaped and influenced the lives of millions of people in Pakistan. Dr Gilani, based his findings of the research of the Gallop Poll Institute, that currently 7% of the population watch satellite television of which 50% of those own a dish antenna. Dr Gilani commented that the work undertaken through the Gallop Poll Institute had shown some disturbing facts. However, it was clear from our discussion that his findings supported the fact that the majority of the people who owned a satellite television, belonged to an identifiable socio-economic group

irrespective of which part in Pakistan they lived. This opinion was also shared by a number of other respondents, with whom I had shared this information and from the information that I was able to access. I was able to support Dr Gilani's view that satellite television was expensive and therefore, was less likely to be available to a significant number amongst the rural and urban poor and more likely to be available for the those who were economically able to afford such communication technology. The fact of the matter was, this information although important, was based upon the assumption that satellite television, had entered the domain of most rural and urban societies in Pakistan and was beginning to influence the behaviour, thoughts, ideals and values that many people held in Pakistan. It was this point that Dr Gilani was concerned with, by examining how electronic technology was beginning to impact on the lifestyles and identity of Pakistani society. The focus soon shifted from the sociological impact of technology and onto the social policy agenda, when Dr Gilani expressed the view that such developments need to be led by an aggressive communication policy by the government if Pakistan was to break out of a backward thinking development strategy on communications.

The growing concern in Pakistan, Dr Gilani stated, was not that Pakistan had an ineffective communication strategy, or that the country's Islamic identity may be hindering any technological development. The concern, Dr Gilani was anxious about, was the concentrated impact of India's communication network in satellite broadcasting and how this was affecting the minds of young people in Pakistan. What he referred to was that India's satellite television was already spilling over into Pakistan and all that one needed to do, to access this, was to purchase a satellite dish and aim it in the direction of India. The nature of India's broadcasting satellite communication technology was impacting in almost all spheres of Pakistan's development; fashion, news, music and so on. Dr Gilani commented that on one hand, Pakistan was promoting itself as a regional liberal Islamic society and on the other hand with the liberalisation of its Islamic values, it was facing a disintegrating cultural identity, bringing it closer to all the values and deeds that Pakistan itself was defending itself against. This development he felt, was having serious consequences on the overall indifference to traditions and

culture between Hinduism and Islam, and which Pakistan as a nation was attempting to maintain. This dual impact of technology on Pakistan was causing a slowing down in financial and economic investment into technology and needed a more aggressive approach towards ensuring that Pakistan can reap the benefits of such a development whilst still maintaining its values and identity as an Islamic nation.

Much of this line of thinking was supported by Syed Talat Hussain, a senior journalist and deputy editor with the *Daily Jang Newspaper* in Rawalpindi Pakistan. Hussain's views echoed the thoughts of many of the cultural scientists in Pakistan when he shared with me his interpretation of what was happening in the wider Pakistani society in general but more particularly amongst the youth. The experiences he shared with me during our discussion were very much reminiscent of those which Dr Gilani has discussed and echoed familiarity with contributions from others with whom I had spoken to in Pakistan. It was clearly apparent from Dr Gilani and Hussain's contributions that they had, in fact, based their thoughts not only on factual material, but that there were also heavily influenced by what they saw around them in their daily work and leisure activity. Both men were strong nationalists, with respect to the Pakistani identity and not necessarily always basing it upon the need to capture the Islamic sense of nationalism, to support their interpretation of technology and its impact upon Pakistan.

Hussain remarked during an interview that his observations of Pakistani society created interesting paradoxes of the nation's behaviour, on the one hand by cultural fashion embracing everything that appears to be anti-Islamic and then on the other hand, the strong sense of nationalism and anti-Indian sentiment expressed through the same cultural norms they are attempting to embrace through the influences of Bollywood and Hollywood. The paradox, to which Hussain refers, is not that dissimilar to what many of us grapple with in our everyday lives, when we face conflicting challenges to our own behavioural norms. The fact this paradox refers to Pakistan, the same paradox is also faced in western society, as much as in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. However, what places this particular paradox 'off centre' from others, is that in an

Islamic nation where nationalism and anti-western feelings run equally as high as the need for modernisation, there is also the desire for material wealth and 'fashionable' norms to be part of a growing sense for global integration. In other-words, the global village has entered the domain of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan, particularly young people and the fashion conscious elites, have begun to respond to this new adventure.

The focus of Hussain's contribution was aimed at the influences that India was having on young people in Pakistan, yet at the same time, such emotions were being over taken by a sense of loyalty to one's own nation, both from an Islamic and nationalist perspective. The 'conflict' or indeed, as Hussain described it, "the clash of culture" was beginning to have its affect on the nation. As a result, Hussain felt that Indian culture through music, drama, education, language and other media facets were more readily accepted by the Pakistani masses, rather than the 'home grown' patterns of cultural entertainment which was being perceived as boring, out-dated and out of touch with the needs of the masses. He argued that the mixture of languages, was more often than not spoken by the educated and mimicked by the less educated. English/Urdu and Urdu/Hindi were a common mix of languages spoken to illustrate a sense of personal development towards becoming the 'modern man'. However, Hussain went on to illustrate this enigma by stating:

The younger generation of Lahore is a fascinating experience; their lingo contains a lot of words from Hindi. But their thought process, which is transmitted to them through the state controlled media and what has been handed down to them by their parents, teachers and others guardians of influence, is that India is out there to destroy Pakistan. And India is bad. The language, however, that they are using is of their enemy. This creates a big problem. The image given to them through the Indian media is different from the images given to them by the state media. The history books that they read are also different. There is going to be a clash? [of Culture].

Syed Talat Hussain (June 1997)

The analysis by which Hussain sees this development in the minds and hearts of young people in Pakistan is very piquant, as most likely there are not many people in Pakistan who would view this influence so openly in the same manner. Except possibly people

such as Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy a renowned radical and rebellious (by Pakistani standards) author and academic at the Quaid-e-Azam University of Islamabad. When young people go out, Hussain explains, they develop new styles of expression as a means of attempting to relate what they hear in the cinema, television and elsewhere, to their own local surroundings. Hussain goes on, “the young person's definition of having fun, has totally changed” new words have new means such as:

“... *Whats the bloody big deal ... What the Fuck ... How u doin Maan ...*”

By using such terms and expressions, the young person begins to develop his/her own cultural identity through their newly developed sub-cultural language and their own little sub-cultural society within which they communicate as insiders influenced by what can be seen as a ‘nation within a matrix’. Some of this debate is referred to in the introduction on how culture, tradition, modernisation and identity exist in parallel dimensions. One can apply a post-modernist perspective to this approach, that of Baudrillard, which Douglas Kellner (1992: 147) dismisses as superfluous. Baudrillard's account, as described by Kellner (1992: 147), sets out telecommunications as pure noise, with an implosive black hole. Kellner continues to berate Baudrillard's version of postmodernist telecommunications, as images that flicker by, stopping only for seconds as they gather a glow before moving onwards, which for the tele-spectator who invariably becomes “lost forever in a fragmented fun house of mirrors in an infinite play of meaningless images”. This very colourful account of Baudrillard's work, *Simulation*, eloquently sets the scene for what is to follow in Kellner's own work when he stated that, one can no doubt see television as a experience of a one dimensional flat wasteland of superficial images which function as a black hole without meaning. However, Kellner's (1992: 147) view suggests that: “one can become overwhelmed by the number, velocity and intensity of images, so that television's signifying function can be de-centred and can collapse altogether.”

Kellner (1990) is not totally convinced of even his own account of the effects of visual media communications on the individual and therefore goes further into his own analysis of postmodernist theory and finally decides that, as people regularly watch

certain shows and events; there are inevitably followers, groupies and fans to the various events; people model themselves on the images they see and mimic the behaviour, style and attitudes on such images. Television advertising has further contributed towards consumer demand; and now Kellner goes on to suggest that television has become a key player in influencing government political elections. Therefore television is now playing an essential role in the new state of the art governance. The new art of imaging and copy cat styles of behaviour, as continued from the screen to the street are a means of satisfying a growing frustration of public entrapment in a society without the means of release. Kellner (1992) debates this issue at some length, and concludes by arguing;

one's identity may crystallise and harden such that *ennui* and boredom may ensue. One is tired of one's life, of who one has become. One is trapped in a web of social roles, expectations and relations. There appears to be no exit and no possibility of change. Or, one is caught up in so many different, sometimes conflicting, roles that one no longer knows who one is.

Douglas Kellner (1992: 142-143)

The issue that Kellner has attempted to draw attention to are the problems of self-identity. It is this precise issue which has caused, as Kellner suggests, a limitless move towards challenging the existence of the self identity to that of their heroes in the television pictures that they see.

Talat Hussain believes that India is deliberately aiming much of its communication channelling at Pakistani audiences. The propaganda signal, Hussain suggests, from India to the people of Pakistan, which clearly suggests, "we are one people, one nation, one tradition and a lot of things combine us together". He went on to comment that these ideals which India is transmitting, are based upon one language and one culture, which, when combined together would arguably point towards challenging the Pakistani government's domestic political message that India is the enemy. The fear which he shared with me during our numerous conversations, was shaped around how this information channelling may begin to change and influence the traditions and cultural norms that many people in Pakistan identified with as Islamic and Pakistani. His commentary pictured eloquently the persona of the beginnings of global change which throughout the world has become a familiar scene with Levis, Coca Cola and

McDonald's burgers leading the cultural changes that we have all seen over many years. Hussain's comparative similarity for Pakistan was:

The cultural identity begins to dilute after a while. This is the type of image which is being received by the dish antenna and through Zee TV, EL TV and all those alphabetical TVs, Indians tend to have, which are being watched a lot in Pakistan.

Syed Talat Hussain

Many times during our discussions, he questioned the real impact of global TV and particularly, the impact that the Indian media was having on Pakistan. He wasn't sure whether this was a good or bad influence, but he was sure it was an influence which would change Pakistan and the people that watch Indian television. Talat Hussain is probably one of the few modern day visionary journalists in Pakistan, although still at a relatively young age, in his early thirties, his journalistic thoughts and sociological analysis on the impact of media communications broadens the horizons of the debate. His view that the cultural invasion which Pakistan faces, not only from India, but from the West, poses a formidable threat to the values and traditions of Pakistan. Although programmes such as *Baywatch* may be frowned upon publicly, he is acutely aware that many of those same families would put their children to bed and then the husband and wife would settle down in front of the TV and watch it. He went on to question his thoughts by stating, "What does this say about us as a people and what does this say about new communication technology"? In 2002, the military government agreed to block all satellite television broadcasting received into Pakistan from India, as a means of closing its cultural borders with India and thereby preventing any degree of cultural influences reaching the people of Pakistan. Some of this has also led to Western movies and documentary dramas becoming blocked as a consequence.

The move towards liberalisation of mass communications technology which was often talked about by the various respondents, but never really placed within any identified context, that was until I spoke to Talat Hussain. His views clearly reverberated the actions of many. From his own research as a journalist, he found that many young people from liberal families watch MTV, BBC, CNN, Hollywood movies and such like,

as an everyday event without the thought of their contents or influences. The result of watching such programmes often translated into the market place for discussions and debates and led to mimics and copycat life styles for the young. Fast cars and fashionable jeans were often the clearly visible results of such actions, compared to rural areas where economic poverty restricted similar extravagant responses. The rural youth would discard the local customary Shalwar Khameez (baggy trousers and knee length shirt) and don the cheap imitation jeans made in China or elsewhere to the dismay and often against fierce objections, of their elders. This was, Hussain remarked, more often than not accompanied by young men with wolf whistles and crude sexual remarks towards lone women, as part of their new western imitated youth culture.

Wherever and whenever the young male would see lone young women out, the reaction towards them by young men was often of a sexual nature, wolf whistles, smiles, and impolite comments, and so on and so forth. This behaviour was often mimicked through what they saw on the big screen and interpretative as a modern man way of behaviour. Reflecting through this that everything that is Pakistani is therefore 'un-modern' and backward. This pattern of behaviour was disconcerting from the perspectives, the first being that young men were degrading the role of women through what they saw and interpreted on the big screen and secondly, the method through which they considered Pakistani tradition and culture as backward and un-modern. My own experiences during my research compared favourably to Hussain's research, when I observed young people in the villages and hamlets acting out scenes which they had seen in movies and music videos. On the one hand, India portrays cultural images which appear to be more fantastic than realistic, then on the other hand, young people see Hollywood movies as realistic, rather than fantastic. The difference in interpretation here, is that although, the Bollywood culture of the 'enemy' may be unwelcome by the establishment and the nation as a whole, it was supported as principally more acceptable, based upon commonality of language, culture and regional identity. Hollywood was projected as the 'other', with no common facets of cultural understanding and therefore sexuality was acknowledged, although inappropriate for traditional Pakistan, but for a fashionable and modern Pakistan, it was therefore acceptable. His thoughts were centred upon Pakistan

culture being basically a conservative culture. It is not, he suggested a “Hip Hop Hooray” type of culture but more subdued to balance the Islamic way of life with historical traditions which have shaped the nation’s identity.

Hussain interestingly compared his own experiences when he first began to wear Shalwar Khameez on live television as a presenter. His more liberal colleagues would openly remark that Hussain “didn’t even know how to dress”, which was, as Hussain commented, “their way of disapproving of tradition and attempting to impose a picture of cultural imperialism based upon the so-called modernisation agenda”. Cultural images for Hussain in Pakistan, are a vital ingredient for survival. “Without our own identity”, Hussain explained, “the nation loses its belonging, cultural proportionality and becomes transfixed on becoming another civilisation’s cultural slave. Although Hussain is a pro-modernist, and supports the conceptual argument that tradition needs to move forward in-order to make way for progress, at the same time he trusts that change should be constructive and positive for a society which both challenges and supports development as the means towards modernisation.

Douglas Kellner (1992: 141) debates the pre-defined social roles of society that are constituted through a system of myths which have provided social and religious sanctions to one place in the society’s social infrastructure. In relation to modernity, Kellner (1992: 141-142) describes identity as a form of mutual recognition of ones changing role and characteristics for a society in which it can often be influenced by the changing social environment and its surroundings. At the same time Marshall Berman’s (1982) work, *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, explores ways in which modern society can, although stalked with conflicts and contradictions, nevertheless enable men and women to become more free and more creative then ever before. Berman (1982) goes on to discuss the conceptual debate of how “modernity signifies the destruction of past forms of life, values and identities, combined with the production of ever newer ones”. Frisby (1985) develops this notion a little further when he comments, “The experience of *modernité* is one of novelty, of ever-changing new, of innovation and transitoriness.” Kellner (1992: 142) suggests that “one may thus experience anomie, a condition of

extreme alienation in which one is no longer at home in the world.” Kellner’s view and that of Frisby argumentatively suggests that the changing behaviour of society, to that which Hussain draws our attention, is based upon an inner need or strong inner desire to combine with the changing nature of a global culture to which young people in this case are readily aligning themselves to. The fact of the matter is, global media communications industries have enveloped themselves around the minds and fantasies of Pakistani society, and in particular young people, and have portrayed new cultural norms, which have remained alien to Pakistani traditions as a route towards modernisation and progress. The norms which Hussain suggests are both culturally dangerous and socially degenerative of the national identity for Pakistan if they remain unchecked and uncontrolled. Hussain stops short at suggesting that state censorship should be applied, but rather implies that self-censorship should be encouraged where such technologies are eroding the cultural traditions of society and Islamic values of the nation.

One of the central themes of a modernist culture, which I believe Dr Ijaz Gilani and Talat Hussain align themselves to as a legitimate concern, is that to which Marx outlines in his work, *The Communist Manifesto*. The modernist culture suggests an inter-connection between the modern desire for self development, and that of the modern movement towards economic development. Marx captures this relationship in his manifesto where he writes:

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man at last is forced to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his fellow men.

Marx & Engels 1848/1959: 10.

Under the pressure of market forces, the modern man and woman are forced to grow in order to survive. Berman (1992: 36) argues that such growth is channelled and twisted into narrow, strictly marketable directions. It is this inner dynamism that captures the spirit for change and the audiences begin to mimic and mime the characteristics of the capitalist bourgeois markets within a strictly controlled market economy.

Information technology is available to the people of Pakistan in an unimaginable array of glitter and style; fashion shows, music, film, sleek cars, rich people, happy faces, healthy women, and people who are simply joyous and wallow in obscene wealth. Traditionally, Talat Hussain explains, people sought pleasure from leisure, by a visit to the local market, cinema and shopping centres. Family and friends were also considered as part of the socialisation process. This generated a sense of localised participation in one's own environment. Now he goes on, "the situation has totally changed. The demands placed upon us reflect the values of a global non-Muslim society. In entertainment, we are expected to dance to loud music and visit pubs and clubs. Pakistan has, to an extremely limited degree, offered to cater for this, not by offering hard drinks, but offering a place that mimics a pub with empty spirit and beer bottles, so that we can feel as though we are acting like Western youth with all the trappings of girls, music, dance, etc. Except that the police and the religious political parties ban us from moving our hips to the music". Such images of socialisation and the mixing of the sexes project a sense of global happiness and participation within a culture which is not only alien to Pakistani society, but welcomed by young people and social elites. On this point, Hussain moves towards criticising the government's lack of investment and foresight. He strongly believes, as does Dr Gilani and many others, that investment in technology is vital for the future of Pakistani media and communications industry.

There are some media moguls in Pakistan who have considered investing into a private communications technology. Shakeel Rehman is one such individual who has explored investment opportunities in Singapore to launch his own satellite television station. Rehman, who accompanied Talat Hussain on one of the unplanned visits to my hotel, is probably understood to be one of the richest men in Pakistan and currently owns many leading daily and weekly newspapers and magazines in the country. *The Daily Jang* Newspaper and the *Weekly Herald* are amongst his prized publications. Rehman commented on his frustration with the government which had inadvertently forced him to seek partners to his media ambitions from outside of Pakistan. He commented that although he wished Pakistan would open the doors to technology development, he

cannot wait for consecutive incompetent and irresponsible government administrations to decide how and when they would do this. Rehman stressed that this was not a party political thing, "we will all benefit", he argued, and went on to say, "there is a whole world of communications out there, yet the Pakistani government is so backward in its thinking, they have hardly invested any money in this area of development".

Shakeel Rehman, who is a billionaire by Pakistani standards, hopes that his investments outside of the country may jolt the government enough to realise the potential markets that they may lose to non-Pakistani media organisations. However, Rehman believes the Islamic influences in Pakistan are the most likely obstacles which currently prevent any real hard cash being spent and therefore leave Pakistan outside any of the developmental patterns on global communications technology. Rehman went on to comment, in our very brief exchange of views, "if Pakistan was to have a communications war with India or any other country, we would be the laughing stock of Asia. We have no communications hardware technology to talk of and we have no communications strategy". Rehman, although a well informed man on communications in Pakistan, was stark and to the point in his criticism. He was not camouflaging his views with colourful language or indeed with polite *tittle tattle*, he threw punches at the government, and they were indeed hard punches.

One of the key areas of discussions that took place and which also cut across all of the interviews was the subject of education. Although this subject area has been covered earlier in this thesis and in particular in chapter one, it is important to draw passing reference to it here as supportive material to the overall discussions that took place with the respondents. Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy, who is a Professor in physics at the Quaid-e-Azam University and a renowned academic critic on cultural politics in the country, who is by no means a supporter of any of the governments past or present, his position and argument is that all of the respective administrations have been corrupt and incompetent. He had organised a student and staff strike over conditions at the university.

Dr Hoodbhoy did not consider the Internet system and cyber technology in general to be a major threat to Pakistan or its cultural heritage. His argument was simply that, "barely a few hundred thousand people use it in any serious capacity". The problem, he explained, "was in the Pakistani education system". Dr Hoodbhoy said that during his lectures in physics at the university, he had to give them in Urdu, as hardly any of his students were able to understand the English language. "These are our future scientists," he jokingly remarked. This he agreed was a very serious problem for Pakistan, particularly, in his view, of the fact that undergraduate students, the scientists of tomorrow, were hardly able to comprehend the English language. Dr Hoodbhoy considered this problem to be so acute in Pakistan, that the government had to seriously improve upon its current education policy, if Pakistan was to be considered even a minor global partner in any social, economic or political sphere. The discussion focused for a short while on cultural imperialism and how cyber technology may be a vehicle towards social, economic and artistic dependency upon the West. Dr Hoodbhoy concluded that although this was a threat, it is more self-imposed by our lack of investments in these fields and therefore we would become even more dependent upon others and more likely thereby, to become a slave to our needs for competition. The only route out of this problem was, as he had earlier suggested to improve educational opportunities, increase educational investment and financial resources, and adopt a more inclusive approach towards equality between the upper class elites and the lower rural poor. Dr Hoodbhoy explained, "before we can even begin to think like the West, we need to improve our own institutions and to get rid of corrupt politicians, civil servants and the nepotism that serves to keep them there".

The real tragedy to which Dr Hoodbhoy refers, is not so much the lack of educational investment in Pakistan. This is nothing new and many societies have adapted themselves to this and made arrangements for themselves and their families to get the best out of what is available. The real concern in all of this, is the impact of technology on Pakistan and most people hardly know anything about this. A simple phone call which I made to the Vice Chancellor of a major university in Azad Kashmir reflects the

level of understanding even amongst many of the intellectuals in the country. A brief extract of the conversation went as follows:

A telephone conversation with the Vice Chancellor of a major university in Azad Kashmir

MpA: Hello Sir. My name is Mohammed Aslam and I wish to come over and meet you to discuss the effects of the Information Superhighway in Pakistan?

VC: Sure ... when would you like to come over?

MpA: Whenever it is convenient for you ... But I will require about an hour of your time to discuss the Information Superhighway.

VC: I am sorry Mr Aslam ... (short silence) ... which motorway are you wishing to talk about, the one to Lahore hasn't been built yet?

MpA: Oh ... (slightly confused) ... you, may have misunderstood me, I am talking about the Information Superhighway, the Internet system in Pakistan?

VC: The what system? I am sorry I have no idea what you are talking about?

..... The telephone goes dead!

Although Dr Hoodbhoy may well be concerned about the lack of educational investment in Pakistan, and this is an issue which cannot be overstated enough; at the same time, it is of major concern to both the student and the teacher that senior figures at university level fail to have the basic understanding of the Internet system and other forms of electronic communications and what its role, functions and influences are. Dr Hoodbhoy's frustration appears not to be with the system, although the system plays a significant part in the overall analysis, but with the apathy that is shown throughout the country towards challenging the corrupt government bureaucracy and the intellectual bankruptcy that is taking place within Pakistan.

Dr Soofia Mumtaz was the only female respondent who agreed to be interviewed. However, like so many others, she insisted that there be no recording of the interview but I was allowed to take notes if I wished. She considered it important to air some views on how she saw the impact of technology on Pakistan and particularly on women. Dr Mumtaz who is a senior anthropologist at the Pakistan Institute for Development Economics (PIDE), and had gained her doctorate from the United States, shared a number of interesting view points from a sociological perspective by suggesting that the impact of technology has two major concerns. The first is that the internet is open to all without any state sponsored censorship. Dr Mumtaz did however show some concern that matters of pornography and Islamophobia would go unchecked. She gave the example of cyber porn. "what is to stop my child logging on to the porn channels when I am not at home, the same applies to 'Islam bashing' by the anti-Islamic forces out there", she continued. The Internet on the other hand, has great advantages for commerce, education, economy and local democracy. It is poorly used, she complained, due to a large uninformed and uneducated mass. What the country was required to undertake was a mass education programme which would both benefit the people and the nation as a whole. She however recognised as did Dr Hoodbhoy, that such investments were unlikely to take place under the current government, not through unwillingness but through the simple lack of financial resources for human development. "If they invested in human development", she commented, "they wouldn't have anything left for themselves and their lavish lifestyles." It is a sad indictment, when almost every respondent that I spoke to, rightly or wrongly, had similar opinions about their government and its civil service bureaucracy.

The issue of local democracy was probably the most interesting point that she wanted to bring to my attention. Dr Mumtaz principally argued that women were getting a raw deal from Pakistan, in education, social and health care, and in career development. Basically, Dr Mumtaz believed that sex discrimination against women was unproportionally high in Pakistan, compared to other developing nations in the region. "Even India has better quality health care for women and more and more women are taking advantage of the social and economic benefits in their country"; she angrily

stated. Women in Pakistan she felt, were denied opportunities because of misplaced Islamic ideals that many senior politicians, some influential elders and the highly influential religious clergy held. The Internet was a great opportunity for women to excel into arenas which would normally be the domain of men, she commented. The Internet also encouraged personal development and confidence building for young women. It allows interaction between women in Pakistan who normally would not interact. Topics can now be discussed openly between women on sex, careers, family planning, dating and even arranged and forced marriages. The list, Dr Mumtaz suggested, was endless and therefore technology could be viewed as a means towards freedom and democracy for women who have been denied simple human rights in this country.

Currently in Pakistan, it is true that women have been heavily restricted in many social, economic and political spheres. The route out of this has been littered with social, economic, cultural and religious obstacles. Although Pakistan was one of the first countries in the Muslim world to have had a female Prime Minister, this in fact mattered very little when it came to women's rights and equality in a very much unequal male dominated society. Some argue that it may have been Bill Clinton who put Begum Benazir Bhutto into office, but it was the traditionalists who removed her, not on one occasion but twice. "Modernity in Pakistan," Dr Mumtaz commented, "was something that the rich and privileged appreciated. To the local village girl, she may as well be on another planet." The stark contrast in lifestyles between the rich and poor, between male and female and between the educated and uneducated was so evident in Pakistan, that modern technology had a long way to go before it would impact in such a manner that may make a serious contribution to the overall values and traditions in Pakistan, said Dr Mumtaz. She went on to say that traditions and culture are not static items which will never change or evolve. The technology of this century will aid human and economic development and if it makes life more equal, then why restrict its usage. This was the view of Dr Mumtaz who, as a professional woman in Pakistani society, argued that Internet technology although unregulated in Pakistan, contributed towards the benefit of

Pakistan, which would also make opportunities more accessible for women and young people throughout Pakistani society.

The cultural norms in Pakistan were the main issues to overcome, if from what Mumtaz, Gilani, Hussain and Hoodbhoy have surmised is correct. It is a fact that tradition in partnership with Islam sometimes, not knowing where tradition ended and Islam began, had hindered progress towards modernity. However, when one debates such issues with the traditionalists, they sternly argue that this is not the case and that Islam and Pakistan welcome technology as a route towards development. Although sometimes this statement is qualified as saying that technology should be used to promote global Islam as a means to combat Islamophobia. Dr Muzafar Iqbal from the Pakistan Science Academy (PSA) discussed the narrowing shades of opinion which have divided the debate between technology & modernity or technology for Islam. Dr Iqbal, as a senior science advisor with the PSA, plays a crucial role in recommending new innovations for scientific development in Pakistan. Yet at the same time, Dr Iqbal is a devout Muslim and a member of the clergy; he believes that technology has an important role in promoting Islam on a global scale. He commented that the relationship between technology and culture may not need to be in conflict as the two, one may argue, are very much fused together. Although his interpretation of technology is very narrow, in that he saw technology as a natural development from the telephone to the mobile and now the Internet. There were in fact other modes of communications such as television media, cinema and print communication technology. This, as discussed earlier was having a tremendous impact on the cultural images for young people in Pakistan. Dr Iqbal felt that although this may be true, the benefits were far greater for Islam and for the country as a whole. "One has a choice on how to use technology," he said, "but this does not mean because a few use it negatively, that we dispense with technology altogether. We should let people take responsibility for their own actions and allow technological growth to take place." It was refreshing to hear this point of view from Dr Iqbal which was rather reminiscent to that of Dr Anis Ahmed. However, one puzzling fact remains, why do the non-traditionalist, the modernisers, still believe the clergy are in opposition to technological development in Pakistan?

One interesting point that came out of our discussion which may shed light on this question reflect, is the view that Dr Iqbal shared with me regarding why Saudi Arabia, which many consider itself to be an Islamic state, still considers Information Communication Technology as being harmful. First of all it must be said, that Saudi Arabia is not an Islamic state, although it is considered to be the guardian of Islam's most sacred and holy places. Therefore their views cannot be considered as representing an Islamic perspective but rather, to be more accurate, their views should be cared for from a perspective of a Muslim nation. Dr Iqbal stated that it was access to information and ideas, which some, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the former Taliban government of Afghanistan and until recently Iran, considered to be harmful and therefore, such countries restricted access to the usage of modern technology, which many would legitimately interpret to limiting access to education and human development, therefore indirectly preventing access to knowledge to its people.

Nevertheless, Dr Iqbal believes that satellite television, as much as other forms of communication technology should be strictly controlled and more use should be made for educational purposes, including Islamic education. However, Dr Iqbal went on to qualify his comments when he stated, "young people are not going to watch Mullahs over Bollywood type of entertainment, unless we can create an environment where Islam is central to the lives of the people of Pakistan. Technology can be used for this in a very positive manner." On the matter of dependency on technology, Dr Iqbal agreed that there was a danger that Pakistan may become totally dependent upon the West for its technology and the danger of this would be that corporate enterprises may one day control domestic and foreign policy in Pakistan. To some degree he went on to say, "this was already happening through the commitment we gave to the World Bank and the IMF over our loans programme". What could happen, he suggested, would be that technology would become the new master and we would just change one master for another. Therefore, dependency becomes more acute through the multi-national corporations, particularly those corporations from within the United States of America. The Pakistan Science Foundation in Pakistan, which is part of the PSA and is a kind of

NGO Dr Iqbal explained, was set up to look into science and technology. This work is mainly research and education-based and currently contributes towards improving government policy directives and development. Dr Iqbal believes that with this work and the work of PSA, Pakistan will be at the forefront of technology development. Pakistan would inevitably benefit from this and through this, we shall be better placed to improve the quality of life in Pakistan. He went on to say, If we are to become less dependent we need to invest more on research and development and try to find our own communications technology for Pakistan. Clearly, the issue here, not only for Dr Iqbal, but for many of the respondents who represent a cross section of Pakistani professionals, is that unless Pakistan is able to develop a more attractive and entertaining social culture for business and for social entertainment value, Pakistan will begin to take on social images of Western decadence which it finds, meet the needs of the masses. This at the same time may fuel the debate of cultural imperialism. Dr Iqbal and Dr Ahmed are not suggesting that Islam should be a central theme for promotion however, they do appreciate the uphill struggle towards capturing their market share of audiences, without whom, they would see the decline of the national Islamic identity of a Muslim state.

To return to the question raised a short while earlier in this Chapter; *why do the non-traditionalist, the modernisers, still believe the clergy are in opposition to technological development in Pakistan?* The answer most likely lies somewhere between the need to develop Islam as an important part of Pakistan's national identity and its place within the international Islamic community; at the same time, to develop Pakistan's 'cultural' and economic strength, which is important for global participation in market economics. Interestingly, I came across an article by Peter Burke entitled; *We, the people: popular culture and popular identity in modern Europe*, where Burke (1992: 294) wrote of how people were divided into two parts. The 'inclusive' and the 'exclusive'. The first group generally link to right wing politics the second link to the left of the political spectrum. Burke (1992: 294) wrote that the study of popular culture in current times is being associated with the left wing movements across Europe. However, in the 19th century, the situation was far different. Students of what was at that time called folklore, were often conservatives who saw themselves as the protectors of traditions and values

against the assaults of modernisation. The situation in Pakistan is a little reminiscent of the history of European folklore where tradition and modernisation clash as two plates beneath the earth's crust creating a cultural earthquake which sends tremors across the Muslim landscape of Pakistan and other Muslim countries across the globe. The traditionalist or the modernisers in Pakistan have a common theme, in that they wish technology to take shape, most likely for differing reasons. However, the importance of its development is equally shared. The modernisers, the left wing liberals of Pakistan, wish to see Pakistan grow towards modernity, yet stall at the first hurdle when it is used for traditionalist and/or Islamic purposes. The traditionalist have an open agenda and openly share the objects of their aims for technology. So, in Burke's analysis, who is the conservative and who is the liberal? Clearly from Pakistan's view point, the traditionalists have a far greater democratic approach towards liberalisation of technology than the current day Pakistani left wing liberals on this subject.

The Pakistan Scientific and Technological Information Centre (PASTIC) is a research organisation which is in greater part funded by the government and attempts to act as the central focal point for academic information resource material. Dr Mohammed Afzal gave a short interview to share with me the conceptual idea that although the Internet has arrived in Pakistan, its usage still remains very difficult and at times impossible for many to access in academic and educational establishments. The costs for its usage remain extremely high and beyond the financial capability of many institutions. He commented that although there are over 15,000 registered researchers in Pakistan, the number that actually use the Internet regularly are no more than 1000. Dr Afzal values the benefits of the technology, but nevertheless sees the new technology as cumbersome and slow, when compared to many other countries in the West. He stated, "that until Pakistan's government or the private sector makes some very real investments into technology, and the channels by which such technology is transmitted, we are going to face hours of idle waiting periods for something that should only take a few minutes to download off the net..." PASTIC currently services over 6,000 subjects on science and technology through 100 journals through the Pakistan Library services. The organisation assists over 300 writers and academics in the publications of their materials Dr Afzal

suggested, in order to ease the problems of manual inventories, technology would offer an valuable opportunity for us to double this amount within years. However, Dr Afzal remains to be convinced if technology in Pakistan is truly a benefit at this time.

The main issue which Dr Afzal felt was of enormous benefit was that technology, although not at its peak, was a invaluable tool for many to search the net for general information and access to general knowledge. Providing, of course, as he stated, “ you can afford to remain connected to the net for very long”. His thoughts moved very much towards the growth in cultural knowledge and this would, he suggested, lead towards a more progressive thinking society, rather than remaining in the clouded sea of cultural backwardness. Many young people, he commented, would use the net for curiosity and leisure time activities. It allowed women to browse the net and become competitive in the field of knowledge and education and this he felt was a very important part of Pakistan’s growth market. Dr Rifat Hussain Professor in International Relations at the Quaid-e-Azam university, supported this debate on the social and economic inadequacies of technology. “Some forms of technology are extremely progressive, for example the Pakistan nuclear arms race is far more advanced and capable of competing in conflict. Therefore such technology has to be tip top.” Dr Rifat was well aware of the complexities of social, educational and economic needs in Pakistan. However being aware of this, he shared many of his thoughts on the successes of technology in Pakistan. He went on to say that Pakistan was not a rich country and much of its national expenditure is aimed for defence purposes, therefore leaving limited levels of GNP for internal investment into technology which may assist Pakistan’s future growth. Dr Rifat stated, the reasons for this were:

We are a two tier society, the very rich and the very poor. The elite classes educate their children in the quality educational institutions, and usage of technology in such institutions is not an issue. The poor people of Pakistan are caught in the ever-growing poverty trap of limited investments in education and this is why the political leadership of Pakistan is less likely to commit higher levels of expenditure to education and technology, for reasons that no real benefit will be achieved for the rich upper class elites by educating the poor who already have a limited scope in personal development opportunities in Pakistan.

Dr Rifat Hussain Quaid-e-Azam University

Dr Rifat's views clearly show that he has concerns and fears that affect Pakistan's ability to share in the cultural wealth amongst its people. However as he had indicated in his interview, Pakistan has also to prepare for its active participation in the globalisation debate and through that, investment in technology and educational development has to be a cornerstone of its internal policy development programme. He said that this was a dual problem which Pakistan faces; does it invest money in education and hope that the dividend pays equal to the economic growth the country expects, or does Pakistan struggle along in the hope that the people of Pakistan will inevitably lead the way ahead for internal growth markets to expand into external markets? Mohammadi and Ahsan (2002: 13) wrote in their recent publication *Globalisation and Recolonisation?* "Globalisation was a double edge sword – it is a powerful vehicle for economic growth, and at the same time is an assault on national sovereignty that easily erodes local cultures and threatens social stability." The issue to which Mohammadi and Ahsan address themselves, is whether the role of the state can influence the decline or growth of national cultural identities or does the globalised movement of multinational corporations shape the future for developing nations to compete in a mirage created by greed and profit. Technology is one form of the mirage that has taken shape in the minds of many amongst the elites in Pakistan. Although this image, may have the trappings of modernisation, Dr Rifat believes the costs of falling into this trap would have disastrous implications for a nation which has not yet fully prepared itself to economically, culturally and educationally embrace the full impact of global information technology. However he did suggest "this is not the reason why we shouldn't move towards the technologicalisation of the nation, but, rather we must be fully aware of the 'pact that we make with the devil' before we can accuse it of social cultural and economic exploitation".

Hasan Rizvi works with Isa Daudpota at the Sustainable Networking Development Programme (SNDP) which is sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and has the status of an Non-Government Organisation. Rizvi remarked that as an NGO the SNDP can offer a wide level of subject analysis on the growth of technology and its real impact on the human growth patterns in Pakistan.

However, the interesting fact about the SNDP is that it came about as a direct outcome of the Rio summit (Earth Summit) in 1992. The idea for the project was to set up a series of electronic networks in Pakistan which would support the infrastructure for communication technology throughout the country.

Rizvi believes this opportunity for Pakistan enabled the setting up of a Usenet chapter with about 35 groups in the beginning which were mainly amongst young people. The discussion groups explored topics from Islamaphobia, to computer technology and the environment. It became, as Rizvi described, “a focus group for open and closed topics” which groups of young people throughout the country could discuss over the net. Rizvi commented, as Dr Rifat and other before him have already indicated, that such groups are mainly from the middle and upper classes of Pakistani society and Rizvi’s analysis was no different from what has already been shared through the series of interviews. However interestingly, the main users of the net are not all competent in English but, because of their professional and/or privileged backgrounds, have sufficient knowledge of the English language to be able to adequately use the net for communication purposes. Rizvi went on to say that Pakistan is facing some very basic problems of poverty, illiteracy, health, and limited telecommunication services. There are two telephone lines per 100 Pakistanis. “These are the problems Pakistan is facing, unless a concerted and forceful action is taken, a kind of sure footing, there will be only slight improvement here and there on the internet services in Pakistan.” The concerns which Rizvi shared were that although Pakistan has attempted to incorporate technology into the infrastructure of Pakistan’s commercial, social and educational sectors, that unless Pakistan aims to secure this development with a coherent and effective policy programme with financial investments, the whole technology infrastructure was in danger of collapsing before it begins to even develop.

Rizvi went on to comment enthusiastically:

Software packages are not a problem in Pakistan. We can buy anything we want, the private software packages are freely available in large quantities. Very few people buy the original copies of software. The Pakistani market is essentially a private (black) market. All general purpose software is not a problem. It is the specialised packages which may be expensive. But very few of these are ever needed. After China, India and Pakistan are the biggest pirate software markets in the world.

Hasan A Rizvi
Sustainable Development Networking Programme

Isa Daudpota is the Director of SNDP and works closely with Hasan Rizvi. Together they shared with me an interesting insight to the Internet world in Pakistan. Neither Daudpota nor Rizvi were as forthcoming on the political aspects of electronic technology in Pakistan as I had expected. However, much of what they had said was already in the public domain and not much more was really added which would have developed the argument further on the political impact of technology in Pakistan. Daudpota's opening remarks were that "from an Islamic perspective, there are those who oppose technology, and there are those who support this type of development, but one cannot get away from the fact that the Internet source is more powerful than STV (Satellite Television). The Net is a two-way dialogue which is not possible through STV." He went on to give some interesting insights on what the government was doing to aid the development of the internet by commenting:

The support from the government of Pakistan has allowed freedom from tax and licences and we have a representative on our committee from the Ministry of the Environment. This is the main government department through which the UNDP operate.

Isa Daudpota. Director SDNP (UNDP)

Daudpota saw the work of the SNDP as a catalyst for networking in technology and which offered a variety of supportive practices to many institutions. The work of SNDP offers assistance to drug enforcement agencies, the police, customs, immigration, embassies, enthusiasts, commercial sectors and development agencies (NGOs).

Daudpota felt that it was this work of his organisation which set it apart from other agencies and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and through this, the government can see the value of technology in Pakistan. He went on to say:

The government of Pakistan cannot control the usage of the net and this is left to the user to decide how the information is used. The government has itself failed in using this technology for educational purposes just like they failed with other media systems such as TV. If the government fails to grasp the potential of the internet and to use it for the development of Pakistan. It will end up that the net will be used to flood information into Pakistan from the West. However the impact of such information would not be as bad as some of the other media systems.

Isa Daudpota Director SDNP (UNDP)

Daudpota felt that the current situation in Pakistan prevents the masses from accessing the Net in a grand manner, but was aimed mainly at those who had a respectable command of the English language. He went on to say that the rural areas of Pakistan would not see the net for many years, the most important issues facing the rural villages were not technology but basic health and social care issues, especially education, clean water and literacy. The main issue facing Pakistan was the lack of its own manufacturing base for computers. Pakistan was dependent on imports from China and Taiwan and this hindered real growth in technology for the country.

The importation of computers into Pakistan, many of the respondents felt disadvantaged the sector growth, Dr Anis and Talat Hussain had made similar remarks with respect to the dependency factor on multinationals competing for the markets in Pakistan. Although Pakistan's market is not as big as that of India or China, there was a real danger that the small market will begin to become even smaller, if and when Pakistan ever manufactured its own computer technology. The globalisation factor was quickly becoming a realisation for many professions who expressed concern about the internal market forces in Pakistan.

The Canadian Company, Nortel Communications (Pakistan), had seen the gap for data communications developing in Pakistan and was one of the first companies in 1994 to set up an office in Islamabad. I went along to meet Ahmed Bilal Afzal who was the

Regional Manager for the company. The interview was basically a public relations presentation of Nortel's intention to promote the world of communications in Pakistan. Ahmed Bilal shared a his concern on the slow growth that Pakistan's government was leading in this sector. Although he was extremely optimistic about Pakistan's future in electronic communications and said that, "we never knew that the Net was going to become so popular". However, he did offer some caution that the government was extremely selective on how it was investing in communications technology.

Ahmed Bilal commented that the difference between Nortel and other ISPs is that the others were locally based; for example there was one in Karachi and the other in Lahore but Nortel, covers nearly all of Pakistan. Nortel currently have 22 sites which are Data-con sites and have Nortel equipment installed. Out of 22 sites, 12 sites provide for Internet access. Therefore, through Pakistan Telecommunications (PCT) phone lines, local people can always use the service at local rates unlike the other services where the call is charged on a national rate if the user wishes the internet-link from city to city.

His findings in Pakistan through the work of Nortel have shown a somewhat different leaning on the overall prospective of electronic communications. Most of the respondents I had interviewed, although they were very supportive of technology, felt frustrated at the lack of availability and the slowness in its application. Some considered that the onset of technology was a negative development, yet welcomed the positive impact it may have on the society as a whole. Ahmed Bilal felt somewhat encouraged by the speedy growth that technology had taken on and argued that the growth had, unexpectedly overwhelmed the company's ability to respond adequately to meet the growing demands on its services. When this information was presented to other respondents, their reaction was that the slowness of Nortel's ability to accommodate the overwhelming demand was due in part to the Pakistan telecommunications infrastructure's inability to cope with the high volume of subscribers. However, Nortel's data base currently holds somewhere between 10,000/12,000 customers and demands are growing daily, he said.

The problem of getting the services to outlining areas of the city is the telecommunication systems are still very basic. If we are to set up the Internet system in rural parts of Pakistan, we will also have to see what the demand is out there for this investment. To set up a proper exchange costs a lot of money and this investment would need to be rewarded by the users.

The current estimates show that the PTC is looking for around a million customers. The highest demand is in Lahore which was surprising, considering that Karachi is the commercial capital of the country. Karachi would have been our expected highest customer base.

Ahmed Bilal Afzal, Nortel Telecom.

Ahmed Bilal felt that although most ISPs were expensive, their charges were somewhere around Rs.100 (97p) per hour, Nortel was offering a much cheaper service and the charges were around Rs.20 (19p) per hour. Although this may be cheap by Western standards, by Pakistani standards, where an average monthly salary for an office clerk is around Rs.4000 (£39), this charge was still out of the reach of many young people, students and most white collar workers. Nonetheless, the more you use the net, Ahmed Bilal commented, the cheaper it became.

Bilal went on to suggest that the Nortel customer block is located across the country from Peshawar to Multan to Lahore to Karachi. For example, on one host Nortel has 191 users in Rawalpindi. Although no statistics were available for me to take away, the following gives some indication of the broad picture that Ahmed Bilal had presented.

Fibre Optics across Pakistan

Box 10

Servers			
Rawalpindi	53	-	Islamabad 12
Lahore	66	-	Gulbur 12
Multan	10	-	Peshawar 8
Fasilabad	12	-	Karachi 44

(Fibre optics are in use from Peshawar to Karachi 565 megabit PDH.
This is an 18 fibre link.)

Ahmed Bilal remarked that there are about 280 on line users at one time out of a 12,000 customer database. The training that is offered to the ISP employees is a regular event for the engineers in Singapore and Australia. The employees in Pakistan cannot gain the same quality of training in Pakistan and the reason for this, he claimed, was that there are no appropriate training facilities available in Pakistan.

There are some 140 megabit short hauls in place in the country mostly in the Punjab and Sindh. Furthermore, there are alternative routes planned along the river Indus based on a 622 megabit SDH transmission. Ahmed Bilal expressed concern regarding the integration of PHD and SDH, however Nortel was currently reviewing this and changes would be made to overcome the basic problems which the company was currently experiencing. However, Nortel are planning to set up a seven ring strategy around the country and this is highly favoured by the government. It is expected that under the current service that is provided by Nortel nationwide, the plan will work like a loop system to aid access to the Internet system which should allow making the usage easier and more reliable.

Although the growing markets have attracted the private sectors to open local, regional and national offices around Pakistan, the issue here remains, can the government of Pakistan maintain an equal commitment to investment in this sector, or will it risk losing the interests of the multinationals in Pakistan? Many of professionals all seem agreed, that there is a desperate need for investment and clear government guidelines for a national policy. The departure from amongst the professionals is, at what cost will this be for Pakistan's national identity and cultural traditions which face the risk of contamination by Western images of decadence?

Globalisation, as a fact of reality, it is not surprising when one examines the serious nature of development and then put against which countries fair worse in that realisation. Technology is one measuring tool for this process and although companies such as Nortel and the SNDP would wish us to see the picture of technology development differently, there are some facts which cannot be changed. In this respect

Mohammadi and Ahsan (2002: 125-126) argue in their work, that the level of Internet usage throughout the world greatly differs when compared between the West (mainly USA) and the rest of the world. The figure presented by Mohammadi and Ahsan suggests that the United States usage of technology at 26% followed by OECD countries showing 7% and an even lower percentage for those countries which fall into South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The following table shows some degree of enlightenment on the growing inequalities of Internet usage across the world.

OECD Countries **Table 10**
Inequalities of Internet usage across the World.

REGION/COUNTRY/ ORGANISATION	REGIONAL POPULATION (as a % of the world population)	INTERNET USAGE (as % of regional population)
United States	4.7	26.3
OECD. (excluding the USA)	14.1	6.9
Latin America and The Caribbean	6.8	0.8
South East Asia and the Pacific	8.6	0.5
East Asia	22.2	0.4
Eastern Europe and the CIS	5.8	0.4
Arab States	4.5	0.2
Sub Saharan Africa	9.7	0.1
South Asia	23.5	0.04
World	100	2.4

Source: UNDP 1999: 63 (Mohammadi & Ahsan 2002: 127)

Table 10 shows an alarming picture of the nature of global inequality on technology usage and accessibility. Although many of the government's supportive institutions in Pakistan and many of the private sector enterprises overwhelmingly praise the development of technology and glowingly exhibit the increasing demands for its usage, the reality, when compared with other regional localities shows that Pakistan, whose average an approximate 0.04% against the world average of 2.4%, and therefore show that it is far short of a competent level of Internet usage to make any real impact for its

part in the global technology market place. In Pakistan around 60 times less than the world average is currently in use, and the figure becomes staggeringly worse within the Arab world. The comparative averages indicate that the government of Pakistan requires to seriously comprehend the lack of technology development and its usage, otherwise the implications of this reality will ricochet across the nation by showing a disintegrating level of educational and economic achievements, limited growth in human development potential and further compromise modernisation programmes in the cultural centres of the more traditional conservative regions of the country. The overall picture shows evidential bleakness as far as technology is compared, yet the visions and aspirations of the professionals in Pakistan exhibit a far greater degree of optimism. The 'Ostrich Approach' shown by the government and many of the professionals in Pakistan is not an uncommon practice.

Ahsan Abdulla from the National University of Science and Technology (NUST) and the Author of *Pakistan and the Internet*, met with me at the military university in Rawalpindi. This interview proved of little value in attempting to clarify the role and impact of technology in Pakistan, but concentrated on value based statements on how technology would be the route towards freedom and security for Pakistan. When probed further on how Ahsan Abdulla, assumed such developments and the evidence from which this information was based, his reference point was military journals and nationalistic jingoism. It became clear that Abdullah's views were more based upon a casual conversation with colleagues and friends than professional analysis of information communication technology. His book turned out to be a slightly upgraded version of a guidebook around the Internet and therefore proved to be of little value where the objectives of the research programme were concerned. When asked why he wrote a book on the Internet usage in Pakistan, he said; "the education system does not have a clear understanding of the Internet and that's why I wrote the book". This was the only valuable information I was able to derive from the short interview. Abdulla shared some supportive thoughts on the views of other respondents but was reluctant to add further information to them. It appeared some days later that Abdulla was fearful of the interview on the grounds of national security and had been instructed by senior military

officials not to participate in the interview but also not to refuse meeting with me, and therefore became an unwilling participant in a casual encounter rather than an active participant in discussing technology growth from a socio-cultural prospective in Pakistan.

Amjad Islam-Amjad, a distinguished cultural artisan in the arts, literature, philosophy and poetry, has been awarded many times for his works including the distinguished Pride of Performance Award, as well as two out of the seven TV awards for arts. He has over 50 published and translated works in political and cultural poetry, including Palestinian resistance poetry. Amjad Islam-Amjad, said that he was interested in the cultural effects of the Western culture, its influences and its identity on the arts and its culture of Pakistan's society, but more importantly, on the socio-chemistry of Pakistani society as a consequence. Amjad Islam-Amjad is a vocal advocate of peaceful resistance movements which he claims is his way of protesting against the erosion of cultured societies. One such protest that he promotes is against Feudalism, which he argues is a root cause of maintaining barriers against the modernisation of our societies. The Feudal lords of Pakistan have, in his view drained the cultural and financial wealth of the country and slowed progress down to a trickle, so that wealth and power remain in the hands of the least progressive individuals and families of Pakistani society.

We are always afraid of the invasion of the West on our society, that through technology they are going to invade us and they will disintegrate us. The indigenous part of our society has defined their roots and origin with the influx of this technology. They are trying to mould us as a modern people, but we don't have the resources to become a modern people. This has made us into trying to travel in two boats. One leg is in the modern era and other leg in our roots and folklore and our social problems. I believe this new information age may be a challenge or a threat to some in (Pakistani) society, but also, it is a blessing in disguise.

Amjad Islam-Amjad

Amjad Islam-Amjad, believes that if Pakistan is to take on the challenge of modernisation, then the social infrastructure of society will be required to change. His proposition was that modernisation will not happen in Pakistan, as Pakistan as a society does not have the ability to challenge the powerful elites which control 9/10 of the

influential institutions and government ministries in Pakistan who can make a difference to its people. He went on to clarify his position when he said that the information highway will eventually spread to large sections of society but it will take time. Amjad Islam-Amjad commented:

The first exposure of technology is confined to the upper or elite classes. This is mainly due to their value systems already leaning towards the West. Their lifestyles and daily routines are like those who live in UK or USA. The problem I see is that when the styles and value systems of the upper classes begin to filter down to other classes. The lower/working classes of Pakistan have a distinct class structure based on many hundreds of years of tradition so when the Internet and technology comes into their lives, it will clash with their culture and value systems.

Amjad Islam-Amjad

It is this point that Islam-Amjad believes, becomes the biggest stumbling block for change. Although Pakistan recognises the values of progress, the route to progress has, in his view, a too greater cost to the traditions and values which the majority of the Pakistani people support as part of the daily living customs and practices. He shared an example of many Pakistanis living in the West, yet their customs and cultural lifestyles remain rooted in their mother country. The foreign Pakistani may live in a modern society and trust and believe in its technology value, but they are the least reluctant, in large numbers, to become active, supportive and embracing participants in such societies in fear of losing their identities and values. In similar fashion the Pakistani, would behave reluctantly supportive of technology development in Pakistan, not owing to their fear of compromising their identity as a society but for the most part, in fear of not fully understanding the values which it holds for the betterment of society.

My experiences of discussing some of these views with village elders and young people had shown that the elders, although believing that modernisation was a thing for the future of their country, nevertheless, found its increasingly difficult to understand, how a basic public telephone line or mobile phone would increase the economic value of their local society. In the same vein, the young people have begun to piece together the value of telephones and other forms of electronic technology to their social lifestyles, the

educational development and the commercial propositions which it may hold for them. The larger than life impact of technology still remained very much within the commercial centres of the country, such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. The small villages and hamlets would hold no more than a daily intrigue into the entertainment values of modernisation for the growing number of interested young people. Islam-Amjad had spent many years exploring the impact of modernisation on the cultural behaviour of rural people as the vast majority of his audiences were from that background. His trust has remained strong that one day, they would break through the poverty centres of rural Pakistan and participate in the full benefits that modernisation holds for society. However, his fear remains equally strong that traditions, cultures and customs will change, but for the better or worse, he said, "we will have to see".

In many ways, we could be experiencing the 'death of culture'. The rebirth or reincarnation of society is what has challenged most, if not all of our 'cultural Einsteins' such as Amjad Islam-Amjad, Talat Hussain, Dr Gilani and many of the other respondents who have participated in the gathering of information for this thesis. Robert D. Romanyshyn wrote of this theory in his work, *Technology as Symptom & Dream* (1989), when he compared artist philosophy to scientific culture. The eye through which he places the birth of technology challenges almost all of the wise, the informed and the considered opinions of the respondents, and indeed many of the scholars to whom references have been drawn throughout the thesis. The theory does not directly challenge the views and opinions of the contributors, but in a very interesting and dispassionate manner adds flavour to their contributions by suggesting, that what we fail to see, we fill such gaps in our minds with fear and anticipation of the unknown. When in reality, Romanyshyn's commentary suggests, the closure of cultural norms by one set of values, will invariably open new doors to unknown worlds of development. In the first few pages of his book, Romanyshyn comments:

Technology is the magic of the modern world and every man, woman and child, however humble their circumstances, can be a practitioner of its art. Here in my island house, in the stillness of a dark night, I can sense Merlin's envy. My finger is a wand and I am invested with his cloak and cap of ancient times. *Technology is awe-ful*. And what is awe-ful, what fills us with awe, invites us to wonder and dream.

Robert D. Romanyshyn (1989: 2)

The idea that technology is something that was created by man and therefore becomes the slave of mankind, is somewhat challenged by the notion that technology, although a superior being to humanity, remains a *chador* covering over almost the entire possibility of recognising that technology is not the slave of mankind, but rather the servant of the earth. In the second part of Romanyshyn's metaphor, he 'binds the notion' that if technology becomes the burden of mankind from which control becomes the ideal for power, and that such power becomes the destruction of humanity, the final solution to society's cultural enrapture would be the elimination of the technology through the employment of its own strength. Here Romanyshyn refers to the "Agents" being 'Man' when he comments:

Agents of earth! Poets sow strange seeds, but perhaps they reap the most bountiful and truthful harvest. Perhaps technology has been part of the earth's long history of coming to know itself, and perhaps in that effort we have been its servant ... In the shadow of the bomb our technological mastery of the earth seems a bad dream, and in the shadows of Chernobyl and the space shuttle disaster our service to the earth seems to have gone terribly awry.

Robert D. Romanyshyn (1989: 3)

His fascination with power and control longs to be explored as a youthful approach, if not also a refreshing challenge to societies such as Pakistan, that technology is not so much a chalice to be treasured or tortured, but a continued improvement towards a social order and structure recreating an evolutionary movement of a continued cultural identity. Some have argued that such a social order is painfully wrong, as it will not only create a social disorder of cultural identities but would change society's behaviour and patterns of kinship. Other societies' cultural influences would overtake our own. Others would add weight to this argument by suggesting that such notions have already

destroyed European values and cultural landscapes in the way society now behaves. However, it must also be recognised that unless a structured society has the strength to off-set such intrusions into their nations, the dominant influence will eventually prevail. This is not a new notion, but a time-tested honoured process of assimilation of the least powerful by the most powerful. In Romanyshyn's words:

Some future morning the sun will rise and there may be no human eyes to bear witness to it. Rising there on the horizon as it has always done, but now lightening a barren and burnt landscape of broken, twisted forms, the sun on that day will have changed. Rising on the void, it will have lost its splendour and in time it will die. And this death will slowly spread over the face of everything on earth, including earth itself. Perhaps this death will even reach into the heavens. The silence will then be most complete and perhaps forever, and when night comes the stars themselves may cease to shine when there are no longer any inquisitive eyes to look at them and to praise their glory.

Robert D. Romanyshyn (1989: 3)

A final extract from Romanyshyn's work is most the likely fitting conclusion to the sentiments of power relations between those that have the power to extinguish identities to those who hold the power to embrace new identities. One day the engagements of technology cultures, just as social, economic and cultural movements towards challenge have influenced change, this new phenomena will further force us into accepting that not only Hollywood, Bollywood, McDonalds, Levi Jeans and the rest, will absorb us into taking refuge in the shadows of our past fears. New technology cultures will also create new public spheres which may overshadow the tired yet possibly equally valuable old arguments of cultural colonisations.

The concluding thoughts of the respondents suggested that Pakistan had a long way to go before it could reach the higher echelons of modernisation through electronic forms of technology. However, electronic democracy and social equality as a source of 'right' was clearly an issue which many of the respondents implied required to be addressed within the nation's future ideological quest. The concept of identity in this context was another issue which was clearly a serious concern. All the of the respondents welcomed the introduction of technology, and most felt that Pakistan would benefit from this new innovation in electronic communication, the serious underlying concern for some of the

respondents, was how would this new development impact on the cultural identity of the nation? No one gave a clear and logical reasoning to this argument, but fears had become entrenched in their minds which would either slow the pace of development or hinder it by influencing certain types of safe guards to be place that would not break 'identity' from its traditional relationship to the Muslim culture of the nation.

Chapter Five

Modernity and Globalisation

'Secular' and 'Muslim' are by definition incompatible words, as any dictionary will confirm. There can be no Muslim without God – just as there can be no Christianity without Christ, Buddhism without Buddha, Marxism without Marx or, in another context no Christmas without Santa Claus, American Politics without the constitution and British Politics without the Houses of Parliament.

Akbar S. Ahmed (1992:173)

Summary

The idea of movement from development to modernisation is clearly influenced by a number of factors which in the most part are controlled or led by external global events through the global application of what has become commonly known as cultural imperialism led by the West and the United States. The market economy, human development, social action programmes and the cultural product are all, to some degree part of the conflict between globalisation and the threat to the Islamic identity. In such a situation, the Muslim nations, and in particular Pakistan, are challenging this threat with counter measures towards an equilibrium within the framework of a 'selectively' controlled modernisation programme for the nation. The hindrance to this is the weakness and distortions of Pakistan's own national infrastructure of its institutions that serve to maintain corruption and nepotism within the system. This particular problem has been discussed at length in Chapter Two and Chapter Four. Until such time as Pakistan can develop a persuasive case for international investment, the country will remain caught in its own creation without mercy or opportunity. Chapter Five looks upon such conditions within a wider

structure of the Muslim 'identity' and its place within the globalisation debate. The chapter discusses the broad analysis of the issue and maintains a limited degree of references to Pakistan in particular, but relates the Pakistani concerns towards modernisation, electronic communication and technology development within a global Muslim perspective. The key issues discussed in Chapter Five focuses around the work of a number of cultural scientists and theorists such as, Mazrui (1990), Weiss (1994), Ahmed (1994) and Saeed (1994), who have an established record in challenging the cultural imperialism debate and have attempted to align the concept of the Islamic identity in the Muslim world with secularism, globalisation and Islamic-centrism.

The Globalisation Debate

The phenomenon, which many refer to as globalisation, is not always presented with the intelligibility that one would expect. Akbar S. Ahmed attempts to place some clarity to the meaning of globalisation when he suggests that; "By globalization we principally refer to the rapid developments in communications technology ... and information which bring the remotest parts of the world within easy reach". (Ahmed 1994: 1-4)

Further to say that the transfer of information and technology within seconds allows the individual to participate within the global network, whether it is economics, education, politics or some other activity. Ahmed (1994: 1-4), accepts that globalisation has differing meanings and does not always mean the same thing to everyone when they talk about globalisation. Ahmed's reference to globalisation is placed within the context of postmodernism and the interconnection with Islam as a global identity. The concept of globalisation for Ahmed suggests that the challenging nature of global conflict emphasises the cultural identity of Islam (Muslims) and its relationship with the West, typifying the expanse of the movement of Muslims around the globe, ensuing an economic, cultural and on occasions, a religious agenda, thus establishing local identities within the nation state of their choice. Vandana Shiva (1993: 53-54) takes the globalisation debate one step further than Akbar S. Ahmed when Shiva comments that

the: “global in the dominant discourse is the political space in which dominant ‘local’ seeks ‘global’ control and frees itself of local, national and global control”. Here, the global fails to recognise the universal human interest; instead it represents the particular local and parochial interest, which has been globalised through its reach. Shiva reflects on this statement in the context of global communities serving the ‘local’ needs of the powerful economic and political interests of the most powerful states on Earth, namely the G-7 countries. Shiva (1988) adds further clarity to the point when she states that post-development should not be considered synonymous with poverty in the context of globalisation by suggesting that:

Culturally perceived poverty need not be real material poverty: subsistence economies which serve basic needs through self provisioning are not poor in the sense of being deprived. Yet the ideology of development declares them so because they don’t participate overwhelmingly in the market economy, and not consume commodities provided for through the market.

Vandana Shiva (1988: 10)

In fact the post-development to which Shiva reflects upon, suggests the portrayal of development as Westernisation and which by implication fails to support the dominant discourse of the ‘global’. This theme is further highlighted by Edward Said in his ‘Orientalism’ Ahmed (1994: 5-6) challenges Said’s (1995) conception of Orientalism, by arguing that with the global movement for Muslim people and with that, Islam as a cultural and traditional identity, they now must be seen as “the local, as indigenous and not as the other, the exotic or the Oriental.” Ahmed’s (1994) contention with Said’s Orientalism is placed within a new theoretical framework of globalisation and therefore requires a move beyond the point of caricaturing and stereotyping of Said’s ‘*Oriental*’, which has been created by Western images of Islam. Ahmed believes that *Orientalism* to which Said refers, has created a serious intellectual problem, principally by the manner in which he has applied this concept, thereby creating an Islamic cultural ‘cul-de-sac’ for the Muslim People. Edward Said’s work ‘Orientalism’, as a cultural ‘phenomenon’ is a highly respected piece of academic analysis which takes into account the Western interpretation of the Eastern civilisation as the ‘strange’ and Western civilisation as the ‘familiar’. Samuel Huntington (1996: 33) argues, unlike Ahmed, that such civilisations of the East have a sense of mythical mystique created about them,

which has been placed there by the West and not by Eastern civilisation itself. This image of the mysterious East has become a globalised identity to which Said's 'Orientalism' has become closely associated, not so much caricaturing the Eastern identity as Ahmed (1994: 5) claims, but rather by creating the difference between 'cultural local' and 'cultural global', thereby attempting to re-establish the theory to which Mike Featherstone (1995) refers to as a 'recentring' of culture, which is discussed later in this chapter.

Modernisation in the context of Development

The basic question that most social scientists ask when issues of globalisation are raised in the context of development is: What is modernisation? It is a fairly basic question, the answers however, are not so simple and it is sometimes the answers that create the debate and not so much the question. Javaid Saeed (1994: 9) addresses this fundamental subject in his book, *Islam and Modernization*, where he challenges some of the concepts that define modernisation and at the same time sets out what can be argued as the definitive attributes of modernisation. Most, if not all modernisation theorists would consider, as does Saeed (1994: 9), that the West's own model of modernisation was achieved through a very long process of development. The developing countries, he goes on to suggest have "imitated" this model of Western development and therefore can serve as a useful 'model for developing countries to follow'. However, on the other hand the West is in a precarious situation, Saeed (1994: 9-10) points out that: "the West having come a long way and has materially developed to the extent that they have, and there being no model to follow". Ozay Mehmet (1999: 154) wrote in the concluding chapter of his book; "the last 50 years painfully show that not only are there no 'quick fixes' for modernisation. But also that Eurocentric blueprints imported from the West for economic growth do not work."

The main features of modernisation to which Saeed (1994: 10) is predisposed to, argues that modernisation begins with the individual, the so called "modern person" and not with a "modern society." In this context, it is the characteristics of the modern individual in society that knows what is required of a society to become truly modern.

The sociological theory of interdependency to which Giddens (1997: 57) refers as the central feature of modernisation is also argued, at least in principle, by Saeed (1994: 10) who suggests that so long as the current world economy remained structured in its present form in the developing countries, it would continue to be almost impossible to seek real change towards economic growth and social development. Max Weber (1958) debates throughout his work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, the importance of the individual in examining the process of modernisation. Weber's (1958) recipe for modernisation is not dissimilar to that of Saeed's, when he calls for the "jettisoning of the caste system, the joint family, ritualism and almost all other practices, institutions and beliefs commonly seen within Hinduism". By discarding such systems and institutions in the developing world, both Weber and Saeed acknowledge that development through modernisation would ease upwards towards economic, cultural and social mobility. Srinivas Melkote (1991: 52) lays out a rational argument which further enhances the argument of Rose (1970), Weber (1958) and Saeed (1994), by discussing how traditional practices and institutions within the Indian sub-continent have led towards the idea that extended family ties have fostered "dependency and submissiveness", and social caste systems which severely restricts "occupational mobility". By exploring such a hypothesis, it becomes clear that the interdependency theory strongly reflects the impossibility for real modernisation to take place within a structured culture of dependency. One of the key elements here is the interesting dilemma that Pakistan faces under its human development programme, where the move towards smaller family units would inevitably lead to greater unitary-independence within the cultural family structure, rather than aiming to maintain inter-dependencies factors for the family unit. Although modernisation is not solely based upon a single changing issue in human development, population control would be a significant contributory factor in the move towards modernisation.

Another theorist who is probably worth noting here is the early work of Goethe's Faust whose ideas have been eloquently described by Marshall Berman (1997: 73-74) when he wrote: "One of the most original and fruitful ideas in Goethe's Faust is the idea of an affinity between the cultural ideal of 'self-development' and the real social movement towards development". Berman (1997: 74) describes Goethe's belief that these two

modes of development must arrive together and become fused into one spirit before these “archetypically modern promises” can be fulfilled. The idea of the “modern man” which Saeed (1994: 10) ensues, is further enhanced by Berman when he suggests that to transform the modern man, is that he first transforms himself and then to radically create the transformation of the whole physical, social and moral world he lives in. The cost of development, to which Berman prescribes, relates to the great costs in human energies of intellectual, moral, economic and social powers, which he argues, is Faust’s descriptive relationship to the devil. He goes on to state that:

Human powers can be developed only through what (Karl) Marx called ‘powers of the underworld’, dark and fearful energies that may erupt with horrible force beyond all human control. *Goethe’s Faust is the first and still the best, tragedy of development...*

Marshall Berman (1997: 74).

The contextual placement of the ‘modern man’ in Pakistan is not based upon the idea of wealth, education, income or bradri status, but on his ability to shed thousands of years of tradition, culture and identity which have caused not a slow down in development, but a resistance to modernisation, cumulating in the idea that developing countries are neither able to develop nor able to modernise. Assuming that both development and modernisation are explicably interlinked and that one cannot happen without the other. This of course, you will agree is untrue. Or is it?

This spirit is captured when Susan Zimmerman (1998: 1-2) debates the human ordeal which developing nations share when progress is quantified as a tool for modernisation and development, when she wrote an introduction to Shakespeare’s Tragedies from a postmodernist perspective:

Fiction is the pre-eminent mode for addressing the social and interpersonal relations which shape human identity, then tragedy is the genre that represents these relations in their starkest and most terrifying dimensions.

Susan Zimmerman (1998: 1-2)

Zimmerman goes on to harvest this by suggesting that although comedy (referencing this within a Shakespearism context), may move towards the reconciliation of human

suffering, tragedy has no such essence to follow in the same manner. In essence, she argues that the taboos of humanity are the very stuff that tragedy is made from.

The argument for modernisation in the context of development is assessed by comparison to the real costs for humanity and the affects of the ideological process of capitalism. Nevertheless, the process of change to encase modernity pushes the boundaries beyond acceptable limits for humanity and towards a sub-existence for developing countries. Susan George (1994: xiii) clarifies this argument by placing it in to a wider debate on third world debt and development, by suggesting the so called 'modernity plan' encourages the elites of the developing countries to welcome structural adjustment policies thereby to assist the exploitation of labour and public services by keeping deliberately inflated conditions in order to increase the profitability of capitalism.

Saeed (1994) argues the point and on which Berman (1997) comments that society, through the 'desired' process of intellectual, cultural and moral 'growth' and by embracing development, that modernisation would take shape in the developing world. Berman (1992: 36) debates modernisation as a constant changing set of circumstances which consequently require and/or force humanity to face the global expanse of social, cultural and economic conditions. Marx and Engels (1848) wrote the following passage that conceptualises Berman's antidote by depicting the relationship between the bourgeois man and his environment:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production and thereby the relations of production, and with them all the relations of society... Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social relations. Everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their venerable train of prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned and man at least is forced to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his fellow men.

Marx and Engels (1848/1959: 10)

Modernity, as Berman sees it, is made up of many contradictions. He goes on to comment that:

It is a condition that at once empowers people and constrains them. They can face it more or less honestly, more or less confidently, more or less bravely, more or less imaginatively. But they can face away from it or stand beyond it.

Marshall Berman (1992: 42).

In essence, Berman empathises that to capture modernity in its reality, first one has to define it in its surreal conscious. Saeed (1994), Berman (1997), Giddens (1990, 1997) and Ahmed (1994, 1992) have all contributed towards the debate on modernity, yet not one perfect view can be established for modernity to be contradictory for humanity to face. Mike Featherstone's work on modernity offers a somewhat clearer debate on the idea of decentralised culture where he sets out an interesting, if not a predictable debate on how culture has become decentred in a globalised world.

Recentering Culture in a Globalised World

The title of this chapter illustrates something of an image that it conjured up within the minds of almost every citizen, when faced with the challenging concepts of modernisation, both in the first world and throughout the developing world. Mike Featherstone takes some credit in influencing the title of this chapter through his book, *Undoing Culture* (1995), where he debates a postmodernist perspective of the movement of cultural icons from tradition to modernity in the minds of the global citizen and within the framework of global cultures. The conviction with which Featherstone equates the changing nature of globalisation suggests two developing conceptual arguments in chapter six of his book; the first concept being 'global cultures' and the second, 'local cultures'. Here he attempts to draw a direct inference to the United States domination of the political and economic cultural boundaries, which Featherstone (1995: 87) refers to as the hegemonic nature of "Americanisation". Featherstone begins his argument with the:

... assumption that all particularities, local cultures, would eventually give way under the relentless modernization force of American cultural imperialism implied that all particularities were linked together in a symbolic hierarchy. Modernization theory set the model into motion, with the assumption that as each non-Western nation eventually became modernized it would move up the hierarchy and duplicate or absorb American culture, to the extent that ultimately every locality would display the cultural ideals, images and material artefacts of the American way of life.

Mike Featherstone (1995: 87)

The modernisation theory suggests, according to Featherstone, an 'end of history' which gives impetus to social change in understanding the challenges to what Featherstone (1995: 87) terms as "industrialization, urbanization, commodification, rationalization, differentiation, bureaucratization, the expansion of the division of labour, the growth of individualism and state formation processes". Therefore, the theoretical challenges he projects are that postmodernity is not a progression from the concept of modernity, but a gradual evolution towards overcoming the sense of the 'present' as an subjective process from the flawed assumptions of postmodernity. Naturally, Featherstone may have some distinct images of American imperialist cultural ideologies, however, they are not so much challenged in my view, as they are compared to traditionalism within the developing nations. Just, as Arturo Escobar (1995) and John Tomlinson (1991) have done in their work on the changes through traditionalism to modernisation theory. Tomlinson examines a simple paradox of socio-economic modernity where he lays out the argument of 'cultural fate-ism' by suggesting that:

... modernity is the fate of all cultures in that they are integrated at a structural level in the orders of the nation-state system and global capitalist markets; but this integration – which is a structural *fait accompli*, not a cultural 'option' – alters the term of culture irrevocably, since it entails a one way journey from 'tradition' to 'modernity'. As this journey is made by human agents and involves the emergence of new senses of possibility – new options, new desires, new freedoms – it too can be understood in 'existential' terms. 'Cultural fate' becomes linked with the realisation of individual human freedom. Cultures are 'condemned to modernity' not simply by the structural process of economic development, but by the human process of *self-development*.

John Tomlinson (1991: 141)

Tomlinson's analysis of 'cultural fate' leading to a "one way journey" towards cultural modernity is at worst simplified, and at best recognised, so that the global discourse of socio-economic and cultural consumerism, spoken of as 'cultural fate', is an inevitability of history, something which Featherstone also draws our attention towards by his suggestion that 'postmodernity' is Tomlinson's version of 'cultural fate-ism'. Although this may well be one recognition of the theory of modernisation, which the developing world is grappling with, nevertheless, it does raise the moral question of who granted the West the role of the 'guardian' of global culture? Featherstone (1995: 89) claims that: "The west understands itself as the guardian of universal values on behalf of a world formed in its own image". He goes on to argue that it is only when the developing world resists such notions that the West may then listen and take notice that such imperialistic constructs are problematic for progression towards modernity. As a consequence of Western cultural domination, the Muslim world has resisted global changes as they impact on their national and global identity. Akbar S. Ahmed (1992: 52-55), comments on the postmodernist theme of the intellectual contribution by the ancient Greek civilisation, where the construct of Greek philosophy contributed towards the identity of Christian and Islamic civilisations, and through this engagement of cultural domination, served to promote the values and attributes of Christianity and Islam. Although the Greeks did not see themselves as the guardians of Christianity or Islam, their influence clearly offered an influential relationship that shaped the future intellectual identity of future civilisations. Many modernists argue, that in such cases, technological and cultural development, as we have witnessed them in the latter half of the twentieth century, become so entrenched in the state system, that such notions of resistance become futile if development was to shape the prioritisation of economic growth. Serge Latouche captures such a spirit through the words of a popular 'postmodernist' actress Mae West, when he quotes:

The actress Mae West used to say:

'When I am good, I am good, but when I am bad, I am even better!'

It is the same with growth. Good or bad, technology and growth are always good as they increase possibilities, create jobs... and offer solutions to all the problems that they cause.

Serge Latouche (1997: 139)

It is through such ideas that Latouche fascinates the creation of growth both in the economic and cultural development of the state. Thus suggesting, by implication, that by embracing such development this would inevitably create opportunities for the state to offer local development possibilities which otherwise may be denied to the developing world. Equally there are others, such as Marshall Sahlin (1997: 3) who would challenge such notions by firstly recognising that traditional tribal life is difficult and unpleasant with its below subsistence economies. Secondly, he insists, many development planners, view that 'culture' becomes strained when culturally chaotic and socio-climatic changes are imposed upon such societies, enforcing structural changes for which they are ill prepared and see no real advantage when compared to local cultural habits with which they feel accustomed and comfortable. This conceptual argument is further supported by The United Nations Department of Social & Economic Affairs, which wrote an article entitled '*The Determinants and Consequences of Population Change*'. In which it stated:

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who cannot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a comfortable life frustrated. Very few communities are willing to pay the full price of economic progress.

United Nations Department. Social & Economic Affairs (1998)

With the expansion of globalisation and the global explosion of new technologies, this has created a wide and disconcerting channel of interest within the public sphere. The political, economic and social policy arenas aim to diagnose every imaginable situation of how this phenomenon may impact on society or on the composition of humanity. The result of not exploring such concerns may indeed have consequences that may lead to severe and impassioned destruction of the existing cultural and traditional structures in society in the developing world. George Spencer (1996: 61) looks at this with some degree of enlightened knowledge, as each society faces new economic, industrial and

technological revolutions, this would “involve the destruction of some trades or even whole industries.” However this would be replaced, Spencer (1996: 61) suggests, “with new and growing industries which would increase standards of living for an increasing number of people”. As Spencer’s (1996: 61) theory of ‘Microcybernetics’ develops, it displaces characteristics that are different from all other forms of technologies, which makes this technology so unique and captures the need for new policies for the public sphere, which would aid its economic growth and cultural development. The focus of Spencer’s (1996: 61) argument forms an interesting move from “the usage of human limbs and minds, and as it grows exponentially in terms of power and economy, it displaces, replaces or improves other means of control with greater facility”.

The nature of Spencer’s theme suggests that this new technology is impassioned with power and influence not yet achieved nor matched through any previous ‘technologicalisation’ of industry, economics, social, cultural and traditional wares. This could lead to what Rojek (1995: 1) terms as a “de-centring of culture” and tradition. Spencer to some degree limits his argument by implication, suggesting that ‘Microcybernetics’ as ‘the challenge’ that faces humanity, rather than as some academics would argue, that such a notion throws out a challenge to humanity by embracing a Neo-postmodernist movement of a kind that has been referred to by Tomlinson (1999: 23) as a “Globalized Culture”. Tomlinson’s (1999: 23) postmodernist analysis argues that a globalised culture has been emerging, against what has traditionally been called a global culture. Therefore Spencer’s impassioned ‘Microcybernetics’ may be easily recognised as a globalised culture of technology, which is better described by Tomlinson when he suggests that:

The Globalized culture is the world-wide installation of one particular culture born out of one particular privileged (recent) historical experience. It is, in short, simply the global extension of Western culture

John Tomlinson (1999: 23)

Put more simply, this could be described as the supra-natural extension of a globalised Western culture.

Recentring Culture in a Decentred World

The Structural Adjustment Policies of the World Bank and the IMF which developing societies have to cope with, create a sense of 'decentralisation' of culture, to which Featherstone (1995: 2) draws one's attention to, by suggesting that 'culture' appears to have become decentred. However, by comparison, he draws an inference to Baudrillard's (1993) theory, by which Baudrillard suggests that culture may now be beyond the social and has become detached from its "traditional determinism in economic life, social class, gender, ethnicity and region". Featherstone (1995: 3) in this context examines this concept of Baudrillard, by suggesting a counter argument where he states that: "in effect culture has not been decentred, rather, it has become recentred". Although Featherstone does not totally dismiss the decentralising process of culture, he argues that this process in fact creates the need for culture to 'recentre' itself to maintain the balance between traditionalism, identity and culture, in order to create the environment for the movement towards modernisation.

Chris Rojek (1995: 1) on the other hand, writes quite extensively on the conceptional theory of 'decenterism'. Rojek (1995; 1993) draws on the philosophy of 'Leisure' as an extension of culture by suggesting 'it is primarily about life-satisfaction, escape and freedom'. Decentring is defined by Rojek to suggest that to understand 'Leisure', we must begin to think that 'Leisure' becomes the object. For example, he suggests that 'Leisure' is subsumed by culture and therefore becomes the object of culture. Additionally, in support of Rojek's thesis, a further argument put forward is that of Edward Soja (1989) and Dear and Flusty (1999: 64-81), who focus on Postmodernism and its connection to urban conditions as a means of continuing to support Rojek's notion that 'Leisure' becomes subsumed by 'culture'. They suggest this, by describing Los Angeles as a vast cultural identity, which has become a decentred place of "generic iconography of the bizarre". Such descriptions project Soja's (1989: 246) testimony to place Los Angeles as an indicative image of a "decentred, decentralised metropolis". A place that Dear and Flusty claim has become a disorganised regime of capitalist accumulation, to which Soja (1989: 249) adds, by suggesting that Los Angeles is a gigantic agglomeration of theme parks, a life span composed of Disney worlds, thus creating the landscapes of the city into a cultural icon for the American way of life.

Emile Durkheim (1964: 41) reflects on such notions by stating, “the law of the division of labour applies to organisms as to societies; it can even be said that the more specialized the function of the organism, the greater its development”. The philosophical nature of Durkheim’s debate suggests that the organism being the conceptual term for culture, becomes more specialised, thus creating greater opportunities for modernisation to take hold of traditionalism and therefore to shape it towards development. Durkheim goes on to debate that such functions of the organism (culture) are no longer considered to be a social institution that conforms to the law to which societies bide. It is implied here that global governance strongly influences the trade in so called cultural products, which overwhelm local traditions and practices within developing nations. A further notion here can be added from Featherstone’s (1995: 90-91) analysis of global trades taking on what he terms as “third cultures”. The concept of third cultures is placed along side nation state theory where different nations are drawn together into a tighter configuration through trade and financial markets which is highly influenced by the development of technology to produce a more rapid process of mass and electronic communications. This form of cultural flow, Featherstone argues that this increases the intensity of a wide variety of transnational encounters, thereby resulting in what Featherstone (1995: 90) refers to as “mediating functions” in case of disputes between people of different cultures, international lawyers, accountants and management consultants all offer to increase the parent country’s influence (i.e. from which the organisation originated) of its ‘cultural identity’ on to a recipient nation. It does not go un-noticed that many of these international organisations are North American and have North American practices thereby ensuring that the flow of culturalism continues throughout the fabric of society. This increased level of cultural flows amplifies the nation’s capability to absorb the concept of familiarity with ‘the other’ through interactive engagement with communities or through images projected across television screens, international trade or indeed through ideological world view.

Anthony Giddens’ (1997: 57) theory of a “Post Traditional Society” debates the affects of interdependence through the movement of globalisation of social, economic and cultural growth. Giddens et al (1997: 57), suggests that globalisation has occurred

almost everywhere and almost everyone is aware of the influences of local activities and their relationship, small or large, with global activity. For example, the simple act of drinking Coca Cola, many are aware, contributes towards the local job market in their own country; mobile phones, satellite television, McDonalds and the Marriott Hotel Group all have a relationship with the local economy, culture and tradition. This invariably contributes towards modernization. Giddens draws particular attention to the period of the Post-Second World War era, where he argues that the pattern of global expansionism has created a 'decentralised' process through the interdependency of the cultural and economic market forces. The new agenda for the social dominance of culture has bound the process of "intentional change" which Giddens et al (1997: 57), suggest is a type of "radicalising of modernity". Featherstone has challenged such philosophies through conceptualising the theory of 'recentring' culture, when compared to Baudrillard, Rojek and to a limited extent Giddens, who examine the 'decentring' theory.

Another suggested theory of cultural realignment to which Ali Mazrui refers, debates a similar argument to Featherstone's 'recentring' theory. Mazrui (1990: 250-2) suggests that the trend towards cultural realignment has began to shape much of the international political arena, citing the former Soviet Union as an example, where the former Euro-Soviet citizen is drawn towards the West, whilst a Muslim from the former Soviet Central Asian Republics would be drawn towards the Muslim world, i.e. the East. Here Mazrui (1990: 250-2) argues that this could be seen as a cultural realignment in the former Soviet Union. The logical reasoning for this may be thought of as an issue of commonality implying, as Mazrui (1990: 250-2) does, that the citizens of Moscow have more in common with New Yorkers, Parisians and Londoners than they would have had with their fellow former Soviet-Russians in the Central Asian Republics. A realignment of culture, in Mazrui's terms, considers the argument that in a shifting socio-political climate, adjustments are made to enable the cultural identity to recentre its focus, to maintain traditions and values, or indeed to re-develop its traditional links and values in the case of development. However, the Euro-Russians may well argue Featherstone's definition, that this realignment is a recentring of culture, economic development and socio-political identity which would serve to endorse a new capitalist ideology by

discarding old traditional ideologies of Communism on the one hand, and on the other hand, endorsing centuries-old values and cultural identities of the Islamic people of the Central Asian Republics.

Needless to say that whatever the focus of the reasoning, there is an arguable stance to which Featherstone and others enlighten the whole debate around 'recentering culture', when used in the context of enabling global cultural development to take place when put against maintaining local traditional and cultural identities of the developing world, or discarding old values for new ones as a move towards modernity. The whole movement to which Featherstone and others refer to as the recentering of culture, suggests in one argument that globalisation has in some way decentred the culture, tradition and identity of developing nations by the creation of modernity, progress and development. Rojek's idea of the de-centralisation of culture is a creation of other objects for cultural development, namely 'Leisure'. The recognition of this idea may not be profound in itself, however, the 'de-central' analysis of culture converses with a replacement concept of 'Leisure' which in itself contributes towards coping with changes in traditions, identity and cultural habits of consumerism in the local and the global context of cultural globalisation.

Cultural Globalisation

John Tomlinson (1999a) writes about cultural globalisation and how the West has used such terms to extend Western domination of 'cultural power'. Tomlinson (1999a: 22) describes, in the context of cultural globalisation and cultural power, how globalisation is a "compression of time and space", which has enabled the distance between humanity across continents to become shorter and easily accessible through cyberspace and technology of other kinds. A United Nations report (Commission on Global Governance. 1995) stated, "globalization produces global neighbourhoods". Such statements imply that the distance between the different world cultures has enabled the creation of 'non-state' boundaries that bring together whole societies into one 'time and space' frame. James Mittelman (1996: 229) disagrees with Tomlinson's version of cultural globalisation by suggesting that the "compression of time and space" is limited

in its capacity, due to the flow of capital and technology, which must eventually be defined within the locale. Some, or much of this, can be described to exist through what has recently become termed as cyberspace, where through new cyber technology, whole societies have become transformed into global (local) societies, easily accessible to the new global citizen.

Mittelman (1996: 229) views globalisation as an idea of new complexities which within International Relations, transcend, blur and redefine territorial boundaries. In support of Tomlinson's view of globalisation, the theory of cultural globalisation which Peter Byer (1994: 14) addresses, suggests that the 'globalisation theory' sets itself apart from other longer-established theories, by ensuring as a primary social unit of analysis, that the entire globe is treated as a single social system. Byer (1994: 15) goes on to argue that we then perceive different views on how we see sub-units such as "ethnies, nation states, organizations, movements and religion". Byers' view examines the interpretation of the social system as single unit in its entirety towards the recognition or acceptance of a collection of sub-units that conceptualise globalisation(ism). Byer (1994: 14) further suggests that by presenting such units for critical assessment they reflect their relative strengths and weakness as a foundation for advancing the globalisation debate.

The continued debate around globalisation has emerged through a series of structured changes in the international political economy, a period that Mittelman states is known as 'Globalisation'. This move is part of the, Mittelman (1996: 231), posthegemonic order, and thus goes some way towards supporting Durkheim's notion that social institutions within the globalisation debate lack the staying power of effective means of regulation. A further argument, that of globalisation, which is promoted within the context of a culture influenced 'free market political economy', is that of Cox (1987) and Gill (1994) who observe that: "globalization is encoded with [the] values of economic liberalism - the inevitability of progress and ultimately a market utopia". Here the theme suggests that the ultimate goal being, that all who participate are able to win by their participation in the process of a free market globalisation of the economy. The emergence of a global 'cultural' political economy is influenced by an economic liberalism progressing towards a market utopia. This 'liberal utopian market economy'

is also referred to by Micklethwait and Wooldridge (1996: 247) in their work *Witch Doctors*, when they quote a passage from Theodore Levitt, a market guru from Harvard University, where Levitt puts forward a typical 'mercerisation' view of a liberal economy when he wrote:

Technology was producing a new commercial reality - the emergence of global markets on a previously unimagined scale of magnitude. The world would be dominated by standardised products and universally appealing brands such as Coca-Cola. Christians and Muslims.... May worship different gods but they still have to wash their hair – and want the best product to do the job. Global companies which ignored 'superficial' regional and national differences and exploited economies of scale by selling the same things in the same way everywhere would soon push out of the way not only small local companies but also the old sort of multinational company that spent all its time trying to be respectful of local quirks and peccadilloes. 'The Earth is round...but for most purposes, it's sensible to treat it as flat.'

Theodore Levitt: Harvard Business Review (1983).

This debate pushes the boundaries of liberalism outwards, by challenging the conceptual theme of liberalism although still maintaining the argument that the role of the nation state is central to a market economy. Robert McChesney comments:

Globalization is, in fact, a set of neoliberal economic policies that regard profit maximisation and the free flow of goods and capital with minimal regulation as the cornerstone principle of an efficient and viable economy. Nation states still have an important role to play, but largely to advance the interests of business.

Robert McChesney (1988: 2)

Michel Chossudovsky (1997) challenges the view that the global market economy is no longer regulated, when he states that the global markets are regulated by a worldwide process of debt servicing through the IMF and World Bank. This view, or indeed fact, is supported by a number of world renowned scholars, (George 1992, Strange 1994, Cutler, Haufler & Porter 1998, and Roxas 1996), who argue that the debt crisis has enslaved the Third World economies into poverty by the financial institutions and their allies, the Multinational Corporations, through the 'Structural Adjustment Policies' of the IMF and the World Bank. An alternative process of globalisation to which Amin (1997) refers, is the examination of a humanist project of globalisation where he

maintains that: "globalization via the market is a reactionary utopia". The objective here, however, directly challenges Cox and Gill's thesis, for Amin is to promote an alternative system to the globalisation of an utopian market economy by arguing for a globalised humanist project which would, in his view, be consistent with a socialist perspective. Amin's (1997: 6) theory of globalisation within the 'market' suggests the re-construction of a "global political system which is not in the service of the global market but one which defines its parameters in the same way as the nation-state". Although Amin himself has a 'utopian' vision, which may not be conducive to the current 'market utopian argument', nevertheless, Amin's claim for a new global political system propels itself into the domain of globalised cultural boundaries, which require greater adherence to the identities of the nation state and it may not be enough to suggest that the so called new system should reflect the existing and historical framework of the nation state in the developing world. Although not being entirely sure what he means by the "existing historical framework of the nation state", one can only surmise that he is referring to the traditions and cultural laws of the developing state, the tribal identity and the local socio-political forces that govern such systems based upon a decentralised or pluralist system of government.

The idea that Amin has raised through the suggestion of a new 'global political system' throws up a series of questions which are poignant for the developing world, and particularly for Pakistan in the context of an Islamic identity. Amin (1997: 55) argues that with the globalisation of capital, this has marked the collective social identification within the developing world, which are different from the defined membership of a nation state or social class. Such differences do not, in Amin's view, apply to the regionalist, linguistic, cultural, tribal, religious and ethnic identities of the nation state. Such a movement of global capitalisation within the Islamic consciousness raises a number of important issues, which Amin (1997: 55) suggests to be a "crisis of the state". Amin considers this as a direct result of the growing contradiction between the transnationalisation of capital and behind it the globalisation of economic life of the capitalist countries of the West.

Muslim Society and Globalisation

Anita Weiss (1994: 128) looks a little further into the effects of globalisation by sharing her thoughts on how the affects of global technology are impacting on the social norms of Muslim societies. Weiss' analysis suggests that the external consumer of cultural forces impregnates the traditions and cultural values of Muslim societies, and are referred to by Weiss (1994: 128) as the global 'super-culture' which over time has become a highly desirable activity for Muslim societies (or parts of Muslim societies) to indulge in as a social norm. Such activities are covered by an array of descriptions such as; Weiss (1994: 128), Mazrui (1990: 119), fast food, beef bangers and burgers, rock music, cinema, fashion, alcohol free beer, Coca-Cola and the like, all of which mimic western values as their own. 'A little like getting the monkey who dances to the music of the piano player for trinkets of change from the passing tourist'.

The conflicts that appear to exist between hidden cultural agendas such as that of the West and the Muslim world, are observed by Ali Mazrui (1990: 119) where he describes the relationship between the hegemonic nature of American (US) culture and the Muslim world as a "dialogue of the deaf leading to the Coca colonization of the world". This argument which he portrays, is the symbolic image of a wider on-going process of transformation of cultural norms and values into what Boulding (1985: 75) argues, is the twentieth-century phenomenon of the world finally having a single social system. In Mazrui's view, the messages from America (USA) are not only about capitalism and liberal democracy through the information infrastructure that are transmitted to the rest of the world, but also included in the cultural agenda are messages of life styles and images of 'social decadence'. The globalisation of cultural and traditional identities has taken on new boundaries in information communication systems that bring previously considered 'passive' societies into 'active' societies, in a global network of technological, social and economic cultures. The argument, to which many ordinary people identify development, growth, information technology, modernisation and so forth, is not only centred around liberalism, democracy and Coca colonization in Mazrui's terms, but to include what Saeed (1994: 11) sees as 'secularism'. Such ideas are inherently placed upon the concept that the secularisation of societies would offer opportunities for modernisation. This is something that both

Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the founder of Pakistan) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto projected in their political philosophies, and is discussed at some length in Chapter Seven. Saeed challenges the modernisation theory as a misconception, indirectly implying that this misconception was placed there by the neo-liberal capitalist market forces of the West. To further this argument, David Martin (1978: 2) wrote on the theory of secularisation, suggesting that secularisation occurs within the ambit of Christian (Western) societies, and was “exported with modifications to other societies”. Daniel Lerner (1958) however, disagrees with Saeed, when he writes that the Western model for modernisation has global relevance and then goes on to state, that it was the secular process of social change which modernised Western countries. His proposition is that it was the Western model of modernisation that is the most developed model of societal attributes, “i.e. power, wealth, skills and rationality” which is also the goal of the Middle East society. Saeed (1994: 11) acknowledges Lerner's view on this point, by suggesting that it is true that the Western model of modernisation has relevance for the Middle East however, he continues on to suggest that Muslim countries have to approach modernisation from a different perspective as far as secularisation is concerned, if they are to be successful in development and modernisation and this can only be done, as Saeed (1994: 11) argues, “if they radically depart from the way societies have organised themselves in the past”. Martin (1978: 77) recognised that secularisation has been used as the justification for invasions by Western Christian civilisations into different cultures of the East, he describes this process as axiomatic, ‘the carrier of identity’.

The theories of secularisation appear to have been placed within the domain of Christian societies, implying to some degree that the institution of the Church has influence over its usage in the general sense. This may not be wholly correct and to some degree, the argument may have been hijacked by such institutions to promote the invasion of Christianity in the East and elsewhere in earlier Centuries. Iqbal S. Hussain (1997: 69-70) suggests that conflicting beliefs are based on the contradictions of religion and materialism which can cause confusion and disintegration. This is the primary reason why Hussain sees what he refers to as “the split personality”, which emerges in societies where secularisation and religious belief collide as the conflicting models for

modernisation in Islamic societies such as Pakistan. Furthermore, Hussain recognises the root causes of what he suggests as “cultural disintegration” bringing the onset of modernisation in the guise of secularisation for societies in the East.

Peter Berger (1974: 125-133) challenges the ‘Christianity’ notion by suggesting the roots of secularisation are: “in the economic area, specifically, in those sectors of the economy being formed by capitalistic and industrial processes”. Akbar S. Ahmed (1992:173) who shows himself to be a (post)-‘modern’ Muslim, argues that secularisation is not a Muslim concept. Ahmed makes this claim at the time when the ‘infamous’ Salman Rushdie¹ had declared to James Woods in *The Guardian* (21st September 1991), that he had in fact continued and reconverted his faith to Islam; only to partially withdraw this remark, to suggest that he was in-fact a ‘secular Muslim’. Ahmed, however, opposes Saeed’s (1994: 11) argument on the relationship between Secularism, Christianity and modernisation where he states:

‘Secular’ and ‘Muslim’ are by definition incompatible words, as any dictionary will confirm. There can be no Muslim without God – just as there can be no Christianity without Christ, Buddhism without Buddha, Marxism without Marx or, in another context no Christmas without Santa Claus, American Politics without the constitution and British Politics without the Houses of Parliament.

Akbar S. Ahmed (1992:173)

Nevertheless, Ahmed appears to alter his definition of what is meant by secularisation and by this confusion argues against himself by supporting the general notion of Saeed. Ahmed’s basic theme however remains unaltered, in that Secularism is a prop towards modernisation and social development.

It is through this ‘contradiction of history’ that triggers Saeed’s basic objection to Western secularisation. Saeed’s argument is a considered and profoundly objective analysis. However, the neo-liberalist school of thought would argue that Saeed’s argument suggests, in the first instance, a theoretical dichotomy. This argument by the neo-liberalists, not only moves away from an established route for modernisation, but also offers a thought-provoking pattern concerning a ‘cultural crisis’ within the backdrop of a colonial framework, which the Muslim world as well as Pakistan has

fallen towards. This naturally, requires to be addressed as part of an onward process towards modernity. The question in such circumstances for Saeed, is not so much that secularism is not appropriate for Islam, but whether or not modernisation is a byword for Christian secularism, as a Western concept?

Nazih Ayubi (1991: 5) debates another aspect of the concept towards secularisation, by taking on board part of the European debate that has been had over the historical role of the Church in state affairs and how the exclusion of the church from politics led towards opening up the way for European secularisation. However, he goes on to suggest that no such concept exists within Islam and as a result Islam has become entrenched in state affairs and consequently, secularisation was not to take place in Eastern Islamic politics. This led to the description of what has now become more commonly known as, 'Political Islam' by Ayubi (1991) Halliday (1996) Esposito (1992) Landau (1990). Although European politics removed religion from politics as a form of emulation, Islam on the other hand, Ayubi contends, required a more 'aggressive' manner in which to embrace and to challenge 'modernisation' through the Islamic fundamental principles of the Shari'a, and the hadith. Modernisation in the Islamic context has been by and large placed around the main principles of the Islamic faith and traditions of such a society, which in itself bears some reflection on whether Islam and modernisation in the Western context are in fact compatible.

Akbar S. Ahmed (1992: 6) discusses the meaning of modernisation as a "marked belief in science, planning, secularism and progress". Ahmed would most likely disagree with Saeed, on how Saeed sees the concept of secularism as a Western propagation, religious or otherwise, of modernisation. Nevertheless, Ahmed has some empathy for the idea of Anthony Giddens (1990: 174-175) who trusts that modernity is indeed a "Western project". Ahmed (1992: 7) takes Giddens' theme one step further, by suggesting it is the "perception of modernity as Western which will explain non-Western responses to it", as a means of attempting to show the perceived fear of Westernisation when put against the practices of 'traditionalism'. To capture the essence of Giddens' and Ahmed's work, Vaclav Havel (1995) shares a thought of how humanity is perceived through his own eyes:

We now live in a single global civilization, and that this is no more than a thin veneer that covers or conceals the immense variety of cultures, of peoples, of religious worlds, of historical traditions and historically formed attitudes, all of which in a sense lie 'beneath' it.

Vaclav Havel (1995: 32)

Huntingdon's (1996: 41-42) version of civilization is described to be a sense stronger than Havel's "thin veneer". Huntingdon (1996: 41-42) advocates that modernity, when put amongst the fervent values, cultures and traditions of Eastern civilizations, creates a strong 'inureness' towards change and progress to become easily absorbed into a society. This often contributes to society's inertness towards modernisation. Huntingdon's thesis offers encouragement to Ahmed's (1992) argument that Muslim society's ties to tradition are at times stronger than the 'tides of change', competing against the theory, is that of Saeed (1994), which earlier in the thesis lay claim to the concept that modernisation of the individual is paramount for societal growth to become a voluminous model for modernisation.

Pan Islam and Globalisation

The idea of modernisation has been shown to have many conceptual themes, many of which offer a wide set of considerations. A further consideration which reflects towards Saeed's debate on how Islamic identities have become a propagation of Western values and political thought, is that of Jacob Landau (1994) who offers an insight to the ideological formation of Pan Islamism. Landau (1994: 249-251) examines the idea of nationalism within Islam in marked contrast to the ideological progress towards modernisation within Islam. The debate examines the impossibility that local nationalism within Muslim states can work hand in hand with Muslim unity. This debate is similar to that of Saeed's (1994: 11) secularisation debate. Miskin Hijazi (1984) wrote that it was Islam that offered the best opportunity for Muslim unity rather than colour, race or language. However, this is contradicted by Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani (1981) when he argues that nationalism, especially the Pan Arab category, is completely compatible with Pan Islam or at least, he continued, with "Islamic solidarity". This debate was somewhat clarified by Abd al-Rehman al-Bazzaz, a noted Iraqi statesman

who, at a lecture in Baghdad in January 1952, distinguished between the arguments by stating:

The national government for which we call does not, in any way, contradict Islam. But this is not to imply a call to Pan Islamism. To say that Islam does not contradict the Arab national spirit is one thing and to make propaganda for Pan Islamism is another. Pan Islamism in its precise and true meaning aims to form a comprehensive political organisation which all Muslims must obey. This organisation, it may be desired by all the pious Muslims, is not possible under present conditions... to call to unite the Arabs-and this is the clearest and most important objective of Arab nationalism-is the practical step which must precede to call for Pan Islamism.

Abd al-Rehman al-Bazzaz (1954: 201-218)

al-Bazzaz's context here, is presumed to be placed within a wider political objective of an Islamic *Jihad* for self-identity against the 'infidels' (Americans) and the 'Jewish' State of Israel. It is a protectionist theme for the Muslim-Arab nation, something which Akbar S. Ahmed² refers to as his newly introduced concept of 'Post Honour'. Another noted Pakistani intellectual, Kalim Siddiqui who looked at Pan Islam as a means of uniting the Muslim *umma*, although Landau (1994: 252) claims he may not be a recognised Pan Islamist. However his ideas and propaganda would definably place him within that school of thought. Siddiqui's (1980) argument stretches across the boundaries of the nation state and identifies the need for the *umma* to unite for the ultimate triumph of Islam. Mohammed Ali Jinnah³, although, he was not himself a Pan Islamist, moved with the mood of the people of Pakistan when in 1939 he called upon the Pakistani people to recognise the importance of a Muslim Brotherhood, this was propagated further in Hyman's work (1985: 174). Whereby, Hyman claimed that Sayyed Maududi⁴ on hearing Jinnah's speech, had intensively campaigned for a political Pan Islamism in the Indian Sub-continent which would finally lead the Islamic world in a united front against Westernisation and anti-Islamic movements. Much of the debate in Landau's work centres around the ideological movement of (global) Pan Islamism, however, the similarities between Landau's (1994) thesis and Saeed's (1994) hypothesis, are quite canny, particularly as Saeed avoids the term Pan Islam, but discretely replaces it with the conceptual argument, that of the incompatibility of 'secularism' with Islam.

Fiction beyond Reality – Islamic-centricism

In the widening debate on globalisation, and especially within the context of the Muslim world, identity, intellectualism and cultural imperialism have become fused concepts, threatening the very nature of Islamic identity and the Muslim nationhood. It is within this framework a new challenging, thought provoking theory has been introduced into the realm of cultural studies and international relations. It has been introduced here because it is aimed at directly challenging the culturalist theory on imperialism and how technology has become a vehicle for such propagation.

I have yet to see the term 'Islamic-centricism', a term entering, probably for the first time, into the globalisation debate which captures a familiar mindset in a manner which engages both the idea of Islamic identity as the sovereign link to Islamic governance to socio-cultural traditions and to Islamic-intellectualism. Islamic-centricism, a term which, in the view of many, shapes the principle argument against technology becoming a determining feature for development and modernity, but more importantly serves to support state and bradri influence towards the indifference to modernity, democracy and inequality in Pakistan.

Islamic-centricism can be more familiarly defined in European terms where Peter Brooker (1999: 79-80) comments on the way that the term Euro-centricism is distinctly referred to as a culture-dominant model, centred upon European intellectual traditions and socio-political systems. Almost, if not entirely, offering the dominant discourse towards European cultural imperialism and European geo-political and cultural identity. In a similar fashion, the Islamic-centricism model is a more acute model of a socio-economic, socio-cultural and politico-intellectual framework within which Islamic human history is based. This model, unlike its European equivalent is not a geo-political led entity aimed largely at nationalism and sovereign identity. Islamic-centricism is centred upon the conceptual theory of breaking the link between the geo-political argument and the global Islamic sovereignty debate which has been the focus for cultural conflict studies in International Relations and Cultural Studies for many years, but more particularly drawn into the international arena since the events of September 11th.

Much or part of the debate within the thesis is centred upon exploring the cultural imperialist debate, such as what Tomlinson (1991), Mazrui (1990), Schiller (1990) and others have already contributed to academia. However, there remained a significant gap between what they referred to as 'Cultural Imperialism', and that of Islamic-centricism in the modern 21st century. The cultural imperialist dimension, I believe, has significantly dispersed in order to embrace a much wider definition and most significantly, since the post September 11th period, that of 'Islamic-centricism' which has come to take up its position in the globalisation debate on nationalism and identity in the context of a new age of international political imperialism, although Islamic-centricism is not a fully functional concept. However, scholars, such as Akbar S. Ahmed have focused some attention towards cornering this theme by suggesting that the international political construct in culturalism has found a 'new infant', to which he refers as "Post Honour". The subject of Post Honour, which Ahmed has drawn in to the cultural studies debate examines how Islam has come in on itself, to protect itself from external 'attack' and to promote the strength of its identity through challenging the cultural constructs of imperialism. Ahmed (31 March 1999) spoke at a seminar in Islamabad on this topic where he saw global civilisation divided into two parts. The first, a Muslim civilization and the second, the Western, including the United States civilization. This relationship between the two civilizations, he said was heading towards what he termed as the last 'crusade' implying that a global conflict between the two civilizations could lead to the elimination of mankind on the planet. The term which Ahmed uses as 'mankind' in this context can be seen in two ways. Firstly the destruction of humanity as a global Armageddon, and secondly as the destruction of 'human culture' as we know it and superimpose the American (US) way of life over the graveyard of Islamic values, traditions and cultures which act as the gatekeepers to the national identity.

Ahmed contends that Islam's aggression towards the West and its partners is not so much a terrorist act in itself but a reaction towards saving its (Islamic) honour from attack from the West; through what he deems as a 'Post Honour' synopsis. Therefore in the same context, an act of aggression or negative action against Islamic values, cultures

and traditions and an attempt towards progressive modernisation is an act of 'Post Honour'. Ahmed equated this with the idea of Princess Diana who became a 'Post Honour' celebrity. The resurgence of Islam in the West is due to the Post Honour syndrome. A climate of challenge or change has entered developing societies, triggered by North American (US) insurgence of the cultural product. Technology can be viewed in such a context as the weapon of mass destruction and the knowledge for technology factor in education institutions can be seen as the tool for propaganda. Although Islamic-centricism is similar in theory but in practice, precedes Ahmed's analysis of Islam's challenges towards North American (US) cultural colonisation of the developing world. The art of shaping the debate arrives not through direct acts of 'aggressive' intervention, that much can be seen as a predictable measure against Western values. The purpose of Islamic-centricism is to challenge the Western-centric concept of a geo-political led entity aimed largely towards Western-cultural imperialism, Western-nationalism and Western-sovereignty, and to replace such a construct with Islamic intellectualism from within the cultural domain against Western economic-cultural domination. It is at this point that both Post Honour and Islamic-centricism can be viewed to be debated as a singular discourse, both constructs challenging and replacing the Western hegemonic identity of the term 'Western cultural and intellectual imperialism'.

The Islamic-centricism debate aims to partly examine how western economic and political powers have significantly aimed at cultural and intellectual colonisation of the Islamic world and by this they have aimed to reshape the whole Islamic cultural identity in the public sphere. The rapid development of information technology throughout the world has further significantly contributed towards the re-colonisation process (Mohammadi and Ahsan 2002) and pro-acted as a Western intellectual tool to reformulate its relationship with the process of development within the neo-liberalist prospective. The current climate under the Western economic regimes have shown the hegemonic nature of Western 'power' and its 'positive' relationship with poverty and modernisation. To this end, the mass movement of techno-intellectualism has taken place within the developing world, as much as it has within the social, cultural and educational fabric of Pakistan. This has, as many of the respondents have verified,

caused enormous hardship on the cultural identity of a nation where competing themes between modernisation and traditionalism have become the staging ground for these intellectual 'techno-wars', rather than where it should remain within the arenas of evolutionary economic progression.

Interestingly, Jude McCulloch (2002: 58) comments on how globalisation within a state system impacts on those who challenge its authority. She comments that "citizens responding to and resisting the negative impacts of globalisation are the 'enemy within' which states seek to put down by the use of force." This unfortunate reality is faced by many of the Islamic nations in their campaign, not against globalisation *per se*, but rather, the effects it has on their position within the hierarchal systems of a global Muslim (Islamic) nationhood. In a similar fashion, Pakistan equally portrays itself as a liberal nation, aiming towards modernisation. In the context of the present study the theme here is not to discuss the conceptual arguments for Islamic centricism but to introduce it as the new order towards challenging the imposition of globalisation upon the increasing disarray within the Islamic world. Much of which has directly moved from cultural conflict studies and contributed towards a much broader agenda of ideological and civilisational challenges for the West and the East alike, leading to what is becoming widely termed as Islamic centricism within the Muslim world.

End Notes

¹ Salman Rushdie (199?) wrote a highly controversial book titled *Satanic Verses* which became popularised by the Western Media but condemned by the entire Muslim Civilisation.

² Professor Akbar S. Ahmed, 31 March 1999, gave a key note speech at a seminar at the Marriott Hotel Islamabad Pakistan. The seminar was entitled; '*Islam and the West*'. Ahmed's Post Honour theory claimed that Muslim aggression towards the West and its partners is not so much a terrorist act in its self but a reaction of saving its (Islamic) Honour from attack from the West. A 'Post Honour' synopsis. An act of aggression or negative action against Islamic values and traditions, an attempt towards aggressive modernization is an act of 'Post Honour'. Notes taken by Mohammed P. Aslam.

³ Mohammed Ali Jinnah was the founding father of Pakistan in 1947. Jinnah's speech was quoted in al-Islam Karachi bi-monthly, (1st May 1953: 19).

⁴ Sayyed A Maududi had founded, in 1941, the Jamaat-i-Islami religious/political Party in Pakistan.

Chapter Six

The Culture of Identity and Communities

If the modern 'problem of identity' is how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the post modern 'problem of identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep the options open.

Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 18)

Summary

The prospect for modernity and traditionalism to coexist in a country such as Pakistan has been one of the greatest challenges that it has faced in its short life. Chapter Seven debates this particular problem in some detail by offering an insight to the minds of three political leaders who attempted to change the cultural identity of the nation through state intervention. Chapter Six, on the other hand, offers a preamble to that debate by focusing on what we mean by Cultural identity and how such an identity impacts on the daily lives of traditional Pakistani people. This is particularly poignant when they are challenged with the changing nature of globalisation, nationalism and traditionalism within a nation that is economically, politically and culturally unstable. The cultural identity debate in this chapter is placed within cultural studies and is deliberately avoided the International Relations debate on political identities. The chapter offers a touching analysis of cultural identity as a facet of togetherness and yet individuality of local communities whose identity belong elsewhere within the nation. There are issues of social, religious and communal conflict in the identity debate and this is equally spread throughout the chapter making appropriate references to this clash of localised civilisations that stretch across thousands of years of communal differences.

Cultural Identity

Pakistan has over the many years of its existence changed, developed and grew from what was primarily an Indian Muslim culture towards its own self defined image of a Pakistani culture, (some would argue it is a Muslim or Islamic culture), based upon a number of guiding principles. It has embraced what it considers as an arrangement of cultural identities. For example the Indian influence remains very strong within Pakistan's notion of cultural practices. The historical influence of colonialism acts as an espousal for a modernising identity and globalisation has taken on a far reaching impact on social and cultural patterns of behaviour. Yet when one speaks of such influences in Pakistan, many of the traditionalist, conservatives and nationalist elements in Pakistan would feverishly challenge this notion. Not because there is a considered fault in this measured perception, but some believe that it offers different negative images of the external influences on its identity. Mostly, this notion is challenged for reasons of promoting its own distinct international and national image as a Pakistani society 'free' of external cultural influences. It goes without notice, that the name given to the nation, *Pakistan*, meaning, *Pure-Land*, which also reflects Muslim-land and as such its identity forms its humble beginning which form the pattern distinctly apart from its neighbour and referring to the difference between itself as the pure-land and that of India which is commonly referred to as Hindustan, *Hindu-Land*.


There is perhaps, no more important topic in cultural studies than the study of inter-cultural perceptions which Robert Young (1996: 1) offers as the analysis of understanding the patterns of inter-cultural communications between peoples of different cultures. The political and cultural identity of a nation offers a variety of notions towards what the nation is able to accept, when compared to what it is. It is this point in fact that challenges both cultural communications and social identity of itself.

The conceptual aim of examining the impact of technology on the 'cultural identity of Pakistan' pre-supposes a debate about what is meant by the term, identity. There are various forms of identity, none of which can be debated with any degree of realism here. It is nevertheless, worth mentioning that identity has a number of strands which

this study explores, and which arguably begin from cultural identity as a people, a nationalistic identity as a nation and the virtual identity towards modernisation. However, I have chosen to set out a broad analogy of the term identity so as to place this study into a wider framework for discussion on Pakistan. Chris Baker (2000: 9) asks the question what is meant by identity? His work explores a number of themes which look at cultural identity yet returns to the simple idea that identity is fundamentally cultural. This conceptual idea of Baker is well explored throughout the study using a range of supportive material for the argument. Bogdan Denitch (1994: 152) goes on to discuss the failures of a nation which leads to direct conflicts in social, cultural and political identity. He suggests that “democracy is the direct victim of the failures of the old and new ... classes”. His remarks are clearly appropriate when placed within the debate on electronic democracy in Pakistan. As such offers to reinforce the comments by Roger Burbach (2001: 73) who suggests that the identity of a nation stems from a yearning desire for change by the intelligentsia and middle classes which directly influence the aspiration for Westernisation. The challenge to which he refers stems from the idea of a movement from a traditional class society to a modern class society. This he argues is increasingly exposed by the globalised media which plays a highly influential role in shaping the ‘desire’ for change. The idea for a nation to aspire for change is placed into one of two concepts; either it is a political or cultural. The study primarily explores cultural identity, or better, identities. The survey in chapter four, discusses at some length the clash of identity in Pakistan, stemming from social, economic and cultural aspirations for modernisation. However, identity is also challenged by some of the more traditionalist writers who hold that technology change may indeed move the nation away from its religious identity and on towards a Westernisation of identity. This theme is further debated in Chapter Five in the context of the Pan Islamic identity where Jacob Landau (1994) amongst others, takes the debate on Islamic identity into the realms of political Islam and the challenges it offers to modernisation and cultural change. In conclusion the conceptual theme of cultural identity in the study is drawn from the debate in cultural studies, where culturalism is the main protagonist; It is not a thesis grounded in International Relations, where academic debates of political identity would be the focus for discussion.

The Clash of Identities Towards a Modern Society

Table 11



In Pakistan, the relationship between identity and culture is thinly disguised, in that it offers a cohesive pattern in its relationship for the differing parts of the nation. On the other hand, the relationship between modernisation and cultural identity is far from simple and offers a much greater challenge for the nation to overcome. In this perspective these are the many debates around identity which offer an opportunity to select and debate the different strands of the concept. One such debate is explored through the work of David Porter (1997: 25-27) who discusses the connection between community and communication as a virtual identity for the collective self. The argument here reflects the nature of Pakistan as a collective cultural identity aiming towards a virtual community identity in the face of opposition against modernisation on the one hand and on the other, the limitation in human and economic resources. The interesting question that arises from Porter's (1997: 26) debate is whether "virtual communities are most appropriately viewed as being structured around personal (modernisation) identities or communal (cultural) identities". Another conceptual theme worth mentioning is that to which Stanley Hoffmann (2002: 108) refers to as the clash of identities led by the culturalisation of a developing nation by the United States. He argues that this process begins with the globalisation of culture through the

“technological revolution and economic globalisation, which together foster the flow of cultural goods” which inevitably leads to the clash of cultures between the modernisers and the traditionalists within the nation. He continues by suggesting that the result of this is both a “disenchantment of the world” and a reaction against uniformity. “The latter takes the form in a renaissance of the local cultures and languages as well as assaults against Western cultures”. The assault on the cultural identity of Pakistan through the usage of technology clearly impacts upon the desire for modernisation that binds the wider cultural connectivity to which Porter referred to earlier. Robert M Bellah (1999) wrote an Internet paper on cultural identity and modernisation where he states:

Ideally the relation between tradition and modernization should be a dialectical and ultimately a harmonious one. A viable tradition should continue to guide individuals and societies in their quest for what is truly good, and modernization should simply supply more effective means for that quest. Often there has been overt conflict between tradition and modernization and often when there seems to be harmony something else is going on beneath the surface.

Robert M Bellah (1999)

Bellah (1999) continues by suggesting that the the push for modernisation, which is largely a Westernisation elicits three responses:

- i. the attempt to eliminate tradition as an obstacle to modernization;
- ii. bitter resistance to modernization considered as a threat to tradition; and
- iii. various efforts to accommodate the two.

When one examines the three responses it is easy to see why any effort to deal with tradition, or even cultural identity, might seem reactionary. It is this reactionary process that circumvents the debates surrounding the cultural identity of Pakistan within the context of technology, bringing both identity as a cultural and traditional concept into direct conflict with identity as a modernisation concept.

Identity and its formation

Our understanding of identity has mostly been located in the nation and the state. This has been the case for International Relations, as it has been for Conflicts Studies.

Perhaps, (Krause and Renwick 1996: x) the only exception to this case had been in the field of Cultural Studies. The dominance of the state in the realist school of thought in International Relations has served to minimise the role of culture and more particularly identity formation in a process in which Kevin Avruch has commented:

The realist paradigm sees the international system in terms of internally undifferentiated, monolithic states, each acting according to a rational calculus in order to maximise security (amongst other utilities) by marshalling in projecting power to coerce adversaries and co-opt allies.

Kevin Avruch (2000)

Such positions have tended to render cultural identity invisible. However, nation-state identity may now be less significant than other identities, particularly ethnic identities, which, as Richard Davis (1996: 79) explains, “often generate loyalty than any national identification to which any individual should nominally subscribe”.

In recent years and in particularly our interpretation of the Balkan conflict in latter part of the twentieth century informs our understanding of the role of religion in identity formation (Smith 1991; Duizings 2000) the role of region (Guibernau 1999; Ignatieff 1993) gender (Yuval-Davis 1997) and even the role of the internet (Hables Gray 1997; Ignatieff 2000) has become influencing tools for the propagation of cultural and political identities. It is now generally accepted that individuals have multiple identities and loyalties, so that identities are not static, but acquiescent or in a state of constant flux. Communities and national identities, Avruch (2000) comments, are made up of lots of other identities, suggesting that there is no uniform distribution of culture for each group, institution or nation. Avruch (2000: 18) argues that no two individuals share the same sociological location in a given population, for example, class, caste, religion, regional or ethnic backgrounds, and as such these sociological locations entail sub-cultural differences, so that any two individuals cannot share cultural contents in its entirety. This what Avruch (2000: 18) describes as the “sociogenic reason”.

Generally speaking there are three approaches to ethnicity that have emerged. The first is referred to as the primordial, and is normally associated with the work of the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz. In this case, ethnicity is seen as something beyond

human control. It is something to which one is born, whereby one is, as Davis (1996: 81) remarks "bound to one's kinsman" through kinship and language. This is what Huntington (1993: 5) would refer to as what one is. Whereby there is no free choice to one's ethnic identity, this is given and cannot be changed. Within the Muslim world and that of Pakistan similar thoughts project the kinship between the different regions and cultures within Islam. Although, against Western popular belief, one cannot give up their Islamic identity (kinship) and therefore, the existence, as was argued by the founding fathers of Pakistan, within a Hindu majority was impossible for the Muslim minorities.

The second approach is referred to as situational, contextual or circumstantial, whereby ethnicity is seen as being an adoptive identity, which is voluntaristic rather than enforced. This approach is associated to the work of another anthropologist, Fredrik Barth, who considers, as Davis (1996: 83) suggests, ethnicity to be seen as being a dynamic form of social organisation in which ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites, so that individuals are mobilised in the pursuit of power for the benefit of the individual or collective interests.

A third approach is that of cultural collectivities, and this type is generally seen to be associated with work of Anthony Smith (1991: 20), who sees the primordial and situational variants as being two poles or extremes. This approach emphasises the myths of decent and historical memories as cultural-historical community identities, where ethnic identity as a group is identified by non-group members; the 'them' as opposed to 'us', which leads us into the discourse of exclusion and identity.

Pakistan's position on the exclusion of communities and identity has been recorded and measured across the last 55 years internally and externally. The external factor of the 'them' and 'us' has been evident by Pakistanis seeing India as the 'other' although much of Pakistan's social cultural fabric is heavily influenced by Hinduism over the centuries. Culture is of course, inherently political, and the impact of culture upon identity, politics and conflict needs to be fully addressed if one is to gain a better understanding of the issues affecting international relations and cultural studies at the

beginning of the early part of the twenty first century. Culture can be used as an ideological sources by contestants. It becomes therefore a source of strife and conflict. When culture is thus politically charged, usually by nationalistic, racialist or ethnic discourses, this can lead to genocide, as has been seen and demonstrated in Indian/Pakistan partition, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Afghanistan, the gulf war (2003) and before them, in Nazi Germany.

There are a number of theorists who have written extensively on the conceptual argument of cultural identity. P W Preston (1997) in his work on political and cultural identity, embarks on a journey where he describes the structural changes in society that cause or lead towards an establishment of a political identity which is followed by the socio-cultural 'inheritance' of a cultural identity from within a wider society in which a newly formed social order has become established. A point in case is Pakistan, where a new nation was born out of the rumbles and ruins of the 1947 religious and communal genocide between the Hindu majority and the Muslim minority in India. The creation of Pakistan, although bought about a structural change in society through partition, there was little evidence of embracing a wider established identity of an existing culture that was argued as fundamentally different from that of their own, irrespective of which part of India the Muslim migrants had travelled for resettlement to a newly formed Pakistan. Hanif Rame, (1995: 46) the former Minister of Punjab, wrote that the people of the new nation had a combination of sub-cultural identities and a nationalistic religious identity from which they were able to [re]create a new sense of belonging in a newly established society. Since 1947, Pakistan has been grappling with the question of what kind of society it has become and the identity it holds? Over the last 55 years there has been numerous changes in government each offering to establish an coherent identity to which the people would warm towards. Much of the challenging political changes that have taken place have been grounded in Islamic jurisprudence, (Miskin Hijazi 1984: 34), where identity, politics, economics, culture and nationalism have an interwoven relationship.

Furthermore, it can be seen as the influence of classic European tradition of social theory in the sub-continent, (Preston 1997: 1), where its characteristic concern to

elucidate the dynamics of complex change within the developing industrial-capitalist system in order to advance the modernist agenda. In both cases, the key tradition in strategic enquiry are political-economics, social-institutional and cultural critical analysis. This modernist agenda affirms the structural shift in the social order from an agrarian, feudalism to industrial-capitalism which was not only accomplished in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries but later transported into political cultures of the colonial South. Therefore the sense of political intrigue that has followed through political change in Pakistani society has in part been influenced by the two main discourses of Islamic jurisprudence and European tradition of social theory which largely established a identity discourse which Gellner (1964) and Habermas (1989) comment as a multidisciplinary, ethnically engaged and prospective in orientation.

The idea that culture and identity are different sides of the same coin may have some grounding in cultural studies however, there are those who would argue against such an assumption. For example discussions of multi-culturalism assume a relationship between identity and culture. The question of course arises, in what sense does culture belong to a group or nation? The argument earlier in this chapter suggested that such a relationship was based upon an historical relationship between a person's faith, social conditioning and local environment which Lawrence Grossberg (1996: 88) describes as a conservative discourse. Although, this is simply portrayed and the argument is far more complex that it would appear to be. Grossberg (1966: 88) examines the process of a changing cultural identity by suggesting that culture is not a constant but a series of changing definitions that exist though a common collective definition rather than a single representative definition. Pakistan, in such circumstances is no different from how this may be defined. There are no single representative definitions of identity from which this study has gathered an assumption, ethical or otherwise, no singular mobility of change nor a renegotiated or rearticulated culture that would form or become part of a single identity. The society which was born out of strife, grief and oppressive social and political challenges had already an established collective identity as Indian Muslims although their subaltern-cultural identities may have varied from region to region nevertheless, their own models of political communities, alliances and social practices distinctly separated them from each other in Pakistan.

Within cultural studies, the constitution of politics of identity are often predicted on a distinction often articulated by Stuart Hall (1990: 37) when he portrays that identity as two forms of a struggle. Hall offers this, not as a theoretical distinction but as a historical and strategic distinction. This definition by Hall may also be viewed as a dispute between the essentialists and anti-essentialists debate. The two models which Hall discusses; the first assumes that there are some intrinsic and essential contents to identity which is defined by either a common origin or a common structure of experience. Thereby, suggesting a common struggle against existing constructions of a particular identity which contests negative images with positive ones. one may view Pakistan's path or journey towards establishing its self defined legal or perceived accepted identity as a Muslim state later defining itself as an Islamic state as its cultural-corporate national identity. Therefore, the view of superimposing a positive image of change over its negative images of belonging to a greater national and regional identity of India, the state attempts to establish an authentic and original content of its own identity. Fundamentally, the struggle over representations of identity here takes the form of offering one fully constituted, separate and distinct identity in place of another.

The second model outlines the impossibility of such a fully constituted, separate and distinct identity. In this context, such a discourse denies the existence of an authentic and originality based upon a universally shared origin or experience. Grossberg (1966) argues that identities are relational and incomplete, in process. Hall (1991: 21) puts it: "Identity is a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself." Identity in such a case, Hall suggests, is always a temporary and unstable effect on relations which define identities by marking differences. Thus the emphasis here is on the multiplicity of identities and differences rather than on a singular identity and on the connections or articulations between the fragments of differences. In such circumstances, there are issues with which Pakistan has to contend with over its multiplicity of identities. The question is, whether Pakistan will be able to, willing to struggle through the eye of the needle to seek that recognition in changing its nationalistic identity as Hall suggests in his second model? The nation although is split

into distinct regions, Balochistan, Sindh, North West Frontier and the Punjab, (this does not of course include the disputed territory of Azad and Jammu Kashmir), with established local and national identities, for example, the volatile region of Sindh which has a significant population of Muhajirs (migrants) from India who had settled in Pakistan since 1947. Furthermore the region also holds a significant number of Hindu minorities in the rural areas. It is interesting to note that the Hindu minorities have a significant financial influence in rural Sindh. There are numerous incidents of violence and social disturbances in the Sindh region which causes the question of multiplicity of identities to become a central feature for discussion. The conflicts in the various regions of Pakistan and in particular in Sindh have led to territorial claims and forcibly annexing of territories as a result of cultural and (Harrison 1996: 295) “ethnicity” identities.

Although Islam is the national identity to which the majority subscribe, the regional diaspora of identity shifts the debate towards Hall’s second model and therefore creating a conflicting challenge, not only for the government of Pakistan but for the unity of the nation. Further, it is the second model that creates the real debate around the multiplicity of identities in cultural studies. The figure of *fragmentation* of identity takes on what Donna Haraway (1991: 174) refers to as a particular lived identity as a kind of “disassembled and reassembled unity” creating a contradiction of images made up out of partial fragments. What she suggests is that identities can be made up from either individual identities or from the social categories of difference within which individuals are placed or some combination of the two. Haraway adds that such a fragmentation of identities can be influenced by historical or constitutive conditions. Hall furthers this debate by calling upon such conditions as

... identities can, therefore, be contradictory and are always situational ... In short, we are all involved in a series of political games around fractured or decentred identities ...

Stuart Hall (1992: 21)

One such case of *fractured* or *decentred* identities is the Balochi identity which in Pakistan is a very distinct and separate identity that has existed for more than two

thousand years. This identity is not based upon a local kindred relationship within the Indian sub continent but came about through an historical symbolism of a tortuous struggle for survival. Harrison (1996: 295) Wolpert (1984) describes the Balochi movement from Aleppo in what is now Syria shortly before Christ and link their national identity to the early Arab. Harrison regards the Balochi identity to have a linguistic connection to the early Kurds from the region of the present day Pak-Iranian borders although there is 'evidence' of a much earlier relationship to the Parthian and Medean civilisation which flourished around the southern shores of the Caspian, but this is mostly unsubstantiated.

The issue of migrant populations and new identities has, according to Michel Giraud (2000: 61), "... with only a few exceptions, resisted any political and scientific analysis". From Pakistan's experience, I can see how the psychoanalysis of a nation can be difficult to project from a mixture of identities that have had reason to combine themselves towards a common identity for the establishment of a common goal. Although Giraud discusses this conceptual framework from a migrant perspective in his work, the difficulty for this study was to attempt to undertake an analysis of a nation which large parts of the existing population was already living in the regional vicinity and therefore had hardly physically moved. Although there were significant numbers of people who did travel from the four corners of the Indian sub-continent in search of Jinnah's vision. Giraud used what is widely referred to as the French model in his analysis of migrant communities however, the French model has some comparable relevance here in Pakistan's case. The migrant populations who had become established in the different regions of Pakistan also brought with them their own regional cultural and religious sectarian identities, each one contributing into a 'melting pot' of potential conflict for the future. The ideas and views that many held at that time from within the political inner circles of Jinnah's leadership felt that (Wolpert 1993: 41) the communities would begin to establish common bonds and identities of which faith would be the overwhelming one. Giraud (2000: 61) argues and to a large degree is commented on by Wolpert that such communal bonds would lead not to the assimilation of cultures and communities but of individuals into the national culture of the host nation as long as there was no question of them being allowed to express their cultural

sectarian characteristics which would be at odds with the majority of people around them. History now tells us that in fact that was not only a failed notion for Pakistan but a foolish one. Interestingly, Jinnah spoke of his new nation as a nation of freedom where cultures, faith and identities would live together safe from victimisation and violence that many had suffered under Hindu majority rule. These sentiments are well founded but reality in the regions of Sindh, Balochistan and parts of the Punjab tell us a very different story where rape, torture, communal and sectarian violence has become living nightmares for local people.

There are many conceptual issues that surround the identity debate not only for Pakistan in its present form but that of its historical relationship to India and the Mogul empire that existed pre-colonialism of India. Some of these identities, as suggested earlier, have different roots and causes such as *bradri*¹, caste, faith, linguistic, regionalism and so on. It may be noted here that due to cohabiting for centuries, South Asian Muslims and Hindus have some influence on each others culture. There is a *bradri* system in Pakistani society. However, such classification in Pakistani society on the basis of *bradri* cannot be considered parallel to the classification of cast-system in India, as the former is based on tribes (families) while the latter is based on faith. Some *bradris* are more progressive as compared to others and this progressiveness is also associated with their economic and cultural identities. The facts that have not yet been proved in this study and continues to be a difficult debate is the 'class identity' of India. The reasons why I have not attempted to cover this debate is due to my belief that class is not purely an Indian cultural characteristic or attribute or definition but rather a western concept attempting to 'slither' in to the sub continent through globalisation and cultural imperialism. Therefore, at this time, I am not convinced enough to consider the class debate to be a significant issue that would influence the identity debate for Pakistan. Pakistan has its own distinct 'social class' identities which are referred to as feudalism, *bradrism*, caste and so on, what remains to be significantly absent from Pakistani society is the Marxist class or indeed the bourgeois capitalist debate on identity. The debate on Pakistan's 'social class' structures have been referred to at various relevant junctures throughout the thesis and it would only serve to repeat those debates here if I continued.

However, among the various civilisations throughout the world the debate on identities and its own regional version of 'classism' continues. As a consequence there are various standpoints in this debate. One such standpoint is that of George Schöpflin (2000: 9) who contests the very idea of identity politics or try to reduce it to a minimum and there are others who like some identities and not others. Schöpflin comments that some of the 'identity politicians', who insist that all problems are derived from identity and should be solved by the criteria of identity. The argument that Schöpflin (2000: 9) puts forward is that "ultimately the opposition between reason and identity is a false one". Schöpflin further adds:

... reason provides clarity in understanding action, consistency, accountability, predictability, the ability to question motives and place them in a reference framework. Identity, as against this, offers individuals the security of community and solidarity, of a shared vision and patterns of meaning, a bounded world in which to live and in which one can find others like oneself. Power operates in both these spheres.

George Schöpflin (2000: 10)

The argument to which Schöpflin attracts the reader suggests with some consideration that the exclusion of either reason or identity creates unease. Without reason, there is a real danger that power will be arbitrary, generate disorder and create fear. But relying solely on reason and denying identity leaves individuals isolated and open to institutional, communal and social oppression which results in the denial of the individual and choices. The Indian sub continent has shown and continues to show to act as Schöpflin suggests in such a manner where reason and identity have acted in isolation to each other not because of any real motive other than the fact that social identity in Pakistan is a fragmented and decentralised concept. Where India and later Pakistan had engineered different concepts towards communal, social and religious differences.

The cultural identity in Pakistan in this sense has been triggered by a unification of reason and identity to create a powerful belonging to meaning, security, understanding, solidarity and so on. However, there have been occasions when reason and identity had

fallen prey to government leaders where identity was used in the negative to create isolation and despair and to create internal and external strife. The icon that Pakistan has established for itself to lead this cultural belongingness is led not by the state, although the state continues to encourage its growth both in the negative and positive, but through the perception of Mohammed Ali Jinnah's vision for Pakistan based upon religious nationalistic tendencies.

In this sense of a vision of the founding father of Pakistan, Jinnah, who some have considered as setting the tablets of stone for a communal, cultural, political and ethnic identity for the people of Pakistan which has exhibited an array of challenging events. As one government is overthrown by another, the new incoming coup d'état leaders took control by attempting to establish their own version of a cultural identity led, as they claim by the aspirations of Jinnah in his vision for a free and independent Pakistan. Whether the masses were taken in by this or not, is something that can never be established. My own experiences both as a researcher and as a tourist have caused only resentment and irritation amongst the many intellectuals and common people with whom I have held discussions on the false assumption that some empathy may be evident with my own perceptions of Jinnah's vision. A vision which I continue to believe was not of a visionary leader but that of one who used cultural, communal and religious identity as a means towards creating a new nation on the back of fear, isolation and disharmony. Pakistan is no more an Islamic nation nor a secularist society today than it was at its birth both in its identity and in its culture.

Pakistan and the Islamic Tradition

Pakistan's Islamic traditions are often confused with the traditions of the Indian sub-continent, notwithstanding that, until August 1947 Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus of India had shared centuries of tradition, culture and social norms as much as political habits, which have contributed towards shaping the national identities of its people in present day India and Pakistan. However, the Islamic identity of Pakistan also has additional factors, those of the influences from the Arab nations (Robinson 1994), Islamic Nationalism (Heywood 1992, Ayubi 1994), Political Islam and (Landau 1994)

Pan-Islamism. Many of the political Islamists have battled strongly for a greater Islamic identity to be established in Pakistan, although the radical voices have been in a minority, their influences are carried in the minds and hearts of the majority of the people of Pakistan. Francis Robinson (1994: 216) wrote about the influences of power and faith in the context of Islamic nationalism in Pakistan, when he said that the experience of the Muslim-majority confirms our belief in the “pervasive influences of the Islamic ideal, the one difference being that whereas in minority communities a primary problem is uniting power to Islam, in the majority communities it is uniting Islam to power”.

The political Islamists, even where there is a Muslim nation, have been marginalized to become a distinct minority voice, it is in such events that Ayubi (1994: 3) claims that the traditional Islamic jurists have forged links between State politics and religion, thereby giving religion the legitimacy to political power. This was the case in Zia’s attempts to forge links both with the political Islamists in Pakistan, the constitution of the country and with outside influences such as Saudi Arabia and the Taliban who later became the popular government of the people of Afghanistan. On further examination of General Zia-ul-Haq’s aim as a military government acting as a pseudo-democracy, his belief was that by attempting to rationalise his authority as a ‘pseudo-Islamic government’ with state power, legitimacy and political Islamic identity would become fused. One can not help but to visualise Machiavelli’s thoughts on the functions of ‘principle power’ and its motivators when he said:

[T]here never was any remarkable lawgiver amongst any people who did not resort to divine authority, as otherwise his laws would not have been accepted by the people; for there are many good laws, the importance of which is known to the sagacious lawgiver, but the reasons for which are not sufficiently evident to enable him to persuade others to submit to them; and therefore do wise men for the purpose of removing this difficulty, resort to divine authority.

Niccolo Machiavelli
(Discourse on Livy. Book I. Chapter XI.)

The idea of principle power is further raised by Michael Oakeshott (1962: 7-8), in his debate on "Rationalism in Politics" where he discusses the two concepts of knowledge that contribute towards the rational character of knowledge and power. Oakeshott suggests that this process of knowledge is shared in two parts, the first is the knowledge of technique, which would offer the basis on which a state or society would be run, much like the technique of driving a car on a road is found in the Highway Code, or the technique of cooking in a cookery book. The second part, is the process of practicality which is the knowledge, without the "formal rules", of how to use the technical ability in the affairs of state. Zia as a soldier had transformed his lack of knowledge as a politician (technique and practical) and introduced the concept of the divine authority to replace his inadequacies in the political field to justify his actions as the leader of a state. Oakeshott (1962: 9) continues by suggesting that as it is true of knowledge which is required for "cookery, natural sciences and religion", is no less true in the case of politics, where the knowledge involved in political activity is both technical and practical. Zia's attempt to combine this knowledge theory into his role as both a military leader and the spiritual leader, almost becoming the 'cultural guardian' of the nation, suggests an impracticability of combining the technical function with the practicable role, much like, as Oakeshott (1962: 9) suggests, a doctor attempting to replace his technical expertise with his bed manner to cure a disease.

The ideological legacies, that have been discussed at some length in Chapter Seven, left behind by the political *Matadors*, have in their own place very important socio-cultural and socio-political messages for the Muslim people of Pakistan. Each, although contradictory to some degree Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq all aimed for an accountable and centrally led government which would in the course of history be debated as to what legitimised their power as respective Heads of State. In the widest sense, legitimacy and power in the context of Pakistan's recent history are very much inter-related. Jinnah, Bhutto and Zia, who had also used their political structures and ideologies to contest the 'legitimacy' of the previous government(s) and thereby attempted to shape and influence the cultural identity of the nation.

David Beetham (1991: 3) discusses the concept of the legitimacy of political power within a state system where power relations are periods of “legal and moral uncertainty, or intense social and political conflict” which become more acute among special interest groups for example; academics, social scientists and legal experts. Bertrand Russell (1975: 177-179), opens this debate further by discussing the impact of “power philosophies”, which he suggests take different manifestations, dependent on the precise nature of how power may be derived as well as dispersed by the ‘lover of power’. His argument sets out the idea that men who love power develop a distorted view of the world, by the very nature that power allows them to become deluded by the sense of the authority over others. Jinnah, Bhutto and Zia had, in their own manner, become very powerful advocates of their respective philosophies, that mass movements of people followed their causes and would act upon the directions of their leadership and engage in communal, as well as inter-state conflict when required. Bertrand Russell comments:

A collection of lunatics, each of whom thinks he is God, may only learn to behave politely to one another. But the politeness will only last as long as each God finds that his omnipotence not thwarted by any other divinities.

Bertrand Russell (1975: 177)

With regard to Zia’s overthrow of Bhutto, Russell comments that Bhutto’s one-time omnipotence had been challenged as legitimate power, thus implying that Bhutto’s Islamic socialism was nothing other than earthly manifestation of ‘Satan’s rule’ and therefore removing such illegitimate omnipotence from office. Imposing, in its place, the legitimacy of another ‘God’ of divine authority - *Islamic governance*. This change of one cultural identity setting the evils of socialism against the divine authority of the legitimate rule of Islam brought a stark realisation of how culture, identity and traditions can become the causalities of political ideologies in Muslim societies such as Pakistan. Maurice Keens-Soper (1993) wrote on the work of Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, that Burke’s contention of Religion in Civic Society captured the view of bringing virtue to the belief that human creatures should live together through the Christian doctrine. This philosophy, Keens-Soper (1993: 94) argues, came about as a response to ensure that men did not rise above their own self estimation, “but towards a constant reminder of the transient nature of mortal powers”. Burke considered that it

was of great importance that the Church should remain as an established body within a political framework of state politics. In a similar strand of Islamic governance, the Shari'a Law, (Islamic Law), has attempted to establish a working partnership between the state and its people, governed by divine legitimacy. Zia, and to a lesser extent Jinnah and Bhutto had attempted to forge a link between the leading religious leaders of Pakistan and the state machinery, however, in the case of Jinnah and Bhutto the state machinery was the primary objective for modernisation. For Zia, on the other hand, the orthodox religious leaders were the primary functionaries for the state machinery for governance.

Islamic Demands and Secularist Needs towards Modernisation.

During Pakistan's chaotic political period of over 50 years, Jinnah, Bhutto and Zia had attempted to share out Pakistan's cultural and political identity into three distinct categories as the formulation for good governance. The *mêlée* between social, religious and cultural legitimacy therefore, was taken up as conflict identities between Modern Secularism, Islamic Socialism and culturally led Theocracy (Islamic conservatism), in a Muslim nation where nationalism and identity was the constellation towards both modernisation and tradition.

The process towards modernisation for Pakistan faced a crucial period of instability under the Bhutto government, which finally caused his eventual demise. Although Bhutto's vision for modernisation was to draw upon the intelligentsia masses, especially academics, social scientists and students, to steer the country towards 'technologicalisation', Zia's ambitions were of the opposite nature. The first attempt towards modernising the nation was for the Pakistan's Peoples Party to redesign the infrastructure of the country through its nationalisation programme. In this context, the battle between Islamisation and secularisation had begun, although unwittingly it was to show, how the two political ideologies were to collide in a world of mercerisation, consumerism, technology and mass communications. David Apter, (1965: 132) wrote that the most obvious way for a government to cope with the political problems caused by a clash of ideologies was to restratify society. In this way, Apter (1965: 132)

continued: “where such an effort is made, power and prestige become highly centralized, with the result that local decision making becomes inconsequential”. Zia and Bhutto and to some degree Jinnah, had attempted to re-stratify their ideological society, in a ‘tug of war’ between traditionalism and modernisation and had, to a greater or lesser extent, compromised democracy and local decision making processes, either through Bhutto’s autocratic style of governance or Zia’s theocratic policies, for what could be construed as for the ‘greater good’ of the nation. Jinnah however, attempted to codify his society creating a non-Islamic form of government but remained committed to the idea that the Muslims of Pakistan would create their own secularist society similar to that to which India was moving towards. Interestingly, secularisation was being questioned as to its appropriateness towards Third World development when T. N Madan wrote:

The principle question ... is not whether Indian society will eventually become secularised as Nehru believed it would, but rather whether it is desirable that it should.

T.N. Madan. (1987: 747-760)

The concept of secularism within the context of culture, identity and tradition, not unlike the case of India, was confronted with a number of obstacles that both Jinnah and Bhutto had to overcome before they could attempt to transform the nation. The first was the clash of ideologies between modernism and traditionalism, such as those which were echoed by Maududi of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* movement (Wilder: 1995), the second was the perception of secularism being what Mushirul Hasan (1997: 138) refers to as a “Western blueprint for imperialist domination of traditionalism” and thirdly, how to create a plural society within the context of strong traditionalist opposition. Zia had of course less of an image to contend with, his function was to, at best enhance, or at worst, restyle the already perceived Islamic identity of Pakistan into an acceptable model for governance. The real problem for Pakistan was to comprehend how secularism was to be understood as a movement towards modernisation. Hasan (1997: 138) offers one possible antidote to clarify this concept by referring to India’s dilemma around the time of partition in 1947 on the same subject, when he commented that:

Yet no two Congressmen understood the meaning of secularism in the same way. But were generally agreed among them ... was that the state as such should not be identified with any particular faith or controlled by it. Nor should its laws be dictated by the fundamentalism of a particular religion, or religion play any part in state affairs.

Mushirul Hasan (1997: 138)

The proclivity of the three leaders of Pakistan was to put to the test. Oakeshott's (1962: 9) theme on the "rationality of politics", which was confined within their respective ideologies through attempting to establish the legitimacy of their governments. Although each of them, in part, succeeded in combining their lack of knowledge of the society's need, with their attempt to change society to their version of what society, they believed, required. Their failure was the lack of understanding of how they could best combine their technical expertise with the desire to restructure the national social policy agenda, which would have theoretically contributed directly to the modernisation of society.

Iran and Pakistan ... What Similarities ?

The conjectural image of modernisation through the eyes of the orthodox clerics in Pakistan, as has been argued earlier, was perceived as being a symbol of anti-Islamisation, although there are no firm evidential facts to prove this perception, there are some examples from Iran's experience that show what could have been the outcome, had Bhutto continued along his road for a modern Pakistan¹ or, had Zia been successful in his programme of Islamisation of Pakistan. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994), wrote an interesting passage where they drew upon the experience of the Iranian revolution. They stated that the revolution came about as a consequence of "uneven socio-economic conditions" and "pseudomodernization" which was perpetuated by the neo-colonialism of the United States and Reza Shah's regime, otherwise more popularly known, as that of the Shah of Iran.

The real problem for Pakistan, which was similar to that of Iran, was how were the religious clerics viewed under the Bhutto's socialist quest for state governance? This issue, was taken up by Sreberny and Mohammadi (1994: 80) and Abrahamian (1982:

433-434), who argued the merits of secularisation by suggesting that the modernisation of the country had brought wealth into religious institutions, which allowed a greater and more balanced participation of the clerics in public spheres of community and cultural involvement, which previously had been inaccessible to them. The modernisation programme under the Shah had caused an acute shortage of trained personnel which led to foreign technicians and professional staff, particularly from the United States and Europe to increase by 50,000 in 1966; similarly, the number of women enrolled in higher education increased by nearly 70,000 in 1977. However at the same time, the religious establishment, (Sreberny and Mohammadi 1994: 81) was losing economic power and influence by the gradual incorporation of many of its traditional functions into modern ... institutions such as education, the legal system and modern bureaucracies, as well as through direct state penetration.

Under Bhutto's 'authoritarian' administration, as much as under Jinnah's visionary Pakistan, similar fears were voiced by the *Jamaat-i-Islami* and other orthodox institutions and political parties. Zia had capitalised on the growing discontent within the country when he seized the opportunity to claim that (Alavi 1988: 64-65) Islam lay at the heart of the Pakistan movement. This view echoed similarities to how the Ayatollahs of Iran, almost two years later, had mobilised the masses against the state machinery leading to a direct challenge to the incumbent government. The differences here are that Zia had used his military machine to overthrow an elected government and the Ayatollahs had used the power of the masses to overthrow an un-elected and unpopular monarchy in Iran; causing what Fred Halliday (1988: 31) terms as the "destruction of the existing political and social order and the establishment of a distinctly new order". The parallels between Bhutto and the Shah had shown that both leaders were modernist visionaries who used the politics of secularisation to control the influences of the religious establishment by restricting the role of religion in the work of the state institutions.

Both Pakistan and Iran through their respective changes of political philosophies from secularisation to traditional Islam were never able to accommodate the national identity of the nation in promoting development and modernisation. The countries had in fact

reversed much of the development that had taken shape under Bhutto for Pakistan and the Shah in Iran. Some reasons for this Halliday (1988: 36) explains are that the Iranian revolution was dominated, not by armed conflict but by severe civil unrest that caused internal pressure on the regime to remove itself from office, thereby opening up dramatic changes to the social and economic infrastructure of the country. The commonality of the two countries which had introduced Islamic law leads to what Halliday (1988: 46) remarks as Islam in all its forms claims to legislate for the whole of human activity, thereby dispensing with the Western style of international trade, financial regulations and the international political economy as is currently in practice through the Western capitalist system of the World Bank and the IMF. This break from the global economic order would without doubt cause tremendous problems for Iran and consequently lead to economic, political and social isolation. Although Pakistan made no such breaks with the Western political and economic order, in fact evidence suggests that Pakistan was supported heavily by the United States in military and economic aid during the Zia years, this nevertheless did not consolidate the growing opposition and disillusionment with Zia's economic failures. Zia did, however, reject the financial and economic reforms of Bhutto which were dependent upon the Western system of economic and financial control. Thus creating a potential crisis for the national economic and political identity of an Islamic state, without a means of adequate economic or political clout in the international political sphere.

Pakistan and Modernisation

Pakistan's transition from secularism (1947-1977), to traditionalism (1977-1988), to a mixed bag of policies of 'modern traditionalism' by subsequent governments from 1988-1999 to replace Zia's Islamic conservatism and Bhutto's Islamic socialism, had raised some fundamental questions among the modernising elites in the country. Although Bhutto had sought to promote a new brand of modernisation, which was referred to as 'Islamic Socialism'. When compared to his predecessors, from Mohammad Ali Jinnah through to General Ayub Khan's government, nothing was to compare with what Bhutto had in mind. This new brand of politics offered to move Pakistan's cultural identity from traditionalism steeped in years of 'backwardness',

towards a more progressive modern day culture where Pakistan would be seen to take its place in modern day politics as a regional power. The first major test for Bhutto was to continue with Pakistan's nuclear energy programme, which had begun from as early as 1947, as a means for economic development for Pakistan and equally important, as a means of moving forward Pakistan's modernisation programme. Dr Zulfqar Khan (2000: 109) wrote: "it is apparent from the available evidence that from 1947 to 1971, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power ... Pakistan's nuclear programme revolved around a strategy to acquire a limited potential for economic and electricity generation purposes". Khan (2000: 109) went on to stress that the governments were at this time only committed to this programme for peaceful and industrialisation means. However, towards the end of Bhutto's time in office, his ambitions were acutely crystallised by his comments when he said:

When I assumed charge of atomic energy, Pakistan was about twenty years behind India's programme. When I ceased to be Prime Minister, I believe, that at the most, Pakistan was five or six years behind India ... We were on the threshold of full nuclear capability when I left government to come to this death cell. We know Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilisations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilisation was without it ...

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1979: 137-138)²

During this period the ambitious plans for both nuclear capability, industrialisation and the technology modernisation in Pakistan had become exceedingly evident. The US Government was becoming increasingly anxious, both in respect to a likely nuclear threat within the region and how this new technology may eventually lead to a progressive modernisation programme for the nation in the region and particularly within the Muslim world. In August 1976, Henry Kissinger³ the then American Secretary of State issued a stark warning to Bhutto's government when he said: "if Pakistan continued with its nuclear programme the Prime Minister would have to pay a heavy price." There is no certainty of evidence of the "heavy price" that Bhutto had paid for his indifference to the US threat. He was, however, over-thrown the following year, along with his policies for modernisation, by General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, who was heavily supported by American military and financial aid from 1977 to 1988. This situational threat by the then American Secretary of State, Kissinger is further

highlighted by Dr John Coleman (1997: 7-9) who debates the conspiracy theory of "The Committee of 300", when he said that Henry Kissinger, in league with a group of international political conspirators, which he refers to as the "Committee of 300," had made a threat to Bhutto's life, if Bhutto were to continue along the line of developing Pakistan's nuclear programme. Although the prospects for modernisation were a product of Pakistan's nuclear programme, it is however, evidently clear that the processes for the development of nuclear capability for defence purposes, industrialisation for economic growth and the information communication technology for modernisation would work hand-in-hand. Dr Coleman (1977: 7) believed, according to his evidence from Bhutto's written testimony, that the desire to continue along the line of nuclear development was a direct threat perceived from the continued Israeli aggression in the Middle East.

Pakistan's political turmoil meant that the whole of the infrastructure of Pakistan's political identity has been 'de-centred' from 1947 to its present day. This created an enormous impact on the various attributes of Pakistani society, such as identity, development and modernisation. The Jinnah doctrine offered hope and salvation to the many disenchanted Muslims of pre-partition India with the aim of establishing a national identity which was different from that of the Indian Hindus, and secondly, one which would eventually cause a divide in India to establish a 'new Pakistan'. Chris Farrands (1996: 4-5) discusses the nature of nationalism, commenting on the work of R Purnell⁴ who wrote: "a nation is a nation when it thinks it is a nation". Farrands suggests that the definition of nationalism in the context of state identities offers no all-encompassing definition and as such should be treated as a broad outline rather than a specific definition. In such circumstances, Jinnah's vision of a secularist nation would capture the collective identity of its people, not because of any outmoded nationalist rationale of the conflict between Hindu and Muslim but because of the need to re-establish a new modern global Muslim identity which would serve for a modern Muslim nation.

Therefore the question arises; can Pakistan be modernised without technology? The simple answer based upon the historical evidence suggests that this is not possible.

However, circumstances that prevailed during significant periods of political change have shown that the traditionalist ideologies had a severing influence on Pakistan's modernisation programme, mainly due to the fear by many of the traditionalists of what modernisation may bring to change the influencing power of the Muslim identity in the country, rather than looking upon the modernisation period as offering a positive image from which Islam and Pakistan's cultural identity may flourish.

Mohammad Munir from the Islamabad Policy Research Institute stated that, although he supported the development of electronic technology feels, "there is clearly resistance against change, which stems from a lack of knowledge and ignorance and through the fear of the unknown that new technology may be anti-Islamic and anti-Pakistan". The concern expressed by Munir is not new in nationalist and Islamic circles, and much of Islamic history has shown resistance to change, not so much by the Islamic Intelligentsia, but more from the Islamic clergy who lack vision and possibly wisdom. Iftikhar Malik (1999: 72-73) wrote on the historical views held in the East of Western civilisations, by remarking on how Muslim travellers from the Indian sub-continent in the late eighteenth century had gained first hand knowledge of Western cultural and educational influences and institutions, which had permutated traditional views of the Indian Muslims, and thus Western values were seen as domineering civilisations by the Muslim traditionalists. However, the modernists, Malik (1999: 73) argues, were more embracing of "Western educational, judicial and constitutional values" and therefore became more receptive towards change.

The art of modernisation, which has been debated by numerous scholars from Weber (1904-5) to Giddens (1990, 1992), who have entertained the ideal of modernity as the concept of self, the portrayal of the individual in organising the movement from traditionalism to modernisation. Alain Touraine's (1995: 9) argument precludes the finality of religion en-route to secularisation of a state. Touraine (1995: 9) states that: "the idea of modernity makes science, rather than God, central to society and at best relegates religious beliefs to the inner realm of private life". The orthodox primates of Zia's government clearly extract the fear of God as the legitimate rationale for slowing

the pace for change, rather than attempting to combine religion and modernisation as the source for change. Touraine (1995: 9-10) goes on to suggest:

the mere presence of technological applications of science does not allow us to speak of a modern society. Intellectual activity must also be protected from political propaganda or religious belief; the impersonality of the law must offer protection against nepotism, political patronage and corruption; public and private administration must not be the instruments of personal power; public and private life must be kept separate, as must private wealth and state and company budgets.

Alain Touraine, (1995: 9-10),

Touraine remarks that in the context of separating the 'state from the self', the idea of modernity is closely associated to that of rationality. However the question that he draws one's attention to is as follows: is modernity reducible to rationalization? Touraine, commenting on the strength of "reason", allows the debate to shape fundamental questions that argue the worth of progress when put against the destruction of traditional beliefs, loyalties and cultures. Touraine's (1995: 10) assertion suggests that when Western thought is most strongly identified with modernity, it is the moment when "the move from recognition of the essential role of rationalization to the broader ideal of a *rational society* in which reason would take control". Bhutto's thoughts on the reformation of society fits into Touraine's logic of rationalism, thereby creating an expectation for an impending intervention from the traditionalists such as Zia to protect and observe the tenets of the social, traditional and cultural codes of behaviour within an Islamic identity of a nation.

End Notes

¹ Throughout the thesis and particularly within this chapter Bradrism and Castism have been referred to. These two concepts are based upon, in Pakistan's case, Bradri is a Pakistani societal-structured order and in the case of India casteism is primarily a Hindu concept based within a religio- structural context. In the Islamic faith, cast-system is non-existent. Here a person is considered vicegerent of God which reflects the element of 'equality' in a social system. See: Ahsan, M, 'Environment, Human Security and Islam: A Case Study of Pakistan', *Muslim Education Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 2001, pp. 48-63. Various Muslim intellectuals have also argued that Classism is unlawful in Islam. In their respective books, Syialkoti and Sarwar quoted Prophet Mohammed's famous sermon which he delivered at the time of his last Hajj. The Prophet strongly emphasised the point that no one is superior on the basis of colour, race, social or economic status, or family background. Superiority is only based on a good moral character. See: (1) Maulan Mohammad Sadiq Syialkoti, *Hajj Masnoon*, Lahore: Ne'mani Kutb Khana, (n.d.), p. 82.(2) Ghalam Sarwar, *Islam: Belief and Teachings*, London: Muslim Educational Trust, 1994, p. 119.

¹ It must be stated at the outset, the compassion between Pakistan's political instability and the Iranian revolution is not based upon similar ideologies and events, but an examination on how differing modernisation and traditional philosophies contributed towards the overthrowing of 'modernising secularists' by the traditionalists. The intervention of the masses in the Iranian revolution had been through a popularist uprising led by the orthodox clerics. In the case of Pakistan, the military establishment were the main protagonists in state intervention against Bhutto and other civilian leaders both past and present.

² Extract from a series of speeches which Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had made during his incarceration and quoted in: Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1979: 137-138) *If I am Assassinated*. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Private Ltd.

³ ANON. www.pakinformation.ppp/zbbiodata.htm

⁴ R Purnell (1973) *The Society of States*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. In Chris Farrands (1996) *Society, Modernity and Social Change: Approaches to Nationalism and Identity*.(pp.4.5)

Chapter Seven

A Legacy for Pakistan (Past and Present)

So what if Decca falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? ... We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan ...

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (15th December 1973)¹

Summary

Chapter Seven looks at the life and times of three prominent leaders of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Haq. Their contribution to the technology development of Pakistan has been somewhat limited and one would have to try very hard to place them into such a category. However, their individual and collective contribution towards Pakistan's Islamic and cultural identity has been enormous and shapes much of the current political, social, economic and philosophical thinking. The debates set out in Chapter Two (Human Development), Chapter Six (Cultural Identity), Chapter Five (Globalisation) and the following chapter on the Development of an Information Society, are all shaped by the political and philosophical contributions made by these leaders over the last 55 years. The reason for adding this Chapter to the study is to place the 'political identity' of Pakistan into an historical context and how it has influenced and shaped Pakistan current development strategies towards modernisation. The aim of this chapter is to ensure that the debates in the previous chapters are brought together in the context of Pakistan's 'Islamic' and cultural identity, its modernisation programme and balancing secularisation with Pan Islamic philosophy. Chapter seven concentrates mainly on the historical identity of the three leaders and how they had successfully lead the nation towards their political ideologies and cultural aspirations.

A Vision Based on a Dream

The past that faces Pakistan today is full of wasted dreams and lost opportunities. This is according to many of the elderly founding *fathers* and *mothers* of Pakistan. The lost hope that hangs over Pakistan today at the dawn of the 21st Century can only be best described by Suzanne Goldenberg who wrote a series of articles in the Guardian Newspaper (5th August 1997) on the Indian sub continent. She wrote of the magnificence of the birth of Pakistan and how such an act of independence gave life to millions of Muslims to cross vast borders in search of a new land of hope and freedom. Many of the travellers gave up their wealth, their families and friends, their land and most important of all their Indian identity to embrace their vision of a Muslim state where equality and justice would be the corner stone of a new Pakistan. However, the reality today for Pakistan is very different and those dreams have yet to become visions for hope and prosperity. Goldenberg comments that "Today's Pakistan is a country where soldiers outnumber doctors nine to one and international recognition comes in the form of reports from the German monitoring group Transparency International which rates Pakistan as one of the world's most corrupt countries". Poverty and under-development are words hardly debated in government circles yet a quarter of its population live in poverty. And only 36 per cent can read or write.

The partitioning of India caught everyone, except for some top government officials and the leadership of the then Indian government, by surprise. The rank and file of the Congress party were unaware of the dialogue that had taken place between the leaders of their party, the 'Muslim League' and the British colonial power. The wider membership of senior figures in the Congress party believed that such a thing could never happen. They described the whole country as one body and dismemberment was something that no one in the Congress party could bring themselves to accept. Chowdhary Rehmat (1995: 235) describes the Muslim League as a well entrenched political body which held at the time of partition five provincial governments out of the twelve Provinces and had a strong representation in the New Delhi's interim government as well but believed that the British Government will keep its promise and allow the majority Muslim provinces of Bengal and Assam in the Eastern Zone and the Punjab, North West frontier, Sindh and Balochistan in the West to form the new

independent state of Pakistan. There were also a planned evacuation, mass voluntary migration between the people of India based upon a religious and 'cultural' divide and a commonly understood agreement between the leaders of Pakistan and India that such movements would be free of any hindrance.

The riots in early 1947 came about in an atmosphere of totally unprepared mass slaughter and genocide between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, where it is estimated by some sources (Pakistan INPB) to be in the region of a million people. Rehmat (1995: 247) comments that as the movement of people started, an era of a bloodbath, looting, rape and whole brutalities emerged in the East Punjab which at the time was under the control of India but heavily dominated my migrating Muslims towards West Punjab in Pakistan. Refugee trains were looted and unarmed refugees slaughtered and when these trains carrying headless bodies of men, women and children reached West Punjab, the mobs there got out of hand. The plains of the Punjab were swarming with war-like tribesmen from the North West Frontier to take revenge of their fellow Muslims murdered in East Punjab. Similar events were now taking place along the Punjab border between India and Pakistan, the security police and the army were helpless in an atmosphere of total chaos and mass mindless slaughter of innocent people.

The demarcation line between the two states was being drawn up by an independent Commission who was advised by the judiciary but worked in consultation with the last Viceroy of India. The partition of the provinces took place in such a way that at times the boundary line would zig-zag into India and then back in to Pakistan. The Boundaries were based upon the Census of 1941 and was carried out on provincial state boundaries. Firoz Ahmed (1965: 31) a leading columnist, wrote a passage in his book; "The Boundary Commission although heavily dominated by the Indian Congress Party had correctly assessed the boundary provisions for separating the two states". He was however, extremely cautious and sceptical of the real intentions of the Boundary Commission and commented that he believed with the help of the top Indian leadership, the commission made sure that the provincial boundaries were reconstructed at will and convenience to the newly independent state of India. This further created a geographical anomaly by placing the State of Jammu and Kashmir which was an integral part of West

Punjab accessible to India. Shaman Bibi (2001: 16) stated on this topic “heads you lose and tails I win, the partition was complete and with it the history of bitterness between India and Pakistan and an ever lasting grudge remained to cripple Pakistan by not giving them the whole of West Punjab, the whole of Bengal and Assam”. Suzanne Goldenberg captured the growing tide of change in Pakistan since its independence when she wrote;

Habib and Zubeida Rahimtoolah were among the millions who cast off their old lives to build a new country. The children of men knighted by the British, their Bombay had been a gilded ghetto. Their days were immersed in politics of the Muslim League, which had championed the cause of Pakistan, their evenings whiled away at the dances at the club. All that changed when the Habib Rahimtoolah reluctantly consented to be the first High Commissioner in London.

Suzanne Goldenberg (Guardian 5th August 1997)

The Rahimtoolahs, like many others of their generation came to political maturity at Oxbridge or at the Bar in London, thought it their duty to look after the lower orders. Ahmed (1965: 17) and Bibi (2001: 111) both agree that although the elite and land owning classes took it upon themselves to become the guardians of the lower orders, they were in fact far removed from the poverty and desperation that millions faced due to the hardship caused by the Partition. However they believed that Jinnah saw Pakistan as an Islamic welfare state, but this was far from reality. Tazeem Faridi, a former Sindhi provincial minister and one the founders of Pakistan’s Women’s League stated in Goldenberg’s column “we did not create Pakistan for the rich to get richer and the poor to be just poor”. This sentiment remains even today in Pakistan at the break-point of technology for a non technologicalised nation. Pakistan’s technology is based upon a number of principles; firstly it is for the educated classes; secondly, it is not for the land working peasants; and thirdly only those who have the means for its production will gain the most from technology. The question arises, how different is that from 1947 where there were only three principles in my view that led to the creation of Pakistan; Firstly, it will be the educated classes who will gain the most from a separated nation, secondly, partition will make little or no difference to the economic and social status of the land working peasants and thirdly only those who have the means for production will gain the most from an independent Pakistan.

A Political Framework for Pakistan

In order to discuss a political framework of a nation, one has to attempt to contextualise Pakistan through its religious, cultural and traditionalist ideology, and how this reflects on the state as a 'law maker' and upon the divine as a 'law giver'. Pakistan, over that last 50 years since its independence on 14th August 1947, has battled between the influence of the more radical political Islamists², the liberal democrats and the intervening military rulers. Roedad Khan,³ (1997), captures the wholesome persona of Pakistan when he quotes Plato in the opening pages of his book:

Ruin comes when the trader, whose heart is lifted up by wealth, becomes ruler or when the general uses his army to establish a military dictatorship. The producer is at his best in the economic field, the warrior is at his best in battle; they are both at their worst in public office; and in their crude hands politics submerges statesmanship. For statesmanship is a science and an art; one must have lived for it and been long prepared ... whereas in simpler matters like shoe-making we think only a specially-trained person will serve our purpose, in politics we presume that everyone who knows how to get votes knows how to administer a city or state. When we are ill we call for a trained physician, whose degree is a guarantee of specific preparation and technical competence ... we do not ask for the handsomest physician, or the most eloquent one; well then, when the whole state is ill should we not look for the service and guidance of the wisest and the best?

Plato (428/427-348/347. BC)⁴

The words of Plato, when put into the context of Pakistan, exhibit the underlying current of dissatisfaction and frustration of a nation against its rulers through the hardship of competing conditions of economic prosperity and agonising poverty in a country where it has become a two nation state; (Abbasi 2000, Atta-ur-Rahman: 2000) "*The haves and the haves not.*" The stark distinction between the two groups of people; the culturally, traditional, rural poor and the comparatively wealthy modernising urban elites are evidently clear and it would not be illegitimate to claim the 'Two Nation' theory in this context. In order to understand Pakistan, this Chapter examines the path of three political leaders of the country, who between them attempted to shape the country's identity, it's culture and it's socio-economic development, almost in to three different directions, yet each one failing to some degree to leave behind any form of imprint, or indeed, some would suggest a blueprint for the nation to follow. However, each of their contributions have left behind a legacy from which decades of debate has

flowed on the future of Pakistan, from a secularly modern nation at its birth, passing through a period of Islamic socialism and through into an Islamic political visionary state. Therefore, the argument is placed from within the inception of a Muslim nation rather than an Islamic state in 1947.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah

Pakistan's creation in 1947 came about in a climate of civil hostility, power relations, and Islamic nationalism. Khalid Mahmud Arif⁵ (1995: 4) wrote of Pakistan's creation as "the road from slavery to freedom passed through the valley of death in which human blood was shed in abundance ... in the name of both religion and secularism." This was the first of many conflicts to have engulfed India and Pakistan in the name of nationalism, faith and identity. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), who was also known as the 'Quaid -i- Azam' (The Great Leader), was an eminent lawyer who practiced in London and Bombay. Jinnah was considered by Wolpert (1993, 1996), Arif (1995), Khan (1997) and Ahmed (1993), amongst many, to be a man of great intellectual ability, personality and vision; his strengths and failings were no more or less than other prominent leaders of the Indian sub-continent, referring to India and Pakistan, such as Mahatma Ghandi (1869-1948), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), Liaquat Ali Khan (1896-1951), and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979).

Volumes of publications exist on Jinnah's life throughout the world, which examine the political motivation behind Jinnah's vision for an independent Muslim nation, some of which conclude, as do Stanley Wolpert (1984, 1993, 1996), Ayesha Jalal (1994), and Akbar S Ahmed (1997) in the final analysis, that the timing of his intervention in the independence movement in India was more of a perceptive judgement for a 'visionary ambition' rather than a judicious act. However, this does not detract from the very serious and important contribution Mohammad Ali Jinnah had made to re-shape the map of the Indian sub-continent and by this, shaping world history. Wolpert (1984), wrote of Jinnah: "few individuals significantly alter the course of history. Fewer still modify the map of the world. Hardly anyone can be credited with creating a nation-state. Mohammad Ali Jinnah did all three". Truly, Jinnah was a unique individual who

brought upon a continent a division between Hindu and Muslim, which altered the global identity of the Muslim world. To dissect a part of India and at the same time to challenge the British Empire for all its might, is not only a courageous act, but many Pakistanis still consider it to be an act of a 'Great Leader' and of an 'Islamic' visionary performance. However not all agreed with this sentiment. One of the most articulate opponents of Jinnah, was a religious scholar Maulana Abdul-Ala-Maududi⁶ of the Jamaat-i-Islami Party. Wilder (1995: 34-35), wrote that Maududi's opposition to Jinnah was motivated by two factors; Jinnah's nationalistic tendencies which were motivated by Western influences which in turn Maududi considered to be of a Western and alien ideology, and secondly that its solitary nature was a contradiction for a pan-Islamist ideology. (Aziz Ahmad 1967: 214). Maududi saw Jinnah as a Western secular thinking nationalist rather than an Islamic leader. Maududi wrote of the Muslim League, of which Jinnah was the Leader, that not single a leader of the Muslim League had any infirmity or devotion to Islam which could be shed upon the political problems of the Indian Muslim nation. In this he also included Jinnah to belong to such an ignoble role.

The idea of Pakistan becoming an Islamic State has been a well-versed nostalgic view of Islamic romanticism for the Political Islamists. Hamza Alavi (1988: 64), wrote that there was a pervasive belief, more so outside of Pakistan than within the country, that Pakistan with Israel and Iran, could be seen as the three confessional states in the world. Alavi went on to suggest that like Israel, Pakistan was seen to fulfil a religious ideal, which was to create an Islamic state and an Islamic society for the Indian Muslims. This, he continues, "became the slogan of the Jamaat-i-Islami (movement) ... interestingly enough it was not their slogan before the creation of Pakistan, for they opposed the Pakistan movement." However, Maududi had believed, correctly, that Jinnah was a secularist by political thought, and this was authenticated by Wolpert (1984: 334), when he (Wolpert) wrote that Jinnah stated at a press conference in mid July 1947, where he assured minorities of the protection in law with regard to their religion, faith, life, property and culture. "They would in all respect, be citizens of Pakistan without discrimination..." Wilder (1995: 35) and Wolpert (1984: 339-340), went on to authenticate Jinnah's ambition for a secularist State, by suggesting, that Jinnah thought out loud in an uncharacteristic manner when he made the statement in

support of a secular state for Pakistan. This statement is further supported in the work of Ishtiaq Ahmed (1987: 78-79), where Ahmed points out that Jinnah had openly declared on several occasions his opposition to a theocratic state in favour of a modern democracy. On 11th August 1947, Jinnah openly committed himself to secularism and democracy when he made the commitment to the Constituent Assembly.

You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan ... you may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of the State ... We are starting in the day where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are all starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in the course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government ... Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain ... all members of the Nation

Mohammad Ali Jinnah.⁷
Karachi Club 9th August 1947

This view expressed by Jinnah and which has been recorded by Wolpert (1983: 339-340) and Ahmed (1987: 78-79), holds some similarities to that of Queen Victoria's Proclamation on the 8 November 1858, when she assured the Indian people and their Princes that:

... their rights, dignity and honour as well as their control over their territorial possessions would be respected, and that the queen "was bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligation of duty which bind us to all our other subjects." All her Indian subjects were to be secure in the practice of their religions. They were to enjoy "the equal and impartial protection of the law", and in the framing and administration of this law: "due regard would be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India.

Queen Victoria's Proclamation⁸
(8th November 1858)

The nature of Jinnah's vision for a just and equal society has varying influences, some may be from his long established ties with the British Empire, some may have been derived from his knowledge and education in Western educational institutions and his practice in law, and some may have been inspired from the Holy Quran, where it states:

Based on the ideals of justice and open consultation, and called upon to be an example of faith-community, Muslim society was from the beginning a multi-religious and multi-ethnic commonwealth. This openness to others in equity and justice is exemplified in the first Islamic constitution, the edict or covenant (*ahd*) of Madinah, which the prophet (Mohammad) established immediately upon his arrival in Madinah as a basis of the equality of rights and responsibilities between the Muslim and Jewish communities of the city. According to this covenant, the tribes, which had hitherto lived in deep conflict and strife, were to be united not on the basis of tribal loyalties, but on the basis of the brotherhood and faith....

Surah Al-Madidah (5): Verse 3.⁹

Whether Jinnah's own 'proclamation' in August 1947 was inspired through his closeness to the British tradition, culture and practice, which he himself had become heavily influenced by, or through some other means, remains an issue for debate and may never be satisfactorily resolved. Nevertheless, the idea that Jinnah was an Islamist, is at best an exaggerated claim. Jinnah's position was very much a secularist position, when Jinnah made it unmistakably clear on numerous occasions that he had no intentions to make Pakistan an Islamic (theocratic) State. However, some confusion may have arisen when Jinnah felt that without the nationalist and religious slogans to rally the masses, this would cause some problems for his ideological quest. Jalal (1994: 35), comments that Jinnah had tasted the flavour of defeat during the Indian national elections in 1937, where he had suffered a humiliating loss both for his party and himself. After the 1937 election defeat, Jalal (1994: 35), observes that Jinnah's "career was marked more by snakes than ladders." Therefore, to avoid any further humiliation of this kind during the campaign for an Independent Muslim State, Wilder (1995: 35), argues, Jinnah adopted the campaign slogan "*Islam in Danger*" to unite the despondent Indian Muslims behind him. Jinnah was considered both by his contemporaries and his adversaries to be of the structuralist school of thought, where he eloquently used the theory of language to project his vision for a Muslim Nation by rallying the masses behind him, for what he shrewdly portrayed for popular consumption an Islamic nationalist and Islamic ideological position. Graeme Turner (1996: 13), refers to Ferdinand de Saussure's¹⁰ theory of language, where he suggests: "Language is to organize, to construct, indeed to provide us with our only access to reality ... that the relation between a word and its meaning is constructed, not given". It is this 'reality' of Saussure that leads one to recognise language to be 'cultural' (nationalism, religious) and not natural. Jinnah had engaged in this concept of Saussure to rally the support for

an independent Muslim nation. Esposito (1991: 113), comments that although Pakistan had used symbolic gestures and religious ideology there was no clear philosophy to guide the state structure and policies that could draw together a consensus amongst the nationhood. Esposito (1991: 113), claims "...simply the ideological questions that faced the nation were: What does it mean to say Pakistan is a modern Islamic or Muslim state? How is its Islamic character to be reflected in the ideology and institutions of the state?"

Out of the ashes of Jinnah's 'noble' vision followed decades of corruption, nepotism and despotic rule. From the time of Jinnah's untimely death in 1948, Pakistan went through, what Keith Callard (1957), called, "political instability" and spent nearly half of its existence under military rule. Callard went on to comment that without a clear political ideology, Pakistan faced an uncertain political future both as an Islamic nation and as a political entity. Esposito's characterisation of that period evidently reflects the instability of the state throughout its history. Table 12 illustrates the chaotic state of the various Presidential and Prime Ministerial office from 1947 to 2000. This is followed by Table 13, which captures the major events that took place since independence in 1947 and have greatly influenced Pakistan's current despondent situation. It appears from all accounts, that with the demise of Jinnah, the country had 'gone to the dogs.'

Leaders of Pakistan (1947 – 2000)

Table 12

Leader	Position	Term in Office
Mohammad Ali Jinnah	Governor General	August 1947 – September 1948
Liaquat Ali Khan	Prime Minister	August 1947 – October 1951
Khawaja Nazimuddin	Governor General	September 1948 – October 1951
Ghulam Mohammed	Governor General	October 1951 – August 1955
Khawaja Nazimuddin	Prime Minister	October 1951 – April 1953
Mohammed Ali Bogra	Prime Minister	April 1953 – August 1955
Iskander Mirza	Governor General/ President	August 1955 – October 1955
Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali	Prime Minister	August 1955 – September 1956
H.S. Suhrawardy	Prime Minister	September 1956 – October 1957
I. I. Chudrigar	Prime Minister	October 1957 – December 1957
Firoz Khan Noon	Prime Minister	December 1957 – October 1958
*Mohammed Ayub Khan	**CMLA/President	October 1958 – March 1969
*Agha M. Yahya Khan	CMLA/President	March 1969 – December 1971
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto	CMLA/President Prime Minister/ President	December 1971 – July 1977
Fazal Elahi Chaudhry	CMLA/President	August 1973 – September 1978
*Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq	CMLA/President	July 1977 – August 1988
Mohammed Khan Junejo	Prime Minister	March 1985 – May 1988
Ghulam Ishaq Khan	President	March 1988 – July 1993
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	December 1988 – August 1990
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi	Prime Minister/ (Caretaker)	August 1990 – November 1990
Mian Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	November 1990 – April 1993
Balakh Sher Mazari	Prime Minister/ (Caretaker)	April 1993 – May 1993
Mian Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	May 1993 – July 1993
Wasim Sajjad	President (Caretaker)	July 1993 – November 1993
Moeen Qureshi	Prime Minister/ (Caretaker)	July 1993 – October 1993
Benazir Bhutto	Prime Minister	October 1993 – October 1996
Farooq Leghari	President	November 1993 – November 1997
Mian Nawaz Sharif	Prime Minister	January 1997 – October 1999
Mohammed Rafiq Tarar	President	December 1997 –
*Pervez Musharraf	Chief Executive	October 1999 –

* Denotes Military Ruler.

<http://www3.simpatico.ca/Shahid.tor/leaders.htm> (1999)

** CMLA -Chief Marshal Law Administrator

Pakistan's History at a Glance		Table 13
1947 Jun	Legislation introduced in British Parliament calling for independence and partition of the sub-continent; communal rioting and mass movements of population begin, resulting in 250,000 deaths and up to 24 million refugees.	
Post Independence		
1947 Aug	Partition of the sub-continent; India incorporates West Bengal and Assam; Pakistan incorporates East Bengal (East Pakistan); Jinnah becomes the first Governor General of Pakistan; Liaquat Ali Khan becomes first Prime Minister.	
1947 Oct	Start of first Indo-Pak war over Kashmir.	
1948 Sep	Jinnah dies; Khawaja Nazimuddin becomes Governor General.	
1949 Jan	United Nations arrange cease fire between India and Pakistan.	
1951 Oct	Liaquat Ali Khan assassinated; Nazimuddin becomes PM, Ghulam Mohammed becomes Governor General.	
1955 Aug	Ghulam Mohammed resigns; succeeded by Iskander Mirza.	
1955 Oct	One unit plan establishes the four provinces of West Pakistan as an administrative unit.	
1956 Mar	Constitution adopted; Mirza becomes President.	
1958 Oct	Mirza abrogates constitution and declares martial law; Mirza sent into exile; Chief Marshal Law Administrator (CMLA) General Mohammed Ayub Khan assumes Presidency.	
1965 Aug	Start of second Indo-Pak war over Kashmir.	
1969 Mar	Martial Law declared; Ayub Khan resigns; CMLA General Agha Yahya Khan assumes Presidency.	
1970 Jul	One unit plan abolished; four provinces re-established in West Pakistan.	
1970 Dec	First General Elections; Awami League under Rehman and Pakistan Peoples party under Z A Bhutto emerge as leading parties in East and West Pakistan .	
1971 Mar	East Pakistan attempts to secede, beginning civil war, Rehman imprisoned in West Pakistan.	
1971 Dec	India enters East Pakistan; India recognizes Bangladesh; Yahya Khan resigns; Zulfikar Ali Bhutto becomes CMLA and President.	
1972 Jul	Bhutto and India's PM Indra Gandhi conclude Simla Agreement adjusting 1949 cease fire line popularly known as Line of Control.	
1973 Aug	New Constitution goes into effect; Bhutto becomes PM.	
1976 Feb	Pakistan and Bangladesh establish diplomatic relations.	
1977 Mar	General Elections; Bhutto's Peoples Party blamed for rigging; evokes widespread rioting and protest.	
1977 Jul	General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq proclaims Martial Law and becomes CMLA.	
1978 Sep	Zia-ul-Haq becomes nations sixth president replacing Fazal Ellahi Chaudhry.	
1979 Feb	Islamic penal code introduced.	
1979 Apr	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto hanged as a result of a Supreme court ruling in the murder case of Nawab Mohammed Ahmed Khan father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri.	
1983 Aug	Zia-ul-Haq announces that Martial Law will be lifted in 1985.	
1985 Jan	Non-Islamic banking abolished.	
1985 Feb	General Elections held for National Assembly.	
1985 Mar	Mohammed Khan Junejo invited by General Zia to form civilian cabinet.	
1985 Jul	Economy declared to be in conformity with Islam.	
1986 Dec	New federal cabinet sworn into office; Mohammed Khan Junejo becomes PM.	
1987 May	President Zia-ul-Haq dismisses Junejo government, dissolves national and provincial assemblies, and orders new election in 90 days.	

1988 Aug	Zia-ul-Haq, US ambassador to Pakistan, and top army officials killed in an airplane crash near Bhawalpur in Punjab; Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of Senate, sworn as acting President.
1988 Nov	Elections held for National Assembly.
1988 Dec	Benazir Bhutto, leader of Pakistan Peoples Party, emerges as the leader of the house and sworn in as the first female Prime Minister of Muslim a nation.
1990 Aug	Benazir Bhutto is dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for alleged corruption. Nawaz Sharif succeeds as the new Prime Minister.
1993 July	Sharif resigns along with President Ishaq Khan under an army-brokerage agreement to end the bitter power tussle between the 2 top functionaries. After election Benazir Bhutto becomes the Prime Minister again.
1996 Nov	Benazir Bhutto is dismissed by President Farooq Leghari on corruption charges.
1997 Feb	The Pakistan Muslim League wins a sweeping election victory. Nawaz Sharif is appointed as Prime Minister and sets up an anti-corruption unit.
1998 May	Relations with India deteriorate as the crisis in Kashmir deepens and Pakistan responds to India's first nuclear test by carrying out its own explosion in May.
1999 April	Bhutto and her husband are sentenced to 5 years in prison and fined \$8.6 Million for alleged laundering of money.
1999 October	Nawaz Sharif is ousted from power in October 1999 and placed under house arrest after attempting to sack his Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf. (Sharif was pardoned in December 2000 and exiled to Saudi Arabia).

ANON: [Bring home on your finger tips](http://www.GetPakistan.com) (December 2000)
<http://www.GetPakistan.com>

President and CMLA¹¹ General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq

The comparative disjuncture for Pakistan is best placed almost three decades later, when Chief of Army Staff General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq seized power through a *coup d'état* with the overthrow of the then 'populist' elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1977. Zia had attempted to bring to Pakistan the respectability of Islamization, which it had lacked for decades. Until this time, Pakistan's elites represented what Akbar S Ahmed (1993: 5), describes as: "...values which were part Westernized and part liberal", more so under the Bhutto government (1971-1977) than

any other. Zia's Islamisation programme was aimed at legal reforms which would enhance the transition of the state from what had become known as an Islamic socialist state, to an Islamic state governed by the Shari'a law, (divine Islamic law). Charles Kennedy (1995: 135), describes the introduction of the reforms as economic reforms, a new education policy conforming to the Islamic tenets and an Islamic penal code. The primary objective for Zia was to destabilise the existing system of 'social decadence', which Pakistan had embraced, under a 'liberal' and 'socialist' agenda and to adhere to an Islamic code of social and legal justice. Another view, which Andrew Heywood (1992: 165), uses in support of the re-birth of Islamic revivalism throughout the Muslim world, is that Political Islam was not borrowed or inherited from the West, unlike liberalism, socialism and conventional forms of nationalism. The desire was justified by moving away from the impure nature of colonialism towards spiritual purification because Heywood (1992), goes on to suggest, colonalised nations needed to regain their "self-respect and purge themselves of Western ideas and influences. By preaching for a return to traditionalism, political Islam became a powerful desire for political and cultural independence."

The transition that began to take place created a vacuum for discontent and frustration for the more liberal-thinking, ruling and influential elites, such as those echoed by Syed Talat Hussain in an interview in 1997, where he shared his concerns about the Islamization process taking place under Zia's government. His argument expressed disquiet. For example, he said that in the visual media industry journalists were forced to wear the "Shalwar Khameez", as a show of an Islamic identity, as much as a cultural identity.

This image of the Shalwar Khameez was deliberately promoted on Pakistan TV during the Zia regime; he promoted this dress because this was our Islamic and cultural identity. This is something that makes us different from the (Hindu) Indians. I am not saying that Shalwar Khameez is a bad dress but one must remember you are competing with Indian TV and people appear in a very sleek form on TV. Since then, it is the only time I have worn a Shalwar Khameez. I have been doing the show for the past 18 months. Everyday I appear on TV as a modern suited booted guy who speaks Urdu and English. But I don't appear as a cultural representative of the Pakistan nation, part of which should be that I should be wearing my Shalwar Khameez. I am not saying that defines our cultural or Islamic identity, but it was Zia's state who choose to define our cultural and Islamic identity until the new changes erupted.

Syed Talat Hussain Interview (Islamabad 1977)

Talat Hussain's contention was that although religion may have a role within society it should not determine the nation's modern culture or modernisation to the extent that the image of modernisation of the state or the nation should be confused with 'cultural backwardness, cultural decadence or cultural imperialism'. Dr Jameel Jalibi (1984: 96-97), wrote that there are two possible approaches to the subject of religion and culture. The first is to ask whether religion should be included in the cultural factors of modern day society. Seeking, to what relevance is faith in a society where status, wealth and power is the cornerstone to life? And the second is that the attitude towards religion is to imagine it to be as necessary today as it was yesterday, suggesting that religion in this context may be the solution to all problems of life. The conflict between modern-day culturalist and the established traditionalists in Pakistan is precisely the battle of identity between faith and culture. Although both groups may believe in their Islamic faith with a hard and uncompromising commitment in the face of adversarial challenges, both groups dream of *idée reçue* of cultural and religious images influenced by either modernity or traditionalism but not necessarily both. Further widespread protests took place in the country where Hamza Alavi (1988: 91), suggests that Zia's Islamisation programme caused strong opposition among women's groups and which further "demonstrated the gulf between the idea of a state for Muslims and his more robust conception of an Islamic state". Such interpretations therefore caused a conflict of identity between traditional images of women in Islam to that of progress and modernity (perceived) by women in an Islamic state.

The cross-over from Westernisation to Islamization for Zia, most likely took place around the same time when Zia felt that to consolidate his power, a new popular and legitimate Islamic image for Pakistan had to be invented. Roedad Khan (1997: 87-88), wrote that Zia had nothing but contempt for Pakistan's constitution and the Western-influenced democratic values of the state; many of his orthodox religious advisors including members of the Political Islamist group *Jamaat-i-Islami* party and senior bureaucrats had advised and strongly encouraged Zia to make structural changes in the constitution along Islamic lines and to discard the Western style constitution that Bhutto had introduced in 1973, on which the nation had become heavily dependent upon. According to Khan (1997: 87-88), this was "music to Zia's ears". Therefore, at a press conference held in Tehran sometime before Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's execution in April 1979, Zia made the following statement:

What is the Constitution? Is it a booklet with ten or twelve pages? I can tear them up and say that from tomorrow we shall live under a different system. Is there anybody to stop me? Today people will follow wherever I lead. All the politicians including the once mighty Mr Bhutto will follow me with their tails wagging....

General Zia-ul-Haq - Tehran Press Statement¹²

This statement, if it is to be believed, is an extremely forceful and challenging position from Zia, the term "tails wagging" if not insulting to the democratic nature of society, is clearly without a doubt a painful reminder of the role and power the military government believes itself to hold over the people of Pakistan. According to Khan (1987), this was the time when Zia had begun to establish his position firmly to remain as the head of government in Pakistan. Interestingly, Ayesha Jalal (1995: 81), commented that during Bhutto's early years he, himself was becoming increasingly concerned at the "Bonapartist tendencies" of the military and therefore set about attempting to curb much of the military influences within government institutions. In an address to the Nation on 3rd March 1972. Bhutto firmly convinced that his power base was under threat from a military coup, made the following statement, aiming his comments directly at a selected group the Military Generals who may have been under the delusion that some degree of Military intervention may dislodge him from his power base. Bhutto said, echoing in spirit the words of Plato:

... [T]he people of Pakistan and the Armed Forces themselves are equally determined to wipe out Bonapartic influences from the Armed Forces ... Bonapartism is an expression which means that professional soldiers turn into professional politicians. So I do not use the word Bonapartism I use the word Bonapartic ... because what has happened in Pakistan since 1954 and more openly since 1958 is that some professional Generals turned to politics not as a profession but as a plunder ... [T]hese Bonapartic influences must be rooted out in the interest of the country, in the interest of Pakistan of tomorrow, in the interest of the Armed Forces and the people of Pakistan.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 3rd March 1972¹³

Roedad Khan (1997: 81), commented on a leading opponent of Zia, Altaf Gauhar¹⁴, who suggested that he (Zia) promised to hold elections and then reneged on that promise. He set out to establish what he called an Islamic system of government which failed to materialise, he was an exploiter, corrupter and an opportunist of the democratic processes. The thoughts of Gauhar ironically reflect the words of Stanley Wolpert (November 12, 1996), who wrote in the *New York Times*: “Four years before his (Bhutto’s) fall from power in 1977,” that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan warned his nation, “What is built on hypocrisy and deceit must finally crumble”. Gauhar’s comments bear-out the historical evidence in so much as the promises that Zia had made never did materialise to any significant sense. However, the image of Zia that was perceptibly shrewd from his Tehran press statement, was that of Napoleon Bonaparte. Khan (1997: 88), remarks in response to Moreau de Lyonne’s question to Napoleon Bonaparte; “*And the constitution?*”:

The constitution, replied Bonaparte indignantly, what is it but a heap of ruins? Has it not been successively the sport of every party? The constitution! Has not every kind of tyranny been exercised in its name since the day of its establishment? Is not its insufficiency manifested by the numerous crimes which have been committed in its name, even by those who are swearing to its contemptuous fidelity? All the rights of the people have been indignantly violated. I speak with the frankness of a soldier!

Napoleon Bonaparte¹⁵

Zia had indeed overcome his most difficult task, which was to project himself as a man of unquestionable Islamic integrity and the only Leader who would transform Pakistan into an Islamic State. Alavi (1988: 64) wrote that once Zia had seized power, he then

needed to strengthen his political position as Head of State. However, he soon discovered that he lacked the people's authority, although the army provide the power, this wasn't enough to legitimise his position. Therefore Zia;

took refuge in divine providence and it was soon claimed that the Almighty has communicated with the General in a dream; that he had experienced *Ilham*, a state of grace in which a divine message entered the heart, charging him with the task of creating an Islamic State and an Islamic society in Pakistan.

Hamza Alavi (1988: 64)

Such a claim, Alavi suggests, to a seat of power is more a kinship with medieval claims of spiritualism as a divine right to the 'King's throne' rather than submitting to the popular will of the people. The legitimacy that Zia claimed was placed upon the success of imaging the embodiment of the divine intervention through signs and dreams to justify General Zia's *raison d' être* of a new Islamic State. Gerald Sussman (June 1999: 8) wrote that in the conceptual theme of seeking to preserve power, societal discourses must reflect and internalise the rights of ruling institutions as "normal, natural and necessary." He went on to say that the:

Monarchy's medieval metaphysical claim to divine right, once such a ruling ideology, was eventually dethroned by ... overpowering ideological myths concerning property, personal liberty and the 'free market.'

Gerald Sussman, (June 1999: 8)

In a similar context, Zia's reliance on his religious advisors and his own self proclamation as the divine ruler of Pakistan, had sought legitimacy for his authority through the established authority of Islam and the spiritual dependency of the 'faithful' masses.

General Zia-ul-Haq attempted to establish a quasi system of democratic rule in 1983 however, this system faced a number of obstacles. Firstly his own belief that a Western style of democracy was incompatible with Islam and secondly, this was influenced by his orthodox religious advisors who were opposed to a democratic parliamentary principle and thereby advocated the election of an Amir. In their view, Khalid M Arif

(1995: 230), reflects that the orthodox religious advisors believed the Presidential form of government was the closest form of government to Islam. This idea greatly appealed to Zia's Islamic and political ideals and ambitions, and for his quest for greater power. Esposito (1991: 110), opens up a space for further thought, when he comments on the Saudi Arabian government which openly supports and funds Islamic groups around the world, including the political party in Pakistan *Jamaat-i-Islami*. Ishtiaq Ahmed (1987: 33), comments that the *Jamaat-i-Islami* movement was also well known in Pakistan to support the Zia doctrine. This induces one to conclude that the religious parties were prone to support a 'despotic presidential' form of government, which was closer to a so called 'Islamic authority' and to the Saudi Monarchy style of governance, rather than support a Western style democracy to which Bhutto had been associated; thereby, maintaining a show of emulative support to the style of governance of the Saudi financial backers for their Islamic party.

Nevertheless, General Zia-ul-Haq cannot possibly be considered a member of the E.H. Carr realist school of thought, in which Carr (1940),¹⁶ established a powerful antidote of a resonant critique of an idealist approach to international relations and helped to bring about a renewed emphasis on the function of power in political affairs. Zia's authority was, in-part, 'Machiavellian spirited' in hope and will. Zia had, until his premature death under suspicious circumstances surrounding an air crash in 1988, become a strong advocate of the Pan-Islamic concept such as that advocated by (Wilder 1995, Ahmed 1987, Esposito 1991, Khan 1997), Maulana Abdul-Ala-Maududi and (Esposito 1991), the late King Fasil of Saudi Arabia. Craig Baxter (1985: 2), commented that had Zia lived, after dissolving the political institutions, he would have imposed his own brand of Islam on the nation. This concept Baxter (1985: 2) went on to say, would have been governed by his own distorted version of "*Nizam-i-Mustafa*" and led by an Amir, to be chosen by some form of election from "among those faithful to Islam and who would be advised by a *Mujlis-i-Shura* of faithful persons but would not be bound by his advice."

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

So what if Decca falls? So what if the whole of East Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan falls? ... We will build a new Pakistan. We will build a better Pakistan ...

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

This extract from a UN Security Council speech made by Bhutto in 1973 and quoted at the beginning of the Chapter, was probably considered in-part the most notable speech ever made by any Muslim leader from the Indian sub-continent to the UN Security Council. This speech was made to the UN Security Council by Bhutto in an failed attempt secure international support to free the Pakistani prisoners of war from India during the East and West Pakistan independence war of 1972. The few words that became world renowned for their ingenuity, flair and bravado made Bhutto a national hero in his country of Pakistan equalled only to, some say, the Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. For this, Wolpert (1993: 92) stated, Bhutto became known as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People). Bhutto was born in Larkana District of Sindh, and a son of a highly influential feudal family in the Sindh province of what is now known as Pakistan. After completing his university education in the United States, first at the University of Southern California 1947 and later transferring to Berkeley Campus USC in 1949. Bhutto went on to Oxford to study law and was called to the bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1953. He married his second wife, Begum Nusrat Bhutto in 1951, whose eldest child Begum Benazir Bhutto in 1988, became the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan. Arif comments that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto began his political career as a Minister of State in Ayub Khan's cabinet at the age of 28, but very quickly gained prominence and stature, and showed promise as a future leader of Pakistan. Subsequently in 1963, Bhutto became Foreign Minister in Ayub's government up until his unceremonious removal by the same route in 1965. In 1966 Bhutto formed the Pakistan Peoples party, which would lead him to capture the world stage of politics up until his death in 1979.

Because of Bhutto's political style and personality, Mohammad Asghar Khan¹⁷ (1983: 51) suggested that Bhutto was not an easy man to get along with. His arrogance and pride stole much of his political thunder, and often he had said that he didn't suffer fools easily. Khan, (1983: 51) went on to say that Bhutto once said, in reply to how he intended to rule Pakistan as its leader, retorted: "the programme is to rule, the people are stupid and I know how to make a fool of them. I will have a *danda* (stick) in my hand and no one will be able to remove me for twenty years". In the same spirit of the debate, Khan (1997: 73), commenting on Bhutto's characterisation, said he was "Churchill's puzzle inside a riddle wrapped in an enigma. He was a human dynamo, a whirlwind, a magnificent, inspiring leader one minute, and a mean and petty person the next." Bhutto's style and image of leadership caused concern amongst many leading members of Pakistani society. Although a 'populist' leader, Bhutto sought little comfort from the continual opposition from the Political Islamists, religious advocates and traditionalists. Ahmed (1987: 32) writes that a writ against him was filed by a former Supreme Court Judge, Badi-uz-Zaman Kaikaus, in the High Court of Punjab in 1976 through an organisation calling itself the *Tanzim Islah-i-Pakistan*¹⁸ (Organisation for the Reform of Pakistan). The petition was filed against Bhutto and many leading members of his government, called upon the court to rule to rid Pakistan of the "infidel Bhutto government, as it was repugnant to the principles of Islamic governance". The writ was consequently dismissed. Another opponent of Bhutto was Maududi, of whom Kalim Bahadur (1978: 121-122) wrote that Maududi, who was opposed to all forms of socialism, even the Islamic socialism of Bhutto was "condemned by him as anti-Islamic" and therefore insupportable in an Islamic state. The political scene for Bhutto's government was becoming increasingly difficult in the light of the growing religious and traditionalist opposition. However, Ishtiaq Ahmed (1987: 177) observes that with the growing opposition, "charismatic leaders such as Jinnah ... and Bhutto ... gained legitimacy ... through personal merit and popularity". This however, according to Ishtiaq Ahmed, was insufficient to maintain a legal form of democracy and "political stability in Pakistan, except under military dictatorship".

Social, Economic and Political Development Programme

After the resignation of General Yahya Khan in 1971, Bhutto took over as the new President on 20 December 1971. In 1973, he was sworn in as Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan after 15 years of military rule. Although the change in titles had a significant impact on his authority within Pakistan, the roles that he undertook were only cosmetically different. Shahid Burki (1980: 182) wrote that Bhutto's sense of power during his tenure was becoming increasingly noticeable, when:

Mr Bhutto's preferences for 'vice-royal system' or 'presidential dictatorship' (became) well known ... His political opponents, particularly the chief of the National Awami Party, Wali Khan, accused him of having 'dictatorial powers.' Mr Bhutto, according to Wali, wanted both a '21-gun salute' and powers of a Prime Minister.¹⁹

Shahid Javid Burki (1980: 182)

Bhutto had an impressive list of major institutional and structural changes that he undertook during his years as the elected leader of Pakistan, some of which are briefly listed in Box 11. The broad principles of his aims were motivated by his socialist beliefs, which led to introducing significant changes to Pakistan's infrastructure, which no previous leader had dared to attempt. If one examines this progressive policy of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) more cynically, then maybe one could conclude that although Bhutto projected himself as an Islamic Socialist, his 'astuteness' made him believe that by providing for the needy and the poor, this would ensure his political stability for the future. Thereby, setting the scene to become permanently endorsed in the history books as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People). The PPP manifesto was the blue print for Bhutto's economic strategy. Although a socialist by political nature, his economic reforms were based upon a 'mixed economy', which proposed to work in partnership between the public and private sectors. One of his early tasks was to set about the nationalisation of key industries and to regulate the financial sector.

Over a period of time new industries were included that would enable the autonomous growth of the national economy. The PPP manifesto (1970) stated that: "... in the public sector will be not only the large-scale production of electrical power but also all other

sources of energy supply namely, nuclear material, gas, oil and coal". This was further expanded by ensuring, "the public sector will completely contain ... major means of public transport, railways, shipping and airways ... A special concern will be the conveyance of workers and employees between their homes and their places of work". Under the Bhutto programme, private sector retail and distribution would be left very much to its own devices, however it was intended to set up urban and rural consumer associations which would help stabilise prices in this sector. Notably, the PPP manifesto made no reference to the development of the Information sector or to the development of electronic technology. On this issue with a number of respondents (Talat Hussain 1997, Dr Rifat Hussain, Dr S Mumtaz and Amjad Islam Amjad), all agreed that Bhutto's manifesto excluded a number of strategies which would have corresponded with modern day developments, mainly due to the fact they were 'irrelevant' at that time. Development in Pakistan, they claimed was extremely limited and electronic technology was not seen as a priority issue by the Pakistan Peoples Party for the rural and under developed urban areas. The respondents went on to argue Bhutto, had in fact deliberately aimed to attract the 'rural' and 'poor' vote. Technology in the manifesto was not considered as an appropriate inclusion for the 1970s.

Box 11

Summary of Reform under Z A Bhutto's government 1971 –1977

- 3rd January 1972- Economic Reforms Order Nationalisation of Key Industries.
- 10th February 1972- Announcement of Labour Policies and Workers would participate in Profits.
- 1st March 1973- Land Reforms.
- Old Age Pensions and Group Insurance.
- Ceiling reduced from 500 Acres to 150 Acres of irrigated land and 1000 Acres to 300 Acres for semi-irrigated land. All lands in excess of 100 Acres allocated to Government servants confiscated and redistributed.
- 21st April 1972- Martial Law lifted.
- 2nd July 1972- Simla Agreement Signed and Pakistan to get back 5000 square miles of territory occupied in 1971 war. India and Pakistan to respect line of control in Kashmir without prejudice to Pakistan's claim and on 28th August 1973 finally setting the scene for the agreement for repatriation of 93,000 POWs.
- 28th Nov 1972 Inaugurated Pakistan's first Nuclear Power Plant at Karachi.
- 9th February 1973- Establishment of Quaid-E-Azam University.
- 12th April 1973- Constitution of Pakistan passed unanimously.
- 1st January 1974- Nationalisation of Banks.
- 21st May 1974- Establishment of Allama Iqbal Open University.
- 22nd February 1975- Islamic Summit at Lahore.
- 3rd March 1976 Inaugurated Pakistan's First Seerat Conference.

ANON: www.pakinformation.ppp/zbbiodata.htm

The nationalisation programme of the financial sector had an enormous impact on the country as a whole when, in 1974, the PPP government nationalised the Banks and Insurance companies. The PPP manifesto (1970), states:

The possession of money institutions in the hands of private parties is the source of exploitation which uses national wealth and private deposits to create money for the financing of monopoly capitalists. All big industries have been set up entirely on bank loans, which means, on the money of the depositors. Such loans can be said to have been the misappropriation of public money by the bankers. To this sort of abuse, which is inherent in any system where banks are in private hands, there has been added the control of banks in cartels belonging to industrial families. Unless the State takes hold of all the banks by making them national property, it will not be able to check inflation. The State's financial policy is at present a prisoner of the bankers. All banks and insurance companies will be forthwith nationalized.

Z A Bhutto: Pakistan Peoples Party Manifesto (1970)

The Manifesto was a fairly radical document for a society that prided itself on its Islamic principles and Muslim identity. The reforms that Bhutto had instigated would demonstrate the great contrast in difference between what Pakistani society had believed itself to be, and what in fact it would finally become. The reforms also created another serious problem for Bhutto: the political Islamists and traditionalists were already plotting for Bhutto's demise, he had now created a new block of political opposition which would hold much more power and influence in Pakistan. They were the Capitalist classes or as some would call them, as Andrew Heywood (1992: 165) implies, the 'Islamic conservative' ruling elite. The bankers, land-owners, commercial classes and the industrialists. According to Burki (1980: 184), made up a group of people whom Bhutto felt was not sufficiently organised enough to cause any political concern to his power base. However, his opponents were able to put together an opposition coalition group of nine parties, under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which Bhutto later dismissed as a "cat with nine tails." Although Bhutto appeared, from his Manifesto, to favour the under-privileged classes, they in fact had little power and influence within Pakistani society. This made Bhutto vulnerable to a challenge to his seat of power and his eventual demise. Begum Benazir Bhutto (1989: 233), published a series of political speeches that had been delivered by her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in her book, *Awaking the People*. In one of his recorded speeches, Z A Bhutto spoke at the District Bar Association in Hyderabad on 26th June 1969,

where he said: “let me make it quite clear that it is a party of the workers and peasants and the students of Pakistan ... It is not a party, afraid of struggle. It is a revolutionary party”. The party not only became a challenging party to the old traditional and religious institutions of Pakistan, but also challenged the fundamental principles of the established elites and their power base. Burki’s (1980: 171) analysis of Bhutto’s earlier period suggested that Bhutto naively continued to feel secure throughout his time in office and in particular during the 1977 election victory²⁰. However, the opposition PNA coalition found it difficult to accept the election result and called upon the Election Commission, accusing Bhutto of rigging the elections. The PNA campaign quickly gained momentum and only a month after the 1977 election, ‘mobs’ protested in the streets of all the major cities. Burki (1980: 171-172), goes on to describe the chaotic state of the country at that time, with widespread demonstrations and protests, and that Bhutto had no choice but to declare military rule in the principle urban areas, thus inviting the armed forces, led by General Zia-ul-Haq, into the political arena.

The Guilty Verdict

An Internet Discussion Paper entitled, “*Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979)*”²¹, suggested that to remove Bhutto through a democratic election was more difficult, and that other means would have to be sought. Circuitously implying, one would assume, that a military option may become an attractive possibility. The Internet Discussion Paper and Burki (1980: 171-172), went on to confirm that on 5 July 1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was arrested by the police on the orders of General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq on charges of having murdered Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan, and conspiracy to murder Ahmad Raza Kasuri. Marshall Law was imposed on the same day. After a protracted and highly publicised murder trail, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, along with four members of his Federal Security Force (FSF) was found guilty and sentenced to death. Khan (1983: 145), and Arif (1995: 184), wrote that over a two year period, after several appeals and lengthy legal debates on the validity of the court’s decision, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged on 4 April 1979. The verdict stated:

... All the offences which the accused are charged with are thus proved to the hilt. It is also proved that the conspiracy to murder Ahmad Raza Kasuri did not end with the death of Nawab Mohammad Ahmad Khan but continued thereafter. He (Mr Bhutto) has been hurling threats as well as insults on us and at times had been unruly. In addition, he has proved himself to be a compulsive liar ... the principle accused (Mr Bhutto) is the arch culprit having a motive in the matter. He has used the members of the Federal Security Force for personal vendetta and for satisfaction of an urge in him to avenge himself upon a person whom he considered his enemy. For his own personal ends he has turned those persons into criminals and hired assassins and thus corrupted them.

Khalid M Arif (1995: 184)

The five accused persons who faced the death penalty were Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mian Muhammad Abbas, Ghulam Mustafa, Arshad Iqbal and Rana Iftikhar Ahmad. The verdict was written by Justice Aftab Hussain, to which the other four judges appended: I agree. Khan (1983: 144), wrote of the trial hearing that Bhutto, during his trial period, had objected to the Chief Justice Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, who presided over the panel of High Court Judges, who were to try him on the grounds that Justice M Mushtaq Hussain had been superseded for promotion to the Lahore High Court twice under his orders, and therefore could not be considered as impartial. This ruling, Khan (1983: 144) goes on to remark, was over-ruled by Justice M Mushtaq Hussain. From this point Bhutto's attitude towards the court was one of defiance and contempt. Khan (1997: 71), recalls that when Bhutto's execution was imminent, that he (Khan) had kept himself away from the "tragic drama that had unfolded," Khan recollects the immediate period after the death sentence was passed by the court, on how Bhutto had accepted his inevitability through the words of Socrates as written by Plato in *The Apology*, which said:

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our way. I die and you live – which is better, God only knows.

Plato: *The Apology*.²²

End Notes

- ¹ Bhutto's speech to the UN Security Council. 15th December 1973. Quoted in Stanley Wolpert (1997: 168). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan.
- ² The term religious or Islamic fundamentalist has been replaced by the term Political Islam, in an attempt to overcome the negative and at times destructive nature of the term fundamentalism, which has become known throughout the world as a 'terrorising, demonistic and destructive body within Islam'. Political Islam is a term that denotes a positive political ideology which is pursued through the strict teaching of the Holy Quran as the guiding principles for human behaviour within a state system. Political Islam also refers to both armed struggle and non-violent confrontation in the cause of Islam.
- ³ Roedad Khan was a career civil servant in Pakistan from 1949, he has held several senior ministerial posts. He has served under five of the six presidents and has personally known all six of them.
- ⁴ Plato quoted in Roedad Khan (1997) Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour. Further reference on Plato not known.
- ⁵ General Khalid Mahmud Arif was appointed as Chief of Staff by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 and in 1984 Zia promoted him to Four Star General and Vice Chief of Army Staff. He was the *de facto* Commander of the Pakistan Army as the powers of Chief of Army Staff were delegated to him by General Zia. Arif was an ardent supporter of Zia and continued to be his close confidant throughout the Zia regime until Arif's retirement in 1987. After his retirement, Arif became a writer of strategic, geopolitical and Nuclear related issues.
- ⁶ Maududi is best known for his profile writings on the nature of the Islamic state, which have inspired Islamic resurgence movements throughout the world. In Pakistan he is best known as the founder of the Jamaat-I-Islami, a highly organised and disciplined political party which has as its primary objective the establishment in Pakistan as an Islamic state. The most concise statement of his thoughts concerning the nature of an Islamic state is Islamic Law and Constitution. (1983) Lahore: Islamic Publications 8th Edition and Maududi and the Islamic State, *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, (ed.) by John L. Esposito (1983).
- ⁷ Speech of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Karachi Club 9th August 1947 as Governor General of Pakistan. Karachi: Quoted in Sindh Observer Press (1948: 10). Also see Andrew Wilder Footnote 10. in Islam and Political Legitimacy in Pakistan. And Stanley Wolpert (1983: 339-340) Jinnah of Pakistan and Ishtiaq Ahmed (1987: 78-79) Concept of an Islamic State.
- ⁸ Queen Victoria's Proclamation November 1858 in CH Phillips (1962) et el (ed). The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858-1947 Select Documents. London: pp. 10-11 Publisher not known. Quoted in Bernard Cohen (1992: 165) Representing Authority in Victorian India.
- ⁹ Quoted in Prof. Mahmud Ayoub (1994, pp.52) The Muslim Ummah and the Islamic State.
- ¹⁰ This account can be found in Saussure's A Course in General Linguistics. (1960).
- ¹¹ CMLA -Chief Marshal Law Administrator of Pakistan
- ¹² The Tehran Press statement is quoted in Roedad Khan (1997: 87-88) A Dream Gone Sour. No time or date is referenced for the press statement.
- ¹³ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's address to the Nation 3rd March 1972. Quoted in Stanley Wolpert (1993: 183-184) Zulfi Bhutto.
- ¹⁴ Altaf Gauhar's comments were made in the Dawn Newspaper Karachi, quoted in Roedad Khan A Dream Gone Sour (1997: 81). No date is referenced of the publication for the Newspaper.
- ¹⁵ Quoted in Roedad Khan. (1997: 88) Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour.
- ¹⁶ Quoted in Paul Howe. The Utopian Realism of EH Carr. Review of International Studies. July 1994. Number 3. Volume 20. GB
- ¹⁷ Mohammad Asghar Khan is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force (Air Marshall Rtd.). He was a leading political figure of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal Party and had been detained in custody by the Bhutto Administration on several occasions, also in October 1979 he was detained by General Zia's military government for his political convictions. Amnesty International had adopted Khan as a prisoner of conscious.
- ¹⁸ The Tanzim Islah-i-Pakistan is an organisation that advocates the establishment of a strict Islamic state where not only the injunctions but every word of the Holy Quran binds the Muslim. A denial of one word

means apostasy. Any order or so called law or direction, declaration or statement which is in direct contradiction with the Holy Quran is void and of no legal effect. The organisation claims that there is no room in such a state for secular politics or politics of power.

¹⁹ Quoted in G W Choudhury New Pakistan Constitution, paper presented at the National Pakistan - Bangladeshi Seminar, Southern Asian Institute, Colombia University 2nd November 1973.

²⁰ The National Assembly Elections were held on 10th March 1977. In the Larkana District of Sindh, Bhutto was elected unopposed. In the Sindh Province nine other PPP members were also elected unopposed.

²¹ ANON (December 2000) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979). *A Discussion Paper*. www.storyofpakistan.com

²² Translated by Benjamin Jowett. and quoted in Roedad Khan (1997: 17) Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had quoted these words before his execution.

Chapter Eight

The Information Society in Pakistan

Knowledge is power, now for Knowledge, substitute the word Information.
Information is needed for Development

Imamul Haq (1993: 57)

To encourage the free flow of information, at international as well as national levels, to promote its wider and better balanced dissemination, of information without any obstacle to the freedom of expression, and to strengthen communication capacities in the developing countries in order to increase their participation in the communication process.

UNESCO General Conference 25th Session - (1989)

Summary

This chapter sets out an argument based on two main themes, the first;

Part I, examines what is meant by an information revolution and how it is applied to Pakistan as a developing nation. It captures the whole persona of technology imperialism and sheds some light on technology imperialism both as an object and as a reality.

Part II of the chapter focuses on the critical analysis of Pakistan's National IT Policy, which was published in August 2000 and how it is expected to be implemented throughout the country, thereby, placing this part of the chapter into a wider discussion on the need for human development and the results of socio-economic development as a consequence.

Part I.

Theory of the Information Society The Information Myth?

The image of an information revolution has created probably the most interesting stimulus for a global debate, both amongst the developed and developing nation states. This so-called revolution has accessed and influenced the minds and hearts of every human being in the First World and many in the developing world in one way or another, yet the most (not so) obvious concern is; how real is this revolution? And, who will really benefit from it?

One such theorist who challenges the revolutionary concept of information technology is Cees Hamelink (1986: 7-8) who wrote an essay, where he studiously questions the 'existence' of the information revolution. His argument suggests that this myth has been created to serve an illusion of an information society, which would pro-actively transform the economic, political and cultural landscape of the global community. Richard Susskind (1996: 1) wrote of a group of executives from a leading manufacturer of electric power tools who were invited to an induction course to consider a slide projected onto a screen. The image put before them was a gleaming power tool and they were asked if that was what the company sold? After some confusion and uncertainty about the question amongst the executives, they all nodded in agreement that in fact that was what their company sold. They were immediately challenged by the next slide, that of a photograph of a hole, neatly drilled into a wall. That is what you sell, the trainer suggested. Very few of your customers are passionately committed to the deployment of the power tool in their homes. They want holes. It is the job of the company to find an ever more competitive, efficient and imaginative ways of giving your customers what they want, of putting holes in their walls. The message in this passage suggests that with the onset of technology, this makes us focus on its benefits for society when indeed it is the manufacturer of that technology which will in the end become the beneficiary of its creation by constructing illusions of aggrandisement of technology for the developing world.

In a recent interview conducted with Dr Muzafar Iqbal from the Pakistan Science Academy in Islamabad, he stated there were in fact two shades of opinion on technology. The first is that: "the relationship between technology and culture is very close, to the point that many cannot, or do not need to see one conflicting against the other. In fact, one may argue that they are very much fused together." The other, he goes on to suggest, is that: "there is a strong resistance towards change and the introduction of technology. The position is very clear, this second group ... would argue technology to be anti Islamic". Dr Iqbal's position on technology suggests that not only technology: "advances social and economic prosperity of the nation but [it] can be positively used to promote Islam in a Global public sphere". The use of technology, whether you are a company executive, a politician or a government adviser on technology, ultimately has the same objective with common goals. The idea of propagation of an ideology through technology can ensue to a blind commitment without recognising the fundamental question: is it technology that requires the promotion for your objective, or is it the objective in itself that requires promotion, and technology serves only to create the illusion for that end?

In the same spirit of this debate, Hamelink's argument suggests that the myth of the information revolution would imply that: "the application of computer-steered technologies will effectively terminate a social structure which is characterized by an endless struggle between the winners and losers, between rulers and ruled". Hamelink (1986: 7-8) questions the illusion created by what he terms the "new age prophets" by suggesting that this information revolution may be a simple continuum of the historical process of change, equally becoming "insignificant" as its predecessor, the Industrial Revolution. Hamelink (1986: 7) further clarifies his comments by suggesting that an information society is a "post society: it means a break with previous values, social arrangements and modes of production", which were associated to the concepts of an Industrial Revolution.

Within the same context, Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1980: 3) writes that those who look approvingly upon the post industrial society, such as Bell (1973), Webster (1995), Lerner (1958), describe it as a new stage in the evolutionary process of a society. It is

therefore not surprising that proponents of a post industrial society believe, as Dupuy (1980: 3) suggests, "that growth of information networks and mass communications will bring people and nations together, fostering mutual understanding and peace". The analogy for this by Dupuy, is shaped by the idea that economic growth brought a sense of competition, envy and the pursuit of selfish interest, creating a society with an awareness of individualism. The information society on the other hand, is perceived to challenge this concept and bring about a strong sense of harmonious community, a village spanning the globe much like (Sir) Thomas More's (1965) work of creating an *Utopian society* in the midst of chaos.

Dupuy suggests that the post industrial society, which he has come to call the 'Information Society' is far from being a stage of evolutionary or progressive function in mankind's history as what is being suggested by Manuel Castells (1996), and to which I refer later. In the words of Dupuy, this is:

... a phase in the history of capitalism coping with its contradictions. Rather than delivering us from material constraints, the information society intensifies the struggle for survival and strengthens the radical monopoly of economic activity over social and political dimensions of our life.

Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1980: 4)

Although Dupuy directly challenges the notion portrayed by Castells, there are some similarities which are worth noting.

Manuel Castells' (1996: 29) own interpretation of the information revolution is that: "the history of life, as I read it, is a series of stable states, punctuated at rare intervals by major events that occur with great rapidity and help to establish the next era". The observation by Castells has a very interesting as well as an extremely challenging notion for many of the academics who have closely followed and measured the changing events in the economic and cultural revolutions of Western society. A further assumption by Manuel Castells' (1997: 31) and David Lyon's (1988: 6) analysis draws upon a comparative relationship between the clock and the steam engine, to that between the computer and an information society. The two questions Lyon (1988: 6) draws from this comparison are; firstly, does the new technology shape the resulting

social and political relations? Secondly, does this create a qualitatively different kind of society? In answer to at least one of these questions, Castells (1997: 32) encouragingly suggests that the characterising features of this technological revolution is: "not the centrality of knowledge and information, but the application of such knowledge and information to knowledge generation...". Castells goes on to clarify his argument by explaining that new information technologies are not just tools to be applied, but processes to be developed, so that the user and the doers become the same. A form of amplification of the human mind. Another of Castells' views goes some way towards addressing Lyon's second question, in that, the growth of technology will create a new generation of "human minds" which can work at two ends of Castells' (1997: 32) "Informational Mode of Development", the so called 'production line' from 'technology application to technology innovation'. Imamul Haq (1993: 57) stimulates the debate further by adding a capturing thought when he states that: "knowledge is power, now for Knowledge, substitute the word Information. Information is needed for Development." There is of course a major debate amongst some intellectuals from around the world about the concept of development and the role of technology in promoting such a concept and whether the information revolution is in fact a tool for development or is Dupuy and Hamelink's version of the information revolution a post-development synopsis?

What Information Revolution?

The information revolution has heavily impacted upon Western cultural, economic and political ideology and which many would argue has become a dependent factor for growth. The information revolution has begun to structure its formation around a wider debate that surrounds its 'causes and affects'. There are also a growing number of other theorists, Castells (1996), Sardar (1996) and Webster (1995) amongst many, who have contributed to this serious debate and offer powerful challenges, as well as exciting antidotes to a post-information society. To continue this debate a step further, Hoodbhoy (1991: 84) comments on the gathering of eminent scholars at the Penang international conference on 'Modern Science in Crisis' in 1986. The conference declared the following statement at its concluding session, which stated:

That modern science and technology are based on Western experience and epistemology, and therefore ill-suited to the needs of the Third World. It was stressed that the most difficult aspect of the fight was to 'de-brainwash' the people of the Third World from the First World's penetration and to 'fight foreign-trained scientists' who are 'the greatest germ-carriers' of the Western virus against which our societies are seeking immunity.

Modern Science in Crisis 1986 Conference¹:

Hoodbhoy (1991: 84) reflects on this statement by suggesting that this situation cannot continue on for much longer without serious consequences for the developing world. He goes on to elaborate on his thoughts when he said that it is altogether different when one looks at the role of 'modern science' as a major factor in "producing inequality between the different cultures". Hoodbhoy (1991: 85) continues, by commenting that this disparity "did not exist in earlier times, no single culture was powerful enough to dominate or devalue the others until the point when modern science was born in Europe", with reference to the Industrial Revolution. Joseph Conrad wrote in his celebrated work; *'Heart of Darkness'* (1995: xix), as a reflective image of colonialism being a powerful instrument for seeking forced change in cultures which were either alien or less developed than his own by opening up Africa to the 'shining light of Christianity'. He wrote: "Africans respect only force, power, boldness and decision". Conrad began his writings in a climate that accepted slavery as the vehicle for Imperial journalism.

However, the 'illusionary' power of such a relationship between the 'master and his slave' is better described by Edward Said (1994: 23-24) when he refers to Joseph Conrad as "different from other colonial writers" of his time, by turning him into a sacramental employee of the imperial system of writers. Said contemplates the idea of power of imperialism when put against the power of the nation under despotic rulers who are considered by Said as no different for the nation than when the colonial masters were exploiting the colonised. Conrad's theme can be equally applied in modern day technology imperialism, where technology imposed upon a nation can bring about inequalities and the erosion of cultures that have for centuries contributed towards the nation's identity. It is through the "power, boldness and decision" of the 'technology masters' that this new terrain has opened up in the less developed nations, creating an

overpowering need for change to take place. If we are to be able to constructively challenge the notions propagated by Said and Conrad, then the National IT Policy developed by Pakistan must be considered with due caution and careful trepidation, so that it is technology that benefits Pakistan rather than Pakistan helping to benefit technology. It is in the context that the Pakistan IT Commission recognises the inequalities of Information Technology, however, there are demands upon the government by the private sector to pursue the development of a National IT Policy, where through such avenues as investment, social and educational development programmes can be created to serve such a policy in its implementation. This new approach, at least in theory, has now allowed the government of Pakistan, the private sector and the international market to work in partnership for IT growth in Pakistan.

At the dawn of the third millennium, the world has seen significant changes in the last two hundred years on the global landscape of what Frank Webster (1995: 31) describes from the work of Daniel Bell (1973) as an inevitable outcome of history, from a pre-industrial (early 18th century), through industrial (late 19th century), and by the end of the 20th century it is a technological society, termed by Bell (1973), as the post industrial society. Hamelink (1986: 7-8) refers to the information revolution as the 'last chapter in this evolution', as the mythical revolution which is simply a continuum of the historical process of change. Castells does theoretically support Hamelink's theme, yet he also moves along a slightly different route in his analysis, when he suggests that:

While there is a historical coincidence between the clustering of new technologies and the economic crisis of the 1970s, their timing was too close, the 'technological fix' would have been too quick, and too mechanical, when we know from the lessons of the Industrial Revolution and other historical processes of technological change that the economic, industrial and technological paths, while related, are slow-moving and imperfectly fitting in their interaction.

Manuel Castells (1997: 51)

The argument by Castells does not take away the principled logic to which Hamelink refers as it is an acceptable description which suggests that the changes which are currently taking place, will forever alter the political, cultural and economic landscape of a global society. Lyon (1988: 55) debates the pivotal question of the Marxist

relationship between class, capital and power. Lyon (1988: 55) disagrees that 'technologicalisation' is indeed an extension of the capitalist mode of production and suggests that this theory would be a misleading route for any student of Information Technology to pursue. Lyon goes on to state, "capitalism is not limited to *industrial* production, hence there is no *priori* reason why capitalism should not continue to help shape the development of new technologies". The question before us is whether or not information technologies and their associated industrial and social processes actually help change the rules of the game." Lyon formats three key debates which he believes would identify the answers to his analysis:

- New technology holds hope of abandoning 'class'; classlessness achieved by technical, not social revolution. As a conceptual casualty of change, this is 'class rejected.'
- It merely strengthens the hand of the already powerful capitalist class, giving it wider (global) scope and the tools for tighter social control. This is 'class reasserted.'
- Marx is now outdated, but not because classes are disappearing. The introduction of new technology tilts the balance of power in different ways realigning classes and releasing new social movements. This is 'class reconceptualized.'

David Lyon (1988: 55)

The Marxist analysis suggests that while information technology makes a significant contribution within a capitalist society, it does not alter the fundamental relationship between class, capital and power. In similar fashion, Mike Featherstone (1995) makes a comparable analogy where, he debates the theory of "recentering culture" in view of the changing nature of modern society. David Albury and Joseph Schwartz (1982) explain the so called micro-processor revolution is part of the effort of capital to ensure its continued domination over social and economic development during a period of crisis and change. Therefore, although the rules of the game may change with the introduction of new technology, the shifting of the balance of power from the factory owner to a technology-led communication industry is still firmly within the grasp of the capital class, creating a new relationship between 'communication and power'.

New World Information Order

The UNESCO² Conference at its 25th Session, in (1989) contributed towards a evolutionary' debate in the global communications discourse, when it agreed a new communications strategy which stated:

To encourage the free flow of information, at international as well as national levels, to promote its wider and better balanced dissemination, of information without any obstacle to the freedom of expression, and to strengthen communication capacities in the developing countries in order to increase their participation in the communication process.

UNESCO General Conference 25th Session - (1989)³

The New Communications Strategy was hardly a major turning point for the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Peter Golding (1998: 69) comments on the withdrawal of the US and the UK from UNESCO in 1986 after UNESCO called for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The NWICO was the first international attempt by the South to draw together a combination of states and non-state actors to develop a coherent and effective International Information and Communication policy to which all its member states would subscribe. There were eleven key objectives that were agreed by UNESCO (June 1980 resolution 4/19) at its Twenty-first General Conference in Belgrade, which would set the ground work for a NWICO:

Eleven Key Objectives UNESCO

Box 12

1. Elimination of imbalances and inequalities which characterise the present situation.
2. Elimination of negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private and excessive concentrations.
3. The removal of internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas.
4. Plurality of sources and channels of information.
5. Freedom of press and information.
6. Freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility.
7. Capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving their infrastructure and making their information and communication media suitable to their needs and aspirations.
8. The sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives.
9. Respect for each others cultural identity and for the right of each nation to inform the world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values.
10. Respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit.
11. Respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process.

Mark Alleyne 1995: 119-120

Mark Alleyne (1995: 119) argues, that with the withdrawal of the US and the UK, the NWICO became ineffective and among the scholars of International Relations, it soon became fashionable to speak of the NWICO in the past tense. Alleyne (1995: 119) refers to this major event as a prominent part of the global communications discourse thereby becoming a significant turning point in the relationship between communications and power whilst the dispute continues on the implications of the information revolution. Golding (1998: 69) reflected on the incoming British Labour government's decision in May 1997, to rejoin UNESCO in the following year. Although Golding (1998: 69) remarks that the announcement drew little international

attention, he goes on to state that many saw this decision as a “clarion call” to a new and harmonious global cultural order for an information society.

One possible argument, amongst many, for the un-principled self-removal of the US and the UK from UNESCO, can be viewed in the same manner as Herbert Schiller’s (1986: 23) argument on the conglomerate attack on national sovereignty of Third World countries. The policies of UNESCO which directly and indirectly sanctioned greater global participation from the South in information sharing and Third World information technology development may therefore, in the same manner be legitimately considered by the USA and the UK as an attack on the commercial sovereignty of capitalism and corporate control. Schiller (1986: 23) debates this issue from the viewpoint of the weaker nations being at the mercy of transnational corporations. Schiller’s view on the political balance between national sovereignty and corporate control is reflected in the following passage, where he comments:

The sovereign rights of the nations to determine their own telecommunications policies is not the issue; rather, it is the international consequences of these national policies that may be subject to legitimate challenges by other countries whose interests are adversely affected.

Herbert I Schiller (1986: 23)

The undermining of national sovereignty in the economic sector is seen by global capital as a major interference by the nation state. Schiller (1986: 24) points out the “cardinal principle of capitalism”, by explaining the long standing insistence of capital to do what it will, with no accountability whatsoever. The information revolution has largely provided greater mobility of modern information and communications technology, which allows instantaneous decision making to shape the future of global capital. It is in light of this argument that Schiller thrusts the debate of economic or capital sovereignty under the spotlight to show how the Third World nation state in its challenges for equality in the information race disturbs the sovereignty of economic stability of the West and which may also be considered as a prime motive for the withdrawal of the US and UK from UNESCO in the mid 1980s.

The information society is considered by many, such as Webster (1995), as the principle logic for the inevitability of 'technologicalisation', which shares a multitude of global development discourses. The central principle for this development stems from the growth of global capitalism, whereby one may 'mockingly' or 'tragically' imply that capitalism has charmed the social traditions off the developing world into economic chaos. Noam Chomsky (1988: 123) refers to this principle of "consent without consent" as a central pinnacle of US imperialism which stemmed from the time of Columbus to present day US economic foreign policy. Chomsky (1988: 123) observes T D Allman's comments, when he stated that the American (US) experience of the genocidal slaughter of the American Indian is almost unparalleled. He then went on to say:

They were not human beings; they were only obstacles to the inexorable triumph of American virtue, who must be swept away to make room for a new reality of American freedom.

T D Allman in Noam Chomsky (1988: 123)

Chomsky (1988: 123) goes on to comment that: "US history is hardly unique in this respect, down to the present day". Suggesting that current US economic foreign policy has led American (US) self-interest, or more precisely, the United States Political Economy of global capital, to the point where it has almost wiped out or dramatically altered third world cultures, traditions and economic stability, to ensure that US economic and cultural influences prevail over 'local' considerations. Much of this can be described as the Political Economy of Global Communications.

Frank Webster (1995) discusses the work of a number of theorists in *The Theories of an Information Society*. Webster draws attention to Hebert Schiller who he considered to have taken a neo-Marxist perspective towards examining the political economy approach towards information. Webster (1995: 76-77) highlights three of Schiller's key arguments, which shed an enlightened image of capitalism in an information market place. The first pays attention to the market criteria in informational development. This is primarily seeking out the essential elements that recognise information and communication as an influence on market pressures. The second argument insists on class inequalities as a major factor in the distribution, accessibility and generation of information. This basic concept suggests that class determines who gets what type and

form of information. Therefore, dependent on the social status of the society or the individual, class would determine the benefits or losses in the information revolution. Thirdly, Schiller contends that society which is going through structural changes in the information and communication system is prey to the power of "corporate capitalism". Schiller goes on to contextualise the argument by claiming that it is corporate capitalism that will in the end control the development and usage of information and communication technology primarily for private use rather than public usage, as it is in this area that the greatest corporate capital is made both in financial and influential terms.

Schiller's main theme, which Webster highlights, that the Marxian influences on the theory of information still holds an important inspiration for information and communication technology. The early period of Marxian tradition played an important part in the theories of class, capital, commodification and profit. Webster (1995: 89-90) contends that Schiller's view still maintains that these elements hold true today, as we have travelled from one end of a millennium through into the next. Information and communication industries are still under the influences of a capitalist system which would have a great bearing over Marxist traditions in society and the growth of communities, societies and nation states.

An interesting analogy on class accessibility of information and communication is preserved through the writings of John Carey who writes about the response of the English literary intelligentsia to the phenomenon of mass literacy culture. Carey (1992: 5) discusses the rise of the huge literate public which led to the direct cause for the 'early day' information revolution to take place. He comments, on the difference between the nineteenth-century 'mob' and the twentieth-century 'mass is literacy'. The premise on which Carey places his argument lends a curious description of how the intelligentsia of the time, the so called intellectual bourgeoisie, had formed their hostility towards the broadsheet newspaper commenting as Nietzsche (1961: 77) did when he said "the rabble 'vomit their bile', and call it a newspaper". The main objection by the intellectual bourgeoisie was not to fail the newspaper, as this was the tool which set them apart from the uneducated masses, but rather to criticize the newspaper owners

for allowing accessibility to the masses to information and communication channelling. The battle for sovereignty of information and communication by the intellectual bourgeoisie and the capitalist tendencies of the newspaper proprietors were in my view, aimed at the same objective, which was to create a mass communications market that would serve, what Marx principally coined the phrase, 'capitalism being the mode of production' and later proved to be an anchor for the success of the industrial revolution. Daniel Bell (1973: 31-51) commented that in order for capitalism to grow geographically, the structure of the capitalist regime had to expand or it would die.

Nevertheless, the intellectual bourgeoisie feared the accessibility to information by the masses; Carey (1992: 7-8) comments that Alfred Harmsworth, who later became Lord Northcliffe had encouraged popular journalism by aiming daily newspaper columns at women readers to which many of the intellectual bourgeois reacted by attacking the tabloids. D. L. Le Mahieu (1988: 33) wrote of Holbrook Jackson who held the view that "female readers (were) responsible for the new evil of pictorial journalism. Women habitually think in pictures, he exclaims, whereas men naturally aspire to abstract concepts. When men think pictorially they unsex themselves". Carey (1992: 4) argues that such views are not helped in the promotion of the information and communication revolution and is particularly disturbed that such writers considered Nietzsche to be a popular and possibly a preternatural mass culturist who served to numb the pain of the mass popular journalism of his time. Nietzsche was seen as a panic response by the intellectuals to the threat of the that the masses aroused. However other writers such as W B Yates (1939: 189-215), recommended Nietzsche as a counteractive force to the spread of democratic vulgarity and George Bernard Shaw (1988: 79) who had nominated Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, as the first modern book which is set apart as a harmonising symbol of socialism, democracy and feminism, is among many who offer supportive yet selective commentaries for the literary consumption of the intellectual bourgeois.

Information [Technology] as Power

Thus far we have examined the basic argument against the idea that International Communications is far from a holistic concept, in fact the idea that communication technology is anything but an illusion has been a reasonably strong feature in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, setting that theme aside for the time being, the concept of communication technology is further explored as a weapon of influence, power, control and economic propaganda by the nation state. Ali Mohammadi (2002: 208), brings a slightly different focused debate to this arena, when he argues the contextual theme of ideology as a means towards challenging despotic rulers of a state. His contention is that by the use of different communication models, this can bring about change to a system by distinguishing between tradition and ideology. It is in a familiar fashion that the West has applied its communication models, by linking the relationship between tradition, culture and modernisation in order to promote tradition and culture as the abstract relation to modernity. This is normally considered as a one way communication channel and is imbued with a certain type of authoritarian, totalitarian image that allows the manipulation of the citizen ... through a visible approach towards information in the international context as economic power. This approach is more subtle where the message reflects a respectable intent towards business ventures, marketing, technology transfer and international development projects. This political power concept is in the form of media news, communications data and cultural symbols which are considered to reflect a neutral and value free commodity. The idea of mass communications in such circumstances allows the transfer of images, ideas, ideals and cultural life styles from one country to another. This, Mazrui (1990: 119) reflects on as 'cultural colonisation' and through his more commonly known phrase "coca-colonization of the world". Mazrui conveys this as "more symbolic of Americanisation of humanity" and projected keenly through communication technology.

Truth -v- Power

Jan Pieterse (2000: 175) rejects the notion of development as a new religion of the West as he claims this concept is the "imposition of science as power". This view is further stretched by Sachs (1992: 3), when he points out that it is not so much the failure of development one needs to fear, but its success. Post development as an 'un-tested' theory rejects the concept of development in the traditional sense as a failed project. The idea which Pieterse's (2000: 176) argument builds upon a formulation of a series of thoughts which offer the notion that post development overlaps with Western critiques of modernity and techno-scientific progress, such as what he suggests to be critical theory, post-structuralism and ecological movements. To structure the argument for post development, Pieterse (2000: 176) suggests that there are differing strands to looking at development as a conceptual theory. The first is anti-development which he agrees is rejectionism inspired by anger with development, beyond-development "*au dela de development*" combines this aversion with looking 'over the fence', and in post development, these two theories are combined with a Foucauldian methodology which is inspired by a post-structuralist analysis. Pieterse suggests that such positions are not inconsistent and by grouping them together, they can be collectively described as post development.


Hamelink's (1986: 10) claim that the body of power derived from the development theory of scientific inclusion can create the disillusionment with an information society, which is based upon the idea that everyone can own information. To support his theme, Hamelink sets out six influencing factors which he considers are central feature to his argument that information, far from being a tool for social and cultural development, is more attuned to Pieterse (2000) and Sachs' (1992) conceptual theory of post development. This implies that the idea of scientific inclusion for growth can lead to cultural and economic exclusion:

1. In certain social sectors information is becoming increasingly complex and specialist. In general this implies that, despite an increased volume of available information. More people know less.
2. The resource 'information' is far more difficult to exploit than land or capital. It demands highly developed intellectual and managerial skills which are very unevenly distributed in society.
3. Advanced hardware and software for information-processing are expensive and can be afforded only by land owners or capital owners. The rest will have to try and catch up using obsolete instruments.
4. Information becomes a source of power only if the necessary infrastructure for its production, processing, storing, retrieval and transportation is accessible.
5. The myth assumes that people were never able to exert power because they were ill-informed. However, too often people knew precisely what was wrong and unjust, and were very well informed about the misconduct of their rulers. Yet they did not act, and their information did not become a source of power, because they lacked the material and strategic means for revolt.
6. Control over access to advances in information technology is unevenly distributed in the world, and the fact that millions of individuals can fiddle with their home computers does not change this. The management structure of the information industry is not affected by the proliferation of electronic gadgets. If anything, it is considerably strengthened by widespread use of its products.

Cees J Hamelink (1986: 10-11)

The six influencing factors set out above can be recognised as an instrument of private/public partnership and its effects on the under-classes in Pakistan. The strategic concepts of the six factors are applied in the analysis of Pakistan's National IT Policy and Action Plan 2000, which is set out later in chapter six.

There is of course a comparable theory set out by Harold Lasswell (1948) which is strongly influenced by Freudian theory. Lasswell's theory sets out a model which is best described in fig. 1 below:

Figure 1.

Presentation of Lasswell's Formula

The Lasswell theory is discussed by Srinivas Melkote (1991: 65) who argues that the Lasswell theory is in direct contradiction to the Libertarian philosophy. Whilst the Libertarian school emphasised the latent rationality in men and women, Lasswell in his formula interpreted Freudian theory to mean that human behaviour is essentially irrational. Based upon this conceptualisation of human behaviour, Lasswell developed a new paradigm which has become known as the "hypodermic needle" model, this theory Melkote (1991: 65) Tudor (1999: 25) state, is also known by several other names such as the: "magic bullet" (Tudor 1999) "bullet theory" (Schramm, 1971) and the "stimulus-response theory" (DeFleur et al, 1975). These models are described by Melkote (1991: 67) as "colourful terms" which denoted powerful media messages and effects on the audiences to which these messages were directed. The bullet theory symbolises a bullet shot at passive and defenceless audiences. Similarly, the Hypodermic needle theory, is based upon the idea of the media as the medicine injected into the veins of passive audiences who offered no resistance and the stimulus-response model equally explains the same kind of effect, suggesting that every stimulus created a response in the receiver.

Wilbur Schramm (1971: 3-53) debates the conceptual theme of how communications theory reflects the on-going passage of communication processes. This examination by Schramm (1971: 3-9) illustrates the argument by suggesting that communication theory is a central block towards uniting and communicating between sections of society through message channelling that aims to capture audiences at their weakest and most vulnerable point, in order that the communicator can achieve the best result. This development in mass communications led to governments becoming disturbed by this apparent change in the use of communication technology. Schramm (1971: 3-9) states,

that governments, therefore, felt it important “that laws were passed and action [was] taken to protect *defenceless* people against *irresistible* communication”. This theory of communication is what Schramm (1971: 3-9) refers to as the *Bullet theory* of communication. Where communication was seen as a magic bullet that transferred ideas and feeling, or knowledge or motivation, almost automatically from one mind to another.

Not surprisingly, some flaws were found in Schramm’s *Bullet theory* by researchers in the United States, when he (Schramm) points out that his theory, when put to the test, led to a studious account of his findings showing that the impact of messages was often related to the class, education and economic background. He also added, to this theory the impact of social tastes, values and opinions upon the receiver. In other words, the same message had distinctly differing effects, depending on the class and cultural background of the recipient. With this in mind, Schramm (1971: 3-9) contends that further work was necessary to examine the “communication process as two separate acts, one performed by a communicator, one by a receiver, rather than as a magic bullet shot by one into the other”. The two acts to which Schramm refers, suggest that:

... the communicator constructs as best he can, the signs which he hopes will call forth the desired responses—whether verbal or nonverbal, auditory or tactile. That is the first act of the communication process. A receiver selects among the stimuli available to him, selects from the contents of the message he chooses, interprets it and disposes of it as he is moved to do. That is the second act of the process.

Nature of Communications between Humans:
Wilbur Schramm (1971: 9)

Schramm goes on to point out that the two acts are separate in their aims and target objectives, they are brought together to convene a collection of signs which in turn transmit a message. It is through this process that a challenge is made to the medium of communication, suggesting that society can, decide what is relevant and appropriate to being accepted, if it so chooses, and also what forms and types of information society they may wish to reject. Although, Schramm (1971: 3-9) accepts the finding of the researchers as a legitimate argument and criticism, he contends that his *Bullet theory*

remains valid, in so much as the audience may not always be privileged to choose and is commonly 'powerless' to pre-select information for consumption.

In this context, many of the interviews undertaken in Pakistan ran a common theme on the role of modern technology and its effects on the participant or receiver of the message. The main argument, which two of the respondents, Dr Anis Ahmed and Syed Talat Hussain portray, which are discussed more fully in Chapter nine, is that cyber technology as much as popular television entertainment offers visions, ideas and popularly cultural products for the masses. This however may not always be compatible with Islam and/or Pakistani culture. Although it is important to recognise the positive nature of the effect of this new technology, one also needs to be wary of the negativity of its message when used as a tool for immoral, unethical and political propagation by unfriendly nations and internal descent. In response to such commonly held views throughout the middle classes of Pakistani society, the government of Pakistan was under pressure to further develop and expand on its Information Technology strategy. Therefore the Ministry of Science and Technology, published its first Government policy on Information Technology in August 2000.

The work of Pervez Hoodbhoy (1991) "Islam and Science", subjects the reader to an examination of the relationship between power and faith and how this impinges on the conflict between technology and nature. Although Hoodbhoy's work is centred around Pakistan as a case study, not through choice but I suspect, through circumstances, this does cause one to consider from his interpretations, whether his argument is based upon 'reason' towards a logic or 'anger' towards a faith. Nevertheless, Hoodbhoy (1991: 2-3) debates the scientific relationship between development and ideology which, he argues, are "indivisibly linked". Hence the question, does the Islamic faith harmoniously complement the science of the natural world or, is there rather an irreconcilable conflict between a metaphysical system based upon faith and the demands of reason and empirical enquiry? Hoodbhoy's contention is that when comparing the role of each of the respective, "the secular character of science does not mean that it necessarily repudiates the existence of the divine. But it does mean that validation of scientific truths does not rely on any form of spiritual authority; observation, experimentation and

logic are the sole arbiters which decide what is truth or falsity". Here Hoodbhoy attempts to show that although the relationship between science and faith has an intrinsic relationship, in that both offer to capture the concept of truth and power through their respective versions of what is natural and what is secularly un-natural. Thereby argumentatively projecting the overall nature of such a philosophy that claims technology as a science empowers the real (science) from the unreal (faith). This notion is however, challenged by Albert Einstein, cited in the work of Jeremy Bernstein (1973: 15), where he observed that the most important and all encompassing element of 'true religion' is the faith, often misunderstood and at times unrecognised. However, the regulations, which govern the world of existence, are rational and comprehensible to reason. He went on to say, "I cannot conceive of a genuine scientist without that profound faith. The situation may be expressed by an image: science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind". Einstein warned that teaching, which suggests divine intervention in human affairs, would not only be unworthy but also fatal. If evidence for such a statement is required, the past several centuries of Muslim history provide incontrovertible proof.

John Locke (1689)⁴ explored this concept of truth and power when he wrote that as 'man' is not permitted without censorship to pursue his own thoughts in search of truth, he would therefore doubt the reality of truth wherever they happen to find it. If power is the censure of truth, then clearly in the eyes of Locke, the ideal of truth becomes somewhat abstract. If on the other hand power is what liberates truth, then truth becomes the objective relationship to power. Roy Bhaskar (1998: 17) writes, "if we can imagine a world of intransitive objects without science, we cannot imagine science without transitive objects". If truth and power are seen in an isolationist sense, then the concept of truth and power becomes an idealist model for Bhaskar's normative analogy by arguing that the relationship between truth and power is very tenuous, if indeed there is one.

A further basic formulation between truth and power is touched upon by David Lyon (1988: 106) when he suggests that Third World countries did not necessarily "herald the coming of the information age", the information age for such societies was seen as a

form of cultural domination and was often transmitted in the language of the “cultural colonisers” sapping of neo-colonialism in its very essence. Lyon (1988: 106) goes on to point out that such perceptions were not only about the idea of information technology, but also about the idea that a developing country's literacy levels were far below that which would be required to access the information flows in any meaningful way. Pervez Hoodbhoy (1991: 3) adds that a meaningful expression such as “undreamed of power” to which Lyon and others have conceptually referred, came about as a consequence of scientific methods, such as technology. In part, he goes on to say that this power was used to understand the laws of nature and subsequently to create new technologies and adds that, science became the weapon with which under-technologically developed countries were deliberately and systematically subjugated and colonised. Thereby both Lyon and Hoodbhoy both link the informational mode of communication technology to the concept of truth and the colonial discourse of cultural assimilation to power. The idea of truth for Lyon and Hoodbhoy is distinctly different, in that Lyon refers to truth in the negative abstract and Hoodbhoy from the conceptual theme of positive abstract of truth.


Zia-ul-Islam wrote a feature article in the *Daily Dawn* (3rd June 1997) on access to information titled, *‘Information: right & reality’*. Here, Zia-ul-Islam debates the wrongful manner in which the government removed the right to access government information, as a means of hiding the ill-mannered corruption of government bureaucrats and politicians. Thereby deliberately creating a restrictive ‘unwritten policy’ on the unavailability of government information for public consumption; creating an ambiguous relationship between the negative use of ‘power’ by the government, to the need for ‘truth’ by its people. In such shadows of questionable accountability of government Ministers and Senators, the confidence in social and economic policy formulation and implementation is that much resisted by the public at large. Zia-ul-Islam goes on to state in his article:

The world today is gripped with the information fever. After the Industrial Revolution, (the) Information Highway is the biggest change happening in the world. Countries which fail to climb on the 'Information Highway' now, will find themselves out in the cold within a few years. In Pakistan only a small number of private organizations is trying to connect themselves to the global information grid. The vast government machinery is completely ignorant and unconcerned about the need to share information.

Zia-ul-Islam (Dawn 3rd June 1997)

The World Development Bank shows in Chart 5 that technology access is restricted within the boundaries of the countries' ability to use them. The contrast between the USA, Germany, India and Pakistan compares tragically to inaccessibility for knowledge resources.

Chart 5.



World Development Bank (1999: 220-221)

Part II.

A Critical Summary: Pakistan's National IT Policy and Action Plan

The Government Policy and the Political Framework for the Development of the Information Highway and Electronic Communications

The introduction of technology in the context of Pakistan, has evaded reason and logic as to why it has taken so long for it to become a recognised commodity which should have been addressing 'modernity' as a manifestation of socio-cultural, political and economic behaviour of society and its social groups. Zubair Faisal Abbasi⁵ (7th June 2000) wrote an article on the internet, titled '*Information technology and social change*', where he addresses such complex issues which face Pakistan at the dawn of the century. He comments that technologies influence, rule and control social groups and societies in as much as they "empower, dis-empower and create (an) underclass as well as hi-tech social groups and other split-ups in terms of *haves* and *have nots*". This thought is further projected by Professor Atta-Ur-Rahman (Minister for Science and Technology), in his opening remarks in the National IT Policy and Action Plan (2000: 6) where he states, "The wealth of the nation is not judged by its physical assets. It is determined by the technological gaps between the *haves* and the *have-nots*". The National IT Policy (2000) attempts to address, as much as cover-over some important facets of Pakistan's economic and social 'backwardness', after recognising that without such a policy, Pakistan would be unable to circumvent the growing demands of industry to bring Pakistan's IT sector into the 21st century. A recent commentary in the *Economist* (September 23rd 2000: 5) the Commissioner of the United States Office of Patents, said; "Everything that can be invented has been invented", these were the sweeping words before he recommended the abolition of his office in 1899. The article goes on to state, "History is littered with such foolish predictions about technology". Although Pakistan may not have been tarred with such a brush, there are some grounds to consider that such an attitude does exist in a society where Tradition (Featherstone 1995), Culture (Mazrui 1990), and Religion and Science (Hoodbhoy 1991, 1998), collide like dodgem cars at a fairground. Syed Mazhar Ali⁶, the Chairman of the Information Technology Commission stated, "there is thus hope that although quite late

but with dedication (and) commitment ... it still may be possible to overcome the effects of years of neglect". His comments illustrating, as much as reflecting on the difficult period through which Pakistan had passed in recent years by ignoring the importance that should have been recognised for such a policy document to have been produced by the previous governments. The National IT Policy is split into three main sections, each attempting to address key action plans of the policy:

- The Policy Direction: → The Cornerstone of the Plan
- The Action Plan: → Recommendations of the Working Groups
- The Implementation Plan: → Details of the success of the Plan

The Pakistan IT Commission which oversaw the development of the National IT Policy and Action Plan, set up eleven working groups to study the proposals on specific areas related to IT and its "development, promotion and application" in Pakistan. Set out below is a list of the eleven working groups under the various chairmanships from the Private Sector:

Working Groups

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. HR Development, Training and Education. | Dr J Ghani
<i>Chairman of Punjab IT Board.</i> |
| 2. IT Government and Databases | Mr Z Ismail
<i>Secretary.</i> |
| 3. IT Market Development and Support | Mr M K Javid
<i>Managing Director PSEB.</i> |
| 4. IT Fiscal Issues | Mr S Taseer
<i>Chairman World Call Payphones.</i> |
| 5. Telecomm, Convergence and Deregulation | Mr S Mahmud
<i>CEO Interactive Communication.</i> |
| 6. Cyber laws, Legislation and IPR | Mr A Z Rizvi
<i>Partner Rizvi Isa and Co.</i> |
| 7. IT and Telecom Manufacture and R&D | Mr A Karim
<i>M. D. Comcept Pvt. Ltd.</i> |
| 8. Internet | Mr S Bhutta
<i>President of ISPAK</i> |
| 9. Software Export | Dr I A Zualkernan
<i>CEO Askari Information Systems</i> |
| 10. E-Commerce | Dr I Hyder
<i>Deputy Director of IBA</i> |
| 11. Incentive IT Investment | Mr A Allauddin
<i>Chairman Computer Society of Pakistan</i> |

IT Policy and Action Plan: (2000. 11-12)

The following statement was agreed by the working group as the main 'principle' theme for the Policy:

The Government has to be the facilitator and an enabler to let the Private sector drive the development in IT and Telecommunications.

IT Policy and Action Plan (2000: 19)

Abbasi (7th June 2000) points out a critical observation on the working groups' make-up by suggesting, "a cursory look at the composition of the working groups reveals that the group's composition seems to be lacking at least two vital interest groups i.e., IT and Information consumers like journalists, intellectuals, ... consumer rights protection bodies, representatives from civil society organizations and the women from civil society at large". The National IT Policy (2000: 20) document comments on its working group make-up by justifying the reasons as to why the selected groups were chosen to ensure the "broad based involvement of the key stakeholders is a must for its sustainable development". Almost admitting the exclusion of other selected groups from its working party by implying that the National IT policy was aimed not for the domestic or indeed social consumption of the nation, but more importantly, to uplift the economic development of the country by suggesting the Stakeholders being the government, commerce and industry in partnership. Although the working group commented that it had carried out extensive consultations with a "large number of professionals, IT users and other stakeholders", it is however unclear to whom they refer. Except when in section 6.2 of the National IT policy (2000: 20) document it suggests that one of the prerequisites for ensuring sustained growth of the industry is the provision of a definite roadmap, for this, "the private sector is being brought into the mainstream as the 'main driver' for growth". On further investigation, I was advised by a senior civil servant from the Pakistan Ministry of Science and Technology, that there is some evidence that the large corporations in Pakistan have had some dialogue with the government on the development of the policy, but little consultation has taken place on who should be the driving force behind the impact of the policy on the economic and

industrial sectors of the nation. The corporations believe it should be the Private Sector, however, the government are privately committed to undertaking this role themselves.

Although Abbasi (7th June 2000) examines the National IT Policy and Action Plan with some analytical criticism, the critical analysis from which I draw my conclusions are much broader in its study. The purpose for this approach suggests that to capture the real essence of the document, it would require a greater degree of objectivity to ensure that this document has the greatest impact in the sectors that would traditionally be seen as an inclusive rather than an exclusive approach towards the betterment of Pakistan's public and economic national policy.

The National IT Policy (2000) offers to expand opportunities almost exclusively for the private sector, and yet fails to address some of the key social and public policy requirements which would enhance the IT policy's impact on the national economy in the long term. The main thrust of the key objectives in this context, captures the interests of the associated industries for the expansion of the private sector. The policy aims to provide some degree of educational development programmes or 'skills development' in IT. This policy aim is encouraged with some recognition of the role for training women in promoting this sectoral growth. The programme of educational development suggests the involvement of the rural and poor in a strategic approach to develop a country-wide participatory role for the destitute and impoverished, however, Pakistan has continually failed to address the needs of the rural and the poor, there is no evidence to suggest that this may be improved within the foreseeable future. The National IT policy itself recognises the failure of previous governments in this aim, when the Chairman of the Information Technology Commission stated:

Unlike the half baked efforts in the past, most of which failed, to achieve success, it has been ensured, that firstly there is unwavering commitment from the government at the highest level, and secondly, appropriate implementation, monitoring and review mechanism is put in place along with the framing the policy.

Syed Mazhar Ali
IT Policy and Action Plan (2000: 9)

Unfortunately, the comments by Ali are no more reassuring than those of his predecessors before him. Rashid Soorty (1996: ix), a prominent businessman in Export Textiles in Pakistan, wrote in his work *Towards the Twenty First Century*: “real power is retained in the hands of a few by crucifying the democratic values at the alter of nepotism, favouritism and corruption in every sphere of life – political, economic and social”. This view offers support throughout the various sections in which the respondents have been quoted in this thesis and in particular this theme has a strong sense of belonging in Chapter Four. Furthermore, Soorty’s comments are echoed within the National IT policy document by drawing attention to the endemic corruption that exists in Pakistan when it stated that by dealing with corruption it would:

Extend existing incentives given to specific sectors of the Its Industry to the entire IT industry; selective application will only encourage corruption, and time consuming equipment, and allied products.

Fiscal Incentives: 8.20.2.1.1.2
National IT Policy and Action Plan (2000: 40)

Although the policy aims to attract attention for the current initiative of the government by promoting a positive image of technology development throughout the country, it also expands further the idea of technology growth towards introducing Pakistan’s launch of its satellite system within the foreseeable future. No time nor future date has been expressed, nor have the costs for such a bold initiative yet been published by the government. Some years earlier, in an interview with Syed Talat Hussain in which he discussed with me the idea that had been shared with the then Nawaz Sharif Government by Shakeel Rehman, Pakistan’s multi-millionaire publishing and media mogul, he commented that:

The government has little vision, even to begin to think about the growth of a information society. It is for this reason the government has been slow in opening up electronic media in Pakistan. The government is not committed to thinking along those lines, whereby they need to pump in resources to develop technology to help us develop our existing media and to protect the little bit of culture and values we have left.

Hussain, clearly frustrated by the lack of commitment by the government shared Rehman’s concern over this matter and went on to say:

What is going to happen is that the private sector will take the lead. This office (News International in Rawalpindi) is owned by the richest man in Pakistan.(Shakeel Rehman). He is currently trying to launch his Satellite TV from Singapore because the government won't let him launch it from here. He wants to do this not out of concern for Pakistan but purely out of concern to develop his business interests. The private sector will then be able to offer an alternative to what is currently being offered by the state run TV channels.

I am not very optimistic about government plans in this field of developing information technology. The government doesn't have the money even if it had the will.

Syed Talat Hussain (Interview 1997)

The policy of the current government of Pakistan offers some hope for the future, there is however little confidence amongst the professionals in the information sector that such a policy would finally come to fruition in Pakistan. Talat Hussain is a respected intellectual media journalist who is currently working freelance, his background in media and journalism offers a privileged position to critically examine the information sector growth both within Pakistan and South Asia. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that the current government National IT policy offers a long road towards establishing a country-wide information technology sector, which is far greater in commitment and enthusiasm than any previous government in Pakistan. It should however be remembered, that this policy is still only a document without adequately recognised resources and inadequately trained professionals. To see this policy change from theory in to an identifiable practice would require more than just goodwill by the government.

The National IT Policy recommendations address five key sectors (2000: 45-49):


- IT Development in Higher Education
- Economic and Commercial Growth
- Private Investment
- Privacy and Confidentiality of Information
- Intellectual Property Rights

To promote the broad recommendations of the policy, efforts are in place to change the commercial and public infrastructure to accommodate the current high costs of Internet usage and enable easier access to electronic technology. The National IT policy (2000: 50) sets out a programme of cost reductions of Internet bandwidth by the Pakistan Telecommunications Company Ltd (PTCL), of up to 53%, which would lead to an overall reduction in costs for the end user. This is further enhanced by the provision of free Internet connections for the public sector and universities, under an agreement with the private sector. Previously, Internet connectivity to the ISPs and other corporate customers was anything between four to twelve months, this has been dramatically reduced to four to eight weeks.

In the area of e-commerce, Pakistan's current position is particularly noticeable, the National IT policy (2000: 13) draws one's attention to the very dire prospects that Pakistan faces due to a lack of commercial, economic and political commitment to technology development in Pakistan. For this reason, the policy attempts to justify its partnership with the private sector over its lack of involvement with other sectors such as the intellectuals, academics, journalists and educationalists.

AFACT (Asia Council for the Facilitation of Procedures and Practices for Administration, Commerce and Transport) aims to support the Asia-Pacific region policies and activities, especially in regional trade agreements. Currently 12 countries are members of AFACT, of which Pakistan is not a member. The following, Chart 6 illustrates the overall position of the member countries including Pakistan.

Chart 6



AFACT Report 1998

The National IT policy document suggests that the IT policy initiative came about as a result of the government's concern over Pakistan's position in the global economic market, and in particular in the Asia-Pacific region. It is from this self-analysis by Pakistan, that she believes by improving its position within e-commerce, its regional trade agreement may increase and improve in competitiveness. To this end, Pakistan has set up an Electronic Commerce Board (EC Board), under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Science and Technology, Dr Atta-ur-Rahman, who shall oversee the development of e-commerce and regional trade through information technology in partnership with what it refers to as the "Stakeholders" who would include Trade Associations, Insurance Companies, Banks, Airlines, Port Authorities, Customs and Shipping Agents.

The overall vision by the IT policy planners can only be commended however, and this is made with some degree of reservation and hesitation. The targets to which the National IT policy draw attention, lack any sensible and logical approach, although, no real resources are identified, no proper consultation with media and information

professionals and others has taken place, and no national assessment has been made of Pakistan's Human Development programme to see what manpower resources may be required to improve the overall status of Pakistan through the formal educational institutions. Poverty, health and development issues have been largely ignored in the policy, and priority appears to be given to placing trust in the private sector to address the issues that need attention for the success of the policy. There may be some obvious reasons for this. However, a further interesting, yet not too surprising a discovery, found that the current new IT initiative by the government may not be that new after all. Mian Muhammad Javaid, the Chairman of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority, who was assisted by the Deputy Director for Licensing Ahmed Shamim, wrote a comprehensive paper in July 1998 entitled, *Indus Information Super Highway (IISH)*. This paper sets out a series of proposals which seek to address the growing demand for an IT infrastructure in Pakistan and suggests that to meet this growing demand for a national IT sector, a series of tasks would need to be completed for its creation. The tasks that this documents outlines fall into eight broad categories:

1. An additional 945 ISP operators over a 4 year period to deal with the projected increase in Internet users of up to 5 million by the year 2000.
2. The installation of over 15,000 new telephone lines to accommodate the increase Volume of Internet usage.
3. The need for a countrywide high capacity bandwidth information superhighway.
4. An improved quality ISDN access for faster and efficient connections.
5. Reduced lease-line costs. PTCL current charges are 2 to 3 times more than for International connectivity.
6. 24 hour service for public and private sectors users.
7. Interactive Web Sites
8. Venture Capital for a new IT network

Indus Information Super Highway (IISH) (July 1998)

It appears from the general analysis of the National IT Policy, when compared to the IISH document that, although the terminology is distinctly different, the general observations and requirements of the document appear to be similar. Two sides of the same coin can be an apt description. The policy although, claims to be breaking new ground in the formulation of a National IT Policy for Pakistan. However, new the

National IT Policy is, offers some food for thought, particularly in-light of the previous document which was written for the previous government.

It is, nonetheless, recognised that the National IT Policy addresses some areas of cultural, economic and social need, which the IISH does not cover. In spite of this, the National IT Policy is, by and large aimed at how information technology can promote its own objectives, through private sector and government partnership, rather than aiming to 'recentre' the national decline in human development in Pakistan. Information technology is propagated by the government as the harbinger of a new era in which not wars but the globalization of economies will be the central role through free market transaction of goods and services. S A Khan (13th August 2000) suggests that: "The First World of course does not require rapid addition any more to its plethora of goods; it needs a globalized market with free flow of information. And for them the quickest and cheapest pathway to this direction is information technology". This of course, notwithstanding, that Pakistan lags behind AFACT countries in the region and far behind the First World. The First World, through their own capital-led interests, is persistently instructing the developing world to jump into the information age of the free market and globalisation. The vivid picture which faces the developing world, is that the First World has entered the information age with its bumper harvest of industrialisation and now want to globalise its post-industrial economies through information technologies. The problems which face the developing world, are not just a lack of access to vast untapped natural resources, but a crisis in human development, corruption, nepotism and a collapse of its political infrastructure. Therefore, the challenge that faces Pakistan and other such countries is, how will the developing countries compete in the information race with the First World?

The information age has shown that as the First World becomes stronger in its globalisation of goods and services, the developing world is facing the critical decision: should it jump into the information age by bypassing the industrial age? If so, how and with what goods compared to the First World, or should it accelerate the efficiency of its industrial technology by co-ordinating capital investment with human capital as a sure basis for rapid industrialisation? Or should there be a way that would ensure the

boom of both ages simultaneously? With no hesitation, Pakistan has embraced globalisation with a leap into information technology as a national policy for development. M B Naqvi captured in a few words, the crisis of technology and industrial identity for the Developing World, when he wrote:

The rapid globalization of almost all countries has been hyped as the quickest road to progress. After the collapse of the Asian Tigers and frequent tremors and turmoil elsewhere, that propaganda sounds vapid. Many more now see globalization as a flawed perception. It is sure to enrich the already rich (developed) countries but would pauperise many more while possibly making a few newly industrialized countries medium rich – possibly for a period.

M B Naqvi. The Daily Dawn (9th January 1999)

Taking the new National IT Policy as a test case for exploring the link between technology with social, political and economic development which are mediated by interest groups and power relations, one can begin to visualise a typical pattern emerging from within Pakistani society in general and the policy makers in particular. The corrupt practices that have so often been exposed in Pakistan, limit the level of confidence society can place within the success of the National IT Policy that would increase the quality of life in Pakistan. Although the National IT Policy has many commendable and comprehensive suggestions, the real analysis that is likely to be applied to the policy is the examination of human resource development, development of software industries, infrastructure development and the development of databases, which are the cornerstone for the implementation of the policy. In addition to this, the suggestion within the document, to offer tax exemptions to the experienced IT experts and the specialised training of IT professionals and a dedicated education for an almost pre-selected sector of Pakistan's 'polite society', will no doubt exclude major sections of the wider population who are unable to access the privileged education institutions and social elites within an already unbalanced social society. In the main, it is expected that rural peasantry and the urban under-classes will remain outside such developments, whereas the middle class urban educated masses may share some of the treasures of economic growth through IT development.

Chapter Six and much of Chapter Eight looks at the life and times of three prominent leaders of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia ul-Haq. Their contribution to the technology development of Pakistan has been somewhat limited and one would have to try very hard to place them into such a category. However, their individual and collective contribution towards Pakistan's Islamic and cultural identity has been enormous and shapes much of the current political, social, economic and philosophical thinking. The debates set out in the previous chapters on Human Development, Culturalism, Modernisation, Globalisation and the Information Society are all shaped by the political and philosophical contributions made by these leaders over the last 30 years. The reason for adding this Chapter to the study is to place the political identity of Pakistan into an historical context and how it has influenced and shaped Pakistan current development strategies towards modernisation. The aim of this chapter is to ensure that the debates in the previous chapters are brought together in the context of Pakistan's Islamic identity, its modernisation programme and balancing secularisation with Pan Islamic philosophy. Chapter Seven concentrates mainly on the historical identity of the three leaders and how they had successfully lead the nation towards their political ideologies and cultural aspirations. Chapter Eight on the other hand offers to put such aspirations into a political context and debates the growing demand for national conciliation between Pakistan's political identity, religion (traditionalism), secularisation and modernisation.

End Notes

¹ Modern Science in Crisis (1986) Conference. A Third World Response. Third World Network and Consumers Associations of Penang. In Pervez Hoodbhoy (1991: 84)

² United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)

³ www.unesco.org/webworld/com/communication_democracy/newcom.htm

⁴ PhilosophyArchive@marxist.org.

⁵ Abbasi Faisal Zubair (7th June 2000). Information Technology and Social Change. <http://www.dawn.com/2000/text/op.htm>

⁶ Syed Mazhar Ali is the Chairman of the Information Technology Commission and Retired Senator, he wrote these opening remarks in the Government IT Policy and Action Plan August 2000. p.2 of the document.

Conclusion

Aim of the Investigation

To examine the relationship between the current development of Electronic Technology and the Information Super-highway in Pakistan and how this may have an impact on the social, cultural and political development in Pakistan.

Nottingham Trent University: Registration Document submission (RD1R)

Summary

The themes that have been unravelled throughout the research investigation have gradually been brought together to support the assumptions, predictions and inferences which have been commented on throughout the thesis. During this research process new thoughts and old arguments emerge together to examine and lay the foundations for review, reflection and by careful trepidation, the future vision through the fabric of the thesis. Thereby, leading the reader to draw upon the findings as conclusive evidence of the serious consequences that 'fast track' modernity may have on a developing nation which is continually battling to blend modernity with traditionalism in the face of heavily restricting human development resources. The aim of this study was to undertake an investigation as a case study on the impact of new technology on Pakistani society and how this imposes on political, cultural and religious identity, cultural patterns of behaviour and social norms. Much of the study is centred on cultural studies as the main focus for debate.

An Overview of the Study

According to a recent United Nations report, the majority of Pakistan's population is illiterate and the country falls in the category of 'low human development'.¹ As mentioned above, in this perspective, the purpose of this study was to analyse the state of (under-)development of electronic technology and information superhighway. The main argument of the study is that the improvement of technology will not automatically enhance human development, rather it is the 'human development' which is the only route towards the technologicalisation for a nation.

In the contemporary complex situation of the country, a number of factors are interlinked with each other and mutually influence positively or negatively, the process of the development of electronic technology and information superhighway. A particular characteristic of this thesis is that rather than presenting a partial picture, it attempts to deal with the problem as a whole and suggests some measures for improvement. An important reason for following this type of specific approach for analysis is that because of the volatile, unstable and fast changing situation in the region, any econometric model or dealing only with a part of the problem was neither a justification of the issue nor useful to the country on which the present research is focused.

This final chapter offers a number of findings that reflect the outcome of the study. However, one cannot conclude without drawing some attention to the key elements of the study that manifestly demonstrate a hinge for 'optimism' in technology development for Pakistan. The optimism through which the study began was challenged throughout the whole period of the research by the unfamiliar surroundings of corrupt and inept bureaucratic institutions and officials in Pakistan. Thereby focusing to a greater degree on the frustrations and contradictions caused by the systematic failure of government policy initiatives, inadequate financial investment and as a consequence, the inability of achieving the desired results for the nation. The study has shown Pakistan to stumble, twist and trip its way through a host of periodic political change, under-development in human intellectualism and conflicting images between traditionalism, culturalism, identity and modernity. This being the main ingredient of the study that contributes towards the conflict between the nations cultural identity, Islamic principles and modernity.

The air of ambivalence is evident when one discusses human development concept with the officials within government circles. Although, no one is suggesting that the current situation in Pakistan is good, and most agree that major improvements are required for the country in human development terms, nevertheless actions and results are clearly not visible in the political terrains of the nation. Promise after promise have been shared with the nation without any positive outcome or noticeable results. On further

investigation during my final field trip in October 2002, there had not been a single policy initiative that had been publicly and with any degree of sincerity, declared as successful. One cannot help but to conclude by noting the mendaciousness nature of the government officials when it comes to investment in major improvements for human development and to ensure that adequate resources are applied in health, education and wherever else it is most needed.

It is worth mentioning here that the study shows that the political manipulation of the census figures and educational development achievements in Pakistan offer a disconcerting picture for its future. The gap between the powerful elites and the destitute poor appears to be growing with every new failed government initiative. Although each successive government has been critical of the practices of its predecessor, this by no means suggests that a previous wrong will be put right. Chapter Two of the thesis illustrates this argument where it states that in 1978, the figures in Karachi, showed that the population stood at 3.6 million this was at a time when it was widely believed that the population of Karachi stood at seven million. If this is to be believed, it is clearly concerning to see how easily large sections of the population can simply disappear from the electoral register. Furthermore promised new investments in education never materialised and whole communities have become disenfranchised from their government and by implication, within their own nation.

Further to say that the country has over a half century attempted to introduce change in cultural practices, traditions and identities. Chapter Four explores the fear, aspirations and contradictions that face Pakistan and such thoughts are a willing participant towards modernisation and cultural identity to be equal partners in the changing nature of Pakistani society. Chapter Seven offers a debate on the legacy that has been left behind by political leaders where change was the central feature for culture, faith and identity in their quest for up-ward movement. Although Pakistan has remained relatively static in its social mobility, however, socio-cultural changes are taking place within the country with the introduction of a range of electronic gadgetry from mobile phones, the information highway, satellite television, electronic games to the motor car.

International and domestic travel is far easier and communications networks around the world are a simple direct line call within minutes.

Therefore, in the above context prevailing situation of the country, fundamental changes are taking place, the nature of human behaviour within the country has clearly accommodated this change and local identities are beginning to embrace such changes as the norm for socio-cultural and socio-economic development. The opposition to this is not about stopping this development, as that will be an impossible task. The real concern faced by the traditionalist is, how can they influence this change to work for their own traditionalist objectives in faith, culture, identity and power?

The various governments of Pakistan, although have failed to progress education and human development opportunities. For this their liability should be seriously brought to account by the nation. The traditionalists have by and large been denied access to information, they have failed to engage in change and they have neglected their responsibilities to seek positive changes for their nation. The traditionalist may be opposed to the changing nature of society within the context of globalisation, but the study has shown that their opposition is based upon a lack of understanding and knowledge of modernity in a traditional society. In order that one may appreciate the essence of the dilemma that faces Pakistan, I quote in full Pakistan's only Nobel Laurite, Professor Abdus Salam (1988) who commented on an experience with the Chairman of Pakistan's Planning Commission, which:

When we speak of bureaucracy's contempt for the scientist, let me recall a past Chairman of the Planning Commission, who had this to say to me when I requested housing for scientists: "Everyone in Karachi sleeps on the footpaths, why cant the scientists do the same?" And when I suggested that he might consult the scientists in the planning of science-based technologies in Pakistan, he replied: "Why should I consult the scientists? I do not consult my cook to show me how to run my household." By what divine right he was running the Planning Commission, he never told me.

Abdus Salam (1988: 39)

Such attitudes and views that are commonly held throughout Pakistan offer no benefits to the long term development plans for the country particularly in the field of electronic

technology. It is as though, the nation is treated like a servant, only to offer its services, its wealth and its opportunities to the needs of the powerful and influential whether they are modernisers or traditionalists. Throughout the thesis, comments, remarks, views and experiences have been shared that offer evidence of how developing countries including Pakistan are having to deal with corrupt and inept institutions, government departments, and its officials. No action is taken and no changes take place. The people of the country, as though slaves to the Galley Master, must do as they are expected, or else the system just would simply exclude them from their own nation?

In such circumstances, the nations cultural identity, social habits and traditional lifestyles are unduly influenced through forced acts of unacceptable behaviour of the political systems that face the nation. For example, a corrupt bureaucratic system will inadvertently encourage that corruption is an acceptable for social interaction between the government and its people. It is this very nature of the systematic failure of the institutions that have led to the political infrastructure to crumble in full view of the nations aspirations.


In today's world, digital systems and communication technologies are visibly dominating national and international economies, cultural lifestyles and social patterns of behaviour. It is now well understood that the economic, social and cultural wealth of a nation will be the determining factor for access to high quality education, electronic information services and digital mass communication networks which can and should be applied to the national development of the country. The study has shown that for Pakistan to prove itself to be capable of bridging the gap between the rich and the poor, the educated and the uneducated and the haves and the have nots, the country will not only have to reach its full potential within its economic, social and cultural development programmes, but the government has to shed its '*oddities and peculiarities*' that determine its political image as a corrupt and inept nation. One recognises that this is a difficult task. But without the removal of corruption, new information technologies will only reinforce the inequalities, which have become all too familiar in Pakistan.

If one takes the idea that *Information is power*, then power clearly has been taken from the masses, not through the act of oppressive state intervention but through a systematic erosion of the state educational services over decades of failed political systems as well as illiterate or semi-literate parliamentarians, most of them belonging to the feudal class. In the contemporary sad situation of the country, lack of education leads to ineffective participation in the affairs of the nation. It seems appropriate at this point to re-emphasise the words of Imamul Haq (1993: 57), who said: “knowledge is power, now for knowledge, substitute the word Information. Information is needed for development”. In the context of the above, the overall framework of the thesis is presented in the following self-explanatory diagram which reflects the links between various component of this research.

The Research Layout:

Chart 7

Electronic Technology and the Information Superhighway



Review and Reflections

This thesis has drawn together the whole of my previous learning experience in a way no other experience could have. I particularly, believe that a number of lessons were learned during the field survey, the analysis of information and the writing of this thesis. In a Third World country such as Pakistan, the development of electronic technology which is the base for information superhighway is totally dependant on the development of the state institutions infrastructure and human development in the county. Unfortunately, the outcome of this research reflects a poor picture of human development in the country and there are various factors responsible for this situation. Among these, high level of illiteracy, inadequate and unreliable national statistics on population and education, poor government policies and plans, high level of corruption, clash between secular and religious forces of the country, and overall inefficiency of the system were the major factors responsible for this sorry state of affairs.

The achievement of human development in Pakistan is dependent upon a series of key factors, which aim to supplement the weakness of the individual sectors with the strengthening of a unified and a cohesive sectoral approach toward growth in Pakistan. However, with the additional problem of institutionalised discrimination and bureaucratic incompetence, it is hard to see how such a strategy could work. Population control is one such sector, which is currently spiralling out of control where Pakistan is currently facing a major task in undertaking regional health and contraception initiatives to curb the problem. The government has developed a two tier strategy aimed at the rural communities which are steeped in traditions, cultures and social habits that clearly conflict with the government's modernisation programme and the urban communities which are seen as a lesser problem but are equally disconcerting.

It is important to highlight that, there are no clear and unbiased evidential facts available on the current situation in Pakistan and the information currently available is clearly questionable. The failures of the 7th and 8th Five Year Plans on Pakistan future strategic planning process has had a profound affect on economic deficits, national inflation and high levels of unemployment. In this context the investment strategies for technology in the country has been delayed. The study shows how the national growth targets failed to

achieve the government's expected targets by 55% (Chapter Two). The GDP has further impacted on the domestic debt by raising the deficit from Rs.290 billion (£2,826,731,129) in 1987 to over Rs.605 billion (£5,897,872,875) in 1992-93. The government in 1997 publicly admitted the costs to the nation based upon corruption and inefficiency totally over two billion rupees per day. During this same period Transparency International had declared Pakistan as the most corrupt country in the world. Therefore unless Pakistan is able to deal with its internal problems, the desire to achieve a successful outcome for the country's human development programme will be greatly hindered due to its inefficiency to the extent that the whole government machinery is grinding slowing away from investing in the nation.

As it is discussed in Chapter Three, the state of education in Pakistan has reached a crisis level, where achievement levels are not only failing to reach the government targets but are also slowing leading to the collapse of the whole educational infrastructure. In addition to exploring the dismal state of education in the country, the discussion in Chapter Three also reflects the shocking levels of underachievement. The study offers some statistical information where it comments that 77% of the female population is illiterate notwithstanding that over two-thirds of the adult population are facing the same crisis. However, 'positive' outcomes in education shows that targeted investments outlined in Table 3 offers some hope with a 100% increase in female literacy over a seventeen-year period. The negligence of the education sector can also be seen in another context. Muhammad Ahsan (2003) wrote a paper entitled: *An Analytical Review of Pakistan's Educational Policies and Plans*, where he discusses *Poor Statistics, Poor Policies and Plans*. He comments (also see Chapter Three, Table 5 *The State of Contradictory Statistics on Literacy*):

Statistical data regarding various sectors plays a pivotal role in the socio-economic development of a country as the resource allocations are always based on this. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, usually national figures are doubtful and a source of confusion. For instance, 'according to the *Economic Survey 1998-99*, the literacy rate of the country is 45 percent, while other government publications give different figures. The same is also true in the case of non-government organisations. The report of the Mahbub ul Haq Centre for Human Development claims 36 percent literacy rate while other newspapers and journals have been quoting it as between 35-40 percent.

Muhammad Ahsan (2003)

Needless to say that the process of education policies and programmes is an indicator of Pakistan's ability to transitionally move from a developing nation to a progressively developing nation. To hinder this process, the census figures are one of a series of hurdles that Pakistan has to cross. The allocation of human development resources, political representation and economic investment are based upon social indicators that the country reflects through various channels of social measurement on human development and population figures. Unfortunately this is one of those channels which has yet to be challenged before we can begin to process the assessment of 'need' when contrasted with the assessment of 'allocation of resources'. Such factors are vital in the age of globalisation especially when one takes into account the fact that a significant part of the population are illiterate. The government's aspirations to place modernisation at the centre of its human development programme cannot be realistically obtainable unless a systematic approach is applied. A further problem which Pakistan faces are the national education enrolment figures have been criticised by UNESCO who commented in their report for 1998-99 that Pakistan has constantly failed to supply enrolment figures in order to independently measure the levels of student participation in education.

The present dilemma for Pakistan is fairly basic. Its previous pace of economic growth cannot be sustained without substantial investment in human development, but its ruling elite, divorced from the aspirations of the masses, is tragically indifferent to the provisions of basic welfare and educational services for the people. Without basic reforms in Pakistan's political, social and economic system, the prospects for Pakistan appear somewhat bleak. Yet the question persists as to how and when such fundamental reforms will be engineered and who will engineer them? Chapter Eight addresses a new policy reform strategy that are expected to bring about the changes proposed by the government through Pakistan's National IT Policy, which was published in August 2000. The main principles of this policy will be addressed later in this chapter.

It is worth mentioning here that throughout the period of the study, a number of respondents during the investigation have continually offered to share their views,

opinions and perceptions on development of electronic technology and human development in Pakistan. This information and their participation have been invaluable to the overall conclusion of the study. Their commentary has shown that although Pakistan has the ability for human development and political commitment, the corruption that nevertheless exists in Pakistan in all of its social, political and economic structures serves to hold Pakistan in abeyance. Nearly all of the respondents without exception agreed that the current level of electronic communication technology used in Pakistan has influenced Pakistan's identity to move away from its traditions and its culture, causing a new identity crisis. Chapter Four looks at this argument in finer detail comparing the darker side of technology as the influencing nature of social and cultural degradation of the nations identity to that of the positive usage of communication technology as a useful tool for development and growth. Nevertheless, the crisis has further contributed to the fear in government circles that a limited level of technology and change is better than a *fast track* approach which would cause a total disintegration of the national identity. Thereby causing a crisis of secularisation verses Islam which Bhutto and Jinnah had revered during their tenure of government and this has been discussed at some length in Chapter Seven.

The usage of technology had a number of advantages to which the respondents felt was a positive move in the right direction for development. Dr Anis debates such a development as an asset for the propagation of Islamic values which would offer a unique opportunity for Islam to place itself on a global network for communications. Although his perception was slanted in a manner which favoured the growth of global Islam, little more could be gained from how he thought technology should be used for the betterment of Pakistan's national economy. In opposition this position, he argued that technology although a positive contribution was also a weapon for economic slavery by western nations, creating as he commented, chains from addiction to dependency. Other respondents such as Dr Gilani and Amjad Islam Amjad shared similar concerns on the manner in which technology may generate a dependency culture on the nation. Although much of this was seen as a negative, the overall belief was that technology can and will be a positive contribution in all the social, economic and commercial aspects for Pakistan.

The cultural identity debate in Chapter Six offers an informed outlook at Pakistan's cultural habits, the social system and traditions. In this context, the argument sets out the challenge that faces Pakistan if it were to become an information society and raises questions on how Pakistan will cope as a nation steeped in traditions with aspirations towards modernity. Many of the respondents had reacted to this view with trepidation and some anxious thought. But most felt that cultural changes and modernisation would follow as a consequence of informed technology innovation. Syed Talat Hussain was by most standards, a far more open and optimistic respondent. His analysis was based, not so much on what technology would offer Pakistan, this much was already debated. His main concern was how would technology affect the nature of human behaviour, cultural identity and socio-economic relationships between the poor and the rich in Pakistan. He drew examples from a variety of sources; music, cinema, arts and culture. All of these he argued were heavily influenced by the dominant Indian culture and Pakistan to a large degree mimicked this trend. His argument was not so much in opposition but mostly referring to the dangers that lurked if Pakistan adopted technologicalisation without addressing how it intended to move culture from Indian domination towards Pakistani nationalism. Actually, in essence, Anis, Gilani, Amjad and Hussain all entered the debate from four very distinguished backgrounds covering faith, government policy, journalism and culture. Yet each one supported his own theme on how they felt technology would be a fabulous asset in the hands of a Muslim nation providing, the nation was ready and equipped to adopt such usage positively, efficiently and effectively.

These respondents felt, almost without exception that technology development would change how society would behave and how such behaviour would interact with the traditional norms of the nation. Globalisation is a breath away if Pakistan's infrastructure embraces this development. The question that remains undecided is how far would globalisation go to feed the appetite for 'climatic' changes in technology. If the United States is an example, or indeed many of the Western nations, then the length of the journey for globalisation is far greater than Pakistan would be able to travel for many reasons. Chapter Seven look at the legacy that has been left behind by three prominent leaders each of whom attempted to globalise their own version of Pakistani

(Muslim) culture. The results being that each one failed dismally and history has borne witness to the problems that such failures have caused for decades. The respondents, although remain optimistic and resolute on the positive nature of technology. Nevertheless, they have not yet addressed the fundamental question on the implications that such a move may have on Pakistan in the event it fails.

The debates which surround globalisation, culture and identity within the context of Pakistan and the Muslim world offers to show the challenging nature of global technological imperialism. This concept has been debated widely in Chapter Five and concludes that whilst Pakistan remains an under developed nation and its institutions require major investments in democracy, equality and openness; investment in technology will continue to remain as an insignificant matter, that will unlikely reach reality. Furthermore, Pakistan has yet to overcome the conflict between modernisation and its own cultural identity. The study has shown that although this conflicting issue has remained as the root cause for the slowing down in investments in the technology infrastructure by consecutive governments, the government will have to eventually decide where Pakistan wishes to stand on this matter. If Pakistan is to seriously move towards modernisation and 'technologicalisation', then the cultural identity will need to be modernised to suit the introduction of a new way of life. The urban centres are more likely to absorb the change in the cultural life styles that modernisation is likely to influence, however, the rural parts of Pakistan will offer stronger opposition to, and will most likely, resist the influences that cultural changes bring to society. This will no doubt also offer greater social challenges to Pakistan's historical identity to traditionalism and Islam.

Globalisation captures the mindset through a far reaching image of the Islamic identity, not through any passage of time or evolutionary movement from traditionalism to modernity but through a wide ranging conceptual theme of the global 'local' identities becoming distorted to match the growing trend for consumerism. Ahmed (1994) and Said (1995) are particularly interesting in this debate as both have consistent theories in this field that capture the mood of the Muslim nation and its identity.

The movement towards modernisation has a number of distinguishing features to which Weber (1958) and Saeed (1994) both concur. The prospects for this movement they argue stems from the characteristic of the individual to first become a 'modern man' before he is able to transform his society in to a modern environment. This concept is further acknowledged by Weber when, he argues this can only take place once tribal rituals have been dispensed with and an upward movement towards modernisation can take place. Bergman's (1997) commentary on this theme offers a further insight on the expanse of cultural and intellectual and moral growth towards modernisation when he suggests that by embracing development, that modernisation will take shape within the developing nations. Chapter Five debates this theme in some details and challenges the concept in its surreal consciousness. Moreover, Mike Featherstone's work, *Undoing Culture*, (1995) on post-modernism accepts that selective cultural changes need to take place for the growth of a nation, however through such changes the idea of culture has become decentred in this process. Therefore, it is not so much that culture needs to change, as Featherstone argues, but it is the process of evolution that shapes such changes that requires to be challenged. Thereby ensuring that culture will remain centred through its natural process of upward development.

As the debate widens in to the international arena various forms of globalisation takes shape to promote differing concepts. Muslim societies, although are heavily dependent on American hegemony, also they equally challenge the nature of Americanisation through the imposition of the cultural product. Giddens work on the *Post Traditional Society* (1997) highlights the debate towards recognising how globalisation offers local incentives within a national and international perspective through local job creation markets, development of the local economy and the inclusive nature of the global village. This he suggests has opened up a serious debate on how such cultures that have become heavily influenced through globalisation have become decentralised through the interdependency nature of culture and identity.

Further to say, the conflicting nature of globalisation is closely observed by the young in societies such as Pakistan and this is where Syed Talat Hussain argues the point of Pakistani youth mimicking the modern 'hip hop' culture of the West. The boundaries

have become fused between what is Pakistani and what is not. What was once seen as an alien cultural practice such as Levi Jeans and Coco Cola are now normal everyday acts of 'local' identities moving towards modernisation. Secularisation and Islam have become two conflicting institutions of the traditionalist and modernisers. Both, almost becoming religions in their own right for which communities and societies are willing to lay their life down in its defence. Yet some 55 years ago, Pakistan would not have imagined that such changes would have taken any more than a passing reference in a casual debate whilst drinking tea.

Through the process of globalisation, the study illustrates the implicit link between tradition, culture, identity and modernity in the context of technology in Pakistan. This link offers to show the delicate balance between the political policy reforms in technology development, cultural challenges that technology offers and the sociological fears generated through the 'porthole' of the Islamic mindset in the country. "The Internet is an instrument of globalisation", wrote Robert C Hudson (2002), when he attempted to define the parameters of how electronic technology has become an implicit component of our freedom of expression. He went on to say:

English is the main medium for communication and expression. By accessing the Internet any individual, identity group or counterculture may be empowered, not only because the Internet affords such individuals and groups with the opportunity of voicing their own ideas and aspirations, but also because individuals and groups have, with notable exceptions generally been able to escape from the censure of the state enforcement agencies, something which has not normally been afforded to them by conventional media such as radio, newspapers or television.²

Robert C Hudson (2002)

In such circumstances, one can not but agree with Hudson, when he argues that the Internet offers a wide range of accessible opportunities for educational and pleasurable pursuits without any serious degree of censure. Nevertheless, this new kind of freedom has done little to convince the government bureaucrats that with freedom of expression comes equality, justice and 'democracy'. The debates that have been pursued throughout the thesis aim towards one major identification of a problem which remains to be, fear generated through the unknown consequences of what technology may bring to Pakistan. During my field research, one of the prevalent issues which rose time after

time was; how would Pakistan deal with the onset of the darker side of technology? Many of the respondents were careful in the manner by which they referred to cultural colonisation, Internet democracy and freedom of expression. However, less-well-known academics cautioned against becoming too heavily dependent on electronic forms of technology. The research has cautiously and vigilantly unpacked the theoretical debates to offer some insight into what technology can offer as much as what can be the less attractive opportunities of technologies in Pakistan and in particular how the information highway has become a studious conscript to the already increasing levels of technology censorship and social dependency for access to globalisation by the growing number of intellectual elites in Pakistan.

Alongside this, the changes that have impacted on Pakistan's cultural identity have also captured an insightful look at the humanistic problems faced by the nation. The clash of identities in Pakistan have created and caused communal and sectarian violence almost equal to that of pre-partition times. Except, here, we have Muslim killing Muslim. Nevertheless, this clash has further raised questions about cultural identity and regional cultures. This is further exacerbated by the conflict that faces Pakistan's cultural identity through the introduction of electronic communications which is discussed in Chapter Eight. The theme which is debated by Chris Baker (2000) suggests that identity is fundamentally cultural in that the local identity becomes part of a social strata for human behaviour. There are many variations to this debate and the commonly accepted themes tend to become more popularly known as the norms of society. This formulation of human behaviour, social conditioning and a sense of desire for 'modernisation' in the localised sense become the wider identity for the group or society.

In the above context, Robert Bellah (1999) remarks that such patterns of change encourage the relationship between modernity and traditionalism to act as a harmonious variable where old customs guide societies in their quest for modernisation. This debate enshrines the idea that all cultures are evolving, growing and changing towards meeting new demands on society. Much like rural societies embracing agricultural technology such as the tractor to harvest their fields. Therefore, modernisation is not so much a threat but may be considered as an act towards societal enlightenment for the

promotion, development and evolutionary change of 'local' identities. It is also important to remember that the nature of change that is discussed is not so much an enlightenment towards modernisation, the issue remains, that it is the pace by which this change takes place and ensuring the 'local' cultures and communities can maintain their pace with change.

The Information revolution outlines the perceived attributes of an information society through what some would argue are the mythical arrangements of what society see as 'need' as opposed to 'desire'. In either case both concepts require some degree of commitment towards promoting the ideological reasoning for an information society. In the spirit of such an argument, Hamelink aspires towards making the reader believe that technology is nothing more than an illusion created for the consumption of the masses. It is not a practical application of a tool, as he suggests. But rather the invention of an idea for the need for such a tool to meet societies objectives. Comparative examples are drawn from the work of Daniel Bell (1973) and Manuel Castells (1996) where each have gone some way towards debating the need for development in the arena of information societies. Claiming, as far as possible, that development, progress and modernisation is a product of an information society.

The theme which is projected within the thesis offers an illuminating experience on how information is seen as knowledge and consequently as power. This is more so portrayed in Chapter Four and Chapter Eight which captures the essence of how such themes are fused together to determine the significance of information led technologies as a mode for development. The idea here, suggests that as the developing countries struggle to meet their ever increasing international debt, tackle high levels of poverty and increase their potential for human development, information technologies will offer a porthole for opportunities which would enhance the potential for growth, assist in the modernisation process and create an informed global community within the nation.

The outlook on such a potential for society is greatly encouraging, providing that information technology can be placed within an appropriate context for growth. The vision is not so much that growth will occur. This much, some societies take for

granted. The question in mind should be, at what cost to traditional cultures does such changes take place. Equally important to this notion is the statement made in Chapter Eight where it stated that the National IT Policy developed by Pakistan must be considered with due caution and careful trepidation, so that it is technology that benefits Pakistan rather Pakistan helping to benefit technology.

Finally, the thesis cannot be completed without offering a critical analysis of the government National IT Policy and Action Plan 2000, which remains as the cornerstone for the future of Pakistan's electronic communications technology development. The National IT Policy outcomes set the scene on how Pakistan intends to develop its information infrastructure. The Policy is the vehicle through which, if change is to take place, development and growth will happen. Although other aspects of this study have an influencing factor on the overall outcome of the original aim of this study, the main focus in my view should be the government's intention to promote its commitment to the success of the National IT Policy 2000.

Pakistan's National IT Policy, although a welcome gesture for the nation and offers to put some direction toward the future communications strategy for the country. It also offers a unique opportunity to develop a private/public sector partnership in promoting a strategic development policy for growth in the technology sector for the country. There have been some legitimate concerns expressed on the fringes of some public debates on both the government's sincerity and its commitment for growth in this sector. But overall most political analysts and observers have been waiting to see the real benefits of the government initiative in this area. One of the main objectives of the Policy was to develop an infrastructure from which it can build its national investment programme in public/private sector partnership.

The proposals have had some initial success but it remains to be seen how this would impact upon the national IT programme as a whole. The main areas of government policy initiatives that were allegedly launched by the Ministry of Science Technology in October 2002 were the, Infrastructure Enhancement Programme, the PakSat Project and Human Resource Development Project. In addition to this, there has been some

evidence offered by Javid Iqbal a Ministry official on the five key strategic development features which were identified as its social policy requirements. These features are argued by the policy forums to be the cornerstone for the Policy's success and which have been identified within its national policy document:

- IT Development in Higher Education
- Economic and Commercial Growth
- Private Investment
- Privacy and Confidentiality of Information
- Intellectual Property Rights

The 'action points' have made no reference to the urgent need for investment at the point of 'first base' primary education and how the less wealthy sections of the nation are likely to achieve the levels of progress in human development. Although the government has set out a quality framework for targeted achievements, this by no means reflects anything other than maintaining the 'unbalanced' *status quo*. It appears that the imbalance between the *have the have nots* continues without any vision for change in the immediate future. However, on further investigation at the Ministry of Science and Technology, I was advised that no new legislative policies have been agreed for the implementation of the key strategic points and thereby, only limited levels of change have taken place in the respective IT sectors.

The government has recently launched its strategy on *E-government* which aims to facilitate the 'citizen' to access government systems and administrative departments. Form filling and public information, it is claimed, will become much easier. The idea of launching a public information service via the Internet is a well intentioned proposal and by all accounts would be a welcome opportunity to access the bureaucratic network of agencies that are normally prohibited by the corrupt officials. However, one should consider that over 80% of the population are living in conditions that have hardly any access to basic amenities such as running water, inconsistent electric power supply, inadequate telecommunications or indeed any basic elementary education. To have access to an Internet in a village that accommodates large sections of such communities, with no investment in the country's infrastructure, is a bad taste attempt at humorous act of incompetence. The fact that electronic technology of such kinds requires some degree

of competent English language skills seems to have been ignored as a slightly problematic issue by the bureaucrats. The government has clearly failed in a number of strategic sectors, which it had highlighted as its priority areas. Of these areas, women, the rural communities and locations have not only been excluded at the point of consultation on the policy but have now been further isolated by ensuring no active engagement with them in identifying their development needs in the policy outcomes. In fact E-government has sternly indicated that ruralism is not a factor taken into account.


Atta-ur-Rehman and Choudhary (1998: 288) wrote an interesting passage when they said: "technology in Pakistan suffers from being given the lowest priority in its development plans. There is no national commitment to acquiring and enhancing knowledge and no realisation that science and technology can be fruitfully applied to solving national problems in Pakistan". They go on to suggest, that most of the problems which occur in Pakistan, when applying technology initiatives, are based upon inappropriately qualified and unqualified professionals, politicians and academics, who were promoted to their higher positions on the basis of seniority and/or nepotism rather than any continuing significant scientific contribution or understanding in the field. Therefore the implementation of policy initiatives are not so much ill thought but lack realism in its application.

To look into the future, Pakistan has to entrust much of its current development programme into building its human resource infrastructure, investment in training and enterprise and education to bridge the gap between the rural illiterate and the educated urbanites. Further research is required in these areas and one possible opportunity that this thesis offers is to explore the global conditioning on technology development and the results of that on Pakistan. The thesis has failed to prove one point, which is that technology will enhance human development. The thesis has in fact proven the opposite conclusion, which is that human development is the only route towards technologicalisation for the nation. Here at the concluding stage of this section, I would like to present the main points of the above discussion in the following diagram.

Review and Reflection

Chart 8

Electronic Technology and Information Superhighway



The Development of Electronic Technology in Pakistan – A Vision for the Future

It needs to be emphasised here that in Pakistan, fundamental reforms are required to remove the current hurdles in the development of electronic technology without which in the new millennium the country cannot run on the information superhighway. If the required reforms are not made, it is unclear how the dream of development in the electronic field will be materialised. As it is reflected from the above discussion, the issue of the development of electronic technology is linked with several other factors, e.g., education and overall human development in the country, modernity and globalisation, cultural identity of the country, its legacy, government policies, particularly human development and information technologies' policies, the position of the country in the global political economy, social and religio-cultural aspects, and national priorities.

Therefore, in the above context, the development of infrastructural facilities and a broad-based strategy for human development are even more important for Pakistan because unlike developed countries where national politics and economies are matured and stable, Pakistan is situated in a volatile and sensitive region. Here, regional and international politics and the security situation deeply influence domestic affairs.³ Therefore, in this type of environment, it is not worth presenting a specific econometric model or a mathematical formula which produces a definite answer. At this stage, the only rational approach is to bring required reforms and adopt measures to start the process of evolutionary change for human development leading to the development of electronic technology in the country. Thus, in this perspective, on the basis of the analysis made in the previous chapters; a package of important recommendations is presented in the following pages.

The thesis concludes by suggesting that the potential for modernisation in Pakistan offered by new technologies is real and important, but that the potential is being missed, and that the net effect of new technologies is profoundly negative despite there being some positive elements in Pakistan's experience of new technologies. The reasons for this lie more in the embeddedness of corruption and the nature of patterns of political

and cultural power than in 'cultural identity' as such, but the study of the impact of technologies throws light on the ambivalence of cultural identities.

Role of Major Global Players

In an age of globalisation and especially when the world is jointly reacting against the threats of violence and terrorism; international politics is a crucial factor in the making and shaping of global maps and models. In this process, the major global players have the power and potential to make or break a nation. Ethically, due to their dominating position in global governance, they also have a responsibility to resolve long-standing disputes in the world. I believe that these countries (which are also major donors to developing countries) bear the moral responsibility for using their influence to resolve conflicts in South Asia. Sadly, Pakistan is encircled by troubled regions and Kashmir is a major cause of the problem. As both countries, i.e., India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve this dispute by themselves; it is the moral responsibility of the international community to help in this regard so that national and regional resources could be utilised for human development and establishment of a strong base for the promotion of electronic technology.

Promotion of Human Development in the Country

The current state of the country also reflects that there is an urgent need to develop a comprehensive strategy to improve the human development situation. The most important and the immediate task for the present government should be to start working on the formulation of a broad based Human Development Policy. This Policy should provide a long-term base and vision for human development in the country and cover at least the period of ten-year as an umbrella policy for various development plans. The formation of the proposed Policy is a huge task and this exercise should be done by the public representatives rather than bureaucrats or military elites. It is a common practice in Pakistan that both houses of parliament (i.e., National Assembly and the Senate) spend several months on the discussion of such matters of prime national importance. Therefore, it is suggested that this whole process should be finalised within the due

course of time so that its implementation may not be delayed. Needless to say that there is no shortcut approach to human development in Pakistan. The preparation of the above stated policy is a long-term measure and a hard task for the present elected representatives.


It is beyond the reach of this piece of research to present a detailed framework of the Human Development Policy, therefore, in the following paragraphs, suggestions are limited to the extent of highlighting the important issues which need to be addressed in this regard. I strongly believe that this Policy should be a broad-based and long-term approach with its particular emphasis on the establishment and promotion of a basic infrastructure in the country, particularly in remote rural areas. This approach is important in the context that in the past a number of segregated efforts did not produce the desired results. Thus, in future all major activities for human development should be started from the platform of this Policy and they must be interlinked and compatible with each other. The main focus of all activities should be the elimination of human poverty particularly by initiating and strengthening activities in the fields of basic education and health care, population welfare, water supply and sanitation, and encouragement of the private sector. This process would require institutional reforms and an efficient framework for adequate implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the Human Development Policy. It would also require close coordination between various government organisations, i.e., the ministries of science and technology, industries, finance, education, health, religious affairs and, labour and manpower.

Revision of the National I.T. Policy

The discussion in Chapter Eight also highlights the fact the National IT Policy is not compatible with the current needs of the country due to a number of reasons. Chart 9 draws attention to the broad outline to these weakness and offers a moment for reflection on the overall situation in Pakistan. The analysis ensues a series of observations which the National IT Policy fails to address and are crucial for the success of the policy in its current format.

Infrastructural Weakness of the National IT Policy

Chart 9



The Incompatibility of the proposed Human Development Policy and IT Policy shows that the Human Development conditions that exist in Pakistan in the current climate can not be considered to adequately meet the demands of the National IT Policy. Notwithstanding that the policy has a number of failings in its overall structure. The social-environmental considerations are relevantly weak in the country for the two policies to be able to work in harmony for the development of an effective IT system within the parameters of the country's limitations. Therefore, the IT Policy should be based on the ground realities of the country. In this context the analysis of the policy had shown that the policy as it currently stands has a number major weaknesses. Without prioritising which are the worst, some are equally as bad as others. One notable weakness I would consider is probably the worst of all its weaknesses is that it is removed from where Human Development considerations currently remain in the country. There are no avenues for investment in this area that will offer adequate levels of resources and its engagement with local communities, in urban and rural areas are ill considered.

The emphasis of the National IT Policy should be on the promotion of basic education particularly in rural areas. The education infrastructure in Pakistan from its primary level through to adult education offers no opportunities for development of its student communities. Investments are poor, the system is corrupt and the foundations for growth are riddled with inappropriately qualified bureaucrats, under-resourced departments and misguided policies that aim for unachievable standards based upon current investment levels.

With regard to E-commerce, at first the government should also focus on the provision of basic infrastructural facilities, particularly rural electrification, rural roads, telecommunications and basic health facilities. Although it is recognised that the E-commerce initiative is a progressive policy for the government however, one should also consider that large sections of the population are living in conditions that have hardly any access to basic amenities such as running water, inconsistent electric power supply, inadequate telecommunications or indeed any basic elementary education. Therefore, E-commerce of this kind without a proper strategic investment policy for the country's infrastructure, can only be considered as an irresponsible act of a serious magnitude. Electronic technology of this kind requires some degree of competent English language skills seems to have been lost on the bureaucrats. The policy is aimed mostly at urban areas without due consideration given to rural areas, young people, district, regional and federal education institutions and women who they have failed consistently to consult on the implications of this policy.

Institutional Reforms

It needs to be emphasised here the proposed Human Development Policy and IT policy should be compatible and mutually supportive, otherwise, any institutional reform or programme will not be successful in an environment where two national policies are contradicting or incompatible with each other. Institutional reforms are required for a wholesale change in the pattern of delivery which will result in: i) real decentralisation of authority and responsibility, ii) rational planning and an equitable distribution of resources, iii) adequate management and monitoring for quality control, iv)

accountability to the user community, and, v) strengthening public and private institutions. Due to the government's inability to generate sufficient resources to provide the required basic services to the masses, there is the need to identify and develop alternatives. In health, population welfare, water supply and sanitation sectors, community health committees should be formed and be given the task to carry out their own developmental plans and programmes. Therefore, the institutional reforms required are substantial. An efficient local governments system must be created with exclusive jurisdiction over specified local functions, such as education, health, water, roads and housing, and must have direct accountability to their electorates. These local governments need to be empowered to undertake overall planning of the package of services, to raise resources and to make expeditious decisions on their implementation. To make this system successful, political will and strong leadership must strictly enforce honesty, discipline and accountability.

In the contemporary state of affairs of Pakistan, the real challenge, therefore, is to enhance the performance of public institutions by improving their accountability, increasing their efficiency and making them more open to public participation. It is recommended that in all provinces, policy cells should be created at district levels to review and assess policies. These cells should comprise of officials from the concerned department and public representatives. There is another important point that while consuming a considerable part of national resources, state institutions in Pakistan only serve the purpose of the upper classes, thus creating mass-dissatisfaction and wide social gaps in the country. The resources must be evenly distributed and under-privileged areas and communities should be given priority.

Participation of the Private Sector

There is another important factor to taken into account that as government facilities have not been able to keep pace with the growing demand for educational services, especially at the lower level, the private sector and NGOs have begun to play a critical role. The researcher hopes that the private sector will continue to grow in future. Recognising this fact, the government should encourage the growth of the private sector, and also develop checks and balances to ensure an adequate and acceptable

quality of facilities and input. To ensure better quality from existing resources, local community groups where schools exist, need to be involved to supervise educational facilities. Participation and control of the lower tiers of government must become part of the educational strategy. Parent teacher associations particularly, need to be set-up and strengthened through training and involvement in local decision-making.

Good Governance

It is beyond doubt that the success of any plan or programme depends on the way it is implemented and administered. There is general consensus in the country that good governance should incorporate democratisation, decentralisation and community participation. Although the present military dominated government is already working on these lines, the current internal and external instability is a major threat to such efforts. There is a need to establish a viable system which should not be affected by the change of government at Federal level. There is a need to change the legislative framework within which institutions, agencies and agents can operate, with much greater emphasis on devolution, discretion and accountability. The private sector is also set to be a decisive participant in the economic arena – institutions will need to be developed and strengthened to facilitate, regulate and oversee that role. Persuasion, rather than dictate, and joint cooperation rather than hostile opposition, should be the key to fostering the public-private partnership. Good governance in the administration of fiscal and monetary policy is essential to provide the guidelines and framework in relation to other sectors of the economy. A more transparent and accountable administrative structure is the key to success. For this purpose, promoting an internal accountability mechanism within the line department, strengthening the judiciary and making the authorities accountable to the public are measures which need to be adopted.

Needless to say that no single approach is likely to be effective in combating corruption. A wide range of integrated strategies need to be evolved and measures are required in administrative structure. Emphasis should be laid on strengthening the institutions, watchdog agencies, the media and the judiciary. It is my belief that at an inauguration ceremony of parliamentarians and other public representatives, a clear and separate commitment be made by them to combat corruption regardless of who practices it. This


commitment should be disseminated by the media. Comprehensive anti-corruption legislation must be adopted and implemented by a strong, independent agency of manifest integrity. This agency should be supported by the judiciary and state administration. Furthermore, the areas where government activity is most prone to corruption must be identified, and relevant procedures be reviewed. It is noteworthy that many people in society have a profound interest in a transparent national system. These include honest people in politics, businessmen, academia, religious circles as well as a majority of the common citizens. There is the need to mobilise and coordinate the activities of such people. Special anti-corruption committees can be formed consisting of those people so that their efforts can bring positive change in society.

Maintenance of Quality Statistics

Chapter Three particularly highlights the poor quality of national statistics. Needless to say, fragmented, incomplete unreliable statistics will provide a weak base for national planning and development. Therefore, a strong and integrated network of database is vital for any developmental programme. Although at central level, the Federal Bureau of Statistics gathers statistics, but the spectrum of this institution is extremely limited and inefficient. It may be suggested here that the establishment of district database centres with their strong coordination with the Federal Bureau of Statistics can be a useful instrument. The collection, collation and analysis of data should be integrated across the sectors and become an effective management tool for district level development planning. This information should be open to the public. It is equally important that regular surveys should be conducted for obtaining reliable data on various basic indicators, so that planning is based on sound information.

A Vision for the Future in Technology

Chart 10



End Notes

¹ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2001*, 2001, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 141-44.

² In the UK and the USA, the most notable exceptions to this freedom from censure have been those individuals and groups who have been using the Internet to download child pornography; and they have been particularly targeted by the police over recent years.

³ Due to various prolonged internal and external problems and the volatile situation, the country has been in a state of instability for a long period.

Tel: (01527) 582 970

14th May 2004.

Dear

Attached is information regarding Funding for voluntary youth projects and groups. If you are aware of any existing local youth groups or a youth group who wish to set themselves up and could do with financial support, please pass this information to them ASAP.

If support is needed in filling in the application, please contact me on the above number.

With regards

Mumtaz H Shah

Black and Minority Ethnic Youth Worker

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APPENDIX 1

Human Advance

Pakistan

Human Distress

EDUCATION	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The adult literacy rate increased from 21% to 36% between 1970 and 1993 The combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment almost doubled between 1980 and 1993 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Over two thirds of Pakistan's adult population is illiterate 17 million children were out of primary school in 1995
HEALTH	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Life expectancy increased by 19 years, from 43 in 1960 to 62 in 1993 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 60 million people do not have access to health facilities; 67 million people are without safe drinking water; and 89 million people are deprived of basic sanitation facilities
FOOD & NUTRITION	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The per capita food production increased by 18% in the last decade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are 740,000 child deaths in a year, half of them linked to malnutrition
DEMOGRAPHIC BALANCE	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pakistan is experiencing one of the fastest rates of urbanisation in the developing world which may result in the urban population exceeding the rural population by the turn of the century 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The population growth rate of around 3% per annum is the highest in South Asia. According to long term UN projections, Pakistan will emerge as the third most populous country in the world by the year 2050
CHILDREN	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The infant mortality rate has been reduced by almost one half in the last decade 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> One half of the primary school children drop out before reaching grade 5
WOMEN	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adult female literacy has more than doubled during the last two decades As a percentage of males, female primary school enrolment increased from 37% to 61% and the secondary enrolment from 26% to 44% in the last two decades 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite enjoying the privilege of an elected female Prime Minister, the share of females in Parliament was 1.6% in 1994—the lowest in South Asia Against—100 males, only 16 females are economically active—the lowest ratio in the SAARC region In the age group one to four years, the female mortality rate is 12% higher than the male
POVERTY & INCOME	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the last two decades, GNP per capita registered an increase of 231% - the highest in South Asia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 36 million people live in absolute poverty. More than half of the cultivated land is in holdings of 50 acres and above, in the hands of big landlords
MILITARY BURDEN	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There has been a significant reduction of the gap between military and social spending during the last three decades, from nearly four times to one and one-quarter times 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There are nine soldiers for every one doctor and three soldiers for every two teachers


Sources: Human Development in South Asia Mahbub ul Haq 1997: pp. 39.

APPENDIX 2

Human Deprivation Profile

	Indian	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bhutan	Maldives	South Asia Weighted Average	Developing Countries
Population in absolute Poverty (%) 1993									
• Number (millions)	416	36	60	8.4	6	n/a	n/a	57T	1,314T
• As % of total Population	46	28	52	40	31	n/a	n/a	44	31
Population without access to Health Services 1993									
• Number (millions)	135	60	63	n/a	1.3	0.6	0.1	260T	790T
• As % of total Population	15	45	55	n/a	7	3.5	25	22	20

Source: Human Development in South Asia Mahbub ul Haq 1997, pp.142



APPENDIX 4

Salient Features of the National Education Policy 1998-2010

- Attaining an acceptable level of literacy by universalising basic education
- Making arrangements for providing quality of education and reducing the gender disparities at all levels
- Encouraging private investment in education
- Making education purposeful and on oriented
- Upgrading the quality of higher education by encouraging internationally recognised research in universities
- Reforming the examination system
- Evolving an efficient decentralised management structure
- Eradication of literacy through formal and informal means for expansion of basic education. The concepts, procedures and targets as envisaged in the Social Action Programme (SAP II) shall be adhered to. The role of the Prime Minister's Literacy Commission will be enhanced for taking educational opportunity to the doorstep of deprived and under privileged segments of society
- Full utilisation of existing capacity at the basic level has been ensured by providing for introduction of double shift in existing school of basic education
- To put 90% of the children in the age group (5-9) in schools by the year 2002-03
- Raising gross enrolment to 105% by the year 2010 and promulgation and enforcement of Compulsory Primary Education
- Diversification of education at secondary level. Three distinct streams will now be available at secondary level. The graduate of basic education who want to join a profession will be able to attend vocational school. A separate stream of Matric (technical) will be added in to general education for those who plan to pursue higher education. The opportunities of joining technical education for graduates of secondary schools will be increased by providing better equipped and easily accessible polytechnics all over the country. To cope with the increasing demands, a special programme for training of technical and vocational teachers shall be undertaken by the National Teacher's Training College in Islamabad.
- To increase the participation rate at higher education and establishing practical linkages between universities and the industries for economic and technological development
- Introduction of computer education as a subject at secondary levels. Proper laboratories and trained teachers will be provided for this purpose
- Upgrading the quality of education in Deeni Madaris. Nazira Quran has been introduced as a compulsory component from grade I-VIII while secondary level translation of the selected verses from the Quran will be offered
- The existing capacity of teacher training institutions shall be fully utilised and surplus demand shall be met by using teaching outposts to be established un the Teacher Education Project and strengthening the capacity of Allama Iqbal Open University
- For raising the quality of teacher education programmes, the policy stipulates to raise minimum educational qualifications for primary teachers from matric to intermediate. Two parallel programmes of F.A/FSc. Education and BA/BSc. Education will be launched. The contents and methodology parts of the teacher education curricula will be revised. The frequency and depth of in-service training courses will be by institutionalising in-service programmes through school clustering and other techniques.
- The education Foundation shall further be strengthened and the unplanned growth of the private sector shall be regulated so that it is bought in line with the overall national objectives
- A competitive system of multiple text books is being introduced at secondary level. The availability of multi-textbooks instead of sole-textbooks is expected to broaden the knowledge base of students and minimise the chances of rote learning
- The total expenditure of the government on education will be raised from its present level of 2.2% to 4% of the GNP
- To upgrade the quality of higher education by bringing teaching, learning and research process in line with international standards

APPENDIX 4 Cont...

- At the elementary level, a system of continuous evaluation will be adopted to ensure attainment of the minimum learning competencies for improving the quality of education. The National Education Testing Service will be established to design and administer standardised tests to professional institutions. Qualifying these tests will become a compulsory requirement for entry to professional education. This mechanism is expected to check incidence of malpractice in examinations. Likewise, standardised tests shall be introduced for admission to general education in universities. The curricula at all levels of education will be reviewed for creating a relationship between education and the environment. The library service will be strengthened to provide increased opportunities of self learning
- A comprehensive monitoring and evaluation system has been envisaged from the grass-roots to the highest level. The District Education Authority will be established in each district to ensure public participation in monitoring and implementation. The Education Ministers at the Federal and Provincial levels will oversee monitoring committees, responsible for implementation at their levels. The Prime Minister and the Provincial Chief Ministers will be the Chiefs of national and Provincial Education Councils respectively which will ensure achievement of targets
- To make the Quranic principles and Islamic practices as an integral part of the curricula so that the message of the Holy Quran could be disseminated in the process of education as well as training. To educate and train the future generation of Pakistan as a true practicing Muslim who would be able to usher into the 21st Century and the next Millennium with courage, confidence, wisdom and tolerance
- To ensure that all the boys and girls, desirous of entering secondary education, get the basic right because of the availability of the schools
- To lay emphasis on the diversification so as to transform the system from supply oriented to demand oriented
- To make curriculum development a continuous process and to make arrangements for developing a uniform system of education
- To prepare the students for the world of work, as well as the pursuit of professional and specialised education
- To increase the effectiveness of the system by institutionalising in-service training of training, teacher trainers and educational administrators. To upgrade the quality of pre-service teacher training programmes by introducing parallel programmes of longer duration at post secondary and post degree levels
- To develop a viable framework for policy, planning and development of teacher education programmes, both in service and pre-service
- To develop opportunities for technical and vocational education in the country for producing trained manpower, commensurate with the needs of the industry and the economic development goals
- To improve the quality of technical education so as to enhance the chances of employment of technical and vocational (TVE) graduates by removing from a static, supply-based system to demand driven system
- To popularise information technology among children of all ages and prepare them for the next century. To emphasise the different roles of computers as a learning tool in the classroom, learning about computers and learning to think and work with computers. And to employ information technology in planning and monitoring of education programmes
- To encourage private sector to take a percentage of poor students for free education
- To institutionalise the process of monitoring and evaluation at the lowest and highest levels. To identify indicators for different components of policy, in terms of quality and quantity and to adopt corrective measures during the process of implementation
- To achieve excellence in the different fields of higher education by introducing new disciplines/emerging sciences in the universities, and transform selected disciplines into centres of advanced studies, research and extension

Source: Economic Survey 1998-2010 (pp. 126-128)