MICHEL FOUCAULT: TOWARDS HETEROGENEITY

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to trace an articulation between the early and late work of Michel Foucault. His earliest work is concerned largely with the theme of transgression as an exploration of the limits of thought and language. He then looks at the close relationship between power and knowledge in the human sciences, and consequently investigates a serial, or "microphysical" conception of the workings of power in modern societies. Finally, his last work reformulates the notion of "pouvoir/savoir" in favour of the notion of "gouvernementalité" as a dominant form of thinking on the conduct of politics in Western societies. As yet no satisfactory consideration of the links between these stages has been offered.

Much of the thesis is based on lectures delivered at the Collège de France, which have yet to be fully exploited by researchers. Here, Foucault characterises the project described above as a continual series of shifts or "déplacements" away from the theory of a dominant ideology. Accepting this description, the thesis argues that the main continuity in Foucault's work — a continuity which both survives and is enriched by these shifts — is characterised by the idea of heterogeneity. That is not to say a theory of difference or otherness, but a sophisticated pluralism. This pluralism works towards a mode of thought which, as Habermas remarks, attempts to contain contradictions, without reducing these contradictions to a system.

Foucault's work on language, literature and the human sciences in the 'sixties is permeated by a set of spatial themes, which culminate in the notion of dispersion in fields of knowledge. These spatial themes have not yet been considered in their relationship to later works. The aim of this early formulation of heterogeneity is to undermine the concepts of progression in the field of the human sciences, and to prise knowledge away from causal paths which can be traced back to a sovereign subjective consciousness. Developing the Nietzschean thesis of genealogy, he shows that methods of thinking and acting may have lowly and contingent origins. Foucault then applies the notion of dispersion to areas such as the penal system, where the discursive and the non-discursive — in the form of buildings and institutions — intersect. Only Gilles Deleuze has suggested the importance of the serial approach to power in *Surveiller et punir*. Finally, Foucault applies the concept of heterogeneity to the neglected question of government in Western societies. Government is defined as the "conduct of conduct", and looks at the circulation of individual and State projects for government as a pastoral and biological concern for the provision of "health". These projects act "heterogeneously", which is not to say that they are either mutually exclusive, nor that they form a coherent system of, for example, a dominant ideology.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

AS	*L'Archéologie du savoir*
HF	*Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*
LMC	*Les Mots et les choses*
NC	*Naissance de la clinique*
OD	*L'Ordre du discours*
PER	*Maladie mentale et personnalité*
P/K	*Power/Knowledge*
RR	*Raymond Roussel*
SP	*Surveiller et punir*
SS	*Le Souci de soi*
UP	*L'Usage des plaisirs*
VS	*La Volonté de savoir*

INTRODUCTION

> I believe precisely that the forms of totalization offered by politics are always, in fact, very limited. I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any *totalization* — which would be at once *abstract* and *limiting* — to open up problems that are as *concrete* and *general* as possible [...][1]

This introductory chapter will deal initially with a brief overview of Foucault's intellectual development and some of the biographical influences on his career. This will be followed by a short consideration of some specific and important critical responses to this work. The greater part of the chapter will be taken up with an introduction to Foucault's methodological pluralism, and a consideration of the ways in which this might be compared to a wider liberal pluralism.

Recently, there has been an increased interest in the biographical details of Foucault's life. This has primarily been due to a well-received biography by the journalist Didier Eribon.[2] Eribon admits that there is obviously a paradox involved in writing the biography of somebody who was so openly sceptical concerning the function and the status of the author.[3] Eribon is also cautious in drawing conclusions concerning the content of Foucault's work from the author's life. However, at this stage, it is certainly worth providing the briefest of outlines of Foucault's career, primarily in terms of intellectual development and influences, but also in terms of institutional and even personal developments. Such an exercise, however brief, is necessary and relevant, particularly in the light of Foucault's own comments to Eribon in an interview from 1981: "Chaque fois que j'essaie de faire un travail théorique, ça a été à partir d'éléments de ma propre expérience: toujours en rapport avec des processus que je voyais se dérouler autour de moi."[4]

Foucault's earliest major influence was the work of Hegel, as presented by Jean Hyppolite. This is perhaps surprising, in view of the increasing distance that Foucault took from a dialectical method. However, as will be shown later in this introductory chapter, he continued to acknowledge the importance of Hegel as the first philosopher of modernity, by introducing history into philosophy. Beginning from Hyppolite's reading of Hegel, Foucault never ceases to emphasise the role of history, thus expanding the traditional discipline of philosophy into the area of "thought" (*OD*, p. 76). "Thought" remains the constant but continually developing problematic of Foucault's entire intellectual career. He asks what thought is; is it uniquely a product of

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1 Michel Foucault, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview," in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) p. 376.

2 Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, deuxième édition (Paris: Flammarion, 1991).

3 ibid., avant-propos, p. 11.

4 Michel Foucault, "Est-il donc important de penser?" *Libération* (30-31 mai, 1981) p. 21. An interview with Didier Eribon.

the individual human consciousness, or is it governed by impersonal rules? And what is the relationship between thought and material forces such as economic relations and, more importantly for Foucault, institutions and the buildings which house these institutions? Do institutions in some way contain thought? Foucault begins to articulate these preoccupations most explicitly in the 'sixties, around what is often viewed by critics such as Dreyfus and Rabinow as his "structuralist" phase. This period embraces *Les Mots et les choses*, which reveals the epistemological certainty of the anthropological foundations of the modern human sciences as an historical transformation and construct, *Naissance de la clinique*, which will be dealt with at some length presently, and *L'Archéologie du savoir*, which is at once a methodological consideration of the preceding works, and a proposal of a method for locating the central rules for the production of true and relevant statements within a given society. Foucault himself reviews his previous work critically at the beginning of *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Firstly, he refuses the term "structuralism" as an adequate description of this work (*AS*, p. 25). However, he does consider *Naissance de la clinique* to have been too heavily influenced by the structuralist vogue in its use of the category of the gaze ("regard") which retains humanistic traces of an anonymous historical subject which organises knowledge (*AS*, p. 27). Similarly, he acknowledges that *Histoire de la folie* depended to too great a degree on the enigmatic category of a general "experience" of madness which might be recovered. (*AS*, p. 27). The overall importance of *L'Archéologie du savoir* will be considered in more detail in the first chapter as an extremely important attempt to outline a methodology for a pluralistic analysis of thought as a set of "events". Even though his first major work, *Histoire de la folie* cannot be included in what has been described as this "structuralist" phase, it already demonstrates an important consideration of the thought and knowledge which are invested in institutions, and the way in which institutions produce thought, rather than simply being the passive recipients of knowledge.[5] This will be treated for the purposes of this thesis as the first third of Foucault's career. This period may also be considered as an "archaeological" phase, when the main emphasis is on defining a new methodology for epistemic concerns.

This is then followed by a "genealogical" period in which the linguistic model diminishes in importance, and questions of power and strategy are developed. In the 'seventies, then, Foucault addresses in a more comprehensive fashion the relationship

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5 Foucault emphasises this aspect of *Histoire de la folie* in a summary of his career prepared to support his candidacy for the Collège de France. This appears as an appendix in, Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* , 1991 (Annexe 3):

> Un objet s'est alors dessiné pour moi: le savoir investi dans les systèmes complexes d'institutions. Et une méthode s'imposait: au lieu de parcourir, comme on le faisait volontiers, la seule bibliothèque des livres scientifiques, il fallait visiter un ensemble d'archives comprenant des décrets, des règlements, des registres d'hôpitaux ou de prisons, des actes de jurisprudence. (p. 362).

between discourse and institutions. One reading, therefore, would consider that before the events of 1968, Foucault had largely been preoccupied with the production of knowledge. This had raised the problem of the role of institutions — the field of the "non-discursive" — in the production and application of this knowledge. In this second period the problem of the non-discursive encouraged Foucault to consider in more detailed material terms the position of the human body within these institutions, and within modern society as a whole. This work centres around the publication of *Surveiller et punir*. This, in turn, created an interest in the fine, or "capillary", networks of power within modern societies. Thus the guiding principle of "pouvoir/savoir" emerges. The question of thought then fragments, multiplies and diversifies. He asks how we locate the foundations of our own thought — a critique of Freudian psychoanalysis — but also how apparently critical thought might operate in perverse and contradictory ways via a strategic reversibility in power relations.

Then, in the third period of Foucault's work, the question of "pouvoir/savoir" is gradually replaced with the formulation of "gouvernementalité"; the thought that is produced from the tension and contact between individuals and the wider concern of the State to foster life. *La Volonté de savoir* provides the archaeology of the particularly paradoxical logic of the peculiar twentieth-century State racisms — particularly National Socialism — which are willing to destroy millions of lives to maintain the "health" of the population in general.

From 1976 to 1984 Foucault did not publish any major works, although he did continue to produce articles, essays, reviews and prefaces. He also collected and wrote the preface to a collection of "lettres de cachet" from the *Ancien Régime*.[6] Foucault's last two publications, *L'Usage des plaisirs* and *Le Souci de soi*, turn away from modernity to examine the culture of the self in antiquity. These works deal with the axis of the self, and the work that the self performs on itself. They maintain a continuity with the theme of thought as an independent force by looking at the ways in which the self in antiquity is a heterogeneous collection of techniques for producing a style of life. Throughout these years from 1976 to 1984 Foucault links his concentration on thought to an intensified consideration of truth and the production of truth. At root, this is obviously a Nietzschean theme, and had played a large part in the formulation of "pouvoir/savoir". However, this earlier formulation had depended on an unsatisfactory metaphor of battle and war (see Chapter Four). Truth still appeared to be largely utilitarian in its application. But in the final phase of his career, he considered truth in terms of points of excess. Why do regimes — of individual or collective truth — need to display "les oripeaux", the false-finery of a pure demonstration of truth? Although it is undoubtedly vaguely formulated, the answer which emerges is that truth is a

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6 Michel Foucault and Arlette Farge, eds., *Le Désordre des familles: Lettres de cachet des Archives de la Bastille* (Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, coll. "Archives", no. 91, 1982).

conductor between heterogeneous elements in a system; it is the product of unusual tensions and questions. These come to be known as "problematisations".[7] Heterogeneity and the materiality of thought and language are constant preoccupations in Foucault's work, from the question of a disturbing and subversive transgressive potential which is the outside of reason and the speaking subject,[8] to the question of heterogeneous elements — such as juridical and economic categories in the formation of a liberal theory of the individual — which contain a productive problematisation. The question of what he calls liberalism becomes extremely important in the last third of Foucault's career. It represents a "style" of thought, rather than a dogma or ideology, and a neglected strand of the production of truth in Western social and political life. This truth is produced by the heterogeneity of individual and State demands. It is one of the features of modernity that they form a space of communication and productive tension. In a version of the preface to *L'Usage des plaisirs*, only published in English, Foucault reviewed his career in terms of a history of thought.[9] Referring to his first book, *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, and thus setting it apart from the main body of his work, Foucault sees that he used an existential analysis to look at psychiatry and mental illness. However, such a schema was unsatisfactory, in that it forced him to combine an ahistorical theory of the human being with social history to provide an economic and social context.[10] In order to escape from such an unsatisfactory juxtaposition, he attempted to introduce a historicity into forms of experience themselves:

> On the positive side, the task was to bring to light the domain where the formation, development, and transformation of forms of experience can situate themselves: that is, a history of thought. By thought, I mean what establishes, in a variety of possible forms, the play of true and false, and which as a consequence constitutes the human being as a subject of learning (*connaissance*).[11]

He goes on to present three principles for thought as a distinct area for analysis.[12] Thought is "irreducible", in that a singular form of experience — madness, criminality, sexuality, illness — can only be experienced through thought. Secondly, thought has its own historicity. Thought therefore has a "singularity". This means that there are

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7 "[...] je m'y étais pris dans cette entreprise d'une histoire de la vérité: analyser non les comportements ni les idées, non les sociétés ni leurs 'idéologies', mais les *problématisations* à travers lesquelles l'être se donne comme pouvant et devant être pensé et les *pratiques* à partir desquelles elles se forment." (*UP*, Introduction, p. 17).

8 See Michel Foucault, "La Pensée du dehors," *Critique*, no. 229 (juin, 1966) pp. 523-546.

9 Michel Foucault, "Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume II," in Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader*, p. 333. This translation is a different version from that which appears in the final publication of *L'Usage des plaisirs*.

10 ibid., p. 334.

11 ibid., p. 334.

12 ibid., p. 335.

"events" in thought, rather than thought being subsumed under the subject. Finally, thought may act upon itself, in the form of critical activity. Critical activity is that which gives thought a history. The question of singularity is obviously important for a thesis which deals with heterogeneity. The major innovation of Foucault's work is to analyse singularities in a manner which is not empirical. That is to say, he attempts to analyse the articulations between particular singularities, for example between the prison and the emerging industrial society, without subordinating the specificity of one or other of the elements. However, the problem for his work created by this innovation is an overall tension, perhaps even contradiction, between the analysis of singularities and synthesising or explanatory theory. For this reason, much critical work has attacked the apparently totalising category of power that emerges in the middle period of Foucault's career.

It is now necessary briefly to look at some of the biographical influences that shaped Foucault's life as a thinker. Surprisingly, perhaps, he did address some of the details of his personal history in an interview conducted in English in Canada in 1983.[13] The interview begins with some thoughts on the value of silence, and the various forms of silence which can, in certain cultural contexts, imply close friendship. Foucault refers to his childhood in provincial France, to his wide experience of Western European life in the 'fifties, to his work in a psychiatric hospital in Paris, two years in Tunisia in the 'sixties, his student life as a pupil of Althusser, the position of drugs and pleasure in his life, and the importance of music for his work. It is particularly striking that in describing both his experiences as a child in Poitiers and as a psychiatric assistant in the Hôpital Sainte-Anne, he is careful to concentrate not on personal reactions to these situations, but on the way in which his external circumstances encroached upon and determined his feelings. Thus, his emotional memories of childhood are related to the turbulent political situation of pre-war France, and he attributes his sympathy with psychiatric patients not to any personal integrity, but to his intermediate position within the institution: "I am sure it was not my personal merit because I felt all that at the time as a kind of malaise. It was only a few years later when I started writing a book on the history of psychiatry that this malaise, this personal experience, took the form of an historical criticism or a structural analysis."[14]

Directly after this medical work, Foucault lived and worked away from France between 1955 and 1960, working as a *lecteur* and completing the research for his thesis, *Histoire de la folie*. He lived in Sweden, Poland and West Germany: "I won't say I had the total experience of all the political possibilities but I had a sample of what

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13 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self," in Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed., *Michel Foucault: Philosophy, Politics, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984* (London: Routledge, 1988) pp. 3-15.

14 ibid., p. 6.

the possibilities of Western societies were at that moment. That was a good experience."[15]

From 1966 to 1968 Foucault taught in Tunisia, and throughout the 'seventies, after leaving the experimental university at Vincennes and taking up a prestigious post at the Collège de France, travelled widely to lecture and teach in Brazil, Japan, Canada and the U.S.A.[16] In fact, Foucault did briefly consider a permanent move to the U.S.A. in the late 'seventies. In short, it seems that he experienced a constant urge to travel and escape from France, combined with long periods of intense research and militant activity in Paris.

But what of the contemporary aesthetic and intellectual influences on Foucault's work? Two points should be made here. Firstly, the major influences are often absent from the work itself in terms of footnotes and references.[17] Secondly, the influences of music and literature in his work tend to have an effect on the "shape" of the thought, rather than a direct relationship to the concepts deployed. In the interview from 1983 in Canada referred to above, Foucault claims to be interested in music, but that it is "enigmatic" to him, and that he can say very little about it.[18] In a short article published after Foucault's death, Pierre Boulez puts forward the idea that both he and Foucault had achieved political impact in their work, not by a direct political engagement, but by means of formal innovation: "Je crois que c'est un point commun entre la musique sérielle et la méthode de Foucault lui-même: chercher un renouvellement de la pensée en renouvelant les fondements mêmes du langage, que ce langage soit philosophique ou musical."[19] In an article on Pierre Boulez published in 1982, Foucault himself acknowledges that contemporary music helped him intellectually to move away from Marxism and phenomenology:

> A l'époque où on nous apprenait les privilèges du sens, du vécu, du charnel, de l'expérience originaire, des contenus subjectifs ou des significations sociales, rencontrer Boulez et la musique, c'était voir le XX^{e} siècle sous un angle qui n'était pas familier: celui d'une longue bataille autour du formel.[20]

Didier Eribon takes the view that the 'sixties were a period of "la fascination

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15 ibid., p. 5.

16 For a brief but illuminating consideration of Foucault's time in America see the chapter entitled "Le Zen et la Californie," in Didier Eribon, *Foucault*, pp. 329-338.

17 Michel Foucault, "Le Retour de la morale," *Les Nouvelles littéraires*, no. 2937 (28 juin-5 juillet, 1984). Interview with Gilles Barbedette and André Scala. Here, Foucault talks of the indirect influence of Nietzsche and Heidegger on his work: "Je crois que c'est important d'avoir un petit nombre d'auteurs avec lesquels on pense, avec lesquels on travaille, mais sur lesquels on n'écrit pas. [...] J'écrirai sur eux peut-être un jour, mais à ce moment-là ils ne seront plus pour moi des instruments de pensée." (p. 40).

18 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self", p. 13.

19 Pierre Boulez, "Quelques souvenirs de Pierre Boulez," *Critique*, no. 471-472, (août-septembre, 1986) p. 747.

20 Michel Foucault, "Boulez ou l'écran traversé," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (3 septembre, 1982) p. 51.

littéraire" for Foucault, and that it was only in the 'seventies, after the events of May 1968, that a more political vision emerged.[21] Eribon cites the work of Blanchot as an important influence on Foucault at this time. Eribon also draws attention to Georges Canguilhem, who examined Foucault's doctoral thesis.[22] Eribon considers Canguilhem to be in some ways a precursor of structuralism, and it was his position as a philosopher of the concept, in the tradition of Bachelard and Koyré, as well as his interest in the links between ideology and science, that provided at least some of the momentum for Foucault's move towards structuralism after *Histoire de la folie*.

It is, then, undoubtedly important to consider Foucault's relationship to the structuralist movement, when dealing with the questions of pluralism and totality. In the simplest of terms, the idea of a structure implies a totalising grasp upon phenomena. How is it, then, that an anti-totalising, pluralist such as Foucault could have been associated with the structuralist movement? Foucault outlined his conception of linguistic structuralism in a little-known article for a Tunisian periodical around the period when he was working in this country on *L'Archéologie du savoir*.[23] Interestingly, he claims quite clearly at this stage of his career that "les sciences du langage" have, for at least two centuries, maintained an epistemological superiority over the other human sciences.[24] The novelty of the current relationship between linguistics and the other human sciences is that the former offers a completely innovatory model, an "instrument formidable de rationalisation du réel."[25] The innovation of this new model, derived from structural linguistics, is to develop an analytical framework that depends upon systematic relations between elements: "La linguistique structurale ne porte pas sur des collections empiriques d'atomes individualisables (racines, flexions grammaticales, mots), mais sur des ensembles systématiques de relations entre des éléments."[26] The major methodological innovation of this model is to move away from empiricist atomism and the concomitant frameworks of cause and effect and determinism. Foucault places the structuralist method against Hegelian dialectics and determinism in Marx, indicating admiration for the strand of "structuralist Marxism" which was current at the time.[27] He also offers a brief summary of the attempt in *L'Archéologie du savoir* to marry structural linguistics with historical analysis, claiming that "le successif" is only one element of history, and that the synchronic analysis of linguistics is not necessarily static, but rather the analysis of "des conditions de

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21 Didier Eribon, *Foucault*, p. 79.
22 ibid., p. 128.
23 Michel Foucault, "Linguistique et sciences sociales," *Revue tunisienne de sciences sociales*, no. 19 (décembre, 1969) pp. 248-255.
24 ibid., p. 249.
25 ibid., p. 251.
26 ibid., p. 250.
27 ibid., p. 251.

changement."[28] This article represents what is a transitional phase in Foucault's project. His rejection of dialectical and empirical methods can be clearly seen, but the uneasy alliance of structuralism and Marxism was short-lived, for the reason that structuralism still retained a strand of totalising methodology. *L'Archéologie du savoir* is notable for largely eliding the questions of power and truth which were to become so important for Foucault. However, as will be shown in the first chapter, the notion of dispersion within discursive formations is undoubtedly important, in that it develops in the direction of heterogeneity.

The final element in this by no means exhaustive summary of the influences at play in Foucault's work is that of Nietzsche. Eribon locates Foucault's reading of Nietzsche in 1953, which coincided with his departure from the Communist Party.[29] In his last published interview he admitted that he was "simplement nietzschéen."[30] Nietzsche inspires the guiding themes which dominate the entirety of Foucault's work, and that have already been identified. Nietzsche opened up philosophical thought to a reflection upon truth and metaphor, attacked the anthropological link between man and God, and undermined the dialectical progress of human reason, proposing instead a genealogy of truth. Foucault pays his most extravagant homage to Nietzsche in *Les Mots et les choses*: "on voit s'ouvrir ce qui peut être l'espace de la pensée contemporaine. C'est Nietzsche, en tout cas, qui a brûlé pour nous et avant même que nous fussions nés les promesses mêlées de la dialectique et de l'anthropologie." (*LMC*, p. 275).

At this point it is worth considering some specific critical responses to these ideas. The amount of critical energy that has already been expended on the work of Michel Foucault — whose life and career ended abruptly and prematurely in 1984 — is impressive and daunting in terms of both quality and quantity. On the one hand there are in existence several major studies aiming to introduce and discuss the often elusive, enigmatic and eclectic range of Foucault's major publications. Numerous articles and books proliferate, which aim to utilise, with varying degrees of success, Foucault's central insights, bearing witness not only to the significance and inventiveness of his work, but also to the crucial position of French literary, cultural and historical work of the post-war period in the context of Western intellectual life in general. The work of Michel Foucault certainly provides what would be an almost model field for a detailed piece of research on the reception of a single body of ideas over a period of approximately twenty years throughout many countries, across a variety of academic disciplines, in the realm of journalistic culture, and in several professional fields.[31] Any

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28 ibid., p. 253.

29 Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, p. 72.

30 Michel Foucault, "Le Retour de la morale," p. 40.

31 See "La Planète Foucault," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 207 (mai, 1984) pp. 55-60. This collectively written article provides a useful summary of the different receptions and

thesis which purports to develop any new insights into the extensive oeuvre of Michel Foucault is under an obligation to provide an overview of some of the critical literature on this body of work. It is also necessary to give clear indications of the ways in which the thesis adds something to works which already exist.

Perhaps surprisingly, it is the English-speaking world which has produced the greatest number of critical and exegetical works on Foucault. In the first major summarising work, Alan Sheridan emphasises the Nietzschean influence of attempting to stand outside established disciplines and institutional frameworks of knowledge, and the concomitant desire to undermine regimes of truth.[32] Sheridan draws attention to Foucault's assertion, in the early 'seventies, that Nietzsche introduces a consideration of power into discourse.[33] In a review of Sheridan's book Clare O'Farrell claims that, in his reading of *Histoire de la folie*, Sheridan confuses madness and mental illness.[34] Consequently, Sheridan claims that Foucault shows how madness constitutes a disturbing void upon which Western reason has been built.[35] O'Farrell criticises Sheridan for reading Foucault as positing an essential and unchanging experience of madness, which constitutes the disturbing void upon which reason is built. O'Farrell's criticism is perhaps unfair, in that there is undoubtedly a strain of such essentialism in *Histoire de la folie*. However, this particular critical conflict illustrates many of the inadequacies of existing works. Several of the critical works from the English-speaking world tend to concentrate too heavily on the transgressive or subversive force of Foucault's work. This may, of course, be a consequence of the fact that some of these books appeared in the late 'seventies and early 'eighties, when Foucault's own work was still arguably closer to such themes. For example, in fairly conventional terms, Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan concentrate on the transgressive potential of Foucault's work for social theory in undermining the traditional separation between knowledge and power.[36] Karlis Racevskis attempts to read Foucault with Lacan by showing that there is an "unconscious" Symbolic order which is potentially liberating, but is colonised by rationality: "What is needed is an understanding of the conjunction that unites unreason to reason, death to life, the Other to the Same, the Symbolic to the Imaginary. The key to this understanding is language."[37]

A concentration on language could well be seen as a typically modernist

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institutional lives that Foucault's work has enjoyed around the world.

32 Alan Sheridan, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*. (London: Tavistock, 1981).

33 ibid., pp. 115-116.

34 Clare O'Farrell, "Foucault and the Foucaldians," *Economy and Society*, vol. 11, no. 4 (November, 1982) p. 450.

35 Alan Sheridan, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth*, p. 15.

36 Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

37 Karlis Racevskis, *Michel Foucault and the Subversion of the Intellect* (London: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. 21.

interpretation of Foucault's work. Such a view concentrates on the subversive power of the Other as a Symbolic order which can undermine the rationalising power of the Same. John Rajchman, on the other hand, considers the "relentless theorization of writing" in the 1960s, of which Foucault was undoubtedly a part, as the "swansong" of a totalising anti-bourgeois modernism.[38] For Rajchman, Foucault's first main thesis in the 'sixties was that contemporary literature enabled language to move closer to its origins.[39] Foucault's final thesis is a Nietzschean-inspired anti-humanist critique of subjectivity. Rajchman focusses on the final Foucaldian formulation of "se déprendre de soi" as an open-ended ethic of continual transformation of one's self and one's thought.[40] In common with Rajchman, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow argue that Foucault ultimately moves away from structuralism.[41] They claim that the project of archaeology founders mainly because it cannot accommodate a consideration of the influence of social institutions.[42] They apply the formulation of "interpretive analytics" to Foucault's later work, which examines the formation of the modern subject. Clare O'Farrell has recently provided what is, in effect, a more abstract summary of these views on the development of Foucault's work, by tracing the path of an increasingly complex and subtle relationship between the Same and the Other.[43] O'Farrell sees the categories of the Same and the Other as becoming problematically coextensive in the work of the 'seventies surrounding *Surveiller et punir*.[44] Then, in the 'eighties, O'Farrell sees the categories of the Same and the Other as becoming once again distinct terms: "In more specific terms, Foucault looks at how human beings order themselves and are ordered into historical entities known as subjects, and how these subjects exercise their freedom by working on the limits of that order."[45]

The above commentators deal mainly with the transgressive potential of Foucault's work, but they are largely silent on what this work might oppose to the discourse of Western rationality, or "Western man". However, in a short, speculative article, Uta Liebmann Schaub considers Foucault to have formulated — and then to a large extent actively suppressed — a positive image of the Orient as a counter-discourse to the Occident. Compared to the expansionist instrumental rationality of the West, the Orient is a spiritual domain which constantly retreats. It is the other of this rationality, but an other which can never be grasped.[46] Jeffrey Minson also makes some concrete,

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38 John Rajchman, *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy* (London: Columbia University Press, 1985) p. 9.
39 ibid., p. 13.
40 ibid., p. 124.
41 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Afterword by Michel Foucault (Brighton: Harvester, 1982).
42 ibid., Introduction, p. xx.
43 Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989).
44 ibid., p. 93.
45 ibid., p. 116.
46 Uta Liebmann Schaub, "Foucault's Oriental Subtext," *Publications of the Modern Language*

if tentative suggestions as to political action in the form of "socialist reformism" which might follow from Foucault's work.[47] Finding correspondences between Left and Right "personalist" politics, he suggests plural possiblities for action — that is to say, both decreasing intervention at some points, and increased State policing in others — in the "hybrid" public/private form of the social field.[48]

Unsurprisingly, several commentators have concentrated on the relationship between Foucault's work and Marxism. Barry Smart argues convincingly that Foucault is concerned primarily with the "politics of truth."[49] Such a project differs from Marxism and critical theory in its refusal to oppose a single, higher rationality to the capitalist, instrumental rationality of modernity.[50] Mark Poster also concentrates on the relationship with Marxism, suggesting that Foucault's innovatory emphasis on knowledge as implicated in power relations extends the explanatory and critical potential of Marxism. In this way, he sees Foucault as pushing Marxism beyond a mode of interpretation which depends upon the model of labour.[51] More recently, Poster has suggested that Foucault's work on the microphysics of power is useful in identifying contemporary circuits of communication as a sort of "Superpanopticon". This is a complex system of surveillance which operates by means of walls, towers or guards.[52]

It has been noted, then, that many of the English-speaking analyses of Foucault's work depend strongly upon the functioning of the categories of the Same and the Other, or the important move from archaeology to genealogy. Another problematic area for much of this secondary literature is the relationship between what might be called the "epistemological" and "aesthetic", or literary, elements in Foucault's work. What, for example, could be the relationship between *Raymond Roussel* and *Naissance de la clinique*, two works which were apparently written simultaneously? One suggestion for such a connection between the work on Roussel and non-literary work will be made towards the end of this chapter. However, for the moment it is necessary to look at the work of Gilles Deleuze, who is one of the few critics to attempt any articulation of these two elements.[53] Deleuze perceives this relationship in terms of multiplicity or pluralism, the figure that runs throughout his important work on Foucault, published after the latter's death. Insisting on the irreducible multiplicity of

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Association of America, vol. 104, no. 3 (May, 1989) pp. 306-316.

47 Jeffrey Minson, *Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics* (London: MacMillan, 1985).

48 ibid., p. 221.

49 Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge, 1983) p. 136.

50 ibid., p. 137.

51 Mark Poster, *Foucault, Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).

52 Mark Poster, *The Mode of Information: Poststructuralism and Social Context* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) p. 93.

53 Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986).

"énoncés" as one of the main principles of *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Deleuze shows that the aim of Foucault's project was neither to overcome the science-poetry duality — potentially problematic in the work of Bachelard — nor to treat literary texts in a scientific manner, bur rather to treat science and poetry equally as "savoir"; but forms of "savoir" whose statements are not governed by the same rules of formation.[54] However, within Foucault's own work, Deleuze demonstrates the importance of aesthetic forms as they inform the former's general methodology. For example, Delaunay's conception and use of light as an independent material form is linked to the way in which Foucault develops a theory of the non-discursive, or the visible, in historical formations of "pouvoir/savoir".[55] Writing on *Surveiller et punir*, Deleuze illustrates clearly the relationship between the discursive and the visual in Foucault's methodology. Deleuze sees this particular publication as being organised around a striking visual contrast, rather than presenting a historical narrative of cause and effect:

> Foucault a toujours su peindre de merveilleux tableaux sur fond de ses analyses. Ici, l'analyse se fait de plus en plus microphysique, et les tableaux de plus en plus physiques, exprimant les 'effets' de l'analyse, non pas au sens causal, mais au sens optique, lumineux, de couleur: du rouge sur rouge des supplices au gris sur gris de la prison.[56]

Despite the fact that much has already been written, there remain areas of Foucault's to be fully investigated. In terms of written material, the period from 1976 to 1984 constituted a break in Foucault's previously prolific output of extensively researched books, although he did continue to produce articles, book reviews and interviews. Foucault also continued to give an annual lecture course at the Collège de France during this period. A number of these lectures are available to researchers at the *Centre Michel Foucault* in Paris.[57] The central argument of this thesis rests upon a careful and troublesome — due to poor reproduction — assessment of the lectures from 1978, 1979 and 1980. During this period Foucault began to explore the apparently unrelated areas of early Christian attitudes towards truth and the self, and eighteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism. The thesis will examine the methodological development of what Foucault referred to — on a few occasions and with no apparent desire to indicate that this term referred to any new practice of thinking — as "l'hétérogénéité". It is, however, a crucial development, linking his early and late

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54 ibid., pp. 28-29.

55 ibid., p. 60.

56 ibid., pp. 31-32.

57 A significant part of the research for this thesis consisted of listening to the tapes of Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France from the years 1978, 1979 and 1980. These were entitled "Sécurité, territoire et population", "Naissance de la biopolitique" and "Du Gouvernement des vivants" respectively. These were the only full lecture courses to exist in a complete state at the Bibliothèque du Saulchoir, Paris at this time. This library owned by the Catholic order of the Dominicans was used by Foucault towards the end of his life, and now houses the collection of the *Centre Michel Foucault*.

work. It will be shown that this practice, or rather way of thinking, is intimately linked to the spatial metaphors which dominated Foucault's work in the 'sixties and 'seventies. Meditations on early Christianity represent a link between early work on the place of the human sciences in the constitution of modernity, a period of unpublished and often unfocussed work on liberalism, and late work on Greek and Roman ethics. It is also important to realise that this shift in interest towards the early Christian period represents, as will be discussed more fully in the final chapter, an important attempt to move away from the project of a painstaking description of the conditions of the emergence of the so-called "human sciences" and the object of "l'Homme" in the period which immediately follows the French Revolution in European history. For Foucault's earlier work, the French Revolution constitutes the birth of a problematic modernity. *Naissance de la clinique* is an explicit investigation of the articulation of the political consciousness that surrounded the revolution and the birth of the human science of clinical medicine. The years which immediately precede and follow the Revolution see the birth of two great myths which are part of the Enlightenment optimism and — Foucault appears to imply at this stage of his career — organising tyranny — which inform the political consciousness of the Revolution: "mythe d'une profession médicale nationalisée, organisée sur le mode du clergé [...]; mythe d'une disparition totale de la maladie dans une société sans troubles et sans passions, restituées à sa santé d'origine." (*NC*, pp. 31- 32). And at the end of *Naissance de la clinique*, Foucault formulates what might be regarded as his central insight on the birth of modernity and the human sciences, which will form the polemical thrust of *Les Mots et les choses*. The new discursive practice of clinical medicine which grows after the Revolution forms part of a wider epistemological shift in European thought: "La possibilité pour l'individu d'être à la fois sujet et objet de sa propre connaissance [...]" (*NC*, p. 201). Whereas, for Classical thought, the finitude of human beings was directly opposed to a cosmic infinity, finitude is now somehow reassuring to the new figure of the discrete individual that it calls forth: "elle lui parle aussi de ce monde technique qui est la forme armée, positive et pleine de sa finitude." (*NC*, p. 202). The limit of finitude bestows upon the figure of "l'Homme" a mysterious power of analysis and objectivity.[58] The new human sciences, which are inaugurated roughly speaking at the beginning of the nineteenth century, finally break the Aristotelean taboo of founding a general science on the figure of the individual. The formal reorganisation of methods of medical perception and examination — placing great emphasis on the medical gaze — restructures medical

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58 See Gérard Lebrun, "Note sur la phénoménologie dans *Les Mots et les choses*," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale Paris 9,10,11 janvier 1988*, (Paris: Seuil, 1989) pp. 33-51. Lebrun outlines what he sees as Foucault's implicit critique of phenomenology in *LMC*. According to Lebrun, phenomenology is shown as being incapable of understanding the originality of Kant. Lebrun thus places the notion of the episteme within a neo-Kantian framework.

discourse around the figure of the individual: "elle a levé le vieil interdit aristotélicien: on pourra enfin tenir sur l'individu un discours à structure scientifique." (*NC*, pref., p. x). *Naissance de la clinique* also develops the revolutionary and post-revolutionary theme of totality and society as another side to the discursive structure which is inaugurated with modernity:

> Ce qui constitue maintenant l'unité du regard médical, ce n'est pas le cercle du savoir dans lequel il s'achève, mais cette totalisation ouverte, infinie, mouvante [...] Mais son support n'est pas la perception du malade en sa singularité, c'est une conscience collective de toutes les informations qui se croisent, poussant en une ramure complexe et toujours foisonnante, agrandie enfin aux dimensions d'une histoire, d'une géographie, d'un Etat." (*NC*, p. 29).

So, the scientific and institutional concentration upon the importance of the figure of the individual runs alongside what, at this stage, Foucault implies is a potentially disciplinary grid which begins to develop across the figure of the State. This theme comes to full fruition in the form of *Surveiller et punir*. Foucault presents an examination of the institution, again alongside the development of the human sciences in the second half of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century, of a so-called "société carcérale". This theme can, however, be overemphasised. Rather than constituting first and foremost the elaboration of a central theory, Foucault's work should be seen as a plural collection of specific histories, of the systems of thought which constitute the pre-history of the modern problematisations of madness as mental illness, discipline and modern penal thought, medicine and the health of the population, and sexuality. Rather than examining the patient construction of modernity as discipline, in the form of either class-based or impersonal rationalities and techniques, Foucault often seems to focus on the *excess* which appears when a political *rationality* becomes a *technique* of government.[59] For example, *Surveiller et punir* looks at the unusual figure of the prison in modernity. Typically, Foucault wishes to highlight the strange existence of a common and naturalised institution. The continued existence of the prison is strange in that eighteenth-century liberal rationalities had proposed what Pasquale Pasquino calls "the triangle formed by law, crime and punishment."[60] The figure of the criminal is absent from this triangle and will be a product of the new penal thought of the nineteenth century. The figure of the criminal cannot be accommodated within liberal theories of contract and deterrent. Penal philosophy therefore

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59 See Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, "Political Power beyond that State: Problematics of Government," unpublished paper presented to the *History of the Present* group in September 1990. According to Rose and Miller, political rationalities have a characteristically ethical and epistemological form (p. 15), whereas the practice also involves "a domain of strategies, techniques and procedures by means of which different forces seek to render programmes operable, a domain of networks and relays that connect the aspirations of authorities with the activities of individuals and groups." (p. 24).

60 Pasquale Pasquino, "Criminology: Birth of a special science," *Ideology and Consciousness*, no. 7 (1980) p. 19.

acknowledges the criminal as a species which must be excluded by means of the prison. In his work on medicine, and particularly the prison system, Foucault begins to outline an innovative conception of the relationship between the individual and the collectivity. Rather than seeing the individual as a discrete atom of liberty whose freedom is restricted by the totalising forces of instrumental rationality, Foucault considers the individual as a series of heterogeneous elements which are continually broken down and reconstituted by power.[61] In a recent book, John E. Grumley looks at the question of the category of totality in historical thought.[62] He takes a more traditional approach, locating an all-embracing tension between the individual and totality within the period of modernity which follows the French Revolution:

> The French Revolution clearly marks the great historical watershed of modernity. Its repercussions overturned all conventional perceptions of history. No longer at the mercy of the ossified traditions and institutions satirised by Voltaire, the future offered new social possibilities requiring urgent philosophical consideration and integration.[63]

Grumley carefully articulates the dynamic and shifting opposition between fragmentation and totality set in motion by the Revolution. Rousseau saw modernity as a tragically decadent fall from grace, whereas Hegel viewed the problem of modernity as division or "diremption" ("Trennung"). The growth of a dynamic economy increases individual specialisation and isolation (a theme which will later be taken up by Weber). However, Hegel came to view the fragmentation that modernity engenders and maintains as a dynamic motor towards cultural totality within the context of a revolutionary culture: "Anticipating radical historical possibilities, he projected his vision of a revitalised, unified, harmonious culture into an immediate future within the grasp of a revolutionary present."[64]

However, in the narrative that Grumley presents, the Revolution only succeeds in instituting a hegemony of bourgeois individualism which, Lukács claims, fails to understand and control the damaging processes of the capitalist productive process.[65] The bourgeoisie, unable to comprehend the historical development of capitalism, begins to view it as a reified "natural" whole, opposing any progressive transformation of the totality. Grumley shows that the later Lukács, after the Russian October Revolution of

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61 See Michel Foucault, "Par delà le bien et le mal," *Actuel*, no. 14 (novembre, 1971) pp. 42-47. This discussion with "lycéens" marks a period of militancy, combined with a strong suspicion of revolutionary left-wing politics. He rejects any politics which seeks to transform the "whole" of society: "'L'ensemble de la société' est ce dont il ne faut pas tenir compte, si ce n'est comme de l'objectif à détruire. Ensuite, il faut bien espérer qu'il n'y aura plus rien qui ressemble à l'ensemble de la société." (p. 47).

62 John E. Grumley, *History and Totality: Radical Historicism from Hegel to Foucault* (London: Routledge, 1989).

63 ibid., p. 6.

64 ibid., p. 15.

65 ibid., p. 143.

1917, becomes politically more optimistic, reconstructing the concept of totality as central to Marx's thought on revolution. Returning to Hegel's "ontologisation of the principle of active subjectivity,"[66] and combining this with Marx's materialist reconstruction of Hegel's idealism, Lukács placed the proletariat at the centre of the historical process as totality. This totality has no immanent meaning, as in Hegel, but would be created by the free and conscious activity of the proletariat.

The Frankfurt School strenuously attack the concept of social totality in their sceptical approach to the force of reason and Enlightenment. Grumley does not bring out the connection, but the materialist critical theory of Adorno and Benjamin, in its commitment to truth as separate from the intentional subject, prefigures Foucault's materialist view of language and discourse. Grumley also shows how Adorno and Benjamin view critical truth as possible only through the accumulation of material fragments.[67]

Overall, then, Grumley articulates a complex, but still fairly conventional opposition between fragmentation and totalisation. His critique of Foucault constitutes a variation on what swiftly becomes a familiar theme for anybody acquainted with critical work on this subject. The central argument is contained within the title that Grumley chooses for the chapter that he dedicates to Foucault; "Michel Foucault: anti-totalising scepticism or totalising prophecy?"[68] He highlights what he sees as a tension between Foucault's methodological attack on totalising views of historical development, and an often implicit prophecy of the sinister development of modernity as a perverse totalisation of Enlightenment reason. If Foucault has killed off the figure of man, then in whose name will resistance take place? "The elimination of historical identity in the name of the critique of totality leaves Foucault's 'politics immanent to history' without even a tentative direction, without the prospect of emancipation, a restless will to change."[69] However, a more nuanced consideration of Foucault's attempts to dismantle totality and totalising thought is necessary. Firstly, it seems reasonable to see him as rejecting both elements of what Martin Jay terms the Western "Discourse of Totality".[70] Jay identifies two main strands in this discourse; a normative aspiration towards some sort of social totality as a desirable state, and a non-normative methodological principle: "it stems from a methodological insistence that adequate understanding of complex phenomena can follow only from an appreciation of their relational integrity."[71]

In terms of politics the idea of the "whole of society" is rejected in Foucault's

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66 ibid., p. 130.
67 ibid., pp. 168-169.
68 ibid., pp. 183-205.
69 ibid., p. 205.
70 Martin Jay, *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas* (Cambridge: Polity, 1984) pp. 21-80.
71 ibid., pp. 23-24.

work as utopian, and methodologically, the idea of the expressive totality is seen as reductive with regard to the plurality of what Foucault calls the event.[72] The problem of whether Foucault's work in the 'sixties was "structuralist" in its method and intentions might be approached from the viewpoint of totality and pluralism. In general, the figure of heterogeneity is deployed as a methodological tool which enables Foucault to work outside the opposition between singularity or fragmentation and totality. It is fair to say that structuralism did exert an influence in the 'sixties, but that ultimately this method is rejected as retaining the totalising traces of an organising subject in the fields of knowledge and historical change. In a lecture from 1976, Foucault distances himself from dialectical materialism and structuralism as the analysis of signs and communication:

> Neither the dialectic, as logic of contradictions, nor semiotics, as the structure of communication, can account for the intrinsic intelligibility of conflicts. 'Dialectic' is a way of evading the always open and hazardous reality of conflict by reducing it to a Hegelian skeleton, and 'semiology' is a way of avoiding its violent, bloody and lethal character by reducing it to the calm Platonic form of language and dialogue. (*P/K*, pp. 114-115).

Here, Foucault proposes an "intelligibility of struggles", a vocabulary of war and battle as an analytic mode for history. It will be shown in the fourth chapter that this particular conception of history and the event is ultimately reformulated. However, the commitment to a theoretical pluralism remains. The plurality and the contingency of the "event" is the central anti-totalising element of Foucault's work. A central statement of this premiss can be found in a talk given in 1978 to the *Société française de philosophie*.[73] In this talk, Foucault draws an important distinction between the questions of Enlightenment, or *Aufklärung*, and "critique" in Kant. He argues that the European critical tradition has concentrated too much on the element of "critique", posing the question of legitimacy in terms of knowledge and science as a viable mode of government. Rather than examine the question of "connaissance", Foucault prefers the question of "pouvoir". And instead of the critique of legitimacy, he proposes "une épreuve d'événementalisation."[74] In eschewing this question of legitimacy, he will investigate the connections between plural and heterogeneous elements in contemporary rationality: "Mécanismes de coercition divers, peut-être aussi bien des ensembles législatifs, des règlements, des dispositifs matériels, des phénomènes d'autorité, etc.; contenus de connaissance qu'on prendra également dans leur diversité et dans leur

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72 See Michel Foucault, "Vérité et pouvoir", *L'Arc*, no. 70, (1977) p. 19.

73 Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce que la critique?" *Bulletin de la Société française de la Philosophie*, (Compte rendu de la séance du 27 mai 1978). pp. 35-63. Here, Foucault uses the term "événementalisation". This talk is extremely important in forming a link between the formulations of "pouvoir/savoir" and "gouvernementalité".

74 ibid., pp. 47-48.

hétérogénéité [...]"[75]

The question of theoretical pluralism, combined with an attempt to move philosophy away from a discursive history of ideas towards an examination of thought as a material force with a variety of distinct forms is a constant presence in Foucault's work.[76] In an important recent paper, Etienne Balibar has addressed precisely these questions of theoretical pluralism and the materiality of thought in Foucault's work.[77] Through a close-reading of *La Volonté de savoir*, he argues that Foucault expands productively upon Marx's historical materialism by means of a concentration on the body as material focus for the operation of power. Whereas, for Marx, the result of conflict between classes is the interiorisation of the class relationship in the individual, Foucault maintains a principle of exteriority in power relations, "ce qui veut dire à la fois que les 'visées' qui s'affrontent dans un conflit stratégique se détruisent, se neutralisent, se renforcent mutuellement ou se modifient, mais ne forment pas d'unité ou d'individualité supérieure."[78] Balibar outlines three counter-arguments that Foucault sets against what he sees as a virtual post-war critical consensus of "freudo-marxism". Firstly, the thesis that sex has somehow been repressed from the eighteenth century onwards. This is obviously Foucault's celebrated attempt to overturn the so-called repressive hypothesis. Secondly this combination of Freudianism and Marxism depends strongly upon juridical theories of power. Finally, and most importantly for any consideration of the theoretical question of pluralism, Balibar quite correctly identifies in *La Volonté de savoir* a rejection of a structural notion of the "expressive totality", whereby in any social or political structure any part will resemble the whole: "La famille est un 'foyer local' de pouvoir-savoir (*VS*, p. 130), mais non pas une monade, *pars totalis* de 'la société', et ce qui fait son importance stratégique n'est pas sa ressemblance mais sa spécificité ou sa différence. Donc, pas plus que la famille n'est un petit Etat, l'Etat n'est un grand patriarcat."[79] However, Balibar does not pay enough attention to Foucault's continual attempts to move his own position away from the Marxist theory of dominant ideology. Balibar effectively glosses over what is perhaps the most enigmatic but, for this thesis, most important statements in *La Volonté de savoir*. That is to say, Foucault's statement that "le pouvoir vient d'en bas." (*VS*, p. 124). For Balibar, such a statement is not incompatible with Marx, in claiming that

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75 ibid., p. 48.

76 See Michel Foucault, "Les Mots et les choses," *Les Lettres francaises*, no. 1125, (31 mars, 1966) pp. 3-4. Interview with Raymond Bellour. Here, Foucault ends the interview by claiming that his project is not to write the history of thought in general, but rather, "tout ce qui 'contient de la pensée' dans une culture [...]" (p. 4).

77 Etienne Balibar, "Foucault et Marx. L'enjeu du nominalisme," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale*, pp. 54-76.

78 ibid., p. 71.

79 ibid., p. 61.

power draws its efficacy from the material conditions within which it exists.[80] Against such a view, it will be argued that the thesis that power comes from below develops ultimately into Foucault's "gouvernementalité" formulation, which treats power relationships themselves as not only strategically reversible, but "heterogeneous".

Balibar's paper also raises the important question of the figure of the State in Foucault's work.[81] He is quite right to note that the "freudo-marxisme" combination entails, for Foucault, a false homology between "l'Etat" and "la Censure morale".[82] In the second part of his career, Foucault attacks the apparently natural and self-evident status of the opposition between State and society. Chapter Two sets out in detail the ways in which this opposition is undermined. For the moment it should suffice to say that the figure of the State is set aside as a principle of either domination or legitimacy, in favour of a materialistic and heterogeneous analysis of power relations:

> l'Etat, ce n'est pas un universel: l'Etat ce n'est pas en lui-même une source autonome de pouvoir; l'Etat ce n'est rien d'autre que des faits: le profil, la découpe mobile d'une perpétuelle étatisation ou de perpétuelles étatisations, de transactions incessantes qui modifient, qui déplacent, qui bouleversent [...][83]

In this thesis, it will be argued that Foucault largely abandons this critical position on what might broadly be called the culture of Enlightenment, but that the drive against a unitary conception of reason is present in terms of both content and — crucially — form. Foucault's use of form is not the equivalent of a literary "style", but rather an aesthetic and principally spatial imagination, which unusually propels what is often a philosophical and even sociological project. This theme of aesthetic modes of thinking will return as an explicit interest for Foucault towards the end of his career (See Chapter Four). Grumley sees themes of fragmentation as opposed to the Hegelian strand of totalising thought. It should however be noted that, although Foucault set his work within a pluralist framework, he did not necessarily consider it to be a radical attack on the Hegelian tradition within European thought. In fact at an important point in his career, when giving his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, he acknowledged his debt to Jean Hyppolite's reading of Hegel. In this light he sees the Hegelian tradition within philosophy as a constant, sceptical questioning, rather than

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80 ibid., p. 70.

81 See Nicos Poulantzas, *L'Etat, le pouvoir, le socialisme* (Paris: P.U.F., 1978). Poulantzas claims that Foucault elides the problem of the power and position of the State. Poulantzas also argues that the State is a point of concentration for State relations and the mode of production. This is presented as a conscious modification of a "base-superstructure" conceptualisation. He accepts what he sees as Foucault's subtle materialist analysis of the power invested in individualising institutions. Ultimately, however, he conceives of power as rooted in relations of production, and therefore views the State as a privileged centre. Despite these differences, Poulantzas may be seen as being close to Foucault in refusing a general theory of the economy or the State as external to society.

82 Etienne Balibar, "Foucault et Marx," p. 60.

83 Michel Foucault, "La phobie d'Etat," (extrait du cours du Collège de France, 31 janvier 1979), *Libération*, (30 juin-1 juillet, 1984) p. 21.

the drive to comprehend thought from within as a totality: "La philosophie, au lieu de la concevoir comme la totalité enfin capable de se penser et de se ressaisir dans le mouvement du concept, J. Hyppolite en faisait sur fond d'un horizon infini, une tâche sans terme: toujours levée tôt, sa philosophie n'était point prête de s'achever jamais." (*OD*, p. 77). This rather energetic scepticism will be seen to make an appearance in Foucault's final work in the form of the demand for a constant inventiveness in thought and the construction of the self. This will in turn occasion a return to the question of Enlightenment, not in order to write against the stranglehold of Enlightenment rationality, as Foucault had in his early work, but rather to reactivate the Kantian question of what exactly constitutes thought with regard to the Enlightenment.[84] It can be seen already that much of Foucault's work is motivated by the question of what exactly constitutes the activity of thought. If the first part of his work is considered as an attempt to discover some ways in which thought might operate in a material form independently of human consciousness in the modern era, and how the possibility of another mode of thought at the limits might disrupt these very limits, then the second part of his work may be seen as a meditation on the ways in which conscious reflection might arm itself against the problems of modernity.

Overall then, Foucault demonstrates a commitment to a plural methodology in his attempts to define events in thought and thus defines himself throughout most of his career as a "historian of thought".[85] A history of ideas looks for an identifiable progression in human consciousness and understanding. The historian of thought, on the other hand, looks for discontinuities, and the singularity of thought as an "event". Foucault's method must therefore be pluralist. It is now necessary to examine in more detail one particular statement of Foucault's "pluralism", in order to speculate about some of the ways in which this might be contrasted to a more traditional Anglo-Saxon liberal pluralism.

At the height of structuralist fervour in France Foucault provided an important methodological statement in the form of an extended reply to questions posed by the readers of the journal *Esprit* in 1968.[86] The main problem posed by readers with respect to Foucault's work at this stage — the major publications being *Naissance de la*

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84 See Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?" *Magazine littéraire*, no. 207 (1984) pp. 34-39. This text is a variation on the theme of Enlightenment which became central to Foucault's final work. In the same way that he acknowledges the role of Hyppolite's reading of Hegel as introducing historical questions into philosophy, so he reads Kant as having introduced a similar historical dimenssion as one half of his consideration of Enlightenment and critique: "on peut opter pour une philosophie critique qui se présentera comme une philosophie analytique de la vérité en général, ou bien on peut opter pour une pensée critique qui prendra la forme d'une ontologie de nous-mêmes, d'une ontologie de l'actualité [...]" (p. 39).

85 Michel Foucault, *Discourse and Truth: The Problematisation of Parrhesia*, unpublished notes of a seminar given by Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley. (1983) p. 116.

86 Michel Foucault, "Réponse à une question," *Esprit*, no. 371 (mai, 1968) pp. 850-874.

clinique and *Les Mots et les choses* — constituted what was to become a familiar refrain amongst critics and those who have been sceptical of the underlying thrust of his work:

> Une pensée qui introduit la contrainte du système et de la discontinuité dans l'histoire de l'esprit n'ôte-t-elle pas tout fondement à une intervention politique progressiste? N'aboutit-elle pas au dilemme suivant:
> — ou bien l'acceptation du système,
> — ou bien l'appel à l'événement sauvage, à l'irruption d'une violence extérieure, seule capable de bousculer le système.[87]

Of course, one of the underlying objects of this criticism is Foucault's much-discussed use of discontinuity in examining systems of thought, particularly in *Les Mots et les choses*. Discontinuity obviously moves a history of thought away from the developmemt of a consciousness or "esprit" through history. Foucault points out that he employs discontinuity, not as a historical method which he applies to the material that he analyses, but rather seeks to investigate the conditions of existence of individual discourses. Against the question of discontinuity, Foucault subtly redefines his own position as one of individualisation; that is to say, locating the specificity of individual discursive events: "Quand on parle de *la* psychiatrie, ou de *la* médecine, de *la* grammaire, de *la* biologie, ou de *l'*économie, de quoi parle-t-on? Quelles sont ces curieuses unités qu'on croit pouvoir reconnaître au premier coup d'oeil [...]"[88] He seeks to counter the claim that *Les Mots et les choses* presents homogeneous epistemes by insisting that he presents a proliferation of systems within the episteme. At this stage of his career, he wishes to undermine and interrogate some of the accepted unities of thinking and acting that structure the human sciences: "Je suis pluraliste: le problème que je me suis posé, c'est celui de l'individualisation des discours. Il y a pour individualiser les discours des critères qui sont connus et sûrs [...] Mais d'autres critères qui ne sont pas moins familiers, sont beaucoup plus énigmatiques."[89]

To illustrate his pluralist method, Foucault uses the example of the formation of clinical discourse which has characterised medicine from the nineteenth century up to the present day. He claims to have chosen this particular example since it represents a scientific development which it is easy to link "intuitively" in terms of its historical context. Foucault seeks to illustrate the error of two such "intuitive" hypotheses. Firstly, that human consciousness has changed, under the influence of social, political and economic changes, and that consequently the general view of illness and death is modified. Following this hypothesis, it would be generally acknowledged that a poor level of health causes dangerous social unrest, and consequently a new, two-tiered health system appears, whereby the bourgeoisie manages to transfer the provision of

87 ibid., p. 850.
88 ibid., p. 851.
89 ibid., p. 851.

assistance to the State, and the poor become integrated within a free hospital system which maintains the health of the working class. Secondly, the notion that the foundations of the new clinical medecine are structurally and thematically analogous to a new political consciousness. This second hypothesis rests upon an interpretation of the new political thought instituted by the French Revolution, either as representing a homogenising conception of the social totality as an organic whole, or a recognition that — in a similar way to the discovery that illnesses no longer form a family of related species — the social fabric can no longer be mastered or controlled by a single theory. Each social element now has its own relevant area of theory and related practices.[90] Foucault rejects these ways of conceiving the relationship between political practice and medical discourse. He claims that his own method of investigation posits a much more direct relationship between political practice and clinical discourse: "la pratique politique a transformé non le sens ni la forme du discours, mais ses conditions d'émergence, d'insertion et de fonctionnement; elle a transformé le mode d'existence du discours médical."[91] He goes on to elucidate some of the ways in which these transformations take place, including new criteria to determine those who will now be permitted to practise a medical discourse, and a new status for the practice of social assistance, which in turn creates a network of hospital and clinical institutions aimed at the new object of the population. In short, the population is now treated in terms of "les catégories de la santé et du pathologique."[92] It is perhaps difficult at first to establish a clear distinction between Foucault's method and the more traditional hypotheses that he so readily attacks. The main innovation of his method is to show how political practices do not have a direct effect upon the methods of analysis that medicine employs. Instead of an intermittent notation of symptoms and a consequent hypothesis as to the functional cause of the illness, political practice permits "la substitution d'un quadrillage anatomique serré [...]".[93]

This early article, then, forms a detailed summary of Foucault's early method. Two main threads of inquiry might be established. He is at this stage continuing the French tradition of the history of the philosophy of science.[94] However, he is also attempting to establish some kind of working relationship between the methods of structuralism and a principle of what he calls pluralism.[95]

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90 ibid., p. 867.
91 ibid., p. 868.
92 ibid., p. 868.
93 ibid., pp. 868-869.
94 See Michel Foucault, "La Vie: l'expérience et la science," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, vol. 90, no. 1 (janvier-mars, 1985) pp. 3-14. In this text, which originally appeared in translation as the preface to the American edition of Canguilhem's *Le Normal et le pathologique*, Foucault emphasises the often neglected importance of Canguilhem as presenting a philosophy of "savoir, de la rationalité et du concept." (p. 4) This is opposed to a philosophy of experience, as characterised by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.
95 See Michel Foucault and Richard Sennett, "Sexuality and Solitude," *London Review of Books*

This thesis will examine the development of the "pluralist" label that Foucault claims in the late 'sixties. In particular, it will examine the ways in which this commitment to pluralism is linked to the aesthetic and spatial themes which form both an imaginary repository, a formal architecture, and a motor for theoretical transformation in Foucault's work. Particular attention is paid to Foucault's own interest in what he called "liberalism" from the second half of the 'seventies onwards, and the inventive applications of some of Foucault's more suggestive notions in the work of several collaborative groups which are currently very much alive.[96] Much of this current work looks at the field of what has become known as the "social", a hybrid public/private space within which social meaning is articulated. Instead of approaching questions of the State and class in terms of conflict, this work departs from one of the important insights of the second half of Foucault's career. That is to say, the central preoccupation of the State in the modern era has been to foster life, rather than subtract from life, and the "pouvoir/savoir" thesis that moves social theory away from questions of sovereignty and contract. The genesis of this argument within Foucault's work is to be found in his 1976 course at the Collège de France, entitled "Il faut défendre la société". Foucault's own summary of the course from the *Annuaire* of the Collège sets out the following aims: "Pour mener l'analyse concrète des rapports de pouvoir, il faut abandonner le modèle juridique de la souveraineté. Celui-ci en effet présuppose l'individu comme sujet de droits naturels ou de pouvoirs primitifs [...]"[97] The course for this particular year provides a link between the two pivotal publications of Foucault's career, *Surveiller et punir* and *La Volonté de savoir*. Foucault takes as his starting point for the year the problem of war as a method of historical interpretation, a mode of thinking which he ultimately rejects. His summary of the course tends to undermine the received wisdom that he reversed Clausewitz's famous dictum on war being politics continued by other means.[98] It is by no means inappropriate to see this course as one example, amongst many, of Foucault's attempts to undermine, or at least provide a critical genealogy of socialism in its various organised forms.

In a recently published set of extracts from the final lecture sets Foucault out the

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(21 May-3 June, 1981) pp. 4-7. In this article, Foucault claims to have been neither a "structuralist" nor an "analytic philosopher", but rather to have explored the "genealogy of the modern subject." (p. 4).

96 For one of the most recent examples of historical work which is influenced by Foucault's genealogy see Mitchell Dean, *The Constitution of Poverty: Toward a Genealogy of Liberal Governance* (London: Routledge, 1991).

97 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours 1970-1982*, Conférences essais et leçons du Collège de France (Paris: Julliard, 1989) p. 85.

98 See Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Colin Gordon, ed., *Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings, 1972-1977* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1980) pp. 78-108. These lectures, which have not yet appeared in French, are extracts from the first two lectures of the year 1976. Foucault admits that until this point he has worked within the schema of "struggle-repression", which he begins to suspect is inadequate. (p. 92).

aim of isolating the particularity of modern forms of power, by distinguishing them from both classical views of sovereignty and contract, and by questioning what he terms a broadly "socialist" sociological vision of the social fabric as traversed by lines of struggle and battle.[99] As such, it provides a typical example of Foucault's innovative pluralism. He puts forward the idea that "la théorie du droit" had as its basis the pair of the individual and society and the contractual rapport between these two. He also shows that his own schema of discipline — here seen to have been developed in the eighteenth century — is overlaid by a new technique of "régularisation". This involves in many ways subtler techniques than discipline, in the form of insurance, individual and collective saving, and moves towards systems of social security etc. Formally, this new formulation is important for Foucault, in that it posits for this technology of power an object which is neither the individual and the individual body, nor the totality of society. It is rather a hybrid of the two that Foucault calls quite simply "la population", and sees as having a serial form:

> Ce à quoi on a affaire dans cette nouvelle technologie n'est pas exactement à la société (ou du moins au corps social tel que le définissaient les juristes) et ce n'est pas non plus à l'individu-corps. Mais à un nouveau corps: corps multiple, corps à têtes innombrables. C'est la notion de population.[100]

So far, then, some aspects of Foucault's methodological pluralism have been examined. However, it is necessary briefly to look at Foucault's work in the context of the European liberal tradition which is often presented as avowedly pluralistic in its philosophical and methodological foundations, and its view of society. Anthony Arblaster provides one of the most coherent recent overviews of this tradition.[101] He admits that liberalism exists as a widely diffused ethos in the contemporary world, and that this constitutes both its major strength and weakness. He in fact sees liberalism as a largely dead dogma. (It should be noted that Arblaster's book was published before the major successes of neo-liberalism in Western Europe of recent times.) For this reason it is difficult to isolate anything but the most general elements within liberalism. Basically, aside from implying fairly strongly that liberalism is the natural ideological expression of capitalism, Arblaster isolates five elements in the liberal tradition from the sixteenth century onwards. These are, a deeply-rooted individualism, a scientific, philosophical and methodological atomism, a concentration on the idea of possession, and a strong suspicion of reason, accompanied by a constant fear of democracy. He sees an obvious concentration on the individual as the "metaphysical and ontological core of liberalism and individualism."[102] Methodologically, this individualism is

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99 Michel Foucault, "Faire vivre et laisser mourir: la naissance du racisme," *Les Temps modernes*, no. 535, (février, 1991) pp. 37-61.

100 ibid., p. 43.

101 Anthony Arblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).

102 ibid., p. 102.

underpinned by a distinction between facts and values. Arblaster sees this distinction as important in linking liberalism to positivist science, and also in supporting the notion of the moral autonomy of the individual. Such a position is pluralistic, in that facts themselves cannot imply any moral obligation or any pattern of historical inevitability to the individual. Although Arblaster presents what often looks like a survey of liberalism as an essentially British tradition, he does at other points attempt to look at liberalism in a European context. For example, he shows that most accounts of philosophy from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries divide philosophers into one of two camps. The French tradition is seen as rationalist and the British tradition as empiricist.[103] Beneath this division, however, lies a common stress on the individual, and the individual's self-consciousness. However, it is within the British tradition of empiricism — that is to say, a stress on the accuracy and primacy of the senses and sense impressions — that Arblaster locates the important element of "atomism" in liberal thought. This may manifest itself in a pessimistic sense, as in Hobbes, who considers the presence of an absolutely powerful sovereign necessary in order to regulate the potentially anarchic jostling of atoms within the social fabric.[104] Or it may appear in a more optimistic form, as in the belief that "these independent atoms cohere, like the physical atoms of Newton's cosmology, into an orderly and harmonious system."[105]

In a slightly earlier work on liberalism, D.J. Manning uses a number of the same elements, but ventures somewhat deeper into the Newtonian framework in order to present what he presents almost as an overall "deep structure" for liberalism.[106] Emphasising the Newtonian framework, he finds three expressed features in liberal thinking. These are, the principle of balance, the principle of spontaneous generation and circulation, and the principle of legal uniformity.[107] In order to maintain this balance and self-generation, society must avoid excessive accumulations of "power, wealth or opinion."[108] This is the core of liberal pluralism, and underpins its suspicion of both the masses, and, to a lesser extent, democracy. Both Arblaster and Manning identify serious problems and contradictions that liberal thought faces. For example, the axiom of possession, of goods, property and labour, as an irreducible right and necessity, cannot easily be restricted to the level of the individual. The risk of monopolies and cartels is ever-present. Manning also shows that what he calls the "symbolic form" of liberalism is threatened by the decline of the scientific appeal of the

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103 ibid., p. 103.
104 ibid., p. 136.
105 ibid., p. 37.
106 D.J. Manning, *Liberalism* (Letchworth: Aldine Press, 1976). Manning claims that "ideologies are not characterised by an unchanging essence." (p. 29). This is in some ways similar to Foucault's interest in liberalism as a "style" rather than a dogma.
107 ibid., p. 13.
108 ibid., p. 16.

Newtonian framework of the spontaneous generation of energies.[109]

How then, can Foucault's work be considered in relation to this brief overview of some of the principles of liberal thought? Firstly, Foucault rejects the liberal paradigm of sovereignty, and the notion of individual possession of the self, along with its physical and intellectual capacities.[110] Thought is a material force which does not emanate from the sovereign consciousness, and power is a reversible and strategic force which operates through the body. The body is constantly trained by the intrusion of mechanical inventions such as the rifle or the prison. These are well-rehearsed moves. But is there perhaps another way in which Foucault does attempt an important advance on liberal/Newtonian atomistic pluralism? Foucault's work is only empirical insofar as he deals in singularities. He does not accept the traditional liberal opposition between facts and values. In the 'mid-seventies, Foucault presents his "genealogical" project of resurrecting "subjugated knowledges" precisely as a pluralism which is not empirical:

> You are well aware that this research activity, which one can thus call genealogical, has nothing at all to do with an opposition between the abstract unity of theory and the concrete multiplicity of facts. [...] It is not therefore via an empiricism that the genealogical project unfolds [...] What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory [...] (*P/K*, p. 83).

Foucault's work, then, can be set against liberal pluralism in two main ways. Firstly, he rejects the opposition between facts and values. Secondly, nor does he work with the opposition between the totality and individual singularity, being interested rather in hybrid forms such as the figure of the population. In order to support this pluralist reading of Foucault's work, the thesis will emphasise the neglected question of historical method in this work. This method is based upon the analysis of points of articulation or the junctions of apparently heterogeneous programmes, demands or principles. One of the clearest examples occurs in the opening chapter of the second part of *Surveiller et punir*. Here, the penal reform of the eighteenth and nineteenth

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109 ibid., p. 19. Interestingly, Manning puts a slightly different slant on contemporary liberal attacks on "historicism" — most famously, that of Karl Popper in the 'fifties — by seeing a teleological concept of progression as present in the Newtonian framework. He then suggests a range of attacks on this framework, from Darwinism, suggesting that temporal events have no goal, and from Gödel and Einstein, making the claim that there is no possibility of following an ultimate set of axioms. (p. 26).

110 See *Surveiller et punir*, pp. 32-33. It is here that Foucault outlines for the first time in a major published text the "pouvoir-savoir" formulation. The fact that "le sujet qui connaît" is inseparable from power relations finds its analogy in the Foucault's desire to avoid questions of "la propriété" and "le contrat". He proposes instead "une anatomie politique" which will map a series of material elements which serve as relay points for the circulation of power, and its investment in the individual's body: "Analyser l'investissement politique du corps et la microphysique du pouvoir suppose donc qu'on renonce - en ce qui concerne le pouvoir - à l'opposition violence-idéologie, à la métaphore de la propriété, au modèle du contrat ou à celui de la conquête [...]" (pp. 32-33).

centuries is analysed in terms of an economy of illegalities, rather than solely as the expression of humane concern. (Importantly, Foucault does not deny that such concern is at work.) Thus, penal reform appears at such a juncture between the "problematisation" — to use Foucault's own later vocabulary — of the excessive sovereign power of the *Ancien Régime*, and the extensive network of minor illegalities that this sovereign power had tolerated. (*SP*, p. 90).

In a recent article which is somewhat over-ambitious in its scope, Fred R. Dallmayr looks at Foucault's pluralist method, and in turn addresses the general relationships between modernity, liberalism and pluralism.[111] Giving brief analyses of key works by C.B. Macpherson, Jürgen Habermas and Hans Blumenberg, he argues that these writers depend too much upon a homegenising programme as the ideal path for social-political development in modernity.[112] They tend to ignore what Dallmayr terms the "dialectic of reason", in the pessimistic sense employed by Adorno and Horkheimer.[113] Dallmayr considers that Macpherson's *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy*[114] ignores the "heterogeneous arrangements in both pre-liberal and post-liberal societies, arrangements which are not reducible to economic or class categories [...]".[115] He goes on to argue that the work of Heidegger, Deleuze and Foucault offers the possibility of a political pluralism which depends neither on class differences, nor on a homogeneous, classless society. Such a pluralism would acknowledge and embrace the heterogeneity of social differences which do not have an economic root.[116] However, Dallmayr concentrates largely on the well-trodden ground of Foucault's pluralistic and non-possessive theorisation of power. In this way, Dallmayr over-emphasises what he sees as the political proposals of Foucault's work. This thesis also considers the development of the "shape" which is inherent in the development of Foucault's thought, to look at the ways in which he finally conceives of heterogeneity both as the articulation of "problematisations", and as a relationship of the self to the self.

One writer who explicitly considers himself to be a liberal, in the widest sense of the word, and who has engaged with Foucault's work, suggesting that it could be recuperated for a liberal project, is Richard Rorty. In a recent work, he demonstrates at least some of the complacency that Arblaster finds at many points in the liberal

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111 Fred R. Dallmayr, "Democracy and post-modernism," *Human Studies*, Foucault Memorial Issue, vol. 10, no. 1 (1986) pp. 143-170.

112 pp. 160-161.

113 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1979): "Myth turned into enlightenment, and nature into mere objectivity. Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise power. Enlightenment behaves towards things as a dictator toward men." (p. 9).

114 C.B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

115 Dallmayr, "Democracy and post-modernism," p. 149.

116 ibid., p. 163.

tradition, when he claims that "my hunch is that Western social and political thought may have had the last conceptual revolution it needs."[117] For this reason, he sees Foucault's desire to promote a new autonomy which is not tied to the philosophy of subjectivity as productive in unmasking abuses and subtle workings of power, but as politically irrelevant. He does this by maintaining the distinction between private and public spheres, which is so important for the liberal tradition, but which Foucault rejects. Rorty thus places himself squarely within the camp of liberal, "negative" freedom:

> Autonomy is not something which all human beings have within them and which society can release by ceasing to repress them. It is something which certain particular human beings hope to attain by self-creation, but which a few actually do. The desire to be autonomous is not relevant to the liberal's desire to avoid cruelty and pain — a desire which Foucault shared, even though he was unwilling to express it in those terms.[118]

Ultimately, Rorty considers Foucault to be "an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal."[119] By this, Rorty means that Foucault takes a relativist stance on the question of knowledge, but feels that modern liberal societies have gone too far in imposing new and subtle restraints on individuals for the pragmatic response of reform to be a viable proposition.[120] Rorty's work leads into an academic debate between Foucault and Habermas in the 'eighties. (It should, incidentally, be noted that this debate was largely carried out by others on behalf of Foucault and Habermas.[121] However the original attack upon Foucault as a "young conservative" came in an article by Habermas[122]). Whereas Rorty sees Foucault as an ironist who is unwilling to become a liberal, he sees Habermas as a liberal who is unwilling to become an ironist.[123] Foucault is seen by most commentators in this debate as basing his work on a radical aestheticising of language and discourse; an attempt to show the ways in which discourse operates independently of the subject.[124] Habermas, on the other hand, is presented as retaining

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117 Richard Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) p. 63.

118 ibid., p. 65.

119 ibid., p. 61.

120 See Ihab Hassan, "Pluralism in Postmodern Perspective," *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Spring, 1986) pp. 503-520. Hassan largely echoes Rorty, arguing that, whilst Foucault's work is useful in delineating the links between knowledge, desire and power, it is the path of a pragmatics — in the sense of William James — of critical pluralism that will mediate between potentially destructive political, social and cultural forces in the contemporary world.

121 For the most comprehensive and accessible summary of this "debate" thus far see: David R. Hiley, "Foucault and the question of Enlightenment," *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, no. 1 (1985) pp. 63-83.

122 Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique*, no. 22 (1981) pp. 3-22.

123 Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*, p. 61.

124 See Thomas L. Dunn, "The Politics of Post-modern Aesthetics: Habermas contra Foucault," *Political Theory*, vol. 16, no. 2 (May, 1988) pp. 209-228. Dunn argues that Foucault's use of aesthetic figures is close to the liberating effects of surrealism.

faith in an intersubjective pragmatics of language. Bernard Waldenfels summarises well what he admits is a largely hypothetical debate between the two, as an opposition between a conception of reason as *dispersed* or *divided.*[125] Waldenfels considers Habermas' project to be essentially Kantian in its attempt to describe in a comprehensive fashion the various strands of rationality which exist within modernity, and to propose practical communications between these strands.[126] Both Foucault and Habermas reject any notion of reason as immanent within the world. However, for Waldenfels, it is only Foucault who retains a material conception of reason. This, in turn, leads to his plural, dispersed view of reason: "Il est vrai qu'il n'accepte aucun retour aux choses mêmes, sans recourir à des ordres des choses, mais ces ordres, il les voit plonger dans la matérialité de l'histoire, il les trouve incorporés dans les matrices de la culture."[127]

Habermas himself provides an extensive statement on Foucault's work, in two lectures published after the latter's death.[128] Here, Habermas concentrates largely on what he sees as a continuity between Foucault's early and later work. It is precisely this continuity which provides the major flaw in Foucault's work for Habermas. In short, Foucault extrapolates rather extravagantly from his initial insight that the human sciences are posited on an implicit and unconscious will to power because of their position as pseudo-sciences and their apparent or feigned ignorance of the curious doubling effect of the subject described in *Les Mots et les choses*. Habermas ends his first lecture by posing the question of how this generalisation can have taken place:

> What, then, are the grounds that determine Foucault to shift the meaning of this specific will to knowledge and to truth that is constitutive for the modern forms of knowledge in general, and for the human sciences in particular, by generalising this will to knowing self-mastery into a will to power per se and to postulate that all discourses (by no means only the modern ones) can be shown to have the character of hidden power and derive from practices of power?[129]

In this way, Habermas attacks Foucault's own pluralism, by presenting his critique of the human sciences as overly-totalising.[130] Ultimately, however, Habermas misrepresents and misreads the middle period of Foucault's work, which develops

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125 Bernard Waldenfels, "Division ou dispersion de la raison: un débat entre Habermas et Foucault," *Les Etudes philosophiques*, no. 4 (1986) pp. 473-484.

126 ibid., p. 476.

127 ibid., p. 479.

128 See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).

129 ibid., p. 265.

130 See Jürgen Habermas, "Une flèche dans le coeur du temps présent," *Critique*, no. 471-472 (août-septembre, 1986) pp. 794-799. In this article published in a memorial issue of *Critique*, Habermas argues that Foucault's claim to concentrate on the question of the present cannot exist easily with his totalising rejection of the present. To illustrate this totalising perspective, Habermas recalls Paul Veyne's image of history in Foucault's work as "un iceberg recouvert arbitrairement par les formes cristallines de formations discursives [...]" (p. 797).

around *Surveiller et punir*, and in which the image and mechanism of the Panopticon plays such an important part. Habermas sees the Panopticon as being the concrete embodiment of the "gaze": "A gaze that objectifies and examines, that takes things apart analytically, that monitors and penetrates everything, gains a power that is structurally formative for these institutions."[131] Habermas perceives in Foucault's work the image of a totalising network of power in modernity, in which institutional architecture and the examining, analytic gaze of the human sciences "frictionlessly intermesh in the overall technology of power that finds its architectural expression in the closed institution [...]"[132] Habermas thus appears to ignore the important guiding principle of Deleuze's work on Foucault, which discovers a series of productive heterogeneities.[133] Deleuze's work on Foucault is structured around such heterogeneities as those between the elements of "dire" and "voir", and the discursive and the non-discursive. In the case of the prison, and the question of closed institutions in general, Deleuze counters what he sees as a current of received wisdom by claiming that Foucault depends neither methodologically on the hermeneutic drive towards interiority, nor on the analysis of forms of "l'enfermement", but is rather essentially a thinker of exteriority. The discursive and the non-discursive, for example, do not form a unified whole: "Foucault invoque souvent une forme du discursif, une forme du non-discursif; mais ces formes n'enferment rien, ni n'intériorisent; ce sont des 'formes d'extériorité' à travers lesquelles tantôt les énoncés, tantôt les visibles *se dispersent*."[134] Habermas is right to insist upon the importance on the "heterology" of Bataille for the work of Foucault.[135] He may also be correct to see early works such as *Histoire de la folie* as dominated by the question of exclusion. (Although the first chapter will argue that there are already indications of a heterogeneity which is not exclusion in this book.) However, he is wrong to see heterogeneity in the form of exclusion as the guiding force of the entirety of Foucault's work. The central argument of this thesis is that Foucault develops a novel conception of heterogeneity in the second half of his career.

As noted above, the main commentator to have investigated to any extent this

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131 Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 245.

132 ibid., p. 245.

133 However, in "Une flèche dans le coeur du temps présent," Habermas does, almost inadvertently, touch upon the core of Foucault's pluralism — which is elaborated as the question of "heterogeneity" in this thesis — at the very end of of the article. Despite his disagreements with Foucault's work, he sees its major strength as resting with a set of "contradictions instructives", such as that between analyses of truth and power, whereby the later project denies truth the normative force that it can derive from the ellision of power relations. (p. 799).

134 Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 50.

135 See Michel Foucault, "Préface à la transgression," *Critique*, Hommage à Georges Bataille, no. 195-196 (août-septembre, 1963) pp. 751-769. In this article — one of a set of literary articles for *Critique* in the early 'sixties — Foucault brings Bataille's notions of excess and transgression with the impersonality and materiality of language in the emergence of sexuality. (p. 767).

methodological interest in hybrid forms is Gilles Deleuze.[136] Deleuze deals with Foucault's oeuvre explicitly as one of philosophy. He conceives of Foucault's "archaeological" task as that of locating that which may be said and seen in a particular epoch. However, he also insisted that the "archiviste" must articulate and understand the heterogeneity, the separation which exists between these two elements. This thesis attempts to exist within the same field as the insights of Deleuze, and recent work by James Bernauer,[137] which seeks to examine the "logic" of Foucault's thought. That is to say, the complex and changing architectural framework which structures the transformations within this work. In an interview concerning his work on Foucault, Deleuze emphasises that Foucault's engagement with history is intended to demonstrate the specificity of the present, and suggests ways in which this specificity undermines any notion of a stable identity in the present. "L'histoire selon Foucault nous cerne et nous délimite, elle ne dit pas ce que nous sommes mais ce dont nous sommes en train de différer; elle n'établit pas notre identité mais la dissipe au profit de l'autre que nous sommes."[138] His formulation might be recast in terms of this thesis, by seeing Foucault's approach to the question of history as showing the the present to be heterogeneous to, but also a problematisation of, the past. Deleuze's approach sets him apart from many English-speaking critics, in that he approaches Foucault's work through largely literary or musical references. Beginning with the notion of "l'énoncé" in *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Deleuze considers Foucault to have introduced a "serial" logic into his philosophical/ historical investigations. According to Deleuze, "l'énoncé" may be seen as the point at which any number of heterogeneous systems intersect: "par exemple, les groupements et distinctions variables de symptômes dans les énoncés médicaux, à telle ou telle époque ou dans telle formation discursive."[139]

Deleuze also argues convincingly against seeing Foucault as a structuralist thinker, since the idea of structure is founded upon "un système homogène".[140] Foucault, on the other hand, conceives of "l'énoncé" as a multiplicity which crosses diagonally through various possible structures to illustrate the limits of thought. In other words, Deleuze shows how Foucault attempts to ground the totalising notion of the "expressive" structure. Whereas structuralism or more traditional linguistic theory depend upon a residual presence of a conscious subject, Deleuze sees *L'Archéologie du savoir* as the first and most decisive step in the direction of "une théorie-pratique des multiplicités."[141] Drawing on the closing section of *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Deleuze

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136 Deleuze, *Foucault*. 1986.

137 James W. Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward an Ethic for Thought* (London: Humanities Press International, 1990).

138 Gilles Deleuze, "La Vie comme une oeuvre d'art," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 1138 (29 août, 1986) p. 58. An interview with Didier Eribon.

139 Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 18.

140 ibid., p. 140.

141 ibid., p. 22.

states that, whereas the structure is always axiomatic, forming a homogeneous system, "l'énoncé est une multiplicité qui traverse les niveaux."[142] Deleuze sees Foucault's method of isolating the archive of statements — rules for what can be thought in a particular epoch with regard to the human sciences — as an attempt to deal with the complexity and contingency of the event in history. In defence of this thesis he cites the perplexity of historians when attempting to explain the emergence of capitalism.[143] The analysis of transformations from one system of thought to another will involve a diagonal relationship between series, whereby elements from the previous series are rearranged under different rules.[144] In this way, Deleuze is able to compare the structure of Foucault's archaeological work to Webern's serial musical world. Deleuze refers to Boulez — a friend and contemporary of Foucault — who sees in Webern the the creation of "une nouvelle dimension". Boulez sees this as a spatial relationship between fragments of music that exist not on a single plane but as points within an imaginary space.[145]

Deleuze locates Foucault historically within a "gauchiste" pluralist tradition which sets itself against Marxist and bourgeois forms of centralisation and totalisation.[146] Finally, however, Deleuze does not fully appreciate the importance of the concept of heterogeneity as it develops in Foucault's work. Ultimately, he returns to the notion of "le dehors" as not only the subversive outside to thought, but as the apparently infinitely resistant potential of life to the power which seeks to foster life.

The first chapter of this thesis develops the analysis and investigation of spatial themes in Foucault's work, a theme which has already been used by critics such as Deleuze and, in the English-speaking world, Pamela Major-Poetzl.[147] In a recent article, Major-Poetzl distingishes her own interest in "his [Foucault's] study of the formation and transformation of specific fields of knowledge,"[148] from the more common interest of American critics in the areas of Foucault's work which investigate "the relationship of knowledge to normative rules,"[149] and the relationship of knowledge to the self. Major-Poetzl sees the early "archaeological" period of Foucault's work as his most innovative. As in her earlier work, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture*, she sees a link between Foucault's work and modern physics:

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142 ibid., p. 23.
143 ibid., p. 30.
144 ibid., p. 30.
145 ibid., p. 30. See also Pierre Boulez, "Quelques souvenirs de Pierre Boulez," *Critique*, no. 471-472 (août-septembre, 1986) pp. 745-747. Boulez claims that Foucault was directly influenced by serial music. (p. 747).
146 Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 32.
147 Pamela Major-Poetzl, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture* (Brighton: Harvester, 1983).
148 Pamela Major-Poetzl, "The Disorder of Things," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol 44, no. 173 (1990) p. 198.
149 ibid., p. 198.

"Foucault's archaeologies, like relativity theory and quantum mechanics, dissolve the distinction between objects and subjects of knowledge, introduce new concepts of space and time to the study of physical and social sciences, and describe a multitude of discontinuous changes while leaving the problem of causality unresolved."[150] Taking one of the primary insights of *L'Archéologie du savoir*, that an object such as a book is not a discrete entity, but rather a nodal point within a network, Major-Poetzl asserts that Foucault's "archaeological" work develops in the field of epistemology insights analogous to those of field physics. Major-Poetzl limits her claims to Foucault's work up to and including *Surveiller et punir*, thus emphasising the importance of a concentration on spatial fields in the analysis of "savoir" and "pouvoir/ savoir". This thesis attempts to go further by looking at the way in which Foucault uses the notion of spatial fields as a grid for the analysis of not only "savoir", but truth as well. *L'Archéologie du savoir* is important not only in introducing principles of uncertainty rather than dialectical processes, but also in developing the methodological principle that apparently contradictory elements might exist within discourses, together with a commitment to investigate relations between the discursive and non-discursive fields which are non-causal. Concomitantly, this formal continuity and development in his work is underpinned by a vaguely defined "theory" of social change in modernity. The idea of a hybrid private public space which is the locus of forces emanating from individuals and higher "State" powers stands in analogous relation to the analysis of knowledge-fields.

In the first chapter of this thesis the trope of heterogeneity is shown to be at work even in Foucault's early writing on madness — *Histoire de la folie* — in the split between "une théorie juridique de la folie" and "une pratique sociale" (*HF*, p. 143), as attitudes towards madness in the classical era. *Histoire de la folie* may be seen as an early effort to employ a new historical and philosophical method of heterogeneity. This is the story of the development of "another" Foucault, not the Foucault who participates in an abusive attack on Enlightenment reason by means of an ill-informed history of the perceived "Others" of that reason. Lawrence Stone provides a typical example of such a position on Foucault's work:

> According to him [Foucault], the whole post-Enlightenment attempt to treat the mad more humanely, and to devise positive ways to cure them, was largely an aspect of a drive to confine and isolate all deviants in society, to lock them up and throw away the key. It was part of what he calls 'the great confinement.' other parts being the extensive growth of workhouses, schools and prisons.[151]

Notwithstanding the fact that this represents a highly caricatured reading, it is certainly true that Foucault becomes sceptical of his own participation in the history of Western

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150 ibid., p. 199.

151 Lawrence Stone, "Madness," *New York Review of Books* (16 December, 1982) p. 28.

Reason as a stranglehold on otherness and deviance. However, *Histoire de la folie* should be read rather as an investigation of the construction of madness rather than as an institutional history of exclusion and confinement.

The second chapter focusses on the question of the State and civil society. *Surveiller et punir* develops a formulation of power as operating strategically upon and by means of individual bodies. Disciplinary power is not a State form of power, in that it operates through specific institutions such as the prison. The State is a point of relay rather than origin or privileged concentration of power. It is also here that Foucault begins his rather enigmatic formulation of power coming "from below". It is from this point on that he begins to consider the relationship or confrontation between the individual and wider governmental structures, which might include the State. The third chapter analyses in some detail the way in which Foucault develops his serial notion of the individual to look at the birth of two hybrid forms, the social, and the population. His reading of liberalism as a form of governmentality is also dealt with. Instead of seeing liberalism as a primarily juridical mode of thought, he considers it as a mode of thought which constantly problematises government. It is inspired by the principle that it is always possible to govern "too much". The final chapter looks at Foucault's later work on the "technologies of the self". He conceives of the individual as heterogeneous to itself, since it may engage in a process of self-transformation. His final work is seen to operate around the principle of government as a "conduct of conduct". Liberty and government form a heterogeneous couple, in that they retain their individual characteristics, and yet work together to produce the distinctly modern formation of "gouvernementalité".

SPACE AND SPATIAL METAPHORS

The introductory chapter of this thesis has provided a brief overview of some of the main points of Foucault's pluralist method, and elucidated some of the questions which arise from this method. The central thesis of a "logic of heterogeneity" has also been stated. This chapter will look at the ways in which the spatial concerns of Foucault's oeuvre, from *Histoire de la folie* to *La Volonté de savoir*, work to bring together several rather disparate strands of thought into the loose constellation which will be this particular "logic" in his later work. At this point, it is worth remarking that Foucault's own spatial concerns are in themselves heterogeneous, in that they constitute no coherent system, but are brought together into creative tension to problematise distinctive modern forms of thought. Foucault is not a systematic thinker, but rather an obsessive stylist, who allows isomorphic relations between different areas of concern within his own work to suggest new articulations and paths for research. In view of this, the introductory chapter provided a preliminary discussion of the problematic but undoubtedly productive relationship between aesthetic and epistemological or genealogical projects. Although Gilles Deleuze goes further than most critics in establishing a connection in this respect, he does not bring out in enough detail the ways in which this particular conjuncture takes its place within a wider logic of heterogeneity.

It is by no means original to suggest that Foucault's early work in particular is dominated by spatial thinking. For example, the useful work of Pamela Major-Poetzl was noted in the introduction. Major-Poetzl's important suggestion is to have linked Foucault's work up to and including *Surveiller et punir* to the insights of field physics.[1] Thus, Foucault follows Einstein's adoption of non-Euclidean geometry to consider space as local, and the subject as a variable function within the field. In a similar way, change is seen as non-linear and discontinuous, with chaos existing beneath the superficial appearance of order. In *Les Mots et les choses*, for example, the figure of heterogeneity is linked to a loosely-adapted theory of the unconscious. Foucault argues that we are in the habit of thinking of order in terms of the Same; as a homogeneous construct. He attempts to show that the order of a given episteme is in fact heterogeneous to itself, in that it is unaware of the structures which found its own identity. Major-Poetzl proposes some useful insights, but they do not develop into Foucault's later work. Nor does she examine in sufficient detail the connections between different spatial concerns.

What, then, are the main spatial concerns of Foucault's work up to and including the publication of *La Volonté de savoir* in 1976? An early interest in the

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1 See Pamela Major-Poetzl, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture* (Brighton: Harvester, 1983).

imaginary and real spaces of exclusion owes much to phenomenology, and is to a large extent superseded by an epistemological analysis of "discourses" as opposed to ideas. Foucault's first publication, *Maladie mentale et personnalité*, is marked quite obviously by the influences of existentialism and phenomenology in considering mental structures as irreducible spatial "a-priori". Although Foucault acknowledges in this work that mental illness must, in some way, be connected to social factors, he also emphasises that the individual sufferer is forced back into "la pire des subjectivités." (*PER*, p. 69). This might take the form of a spatial disorientation, which appears to pre-empt the notion of heterotopia in *Les Mots et les choses*: "Les objets ont perdu leur cohésion et l'espace, sa cohérence; comme chez ce malade qui dessinait sans cesse le plan d'une ville fantastique dont les fortifications ne protégeaient qu'un agglomérat d'édifices sans significations." (*PER*, pp. 63-64).

Parallel to these developments is an important body of work on the space of language as a material and distinctively modern form of experience. As the introduction has already shown, the work on discourse has often been considered to be Foucault's "archaeological" period. This is followed by a "genealogical" consideration of multiple and accidental beginnings — rather than origins — with power and knowledge forming a complex spatial network traversed by strategic possibilities. This shift from archaeology to genealogy might be located around the time of Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, published as *L'Ordre du discours*. Here, for the first time, he moves away from a critical analysis of discourse and the interdictions that rational thought puts on discourse, towards what he calls a genealogical analysis. The spatial metaphor of an "outside" to thought is to some extent replaced by a more complex concentration on the relationship between discourse and power: "La part critique de l'analyse s'attache aux systèmes d'enveloppement du discours [...] La part généalogique de l'analyse s'attache en revanche aux séries de la formulation effective du discours [...]" (*OD*, p. 71).

In simple terms, then, Foucault begins his intellectual career with two overriding spatial themes of exclusion and transgression; the relationship between the "inside" and "outside" of thought. He claims that we tend to ignore the fact that the thought which comes from the outside, an example being the spatial confusions of the mentally ill, is actually far more fundamental to the "inside" of thought than is commonly recognised. He then develops a spatial consideration of knowledge and change in history as the reorganisation of elements within a spatial field, rather than a temporal evolution of "savoir". Then, in the 'seventies, he develops a quasi-military language of strategy to examine "micro-pouvoirs" which operate within a territory, and within the fabric of the population. In the most general of terms, Foucault perceives, beginning in the sixteenth century, a new political obsession with the internal space of the nation-State, its political economy, the construction of a market, systems of

discipline, and the general problems of control and circulation. The small-scale spaces of domestic, factory and penal life are the "battlefield" of modern power. The body is seen as an increasingly privileged, enigmatic locus of knowledge, and also as a relay point within networks of power. In terms of this line of development, the emphasis on space reaches its most intense and persuasive formulation in the central section of *Surveiller et punir*, concerning the development of techniques of discipline from the seventeenth century onwards. The body of the infantryman in the eighteenth century represents for Foucault a particularly striking example of this disciplinary technique, in that this body is ideally broken down into segments and recomposed into an efficient machine. (*SP*, p. 166).

The above, then, represents a fairly conventional pathway through Foucault's work from the early 'sixties to the mid-'seventies. However, it can also be argued that this work establishes an intersecting network of concerns, leading to the development of a spatial logic which is something more than the sum of its parts. That is to say, from the very beginning of his career, Foucault is concerned with complex systems of rationality, which are made up of various linguistic *and* non-linguistic elements, and which work together within a system without mutually cohering as a unified whole. In other words, his work in general is marked by the desire to undermine a mode of thought which attributes to itself a stable identity. He seeks to illustrate the ways in which thought, and the relation of thought to political, institutional and personal practices, is heterogeneous to itself and non-identical. Also, throughout his work, Foucault leaves explanatory "gaps" in his descriptions of historical change. For example, *Histoire de la folie* is set against a conventionally totalising base/superstructure model. Foucault acknowledges that the tendency towards confinement which sweeps Europe in the seventeenth century is linked to an economic crisis which affects the whole of Europe. (*HF*, p. 77). However, the precise way in which this particular institutional development is linked to the philosophical shift from "la folie" to "la déraison", which occurs at roughly the same period, is left largely unexplained. According to Foucault, the fact of internment precedes the modern consciousness of madness as a form of alienated truth. (*HF*, p. 91). It may be argued, with some justification, that a weak notion of resemblance is substituted here for a causal link. (The introduction dealt briefly with the ways in which Foucault sought to articulate the links between institutional and epistemological shifts by means of a pluralist methodology.) However, such gaps should also be seen as a conscious effort to avoid the recuperation of changes in thought to an explanatory model.

This early commitment to developing the figure of heterogeneity can be illustrated further with reference to contemporary reconsiderations of Foucault's first major work, *Histoire de la folie*. Colin Gordon counters what he sees as the conventional view that Foucault conceives of the creation of the category of mental

illness as the practice of labelling deviant individuals as insane. According to Gordon, Foucault rather shows that internment gives rise to "promiscuous complicity" between heterogeneous categories of "déraison".[2] Gordon's point could be developed a little further by looking at Foucault's description of the construction of modern psychiatric medicine towards the end of the eighteenth century. The practices of "l'internement" and "la pensée médicale" begin to draw closer together. However, for Foucault, this movement is not the result of the "enlightened" discovery that those who are interned are actually ill. Instead he characterises the "rapprochement" as:

> un obscur travail dans lequel se sont confrontés le vieil espace de l'exclusion, homogène, uniforme, rigoureusement limité, et cet espace social de l'assistance que le XVIII^{e} siècle vient de fragmenter, de rendre polymorphe, en le segmentant selon les formes psychologiques et morales du dévouement [...] (*HF*, p. 447)

It can be seen, then, that this superposition of different "spaces" is central to Foucault's development of heterogeneity, and is already present in a rudimentary form in *Histoire de la folie*. Overall, however, this book retains a phenomenological interest in a "lost" experience of madness as an homogeneous space. Madness does appear to be a subjective experience which is denied by Western reason in general.

In a similar way to Gordon, Roberto Machado attempts to show that, growing out of the French epistemological tradition, Foucault's early "archaeological" work depends upon notions of discontinuity and rupture, but that in *Histoire de la folie*, "les ruptures sont générales, verticales et partielles."[3] An example of a vertical rupture would be the fact that psychiatry is presented as "un compromis" between medical analysis and institutional perception. Machado also highlights a set of "hétérogénéités", which contradict any idea that Foucault is attempting to portray the construction of a monolithic category of exclusion:

> Mais il y a aussi hétérogénéité: entre conscience critique et expérience tragique de la folie à la Renaissance; entre les deux formes institutionnelles de réclusion — l'hôpital et le Grand Renfermement — à l'âge classique; entre une conscience juridique et une conscience sociale de la folie [...][4]

Again, Machado does not link this use of heterogeneity to the wider context of Foucault's work, or the question of space. However, he does suggest that Foucault's later work moves away from the normative elements in *Histoire de la folie*, whereby history moves largely in a unified way towards towards the progressive repression of

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2 Colin Gordon, "Histoire de la folie: An Unknown Book by Michel Foucault," *History of the Human Sciences*, vol. 3, no. 1 (February 1990) p. 8.

3 Roberto Machado, "Archéologie et epistémologie," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) p. 19.

4 ibid., p. 20.

the truth of madness.[5] That is to say, the book does have as one of its organising principles the idea that there must have been an original bifurcation of reason, whereby madness was excluded.

So, while *Histoire de la folie* must be seen, to a certain extent, as caught within a confrontation between the inside and outside of thought, there are here the germs of the complex space(s) of rationality towards which Foucault will move in his later work. Although he does not make any direct statement to this effect, Machado certainly implies that archaeology already contains elements of the genealogical method, in that *L'Archéologie du savoir* does begin to grapple with the question of non-discursive factors. Both Gordon and Machado highlight the importance of heterogeneity in Foucault's method, but fail to link this explicitly to spatial concerns, and do not propose an articulation between heterogeneity and a wider pluralism. However, for the moment, it is necessary to consider the wider context of Foucault's participation in a move away from time to space as instruments of analysis.

Debates over space and time in contemporary social theory tend to concentrate on the political implications of a concentration on one of the two concepts. This can be demonstrated by comparing two pieces of work which both cite Foucault as an important and innovative social theorist because of his interest in spatiality. David Gross argues, almost in conservative terms which are curiously similar to Daniel Bell in the opening section of *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*,[6] that the spatialisation of contemporary life has impoverished an important historical sense.[7] He cites as instances of such impoverishment, the "spatialisation" of urban life, the decline of class-consciousness, the commodification of everyday life and leisure leading to an overdeveloped sense of immediacy, an inability of the individual to communicate with the past, and a privileging of the visual over the oral tradition. He cites Bergson and Lukács as important figures in the attempt to reassert the primacy of time. Foucault is important for Gross in that he sees the spaces of modernity as non-transparent. In simple terms, then, Gross sees Foucault as an "anti-spatial" thinker: "The importance of Foucault for modern historiography is that he, too, wants to rid modern thought of the antiseptic, 'clean' space in which it operates, since this makes impossible any tragic confrontation with otherness."[8] In this way, Gross provides a variation on an important debate within contemporary critical thought which concerns the opposition between space and time, or rather the dominance of history as an explanatory and critical mode as opposed to a recognition of the specificity of space and locality.

The opposition between space and time is also dealt with effectively in Edward

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5 ibid., p. 21.
6 Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1978).
7 David Gross, "Space, Time and Modern Culture," *Telos*, vol. 50 (1981-82) pp. 59-78.
8 Gross, p. 78.

Soja's recent publication, *Postmodern Geographies*.[9] Basically, he reverses Gross' argument, to claim that specificity of space and geography has constituted an important gap in traditional Marxism, being considered as at worst irrelevant and at best an inconvenience when confronted with the globally dynamic and explanatory power of history.[10] Soja defines traditional Marxism's concentration on a critical historical discourse as an obstructive historicism. He first looks at Raymond Williams' definition of "historicism" in *Keywords*,[11] and offers an alternative to Williams' choices: "I wish to give an additional twist to these options by defining historicism as an overdeveloped historical contextualization of social life and social theory that actively submerges and peripheralizes the geographical or spatial imagination."[12]

Soja argues that Marxism ironically mirrors capitalism's own propensity to annihilate space by time in its own disregard for geography.[13] David Harvey, one of Britain's foremost Marxist geographers, would attempt to recuperate such criticisms by arguing that capitalism's attempt to annihilate space by time — a good example being the growth of railways — cannot help but institute the material contradiction of an immobile spatial configuration which remains. He therefore proposes a "spatialised" version of Marxism.[14] Soja claims Foucault, Lefebvre and Berger as the main social theorists to have attempted a reinstitution of the geographical imagination. Although this is by no means an invalid use of Foucault, the overriding spatial dimension of his work is perhaps better served by considering him not as thinker who privileges space over time, but rather as privileging heterogeneity and pluralism over totalisation.

How, then, can Soja and Gross come from what are apparently directly opposed angles and still claim the importance of Michel Foucault as a contemporary social theorist? For the moment, it should suffice to say that each has picked up on one of the several spatial elements in Foucault's work, containing, as it does, a methodology which is organised around the figure of heterogeneity. Gross correctly identifies the fact that Foucault often appears to attack any mode of thought which is organised around the dream of a transparent space of exchange or communication. Soja, on the other hand, is also correct in pointing out that Foucault criticises modes of critical thought which ignore the specificity of power relations as they are organised by space and architecture. However, such approaches ignore another important aspect of spatiality in Foucault's thought. That is to say, rather than seeing spatial metaphors as an inherently reactionary method of analysis, Foucault uses the idea of spatial fields,

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9 Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies* (London: Verso, 1989).
10 ibid., pp. 32-33.
11 Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (London: Fontana, 1983) p. 15.
12 Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*, p. 15.
13 ibid., p. 33.
14 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989) p. 232.

and particularly dispersion within a spatial field, in order to move away from the notion of a subjectivity which controls and accumulates knowledge.

Before examining Foucault's work in detail, it is worth quoting a passage from what is broadly speaking a sociological article by Jean-Paul Tricart in 1977, which alludes to Foucault's influence on spatial thinking:

> Cette dénonciation du contrôle social s'est inscrite, pour une part, dans une perspective de critique radicale, tendant à assimiler toute 'intervention' à une entreprise de coercition et prêtant aux dispositifs de prise en charge cohérence et fonctionnalité. C'est ainsi que certains auteurs ont décrit l'espace social comme un espace 'saturé' par des institutions d'encadrement et des agents d'observation, de délation, de contrôle et d'hygiénisation [...] Notre société serait ainsi traversée de 'dispositifs disciplinaires' et de 'technologies politiques' concourant au 'quadrillage de l'espace et des corps'.[15]

The above quotation is useful for two reasons. Firstly, as evidence of the wide currency of Foucault's emphasis on the disciplinary use of social spaces, particularly in the well-known work *Surveiller et punir*[16], in an article which is sociological in orientation, rather than the philosophical hybrid which characterises Foucault's line of enquiry. Secondly, it demonstrates a widespread misinterpretation of Foucault's work. Tricart is obviously critical of what he sees as an overly reductive and negative view of social work that he perceives in Foucault's work. It is undoubtedly true that *Surveiller et punir* demonstrates the importance of the use of social spaces for control, surveillance and normalisation.[17] However, it will be shown that in this book Foucault approaches the question of discipline rather as a point of articulation or transmission between the heterogeneous categories of penal reform and the successful existence of the prison. The technique of "discipline", as it is presented in *Surveiller et punir*, is not intended as a diagnostic description of the predominant preoccupation of modern States. It is in part a "fictional" means of understanding the articulation between the figure of the prison, the techniques of industrial society, and a growing technical preoccupation with the individual body. To conclude this section, it should be noted that the brief discussion of the work of Gross, Soja and Harvey approaches questions of spatiality as a descriptive or critical tool. Foucault, on the other hand, whilst not denying these functions, also uses spatiality as a tool for thinking outside of traditional frameworks of progress and intentionality.

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15 Jean-Paul Tricart, "Genèse d'un dispositif d'assistance: les 'cités de transit'," *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 1 (1977) p. 601.

16 In *Surveiller et punir*, Foucault considers the military camp to be the model for the various human "observatories" which emerge during the course of the classical age:

> Le camp, c'est le diagramme d'un pouvoir qui agit par l'effet d'une visibilité générale. Longtemps on retrouvera dans l'urbanisme, dans la construction des cités ouvrières, des hôpitaux, des asiles, des prisons, des maisons d'éducation, ce modèle du camp ou du moins le principe qui le sous-tend: l'emboîtement spatial des surveillances hiérarchisées. (p. 174).

17 This view is taken up by Paul Claval in *Espace et pouvoir* (Paris: P.U.F., 1978) p. 9.

At this point, it should be noted that Foucault maintains his own commentary on the use of space and spatial metaphors in his thought. Firstly, corroborating Soja's insights, two passages from different periods indicate that he considered his work to be a direct challenge to a period in which the notion of time as a privileged element of positive development has held sway. He certainly indicates a conscious effort to re-establish the use of spatial description as a tool for radical critique. In the 'seventies, Foucault states quite clearly that critical thought has tended to avoid the use of spatial analysis and metaphors, since these are seen as static and non-dialectic:

> Il y aurait à faire une critique de cette disqualification de l'espace qui a régné depuis de nombreuses générations. Est-ce que ça a commencé avec Bergson ou avant? L'espace, c'est ce qui était mort, figé, non dialectique, immobile. En revanche, le temps, c'était riche, fécond, vivant, dialectique.[18]

Here, the opposition between space and time is put in the most simple terms. Space has been for a long time, according to Foucault, seen as somehow reactionary. These remarks also indicate that Foucault's obsession with space may be connected to the often complex and ambivalent confrontation with Marxism which must be acknowledged as another motivating element in his work, particularly in the way he seeks to break with the synthesising drive of a dialectical project; a move which has been discussed in some detail in the introduction. For this reason, the concept of change in his earlier "archaeological" period is left largely unexplained, while the later "genealogical" work premises change upon the minutiae of the everyday, the inertia of the spatial and material, the social moulding and creation of the body, and the contingency of error, anachronism and chance. It is worth noting that, in an interview given towards the end of his life, Foucault again deals specifically with the question of the importance of space for his work, and mentions briefly a story of being attacked by a "Sartrean" at a conference in the 'sixties for a reactionary and "technocratic" obsession with space at the expense of the existentially dynamic element of time.[19]

In a second passage from the 'seventies, Foucault also offers a direct challenge to the philosophical supremacy of the temporal in *Naissance de la clinique*, again placing himself in opposition to Bergson. Bergson sees the core of individuality in a consciousness of time and memory, as opposed to the geometric "spatialisation" of the intellect. Foucault, on the other hand, considers the modern form of individuality to lie in a spatialisation of the body, whereby the body is now seen as containing an explanation of its own death. The nineteenth-century clinician is haunted by "un oeil absolu", which will paradoxically find the light of truth in dead body. Death finds a

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18 Michel Foucault, "Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie," *Hérodote*, no. 1 (1976) p. 78.

19 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge and Power," in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) pp. 252-253.

space in language and knowledge by means of a respectable science of the individual:

> L'individu, ce n'est pas la forme initiale et la plus aiguë en laquelle se présente la vie. Il n'est donné enfin au savoir qu'au terme d'un long mouvement de spatialisation dont les instruments décisifs ont été un certain usage du langage et une conceptualisation difficile de la mort. Bergson est strictement à contresens quand il cherche dans le temps et contre l'espace [...] les conditions auxquelles il est possible de penser l'individualité vivante. (*NC*, pp. 174-175).

This short passage is representative of one of the central, and most polemical of Foucault's insights from his work up until the mid-'seventies. That is to say, the increasing spatial concentration upon the individual and its body is linked to the development of the importance of history and evolution as explanatory categories. In *Les Mots et les choses*, the finitude of Man as an individual is shown to be the foundation of the claims to knowledge embodied in the human sciences. Therefore, Man's evolution as a species takes on an enigmatic power. Foucault attempts to reverse an accepted mode of thought, by showing that the concentration on time and history which the nineteenth century develops is actually based to a certain extent upon the spatialisation of the individual. In *Surveiller et punir*, this insight is taken a degree further, to suggest that this double of finitude and evolution is equivalent to the integration of a microphysics and macrophysics of power in the modern era. The various articulations between the apparently heterogeneous micro- and the macro-levels of power are extremely important for Foucault's later work. The two "great discoveries" of the eighteenth century are the "genesis" of the individual, and the progress of society:

> Une macro- et une microphysique de pouvoir ont permis, non pas certes l'invention de l'histoire (il y avait beau temps qu'elle n'avait plus besoin de l'être) mais l'intégration d'une dimension temporelle, unitaire, cumulative dans l'exercice des contrôles et la pratique des dominations. (*SP*, p. 162).

Here, he talks of a "sériation du temps", whereby tasks are imposed upon the body which are repetitive, but also graduated. Time is spatialised, in that it becomes serialised and tabulated. It is broken down into segments which can be built into a new totality. This technique of detailed segmentation of tasks, units of time, and ultimately the body itself, is the basis of the much-discussed category of discipline that appears in *Les Mots et les choses*.

At this point, it is worth returning to *Naissance de la clinique*, in order to bring out in more detail Foucault's use of spatiality at this particular stage of his career. Dreyfus and Rabinow consider its spatial importance to lie in the fact that this is a structuralist text.[20] However, it should not be forgotten that Foucault produced a

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20 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982) p. 15.

second version of this book in 1972, from which he edited passages and phrases that he considered to be too overtly structuralist.[21] The question of Foucault's relationship to structuralism has already been touched upon in the introduction, and will be returned to in this chapter when discussing *L'Archéologie du savoir*. For the moment, it is necessary to concentrate on the spatial questions which arise directly from this book. (The edition referred to is the second edition.) *Naissance de la clinique* is a complex and perhaps neglected work in Foucault's oeuvre. It contains, in an often uneasy juxtaposition, the four main strands of Foucault's "spatial" awareness at this stage. These are as follows:

1) The spatialisation of the individual body, in that disease begins to be related to the specific body suffering from this disease.

2) The establishment of certain sites; hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools and workhouses which organise, normalise and provide a relay point for the positive management of the social body.

3) Linked to this, the idea that the clinic or teaching hospital constitutes, in a similar way to the prison in *Surveiller et punir*, a point of articulation or compromise between apparently heterogeneous categories or programmes. In this instance between a "liberal" desire for transparency of communication within the social space, and the extraction of useful knowledge from disease.

4) Finally, and this is perhaps the most neglected aspect of Foucault's spatial awareness, the attempt, certainly influenced by the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem,[22] to examine mutations and transformations in knowledge as spatial reorganisations of existing knowlege. François Dagognet, in a review of *Naissance de la clinique*, emphasises that Foucault does not present Bichat as the individual who "discovers" clinical pathology. Dagognet rather sees Foucault's analysis as a Kantian exploration of the various circumstances which make clinical medicine possible:

> Assurément, M. Foucault ne voit pas en Bichat celui qui, délibérément, aurait chassé les ombres, les épais brouillards pour constituer un savoir neuf et clair. Le langage du *Traité des membranes*, lui-même inséparable d'une culture qui intègre la mort, réorganise l'espace de la maladie et fonde surtout une perception.[23]

By seeing developments in science as spatial reorganisations rather than as temporal developments, Foucault allows for the continued presence of "anachronistic" elements

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21 See James Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought* (London: Humanities Press International, 1990). Appendix 2. Here, Bernauer outlines the major changes between the two editions.

22 See Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Scientific Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Gutting argues that the influence of Bachelard and Canguilhem has been neglected in secondary literature on Foucault's work. He maintains that this concentration on Foucault's early interest in the philosophy of science offers a reading that circumvents problematic discussions on the so-called "structuralist" period of the 'sixties.

23 Francois Dagognet, "Archéologie ou histoire de la médecine," *Critique*, vol. 21 (1965) p. 443.

within a system — whether as obstacles or positive forces — and is able to present change as both impersonal and not necessarily as a linear development from a previously inadequate paradigm.

Naissance de la clinique, then, deals on one level with the formation of a science of the individual case, the individual body. On another level, it might be seen as anomalous, in bringing together epistemic, or discursive, and social, or non-discursive, concerns at such an early stage of his career. One of the intentions of this thesis is to show that such aspects are not in fact anomalous. It has, for example, been shown that moves had already been made in this direction with *Histoire de la folie*. It should also be noted that Foucault pre-empts the theme of an increasing spatialisation of the individual body in *Histoire de la folie*. Here, he notes that eighteenth-century medicine did not, as is often supposed, operate in terms of a mind-body dichotomy. "La médecine des esprits" sees the body as a geometric figure which expresses the movement of the passions. (*HF*, pp. 244-245). As previously discussed in the introduction, *Naissance de la clinique* is concerned with the emergence of a clinical practice of dissecting corpses, not only as the result of a spatial reorganisation of medical knowledge, but also as the result of an articulation between plural or heterogeneous discursive and non-discursive domains.

To summarise, *Naissance de la clinique* can undoubtedly be read as a structuralist text, describing in painstaking detail the architecture of a new spatiality of clinical medicine at the beginning of the nineteenth century, which is different from the spatiality which organised eighteenth-century classificatory medicine. The opening sections of the first chapter describe in some detail the "geography" of disease in this classificatory medicine. (*NC*, pp. 2-14). This medicine of species is based upon diseases existing within a natural environment within the social field, which precludes the widespread existence of medical institutions. However, there does exist within this particular form of medicine the potential for the spatiality of the individual to increase in importance. In short, eighteenth-century medicine is shown to contain two major forms of spatiality, with the disease as a naturally occuring phenomenon within a social space, and a secondary spatiality of the relation between the disease and the individual. The advent of clinical medicine is made possible by a "tertiary", institutional spatialisation: "On appellera spatialisation tertiaire l'ensemble des gestes par lesquels la maladie, dans une société, est cernée, médicalement investie, isolée, répartie dans des régions privilégiées et closes, ou distribuée à travers des milieux de guérison, aménagés pour être favorables." (*NC*, p. 14). Foucault also draws an important distinction between the rationalist conception of sight, represented here by Descartes and Malebranche, and the act of seeing linked to clinical medicine at the end of the eighteenth century. For Descartes and Malebranche, light is anterior to the act of seeing and reveals the essence of the object. (*NC*, p. ix). However, alongside the advent of clinical medicine, the act

of seeing paradoxically depends upon the opacity of the object. In this way, as noted above, the individual body becomes the central focus of clinical medicine. The truth which the body may reveal emerges from the fact of it being caressed by "le regard médical". (*NC*, pp. ix-x). In rather extravagant terms, Foucault claims that medicine had sought an articulation between disease and life for centuries. It is only at the end of the eighteenth century that death is introduced as a third term, which allows disease to be represented in a space coinciding with the individual organism. Death allows disease to be spatialised and individualised. (*NC*, p. 162).

However, aside from the spatial move of analysing historical shifts as the reorganisation of elements within a field, *Naissance de la clinique* also represents an important statement of the co-existence of apparently contradictory or heterogeneous demands and programmes. Thus, although the political ideals of the Revolution resemble the new medical technology in their demand for a free and pure space of communication (NC, p. 37), the clinic as a space is the consequence of compromise emerging from a complex of issues, including the economic status of disease (*NC*, p. 43), the contradiction of the freedom of citizens within the State and the potential tyranny arising from the "free" practice of medicine (*NC*, p. 46), and the possibility of forming a national fund of medical knowledge (*NC*, p. 47). This is an early example of the sort of historical analysis which will later be seen as a "problematisation". However, Foucault's work at this stage differs in two ways from his later work, particularly concerning his last work on "sexuality". Firstly, a concrete "solution" to this problematisation emerges in the shape of clinical medicine. This solution is explained rather uneasily as both the inevitable outcome of a pregnant "gap" in a field of knowledge (*NC*, p. 2), *and* a "contract" between rich and poor, whereby clinical medicine is the interest paid by the poor for the capital that the rich have invested in hospitals. (*NC*, p. 85). Secondly, this solution constitutes a unified, single discourse, which leads to a limit-experience of finitude. Foucault's work at this stage employs a curious sleight of hand, in that the de-sacralisation of death opens a space of "transgression", whereby the literary imagination can undermine the certainty of the human sciences. This literary theme will be returned to later in the chapter. In later work, Foucault presents the general reaction to problematisations as more circumspect responses, rather than as direct solutions, and in many ways dispenses with the question of transgression, in favour of the analysis of multiple truths.

Having established a relatively complex set of spatial elements within Foucault's work, it is worth looking in some detail at a recently published article, which was originally presented as a talk in 1967.[24] This paper constitutes a fund of spatial themes, some of which are developed, whilst others are apparently neglected in

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24 Michel Foucault, "Des autres espaces," *Architecture, Mouvement, Continuité*, vol. 5 (1984) p. 47.

later work. Firstly, the influence of Bachelard in relation to spatial themes is directly acknowledged. Bachelard's *La Poétique de l'espace*,[25] published in 1958, has direct recourse to a phenomenology of the poetic imagination, considering poetic similes as in some way expressing the root of human consciousness. Obviously, Foucault is often presented as being in direct opposition to the subject-centred philosophy of phenomenology. However, it is from these phenomenological roots that the early insistence on the subversive and transgressive power of language develops. For Bachelard, the poetics of space is an instance of the freedom of language to go beyond the purely instrumental, and of the suspension of time in favour of the daydreams of space. Foucault develops from these themes an interest in the materiality of language, which helps to distance his work from the formalism of structuralism: "L'oeuvre (immense) de Bachelard, les descriptions des phénoménologues nous ont appris que nous ne vivons pas dans un espace homogène et vide, mais au contraire, dans un espace qui est tout chargé de qualités, un espace qui est peut-être aussi hanté de fantasme [...]"[26] This is a useful reminder of the existential and phenomenological roots of Foucault's work. In his introduction to Ludwig Binswanger's *Le Rêve et l'existence*, published in 1954, he sees the dream as an existential limit-experience. The dream represents a complex space of radical freedom which is irreducible to the categories of psychology.[27] In the article referred to above Foucault distinguishes between the inner space of thought, what might be called Bachelard's psychoanalysis of thought, and the material space within which life is played out. However, this space is equally as complex, in that we live within a series of sites ("emplacements") which are irreducible to one another:

> L'espace dans lequel nous vivons, par lequel nous sommes attirés hors de nous-mêmes, dans lequel se déroule précisément l'érosion de notre vie, de notre temps et de notre histoire, cet espace qui nous ronge et nous ravine, est en lui-même aussi un espace![sic] éthérogène. Autrement dit, nous ne vivons pas dans une sorte de vide, à l'intérieur duquel on pourrait situer des individus et des choses.[28]

He begins with the assertion that the nineteenth century demonstrates an obsession with history. This manifests itself in the shape of the second law of thermodynamics, the potential "cooling", or entropy, of time as "l'essentiel de ses ressources mythologiques." The present age is, on the other hand, "l'époque du simultané", or of what he calls the "dispersé". Structuralism is one attempt to map dispersed relations. However, Foucault points out that structuralism is not an attempt to deny "le temps",

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25 Gaston Bachelard, *La Poétique de l'espace* (Paris: P.U.F., 1958).
26 ibid., p. 47.
27 Michel Foucault, "Introduction," to Ludwig Binswanger, *Le Rêve et l'existence* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954) pp. 9-128.
28 Michel Foucault, "Des autres espaces," p. 47.

but rather a method of establishing relationships, juxtapositions and oppositions between elements which occur in time.[29] In a move which seems designed to avoid the potential ahistoricism of structuralism and phenomenology, Foucault introduces the most important insights of the paper by insisting upon the fact that space itself has a history. Three eras of spatialisation are outlined in the broadest terms possible. The Middle Ages are an era of "localisation", a hierarchy of spaces, whereas in the seventeenth century Galileo emphasises the importance of infinite movement and a space of "l'étendue". Finally our own era is one of "l'emplacement". In abstract terms, the modern era is characterised by serial spaces which are characterised by the plural relationships between various elements, rather than a hierarchical or general and totalising perspective. Foucault offers the obvious example of contemporary systems of communication: "De nos jours, l'emplacement se substitue à l'étendue qui elle-même remplaçait la localisation. L'emplacement est défini par les relations de voisinage entre points ou éléments; formellement, on peut les décrire comme des séries, des arbres, des treillis."[30] Moving on from here, Foucault introduces the notion of "hétérotopies", which are described as "contre-emplacements". Heterotopias are literally "other" spaces, neutralising or inverting the relations which are reflected in them. As an example of a "hétérotopie de déviation", Foucault cites the prison and the psychiatric clinic, in that individuals who depart from the norms of society are placed in this other space. The notion of heterotopia is closely linked to the figure of heterogeneity, since the heterotopia is essentially a mixed space in which different times — "hétérochronies" — may be accumulated, such as in the museum, as well as different spaces: "L'hétérotopie a le pouvoir de juxtaposer en un seul lieu réel, plusieurs espaces, plusieurs emplacements qui sont eux-mêmes incompatibles."[31] Foucault's work in its entirety will be shown to deal with real or metaphorical heterotopias, whereby several elements are held in productive tension within a system. The notion of a heterotopia will be returned to in this chapter in the context of a brief discussion of *Les Mots et le choses*.

In general, then, much attention has been paid to Foucault's utilisation of spatial analysis in his descriptions of surveillance and the social disciplining of the body as a productive machine. Although this is an important and useful account of his work, the more abstract spatiality of heterogeneity ultimately organises and forms links between the use of space in questions of epistemology and disciplinary technologies. Space is a method of conceptualising the material life of thought. In the article discussed above, Foucault sees space as something which draws us as human beings "hors de nous-mêmes." He uses spatial figures to undermine the notion of thought as the direct

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29 ibid., p. 46.
30 ibid., p. 46.
31 ibid., p. 38.

expression and application of ideas.

An example of the complexity and elusive quality of Foucault's spatial thinking would be a relatively well-known discussion with a group of Maoists in the early 'seventies.[32] Basically, the discussion centres around a disagreement over whether a revolutionary situation calls for people's courts or a more spontaneous, less disciplined form of justice. An important adjunct to this discussion is the relationship between proletarianised and non-proletarianised elements of the masses. The "young Maoists" are in favour of revolutionary courts and a body such as the People's Red Army which in some ways stands for the people and organises the revolutionary movement. Foucault basically deploys two instances of what might generally be termed "spatial" arguments. Firstly, he shows how the spatial organisation of the court itself implies a third, intrusive, element between the people and the ruling classes. He argues that the table at which the "third party", the judges, sit, implies a neutrality and a certain conception of truth in the form of the "just", the "unjust" and a third party qualified to dispense justice.[33] Secondly, he insists upon the complexity and spatial dispersal of techniques which implant contradictions between proletarianised and non-proletarianised elements in society, which fulfil the role which was previously taken by colonisation, in relocating people geographically:

> Le quadrillage policier quotidien, les commissariats de police, les tribunaux (et singulièrement ceux de flagrant délit), les prisons, la surveillance post-pénale, toute la série des contrôles que constituent l'éducation surveillée, l'assistance sociale, les 'foyers', doivent jouer sur place un des rôles que jouaient l'armée et la colonisation en déplaçant les individus et en les expatriant.[34]

In this interview, Foucault constantly emphasises a methodological concentration on the plurality which underpins an apparently unified, universal and unitary structure such as the court. He notes that there have been a plurality of judicial systems and practices throughout history, in order to attack what he sees as the Maoists universalisation of the court. In general, he works from the assumption that it would be an error to consider the court as representing a privileged point of subjectivity from which to judge, since the court is an institutional mechanism, but also because the techniques of power are dispersed in a complex way throughout society. Although this particular interview represents what is perhaps a rather naïve and overly modish belief in the spontaneity of popular political action, it also illustrates in a simple manner the way in which Foucault uses a broadly "spatial" mode of thought.

In Foucault's major methodological work, *L'Archéologie du savoir*, the spatial figure of dispersion emerges explicitly for the first time, and forms an important

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32 Michel Foucault, "Sur la justice populaire: débat avec les maos," *Les Temps modernes*, no. 310 (1972) pp. 335-366.

33 ibid., pp. 341-342.

34 ibid., p. 350.

category. In the introduction to this important work, he begins to develop a new and complex spatial turn to his work, by acknowledging the usefulness of recent developments in the field of history, together with a move away from the early concentration on language in favour of an attempt to deal with the linguistic traces of a society in their full materiality. Firstly, he notes that there has been a contemporary move in history away from a linear narrative approach which deciphers and interprets the causal chain of political events from written documents such as letters, treaties, parliamentary proceedings etc. History, particularly under the influence of the *Annales* school, has begun to acknowledge multiple temporalities, temporalities which are often linked to geographical location and space:

> Derrière l'histoire bousculée des gouvernements, des guerres et des famines, se dessinent des histoires, presque immobiles sous le regard, des histoires à pente faible: histoire des voies maritimes, histoire du blé ou des mines d'or, histoire de la sécheresse et de l'irrigation, histoire de l'assolement, histoire de l'équilibre, obtenu par l'espèce humaine, entre la faim et la prolifération. (*AS*, p. 10)

The importance of the *Annales* group, and particularly the theoretical reflections of Fernand Braudel, should not be underestimated in Foucault's work at this time.[35] His attack on documentary history, and the formulations of "l'énoncé" and the "épistème" can be traced back in part at least to Braudel's notion of "la longue durée".[36] In the late 'fifties and early 'sixties Braudel became interested in a history of "mentalités". These are assumptions or frameworks of thinking which form the background of "une longue durée". He also questioned the status of the "event" as prime motor in history, whilst attempting not to abandon a concern with the contingency and plurality of human life. Foucault takes up all of these themes, including the attack on nineteenth-century documentary history.

As noted already, *L'Archéologie du savoir* is dominated by the figure of dispersion, by means of which Foucault distinguishes his own mode of analysis from those often prevalent in philosophy, the history of sciences, and linguistics. Such a method of analysis will depend neither upon "*chaînes d'inférence*", nor upon "*tables de différences*", but rather "*systèmes de dispersion*". (*AS*, p. 53). Through this notion of dispersion, an attempt is made to move away from the recuperation of written material into a linear narrative structure, and to treat discourse in its materiality; in other words, to break up the document and to treat it as a "monument". Here, Foucault introduces the idea that architecture and geography can be part of this "matérialité documentaire". (*AS*,

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35 Alan Megill, "The Reception of Foucault by Historians," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 48, no. 1 (1987) pp. 117-141. Megill notes, however, that at first there was little contact between Foucault and the *Annales* group.

36 For an exposition of the notion of "la longue durée" see Fernand Braudel, "Débats et combats," *Annales E.S.C.*, no. 4 (octobre-décembre, 1958) pp. 725-752.

p. 14). Dispersion refers not only to statements within a field, but also to a plurality of subject positions which a discourse might regulate. (*AS*, p. 74). It is also deployed in order to undermine the assumption in a traditional history of ideas that discursive practices such as medicine or economics emerge as coherent and well-defined areas with clear boundaries. A discursive formation is defined as occurring when a number of statements form "un pareil système de dispersion." (*AS*, p. 53). Foucault immediately rejects the idea that a set of statements might form a unity by reference to a sovereign subject. He then proposes four different ways in which statements might form a unity. That is to say, by reference to a common object, a common style or mode of expression, a coherent set of concepts, or the persistence of a theoretical theme. These four hypotheses are ultimately rejected since, in looking at medicine, economics and grammar, Foucault notes that he found "des formulations de niveaux bien trop différents et de fonctions bien trop hétérogènes pour pouvoir se lier et se composer en une figure unique et pour simuler [...] une sorte de grand texte ininterrompu." (*AS*, p. 52).

The rejection of the idea of a common style represents a move towards heterogeneity. In rejecting this hypothesis Foucault indicates that this error had characterised *Naissance de la clinique*. (*AS*, p. 47). The hypothesis is discounted on the grounds that medicine is not characterised by a unified discourse which produces a set of statements, but rather a system which maintains and manages a diversity of dispersed statements: "Ce qu'il faudrait caractériser et individualiser ce serait la coexistence de ces énoncés dispersés et hétérogènes; le système qui régit leur répartition, l'appui qu'ils prennent les uns sur les autres [...]" (*AS*, p. 48). As much as clinical medicine formed a coherent style of description, Foucault acknowledges that it is also a set of propositions on death and life, ethical choices, institutional rulings and teaching models. (*AS*, p. 47).

Another move towards heterogeneity is instituted in the rejection of the hypothesis that statements might be grouped according to a set of "concepts permanents" which define a discourse once and for all. (*AS*, p. 48). This proposal is dispensed with on the grounds that a discourse does not represent a stable structure, but rather a moving field within which new concepts will emerge which are derived from the originals, but which "leur sont hétérogènes et quelques-uns même sont incompatibles avec eux." (*AS*, 49).

Apart from the relationship to history, it is also necessary to consider *L'Archéologie du savoir* — and, as has already been noted, Foucault's work generally throughout the 'sixties — in terms of its relationship to the structuralist movement. Such a discussion hinges on the question of whether this book is concerned solely with linguistic structures. (This point will also be dealt with in the argument of Chapter Three.) Before looking at specific criticisms of Foucault's own "structuralist" work, it

is important to understand the widespread nature of the critique of structuralism by the end of the 'sixties. In general, structuralism is seen by this stage as a somewhat naïve form of positivism which assumes the possibility of a source of meaning as immanent in the structure. This is, in part at least, the essence of Henri Lefebvre's *Au-delà du structuralisme*,[37] describing structuralism as "le fétichisme du savoir."[38] However, Lefebvre takes his materialist critique further, linking structuralism's "belle époque" with "la planification (ou semi-planification) centralisatrice, la croissance programmée, la consommation cybernétisée, l'action de la technostructure."[39] In a similar vein, André Glucksmann sees Althusser's structuralist Marxism as hiding a certain metaphysics of "production" behind an apparently structuralist attack on Hegelianism or humanism: "Le concept de production s'avère ainsi le premier et le dernier mot de la réflexion théorique aussi bien que l'élément originel et la forme définitive de la structure du réel. Il règle la naissance et la totalisation du savoir."[40] Here, incidentally, can be seen the seeds of a demand for social and theoretical pluralism that will come to greater prominence in the 'seventies. Thomas Pavel levels similar claims against Foucault's *L'Archéologie du savoir:* "Le descriptivisme le plus pur repose sur la croyance tacite soit à la finalité, soit à l'harmonie préétablie entre la description et son champ empirique."[41] However, Foucault's work is underpinned by a pluralism which avoids the problems of a totalising perspective.

As has been shown already with Roberto Machado's comments, it is illuminating to consider *L'Archéologie du savoir* in terms of the spatial model inherent in archaeology itself. Foucault does not simply uncover historical strata of thought, but rather looks at the relationship between the elements of discourse that he uncovers. In a particularly enthusiastic review of *Les Mots et les choses*, Georges Canguilhem had attempted to pre-empt some of the "humanist" criticisms of Foucault's archaeological method by distinguishing it from any "geological" connotations. For Canguilhem, the spatial importance of Foucault's archaeology does not reside primarily in the use of terms borrowed from geology. Foucault rather seeks to look at the discontinuities which the archaeologist must try to explain:

> Il est bien vrai que Foucault emprunte quelques termes au vocabulaire de la géologie et de la sismologie [...] Mais il n'est pas moins vrai que ce que Foucault tente de remettre au jour ce n'est pas l'analogue d'une couche de l'écorce terrestre dérobée aux regards par un phénomène naturel de rupture et d'affaissement, c'est une 'dénivellation de la culture occidentale', c'est-à-dire expressément un 'seuil' [...] La géologie connaît des sédiments et l'archéologie

37 Henri Lefebvre, *Au-delà du structuralisme* (Paris: Anthropos, 1971) pp. 11-12.
38 ibid., p. 14.
39 ibid., p. 16.
40 André Glucksmann, "Le Structuralisme ventriloque," *Les Temps modernes*, no. 250 (1967) p. 1563.
41 Thomas Pavel "Jeux de dispersion, illusion de la correspondance," *Semiotic Inquiry*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1987) p. 186.

des monuments.[42]

Canguilhem is correct to point out that, whereas geology deals with neatly "sedimented" layers — that is to say layers created by the downward pressure of the present — archaeology seeks to question the accepted continuities of historical periodisation. Not only does archaeology investigate the discontinuities between epistemes, it seeks to make these layers more uneven, to break down and disperse their continuities. Canguilhem introduces the notion of the "monument" which Foucault himself later takes up in *L'Archéologie de savoir* in opposition to the "document". The excavator of the present is faced with a set of monuments to discursive events. The idea of the monument emphasises the materiality of "l'énoncé", being an event with concrete consequences. Foucault's insistence upon the status of language or discourse as an "event" distances his methodology from any structuralist ghost of the expressive totality. His position, however, should be distinguished from a phenomenological method which, as in Paul Ricoeur's article from 1967, depends upon the creative actions of the subject to turn the word into an event:

> Ainsi le mot est comme un échangeur entre le système et l'acte, entre la structure et l'événement: d'un côté il relève de la structure, comme une valeur différentielle, mais il n'est alors qu'une virtualité sémantique; de l'autre, il relève de l'acte et de l'événement, en ceci que son actualité sémantique est contemporaine de l'actualité évanouissante de l'énoncé.[43]

Ricoeur rejects the structuralist method because it treats language as both a paradigm for analysis, and as a closed system, ignoring agency and history. Foucault, however, uses the spatial figure of dispersion to investigate discourse as an event which operates independently of the thinking and speaking subject. In using the figure of dispersion he seeks to attack what he sees as a conventional view of history as continuity.

Foucault detects two apparently contradictory trends in the fields of history, and the history of ideas in an article published in 1968.[44] This opposition also appears in the opening section of *L'Archéologie du savoir*. As noted already, history has for several decades been moving away from the recuperation of dispersed events in time through overarching concepts, and has begun to acknowledge relatively unchanging layers, which has given rise to questions of what kinds of relationship, hierarchy and periodisations should link these layers. In the history of ideas, on the other hand, a move has been made away from the units of an epoch or century and its attendant *Zeitgeist* towards the idea of rupture. Foucault maintains that the apparent opposition

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42 Georges Canguilhem, "Mort de l'homme ou épuisement du cogito," *Critique*, vol. 24 (1967) p. 602.

43 Paul Ricoeur, "La Structure," *Esprit*, vol. 5 (1967) p. 817.

44 Michel Foucault, "Sur l'archéologie des sciences. Réponse au Cercle d'epistémologie," *Cahiers pour l'analyse*, no. 9. (été, 1968) pp. 9-40.

between these two moves is illusory. In fact, they are both manifestations of a new status for the category of discontinuity. Discontinuity was previously given to the historian in the form of temporally dispersed events, which the historian then had to reproduce as a developing unity in time. Now it has become one of the basic elements of historical analysis with a three-fold role:

1) The historian must acknowledge the existence of different levels of analysis with different levels of periodisation.

2) The historian must now describe rather than analyse. Which means that obstacles to analysis must not be subsumed under the totalising process of such an analysis.

3) Discontinuity must introduce a self-awareness into history, since its use as a descriptive tool must be within the rupture that it posits. In other words, history can no longer be a process of return and recuperation, but of descriptive dispersal.

L'Archéologie du savoir develops the figure of dispersion, and begins to raise explicitly the question of non-discursive elements. It was intended as a methodological explanation of the controversial *Les Mots et les choses*, which has been considered as a structuralist work.[45] Here again, a complex thematics of space weaves through the entire book. Although by this stage he has not fully formulated the crucial figure of dispersion, the book is important for this thesis in that it outlines a "heterotopian" mode of thought. Foucault looks at two main ruptures which have taken place in Western thought on life, labour and language. Firstly, the structure of knowledge, or episteme, which appears with the seventeenth century, labelled by Foucault as the Classical age. Then, at the end of the eighteenth century, this epistemic structure breaks down and the distinctive features of the modern age emerge. To examine these changes, Foucault conceives of knowledge both as a structured space of signifier and signified, Same and Other, time and space, difference and similitude, and as having a form of spatiality specific to each episteme. So, in the Renaissance episteme of resemblance which precedes the Classical age, the world is an enclosed space of similitude in which signs, including language, have a materiality which distributes them throughout the physical world: "On voit que l'expérience du langage appartient au même réseau archéologique que la connaissance des choses de la nature. Connaître ces choses, c'était déceler le système des ressemblances qui les rendait proches et solidaires les unes des autres [...]" (*LMC*, p. 56). However, in the Classical episteme, a gap opens up between signs and the world. That is to say, the elements of knowledge are rearranged in a new spatial configuration. Now, according to the Port-Royal Grammar, a sign might be separate from that which it represents. But this move also prises open the closed circle of

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45 See Pierre Burgelin, "L'Archéologie du savoir," *Esprit*, no. 35 (mai, 1967) pp. 843-861: "L'épistémè constitue une structure, un système cohérent. On voit que l'idée maîtresse de la linguistique sert de fil conducteur." (p. 844).

Renaissance "ressemblance". This enables "la raison occidentale" to move into an era of analysis. (*LMC*, p. 75). In the chapter entitled "Représenter" Foucault states that the event of the Classical episteme can be seen as either the result of a growing "rationalisme", or as the disappearance of a naïve and superstitious attitude in the Renaissance which sees "ressemblance" as evidence of divine intention. (*LMC*, p. 68). He prefers rather to look at this rupture more agnostically, as it were, in terms of the specific modifications which take place in the field of knowledge. In this way, analysis replaces analogy and hierarchy, and science and history are pulled apart.

> Dès lors, le texte cesse de faire partie des signes et des formes de la vérité; le langage n'est plus une des figures du monde, ni la signature imposée aux choses depuis le fond des temps. La vérité trouve sa manifestation et son signe dans la perception évidente et distincte. (*LMC*, p. 70).

Foucault implies throughout this work that the Classical episteme opens up a gap between signifier and signified, history and science, which the modern episteme attempts to fill. The methodological choice of seeing developments in the field of knowledge as epistemological reorganisations, rather than the result of considered and progressive refinements of discursive practices appears in its earliest guise in *Naissance de la clinique*:

> le nouvel esprit médical dont Bichat porte sans aucun doute le premier témoignage absolument cohérent n'est pas à inscrire à l'ordre des purifications psychologiques et épistémologiques; il n'est pas autre chose qu'une réorganisation épistémologique de la maladie où les limites du visible et de l'invisible suivent un nouveau dessin [...] (*NC*, p. 199).

The extended reading of Velasquez's *Las Meninas*, with which *Les Mots et les choses* begins, is presented as the definitive example of Classical representation. That is to say, pure representation which excludes the representing subject. But Foucault also suggests that this painting anticipates the modern episteme by suggesting a dark void from which the figure of man will emerge. The figure of "Man" for the modern episteme constitutes the representing subject which reflects on the problems of this capacity to represent, who will also become the object of representation. So, for Foucault, the Classical episteme is organised around the principle of the table, whereby the overall project of knowledge is to organise representative tables of difference and identity. The classificatory project of the Classical episteme is therefore based on an ideal conceptual space. However, for the modern episteme, the essential reality of things is not discovered by their spatial proximity in a table, but rather by their temporal proximity, which might account for the importance of historical forces in modern forms of knowledge:

> L'ordre classique distribuait en un espace permanent les identités et les différences non quantitatives qui séparaient et unissaient les choses: [...] A

> partir du XIX^{e} siècle, l'Histoire va déployer dans une série temporelle les analogies qui rapprochent les unes des autres les organisations distinctes. (*LMC*, pp. 230-231).

So, in crude terms, the Classical epoch depends on, and organises itself around space, whereas the modern epoch organises itself around time. Foucault signposts one of the starting points of this work in the preface, as the recognition that language always intersects with space, in creating a site where words and things can exist together. (*LMC*, p. 9). He suggests that the consoling force of utopian fables and discourse derives from the fact that they create imaginary spaces within which identity is unproblematic. Utopias do not problematise language and the relationship between words and things. "Les hétérotopies", on the other hand, undermine language by bringing together elements in a disordered, fragmentary, "non-space". Heterotopias remind us that the relationships between words and things might not be as straightforward as they initially appear. Whereas his history of madness had been a history of the Other, this book will be a history of the Same. That is to say, a history of the way in which order and identity run alongside dispersion and heterogeneity: "l'histoire de l'ordre des choses serait l'histoire du Même — de ce qui pour une culture est à la fois dispersé et apparanté — donc à distinguer par des marques et à recueillir dans des identités." (*LMC*, p. 15). A mode of thought which depends upon the category of the Same disperses into marks of difference only to recuperate them into identity. In order to illustrate this, towards the end of *Les Mots et les choses* Foucault returns to the question of "le Même". Even though the modern episteme appears to be dominated by temporal concerns, namely the return of the origin through history, modern thought is in fact founded on a profound spatiality, which continually disperses and regroups the category of the Same. It is as if the distance between the Same and the Other were a vacuum: "Dans la pensée moderne, ce qui se révèle au fondement de l'histoire des choses et de l'historicité propre à l'homme, c'est la distance creusant le Même, c'est l'écart qui le disperse et le rassemble aux deux bouts de lui-même." (*LMC*, p. 351).

The pluralism, therefore, which informs the core of Foucault's work can be conceived of primarily in spatial terms. He attempts to highlight the existence of heterogeneous elements beneath apparent identity and continuity. Of course, this concentration on space and spatial metaphors has opened Foucault's work to the criticisms that it might be apolitical, or, worse, technocratic and even reactionary. Such criticisms would de directed at a perceived attack on human agency.[46] The first

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46 See Michel Foucault, "Foucault répond à Sartre," *La Quinzaine littéraire*, no. 46 (1 mars, 1968) pp. 20-22. Interview with Jean-Pierre El Kabbach. Here, Foucault replies to Sartre's criticisms of "structuralism" by denying that the so-called "structuralists" form any sort of coherent group. He also points out that his aim in *Les Mots et les choses* was to uncover "l'inconscient de la science," since, in looking at the the phenomenon of madness, he had

objection, which might be seen as a general Marxist position, is of the kind presented to Foucault by the readers of the journal *Esprit* in 1968, already discussed in the introduction.[47] The readers ask whether a method which introduces the constraints of system and discontinuity doesn't remove the possibility of progressive political action. Foucault responds by saying that instead of being a totalising gesture, the deployment of the notion of an episteme is meant to create an area of "dispersion", breaking down the assumed continuities of modern knowledge by using the criteria of "formation", "transformation" and "correlation":

> Ces critères permettent de substituer aux thèmes de l'histoire (qu'il s'agisse du 'progrès de la raison' ou de 'l'esprit d'un siècle') des analyses différenciées. Ils permettent de décrire, comme *épistémè* d'une époque, non pas la somme de ses connaissances, ou le style général de ses recherches, mais l'écart, les distances, les oppositions, les différences, les relations de ses multiples discours scientifiques.[48]

In part at least, Foucault's reply constitutes a faintly damning attack on those critics whom he views as not appreciating that the culture within which they participate obeys rules which are not given to their consciousness. Against a form of history which is primarily concerned with the themes of tradition and innovation, Foucault proposes a method of investigating difference, the non-identity of thought: "de raconter l'histoire des idées comme l'ensemble des formes spécifiées et descriptives de la non-identité."[49] The drive to free thought from a stifling identity, via a methodological pluralism and heterogeneity, forms a constant presence throughout his work.

Perhaps the most important piece of writing to be considered when dealing with Foucault's deployment of spatial metaphors is the pivotal section of *Surveiller et punir* which deals with Bentham's Panopticon. Here, he presents the architecture of the Panopticon — a central tower from which each prisoner can be observed and surveyed by a single warder as both a concrete model for other institutions such as schools and factories — as the abstract model of a technological dream of a totally ordered social space. It is the model of a social system which no longer wishes to punish spectacularly and occasionally in order to reinforce the power of the sovereign, since this system must inevitably leave large social spaces of invisible and tolerated infringement. Such areas of tolerance are unacceptable for the developing industrial economy. The disciplinary paradigm of the Panopticon also produces knowledge and analysis of the individual. *Surveiller et punir* is a major development of the "modern" obsession with the three-dimensional space of the individual body that was first introduced in

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discovered "un espace topologique" which operates independently from what is conventionally seen as a human essence. (p. 20).
See also Jean-Paul Sartre "Jean-Paul Sartre répond," *L'Arc*, no. 30 (1966) pp. 87-96.

47 See Michel Foucault, "Réponse à une question."

48 ibid., p. 853.

49 ibid., p. 862.

Naissance de la clinique. However, it is important to any understanding of this text and its reception to understand that Foucault is not describing a thoroughly "disciplined" modern epoch, but rather a technique of power which is serial, in that it does not derive directly from the sovereign or the State. For example, the introduction of "un espace sériel" in elementary schooling, whereby pupils move through a series of fixed positions in a highly organised space, allows the school to function as a kind "machine" for learning and organising. (*SP*, pp. 148-149).

The description of a totally disciplined societal space would appear to have much in common with Weber's "iron cage" of rationality which is ushered in by the industrial age,[50] but it is against such an ultimately causal explanations of the "disciplinary" techniques of modern power that Foucault, in interviews following the publication of *Surveiller et punir*, wished to place his own work. In arguing for a polymorphous account of the "event" and the disciplinary system/technique, Foucault deploys his "meta-spatial" theory of knowledge and change. He introduces a striking and useful spatial image for his "genealogical" method, which has as its origin in his thought an early interest in the philosophy of science in the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem. The singularity of the event is surrounded by a complex network of factors which cannot be totalised:

> L'allégement de la pesanteur causale consistera donc à bâtir, autour de l'événement singulier l'analyse comme processus, un 'polygone' ou plutôt 'polyèdre d'intelligibilité' dont le nombre des faces n'est pas défini à l'avance et ne peut jamais être considéré comme fini de plein droit.[51]

In order to illustrate this point, we might consider the heterogeneity of forms which Foucault identifies as constituting the mechanism, or "dispositif", of the prison itself. The prison is not endogenous to the new penal system outlined at the end of the eighteenth century. (*SP*, pp. 116-134). It in fact contains the heterogeneous elements of "le droit pénal" and a new disciplinary technnique of manipulating the body. In keeping with his earlier archaeological work, the prison is shown to be the point of intersection for a dispersed set of statements.This analysis of the birth of the prison also enables Foucault to work on the genealogical project of considering the ways in which truth and knowledge are related to the question of power.

It is with the publication of *Surveiller et punir* that Foucault's emphasis on the body as a crucial object and space of knowledge is developed in an important new direction. Briefly, the new formulation of "pouvoir/savoir" allows him to look at power

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50 For a full discussion of the links between Foucault and Weber see John O'Neill, "The Disciplinary Society: from Weber to Foucault," *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, no. 1 (March, 1986) pp. 42-57.

51 Michel Foucault, "La Poussière et le nuage," in *L'Impossible prison: recherches sur le système pénitentiaire au XIX^e siècle*, réunies par Michelle Perrot (Paris: Seuil, 1980) pp. 44-45.

in a strategic and serial form, rather than as a hierarchic form of State control. In a typically Nietzschean move, he shows the individual, the crucial figure of modern humanism, to have inauspicious and even sordid origins in the techniques of discipline. The individual is actually fabricated by power: "Une observation minutieuse du détail, et en même temps une prise en compte politique de ces petites choses, pour le contrôle et l'utilisation des hommes, montent à travers l'âge classique [...] Et de ces vétilles, sans doute, est né l'homme de l'humanisme moderne." (*SP*, p. 143).

The Nietzschean preoccupation with the fact that the grandest, or most self-evident, of perceptions and practices, may have dispersed, lowly origins, is sometimes neglected in discussions of *Surveiller et punir*. Through this concentration on the body, and, consequently, the claim that the prison is only one institution within a wider disciplinary, carceral network, Foucault places his own work explicitly in opposition to Rusche and Kirchheimer's *Punishment and Social Structure*.[52] The latter concludes that forms of punishment coincide with given stages of the mode of production, whereas Foucault bases his investigation on the puzzling fact that prisons were initially criticised by eighteenth-century reformers, and also proved to be economically unviable. Certainly, Foucault's concentration on the body in *Surveiller et punir* does — as he claims in an interview — distance himself from conceiving of the history of the penal system solely in terms of class domination.[53] However, it must be acknowledged that it is sometimes hard to see, as Mark Poster claims in *Foucault, Marxism and History*,[54] how he is making a strong move away from seeing the disciplinary system as a whole as paralleling the industrial stage of capitalist production. Michael Ignatieff, reassessing his own and Foucault's work on the prison system in the nineteenth century, notes that there is "more than a touch of Marxist reductionism in Foucault's treatment of law as a pliable instrument of the ruling class."[55]

However, it cannot be denied that *Surveiller et punir* does develop a problematic thesis for the spatial conceptualisation of power. Power is seen as being constituted "from below" in the play of power and resistance at the level of the individual. The "localities" of this "microphysics" of power are the individual and his/her pleasures, the family and the immediate physical and institutional environment. Foucault also begins to see the material specificity of institutional architecture in producing "docile bodies". Despite these reservations, the book does begin to develop the important notion of

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52 Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer, *Punishment and Social Structure*, trans. M. Finkelstein (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968).

53 Michel Foucault, "Entretien sur la prison: le livre et sa méthode," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 101 (1975) pp. 27-33. Interview with Jean-Jacques Brochier.

54 Mark Poster, Foucault, *Marxism and History: Mode of Production versus Mode of Information* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984).

55 Michael Ignatieff, "State, Civil Society and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment," in S. Cohen and A. Scull, *Social Control and the State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985) p. 95.

power being distributed through a serial space. Foucault's work also becomes more closely focussed on the study of the growth of the European nation-States since the seventeenth century as a set of political anatomies. Each nation-State constitutes a population in which life must be at once fostered and policed. *Naissance de la clinique* looks at clinical medicine as an example of the increased concentration on the body which is linked to the growth of the new human sciences. The segmentation of the individual body and the articulation of these elements within the wider "body" of the population becomes one of the most important principles which organises Foucault's later work. In *La Volonté de savoir,* Foucault expands upon the theme of space and power, to consider the arrangement of the family house in the nineteenth century. Instead of seeing the family as a conjugal cell, he considers it rather as a network of "plaisirs-pouvoirs" which are multiplied and intensified by the spatial arrangement of the house: "La séparation des adultes et des enfants, la polarité établie entre la chambre des parents et celle des enfants (elle est devenue canonique au cours du siècle quand on a entrepris de construire des logements populaires), la ségrégation relative des garçons et des filles [...]" (VS, p. 63). This distinctively modern technique of power is seen by Foucault as introducing a literally perverse play of sexuality and power, and is investigated more fully along the lines of Foucault's methodology in Donzelot's *La Police des familles*,[56] which demonstrates the ways in which the family is used strategically from the mid-eighteenth century onwards as a site of normalisation. The family is a site traversed by a multiplicity of forces, which may be apparently liberating, such as Freudian psychoanalysis and Keynesian economics, but in effect manoeuvre the members of the family subtly into well-established channels of power. Freudianism and Keynesianism together constitute a complex technique of power which breaks down the family and the possessive individual of capitalism, only to reconstitute them both in a new field of forces. Freud saves the individual ego from the rigours of the family whilst "dressing the wounds" of the family, and Keynes saves the family from being torn apart by the rigours of capitalism.[57]

The concentration on the body and strategic "fields" of power enables Foucault to make what he sees as a further move away from a theory of ideology. As Michel de Certeau highlights, reiterating Deleuze's point, *Surveiller et punir* is methodologically important in emphasing the heterogeneity between apparatuses and ideologies.[58] In short, "ideology" would here mean the notion that the individual is a continuous entity through time, whose consciousness is deformed, alienated and corrupted by material forces. By concentrating on the body as increasingly trained and drilled, he can begin to

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56 Jacques Donzelot, *La Police des familles* (Paris: Minuit, 1977).

57 ibid., p. 209.

58 See Michel de Certeau, "Microtechniques et discours panoptique," in *Histoire et psychanalyse entre science et fiction* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987) pp. 35-70.

see the individual as actually constituted by strategies of power. For Foucault, ideology must ultimately refer to a scientific truth which is denied to a stable subject. Rather than analysing discourses for the truth which they might contain, he prefers to look at the ways in which effects of truth are produced.[59] This does not mean that the individual is caught in a web of power which is all-pervasive and inescapable, but rather that the individual is a product of different forms of power. In other words, at this stage, Foucault deploys the *spatial* notion of power as a non-subjective grid or field in which the individual constantly faces new challenges and ruses, is constantly broken down and reconstituted, in order to question the "becoming" of subjectivity through time. This spatiality is captured in the title of an interview from 1977 with Lucette Finas, "Les Rapports de pouvoir passent à l'intérieur des corps."[60] Here, Foucault deals with the implantation of "sexuality" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He refers back to *L'Ordre du discours*, where he considers himself to have proposed a largely negative conception of power. He now realises that he had characterised power as essentially negative and prohibitive at this stage. Overall, such a conception of power remains caught within the question of sovereignty, and the constitution of a unified social body. Foucault now prefers to consider power as fragmented and plural in relation to the multiple bodies in a given society. Power does not refer to individual or collective wills. Nor can power be delegated from, for example, the State, to the family. It is not the function of a subject. From his early work, the figure of exteriority remains:

> Ce que je cherche, c'est à essayer de montrer comment les rapports de pouvoir peuvent passer matériellement dans l'épaisseur même des corps sans avoir même à être relayés par la représentation des sujets. Si le pouvoir atteint le corps ce n'est pas parce qu'il a d'abord été intériorisé dans la conscience des gens.[61]

In the interview referred to above, Foucault considers his own work as a series of fictions. This does not mean that he operates outside of conventional notions of truth, but rather expresses the hope that fictional discourse might give rise to effects of truth. The art of fiction for Foucault is to narrate a course between the elements of a discourse of truth, in order to construct new effects of truth.[62] It is as if truth were a spatial field which can be "mapped" by a variety of routes, but which guarantees no overall perspective. In a little-known article concerning the so-called antipsychiatry movement from 1980 Foucault shows that, in spatial terms, his work is concerned with the *geography* of the production of truth. He emphasises that such a geography outlines

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59 See Michel Foucault, "Vérité et pouvoir," *L'Arc*, no. 70 (1977) pp. 20-21. Here, Foucault claims that ideology must always be in virtual opposition to truth.

60 Michel Foucault, "Les Rapports de pouvoir passent à l'intérieur des corps," *La Quinzaine littéraire*, no. 247 (1977) pp. 4-6. Interview with Lucette Finas.

61 ibid. ,p. 5.

62 ibid., p. 6.

the positions at which truth is produced, rather than the best positions from which to observe truths. In the most simple of terms, truth is a fictional event which emerges from narrative, rather than the moments at which a "truthful" perspective is revealed:

> s'il y a une géographie de la vérité, c'est celle des sièges où elle réside (et non pas simplement des lieux où on se place pour la mieux observer); sa chronologie, c'est celle des conjonctions qui lui permettent d'arriver comme un événement (et non pas celle des moments dont il faut profiter pour l'apercevoir).[63]

David Harvey is, therefore, only partially right to read Foucault as claiming that space "is always a container of social power."[64] This would tend to imply that space is manipulated by a dominant group in society. Foucault rather constructs his work around an interest in space in order to analyse forms of "pouvoir/savoir" away from the framework of "le sujet de connaissance".

Deleuze's sympathetic reading of Foucault focusses on this spatial logic, and expands upon the theme of fiction, defining it as a "new" map-making which represents a kind of Copernican revolution in the conception of power. Foucault's concentration on the visibility of power, in the form of the Panopticon for example, has the effect of undermining the notion that power may be located at any specific and privileged point. He introduces a new way of mapping power relations. Deleuze therefore emphasises Foucault's non-subjective approach to the question of power:

> Bref, au fonctionalisme de Foucault répond une topologie moderne, qui n'assigne plus un lieu privilégié comme source de pouvoir, et ne peut plus accepter de localisation ponctuelle (il y a là une conception de l'espace social aussi nouvelle que celle des espaces physiques et mathématiques actuels, comme pour la continuité tout à l'heure).[65]

Foucault's innovation, according to Deleuze, is to see the various strategies of power as operating within a "serial" space, having no focal point from which power emanates or is possessed by a dominant group. Deleuze considers that there has been an archaeological concensus between liberal democracy and Marxism concerning the State apparatus as the central point of the possession and exercise of power. He claims that Foucault, by challenging this consensus, has managed to introduce a genuinely innovative element into political theory.[66] In assessing the development from *L'Archéologie du savoir* to *Surveiller et punir*, Deleuze notes that the latter puts forward for the first time in Foucault's work the notion of discursive and non-discursive

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63 Michel Foucault, "La Maison des fous," in F. Basaglia and F. Ongardo, *Les Criminels de la paix* (Paris: P.U.F., 1980) p. 145.

64 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 255.

65 Gilles Deleuze, "Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe," *Critique*, vol. 31 (1975) p. 1210. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986) p. 34. Deleuze provides a slightly modified version of his original essay in his important full-length work on Foucault.

66 ibid., p. 1212.

formations which may become superimposed in the same historical space.[67] He concludes that *Surveiller et punir* actually investigates the superimposition of the discursive formation of delinquence and the non-discursive formation of the prison. Deleuze considers it to be particularly important that, although Foucault insists on the heterogeneity of these two formations, he also demonstrates their mutual interpenetration.[68] Employing his own spatial metaphors to investigate Foucault's work, Deleuze claims that *Surveiller et punir* represents an advance on *L'Archéologie du savoir* by bringing the fact of inter-penetration betweem forms of expression (discursive formations) and forms of content (non-discursive formations) to the surface, rather than the return to a "base" ("le socle") at the limits of language from which to derive the statement ("l'énoncé"). This surface effect is created by the notion of a "diagramme" of power relations, the "diagramme" in this case being Bentham's Panopticon. Instead of seeing power as finding its ultimate reference point in the State, Foucault illuminates the "diagramme" of discipline in order to suggest possibilities for change. The "diagramme" acts as a sort of intense abstract form of light, which illuminates statements and permits action to be represented in the form of language.[69]

Over a decade later, in a collection of papers from an international conference intended to discuss the impact of Foucault's work after his death, Deleuze presented a short paper which refined and developed this spatial understanding. In "Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif?" he puts forward the idea that the problematic term of "le dispositif" in Foucault's work deals with "machines" which induce sight and speech.[70] Further dimensions added in later work are lines of power and subjectivation. Deleuze maintains the notion that Foucault is "un cartographe", mapping the complex social machines within which we live, the systems of social architecture that manufacture certain statements, certain areas of visibility, systems of power, and systems of subjectivation. To illustrate this, he employs the the spatial image of a constantly shifting set of lines of force, speech, visibility, and subjectivation has the consequence of repudiating any notion of universal truths or explanatory categories: "L'universel en effet n'explique rien, c'est lui qui doit être expliqué. Toutes les lignes sont des lignes de variation, qui n'ont même pas de coordonnées constantes."[71] That which is new and present is not the originality of a given "dispositif", for example the disciplinary project of the Panopticon, but the resistances and creativities which this field of forces sets in motion. That is to say, the present has its own dynamism, and is not the static end-point of history.

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67 ibid., p. 1213.
68 ibid., p. 1215.
69 ibid., p. 1226.
70 Gilles Deleuze, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) p. 188.
71 ibid., p. 188.

Deleuze is undoubtedly one of the most subtle commentators on Foucault's work. He constantly returns to the driving force of an attempt to break with established identities in thought which is central to Foucault's overall project. Taking Deleuze's reading as a starting point, this thesis seeks to analyse the articulation of the principle of heterogeneity with Foucault's other main preoccupation; a constant "déplacement" away from the notion of dominant ideology. Foucault's later work on liberalism represents an attempt to analyse a mentality of government which accepts the liberty of those who are governed. Deleuze and Michel de Certeau show that *Surveiller et punir* attempts a new method of historical writing which acknowledges a chiasmus and an articulation between discursive and non-verbal gestures. However, it should also be noted that a further point of heterogeneity is suggested in this book. In consciously constructing a fictional narrative which seeks to describe the colonisation of Enlightenment reformist proposals by disciplinary techniques, Foucault also implies that the techniques of Panopticism, which are absorbed into the discourse of the human sciences, might also be colonised by new techniques. His fictional account can only ever be a snapshot of a history which is in motion.

Having discussed the development of spatial themes up to the 'seventies, it is now worth returning to Foucault's aesthetic concerns of the 'sixties. In part this work is informed by a commitment to probing the "outside" of thought and language; the point at which the thinking and speaking subject is dispersed. However, it also provides clues to the later development of the figure of heterogeneity. Importantly, Deleuze perceives a continuity between Foucault's historical analyses, and work which centres on aesthetic concerns, such as his publication on Raymond Roussel. This work is often obscure and inaccessible, made up of extravagant poetry and word-games. In order to place this early concentration on space, language and the materiality of language in the wider context of Foucault's work as a whole, it is useful to consider the overall shape of this work in the metaphorically "spatial" terms used by Claire O'Farrell.[72] She perceives a changing relationship between the categories of the Same and the Other. Schematically, Foucault's work is seen as examining the "limits" of thought and identity, of the Same, in its confrontation with the Other, that which threatens to break down identity. In spatial terms, this early work presents the Same and the Other in a relationship of interiority and exteriority. Madness is constructed as "outside" Western rationality by the Classical and then the modern ages. However, confrontations may take place across this boundary. O'Farrell does not refer to Foucault's short essay on the work of Maurice Blanchot, but this provides a clear example of Foucault's early thinking on literature, and the way in which this is formulated in explicitly spatial terms.[73] At this stage, Foucault writes against what he

72 Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher?* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989).
73 See Michel Foucault, "La Pensée du dehors," *Critique*, no. 229 (1966) p. 523-546.

sees as the Western tradition of an unproblematic identity attributed to the thinking subject. This identity is bolstered by a constant commentary on thought which makes the interiority of consciousness a place of fullness and significance. The breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded turns away from this interiority to a disturbing exteriority: "La pensée de la pensée, toute une tradition plus large encore que la philosophie nous a appris qu'elle nous conduisait à l'intériorité la plus profonde. La parole de la parole nous mène par la littérature [...] à ce dehors où disparait le sujet qui parle."[74] This essay, published in 1966, remains within the question of limits which, as O'Farrell states, dominates Foucault's early work. Reason has an outside, a limit, which it denies. However, certain forms of modern literature seek out this limit-experience of the possibility of a "thought from the outside." This literature develops an intimate link with the theme of death through the undermining of the speaking subject. However, attention should also be drawn to the fact that Foucault's essays on literature, published mainly in *Critique*, in the 'sixties are not without their complexities and ambiguities, and that certain of these ambiguities point towards the spatial developments which appear in his work in the 'seventies. For example, in his essay on Blanchot, Foucault rejects the notion that modern literature is exclusively self-referential. This might be seen as a shift away from his position in his 1963 essay, "Le Langage à l'infini":

> [...] mais la limite de la mort ouvre devant le langage, ou plutôt en lui, un espace infini; devant l'imminence de la mort, il se poursuit dans une hâte extrême, mais aussi il recommence, se raconte lui-même, découvre le récit du récit et cet emboîtement qui pourrait bien ne s'achever jamais.[75]

Even in the 1963 essay on transgression, Foucault recognises that the limits of reason cannot be crossed in a single movement. Transgression can only take place momentarily as a "flash" of recognition. O'Farrell is therefore only partially correct to see the categories of the Same and the Other as in a relationship of interiority and exteriority in Foucault's early work. Transgression can only be a momentary flash of recognition, since the limit always recedes:

> La transgression est un geste qui concerne la limite; c'est là, en cette minceur de la ligne, que se manifeste l'éclair de son passage, mais peut-être aussi sa trajectoire en sa totalité, son origine même. Le trait qu'elle croise pourrait bien être tout son espace [...] la transgression franchit et ne cesse de recommencer à franchir une ligne qui, derrière elle, aussitôt se referme en une vague de peu de mémoire [...][76]

The main point of contact between these subtly different positions around the notions of

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74 ibid., p. 525.
75 Michel Foucault, "Le langage à l'infini," *Tel Quel*, vol. 15 (1963) p. 45.
76 Michel Foucault, "Préface à la transgression," *Critique*, nos. 195-196 (1963) pp. 754-755.

limits and transgression and Foucault's later work is evident if these essays are seen as an early attempt to formulate a non-dialectical mode of thinking. Transgression brings into question both "l'être" and its limit. It does not stand in relation to the limit as black to white, but rather forms a spiral relationship, "un rapport en vrille". Foucault opposes this questioning of being and its limit to the dialectical "slumber" of "le jeu de la contradiction et de la totalité."[77] The spatial figure of the spiral is also extremely important for Foucault's later work on power.

Foucault's work in the 'seventies is seen by O'Farrell as being characterised by a conception of the Same and the Other as, "totally coextensive and indeed interchangeable, inextricably bound together in their movement."[78] She considers his work at this point as portraying a scenario in which the Same totally dominates and controls the Other. It is paradoxical, she says, that the images of struggle which permeate this period of Foucault's work exist within a totalising system. It is only in the 'eighties that O'Farrell sees Foucault as returning to an ethical consideration of the limits of our constant re-invention of ourselves in the present. Here the possibility of transgressing the limits of identity breaks down. Although useful, this is a reductive vision of Foucault's work, which identifies discontinuities rather than shifts or, as Foucault describes his own work in his lectures at the Collège de France, "déplacements". It cannot be denied that, in *Histoire de la folie*, Foucault thinks in terms of an "outside" to reason. However, from the beginning, his work aims at introducing heterogeneity into the act of thought and the construction of identity, or, as O'Farrell puts it, the category of the Same. In this way, principles which appear in his work on art and literature in the 'sixties reappear throughout his career. For example, in the first phase of his work, Foucault sees the materiality of language as a threatening "non-place", a heterogeneous force which undermines the certainties of representation, consciousness and subjecthood. This is shown most strikingly and extravagantly in an essay from 1968 on Klee, Kandinski and Magritte.[79] Foucault begins this essay by looking at two versions of Magritte's "Ceci n'est pas une pipe". The common space of language and representation is undermined by the denial that the pictoral representation of the pipe is a pipe, and by the suggestion that the "calligramme" itself is drawing attention to the fact that "ceci n'est pas une pipe." The small, neutral space between the image of the pipe and the text forms "un creux", a space of uncertainty between what is seen and what is said: "Encore est-ce trop de dire qu'il y a un vide ou une lacune: c'est plutôt une absence d'espace, un effacement du 'lieu commun' entre les signes de l'écriture et les lignes de l'image."[80] This gap between "le dire" and "le voir"

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77 ibid., p. 755.
78 Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault: Historian or Philosopher*.
79 Michel Foucault, "Ceci n'est pas une pipe," *Les Cahiers du chemin* (11 janvier, 1968) pp. 78-95.
80 ibid., p. 84.

characterises much of his work. For example, *Surveiller et punir* deals with the discrepancy between a disciplinary *visibility*, and a *discourse* of penal reform.

Foucault's neglected work on Raymond Roussel, published in 1963, concentrates on the space, or rather hollow, which Roussel manages to open between language and visibility. In a recent work, Simon During notes, in common with other recent reappraisals, that Raymond Roussel demonstrates how Foucault's interest in language in the 'sixties was not primarily linguistic.[81] Foucault rather emphasises the ways in which Roussel's fictions are obstinately caught within the desire to prise open the space between language and seeing. Roussel begins with the dream that language might be an "absolute eye", and the madness which is at the centre of his work is the void, "le creux", which opens as the linguistic and the visible are forced together and fall apart. He equates this void with "le soleil", since it provides illumination and yet remains paradoxically obscure. (*RR*, p. 207). In the same way, language is the source of meaning, but only because of a paradoxical poverty which lies at its heart:

> Si le langage était aussi riche que l'être, il serait le double inutile et muet des choses; il n'existerait pas. Et pourtant sans nom pour les nommer, les choses resteraient dans la nuit. Cette lacune illuminante du langage, Roussel l'a éprouvée jusqu'à l'angoisse, jusqu'à l'obsession, si l'on veut. (*RR*, p. 208).

Demonstrating the continuing influence of phenomenology, Foucault sees Roussel's work as dominated by the enmeshing of two mythic spaces of the Western imagination; the spaces of the labyrinth and metamorphosis. (*RR*, p. 102). The space of the labyrinth corresponds to language in its connotations of the quest for the treasure or origin. The space of metamorphosis corresponds to the visible, containing virtually endless possibilities for symbolism and metamorphosis. As stated already, this heterogeneity between the linguistic and the visible informs much of Foucault's work. For example, *Naissance de la clinique* shows how the Enlightenment ideal of medicine begins with the dream of the absolute gaze. It also goes on to chart how this dream of visibility fails, and becomes linked to other actions, and ultimately to statements on the normal and the pathological. (*NC*, p. 166).

Deleuze also highlights the significance of the ideas in *Raymond Roussel*, by comparing Foucault's notion of the "dispositif" — an impersonal description of a particular kind of rationality — to the "machines" in the writing of Roussel.[82] Roussel's method of writing was based on the formalistic use of puns built into complex sequences. He also used "found" language of popular songs, advertisements, children's stories etc. to populate his stories with bizarre "machines". In an interview

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81 See Simon During, *Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing* (London: Routledge, 1992). Here, During notes that language does not function for Foucault as an autonomous and rule-bounded system, but as "a condition delicately balanced between ontological and the experiential." (p. 76).

82 Gilles Deleuze, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif?" p. 186.

given shortly before his death, Foucault sees these language machines as a rigorously aesthetic method of elaborating upon a childlike imagination:

> Roussel, pour sa part, pousse cet imaginaire à son propre niveau; à partir du lapin-qui-joue-du-tambour, il rend la machine de plus en plus complexe, mais en restant toujours dans ce même type de machine, sans passer à un autre registre, il arrive à des constructions qui sont intensément poétiques [...][83]

In this interview, Foucault links his interest in Roussel to the idea of language as a material trace. Language does not move through the world as if it were a wind which leaves no traces, it is a material event. Likewise, Roussel works with "le déjà dit". This early interest in the materiality of language informs much of Foucault's thinking in *Les Mots et les choses*, together with an almost surrealist fascination with the juxtaposition of apparently incongruous elements in a single space. Language has a variety of plastic forms which correspond to the ordering of knowledge in different epistemes. This link between space and language also leads Foucault to an interest in "le nouveau roman", which owes a specific debt to Roussel. Here, language is considered as an autonomous existence, or "fold" within the world of objects. One of Foucault's objectives is to move away from the modern obsession with language as somehow rooted in the expressive and yet curiously mute potential of the body. In the same way that Nietzsche gestured towards returning to language its own creativity and subjectivity, Foucault shows that a spatial conception of language frees it from the constraints of being an imperfect vehicle for the fullness of human thought.

In one of his literary articles for *Critique* in 1963 entitled "Le Langage de l'espace" he addresses the contemporary obsession with space and spatial metaphors which pervaded the French literary scene.[84] He contests that this is not the result of a decadent inability to pursue the grand themes of time, but rather a new attitude towards the autonomy of language itself. Western literature has previously been obsessed with "le retour homérique", fate and prophecy. Now, however, literature works under the realisation that language has its own spatiality. These elements of "L'écart, la distance, l'intermédiaire, la dispersion, la fracture, la différence," are the recognition that there is a heterogeneity between words and things. Contemporary literary language is therefore derived from these dimensions. It is a language which is non-metaphorical, since it seeks to undermine the supposition of a natural human ability to read the world in terms of analogies: "Ces dimensions, il ne les a pas prélevées sur les choses pour en restituer l'analogon et comme le modèle verbal. Elles sont communes aux choses et à lui-même: le point aveugle d'où nous viennent les choses et les mots au moment où ils vont à leur point de rencontre."[85]

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83 Michel Foucault, "Archéologie d'une passion," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 221 (1985) p. 103.
84 Michel Foucault, "Le Langage de l'espace," *Critique*, vol. 20 (1964) pp. 378-382.
85 ibid., p. 379.

In another early literary article for *Critique*, "Distance, Aspect, Origine", Foucault also takes up the idea of the distance between words and things.[86] Like Roussel, Alain Robbe-Grillet seeks to produce visibilities by recording the exteriority of things to each other, rather than using language metaphorically. Fiction is now a mode of writing which hollows out the distance between language and objects:

> Il n'y a pas fiction parce que le langage est à distance des choses; mais le langage, c'est leur distance, la lumière où elles sont et leur inaccessibilité, le simulacre où se donne seulement leur présence; et tout langage qui au lieu d'oublier cette distance se maintient en elle [...] est un langage de fiction.[87]

In general, then, it can be seen that the early impetus for Foucault's interest in a reassessment of space as opposed to the dominance of time is articulated via substantial claims for the status of literature as a means of decentring and undermining the Western obsession with time, narrative and presence. Such claims on behalf of aesthetic subversion are reminiscent of surrealism's radical spatiality of the explosion of libidinal energies across the disturbing surface of the everyday. However, Foucault points out that space in contemporary avant-garde fiction in the 'sixties is linked to thought rather than the vague surrealist notion of the unconscious.[88] Then, the dominant spatial thematics of language and the table is in part abandoned after 1968, in favour of a re-assessment of material Marxism in the light of a new development with regard to these early influences of Nietzsche, de Sade, Bachelard, Canguilhem etc. In short, Foucault develops a heterogeneous politics of local or regional resistance. However, as we have seen already, this work on power is also characterised by a heterogeneity between "le dire" and "le voir" which is present in Foucault's work on literature in the 'sixties. Regarding the later "genealogical" project, it is important to examine the thematics of light and Enlightenment which develops throughout much of his work.

This thematics of light and darkness appears in the first major published work, *Histoire de la folie*. Foucault's adversary here is Western rationality in general, from Descartes onwards. He traces the ways in which reason forms different relationships with its other, as unreason, then as madness and mental illness. In the Renaissance the world of unreason can still communicate with reason, but from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards, unreason is reduced to the animality within man. Henceforth, it cannot enter into discourse, and can only be normalised by moral education into the area of light and responsibility that is reason. But Foucault wishes to retain the sense of a "zero-point", an essential madness which can rise from the darkness and transgress the norms and constraints of modern rationality. The heroes of

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86 Michel Foucault, "Distance, Aspect, Origine," *Critique*, no. 198 (novembre, 1963) pp. 931-945.

87 ibid., p. 940.

88 Michel Foucault, "Débat sur le roman," *Tel Quel*, no. 17 (printemps, 1967) p. 12.

unreason or madness are, among others, Goya, Nietzsche and de Sade. It is by now obvious, when this work is placed alongside the rest of Foucault's canon, that there is a Romantic appeal to madness which cannot be maintained in a non-essentialist philosophy. However, a theme which has not been pursued at great length is the influence of phenomenology on this particular work. There is a tension between historical attemps to investigate the phenomenon of madness, and the implication of an ahistorical structure of exclusion in Western reason, which meant that the lazar houses of the Middle Ages would inevitably be superseded by another set of exclusions. Foucault alludes to this tension briefly in the interview referred to above on Raymond Roussel:

> En fait, j'ai lu Roussel au moment même où j'écrivais ce livre sur la folie. J'étais écartelé entre la phénoménologie et la psychologie existentielle. Mes recherches étaient une tentative de voir dans quelle mesure on pouvait les définir en termes historiques. J'ai compris que le problème devait être posé en d'autres termes que le marxisme et la phénoménologie.[89]

Foucault's early work in particular places itself in opposition to the Enlightenment dream of an all-seeing eye of science and knowledge. In one way, *Histoire de la folie* opposes a dark space of madness to this humanistic optimism. It represents a darkness into which the illuminating eye of the Enlightenment cannot see. This space is external, the "outside" of thought, but it is also the internal, existential freedom of the psyche. However, the book on Roussel highlights another aspect of his early work, in demonstrating the elusiveness of that which is "interior". Roussel's writing is characterised by the effect of "la doublure", whereby that which is most interior, the meaning of a phrase, refers to an exterior in the shape of a writing-machine, or a play on words. So, Roussel's explanation of how his own books were written remains ultimately enigmatic: "En donnant une 'solution' il transforme chacun de ses mots en piège possible, c'est-à-dire en piège réel, puisque la seule possibilité qu'il y a un double fond ouvre pour qui écoute un espace d'incertitude sans repos." (*RR*, p. 17).

In his final work on ethics and subjectivity Foucault retains this figure of an interiority which immediately returns analysis to an exteriority. The self might actually be formed by a constant movement away from the self. In conclusion, then, it can be seen that Foucault's work on literature and madness anticipates the figure of heterogeneity, whilst remaining partially under the thrall of phenomenology. As noted already, Foucault's work in the 'seventies moves towards an interest in space as a method of investigating the strategic power relationships within a society. It has been shown that Foucault's use of Bentham's Panopticon is arguably a turning point in his development of the themes of vision, space and power. It may be here, that, under the influence of spatial or geographical thinking, the unitary image of reason and

89 Michel Foucault, "Archéologie d'une passion," p. 105.

Enlightenment in his work begins to break down. Basically, the Enlightenment question of the present and our relation to the present is acknowledged as, in one way, the only possible limit of contemporary philosophical horizons. In an interview that appeared in English for *Telos*, Foucault characterises this new-found "modesty" with regard to Enlightenment, rationality and the present interestingly enough with images that undercut his own previously Messianic preoccupations with light and darkness:

> I wonder if one of the great roles of philosophical thought since the Kantian 'Was ist Aufklärung?' might not be characterized by saying that the task of philosophy is to describe the nature of the present, and of 'ourselves in the present.' With the proviso that we do not allow ourselves the facile, rather theatrical declaration that this moment in which we exist is one of total perdition, in the abyss of darkness, or triumphant daybreak, etc.[90]

The prehistory, as it were, of this development is followed in a very detailed manner in the interview mentioned above from *Hérodote*,[91] a geographical magazine. The editors of the journal begin by circling around what is an apparent contradiction in the work of Foucault up to this point in 1976. They are interested in the fact that his work appears to privilege time, or at least an interest in periodisation, at the expense of a rather nebulous spatialisation — sometimes speaking of the West, sometimes of Europe and sometimes of France — whereas his use of spatial metaphors — "position, déplacement, lieu, champ [...] territoire, domaine, sol, horizon, archipel, géopolitique, région, paysage,"[92] — is profuse and specific. Both parties agree that these are not only spatial but strategic metaphors relating to the development of national armies. Foucault shows that these spatial and strategic metaphors have enabled him to think of both the relations between power and knowledge in terms of the dispersed "implantation" of rationalities and of discursive formations away from the opposing metaphor of an individual consciousness:

> Qui n'envisagerait l'analyse des discours qu'en termes de continuité temporelle serait nécessairement amené à l'analyser et à l'envisager comme la transformation d'une conscience individuelle. Il bâtira encore une grande conscience collective à l'intérieur de laquelle se passeraient des choses.[93]

For the interviewers, it is *Surveiller et punir* that, with the idea of "Panopticism", moves this strategic vocabulary away from the merely abstract towards a more concrete examination of power struggles dispersed across societal space. Around this theme Foucault admits that he would like in the future to investigate the question of the implantation of power within geographical spaces.[94] In seeking to write a history of the

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90 Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Poststructuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault," *Telos*, vol. 55 (Spring, 1983) p. 206. Interview with Gérard Raulet.

91 Michel Foucault, "Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie," 1976.

92 ibid., p. 76.

93 ibid., p. 77.

94 ibid., p. 85.

present he singles out the Panopticon, an architectural design for the surveillance of many prisoners individually by one warder, as the basis for a new technique of power in modernity. He is not claiming that our modernity is made up of a complete network of panoptical institutions, or that power can only work in this way. It is simply that the Panopticon is one of the most eloquent archaeological monuments to one of the dreams of modernity: "Je dirai que Bentham est le complémentaire de Rousseau. Quel est, en effet, le rêve rousseauiste qui a animé bien des révolutionnaires? Celui d'une société transparente, à la fois visible et lisible en chacune de ses parties [...]"[95]

Methodologically, the Panopticon offers a spatial image for the consideration of power as dispersed and imbued materially in social architecture. Importantly, it also enables Foucault to think of power away from the structure of the State. And certainly in the way that *Histoire de la folie* was written with the fact of politically motivated psychiatric confinement in Eastern Europe in mind, so too was *Surveiller et punir* an attack on what Foucault saw as a Marxist obsession with the idea that power ultimately resides within the State apparatus. This is obviously the reason for the choice of vocabulary in the following statement: "On a vu que la prison transformait, dans la justice pénale, la procédure punitive en technique pénitentiaire; l'archipel carcéral, lui, transporte cette technique de l'institution pénale au corps social tout entier." (*SP*, p. 305). It should be noted that, as will be shown in Chapter Three, and as has been discussed already in this chapter, Foucault does not actually present the Panopticon as a model for modern society, which is endlessly and increasingly replicated. Instead, it is a form of visibility which, in the form of a "mixed metaphor", refers to older forms of confinement, moral police, and new techniques of discipline.

Having established that Foucault's work is organised from its inception around a set of spatial preoccupations, this chapter has attempted to show that, alongside broadly spatial concerns with what Foucault calls "la pensée du dehors", and the internal disruption of madness, he also works on a spatial form of heterogeneity or dispersion from the beginning of his career. The following Chapter shows how these spatial figures are applied to the question of power and political legitimacy. Foucault's attack on the principle of legitimacy and the traditional opposition between State and civil society is shown to depend upon the notion that power is a dispersed, heterogeneous and, importantly, strategic form. He begins to move away from the "discursive" notion of interdiction imposed from above, and looks closely at what might be termed strategic "spirals" of power. It is no longer a question of limits imposed upon freedom, but rather the circulation and transformation within a common system of demands for security and liberty. The demand for liberty may become a useful tool for the State and the individual may use a demand for security against the

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95 Michel Foucault, "L'Oeil du pouvoir," *Nouvelles littéraires*, no. 2578 (1977) p. 6. Interview with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle Perrot.

State.

THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The fate of the State, as both a real set of institutions, and as a principle of legitimacy in the wider sense of State theory and a political mandate, has often been central to political and theoretical debate in recent times in France and Europe in general. This broad sweep of post-'68 thought encompasses a heterogeneity of confused and sometimes antagonistic positions, some of which are widely considered to be opportunistic and overly eclectic recantations of Marxism, and in particular the controversial history of the Communist Party (PCF) in post-war France. One of the most notorious attacks on some of the theoretical orthodoxies of the 'sixties arose with the sudden arrival on the small but complex and aggressive Parisian intellectual scene of the so-called "Nouveaux philosophes" in the mid-'seventies.[1] Bernard-Henry Lévy introduced a selection of pieces by this new grouping in what may now appear to be an exaggeratedly apocalyptic style: "Une nouvelle génération de philosophes monte à l'assaut des citadelles d'hier, ébranle leur assises et fait vaciller les certitudes [...] Comme si le structuralisme, sitôt consacré, devait être détrôné."[2] It is important to note the rejection of "structuralism" as the academic homology of a technocratic notion of economy, government and social order. (This is a similar point to Henri Lefebvre's, dealt with in Chapter One). As Keith Reader points out in *Intellectuals and the Left in France since 1968*, Lévy and André Glucksmann depend for their often righteous anger on a perceived close family-relationship between Fascism and the aims of French communism, as an undeniably conservative and even potentially authoritarian force: "The Party's discourse and activity, as in its recent campaigns against the use of illegal drugs or the concentration of immigrants in working-class suburbs and shanty-towns, has often been characterised by a populism that feeds off many of the same anxieties as fascism."[3]

"La Nouvelle philosophie" might be characterised as an attempt to articulate a populist anti-State stance, having its roots in the libertarian strands of thinking which undoubtedly existed within the complex events of 1968 in France. Peter Dews draws attention to this "anti-Statism" as an important reference point for several of these Parisian writers, including Foucault.[4] They attack the State not simply as an apparatus of oppression, but also as a principle, or all-embracing concept, representing science, reason, or even the figure of the intellectual as "le maître penseur". They therefore reject

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1 Peter Dews, "The 'New Philosophers' and the End of Leftism," *Radical Philosophy*, no. 24 (1980) pp. 2-11.

2 Bernard-Henry Lévy, "Les Nouveaux philosophes," *Les Nouvelles littéraires*, no. 10 (juin, 1976), p. 15.

3 Keith A. Reader, *Intellectuals and the Left in France since 1968* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987) p. 112.

4 Peter Dews, "The 'New Philosophers' and the End of Leftism," pp. 4-5.

the anti-humanism of structuralism — particularly Althusser — as technocratic and elitist, and espouse individualism, spontaneity, local resistance, and even a vaguely mystical combination of Christian and literary spirituality.[5] Marxism is equated with the ever-increasing centralisation of power, and is held to be directly responsible for the so-called Soviet "Gulag". This critique of State-power means that the work of the "nouveaux philosophes" can often appear to be close to a neo-liberal libertarian view. In short, a fairly crude pluralism is opposed to the totalising effects of Marxist theory. Drawing much of their inspiration and indignation from Solzhenitsyn, they tend to characterise themselves as "dissidents". Peter Dews also suggests that Foucault colludes with what he considers to be this largely reactionary mode of thought by abandoning the question of class in his elaboration of a "functionalist" analytics of power. For Dews, Foucault perceives power as productive as well as repressive and negative, and thereby devalues the potential of resistances to power. In this way, Foucault contributes to an irrational and paranoid position which sees any institution as forming part of the established order. Dews considers the position of the "nouveaux philosophes" to be a neurotic fear of the crystallisation of power at any point since, for them, power is "everywhere".[6] Dews is right to question some of the inconsistencies in Foucault's work on power in the 'seventies. However, he does not address the moves that Foucault makes in the late 'seventies both to distance himself from the "nouveaux philosophes" and to look more closely at the question of the State. This chapter will look at these developments in Foucault's work.

Firstly, it is necessary to consider in more detail the relationship of Foucault's own work and political activity to the "nouveaux philosophes". Largely, this can be seen to centre on the question of dissidence. It should be noted that the issues surrounding this debate emerged in the context of the problem of extreme-left terrorism in Western Europe, particularly the so-called Baader-Meinhof group. In 1977, Foucault was involved in a campaign against the extradition of Klaus Croissant, the lawyer of the Baader-Meinhof group.[7] The question of legal rights — apparently uncharacteristically invoked by Foucault — will be returned to in the next chapter. The important aspect of the Croissant affair for this chapter rests upon the question of

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5 See Michel Foucault, "Vivre autrement le temps," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 755 (30 avril, 1979) p. 20. Foucault sees Clavel as proposing a unique synthesis of "Kant et le Christ", concentrating on the unique character of the historical present. Clavel replaces "la révolution" with "le soulèvement".

6 Peter Dews, "The 'Nouvelle Philosophie' and Foucault," in Mike Gane, ed., *Towards a Critique of Foucault* (London: Routledge, 1986) p. 99.

7 Foucault wrote two polemical pieces for Le Nouvel Observateur concerning the so-called Klaus Croissant affair:-
i) "Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant?" *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 679 (14 novembre, 1977) pp. 62-63.
ii) "Lettre à quelques leaders de gauche," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 681 (28 novembre, 1977) pp. 62-63. See also Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Paris: Flammarion, 1991) pp. 275-276.

terrorism and the State. For Foucault, this is a new relationship, or problematisation, which sheds light on the contemporary forms of the State and protest against the State. Essentially, this involves a re-evaluation of traditional political thinking. According to Foucault political thought had previously concerned itself with the struggle between those who govern and those who are in opposition; those who seek themselves to govern in the future. Now, with the advent of a particular type of political terrorism, a new figure emerges. This new figure is not destined to be "le futur gouvernant", but rather "le perpétuel dissident".[8] This figure has its genealogy in the anarchist movements of the late nineteenth century. The emergence of totalitarian regimes in the twentieth century also means that a common currency for the definition of political crimes disappears. A curious complex of judgements is constructed, whereby criticism of party discipline in totalitarian States is apparently denigrated as a form of delinquency or mental illness, whereas the same individuals are received as political exiles in Western Europe.[9] However, Western democratic States are reluctant to define the activity of terrorists such as the Baader-Meinhof group as specifically political. For Foucault, terrorism which does not arise from a nationalist demand for the freedom to govern is highly problematic for the contemporary Western European "security" State: "Ce qui choque absolument dans le terrorisme, ce qui suscite la colère réelle et non pas feinte du gouvernement, c'est que précisément le terrorisme l'attaque sur le plan où justement il affirme la possibilité de garantir aux gens que rien ne leur arrivera."[10] The security State — Foucault's shorthand for the Western Democratic State — is not a totalitarian State. The totalitarian regime is marked by an elaborate system of party discipline, which Foucault calls "une gouvernementalité de parti". (*Lecture*, 07/03/79). Security is rather a pact between those who govern and those who are governed. This pact is not a legal contract which devolves power to a sovereign; it is instead a technique of government, which seeks to order natural liberties in such a way as to achieve security. For this reason, security involves "une marge de manoeuvre et un pluralisme toléré infiniment plus grand que dans les totalitarismes."[11] Foucault demonstrates an initial enthusiasm for the iconoclastic approach of the "nouveaux philosophes", particularly in his review of Glucksmann's *Les Maîtres penseurs*.[12] However, through his own work on government and liberalism, he distances himself from critiques of the State and re-evaluates the question of dissidence. He proposes the replacement of the term dissidence, with that of "contre conduite". (*Lecture,* 01/03/78). In this way, Foucault seeks to identify as dissident activity only that which seeks to

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8 Michel Foucault, "Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant," p. 63.
9 ibid., p. 62.
10 Michel Foucault, "La Sécurité et l'Etat," *Tribune Socialiste* (24 novembre, 1977) p. 8.
11 ibid., p. 8.
12 Michel Foucault, "La grande colère des faits," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 652 (9 mai, 1977) pp. 84-86.

invent new ways of governing and being governed. In this way, his political position becomes somewhat more modest, and less overtly and modishly subversive.

The theme of the State and its relationship to society was central to late eighteenth-century theories of legitimacy and sovereignty, and has re-emerged in recent years around a cluster of issues including the problems faced by the post-war Western Democratic Welfare State, the concomitant rise of the New Right, and the crucial changes in Eastern Europe. Of related importance are the growth of the nuclear industry — particularly in France — and the opportunities for electronic surveillance offered to modern nation-States by contemporary microelectronics technologies. These and other developments have had various effects distributed across the nation states of Western Europe. There are also a number of theoretical and political strands that intertwine in this debate in what can sometimes create a confusing spectrum of subtle differentiations. Jürgen Habermas[13] and Daniel Bell[14] have, in different ways, examined the process of societal "differentiation" that capitalism creates. In doing so, they question the legitimacy of the contemporary State. Bell has looked at the tensions between hedonism, efficiency and individualism in what has been widely regarded as a "conservative" critique of postindustrialism, while Habermas has investigated the "colonisation" of the everyday "lifeworld" by the technical and dehumanising force of contemporary "Expertenkultur". Finally, in his capacity as economic adviser to the radical French trade union, the CFDT, Pierre Rosanvallon[15] has attempted to provide a theoretical project whereby the distinctively French tradition of "autogestion" can be moved beyond the post-war project of workers' control towards a wider societal project.

Theoretically, the various versions of the State/civil society division that inform modern social and political thought are still largely based on one of two assumptions.[16] The State is either seen as a principle of sovereignty that founds the laws and rights which will bring order to an anarchic civil society, or as a mechanism that threatens to choke the natural potential of civil society. In *Democracy and Civil Society* [17] John Keane gives a useful survey of the various ways in which the State has been distinguished from the "non-State". These are, briefly, as follows:

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13 Jürgen Habermas, "What does a Legitimation Crisis mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," *Social Research* (Winter, 1973).

14 Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity, 1978).

15 Pierre Rosanvallon, *L'Age de l'autogestion* (Paris: Seuil, 1976).

16 See Jacques Donzelot, "The Mobilization of Society," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) pp. 169-179. Donzelot notes a fracturing of the theme of right in France following the proclamation of the right to work in 1848. Opposed to this is the right to property. In an attempt to solve this problem, the founders of the Third Republic proposed the substitution of solidarity for sovereignty, and statistics for this contradictory theme of rights. (p. 171.)

17 John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London:Verso, 1988).

1) In the work of Hobbes and Spinoza the idea of the State as an organising principle in society is opposed to the natural selection of anarchy. It is here that the genesis of the notion of contract emerges.

2) In this second version Keane includes Pufendorf, Locke, Kant, the Physiocrats and the Scottish Enlightenment figures. The State is seen as completing and protecting the actual and positive potentials within society. This new developmemt institutes the notion of society as threatened in its natural positivity by a despotic figure of the State.

3) Keane sees the third version of the relation between the State and the non-State as evident in Paine's reply to Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. It is here for the first time that the State is deemed a necessary evil and natural society an unqualified good.[18]

4) Hegel is the first thinker to historicise "civil society" as an ethical and institutional entity that can be transcended by an independent State. The State works on the potential of civil society, which has a "formal universality" in the infinitely fluid nature of the market and the division of labour.

5) Keane locates the fifth version in the work of John Stuart Mill and Tocqueville who, again, wish to protect "civil society" from the new dangers of "popularly elected despotism."[19] That is to say, the modern paradox that the democratically created state apparatus and rationality can begin to choke the spontaneity of civil society.

Z.A. Pelczynski emphasises that Hegel conceives of civil society as a type of social, ethical life which is distinct from the State, representing a stage or "moment" in the dialectical development from the family to the public life of the State.[20] Pelczynski highlights Marx's criticisms of Hegel's separation of the State and civil society as centring on Marx's own rejection of the State as an ethical political community. Marx reversed the relationship, to consider civil society as the site of political life, conceiving of it as the primary economic sphere.[21] One consequence of this conception of bourgeois civil society as containing the potential for change, is that the State is seen not as a principle of community, but as the privileged superstructural site of class domination. Bourgeois civil society will provide the class which controls the State apparatus. Foucault's extreme nominalism regarding the State and civil society is anti-Hegelian, in that he rejects any notion of the State as an ethical principle of legitimacy or sovereignty. However, he also attacks what he sees as the Marxist position on the

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18 ibid., p. 35.

19 ibid., p. 36.

20 Z.A. Pelczynski, "The Significance of Hegel's Separation of the State and Civil Society," in Z.A. Pelczynski, ed., *The State and Civil Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) p. 1.

21 ibid., p. 2.

State as a privileged location of economic, and thus political, power.

Much of Foucault's work in the 'seventies is based upon an indirect attack on what he sees as Marxist economism. At several points, he outlines the methodological presumption that power relations are not secondary to other relationships, such as economic processes, but are rather immanent within these relations. (*VS*, p. 123). Firstly, he challenges the notion that the State is a privileged locus of power, either as a institutional supplement to the economic domination of civil society by the bourgeoisie,[22] or as a superstructural reflection and concentration of that domination. Secondly, he considers this particular opposition in a similar way to his nominalist approach to the oppositions of madness/sanity, sickness/health, criminality/legality and productive/non-productive sexuality. That is to say, he does not wish to deny the existence of madness, for example, but rather to question the regimes of truth which these oppositions help to establish. How is the division managed, and for what ends? This does not mean that these oppositions are a fiction imposed upon a pre-existing reality, nor is it his intention to valorise one half of the opposition over the other half — "madness" is no more liberating than "sanity" since it obviously has painful and debilitating effects on the individual — but rather to look at how these oppositions have *real* effects as regimes of truth. In short, Foucault is suspicious of any body of knowledge which claims to be a "science", and, in the crudest Nietzschean terms possible, the "will" to collect knowledge or open up a new area for investigation is always haunted by a "will" to political power. A particular example of this would be "l'hôpital maritime" in the eighteenth century at Rochefort, referred to in *Surveiller et punir*:

> Peu à peu un espace administratif et politique s'articule en espace thérapeutique; il tend à individualiser les corps, les maladies, les symptômes, les vies et les morts; il constitue un tableau réel de singularités juxtaposées et soigneusement distinctes. Naît de la discipline, un espace médicalement utile. (*SP*, p. 146).

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22 An early example of such an attack by Foucault is noted by Peter Dews in *Logics of Disintegration: Poststructuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory* (London: Verso, 1987):

> *The Birth of the Clinic* can be seen as an oblique polemic against the Marxist view that, in the initial phases of industrial capitalism, the role of the bourgeois state was characteristically limited to upholding the order of private law which secures economic activity and providing general guarantees of order. According to this view, the bourgeois state has been driven into increasing intervention by the functional inadequacies of the market, whereas Foucault wishes to show that - from the very beginning - intervention and administrative control have defined the modern State. In the debates which Foucault follows, the dictates of economic liberalism, which would have entailed an entirely deregulated, freelance status for medicine, are shown to have been defeated by the demand for surveillance of the health of the nation [...] pp. 146-147.

Foucault underlines this view in a piece for a collective work in the mid-'seventies: Michel Foucault, "La Politique de la santé au XVIII^{e} siècle," in *Les Machines à guérir: aux origines de l'hôpital moderne; dossiers et documents* (Institut de l'Environnement, Paris, 1976) pp. 11-21.

In this way, discipline illustrates the links between power and knowledge. It is a technique, rather than the effect of an ideology, which means that it can operate to some extent independently of the ideological formation in a given State. For these reasons, Foucault points out in the 'seventies that the techniques of discipline are by no means foreign to socialist regimes. For example, in an interview from 1976, concerning recent revelations on detention camps in the U.S.S.R., he observes that even if the Soviet regime has apparently transformed the role of the State with regard to the control of production, methods of managing society retain the mark of those developed in Europe in the nineteenth century: "Les types de moralité, les formes d'esthétique, les méthodes disciplinaires, tout ce qui fonctionnait effectivement dans la société bourgeoise déjà vers 1850 est passé en bloc dans le régime soviétique."[23] In a similar vein, he also admits, in an interview from 1978, that his early work on madness was viscerally influenced by a period spent living and working in Poland.[24] That is to say, "le grand renfermement" in *Histoire de la folie* was influenced by revelations concerning Soviet psychiatry.

In the 'seventies, his engagement with the question of the State is complex. On one hand, he criticises the use of the figure of the State as a principle of identity for critical thought, and as a privileged target of political struggle. On the other hand, reacting against a dual criticism of the State from both the Left and the Right, he finds it more useful to suspend judgement on the State as a unified entity.

> On sait quelle fascination exerce aujourd'hui l'amour ou l'horreur de l'Etat; on sait combien on s'attache à la naissance de l'Etat, à son histoire, à ses avancées, à son pouvoir, à ses abus [...] Mais l'Etat, pas plus actuellement sans doute que dans le cours de son histoire, n'a eu cette unité, cette individualité, cette fonctionnalité rigoureuse et je dirais même cette importance; après tout, l'Etat n'est peut-être qu'une réalité composite, une abstraction mythifiée, dont l'importance est beaucoup plus réduite qu'on ne croit.[25]

Instead of being blinded by the growth of a mythical State, Foucault concludes that the important question for our present is not "l'étatisation de la société", but rather "la 'gouvernementalisation' de l'Etat."[26] That is to say, the way in which the State develops an interest and a participation in the ethical question of government. This theme of governmentality will be elucidated later in this chapter, and will be expanded upon in the following chapter.

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23 Michel Foucault, "Crimes et châtiments en U.R.S.S. et ailleurs," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 585 (26 janvier, 1976) p. 35.

24 Michel Foucault, "Du Pouvoir," Interview with P. Boncenne, *L'Express* (6-12 juillet, 1985). In this interview Foucault sums up succintly the confrontation and critical engagement with existing Marxist theory that informed his work from the very beginnning. Here, he refers to his early work on madness: "J'ai fini la rédaction de ce livre en Pologne et je ne pouvais pas ne pas penser, au moment où je l'écrivais, à ce que je voyais autour de moi." (p. 57).

25 Michel Foucault, "La Gouvernementalité," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 269 (septembre, 1989) p. 103.

26 ibid., p. 103.

This contemporary interest in the figure of the State has been, in part, a result of the success of the so-called New Right and the decline of Marxism as a political movement. Foucault's engagement with Marxism is complex and at times apparently contradictory. It might even be suggested that his entire project could be seen as an attempt to complete and even expand a genuinely materialist Marxist strain of thought. (It will be recalled from the introduction that Etienne Balibar reads *La Volonté de savoir* as an important supplement to Marxist materialism.) There are certainly points in Foucault's work at which he acknowledges the thought of Marx as one of the corner-stones of modernity. For example, in a published conference paper from 1967 entitled "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx",[27] Marx is presented as in some way compatible with Nietzsche in his reflection upon the act of interpretation itself. In the same way that Nietzsche attempts to show that "depth" is an illusion — "le renversement de la profondeur, la découverte que la profondeur n'était qu'un jeu, et un pli de la surface"[28]) — so Marx undermines bourgeois relations of exchange and value as demonstrating a false "depth":

> Cette spatialité, ce jeu de Nietzsche avec la profondeur, je me demande s'ils ne peuvent se comparer au jeu, apparemment différent, que Marx a mené avec la platitude. Le concept de platitude, chez Marx, est très important; au début du *Capital*, il explique comment, à la différence de Persée, il doit s'enfoncer dans la brume pour montrer en fait qu'il n'y a pas de monstres ni d'énigmes profondes, parce que tout ce qu'il y a de profondeur dans la conception que la bourgeoisie se fait de la monnaie, du capital, de la valeur, etc., n'est en réalité que platitude.[29]

In a similar vein, Foucault acknowledges a large debt to the legacy of Marx's work in an interview from 1975. The interviewer remarks that much of Foucault's work is marked by an apparent attempt to distance himself from Marx. Foucault's rather typically aggressive reply is in part at least motivated by the theoretical strategy of acknowledging Marx's importance while at the same time resisting the reification of Marx as an individual genius. He admits that he incorporates concepts and even short extracts from Marx's work without actually citing them, since the work of Marx forms the archaeology, as it were, of all modern critical thought.[30] However, he also sets his work in almost direct opposition to the Marxist tradition. In a now infamous passage from *Les Mots et les choses*, Marx is presented as introducing no fundamental rupture in nineteenth-century thought. (*LMC*, p. 257). Both Marxism and nineteenth-century bourgeois economics look to an end to History to reveal the anthropological truth of the

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27 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," in *Nietzsche, Cahiers de Royaumnont* (Paris: Minuit, 1967).

28 ibid., p. 187.

29 ibid., p. 187.

30 Michel Foucault, "Entretien sur la prison: le livre et sa méthode," Interview with J. -J. Brochier, *Magazine littéraire*, no. 10 (juin, 1975) p. 33.

labouring subject.

Marx's position on the relationship between the State and the class basis of civil society is summarised in some detail by David Held in *Political Theory and the Modern State*.[31] The State assumes a "neutral" position, as if class differences did not exist. In short, the State defends all elements of society as if they were equal, but in effect defends property and economic dominance. Although — as Held goes on to state — there are at least two strands in Marx's theorising of the relationship between the State apparatus and classes, namely that the State is a) a superstructural element representing exclusively the interests of the dominant class or classes or b) has a degree of "relative autonomy" from relations of class domination and exploitation. The power of the State is therefore considered to be either political or economic in derivation. Even if the State is considered to be relatively autonomous from the economic base, or the logic of Capital, political power is still seen as being possessed by the State. In contrast, Foucault attempts the sort of analysis suggested by Marx's attack on platitudes discussed above. That is to say, the relationship between State and society is considered not as an equation governed by laws, but as a fluid "game" which produces norms. In his 1979 lectures, Foucault adopts the nominalist methodology of approaching the State and civil society not as historical universals, but as a schema for thinking about, and practising government. He outlines his nominalist approach in his 1978 lecture course. The object of analysis for the year's course is defined as government, or the problem of the State and the population. In previous years he has taken as his object "les disciplines" in the form of, for example, the prison. In order to carry out these analyses, he found it necessary both to approach the institution from the exterior, and to consider the institution within "un champ de vérité." His task in this year will be to approach the question of the State in a similar way, to consider the conditions which are exterior to the State. (*Lecture*, 08/02/78). Paul Veyne cites Foucault's own succinct description of his nominalism from this lecture:

> Je n'ai personnellement jamais écrit *la folie n'existe pas*, mais cela peut s'écrire; car, pour la phénoménologie, la folie existe, mais elle n'est pas une chose, alors qu'il faut dire au contraire que la folie n'existe pas, mais qu'elle n'est pas rien pour autant.[32]

Foucault considers what he sees as "la tradition anglaise" in liberal political thought to have provided no theory of the State, and instead elaborates different ideas of government. One of the critical targets of these lectures is the fact that socialist thought in Europe lacks an autonomous theory of government. (*Lecture*, 31/01/79). In general, these lectures constitute a considered, but open-ended reaction to the increasingly wide

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31 Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State*, p. 33.

32 These remarks are cited in Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire suivi de Foucault révolutionne l'histoire*, 2nd edn., (Paris: Seuil, 1978) p. 229.

currency of neo-liberal themes of self-management in the late 'seventies in Europe.

Before discussing any further these analyses of the State and population, it is necessary to look in more detail at the way in which Foucault develops his work on power in the 'seventies. The previous chapter provided an overview of the way that spatial themes in Foucault's work operate in a number of ways. Two methodological paths in particular were highlighted. Both of these themes — a concern with the heterogeneity of rationalities, and an increasing concentration on the individual and the individual body — lead Foucault into the analysis of "power". He develops a strategic conception or "analytics" of power, which informs his work in the 'seventies. Methodologically, he rejects the analysis of power as a possession. He also begins to conceive of power as a "spiral" form, which operates by means of pleasure and incitement to action as much as it does through interdiction. In short, power is something other than violence for Foucault. As noted in the previous chapter, *L'Ordre du discours*, the inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, is in many ways a transitional point in this move from an analysis of discourse towards an analysis of power. However, it can justifiably be claimed that Foucault's work is, from its inception, concerned with the interweaving of knowledge and power, starting as it does from the Nietzschean premise that knowledge cannot be in some way innocent, neutral or unmotivated. The move from discourse to power/knowledge (*SP*, p. 32) as a method of work may be seen in terms of a move from "archaeology" to "genealogy". This is, in fact, Foucault's own approach in the English transcript of a 1976 lecture. Here, he consciously applies the figure of dispersion from archaeology to a new "genealogical" attempt to bring together "erudite" and "subjugated" knowledges as an opposition to scientific totality:

> If we were to characterise it in two terms, then 'archaeology' would be the appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and 'genealogy' would be the tactics whereby, on the basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjugated knowledges which were thus released would be brought into play. (*PK*, p. 85).[33]

In the following lecture, which is also translated in the *Power/Knowledge* collection, Foucault goes on to state that, in this local analysis of power, he wishes explicitly to move away from considering questions of sovereignty and obedience, towards questions of domination dispersed throughout society. Rather than being concerned with the question of the legitimacy of central forms of power, he wishes henceforth to examine "power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary." (*PK*, p. 96). Giving an example, he goes on to say that rather than

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33 The dual strategy of archaeology and genealogy is related to the notion of "problematisation", as discussed in *L'Usage des plaisirs*. (*UP*, pp. 17-18.) The archaeological dimension is seen as the form of the problematisation, whereas the genealogical dimension is that of the practices and transformations which surround a problematisation.

concerning himself with punishment as it is derived from sovereignty or democratic rights, he has rather looked at the "ways punishment and power of punishment are effectively embodied in a certain number of local, regional, material institutions." (*PK*, pp. 96-97). The project of genealogy is only ever vaguely formulated. It appears in fact to be divided, sometimes rather uneasily, between two projects. Firstly, Foucault demonstrates a commitment to emphasise the importance of what have been previously regarded as "footnotes" in history. An obvious example would be the Panopticon. Secondly, he also wishes to reconstruct something of the dignity and poetry of individual lives as they are formed and fragmented by power. An obvious example of this would be the memoir of *Pierre Rivière*.

Surveiller et punir marks the first point at which power is considered at some length. Here, Foucault challenges both the traditional Marxist and liberal division between State and society. In short, the liberal view sees the State as defending the "property" of certain rights of spontaneous action within civil society, whereas the Marxist version sees the State, in various ways, as being a focal point and central disseminator of ideological violence: "Analyser l'investissement politique du corps et la microphysique du pouvoir suppose qu'on renonce — en ce qui concerne le pouvoir — à l'opposition violence-idéologie, à la métaphore de la propriété, au modèle du contrat ou à celui de la conquête [...]" (*SP*, pp. 32-33). However, Jacques Donzelot remarks that *Surveiller et punir* has been "misread" as a sort of supplement to dialectical materialism, bolstering, through the use of the new category of "power", previously vague categories such as "ideology" and "alienation".[34] Donzelot counters such readings claiming that, instead of outlining a history of the "error" of the State, Foucault instead examines the confrontation and interaction between the complex materiality of society and the discursive acts of political theory. Thus the State would never be a subject of history as such but a support for technologies and a resultant effect of governmental strategies. As regards the formulae of government, they would never be seen as dealing with the raw materials of society in its primitive, natural state but with a social materiality which is increasingly highly elaborated.[35]

Although Donzelot presents a useful and convincing discussion of the importance of Foucault's "discovery" of power, he underestimates the extent to which *Surveiller et punir* is still, to a certain degree, caught within a notion of power as domination.[36] Foucault provides a convincing description of the way in which the

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34 Jacques Donzelot, "The Poverty of Political Culture," *Ideology and Consciousness*, no. 5 (1979) p. 76.

35 ibid., p. 78.

36 See Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: an introduction," Graham Burchell et al., eds., *The Foucault Effect*, p. 5. See also Stephen J. Ball, ed., *Foucault and Education: Disciplines and Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1990).This collection bears witness to the impact of *Surveiller et punir* on the English-speaking academic sphere, and to the over-estimation of discipline as an explanatory concept. Keith Hoskin, for example, in "Foucault under

individual is fabricated by power, and is therefore not anterior to that power. However, this means that he does raise the question of how power might possibly be resisted.

Surveiller et punir is more successful in its genealogical aim of "liberating a forgotten history, the "counter-memory" of an illicit "science", which was nevertheless a fully-fledged tactic of discipline. Foucault argues that the traditional approach in the area of the history of ideas has been to emphasise the contractual notions that lay behind philosophical constructions of a fully-legitimised State which is an expression of the collective will, and knows the limits of its own power. He sets out to show that there also exists a more "impersonal" tactic which comes from below; the dream of a military society, a society which is fully mechanised. The elaboration of these techniques of detail and discipline did not come not only from jurists and philosophers, but also from "des bas officiers", and "des hommes de camp". This tactic is more humble in origin than the contractual problem of "natural" rights: "sa référence fondamentale était non pas à l'état de nature, mais aux rouages soigneusement subordonnés d'une machine, non pas au contrat primitif, mais aux coercitions permanentes." (*SP*, p. 171). It might, however be difficult, on a first reading, to see in what ways Foucault's account of disciplinary techniques, the creation of docile bodies and the construction of delinquency — all linked to the economic use of the body (*SP*, p. 30) — differs from a more traditional account in which discipline is a function of the growth of industrial society. To investigate the way in which Foucault does draw an important distinction between his project and a model based on violence/ideology, it is useful to turn to his remarks at the beginning of *Surveiller et punir* on the State. He introduces the notion that the subjectification of the body and the individual, which is necessary for the body to be economically productive and useful, is achieved not by the direct application of violence, but by a "savoir" concerning the body, which involves a mastery and an organisation of its forces. The body must become the subject of minor knowledges, but also forms an important element in the subjecthood of the individual. These minor knowledges are presented as "la technologie politique du corps". In terms of genealogy, it is a diffuse and disparate technology:

> Bien sûr, cette technologie est diffuse, rarement formulée en discours continus et systématiques; elle se compose souvent de pièces et de morceaux; elle met en oeuvre un outillage ou des procédés disparates. Elle n'est le plus souvent, malgré la cohérence de ses résultats, qu'une instrumentation multiforme. De plus en plus on ne saurait la localiser ni dans un type défini d'institution, ni dans un appareil étatique. Ceux-ci ont recours à elle; ils utilisent, valorisent ou imposent certains de ses procédés. (*SP* p. 31).

In this way Foucault develops the spatial figure of heterogeneity to introduce the idea of

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examination: the crypto-educationalist unmasked," emphasises the double sense of "discipline" in both English and French in order to highlight the importance of education as a nexus of "power-knowledge" in Foucault's work.

a micro-physics of power. Power operates through strategic and fragmentary relationships, rather than as a totalising force of control and domination which is the property of the State or the ruling class. Foucault therefore proposes "une 'anatomie' politique", which is different from the notion of the State as a body and the individual body as "un petit Etat". (*SP*, p. 33). It has already been shown that Deleuze considers this new, serial political anatomy to be a radically new conception of "l'espace social".[37]

Foucault sees his own work as in opposition to theories of sovereignty, citing Hobbes' notion of the sovereign State as the contractual distillation of a multiplicity of wills in a single point. He works from the premise that the traditional Western representation of power involves the double image of the sovereign in "lofty isolation" as an individual body ruling over an organic *body-politic*. Against this image he proposes that of a multiplicity of bodies. Eschewing completely any notion of society as a "natural" entity which can be opposed to the necessary evil of a guiding sovereign State, he presents, in a lecture that has yet to appear in French, the idea that each society is a project which is in a continual state of renewal at every level. And by dismantling the monarchical image of the sovereign as a unified subject, he can portray the individual subject as a "vehicle" of power. Perhaps the best way to consider this notion is the image of the individual subject as continually reassembled and dismantled by the effects of power, encouraged to exercise power both on others and on the self, in what may be a pleasurable experience. Instead of concentrating on the constitution of individuals as subject to a sovereign power, Foucault proposes to reverse the direction of his analysis:

> This would be the exact opposite of Hobbes' project in *Leviathan*, and of that, I believe, of all jurists for whom the problem is the distillation of a single will — or rather, the constitution of a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty — from the particular wills of a multiplicity of individuals [...] Well, rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit, I believe that we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power. (*P/K*, pp. 97-98).

He makes the point that both Marxist and liberal conceptions of power share an analogous "economism". The juridical, or "liberal" — as Foucault calls it at this stage — formulation of power entails a model of transaction. Each individual holds power as a possession, a certain amount of which can be given up in order to found sovereignty. Marxism, on the other hand, proposes an "economic functionality" of power. In short, Marxism locates the principle function of power within the economy; power is conceived of in the ways that it maintains the relations of production. (*P/K*, pp. 88-89). Pierre Rosanvallon, a member of Michel Foucault's seminar at the Collège de France in

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37 Gilles Deleuze, "Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe," *Critique*, vol. 31, no. 343 (décembre, 1975) p. 1210. See also Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1986) p. 34.

the late 'seventies, puts forward similar arguments in *Le capitalisme utopique*.[38] However, Rosanvallon perceives a common economism between eighteenth-century political economy and nineteenth-century socialism, which are both underpinned by an "economic" (in the widest sense of the term) theme of transparent commerce in society, against which the State withers away:

> Arithmétique des passions, harmonie des intérêts, fraternité universelle: c'est la même représentation de l'homme et de la société qui est à l'oeuvre que ce soit dans l'économie du XVIII^{e} ou dans la politique du XIX^{e} siècle. C'est en ce sens que l'idéologie économique est au coeur de la modernité.[39]

According to Rosanvallon's thesis, both Hobbes' theory of contract and sovereignty, and Adam Smith's political economy constitute a similar economic response to the problems of modernity. Foucault, as we shall see, takes a slightly different approach, in considering the discovery of political economy as a decisive move away from the paradigm of sovereignty towards government by means of truth, with the market as a privileged testing-ground for truth.

However, returning to Foucault's elaboration of an analytics of power in the 'seventies, his move away from economistic conceptions, *and* the struggle-repression hypothesis, (*P/K*, p. 92) constitutes one of the crucial problems in his work for many commentators. If power is "always already" present, as it were, it is presumably unlocatable. Also, Foucault may be seen as retreating to an essentialist position whereby the will to power is seen as a universal attribute of the human subject. The central problem of *Surveiller et punir* remains the simple objection that, if power acts as a set of strategic relationships, rather than the possession of a dominant group, what is the source of the rationality which underpins the unacceptable effects of power that Foucault appears to describe?

In general, the difficulty and elusiveness of Foucault's position, a position which is subtly but crucially different from Marxian readings of oppression and ideology, is well illustrated in the short section at the end of the first chapter of *Surveiller et punir*, which deals with the proliferation of literature (both popular and official) around crime under the *Ancien Régime*, and then in the "modern" period of penal reform; these distinctions obviously corresponding to the major division that Foucault himself uses in his book. (*SP*, pp. 69-72). This centres on what Foucault calls the "discours d'échafaud" which, under the *Ancien Régime* in the period of the "supplice" — the ceremonial inscription of the sovereign's revenge on the body of the criminal — is one element of the "carnival" aspect surrounding execution as a type of literature. (*SP*, p. 68). This discourse can be broken down into several elements.

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38 Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Capitalisme utopique: critique de l'idéologie économique* (Paris: Seuil, 1979).

39 ibid., p. 226.

Firstly, the "amende honorable" which the criminal was forced to proclaim, along with a placard announcing his guilt that he was forced to wear. Secondly, the opportunity for the condemned man to speak in front of the crowd. These speeches were in turn recorded in official chronicles, most probably in a fictional "official" form. Foucault also emphasises that there was a rather different and unofficial literature of songs, broadsheets and almanacs. For Foucault, a reversibility and equivocation surrounds this proliferation of literature. However, these old broadsheets disappear as the political significance of crime altered. A new "aesthetics" and even "nobility" of crime develops. Crime becomes the province of a new class. It is "psychologised", illustrated in crime fiction as the clash between the quiet ruses and intellect of the bourgeois criminal and the detective. There is certainly a thread of nostalgia for the era of a popular celebration of crime in Foucault's description of this shift, which closes the first chapter:

> La littérature policière transpose à une autre classe sociale cet éclat dont le criminel avait été entouré. Les journaux, eux, reprendront dans leurs faits divers quotidiens la grisaille sans épopée des délits et de leurs punitions. Le partage est fait; que le peuple se dépouille de l'ancien orgueil de ses crimes; les grands assassinats sont devenus le jeu silencieux des sages. (*SP*, p. 72).

However, putting aside this "nostalgia" — a not unproblematic element of Foucault's work in its totality — the shift in the status and function of the literature surrounding and defining "popular" and "official" conceptions of that which constitutes both the dignity and abomination that is crime is a concrete example of what Foucault calls a "microphysics" of power.(*SP*, p. 31). It is not a question of two different projects of domination and propaganda, but of two different "diagrammes" of power strategies; distinct sites where the meaning of crime is fought over. The status of "le discours d'échafaud" under the *Ancien Régime* is marked by an ambiguity and reversibility:

> il ne faut voir sans doute ni une 'expression populaire' à l'état pur, ni non plus une entreprise concertée de propagande et de moralisation, venue d'en haut; c'était un lieu où se rencontraient deux investissements de la pratique pénale — une sorte de front de lutte autour du crime, de sa punition et de sa mémoire. (*SP*, p. 71).

Here, the principle of heterogeneity can be seen to be at work. These two elements, the official and the popular, circulate in a common site of conflict. Heterogeneity here means that it is not possible to fix an overall perspective from which to view the discourse which surrounds crime in the *Ancien Régime*. The two versions of the crime are not in simple opposition. Justice needs the voice of the criminal to justify itself, but this in turn can turn the criminal into a hero. In an apparently unimportant remark Foucault emphasises the importance of "curiosity" as a motive invested with political interest : "l'intérêt de 'curiosité' est aussi un intérêt politique." (*SP*, p. 71).

So, the idea of a "microphysics" of power does not only apply to the

"disciplinary" era, it appears to be a general principle for the investigation of historical change. This "retrospective" use of concepts in Foucault's work, whereby later developments are brought to bear on his own early work, but also principles employed for one historical period are fed back into earlier work, can be seen in his 1982 publication with Arlette Farge on the seventeenth and eighteenth century "Lettres de cachet" in Paris.[40] These letters were an important element of the mechanism whereby families could denounce and bring about the imprisonment of individuals, and might be seen quite simply as an expression of Absolutist sovereign power. The basic argument and historical framework that emerges from this collection is similar to that of *Surveiller et punir*, which is to say that the disappearance of the "lettres de cachet" parallels the appearance of increasing public debate on penal and juridical matters: "Et à l'époque où l'emprisonnement commence à être inscrit dans la panoplie possible des châtiments légaux, la circulaire de Breteuil insiste sur l'idée d'une détention spécialisée: elle n'aurait pas pour objectif de punir des actes mais plutôt de modifier les individus."[41] However, the "lettres de cachet" are not seen only as an example of anonymous sovereign power, but rather as a complex "micro-physics" of relations within society:

> Cette pratique si singulière des lettres de cachet offre ainsi les possibilités de voir fonctionner concrètement un mécanisme de pouvoir; non pas bien sûr comme la manifestation d'un 'Pouvoir' anonyme, oppressif et mystérieux; mais comme un tissu complexe de relations entre des partenaires multiples: une institution de contrôle et de sanction.[42]

Foucault also looks at the system of "lettre de cachet-enfermement" in the preface to a projected publication concerning the Bastille archives, eloquently entitled "La Vie des hommes infâmes".[43] Here, he considers the ways in which, "la souveraineté politique" inserts itself at the most elementary level of the social body, via a utilisation of the most minor confrontations: "de sujet à sujet — et il s'agit parfois des plus humbles —, entre les membres d'une même famille, dans des rapports de voisinage, d'intérêts, de métier, de rivalité, de haine et d'amour [...] chacun, s'il sait jouer le jeu, peut devenir pour l'autre un monarque terrible et sans loi."[44] These exceptionally fine networks of power represent, in part at least, the origins of an excessive individualisation of power.[45] Foucault also sees them as evidence of a curious intimacy between the individual and the excessive power of the sovereign. These two elements are heterogeneous, and yet together they produce a network of

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40 Arlette Farge and Michel Foucault, eds., *Le Désordre des familles: Lettres de cachet des Archives de la Bastille* (Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1982) p. 16.

41 ibid., p. 17.

42 ibid., p. 17.

43 Michel Foucault, "La Vie des hommes infâmes," *Les Cahiers du chemin*, no. 29 (15 janvier, 1977) pp. 12-29.

44 ibid., p. 23.

45 ibid., p. 24.

power. In a similar fashion in later work, it will be shown that Foucault focusses on the important links between individual projects of government and the State.

Colin Gordon, in an article for *Critique* which summarises the reasons for the often hostile reception of Foucault's work by the left in Britain, notes that Foucault's refusal to see society as a generally positive space as opposed to the inherently expansionist tendencies of the State has not endeared him to traditional left-wing critics in Britain: "Foucault s'est notoirement abstenu de faire une théorie de l'Etat, se moquant un peu de ce qu'il appelait la 'phobie d'Etat'[...] Le vrai tort de Foucault ne fut pas tant, je pense, de redouter trop peu l'Etat, que de ne point vouloir jouer la société contre l'Etat."[46] Gordon is quite right in seeing Foucault's unusual, challenging and little-discussed disregard for "le lien social" — meaning a natural and popular solidarity amongst the general population — as one of the most unpalatable aspects of his work for the traditional Left. Gordon does not outline them in any detail, but these are precisely the ambigous and even apparently minor lines of conflict which have already been discussed in this chapter with regard to *Surveiller et punir*.

Although the methodological principle of a microphysics of power is not necessarily applied to the modern era, Foucault does imply that it has specific relevance for the patient construction of "discipline" from the middle of the eighteenth century onwards. The technique of discipline is a work of minute detail: "Ruses, moins de la grande raison qui travaille jusque dans son sommeil et donne du sens à l'insignifiant, que de l'attentive 'malveillance' qui fait son grain de tout. La discipline est une anatomie politique du détail." (*SP*, p. 141). So, although Foucault rejects the idea that power is the intention and the possession of a dominant group or the State, he still attributes to it a lowly "malevolence". However, the important point to note is that his description of the growth of discipline as a dominant figure of social control corresponds to the logic of a heterogeneous spatial field in which countless elements — many apparently trivial — gradually coalesce into a coherent tactic, rather than a consciously premeditated project. This new political anatomy of detail is not a sudden discovery, but rather a gradual movement, whereby minor and contingent processes coalesce into wider tactics of discipline. (*SP*, p. 140). Examples given are industrial innovation, the containment of epidemics and the invention of the rifle. The emphasis is evidently on events which are only indirectly related to economic domination. Foucault does not deny that the redeployment and re-definition of "illégalismes" parallels the rise of capitalism: "l'économie des illégalismes s'est restructurée avec le développement de la société capitaliste." (*SP*, p. 89).

To summarise, *Surveiller et punir* proposes an analytic of power as it is formed from below, and not power as it is disseminated from a centralised State. However, in

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46 Colin Gordon, "Foucault en Angleterre," *Critique*, vol. 52 (août, 1986) pp. 835.

apparent contradiction to this, it also deals with the various ways in which this micro-power is manipulated by, and becomes invested in, State or quasi-State institutions. The main problem with this analytic of power is that it depends on a military vocabulary of war and strategy. In the later part of his career this formulation becomes insufficient and Foucault takes his work in two directions: the play of liberties and the construction of the self. Overall, Foucault's analysis of power throughout the 'seventies is based around four principles which attempt to go beyond four traditional analyses:[47]

i) Against the idea that power is possessed, he proposes that it acts as a system of relays, etc., by means of the fabric of the social field itself. Power is never totally possessed by one side or the other in the social field. This will develop into the theme of the "strategic reversibility" of power.

ii) Power is not "localised" in State apparatuses. At most the State is an instrument of powers which operate far away from it, on the micro-physical level of the "social". Power may ultimately refer itself to the State, but the State does not originate power by functioning as a concentrated point or reflection of economic domination. In *Surveiller et punir*, the disciplinary techniques of police in the eighteenth century refer to, and are integrated with the juridical form of the State, but operate in a very different way from the power of the monarchy:

> Mais si la police comme institution a bien été organisée sous la forme d'un appareil d'Etat, et si elle a bien été rattachée directement au centre de la souveraineté politique, le type de pouvoir qu'elle exerce, les mécanismes qu'elle met en jeu et les éléments auxquels elle les applique sont spécifiques. C'est un appareil qui doit être coextensif au corps social tout entier. (*SP*, p. 215).

iii) Power is not subordinated to the mode of production. *Surveiller et punir* shows power itself as helping to constitute the mode of production. The disciplinary techniques of the factory are not the consequence of a new mode of production, but actually help to construct it.

iv) Foucault rejects the thesis that power can only operate either through violence or ideology. Firstly, instead of acting violently to repress or dominate, power may also have positive and productive effects. Secondly, the formulation of "ideology" has as its corollary the notion of "science", as a form of knowledge which unmasks the lies of ideology. Against this, Foucault asserts that all knowledge implies power relations. This is the "pouvoir/savoir" formulation. Foucault argues against the thesis that power and the agents of power can be located within the State apparatus, whilst not denying that the State constitutes a point of relay and reference for power. It is the first step in looking at the "how" rather than the "why" of power.

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47 See "Power and Norm: Notes," in Meaghan Morris and Paul Patton, eds., *Michel Foucault, Power, Truth, Strategy* (Sydney: Feral, 1979) pp. 59-66. A translation of a series of notes taken from one of Foucault's lectures. The notes refer specifically to Foucault's own summary of his analytics of power.

La Volonté de savoir develops this analytic of power, under the general heading of "pouvoir/savoir", even further. If *Surveiller et punir* had shown that power was not an institution, then it had perhaps not completely dispelled the suspicion that "le Pouvoir" is a structural inevitability within society. This may be why Foucault explicitly adopts a "nominalist" position on power, defining it as "le nom qu'on prête à une situation stratégique complexe dans une société donnée." (*VS*, p. 123). As a consequence of this nominalist approach, Foucault outlines in some detail some important refinements to his analytic of power. Firstly, that power comes "from below":

> c'est-à-dire qu'il n'y a pas, au principe des relations de pouvoir, et comme matrice générale, une opposition binaire et globale entre les dominateurs et les dominés, cette dualité se répercutant de haut en bas, et sur des groupes de plus en plus restreints jusque dans les profondeurs du corps social. (*VS*, p. 124).

Secondly, he introduces the principle that "les relations de pouvoir sont à la fois intentionnelles et non subjectives," (*VS*, p. 124). This means that strategies of power are calculated and deliberate, but that they do not depend upon the conscious choices and decisions of groups or individuals. Thirdly, they are strategically reversible, or tactically polyvalent, in that, for example, the psychiatric and literary discourse of the homosexual as a species allows homosexuality the counter-discourse of claiming its own "naturalité". (*VS*, p. 134). In *Surveiller et punir*, Foucault notes that disciplinary power operates by means of a serial space, in real and ideal terms. (*SP*, pp. 148-150). In *La Volonté de savoir*, he goes one step further, in considering power to operate through the field of discourse itself in serial form: "il ne faut pas imaginer un monde du discours partagé entre le discours dominant et celui qui est dominé; mais comme une multiplicité d'éléments discursifs qui peuvent jouer dans des stratégies diverses." (*VS*, p. 133). Fourthly, power relations are also doubly conditioned, in that they depend upon a relay, or point of contact, between local and global strategies. Global and local strategies are not discontinuous, but neither are they homogeneous. They rather come together to form a specific strategic effect. In this way, the very fact that the family forms an isolated unit makes it a useful strategic prop for more global projects: "le dispositif familial, dans ce qu'il avait justement d'insulaire et d'hétéromorphe aux autres mécanismes de pouvoir, a pu servir de support aux grandes 'manoeuvres' pour le contrôle malthusien de la natalité, pour les incitations populationnistes." (*VS*, p. 132). This principle of double conditioning is, in terms of this thesis, also dependent upon Foucault's development of the figure of heterogeneity. The family and wider governmental strategies are to a large extent heterogeneous, or, as Foucault puts it here, heteromorphous, but they do have a point of contact which produces a relation of power which is neither one nor the other. (See *VS*, p. 147).

In general, *La Volonté de savoir* constitutes an important development in

moving Foucault's work away from a residual "naturalism" in his analysis of power, which conceives of power in terms of violence, repression or interdiction, and considers spontaneity and richness to lie behind the imposition of power. In this way, although Foucault demonstrates, as we have already seen, a certain admiration for the work of the "nouveaux philosophes", his own work moves away from their own over-simplifications of power.

In an interview given at the time of publication, Foucault indicates clearly that the methodological and theoretical shifts outlined in the book with regard to power are in part a response to what he calls a certain "doxa gauchiste", which, out of an aesthetic and moral choice, considers power to be in itself ugly, sterile and undesirable. Foucault sees this act of aligning oneself with the "right side" to be fundamentally mistaken: "Il faut passer de l'autre côté — du 'bon côté' —mais pour essayer de se déprendre de ces mécanismes qui font apparaître deux côtés, pour dissoudre la fausse unité, la 'nature' illusoire de cet autre côté dont on a pris le parti."[48] Whereas *Surveiller et punir* looks largely at power as a material technique which operates outside and away from the State, *La Volonté de savoir* elaborates upon this analytics, but also represents a concerted attack upon critical thought which remains within the paradigm of the State. Foucault claims, famously, that in political thought, we have yet to think outside the framework of sovereignty and the localised power of the State: "on n'a toujours pas coupé la tête du roi." (*VS*, p. 117). At this stage, he sees his work explicitly in terms of analysing ways of producing truth. The primary insight of this period is that sexuality, and the incitement to explore one's sexual identity as a method and form of truth, is in itself a historical formation of truth. However, running parallel to this is the related argument that modern critical thought depends upon a similar form of truth based upon identity. Thus two strategies which are heterogeneous work together in a spiral form to produce effects of power. Also, Foucault suggests that effective political thought must take a genuinely heterogeneous approach to identity, setting itself free from the search for, and the assertion of a fixed identity. The article briefly referred to above is particularly notable in revealing that in 1977, Foucault had already begun to extend his thinking on modernity to encompass early Christian thinking. As is often the case in interviews, Foucault is speculative and inventive, producing some of his most provoking thoughts. Here, he suggests a link between early Christian attitudes to the Second Coming and the modern "obsession" with revolution. Faced with a revolution which is constantly deferred we (referring here to a dominant form of Left thinking) ask, "Qui sommes-nous, nous qui sommes en trop, en ce temps où ne se passe pas ce qui devrait se passer?".[49] Foucault suggests that the link between political identity and revolution might usefully be broken. Politics as we understand it is a field which is

48 Michel Foucault, "Non au sexe roi," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 644 (12 mars, 1977) p. 113.
49 ibid., p. 113.

opened up by the French Revolution, in that it is a search for identity. For the first time, he suggests that it might be necessary to invent a new form of ethical activity which would replace "la politique politicienne": "Il faudrait en inventer une autre ou quelque chose qui se substituerait à elle. Nous vivons peut-être la fin de la politique [...] et si la question de la révolution ne peut plus se poser en ces termes, alors la politique risque de disparaître."[50] This perhaps goes some way to explaining Foucault's enthusiastic reception of the "nouveau philosophe" figure André Glucksmann. Foucault responds particularly favourably to Glucksmann's rejection of the German idealist elevation of the State and Revolution as principles of abstract reason and identity, and not to any vague criticism of the liberal-democratic State as increasingly totalitarian: "Ayant à penser la Révolution, commencement et fin, les penseurs allemands l'ont chevillée à l'Etat et ils ont dessiné l'Etat-Révolution avec toutes ses solutions finales."[51]

Foucault sees as his main theoretical adversary in *La Volonté de savoir* what he calls a "juridico-discursive" approach to power. (*VS*, p. 118). Such an approach conceives of power as functioning solely in terms of law or prohibition, and considers that a discourse of truth can unmask power. In a recent paper Alessandro Pizzorno considers Foucault's dismantling of the "juridico-discursive" in relation to what he calls the "liberal" conception of the individual.[52] For Pizzorno, Foucault's insight that power can be positive and enabling — that is to say, it does not function solely in terms of law and interdiction — does perhaps not have the force of originality that is sometimes attributed to it. He considers the thesis of discipline — and especially self-discipline — to be potentially more productive for analysing the functioning of liberal democratic regimes.[53] However, this is to ignore the fact that, as a consequence of attempting to think beyond the juridico-discursive, Foucault refines his analytics of power in the directions discussed above. Foucault does, in fact go on to develop a "governmental" approach to power, which is precisely designed to be adequate to the functioning of modern neo-liberal and liberal democratic regimes.

In general, then, Foucault formulates a fairly complex attack on the idea of the State in the 'seventies, which remains an important part of his work to the end of his career. He attempts to cast doubt upon theories of sovereignty and legitimacy, on an excessive fear of the repressive potential of the State, and on the State as a principle of revolutionary identity. In refusing the classic opposition between State and civil society as an essential balance which must be struck between the natural state of society and the necessary interventions of the State, he looks at this opposition as a discursive *act* with

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50 ibid., p. 124.

51 Michel Foucault, "La grande colère des faits," p. 86.

52 Alessandro Pizzorno, "Foucault et la conception libérale de l'individu," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris 9, 10, 11 janvier 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) pp. 236-245.

53 ibid., p. 224.

real material consequences rather than a description of an ideal reality.

Criticisms of Foucault's work on power come from widely different, even opposing angles. Baudrillard, for example, considers Foucault as being able to speak of power only because the very idea of power about which Foucault writes is already something of the past in contemporary Western societies.[54] For Baudrillard, power is merely a signifier which is constantly deferred and absorbed into a hyper-reality, whereas Foucault's work retains unmistakeable traces of a reality principle. He condemns Foucault's critique of modernity as being, itself, paradigmatically modernist in its perspective. Baudrillard's attack is somewhat flawed, in that he underestimates Foucault's nominalism with regard to power. However, he does highlight the problem that power becomes a universal and almost ahistorical category for Foucault: "il n'y a pas de fin pour lui au politique, seulement les métamorphoses, du despotique au disciplinaire et ici au microcellulaire, selon le même processus qui fut celui des sciences physiques et biologiques."[55] Baudrillard is correct to suggest that power becomes almost a universal category for Foucault. However, his critique was written before Foucault reassessed his position on power, and moved towards the formulation of governmentality.

From a very different position, Sheldon S. Wolin also re-assesses Foucault's work on power in the light of what he sees as a "postmodern" shift in political practices. Wolin criticises Foucault precisely for colluding with a "postmodern politics" which has only "a minimal dependence on the principle of legitimacy."[56] In this way, Wolin recalls Habermas' notion of a contemporary "legitimation crisis", and Lyotard's controversial and misunderstood concept of the death of master narratives. Wolin sees the electorate as increasingly taking on the role of consumers of "competency", rather than being involved in any real consensual activity. He concludes by placing Foucault's work within a "postmodern attack upon foundationalism."[57] This is an often confusing essay, claiming as it does that Foucault reacts against the "classical" State-centred concept of legitimacy and sovereignty, at the same time stating that Foucault presents an overall conception of the State and power which concentrates far too closely on the repressive and negative aspects of power, whilst remaining within a Marxian inspired model of State and superstructure. The latter point is based on a misreading on Wolin's part of Foucault's comments as presented in an interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino in the English-language *Power/Knowledge* collection. It is incidentally interesting to note that this statement does not appear in the original French

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54 Jean Baudrillard, *Oublier Foucault* (Paris: Galiléc, 1977).

55 ibid., p. 14.

56 Sheldon S. Wolin, "Theory and Practice of Power," in Arac, Jonathan, ed., *After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge, Postmodern Challenges* (London: Rutgers University Press, 1988) pp. 179-201.

57 ibid., p. 180.

version of the interview, which is attributed to M. Fontana in 1977.[58] Wolin states that Foucault describes the state as "superstructural". His comments as translated in the English version are as follows:

> I don't want to say the State isn't important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State [...] The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth.(*P/K*, p. 122).

Wolin, then, misreads Foucault, who does not reproduce the Marxist model of an economically-defined base, with the State as a superstructural reflection of the power of the dominant class. Foucault is rather moving in the direction of his later work, which will be an emphasis on the positive "pastoral" investment of the State by a wide range of techniques for the maintenance and fostering of the population. His main point in this interview is that the State is a reference-point for other forms of power, rather than a privileged locus at which power can be located.

Overall, it can be seen that there are flaws in Foucault's work on power. However, it is crucial to understand that he tacitly acknowledged some of these criticisms, and moved to new formulations in his later work. Having established a distinctive position on the question of power, Foucault begins to question his own concentration on the war-repression hypothesis with *La Volonté de savoir*. Through the idea that power relations are strategically reversible, he moves into the area of the "social" and "la gouvernementalité". It should be noted at this stage that, as a consequence of his regular seminar at the Collège de France, other writers began to develop important work which takes as its starting point a Foucaldian ethos in the 'seventies. To a certain extent, then, the insights of this period must be seen in the context of collaborative work. The two most important "collaborators" were François Ewald, who was for several years Foucault's assistant at the Collège de France, and Jacques Donzelot. Both have developed their own areas of interest around the question of what Foucault called "biopolitique" or "bio-pouvoir":

> Développement rapide au cours de l'âge classique des disciplines diverses — écoles, collèges, casernes, ateliers; apparition aussi, dans le champ des pratiques politiques et des observations économiques, des problèmes de natalité, de longévité, de santé publique, d'habitat, de migration [...] S'ouvre ainsi l'ère d'un 'bio-pouvoir'. (*VS*, p. 184).

La Volonté de savoir explicitly expands upon the disciplinary schema — "anatomo-politique du corps humain" — adding to this "une biopolitique de la population" which forms itself from the second half of the eighteenth century. (*VS*, p. 183). By

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58 Michel Foucault, "Vérité et pouvoir," Interview with M. Fontana, *L'Arc*, no. 70 (1977) pp. 16-26.

suspending the question of the State, Foucault seeks to open up the field of the social. That is to say, the tactics and technologies which seek to foster life, and draw their power from the demands and struggles of the population itself. The field of the social is governed by the principle of the norm rather than law and sovereignty. (*VS*, p. 189).

Both Donzelot and Ewald have developed the question of the social. For example, Ewald, in his comprehensive study *L'Etat providence*, considers the "contrat de solidarité", developing around the questions of "accident" and "risque" which emerge with industrial society, as completely separate from Rousseau's idea of "le contrat social".[59] It is "[le] contrat de solidarité" which represents the "social", as opposed to the "political".

Jacques Donzelot's *La Police des familles* may be considered as an ambitious continuation of the project of research into "la biopolitique" set out in *La Volonté de savoir*.[60] Rather than treating the family as a stable and discrete structure, Donzelot introduces the notion of the family as "un mécanisme", functioning as a nodal point in a series of productive tensions.[61] Firstly, the theme — which gains momentum throughout the eighteenth century — of "la conservation des enfants" — is shown to have opposite effects on family life in these two classes. The bourgeois mother gains a new power and status within the family, in alliance with the doctor, as the bourgeois family turns inward and rids itself of the deleterious effect of education by servants. Families from the popular milieu are, on the other hand, opened up to a a new series of surveillances and constraints.[62] Secondly, the modern family participates in discrepancies between individual and familial aspirations, and potential conflict between private initiative and collective, primarily national stability:

> En ce sens, la famille moderne n'est pas tant une institution qu'un mécanisme. C'est par la disparité des figures familiales (bipolarité populaire et bourgeoise), par les dénivellations entre l'intérêt individuel et l'intérêt familial, que ce mécanisme fonctionne. La force de ce mécanisme réside dans une *architectonique sociale* dont le principe est toujours de coupler une intervention extérieure avec des conflits ou des différences de potentiel à l'intérieur de la famille.[63]

In his enthusiastic afterword, Gilles Deleuze considers Donzelot to have introduced a sketch of the field of the "social", which begins to emerge in the nineteenth century, and is presented as a hybrid space which is neither public nor private.[64] In his work on space in the 'sixties Foucault remarks on the strange sacralisation of the public/private opposition, and the attempt to undermine this opposition plays a large part in his work

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59 François Ewald, *L'Etat providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1986) p. 22.
60 Jacques Donzelot, *La Police des familles* (Paris: Minuit, 1977).
61 ibid., p. 89.
62 ibid., pp. 26-27.
63 ibid., p. 89.
64 ibid., p. 214.

on power from the 'seventies. Deleuze also highlights the role of the State as portrayed by Donzelot. The social is not a reflection of the power of the State, but rather a field constructed from "des interventions de l'Etat et de ses retraits."[65] The social is a hybrid field or space, in which heterogeneous tactics have strategic consequences. For example, Deleuze notes that Donzelot shows how "l'appel à l'épargne" represents a liberal move by the State to free itself from the heavy burden of social costs, whilst undermining the dominant position of the father in the household. At the same time, the State finds it necessary to intervene in the industrial sphere in order to protect wives and children from exploitation.[66] Thus, the family becomes simultaneously, "l'occasion d'une décharge de l'Etat libéral, et la cible ou la charge de l'Etat interventionniste".[67] Donzelot's work may therefore be seen to be derived from Foucault's principle of "double conditionnement", in the exercise of power, dealt with above, whereby local centres of power serve as props for wider strategies and vice versa. In this way, the father in the family does not represent the sovereign or the State, and it is precisely this fact that the family is insular with regard to the mechanisms of power which means that it can be used to support wider and even contradictory "manoeuvres" such as Malthusianism and populationism. (*VS*, 132).

Deleuze considers Donzelot to have drawn on Foucault, in employing a methodology which is "généalogique, fonctionnelle et stratégique."[68] Using the metaphor of currency and exchange-rate, he suggests a way in which Foucault's (and Donzelot's) dismantling of the State/civil society opposition might be read in relation to Foucault's remarks above concerning Marx's attack on platitude. In the same way that Marx shows the bourgeois conception of value and depth to be platitude, so Donzelot and Foucault prise apart the stable equivalence between State and society based on law, to introduce a "floating", heterogeneous relationship, based on the principle of the norm: "Mais 'le' social naît avec un régime de flottaison, où les normes remplacent la loi, les mécanismes régulateurs et corrrectifs remplacent l'étalon."[69]

Donzelot presents Foucault's work on power as having undermined some of the traditional oppositions of political thought.[70] The poverty of contemporary political culture is its essential dualism: "Capital, as foil and scapegoat, is replaced by the State, that cold monster whose limitless growth 'pauperises' social life; and the proletariat gives way to civil society, that is to say everything capable of resisting the blind rationality of the State [...]"[71] Donzelot locates two apparently contradictory strands of

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65 ibid., p. 214.
66 ibid., p. 216.
67 ibid., p. 217.
68 ibid., p. 215.
69 ibid., pp. 219-220.
70 Jacques Donzelot, "The Poverty of Political Culture," *Ideology and Consciousness*, no. 5 (1979).
71 ibid., p. 74.

political thinking which oppose themselves to the "monstrous" State; German terrorist movements of the late 'seventies, and workers' control groups (known in the French tradition as "autogestion"). They both place themselves in opposition to a fictional State which will engulf and choke civil society. For the workers' control movements it is the "Soviet State", whilst for the Red Army Faction it is the "Fascist State".[72] Donzelot emphasises the point that these movements ultimately have as their target society itself rather than the State. Donzelot sees the paradox of these new political movements in their justifiable concentration on "power" (as opposed to a narrow and self-evident principle of State legitimacy), which becomes, however, an unjustifiable emphasis on the negative and repressive aspects of power. He argues for an analysis of Western nation-States in terms not of a "Soviet" or "Fascist" model, but rather in terms of the positive and productive aspects of the Western Welfare State. In other words, the State has had a positive *social* role in developing programmes of social welfare. The question of the State should be provisionally bracketed in favour of a "positive" analysis of power, "in the sense of a *productive* force engendering social processes — 'agencements' — that tend towards the intensification of functions of surveillance, security, productivity, well-being."[73] For Donzelot, Foucault's exploratory work in the domain of power has formed an analogous role to Freud's work in the area of sexuality, in that Freud saw sexuality as irreducible to a subject in the shape of sex and sexual identity.[74] This is perhaps where Donzelot's development of Foucault's theme of power becomes problematic. Whilst denying that power is a "lost" element, he elevates power to the explanatory and problematic status of sexuality in Freud. The final chapter will consider some further ways in which Foucault moves away from power and strategy as the organising principles of his work to a more detailed exploration of questions of truth. Scott Lash and John Urry for example, would tend to see this work on power and discipline in the 'seventies as having strictly limited applications. They suggest that Foucault's work on discipline, which, in schematic terms, roughly corresponds to the first stages of his work on power in the 'seventies, is most useful in its application to what they term "organised" capitalism.[75] Also, of course, Foucault re-evaluates his own work on power in the later part of his career, to concentrate more closely on the question of government, and technologies of the self. However, Donzelot's work is important in emphasising Foucault's concentration on techniques, rather than programmes or ideologies.

Ewald also takes up the idea of "techniques", derived from Foucault. In *L'Etat providence*, he claims that a political rationality can be examined, "comme rationalité de

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72 ibid., p. 75.
73 ibid., p. 76.
74 ibid., p. 76.
75 See Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organised Capitalism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) pp. 54-55.

programme et comme rationalité de *diagramme*."[76] Echoing the spatial thematics of *Surveiller et punir*, he chooses to concentrate on the "diagramme". For Ewald, there are two major characteristics which constitute a "diagramme" of a political rationality. Firstly, it functions in direct contrast to the idea of a utopia. That is to say, it is the imaginary principle upon which the various functions of rationality in the present moment are based. Secondly, as in the case of the Panopticon, it involves the dream of "autorégulation": "Si le rêve des physiciens est la découverte du mouvement perpétuel, peut-être celui du politique est-il de trouver un dispositif qui, à l'exemple du panoptique, fonctionnerait indéfiniment tout seul: autorégulé."[77] Here, Ewald highlights one of the most important spatial figures for Foucault's work on liberalism, which will be explored in the following chapter. That is to say a liberal belief in spontaneous generation arising from the subtle *conduct* of liberties. In short, it would be a mistake to consider the Panopticon as equivalent to the growth of the State. It is precisely a technique designed for the self-regulation of society.[78]

The work of André Gorz is one of the most thorough, and neglected, examples of the "autogestion" tradition which Donzelot links with a left critique of the State, via themes of "workers' control" and "spontaneity". Gorz, in short, criticises the "economism" of much Marxist analysis, seeking instead to re-introduce the importance of notions such as alienation. In a deceptively dense opening series of arguments from *Les Métamorphoses du travail* [79] Gorz deals with what he sees as a central contradiction within Marxism. In simple terms, he sees Marx as putting his faith in the unitary economic rationality of industrial production in order to transcend precisely that rationality. In this way, Gorz's later work bears the distinctive mark of the Frankfurt School. In contrast to this he looks at the Greek notion of economy, which drew a clear distinction between public and private rationalities. Freedom began outside the domestic household sphere, which could be regarded as a sphere of violence, since harmony is achieved through the use of slaves and wives. Gorz, as a proponent of "workers' control", would wish to oppose a "positive" civil society to the pernicious effects of the State. However, Gorz wishes to retain a limited managerial and juridical role for the State:

> La possibilité de réduire l'Etat dépend donc de la réduction et de la décentralisation des unités techniques et économiques. Evidemment, l'Etat n'a pas intérêt à cette réduction puisqu'elle va réduire son pouvoir. Mais la société civile et la population y ont intérêt. Elles n'ont pas intérêt pour autant à

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76 François Ewald, *L'Etat providence*, p. 50.

77 ibid., p. 51.

78 See Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: an Introduction," in *The Foucault Effect*, p. 27. Gordon puts an interesting slant on the idea of panoptic discipline, by considering it to be a principle of "inspectability" for the State itself. The State and its civil servants should engage in auto-surveillance.

79 André Gorz, *Métamorphoses du travail: quête du sens* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989).

> supprimer l'Etat. Il reste une sphère incompressible qui doit relever de lui, non seulement matériellement mais juridiquement.[80]

Such a view obviously has a somewhat surprising similarity to the neo-liberal conception of the minimal State. That is to say, a reduction of the oppressive and intrusive role of the State, a "rolling back" of the State, in favour of a limited juridical role in assuring "law and order". In fact, in the mid-'seventies, Gorz, under his pseudonym of Michel Bosquet, as a journalist for *Le Nouvel Observateur*, explicitly calls for a strategic appropriation of neo-liberal ideas concerning decentralistion as part of a New Left desire for a genuine "autogestion". Referring to Pierre Rosanvallon's *L'Age de l'autogestion*,[81] he perceives similarities between apparently different ends of the political spectrum: "partout en Europe, il y a aujourd'hui, entre néo-libéraux et néo-socialistes, des échanges et des osmoses partiels. Leurs buts sont fondamentalement différents, et leurs méthodes."[82]

For the theorists of "autogestion", such as Gorz, the contemporary Western European State typically represents a double problem. It is both authoritarian and manages to co-opt and tame the revolutionary potential of the working-class movement. In his work as economics editor for *Le Nouvel Observateur* throughout the 1970s Gorz constantly comes back to the question of nuclear power as being closely linked to an authoritarian notion of State and government. Gorz's notions of self-determination are developed from an abiding interest in the so-called "humanistic" Marxism of Sartrean existentialism. Ultimately, the question of "autogestion" must depend upon strictly delimited areas of sovereignty for both individual and the State. Foucault's position can be distinguished from this in two ways. Firstly, he considers the role of the State to be individualising as well as collective and totalising.[83] Secondly he insists upon the fact that civil society cannot be separated from the State as a sphere of relative innocence which is not permeated by power relations.

It should, however, be noted Foucault did in fact show a certain amount of personal and theoretical sympathy with the CFDT, the French trade union which was most closely linked with the ideals of "autogestion".[84] However, he consistently refuses to consider the State as an ahistorical object which has an intrinsic inflationary drive towards enveloping its other, civil society. For Foucault, the State has no essence, and therefore there can be no family relationship between fascist,

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80 André Gorz, Interviewed by Corpet, Gaudin, Grupp and Mattei, "La conquête de l'autonomie," *Autogestion*, nos. 8-9 (1982) pp. 199-200.

81 Pierre Rosanvallon, *L'Age de l'autogestion* (Paris: Seuil, 1976).

82 Michel Bosquet, "Occupons le terrain," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (30 août, 1976) p. 23.

83 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," An Afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1982).

84 See Didier Eribon , *Michel Foucault*, pp. 314-328.

administrative and totalitarian States. (*Lecture*, 07/03/79). This means that the proposal of a minimal juridical State is, for Foucault, a false diagnosis of the distinctive problematic of Western democratic States, which is that of "L'Etat-providence", or "L'Etat de sécurité".[85] Instead, Foucault looks at a European-wide process of "gouvernmentalisation" which develops from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. In some ways, this may be seen as a similar move to that of Weber away from Marx. Weber's opposition to Marx, as summarised by David Held,[86] is twofold. Firstly, the question of violence: the modern nation-State has a monopoly on violence, being no longer divided by internal warring factions, but turning outwards in potentially violent competition with other international States. There is an implicit link between bureaucracy and violence. Secondly, Weber makes a pluralist challenge both to the notion of class and the State apparatus as as reflection of economic dominance, and to the conception of the modern State as the effect or product of capitalism; its origins are rather seen as plural, in the same way that Foucault sees the effects and origins of power in contemporary society as plural.

In his important afterword to Dreyfus and Rabinow's *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, Foucault emphasises, whilst in no way ignoring the central importance of the State and its institutions, that his notion of "government" accounts for the plurality of rationalities of power within the social fabric. It is important not to be caught within the model of sovereignty, which sees the State as founding legitimacy, the just limits to its own power of intervention etc. and, by analogy, producing and founding its own excesses. Foucault acknowledges that power relations may have come more and more under State control, they may refer themselves to the State. However, the techniques of government within a given society are multiple.[87]

In his 1979 lectures, Foucault draws what is for him an important distinction between "la phobie d'Etat" and the governmental process of "étatisation". He distinguishes his own work from traditional thought on the question of the State in several ways. Firstly, the State does not constitute a universal essence, nor is it in itself an autonomous source of power. His position on the State is nominalist: "l'Etat ce n'est rien d'autre que des faits: le profil, la découpe mobile d'une perpétuelle étatisation ou de perpétuelles étatisations, de transactions incessantes [...] les rapports entre pouvoirs

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85 See Michel Foucault, "La Sécurité et l'Etat," pp. 7-8.

86 David Held, *Political Theory and the Modern State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). Held emphasises the fact that Weber, whilst drawing importantly on the work of Marx, refused any notion that the State was "parasitic" on the activity of classes. (p. 39): "The modern state is not, Weber contended, an effect of capitalism; it preceded and helped promote capitalist development [...] Capitalism, however, provided an enormous impetus to the expansion of rational administration, that is, the type of bureaucracy founded on legal authority." (p. 41).

87 Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p. 224.

locaux et autorité centrale etc."[88] These insights were developed further in his annual course of twelve lectures at the Collège de France, and in occasional articles and interviews. Several important reformulations can be located in the work of Foucault around this period, which of course corresponds with a considerable length of time during which no major works were published and the projected form and content of the multi-volume *Histoire de la sexualité* was abandoned. Firstly, he adds the notion of "gouvernementalité" to the technique of "discipline", both as a chronological development coming after the so-called disciplinary or carceral era, and as a subtle rethinking of the formation of the subject. Secondly, whilst in no way questioning the formation of a distinctively "modern" episteme which first appeared in *Les Mots et les choses* Foucault begins to reach further back — initially to the Medieval era, and then eventually to Greek and Roman civilisation — in order to trace the paths of contemporary regimes of truth. This second reformulation is part of a wider move away from the investigation of the "objectivation" and creation of individuals by means of the new, modern human sciences towards an analytic of "technologies of the self". This new formulation is found in a collection based on a series of lectures and seminars at the University of Vermont in 1982. Foucault unusually uses the term "practical reason", which he divides into four "technologies".[89] Aside from technologies of production, sign-systems and power, there are technologies of the self:

> technologies of the self, which permit individuals to affect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.[90]

Here, Foucault introduces a new formulation, in considering the connection between the domination of others and "technologies of the self", which he admits to having previously neglected, as "governmentality".

In referring to a differentiated field of practical reason, Foucault begins explicitly to articulate principles of heterogeneity and pluralism with regard to rationality. This move is designed in part to set his work against that of the Frankfurt School, which he sees, in his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France, as seeking to correct the irrational rationality of capitalism. He refuses the "blackmail" of considering Western societies as dominated by one major form of rationality, which might be called the Enlightenment. In an important interview with Gérard Raulet in 1983 Foucault

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88 Michel Foucault, "La Phobie d'Etat", (excerpt from lecture given at the Collège de France, 31 January, 1979) *Libération* (30 juin, 1984) p. 21.

89 Michel Foucault, "Technologies of the self," in Luther H. Martin, H. Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (London: Tavistock, 1988) pp. 17-49.

90 ibid., p. 18.

makes some interesting remarks concerning the relationship between his own work and the German sociological tradition.[91] He admits that French and German intellectual life have worked along parallel paths which were in many ways similar but have failed to influence one another. The question of the history and function of rationalities in Europe has not been posed in Germany around the issue of "science" — the theoretical inspiration for much of Foucault's work via Bachelard and Canguilhem, as was demonstrated in the last chapter — but rather in the strand of sociological thought that begins with Max Weber through Critical Theory to Jürgen Habermas:

> And the same question arises here. How do matters stand with the history of reason, with the ascendancy of reason, and with the different forms in which this ascendancy operates [...] The understanding that might have been established between the Frankfurt School and French philosophical thought — by way of the history of science and therefore that question of the history of rationality — never occurred.[92]

Foucault agrees with Raulet that Habermas conceives of reason as having, at a given moment, "bifurcated". At this point, reason becomes instrumental. That is to say, reason has become perverted and must be rectified. In other words, reason can be seen to follow a dialectical continuity. He goes on to distinguish his project as the analysis of a constant and multiple bifurcation of reason. His position on reason is explicitly pluralist. The distinction between these two approaches might be seen as equivalent to the difference between "programme" and "diagramme" dealt with by François Ewald, as discussed above. In crude terms, the sociological tradition deals with the teleological aims of the "programme", whereas Foucault's concentration on "science" and knowledge seeks to analyse the circulation of knowledges in the form of a "diagramme". That is to say, a grid or map of society. The "diagramme" is the impersonal set of rationalities that emerge — potentially in a piecemeal fashion — from and within a society. The notion of "programme" certainly has connotations of intentionality. The significance of this pluralistic approach to rationality is that, in the final part of his career, Foucault fully develops the archaeological figure of dispersion as a genealogical analytic of heterogeneity both within and between rationalities. That is to say, the fact that rationalities are plural, and that they may produce effects even though they are heterogeneous, emphasises both the contingency and the fragility of the present.

Foucault's later inclination to frame his thought with reference to questions of rationality, truth, style and the Enlightenment often appears to make tacit reference to Max Weber. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century the work of Max Weber was of crucial importance in theorising the modern nation-State. Several

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91 Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Poststructuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault," Interview with Gérard Raulet, *Telos*, vol. 55 (Spring 1983) pp. 195-211.

92 ibid., p. 200.

commentators have noted certain similarities between the work of Foucault and Weber.[93] Weber is important in four main ways when looking at the question of the State and civil society with reference to the work of Foucault:

1) Weber might be considered as the first theorist of a disciplinary society. His formulation of society as the progressive realisation of an "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationality is by now well-known.[94]

2) Weber is, along with Nietzsche, one of the first theorists to question the advantages and "progress" offered by instrumental reason and the domination of Nature. In a recent study Georg Strauth and Bryan S. Turner look at Weber's critique of instrumental rationality or "utilitarianism" in terms of a complex meditation on Nietzsche's principle of resentment ("ressentiment"). In short, the instrumental domination of Nature is basically the result of an externalisation of a European Christian slave morality: "Weber regarded these Protestant men of calling as bearers of world mastery involving a denial of irrational passions. Their lives were committed to an ethic of control to subordinate such deviant emotions."[95]

3) In this way, Weber is one of the first theorists to acknowledge the irrational potential that is within modernity's project of instrumental rationality.

4) Finally, and this is the most neglected example of his influence on contemporary social theory, Weber was important in his opposition to Marx, in seeing the roots of capitalism as cultural just as much as economic. In his inaugural lecture at Freiburg in 1895, Weber criticised the important concept of political economy:

> And it is one of the delusions which arise from the modern overestimation of the 'economic' in the usual sense of the word when people assert that feelings of political community cannot maintain themselves in the face of the full weight of divergent economic interests, indeed that very possibly these feelings are merely the reflection of the economic basis underlying those changing interests.[96]

In this way, Weber raises the question of the survival of certain forms of rationality in the face of economic theory which considers them to be untenable. Weber suggests that part of the answer might lie in the articulation of a personal style of life which the individual finds within the economic realm. The final chapter will deal more fully with the question of "Lebensführung" and its connection with Foucault's work. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that the question of the Welfare State might be seen to be

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93 See Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge) pp. 123-132.

94 See John O'Neill, "The Disciplinary Society: from Weber to Foucault," *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 37, no. 1 (March, 1986) pp. 42-60. O'Neill takes the fairly conventional view that both Foucault and Weber write against modernity as a form of growing irrationality. He appears to be unaware of Foucault's pluralist stance on rationality.

95 Georg Strauth and Bryan S. Turner, *Nietzsche's Dance: Resentment, Reciprocity and Resistance in Social Life* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) p. 119.

96 Max Weber, "The Nation State and Economic Policy (Inaugural Address at Freiburg, 1895)," *Economy and Society*, vol. 9, no. 3 (1980) p. 442.

one of the sources of the ethical theme of Foucault's final work.

In a recent publication concerning the question of the State and civil society Hinrichs, Offe and Wiesenthal examine this contemporary "crisis" of the Welfare State.[97] They begin by illustrating the material dilemma of such a State in the context of the reduction of economic growth in Western Europe. That is to say, the more necessary the Welfare State is made by decreasing employment opportunities, the less capable it is of raising sufficient funds to play its role. They go on to outline the reciprocality of the New Right and the New Left critiques of the Welfare State, in that both see its function as incompatible with a market economy. In short, the New Right maintains that the demands of welfare tend to suffocate the market by reducing the incentive to invest and to work, whereas the New Left maintains that the continual economic and employment crises of advanced or "late" capitalism always tend to undermine the compensatory mechanisms of the Welfare State. In contrast to these views, Foucault attempts to introduce ethical concerns, in considering the growth of the Welfare State as emerging from the real demands of individuals which are formed by a power which is at once individualising and collective in its vision. He seeks to dispense with binary oppositions, such as that between the State and civil society. Instead of acting in the form of oppositions, power is dispersed and heterogeneous in its operation. In this way, the individual too, is not an essential atom of activity, thought and behaviour, but is rather a collection of elements. As a consequence of these speculations on power Foucault becomes interested in the question of government. That is to say, the multiple relations of power which traverse a society, and the positive ways in which the State seeks to foster and even enhance life for the individual. In an interview with Robert Bono on the Welfare State from 1983, Foucault claims that the division between State and civil society may have had a positive polemical force in the eighteenth century, but that it should not be viewed as a normative concept.[98] He is critical of the example of an experimental form of "informal justice" in the U.S.A., whereby judgement is provided by the offender's peer-group, on the grounds that it is idealistic to conceive of society as capable of generating the solutions to its own problems by means of internal regulation.[99] It is clear that Foucault is scornful of any naïve faith in the naturally positive potential of civil society. His remarks recall Donzelot's equally vehement dismissal of the Manichean tendency of much contemporary political speculation: "la référence à ce couple antagoniste n'est jamais exempte d'une sorte de manichéisme affligeant la notion d'Etat d'une connotation

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97 Karl Hinrichs, Claus Offe and Helmut Wiesenthal, "Time, Money, and Welfare-State Capitalism," in John Keane, ed., *Civil Society and the State* (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 221-245.

98 Michel Foucault, "Un système fini face à une demande infinie," in *Sécurité sociale: l'enjeu* (Paris: Syros, 1983) p. 50. Interview with R. Bono.

99 ibid., p. 51.

péjorative en même temps qu'il idéalise la société en un ensemble bon, vivant et chaud."[100] In this interview, Foucault returns at several points to what he perceives as the necessity for a new inventiveness in political thinking. Thinking on the Welfare State remains locked within the mental frameworks of the Beveridge plan of the 'forties.[101] In general, Foucault seeks to emphasise the fact the project of the Welfare State rests within the framework of the social. It is, therefore, anachronistic to the extent that it depends upon the integration of the individual. The individual who refuses integration is marginalised. Thus, the effect of the Welfare State is paradoxical and perverse in creating dependence both by integration, and by marginalisation.[102] Foucault acknowledges the need for a resistance to integration, but, in refusing to see civil society as capable of generating natural principles of liberty, he suggests that an ethical consensus needs to be constructed. Such a consensus would be ethical to the extent that the individual would be implicated in the process of government.[103] Against the dualism of the State and civil society, Foucault proposes the analysis of an "interface" between the moral sensibility of individuals and more centralised powers: "je parle plutôt de cette espèce d'interface entre, d'une part, la sensibilité des gens, leurs choix moraux, leur rapport à eux-mêmes et, d'autre part, les institutions qui les entourent."[104] This ethical consideration of the articulation between individual and wider projects of government is central to Foucault's later work. It is a principle of heterogeneity, whereby two elements are shown to have distinctive and separate origins, but still share an articulation or interface. It is the possibility of maximising the ethical possibilities of this articulation which particularly interests Foucault.

In his 1978 and 1979 lectures, Foucault deals with the birth of the modern Welfare State, or security State, as he sometimes calls it. Schematically, these lectures organise themselves around discussions of the terms, police, security and governmentality. At the risk of over-simplification, governmentality is a technique, concerned with the "how", rather than the "why" of government. It is an analysis of the birth of political economy in Europe as a specific, and then gradually as a pre-eminent form of rationality. In schematic terms, Foucault locates an "explosion" of themes of government in the sixteenth century. Questions of how to govern oneself, but also of how to govern and be governed begin to flourish. In particular, the question of how to govern oneself becomes increasingly important for Foucault's final work, and will be dealt with at length in the final chapter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that this flourishing of themes of government is bolstered by the Christian pastoral theme of the government of lives and souls.

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100 ibid., p. 50.
101 ibid., p. 48.
102 ibid., p. 42.
103 ibid., p. 59.
104 ibid., p. 42.

However, returning to the question of governmentality with regard to the State, Foucault makes the point that much of this thought on government constructs as its point of opposition a reading of Machiavelli's figure of the Prince. This reading tends to see the politics of *The Prince* as residing in the principles of the singularity and exteriority of the prince with regard to his principality. Against this, the literature on government proposes a plurality of forms of government which should be immanent within the State. Government is an art which is not solely concerned with the ability of the prince to maintain his hold over a principality. In the sixteenth century doctrines of "reason of State" emerge, according to which the principles of government are no longer part of the divine order, but are to be discovered within the State itself. In other words, the State contains its own reasons which are not religious in origin.

> reason of state is not an art of government according to divine, natural, or human laws. It doesn't have to respect the general order of the world. It's government in accordance with the state's strength. It's government whose aim is to increase this strength within an extensive and competitive framework.[105]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries techniques of police are developed, which are concerned largely with the government of a territory through the compilation of detail. The principle of police is that one can never govern in sufficient detail. Police is thus linked with the techniques of discipline. (See *SP*, pp. 214-215). However, it is only with the discovery of political economy in the second part of the eighteenth century that themes of government cease to be immobilised by a continuing fixation with sovereignty and contract in Europe.[106] Political economy focusses fully on the population, and supplements discipline with the implantation and incitement of techniques of security. In general, in the transition from the notion of a principality ruled over by a monarch — who has the power to crush life and therefore diminish the population — to the notion of a territory within which life is positively fostered, European society moves from the constant principles of sovereignty to a triangular principle of sovereignty-discipline-government which concentrates on the population and its *security*. Governmentality acknowledges a plurality of rationalities for achieving these ends. In his lecture course for 1978 Foucault sees in La Perrière's *Le miroir politique, contenant diverses manières de gouverner et de policer les républiques* from 1555 the emergence of the idea that "government" implies the correct, or fitting, disposition of things. Government is the deployment of tactics — which are involved in a set of specific finalities — such as the production of sufficient wealth, the distribution

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105 Michel Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a critique of 'Political Reason'," in S. MacMurrin, ed., *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values: volume II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 246.

106 Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Reader*, p. 98. This translation, by Colin Gordon, from an original Italian transcription, is the longest available printed version of this important lecture.

of the means of subsistence and suitable conditions of reproduction. This plurality of aims is, however, ultimately reducible to the model of the family. It is only in the eighteenth century, with a demographic explosion, that the population becomes the major target for government. The family becomes an instrument rather than a model, and "discipline" becomes an important technique for the government of population, rather than the overriding principle of government. In short, the population within the territory of the nation-state achieves its own specificity as an object of government.

It should be emphasised that the notion of security constitutes an important advance on previous work concerning discipline. In *Surveiller et punir* Foucault concentrates on a disciplinary "supplement", as it were, to the new penal code. The penal code concerns itself with the codification of that which is forbidden and that which is permitted, whilst discipline concentrates on the body of the individual. Security differs from both law and discipline, in the calculation of means and tolerable variations as opposed to laws, and the concentration on the population as opposed to the individual. In the opening lecture of the 1978 course discipline is compared to security. Discipline establishes sequences and co-ordinations of behaviour in order to achieve optimal effects. It is based on the establishment of norms. Security, on the other hand, depends upon the subtle and often delicate management of elements of the "real", which must be respected in their "naturalité". (*Lecture*, 18/01/78). It would be a mistake to see the figure of the Panopticon solely as an expression of the drive towards discipline, although *Surveiller et punir* does undoubtedly suggest close affiliations between Bentham's invention and the disciplinary techniques. The Panopticon also embodies the ideal of self-regulation which is intimately linked to security. "Un regard qui surveille et que chacun, en le sentant peser sur lui, finira par intérioriser au point de s'observer lui-même; chacun, ainsi, exercera cette surveillance sur et contre lui-même. Formule merveilleuse: un pouvoir continu et d'un coût finalement dérisoire!"[107] Security is linked to the development of liberalism for Foucault, which will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter. For the moment, it should be noted that security is a technique which respects the heterogeneity of the real, but which also depends on a strong conception of that which is "natural". We shall also return to this formulation of the differences between discipline and security in the final chapter in order to consider the question of truth.

One of the central points of Foucault's 1978 lecture course is to show that the contemporary form of the State in Western Europe owes its existence to the growth of governmentality. Instead of redefining the role of law and sovereignty in relation to the State, Foucault suggests that we should concentrate on the ways in which the State has been "governmentalised". The State and civil society are apparently heterogeneous, but

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107 Jeremy Bentham, *Le Panoptique*, preface by Foucault, "L'Oeil du pouvoir," Interview with Jean-Pierre Barou and Michelle Perrot (Paris: Belfond, 1977) pp. 19-20.

Foucault argues that they articulate between them the regimes of security in Western Europe. In the same way that eighteenth-century critiques of "la Raison d'Etat" — Foucault suggests they are the secular equivalent of religious "contre-conduites" — actually (perhaps unwittingly) draw support from the very objects of government that this reason of State had created, so contemporary critiques of the State draw on governmental techniques which actually support the development of a certain kind of State. In a typically Foucaldian spiralling form, it is a third element, liberalism, which is produced.

Overall, then, Foucault refuses to start with the classical opposition of the State and civil society, seeing both as objects which are under continual construction, and elements that circulate in strategies for the production of truth. In the same way that the spatial basis of his thinking depends on the figure of heterogeneity, he explicitly draws attention — in his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France — to the heterogeneous nature of civil society itself in the work of Adam Smith. Here, civil society becomes an objective for government as a mediation between purely juridical and purely economic areas. Civil society is seen as the motor of history, but of a society which is always threatened with dissolution because of the anarchic forces of the economic sphere, and ignorance or incompetence of the sovereign. In the final lecture of his 1979 series, Foucault describes civil society as "une réalité de transaction". That is to say, like madness and sexuality, it is an effect of a certain way of thinking about government, rather than an essence. This also means that civil society is a principle of articulation between political power and that which, justly and correctly, escapes its reach. (*Lecture*, 05/04/79). The idea of civil society which emerges in the second half of the eighteenth-century — as exemplified by the work of Adam Ferguson — is strongly determined by the idea that there are any number of naturally-occurring factors within the population. These include relations of authority and domination, egoistic and non-egoistic interests, sympathy, compassion and repugnance. The theme of civil society certainly seizes Foucault's interest because of the conscious "problematisation" of government and the individual that it entails. The heterogeneity of the legal and economic subject forms the accepted starting-point of civil society. However, by means of judicious management of this collection of atomised economic subjects the techniques of security seek, "une réciprocité entre les éléments et le tout." The emergence of the figure of civil society is consequent upon a pragmatism which Foucault identifies with Hume in, perhaps surprisingly, *Histoire de la folie*. (*HF*, p. 435). It is acknowledged that the natural disposition to compassion is not inexhaustible or indefinite. Assistance for the ill must, then, take into account the fact that the space of the social field is fragmented and heterogeneous: "Le malade se trouve situé dans les unités discontinues: zones actives de vivacité psychologique, zones inactives et neutres d'éloignement et d'inertie du coeur. L'espace social de la maladie est fragmenté [...]"

(*HF*, p. 436).

To conclude, Foucault rejects the idea of the State as a principle of either legitimacy or domination, and questions the dualist opposition of the State and civil society, whereby civil society represents an innocence which is corrupted and invaded by the State. Instead, he considers the growth of techniques of security and the field of the social as that which characterises the regimes under which we live in Western Europe. The figures of the State and civil society are heterogeneous, but also form an articulation to produce the principle of governmentality. The social is a hybrid space, and the principle of civil society in the second half of the eighteenth century is based on the management of heterogeneous elements and principles. In *Surveiller et punir*, and the minor text "La Vie des hommes infâmes", Foucault suggests that the "microphysical" level of power relations between individuals maintains an articulation with centralised macro-powers and, importantly, that these power relations are highly ambivalent. In contrast to the "poverty" of contemporary political speculation, Foucault suggests (although at no point explicitly) that the project of civil society suggests a political and ethical inventiveness which is admirable. The next chapter will examine in more detail the ways in which the figure of heterogeneity, primarily as a mode of problematisation, operates in liberalism.

THE INDIVIDUAL, RIGHTS AND LIBERALISM

This chapter, a large part of which will be taken up with a detailed examination of Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France on liberalism, will show how he becomes more and more interested in what the "liberalisation" of government in Europe means.[1] A large part of the chapter will also be taken up with the increasing importance for Foucault of the figure of the individual. His early work, instead of being read as "structuralist", may be seen as a preparatory genealogy of the construction of the figure of the individual which becomes the crucial focus of the ethical concerns of his later work.

The previous two chapters have dealt broadly with the development of spatial themes in Foucault's work. Beginning with his attack on the foundational subject of knowledge and linear history in *L'Archéologie du savoir* and *Les Mots et les choses*, it has been shown that this early figure of dispersion is progressively applied to the individual body and society as a methodological move against theories of sovereignty and legitimacy. The body is not an inalienable possession, it is broken down and reconstructed by "power". Power relations are diffused throughout society; they do not emanate from a State. At the end of Chapter Two the idea was introduced that Foucault's work begins, in the late '70s, to move towards a notion of the construction, in modern Western societies, of a *social* sphere. This involves, as will be shown, a partial shift away from, or rather reconsideration of the notion of power/knowledge, and a development of the theme of "conduct". Government and the demand for government are seen as a distinctive form of the modern modality of power. Foucault also concentrates on the theme of dispersion in the form of the heterogeneity of multiple rationalities. Although government and security form the major expression of modern political rationality, they are not the only "technologies", or rationalities at work in the history of thought in the present towards which Foucault constantly works.

The previous chapter also introduced Foucault's repeated calls for an inventiveness in political culture.[2] This chapter will go further, to look at Foucault's interest in what he calls "liberalism". He does not become a liberal thinker, but is undoutedly drawn into the first steps towards a discussion of liberalism by way of what he sees as liberalism's willingness to be politically inventive. Despite Foucault's apparent neutrality, it is possible to suggest briefly some points of contact between his work and certain strands of modern American liberalism. These connections are linked

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1 See Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, 1970-1982 (Paris: Collège de France/Julliard, 1989) 1978 — "Sécurité, territoire et population", and 1979 — "Naissance de la biopolitique".

2 See Michel Foucault, "Pour en finir avec les mensonges," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 1076 (21-27 juin, 1985) pp. 76-77. "La mise en communication des mouvements de pensée, de l'analyse des institutions et de la problématisation de la vie quotidienne, personnelle, individuelle, tout cela a permis que soit crevé l'écran que formait des catégories comme 'la politique' ou 'le politique'." (p. 77).

to the pluralist "logic" of Foucault's work which was discussed in the introduction.

In the previous discussion of the question of the State and civil society, it has already been shown that Foucault perceives something within the appearance of the theme of civil society in the nineteenth century which is a new and important event in European thought. Cameralism and mercantilism remain trapped within the question of sovereignty, but, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the problem of government is finally posited outside of the juridical framework of sovereignty. Political economy establishes a form of government in the name of society, which takes into account the density and complexity of civil society: "Une tentative pour répondre à la question: comment gouverner selon les règles de droit un espace qui a le malheur/avantage d'être peuplé par les sujets économiques." (*Lecture*, 05/04/79). Liberalism offers Foucault a particularly striking form of ongoing problematisation. In keeping with the methods of archaeology and genealogy which he had developed earlier in his career, he shows that liberalism actually demonstrates much less cohesion than might be expected when it is dismantled. Its major interest for Foucault, however, lies in the fact that as a style of thought it appears to accept in advance this lack of cohesion.

Foucault suggests that the idea of liberal government, as it emerges in the second half of the eighteenth century, has a certain ethical content. The introduction of political economy means that the principle of legitimacy is no longer of central importance. Liberal government, or "gouvernementalité" as Foucault calls it, is bound to take into account the element of "naturalité": "La nature n'est pas pour l'économie politique une région réservée et originaire sur laquelle l'exercice du pouvoir ne devrait pas avoir prise [...] la nature est quelque chose qui court sous, à travers, dans l'exercice même de la gouvernementalité." (*Lecture*, 10/01/79). Liberalism is not constructed on any system of "natural" rights. What it does respect is the irreducibility, or heterogeneity, of the subject of interest to the subject of contract.[3] In this way, Foucault considers British empiricism, with its insistence on the individual as the essential atomistic element of rationality, as a major mutation in Western thought. Quite simply, liberalism acknowledges that it is impossible to prevent the individual from preferring — as Hume puts it — the death of others to the most minor personal injury. (*Lecture*, 28/03/79). Civil society is not a natural reality, but rather a project for the regulation of reality.[4]

There are several elements which capture Foucault's imagination in his reading of liberalism, and which in turn feed into later work in a sometimes tangential form. On

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3 See Graham Burchell, "Civil Society and Governing 'The system of Natural Liberty'," in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) p. 137. "Liberalism begins, Foucault says, with the recognition of the heterogeneity and incompatibility of the principles regulating the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and those operating in the totalizing unity of legal-political sovereignty." (p. 137.)

4 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, p. 113.

the positive side, liberalism is a *non-totalising* mode of thought, in that it acknowledges its own inability fully to account for all aspects of reality. This might be linked to the tentative re-emergence of a category of the real in Foucault's own thought, whereby critical work prepares the ground, as it were, for "real" transformation.[5] On the negative side, liberalism often takes a naturalistic stance on categories such as the market, which does, of course, negate the force of its claims to be anti-totalising. Overall, however, it is the unwillingness of liberalism to act as a scientific mode of thought which interests Foucault:

> On ne peut donc pas dire que le libéralisme soit une utopie jamais réalisée — sauf si on prend pour le noyau du libéralisme les projections qu'il a été amené à formuler de ses analyses et de ses critiques. Il n'est pas un rêve qui se heurte à une réalité et manque à s'y inscrire. Il constitue — et c'est là la raison de son polymorphisme et de ses récurrences — un instrument critique de la réalité.[6]

Liberalism as a "style" of thinking represents for Foucault a problematisation of reality. Central to this style is the constant concern that government might become excessive. Liberalism constitutes a "problematisation", to the extent that it is borne out of a recognition of the need for government, but sees government always as a supplement which risks becoming "de trop".[7] Despite frequent isolated insights, it is sometimes difficult to extract and synthesise an overall angle of analysis, by means of which Foucault's handling of liberalism provides any more illumination than simply illustrating liberal scepticism and pragmatism. However, although the idea is not explored explicitly in his 1979 lectures — which represent, of course, work-in-progress — one suggestion could be that it is the perceived fragility of "la naturalité" which characterises liberalism as an innovatory mode of thought. Liberalism itself accepts a heterogeneity between naturality and artifice which is not exclusive. In the same way that the subjects of contract and interest are heterogeneous and find a point of articulation, so we might deduce, even though Foucault does not indicate this directly, that nature and artifice work in a similar way for liberalism. A specific kind of liberty, the non-transferable liberty of interest, is a natural given, but the society which contains these elements of "la naturalité" is subject to historical change.

How, then, can Foucault find anything interesting in liberalism, when his

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5 See Michel Foucault, *Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia*. Notes to the Fall, 1983 seminar given by Michel Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley. "And even if I won't say that which is characterized as 'schizophrenia' corresponds to something real in the world, this has nothing to do with idealism. For I think that there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an 'answer' to a concrete situation which is real." (p. 115).
See also Michel Foucault, "Est-il donc important de penser?" *Libération* (30-31 mai, 1981) p. 21. Here, Foucault accepts the opposition between "ideal" critique and "real" transformation, but only in the sense that a critique should point out the assumptions upon which accepted practices rest, as a sort of preparatory work for transformation.

6 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, p. 113.

7 ibid., p. 113.

previous work is dedicated to undermining the stable identity of the subject of knowledge, and the cherished liberal figure of the sovereign individual? It has already been shown that *L'Archéologie du savoir* depends upon a dispersal of the subject. Foucault shows that "l'énoncé" is not the product of a unified subject. This in turn means that the foundational subject of knowledge is itself a historical construct: "En somme, on ne réfère pas les modalités diverses de l'énonciation à l'unité d'un sujet — qu'il s'agisse du sujet pris comme pure instance fondatrice de rationalité, ou du sujet pris comme fonction empirique de synthèse."(*AS*, p. 74). Also, one of the main thrusts of Foucault's work on modernity is to show that the individual is "fabricated" by power relations. *Surveiller et punir* follows through the Nietzschean proposition of ignoring the traditional possessions of the individual such as sentiment and consciousness, and instead concentrates on showing how the individual has been built by a lowly process of training. And, at the heart of *La Volonté de savoir* is an attempt to show how sexuality and the individual possession of "a sexuality" is a specifically modern event. This event is part of a wider individualising drive towards a biographical mode of "telling" in Western societies. In short, Foucault's position is incompatible with what Alessandro Pizzorno calls a "a liberal view of the individual."[8]

It is around the questions of the subject and the individual that most of the controversy concerning Foucault's work has revolved. At the most simple level he is seen as demonstrating a residual humanist individualism which is at odds with his avowedly anti-humanist/anthropological critique of reason and the subject and epistemological impersonality with regard to the development of knowledge. This is the view of Nancy Fraser, when she questions the efficacy of Foucault's critical standpoint if, as she claims, he rejects the "metaphysics of subjectivity" and its concomitant humanist presuppositions of "autonomy, reciprocity, mutual recognition, dignity and human rights":

> Whence, then, does Foucault's work, his description of the 'carceral society', for example, derive *its* critical force? How does Foucault make it look so ugly and menacing without appealing to the humanist ideals associated with the concept of the subject? Does he presuppose some alternative, post-humanist standpoint, and if so, what justifies it? Does he presuppose some alternative metaphysic, say, one of bodies? Or is his critique radically anti-foundationalist and if so, to what sort of justification can it lay claim?[9]

This view is shared by several American critics of Foucault's work, such as Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer, whose positions on Foucault are briefly presented in an important volume of criticism.[10] Charles Taylor considers Foucault's project to be

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8 See Note 52. Chapter Two.

9 Nancy Fraser, "Foucault's body language: a posthumanist political rhetoric," *Salmagundi*, no. 61 (1983) p. 56.

10 David Couzens Hoy, ed., *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

ultimately incoherent and paradoxical, in that he brings to light domination and repression, but has no commitment to the values of freedom and truth which would help to liberate us from these evils.[11] Foucault's early work is an attempt to stand "nowhere", outside of value judgements of different eras. In fact, Foucault is at pains to show that truth and freedom can never be absolute values. They can even function as subtle ways of elaborating domination. Taylor sees Foucault as denying that modern humanism can be compared favourably to older forms of sovereign power. In this way, Foucault wilfully ignores the gains of "personal independence and collective self-rule."[12] The only way in which Foucault's work can be useful, according to Taylor, is to have recorded some of the undeniable "losses" which have accompanied these gains.[13] Michael Walzer goes further, seeing Foucault as basically a nihilist.[14] Walzer concentrates on discipline as representative of his overall stance. By means of "an elaborate pun" on the idea of "discipline" as power and knowledge, Foucault outlines the belief that "truth is relative to its sanctions and knowledge to the constraints that produce it."[15] In short, he sees Foucault as a relativist who refuses to consider any form of privileged standpoint from which to condemn domination. His project is diabolically self-defeating. Against what he perceives to be Foucault's outright rejection of juridical conceptions of power, Walzer emphasises the continuing importance of the State as a sovereign power: "A liberal state is one that maintains the limits of its constituent disciplines and disciplinary institutions and that enforces their intrinsic principles. Authoritarian and totalitarian states, by contrast, override these limits [...]".[16]

These positions on Foucault's work are really sophisticated and clear-sighted restatements of the criticism that he simply presents knowledge as a mask for power. This is a criticism which Foucault addresses in one of his final interviews.[17] His reply hinges on the question of identity. Instead of proposing an identity between knowledge and power, he claims to have shown how a power structure can give rise to different forms of knowlege. He gives the example of the hospital ("la structure hospitalière"), which is linked to the emergence of both psychiatric knowledge, and an anatomo-pathological knowledge:

> On a donc des structures de pouvoir, des formes institutionnelles assez voisines: internement psychiatrique, hospitalisation médicale — auxquelles sont liées des formes de savoir différentes, entre lesquelles on peut établir des

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11 Charles Taylor, "Foucault on Freedom and Truth," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, p. 69.
12 Ibid., p. 96.
13 Ibid., p. 97.
14 Michael Walzer, "The Politics of Michel Foucault," in *Foucault: A Critical Reader*, p. 61.
15 ibid., p. 64.
16 ibid., p. 66.
17 Michel Foucault, "Le Souci de la vérité," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 207 (mai, 1984) pp. 18-23. Interview with François Ewald.

> rapports, des relations de conditions, et non pas de cause à effet, ni *a fortiori d'identité*.[18]

It is the question of identity, or rather the absence of identity which may exist between the elements of an apparently coherent rationality, which forms one of the major continuities of Foucault's work.

Returning to the criticisms raised above, it is inevitable that the American reception of Foucault's work should be important for any consideration of liberalism and individualism, both because of the strong commitment to, and debate surrounding such notions in American intellectual and political life, and the increasing amount of time that Foucault spent in North America throughout his later career.[19] In a recent conference paper, Richard Rorty addresses the relationship between Foucault's work and a sort of American "liberalism", represented by himself, Walzer and Taylor.[20] Here, he distinguishes between an "American" and a "French" Foucault.[21] The former is committed to the construction of individual autonomy in purely "human" terms, whereas the latter is concerned with the Nietzschean theme of the construction of autonomy through the consideration of what is "inhuman".[22] The French Foucault, on the other hand, is committed to having inhuman thoughts, to thinking beyond what we conventionally define in the present as human. The politics of the French Foucault are therefore anarchist for Rorty, who summarises succinctly the criticisms of American liberals when confronted with Foucault's work, as having hoped that Foucault might offer a more positive evaluation of the liberal State. In general, Rorty agrees with Taylor, that Foucault's work on power is pervaded by a troubling ambiguity between pejorative and more neutral connotations of the term.[23] Rorty sees power in its neutral and descriptive sense as a vague and ultimately empty Nietzschean formulation: "Dans son deuxième sens, le mot a cette vacuité que Nietzsche, dans ses pires moments, donnait à l'expression *Wille zur Macht*."[24]

Overall, Rorty derives his position on Foucault from the traditional liberal

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18 ibid., p. 22. See also references to Michel Foucault, "Réponse à une question," in the Introduction. The latter constitutes an important early statement of Foucault's theoretical pluralism.

19 See Michael Donnelly, "La Planète Foucault," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 207 (mai 1984) pp. 55-56. A short account of Foucault's influence in the U.S.A. Donnelly notes that, amongst the group of writers who specialise in "la philosophie continentale", Foucault is most often read in association with the Frankfurt School and Habermas. Most of these critics tend to concentrate on his "pouvoir/savoir" formulation.
See also Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault* (Paris: Flammarion, 1991) Part 3, Chapter 8, "Le Zen et la Californie," pp. 329-338.

20 Richard Rorty, "Identité morale et autonomie privée," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier, 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) pp. 385-392.

21 ibid., p. 385.

22 ibid., p. 387.

23 ibid., p. 388.

24 ibid., p. 388.

division between the private and public spheres. The Nietzschean Foucault, an ascetic "chevalier d'autonomie", should have remained as a private, ethical project. Foucault has confused the ethical and moral spheres: "Les compromis susceptibles d'un débat public nécessitent un discours qui soit formulable dans un vocabulaire commun — vocabulaire qui est lui-même requis pour décrire l'identité *morale* qu'une société exige de ses citoyens."[25] Rorty's article sets out a useful strategy for negotiating what are, for some readers, the more extravagant and impractical political positions in Foucault's work. However, he also tends to misunderstand and neglect the full import of the ethical turn of Foucault's later work. For Rorty, public discourse in a liberal society should be characterised by the "everyday intelligibility" of the courtroom and the market.[26] However, Foucault's interest in liberalism is stimulated precisely by the fact that questions of government, such as the market, have an unacknowledged ethical content. He is also sceptical of the traditional liberal division between private and public spheres, which Rorty uses as a reference point.

Mark Maslan, on the other hand, provides a useful corrective to some of the above views, in pointing out that Foucault does carefully distinguish his own position from determinism, by claiming that a relationship of power means not that the individual is directly acted upon, but that the *actions* of the individual are acted upon.[27] Power is thus distinguished from violence by the fact that the individual "must be able to act as he chooses."[28] Maslan therefore concludes that Foucault does not finally avoid "concrete positions" as a relativist gesture, but rather offers positions on relationships of power that he considers to be "particularly bad."[29]. He would therefore see Foucault as a pragmatist. Insofar as Foucault's work tends towards a critical ontology of the present, this is a reasonable view. However, it tends to ignore the call to inventiveness in thought which is also present in this work.

In general, then, much of the North American response to Foucault's work has concentrated, in some ways rather arbitrarily, on two relatively isolated aspects of his oeuvre. We have already seen that *Surveiller et punir* and the formulations which surround it have been important for debates concerning political theory. This might be seen as the debate surrounding the "pouvoir/savoir" formulation. Attention has also been focussed on the concept of transgression.[30] This concept is expanded to become the challenge of unreason to the complacent language of reason, science and legitimacy. It is worth considering briefly two rather different readings of Foucault's work which

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25 ibid., p. 389.
26 ibid., p. 389.
27 Mark Maslan, "Foucault and Pragmatism," *Raritan: A Quarterly Review*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1988) p. 96.
28 ibid., p. 97.
29 ibid., p. 114.
30 See David Miller, "Foucault and the Concept of Transgression," *Origin: Fifth Series*, no. 5 (Spring 1985) pp. 77-89.

focus indirectly on the concept of transgression.

In Lemert and Gillan's reading of transgression, reason constructs oppositions such as madness/sanity and life/death, and thus "tames" death, but also defines life in terms of death.[31] They seek to reproduce Foucault's own complex wordplay in showing that transgression seeks both to cross the limits of these oppositions, and also to undermine the very notion of a "Limit". They refer to Foucault's interest in Bataille's use of the erotic:

> Eroticism both crosses and sustains the limit of the taboo. The limit is an internal necessity for transgression. At the same time, it is the recognition that, in crossing the limit, the taboo is not eliminated. Transgression is the movement that creates, in the absence of an absolute Limit, a limit-lessness essential to the transgression of limits.[32]

In the same way that literature opens a disturbing and potentially unlimited space for the unthought, trangression can operate for Lemert and Gillan as a subversive tool to undermine the stability of the social and political sciences. They see Foucault's work ultimately as deconstructing epistemological certainties. In his later work they identify the operation of power to "disperse" and "fracture" the body as important. This remains a "transgressive" theme, whereby the fracturing of the body is reaffirmed against power as a plural and "nomadic" force of desire.[33] In short, Lemert and Gillan perceive a sophisticated pluralism in Foucault's work. However, they lend too much importance to the concept of transgression as the driving force behind this pluralism. The notion of the unthought in Foucault's work is largely transitional. As was shown in the first chapter, transgression still depends to some extent on the spatial notion of an "outside" to thought.

William Connolly also takes up what he perceives to be Foucault's attack on reason. Describing himself as a "critical legitimist", Connolly proposes some ways in which Foucault provides an important and necessary stimulus to the "liberal" belief in legitimacy.[34] He summarises this importance succinctly, in considering that Foucault's history of "unreason" undermines the complacency of "the contemporary constitution of reason."[35] Connolly represents perhaps one of the closest encounters between Foucault's work and contemporary American liberalism, in that he acknowledges the dangers of a conception of the self which becomes fixated on a narrow stability and identity, without recognising the costs of that identity. He proposes "an ideal of social order which can sustain itself without having to draw so much of the self into the orbit

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31 Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).

32 ibid., p. 66.

33 ibid., p. 85.

34 William Connolly, "The Dilemma of Legitimacy," in *Legitimacy and the State* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) pp. 222-249.

35 ibid., p. 241.

of social control."[36] These comments are certainly very close to one of the important implications which emerges from Foucault's work on liberalism; that politics should be answerable to ethics both in making its rationality explicit, and in engaging with the individual. Foucault's position is pluralist, but not in terms of the fracturing of the body which Lemert and Gillan locate in earlier work. Rather, he concentrates on the multiplicity and plurality of real and potential rationalities.

Lemert and Gillan do share with Connolly the tendency to concentrate on the aspects of Foucault's work which indicate the possibility of "deconstructing" oppositions such as reason/unreason, which produce meaning by means of privileging one side of the opposition. However, Foucault increasingly sees his own work as dealing with what he calls "problematisations" in thought, which he explicitly distinguishes from deconstruction. Deconstruction being, in the simplest terms possible, the attempt to show that one of the terms in an ethical system such as good/evil or an epistemological system such as internal/external, is always unjustly or untenably privileged. Foucault's notion of problematisation will be taken up in greater detail in the final chapter. It is, however, necessary to consider the theme briefly at this stage, because of its importance for Foucault's interest in liberalism. In an interview with Paul Rabinow, conducted shortly before his death, Foucault considers his "history of problematics" as an attempt to write a history of thought which is distinct from a history of ideas or mentalities.[37] Thought, in this context, occurs when action or behaviour becomes unfamiliar or uncertain. In this way, a domain of action or behaviour is problematised. Foucault gives the example of penal practice in the second half of the eighteenth century. Several groups of solutions are proposed to this single problem. A historian of thought wishes to rediscover the common root of these diverse solutions, to find "the general form of problematization that has made them possible."[38] Thought is more, therefore, than a representation of actions. It is rather a framework for considering obstacles and difficulties as problems to which solutions can be offered:

> Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and question it as to its meaning, its conditions and its goals.[39]

Thought therefore implies a degree of freedom in relation to the action or behaviour which is problematised. It is the "development of a given into a question." Foucault opposes his own method of problematisation to the practice of polemics. This opposition is drawn in the most simple of terms. The polemicist proceeds as if into

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36 ibid., p. 243.

37 Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations," Interview with Paul Rabinow, translated by Lydia Davis, in *The Foucault Reader* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) p. 388.

38 ibid., p. 389.

39 ibid., p. 388.

battle, assuming the right to wage war, and possessing privileges which he will never question.[40] In short, polemics is an obstacle to the search for truth. Partners in a discussion, however, engage in a game which creates their rights as immanent within the exchange of question and answer. A discussion seeks to create or construct truth, whereas polemics is a fight to the death. He doubts whether it is possible for a new idea to emerge from a polemic.[41] One of the dominant themes in Foucault's later work is the inventiveness of thought. Instead of "deconstruction", as he calls it, Foucault proposes a critical method which looks at the ways in which different solutions are offered to a problem.[42]

Foucault's work can therefore be seen to sit rather uneasily with much contemporary North American criticism; even with those authors who are positively predisposed towards this work. His interest in liberalism does not indicate a "return" to a philosophy of the subject, nor is it an attempt to outline a coherent set of human rights. Rather it is linked to an interest in liberalism as a practice rather than a dogma. As a style of thinking it constantly problematises the real, and proposes forms of knowledge which will automatically limit government action and intervention. These points of reflection and research in turn institute several important realignments of interest, which begin to emerge from the publication of *La Volonté de savoir*. Firstly, a change of emphasis from the way in which the subject and the individual are the products of power to a concentration on the individual as actively constructing a heterogeneous subjectivity. Effective government actually requires the freedom and activity of those who are governed.[43] Foucault considers the most important contemporary political question to be the analysis of individual identity as it is linked to, and part of, State power, rather than the liberation of the individual from the State:

> the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state.[44]

When contemporary political rationality is broken down into its constituent elements, something unexpected is found. That is to say, the modern State is seen to be both individualising and totalising. Two forms of rationality work together. Overall,

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40 ibid., pp. 381-382.
41 ibid., p. 383.
42 ibid., p. 389.
43 See Michel Foucault, "Foucault, Michel, 1926- ." Entry under the pseudonym of Maurice Florence, in Jean Huisman, ed., *Dictionnaire des philosophes* (Paris: P.U.F., 1984) pp. 941-944. The question of individual identity/biography and its relation to political power becomes increasingly important for Foucault.
44 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," an Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1982) p. 216.

Foucault moves, from the publication of *La Volonté de savoir* onwards, towards a greater concentration on the active ethical behaviour of the individual. In order to clarify, Foucault might be considered as reversing several emphases in his work:

1) From death to life. In *Naissance de la clinique* the individual's body is opened after death in order to explain that death. In *Les Mots et les choses*, death or the fact of finitude, becomes the basis for the modern era's analysis of the figure of Man. In his later work, Foucault becomes interested in the way that life is positively fostered in the modern State.

2) From systems of exclusion to systems which increase social participation. For example, in *La Volonté de savoir* the hypothesis of a repressive phase inaugurated in the seventeenth century with regard to discussion and thought on sexual matters is overturned. Instead, Foucault remarks upon "une inventivité perpétuelle, un foisonnement constant des méthodes et des procédés." (*VS*, p. 158).

3) From silence to talk. In *Histoire de la folie* madness is gradually reduced to silence. In *La Volonté de savoir* the thesis that the Victorian era silenced and repressed "sex" is replaced by a concentration on the continual discourse on sex that this era created.

4) Connected to the above point, a move is made away from transgression and eroticism towards what might be called the more banal pleasure of talk.

5) Finally, as discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the notion of discipline recedes in importance, to be replaced by a demand for, and a concern with, *security*. The dream of the panoptical society is a dream of societal transparency which ultimately fails. Security implies a constant and anxious vigilance, but also a demand from below, from the very roots of society, for government. As we shall see, the liberal drive towards security also accepts the opacity of the sphere of the social.

Foucault becomes more concerned, then, with the question of the individual (as opposed to the subject of knowledge), and the ethical relation of the individual to government and to itself. Whilst denying that the individual represents a discrete and self-sufficient atom of liberty, he begins to look at the ways in which the individual might work on its own subjectivity. In short, he becomes increasingly interested in ethics. What is meant here by "ethics"? This question will be explored more fully in the final chapter. However, for the moment it is useful briefly to consider Foucault's own statements on his very final work on Greek and Roman antiquity, although these works will not be considered in full until the final chapter of the thesis. Characteristically, he maintains that this work is a natural progression from his early studies on, for example, madness. However, the shift that he outlines to François Ewald in 1984 helps to extract the "ethical" thread of his later work. In the case of his work on madness, he

considered the problems that madness posed "aux autres".[45] Now he wishes to look at the ways in which sexual conduct poses problems for individuals themselves. There is a link between the relationship to oneself and the relationship to others. The two elements exist within a common system. In terms of Foucault's notion of heterogeneity, they are separate, and yet share points of articulation:

> Dans un cas, il s'agissait en somme de savoir comment on 'gouvernait' les fous, maintenant comment on 'se gouverne' soi-même. Mais j'ajouterai aussitôt que dans le cas de la folie, j'ai essayé de rejoindre à partir de là, la constitution de l'expérience de soi-même comme fou, dans le cadre de la maladie mentale, de la pratique psychiatrique et de l'institution asilaire. Ici je voudrais montrer comment le gouvernement de soi s'intègre à une pratique du gouvernement des autres.[46]

His main claim is that his work demonstrates an overall coherence in terms of a concern with the constitution of individual and collective "experience". However, the final part of this quotation may be read as an admission that "government" is a new object of analysis. This is the ethical element in Foucault's later work. It concerns the interaction between the individual and the collectivity in terms of an ethical structuring of action.

In order to illustrate the question of the individual and ethics further, it is worth rehearsing briefly the main arguments of Jeffrey Minson's provocative interpretation of Foucault's work.[47] His starting point is that of a dissatisfaction with a reading which depends completely on the notion of *power* as a force of repression. He proposes a reading of *Surveiller et punir* which avoids seeing the Panopticon as a totalising representation of a disciplinary society.[48] Foucault notes that the Panopticon is an architectural figure of combination between pre-disciplinary symbolic representations of the leper and techniques of discipline which surround the deviant, "pour le marquer comme pour le modifier." (*SP*, p. 201). So, instead of reading discipline in terms of a continually-growing monster, he rather sees the genealogy of the modern individual as "an instrument and effect of liberal police."[49] Minson's central argument is that the importance of Foucault's work lies not in an analysis of the subject of knowledge, but in highlighting the construction of the contemporary idea of the human personality: "If we were to sum up what we have taken from Foucault's genealogical studies in a single line, it would be the general proposition that the figure of the person is an historical innovation consequent upon a series of 'liberal' transformations of 'police'."[50] The totalising drive of semiotechnique — the dream of exemplary punishment as a moral

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45 Michel Foucault, "Le Souci de la vérité," p. 19.
46 Ibid., p. 19.
47 Jeffrey Minson, *Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1985).
48 ibid., p. 101.
49 ibid., p. 145.
50 ibid., p. 145.

fable or school lesson for the eighteenth-century reforming jurists — as a utopian project undergoes a "liberal" transformation, whereby the individual is not only an object of power but, importantly, a source of demands. Modernity implies both an "institutionalisation" and a "disinstitutionalisation" moving "towards an institutional differentiation of specialised knowledges, powers and functions and their distribution across the social body."[51] The individual becomes an important player in the game of government. This involves a *dispersion* across the social field of concerns with government, health and security, which builds up an idea of the private individual:

> Liberal transformation of police is not simply the imposition of power on individuals, but the incorporation into the very grain of individuals of a host of 'micro-powers', prerogatives and duties which an unreconstructed police would have allotted to authority.[52]

Minson returns to Foucault's early work, namely *L'Archéologie du savoir* and *Naissance de la clinique*, in order to show that neither are concerned primarily with the structuralist problem of the subject. Minson shows that the enunciative modalities involved in clinical practice cannot be reduced to structures of speech and perception.[53] In doing this, he reiterates the idea that Foucault identifies a plurality of origins for the clinic. These include the development of medical records, "architectural, engineering and medical knowledges," and a variety of personnel from surgeons, through laboratory assistants, to administrators. The clinic does not form a unified point of knowledge and perception on its own. It forms rather part of an evolving "medico-social complex" which is part of the institution of new social norms.[54] It fits into a wider concern for "health" in society, which does not necessarily have a purely medical origin. As Foucault himself notes above, "la structure hospitalière" can also be shown to be linked to diverse forms of knowledge. Foucault takes up the question of health in an article from a collective work in 1976 on the origins of the modern hospital.[55] Foucault here bears out Minson's thesis by claiming that the growth of a "noso-politics" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is not only the result of State intervention, or of a uniquely private set of initiatives forming a market for medicine. It does in fact have a plurality of origins, including religious groups, charitable organisations and academic statistics societies. Multiple sites emerge in society where health and disease become problematic, and there is a *demand* for government. As will be seen later, the notion of the market forms an extremely important technique for liberalism, but Foucault shows that its demands often exist in tension with collective

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51 ibid., p. 107.
52 ibid., p. 108.
53 ibid., p. 134.
54 ibid., p. 138.
55 Michel Foucault, "La Politique de la santé au XVIII^{e} siècle," in *Les Machines à guérir: aux origines de l'hôpital moderne* (Paris: Institut de l'Environnement, 1976) pp. 12-21.

ethical and practical solutions.

In general, Minson is right to shift the focus of attention on Foucault's work from what he terms "power", to liberalism, and to do so through a re-reading of the figure of dispersion in *L'Archéologie du savoir*. However, he does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that liberalism represents something new to Foucault, an innovation in thought as a problematisation of reality, the full significance of which for his own work he was not to articulate fully.

In summary, Foucault shows in his early work that the subject of knowledge is a product of social practices. In his later work, he looks at the way in which the individual is fabricated by power, and considers the possibility of a more active constitution of subjectivity by the individual. His archaeology disperses the subject of knowledge, and he considers the political figure of the individual in a similarly "dispersed" way. The terms "subject" and "individual" are not closely defined or differentiated in Foucault's work. However, it is reasonable to perceive a movement from an early attack on the philosophical concept of the subject towards a consideration of the individual as a distinctive figure of contemporary political rationality. He questions the identity of the individual as a player in the game of government: "What are we? As *Aufklärer*, as part of the Enlightenment? Compare this with the Cartesian question: Who am I? I, as a unique but universal and unhistorical subject? I, for Descartes is everyone, anywhere at any moment."[56]

However, the beginnings of this interest in the dispersed origins of the modern individual can actually be seen in his earliest, so-called "structuralist" work. He also becomes interested in questions of health and the demands that the individual begins to make of government at a fairly early stage. The characteristic move of his later work is away from power and violence imposed by the State — which might still be one way of reading *Surveiller et punir* — and towards the notion of "gouvernement". That is to say, action upon action, the structuring of a field of action. This may, or may not, involve the intervention of the State. The question of the "government of the self" develops out of Foucault's work on liberalism in the late 'seventies, becoming the subject of his very final work. This will be dealt with in the following chapter. This chapter deals with the "government of others", the demand for government and how these two relate to the figure of the individual. It will also highlight the close link that Foucault perceives at certain times between the government of the self and others, thus giving liberalism its "ethical" characteristics.

The previous chapter has shown how Foucault refuses both the idea that the State can be a principle of legitimacy and the idea that it functions as the founding site

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56 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," an Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982) p. 216.

of oppression and power. This chapter looks at some of the ways in which Foucault is unwilling to see the State as the sole provider of welfare and collective solutions to problems such as health and security in modernity. Foucault chooses to investigate the axis of individuality and its own problematisations. This axis of individuality is intimately linked to the modern process of government. However, it does have one of its terminal points in the State which functions primarily as a set of legal, economic and welfare institutions. In seeing the development of the modern State from the sixteenth century onwards as both individualising and totalising, Foucault avoids the pitfall of championing a traditionally individualist philosophy. For a more traditional "liberal" such as Rorty, it is this Nietzschean refusal to distinguish between private and necessarily functional public morality which undermines the political usefulness of Foucault's work.

Returning to Rorty's reservations concerning the "French Foucault", his objections must ultimately be seen as untenable, since it is impossible to deny the presence of Nietzsche within Foucault's thought. Although he does seek to distance himself from the somewhat messianic rhetoric of Nietzschean irony which pervaded much of his early work, the influence of Nietzsche remains in his final work in the desire to outline a method for thought which might avoid the problem of identity. In simple terms, Nietzsche deals with the problems of self-consciousness and knowledge. For Nietzsche, knowledge emerges as the "will-to-power" in human life, but may become perverted as the "will-to-truth", whereby the conscience polices itself and institutes the weaknesses of guilt and pity. This decadent relation of guilt is seen in religious terms as the influence of the Reformation by Nietzsche. He is ambiguous concerning the individualism instituted by the Reformation:

> Die Verflachung des europaïschen Geistes, namentlich im Norden [...] tat mit der Lutherischen Reformation einen tüchtigen Schritt vorwärts, es ist kein Zweifel; und ebenso wuchs durch sie die Beweglichkeit und Unruhe des Geistes, sein Durst nach Unabhängigkeit, sein Glaube an ein Recht auf Freiheit, seine 'Natürlichkeit'.[57]

In this way, Nietzsche's championing of an aristocratic individualism is set against a critique of the guilty individuality of Christianity. This individuality is paradoxical for Nietzsche, since it leads to a "herd instinct". Foucault also uses the image of the herd, but this time to deal with the Christian "pastoral" power that both individualises and collectivises. Foucault takes up the question of the Christian tradition of self-examination and confession in *La Volonté de savoir*, as a critical theme which is close to Nietzsche's critique of "guilty" individuality. Confession is important in the creation of modern individuality by linking sexuality and truth, as a ritual in which the subject

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57 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* in *Nietzsche Werke* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), II, #358 pp. 286-287.

investigates its own truth, and as a power relationship. (*VS*, pp. 82-83). In a move which owes much to Nietzsche, he shows how the forging of subjectivity through the interrogation and problematisation of sex and desire is a tantalisingly endless process: "le point de fragilité par où nous viennent les menaces du mal; le fragment de nuit que chacun de nous porte en soi. Signification générale, secret universel, cause omniprésente, peur qui ne cesse pas." (*VS*, p. 93).

In the years following the publication of this work in 1976, however, Foucault also develops his analysis of individuality in the less obviously critical direction of "care". In a lecture delivered at Stanford University in 1979 in English he begins to elaborate upon this theme.[58] He starts by setting up an opposition between the "centralised and centralising" power of the State,[59] and the "individualising power" of "pastorship".[60] These work in combination, but most critical thought has concentrated on the first kind of power in European societies. Throughout this lecture Foucault develops a hesitant and schematic comparison between the Judeo-Christian theme of pastorship and the Greek theme of the city. Several elements in his work appear here which have particular relevance to the questions of liberalism and individualism in Europe. Firstly, in Jewish thought the Shepherd-God "gives, or promises, his flock a land."[61] Here, then, Foucault points to what he considers to be one of the founding mythologies of nationalism. Secondly, echoing Nietzsche's theme of "ressentiment", he looks at Christian "mortification", which link self-examination/identity, death and political power. Mortification is an "everyday death" of renunciation, whereby individuals constantly interrogate and examine the self. The final chapter will examine in more detail Foucault's interest in the link between renunciation and identity in Christianity:

> We can say that Christian pastorship has introduced a game that neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews imagined. A strange game whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity; a game which seems to have nothing to do with the game of the city surviving through the sacrifice of its citizens. Our societies proved to be really demonic since they happened to combine these two games — the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game — in what we call the modern states.[62]

With Christianity emerges the figure of the pastor. This figure represents a form of power whose aim is to ensure the salvation of each individual after death. Pastorship is, in short, the question of welfare. The title of the Stanford lecture is "Omnes et

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58 Michel Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'," in Sterling McMurrin, ed., *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values II* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981) pp. 225-254.

59 ibid., p. 226.

60 ibid., p. 227.

61 ibid., p. 228.

62 ibid., p. 239.

Singulatim", which is a condensed form of the equation with which Foucault works in the later part of his career. The tradition of the State and centralised, collective power in European societies is not only collective, but also individualising. That is to say, it is continually taking into account the care of the individual, the "singulatim" side of the equation. Foucault ends this lecture by claiming that "right from the start, the State is both individualising and totalitarian."[63] Comparing the Christian (particularly the Protestant) to the Greek tradition, Foucault draws the crude opposition of life to law. The theme of pastorship transforms into the concern for life and population known as "police" in the eighteenth century.[64]

Returning to the idea of civil society, which was introduced in the previous chapter, care is linked to "duty", or social responsibility, a new set of demands on the individual which relate neither to purely economic (market) nor juridical interests.[65] The eighteenth century demonstrates a double-sided process of individual demand for medical care and a collectively organised medical profession, whereby health becomes a generalised problem. The two sides of this process are heterogeneous, in that they share no "rapport d'antériorité ou de dérivation."[66] However, they do share an articulation: "La problématisation de la noso-politique au XVIII^{e} siècle ne traduit donc pas une intervention uniforme de l'Etat dans la pratique de la médecine, mais plutôt l'émergence, en des points multiples du corps social, de la santé et de la maladie comme problèmes qui demandent d'une manière ou d'une autre une prise en charge collective."[67]

In "Omnes et Singulatim" Foucault is at pains to point out that both of these roots must be attacked; the State and the individual: "Opposing the individual and his interests to it is just as hazardous as opposing it with the community and its requirements."[68] Foucault here appears to be distancing himself from what would be commonly seen as a "liberal" project. Giovanna Procacci shows that Foucault's definition of government — the structuring of the field of action of others — implies an indetermination in potential of the subject: "But this giving-form-to-action requires that, at the other end of the relation, there be a heterogeneity of elements — that there be, in sum, liberty of the subject, expressed by the field of possibilities offered to his/her

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63 ibid., p. 254.

64 ibid., pp. 248-252.

65 See Giovanna Procacci, "Notes on the Government of the Social," *History of the Present*, no. 3 (Fall 1987) pp. 5-15: "Duty, finally, is an operative notion which makes it possible to link the omnes et singulatim about which Foucault spoke. If the modern political rationality is characterised by the fact of being at once totalizing and individualizing, the government of the social offers, through the notion of duty, a means of regulating at the same time the production of the social tie and that of an individualizing pedagogy." (p. 15).

66 Michel Foucault, "La Politique de la santé au XVIII^{e} siècle," p. 11.

67 Ibid., p. 12.

68 Michel Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim," p. 254.

action."[69] Procacci therefore sees the theme of duty which is linked to the emergence of civil society, as a method of linking "omnes et singulatim". It is a "pedagogics of the citizen" which individualises by linking each individual to the collectivity. Thus, the traditional liberal scenario of a confrontation between the individual and the State, via the notion of contractual rights, is effectively avoided.[70] Governmental power is therefore "anarchic", in the sense that it is not founded through a principle of contract or legitimacy embodied in the State. It produces individuality, and is even infra-individual. The principle of "omnes et singulatim" is a development of the apparently polarised movement of power that Deleuze locates in *Surveiller et punir*: "le champ d'immanence, l'exercice du pouvoir, doit être représenté d'un certain point de vue comme parfaitement continu, mais d'un autre point de vue comme parfaitement discontinu, procédant par segments séparés."[71]

John Rajchman recognises this "anarchism" of power as a common theme in Foucault and Nietzsche. However, he accuses Foucault of portraying politics as a "losing battle", whereby the power of domination is presented as endlessly efficient and cynical.[72] Rajchman is apparently dismayed that, by the late 'seventies, however, Foucault "no longer celebrates the anarchism in art as he once did in his work on Raymond Roussel."[73] Rajchman makes the rather extravagant claim that Nietzsche, on the other hand, produces a philosophy of modern art which is anarchic, non-representational, and thus "anti-fascist".[74] In fact, Foucault by no means abandons his rejection of representational aesthetic theory, but he does rethink, as has been discussed in previous chapters, his position on the transgressive potential of art and literature. As noted in the introductory chapter, Rajchman himself later acknowledges this shift and uses it as a basis for arguing that Foucault is in fact a "postmodern" thinker in his strategic thinking, and in his final formula of "se déprendre de soi".[75] And in a more recent work, Rajchman places Foucault's final work firmly in the Nietzschean project of refusing historical identity: "We are not condemned to think that only Tradition or Eternity can tell us who we are and what is worthwhile about our existence; we are not condemned to what Nietzsche called "ressentiment."[76]

Overall, as mentioned above, Nietzsche cannot be subtracted from the work of

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69 Giovanna Procacci, "Notes on the Government of the Social," p. 5.
70 Ibid., p. 15.
71 Gilles Deleuze, "Ecrivain non: un nouveau cartographe," *Critique*, no. 343 (décembre,1975) p. 1218.
72 John Rajchman, "Nietzsche, Foucault and the Anarchism of Power," *Semiotexte*, vol. 3, no. 1 (1978) pp. 96-107.
73 Ibid., p. 107.
74 Ibid., p. 98.
75 John Rajchman, *Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy* (London: Columbia University Press, 1985) p. 124.
76 John Rajchman, *Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1991) p. 146.

Foucault, since Nietzsche provides not only thematic and methodological influences but, perhaps more importantly, a philosophical style for Foucault. Part of this Nietzschean "style" is, as Foucault admits, the willingness to pose non-Nietzschean questions.[77] The important, but ambiguous, status of Nietzsche within Foucault's work is well-illustrated by his 1964 paper "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx".[78] Foucault sees these three figures as instituting a new technique of interpretation in the nineteenth century. That is to say, interpretation now becomes "un jeu de miroirs." It is a process which is potentially endless, undermining the belief that language always contains a meaning behind that which is said, and that other objects in the world, which are not language, speak to us. Interpretation must always be incomplete in Nietzsche's thought, since "la connaissance absolue" would destroy the human being. In this way, Foucault places Nietzsche within the tradition of transgression, in claiming that Nietzsche did in fact come near, through his own experience of madness, to the madness which would be "la conscience absolue." This was an experience that he shared with Freud: "Cette expérience de la folie serait la sanction d'un mouvement de l'interprétation qui s'approche à l'infini de son centre, et qui s'effondre, calcinée."[79] This discussion encapsulates much of Foucault's work in the early 'sixties. Transgression undermines the modern episteme's dependence on the interpretation of an unknown, which is returned to Man through the process of History. Nietzsche, Freud and Marx are therefore ambiguous figures, in that they form part of this episteme, but suggest that interpretation might be more elusive than the modern era has been able to imagine. In later work, Foucault maintains the Nietzschean influence, but rather as a theme of escape; a commitment to the possibilities for freedom which are immanent within the constant bifurcation of reason in the present moment. Overall, he remains committed to a systematic attack on any philosophy of individual or collective identity. History reveals itself to be a discontinuous series of disparities, rather than the development of an identity which can be referred to a single origin. Genealogy reveals the heterogeneity of an identity that was previously seen as consistent with itself. This means that the past cannot be evaluated and reviewed from the privileged perspective of the present, and that, in turn, the identity of the present is challenged: "Il ne s'agit plus de juger notre passé au nom d'une vérité que notre présent serait seul à détenir; il s'agit de risquer la destruction du sujet de connaissance dans la volonté, indéfiniment

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77 Michel Foucault, "Le Retour de la morale," *Les Nouvelles*, no. 2937 (28 juin-5 juillet, 1984) pp. 36-41: "je suis simplement nietzschéen et j'essaie dans la mesure du possible, sur un certain nombre de points, de voir, avec l'aide de textes de Nietzsche — mais aussi avec des thèses antinietzschéennes (qui sont tout de même nietzschéennes!) — ce qu'on peut faire dans tel ou tel domaine." (p. 40).

78 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," in *Cahiers de Royaumont 6: Nietzsche* (Paris: Minuit, 1967).

79 ibid., p. 189.

déployée, de savoir."[80]

Gilles Deleuze has recently reinforced the idea that this reading of Nietzsche represents one of the philosophical motors of Foucault's work.[81] For Deleuze, the importance of the present, or "l'actuel", particularly in the later Foucault, is precisely the possibility of something new appearing from the constant bifurcation of reason.[82] In considering the influence of Nietzsche, Deleuze points out what we might consider as yet another example of the figure of heterogeneity in Foucault's thought. There is a heterogeneity in the present moment between that which we are in the present, and that which we are becoming. Social apparatuses in the present consist of heterogeneous practices. Foucault's thought may therefore be considered as pluralist and pragmatic.[83]

Deleuze also attempts to show that Foucault might be influenced by Nietzsche in a way which overcomes the problem of liberation and self-creation being reserved for the aristocratic "knights of autonomy", as Rorty describes them.[84] Deleuze suggests that Foucault may have used Nietzsche's discovery of the historical nature of reason to suggest new ways in which subjectivity might be produced: "Ce qui (se) subjective, ce sont tantôt les nobles, ceux qui disent selon Nietzsche 'nous les bons...'. Mais dans d'autres conditions ce sont les exclus, les mauvais, les pécheurs, ou bien ce sont les ermites, ou bien les communautés monacales, ou bien les hérétiques [...]"[85]

Having established that one of the essential themes of Foucault's work is a Nietzschean dismantling of identity, it must also be understood that he increasingly finds himself in the position of tentatively dealing with ethical concerns, whilst consistently undermining any unity of identity or origins for the individual. His work becomes an attempt to go beyond the analysis of strategies of "pouvoir-savoir" which play such an important part in *Surveiller et punir*. After *Surveiller et punir*, particularly in *La Volonté de savoir*, he uses the provocative and potentially scandalous notion that the individual might actually be seduced by power in several ways. By exercising power over others, by exercising power on oneself, and by endless talk on the self, sex and health. This is the fascism which is — according to Foucault — within ourselves; a seductive form of infra-individual power. He ironically describes such a process as an alternative form of mortification or confession: "Comment débarrasser notre discours et nos actes, nos coeurs et nos plaisirs, du fascisme? Comment débusquer le fascisme qui

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80 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire," in *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (Paris: P.U.F., 1971) p. 172.

81 Gilles Deleuze, "Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier, 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) pp. 185-193.

82 ibid., p. 191.

83 ibid., p. 188.

84 See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Rorty considers Nietzsche to "relegate the vast majority of humanity to the status of dying animals." p. 35.

85 Gilles Deleuze, "Qu'est-qu'un dispositif?" p. 188.

s'est incrusté dans notre comportement?"[86]

These comments come from the preface to the American edition of Deleuze and Guattari's *Capitalisme et schizophrénie: l'Anti-Oedipe*. Foucault claims that, as an introduction to "la vie non fasciste", it is an "ethical" work.[87] Here, Foucault, in a rather exuberantly polemical piece, outlines his own distaste for the links which are forged between pleasure and power. He compares Deleuze and Guattari's book to François de Sales' *Introduction à la vie dévote*, considering how it might be read as a series of maxims for the ethical practice of everyday life. The most important maxim would be to guard against "falling in love" with power. This apparently minor preface is important, in that Foucault links the emerging ethical content of his work to the theoretical pluralism that he so admires in Deleuze. As an ethical maxim, *l'Anti-Oedipe* encourages the intensification and multiplication of forms of thought, rather than the binary form of the intellectual triumvirate of Freudianism, Marxism and structuralism — chracterised by the negative categories of law, limit and lack — which have dominated much of the post-war era in Europe. This positivist pluralism runs counter to a conventional notion of rights: "N'exigez pas de la politique qu'elle rétablisse les 'droits' de l'individu tels que la philosophie les a définis. L'individu est le produit du pouvoir. Ce qu'il faut, c'est 'désindividualiser' par la multiplication et le déplacement, l'agencement de combinaisons différentes."[88]

As he goes further in his work on liberalism, Foucault shows that the State may see itself in an ethical relationship to the individual in the institution of a form of government. The formulation of "gouvernementalité" was introduced at the end of the previous chapter. Government is the "conduct of conduct", which may operate in several ways. These include the government of the self, personal relations and the relationship between individuals and institutions. Government works in a circular fashion by shaping the conduct of individuals, and taking into account the demands of the individual. In his lectures on liberalism Foucault is particularly interested in periods of Western history when government and the attendant conception of the State have had an explicitly ethical content, due to the intimate link between government of the self and political action — i.e. "omnes et singulatim" — which is intrinsic to these periods. The police State of early modernity is an ambitious example of the goal of governing individual and collective life in almost infinite detail. Liberalism, and particularly Adam Ferguson's project of civil society, however, emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century, is a style of thinking which constantly reflects on this ethical relationship between "each and every one." Foucault maintains a scrupulous neutrality

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86 Michel Foucault, "L'Anti-Oedipe: une introduction à la vie non fasciste," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 257 (septembre, 1988) p. 50. See also Section II of Bibliography.

87 ibid., p. 50.

88 Ibid., p. 50.

in his 1978 and 1979 lectures. However, he does imply that the success of contemporary neo-liberal government in Western Europe is due to the ability of these governments to define in almost ethical terms the relationship between government and governed.

The question of Foucault's work in relation to American "liberal" critical thought has been dealt with above. However, before looking at these lectures in more detail, it is necessary to consider his work in relationship to what might be termed more conservative liberal ideas. Again, the question of pluralism should be considered. For Foucault, this represents the shift from an interest in discursive practices of social transparency, such as the connection between Rousseau's social theory and the ideal "semiotechnique" of the eighteenth-century reformers, (*SP*, p. 96) towards an interest in practices which acknowledge the opacity of society. However, Foucault cannot be considered in any way as a traditional liberal theorist, since his own methodological pluralism is not individualist.

In one of the most influential statements of postwar liberal theory, Isiah Berlin outlines "two concepts of liberty". "Negative freedom" is not seen as incompatible with authority, but is crucially important in protecting the plurality of human desires and ways of life. "Positive freedom" is embodied by the Jacobin form of the French Revolution in the desire for a monadic self-mastery on behalf of individuals and whole classes. This is potentially disastrous for Berlin, and the category of "negative freedom" is seen as certainly more preferable:

> Pluralism, with the measure of 'negative' liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more human ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of 'positive' self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.[89]

Berlin would agree with Bentham, as Anthony Arblaster notes, that individual interests are the only real interests, and that such a view is central to an empirical, rather than a metaphysical view of politics.[90] How, then, does Foucault's pluralism compare with Berlin's empirical pluralism? There are three main ways in which his position may be distinguished from that of Berlin. Firstly, the liberal idea of negative freedom is still the "conduct of conduct", a strategy of government. Secondly, Foucault does not bracket the plurality of "human goals" as an unproblematic, if necessarily uncertain, area. He spends the first half of his career carefully outlining modernity's construction of the individual. Finally, as has been shown with the discussion concerning the figure of

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89 Isiah Berlin, "Two Versions of Liberty," in Michael J. Sandel, ed., *Liberalism and its Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) p. 33.

90 Anthony Arblaster, *The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) pp. 51-52.

dispersal in his work, his is a thoroughgoing *theoretical* rather than a humanist pluralism. For example, *L'Archéologie du savoir* undermines the unity of the "event" in history. The event is not a matter of pure agency or chance, but is enmeshed in a discursive framework. Whilst carefully distancing himself from speech act theory, with its attendant intentionality, Foucault shows that discourse is a type of action. He proposes an analysis which breaks down the unity of the event into a field of discursive and non-discursive practices. Therfore, he considers the French Revolution, since this threshhold has been the unspoken reference point of much of his work, in the following way:

> Ainsi la Révolution Française [...] ne joue pas le rôle d'un événement extérieur aux discours, dont on devrait, pour penser comme il le faut, retrouver l'effet de partage dans tous les discours; elle fonctionne comme un ensemble complexe, articulé, descriptible de transformations qui ont laissé intactes un certain nombre de positivités [...] (*AS*, p. 231).

This methodological pluralism has already been discussed with regard to the emergence of clinical medicine in the introduction. Foucault uses this example to illustrate methodological principles in an article where he admits happily to being a pluralist. Towards the end of *L'Archéologie du savoir*, the description of the archive of statements is described as a process which embraces the fact of difference, of historical discontinuity. It is the analysis of that part of our present which we are already in the process of ceasing to be: "La description de l'archive déploie ses possibilités (et la maîtrise de ses possibilités) à partir des discours qui viennent de cesser justement d'être les nôtres [...] elle nous déprend de nos continuités [...]" (*AS*, p. 172).

Foucault is, therefore, committed to a theoretical and methodological pluralism, but he also applies this pluralism to the figure of the individual itself. The strand of liberal thought which is common to Bentham, Hume and Berlin, on the other hand, treats the individual as an indivisible and irreducible empirical atom of calculation. Foucault also proposes a historical pluralism which questions the unity of origins and the stable identity of the present. In his analysis of liberalism, Foucault does admit that what he calls British empiricism represents an important innovation in European thinking, but considers it as a tactic to guide conduct, rather than the foundation of a contractual freedom for the individual.

Jean-Marie Benoîst represents a rather different sort of liberal conservative, who sees no contradiction between liberalism and the post-structuralist attack on the individual subject. He sees Foucault's analysis of discontinuity in history as directly opposed to economic determinism, just as Lacanian psychoanalysis undermines the privileged position of the proletariat as the "subject" of history in Marxist thought.[91] This is obviously a highly selective reading, which ignores much of Foucault's

91 Jean-Marie Benoîst, *Les Outils de la liberté* (Paris: Laffont, 1985) pp. 11-12.

important work on the construction of the individual by power. Benoist bases his influential contribution to what might be called "continental liberalism" on an opposition between "l'Etat homogénéisateur" and "les droits de l'hétérogène."[92] His contentious work also serves as an interesting introduction to the other major way in which Foucault's work has proved useful to, and has been open to abuse, by conservative liberals. That is to say, in the field of a neo-Kantian conception of individual rights. In what is obviously in part a tactical move to distance liberalism and neo-liberalism from criticisms of a naïve belief in an anarchistic natural selection, Benoist contrasts what he sees as "le darwinisme social" of Marxism with "l'éthique kantienne de la personne."[93] In a move which recalls Foucault's controversial claims concerning Marxism in *Les Mots et les choses*, he asserts that there is a commonality between Marx and Darwin in their view of history as a unifying process: "On sait la fascination de Marx pour Darwin: l'archaïsme de cette théorie historique continuiste et abusivement unificatrice de la Révolution se trouve aujourd'hui contesté par les libéraux alliés aux libertaires, en une revendication formidable du respect de la personne."[94] Here, Benoîst makes what is in effect an anti-Hegelian point. He refutes the validity of dialectical thought, whereby greater unity emerges from struggle, either between individuals or classes. Social anarchy will be avoided by the institution of law as a set of rights following on from the precept of Kant's second maxim, concerning the limits of reason:

> S'il est alors une éthique et une métaphysique qui puissent servir de fondement à une politique libérale qui aurait à affirmer sa distance avec les divers naturalismes dont le darwinien est le plus dangereux, ce sont celles de Kant, illustrées par la seconde maxime: 'Agis toujours de telle sorte que la personne humaine en autrui et en toi-même soit considérée comme une fin et non pas seulement comme un moyen.'[95]

In general, then, Benoîst perceives no discrepancy between a kind of plural liberal individualism and Foucault's sceptical genealogy of the individual. His use of Kant is important with regard to the theme of welfare. For Kantian liberals right must be prior to good. In other words, the principles of justice and individual rights cannot be sacrificed in favour of the imperative of general welfare. This argument is, of course, based on the assumption that a system of rights cannot have perverse effects, whereas any homogenising concept of the "common" good — whether it be utilitarian or socialist — can and will have such effects.

Foucault, on the other hand, has much less faith in law and rights. He points out that there is no inherent link between "L'Etat de droit" and liberalism. Liberalism as a technique of government has traditionally used law as a method of regulation only out

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92 ibid., p. 146.
93 ibid., p. 72.
94 ibid., p. 72.
95 ibid., p. 72.

of respect for economy and efficiency.[96] It is, of course, important to note that, in the context of his activity as an intellectual with a "public" profile, Foucault readily lent his support to the cause of "les droits de l'homme". However, he considers these rights to be those of "des gouvernés", rather than the legal right which recognises the importance of curbing the sphere of governmental interference. They are more an informal set of rights to interrogate the workings of government. They constitute a set of rights which represent a positive obligation to act critically:

> Parce qu'ils prétendent s'occuper du bonheur des sociétés, les gouvernements s'arrogent le droit de passer au compte du profit et des pertes le malheur des hommes que leurs décisions provoquent ou que leurs négligences permettent. [...] Le malheur des hommes ne doit jamais être un reste muet de la politique. Il fonde un droit absolu à se lever et à s'adresser à ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir.[97]

Foucault considers human rights to be international, and to be a principle of action for those who are governed, rather than as a principle of government itself. He also sees the act of speaking out against the abuses which governments may commit in the name of general happiness as an ethical duty for "individus privés". In short, against the dominant liberal conception of negative liberty, Foucault proposes an active and ethical form of citizenship. However, it cannot be denied that Foucault is interested in the possibility of the rule of law as a technique for constructing and maintaining social pluralism.[98]

In general, Foucault eschews the question of legitimacy and rights, to concentrate on the practice of government. His work on government from the second half of the 'seventies onwards is a project which looks at the way security is sought by and for the State and the individual. It is a "counter-history" of thought on who governs, when, how, how much, to what ends, and at what cost. This is opposed to the history of sovereignty and legitimacy. It has already been shown in the previous chapter that, in general, he considers two modes of political thinking which allow the principles of government to move away from their subordination to either a divine order, or the perceived Machiavellian strategies for maintaining the sovereignty of the Prince. These are the doctrines of police and, supplementing and to a certain extent superseding this, security.

Returning to the themes with which this chapter began, from Foucault's own

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96 See Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, p. 115.

97 Michel Foucault, "Face aux gouvernements, les Droits de l'Homme," *Libération* (30 juin-1 juillet, 1984) p. 22. From a statement originally delivered in June 1981.

98 See Robert Badinter, "Au nom des mots," in *Michel Foucault: une histoire de la vérité* (Paris: Syros, 1985) pp. 73-75: "Au cours de nos derniers entretiens, Michel Foucault soulignait la nécessité de mieux appréhender [...] l'importance de la règle de droit et sa fonction architecturale, transcendant le normatif pour devenir, de l'édifice social, l'arc-boutant [...]" (p. 74).

summary of his lecture courses, it is important to recognise that he sees liberalism, in its actual function as a governmental process as, itself, a critique of reality. This scepticism lends the polymorphous forms of liberalism their ethical force. Prior to his work on liberalism Foucault had put forward a critical analysis of the truth claims of, for example, penal reform or sexual identity and the repressive hypothesis. His work on liberalism is the analysis of a style of thinking which is already self-reflexively critical of truth claims and representational versions of reality. This point concerning liberalism represents perhaps the most refined example that he offers of the "strategic reversibility" of power relations. Government, as opposed to "pouvoir-savoir", does not completely determine action. It rather presupposes action, critique, demands and scepticism on the part of the individual.

In his lecture course for 1979, Foucault draws an overall distinction between Marxism and liberalism in the Western tradition of government. Marxism implies a form of governmentality based on the rationality of history as teleological truth, whereas liberalism is based upon the notion of an unfathomable individual rationality. However, he wishes to show that liberalism and neo-liberalism are not concerned solely with liberty, but rather with the calculation of the play of liberties. The theme of security with reference to, for example, Bentham's Panopticon, demonstrates both how Foucault himself had by this stage considerably refined his analysis contained in *Surveiller et punir*, and how this book has been oversimplified by critics and commentators. The *disciplinary* aspect of Bentham's philosophy is a development of eighteenth-century police, which is undoubtedly a very important aspect of the Panoptic "dispositif". However, Bentham's Panopticon also represents the ideal of the generalisation and internalisation of discipline as "autorégulation". That is to say, a self-generating mechanism of security. The Panopticon can therefore be seen to straddle the techniques of discipline and security.

Before moving on to a discussion of what Foucault means by security, it is worth restating and expanding the main principles of the technique of police. Police is linked to the doctrine of "Raison d'Etat", which emerges in sixteenth-century Europe. The State has its own reasons; it has its own rationality, as it were. Foucault calls this reason of State, "government in accordance with the the state's strength."[99] It is a principle of knowledge, scandalous in its rejection of natural laws, which enables the State to know its own strength and to increase this strength within the competitive context of a European system of States. The State is equivalent to its territory, and there is no division between the State and society. The technique or doctrine of police is the fullest expression the reason of State. The police State has the "pastoral" role of concerning itself with, "a live, active, productive man."[100] Together with the strength

99 Michel Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim," p. 246.
100 ibid., p. 248.

of the State, police also ensures communication or commerce. One model of police is to consider the sovereign territory as a vast city with its manifold flows of communication. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mercantilism, police and diplomacy work together in an attempt to maintain a European balance. The limited external objectives of the State are contrasted to the unlimited objectives of the internal function of "police". From this period onwards Foucault also notes the growth of discussions concerning the status of various laws and rights; natural rights, contractual theories of law, and rights, both between individuals and subjects and the sovereign.

Out of these problematisations surrounding the development of police, an important transformation takes place in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the possibility of governing too much becomes a central question. In other words, an internal limitation is introduced to the principle of government. Government should be adept in the field of a particular scientific knowledge which is political economy, but it cannot, in itself, constitute the art of government and provide a programme for State intervention. As Foucault remarks succinctly, "l'économie est une discipline athée." (*Lecture*, 28/03/79). Political economy is "une sorte de réflexion générale sur l'organisation, la distribution et la limitation des pouvoirs dans une société." (*Lecture*, 10/01/79). The Physiocrats introduce the principle of *laissez-faire* as "une critique sévère de la réglementation administrative," but Quesnay's economic "Table" still allows the sovereign an overview of economic processes within the State. "Laissez-faire", then, for the Physiocrats can perfectly well exist within a potentially despotic order. Adam Smith, however, moves a step further by rejecting the principle of the Table. Economic processes must remain opaque both to the government and individuals. Thus, the State is separated from civil society, and liberty becomes a condition of security. As a summary of the development of governmentality, Foucault outlines his own historical schema. From the Middle Ages onwards he perceives three dominant questions:

1) Before the sixteenth century it is necessary to determine whether one governs in conformity with the law.

2) In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it is necessary to determine whether one governs with enough attention to detail.

3) Finally, from the second half of the eighteenth century onwards it has been necessary to decide whether one governs too little or too much. The eighteenth century "discovers" society as a new form of reality. Society is an independent field with its own laws and "mechanisms of reaction". Society must be manipulated to produce security, but it cannot, by definition be penetrable by police: "It is here that the question of liberalism comes up. It seems to me that at that very moment it became apparent that if one governed too much, one did not govern at all — that one provoked results contrary to those one desired. What was discovered at that time [...] was the idea of

society."[101]

Foucault argues that we continue to live largely in an era which has as its primary rationality that of security. The State is "governmentalised", in that it does not necessarily seek its own enhancement, but the maintenance of security — and thus general prosperity — within the fabric of the population. The administrative State, which emerges in the sixteenth century, finds its most fully developed embodiment in the techniques of police: "Etat administratif qui correspond à une société de règlements et de disciplines."[102] The "Etat administratif" is linked to the territoriality of national, rather than feudal, boundaries. The "Etat de gouvernement" is, on the other hand, no longer "défini par sa territorialité, par la surface occupée, mais par une masse: la masse de la population, avec son volume, sa densité, avec, bien sûr, le territoire sur lequel elle est étendue, mais qui n'en est en quelque sorte qu'une composante."[103] The ways in which this assertion of the pre-eminence of security undermines any notion of Foucault's work as outlining a theory of an oppressive discipline which is inherent in the perverse rationality of modernity have already been discussed. The important theme for this chapter is the interest in, and acceptance of, liberty as the correlate of security. In short, it is the ethical inventiveness of liberalism in the eighteenth century, and particularly contemporary neo-liberalism in the U.S.A., together with post-war neo-liberalism in West Germany, which seizes Foucault's attention. In the last lecture of his 1978 course, he emphasises the fact that, from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, liberty becomes an essential element of the security which is the aim of governmentality. The neglect of liberty constitutes an ignorance of the technique of government: "L'inscription de la liberté; de la liberté non pas comme droit des individus [...] Mais la liberté qui est devenue maintenant un élément indispensable à la gouvernementalité elle-même. On ne peut bien gouverner maintenant qu'à la condition qu'effectivement la liberté soit respectée." (*Lecture*, 05/04/78).

The elements of this new governmentality are set out succinctly as, "société, économie, population, sécurité, liberté." The question of liberty becomes one of the major concerns of Foucault's later work. Regarding liberty as a positive element of his own thought, he insists, in an important interview, that it is a practice which cannot be guaranteed by institutions or laws.[104] Foucault does not deny the importance, as we have seen above, of universal principles and rights. Power is potentially unlimited, and for this reason, rights can never be sufficiently rigorous. Foucault reverses the traditional notion of rights guaranteeing freedom. Freedom must rather act as a constant practice which reinforces rights: "Pour le limiter, les règles ne sont jamais assez

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101 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, p. 242.

102 Michel Foucault, "La Gouvernementalité: un cours inédit de Michel Foucault," *Magazine littéraire*, no. 269 (septembre, 1989) p. 103.

103 ibid., p. 103.

104 Michel Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, p. 245.

rigoureuses; pour le dessaisir de toutes les occasions dont il s'empare, jamais les principes universels ne sont assez stricts. Au pouvoir il faut toujours opposer des lois infranchissables et des droits sans restrictions."[105] However, these rights can never guarantee the practice of liberty, and should never provide a pretext for complacency or silence on the part of those who are governed. Liberalism itself, as a political practice, appears to understand the fact that law must take into account the practices which it seeks to regulate. As Graham Burchell points out,[106] Foucault refuses to see the individual as being "privatised" by eighteenth-century liberalism in order to justify the appropriation of surplus value. Firstly, eighteenth-century liberal thought problematises individuality. Secondly, this body of thought is a continuation of a set of political rationalities which seek to combine political unity with pastoral government of individuals.

So, one of the critical targets which emerges from Foucault's work on liberalism is the notion that it represents what is predominantly a juridical mode of thought. That is to say, a mode of thought which is based on the Lockean principle of contract. Foucault considers theories of contract to be the attempt by the art of government in the seventeenth century to reconcile itself with the framework of sovereignty. The end of sovereignty is circular in its aim of securing obedience to the laws of the sovereign. Although liberalism does not dispose with sovereignty, dealing with it enthusiastically through the theme of contract, the imposition of law is not the primary objective of liberalism: "Au contraire, il ne s'agit pas d'imposer une loi aux hommes, il s'agit de disposer les choses, c'est-à-dire d'utiliser des tactiques plutôt que des lois, ou, à la limite, d'utiliser des lois comme des tactiques."[107]

As we have already seen, Foucault considers liberalism to begin with the recognition of the heterogeneity of legal and economic principles; between the legal subject of right and the economic subject of interest. He is at pains to point out that the use of the concept of "heterogeneity" here does not imply exclusivity between these two areas, but rather that they circulate in a common system, and are used in the continual construction and reconstruction of the State. Society forms a curious relationship of interiority and exteriority with the State. For example, two ideas of law are seen as developing after the French Revolution. The principle of revolutionary law is based on "la volonté collective", whereas radical law is based on the principle of economic independence for the individual. These two ideas of law circulate and have currency in European societies. Liberalism uses "law", but only as an instrument of general interventions: "Cette régulation, c'est dans la 'loi' que le libéralisme l'a cherchée, non

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105 See Michel Foucault, "Inutile de se soulever?" *Le Monde* (11 mai 1979) pp. 1-2.

106 Graham Burchell, "Peculiar Interests: Civil Society and Governing 'The System of Natural Liberty'," in *The Foucault Effect*, p. 122.

107 Michel Foucault, "La Gouvernementalité: un cours inédit de Michel Foucault," p. 101.

point par un juridisme qui lui serait naturel, mais parce que la loi définit des formes d'interventions générales exclusives de mesures particulières [...]"[108]

Shortly before his lectures on liberalism Foucault claims that the second half of the eighteenth century institutes "une phase de régression du juridique." (*VS*, p. 190). This might appear to be perverse reasoning in light of the fact that the period immediately following the French Revolution had given rise to a great deal of legislative activity in the form of Constitutions and Codes. However, he sees this "activité législative permanente et bruyante," as the form of activity which makes an essentially *normalising* power acceptable. (*VS*, p. 190). This entails a new relationship between the individual and totality. The police State depends upon a narrowing of the distinction between law and decree. Government by decree has as its target the individuality and specificity of elements which constitute the population within a given territory. Government by means of mechanisms of security, on the other hand, aims at "une sorte de complexe constitué par les hommes et les choses." (*Lecture* , 01/02/78). Discipline is normalising and prescriptive, classifying the elements of reality in a largely empirical manner: "La discipline analyse et décompose en éléments minimaux de perception," whereas security employs the concept of the norm as a judicious knowledge; "un repérage du normal et de l'anormal." (*Lecture*, 01/02/78). Discipline has the individual body as its primary target, whereas security focusses on the population as a whole. Security will accept a certain degree of variation from the norm, and will attempt to play off the abnormal against the normal. Security is a technique which respects the natural processes of reality, but at the same time seeks to "jouer la réalité". The figure of heterogeneity can be seen to operate in two ways. Firstly, the techniques of security which are at the heart of liberalism are created from forms of rationality which are heterogeneous. Secondly, liberalism and security entail a new form of spatiality, which might be considered as a shifting and fluid system of configurations of which no single subject can have an overall view. In general, Foucault attempts to outline some of the ways in which the link between the sovereign and a juridical form of law is overlaid and superseded in importance by "un pouvoir normatif", which finds one of its expressions in the proliferation of legislative activity which follows the French Revolution.

In *L'Etat providence*, François Ewald pushes Foucault's initial and rather schematic reflections on security further to consider the development of "le droit social" in the nineteenth century. He places his work within the field of the analysis of "bio-pouvoir" which Foucault introduces in *La Volonté de savoir*. Foucault notes the growing importance of the norm, and Ewald considers the series "Etat providence, norme, droit social."[109] "Le droit social" supplements "la sûreté" which is established

108 See Michel Foucault, *Résumé de cours*, p. 115.
109 François Ewald, *L'Etat providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1986) p. 27.

as "un droit de l'homme" by the French Revolution.[110] Ewald concentrates largely on the unambitious and unimaginative tenor of the Welfare State. Its main function is prophylactic, considering the life of each individual to be a danger for others.[111] For Ewald, then, security is a technique which overplays its hand, as it were, and creates political stagnation. Foucault, too, identifies the concern with security as a specific political problem for democracy in the twentieth century. In a piece which provides a typical example of his work as a "specific intellectual",[112] from 1979, he returns to "la justice pénale" — one of his specific areas of concern — to criticise "la stratégie du pourtour".[113] Here he points out the injustice of the legislative procedure of "flagrant délit" in the context of convictions arising from demonstrations. Foucault considers such a procedure to be the result of an insidious philosophy which increasingly penetrates penal practice. Instead of punishing specific crimes, penal justice becomes more concerned with the general problem of perceived and possible dangers for society: "Une justice qui [...] a à gérer une société, à détecter ce qui est périlleux pour elle, à l'alerter sur ses propres dangers. Une justice qui se donne pour tâche de veiller sur une population plutôt que de respecter des sujets de droit."[114]

Foucault also turns his attention to contemporary manifestations of liberal governmental practice, considering two versions of neo-liberalism in the U.S.A. and West Germany in order to analyse specific responses to the perceived problems of an over-concentration on welfare capitalism and security. In the case of post-war West Germany, Foucault introduces a rather unexpected similarity of form between the Frankfurt school and the Freiburg School of the so-called "Ordoliberalen". (*Lecture*, 07/02/79). Eschewing Marx's notion of "la logique contradictoire" of capitalism, they both take up, in different ways, "la rationalité irrationnelle" of capitalist societies; a notion associated with Weber. Underlying such an approach is the conviction that rationality and processes of rationalisation are multiple, specific and heterogeneous. That is to say, an approach to the present which looks at the possibility of survival of rationalities which already exist, but also seeks to correct present irrationalities. In its ideal form, this would be a genealogical approach which analyses and intensifies the recognition, which Foucault himself outlines in *L'Archéologie du savoir*, of the present not as a moment of identity, but as a movement between that which we are ceasing to be and will become.

The Ordoliberals therefore seek to recover an economic rationality which has

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110 ibid., p. 375.
111 ibid., p. 375.
112 See Michel Foucault, "La Fonction politique de l'intellectuel," *Politique Hebdo*, no. 247 (29 novembre, 1976) pp. 31-33.
113 Michel Foucault, "La Stratégie de pourtour," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 759 (28 mai, 1979) p. 57.
114 ibid., 57.

not been sufficiently tried and tested; that of the market. However, they recognise that the market is not a "natural" form, and therefore requires its own specific rationality in order to survive. The major irrationality of the capitalist system for the Ordoliberals is the inevitable emergence of monopolies, leading to the reduction of competition in society. Therefore, "la concurrence pure doit être produite par une gouvernementalité active." (*Lecture*, 07/02/79). Marxism only acknowledges one logic of capitalism, whereas the Ordoliberals propose the creation of a new rationality. This new rationality involves, "la démultiplication de la forme-entreprise à l'intérieur du corps social." (*Lecture*, 14/02/79). Foucault presents West German post-war neo-liberalism as a juridical mode of thinking but, as with his remarks on the place of law in earlier liberal thought, he does not see this as a contractual approach to the legal responsibility of the State. For the Ordoliberals, "le juridique" does not form the superstructure of the economy. Economy is not a process which can be formally abstracted from law, since economy is "un ensemble d'activités réglées." (*Lecture*, 20/02/79). In one way, then, the "Rule of Law" becomes a method of juridical intervention which is designed to produce competition, and to maintain the economy as a set of rules which are generally and publicly known: "L'économie est un jeu. Et l'institution juridique qui encadre l'économique doit être considérée comme la règle du jeu." (*Lecture*, 20/02/79). Such a conception of market rationality does not preclude a range of social interventions, such as unemployment benefit, health-care, and housing policies.[115]

Foucault begins and ends his 1979 lecture series with brief comments on the growth in popularity and political importance of neo-liberal thought in contemporary Europe. In a significant gesture towards the contemporary significance of his lectures, he points out that the formulation of "law and order" is not simply a slogan which represents the authoritarian tendencies of the far-Right, but can also be seen as a shorthand form of the economic rationality outlined by neo-liberalism. In other words, this is not a phrase which simply has connotations of authoritarian and morally decisive government action, but rather of the commitment of government legally to guarantee the "rules" of an economic game out of which no player should fall.

Foucault also examines some of the themes in the contemporary American neo-liberal thought of Gary C. Becker and the so-called Chicago school, as an example of another attempt to renovate the rationality of capitalism. In a brief preamble, he emphasises that he considers North American liberalism in its various forms to have had a slightly different function from similar forms of governmental practice in Europe. In short, he sees liberalism as one of the founding elements of the North American State, rather than "un principe modérateur" opposed to the pre-existent "Raison d'Etat", as it was in Europe. (*Lecture*, 14/03/79.) However, he does concede that the post-war

115 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, p. 119.

development of welfare, through the New Deal, together with the growth of federal administration, give rise to a set of questions and problems similar to those posed in France and the rest of Western Europe. Where American neo-liberalism differs from the Ordoliberals is in its rejection of social interventions, both in the form of social assistance, and also the attempted fostering of ethical life by means of what Alexander von Rüstow labels *Vitalpolitik*: "ce néolibéralisme américain cherche plutôt à étendre la rationalité du marché, les schèmes d'analyse qu'elle propose et les critères de décision qu'elle suggère, à des domaines non exclusivement ou non premièrement économiques."[116]

Two elements of contemporary American neo-liberal thought receive particular attention. These are the theory of "human capital", and an attempt to introduce a new analysis of criminality and delinquence. For neo-liberals such as Becker, classical political economy concentrates on land and capital as resources, to the neglect of labour. This particularly radical strand of neo-liberalism dispenses with the anthropological mystification of labour — described by Foucault in *Les Mots et les choses* — to consider work as a form of enterprise. In fact, virtually all meaningful human activity is treated as the exercise of choice, and thus as a form of enterprise. Indirectly recognising the existence of the "social" as a hybrid space of articulation between private behaviour and the wider sphere of biopolitics, neo-liberalism in this form proposes the extension of a particular kind of economic rationality to social activity. Against what is perceived as the passive conception of work, reproduction and consumption in earlier modes of thought, theorists such as Becker see these as areas in which meaningful and "enterprising" choice can and must be made. In this way, work is seen as a capital to be invested, and the worker becomes, "la machine constituée par la compétence du travailleur." (*Lecture*, 14/03/79). Similarly, the possibility is explored of extending economic rationality to the sphere of reproduction, since "les bons équipements génétiques" represent a scarce resource. Education becomes a form of personal choice and investment, as does medical care. Perhaps most interestingly, the consumer becomes, in this neo-liberal inversion of one of the dominant modes of post-war critical thought, a producer of his or her own satisfaction. This is a new way of regulating, organising or "governing" the fabric of the population. The individual is now theoretically more responsible for his/her future well-being than was possible within the Welfare State. However, this individual of economic interest is also seen as manipulable and subject to the laws of behaviourism. To illustrate this point, Foucault also provides a brief illustration of the American neo-liberal analysis of criminal behaviour. (*Lecture*, 21/03/79). Basically, he shows how the nineteenth-century "homo criminalis", a figure described in *Surveiller et punir*, is replaced by "homo

116 ibid., p. 119.

economicus". In the nineteenth century, a "carceral" network of norms and normalisation grows out of the development of discipline as a technique. Penal practice becomes interested in biographical, biological and environmental factors surrounding the criminal. Judges develop an "immense appetite" for medicine, and a new form of law emerges, which is a mixture of legality and proposed therapy. This creates a series of confusions. It becomes "de plus en plus une difficulté à juger, et comme une honte à condamner; un furieux désir chez les juges de jauger, d'apprécier, de diagnostiquer, de reconnaître le normal et l'anormal." (*SP*, pp. 310-311).

In an article written for an American legal journal shortly after the publication of *Surveiller et punir*, Foucault develops further the idea that the figure of the criminal emerges in the nineteenth century to overshadow the crime.[117] Over a period of a century, via the equation between monomania and a sort of absolute crime, and the so-called school of Criminal Anthropology, which proposes penalty as social defence rather than punishment, the figure of the "dangerous individual" takes hold. Foucault is unequivocal in pointing out the sinister developments to which such a mode of penal thought might lead, remarking on "the dreadful dangers inherent in authorizing the law to intervene against individuals because of what they are; a horrifying society could emerge from that."[118]

The American neo-liberals, however, reject the figure of "homo criminalis". Foucault concentrates on the now-familiar neo-liberal project for the de-criminalisation of drug-use. This does not simply imply a libertarian stance on personal choice, although it is hard to see how this is not an extremely important consideration for much neo-liberal thought, but also an *active* attempt to manipulate the environment and thus reduce the criminality which surrounds drug use. The rationale for this de-criminalisation is thus based on a relatively simple calculation of the use and consumption of drugs in the market-place. That is to say, drugs are subject to two types of demand; firstly the inelastic demand of addiction, and secondly the elastic demand of leisure use. The success of such a scheme must be based on government intervention to create a two-tier system of prices. Cheap drugs will be offered to addicts in order to minimise the dangers of criminal activity associated with the clandestine drug market, and relatively expensive drugs will be sold to a leisure market. This is not, then, the application of a disciplinary project through social norms, but rather a legal re-definition of drug use and a project for strictly defined government interventions. The aim is to secure the market for drugs as a market free of criminal behaviour, which is damaging to the collectivity. The State has no place in dictating personal morality, but it does have

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117 Michel Foucault, "About the Concept of the Dangerous Individual in 19th-Century Legal Psychiatry," translated by Alain Baudot and Jane Couchman, *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry*, vol. 1 (1978) pp. 1-18.

118 ibid., p. 18.

as a role the maintenance of security for society as a whole. The classic liberal figure of "homo economicus" is now subjected to techniques of manipulation. American neo-liberalism conceives of the social now as a network of markets, which must be extended and manipulated. In this way it, too, represents a "Vitalpolitik". Crime itself functions within a market mechanism. Law enforcement has its cost, and certain crimes, such as shoplifting, demonstrate a law of diminishing returns. It is not therefore unreasonable to calculate the amount of criminal activity which a society can profitably tolerate.

Ultimately Foucault's work on liberalism in the late 'seventies is frustratingly open-ended, presented, as it is, in the form of two rather speculative lecture courses. What is the major significance of this work for the thesis of heterogeneity? Firstly, speculation on liberalism introduces the important shift in Foucault's work away from power/knowledge to governmentality. The liberty of the individual must be heterogeneous to the exercise of governmental power. Government is a "conduct of conduct", which presupposes liberty. Secondly, liberalism introduces a new, heterogeneous spatiality. This is not the meticulously detailed table of discipline, but a fluid and unmappable social space, the dynamic state of which must be maintained. Thirdly, liberalism and neo-liberalism recognise that the processes of rationality are multiple and heterogeneous. Certain forms of liberalism appear to accept the insights of post-Newtonian physics, that chaos is more intimately linked to order than was previously thought. Linked to this, when the edifice of liberalism is dismantled, its constituent elements reveal unusual and unexpected chracteristics. For example, eighteenth-century British liberalism works with a formal heterogeneity between the legal and economic subject. Finally, the liberal view of the individual is shown to be far more complex and inventive than the classical notion of the contractual foundation of individuality and property rights.

However, the question of the overall significance and value of these lectures as contributions to contemporary debate should also be posed. It should not be forgotten that the 1979 lecture course is a typical example of Foucault's wilful perversity in presenting work under titles which are somewhat misleading.[119] So, the 1979 course is called "Naissance de la biopolitique", and Foucault's question, or "problematic", is the development of the figure of population alongside a mode of thought which is

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119 Michel Foucault, "Le Retour de la morale." Foucault suggests that one reason for the discrepancy between titles and content in his published work is simple clumsiness; a stubborn unwillingness to change the original title after reworking the original draft. But he also suggests as a more substantial reason a necessary heterogeneity, which underlines Foucault's method of problematising thought in a new way. This gap between the title and content corresponds to the personal transformation which is involved in writing for Foucault: "Dans les livres que j'écris, j'essaie de cerner un type de problème qui n'a pas été cerné auparavant. [...] Il est certain qu'il faudrait ou bien me dire que ces livres ne riment à rien sous ces titres-là et qu'il faut effectivement changer leur titre, ou bien se dire qu'il y a une sorte d'écart qui se dégage entre le titre du livre et le contenu; [...]" (pp. 40-41).

traditionally associated with a non-interventionist stance: "Dans un système soucieux du respect des sujets de droit et de la liberté d'initiative des individus, comment le phénomène 'population' avec ses effets et ses problèmes spécifiques peut-il être pris en compte?"[120]

Overall, this work on liberalism and neo-liberalism should be seen as a form of intellectual problematisation, which refrains from prescribing action but rather sets out to highlight the strangeness of what is, and has been accepted as self-evident.[121] So, whilst presenting liberalism as a form of governmentality which is undoutedly more inventive than socialism has been in recent times, Foucault also highlights to some extent the continuation of an obsession with security, and sinister additions such as behaviourism in North American liberalism. In *La Volonté de savoir*, he addresses himself to the potential for genocide which is the most extreme form of protecting and fostering the life of a population as "race". His work on liberalism suggests some of the problems raised by the fostering of a population in conditions of apparently permanent mass unemployment, and the increasing potential of the scientific sphere to intervene and experiment upon the life of the individual and the collectivity.

Returning briefly to the question of rights as raised by Foucault's work, it has been shown that he is seen as rejecting any conception of rights, since he is sceptical of the political legitimacy represented by the figure of the State. Scott Lash outlines such objections in a recent work. In a now familiar argument, Lash claims that Foucault's perspective is totalising and deterministic:

> If we understand rights in terms of the justified powers that are ascribed to individuals, then there must be a second and separate instance, typically the state or political doctrines themselves — as in natural rights theory — that does the justifying. But for Foucault any such notion is associated with the Classical period and badly outmoded. [...] In his eager and thoroughgoing anti-platonist hostility to any two-world conceptualizations, Foucault has thrown out the liberating (moral rights) baby with the statist bathwater.[122]

In a recent paper, Blandine Barret-Kriegel takes a view which is apparently directly opposed to Lash. Drawing on the idea of "l'Etat de police" as a drive to preserve and foster life, she considers that the system of laws — public law, civil law and penal law — created in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are based upon the Cartesian rational subject, in that they are normalising and treat the individual's body not as an inalienable possession, but rather "le point d'application de la gestion et de l'administration de la bonne police par l'entendement du sujet."[123] In nineteenth-century Europe the Declaration of Rights was almost universally rejected. Thus for

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120 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, pp. 110-111.

121 See Michel Foucault, "Est-il donc important de penser?" p. 21.

122 Scott Lash, *The Sociology of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1989) p. 106.

123 Blandine Barret-Kriegel, "Michel Foucault et l'Etat de police," in *Michel Foucault philosophe: Rencontre internationale, Paris, 9, 10, 11 janvier, 1988* (Paris: Seuil, 1989) p. 227.

Barret-Kriegel, the institution of "l'Etat de police" and the theory of the foundational subject go together. She treats "police" as a a general term for the intrusive and normalising potential of the modern State. This is expanded upon in a recent interview:

> Or l'objet majeur que Foucault rencontrait et qu'il a très minutieusement décrit, c'est l'Etat de police. Il n'exhaussait pas le poids des normes pour dévaluer le prix des lois, il observait seulement qu'à l'intérieur de l'Etat de police le droit est une expression du pouvoir normatif.[124]

Barret-Kriegel considers the theory of man as subject to parallel the development of "l'Etat de police". In this interview she is questioned about the apparent discrepancy between Foucault's anti-humanist philosophy and his "humanist" or even "Christian" political engagements on behalf of the mentally ill and the "boat-people". She rejects this discrepancy, maintaining that "les droits de l'homme" are actually *opposed* to a foundational notion of the subject. She claims that Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke, the originators of contractual rights in her opinion, emphasised a relationship with nature rather than a philosophy of the subject. She also claims that Fichte, a major philosopher of the subject, rejected "les droits de l'homme". This position is surprisingly close to Isiah Berlin's concepts of "positive" and "negative" freedom, dealt with earlier in this chapter, and is perhaps indicative of a certain amount of contentious speculation in recent French experimentation with liberal ideologies. However, it is crucial to note that Barret-Kriegel emphasises Foucault's attack on the *subject* in favour of the *individual*: "je crois que comme Spinoza combattait les illusions de la liberté pour dégager une philosophie de la libération, Foucault a rejeté les délires du sujet pour retrouver une chance de réalisation des individus."[125]

Barret-Kriegel's point can be expanded, to show how Foucault's later work is an attempt to outline a method for thought which would constantly seek to escape identity; of a thought which would strive to be heterogeneous to itself. This would be a mode of intellectual activity which is respectful of the singular event which breaks the flow of history, but is also mindful of the universal constraints which should be placed upon political power.[126] This commitment to a constant and vigilant scepticism is reinforced in Foucault's review, in 1979, of Jean Daniel's *L'Ere des ruptures*: "Bien sentir que tout ce qu'on perçoit n'est évident qu'entouré d'un horizon familier et mal connu, que chaque certitude n'est sûre que par l'appui d'un sol jamais exploré. Le plus fragile instant a ses racines."[127]

To conclude, this chapter has attempted to develop the spatial figure of

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124 Blandine Barret-Kriegel, "De l'Etat de police à l'Etat de droit," *Le Monde* (13 octobre, 1990) p. 43.

125 ibid., p. 43.

126 See Michel Foucault, "Inutile de se soulever?"

127 Michel Foucault, "Pour une morale de l'inconfort," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 754 (23 avril, 1979) p. 83.

dispersion, through a strategic conception of power, to a heterogeneous notion of elements in a governmental system as the logic of Foucault's work. This formal movement helps Foucault to take seriously his contention that power comes "from below" and develop a strand of ethical rationality that functions separately fron the traditional Western/European history of sovereignty. If we were to look for a precise example of these principles of power, heterogeneity and individuality, we need look no further than Pierre Rivière's confession, expressing what it does through the bizarre eloquence of a jumble of Biblical quotations, personal exasperation on behalf of his maligned father and Napoleonic rhetoric.[128] Materially, this figure of dispersion feeds into Foucault's interest in space as a political strategy in the 'seventies, and finally appears as a heterogeneous treatment of the *individual*, as opposed to the *subject* in the latter part of Foucault's career. Heterogeneity here means various elements that circulate, without being mutually exclusive, but also without forming a coherent whole, within a system. The individual, then, is not just subject to the power of the State; there are multiple force lines acting upon the actions of the individual. The importance of the move from subject to individual is neglected in Foucault's work, and is a counter to criticisms of determinism. His early work showed how the *subject of knowledge* is constructed, whilst later work shows the multiple practices — some of them generated by the self — which come to bear on the individual. In other words, free-agency in terms of an authentic self is ruled out, but freedom to act is not. Foucault's project is not that of the description of a monolithic determinism.

128 See Michel Foucault, "Les Meurtres qu'on raconte," in Foucault, ed., *Moi, Pierre Rivière, ayant égorgé ma mère, ma soeur et mon frère* (Paris: Gallimard/Julliard, 1973) pp. 265-275.

4: TRUTH AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF THE SELF

This final chapter will be based on a discussion of Foucault's lecture courses at the Collège de France from 1978 and 1980, and some of the problems surrounding his final two works, *L'Usage des plaisirs* and *Le Souci de soi*. Although the introduction deals with the content of these two final works in more detail, it is worth recapping some of the methodological points dealt with. Firstly, at this point Foucault introduces a further reformulation of the question of epistemic shifts; a reformulation that was already under way in the 'seventies with speculations on the State and government that had begun to reach back to the Middle Ages. These final works stretch back to the fourth century B.C. to analyse a growing problematisation surrounding the question of sexual behaviour as a moral system. A moral system may contain different proportions of "codal" or "ascetic" elements. In simple terms, the overall distinction drawn is between a moral system in antiquity which places the emphasis on "ascetic" elements of practices of the self — active processes of organising a moderating sovereignty over the self — and a Christian era which introduces more "codal" elements in the form of a universal and quasi-juridical set of rules. Although the moral system of antiquity is implicitly criticised by Foucault for its exclusively masculine and elitist principles, it is implicitly valorised for its plurality and creative richness. *L'Usage des plaisirs* deals with medical and philosophical texts largely from the fourth century B.C., for the most part prescriptive in nature, focussing on the areas of dietetics, economics (in the domestic and personal sense) and erotica. Although Christian morality is not "préformée" in the thought of antiquity (*UP*, p. 28), the roots of a developing problematisation of sexual austerity can be found here. *Le Souci de soi* deals with the first two centuries of our epoch, and focusses on the general move towards the development of a more intense concern with the the self and sexual austerity in this imperial era. Links are suggested between this era and the later development of Christianity in the form of an increasing emphasis on the struggle of the self to control *and* examine the self. So, a recognisable development is set in motion, from antiquity's concentration on the free construction of a moderating government of the self, through Christianity's universalised moral code and increasing emphasis on a hermeneutic relationship to the self, to modernity's obsessional interest, through Freud and psychoanalysis, with seeking out the buried secrets of the "man of desire". This schema is undoubtedly important for any overall understanding of Foucault's work, but it will be argued here that, in his increasing emphasis on the "longue durée", the question of the ascetic, both with relation to the government of the self, *and* the government of populations is the central, but unfortunately unformulated and prematurely terminated, concern of the last part of Foucault's life and work.

This chapter also uses the formal organisational, methodological principle of

heterogeneity in Foucault's work in order to forge a set of connections between the final work on "technologies of the self" — the widespread culture of the self in certain social classes from the period of late antiquity — and Foucault's unpublished lectures on the development of liberalism from the late 'seventies. Chapters Two and Three have examined the ways in which he begins to work on this relationship between a "microphysics" of discipline and subjection, and a "macrophysics" of the biopolitical concern with the fostering of life. These rationalities — or techniques — cut across traditional notions of the private/public and State/Civil Society opposition. It has been shown that, in what became an increasingly collaborative project, Foucault and his fellow researchers worked on a hybrid space of the social. Importantly, the State is seen as having no essence. Instead of looking at the continual growth of a modern and monstrous State, Foucault insists that it is rather "la gouvernementalisation de l'Etat" which is a real historical process in modernity. "Gouvernementalité" is the term that Foucault attaches to the growth of a distinctively modern concern with a simultaneously individualising and totalising concentration on the fostering of life at the level of the nation-State. "Gouvernementalité" also highlights the modern concern with the heterogeneous intersection of individual government of the self — for example, the sixteenth-century neo-Stoic interest in the culture of the self — and the State interest in collective security, the provision and fostering of the collective life of citizens. This latter element finds its most extravagant development in the State racisms of National Socialism and Stalinism in the twentieth century. We have seen that liberalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries introduces an element of "sécurité" into techniques of government, which had previously depended upon "discipline". However, this does not mean that the State disappears or shrinks in any meaningful way. Foucault uses, as was shown in Chapter Two, the example of the State in the constitution of post-war social democracy in Federal Germany. Here, the State plays the role of sustaining and bolstering the legitimacy of the market system as a suitable way for citizens to become entrepreneurs of both themselves and their lives, in economic and non-economic spheres.

In a typically skilful essay on the connections between the work of Foucault and Max Weber, Colin Gordon highlights Foucault's important insights — from his 1980 lectures — on the post-war German so-called "Ordoliberalen":

> One is to note the constructivist, anti-naturalist nature of their thinking. The market is seen as an autonomous but not a self-sustaining order. [...] His second remark concerns the anti-fatalistic character of neo-liberalism [...] Foucault presents the *Ordoliberalen* as vehement opponents of the thesis that he attributes primarily to Sombart, that the moral emptiness and disorientation of modern mass societies are a direct consequence of the liberal economic system.[1]

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1 Colin Gordon, "The Soul of the Citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on Rationality and

Gordon, then, shows Foucault to be concerned with the role of the State in neo-liberalism, together with the crucially important "spiritual" or ethical role that the possibilities of personal entrepreneurship within the market system will offer. Linking Foucault's work with what he sees as the neglected potential of Weber for Left thinking, Gordon suggests that questions of a plausible *Lebensstil* have been neglected by the contemporary and traditional Left. He uses the example of the inability of the Left in government to respond to widespread demands for reconsiderations of the dependencies created by the post-war Welfare State, and the concomitant rise of the so-called New Right in Western Europe. If "gouvernement" involves the particular intersection of collective *and* individual projects of government *and* self-government, then the New Right succeeded in returning the question of government to the political agenda.[2] Taking Gordon's analysis as a starting point, this chapter seeks to go further into the formal and methodological architecture which organises the connections between Foucault's earlier work and the final shift to antiquity, together with connections between the micro- and macro-studies of power. It will be argued that it is finally in early Christianity — in what is a typically schematic and undefined period approximately from the second to the fifth century A.D. — that Foucault locates the genesis of a distinctively modern heterogeneity, or simultaneous presence, of wills in a relationship which does not involve domination but a conscious desire for spiritual guidance, in the form of "direction". "Direction" is common to both antiquity and early Christianity, and is a form of *Lebensstil*. It plays a part in monastic life, but monastic life feeds into modernity by means of its concentration on the practice of "direction" as a continual process of self-examination. It will be argued that the drive of Foucault's final work is to consider ways in which a reconsideration of the ethical question of the "style" of the individual life in its relationship with government could be useful. For example, in his involvement with the CFDT, Foucault sought to shift the focus of critical thought onto issues such as ways of reinventing the Welfare State in order to provide well-being and autonomy for the individual. The Left had neglected to construct a technique of government, concentrating rather on strictly economic demands, or on undeniably successful attempts to gain recognition of personal needs and autonomy from the State, without redefining the relationship between the individual and the State.

There are many grounds for considering Foucault's final two works as offering suggestions for an "aesthetics of existence" for modern man. By such an "aesthetics of existence", Foucault means two things. Firstly, as will be shown in an article concerning writing and the self, he is interested in an eclectic accumulation of disparate

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Government," in Sam Whimster and Scott Lash, eds., *Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987) p. 298.

2 ibid., pp. 299-300.

truths into the self. This contrasts with Foucault's main adversary in his project as a whole; the christianised hermeneutic and psychoanalytic stance towards the self. Secondly, he suggests a way for the individual of working upon the self which will not have as its target integration within a higher rationality. In this way he seeks to re-problematise the modern psychoanalytic self, and its relationship to truth. However, this is not to say that this stage of Foucault's career outlines further steps in a project of post-Enlightenment scepticism, whereby truth must be entirely relative. Foucault in fact locates his work more closely with the Enlightenment tradition towards the end of his career, positing it as a principle of continual creativity, scepticism and inventiveness towards reason. Instead of posing the Kantian question concerning the limits of reason, he asks how we may act as a permanent critique of ourselves:

> on peut opter pour une philosophie critique qui se présentera comme une philosophie analytique de la vérité en général, ou bien on peut opter pour une pensée critique qui prendra la forme d'une ontologie de nous-mêmes, d'une ontologie de l'actualité; c'est cette forme de philosophie qui, de Hegel à l'Ecole de Francfort en passant par Nietzsche et Max Weber, a fondé une forme de réflexion dans laquelle j'ai essayé de travailler.[3]

Quite simply, Foucault wishes to place himself within a tradition which examines the ways in which truth is produced, circulated and maintained, rather than an analytical project which examines the internal structure of truth. This is the point at which the *Histoire de la sexualité* project intersects with what Foucault calls "gouvernementalité", the mentality of government which was dealt with in the second and third chapters. Instead of investigating, for example, the principle of civil society as a principle of truth, Foucault proposes to examine the ways in which the heterogeneity of juridical and economic conceptions of the individual, positive and negative freedoms, or principles of infraction and psychological motivation in penal practice, produce a tension which is something else. In this case it is the field of the "social" that has already been shown as important to Foucault in the second and third chapters. In this way, Foucault's work can be seen as the gradual refinement of a methodology for looking at the production of truth within modern societies.

However, there is something more than this in Foucault's work in the 1980s. In addition to the principle of "gouvernementalité", which has been shown to depend on the methodological notion of heterogeneity, he begins to be interested in the various ways in which truth is an excessive principle, both for the individual and for government. Systems of thought, whether critical projects, or principles for governing, will tend to have a point of privilege or excess of "truth". Too much may be staked on the ability of one element in the system to represent the truth. The example presented in the second chapter was the figure of the market for post-war liberalism in the U.S.A.

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3 Michel Foucault, "Une esthétique de l'existence," *Le Monde* (15-16 juillet, 1984) p. 11.

and West Germany. The market is not a principle of the providential invisible hand, or even an area from which government intervention is entirely excluded. The market is rather a mechanism which is to be maintained as a privileged testing-ground for truth. The final "ethical" shift of Foucault's work engages with the way truth is constructed for the individual and government. He calls for a renewed ethical concentration on the costs of producing truth. If truths are multiple, disparate and heterogeneous they can only produce, periodically, points of provisional truth, which must be constantly problematised. The "aesthetic" element of the final work is threefold. Foucault calls for an aesthetic fashioning of the self which avoids a hermeneutics of desire. He also calls for an aesthetic concentration on the "style" of life we may choose to lead via projects of government. How will we invent freedom, and what will we renounce in order to achieve this freedom? Finally, he develops the aesthetic elements of his theoretical and methodological project. In the same way that it has been suggested that the principle of heterogeneity is an image or spatial notion which organises and motivates much of Foucault's thought, so he seeks out the aesthetic elements within a system of thought such as liberalism. The 1978 lecture course on "Sécurité, territoire, population" looks at the the nineteenth-century principle of security as a programme which posits the gentle organisation of natural processes in order to achieve security for the population. The principle of *laissez-faire* becomes central to Foucault's preoccupations in its curious heterogeneity of natural processes coupled with artificial constraints and structuring processes.

It is evident, on reading articles and listening to lectures from the period immediately preceding the writing of his final works that the last period of Foucault's career, from the late 'seventies onwards, was characterised — perhaps more than any other in his career — by an intellectual uncertainty and, importantly, eclecticism. Much of this chapter is based on tapes of lectures from 1978 and 1980. These lectures deal with subjects as diverse as Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, the palace of *Septime Sévère*, early Christian practices of baptism and penitence, and the genealogy of the modern State. Themes and topics are elaborated at length and abruptly abandoned, and enigmatic remarks are made on the received wisdom that had begun to surround the critical work on Foucault. Over a decade later, these lectures appear to convey a feeling of confusion allied to creativity. The provisionality and eclecticism of these lectures also represents a methodological choice, which is allied to the figure of heterogeneity that has been identified as a continuous *isomorphic* element in Foucault's work. Just as his own ideas become more provisional — a sort of work in progress — so he begins to examine "problematisations" in the history of thought. How is it that something such as madness or sexuality becomes a matter for concern? This is a slightly different task from asking how an object — such as the body as the focus for clinical medicine — comes to be constructed. "Concern" implies ethical, as opposed to utilitarian, strategic,

or even Machiavellian attitudes towards the construction of truth. It also implies an active mode for the subject, rather than the mode of "assujettissement" that emerged from the power/knowledge formation. This can be seen in the same interview, when Foucault describes the change that the interest in Greek and Roman thought represented: "au lieu d'étudier la sexualité aux confins du savoir et du pouvoir, j'ai essayé de rechercher plus haut comment s'était constituée, pour le sujet lui-même, l'expérience de sa sexualité comme désir."[4]

James W. Bernauer's recent *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought* constitutes an important statement on the overall shape of Foucault's thought and life.[5] He makes the assumption that the final "ethical" emphasis of the second two volumes of *Histoire de la sexualité* represents the culmination of an underground force, which is present from the beginning of Foucault's career. Bernauer concentrates on Foucault's attempt to examine the curious intersection of thought and language, to give thought and language a materiality, via images of a "theatre"[6] of thought, or a "carceral" stranglehold of misguided humanism. It seems that the trajectory he traces spans two questions concerning language and thought. In a round-table directed by Foucault in 1964 Foucault himself introduces a discussion on the contemporary novel by comparing the work of Sollers to that of the surrealists. For Foucault, the surrealists concentrated on a psychological space: "cet au-delà ou en-deçà du monde qui était pour eux le fond de toute raison."[7] Although there is an isomorphic relationship between the work of the surrealists and the *Tel Quel* group, the latter differ from the surrealists in their excavation of a different space: "l'espace épais dans lequel et à l'intérieur duquel se font ces expériences."[8] Foucault proposes that, whereas the surrealists had accepted some idea of a collective unconscious, avant-garde literature is now motivated by a new question:

> Qu'est-ce que c'est que penser, qu'est-ce que c'est que cette expérience extraordinaire de la pensée?; et la littérature actuellement, redécouvre cette question, proche mais différente de celle qui a été ouverte récemment par l'oeuvre de Roussel ou de Robbe-Grillet: qu'est-ce que voir et parler?[9]

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4 Michel Foucault, "Une esthétique de l'existence," p. 11.

5 James W. Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought* (London: Humanities Press International, 1990).

6 The image of thought and discursive practices as a kind of theatre recurs throughout Foucault's work. See Michel Foucault, "Médecins, juges et sorciers au XVII[e] siècle," *Médecine de France*, 200 (1969) pp. 121-128. Here, Foucault puts forward a schema for looking at the ways in which European society "medicalises" witchcraft from the late sixteenth-century onwards:

> Comédie à six personnages: le juge, le prêtre, le moine, l'évêque, le roi, le médecin; à quoi il faut ajouter, prélevé sur le choeur de la cité, un X, figure anonyme et sans visage auquel chaque épisode donnera une figure, des caractères et des noms différents. (p.122).

7 Michel Foucault, "Débat sur le roman," *Tel Quel*, 17 (printemps, 1964) p. 12.

8 ibid., p. 12.

9 ibid., p 13.

In the 'seventies, around the publication of *Surveiller et punir* and *La Volonté de savoir*, Bernauer presents — in fairly conventional terms — Foucault as examining the life of thought as a material force, rather than a neutral instrument — in the construction of modernity. Then, finally, in the 'eighties, he sees Foucault as asking a new question concerning thought. This is an ethical question: "Est-il donc important de penser?"[10] Foucault seeks to free thought from the instrumentalising and totalising imperatives of modernism.[11]

Bernauer does not highlight the methodological changes which produce this late "ethical" or "aesthetic" shift, relying as he does on an intrinsic ethical drive which is present from the beginning. However, he does provide brief indications of these crucial changes, in his remarks on Foucault's developing interest in the early Christian experience. Bernauer's remarks are based in part on the transcript of an unpublished lecture delivered in America in 1980:

> While he gave up its [Christianity] project of seeking a hidden self, he also appreciated the "great richness" of the ascetical moment of self-renunciation. His regard for this self-denial was due to his understanding of how positive knowledge of the self often entails the obligation to identify oneself with the object of that knowledge. He had long appreciated that the self could become a prison.[12]

This theme of self-renunciation becomes extremely important to Foucault throughout the course of his final work. It will be argued in this chapter that there is a force in Foucault's work which propels the various transformations or "déplacements", as he calls them, up to, and including what is certainly an ethical shift. However, unlike Bernauer, a certain amount of attention will be paid to the *problematic* relationship between formal — "spatial" as they have been called — elements and the continually shifting nature of the content of Foucault's work. His work had both an overall shape, but was also preoccupied — as has been shown — with spatial images and the formal constraints which contain technologies of government. In this way, Foucault's final

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10 Michel Foucault, "Est-il donc important de penser?" *Libération* (30-31 mai, 1981) Interview with Didier Eribon. p. 21.

11 In an unusual interview conducted in English during a teaching appointment in Canada, Foucault expressed the apparently contrary and pessimistic view that thought could only ever function as a protection for the individual, rather than as an instrument of criticism and change: Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self," in Lawrence D. Krizman, ed., *Michel Foucault: Philosophy, Politics, Culture: Interviews and other Writings 1977-1984* (London: Routledge, 1988) pp. 3-15:

> But if I refer to my own personal experience I have the feeling knowledge can't do anything for us and that political power may destroy us. All the knowledge in the world can't do anything against that. All this is related not to what I think theoretically (I know that's wrong) but I speak from my personal experience. I know that knowledge can transform us, that truth is not only a way of deciphering the world (and maybe what we call the truth doesn't decipher anything) but that if I know the truth I will be changed. And maybe I will be saved. Or maybe I'll die but I think that is the same anyway for me. [Laughter] (p. 14).

12 James Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight*, p. 80.

work was an attempt to bring together the aesthetic and the ethical.

Of course, the problematic nature of the terms "ethical" and "aesthetic" needs to be dealt with before advancing. It is not an uncommon move amongst critics of Foucault's work to conflate the "ethical" and the "aesthetic" in his final published work. This idea is put forward by Terry Eagleton in his recent *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, in what constitutes a vigorous polemic against Foucault's aestheticised "libertarian pessimism".[13] Eagleton reads Foucault's objection to the "shackling" of madness in *Histoire de la folie* as an essentially aesthetic refusal of "the disciplines which regulate madness and rob it of its drama and sublimity."[14] He also sees Foucault as "aestheticizing" power in a formulation which "has much in common with the classical aesthetic artefact, self-grounding, self-generative and self-delighting."[15] Eagleton conceives of Foucault's central insight, from *La Volonté de savoir* onwards, as the notion that power is intimately linked to pleasure, as an essentially aesthetic construction. By conceiving of power in such a way, Foucault maintains a positivist stance, but avoids the problematic — yet crucial for Eagleton — attempt to locate a subject of power. In other words, Foucault is seen to evade the issue of an ideological explanation of power. Eagleton goes further to shed light on what he sees as a sort of "pornography" in Foucault's work; a "conflation of clinicism and sensationalism,"[16] in the way that Foucault describes the torture of the regicide Damiens with a distanced neutrality. Eagleton focusses persuasively on the central dilemma, that Foucault was to acknowledge himself in various ways, at the heart of his undertaking:

> We can never escape law, representation, the prison house of the metaphysical; but this does not stop one fantasizing for a moment (a moment usually reserved for one's more 'poetic' texts) of some apocalyptic moment in which all this might come to an end, finding pro-leptic traces of such a revolution in avant-garde literary works.[17]

Here, Eagleton is obviously referring to Foucault's championing of literary "transgression" in the 'sixties. (See Chapter One) The final attack is on the second volume of *Histoire de la sexualité*, *L'Usage des plaisirs*. Eagleton centres his criticism on what he sees as Foucault's overriding distinction between Christian culture, and the culture of antiquity: "With many judicious qualifications, Foucault equates Christianity with the dominance of a fixed universal code, and the ancient world with a more conjuncturally variable kind of conduct."[18]

As we shall see, Foucault is in fact ambivalent, and even confusing, with regard

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13 Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990) p. 387.
14 ibid., p. 388.
15 ibid., p. 388.
16 ibid., p. 384.
17 ibid., p. 386.
18 ibid., p. 391.

to the role that he attributes to Christianity. Although early Christianity undoubtedly becomes a new focus for his attention, replacing his previous obsession with the French Revolution, he claims, on at least one occasion, that Christianity as a system of thought represents no essential rupture with the world of antiquity.[19] Overall, Christianity is shown to continue the Graeco-Roman tradition of self-renunciation, but also to institute a relationship to the self which will eventually appear in the modern "psychoanalytic" obsession with the secret or "hidden" sexual self. This distinctively modern "technology" of the self is undoutedly the major adversary against which Foucault writes in his final work. Eagleton, however, sees Foucault's apparent valorisation of the "ethical" construction of the self in antique culture as typical of post-structuralism's drive towards a spurious pluralism.[20] He also sees the project of Foucault's final work as one of aesthetic "self-production,"[21] directed against a constraining humanist morality. For Eagleton, Foucault's appeal to an ascetic, aesthetic and ethical construction of the subject is "troublingly formalistic."[22] It appears to involve no normative moral judgements, but rather an aesthetic demand for moderation, self-discipline and "symmetry". Although it cannot be denied that Foucault does appear to present his study of antiquity and the construction of the self as in some ways a positive alternative to a modern hermeneutic attitude towards the self, Eagleton fails to acknowledge that Foucault's work at this stage is in no way prescriptive. In fact, in an interview given shortly after the publication of his final two books, he claims to have found the Greek "stylisation" of moral life neither admirable nor desirable, citing a central contradiction in the moral life of antiquity: "entre d'une part cette recherche obstinée d'un certain style d'existence et, d'autre part, l'effort de le rendre commun à tous [...]".[23] Eagleton places Foucault within a disturbing European tradition which seeks to aestheticise political life. This is to misunderstand Foucault's project, which sought to describe and suggest possibilities for an articulation between personal aesthetic and ethical considerations and the public world of the *polis*.

It should not be underestimated that the change of tone which characterises Foucault's final two publications is related to a new, possibly more self-reflexive, relationship that Foucault forms with his own thought and work. In an interview given only weeks before his death, Foucault reflected on the proposed series of publications for the *Histoire de la sexualité* project. A series of books that he had apparently written and then destroyed, replacing them with *L'Usage des plaisirs* and *Le Souci de soi*:

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19 See Michel Foucault, "Le Combat de la chasteté," *Communications*, 35 (mai, 1982) pp. 15-25.

20 Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, p. 392.

21 ibid., p. 391.

22 ibid., p. 392.

23 Michel Foucault, "Le Retour de la morale," *Les Nouvelles*, no. 2937 (28 juin-5 juillet, 1984) p. 38. Interview with Gilles Barbedette and Alain Scala.

> Ces livres, j'ai failli mourir d'ennui en les écrivant: ils ressemblaient trop aux précédents. Pour certains, écrire un livre, c'est toujours risquer quelque chose. [...] Quand on sait à l'avance où l'on veut arriver, il y a un élément de l'expérience qui manque, celle qui consiste précisément à écrire un livre en risquant de ne pas venir à bout.[24]

In this particular interview, Foucault begins to imply a connection between the moral and ethical systems that he works on, and a certain aesthetic reflection upon his own thought. He goes on to say that his final two books left him right up until their publication in a state of "pas mal d'incertitude, d'hésitations."[25] These comments serve, if nothing else, as a useful corrective to any retrospective ideas of Foucault's final work constituting a consciously *final* statement. Of course, one of the main differences between Foucault's final two works and his previous output that has been immediately evident to some commentators is the apparently positive presentation of Greek and Roman constructions of the self, as opposed to the critical project that sustained the earlier part of his career. For example, Maria Daraki considers, in a recent article, that Foucault "pense se faire le porte-parole des Grecs."[26] She finds the project of *Le Souci de soi* and *L'Usage des plaisirs* problematic precisely because Foucault appears to find in his study of the Graeco-Roman period a new way of considering the aesthetic formation of the subject which is *personally* useful. She refers to the section entitled "Modifications" which forms a sort of foreword to *L'Usage des plaisirs:* "Foucault rejoint l'histoire, découvre le sujet et, mieux encore, *l'autoconstruction du sujet*, et il renonce, en y mettant de l'insistance, à privilégier le pouvoir constructeur des seuls interdits."[27] It is certainly true that the style of Foucault's work changes with the publication of *L'Usage des plaisirs*. As Daraki comments: "Dans *L'usage des plaisirs* et *Le souci de soi*, l'écriture est aimable, on n'y trouve plus le style torturé des 'représentations perpendiculaires à elles-même'[...]".[28] Daraki objects that this is the point in his work where Foucault begins explicitly to apply the vocabulary and concepts that appear in his studies to his own theoretical development, and his own thought. Thus his own theoretical shifts, or "déplacements" are described by Foucault as "une 'ascèse', un exercice de soi, dans la pensée." (*UP*, p. 15). It is in the first section of the Introduction to *L'Usage des plaisirs*, entitled "Modifications", that Foucault outlines the often tortuous theoretical deliberations that had preoccupied him during the late 'seventies. Basically, he describes the theoretical questions which shifted his attention away from the construction of "sexuality" as a discursive object of experience in the modern period, and backwards to antiquity. This represents a period which both

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24 Michel Foucault, "Une esthétique de l'existence," p. 11.
25 ibid., p. 11.
26 Maria Daraki, "Le Voyage en Grèce de Michel Foucault," *Esprit*, no. 100 (1985) p. 72.
27 ibid., p. 66.
28 ibid., p. 67.

predates and also begins to form the pre-history of the Western notion of "désir" or "sujet désirant". (*UP*, p. 11). Foucault thus arrived at a decision to reorganise his work around "[...] la lente formation, pendant l'Antiquité, d'une herméneutique de soi." (*UP*, p. 12). Both modernity and the period of the insertion of Christianity into the Western tradition seemed to share the notion of "un sujet désirant". (*UP*, p. 11). That is to say, the drive to comprehend and control a primitive or unconscious force which resides within the "flesh", in the case of Christianity, or as the dual source of both unproductive abnormality and productive power for the human species, in the case of modernity. Thus, Foucault, when he began the *Histoire de la sexualité* project, could confidently use the theoretical tools that he had developed in his earlier career to examine discursive practices and objects — in this case sexuality and its role in the formation of the modern state — so as to avoid positing the intentionalist fallacy of theories of science and ideology. (*UP*, p. 10). However, he found himself quickly confronted with the problem of the ways in which individuals came to think of themselves as "sexual" beings. (*UP*, p. 11). Rejecting the naturalised modern conception of sexuality was not sufficient. Whereas previous work had concentrated the external forces that produce subjects, Foucault became more and more interested in the work that the subject performed on itself.

In the rest of the Introduction to *L'Usage des plaisirs* Foucault situates his work on the Greek and Roman periods through a discussion of "moralité", "éthique", "l'esthétique" and, importantly, "ascèse". In many ways, although he himself does not explicitly draw out this particular continuity, his new work will continue the "pouvoir-savoir" construction — which reached its fullest conception in *La Volonté de savoir* — whereby the strategic operation of power in structuring thought and behaviour is examined away from the notion of interdiction and repression. This is the angle from which morality and moral behaviour is initially approached: "il arrive souvent que la préoccupation morale soit forte là où, précisément, il n'y a ni obligation ni prohibition. Bref, l'interdit est une chose, la problématisation morale en est une autre." (*UP*, p. 16). It is certainly difficult to know whether the terms "éthique" and "moralité" are used interchangeably, although this would be somewhat uncharacteristic. It seems that by "éthique", Foucault intends to highlight the "problematisation" of a particular moral area. "Ethics" do not constitute a private field, which is opposed to the "public" field of morality. It is rather the case that ethics constitute for Foucault the relationship of the self to the self. The ethical field may be seen as the way in which the self is thought of, before being subject to moral codes or constraints. This question now becomes the "fil directeur" of Foucault's work.[29] In a late interview, he identifies four elements of this

29 Arnold I. Davidson has provided a recent discussion of the relationship between morals and ethics in Foucault's work: Arnold I. Davidson, "Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics," in David Couzens Hoy, ed., *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) pp. 221-233:

relationship to oneself: the "ethical substance", "the mode of subjection", "self-forming activity" and, finally, the *telos*, the goal of ethical activity.[30] The ethical is linked to the theme of problematisation: "Pourquoi ce souci éthique si insistant, quoique variable dans ses formes et dans son intensité? Pourquoi cette 'problématisation'?" (*UP*, p. 16). The notion of "problématisation" grows out of Foucault's "gouvernementalité" formulation and is, it will be argued, a development of the theoretical figure of heterogeneity with regard to the subject. He argues that every moral action also implies "un certain rapport à soi." (*UP*, p. 35). This "rapport à soi" may take different forms at different times with respect to a single moral area. So, marital fidelity implies not only, as has been seen above, a code of behaviour which may or may not be followed, but also several different ways of actively and continuously "constructing" the self through moral conduct. It may imply an attempt to master the self, to withdraw from the world, a stoic indifference to passion, or a form of preparation for eternal life. (*UP*, p. 35). Underlying the "mode" of being is an "ascetic" "pratique de soi". In *L'Usage des plaisirs*, Foucault looks similarly at the way in which the problematisation of homosexual relations between men and boys in Ancient Greece led to the emergence of a set of moral problems between the second and fourth centuries BC.

Foucault sees his work in the final two volumes as still broadly "genealogical" in intent. However, some critics have claimed that the procedure of merely summarising a highly selective range of texts leads to a homogenising cultural and temporal view of Western attitudes to sex, whereby the tendency, for two milennia, has been towards an "austere economy": "In his story of antiquity, Foucault is able to trace an over-arching continuity, the concern for austerity — a theme which serves as the harbinger of an ascetic Christianity."[31] The contention of the authors of this article is that Foucault presents an overly homogeneous version of "austere" antiquity and Christianity. Furthermore, he is seen as presenting this assessment as the result of a systematic, but distorting, attack on psychoanalysis which runs throughout the *Histoire de la sexualité* project. In this reading, "Christianity becomes established as the parent of psychoanalysis."[32]: The authors also consider that it is "Christianity that comes to

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> Foucault took ethics to be one part of the study of morals. In addition to ethics, morals consists of people's actual behaviour, that is, their morally relevant actions, and of the moral code which is imposed upon them. By the moral code Foucault understood, for example, the rules which determine actions are forbidden, permitted or required, as well as that aspect of the code that assigns different positive and negative values to different possible behaviours. [...] Foucault wanted to shift the emphasis to 'how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions', without, however, denying the importance of either the moral code or the actual behaviour of people. (p. 228).

30 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics: an overview of work in progress," in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) pp. 340-372.

31 Phil Bevis, Michèle Cohen and Gavin Kendall, "Archaeologizing Genealogy: Michel Foucault and the Economy of Austerity," *Economy and Society*, vol. 18, no. 3 (August, 1989) p. 331.

32 ibid., p. 335.

play a determining role throughout Foucault's project, as the 'silent presence', the omnipresent spectre which constrains his conceptual categories, governs his choice of sources, and dictates the form that his developing work will take."[33]

However, it is the contention of this thesis that, although Christianity becomes an important theme for Foucault's final work, it does not represent a monolithic link of "austerity" between antiquity and modernity. Early Christianity forms rather a link for Foucault between the "ethical" preoccupations of antiquity and modernity. If he does put forward monolithic conceptions, they are of antiquity as a period of personal ethical flexibility and — as Eagleton has noted — pluralism, and Christianity as a period which preempts modernity in its ethical obsession with a utopian and eschatological notions of personal and global revolution. It is essential not to look at Foucault's final two published works in isolation. Broadly, they may be seen as suggesting that an aesthetic ethic of the self could be a useful tool for the development of an idea of the individual which is different from the obsession of a Christianised modernity with "desire" and "feelings" as a hermeneutics of the self.[34] However, they emerge from the period of the late 'seventies, when Foucault examined in his lectures another related, and as stated above, in some ways reciprocal question. That is, as was shown in the previous chapter, the relationship between ethics and what is known as political life in modernity. In the same way that Foucault attempts to show in his final work that the ethical choice is a choice about which part of ourselves we will choose to be the basis of moral and political life, so in his often hesitant and disorganised work on liberalism he shows that the process of being governed may often appear to be an ethical choice about which part of our life will be governed. What will be the style of "life" that individual and government work towards? This notion stands against traditional liberal theory which does not acknowledge any intrusion into private life. The category of the "ascetic", then, for Foucault is in some ways positive, since it implies conscious participation in these ethical processes. Ascetic considerations also imply for Foucault the neglected history — only previously touched upon by Weber — of "styles" of life. That is to say, the way in which the individual problematises and works on the self. Instead of locating a problematic heterogeneity of the "Other" of madness, Foucault now treats the subject as heterogeneous to itself, in that the subject constitutes a series of dispersed elements which are brought together within a system that is that subject. Schematically, one might say, that if the classical liberal concept of negative liberty involves a somewhat "static" renunciation of a part of the self in return for private freedom, then Foucault works towards the notion of a "dynamic" and mutual pocess of renunciation and ethical dialogue between those who govern and the governed (who also govern themselves). Colin Gordon seems to approach this view of

33 ibid., p. 335-336.

34 Michel Foucault, "On the Genealogy of Ethics," in *The Foucault Reader* p. 352.

Foucault in his useful assessment of the sketches on liberalism:

> One might see the consequent meaning of the relation of government for Foucault as a kind of moral judo (or 'agonism'): to the extent that the governed are engaged, in their individuality, by the propositions and provisions of government, government makes its own rationality intimately their affair: politics becomes, in a new sense, answerable to ethics.[35]

In his own admirably, and perhaps surprisingly, direct "Afterword" to Dreyfus and Rabinow's study a similar change in the emphasis of Foucault's work is elucidated within the first few paragraphs.[36] He considers his work in its entirety as an attempt to describe the ways in which human beings become subjects. His early work looks at "three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects."[37] And his later work looks at "the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject."[38] However, beyond this shift, there is also a methodological shift away from a vocabulary of battle.[39]

In order to further investigate the idea that Foucault's final work on the technologies of the self is linked with his work on government, and can thus be seen as a development of the elusive concept of heterogeneity, then it is necessary to look at his 1980 course at the Collège de France, entitled "Du Gouvernement des vivants".

In the very first lecture of the 1980 "Du Gouvernement des vivants" course (09/01/80), this development in Foucault's work is outlined. Characteristically, he presents it not as a transformation but rather as a "déplacement", another in a series of "déplacements" that he has made throughout the ten years of his courses at the Collège away from the theory of "l'idéologie dominante". This lecture consists largely of a

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35 Colin Gordon, "Governmental Rationality: an introduction," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) p. 48.

36 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," An Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982).

37 ibid., p. 208.

38 ibid., p. 208.

39 In his 1976 lecture course, Foucault instituted what was for him the familiar double move of rejecting the model of battle or struggle as a methodological tool for his own analyses, but also shows how European States in the nineteenth century moved away from a discourse of war. These two statements are shown below:

(i) "It is obvious that all my work in recent years has been couched in the schema of struggle-repression, and it is this — which I have hitherto been attempting to apply — which I have now been forced to reconsider, both because it is still insufficiently elaborated at a whole number of points, and because I believe that these two notions of repression and war must themselves be considerably modified if not abandoned. In any case, I believe that they must be submitted to closer scrutiny." (*P/K*, p. 92).

(ii) Michel Foucault, "Faire vivre et laisser mourir: la naissance du racisme", *Les Temps modernes*, vol. 46, no. 535, (février, 1991) pp. 36-61.

J'ai essayé cette année de poser le problème de la guerre, envisagée comme grille d'intelligibilité des processus historiques. Il m'a semblé que cette guerre avait été conçue, initialement et pratiquement pendant tout le XVIII^{e} siècle encore, comme guerre des races. C'est un peu cette histoire de la guerre des races que j'avais voulu reconstituer. Et j'ai essayé, la dernière fois, de vous montrer comment la notion même de guerre avait été finalement éliminée de l'analyse historique par le principe de l'universalité nationale. (p. 37).

theoretical introduction to what will be a series of analyses of the Christian practices of baptism, penitence and, most importantly, confession. Foucault divides the theoretical/methodological framework of his investigations into three areas of concern, roughly equivalent to three periods of research. Firstly, he began with three objections to the theory of "l'idéologie *dominante*". (i) That it is an ill-founded theory of representation. He cannot agree that there is somehow an "ideology" which can be located and described or represented. (ii) Foucault's work is set against such oppositions as "vrai/faux" and "rationnel/irrationnel". Truth and rationality are multiple practices and strategies, they do not exist as realities that can be distorted. (iii) The notion of "idéologie dominante" is opposed to what Foucault calls "assujettissement". Truth and power are inextricably linked to the construction of identity. Secondly, and following on from these reservations concerning "l'idéologie dominante", Foucault went on to employ the framework of "pouvoir-savoir" in the 'seventies. Questions of truth and rationality are here treated as intrinsic to constitutive practices, and relations of power are seen as strategic. Finally, his work has undergone a certain "déplacement" away from this idea of dominant ideology. The new schema is called "gouvernement par la vérité", and is an attempt to give a positive value to the terms "savoir" and "pouvoir". Instead of looking at "savoir" in terms of constitutive practices, he now wants to look at it in terms of "vérité". As examples, he gives five ways of conceptualising the relationship between power and truth;

a) The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century "Raison d'état" is based on a relationship of detail between power and truth. If power is exercised in enough detail, then it will attain a sort of truth.

b) Quesnay's liberal theory of "naturalité". There is a natural commerce inherent in society that the state will do well to respect. Truth is linked to this "naturalité".

c) Saint-Simon's principle of technocracy. Scientific principles of truth for the ordering of society may be discovered.

d) Rosa Luxembourg proposes a principle of "l'éveil universel". If a large enough part of the population were suddenly to attain consciousness of the truth of the capitalist regime, then revolution would be instantaneous.

e) Solzhenitzyn puts forward the principle of "la conscience commune de la terreur" that is the inverse of Rosa Luxembourg's proposal. It is precisely because people are aware of the presence and reality of a repressive regime of terror that they do not revolt.

Part of the year's course deals with an extended meditation on Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*. This constitutes in itself (as Bernauer mentions — although he disappointingly does not deal in any detail with the rest of the 1980 course) a thinly-

veiled attack on a Freudian hermeneutic of the self.[40]Against Freud's reading of the play as a dramatic enactment of psychoanalysis, whereby Oedipus seeks his own identity and finds it linked to desire, Foucault substitutes a meditation on the play as a formal dramatisation of a "game" of doubles:

> Oedipe, on le sait bien, c'est la tragédie de l'ignorance, ou c'est la tragédie de l'inconscience, c'est en tout cas, à coup sûr, la dramatique de l'aveuglement, mais je crois qu'on peut y voir aussi [...] une dramaturgie des vérités multiples, des vérités foisonnantes. (*Lecture*, 16/01/80).

It is this formal element of multiple truths which links to the question of heterogeneity. Foucault expands the concept of multiple truths in the direction of the co-existence of apparently heterogeneous elements within coherent systems. It is illuminating at this point to consider the connection between Foucault's use of the Oedipus story, and Deleuze's attack on Freudian dualism in *Logique du sens*. Here, Deleuze breaks down the Freudian theory of the construction of a coherent identity. He rather sees the development of the child as the intersection — "conjoncture" — of heterogeneous series:

> Cette zone génitale a elle-même sa série. Mais elle n'est pas séparable d'une forme complexe qui subsume maintenant des séries *hétérogènes*, une condition de *continuité ou de convergence* ayant remplacé l'homogénéité; elle donne lieu à une synthèse de *coexistence et de coordination* des séries subsumées.[41]

It is precisely this heterogeneous conjuncture of multiple truths that Foucault finds useful in the tragedy of Oedipus. The play constitutes a meditation on the serial form. Foucault cites Aristotle's conception of tragedy as being formed of two elements; "la péripétie" and "la reconnaissance". The former is the internal movement of the tragedy, whereby the fortune of the characters is reversed. The latter is the revelation of that which was not known at the start. He then claims that it is the reversal of the fortune of the characters that in turn leads to revelation. However, this is reversed in the case of Oedipus. Here, it is the ritual of truth which brings about Oedipus' downfall. The play represents a formal ordering by doubles, and a dramatisation of the problem of tyranny and democracy for the Greek State:

> En fait, il s'agit d'ajustements de fragments complémentaires qui se font deux par deux, avec, si vous voulez, à chaque niveau la totalité de la vérité. Vous avez la totalité de la vérité qui au fond est dite par les dieux; la totalité de la vérité, elle est, sinon tout à fait dite du moins comme touchée du doigt par

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40 James Bernauer highlights the importance of Foucault's critique of Freud, whose work had previously provided one of the theoretical cornerstones for Foucault's work, in his recent *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight*: "The failure to recognize the confrontation with Freud that is taking place in Foucault's last works has often prevented commentators from appreciating his intentions and organization in these writings, most especially with regard to their central history of the man of desire." (p. 167).

41 Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969) p. 262.

> Oedipe et Jocaste lorsqu'ils rappellent leurs souvenirs et enfin, la totalité de la vérité elle est à un niveau, un troisième fond, dite par les serviteurs. En somme, à chaque niveau, il y a deux personnes qui détiennent chacune un des fragments de la vérité. (*Lecture*, 16/01/80).

In a rather elaborate formal reversal of the Freudian reading of *Oedipus Rex*, the procedure of truth unfolds with the final result of Oedipus being a superfluous token in the game with regard to the purification of the city. The story is thus read not as a meditation on identity, but rather as the ritual of circulation of the "symbolon", the Greek game of doubles. Asceticism and dissidence play the role of the "symbolon" in his reflections upon government, in that they are reversible. The story also provides an illustration of a hierarchical structuring of truth, and procedures of truth within a society. (This is taken up in further detail in a short series of seminars on parrhesia, "truth-telling", given in America in 1983).[42] The method of eliciting truth from the gods is different from the method used for slaves.

Oedipus Rex is thus read as a treatise on acts of truth. It also poses the problem of tyranny and democracy for the Greeks. Foucault highlights the difference between modern and ancient notions of truth and subjectivity. The city of Thebes owes a debt of "reconnaissance" to Oedipus, and he thus considers himself to be "en vérité" when his power is challenged. In the lecture from 30/01/80 Foucault identifies three categories of truth in Oedipus Rex. There is "le sacrificateur grec", who operates and sets truth in motion, and "le spectateur", who saw and can verify what happened. And finally there is the confessor who can locate the mechanisms of truth within his own conscience. Foucault wishes to know why the final category has become quite so important for what we now consider as truth with regard to the individual. He asks the following question: "Pourquoi l'exercice du pouvoir comme gouvernement des hommes demande non seulement des actes d'obéissance et de soumission, mais aussi des actes de vérité." (*Lecture*, 30/01/80).

Attention is then switched to early Christianity, from the end of the second century onwards. Here, Foucault sees a *heterogeneity* between "l'acte d'aveu" and "l'acte de foi". The latter is a declaration of intent or belief, whereas the former is a commitment to seek out a truth or truths within the self. In a rather sweeping gesture, this act of making the truth and secrets within the self visible is seen as being a crucial component of Western technologies of the self up to the fifteenth century.

In the following lecture (06/02/80), Foucault expands upon his theme of truth. If truth does not operate with the benefit of reinforcement from ideology, then surely the obligation to truth can be resisted? This objection is anticipated by claiming that

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42 Michel Foucault, Discourse and Truth: *The Problematization of Parrhesia*. Notes to the Fall, 1983 seminar given by Michel Foucault at the University of California, Berkeley. A privately printed transcription of Foucault's presentation by Joseph Pearson. These notes may be consulted at the "Bibliothèque du Saulchoir", Paris.

certain assumptions must be accepted to enter the "game" of truth as a player. This is another point at which Foucault seeks to reinstate the importance of ethical considerations for the history of truth. Foucault formulates his new question as the following: "Comment l'homme d'Occident s'est-il lié à l'obligation de manifester en vérité ce qu'il est lui-même?" (*Lecture*, 06/02/80). It is important to note that Foucault insists upon the *multiplicity* and *heterogeneity* of regimes of truth. For example, as we have already seen, early Christianity has two main mechanisms of truth, in the form of faith and avowal or confession, forming a "relation entre l'obligation individuelle de la manifestation de vérité, et la dette du mal." (*Lecture*, 06/02/80). Early Christianity has, in turn, three main rituals for the attainment of this truth, in the form of baptism, penitence and "conscience". In Saint Justin's First Apology he states that baptism can only be granted to those who will believe what they are taught. Baptism is here a process of "illumination", whereby the soul is moved towards the light. This is a process of "enseignement". However, in the following lecture (13/02/80), Foucault goes on to locate a development in the conception of baptism which takes place at the end of the second century in the teaching of Tertullian, who introduces two major changes. Firstly, the soul becomes an object of knowledge ("connaissance") and, crucially "la relation entre purification et accès à la vérité ne prend plus la forme d'enseignement, mais d'épreuve." (*Lecture*, 13/02/80). Tertullian introduces a chronological displacement into the act of baptism. The act of purification must now come *before* baptism. The time of baptism is now a time of testing and danger, during which a new demand of maturity is placed upon the subject. Tertullian introduces the idea that the soul must be purified before undergoing baptism, which in turn involves a distinction between the work that God will perform on the soul, and the work that the soul must perform on itself. This implies, for Foucault: "Une nouvelle histoire des rapports entre subjectivité et vérité." (*Lecture*, 20/02/80). From the end of the second century onwards, the practices of examination, self-examination and confession are developed within this framework. From the third century onwards, baptism becomes a process of death, rather than life. A permanent mortification is instituted: "Le baptême (avec tout ce qu'il comporte de lutte, d'expulsion, de mortification) doit devenir une sorte de modèle permanent de la vie. On est perpétuellement en condition de baptême." (*Lecture*, 20/02/80). Thus, a link is forged between truth and the truth of the self which must be sought out by the individual subject. This link is, according to Foucault, entirely alien to antiquity.

The eighth lecture of the 1980 course (27/02/80) moves on to the problem of post-baptismal penitence. In schematic terms, Foucault considers the Graeco-Roman world as a culture of law, in the form of "le quadrillage de tous les comportements humains." (27/02/80) If the culture of antiquity is characterised by "la faute" and "la responsabilité", then early Christianity is characterised by the concept of "la rechute",

of falling from a state of truth. From the third century onwards, the idea of post-baptismal penitence becomes increasingly important for the Christian community, which no longer considers itself to be a community of perfect souls.

The ninth lecture of the 1980 course deals with the early Christian practice of "la pénitence canonique", a sort of second baptism. Penitence now becomes a public act or demonstration of remorse and the exposition of sin. Gradually, the "confession verbale" [*expositio casus*] replaces — by the twelfth century — this "dramatisation" [*publicatio sui*]. At first, confession is exterior to penitence, but it steadily takes on a central position. (*Lecture*, 05/02/80).

In his tenth lecture (12/03/80), Foucault links the emergence of confession and monastic life to a technique of the construction of the subject which he sees as central to the modern subject: "Ce jeu entre l'inexistence du péché et l'émergence de soi dans un processus de connaissance de soi par soi." (*Lecture*, 12/03/80). Summarising his lecture course up to this point, he sees himself as having attempted to trace the development of procedures of truth with relation to the subject through baptism, penitence and, finally, monastic life. The first two procedures do not seek the truth of the subject, but rather seek to return the sinner to another, better state. However, in monastic life the subject must move, from moment to moment, towards greater perfection. This is a process of "désidentification": "Il ne s'agit pas de saisir le sujet tel qu'il est, en son fonds, et en son identité, mais au contraire de faire de la manifestation de la vérité une sorte de désidentification du sujet." (*Lecture*, 12/03/80). He then takes a step backwards to antiquity to look at the practice of "direction", which is common to both Christianity and antiquity. A formal connection of heterogeneity is suggested between "le directeur" and "le dirigé", whereby the latter positively desires to be directed. This is seen to be an important element of political utopias from Plato to Thomas More.

In the eleventh lecture of the 1980 course (19/03/80), Foucault is at pains to point out that the practice of "direction" does not develop out of the comparatively late Christian theme of the pastoral. The principle and practice of direction is yet another procedure of truth that Foucault opposes to the juridico-discursive. From the fourth century onwards, Christianity reinvents the antique practice of spiritual direction. The innovation of Christianity is to make "direction" — particularly within the context of monastic life — a continual process rather than "un passage": "L'obéissance n'est pas une manière de réagir à une autre. L'obéissance doit être une manière d'être." (*Lecture*, 19/03/80). Whereas "la direction antique" has as its aim a movement towards autonomy for the individual, "la direction chrétienne" has as its aim a perfected state of obedience and dependence.

The final lecture of this particular course recalls Foucault's encounter with Descartes in *Histoire de la folie*. Descartes is seen as being fully in the Christian

tradition in his desire to perform a sort of confession, the exercise of expelling the *material* presence of a threatening entity within the self which is a foreign and threatening thought. Foucault thus summarises "la direction chrétienne" as "production de vérité et renonciation à soi-même." (*Lecture*, 26/03/80). How, then, does this course illustrate the figure of heterogeneity, and the political theme of liberalism that have been so neglected in Foucault's work? The question of Christianity and the formation of the self is taken up by Foucault in "Le Combat de la chasteté", part of the fourth volume of *Histoire de la sexualité*, which has yet to appear.[43] In this brief extract, he looks at Cassian's description of the individual's battle for chastity. Cassian maintains that man must maintain a constant surveillance over his thoughts and bodily movements. The individual must "discriminate" amongst his thoughts like a miller sorting out grains, or a centurion picking out troops. Instead of a technique which has an effect exclusively upon sexual and moral behaviour, Foucault considers this monastic self-analysis as a technique of "subjectivisation", and as developing a specific "ascetic" mode of thought. It implies a new way of analysing thought itself. Thought must constantly be examined and extended, in order to rid oneself of the material presence of the Other, an enemy from within which must be chased out. However — and perhaps surprisingly — at the very end of this extract, Foucault claims that these developments in monastic sexual *mores* involve no new point of departure. These elements may be found in a rudimentary form in Stoic or neo-Platonic philosophy. It does not make sense, he says, to talk of a Christian sexual ethic. Citing Peter Brown,[44] he suggests that early Christianity belongs more closely to the field of antiquity than is often thought. The argument of this thesis is that, through the introduction of the theme of ascetics — or style — to his investigations of the history of thought — or rather, reflections upon thought itself — Foucault attempts to approach thought without using the principle of revolutions or thresholds. In abandoning the cusp of the French Revolution and the revolution of modernity in thought and societal discourses, he begins to consider the inflections of thought over the "longue durée", as it were. Whereas the principle of heterogeneity had earlier been used to investigate epistemic shifts and discontinuities in systems of thought, he is more interested in the later part of his career in teasing out threads of thought and discourse which appear to operate over centuries, *and* co-exist alongside apparently contradictory paths of thought. Thus, although Christianity has

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43 Michel Foucault, "Le Combat de la chasteté".

44 Peter Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989): Brown places early Christian themes of austerity in an ambiguous relationship with antiquity. The major differentiation that he locates is between the "benevolent dualism" (p. 27) of antiquity - whereby the body is the inferior "other" to the soul - and the early Christian eschatological theme of the complete transformation of the body. However, another important element of Brown's work, which appears to have influenced Foucault,is the notion of a series of "problematisations" surrounding celibacy, austerity and sexual renunciation which characterise early Christianity.

undoubtedly provided the West with moral prohibitions, it has also provided the continuation of an ascetic tradition, developed from antiquity. Foucault himself felt that this ascetic tradition could be given new inflections, primarily as an ethical reflection on thought — particularly critical and governmental thought — and selfhood. In the same way, he appeared to be tentatively moving towards an attempt to give new inflection to liberalism, as an ethical responsibility of the individual faced with government, rather than an acceptance of authority in return for a spurious privacy and independence.

In an ideal portrayal of liberalism, the individual would be involved in a process of negotiation with government. Importantly, there is an aesthetic element to this negotiation. Thus, Foucault's early work deals with the "objectification" of the subject, whereas the later work deals with the elaboration of the subject by itself. Foucault's work cannot be understood in its entirety without the important but hitherto neglected strand of early Christianity which supplements his earlier work on modernity. It is an error to consider Foucault's work as presenting confession and autobiography as exclusively negative.[45]

It is important to note that the passage of Foucault's final work is marked by a set of dispersed statements, articles and reviews on the nature of writing, autobiography and confession. Firstly, on several occasions, Foucault claims that his own work constitutes the "fragments" of an autobiography.[46] Secondly, he becomes interested in the Graeco-Roman theme of *parrhesia* or "free speech", as a technique of interrogation and a personal enactment of truth rather than self-examination. John Rajchman has recently drawn attention to Arnaldo Momigliano's insight that the Athenian distinction between *isegoria* — the right of free speech in public assembly — and *parrhesia* — the private virtue of telling the truth — prefigures the modern

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45 See Bernauer, *Michel Foucault's Force of Flight*: Bernauer goes some way to highlighting the importance of the "lost" element of early Christianity in Foucault's later work. However, he fails to draw conclusions concerning the consequences this might have for Foucault's work on liberalism and the modern subject:

> As opposed to both the Greek and Roman periods, the modern subject was fashioned in isolation from ethical and aesthetic concerns; truth itself becomes the uncontested ruler of human life. This tyranny of the scientific was strengthened by modernity's rejection of the cardinal element of Christian asceticism. Christian practices involved a renunciation of the self who was articulated. For the Christian the truths of the self were always precarious, for they always related to the soul's continual conflict with the evil within itself. There could be no firm allegiance to a positive self, for there was no truth about the self that could not be utilized by the False One as a device for misleading and ensnaring the soul. (p. 174).

46 Michel Foucault, "Truth, Power, Self," in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (London: Tavistock, 1988) pp. 9-15:

> I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning. If you knew when you began a book what you would say at the end, do you think that you would have the courage to write it? What is true for writing and for a love relationship is true also for life. The game is worthwhile insofar as we don't know what will be the end. (p. 9).

distinction between "positive" and "negative" freedom.[47] Foucault wishes to overcome this public/private opposition by giving a new inflection to the tradition of *parrhesia* in the form of citizens demanding the truth concerning a government's ends and tactics. He also begins to examine the question of reading and writing in the development of "technologies" of the self. Writing about the self does not necessarily entail a "modern" psychoanalytical drive to root out the stubborn truth of the self's sexuality. In Foucault's later work, writing becomes linked to life, and the production of individual life, as opposed to the early concentration on death and the dispersal of the stable subject. What Foucault in fact does is to re-examine the question of identity as an *active* process of the assimilation of fragments. In an article which forms a companion piece to *L'Usage des plaisirs*, he sets out to look at "les arts de soi-même" in the first and second centuries.[48] This article on "L'Ecriture de soi-même" begins with a comparison of the treatment of writing in Saint Athanasius' examination of the life of Saint Anthony, and in "le rôle de l'écriture dans la culture philosophique de soi juste avant le christianisme."[49] In Athanasius' Christian text, the personal task of writing is important in three ways. It substitutes for the role of a spiritual guide or companion, it constitutes a way of reflecting upon thought itself, and thus is a method of testing the truth of one's existence. Foucault claims that these elements are present in the writings of Seneca, Plutarch and Marcus Aurelius, but function according to quite different principles. The act of writing in the antique practice of *hypomnemata* represents a reflection upon fragments which have been gathered and can now be assimilated to the self: "il s'agit, non de poursuivre l'indicible, non de révéler le caché, non de dire le non-dit, mais de capter au contraire le déjà-dit; rassembler ce qu'on a pu entendre ou lire, et ceci pour une fin qui n'est rien de moins que la constitution de soi."[50] In this particular article, three "techniques" of the self are highlighted. The practice of *hypomnemata* is the collection of fragments from reading or listening; the "récit épistolaire de soi-même" entails the practice of attempting to see oneself through another's eyes in daily life; and the Christian practice of "la notation monastique" involves the attempt to "débusquer de l'intérieur de l'âme les mouvements les plus cachés de manière à pouvoir s'en franchir."[51] This would apparently contradict Foucault's assertion that there is no grand rupture between antiquity and early Christianity. However, it has already been noted that Foucault moves towards a historical method which is less dependent on the notion of rupture at this point of his

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47 John Rajchman, *Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan and the Question of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1991): "In his lectures, Foucault hoped to add yet another sense, or to rethink *parrhesia* in yet another way: in terms of the "concern for truth" that would be characteristic of his own ethic, his own passion of free critical community." (p. 121).

48 Michel Foucault, "L'Ecriture de soi," *Corps Ecrit*, no. 5 (1983): L'Autoportrait (pp. 3-23).

49 ibid., pp. 4-5.

50 ibid., p. 8.

51 ibid., p. 21.

career.

When considering the question of autobiography in Foucault's later work, it is certainly justifiable to look at comments made in interviews. In an extraordinary interview given in English in Canada in 1983, he claims that intellectual work is for him an aesthetic and personal project:

> For me intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, meaning transforming yourself. I believe my problem is this strange relationship between knowledge, scholarship, theory and real history. I know very well, and I think I knew it from the moment I was a child, that knowledge can do nothing for transforming the world. Maybe I am wrong. And I am sure that I am wrong from a theroretical point of view for I know very well that knowledge has transformed the world.[52]

The argument of this thesis is that the theme of autobiography itself becomes a mode of theoretical deliberation in Foucault's late work. It is an "aesthetic" and "heterogeneous" relationship to the self that he seeks in the form of a desire to escape from the self. This interview also raises again the question of the public/private opposition that is so important for any consideration of the transformations that take place in Foucault's later work.[53] He claims that the genesis of a personal interest in the influence of public events on private life came from the personal experience of growing up in provincial France under the growing menace of the Second World War: "Our private life was really threatened. Maybe that is the reason why I am fascinated by history and the relationship between personal experience and those events of which we are a part. I think that is the nucleus of my theoretical desires."[54]

Much of Foucault's late work is based on an implicit re-evaluation of the public/private opposition. Foucault's strategic/spatial preoccupation of the 'seventies effectively refused absolutely the traditional liberal notion of the "private". Sexuality, the most "private" and intimate possession of the individual is reduced to the level of a "technology". It is one of modernity's ruses to fix identity and to use it productively. The celebrated overturning of the "repressive hypothesis" of Victorian attitudes towards all matters sexual is an ironic destruction of the "private" sphere. Received wisdom tells us in the modern era that we are prudish, introverted and secretive about our sex lives. Foucault counters that they are rather the subject of constant public discourse. However, in some ways Foucault here falls into the trap of equating sexuality with modernity. He is also close here to writing himself into the sort of determinist impasse that some critics have accused *Surveiller et punir* of presenting.[55] In crude terms, if all

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52 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self," p. 14.

53 As early as *Histoire de la folie*, Foucault deals with the emergence of private life in the modern era. See (p. 106 & p. 447). However, in this particular work he equates the emergence of the bourgeoisie with the emergence of private life.

54 Michel Foucault, "The Minimalist Self," p. 7.

55 For an eloquent statement of this position see: Mark Philip, "Foucault on Power: A Problem

that is private, personal, individual, is locked in impersonal strategies of power, how can the individual develop the sort of personal *ars erotica* which Foucault appears to oppose to the tawdry, voyeuristic pleasure of constant discourse on sex and sexuality? One answer must be that, from the late 'sixties onwards, Foucault abandons any "structuralist" notion of a language that effectively *speaks* the individual. In his early work, writing is linked with transgression and death. Writing postpones death, but also disperses the author across the impersonal and material structure of language.[56] In later work, he acknowledges that writing and biographical reflection may constitute a method of self-transformation.[57]

It is certainly justifiable to see Foucault's work in the 'sixties and 'seventies as in some ways a sustained attack on the illusory privacy of the bourgeoisie in modernity. *Naissance de la clinique* examines the role of the teaching clinic in giving the individual a specificity through death, and *La Volonté de savoir*, by means of its celebrated reaction against the "repressive" hypothesis of the Victorian bourgeoisie's attitude towards sexual matters, is a skilful disassembling or deconstruction of the notion of the bourgeoisie imposing a prudish public censorhip on sex, whilst pursuing private projects of licentiousness. Foucault rather puts forward the thesis that the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European bourgeoisie, operating as it does within a strict lineage of the Christian pastoral of avowal, actually creates "sexuality" as a matter of private reflection by means of a "public" incitement to think about, to register, to regulate sex: "Plutôt que le souci uniforme de cacher le sexe, plutôt qu'une pudibonderie générale du langage, ce qui marque nos trois derniers siècles, c'est la variété, c'est la large dispersion des appareils qu'on a inventés pour en parler, pour en faire parler [...]" (*VS*, p. 47).

The nuclear family of the nineteenth century is revealed as being much more integrated within a wider network of incitements and powers than the traditional image of the closed and secretive family would suggest: "La famille du XIX^{e} siècle est-elle bien une cellule monogamique et conjugale? Peut-être dans une certaine mesure. Mais elle est aussi un réseau de plaisirs-pouvoirs articulés selon des points multiples et avec des relations transformables." (*VS*. p. 63). This attempt to overturn the "repressive hypothesis", and thus to call into question some accepted notions of private/public, internal/external oppositions, is also very well illustrated by Foucault's brief remarks on the nineteenth-century campaign against childhood masturbation. The "vice" of the child would normally be seen as a dangerous *private* pleasure. However, Foucault

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in Radical Translation?" *Political Theory*, vol. 11, no. 1 (February 1983) pp. 29-52.

56 This is similar to Derrida's critique of Rousseau's position in Western metaphysics in *De la grammatologie*. Derrida perceives a false opposition between the immediacy and self-presence of the voice, and the artifice of writing. (p. 146).

57 Michel Foucault, "L'Ethique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté," *Concordia, Revista Internacional de Filosofia*, no. 6 (1984) p. 102. Interview with H. Becker et al.

claims that masturbation is pushed into hiding only so that it may be discovered. (*VS*, p. 58). In a strategic "game", these secrets are both invented and possibly incited by the desire to seek out such behaviour.

As noted already, Fouacult sees his work from the mid-'seventies onwards as a project of writing against the concept of the "dominant ideology". *La Volonté de savoir* is the first major work in which this project becomes explicit. It is also the first work in which Foucault looks at the Western practice of confession, developed from the Middle Ages onwards. The practice of confession supposes a truth which must be sought out and revealed to the individual. By using the provocative inversion of secrets being implanted so as to be sought out, confession is seen as productive of truth, rather than as revealing truth. The practice of confession itself becomes naturalised, and is seen a as an attempt to attain liberty:

> L'obligation de l'aveu nous est maintenant renvoyée à partir de tant de points différents, elle nous est désormais si profondément incorporée que nous ne la percevons plus comme l'effet d'un pouvoir qui nous contraint; il nous semble au contraire que la vérité, au plus secret de nous-même, ne "demande" qu'à se faire jour [...] (*VS*, p. 80).

However, in *La Volonté de savoir* confession is still seen firmly within the framework of power and knowledge that Foucault had introduced as a guiding methodological tool in the early 'seventies. Confession may either be spontaneous, or may be extracted by violence. In fact, since the Middle Ages, it has been accompanied by the "spectre" of violence: "Depuis le Moyen Age, la torture l'accompagne comme une ombre, et le soutient quand il se dérobe: noirs jumeaux. Comme la tendresse la plus désarmée, les plus sanglants des pouvoirs ont besoin de confession. L'homme, en Occident, est devenu une bête d'aveu." (*VS*, pp. 79-80). Confession is a ritual of truth, in which the subject of the enunciation must coincide with the subject which speaks, a modificatory act which takes place within the context of a power relationship. (*VS*, p. 82). The problem with Foucault's analysis here is the contradiction between a process, or a ritual, of confession — "l'aveu" — which unfolds within the context of a power relationship, and is often closely linked to real violence, but which can also be "spontané, ou imposé par quelque impératif intérieur." (*VS*, p. 79). It is the argument of this thesis that Foucault attempts to solve this problem by transforming his methodological framework from an analysis of power/knowledge relations, towards an analysis of *governmental* relations. This is not to say that he "solves" the problem of the "will to truth" and its origin. What he does do is place the development of Western subjectivity within a convincing historical framework that attempts to go beyond both the "dominant ideology" thesis, and dialectical materialism. In short, he becomes less and less interested in the question of violence, and concentrates on the articulation between the individual and wider projects of government. Developing the spatial notion

of heterogeneity into the concept of the co-existence of potentially contradictory or even competing wills in society, he examines two "neglected" themes of *dissent* and *ethics*. From the very beginning of his work Foucault is concerned with the *ethical* value and importance of social practices. For example, it has already been noted in the first chapter that only brief allusion is made in *Histoire de la folie* of the economic causes of "le grand renfermement" of the seventeenth century: "baisse des salaires, chômage, raréfaction de la monnaie, cet ensemble de faits étant dû probablement à une crise dans l'économie espagnole." (*HF*, p. 77). The "maisons d'internement" of the Classical age — in a similar way to the nineteenth-century prisons which inspire *Surveiller et punir* — are notoriously unsuccessful in economic terms. However, it is their symbolic and ethical value that interests Foucault:

> Et pourtant, dans cet échec même, l'âge classique faisait une expérience irréductible. Ce qui nous apparaît aujourd'hui comme une dialectique malhabile de la production et des prix détenait alors sa signification réelle d'une certaine conscience éthique du travail où les difficultés des mécanismes économiques perdaient leur urgence au profit d'une affirmation de valeur. (*HF*, p. 82).

It is important to understand, however, that *Histoire de la folie* deals with the notion of "l'éthique" very much in the moral sense of a public rationality. In talking of "tout un réajustement du monde éthique," (*HF*, p. 121) Foucault examines a shift of public perspective. The sense of "l'éthique" in his later work, as dealt with in the previous chapter, is the twofold concentration on individual behaviour and thought as a material act. So, in *Histoire de la folie*, "l'éthique" is distinguished from "la moralité" in terms of will. "Raison" — as opposed to "déraison" — becomes a force of will. The "ethical" does not exactly imply a conscious choice between good and evil, but rather a structuring force which underpins the entire classical drive towards liberty through reason. In other words, "l'éthique" is one element of the classical project of "Reason", against which Foucault is writing in *Histoire de la folie*:

> La raison classique ne rencontre pas l'éthique au bout de sa vérité, et sous la forme des lois morales; l'éthique, comme choix contre la déraison, est présente dès l'origine de toute pensée concertée; et sa surface, indéfiniment prolongée tout au long de la réflexion, indique la trajectoire d'une liberté qui est l'initiative même de la raison. (HF, p. 157).

At this stage, "l'espace de l'éthique" of the classical age is part of the individualising drive towards modernity of which Foucault is so critical in his early work. However in his final work, he becomes interested in the ethical as a space in which the individual can care for itself. Foucault now writes not against the repressive liberty of modern reason, but against the "reasonable" self-renunciation that has become the dominant drive of Western society from the beginnings of Christianity, though not solely as a result of Christian doctrine. In a late interview, he notes that it has discredited caring for

oneself as a form of egoism. He sees this as only in part due to Christianity. Foucault's project from its inception is the examination of systems of truth, but now truth itself and its problematisation becomes his object. Whereas earlier work had concentrated on the price that liberty must pay for knowledge and the social applications of the human sciences, his later work changes focus to concentrate on the "care" that surrounds different objects at different times. The "care of the self" is a lost form of knowledge, which Foucault implies might be usefully reinstated in a new form. The idea of "problematisation" develops the figure of heterogeneity by examining the juxtaposition, or circulation — in a hybrid public/private space — of the demands of individual government, and government at the level of the population as a whole.

Problematisation introduces the element of self-conscious reflection that was not present in earlier work. In an unpublished set of notes from a 1983 seminar on *Discourse and Truth: The Problematisation of Parrhesia*, delivered at Berkeley (University of California), Foucault distinguishes himself as an historian of thought from a historian of ideas. The historian of ideas is forced to consider ideas as a form of progression or, alternatively, error. Such work is often tied to the emergence of a new word or concept. The historian of thought tackles the ways in which certain objects become areas of ethical concern:

> The history of thought is the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices, which were accepted without question, which were familiar and 'silent', out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and debate [...] The history of thought, understood in this way, is the history of the way people begin to take care of something [...][58]

This series of seminars is based on the problematisation of *parrhesia* (free- or frank speech: "franc-parler" in French) in Euripedes' *Orestes*. Euripides raises the question of who may use *parrhesia*. This is the problem of an egalitarian as opposed to a hierarchical system. He also raises the question of the relation of *parrhesia* to *mathesis*, knowledge and education. There is also the problem of a legal framework to organise the telling of truth.[59] Foucault sees these problematisations are seen as of central importance for Western culture in general:

> These four questions about truth-telling as an activity — who is able to tell the truth, about what, with what consequences, and with what relations to power — seem to have emerged as philosophical problems towards the end of the Fifth Century around Socrates, especially through his confrontations with the Sophists about politics, rhetorics and ethics.[60]

In general, this problematisation is seen as having two consequences for contemporary

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58 Michel Foucault, "Discourse and Truth," p. 48.
59 ibid., p. 46.
60 ibid., p. 114.

Western thought. Firstly, in the field of what Foucault calls the "analytics of truth",[61] great concern is shown for ensuring that the process for testing the truth of statements is correct. Secondly, in the "critical" tradition of the West it is extremely important to know who is telling the truth and why the truth should be told. This second element is seen to be at the root of the critical tradition in the West. Foucault admits that one of the aims of his seminar is the construction of a genealogy of the critical tradition in the West.[62]

Early Christianity and the "christianisation" of modernity provide Foucault with a provocative, but little discussed, set of analogies between Christian culture — particularly ascetic Christian culture — and contemporary philosophical, revolutionary, "dissident" and Left culture. Early Christianity supplements earlier problematisations of truth with the theme of self-renunciation. The eschatalogical themes of early Christianity have also bequeathed to us the notion of revolution. However, Foucault seeks to reassert the ascetic theme of scepticism, of the examination of thought itself, and its relation to real practices. In many ways, this is a return to the question of the position of the intellectual, which is a constant concern for Foucault.[63] It is also another move to question the validity of the public/private opposition that has characterised much thought on modernity. Foucault attacks a hermeneutics of the self, but also the idea that truth is a matter either for the individual or the State. His later work, as has been shown in his use of the tragedy of Oedipus, places itself against a Freudian hermeneutic of the self. Freud may be seen as modernity's final development of the Christian theme of a hermeneutics of desire. John Rajchman has recently remarked upon Deleuze's important insight that one of Foucault's particularities as a philosopher was his ability to free himself from the modernity of the nineteenth century.[64] Rajchman shows that this desire to be free of the assumptions of modernity refers not only to the Christian/Freudian hermeneutics of desire, but also to the nineteenth-century

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61 ibid., p. 114.

62 ibid., p. 114.

63 See Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, "Les intellectuels et le pouvoir," *L'Arc*, 49 (1972) pp. 3-10.

64 John Rajchman, *Truth and Eros*:

> Our twentieth-century problem is not *Gemeinschaft*; it is 'identity', the sort of identity shown in the spectacular irruption of racism and nationalism. We may view the opposition between 'individualism' and 'collectivism' in nineteenth-century philosophy in terms of their attempts to overcome or eliminate the problem of 'particularist identity'. (p. 103).

Rajchman goes on to point out that Foucault emphasises the twentieth century's concentration on administration and normalisation. His argument is that, whereas collectivism and individualism ignore the tendency of the State to control and normalise the biological life of the population, so Foucault sees the "critical community" in the twentieth century as facing the necessity of constantly questioning its own identity and identifications. The universal intellectual in the nineteenth century had been a figure who attempted to transcend particularist identities, whereas the twentieth-century intellectual should constantly question the bounds of experience.

opposition between community and the individual.[65] Rajchman offers no methodological insight, but it is clear from Foucault's 1978 lectures that this "game" of truth between the State and the individual is an example of heterogeneity. It is a method for Foucault of excavating modernity's grand theme of revolution. Traditional liberalism dreams of the most severe limits possible on the powers of the State, and the socialist tradition dreams of a revolution which will abolish the State. This simple insight was already encountered in the second chapter. The important point here is that, out of the insight that there is a curious correspondence and communication between the apparently antagonistic elements of the State and the individual (i.e. a "heterogeneous" relation), Foucault seeks to lay the groundwork for a new ethical construction of the self. Against government of the self and the State through utility and a search for moral truth, he proposes a construction of the self through pleasure and an aesthetic sense. In this way, Foucault begins to question the value of "dissident" critical culture, if it does not have the ethical drive of inventing new ways of being and thinking; new ways of problematising, of "taking care". In his 1978 "Sécurité, territoire et population" lectures the birth of the modern State is examined as a result of dissidence directed against the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century "Raison d'Etat". "Raison d'Etat" is seen as placing man in an indefinite time of regulation. There will always be a need for intervention in the form of the State. However, a set of "contre-conduites" begin to propose an eschatological notion of a time when the "gouvernementalité indéfinie de l'Etat" (*Lecture*, 05/04/78) will be overturned by society itself. In these lectures, Foucault sees the problem (or "problematisation") of "gouvernement", which explodes in the sixteenth century, as operating at the crossroads or juncture of two transformations. These are, the disappearance of feudal structures, and the consequent development of "les grands Etats territoriaux", and also the movements of reform and counter-reform, which call into question the ways in which the individual wishes to organise personal salvation.

Christianity, then, functions for Foucault both as an escape from his own theoretical prison-house of modernity, and as a satisfactory meditation on the paradoxical nature of liberty. One example would be the birth of the social field, as discussed previously. It has already been shown that the development of work on liberalism and the field of the social from the late 'seventies onwards involved Foucault in a collaborative project of examining modernity's obsession with risk and security.[66] This notion of "risk" provides a mediating factor between public and private spheres in the development of modern governmental relations. For example, from the mid-

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65 ibid., p. 104.

66 François Ewald, *L'Etat providence* (Paris: Grasset, 1986). Ewald's examination of the development of the Welfare State attempts to overturn the received view of modernity as a Faustian gamble, by emphasising the obsession with risk, insurance and security.

nineteenth century onwards in France the "private law" of individual companies encourages personal indemnity against risk and fulfils a public or "State" function of security. Foucault traces modernity's theme of security back to the Christian demand for new forms of government. Aside from its diplomatic/military institutions and the question of "police" (the correct disposition of national capacities), the modern State also contains elements of the Christian pastoral. That is to say, a simultaneously individualising and totalising attempt to foster the life of the population within national boundaries.

As has already been discussed, the principle of heterogeneity is linked to a thoroughgoing spatial form of thinking which permeates all of Foucault's work. It is important not to restrict the notion of the spatial in Foucault's work simply to architecture. The spatial interests in his work function more as a speculative physics of thought and social development. It is the complex articulation of public and private, individual desire and government, and public government, that comes to dominate in his final work. This interest obviously derives from the late-'seventies work on liberalism that was dealt with in part in previous chapters.

Two themes emerge from Foucault's work on liberalism in the 'seventies. The first is an interest in subjectivity not as a constraint of modern humanist reason,[67] but as an *active* technique of the self. Secondly — and obviously connected to this — is the social importance of the figure of the individual as an *ethical* component in the development of Western society. His later work — particularly his lecture course — are in large part organised around the principle that "truth", in its production and particularly manifestation, constantly exceeds utility. Thus, the figure of the individual in Western society is not a unit constructed for the cynical utility of a sovereign power. It is possible, for example, to see *Surveiller et punir* as outlining the way in which the desire to manifest truth exceeds utility. Bentham's utilitarian calculus of pain and pleasure is in part supplemented by a drive to truth and knowledge of the "criminal" personality. This point is underlined in an article on nineteenth-century legal psychiatry, which also refers to contemporary legal philosophy and practice: "Beyond admission there must be confession, *self-examination*, explanation of oneself, revelation of what one is. The penal machine can no longer function simply with a law, a violation and a responsible party. It needs something else, a supplementary material."[68]

The major transformation in Foucault's later work is to see confession, and the concentration on the individual it entails, in its positive and productive characteristics, very much as he had done earlier with the notion of power in the power/knowledge

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67 *Histoire de la folie*, pp. 363-372. This is the earliest example of Foucault's critique of reason. He cites Diderot's *Le Neveu de Rameau* as an example of transgression, whereby the imaginary plenitude of reason is constantly undermined.

68 Michel Foucault, "About the Concept of the 'Dangerous Individual' in 19th-century Legal Psychiatry," *International Journal of Law and Psychology*, vol. 1 (1978) p. 2.

formulation. He becomes interested in the individual concern for truth. The technique of confession is often read as just another component of disciplinary modernity; the "iron-cage" of a micro-physics of power, that Foucault constructs as an elaborate and terrifying edifice from which there can be no satisfactory escape. This is perhaps justified if one of the very first references to confession in his work is considered. Towards the end of *Histoire de la folie*, in the section where the birth of the modern asylum is considered, reference is made to the admisssion of guilt which is now inherent in confession, the only voice that modern psychiatric practice gives to madness. At least the Classical age had constituted confinement as "un dialogue muet", in the form of a struggle. The modern age, however, beginning with Tuke and Pinel, eradicates any common language between madness and reason. Madness is now forced, under the guise of toleration and even liberation, to confess to its "fault": "L'absence de langage, comme structure fondamentale de la vie asilaire, a pour corrélatif la mise au jour de l'aveu. [...] Dans ce silence invétéré, la faute avait gagné les sources même de la parole." (*HF*, p. 517). Confession is seen at this stage as part of modernity's disciplinary stranglehold on difference. However, in his final work, Foucault considers the curious relationship between confession, truth and self-renunciation. Confession is seen less as a method of domination, and more as a problematic form of self-government.

Finally, in this chapter, it is necessary to return briefly to Foucault's 1978 course. It will be recalled that an important step away from the idea of dominant ideology is taken with the 1978 lecture course entitled "Sécurité, territoire et population". Foucault uses a discussion of the techniques of grain production, and the new technique of innoculation, to elucidate the differences between systems of "discipline" and "sécurité". In short, innoculation and the free circulation of grain, together with a liberal pricing policy, are seen to be techniques of "sécurité". "Discipline" is a technique of "normation", whereas "sécurité" is a technique of "normalisation" (*Lecture*, 18/01/78). Discipline seeks to regulate a system down to the finest detail, whereas "sécurité" is a social physics which seeks to play normal and abnormal elements of society, and systems within society, against one another to achieve normalisation. The example given is that of "la variolisation" in the eighteenth century, which was "unthinkable" in terms of the medical rationality of the time. It did, however, find support in mathematical theory, and as an analogical method to the free circulation of grain. (*Lecture*, 18/01/78). Whereas, in the case of a disciplinary system, as described in the case of plagues in *Surveiller et punir*, the individual is isolated, "sécurité" marks the beginning of a social physics of population as a continuity. This continuity must be governed. That is, manipulated and guided into producing positive results. If sovereignty and its close relation discipline are methods for achieving stasis and immobility, "sécurité" is a method of achieving movement and circulation.

Emphasis is given to the fact that this is a totally new way of looking at the individual and the individual case in relation to the totality.

The reason for this brief return to an earlier discussion is to illustrate the way in which the formulation "gouvernementalité" prepares the ground for Foucault's final work on the individual and technologies of the self. Under the general heading of "gouvernementalité", he uses the 1978 courses to deploy fully the figure of heterogeneity as the co-existence of disparate elements, and as struggle between elements which appear to be contradictory, but have a common origin. In other words, the emphasis on epistemological shifts in systems of thought which characterised much of Foucault's early work is replaced by a concentration on complex systems. For example, as has already been shown, Western societies are not seen as moving from a system of sovereignty, through discipline, to security, but rather as developing a complex of sovereignty-discipline-security from the sixteenth century onwards. Taken as a whole, Foucault's lecture series from 1978, 1979 and 1980 could be seen as outlining a sort of "speculative new physics" of knowledge, social practice and critical practice. In a similar way to the individual being a real effect but unlocatable discrete entity in the nineteenth century social physics of security, so belief and ideology are real functions, but unstable and unfounded elements within existing systems of thought. In the fourth lecture of the 1980 "Du Gouvernement des vivants" course (*Lecture*, 30/01/80) — in a somewhat humorous aside — Foucault proposes the concept of "anarchéologie" as an adequate description of his work. Basically, this involves treating power formations, and social policy constructions, such as the prison system, as perfectly comprehensible and "rational", but also fragile and eminently contingent. In a purely formal sense, a similar concept of a speculative and "anarchistic" physics of knowledge is put forward in an important article from the early 'seventies, concerning two publications by Gilles Deleuze.[69] These two works are seen by Foucault as representing an important attempt to create a "platonisme renversé".[70] Deleuze opposes to the platonic search for identity, and thus the circularity of the Same, a serial and linear conception of "events": "Abandonnez le cercle, mauvais principe de retour, abandonnez l'organisation sphérique du tout: c'est sur la droite que tout revient, la ligne droite et labyrinthique."[71] Foucault considers Deleuze to be no less than a new metaphysician, or rather as attempting to institute the rebirth of a "fantasmaphysique".[72] He is announcing an era that will embrace the "simulacrum", the copy to which there is no original. "Theatre" will therefore be the privileged mode for this new anti-representational mode of thought: "et le théâtre, le théâtre multiplié,

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69 Michel Foucault, "Theatricum Philosophicum," *Critique*, 282 (novembre,1970) pp. 885-898. A reflection on two books by Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*.

70 ibid., p. 886.

71 ibid., p. 885.

72 ibid., p. 890.

polyscénique, simultané, morcelé en scènes qui s'ignorent et se font signe, et où sans rien représenter (copier, imiter) des masques dansent, des corps crient, des mains et des doigts gesticulent."[73] This particular article represents the apotheosis of an extravagant prose style that Foucault developed throughout the 'sixties. Deleuze's two recent publications are used as a springboard for a meditation on "a-categorical" thinking; the sort of wilful aphasia of Borges' fictional encyclopaedia that begins *Les Mots et les choses*. Allusions are made to the bizarrely heroic stupidity of Flaubert's Bouvard and Pécuchet — "des êtres a-catégoriques" — the potential of drugs to introduce thought to difference, and, perhaps surprisingly for Foucault, Andy Warhol's use of the repetition of images. The repetition of soup-cans, accidents and the electric chair presents the possibility of a confrontation with a theatrical banality of repetition and monotony which may allow a momentary recognition of what Foucault calls the "event". That is to say, the contingency and brutality of death. The aesthetic theme of thought as a theatre, as both a material entity with its own specificity, and as a repertoire of possible problematisations and reactions is important in that it bridges the gap between Foucault's early and late work. This is the theme that is reactivated in Foucault's presentation on parrhesia — dealt with above. Thought as an intellectual reaction or problematisation of existing circumstances can never be a representation or a full explanation. It is rather a reaction and a "creation" which has a life separate from that of the elements in the real world to which it corresponds:

> A problematization is always a kind of creation; but a creation in the sense that, given a certain situation, you cannot infer that this kind of problematization will follow. Given a certain problematization, you can only understand why this kind of answer appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world. There is the relation of thought and reality in the process of problematization.[74]

In other words, Foucault reasserts a heterogeneity between thought and the world. It is part of his final attempt to analyse thought itself — primarily critical thought and expert knowledges — in its specificity. In part, this constitutes a methodological defence of critical misinterpretations of idealism in Foucault's work, whereby he would deny the reality of an object such as mental illness. But it is also a call to open a space in which "problematisations" may be pluralised.

Overall, this chapter constitutes a speculative attempt to outline a link between Foucault's final working methodology for the history of thought as problematisation, and his work on the technologies of the self. The individual is not a natural entity, but is rather the real effect of problematisations. In this way, the identity of the individual is paradoxically linked to forms of self-renunciation. Early Christianity represents for

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73 ibid., pp. 889-890.
74 Michel Foucault, "Discourse and Truth," p. 116.

Foucault a particularly illuminating example of this paradox, in that it demonstrates an intensification of the drive to knowledge of the self, but also to a renunciation of the self. In the same way, projects for individual spiritual government are linked to the desire to be directed, or governed. If it is accepted that the individual is an effect rather than an atom of liberty, then the political imperative becomes that of a participation in the "styling" of government. If the political theme of identity, in the form of a stable and yet unfathomable form of liberty, is abandoned, then new forms of liberty might be constructed. Ultimately, Foucault considers truth and identity as the effect of an articulation between heterogeneous elements. Freud reads the story of Oedipus as equivalent to the work of psychoanalysis. It exemplifies a certain model of self-knowledge. Foucault, on the other hand, re-reads the play as a meditation on the objective construction of truth. Rather than illustrating the truth of Oedipus' identity, the story illustrates a mechanism for producing truth. This mechanism finally excludes Oedipus as a superfluous token in the game of truth.

CONCLUSION

> La logique d'une pensée, ce n'est pas un système rationnel en équilibre. La logique d'une pensée est comme un vent qui nous pousse dans le dos, une série de rafales et de secousses. On se croyait au port, et l'on se trouve rejeté en pleine mer, suivant une formule de Leibniz.[1]

In this quotation Gilles Deleuze captures the restless quality of Foucault's thought. Each step, or "déplacement" in this project is, in terms of this thesis, heterogeneous to the previous formulations. This does not mean that earlier work is rejected, but rather that the questions and problems arising from a particular formulation propel the shape of Foucault's thought in a new direction. At the most abstract, formal level, one might attempt to describe this shape as a series of spirals. Clifford Geertz has already compared the act of reading Foucault's work to the experience of attempting to follow the deliberate confusion of levels in a drawing by Escher,[2] and Foucault himself has applied the figure of the labyrinth — so important in his study of Raymond Roussel — to his own work in a much-quoted passage. At the end of the introductory chapter of *L'Archéologie du savoir* the process of writing is described as that of creating a labyrinth:

> [...] le labyrinthe où m'aventurer, déplacer mon propos, lui ouvrir des souterrains, l'enfoncer loin de lui-même, lui trouver des surplombs qui résument et déforment son parcours, où me perdre et apparaître finalement à des yeux que je n'aurai jamais plus à rencontrer. (*AS*, p. 28).

One could go further in describing the shape of these spirals. To do so, it is necessary to return to *L'Archéologie du savoir*, since, as shown in the first chapter, this work constitutes the statement of a central problematic and a sort of repository of spatial thinking for Foucault. It is suggested that, in part at least, this methodological statement arises from the effort to prise open the double of "les mots et les choses", in the earlier publication which, in an ironic gesture, had taken its title from this project. Foucault states that he wishes to demonstrate in his work that what he now calls "discours" is not "une mince surface de contact" between words and things. (*AS*, p. 66). So, the discursive formation is shown to be a monument, or an event, in the history of thought and its relation to practice, rather than a document through which another, more "real" or concrete level of meaning might be sought. This, then, is the first spatial move; the prising apart of "les mots et les choses." In other words, the concept of discourse or the discursive formation appears in the gap, or heterogeneity, opened up between words and things. But from this a new question appears, which is the relation of discourse to

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1 Gilles Deleuze, "La Vie comme une oeuvre d'art," *Le Nouvel Observateur* (28 août, 1986) p. 58. Interview with Didier Eribon.

2 Clifford Geertz, "Stir Crazy," *The New York Review of Books* (January 26, 1978) p. 3.

"*un champ de pratiques non discursives.*" (*AS*, p. 90). At this stage, the question of the non-discursive is linked to the concepts of "stratégie" and "désir", which, as has been shown, forms the methodological framework for *Surveiller et punir*, and the work that surrounds it. Again this new formulation, generally known as "savoir/pouvoir", produces another problematic, which is the active relation of the individual to "savoir" and "pouvoir". This becomes the focus of Foucault's final work.

In a piece from the very latest collection on Foucault's work published in France, Yves Roussel traces an important connection between the theme of a "tropological" space of "l'écriture" and the notion of "déplacement".[3] Raymond Roussel uses the poverty of language to set up language-machines, which produce meaning from the movement across a space between an original phrase and a play on words derived from this phrase. Foucault uses a similar method to investigate the gap between two moments in the history of thought. Yves Roussel uses the example of the two texts cited at the beginning of *Surveiller et punir*: a description of the execution of Damiens and the rules for a juvenile prison in Paris eighty years later: "Trois quarts de siècle entre ces textes, et toute la distance qui sépare le spectacle d'un supplice et l'économie d'un emploi de temps; c'est la juxtaposition d'un texte à l'autre qui inaugure la tentative de penser la transformation de la justice pénale."[4]

The first chapter, then, offers a general introduction to this spatial thinking in Foucault's work, making two claims for the specificity of the spatial in this work. Firstly, that it works on several different levels, constituting a way of looking at knowledge and historical change, a way of focussing upon power relations in society, and a method for advance in Foucault's own work. Importantly, the formal principle of the co-existence of heterogeneous elements within a discursive practice was noted in as early a work as *Histoire de la folie*. Secondly, in more precise terms, it was suggested that the figures of dispersion and heterogeneity in *L'Archéologie du savoir* crystallised an abstract methodological principle that was to guide the following stages of Foucault's career, and pointed ahead of archaeology towards a genealogical method. In his penultimate publication, *L'Usage des plaisirs*, Foucault retrospectively sums up what he sees as the relationship between archaeology and genealogy in the most succinct terms possible: "La dimension archéologique de l'analyse permet d'analyser les formes mêmes de la problématisation; sa dimension généalogique, leur formation à partir des pratiques et de leurs modifications." (*UP*, p. 17). The move from archaeology to genealogy must ultimately be seen as a way of "solving" the problem of causality that is created by treating discourse as autonomous, and thus the factors which affect discourse as in some way internal to discourse itself. This problem of causality

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3 Yves Roussel, "Le Mouvement d'écrire," in *Michel Foucault: lire l'oeuvre*, sous la direction de Luce Giard (Grenoble: Jérôme Millon, 1992) pp. 97-110.

4 ibid., p. 106.

is, in the final analysis, one of the major problems in Foucault's work. On the negative side, this means that an unacknowledged, and potentially ahistorical, figure of causality must always haunt his work, whether in the form of the hidden subject of power, the will to truth, a neo-Nietzschean/Hegelian notion of the constancy of struggle and a drive towards recognition, or what might be called an impersonal will towards the "accumulation of truth", which characterises aspects of the final work.

In the first chapter the question of Foucault's work in the context of a contemporary "information society" is briefly raised. This particular question raises the possibility that much of Foucault's work remains within the thrall of a structuralist conception of language as a privileged system for the production of meaning. Information technology arguably both disrupts the primacy of the linguistic "text", by means of a number of non-written or non-verbal forms of communication, and invites an increased participation on the part of individuals in the process of creating meaning. In this way, the policing of discursive boundaries and particularly the construction of a general consensus on taboo areas becomes harder to enforce. However, these objections concerning the elision of important contemporary questions also illustrate some of the strengths of Foucault's work. The potential for auto-surveillance which arises from information technology is already outlined in the figure of the Panopticon in *Surveiller et punir:* "Notre société n'est pas celle du spectacle, mais de la surveillance; sous la surface des images, on investit les corps en profondeur [...] les circuits de la communication sont les supports d'un cumul et d'une centralisation du savoir [...]" (*SP*, p. 218). And the drive towards self-exposure and self-examination, involving the strange spiral of power and pleasure, in *La Volonté de savoir* explicitly anticipates the way in which increased talk of taboo subjects in the media might lead to unusual and subtle new policing effects.

The second chapter shows how the insights of *Surveiller et punir* lead Foucault to question the prevalent opposition often perceived between the State and civil society, with the State functioning as "un monstre froid", which increasingly engulfs and dominates the innocence of civil society. Discipline itself seems to suggest the integration of a proliferating and increasingly subtle network of procedures for surveillance into the State. However, Foucault does in fact begin to explore a new area in his work, by considering discipline as a "technique", rather than a practice associated with a single institution such as the State:

> La 'discipline' ne peut s'identifier ni avec une institution ni avec un appareil; elle est un type de pouvoir, une modalité pour l'exercer, comportant tout un ensemble d'instruments, de techniques, de procédés, de niveaux d'application, de cibles; elle est une 'physique' ou une 'anatomie' du pouvoir, une technologie. (*SP*, p. 217).

In this way, he suggests that even "les relations intra-familiales" absorb and integrate

disciplinary techniques from the seventeenth century onwards. (*SP*, p. 217). Again, the figure of heterogeneity is applied in the form of a complex surface of communication and relay between micro- and macro-levels of power. Foucault shows that the State/civil society opposition depends to a large extent upon a stable notion of the private individual. (*SP*, p. 218). This conception of the individual is undermined by showing that the figure of the individual is in fact constructed within the spatial field of discipline. (*SP*, p. 218).

The second chapter also deals briefly with what Foucault calls the "discours d'échafaud", which surrounds the ritual of execution in the *Ancien Régime.* (*SP*, p. 68). It is argued that this represents a retrospective application of a "micro-physical" approach to power, emphasising the strategically reversible effects of a confrontation between sovereign and popular power. The possibility of new formations of power, thought or discursive practices emerging from the contact — either in the form of confrontation or ethical negotiation — between individuals or groups and governmental, disciplinary or sovereign powers is central to the figure of heterogeneity. Thus, the new emphasis on "la littérature policière", which accompanies the dual process of penal reform and the emergence of disciplinary techniques is still characterised by an ambiguous confrontation. However, this time the confrontation is characterised as "la lutte entre deux esprits purs," as spectacular crime becomes the exclusive property of exceptional natures. (*SP*, p. 72). The ambiguity of this new discourse of crime literature is linked to the "aestheticisation" of great and admirable crime: "C'est, en apparence, la découverte de la beauté et de la grandeur du crime; de fait, c'est l'affirmation que la grandeur aussi a droit au crime et qu'il devient même le privilège exclusif de ceux qui sont réellement grands." (*SP*, p. 72).

This particular section of *Surveiller et punir* is apparently unimportant and unproblematic, constituting a "stylish" aside on the growth of crime fiction. However, it illustrates well one of the major tensions of Foucault's work, and raises the questions of aesthetics and truth which become increasingly important in later work. Firstly, the tension which underpins *Surveiller et punir* is between a conception of power which is non-subjective, but intentional, and another conception of power as purely strategic, but that moves upwards from the fabric of social relations, and must therefore be linked to desire. (See *P/K*, p. 99). Secondly, the operation of power is increasingly shown to have an aesthetic element, whereby effects of truth are accumulated at certain points, in this case the beauty of formal and intellectualised crime. That is to say, truth is shown to exceed utility.

The second chapter also looks at Foucault's growing recognition of a different sort of power which is at work in Western societies. This "pastoral" power is concerned with "sécurité", and is orientated towards fostering the life of the population. These ideas represent the beginning of the "gouvernementalité" formulation which runs

throughout the remainder of Foucault's work. Instead of tending towards the development of techniques of discipline, contemporary Western societies are shown to be caught within a schema of "souveraineté-discipline-gouvernementalité". The co-existence of disciplinary and regulatory schemas of power is shown explicitly in *La Volonté de savoir*, in the form of two poles of power which operate upon life from the seventeenth century onwards:

> L'un des pôles, le premier, semble-t-il, à s'être formé, a été centré sur le corps comme machine [...] *anatomo-politique du corps humain.* Le second, qui s'est formé un peu plus tard, vers le milieu du XVIII^{e} siècle, est centré sur le corps-espèce, sur le corps traversé par le mécanique du vivant et servant de support aux processus biologiques [...] (*VS*, p. 183).

Surveiller et punir constitutes an attempt to undermine the traditional public/private opposition of much political theory. Foucault takes note of a common point between what he calls juridical or liberal — referring to the eighteenth-century "philosophes" — and Marxist conceptions of power. They share an economic conception of power as a possession. (*P/K*, p. 88). *Surveiller et punir*, however, attempts to analyse questions of power strategically. This entails a mapping of the serial grid across which the body is broken down and reassembled. (*SP*, p. 162). In concentrating upon the techniques and mechanisms of power which focus upon the individual, as opposed to the theoretical level of law and rights, Foucault defines his project as genealogical. That is to say, he focusses on "local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges". (*P/K*, p. 83). Discipline is concerned with the individual and institutions in modernity. It is not presented as a theory of the State, as has already been noted. However, *Surveiller et punir* does at times present certain forms of power as potentially unlimited. For example, the final section of this book presents "le carcéral" as a proliferating network dating from the opening of the Mettray colony for young offenders in 1840. (*SP*, p. 303).

So, from the formulation of discipline operating through institutions and upon the individual in *Surveiller et punir*, the problem emerges of the articulation between the individual and the State. This produces another heterogeneous double, which takes the form of the two "poles" of discipline and regulation discussed briefly above. They are heterogeneous in that they do not belong to the same level of elaboration, but this does not preclude an articulation between the two: "ces deux ensembles de mécanismes, l'un disciplinaire, l'autre régulisateur, ne sont pas de même niveau. Ce qui leur permet, précisément, de ne pas s'exclure et de pouvoir s'articuler l'un sur l'autre."[5]

The techniques and mechanisms of "sécurité" are added to those of "discipline". These techniques are concerned with fostering and protecting the life of the population.

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5 Michel Foucault, "Faire vivre et laisser mourir: la naissance du racisme," *Les Temps modernes*, no. 535 (février, 1991) pp. 48-49.

At several junctures, Foucault refers to the spatial image of "la ville-modèle, la ville artificielle, la ville de réalité utopique,"[6] to illustrate the articulation between techniques of discipline and security. Essentially, discipline assures the exercise of power upon the individual body located within a serial space which allows for optimal visibility. Discipline is characterised by the imposition of a static grid. Techniques of regulation or security, on the other hand, are characterised by the fact that they encourage the circulation of elements within the system of "la ville". Security is also a largely "insurational" system, since it is concerned with the individual who falls outside the productive activities and capacities which arise from the process of industrialisation. In other words, these insurational mechanisms introduce the question of welfare into the construction of Western societies.

Although Foucault does not enter into any protracted analyses of security and insurance, the principle of techniques which bring together the figure of the State, the population or society and the individual in transactions and points of contact which are not contractual, but rather a point of contact between private responsibility and public responsibility and intervention, is extremely important for the development of his work. In this way, he develops upon a question which had been raised briefly and apparently inconsequentially in a paper from 1967, which was identified as an important repository of spatial thinking in the first chapter, remarking that contemporary society maintains a number of apparently sacred oppositions which distinguish certain spaces: "par exemple entre l'espace privé et l'espace public, entre l'espace de la famille et l'espace social, entre l'espace culturel et l'espace utile, entre l'espace de loisirs et l'espace de travail; toutes sont animées encore par une sourde sacralisation."[7]

Foucault's conception of power is modified to encompass the formulation of "gouvernementalité", defined as the "conduct of conduct", or the way in which the concern for government of the self interacts with wider projects for the government of the population in general. This entails seeing the family as a hybrid public/private space, rather than an autonomous unit affected to a greater or lesser extent by State intervention. Power is now defined as "an action upon an action", and is seen as a way of conducting or governing the actions of others: "The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically, power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government."[8]

The question of the State is somewhat elusive in Foucault's work. It should be

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6 ibid., p. 49.

7 Michel Foucault, "Des espaces autres," *Architecture-Mouvement-Continuité*, no. 5 (octobre, 1984) p. 47.

8 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester, 1982) p. 221.

concluded that three general principles emerge. Firstly, the State is neither the point from which power emanates, nor an institution through which power can be exercised either positively or negatively. In other words, Foucault is suspicious of political programmes which seek a straightforward "take-over" of State power, and considers their own "party" organisation as a reflection of the centralised State.[9] Secondly, the State is not in a position of exteriority to civil society, either in terms of the State as a reflection of the economic base, or as a relatively autonomous "political" level.[10] This means that the State cannot gradually eat away at the fabric of civil society. Thirdly, however, the State is an important reference point for all forms of power. Foucault proposes that, instead of looking at the steady growth of the State, it is the "governmentalisation" of the State which is important: "In referring here to the restricted sense of the word government, one could say that power relationships have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions."[11]

Foucault also looks at "government" in the wide sense attributed to it in the sixteenth century, taking in the government of individuals and groups as well as a territory or nation-State. The formulation of "gouvernementalité" is essentially a development of the notion of a heterogeneity of elements which construct power relationships. In an interview concerning the question of power in 1978 Foucault retrospectively considers his project in *Histoire de la folie* to have been not the analysis of an institution or a law which silences madness, but rather to have emerged from a very different transformation which begins with the internment of the poor and homeless: "It is precisely the heterogeneity of power which I wanted to demonstrate, how it is always born of something other than itself."[12] Such a subtle re-reading illustrates very well the way in which the internal architecture of Foucault's own work mirrors the strange architecture of an Escher drawing, whereby figures on a circular set of steps constantly ascend, only to be returned to a lower point than that at which they apparently began. In a similar way, Foucault's work operates as a series of "strange loops", by constantly moving away from previous formulations, only to return to them in a new light which has been generated by the force of moving away. A more prosaic

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9 See Michel Foucault, "Pouvoir et corps," *Quel Corps?*, no. 2 (septembre-octobre, 1975) pp. 3-5. Interview with the editorial collective. Here, Foucault remarks on the fact that, since the late nineteenth century, Marxist-inspired revolutionary movements have seen the State apparatus as a particularly important adversary, and have paradoxically adopted a similarly hierarchical party system.

10 Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (London: Routledge, 1983) pp. 96-104.

11 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," an Afterword to Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: Harvester, 1982) p. 224.

12 Michel Foucault, "Clarifications on the Question of Power," in *Foucault Live: Interviews, 1966-84* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989) p. 186. Translated from the Italian by James Cascaito. First appeared as "Prescisazioni sul potere. Riposta ad alcuni critici," *Aut Aut*, no. 167-168 (Sept.- Dec., 1978) pp. 3-11.

reading, which should be by no means discounted, is that Foucault simply "re-wrote" his previous work in order to support his current project. This would coincide with the thesis that his work is that of a highly-developed "stylist", but is in itself too heterogeneous to constitute a methodology for analysing the history of the present.

The third chapter outlines some of the major elements of Foucault's engagement with what he calls "libéralisme", which develops in the late 'seventies. The suspension of the question of the State as the locus or originator of power frees Foucault to look at the techniques of government. The object of such techniques and mechanisms is the field of the "social", having as its primary targets the welfare, health, economic vitality and reproductive powers of the population. The birth of the social is linked to the development of the science of "police", as exemplified by the German interest in *Polizeiwissenschaft* throughout the eighteenth century.[13] This interest in liberalism emerges partly from the genealogical analysis of the individual as fabricated by power in the 'seventies, and also from the recognition that the State is a reference point for power which ascends from below, rather than a producer of power. The idea of a genealogy of specific and multiple rationalities suggests productive links between the work of Foucault and Weber, which would certainly offer opportunities for further research. Foucault rejects the millenial or apocalyptic theme of a complete collapse in rationality, to question paradoxes and unexpected effects of current rationalities, along with the possibility that multiple and heterogeneous rationalities might exist within the present moment. Foucault acknowledges that such a "rational critique of rationality" is close to Weber's concern with the possibility of the survival of rationality through modification and a self-reflexive recognition of its own contingency:

> I think, that since Max Weber, in the Frankfurt School and anyhow for many historians of science such as Canguilhem, it was a question of isolating the form of rationality presented as dominant, and endowed with the status of the one-and-only reason, in order to show that it is only *one* possible form among others.[14]

Concentrating upon English liberalism from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, along with twentieth-century American and West German versions of liberalism and social democracy, Foucault provides some prescient implicit suggestions for an engagement with the emerging forces of neo-liberalism in Western Europe as a whole. Two main Weberian themes appear. Firstly, the liberal approach to knowledge as a technology of government is largely neo-Kantian. That is to say, reality is conceived as a complex of events which cannot be accurately represented in knowledge. It might be possible to govern too much, and it might be possible to know

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13 Michel Foucault, *Résumé des cours*, 1970-1982 (Paris: Julliard, 1989) pp. 104-105.

14 Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Poststructuralism," *Telos*, vol. 16, no. 55 (Spring, 1983) p. 201. Interview with Gérard Raulet.

too much about the population. Secondly, liberalism is seen by Foucault as having an ethical component, whereby one of its governmental techniques is to take the liberty of the individual as an object of power. In his 1978 "Sécurité, territoire, population" lectures Foucault emphasises that, in the nineteenth century, liberty and the creation of liberty becomes a duty of government. This is undoubtedly linked to the Weberian themes of *Lebensstil* and *Lebensführung*, the style and conduct of individual life. That is to say, the scope that the individual has to evaluate and perhaps reinvent the use of practical reason in its own life. In suggesting that there might be a need for contemporary discussions on the ethical norms, and the position of the individual with regard, for example, to the provision of health care, Foucault can be seen as approaching a left/liberal position towards the end of his career. For example, in a discussion on social security in 1983, he addresses the problem of health-care in terms of "une demande infinie avec un système fini." In response to this, he proposes a system of "arbitrages et de normativité," whereby some consensus might be reached on the questions of individual responsibilities and rights with respect to health.[15] However, he is at pains to point out that he is not proposing "je ne sais quel libéralisme sauvage" which will only allow those with sufficient funds to be treated, but rather a general ethical consensus on what constitutes the fact of "health": "Je souligne simplement que le fait 'santé' est un fait culturel au sens plus large du terme, c'est-à-dire à la fois politique, économique et social, c'est-à-dire lié à un certain état de conscience individuelle ou collective."[16]

The conclusion to the third chapter addresses the connection between the spatial figures heterogeneity and dispersal, and the concentration upon the individual as an important element in the "game" of government. It is suggested that, by eschewing theories of identity, contract and sovereignty, Foucault sees the individual as constructed by, but also exercising power. Instead of concerning himself with "le sujet de l'énonciation", Foucault begins to look at the individual which is a set of heterogeneous elements, and which operates within hybrid private/public space of the "social".

Foucault looks at liberalism within the context of a biopower, which seeks to foster the life of the population. Western societies are therefore dominated by a dual concentration on the individual and the collectivity; the principle of "omnes et singulatim". One area of future research, which could be developed from Foucault's work, would be the prospect of scientific experimentation upon the individual. Christiane Sinding notes that contemporary developments in genetics raise ethical

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15 Michel Foucault, "Un système fini face à une demande infinie," in *Sécurité sociale: l'enjeu* (Paris: Syros, 1983) p. 59.

16 ibid., p. 60.

questions pre-empted by Foucault in *Naissance de la clinique*.[17] Sinding sees the principle of Foucault's final work as that of analysing forms of individuality imposed by the human sciences, and promoting new forms of subjectivity which might offer an ethically viable alternatives.[18]

The final chapter develops these insights to look at the final theme of the "technologies of the self". Although the subject is constituted by "pratiques d'assujettissement", the individual also has at its disposal more autonomous "pratiques de liberté".[19] This theme is in part at least a continuation of the Weberian concept of a "style" of life, and is also linked to the Kantian question of *Aufklärung*, as the question of identity in the present. It is to the possibility of creating and inventing new possibilities in the field of ethical identity that Foucault now turns his attention:

> Les récents mouvements de libération souffrent du fait qu'ils ne parviennent pas à trouver un principe sur lequel fonder l'élaboration d'une éthique nouvelle. Ils ont besoin d'une éthique mais ils n'en trouvent pas d'autres qu'une éthique basée sur une connaissance prétendue scientifique de ce qu'est le moi, de ce qu'est le désir, de ce qu'est l'inconscient, etc.[20]

The individual is seen now as a collection of heterogeneous elements which, importantly, the subject itself can work upon. In elaborating upon this theme of what might be called self-fashioning, Foucault is shown to re-activate and transform some of the aesthetic questions which informed his earlier work. In considering the aesthetic articulation of ethical questions between the individual and State projects of government, Foucault also develops the Nietzschean theme of the construction of truth. This investigation of the question of truth is linked to the figure of heterogeneity via a thoroughgoing anti-naturalism, both in terms of the analysis of truth as contingent and constructed, and in the more normative sense of Foucault's own admiration for consciously constructed truth. In a similar way, he had not voiced admiration as such for the liberal model of the market, but suggested that the continued presence of such a model within liberal discourse was based not upon claims for the universal truth of the market, but upon its supposed efficacy as a privileged mechanism for the testing of truth. This means in turn that much liberal thought and practice considers that the market should be maintained and constructed, which is seen as in no way contradicting the possibilities it offers for the exercise of freedom. The final phase of Foucault's work is the first in which he looks at the question of truth away from utilitarian or functional considerations of power and domination. In this way, the "savoir/pouvoir"

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17 Christiane Sinding, "La Méthode de la clinique," in *Michel Foucault: lire l'oeuvre*, pp. 59-81.

18 ibid., p. 81.

19 Michel Foucault, "Une esthétique de l'existence," *Le Monde aujourd'hui* (15-16 juillet, 1983) p. xi. Interview with Alessandro Fontana.

20 Michel Foucault, "Le Sexe comme une morale," *Le Nouvel Observateur*, no. 1021 (1 juin, 1984) Interview with Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. p. 62.

formulation, which was itself a conscious move away from the dominant ideology thesis, is developed by giving both elements a positive content.

Christianity, and the "christianisation-in-depth" of modernity provides an ambiguous and under-researched area which links Foucault's work on government, and his final analyses of the ethical concerns of antiquity. The contention that Christianity has gradually instituted a hermeneutic relationship between the self, sexuality and truth is comparatively well-documented. However, Christianity also encourages the ascetic practice of self-renunciation, which is linked to personal freedom. The "spiral" of renunciation and self-examination is the essential dynamic of the Christian relation to the self:

> The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the more we have to renounce ourselves: and the more we want to renounce ourselves, the more we need to bring to light the reality of ourselves. That is what we could call the spiral of truth formulation and reality renouncement that is at the heart of Christian techniques of the self.[21]

In his 1978 lectures, Foucault introduces the idea that the Christian pastoral, along with "le système diplomatico-militaire" and the concern with "la police" in the eighteenth century form the framework of the modern governmental system under which we live in Western Europe. From this very point, and what appears to be overnight, his work takes an abrupt turn to consider the difference between the Christian pastoral and the Greek ideal of "la cité". This discussion forms the basis of the opposition between the Christian period and Antiquity stated above, which forms a large part of Foucault's final two publications. However, just as *Histoire de la folie* contained conscious allegorical references to the Gulag, so this final work makes constant indirect and even direct reference to contemporary political culture, and serves as another "déplacement" in Foucault's conceptions of power and truth.

Although it is not indicated explicitly, Foucault suggests that the explosion of concern for projects of government in the sixteenth century sets in motion an analogous spiral which is likewise concerned with Christian asceticism and self-renunciation, but which emerges in modernity as the Enlightenment question of revolution and identity. The sixteenth century inaugurates a spiral between the Christian form of the pastoral power of the Church and ascetic or mystical "contre-conduites", which resist the power of the pastoral but produce with it a form of "gouvernementalité". The relation between the pastoral and counter-conducts is not a relationship of exteriority and straightforward struggle, but a relation of heterogeneity, whereby the two are in a strategic and tactical relationship which produces a third element. Foucault proposes the replacement of the contemporary notion of dissidence with that of counter-conduct, since the counter-

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21 Michel Foucault, "Sexuality and Solitude," *London Review of Books* (May 21-June 3, 1981) p. 5. Appears in conjunction with a short piece by Richard Sennett.

conduct in some way draws its identity from the conduct that it opposes. His work from the late 'seventies constantly returns to the necessity of inventing new forms of political identity, and thus new forms of rationality, as opposed to the easy denunciation of oppression: "Consequently, those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticise an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake."[22]

Truth and rationality are always "problematisations" of the real. They are ways of highlighting objects, such as sexuality and madness, as the targets of natural concern. The simple aim of Foucault's final work, and perhaps his entire output, is to ask why people become concerned with certain things at certain times. His work leaves us with the question of why he chose increasingly to problematise, to be concerned about, thought itself. We may well ask whether this work of unusual erudition and synthesis will ultimately find its place as an extravagant last attempt to simulate "la bibliothèque fantastique" of the Western culture of print and political rationality. As a laudable but baroque attempt to trace links between the impoverished but curiously compelling home-made rhetoric of the criminal Pierre Rivière, obscure seventeenth-century treatises on matters of police and government, avant-garde literature, detective novels and Machiavelli's advice to the Prince. Or whether his attempts to portray thought as a material force anticipate the non-linguistic information networks to which we are increasingly exposed. Finally, Foucault shows us that thought bears no natural relation to reality. The relation between the two is one of heterogeneity, constantly producing new rationalities for ordering and thinking about reality. But in a characteristically spiralling movement, thought bears no natural relationship to itself. In terms of Foucault's elegant essay on Magritte thought bears a relation of resemblance, and not similitude, to itself. There is no model of thought to copy, but it acts as a series which must constantly refer back to itself.

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22 Michel Foucault, "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'," in Sterling McMurrin, ed., *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values II* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1981) p. 253.

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