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THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION  
OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE  
BARCELONA PERIPHERY  
(A CASE STUDY APPROACH)

A PhD Thesis, undertaken at the Department of Town and  
Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic, and submitted to  
the Council for National Academic Awards.

by

Martin George Wynn, B.A., M.A. (Dunelm)

November, 1980

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THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE BARCELONA PERIPHERY  
(A CASE STUDY APPROACH)

by

MARTIN WYNN

Abstract

In this thesis, a case study approach has been used to investigate the planning and implementation of urban development at local level in the periphery of Barcelona, Spain. From a review of existing literature on the case study research methods in the social sciences, certain guidelines for the research design emerged. A conceptual framework was first assembled, from which research hypotheses were derived, to act as a loose analytical framework within which case study findings could be considered. The conceptual framework incorporates a review of the planning, legislative and developmental backgrounds; and the nine postulated hypotheses concern three interrelated aspects of planning and implementation : planning and control mechanisms, agency roles and activities, and the decision-making process itself. The actual case study method focuses on the compilation, structuring and analysis of three case study 'data-bases', comprising on-file documentation, plans, photographs etc obtained from local planning authorities and development agencies. First-hand accounts from agency personnel were also taken into account in the interpretation of data.

The thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in the subject area in two ways. First, the research findings break new ground as regards existing literature on the development process in Spain. The case studies, both individually and collectively, provide new insights into how and why the planning system failed in its statutorily attributed planning and control functions at local level; and conceptualization and analysis of decision-making in the case studies provide new perspectives on the Spanish planning process. Second, the development and application of a case study research method to investigate the functioning, at local level, of one of Europe's lesser developed planning systems, provides scope for the subsequent adaptation and use of this method for the monitoring and exchange of urban management experience in different planning environments and the conduct of international comparative research.

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Abbreviations used in the Text.

COACB	:	Official College of Architects of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands.
COAATB	:	Official College of Draughtsmen and Architects Assistants of Barcelona.
CUPC	:	Central Urban Planning Commission.
FSR	:	Floor Space Ratio (i.e. number of square metres of Floor Space built per square metre of ground space).
GBPC	:	Greater Barcelona Planning Commission.
GDAUP	:	General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning.
GDUP	:	General Directorate of Urban Planning.
IEAL	:	Institute for the Study of Local Government.
LPM	:	Local Plan Modification.
MCB	:	Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.
MHF	:	Municipal Housing Foundation (Barcelona).
NIH	:	National Institute of Housing.
NUPC	:	National Urban Planning Council.
PPC	:	Provincial Planning Commission.
PTSC	:	Provincial Technical Services Section.
SDRA	:	San Damian Residents Association.
SHA	:	Syndical Housing Authority.
SPIR	:	Special Plan of Interior Reform.

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## INTRODUCTION

### 1. Barcelona and the Development of Research Objectives.

Before embarking on this research project the author lived in Barcelona for over two years. During this period, a review of existing literature and research concerning planning and development in the city was undertaken and this, combined with first-hand experience of the city, provided the initial impetus for this research. One became increasingly aware that the quality of the urban environment, particularly in the city periphery, was poor indeed. Apart from the seemingly low standard of house design and construction, the most striking feature of development in the periphery was the inadequacy, or complete absence, of basic service infrastructure. Housing tower blocks had been built, sometimes on steeply sloping land, hundreds of yards from the nearest road, with no permanent access ways, even for pedestrians; and the nearest 'road' was often not hard-surfaced, sometimes without street lighting, paving, and sewerage and drainage systems (Figure 1). On recently built housing estates, schools and libraries, where they existed, were often makeshift affairs, housed in buildings clearly not originally destined for such purposes. In industrial zones, access roads were invariably poor, drainage channels uncovered and the building lay-out seemingly haphazard. And occasionally, one would stumble on one of the small, remaining shanty towns, in a marginal hill area, or alongside a railway line or industrial estate (Figure 2). In short, the country's planning machinery appeared to have failed to ensure adequate provision of basic service infrastructure in the growth of the periphery.

It was these initial impressions that gave rise to the major objective of this research - namely to investigate decision making in the urban planning process with a view to developing an understanding of how and why the planning machinery had failed in its planning and control functions. It was believed, then, as Drewett has said that,

"the urban development process is the aggregate of many decisions in a complex social-economic-political system, which will remain difficult to articulate and comprehend, unless a deeper understanding is achieved of the decisions determining it" (1).





Figure 1. Hospitalet de Llobregat, 1977.

Typically haphazard development in the Barcelona periphery. (Photograph : M.G. Wynn)




Figure 2. 'La Perona' 1976.

Typical street scene in one of the largest (then) remaining shanty towns. Many of these 900 dwellings, built alongside a railway cutting, have since been destroyed and residents moved to new housing estates.

(Photograph : M. G. Wynn).



Further, a review of planning legislation and relevant literature recommended a research focus at the local planning level; the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act, which established the legislative framework for urban planning in the country for the following 20 years, laid down that city growth should be planned and implemented in 'estates' (poligonos<sup>1</sup>) for which, in most cases, Local Plans would have to be drawn-up and approved. It was at this level then that the interface between planning and development in the post-war could usefully be investigated.

At the same time, the rapid expansion of Barcelona over the past two decades, provided ideal time-space frameworks for studying the functioning of the country's planning machinery in the transformation of green field sites into built-up, functional zones in the city periphery. Thus, although preliminary contacts were made with planning authorities in Madrid, it was soon decided to concentrate solely on Barcelona. Responses from the Polytechnic University and various planning and development agencies in Barcelona<sup>2</sup> were encouraging, and the author's previous knowledge of the region suggested that satisfactory data sources could productively be sought there. Political, administrative and social change since the death of Franco in 1975 had removed many pre-existing barriers to data access, as well as providing a marked impetus to the dynamics of change within the planning and development processes themselves.

Barcelona itself is arguably Spain's leading city. It has been described by Teran as "the centre of one of the most dynamic regions in Spain, an urban system on a European scale" (2). The city is the central nucleus of an urban continuum that encroaches on the majority of the 28 municipalities that make up the Barcelona Sub-Region,

<sup>1</sup> 'poligonos', literally 'polygons'. There is no really accurate translation for the use of the word in its planning and developmental context, although 'estate' seems the nearest. It implies development of more than one block ('manzana'), but could also be extremely large (e.g. Ciudad Badia, a mini 'new-town' of 5000 dwellings outside Barcelona, is referred to as a 'poligono').

<sup>2</sup> In Barcelona, the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission, School of Civil Engineers (Barcelona University) and Provincial Office of the Syndical Housing Authority pledged support. Professor Serratosa, formerly Director of the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission, and then Professor in the School of Engineers, agreed to act as external supervisor for the research (see Appendix 1).

which is itself part of a Metropolitan Area covering 193 municipalities with a total population of over 4 million people (Figure 3). The Metropolitan Area (MAB) constitutes the largest concentration of population in the country - 10.8% of the national total of 36 million - and accounted for 25% (100,000 a year) of the national annual demographic increase in the early seventies; the MAB produces 16% of the Gross National Product, consumes 20% of the nation's fuel intake and 20% of its electricity. It is the greatest producer of textiles in the country and supplies 15% of Spain's metallurgical goods; its port is the first in terms of value of merchandise, and the city is the editorial centre of Spain with an intense cultural and artistic life to complement its economic dynamism. In an EEC context the MAB is the obvious development centre<sup>3</sup> to challenge the other Mediterranean ports of the common market countries.

The research methodology employed in this thesis centres on a case study approach, and the rationale behind the adoption of such an approach and selection of the case studies is argued in Chapter 1 and 4. Briefly, however, we can note here that a review of case study research in the social sciences highlighted the advantages that case studies offer for investigating what Walton terms "processes of change" (4), such as those associated with peripheral development. Parallel running research undertaken by Faludi et al (5), Hammett (6) and Masser et al (7) on planning and development in different parts of Holland also centred on case studies of the decision-making process, and Masser et al have recently pointed out how case study research needs to be extended "in the light of further case studies, to make it applicable for complex and poorly structured planning processes" (8). It was hoped, then, that the development and testing of a case study method in a Spanish planning environment would provide evidence of the potential and value of such an approach, which might subsequently be used in other planning environments.

<sup>3</sup> Spain is scheduled to become the EEC's 12th member, following Portugal and Greece to full membership in the 1980's. The Metallurgical Industries Council of Spain have asserted that "the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona is precisely the vertex of the triangle (within Spain) best oriented to meet European competition i.e. Barcelona-Madrid-Bilbao. Thus, there is a need for orderly growth in the region and its firm establishment as a bridgehead against the industrial triangles of Lyon-Grenoble-Marseilles and Milan-Turin-Genoa". (3)




Figure 3. Major Administrative Divisions in Catalonia.

Catalonia consists of four Provinces - Barcelona, Lerida, Gerona and Tarragona. Within the Province of Barcelona, the Barcelona municipality is one of 28 municipalities which comprise the Barcelona Sub-Region. The Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, as defined in the 1968 Plan Director (see Chapter 2, Section 5) comprises 193 municipalities.

The need to test such methods would seem of particular value in a European context, for, although existing planning literature contains broad descriptive overviews of the Regional-Economic and Physical planning systems, e.g. Hall (9); Wood and Lee (10), the functioning of the development process at local level remains relatively unresearched. This is particularly true of the Southern European countries, where, despite the planned entrance of Spain, Portugal and Greece into the EEC in the 1980's, the functioning of the planning and development processes at both macro and micro levels remains poorly documented. It was hoped that this thesis, in a Spanish planning context at least, would go some way towards redressing this balance.

## 2. Research Hypotheses and Research Results.

Case study research is in many ways a cyclical process by which hypotheses are developed inductively as much as tested deductively (see Chapter 1). Similarly, case studies are set within a broad conceptual framework which itself is developed and refined as the research project progresses (see Figures 5 and 45). This is well illustrated by the refinement of hypotheses that took place during the first year's research, by the end of which development of the conceptual framework was well advanced, preliminary research on a number of case studies was underway, and a total of nine loose interrelated hypotheses had been established, pertaining to three main aspects of planning and implementation.

These hypotheses, then, were designed to provide a loose analytical framework within which case study findings could be considered and compared. For reference purposes, it is perhaps useful to state these in full here. They are :-

### A. CONCERNING PLANNING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS.

- (1) That the Local Plan/Roads and Services Project/Building Permit/Industrial Licence mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of development in the Franco era.
- (2) That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Planning Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of service infrastructure in the implementation of estate development in the Franco era.

- (3) That the Special Plan of Interior Reform has functioned successfully in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal in the post-Franco era.

B. CONCERNING AGENCY ROLES AND ACTIVITIES.

- (4) That local planning authorities have failed to exercise their statutory attributed planning and control functions.
- (5) That State housing authorities have failed to observe statutory planning procedure in the planning and implementation of housing estates.
- (6) That private sector developers have been permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure.
- (7) That the Residents Associations have emerged as an important force in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal schemes in recent years.

C. CONCERNING THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

- (8) That irregularities in the decision-making process have been common-place.
- (9) That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

These hypotheses, then, provided a loose structure for the analysis of case studies, and it is believed that the research findings break new ground as regards existing literature on the planning and development processes in Spain. The case studies revealed how the planning and control system and the 'systems of intervention' created in the 1956 Planning Act were likely to be unworkable or ineffective in practice, given the limitations imposed on land ownership and development by the political and economic structure of society in the Franco era; and how the statutory planning system was frequently contravened by both public and private agencies during this period. The cases also throw light on the changes in agency roles and activities in the seventies, when, in different developmental contexts, and within reformed planning and legislative frameworks, improvement, renewal and service provision emerged as major aspects of change; at the same time, the inadequacy of existing planning machinery to deal effectively with these aspects of development has been highlighted. Further, consideration

of the decision-making process itself led to some necessarily tentative suggestions for the future development of analytical frameworks for researching this aspect of planning and implementation in other developmental contexts.

In general, it is felt that this thesis constitutes a significant contribution to two main aspects of international comparative research. First, as noted above, the case study findings provide documented evidence of a hitherto unresearched area of planning and development, which may be seen as complementary to the findings from the growing number of research projects (often financed by international organizations<sup>4</sup>) focusing on planning and development in Europe, which nevertheless generally exclude Spain from their field of study. Second, the use of the case study research method to investigate the functioning of one of Europe's lesser developed planning systems, may give encouragement and provide useful experience for its adaptation and application in other local planning environments both within and outside Europe. Whilst some progress<sup>5</sup> has already been made in this direction, it is

<sup>4</sup> For example, the EEC financed project on 'Urban problems facing the Community', currently be undertaken by the Centre for Environmental Studies, London; the project on 'Urban Change and urban growth in Europe 1950-75', financed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), now nearing completion at the Department of Geography, University of Reading (under the direction of Professor Peter Hall); and the 'Costs of Urban Growth' project, involving research in 14 European countries, currently being organised and co-ordinated by the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences (The Vienna Centre).

<sup>5</sup> Further case studies, using the same methodology as that used in this thesis, have been undertaken in Santander (Spain) and Milton Keynes and Nottingham (England) with finance from the Urban Management Unit of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris. Data-bases are available from the Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic and research findings from two of these cases have recently been published; see M. Wynn, P. Portilla and J. Urena 'The Port Service Area Project, Santander', Planning and Administration, 1980, No. 1; and M. Wynn and I. Haywood, 'The Buildings, Eastwood, Industrial Archaeology, Winter, 1978.

hoped that this research project, in conjunction with others<sup>6</sup> using similar methodologies, may provide the stimulus for further case study work in the near future.

### 3. Thesis Plan and Presentation

Whilst the contents page of this thesis gives the bones of the thesis structure, an attempt is made here to briefly put each chapter in the context of the research project as a whole. At the same time, this section makes a few introductory comments on the style of presentation and layout used in the thesis.

Chapter one discusses some of the methodological problems, and theoretical and practical implications of adopting a case study approach. It establishes that case studies must be set within a broad conceptual framework, and that a number of related, loose, hypotheses should be formulated, to be developed and reconsidered in the light of case study findings. The following three chapters (2-4) concern the development of this conceptual framework and the formulation of hypotheses. Chapter 2 deals with the historical, legislative, and broad planning contexts; Chapter 3 describes the local developmental and planning backgrounds. In Chapter 4, the main points of the previous two chapters are summarised in the form of a synthesis, from which nine loose hypotheses are derived; and the rationale underlying the selection of three case studies is argued.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 contain rigorous description and systematic analysis of the different 'Phases' of development encompassed by the case studies. Finally, Chapter 8 draws the research findings together to provide an overview of various aspects of the planning and implementation of development that the case studies set out to examine; concluding remarks are also made on the strengths and weaknesses of the research method, and a series of summary statements are provided in the form of a conclusion to the thesis as a whole.

<sup>6</sup> Most notable here are the case studies undertaken by I. Masser et al at Utrecht University, and those carried out in Oxford and Delft by A. Faludi et al; see I. Masser, W. Van Hal, W. Post and R. Van Schijndel 'The Dynamics of the Development Process: Two Case Studies' Town Planning Review, Vol. 49 No. 2, 1978; W. Van Hal, W. Post and R. Van Schijndel, Een Analyse van Besluitvormingsnetwerken (Oostrand Project Report No. 7), Utrecht, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht Instituut voor Planologie, 1976; A. Faludi, S. Hamnett, D. Barell, D. Thomas, S. Hopkins, J. Minett, Oxford-Leiden, A Comparative Study of Local Planning, Oxford Polytechnic/Delft University, 1978, Project Papers 1-5.

There are also two appendices. The first comprises letters of support from agencies and authorities who kindly provided access to on-file documentation; the second, in accordance with CNAA regulations, contains material published by the author whilst undertaking this research thesis.

As regards the lay-out and presentation of the thesis, brief summaries have been provided at the end of most chapters, noting the major points. Each chapter is divided into sections (e.g. 2.2 The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956), and some sections have their own sub-sections (e.g. 2.2.1 Plans and Planning Authorities). Following the CNAA and British Standard guidelines, one noting system has been used for works actually cited or referred to in the text, another for footnotes which follow-up or refer to points made in the text. For the former, numbers, typed on the line in round brackets, have been used; in the latter, numbers, typed above the line as superscripts, without brackets, are employed. The references are listed at the back of the thesis in the order in which they appear in the text, and a full bibliography is also provided. For the citations, taken from Spanish works, included in the text, all translations are by the author of this thesis. For Figures and Tables included in the text, the original source (if there is one) is given underneath.



## CHAPTER 1

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN : A CASE STUDY APPROACH

"Case studies are not easy to do. In the conduct of a case study, a whole range of problems will have been resolved, for better or worse. In planning a case study, considerations arise about the circumstances of the case, the conduct of the study and the consequences of the research; since these considerations are fundamentally inter-related, choices in one domain will have implications for the others. If the case study worker is not to lose control of these implications, he must 'get it all together', i.e. have a considered stance on the issues raised across the board." (11)

Dr C Adelman, 2nd Cambridge Conference on Case Studies.

The methodological dilemmas implicit in the above citation perhaps help to explain why case study research methods are generally poorly developed. Certainly, in the 'practitioner disciplines' such as Town and Country Planning, only recently have attempts been made to establish general guidelines for the design and execution of case study research; and yet recent research focuses on, for example, plan implementation<sup>7</sup> and comparative planning<sup>8</sup> have served to underline the need for the development and testing of case study research methods.

This chapter, then, discusses various aspects of case study research methodology. First, some definitions and advantages attributed to case study are considered. Section Two deals with the thorny problems of generalization and hypotheses development from case studies and Section Three discusses some aspects of planning theory which, although not central to the investigation, are of relevance to the decision-centred focus of the case study research. Section Four concerns the problems and practicalities of data collection and analysis. Finally, Section Five briefly summarises the main points of the chapter.

<sup>7</sup> For a review of recent research on implementation, see M. Hill et al, Implementation and the Central-Local Relationship, Report to Social Science Research Council by School of Advanced Urban Studies (SAUS), University of Bristol (mimeo), 1978.

<sup>8</sup> For a review of problems involved in comparative planning studies, see A. Faludi and S. Hamnett, The Study of Comparative Planning, CES CP, March 1975.

## 1.1 Case Study : Some Definitions, Descriptions and Advantages

Recent attention by educational researchers on case study research methods have produced attempts to define 'case study'. Adelman et al see case study as "an umbrella term for a family of research methods, having in common the decision to focus an enquiry around an instance," (12) whilst Nisbett and Watt note that a case study must be "more than just an extended example or an anecdote interestingly narrated. It must have interest, relevance and a sense of reality, but it must go beyond mere illustration". (13) They go on to stress that evidence must be gathered systematically and presented in a way that demonstrates the interaction of factors and events. The case study reveals, then, as Oscar Lewis has pointed out, "what institutions mean to individuals, and helps us to get beyond form and structure to the realities of human life ,or to use Manlinowski's term 'it puts flesh and blood on the skeleton'." (14)

Nisbett and Watt also point out the importance of the flexibility and adaptability that case study research facilitates, stressing a case study's "capacity to take into account the uncontrolled variables, those aspects of a situation - often important ones - which you have not clearly foreseen at the time when you began to gather your data." (15) This freedom to 'follow one's nose' has been termed 'theoretical sampling' by Glaser and Strauss, enabling the researcher to "jointly collect, code and analyse his data, and then decide what data to collect next and where to find them." (16) In similar vein, and referring particularly to planning research, Hamnett has praised the facility of case studies "to move with events - its dynamic character - and the way in which it has proved possible to integrate historical material, secondary sources, participant interviews and the perceptions of various actors in the case." (17)

The realism, incisiveness and flexibility of case study research make it a particularly valuable approach for researching the dynamics of the planning process. Indeed some argue that such processes can only be investigated through case studies. Walton, for example, asserts that:

"The case study can attend to aspects of a change programme which other methodologies cannot; namely processes of change and of change interventions." (18)

To do this effectively, Walton concludes case studies must

- 1) contain longitudinal data from each of several phases -- pre-intervention, intervention, post intervention.
- 2) contain a rigorous description of the process, especially during the intervention phase and
- 3) conceptualize and theorize about the process itself, e.g. the place of interactions, phases, critical incidents and their effect on subsequent attitudes and actions.

We shall return to look at these design objectives subsequently (in Section Four), after an examination of the major methodological dilemmas inherent in case study research. We can summarise this introductory section by stating that although specific case study research methodologies are not well established in town planning, a brief review of relevant literature from other disciplines suggests a case study research approach is well suited to investigating dynamic change processes. It is such processes, as evidenced in the growth of the Barcelona periphery, that are the focus of this research project.

## 1.2 Case Studies and Hypotheses Development


"It might be asked whether the generalisations produced in case study are stronger or weaker than those of experimental research. Stronger or weaker, they tend to be different. At risk of oversimplification, it might be argued that case study and experimental research are based on different views of social science: case study might be seen in the context of an historical or interpretive tradition; experimental research in the context of a natural science tradition." (19)

In case study research, the cases themselves constitute the actual tool for investigation of the subject area. This has meant that case study research has generally been associated with the inductive development of hypotheses, as compared with the classic logico-deductive research method. Towl, for example, writing in McNair's now standard work on the Harvard Case Method, noted:

"The decision to base a research project on cases carries with it an obligation to adhere to the individual method and not to gather material primarily with a view to demonstrating the validity of preconceived ideas." (20)

Thus, in case study research, rather than deductively 'testing' specific hypotheses, one may set out with open loosely structured hypotheses which can be developed, extended and clarified through the incorporation of new knowledge brought to light in the case studies.

As Waldo (21) and Webb (22) have pointed out, this association with induction has led some critics to question the value of case study research because of the problems involved in generalizing from cases. Here, Adelman et al's (23) distinction between the three types of generalization (Figure 4) that could be linked with case study research is of importance. First, generalizations can be made 'within' and 'about' each case study individually e.g. the planning and implementation of San Cosme (Chapter 5) was characterized by irregularities in the statutory planning process.



#### Types of Generalization

1. 'Within' cases
2. 'Between' cases
3. 'Upwards' or 'from' cases

Figure 4. Generalization in Case Study Research

Secondly, generalizations can be made 'between' two or more cases e.g. the San Cosme and Can Serra (Chapter 6) cases are characterized by irregularities in the statutory planning process. Thirdly, generalizations might be made 'upwards' or from cases e.g. based on the 3 case studies we can say that irregularities in the planning process characterize the planning and implementation of development in the Barcelona periphery. What it is important to stress is that the academic standing of case study research does not hinge on the defence of this third type of generalization from an 'experimental research standpoint'. Given the vast number of variables involved in cases as complex as those used in this research, it can justifiably be argued that this upward generalization from cases (i.e. about a 'class' of which the case is an 'instance') can never be 'scientifically rigorous'. This has led Glaser and Strauss (24) to suggest that individual case studies, or sets of case studies can be used to generate 'multiple theories', all grounded in different sets of empirical data. The essential point would seem to be, however, that it is the generalization and conceptualization within and between cases which represents the major component of this type of research, and this in itself is its 'raison de'etre'. Of course, cases cannot just be left floating in thin air, and some delimiting context or 'conceptual framework' must be given (and this itself can be refined and developed through the case studies); but this is not to say that case study findings facilitate sweeping generalizations about certain variables examined in specific case studies.

This approach has been termed 'abduction' by Faludi et al, who differentiate it from 'induction' as follows :-

"Unlike induction, which requires a logical progression from singular statements about observations to validated generalization, abduction is a process of devising sets of concepts to organize and explain data without claiming that these concepts are 'valid' just because they have been derived from facts. Such validation as is possible is left for subsequent stages of the research process." (25)

Thus, by providing wider-ranging surveys and overviews, case studies can be set in a broader context, giving research results a deeper significance. And the case studies themselves contribute to this broader picture both directly, through the case study data, and




Figure 5. The Cyclical Nature of Case Study Research

indirectly by suggesting new lines of inquiry and variables which might be considered at the macro-level. Similarly, the development of hypotheses is a cyclical, incremental process which reflects the nature of case study findings. (Figure 5) We have already noted that case studies can accommodate the 'uncontrolled variables' not clearly foreseen when data-gathering began; and so hypotheses must be loosely formulated and open-ended, particularly when the subject area is relatively new and unresearched. Nisbett and Watt have contrasted the respective roles of hypotheses in case study and survey as follows :-

"both survey and case study involve formulation of hypotheses. Without hypotheses, both become merely a formless and uninformative rag-bag of observations. Hypotheses have to be specified at an early stage in a survey, and this makes it more rigorous, but also more limited. In case study, it is possible to preserve a more open approach, until the researcher has really begun to 'get the feel' of the situation ... The two approaches can be used to complement each other: together they represent the macro and micro-approach. A large scale survey can be followed up by case studies to test out conclusions by examining specific instances. Alternatively, for opening up a new problem where it is difficult to formulate hypotheses, the case study may precede a survey, to identify key issues". (26)

Based on similar reasoning, Hall et al (27) stipulate certain safeguards which should be observed in the broad design and execution of case study research, and it is these that are used as guidelines for this research. These may be summarised as follows :-

- 1) There must be an acknowledged conceptual framework, however modest or rudimentary with reference to which the cases are studied and conclusions drawn. There must be a set of questions or loose hypotheses which cases are intended to help answer. There has to be a delimiting context.
- 2) There needs to be a collection of cases sharing this common framework and, as far as possible, concerned with a reasonably similar order or episodes or events. The notion of a 'collection' implies some prior system of classification.

- 3) Following from this last assumption, we must try to proceed by the comparison of cases. Generalization implies a search for regularities within and between cases. The task becomes more possible to the extent that we take our first precaution: namely start with a conceptual framework. Only in this way will sufficient order be imposed upon the mass of information which cases studies provide.
- 4) Finally, we must try to avoid the traps which case studies set for us. Case studies overwhelmingly move towards a conclusion; but the process itself is clearly a flow of events and actions over time in which few of the participants will be concerned with that development alone, and some hardly conscious of it as a 'development' at all. The researcher raises it to a special position and thereby artificially removes it from the press of other concurrent, overlapping and competing events. Although some boundaries have to be imposed, the more the chosen case or cases are set in the context of what else was or was not happening, as well as being related to a relevant history, the less risk there will be of this oversimplification.

In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, major aspects (legislative, historical, planning, spatial etc) of the conceptual framework are examined and these are summarised in Chapter 4, where the loose hypotheses for research are stated and selection of the case studies discussed. First, however, let us turn our attention to some areas of planning theory upon which this research project encroaches.

### 1.3 A decision-centred focus : theoretical perspectives

We have briefly noted in the Introduction to this thesis that the primary research objective was to investigate how and why 'estate' development had taken place, at local level, in the Barcelona periphery, over the past two decades; and in this chapter we have seen how case studies may be used to develop hypotheses relating to such change processes. In each case study of local level development, then, the inquiry centres on investigating what may be termed the 'mechanics and dynamics' of development; in other words, we are concerned with examining the type of planning mechanisms used in local level development, and the decision-process involved in getting that development on the



ground; and in examining the decision-making process we are concerned not only with investigating the strategies, roles and interactions of the various planning and development agencies, but also with attempting to conceptualize and theorize about the decision-making process itself. This section explores some of the more fundamental concepts involved in adopting such a 'decision-centred focus', and the discussion is reinforced and extended in the next section which concerns the more practical and technical area of data collection, structuring and analysis.

Apart from the fact that this research is 'decision-centred' it may also be termed 'bottom-up', in that its starting point is to investigate how and why existing development took place in selected case studies. It assumes that a mass of decisions, acts and activities are responsible for development having taken place, and this can be conceived of as the 'development process'. The research focus, however, does not directly encompass all these decisions (indeed there are so many that it would be impossible to do so anyway), but rather centres on those which relate most directly to the role of urban planning in this process. In other words we are concerned with the functioning of planning and control mechanisms, and the decisions and activities of both planning and development agencies which determine that functioning. This more limited flow of decisions, acts and activities may be conceived of as the 'planning process', and for the purposes of this research, we will broadly accept Levin's definition of the planning process, which is as follows :-

"It will be convenient to define 'the planning process' in an urban planning context as comprising the sequence of steps - acts, actions and activities - that begin with the first step towards meeting a perceived need for urban development, and end when the development has been realized, or when there is no longer any intention to go ahead. On this definition the planning process extends beyond the preparation and adoption of a plan, and this is in recognition of the fact that the best-laid plans are liable to change (twixt cup and lip)." (28)

This, then, brings us onto the related and much debated area of 'planning' and 'implementation'. Over the past five years, a plethora of books and articles have been published dealing with various aspects of 'implementation' and more recently authors such as Hill (29) have attempted to disentangle its various meanings.

The majority of authors writing on implementation are essentially writing about 'policy implementation' although some such as Lichfield (30) have tried to provide frameworks for studying 'plan implementation', seeing this as one stage within the 'rational decision-making model' of the planning process. This model, which underlies the bulk of existing literature on policy and planning implementation, presupposes that the policy and planning processes can be divided, for the sake of analysis, into a series of stages, of which implementation is one. This has been challenged by authors such as Flynn and Lewis (31) who, building on Anderson's assertion that 'policy is being made as it is being administered, and administered as it is being made' (32) suggest that the idea of a linear division of these processes into stages is not acceptable for the study of plan and policy making and implementation. Rather, they suggest that implementation should be seen as a 'description of actual behaviour' concerned with 'how things get done' on the ground.

This latter-stated view accords most closely with the 'bottom-up' stance of this research. As in Levin's and Masser et al's research into town expansion schemes in Great Britain and Holland respectively, the planning and development processes are seen as "growing commitments to particular courses of action" (33), reflecting what Lindblom has termed "partisan mutual adjustment" (34). Thus, although both 'planning' and 'implementation' appear in the title of this thesis, and are used subsequently, this does not imply that it is accepted that both are easily identifiable categories within the planning and development processes. Rather, it is hoped that research findings will enable us to comment on how such categorization fits the realities of decision-making in a Spanish urban planning context.

This brings us to the broader and more fundamental question of planning paradigms. As is well known the 'decision-centred' paradigm, which is at the heart of planning theory and practice in Great Britain, "is concerned with the processes and techniques which are employed by planners in their work as well as the operating modes of planning agencies" (35). The 'political-economy' paradigm on the other hand, has its foundation in the analyses of late capitalism, and identifies contemporary planning explicitly as one aspect of the growing intervention of the State in the continuing conflicts of interests which characterise capitalist societies.

These two paradigms are often seen as being mutually exclusive, and Frisby (36), amongst others, has likened discourse between the two camps to a dialogue between the deaf. In Spain, and particularly in Catalonia, most of the literature that has appeared on planning and development over the past five years has been dominated by those adopting structuralist-marxists ('political-economy') frameworks for analysis.<sup>9</sup> Yet this research project, with its focus on the mechanics and dynamics of planning and development at local level, is clearly more closely allied to the decision-centred paradigm. It is thus of considerable interest that Faludi has recently suggested that the two paradigms can live happily together, side by side.

<sup>9</sup> The importance of the impact of these modes of thought on Spain's planning is indicated by Teran who has recently suggested that this influx of new theoretical perspectives was largely responsible for the widespread resignations of planners and economists working on the revision of the national Land and Urban Planning Act (Chapter 2) in the seventies. Teran asserts that:-

"One must see this in terms of the invasion of the Spanish cultural panorama by the new and enlightening theoretical content of the French structuralist - marxist school and the Italian parallels. The appearance of the works of Castells, Poulantzas, Lojkine, Preteceille, Indovina, Ceccarelli, etc, in the early seventies marked a new and persuasive general orientation of thinking and explanation of reality through which the Act was viewed with increasing hostility".

F. de Teran, 'El Planeamiento Urbano en la España Contemporanea', Gustais Gili, Madrid, 1979, p. 593.

Faludi comments that :-

"It is possible to see a certain measure of convergence between the two paradigms ... recent work in Germany points in the same direction. Research into local politics has attempted to interpret relations at micro-level in terms of the macro-level principles of the political-economy of late capitalism. My work is being undertaken in this belief, the emphasis being on decisions and actions of participants in the 'planning process' but with the awareness that these are set within a framework which is determined by macro-level forces and which frequently limits their freedom of action".(37)

This debate is not central to this thesis, and we will not pursue it further here. Suffice it to say, however, that although the conceptual framework for analysis in this thesis (Chapter 4) is based essentially on local level planning and decision-making, it is contended that, as Faludi suggests, this does not necessarily preclude setting the research findings within wider-ranging, political-economy contexts. Let us now turn to consider some of the concepts involved in the collection, structuring and analysis of case study data.

#### 1.4 Data Collection. Structuring and Analysis

This research project focuses on decisions that led to, and were part of, the planning and implementation of peripheral development in Barcelona in three separate case studies. These case studies involve central and local governments, public housing authorities, private developers, consultant planners and resident associations and it is these authorities that have been used as major data sources. Leaving aside the examination of relevant legislation and existing literature (Chapters 2 and 3), the primary data in the case studies comprises the authentic documentation of plans and decisions, taken from the files and archives of the above-mentioned agencies. At the same time, interviews with agency personnel have occasionally suggested that important decisions may not have been recorded, for one reason or another, in the on-file documentation, and thus personal accounts have at times been used to 'plug the gaps', as well as generally contributing to an overall comprehension of the order, flow, and overlap of events and activities.

The vast number of decisions involved, however, poses certain problems. Faludi has pointed out how "the implementation of plans involves operational decisions taken over considerable periods of time, and there are hundreds, maybe even thousands, of operational decisions involved in implementing just one plan"; (38) and this has led Whitehand to assert, with regard to peripheral urban growth that, "the decision-making process is exceedingly time consuming to study and by its very nature only a small fragment of it can ever be unravelled." (39) A selection process is therefore necessary and yet this inevitably raises questions of 'validity' similar to those discussed in section two of this chapter, with regard to generalization in case study research. Altshuler, faced with this problem in the data-gathering process for his four case studies which aimed "to isolate and analyze fundamental obstacles to land-use planning" (40) in the U.S.A., defended the necessity for this selection as follows:-

"whenever a study focuses on a small sample of decisions.. the objection may validly be made that their relevant uniqueness is unknowable with any certainty or precision. A related charge that might be levelled is that the methods of information - gathering employed in this study were insufficiently rigorous ... the defence against the charge ... is that the greatest care for accuracy (of both fact and inference) consistent with the purposes of the study and the resources available for it, has been taken.... The ultimate defence of this defence must in turn be that, if its validity were denied, scholarly consideration of nearly all important social and political issues would have to cease, pending the unlikely development of rigorous scientific procedures for dealing with them". (41)

In this sort of case study research, then, the assumption must be, as Masser et al (42) have pointed out, that decision-making can be studied at different levels of complexity; inevitably data collection, and analyses, could be undertaken at both higher and lower levels of complexity within the general conceptual framework of this research project.

As regards the structuring and analysis of data, Berelson (43) has pointed out that the constant review and redesign of analytical methods is a well-known normal tendency of qualitative research, and

this is particularly true of case study research (Figure 5). The initial structuring of data took place more or less at source. With the help of agency staff, and bearing in mind the procedural aspects of the Spanish planning machinery (Chapter 2), a loosely structured data-base was compiled for each case study. These data-bases were divided into 'decision-making areas',<sup>10</sup> each representing roughly defined, sometimes overlapping, stages in the decision-making process; and for each 'decision-making area' a summary 'commentary' of the content and context of the documentation was undertaken, as a first step towards comprehending, conceptualizing and analysing the processes involved.

In Chapter 4, the loose hypotheses (closely related to the conceptual framework for research) to be examined in each case study are stated. These concern three major aspects of the planning and implementation of development:- the role of the statutory planning mechanisms; the role, strategies and interaction of major actors; and conceptualization of the decision-making process itself. As noted above, each data-base was divided into 'decision-making areas', and the writing, rewriting, comparison and descriptive analyses of the accompanying commentaries constitutes perhaps the most important means

<sup>10</sup> The Decision-Making Areas were so termed because they are loose, provisional classifications of decisions and documents that will inevitably encompass more than one decision, particularly as we are largely concerned with inter-agency, or inter-departmental decision-making. In this context, this thesis accepts Levin's conception of decision, which builds on the definitions of Jaques and Etzioni. Levin notes:-

"It is commonplace that there occur during planning processes certain events, each of which may - without offending against the customary usage of language - be described as the taking of a decision to do something. Observation of the common features of such events suggests that we may define the taking of a decision of this kind .. as the performing of an action of conscious choice that generates commitment on the part of the decision taker towards carrying out an envisaged course of action of some specificity. Where the decision taker is a group of people, the act of conscious choice is in fact an aggregate of such acts on the part of individual members of the group." (44)



of developing and extending these hypotheses. At the same time, however, graphic representations of the decision-making process were used as analytical aids and it is perhaps worth briefly reviewing here some of the ways in which these can be used in decision-making studies.




Figure 6. Wheaton's 'Flow of Communication in a Development Decision Process'.

Wheaton is primarily concerned with illustrating how the decision-making process is dependent on 'networks of political influence' via the 'information links' shown on his figure. Although this research does not share such a political science orientation, similar graphic representations of the decision-making process can be used as aids to analysis.

Source : W. Wheaton, 'Integration at the Urban Level : Political Influence and the Decision Process', in P. Jacob and J. Toscano (eds), The Integration of Political Communities, Lippincott, New York, 1964.

In the field of political science, Wheaton's decision-flow figure for decision-making in a development corporation (Figure 6) highlights the potential value of graphic representation of inter-agency and inter-departmental decision-making. In similar vein, decision-making networks were assembled for each of the case study data-bases, showing

which agencies were involved in each of the decision-making areas; Masser et al, who constructed similar networks (Figure 7) for their case studies of town expansion schemes in Holland, have noted that "this enables large quantities of detailed information to be summarised in an easily understandable form, which draws attention to the sequencing of events over time". (45)

These networks can be refined, however, to include more than just 'decisions'. We have already noted that one of the research objectives is to examine the role of statutory local planning mechanisms (Local Plans, Roads and Service Projects etc, see Chapter 2) in the planning and development processes. The actual drawing-up of such plans, can be conceived of as an 'activity' or 'sub-process', which stems from or leads to actual decisions e.g. authorization, approval etc, and or other 'activities' eg. tendering, construction. Yet these activities themselves incorporate a whole range of decisions which




Figure 7. Masser et al's Decision Making Network for Rustenburg, Holland.

Each number represents a stage in the decision-making process; slightly more heavily ringed numbers are the 'critical points' in the process.

Source : I. Masser, W. Van Hal, W. Post, R. Van Schijndel, 'The Dynamics of Development Processes', Town Planning Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 1978.



are generally of less importance than those referred to above. Here, then, we can distinguish between 'strategic' and 'dependent' decisions, much in the way Steeley does in his assessment of Strategic Local Planning in Great Britain

"My first distinction is between strategic and dependent decisions. I am using the word 'strategic' operationally, that is, that the decision is consciously seen to govern what subsequently happens. Dependent decisions are but relatively minor steps in a predetermined process, and are concerned more with the onward flow of events than the initiating or shaping of them". (46)

Thus in the decision-making networks used in the case study analyses, the bulk of actual decisions or acts represented as such are those considered to be 'strategic'; 'activities' or 'sub-processes' are understood to involve a number of 'dependent' decisions which individually are not actually shown on the networks. As already noted, such selectivity is inevitable and quite consistent with the 'intermediate level' of complexity at which decision-making is being investigated.

This form of network presentation is also of considerable use in considering the roles and strategies of the various entities involved in the decision-making process, providing overviews of inter-agency decision flows over long periods of time. Masser et al (47) have also attempted to identify 'critical points' and 'thresholds' in the overall decision-making process. Certainly, in attempting to conceptualize and theorize about the processes involved, graphic representations of different phases, sub-processes, linkages and key decisions, such as those devised elsewhere by Boyce, May and McDonald (48), Kaiser and Weiss (Figure 8) and Friend and Jessop (Figure 9) can play a part.

It seems important, however, to finally stress two points. First, these are essentially aids to analysis, which have been used to develop and graphically illustrate the research findings, and to stimulate discussion and response from agency personnel (see 'acknowledgements' in front of thesis), whose opinions and perspectives have been taken into account in the interpretation of data. Secondly,




Figure 8. Kaiser and Weiss's Conceptualization of the 'Residential Land Conversion Process'.

In Kaiser and Weiss's model, the division of the 'land conversion process' into a sequence of stages, with their corresponding key decisions, bears similarities to Masser et al's identification of 'thresholds' and 'critical points' in the decision-making process in town-expansion schemes in Holland.

Source :- E. Kaiser and S. Weiss 'Public Policy and the Residential Development Process' Journal of the American Institute of Planners, January, 1970.




Figure 9. Friend and Jessop's Sequential Network Analysis.

Similar graphic representations can be used to illustrate the inter-dependence and overlap of sub-processes in the planning and implementation of case study development.

Source : J. Friend and N. Jessop, Local Government and Strategic Choice : An Operational Research Approach to the Process of Public Planning, London, Tavistock, 1969.

and notwithstanding the above point, we must always bear in mind that in this form of 'retrospective monitoring' the identification of 'phases', 'critical points' etc inevitably involves subjective judgements. This, to some extent, can hopefully be offset by the quality of the argument; and, as noted above, in the guidelines we are using for this research (section 2), we must attempt to find a set of cases, sharing a common framework, and set them in the context of what else was or was not happening at the time to avoid oversimplification. It is to these aspects of the research that we turn in the next three chapters.

### 1.5 Summary of Main Points

- (a) Case Study is a particularly suitable research method for investigating change processes.
- (b) Loose initial hypotheses can be developed and extended through making generalizations 'within' and 'between' case studies; these case studies must also be set in a wider 'conceptual' framework'.
- (c) The research focus is 'decision-centred' in that it concerns the flow of decisions and activities involved in the planning and implementation of development at the local level; but this does not necessarily preclude viewing research findings within wider-ranging macro-level contexts.
- (d) The research cannot encompass all decisions involved in the planning and implementation of the three case studies, and a selection process is necessary.
- (e) Graphic representations are particularly useful aids to understanding and conceptualizing the decision-making process.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE PLANNING SYSTEM IN SPAIN

In the previous chapter it was established that case studies must be set within a broad conceptual framework, to enhance the significance and understanding of research findings. This chapter provides a wide-ranging review of the major features of the plans and planning acts which set the national and sub-regional contexts for the investigation of local level planning and development in Spain and Barcelona.

The key piece of legislation is the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act, which provided the framework for the functioning of urban planning in the country for the next two decades. The 1956 Act represented, in fact, the consolidation of previous legislation and the crystalization of a planning doctrine that had evolved over the previous century. For this reason, Section One of this chapter briefly outlines the pertinent antecedents to the 1956 Act and helps set it in a broader historical context. The major features of the Act are then examined in Section Two, and an overview of the functioning of the planning system in the post-1956 era is given in Section Three. Recent reform in the planning machinery, embodied in the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, is outlined in Section Four, and Section Five examines the 1953 and 1976 Sub-Regional Plans for Barcelona. Finally Section Six summarises the main points of the chapter as a whole.

#### 2.1 Evolution of Urban Planning up to 1956

Until the middle of the 19th century, Spain's cities were confined to their old medieval walls. It was only then that the Madrid government decreed that the walls were no longer necessary for defence purposes, and permitted city expansion out and beyond the old medieval quarters. The growth of Madrid and

Barcelona - Spain's two foremost cities<sup>11</sup> - quickly followed, with City Expansion Plans becoming a major new component of urban planning, which until then had concerned compliance with municipal building regulations approved in city bye laws (where they existed<sup>12</sup>), and street alignment plans.

The Madrid and Barcelona Plans paved the way for other smaller-scale plans in other cities, and the City Expansion Acts of 1864 and 1876 attempted to standardize the planning and land development procedures. Although some of the City Expansion Plans were important technical planning landmarks (see for example Wynn's examination of the Plan Cerdà (49) - Figure 10), the classic old city problems of overcrowding, congestion and insanitary housing by and large remained, whilst city expansion by no means always accorded with the dictates of approved plans. In Barcelona, the central axis of the new city (the 'ensanche') was rapidly developed with building densities far exceeding those contained in Cerdà's Plan.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, the suburbs grew in disjointed anarchical fashion, as immigrant and lower-paid workers sought housing around new expanding industries in the peripheral municipalities, where building regulations were often lax or non-existent. These inconsistencies in planning regulations between municipalities served to underline the need for supra-municipal planning.

<sup>11</sup> Madrid and Barcelona have been Spain's two largest cities in population and spatial terms since medieval times. During the 19th century both cities expanded from less than 200,000 each in 1800 to over half a million each in 1900, whilst the population of the country as a whole increased from 10.5 to 18.5 millions. In 1975, the Barcelona Metropolitan Area contained a population of over 4 million, that of Madrid 3.3 million. The Metropolitan Area of Bilbao, the next largest city, contained 1 million people in 1976.

<sup>12</sup> As late as 1910, 5210 of Spain's 9266 municipalities did not have approved building regulations.

<sup>13</sup> Bordoy has estimated that the built volume in the standard block ('manzana'), the characteristic feature of the Barcelona 'ensanche', has increased from 67,000m<sup>3</sup> in 1860 to 295,000m<sup>3</sup> in 1960. For more details see M. Wynn, 'Barcelona: Planning and Change 1854-1977', Town Planning Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 1979 pp 185-203.






Figure 10. The Plan Cerda, 1860

Cerda's plan envisaged the growth of the city in quadricl blocks ('manzana'), built-up on two sides only, with green areas in their interior. At the same time, some blocks were classified for use as schools, social centres, markets, hospitals, administrative buildings etc in a hierarchicalised polycentric division of space based on 'neighbourhoods', 'districts' and 'sectors'.

Source : The Historical Archive of the Municipality of Barcelona.

Around the turn of the century a series of new planning concepts were beginning to find expression in the urban plans of the time. In Barcelona, French architect Leon Jaussely's 1903 Plan<sup>14</sup> for the city attempted to link the 'ensanche' with the outlying suburbs and to transform Cerda's quadricle street pattern through the incorporation of geometric layouts (diagonals, radials, curves and right angles), that epitomised the French 'belles artes' school of the time. Meanwhile, in Madrid, Spanish planners failed to realize the importance of Soria y Mata's Linear City, a concept that was subsequently to receive widespread acclaim overseas.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, the garden-city concept,<sup>16</sup> evident to some extent in the work of Soria y Mata, was propagated by various authors, above all Cebriu de Montoliu in Barcelona, who translated Howard's 'Garden Cities of Tomorrow' into Spanish, and described in detail the early garden cities - Letchworth, Welwyn etc. It was in Madrid, however, in the 1920's that the Garden City concept was most formerly applied to urban planning - in Zuazo and Jansen's 'Plan de Extension' for Madrid (Figure 11), passed in 1929; the Madrid Central core was given new land use classifications and a series of satellite cities were planned beyond a green belt encircling the central nucleus of the city.

<sup>14</sup> Only a very watered-down version of the Plan Jaussely was approved (in 1917) in which Cerda's 'ensanche' remained unaltered. See M. Wynn 'Barcelona: Planning and Change 1854-1977' Town Planning Review, Vol. 50, No. 2. April 1979, pp 188-191.

<sup>15</sup> It can be argued that the linear concept was a major influence on the work of Garnier, Le Corbusier, Miliutin, Hilberseimer, The Mars Group etc. See, for example, A. Ortiz 'Una linea de tendencia' in Cerda 1876-1976, Colegio de Caminos, Barcelona 1976, pp 154-159.

<sup>16</sup> For a review of the appearance and influence of the garden-city concept in Spain, see M.G. Wynn and R. J. Smith 'Spain, Urban Decentralization', Built Environment Vol 4, No. 1, March 1978, pp 49-55.





This influx of new planning ideas emphasized the need for the revision of existing planning legislation, which remained anchored in the disparate Acts of the previous century. The Municipal Statute of 1924 synthesized, reordered and consolidated previously passed planning legislation but failed to introduce new measures to facilitate supra-municipal planning. The Statute did, however, establish that urban planning was the responsibility of individual Councils, in accordance with the general spirit of municipal autonomy that characterized the text, and specified that Councils of municipalities which had experienced a population increase of 20% or more in the decade 1910-1920 were legally obliged to draw up a plan of 'ensanche' or 'extension' within the following 4 years. Here then, a new type of plan was recognised. Whilst plans of 'ensanche' (expansion) were to accommodate city growth beyond the Old City walls, plans of 'extension' (extension) were to cover the areas between the 'ensanches' and the territorial limits of the municipality. However, as Bassols (50) has pointed out, the concept of one development plan encompassing the entire Municipality was not evident in the Municipal Statute, which rather recognised a series of different plan types - expansion, extension, inner city reform - to be used according to the needs and individual circumstances of each municipality.

The Municipal Statute was severely criticised at the eleventh National Architects' Congress in Madrid in 1926 in which Nicolau Rubio, Secretary of Montoliu's Garden City Society in Barcelona, introduced the theme of Regional Planning into Spain, probably for the first time, taking largely from British and French developments that had been propounded at the International Federation of Garden Cities' congresses in Amsterdam (1924) and New York (1925). The principle conclusion of the congress was that there was an urgent need for a General Planning Law to recognize the modern concepts in urban and regional planning, which continued to appear in the urban plans of the 20's and 30's, entered in competitions held by the Councils of major cities to find new plans of 'extension'. These competitions attracted entrants from abroad; Stubben, for example, entered the Bilbao competition in 1926; Zuazo y Jansen won the 1929 competition for Madrid (Figure 11); and, most famous of all, Le Corbusier's Plan






Figure 12. The Plan Macia, 1932

Source : The Historical Archive of the Municipality of Barcelona.

Macia<sup>1</sup> (Figure 12) won the 1932 Barcelona competition, in a period of intensive urban planning activity and citizen participation that characterized the second Republic (1931-36).

The Republican era closed with considerable progress in the development of ideas concerning what reforms were needed in the institutional framework of urban planning. The major reports (51) from the Municipal Congress held at Gijon in 1934 contained a variety of new ideas that can be summarised as follows:-

- Legal obligation of all Municipalities to draw up Development Plans to cover the entire municipal area, with state subrogation in case of default.
- Urban plans to be revised after 15 years in force.
- Regional Plans to be drawn-up to provide guidelines for the development of the country's major city-regions.



- Land-use classifications to be used in all plans; each classification to specify land use and maximum building volume, and to have clear and precise regulations to be binding on all developers.
- Land re-division procedure to be revised and standardized to facilitate smooth plan implementation.
- Activities and responsibilities of National, Regional and Municipal planning authorities to be co-ordinated.
- Creation of Central Planning Authority to work in conjunction with a National Economic Planning Board.
- Creation of Regional Planning Authorities with their own planning offices.
- Formulation of Municipal Land Value Indices, as guidelines for land expropriation by municipal Councils.
- Introduction of legislation to give municipal Councils the necessary powers for expropriation of any land deemed necessary for the successful implementation of Municipal Development Plans; alternatively, 'Collective Associations' could be formed to act as development agencies, in which landowners would be represented according to the value of their property.




Figure 13. Madrid Sub-Regional Plan, 1946.

Source : F. de Teran, 'Notas para la historia del planeamiento de Madrid', Ciudad y Territorio, 2/3 76, IEAL, Madrid.

In the 1940's, despite the change to a totalitarian political regime, many of the pre-war planning concepts, formally expressed in the reports of the Gijon Congress, continued to be evident in approved urban plans. The most important of these was the Madrid Sub-Regional Plan of 1946 (Figure 13), which covered 29 municipalities and further developed the decentralization and satellite-city components of Zuazo and Jansen's 1929 Plan (Figure 11). In addition, however, the legal text approving the plan drew the distinction between General (Municipal or Sub-Regional) Plan and Local Plan, which was subsequently to become of paramount importance in urban planning and development in Spain and is one of the major aspects of the planning system investigated in this research.




Figure 14. The Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, 1953.

Source : The Historical Archive of the Municipality of Barcelona.



The General Plan was to provide the structure for urban growth of the city, providing land-use classifications for the entire plan area; Local Plans were to "be in accordance with the outline structure of the General Plan, and must specify the design, volume and use characteristics for all buildings and free space zones within the area covered by the Local Plan" (52). The 1953 Sub-Regional Plan for Barcelona (examined in more detail below) similarly gave land-use classifications to the 28 municipality Sub-Region, and the General Plan - Local Plan distinction was again made. The plan attempted, through the enforcement of land use classifications and corresponding building regulations, to control the growth of the Barcelona conurbation and to encourage a poli-nuclear growth structure in the Sub-Region (Figure 14).

The first post-war<sup>17</sup> decade also saw significant advances in the establishment of upper-tier planning authorities in Spain. The General Directorate of Architecture was created in 1939 as part of the Home Office, with the specific task of directing the reconstruction of settlements destroyed or damaged in the war, as well as co-ordinating and regulating architectural practice in the country. The National Reconstruction Plan revived pre-war initiatives to draw up a National Urban Plan, and to this end, an Urban Planning Division was established in 1949, to function within the General Directorate of Architecture. It was empowered to direct all urban planning matters in the country and to carry out preliminary studies for the drawing-up of a National Urban Plan. This process had already been put in motion through the creation of Provincial Planning Commissions<sup>18</sup> in the 1940's to function as part of the Provincial Governments ('Diputaciones'), with the task of drawing up outline development plans for the Province as a whole, to act as a guideline for lower tier (municipal or sub-regional) planning authorities and to contribute towards the formulation of

<sup>17</sup> In the context of this research 'post-war' means after the Spanish Civil War which was fought between 1936 and 1939.

<sup>18</sup> A Provincial Planning Commission sat under the presidency of the Civil Governor of the Province and was made up by representatives of the Ministries of Public Works, Industry and Agriculture, plus specialist planners, engineers, architects and surveyors drawn from local authorities, consultancies, and elsewhere.

planning policy at National level and the configuration of the National Urban Plan. In Barcelona, the Provincial Planning Commission was created in 1945, but in 1948, two separate planning offices were created, one to draw up the Provincial Plan, which eventually appeared in 1963,<sup>19</sup> the other to work on a plan for the Barcelona Sub-Region, but a small part of the Province as a whole. The Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, briefly mentioned above, was the product of the labours of this second office.

These, then, are the more immediate antecedents to the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act, which represented the consolidation and formal expression of a planning doctrine that had evolved over the previous century. Let us now turn to examine the 1956 Act in detail.

## 2.2 The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956

The Land and Urban Planning Act was the key piece of planning legislation in Spain for the following two decades and constitutes the principle component of the planning - legislative context to the case study research. Clearly, space does not allow scrutiny of all 24 chapters and 288 articles that make up the Act. Rather, the major features are outlined and other matters relating to the Act will be discussed subsequently as is necessary.

Although the Act was passed in 1956, a Committee was set up as early as 1949, within the General Directorate of Architecture, to work on the Act, which established a planning system that was clearly inspired by many of the ideas and aspirations contained in the reports of the Municipal Congress held at Gijon in 1934. We shall return in the following section to review the overall functioning of the Act in the years following its approval; first, however, let us look at the planning system embodied in the 1956 Act.

<sup>19</sup> The Barcelona Provincial Plan was one of only two Provincial Plans ever approved by Central Government. It was of little importance, as it was intended to be only 'indicative' of future development trends (see Figure 22).



### 2.2.1 Plans and Planning Authorities

The Act made provision for a tiered hierarchy of urban plans and planning authorities at the National, Provincial, Sub-Regional, Municipal and Local Levels (Figure 15). The National Urban Planning Council (NUPC), was to be set up within the Home Office as the "upper level planning authority in the country ... to co-ordinate the plans and projects of the different Ministries that intervene in urban planning" (53). It was made responsible for the overall direction of a National Urban Plan, which was to set out the "major guidelines for urban development" (54) in all Spain. Within the NUPC, a Central Urban Planning Commission (CUPC) was to be created to "act as a Standing Committee for the NUPC, to implement and administer the NUPC's policy directives". (55) Within the General Directorate of Architecture, the Urban Planning Division was expanded and the Directorate was renamed the General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning (GDAUP), to act "as a permanent authority charged with the preparation, management and implementation of the directives of both the NUPC and the CUPC". (56)

At Provincial level, Provincial Planning Commissions, some of which already existed, were empowered to draw-up Provincial Plans "to provide the basic structure for urban planning in the Province" (57), whilst at the level of the municipality, Councils<sup>20</sup> were made responsible for producing General Development Plans, giving land-use classifications to the entire municipality, to be binding on all developers and development. Councils could combine together to form Sub-Regional Planning Authorities, and draw up Sub-Regional General Development Plans. Some of these, in fact, preceded the 1956 Act; such was the case in Barcelona where the Sub-Regional Plan had been approved by Central Government Act in 1953 (See section five below).

<sup>20</sup> Only those Councils of municipalities with a 50,000 population, and Councils of Provincial Capital Cities were made legally responsible for drawing-up Development Plans. In other municipalities it was the overall responsibility of the Provincial or Sub-Regional Planning Commissions to do so.

<u>PLAN DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>PLAN-MAKING BODY</u>	<u>PLAN-APPROVAL AUTHORITY</u>	
		<u>I.A./P.A.</u>	<u>D.A.</u>
NATIONAL URBAN PLAN	NUPC/CUPC/GDAUP + PPC's.	NUPC	NUPC (+ endorsement of Home Office).
PROVINCIAL PLANS	PPC	PPC	NUPC
GENERAL PLANS			
a) SUB-REGIONAL	SRPA or PE	PPC	NUPC
b) MUNICIPAL	MC or PE	MC	SRPA or PPC
LOCAL PLANS	Any Planning Authority or State body or PE	MC	SRPA or PPC
ROADS AND SERVICE PROJECTS	as above	MC	SRPA or PPC
BUILDING PERMITS	developer	MC	SRPA or PPC

Figure 15 Plan making and approval authorities, according to the  
1956 Land and Urban Planning Act.

Abbreviations:

NUPC - National Urban Planning Council.  
 CUPC - Central Urban Planning Commission.  
 GDAUP - General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning.  
 PPC - Provincial Planning Commissions.  
 SRPA - Sub-Regional Planning Authorities.  
 MC - Municipal Council.  
 PE - Private Enterprise.  
 I.A. - Initial Approval.  
 P.A. - Provisional Approval.  
 D.A. - Definitive Approval.

At micro-level, Local Plans were seen as an instrument for the implementation of General Plans. They were "for the development of General Plans" (58) and were to contain the detailed design and lay-out for new development and building regulations based on limits set in the land-zone classifications of the General Plan. Similarly, Roads and Service Projects were to design, programme, and cost out the provision of service infrastructure (roads, drainage, sewerage system, street lighting) in the Local Plan areas. Local Plans and Roads and Service Projects could be drawn-up by any planning authority and "along with municipal plans, these can be drawn up by private individuals" (59). The plan approval process, however, remained in the hands of the planning authorities (Figures 15 and 16).

#### 2.2.2 The Plan Approval Process

The 1956 Act established a four-phase plan approval process for all plans (Figure 16):-

"The Plan or project is Initially Approved by the Corporation or Authority which drew-up the plan;<sup>21</sup> the Plan is then submitted to a Public Information Stage, lasting one-month, and if the Local Council were not the plan-making authority, a further month's period is opened for Local Corporations to report on the plan (Audience of Local Corporations Stage).

The Corporation or authority which drew-up the plan or project will consider the appeals presented during the Public Information Stage (and Audience of Local Corporations Stage) and make the modifications that they deem necessary before giving Provisional Approval to the plan. The plan will then be submitted to the National Urban Planning Council or the respective Provincial or Sub-Regional Planning Authority for Definitive Approval". (60)

<sup>21</sup> If the plan was drawn-up by private individuals or groups, this had to be submitted to the Local Council for Initial and Provisional Approval, and to the Sub-Regional or Provincial Authority for Definitive Approval.

PLAN-MAKING AUTHORITY	INITIAL APPROVAL	PUBLIC INFORMATION STAGE	AUDIENCE OF LOCAL CORPOR- ATIONS STAGE	PROVISIONAL APPROVAL	DEFINITIVE APPROVAL
1. Local Council or Private Enterprise	By the Local Council.	Opened by the Local Council, to last one month, during which time members of the public and private sector development agencies may put their case either for or against the plan.	-	By the Local Council.	By the Sub- Regional or Provincial Planning Authority.
2. Other Planning Authority or State Agency.	By the Plan- Making Authority.	As above but opened by the Plan-Making Authority.	Opened by the Plan-Making Authority, to last one month, during which time the Local Council and other public agencies may put their case either for or against the plan.	By the Plan- Making Authority.	By the Sub- Regional, Provincial or other upper- tier Planning Authority (e.g. General Directorate of Urban Planning).

Figure 16. The Plan Approval Process established in the 1956 Planning Act.

Regulations were also laid-down for the advertisement of the opening of the Public Information Stage and plan approval decisions. Revision of General Plans was to be undertaken every 15 years, and "modification to any plan or project" would have to follow the same approval process. Furthermore, "if modification means an increase in the building density of a zone, this will necessitate the provision of greater free space areas in proportion to the increase in building density". (61)

### 2.2.3 Land Use Classification

The land-use classification system was based on a three-way generic division of land into which all classifications were to fall - 'urban land', 'urban reserve' and 'rural land'. As a rule, land comprising, and within, the existing built up area at the time of plan approval was given 'urban land' status, 'urban reserve' comprised those areas earmarked for the possible future expansion of the built-up area, and all other terrain was classified as 'rural land'.

Through this classification system, the Act imposed strict conditions on development. In 'rural land' all development was prohibited except that conforming with the particular rural land-use (e.g. farm houses, forestry administration etc). For development to take place in 'Urban Reserve', a Local Plan would have to be first drawn-up and approved, providing detailed plans of the proposed development, and changing the land-use classification(s), as necessary, thereby giving the area the generic status of 'urban land'. Even then, however, development could not take place until the necessary service infrastructure had been provided, which was stipulated as "road surfacing and paving, and water, sewage and street lighting systems". (62) This meant, then, that any development in green-field sites would have to follow a strictly regulated procedural course in which Local Council and Sub-Regional or Provincial Planning authorities could exert a planning and development control role at the Local Plan, Roads and Service Project and Building Permit cession stages (Figure 17). It is worth noting here that Sub-Regional Plans for most of the country's major cities, notably Madrid and Barcelona, pre-dated the 1956 Act and more complex land-use classification systems had been used in these plans. Whilst the 1956 Act recognised these plans and their land classification systems, it left each municipality within the Sub-Region to superimpose the three-way generic division of land onto the established classifications subject to approval by the Sub-Regional Authority. In practice, this became a mere technicality, as the rural classifications were self-evident, and in these zones non-conforming development was prohibited; if basic service infrastructure did not exist in areas classified for development, then by definition these were 'urban reserve', and a Local Plan and Roads and Service Project had first to be drawn-up and approved before development could proceed, as shown in Figure 17.

#### 2.2.4 The Implementation of Plans and Development

The 1956 Act emphasised that urban growth should proceed through the controlled development of new estates ('poligonos'):-



"For the implementation of General Plans, the plan area may be divided into so many estates, to attend to the necessities of urban development. These estates will normally comprise several blocks ('manzanas') of development and will be planned for one or more of the following reasons:-

- To create an integrated nucleus of building and services.
- To create a homogenous area of development in a zone characterized by a predominantly different type of development.
- To facilitate the development of an area by public or private enterprise". (63)




Figure 18. The Model of Urban Growth envisaged in the 1956 Planning Act (after Teran).

Source: F. de Teran, Planeamiento Urbano en la Espana Contemporanea, Gustavi Gili, Madrid, 1978, p. 569.



The legislators, then, envisaged a model of urban growth in which the sprawl of the central core was arrested, and new development, carefully planned and controlled through the Local Plan mechanism, would take place in the 'urban reserve' areas surrounding the central core (Figure 18).

The Act also devised four 'systems of intervention' in which landowners and local authorities could combine to finance and manage the implementation of new development. Under the Co-operative System, owners of land to be developed had to:-

- "a) Cede, without payment of compensation, the land on which roads are built.
- b) Cede, without payment of compensation, land used for public parks and gardens.
- c) Meet the cost of public works in squares and grandiose avenues, payment being in proportion to the value of landowners estates, following land redivision.... Landowners must also finance and manage the provision of road surfacing and paving, drainage, sewage, streetlighting, water, gas, and electricity networks, and such tree, shrub and flower planting as there may be ...." (64)

Councils and other public bodies authorized by the CUPC were empowered to declare development to be of 'immediate importance' and bring the co-operative system into effect, or alternatively, proceed by compulsory purchase (expropriation system) and undertake development themselves.

Landowners could also join together to form Development Boards to finance and manage the plan-making for, and development of, their land. Members of the Council and other local corporations could be co-opted onto the Board, which became responsible for working out compensation payments for landowners affected by the proposed development. For this reason, this form of management, which allowed for the planning and development of completely private estates, was called the Compensation System.

Finally, the Cession of Roads System was similar to the co-operative system, except that the Local Authority, rather than the developers, took responsibility for financing and managing the provision of service infrastructure (roads, pavements, sewage system, drainage, street lighting etc). The Local Authority, however, could then charge landowners benefiting from the infrastructure 'special contributions' to cover 80% of the capital expenditure.

It is worth briefly noting here that the two commonest forms of intervention have been the 'co-operative' and 'cession of roads' systems. Local Authorities have, as a rule, been limited by lack of finances from using the expropriation system, although development by Central State authorities has often involved expropriation on a large scale. The Compensation System has been used for financing and promoting private estates, but these have constituted a relatively minor component in the growth of Spain's cities. We shall return, in Chapter 3, to discuss these aspects in greater detail, with particular reference to Barcelona.

Finally, the Act established procedure for redividing land amongst landowners to effect a fairer distribution of new property values following the implementation of new development. To do this, a 'project of land redivision' had to be drawn up and approved by respective planning authorities. In practice, this was often included as part of the Local Plan documentation.

#### 2.2.5 Summary

There are many other aspects of this Act that could be discussed, and this brief account has attempted to cover the fundamental components only. Other, more minor, aspects of the legislation will be examined later on in the thesis as deemed necessary. We can summarize the most significant features of the Act as follows:-

- It established the distinction between General (Municipal or Sub-Regional) Plan and Local Plan. Local planning authorities were made responsible for drawing-up and approving General Development Plans. Local Plans were to be used for the detailed planning of 'estates', which constituted the major physical form of urban growth.
- A land-use classification system was to be used in General Plans, as a means of controlling development. New 'estate' development was to take place in the areas of 'urban reserve', but a Local Plan had first to be drawn up and approved. Systems of intervention were set out to provide further guidelines for co-operation between the various agencies involved in the development process.
- The Act accepted that private enterprise could play a leading role in the plan making and development processes, although plan approval remained in the hands of planning authorities within the Public Administration.

Let us now turn to review the overall functioning of this planning machinery in the years after 1956.

### 2.3 State Housing Policy and the Application of the 1956 Planning Act

Detailed studies on the functioning of the planning and development processes in Spain are relatively few and this indeed was the point of departure for this research project. Nevertheless recently published research undertaken by Teran (65) provides valuable insights into the functioning of the planning machinery, particularly at the upper-tier levels, in the post-1956 era, and together with data taken from other sources, it is possible to piece together a general overview of the functioning of planning machinery in this period.

There seems little doubt that the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1957 and the Government preoccupation with housing policies and programmes in the 1950's and 1960's contributed significantly to the rupture of the tiered hierarchy of planning authorities which was central to the functioning of the planning system laid down in the 1956 Act, and it seems appropriate to first briefly examine the history of housing and state housing policy since the turn of the century.

During the first 40 years of this century annual house construction figures in Spain remained modest, there being 1 million new dwellings constructed during this period (Figure 19). The Cheap Housing Acts of 1911 and 1921 empowered Local Authorities to build and rent out low-cost dwellings, but only in the brief Republican era of the early thirties, when Councils had greater political independence and financial resources, did application of the Acts become a realistic possibility. Following the end of the war, Franco's Government passed new Housing Acts in 1939 and 1944 making Central Government funds available to state authorities to provide new dwellings as part of the National Plan of Reconstruction. During the 1940's over half a million new houses were built, over 120,000 of them by Central State authorities; but nearly all were located in the 'devasted regions' of the south and west, where whole villages had been destroyed in the war. In Barcelona, for example, only 15,000 houses were constructed in the 1940's, of which 13,500 were financed by the private sector.

Yet it was in the country's major cities that the housing deficit was most acute. With the pace of country-city migration increasing throughout the 1940's, the housing deficit was estimated at 80,000 in Barcelona in 1950 and 30,000 in Madrid, totalling 1.5 million, according to Teran (66), in the country as a whole by 1955. Cotorruelo has summarised State Housing policy in the first half of the century as follows:-

"Until the mid-fifties, the problem of the housing deficit was not tackled with the required intensity; very few new dwellings were constructed which came within the financial limits of the working-classes; and very limited attempts were made to subsidize the costs of house construction" (67).




Figure 19. House Construction in Spain this century.

Source : Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda, Memoria de Actividades, INV, 1976.

This shortage of houses in the major urban centres led to the rapid spread of shanty towns in the city peripheries, constituting something of a crisis situation. The masses encamped in the shanty areas represented an ever present threat to law and order, and the General Strike in 1951 in Barcelona was repeated elsewhere in the early fifties; the 'resistencia de la poblacion' more or less forced the Central Government to intervene more directly in the housing sector.

From the early 1950's onwards, the General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning (then part of the Home Office) worked in conjunction with the Ministry of Work and the Sub-Regional Planning Authorities on the planning and development of the early housing estates in the major cities. In 1954, however, the Limited Cost Housing Act introduced subsidies<sup>22</sup> for private and public promoters of limited cost housing, and the majority of housing estates constructed in Madrid and Barcelona over the next 25 years drew on state aid and subsidies made available in this Act, and its 1957 amendment Act.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> The 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act introduced two categories of State aid. For 'Group 1 houses' no direct state subsidy was given, but constructors were conceded low interest loans and fiscal exemptions from the State run Construction Credit Bank. 'Group 2 houses' were divided into 3 sub-categories depending on house size and unit cost. 90% grants were available from the State for construction of these houses but the sale or rent return to the promotor was strictly limited. As Table 1 suggests, this limitation on profits restricted the uptake of grants by house promoters in comparison with the 'Fixed subsidy' system (see below).

<sup>23</sup> The 1957 Act introduced the category of 'fixed subsidy dwellings', for which a 30,000 peseta (£230) per house direct state grant was made available. Loans from the Construction Credit Bank were also made available at low interest rates with fiscal exemptions. In 1963 certain incongruities between the 1954 and 1957 Acts were smoothed out in a further amendment Act.

In 1955, the first National Housing Plan was launched with the objective of constructing 550,000 houses between 1956 and 1960, and was followed in 1961 by a more ambitious Housing Plan with a target figure of 3.7 million houses in the period 1961-76, a figure passed in 1975 (Table 1).

The provision of housing, then, through direct intervention by State Housing authorities, but above all through subsidizing the private sector, was a major concern of successive Franco governments from the early 1950's onwards. This tended to divert attention within the Cabinet away from creating the upper-tier planning authorities which featured in the 1956 Planning Act, and this in turn resulted in a general lack of control, co-ordination and direction of urban

Year	Programmed House Construction	Total House Construction	STATE SUBSIDIZED HOUSING				Non-aided private sector dwellings
			GROUP 1	GROUP 2	FIXED SUBSIDY	TOTAL	
1961	125 085	135 446	28 109	37 230	52 771	121 902	13 544
1962	139 603	162 445	24 453	36 042	82 558	147 833	14 612
1963	150 518	206 703	33 870	32 773	117 968	187 885	18 818
1964	162 144	256 894	57 668	26 319	142 928	231 205	25 689
1965	175 051	283 285	79 334	19 229	140 716	240 793	42 492
1966	188 392	286 366	88 429	17 189	104 768	211 366	57 000
1967	210 577	204 471	51 553	12 233	68 093	132 096	72 375
1968	216 623	248 089	43 724	26 831	62 430	133 398	114 719
1969	232 627	270 254	42 465	17 960	97 373	157 969	112 285
1970	249 258	308 049	54 826	17 043	113 079	185 294	122 755
1971	265 920	318 941	54 033	34 935	101 726	190 694	128 247
1972	285 018	336 309	51 075	35 450	103 889	190 404	145 610
1973	303 719	348 548	49 932	28 266	99 125	177 323	171 225
1974	323 900	358 460	51 373	24 039	100 371	175 783	182 677
1975	340 955	374 391	66 384	26 370	103 712	196 466	177 925
1976	353 510						
TOTAL	3 713 900 (1976)	4 080 619 (1975)	843 370	500 682	1 552 211	2 896 263	1 184 356

Table 1. House Construction in Spain 1961-75

Of the three types of state-aided houses, the 'fixed subsidy' system (30,000 pts per house) proved the most popular. Note also the growing importance of non-subsidized private housing throughout the period.

Source : Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda, Memoria de Actividades, INV, 1976.

planning practice and machinery in the country as a whole. In October 1956, just 5 months after the passing of the 1956 Act, a Decree was issued setting out the guidelines for collaboration between the National Institute of Housing and the General Directorate of Architecture and Urban Planning (GDAUP) on the acquisition and preparation of urban land to be used for the construction of State housing estates. This role was reinforced with the creation of the Ministry of Housing in 1957 and the removal of the GDAUP from the Home Office to function within the new Ministry as two new separate Directorates - the General Directorate of Architecture and the General Directorate of Urban Planning (GDUP). Similarly the National Institute of Housing was taken from the Ministry of Work to become part of the General Directorate of Housing within the new Ministry (Figure 20).




Figure 20. Internal Structure of the Ministry of Housing 1957






Figure 21. Migration Flows in Spain.

One of the preparatory studies for the National Urban Plan, 1962.

Source: Ministerio de la Vivienda, Plan Nacional de Urbanismo, 1962.

This reorientation of the GDUP meant that little attention was given to creating the other upper-tier planning authorities referred to in the 1956 Act. Neither the National Urban Planning Council nor the Central Urban Planning Commission were ever created, with the GDUP theoretically taking on all upper-tier responsibilities assigned to these two bodies in the 1956 Act. But in fact, the Ministerial reorganization destroyed the coherency of the country's planning machinery with the GDUP functioning within the Ministry of Housing and the Local Councils still directly answerable to the Home Office.

The GDUP became increasingly concerned with the acquisition of land for the construction of State financed (and subsidised) housing estates, acting independently from the local councils, often without consultation, in the programming of State housing estates. Work on the National Urban Plan did not start until the early 1960's, following the creation of the National Institute of Urban Development in 1959 (within the Ministry of Housing) to take on some of the land acquisition responsibilities of the GDUP; but even then, only preparatory studies (Figure 21) were undertaken before the whole project was shelved after the World Bank report of 1962 recommended the adoption of 4-yearly National (Regional-Economic) Development Plans,<sup>24</sup> three of which were subsequently drawn-up and approved for the periods 1964-7, 1968-71, 1972-75, based very much on the French growth poles model.

In this changing political-economic and planning context, the Provincial Planning Commissions, which as noted above were supposed to have played a crucial role in strategic and regional planning, as a link mechanism between the National Urban Plan and the General Plans, found themselves overshadowed by Ministerial investment programmes and Central State intervention that by-passed the Provincial Governments, or at most, used them as rubber stamp authorities. At the same time they received "increasingly less economic support from the Local Corporations, which had previously felt under some obligation to co-operate when the General Directorate of Urban Planning was part of the Home Office." (68) Only two Provincial Plans (Barcelona 1963, Guipuzcoa 1964) were ever approved, both drawn-up by Dioxiadis, the international consultants, and both plans soon became obsolete because of changes in the economic policies to which they were closely tied. The Barcelona Provincial Plan (Figure 22) is of interest as a technical planning document based on a decentralization strategy in line with the Draft National Plan of 1962. It was, however, only passed as 'indicative' of future development trends and the Provincial

<sup>24</sup> The history of National Development Planning in Spain is dealt with fully in : H.W. Richardson, Regional Development Policy and Planning in Spain, Saxon House, 1975.



Planning Commission devolved development control and plan approval responsibilities to the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission for planning and development in the Barcelona Sub-Region, and similar arrangements were made in the country's other major cities. At the National and Provincial levels, then, neither the planning authorities nor the plans for which provision had been made in the 1956 Act fulfilled their attributed responsibilities and roles.

At the General (Sub-Regional and Municipal) plan level, however, the story is not so bleak, partly because the General (Sub-Regional) Plans for the country's major cities pre-dated the 1956 Act anyway. In a study published in 1974, Capel (69) noted that there existed




Figure 22. The Barcelona Provincial Plan 1963

The Plan envisaged the resettling of 530,000 people from the Sub-Region in other parts of the Province in the growth centres shown in the figure.

Source: Comision de Urbanismo de la Provincia de Barcelona, Plan Provincial de Barcelona, 1963.

1,116 General Plans in all Spain (the vast majority of which had been drawn-up since 1956), 738 having been Definitively Approved and 378 being in various stages of preparation. Although these General Plans collectively encompassed only 1,389 municipalities out of a national total of over 9000, nearly all the country's major urban areas were covered (Figure 23). In general, however, relatively little research has been undertaken in Spain on the plan-making process in the formulation of these plans, apart from those for Madrid and Barcelona for which a considerable amount of literature exists (e.g. Soteras (70) and Larrodera (71)). Teran (72), however, has pointed out how the ministerial schism between the GDUP and the Local Councils, alluded to above, resulted in Councils adopting a much more autonomous line than would otherwise have been the case, with the procedural and technical demands of the 1956 Act often being misunderstood or even deliberately ignored.

As regards the Local Plan level we have already noted that the 1956 Act laid particular emphasis on the 'estate' as the major morphological form of peripheral growth and that planning law demanded that a Local Plan and a Roads and Services Project be drawn up and approved before estate development could take place. This, then, would enable planning authorities to exercise a development control role at this level, as well as at the building permit level. Of the few comprehensive studies undertaken on the role of local plans in the expansion of metropolitan areas, nearly all (Ferrer (73), Herrero (74), Ribas Piera (75)) reveal that the Local Plan mechanism was indeed a key element in the planning and development of peripheral growth, even though these plans were not always Definitively Approved by the planning authorities. At the same time, studies such as Ferrer's (76) in Barcelona show that Local Plans were often used to bring about changes in land-use classifications established in General Plans, usually with resultant increases in residential and/or building densities compared with those specified in the General Plan. We know, for example, that this happened on a fairly large scale in Barcelona (see Chapter 3), and the resultant degradation and generally poor urban environment in the periphery are evident enough.






Figure 23. Municipalities with approved General Plans. 1972.

This map is based on Teran's 1973 review and is not quite as up to date as Capel's 1974 study quoted in the text.

Source: F. de Teran, 'Algunos aspectos de las relaciones entre planificacion fisica y planificacion economica en la experiencia espanola', Ciudad y Territorio, 2/73, IEAL, Madrid.






Figure 24. Teran's Model of Urban Growth in Spain since 1956.

Source : F. de Teran, Planeamiento urbano en la Espana Contemporanea, Gustavi Gili, Madrid, 1978.

The poverty of the urban environment is also explained by the fact that development has not always been carried out in accordance with the dictates of the Local Plan for a specific zone, as is witnessed by the lack of made-up roads, green spaces, schools etc in many of Spain's peripherally located housing estates. Teran (77) has suggested a model for city growth in Spain in which housing and industrial estates (with or without Local Plan approval) and haphazard shanty development have been built in land classified as 'urban reserve' and 'rural land' in the General Plan, and increased building densities in the centre ('urban land') have resulted in congestion and overcrowding (Figure 24). What, until now, has received very little attention - partly because of inadequate access

to data - is the decision process within planning authorities that enabled this type of development to take place, and it is this that this research project attempts to investigate, with particular reference to case studies taken from the Barcelona periphery. We shall move on to look at the Barcelona sub-regional plans and aspects of peripheral growth in the Sub-Region subsequently, but let us first briefly outline changes in the planning system introduced in the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act.

#### 2.4 The Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, 1976

In the late 1960's, the General Directorate of Urban Planning's Research Unit embarked on a series of preliminary studies with the aim of providing a basis for the formulation of a new Planning Act. At the upper-tier levels, the Provincial Plans had failed to provide the necessary link between national economic planning and 'General' urban planning, and the 3rd National (Regional-Economic) Development Plan (1972-75) called for a new type of regional plan to fulfil this role. At the General Plan level, there was a general feeling amongst the planning profession that the 1956 Act was inadequate, in that it was too rigid to accommodate new planning concepts and techniques, with its emphasis on blue-print, land-zone classification plans. Teran (78) points out how, in the General Plans of Logrono, Elche, Santiago and the revision of the Barcelona plan, planners were incorporating new techniques that were contradictory to the planning concepts underlying the 1956 Act. General criticism of the Act was only reinforced by comparison with the new planning ideas and concepts introduced in the 1968 Town and Country Planning Act in Great Britain and the 1967 'Loi d'orientation fonciere' in France.

It was, however, at the Local Plan level that many planners felt the law should be tightened up. The vagueness<sup>25</sup> of the 1956 Act on

<sup>25</sup> The 1956 Act stated that Local Plans were for "the development of" General Plans. (Article 10). Similarly vague on this issue was the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan. (see below, Section Five).



the Local Plan - General Plan relationship and the freedom given private enterprise in the plan-making process had meant that in some cities, private and public developers had been permitted to radically change land-use classifications in General Plans, through the Local Plan mechanism. At the same time, direct intervention by State Housing authorities in the construction of housing estates had not always followed 'Local Plan' regulations and procedure, only compounding the 'credibility problem', with the GDUP finding it increasingly difficult to enforce planning law at the local level when other state authorities were known to have contravened planning procedure themselves.

Land speculation, as part cause, part effect, of the failure of the 1956 Act, remained a major feature in determining the pace, cost and nature of urban growth. Lasuen, one of the main architects of the 1976 Reform Act, wrote in 1972 that "the critical factor is not so much whether or not there is a monopoly of land, but rather the series of conditions that determine the elasticity of the supply of, and demand for, land. What is needed is a policy directed at increasing the effective availability of land for development". (79)

In the end, however, following a series of drafts and amendments in the Spanish Parliament, the modifications introduced in the Act were essentially technical. These are not central to this thesis, but it nevertheless seems relevant to provide a brief summary here:-

- (1) At the upper-tier level, a new type of plan - the 'Plan Director de Co-ordinacion' (PDC) was introduced to replace the old Provincial Plans. The PDC could be on Provincial or Supra-Provincial scale and was intended to set general planning regulations to act as guidelines for the drawing up of lower-tier (General) plans. At the same time, it was to establish "the physical framework for the implementation of national, economic and social planning, and in particular regional development policy". (80) This, then, represented a new conception of the role of Regional Planning to link physical planning with national economic planning, and co-ordinate sectoral intervention. Unfortunately, however, the Act did not introduce any new planning authorities to take responsibility for this level of planning, and, to date, no PDC has been drawn-up in Spain.

- (2) As regards General Plans, the Act gave them a more open, flexible role that did not have to be so closely tied to strictly defined land use zonings. Nevertheless, General Plans had to "classify the plan area to establish the corresponding legal framework for development; define the fundamental elements of the general structure for the ordering of the area; and establish a programme for its development and implementation." (81)
- (3) On the crucial issue of Local Plans, the Act stated that "they (Local Plans) cannot be drawn up unless there is an existing General Plan, and in no case can they modify the specifications of the General Plan". (82) At the same time, minimum standards for green zones and service provision were established for local plans, and a general prohibition on all buildings of more than three floors high, unless special provision was made for such in plans and planning regulations, was introduced.
- (4) The Act introduced the concept of 'Special Plan of Interior Reform' (SPIR) to be used for the "improvement of the urban and rural environment and the city suburbs" (83), at local level. More specifically, they could be drawn-up and approved with the "objective of carrying out operations in urban areas aimed at the decongestion of crowded zones, the clearing and improvement of unhealthy areas, improving traffic circulation, environmental conditions or public services, or achieving similar objectives" (84). The concept of Special Plan had, in fact, been introduced in the 1956 Act, but had been scarcely used in the urban areas, and the emphasis on improving and renewal, a concept poorly developed in Spanish planning history, was new to the 1976 Act. We shall return subsequently to examine the SPIR concept in greater depth, in the light of case study findings.

In summary, the 1976 Reform Act undoubtedly had its limitations, and should perhaps best be seen as an attempt to rationalize and control the urban growth process, which those who worked on the Act generally accepted as being necessarily linked to the evolution of Spanish capitalism at the time. As Ribas Piera has said:-

"Clearly one law cannot stand-out as being radically different from the general legal system of the country, which is a faithful reflection of the social-political structure which it attempts to regulate." (85)

In comparison with the 1956 Act, the 1976 Reform introduced certain new positive measures to improve and update the potential functioning of the planning and control system. Clearly, however, the Public Administration needed the political will to implement these changes if the Act's innovations were to take effect; and today, in a changed political climate, a more radical reform of the law may soon be required.

## 2.5 The Barcelona Sub-Regional Plans of 1953 and 1976

The 1953 Sub-Regional Plan for Barcelona and its 1976 revision provide the more immediate spatial-planning parameters for the case study research. As already noted, the 1953 Plan was of major significance in the national context, constituting an important step towards the shaping of the Land and Planning Act of 1956, and the 1976 revision was similarly linked with the reform of the National Planning Act, approved the same year.

The 1953 Plan was based on a 'nuclear conception' of urban development (Figure 14) in which growth of the different settlements in the sub-region was to be controlled and directed through adherence to a landzone classification system (Figure 25), stipulating land use and building densities for each classification. The plan documentation noted that:-

"One of the principal concerns of the plan is to avoid the growth of an immense city, a shimmering Mesopotamia, an amorphous mass in which the inhabitants are slaves to its enormity. In summary, a city, monstrous in its form and size, must not be built; but rather a great city, consisting of a series of individual nuclei". (86)

The land zone classification system comprised thirty-nine different classifications, grouped into six major divisions - Housing, Housing and Industry, Industry, Special (Service/Infrastructure) zones, Parks and Green Areas, and Rural Areas with the generic 'urban land', 'urban reserve' and 'rural land' division being superimposed by municipal authorities after 1956. The zoning was based on a population forecast of 4.1 million for the entire 28 municipality Sub-Region (Figure 31) in the year 2000, of which 2.3 million would reside in the Barcelona municipality.<sup>26</sup>




Figure 25. A section of the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, showing land-use classifications in the city centre.

Source: C. Teixidor, M. Tarrago and L. Bran, 'Documentos 1953-71', Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 87, COACB 1972.

<sup>26</sup> These population forecasts were rather adventurous, being little more than guess work and have since been revised. The 1976 General Metropolitan Development Plan for Barcelona (Revision of the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan) included population forecasts of 2.2 million for Barcelona municipality and 2.5 million for rest of the Sub-Region, by the year 2000.

As regards implementing the plan, great importance was attached to Local Plans as a means for planning and regulating city growth, very much along the lines of the 1956 Act on this matter. Similarly, however, the exact nature of the Local Plan/General Plan relationship was not specified; the Plan Report vaguely alluded to the fact that "the General Plan shows the way .... the Local Plan establishes a definite programme" (87), whilst the Parliamentary Act approving the plan specified that :-

"The Sub-Regional Plan is approved; with the subsequent approval of Local Plans, it will be modified as necessary to facilitate a more effective realization of the plan's objective". (88)

These objectives, as noted above, were very generally stated, and concerned essentially the control of urban growth and the development of a poli-nuclear urban structure in the Sub-Region.

The Parliamentary Act approving the plan also created the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission (GBPC), to be made-up of Councillors from the Sub-Region's 28 municipalities and representatives from Government Ministries, under the presidency of the Civil Governor of the Province. Full-time technical staff were employed to carry out the functions of upper-tier urban management and control of the plan-making and approval processes at lower-tier (municipal, local) levels. The control function of the GBPC was particularly stressed in the 1953 Act:

"The Greater Barcelona Planning Commission will look out for infringements of approved plans and projects, and to such effect, will have the power to order the stoppage or destruction of building and to impose fines of up to 50,000 pesetas" (89).

The annual state budget of the GBPC was set at 25 million pesetas (£150,000) which had increased to 200 million pesetas (£1½ m) by 1975. This relatively small budget meant that the GBPC had only very limited scope for direct intervention in the financing of development (see Table 8).

Let us summarise, then, how the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan 'fitted' the machinery created in the Planning Act passed three years later. The 1956 Act officially recognised the 1953 Plan as a General (Sub-Regional) Plan, and the GBPC as an upper-tier Sub-Regional authority charged with Definitive Approval of all Local Plans, Roads and Service Projects, and



Building Permit applications in the Sub-Region. Both the 1953 Plan (and the Act approving it) and the 1956 Act laid emphasis on the Local Plan as an important vehicle for planning and controlling new development although neither specified the extent to which a Local Plan could change or modify land use classifications established in the General Plan. The land-use classification used in the 1953 Plan established a model which other municipal and sub-regional authorities were subsequently to adopt and adapt to local circumstances, to co-exist within the three way generic divisions of 'urban land', 'urban reserve' and 'rural land', established in the 1956 Act. In Barcelona, individual local authorities were left to superimpose these three generic divisions over those set in the 1953 Plan and submit these proposals to the GBPC for Definitive Approval.

Finally, let us briefly examine the major changes introduced in the 1976 revision of the Plan and the series of events that preceded the approval of the revision. As early as 1963, the GBPC had embarked on preliminary studies for the revision of the 1953 Plan, but from the start the general thinking of planners in the Commission was that there was a need for a change in scale as well as content. By 1965, the GBPC planning office had completed the Plan Director, which covered the Metropolitan Area of 193 municipalities, an administrative unit not previously recognised and for which no government or planning authority existed (See Figure 3).

The Plan (Figure 26), which attempted to decongest the Barcelona city centre and stimulate growth in a series of inland growth centres, was approved by Central Government in 1968 as 'a Provincial Plan for part of the Province' but was shelved in the early 70's following the appointment of a new Minister of Housing in 1970 and subsequent changes in the General Directorates. The outcome was that from the early 70's onwards the GBPC concentrated its energies on drawing up a new plan for the Sub-Region, as delimited in the 1953 Plan, with the first draft appearing in 1974. Again, however, political lobbying, both in Madrid and Barcelona, particularly by the large landowning factions adversely affected by the plan's new zonings and stricter controls, held up the approval process. The controversy surrounding




Figure 26. The 'Plan Director' for the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona

Source : Circulo de Economia, Gestion o Caos, Ariel, Barcelona, 1973.

the plan led to a political crisis within the GBPC, which was reorganised from Madrid and renamed the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona in 1974, with the new plan in the throes of the first Public Information Stage. In the end, however, as a result of the changes in Central and Local Governments following Franco's death in 1975, the basics of the 1974 plan were included in the definitively approved 1976 version.



The Plan attempted to "preserve the position of the Barcelona centre as capital of one of the most dynamic regions in Spain, as an urban system on a European scale" (90). The fundamental objective was to ensure that the continued growth of the city could take place without being impeded by limitations on the availability of land, problems of congestion and service and infrastructural deficits. At the same time, the plan accepted the impossibility of effecting radical change; it "does not attempt to force drastic changes in the spontaneous development process" (91), but rather attempted to guide and rationalise the location of different land uses and activities. Because of the lack of financial and political muscle of planning authorities, the plan could not be a "programme of intervention"; rather it represented an attempt to "co-ordinate a mass of independent decisions, regulated by free market mechanisms". (92) The Plan introduced a new zoning system, in which many classifications were sufficiently wide-ranging to keep options open on the exact nature and timing of development; only in the classifications for the existing built up areas were strict building regulations introduced. For other zonings 'incompatible' (i.e. non-conforming) uses were established, but a flexibility remained "to facilitate a multiplicity of physical mixes for those uses which are mutually compatible". (93)

As concerns services and infrastructure, the plan specified the location of only large scale developments, which, because of their specific demands on size and location, had to be fixed (e.g. extension of the port service area). Other than this, the plan specified 'ideal locations' for such things as new sports areas and hospitals, but these were not binding. Certain minimum overall levels, however, both for the plan area as a whole and for individual zonings, had to be observed.

Somewhat in contrast to this 'controlled flexibility', the actual delimitation of zoning areas was minutely detailed to a degree unparalleled in the history of town planning in Spain, in an attempt to eliminate any possible contradictions between the given classification and existing land use. Of particular interest were the introduction of zonings involving specified change of land use e.g. new park areas




Figure 27. A Section of the 1976 Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan.

This section shows the new land-use classifications in and around the 'Tres Turons' hill area on the northern outskirts of the Barcelona municipality, an area of shanty development. Of particular interest are classifications 6b - new park areas; 14a - public renewal; 16 - urban renewal or rehabilitation and 17-6 - urban renewal/change of use. The Special Plan of Interior Reform can be used to plan and programme such changes in functional land use.

Source of plan : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 'Plan General Metropolitano de Ordenacion Urbana', CMB, 1976.

and urban renewal and rehabilitation zones (Figure 27), and the emphasis laid on 'Special Plans of Interior Reform' as a means of bringing about this change, in accord with the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act. The Plan also recognised 'directional (Service/Employment) centres' in the sub-region to counterbalance the domination of Barcelona city centre, very much in-line with the decongestion strategy of the Plan Director.

In summary, then, the Revision of the 1953 Plan was realistic in what it attempted, and along with the Plan Director, represented an important step away from the blue-print planning that had dominated Spanish town planning since 1956. Despite the changes introduced as a result of appeals presented in the two public information stages held 1974-1976, the plan has enabled planning authorities to exercise a strict development control function in the post-Franco era, and make a modest start on direct intervention in the improvement and renewal of the urban environment.

## 2.6 Summary of Main Points

- (a) The concept of urban planning is not new to Spain. Planning theory and practice have been developed since the middle of the last century when expansion plans for the growth of the country's major cities were first approved. Barcelona has figured prominently in the evolution of urban planning in the country as a whole.
- (b) The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 established the machinery and legal framework for the planning and control of city growth in Spain for the next 20 years. Cities were to expand in the form of 'estates', planned and programmed through 'Local Plans' and 'Roads and Service Projects' which had to be approved by the Local Council and Sub-Regional (or Provincial) planning authorities.
- (c) At the upper-tier levels, the planning system established in the 1956 Act has not functioned effectively, largely because of Central Government's concern with housing policy and housing programmes which has tended to dominate the activities of Central

Government planning authorities. At city level, however, Local Plans have been an important planning figure in the expansion of the country's major urban areas. These have been drawn-up and approved to plan and programme new development. In some cases, such Local Plans have involved changes in land-use classifications contained for the respective area in the city's General Plan.

- (d) The 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act attempted to make the planning machinery more flexible and workable at the upper-tier levels (Provincial and General Planning), and to tighten up on the Local Plan - General Plan relationship. Special Plans of Interior Reform were introduced as a means of planning the renewal or improvement of the urban environment at the local level.
- (e) In Barcelona, a General Sub-Regional Plan was approved in 1953, which provided the framework for planning in the city until the revision of the plan in 1976. The 1953 Plan was a classic blue-print plan that gave land-use classifications to the entire sub-region of 28 municipalities. The Greater Barcelona Planning Commission was created in the Act approving the 1953 Plan to manage and direct the implementation of the plan; the plan documentation also stressed the role of Local Plans as a means of planning and programming new development. The 1976 Revision updated the 1953 Plan in accord with the Land and Urban Planning Reform Act. A more open (though spatially very precise) land zoning system was introduced; and the plan specified minimum levels for services and infrastructure provision which had to be met in new development areas.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE BARCELONA PERIPHERY : AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCESSES OF CHANGE

"The urbanization process in Barcelona represents one of the most extreme cases of rapid and intensive development of an urban agglomeration in the post-war....The Local Plan must be considered the major mechanism responsible for the devastation produced in the Sub-Region". (94)

In chapter 2, the major components of the legislative and planning framework were outlined; in this chapter major aspects of the peripheral growth process in Barcelona in the post war are discussed, in an attempt to extend and develop the general 'conceptual framework' for the case study research. It seems important to stress at the outset, however, that this task has been hampered by the paucity of existing material (in any language) based on hard data, and one is left all through with a somewhat incomplete picture. Nonetheless, there seems to be sufficient information, drawn from disparate sources, to provide an introductory overview to the mechanics and dynamics of the growth of the Barcelona periphery, and thereby help 'set the scene' for the case studies.

This chapter is divided into six sections. The first deals with spatial and demographic aspects of peripheral growth, and the second with house construction in the periphery. Section three examines the growth of industry in the Sub-Region and section four looks at the general quality of the urban environment and the role local plans have had in effecting change in the urban environment. Section five provides an introduction to the activities of the major agencies intervening in the planning and implementation of development in the periphery. Finally, section six summarises the main points of the chapter.

#### 3.1 Spatial and Demographic Growth of the Barcelona Periphery.

The object of this section is to establish the broad spatial and demographic parameters to the growth of the Barcelona periphery in the post war. The major components of this growth and agencies operating in the peripheral growth process will be examined in subsequent sections.






Figure 28. The Growth of Barcelona 1859-1935

Source :- S. Tarrago, 'Los Planes de Barcelona - 1', Construccion de la Ciudad, No. 0, 1972.

In the 80 years between the approval of the Plan Cerdà (Figure 10) in 1860 and the end of the Civil War, the old city and the settlements on the plain of Barcelona had grown radiocentrically<sup>27</sup> (Figure 28) to form a reasonably continuous built-up area, filling most of Cerdà's 'ensanche'. There nevertheless remained considerable expanses of

<sup>27</sup> Of the major urban structure models developed by the Chicago School, Barcelona's growth perhaps best fits the Multiple Nuclei Model of Ullman and Harris.






Figure 29. Barcelona 1943.

Source : M. Galera, S. Tarrago, F. Roca, Atlas de Barcelona, COACB, Barcelona, 1972.

undeveloped land in the outlying areas of the municipality, particularly to the north and west, whilst development remained uneven within the eastern section of the 'ensanche' (Figure 29). Outside the municipality, Badalona (to the east) and Hospitalet (to the west) retained their own identities as separate settlements, cut off from Barcelona by large tracts of undeveloped terrain.

The 1970 Plan of the Barcelona Sub-Region (the most recent available - Figure 30) gives some indication of the extent of peripheral growth in the post-war. The built-up continuum had grown to cover most of the Barcelona Municipality (excepting the hill area to the north) and nearly all the territory of the adjoining municipalities of San Adrian, Santa Coloma and Badalona (to the east) and Hospitalet, Cornellà and Esplugas (to the west), stretching up the Besos and Llobregat valleys to encompass the valley settlements of the outlying municipalities.



Demographically, most of these municipalities experienced at least 300% increases in population between 1950 and 1970 (Figure 31), with the population of the 27 municipalities (excepting Barcelona) in the Sub-Region increasing more than three-fold, from 265,000 to 987,000 over the 20 year period (Table 2). This demographic boom was largely the product of an inter and intra-regional migration on an unprecedented scale (in a Spanish context), with 31.6 per cent of all migrants in Spain coming to Barcelona in the period 1962-71, when over 800,000 in-migrants arrived in the North-East Region of Spain (Table 3) every year, with over 50,000 settling in the Barcelona Sub-Region per year.



Figure 30. The Barcelona Sub-Region. 1970.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 'Plan Topografico de la Comarca de Barcelona' (original scale 1:50,000), MCB, 1976.






Figure 31. Percentage Increase in Population in the Municipalities of the Barcelona Sub-Region.

The municipalities are : 1. Palleja 2. San Vicente 3. Santa Coloma de Cervello 4. Gava 5. Castelldefels 6. San Clemente 8. San Baudilio 9. Prat 10. Papiol 11. Molins 12. San Feliu 13. San Juan Despi 14. San Justo Desvern 15. Esplugas 16. Cornellà 17. Hospitalet 18. San Cugat 19. Sardanyola 20. Ripollet 21. San Adrian 22. Montcada y Reixach 23. Santa Coloma de Gramanet 24. Badalona 25. Tiana 26. Montgat 27. Les Botigues.

Source : L. Carreno Piera, 'Proceso de Suburbializacion de la Comarca de Barcelona' Ciudad y Territorio 1/76 IEAL, Madrid.

	Municipality of Barcelona	Rest of Sub-Region	Total Sub-Region
1940	1,081,175	217,518	1,298,693
1950	1,280,179	265,119	1,545,298
1960	1,557,863	449,085	2,006,948
1970	1,745,142	986,742	2,731,884

Table 2. Population Increase in the Barcelona Sub-Region 1940-70.

Source : Censo de la Poblacion de Espana, Decenal.

Tarrago's analysis (95) of population change within the Barcelona municipality reveals that the 'East Residential' area experienced most growth<sup>28</sup> over the period 1950-68, and that the numbers living within the 'ensanche' dropped<sup>29</sup> in the sixties as tertiary and quaternary activities in the central areas increased. But from 1960 onwards as Table 2 and Figure 31 reveal, it was the municipalities outside Barcelona which experienced the bulk of the demographic growth in the Sub-Region, with some of the most spectacular increases occurring to the west where the hitherto largely agricultural municipalities of the Llobregat valley were enveloped in the outward expansion of the Barcelona conurbation. Let us now move on to examine the 'estate' development (housing or industrial) which constitutes the major morphological form of growth in the periphery.

<sup>28</sup> The East Residential area, stretching from the North-East borders of the 'ensanche' to the foothills of Tibidabo, experienced a fivefold population increase from 63,000 in 1950 to 350,000 in 1968.

<sup>29</sup> Numbers living in the ensanche dropped from 444,000 in 1960 to 429,000 in 1968.

Region	Net Migration ('000)		
	1901-30	1951-60 average per decade	1961-70
Galicia	-109	-227	-229
Cantabrico	-12	121	168
Western Duero	-103	-196	-276
Eastern Duero	-70	-153	-190
Madrid	150	412	687
Western Tajo-Guadiana	-32	-302	-618
Eastern Tajo-Guadiana	-30	-167	-217
Western Ebro	-41	-35	48
Eastern Ebro	-51	-79	-46
<u>North East</u>	190	484	806
Levante	-66	5	201
Western Andalusia	32	-156	-435
Eastern Andalusia	-106	-413	-409
Canaries	10	-6	19
Whole Country	-238	-712	-491

Table 3. Inter-Regional Migration 1900-1970

The 'North-East' includes three of the Catalan provinces - Barcelona, Tarragona and Girona, plus the Balearic islands. The figures strikingly reveal the increasing dominance of the North East and Madrid as the main migration 'gainers' in the country this century.

Source : H. W. Richardson, Regional Development Policy and Planning in Spain, Saxon House, 1975.



### 3.2 House Construction in the periphery

During the first post-war decade, 100,000 in-migrants arrived in Barcelona, and an estimated housing deficit of 20,000 houses<sup>30</sup> in 1940 had increased to 80,000<sup>31</sup> by 1950 in the Barcelona municipality alone. With only 15,000 new houses (many of which were for the middle to upper class end of the market) built in the decade, many in-migrants were forced into taking overcrowded sub-let accommodation, or building their own dwellings in the rapidly expanding shanty towns which had sprung up in the green zones and hitherto empty tracts of land in and around the 'ensanche' and in the adjoining municipalities (Figure 32). By the end of the 1940's an estimated 26,000 people<sup>32</sup> were living in shanty towns in and around the city; by 1954, the figure had doubled.

We have already noted (Chapter 2.3) that the housing deficit in Spain as a whole led the Central Government to pass the Limited Cost Housing Act of 1954 (in an attempt to induce the private sector to build state subsidized housing) and to approve a series of National Housing Plans to programme and co-ordinate private and public intervention in the housing sector in the country as a whole. At the same time, the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956, then in study, and the approved Sub-Regional Plans for Madrid (1946) and Barcelona (1953) laid great emphasis on the 'estate' as the major morphological form of urban expansion to be planned through the Local Plan/Roads and Service Project mechanism. In Madrid, the Sub-Regional Planning Authority embarked on the "urgent construction of housing estates in satellite

<sup>30</sup> J. Borja 'Planeamiento y Crecimiento Urbanos de Barcelona 1939-58', Construccion, Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 22, Barcelona 1973, pp 86-92.

<sup>31</sup> M. Ribas i Piera, 'Planificacion y Crecimiento de Barcelona 1939-58', Construccion, Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 22, pp 78-85.

<sup>32</sup> According to a survey carried out by the Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos de Cataluna y Baleares (COACB), quoted in M. Galera, et al, Atlas de Barcelona, COACB, Barcelona, 1972.




Figure 32. Major shanty towns in the Barcelona Sub-Region in 1949.

Source : M. Galera, S. Tarrago and F. Roca, Atlas de Barcelona, COACB, Barcelona, 1972.




Figure 33. Can Ros in the Northern Eastern outskirts of the 'ensanche'. The estate was built by the Eucaristic Congress to celebrate their 35th International Conference in Barcelona in 1952; it was one of the earliest publicly promoted estates in the city.

Source : M. Galera, S. Tarrago, F. Roca, Atlas de Barcelona, COACB, Barcelona, 1972.

nuclei around Madrid to house those currently living in shanty towns" (96), and the construction of 8 overspill estates<sup>33</sup> followed in the early and mid-fifties, comprising 27,000 houses in all. Similarly in Barcelona, the Council and the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission played a major role in planning and promoting new housing estates, and by the end of the decade Barcelona had more approved Local Plans, the majority corresponding to these new estates, than any other city in Spain. These included Can Ros (Figure 33), built to commemorate the Eucaristic Congress in 1952, and Verdun (Figure 34), one of the earliest promotions of the Syndical Housing Authority, both of which epitomize the modest internal dimensions, rationality of street lay-out, and general low rise development (3-4 storeys) that typified these early public estates and set the planning and design standards for state subsidized housing, in both public and private sectors, for the next decade.

From the mid-fifties onwards, private initiative, taking advantage of the subsidy system introduced in the 1954 and 1957 Housing Acts, played an increasingly dominant role in house promotion. The mid-fifties witnessed a surge in house construction in the Barcelona municipality, with new houses exceeding new demand in some years (Figure 35). Between 1954 and 1958, over 40,000 new houses were built in the municipality of Barcelona, over 75% of them by the private sector, and it was in these years and in the early 60's that the northern and eastern borders of the 'ensanche' were infilled. According to Borja, it was only in the 1960's that the "overflowing of the city into the Sub-Region" (97) began on a large scale, as, with most of the 'ensanche' infilled, both public and private promoters constructed estates in cheaper land in the peripheral municipalities. Because of the greater availability of space and advances in building technology,<sup>34</sup> these estates tended to comprise more and higher blocks - up to 15 storeys in some cases (Figure 36) - housing up to 3000 people, far larger estates in every way than those built in the early fifties.

<sup>33</sup> The eight estates were built at Penagrande, Mantoeras, Canillas, San Blas, Vicalvaro, Palomeras, Villaverde, and Carabanchel.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of changes in building technology in house construction in Spain in the sixties, see I. Paricio 'Las Razones de la forma en la vivienda masiva', Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 96, COACB, Barcelona, 1973.





Figure 34. Verdun (1,460 houses), one of the first estates built by the Syndical Housing Authority in the Barcelona Sub-Region. It was built in 1954 in the north-eastern limits of the Barcelona municipality. (Photo : M. G. Wynn).






Figure 35. Housing Needs and House Construction in the Municipality of Barcelona 1940-63.

Source : M. Sala Schnorkowski 'El Sector Inmobiliario en Cataluna', Ciudad y Territorio, 3/77, IEAL, Madrid, 1977.



Figure 36. Bellvitge in Hospitalet This estate of 3000 housing units was built by private developers in the mid-sixties. Note the contrast in the scale of construction when compared with an early fifties estate such as Verdun (Figure 34). (Photo M. G. Wynn).

The building of housing estates, then, by both public and private agencies, constituted one of the major forms of urban growth in the peripheral municipalities from the early sixties onwards, as the housing 'boom' in the city periphery continued. This is illustrated by Ferrer's analysis (98) of Local Plans approved in the Province of Barcelona between 1956 and 1970 which shows that, of the 371 plans approved in this period, 197 were in the Barcelona Sub-Region, of which 113 were for new housing estates (Table 4). Specifically as regards these estates, Ferrer identifies a major ring of development in the peripheral municipalities of Badalona, Montcada, Esplugas, Hospitalet and Prat, containing 60%

of all 'housing estate' Local Plans approved in the Province as a whole, coinciding very much with the major areas of demographic growth shown in Figure 31.

Type of Local Plan	Sub-Region	Rest of Metro-politan Area	Rest of Province	Total
A. Affecting one block only.	32	5	2	39
B. Housing estates.	113	102	21	236
C. Industrial estates.	44	37	5	86
D. Service and Infrastructure.	8	2	0	10
TOTAL	197	146	28	371

Table 4. Local Plans in the Province of Barcelona 1956-70 :  
Functional types.

Source : A. Ferrer Presentacion y Estadistica de los Planes Parciales de la Provincia de Barcelona (1956-70), COACB, 1974.

It is worth briefly noting here that, as Ferrer points out, some of the publicly promoted housing estates, particularly those built by the Syndical Housing Authority (see Section Five, below), were built in accordance with Local Plans that were not submitted to the plan approval process outlined in Chapter 2 (Figure 16), but were approved only within the plan-making authority itself. These plans Ferrer nevertheless includes in his analysis. Equally, it should be noted that not all dwellings built in the periphery over the past two decades have been in the form of housing estates, although most authors agree that in quantitative terms it has been the most significant form of house construction. Busquets (99), for example, identifies three types of development that collectively make up the 'human habitat' in the periphery. First, there are the remaining shanty towns, which Busquets has studied in great detail,<sup>35</sup> and which

<sup>35</sup> Busquets' PhD, undertaken at the Barcelona University in the early seventies, concerned shanty development in the Sub-Region. It has since been published in 3 volumes. See J. Busquets La Urbanizacion Marginal, Vols 1-3, ETSAB, Barcelona, 1975.

largely date from the forties and fifties. Busquets notes that this type of development has taken place "completely outside the planning system" (100). Secondly, there are the old outlying settlements which have undergone piecemeal infilling and expansion, and thirdly, and most importantly, the 'estate development' discussed above. Here, however, we shall not examine the first two types of development further. Whilst shanties constitute a relatively minor form of urban growth over the past two decades and the statutory planning machinery has had little to do with their appearance and demolition, suburban infilling has been small scale and gradual. Here then, as regards housing, we are more concerned with the larger scale, more dramatic, 'estate developments', which are set within more readily identifiable spatial and procedural frameworks for examination of the decision-making processes involved in their planning and implementation.

### 3.3 The Growth of Industry in the Periphery

In the Introduction to this thesis the importance of Barcelona as an industrial centre in a national and European context was recorded. In 1973, the Province of Barcelona produced over 23% of the country's industrial goods (by value), and employed 25% of the country's industrial workers; and within the Province, industry accounted for 57% of all employment (Agriculture - 3.5%, Tertiary/Quaternary - 39.5%)<sup>36</sup>. It nevertheless remains difficult to ascertain the overall spatial distribution of industrial growth in the Sub-Region over the past two decades. Again, as with the section on housing, we are left trying to piece together the few existing part-studies to form a composite overview.

According to the GBPC's 1973 study (101) of industry in the Sub-Region (Figure 37), the major industrial zones are in the eastern section of the 'ensanche' and, above all, in the adjoining municipalities, stretching up the Llobregat and Besos valleys. Further, the GBPC's

<sup>36</sup> See Comision de Urbanismo de Barcelona, La Localizacion Industrial en la Comarca de Barcelona, Comision de Urbanismo, 1973.

analysis of industrial licence cession<sup>37</sup> in the Sub-Region between 1964 and 1969 (Figure 38) reveals that 80% of licences were ceded by Councils other than Barcelona, with the major growth centres being Hospitalet to the west and Badalona to the east; and the Llobregat valley<sup>38</sup> as a whole emerges as the major axis of industrial growth in the Sub-Region, attracting over half the 1.3 million square metres of industrial floor space for which licences were granted during this period.

The GBPC's survey also reveals that a large proportion of land used for industry falls within Local Plan areas (Figure 37), even though much of this land was already zoned for industrial development in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan. In these cases, then, the Local Plan has been used for the detailed site planning of industrial estates, built on land which was frequently already zoned, in part at least, for industrial use, but which was devoid of development in 1953. According to the 1956 Planning Act (Chapter 2.2) development in such areas could not proceed until a Local Plan and Roads and Service Project were drawn-up and approved and the necessary permits and licences ceded.

Ferrer's analysis of Local Plans in the Province reinforces and complements the GBPC's findings. Of the 86 Local Plans in the Province making provision for industrial development, over half were located in the Sub-Region (Table 4). As regards the location pattern of industrial Local Plans, Ferrer concludes :-

"In the Barcelona Sub-Region, we can discern an inner ring stretching from Prat, up the Llobregat valley, through San Baudilio, Cornellà, Hospitalet, Esplugas, San Feliu and Molins in the south and west, to Sardanyola, Montcada, Santa Coloma, Badalona and San Adrià to the north and east; outside the sub-region a second ring runs from Martorell-Castellbisbal through Terrasa-Sabadell to Mollet-La Llagosta" (102)

<sup>37</sup> The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act established that Industrial Licences had to be ceded prior to the installation of industrial machinery, in addition to building permits for construction of the factories, workshops, warehouses etc. The Industrial Licence procedure was further refined in the 1961 Industries Act which introduced a four way grading of industrial installations. This is further discussed in Chapter 7.

<sup>38</sup> The Llobregat valley - i.e. The municipalities of Molins, San Vicens, San Feliu, San Juan Despi, Cornellà, Hospitalet, Prat and San Baudilio (see Figure 31).






Figure 37. The Location of Industry and Local Plan areas in the Sub-Region 1971.

Source : Comision de Urbanismo La Localizacion Industrial en la Comarca de Barcelona, Comision de Urbanismo, 1973.




Figure 38. Industrial Licence Cession in the Barcelona Sub-Region 1964-69.

Source : Comisión de Urbanismo, La Localización Industrial en la Comarca de Barcelona, Comisión de Urbanismo, 1973.

These two rings are clear enough in Ferrer's location plan of Industrial Local Plans (Figure 39), and the two valley axes again emerge as the major areas of industrial growth in the Sub-Region.




Figure 39. Location of Industrial Local Plans in the Province of Barcelona.

Source : A. Ferrer Presentacion y Estadistica de los Planes Parciales  
COACB, Barcelona, 1974.




Figure 40. Variation in industrial land prices in Barcelona.

The broken line links settlements going approximately south (*italicized*); the unbroken line, settlements going approximately north.

Source : Circulo de Economia, Gestion o Caos, Ariel, Barcelona, 1973.

This thesis is not primarily concerned with investigating locational factors in the peripheral growth process, but it seems relevant as background information to briefly mention the findings of Ferrer and the GBPC on this aspect of industrial growth. Ferrer concludes that dependence on lines of communication, and energy and waste disposal systems, have been major factors in determining industrial location in the Province, along with proximity to the markets and labour supply of the Barcelona conurbation. At the micro-level, and with specific reference to industry in the Sub-Region, the GBPC found that "planning regulations, the 'availability of land' and 'the absence of adequate service infrastructure' have acted as significant constraints on the process of physical occupation of land". (103) But despite the great differences in the value of industrial land, which drops dramatically away from Barcelona-centre (Figure 40), the GBPC's survey concluded that there was no evidence to suggest a significant decentralization of industry in the Sub-Region, although the high density of plant construction in the Barcelona municipality was indicative of the congested nature of the centre.

Let us now return, in summary, to the more central theme of local level planning and development in the periphery. We have already established (Table 4) that the majority of Local Plans in the Sub-Region have concerned housing or industrial estates. This is reaffirmed in Ferrer's survey of land classification contained in these Local Plans (Table 5), which reveals that over half the land covered by Local Plans has been zoned for residential use and almost one third for industrial use. These figures lead Ferrer to conclude that Local Plans have been used to plan development that answers to two main needs :-

"First, the need to provide housing for the natural, and above all migratory, increase in demand, from the mid-fifties onwards. Second, the need for industrial land - almost one third of all land destined for building in Local Plans has been classified for industry" (104).



Type of Local Plan	Residential	Industrial	Tertiary Services	TOTAL
A. Affecting one block	35.15	1.70	3.70	40.55
B. Housing Estates	5471.00	113.00	700.00	6284.00
C. Industrial Estates	14.85	2,846.90	65.00	2926.95
D. Service & Infrastructure	2.25	00.00	214.00	216.25
TOTAL	5,523.25	2,961.60	982.70	9467.55

Table 5. Land zonings (hectares) in Local Plans in the Barcelona Province.

Source : A. Ferrer, Presentacion y Estadistica de los Planes Parciales, COACB, 1974.

By building on the existing information sources cited in this chapter, we can now conclude the main points of the first three sections of the chapter as follows:-

- (1) The municipalities to the east and west of Barcelona centre have been the major areas of peripheral growth over the past two decades.
- (2) Estate development has been the major morphological form of growth.
- (3) Estates have generally been planned through the Local Plan Mechanism and
- (4) They have generally comprised new housing or industrial development.

Let us now return to a theme alluded to in the Introduction to this thesis, a theme which in many ways was the starting point for this research: the poor quality of the environment in the periphery, and the role of local planning in its creation and improvement.

### 3.4 Environmental Quality and Local Level Planning

In Chapter 2.3 brief mention was made of Teran's model of city growth in Spain since the approval of the 1956 Planning Act (Figure 24). In this model the city core has grown anarchically, and the periphery consists of housing and industrial estates and haphazard growth, generally deficient in service infrastructure. Teran admitted, however, that his model (which dates from 1970) was only hypothetical (for all Spain) as it was based essentially on studies of the urban growth process undertaken in Alicante, Malaga, Granada and Palma de Mallorca.

In terms of its major components, and generally poor quality of the peripheral environment, the Barcelona case would seem to fit Teran's model well. As regards the poverty of the urban environment, we can get some idea of the magnitude of the problem from the Financial-Economic Survey (105) undertaken by the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona as a preliminary study for the revision of the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan (Chapter 2.5). The survey found that to meet existing deficits in schools, water supply, drainage and sewerage networks, road infrastructure, health centres, markets etc., in the Sub-Region, the Public Administration would have to find 64,000 pesetas (£420) for every person (3.2 million) living in the Sub-Region. To comply with the minimum service standards set by statute and incorporated into the 1976 Sub-Regional Plan, the Local Councils alone would have to buy 1500 hectares for urban parks, 450 hectares for collective service buildings (schools, hospitals, libraries etc) and 1,800 hectares for roads. However, where Teran's model suggests this absence or general poverty of services and infrastructure is, in part, a result of the inexistence of Local Plans to plan and control development, a review of relevant literature suggests this situation has come about in Barcelona in spite of their existence.

The analyses of Ferrer and the GBPC, referred to above, bear witness to the importance of the Local Plan mechanism in the growth of the Sub-Region, and Montero (106) has pointed out that 16,500 hectares in the Sub-Region have been affected by Local Plans, almost one third of the entire area (Figure 41). Additionally, isolated studies, such as those of Olive (107) in Santa Coloma, Junyent (108) in Cinco Rosas, and Secod in La Mina (109) and Zona Franca (110), have drawn attention to the general poverty of infrastructure and the urban environment in general in areas in which development has, in theory, been planned and controlled through approved Local Plans.




Figure 41. Local Plans in the Barcelona Sub-Region.

Source : A. Ferrer Presentacion y Estadistica de los Planes Parciales, COACB, Barcelona, 1974.

What, then, has been the function of the Local Plan mechanism in this process, which has produced an urban periphery so deficient in services and basic infrastructure? From the existing surveys and studies, some things are clear. Local Plans have been a major vehicle for the reclassification of land to facilitate development by both public and private agencies alike. Teixidor et al's study (111) of the 41 Local Plans approved in the Barcelona municipality between 1956 and 1971 reveals that over one-third of the area covered by these plans was reclassified for a different form of development than that specified in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan; and Montero's analysis of changes introduced in Local Plans approved in the Sub-Region in the 60's (Figure 42) gives an indication of the nature of these changes: industrial and residential classifications were introduced at the expense of free space and collective service areas, with 1295 hectares of 'green zones' having been reclassified for other uses through the Local Plan mechanism. At the same time, there have been qualitative changes, above all within Residential classifications, not reflected in Figure 42 e.g. an existing low-density residential classification is replaced by a higher density residential classification in a Local Plan. Sabater Cheliz (112) has shown that, with all changes introduced in Local Plans, the population potential of the Sub-Region in 1974 was 7½ million, compared with 4.1 million in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan and 4.7 million in the 1976 revision.

What has been given relatively little attention in these studies, however, is the decision-making process that permitted such development to take place; and whilst we know Local Plans were used to change land-use classifications, this still does not explain why so much of the basic service infrastructure is missing or deficient in the periphery. In other words, even if a Local Plan increased residential densities and reclassified green zones, (as many surely did), the Roads and Service Project/Building permit mechanism should still have ensured that roads were built, pavements laid and sewerage networks provided; and we still do not know why schools, markets and health centres have not been built, when provision was




Figure 42. Changes in Land-use classifications in Local Plans in the Barcelona Sub-Region 1960-70.

Source : J. Montero 'El planificacion parcial en la Comarca de Barcelona' Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo No. 87, COACB, Barcelona, 1972.



made for them in Local Plans. Existing studies, then, provide us with some useful overviews of the role of the Local Plan in the growth of the periphery; what has not been researched in any depth is the decision-making process that enabled such change to take place, and the functioning (or malfunctioning) of the more detailed planning mechanisms, controls and systems of intervention in this process. It is these aspects of the 'change process' then, upon which the case studies will centre.

The above discussion concerns the mechanics and dynamics of change in the Barcelona periphery in the sixties and early seventies. However, changes in the broader political-social environment and the more local planning framework in the post-Franco era have added a further dimension to this investigation; apart from researching how and why such a poor quality environment was created in the sixties and early seventies, the same case studies may also research the improvement or renewal of development in more recent years.

In the 1976 Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, 15% of the built-up area, largely in the periphery, was classified as 'previously replanned zone'. The zoning was for "areas of urban land, developed or in the process of development, for which a Local Plan has been drawn-up and approved" (113). This treatment of many of the Local Plan areas was criticised at the time by writers such as Sabater Cheliz (114) and Jubert and Sodupe (115) because it appeared to represent an acceptance of the nature of development in these areas as a 'fait accompli', and did not make any positive attempt to improve the urban environment. However, with the subsequent rapid moves to democracy in Spain and consequent changes in local authority politics<sup>39</sup> and practice, attention has focused

<sup>39</sup> In the first democratic local elections for over 40 years, in April 1979, only one of the 28 municipalities in the Sub-Region was won by the National Government's UCD (Conservative) party. The remaining 27 were won by either the left of centre Catalan Nationalist party, the Socialists or the Communists.

on the Special Plan of Interior Reform (SPIR) as a potential planning mechanism for bringing about renewal, rehabilitation and the provision of new service infrastructure in the periphery.

It has already been noted (Chapter 2.4) that the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act stipulated that the SPIR could be used for "the improvement of the urban and rural environment and the city suburbs" (116), and the 1976 Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan made provision for the drawing-up and approval of SPIR's "when modification of the existing building density, or provision of new service infrastructure, are considered necessary" (117). This, then, opened the door to the planning and programming of area improvement or renewal in the periphery and elsewhere. In a recently published article (June 1979), Roca Cladera notes that two such plans were approved in 1977, three in 1978 and 3 more were under study, all drawn-up by Councils in the periphery and all covering Local Plan areas developed in the 'boom' expansion years of the sixties and early seventies (Figure 43). Roca Cladera concludes that this intervention represents:-

"a real precedent in our (Spain's) planning history. Until now planning has essentially concerned extending the built-up area to the exclusion of service and free space areas; in this way the property value of land has been increased. With the Special Plans of Interior Reform, this value has been reduced and the use of land for communal services increased. This has signified, then, a qualitative change in the content and function of urban planning" (118).

Again, however, although Roca Cladera briefly examines the content of these plans, we know very little about how the intricate mechanisms of planning and implementation have functioned in practice and the decision-making processes involved in what are, in effect, pioneer schemes in the rehabilitation and renewal of the urban environment.

In summary, then, this section has attempted to further develop the argument towards the establishment of a conceptual framework for research and the formulation of loose hypotheses. We can summarise the main points of this section as follows :-



Figure 43. The Special Plans of Interior Reform, approved or under study, in the Barcelona Sub-Region 1979.

1. Can Serra (approved 31-3-77; covers 29.4 hectares).
2. Bellvitge (15-5-77; 64.1 hectares).
3. Gornal (24-2-78; 18.1 hectares).
4. San Cosme (21-4-78; 50.2 hectares).
5. Liefia (30-10-78; 103.8 hectares).
6. Manzana de sindicatos (under study).
7. Santa Eulalia (under study).
8. San Roque (under study).

Source : J. Roca Cladera 'La Recuperacion de la Peripheria Barcelonesa', Construccion Arquitectura y Urbanismo No. 57, June 1979.

- (1) The quality of the urban environment in the periphery is generally poor. Basic service infrastructure is often deficient or missing altogether.
- (2) The Local Plan mechanism was used in the sixties and seventies to reclassify land for industrial and residential development at the expense of free space areas and collective service infrastructure.
- (3) In the post-Franco era, the Special Plan of Interior Reform has been used to re-equip and renew areas of the periphery.
- (4) In general, however, the detailed functioning of planning mechanisms at local level has received little attention; and we know very little about the decision making process involved in local level planning and implementation.

This therefore suggests a research focus on the mechanisms of change and dynamics of decision-making at local level. Such a focus inevitably involves consideration of inter-agency relationships and interaction, and the strategies and roles of the various decision-making entities. Let us now move on, then, to consider the generalised roles of the major agency-types in the planning and implementation of periphery development as background to the more detailed research of their functioning in the case studies.

### 3.5 Planning Authorities and Development Agencies

There is a general absence of comprehensive surveys or detailed studies on the activities and interactions of planning and development agencies in the Sub-Region, but in the past two or three years, in particular, a number of books and articles have appeared that help to set the activities of these agencies in a contemporary historical perspective. Here, then, an attempt is made to provide a brief generalised introduction to the roles and activities of the major entities who figure in the case studies, ie. Municipal Councils, private sector developers, the Sub-Regional planning authority, public housing agencies and residents' associations. Unfortunately, this is inevitably a fragmentary account as the necessary research

to present a comprehensive picture has not, as yet, been undertaken. Nor is it contended that this is an exhaustive list, but rather reflects the planning process - decision orientated framework for this investigation. This has meant that relatively little attention has been given to other agencies (e.g. building contractors, large financiers, estate agents) which might be considered of primary importance by those adopting different analytical frameworks or alternative research perspectives.

### 3.5.1 Municipal Councils and Private Sector Developers.

We will deal with these two groups together as their functioning in the planning and implementation of development is closely linked, and in many ways the weakness of the former is the strength of the latter. Let us first briefly sketch out the history<sup>40</sup> of municipal councils.

The creation of municipal councils in all Spain's 9000 odd municipalities dates from the 1812 constitution, but they remained very much subjected to Central State repression throughout most of the 19th century. In 1924, the Municipal Statute introduced a new electoral system for councillors (two thirds by popular vote, one third corporate vote) and, as noted in Chapter 2, the Statute made Councils responsible for drawing up plans of 'ensanche' and 'extension', to plan the growth of the country's towns and cities. Because of Primo de Rivera's coup in 1927 and the subsequent fall of the Monarchy, elections based on the 'thirds system' did not follow until 1931, in the early days of the Second Republic. Much of the 1924 Statute, however, and the 1935 Local Government Act, which introduced universal suffrage for council elections and gave Councils wider-ranging powers, were suspended or repealed by Franco's government at the end of the Civil War in 1939.

<sup>40</sup> For a more detailed account see : J. Angulo Uribarri, Municipio, Elecciones y vecinos, La Torre, Madrid 1978.



The first Council elections held in the Franco era were in 1948 when 80% of voters were 'chosen' by the Home Office, and strict State Control of both voters and candidates characterized the subsequent three-yearly elections held throughout the Franco dictatorship. In 1955 the Local Government Act established a new electoral system termed 'organic suffrage' : one-third of councillors elected by heads of families, one third by local delegates of the State-run unions ('sindicatos') and one-third by these 'elected' councillors. In practice, however, the Home Office, through the Provincial Civil Governors, ensured that members of the Falange dominated the candidate's list; and the Mayors, like the Civil Governors, were appointed from above, by the Home Office.

With such a limited franchise, it is not surprising that the rumours of corruption and collusion between councillors (and Council staff) and developers have been rife. Marti and Moreno (119), for example have alleged that Porcioles, mayor of Barcelona from 1957 to 1973, was head of a mafia-like power network (chiefly through his two sons-in-law), which included some of the largest developers, the major banks and organs of the press in Barcelona. On a smaller-scale, Capel has asserted that "land-owners and developers are well represented on Councils, and so the planning and approval of high density residential development has been achieved without much difficulty" (120). These connections, however, are very difficult to substantiate, and research of wider-ranging power networks and systems of political influence is not central to this research. Nevertheless it is a relevant background scenario against which research findings can be viewed.

We have already examined (Chapter 2.2) the major powers and responsibilities attributed to Councils in the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act, and it is not necessary to repeat these here. However, it does seem worth noting that the financial weakness of most of the Councils in the Sub-Region has meant they have had to rely almost entirely on the private sector or Central State agencies to finance new development. Clusa (121) has recently pointed out

that Council budgets in Spain have rarely totalled 10% of the gross Public Sector budget over the past 40 years, compared with average figures of 18% for West Germany, 27% for Great Britain and 38% for Holland. Furthermore, gross Public Sector expenditure in Spain has averaged about 25% of the GNP, compared with figures of around 50% for these other countries. Clusa also notes that staff salaries alone account for up to 50% of a typical Council budget and that investment in new development and infrastructure is generally limited to 10 - 20% of the budget (Table 6).

1. Staff Salaries.	30 - 50%
2. Municipal services: maintenance and provision.	30 - 40%
3. Annual interest payments and repayments on loans.	10 - 20%
4. Investment ('special budgets').	10 - 20%

Table 6. The Council Budget - the 4 major elements.

Source : J. Clusa, 'Algunos problemas economicas y administrativas de la gestion publica urbana', Butlletí No. 5, CEUMT, June 1978.

Responsibility for planning and development control in the municipality has until recently been in the hands of the Technical Services Section in most Councils. This Section is traditionally headed by the Municipal Architect, perhaps assisted by another architect,<sup>41</sup> draughtsman and an industrial or civil engineer, although in the larger Councils, things have changed considerably over the past decade, with the creation of new divisions and units to handle different aspects of planning and development. But in many of the smaller municipalities of the Barcelona sub-region, the old Technical Services Section has remained in charge of planning matters, often paying little attention, as Teran has pointed out (Chapter 2.3), to the official directives and planning guidelines set by the General Directorate of Urban Planning.

<sup>41</sup> Planning as a profession does not exist in Spain, although a post-graduate course in 'Ordenacion del territorio' has recently been set up in the School of Civil Engineers at Madrid University. Traditionally, architects have dominated the urban design side of planning, whilst civil engineers have been more concerned with road and service infrastructure. Thus a qualified architect would normally draw-up a Local Plan, and a Civil Engineer would draw-up the Roads and Service Project. There are also university courses (and professional colleges) in Industrial Engineering and Draughtsmanship ('Aparejador') and such professionals are also found on occasion as members of the Technical Services Section.

In the realm of development control, the Section's responsibilities encompass the processing of building permit and industrial licence applications (decisions being made with reference to approved General and Local Plans) and the initial and provisional approval (or non-approval), subject to confirmation by the Full Council, of Local Plans and Roads and Service Projects submitted to the Council by other agencies or individuals. As regards 'plan-making' some city Councils have drawn-up their own General Plans, although this task may be contracted out to consultants; and a great many Councils in the major urban areas have drawn-up and approved their own Local Plans and Roads and Services Projects. Ferrer's analysis, for example, referred to above, shows that just over half the Local Plans approved in the Province between 1956 and 1970 were drawn-up by public agencies (Table 7).

Type of Local Plan	Unknown	Public	Private	Mixed	Total
A. Affecting one-block.	0	26	12	1	39
B. Housing Estates.	10	112	110	4	236
C. Industrial Estates.	9	40	34	3	86
D. Service & Infrastructure.	1	8	1	0	10
TOTAL	20	186	157	8	371

Table 7. Plan-making agencies for Local Plans in the Province of Barcelona.

Source : A. Ferrer Presentacion y Estadistica de los planes parciales, COACB, Barcelona 1974.

As regards the financing of new development, Teran has emphasised that, from the mid-fifties onwards, "the landowners and developers became the most important agencies of economic development and urban growth in Spain." (122) An impression of the predominance of the private sector in overall investment in the Sub-Region can be gained from 1968 figures (Table 8) which show that 83% of total investment in the Sub-Region came from the private sector, with the 27 Municipal Councils (excluding Barcelona) contributing only 1%; and of the 280,000 houses built in the Sub-Region in the sixties, 250,000 were constructed by the private sector, of which almost 180,000 were state aided.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> Patronato Municipal de la Vivienda La Vivienda en Barcelona, Barcelona, April 1973.

(percentages)		(percentages)	
Council of Barcelona.	6.7	Industry	27.6
The other Municipal Councils in the Sub-Region.	1.0	Rest of Private Sector.	55.3
Provincial Government.	0.6		
Greater Barcelona Planning Commission.	0.4		
Autonomous Municipal Bodies.	0.3		
Total Local Administration	9.0		
Government Ministries	5.6		
Autonomous State Bodies	3.4		
Total Central Administration	8.0		
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR	17.0%	TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR	83%

Table 8. Investment in the Barcelona Sub-Region 1968.

Source : Circulo de Economia, Gestion o Caos, Ariel, Barcelona, 1973.

Development of industrial estates in the Sub-Region has been almost exclusively by the private sector, although the largest estate - Zona Franca - is owned by the 'Consorcio de Zona Franca' (Council of Barcelona/Central State, major shareholders) and sub-let to private industries, rather like a new town Development Corporation. This, however, is the exception to the rule and, apart from Zona Franca, public ownership of industrial land or plant investment is very limited in the Sub-Region, although more in evidence in the rest of the Province.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> The National Institute of Urban Development (Figure 20) own a number of industrial estates in the backwaters of the province at Vich, Manresa, Berga and Igualada, and in the Martorell - Sabadell - Terrasa Sub-Region. The basic service infrastructure and plant was provided by the Institute and sublet to the private sector, in an attempt to stimulate growth outside the Barcelona Sub-Region, in line with the directives of the 2nd and 3rd National Regional-Economic Development Plans.  
See: H.W. Richardson, Regional Development Policy and Planning in Spain, Saxon House, 1975.

This predominance of the private sector in the development process is reflected in Ferrer's analysis of the systems of intervention used in Local Plans in the Province (Table 9), with the 'co-operative' and the 'cession of roads' systems (see Chapter 2.2) emerging as the major forms intervention. On the crucial matter of the provision of road and service infrastructure (roads, lighting, drainage, sewerage, roadside green areas), it is perhaps worth re-iterating that the 'co-operative system' makes the developers directly responsible for the finance and provision of this infrastructure, and, once the Council have checked that it complies with the approved 'Roads and Service Project,' it is handed over to the Council. In the 'Cession of Roads' system, the land on which this infrastructure is to be built is given over to the Council and the financing and provision of this infrastructure becomes the Council's responsibility. Once completed, however, the Council can recoup 90% of capital expenditure by imposing 'Special Contributions' (special rates) on the benefactors. Clusa (123) has pointed out, however, that the lack of municipal finances<sup>144</sup> has discouraged Councils from pursuing this form of intervention, generally preferring to leave it to the private sector to finance the provision of infrastructure directly through the co-operative system. Nevertheless, the fact remains that whichever system of intervention is used the provision of road and service infrastructure has according to the 1956 Act, to be checked by the local Council before Building Permits can be ceded and development takes place.

<sup>144</sup> To help municipal authorities in the financing of infrastructure and new development, the state-run Local Authority Loans Bank ('Banco de Credito Local') was created in 1955. Clusa, however, has pointed out that "the means of obtaining loans from this bank has never been clear, and the two Councils which have benefitted most have been Madrid and Barcelona, largely because of the political pressure they can bring to bear." See : J. Clusa, 'Algunos Problemas Economicos y Administrativos de la gestion publica urbana', Butlletí No. 5, CEUMT, 1978, p.6.



Type of Plan	<u>System of Intervention</u>					
	Unknown	Cession of Roads	Co-operative	Exprop-riation	Compen-sation	Various
A. Affecting one-block.	24	7	6	0	2	0
B. Housing Estates.	95	20	96	3	8	14
C. Industrial Estates.	36	11	31	2	5	1
D. Services and Infra-structure.	7	0	1	2	0	0
Total	162	38	134	7	15	15

Table 9. Systems of Intervention used in Local Plans in the Province of Barcelona 1956-70.

N.B. Ferrer's figures for the 'expropriation' system especially in housing estates, are suprisingly low, and one suspects a fair number of the 'unknowns' used this sytem. Certainly, central state housing authorities (Syndical Housing Authority/National Institute of Housing) invariably did so; and it is likely that access to these authorities' plans was most difficult to secure as copies were not always given to the municipal councils.

Source : A. Ferrer, Presentacion y Estadistica de los Planes Parciales, COACB, Barcelona, 1974.

In summary, then, it is clear that private enterprise has played the leading role in the development of the periphery, and that the financial weakness of municipal Councils precluded the majority from playing a positive interventionist role in the development process. Nevertheless, as plan-making and approval authorities, the Councils had a vital statutorily regulated control function to fulfill, and the interaction between municipal authorities and the private sector in the planning and implementation of development will be one of the aspects of the decision-making process research in the case studies.

### 3.5.2 The Sub-Regional Planning Authority

The statutory planning responsibilities of The Greater Barcelona Planning Commission are noted in Chapter 2. They were the upper-tier authority responsible for definitive approval of all plans, projects and permits. Their relatively small budget severely limited their role as a development agency, although they played a major role as a plan-making authority in the design of the early public housing estates<sup>45</sup> built on the eastern fringes of the municipality in the fifties.

In 1960, the administrative structure of the Commission was re-organised to reinforce the dominance of the Sub-Region's biggest municipalities in policy making, and throughout the sixties, as Montero has said, "decisions were frequently 'political', unjustifiable in urban planning terms, and aimed solely at satisfying certain municipal interests" (124). The early seventies, however, saw the beginnings of a gradual change in the GBPC's planning policy that culminated in the reorganisation and renaming of the authority as the 'Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona' (MCB) in 1974. The eras of Parciols and Muntadas as mayors of Barcelona and Hospitalet came to an end in 1973 and 1972 respectively. Whilst these two men had had notoriously close ties with property developers and large financiers, their successors, Maso and Capdevilla, were more sympathetic towards the increasingly vociferous demands of the ('neo capitalist') industrialists for a planned and controlled 'rational' growth of the sub-region.

The re-organization of the authority in 1974 and final approval in 1976 of the Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan signified the start of a new era in which the MCB has exerted a firm development control role after two decades in which it largely acted as a rubber stamp authority for the planning decisions of the larger Councils. This role has been reinforced with the coming of democratically elected local as well as central authorities and Catalan autonomy is likely to bring about a more positive interventionist role for the authority. Let us now turn to the major public housing authorities that have operated in the sub-region over the past two decades.

<sup>45</sup> The housing estates planned by the GBPC include : Guineueta, Porta, San Martin, Buen Pastor and Baron de Viver.

### 3.5.3 Public Housing Authorities

Of the public housing authorities which have constructed estates in the Barcelona sub-region in the post-war, the most important have been the Syndical Housing Authority (Ministry of Work and Labour Relations), the National Institute of Housing (Ministry of Housing) and the Municipal Housing Foundation, a semi-autonomous housing agency attached to the Barcelona Council. Collectively, Borja et al (125) have estimated that the public sector as a whole have provided 10 - 15% of all houses built in the sub-region since 1960.

Since the end of the Civil War, and largely since the early fifties, the Syndical Housing Authority (SHA) have built over 380,000 dwellings in all Spain, of which 24,000 have been located in the Barcelona Sub-Region (Figure 44) and a further 25,000 in the rest of the Province. All their housing promotions since the mid-fifties have taken advantage of State subsidies made available in the 1954 and 1957 Limited Cost Housing Act, and Jubert (126) has drawn attention to the generally poor quality of house design, minimal internal room dimensions<sup>46</sup> and poverty of service infrastructure that characterize their estates. The National Institute of Housing (NIH) have primarily been concerned with administering the state subsidy system for private developers, but they have also acted as land acquisition agency for the SHA, and as house constructor in their own right, constructing over 10,000 houses in the Sub-Region since the mid-fifties. The Municipal Housing Foundation (MHF) are one of the few locally based housing authorities in Spain, being financially dependent on the Barcelona Council and Central State subsidies. Since the mid-fifties the MHF have built over 16,000 dwellings, nearly all in the eastern and northern margins of the Municipality of Barcelona. As with SHA and NIH estates, most MHF operations have been aimed at the bottom end of the market and

<sup>46</sup> In the early SHA estates such as Trinidad, usable floor space in a two-bedroomed dwelling was 31m<sup>2</sup>, constructed floor space 38m<sup>2</sup>. In a three-bedroomed dwelling, figures were 39 and 49m<sup>2</sup> respectively. Borja et al, however, estimate that the average floor space of all publicly promoted houses built in Barcelona between 1950 and 1969 is 69m<sup>2</sup>. See : Seccion Estudios de la Vivienda, 'Trinidad', Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 105, COACB, 1974; and J. Borja, M. Sola-Morales, E. Llexia, J. Verrie, 'El Habitat en Barcelona', Construccion, Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 10, Barcelona, 1971.





Figure 44. The Major Residential Estates of the Syndical Housing Authority in the Barcelona Sub-Region

1 - Meridiana (1945; 406 houses). 2 - La Merced (1948; 130) 3 - Trinidad (1954; 1,154) 4 - Verdun (1954; 1,464) 5 - Onesimo Redondo (1955; 816) 6 - J A Parera (1956; 1,637) 7 - San Roque (1956-60; 3,395) 8 - La Paz (1963; 2,499) 9 - Guineueta (1964; 1,517) 10 - San Coume (1965-7; 1,500) 11 - Cinco Rosas (1967-8; 1,500) 12 - Pomar (1967; 2,000) 13 - Gornal (1972-3; 4,262)



have received Central Government subsidies. Let us now move on to briefly consider the emergence of the Residents Associations as a force in the planning and implementation of development.

### 3.5.4 Residents Associations

According to authors such as Castells (127) and Berriatua (128), the Residents Association movement in Spain is one of the most advanced in Europe in terms of organization and political activity. The widespread 'mobilization' of Residents Associations is nevertheless a relatively recent phenomenon, and Borja, referring essentially to the Barcelona case, identifies the mid-sixties as the turning point in the history of the movement.

"The relative passivity of the working classes up until the mid-1960's manifested itself in a general acceptance of the disorderly growth of the city and the scant publicity given to the role of Local Plans in the development process. But from the mid-sixties onwards, the working classes and certain elements of the press adopted more active stances, as witnessed in recent years in increasingly successful campaigns against the lack of collective service installation (schools, hospitals and green zones ...)" (129)

By the mid-seventies, the political and academic left were hailing a number of victories<sup>47</sup> by Residents Associations in their fight against housing agencies, local authorities and developers. One of the most publicised and successful campaigns was that fought by local residents against the proposed large-scale redevelopment of the 'Ribera' - the run-down coastal area of the 'ensanche' to the east of the old city. The developers' proposals for high rise luxury apartments were supported by Barcelona Council, but modified, and then abandoned, following a lengthy appeal court case against the legality of the operation.<sup>48</sup> In many of the public housing areas, residents demanded house repairs, the provision of missing schools,

<sup>47</sup> See for example : Asociaciones de Vecinos de la OSH. ('9 barrios'), Dos años de Lucha Contra la OSH, Barcelona, 1975; and the two books cited below.

<sup>48</sup> For an account of the Ribera case, see F. Marti and E. Moreno, Barcelona - a donde vas?, Dirosa, 1974; or S. Morales, J. Busquets, M. Domingo, A. Font, J. Gomez-Ordóñez, Barcelona. Remodelacion Capitalista o Desarrollo urbano en la sector de la Ribera Oriental? Gustavo Gili, Barcelona, 1974.



roads and green areas, and the drawing-up of missing tenancy agreements;<sup>49</sup> but protest campaigns were not only limited to the public housing estates. Castells notes that :-

"In recent years, new social classes have become involved in these disputes, especially those in the residential complexes in the immediate suburbs, which were constructed by private promoters for skilled workers, officials and technicians. Their main concerns are with urban facilities and services, particularly schooling, where there is an insufficient number of places. In other cases, demands concern the quality of the environment, proposed increases in population density and the preservation of park areas." (130)

Berriatua (131) has recently published his survey of Resident Association campaigns in Bilbao, and he notes how the Associations moved from an essentially defensive stance in the early seventies to a more positive involvement in the planning and development processes in the post-Franco era, formulating (often with the help of consultants) their own proposals for renewal and improvement, and this impression is borne out by the accounts of Castells (132) and Borja (133) referring to Madrid and Barcelona. This involvement of Residents Associations in the planning process, the study of their interaction with other authorities and the planning mechanisms by which change has been secured, nevertheless remains poorly researched; this, then, is another aspect of planning and development which the case studies will encompass.

<sup>49</sup> The 1954 and 1957 Housing Acts made possible both the sale or renting out of state subsidized housing. In the sixties there was a general tendency towards sale and away from renting-out by both public and private sectors alike. In the public housing estates, most Residents Associations demanded that they paid fixed rents (at no more than 10% of average salary), rather than long term mortgage payments. Acceptance of a sale contract would invariably mean accepting responsibility for the repair of what were often poor quality dwellings.

### 3.6 Summary of Main Points

We can summarise the main points of this chapter as follows :-

- (1) Over the past two decades the Barcelona continuum has expanded to encompass the adjoining municipalities to the east and west and the valley settlements of the lower reaches of the Llobregat and Besos rivers.
- (2) Housing and industrial estates have constituted the major morphological form of new development in the periphery during this period.
- (3) The environmental quality of these estates is generally poor. Basic service infrastructure is often inadequate or missing altogether.
- (4) In the Franco-era the Local Plan mechanism was used to plan estate development. Many of these Local Plans changed existent land-use classifications, often to facilitate higher residential densities in the housing estates, at the expense of green zones.
- (5) In the post-Franco era, the Special Plan of Interior Reform has been used as a planning mechanism to plan and programme the improvement of some areas in the Barcelona periphery.
- (6) The Municipal and Sub-Regional Planning Authorities have generally been prevented from intervening as development agencies because of lack of finances, and the private sector have played the dominant role in the financing of development. Public housing authorities have provided 10-15% of houses in the Sub-Region since the early fifties. Residents Associations have emerged in recent years as an important force on the local political scene; their protest campaigns have centred on the lack of service infrastructure and generally poor living conditions in housing estates.
- (7) This chapter in many ways poses more questions than it answers: planning and development in Barcelona remain poorly researched.<sup>50</sup> Above all, little is known about the decision-making process and the functioning of the planning and control mechanisms in the planning and implementation of development. It is this area which is the focus of the case studies.

<sup>50</sup> It is perhaps worth noting here that none of the university departments with urban planning related courses (School of Civil Engineers, School of Architecture) employ full-time research staff; all research that is undertaken in these institutions is done by teaching staff in their spare time.

## CHAPTER 4

### HYPOTHESES FORMULATION AND SELECTION OF THE CASE STUDIES

In Chapter 1, four requirements for the design and conduct of case study research were established. This chapter, building on chapters 2 and 3, concerns the first two of these, i.e.:-

- (1) There must be an acknowledged conceptual framework, however modest or rudimentary, with reference to which the cases are studied and conclusions drawn. There must be a set of questions or loose hypotheses which cases are intended to help answer. There has to be a delimiting context.
- (2) There needs to be a collection of cases sharing this common framework and, as far as possible, concerned with a reasonably similar order of episodes or events. The notion of a 'collection' implies some prior system of classification.

In the first section of this chapter the major components of the planning, spatial, legislative and developmental frameworks (Chapters 2 and 3) are knitted together in summary form to provide the outline of the 'conceptual framework' for the case study research. From here, emergent lines of inquiry are developed into loosely formulated hypotheses which will subsequently be reconsidered and extended in the light of case study findings. In section two of the chapter, the rationale behind the selection of the case studies is discussed. As this chapter is relatively short, and is in many ways a synthesis of previous argument and debate, no summary section is provided.

#### 4.1 The conceptual framework and hypotheses formulation

Let us start, therefore, by summarising the major aspects of the 'conceptual framework', a synthesis, in fact, of the summary sections of Chapters 2 and 3.

- (1) The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act established the machinery for the planning and control of city growth in Spain for the following two decades. City expansion was to be in planned 'estates', for which Local Plans, and Roads and Service Projects, had to be drawn up and approved, (and corresponding Building Permits ceded) before development could take place. Whilst private enterprise could draw-up these plans, plan approval responsibility remained in the hands of Local Councils and Sub-Regional (or Provincial) planning authorities. 'Systems of intervention' were established to ensure collaboration between agencies in different developmental contexts.
- (2) The Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan was approved in 1953. It gave land-use classifications to Barcelona and the surrounding 27 municipalities, broadly based on a polynuclear settlement structure; and it stressed the role of Local Plans as a vehicle for planning and implementing new 'estate' development. However, both the Sub-Regional Plan and the 1956 Planning Act were vague on the extent to which a Local Plan could change the directives and land use classifications of a Sub-Regional (General) Plan.
- (3) In the past 2 decades the main areas of peripheral growth in the Barcelona conurbation have been in the outskirts of the municipality of Barcelona, and, above all, in the adjoining municipalities to the east and west of Barcelona, stretching up the Llobregat and Besos river valleys.
- (4) Housing and Industrial estates have been major components of this growth; and most of these estates correspond to Local Plans approved by the local planning authorities. Many of these Local Plans changed existing land-use classifications, generally increasing residential and industrial land-uses at the expense of free space areas and collective service installations.

- (5) The quality of the urban environment in the periphery is generally poor. Basic road infrastructure is inadequate or missing, schools have not been built, and the quality of housing in many estates is deficient.
- (6) Private enterprise has played the major role in the financing of development; local authorities have been restricted in their developmental role by lack of finances; State housing authorities have provided generally poor quality housing for the lower end of the market; Residents Associations have fought increasingly successful campaigns for house repair and service provision in peripheral housing estates.
- (7) In the post-Franco era there have been significant changes in the political, legislative and planning contexts to development in the periphery. At local level, the Special Plan of Interior Reform has been used as a planning mechanism for area improvement in the periphery.
- (8) There is a general paucity of detailed studies on the functioning of planning and control mechanisms over the past 20 years, and on the evolution of the changing roles, activities and interrelationships of planning and development agencies over this period. This, then, is the research focus of the case studies.

From this conceptual framework a series of loose hypotheses can be formulated and these are stated in full in Figure 45. It seems important to stress that these hypotheses are purposely and, indeed, necessarily fairly general and 'open'. The lack of existing research on these aspects of planning and development recommends against being more specific and pointed; equally, as already noted, case study research is essentially an inductive (or 'abductive') exercise in which the unforeseen or unknown variables may be taken on board as case studies progress. This demands, then, that hypotheses be flexible, wide-ranging and open-ended; they are to be developed and discussed, as much as 'tested'.



## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### METHODOLOGICAL STANCE

- (1) 1956 Planning Act established machinery for planning and control of development; Local Plan/Road and Service Project/Building Permit/Ind. Licence; Systems of Intervention; plan approval process; estate development.
- (2) 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, land-use classifications; Local Plan as means of implementation; vagueness on Local Plan/General relationship.
- (3) Peripheral Growth of Barcelona over past 2 decades has enveloped municipalities to east and west, and settlements of Llobregat and Besos valleys.
- (4) Housing and Industrial estates have constituted the major form of peripheral growth; most estate development has been implemented following approval of a Local Plan by planning authorities. Many Local Plans changed pre-existing land-use classifications.
- (5) The quality of the urban environment in the Barcelona periphery is generally poor. Basic road and service infrastructure are often deficient or absent.
- (6) Private enterprise has played major role in the development process. Local authorities financially weak; state housing authorities have provided poor quality housing for lower end of the market; Resident Associations have fought increasingly successful campaigns against poor environmental quality in housing estates.
- (7) Post-Franco era has witnessed significant changes in the political and planning frameworks at local level. The SPIR has been used to improve areas of the Barcelona periphery.

(8) Case studies can be used to research change processes such as those involved in the planning and development. Although the argument will be essentially inductive (or 'abductive'), it is necessary to establish a rudimentary conceptual framework, with a related set of questions or loose hypotheses with reference to which cases are studied.

(8) RESEARCH FOCUS is on the changing roles, activities and inter-relationships of planning and development agencies, and the functioning of planning and control mechanisms over the past 20 years.

LACK OF DATA specifically on these aspects of planning and development in Barcelona means that hypotheses, derived from the conceptual framework, must necessarily be open-ended, and thereby open to inductive development through case studies.

## HYPOTHESES FORMULATION

### A. PLANNING AND CONTROL MECHANISMS

- (1) That the Local Plan/Roads and Service Project/Building Permit/Ind. Licence mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of new development in the Franco era.
- (2) That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of road and service infrastructure in the implementation of estate development.
- (3) That the Special Plan of Interior Reform has functioned successfully in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal in the post-Franco era

### B. AGENCY ROLES AND ACTIVITIES

- (4) That Local Planning Authorities have failed to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions.
- (5) That State Housing Authorities have failed to observe statutorily planning procedure in the planning and implementation of housing estates.
- (6) That private sector developers have been permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure.
- (7) That Resident Associations have emerged as an important force in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal schemes in recent years.

### C. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

- (8) That irregularities in the decision-making process have been common-place.
- (9) That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

Figure 15. The Conceptual Framework and the Development of Research Hypotheses.

To this end, nine hypotheses, in all, have been formulated, some overlapping and interrelated, concerning three broad areas of the planning and implementation of development; namely 'Planning and Control Mechanisms', 'Agency Roles and Activities' and the 'Decision-making process'. These areas of inquiry emerge from the overview and insights provided by the conceptual framework, and the linkages are plain enough. Of course, there are more specific questions that it is hoped case study findings will help to answer, mainly concerning how and why development has occurred. For example, relating to hypotheses (6), not only do we need to know from the case studies whether private developers contravened planning procedure, but how they managed to get away with it? What was said by the relevant planning department and in the respective Council committee meeting? Why didn't the planning control mechanisms prevent them contravening planning procedure? etc etc. Similarly, it is hoped that consideration of hypotheses (8) and (9), concerning the decision-making process itself, will facilitate further conceptualization, e.g. as regards different forms of decision making, and the identification of phases or sub-processes within the overall flow of decisions, acts and activities. Here, however, existing literature, as noted in Chapter 1, is not well developed outside Spain and is virtually non-existent within, and thus there are not sufficient grounds for formulating specific hypotheses relating to these aspects of the decision-making process, although research findings may well provide sufficient material for their subsequent development.

Let us now turn to consider the selection of case studies included in this thesis.

#### 4.2 The Selection of the Case Studies

In this section, the rationale behind the selection of the case studies is discussed. First, let us reaffirm that in this research project we are not attempting to make what Stake (134) terms 'formalistic' (upward) generalisations from the case studies,

but rather 'naturalistic' generalisations 'within' and 'between' cases. A corollary to this research method is that the selection of case studies does not have to answer to any rigorously scientific sampling procedure, and indeed, given the vast number of variables involved in case studies of this type, it can with justification be argued that each case is unique and that such a rational selection is impossible.

Nevertheless, we have also argued that in case study research there must be a conceptual framework, with reference to which cases are studied, and that there should be a 'set' of cases involving some prior system of rudimentary classification. In this way, by relating case studies to the major variables embodied in the conceptual framework, the significance of research findings is enhanced and the potential scope of the conclusions is broadened.

At the same time, it must be stressed that the conduct of case studies which centre on the compilation and analyses of data taken from the files of planning and development agencies, inevitably depends on the establishment of initial contacts and the continuing co-operation of agency personnel in pursuing new lines of inquiry and carrying out new data-searches as cases 'unfold'. This inevitably has repercussions on the case study selection process. In Barcelona, for example, following preliminary meetings with leading representatives<sup>51</sup> of planning and development agencies, exploratory investigation of eight case studies was started, of which three were dropped at an early stage largely because of inadequate data availability.

<sup>51</sup> These included: Councillor-Professor A. Serratosa (formerly, Director of the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission; now Councillor responsible for Public Works in Barcelona Council); Dr. J. Subias (current Director of Planning in the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona); Snr. F. Paya Agusti (Provincial Director of Syndical Housing Authority, Barcelona); Snr C. Gomez Pardo (Director of Gallecs New Town Development Corporation); Snr M. Dargallo (Chief Architect, Municipal Housing Foundation); Snr A. Fernandez (Chief Architect, Prat Council); Dr C. Ponsa, (Civil Engineer and Planning Officer, Hospitalet Council); Snr. L. Trapero (Chief Architect, Molins Council).

Data-bases were compiled for the remaining five cases, but two<sup>52</sup> have not been used (as case studies) in this thesis because they have, on reflection, either not 'fitted' the conceptual framework particularly well, not contributed significantly to the development of the postulated hypotheses, or not been consistent enough in the quality of primary data. In the end, then, the selection process for the case studies incorporates general guidelines drawn from the conceptual framework (and reflected in the loose hypotheses), the pragmatic evaluation of the limitations and possibilities of securing adequate data access throughout a case study, and the considered assessment of the quality and relevance of assembled data-bases.

<sup>52</sup> The two case studies not used in this thesis are a) The Gallecs New Town, and b) A section of the Montbau housing estate, Barcelona. On reflection, Gallecs did not seem to fit the conceptual framework very well. It is located outside the Sub-Region and outside the periphery. It has not been built and is essentially a history of central government policy changes in the mid-seventies, which is interesting in itself but does not fit the time framework very well. Its size (1,500 hectares) is also very much different to the other cases. Nevertheless the author has written up this case history elsewhere. See M.G. Wynn 'Gallecs -Rebirth of a Spanish New Town?', Town and Country Planning, November 1980. The Montbau estate was planned and built in the late fifties in the north east suburbs of Barcelona municipality, but the case study concerned only a small infill-scheme (108 houses and a school) undertaken in the seventies. Both these cases were pursued because of the availability of data and the readiness of staff personnel to co-operate. They also reflect the fact that the development of the conceptual framework is an on-going, refinement, process to which cases themselves can contribute.

Let us now consider the three case studies in the light of the variables discussed in the development of the conceptual framework. The case studies are taken from three different municipalities to the west of Barcelona, in the Llobregat valley (Figure 46), arguably the major growth area in the Sub-Region over the past two decades. (The selection of three separate municipalities provides a broader cross-section of local authority involvement in the planning and implementation of development than if all cases came from just one municipality). Tables 10 and 11 contain summaries of how the three cases collectively encompass some of the major variables discussed in the elaboration of the conceptual framework and the formulation of hypotheses. Collectively they concern the major types of development, the different planning and development agencies and the primary planning and control mechanisms evident in the planning and implementation of peripheral development in Barcelona over the past two decades. Additionally, the size of developments (Table 11) fits the norm of 20 - 40 hectares identified by Ferrer (135) for Local Plans in the Province; and all three cases span the past 20 years and are still 'alive' in that new development or improvement is currently taking place. The fact that two of the cases involve SPIR's as well as Local Plans adds an extra dimension to the research, as does the involvement of Resident Associations in the two housing estate cases. In general, then, cases have been chosen because they collectively cover a wide range of issues identified as being of major importance in the conceptual framework and formulation of hypotheses. In short, they are cases which, it is felt, are generally 'representative', address the postulated hypotheses, and from which our knowledge of the processes involved in the planning and implementation of development can be advanced. Let us now, proceed, then, to consider the first of these cases: the San Cosme housing estate in the municipality of Prat de Llobregat.






Figure 46. The Lower Llobregat Valley - Location of the Case Studies.

Key : 1 - San Cosme (Prat de Llobregat); 2 - Can Serra (Hospitalet de Llobregat); 3 - Industrial Zone No. 2 (Molins de Rey).

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Guidelines derived from conceptual Framework</u>	<u>Comment on 'balance' of 3 case studies</u>
1. Location in Periphery	- Outer area of Barcelona municipality or in Llobregat or Besos valleys to west and east (Ch 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)	- All three are located in Llobregat valley, arguably the major axis of peripheral growth over the past two decades. Each case is located in a different municipality
2. Time framework	- From late fifties onwards; if cases are still 'live' in some way all the better; should be 'concerned with a reasonably similar order or episode of events' (Ch 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; 1.2)	- Plan making began in late fifties in one case and in early sixties in the other two. Development on the ground began early/mid sixties in all three cases. All three remain 'live' in one way or another (See Below)
3. Functional type and morphological form	- Housing and Industrial 'estate' development is the major form of growth (Ch 3.2, 3.3)	- Two case studies are housing estates; the third is an industrial estate
4. Environmental quality/state of development	- Poverty of service infrastructure is the norm; generally poor quality environment (Ch 3.4)	- Road and service infrastructure is generally deficient in all three cases; in the two housing estates provision of collective service installations (schools, green zones, play areas) lagged behind house construction and some are still missing
5. Planning and control mechanisms	- Local Plan/Roads and Service Project/Building Permit/Ind. Licence were the main planning and control mechanisms for local level development in the Franco era (Ch 2.2, 2.3, 3.4) - Systems of intervention; Ferrer's analysis reveals 'co-operative' and 'cession of roads' systems have been most common; central state authorities generally used expropriation system (Ch 2.2, 3.5.1) - In post France era, Special Plan of Interior Reform has been used for area improvement or renewal (Ch 2.4, 2.5, 3.4)	- Local Plans etc. mechanism figures in some form in all three cases - 'Co-operative', 'cession of roads' and 'Expropriation' systems feature in the three cases - In two of the cases SPIR's have been drawn up and approved for area improvement and renewal respectively. In the third case local authority staff are considering doing so
6. Planning and Development agencies	- Ferrer's analysis suggests plan making agencies for Local Plans are drawn about equally from the public and private sectors (Ch 3.5.1) - Plan approval should involve municipal council and sub-regional planning authority (Ch 2.2) - Private sector have played major role in the financing and implementation of development Public agencies largely restricted to provision of low-cost housing (Ch 3.5.1, 3.5.3)	- Plan making authorities in three cases are:- 1) private land-owners and developers, 2) local council and 3) Central State housing authorities - Plan approval procedure in all three cases involves the Local Council and Sub-Regional planning authority, with central state or provincial agencies involved in two of the cases - Development is undertaken by private sector agencies in two of the cases (one residential, one industrial); and by a public sector agency in the third case study (central state housing authority) - Active resident involvement in the planning process occurs in the two housing estate cases

Table 10. The Case Studies set against Guidelines derived from the Conceptual Framework.



CASE STUDY	SAN COSME	CAN SERRA	INDUSTRIAL ZONE NO. 2
Location	Prat de Llobregat	Hospitalet de Llobregat	Molins de Rey
Size of Development	38 hectares	32 hectares	34 hectares
Type of Development	Public housing estate	Private residential estate	Industrial estate
Planning and Control Mechanisms	(1) Local Plan (not approved); Building Permits. (2) Special Plan of Interior Reform; Roads and Services Project; Building Permits.	(1) Local Plan and Local Plan Modifications; Roads and Service Projects; Building Permits; (2) Special Plan of Interior Reform; Roads and Services Projects.	Local Plan; Roads and Services (street lighting) Project; Building Permits; Industrial Licences.
Plan-making authorities	(1) Syndical Housing Authority. (2) National Institute of Housing/Residents' consultants.	(1) Private developers and their consultants; Hospitalet Council. (2) Hospitalet Council.	Molins de Rey
System of Intervention	Expropriation	Co-operative/Cession of Roads.	Co-operative/Cession of Roads ('Special Contributions').
Development Agencies	(1) Syndical Housing Authority. (2) National Institute of Housing.	(1) Private developers. (2) Private developers/Hospitalet Council.	Private Sector industrialists; Molins de Rey Council.
Time span of case study	1963-1979	1959-79	1960-79
Major agencies from which data was collected.	- Prat Council. - Calbet Elias y Asociados (consultants). - San Damian Residents Associations. - Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.	- Hospitalet Council. - Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona. - Official College of Architects of Catalonia (GOACB).	- Molins de Rey Council. - Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.

Table 11. The Three Case Studies: Summary Chart of some Major Variables.

## CHAPTER 5

### CASE STUDY 1 - SAN COSME, PRAT DE LLOBREGAT

This chapter describes and analyzes the first of the three case studies included in this thesis, San Cosme (Figure 47) a 1500-house estate built by the Syndical Housing Authority in the mid-sixties, which is currently undergoing renewal. The chapter comprises five sections, all of which are divided into sub-sections. Section one sets the case study in the macro-level framework of the state housing policies and programmes of the early sixties and examines the micro-level planning and developmental background contexts. Sections two, three and four examine the chronological unfolding of events over the period 1963-1979. Section two concerns the sequence of decisions, acts and activities during the period 1963-68 (Phase I) when San Cosme was designated, planned and constructed and became a functioning estate, housing 7,000 people by 1968; section three examines the period 1969-75 (Phase II), which saw the rapid deterioration of the dwellings, the start of the residents' campaign for improvements and the unsuccessful attempts by Central State authorities to implement repair and renewal schemes; and section four covers the period after Franco's death (Phase III), when, in a changing political and planning environment, a new renewal scheme was drawn-up and approved in collaboration with the local Residents' Association. Whilst each of these sections contains its own summary analysis, section five draws together the research findings of the case study as a whole, through a reconsideration of the research hypotheses postulated in Chapter 4.

#### 5.1 Introductory Contexts

This section 'sets the scene' for the case study and outlines the major features of the legislative, institutional and planning contexts particular to the San Cosme operation in the mid-sixties.






Figure 47. Aerial view of San Cosme, 1975

Source : Spanish Ministry of Housing, Madrid.



Major changes in the wider-ranging political and planning frameworks that occurred in the seventies are not discussed here, but rather in the appropriate section included below. (5.4.1.) This section should also be seen in conjunction with the broader overviews discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

#### 5.1.1 National Housing Policy, Programmes and Authorities

We have already noted in Chapter 2 that State housing policy in Spain in the Franco era centred on the 1954 and successive Housing Acts, which made state subsidies and fiscal benefits available for the promoters of 'limited cost' housing. Within the framework<sup>53</sup> of the 1961 National Housing Plan, the Syndical Housing Authority (SHA) were provisionally allocated central government funds to construct 170,000 subsidized dwellings during the ensuing 15 year period, in collaboration with the National Institute of Housing, who were to take charge of the designation and land expropriation stages in the planning and implementation of housing estates.

Throughout the early sixties a series of Decrees was issued by the Ministry of Housing, formalising this arrangement between the NIH and the SHA for house construction in different parts of the country. In July, 1963, the NIH were authorized by one of these Decrees to "put other state authorities in charge of the construction of 6,500 houses and complementary service buildings in Barcelona. These houses are to be built with the funds of the National Institute of Housing and to be considered as part of the National Housing Plan". (136)

<sup>53</sup> In fact this provisional arrangement between the NIH and the SHA was an extension of the 'Plan of Reserves' of 1960 which was incorporated into the National Housing Plan in 1961. The 'Plan of Reserves' authorized the NIH to programme and finance the construction of 150,000 dwellings to meet the most pressing housing needs and "to make arrangements with the Syndical Housing Authority for the development and execution of the Plan." The 'Plan of Reserves' was approved by Decree 2229, 17th November 1960, reproduced in Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 288, 1st December, 1960 p. 16551.

It was within the framework of this legislation, then, that three 'overspill estates', collectively comprising over 6000 dwellings, were built in the Barcelona periphery (Figure 44) in the mid-sixties at Pomar (in Badalona), Cinco Rosas (San Baudilio) and San Cosme (Prat de Llobregat) by the SHA, in collaboration with the NIH. These three estates were specifically intended to provide new homes for the inhabitants of shanty towns on Montjuich,<sup>54</sup> the hill area overlooking the port, where over 12,000 shanty dwellers lived in 1966. By the late sixties the area had been cleared, and over seven thousand of these shanty dwellers had been moved to San Cosme. Let us now consider the more immediate local background to the case study.

#### 5.1.2 The Local Level Contexts

San Cosme lies in the municipality of Prat de Llobregat (Figures 31 and 46), 12 kilometres south-west of the Barcelona city centre. Prat occupies 3,220 hectares of land in the western delta area of the Llobregat valley (Figure 48), being the third largest municipality in terms of area in the Sub-Region and, with a population of 56,000 (1977), it has the sixth largest population.

Until the turn of the century, nearly all Prat was given over to agriculture, with settlement being restricted by the threat of malaria and construction hazards in what was an unusually moist and marshy landscape. In 1910, however, the first industries - a textile mill and a paper mill - were established in the area, and so began the process of change from old agricultural economy to the mixed agricultural-industrial community of today. In the late fifties and sixties, the growth of industries along the Barcelona-Castell de fells road to the north of Prat brought a boom in property development in the municipality, the population increasing fourfold from over 14,000 in 1960 to the 1977 figure of 56,000. The movement of people into the municipality increased sharply in the mid-sixties, and the arrival of San Cosme residents in the 1967-69 period undoubtedly accounts for the peaks in net in-migration in these years (Figure 49).

<sup>54</sup> For a chronology of the growth of shanties on Montjuich, see: T. Sabater 'Cronologia de Montjuich' Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 86, COACB, Barcelona, 1971.




Figure 48. Settlement on the Llobregat Delta in the 19th century.

Source : J. Codina, El Delta de Llobregat y Barcelona, Barcelona, 1953.




Figure 49. Net In-migration in the Municipality of Prat de Llobregat 1950-77

Source : Prat Council, 'Censo de poblacion anual'.

Despite the rapid growth of Prat in the sixties, the Council remained relatively small in staff terms. The number of councillors increased from 12 in 1960, to 15 in 1965 and to 18 in the mid-seventies as the population grew in size<sup>55</sup> and councillors served on one of four main committees - Finance, Construction and Installations, Culture and Administration. The permanent staff, who have increased in number from under 20 to over 40 since the early sixties, are divided into five main departments (Figure 50), with the Technical Services Section, in collaboration with the Works and Installations Department

<sup>55</sup> The Local Government Act of 1955 established that all Councils should have between 3 and 24 councillors depending on population size. When the population of Prat passed the 20,000 and 50,000 marks, the number of councillors rose to 15 and 18 respectively.

(created in the early seventies) being responsible for urban planning and development control. The internal functioning of the Council, however, is not of primary importance here as the Council did not play a leading role in the plan-making and implementation processes in the San Cosme case; rather their role was largely confined to opposition to the original designation in the mid-sixties and rubber stamp approval of the renewal scheme in the late seventies.




Figure 50. Administrative Structure of Prat Council, 1978

In the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, blocks of empty land to the south and west of Prat town centre were classified for a variety of forms of suburban development, with zonings of 'permanent agricultural land' and 'special airport zone' to the west and south respectively (Figure 51), and it was here that the SHA planned to build the San Cosme housing estate. As we have seen, the Local Plan/Roads and Service Project mechanisms were specifically designed to facilitate the planning and implementation of this type of development; and the plan approval process established in the 1956 Planning Act allowed for an Audience of Local Corporations stage, during which local authorities could put their case, either for or against the development proposals of outside authorities, such as the NIH and SHA (Figure 16). Let us now turn to examine the sequence of decisions, acts and activities involved in the planning and construction of San Cosme in the mid-sixties.






Figure 51. Land-use Classifications south of Prat Centre, in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan.

The Plan shows existing development in 1965, prior to the construction of San Cosme.

Source : Comision de Urbanismo de Barcelona, 'Plan General de Ordenacion Urbana de Barcelona y Su Comarca', CUB, 1953.

## 5.2 San Cosme - Phase I (1963-68)

This is the first of three sections which concentrate on the description and analysis of decision-making in the different Phases of the case study. Although decision-stage and process flow charts are used to graphically represent the sequencing and relationship of decisions, acts and activities, rigorous and detailed description of the decision-making process is also included. This has been necessary partly because of the sheer complexity of the case study; and partly because it is felt that the basic facts of the case must be set out, against which the analysis and conclusions can be checked and subsequently developed. In this section, then, the decision-stage chart (Figure 52) is referred to as decisions and activities are discussed, the prefix PI denoting Phase I; and the process-flow chart is used subsequently in the summary analysis sub-section. The distinction between 'strategic' and 'dependent' decision, and the definition of a 'sub-process', used in these charts, have already been discussed in Chapter 1.4.

### 5.2.1 Designation, Expropriation and Plan-Making 1963-65

We have already noted that Central Government Decree 1622 of July 4th, 1963 authorized the NIH to construct 6,500 dwellings in Barcelona (PI-1) in collaboration with other state entities, to meet "the particularly urgent cases, such as the situation on Montjuich, (where) families are now resident in dwellings, which, apart from their poor quality, are in imminent danger from landslides". (137). Prior to the official declaration of the Decree, however, the NIH had been working with the SHA in selecting possible sites for the provision of new housing estates in the Sub-Region.

On July 29th, 1963, the NIH, through the Provincial (Barcelona) Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, notified Prat Council of their intention to expropriate 100 hectares of agricultural land to the south of Prat for the construction of 300 dwellings by the SHA (PI-2). From the plan of the designated area (Figure 53) forwarded by the NIH, Prat Council were asked to provide a list of names and addresses of affected landowners, a description and valuation of their estates, and an estimate of the value of the pending harvest.






Figure 52. San Cosme, Phase I (1963-8) : Decision Stage Chart



On September 21st 1963 the Municipal Architect reported that the proposed designation encompassed land classified (in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan) for residential expansion of the city, and also tracts of land zoned for expansion of the airport to the south and an area of 'permanent agricultural land' to the west. (Figure 54) Additionally, all this land had been given the generic 'urban reserve' classification by Prat Council, excepting the 'permanent agricultural land' which was generically classified as 'Rural Land'. This meant, then, that under no circumstances could development legally take place in the 'permanent agricultural land' to a density of more than 5 inhabitants per hectare, the limit set for




Figure 54. Land-Use Classifications in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan in the Designation and Construction of San Cosme.



No.	Land Use classification	Inhabs/ Hectare	Max. Height	Distance between buildings	Housing Usage
5	Semi-Intensive Urban Residential Devpmt.	500	18.30	Continuous	Multifamily buildings.
7	Extensive Suburban Development.	200	10.50	Continuous	Multi- or Uni-family buildings.
9	Intensive Garden City Development.	200	11	Minimum 4 metres	Multi- or Uni-family buildings.
37	Permanent Agricultural Land	5	9	Minimum 200 metres	Uni-family buildings.

Table 12. Controls on development set for respective Land Use Classifications in the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, 1953.

this classification in the Sub-Regional Plan (Table 12). At the same time the Municipal Architects' report stressed that development in the other classifications:-

"is prohibited unless a Local Plan has been drawn up and approved to replan all the affected area, as stated in Article 67 of the Land and Urban Planning Act, a ruling which has always been strictly observed in this municipality because of the problems associated with the nature of the subsoil, the flatness of the land and the possibilities of subsidence and flooding." (138)

The report also pointed out that the designated area contained agricultural land of great value, and expressed dismay at the fact that the SHA had designated a 100 hectare site for the construction of only 300 dwellings, whereas, based on a population density of 200 inhabitants per hectare,<sup>56</sup> some 5-7,000 houses could be built in such a large area.

<sup>56</sup> 200 inhabitants per hectare is the maximum density permitted for 'Extensive Suburban Development' (see Table 12).

The Municipal Architect's report was endorsed by the Committee of Construction and Installations, and by the Full Council in their meeting of October 8th, 1963, at which a resolution opposing the NIH's designation was unanimously approved. The resolution recounted the planning and legal grounds for opposition outlined in the Municipal Architect's Report and expressed fears about the "implications of development of such a large area within the Municipality, which in 1962 had a population of only 16,021." (139) Prat Council's resolution was communicated to the NIH, via the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, at the end of October 1963, along with the facts and figures concerning the ownership and valuation of the land, and the pending harvest, falling within the designated area (PI - 3).

In December 1963, the reason for the NIH's designation of a 100 hectare site for the construction of only 300 houses became clearer. The July 1963 Decree (140) had authorized the NIH to construct 6,500 dwellings in 'Barcelona'. Now, on December 26th, 1963, a further Decree was issued (PI - 4) whereby "application of Decree 1621 of July 4th, 1963, is extended to include the entire Barcelona Sub-Region of 28 municipalities." (141) With this new Decree, the definition of the area within which the NIH were authorized to build new housing estates was officially enlarged to include all the Sub-Region. In February 1964, the NIH wrote to Prat Council, informing them that about half<sup>57</sup> the area (Plots 40 and 42, see Figure 53) designated in July 1963 was to be expropriated immediately, for the construction of 3000 dwellings, to be planned and managed by the SHA. (PI - 5).

Whilst the SHA's Provincial Office in Barcelona began drawing-up the Local Plan for the 3000-house estate (PI - 6, Figure 55), to be called San Cosme, Prat Council hurriedly reorganised and intensified their opposition to the designation. A further Council resolution,

<sup>57</sup> Informal discussions with staff in the Barcelona Provincial Office of the SHA in 1978 suggested that the NIH, in collaboration with the SHA, had originally intended to build all 6,500 dwellings in the 100 hectare designated area in Prat, and that the objections of Prat Council persuaded them to reduce the size of the estate to 3000. The persistence of Prat Council in opposing the San Cosme operation later led to a further reduction in the size of the estate to 1,500 dwellings.




Figure 55. The SHA's Plan for a 3000 house estate in San Cosme, June 1964.

When the Minister of Housing decided that only 1500 rather than 3000 houses should be built in Prat, the SHA kept the same plan, but decided that only the eastern half would be built.

Source : Provincial Office of Syndical Housing Authority, Barcelona, 'Plan Parcial de San Cosme', June 1964.

opposing the designation was approved and sent to the NIH (PI - 7). The Council pointed out that the 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act demanded that the Council be consulted on any expropriation proposal by the State,<sup>58</sup> and that the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act also stressed that even Central State development proposals were subject to local authority planning controls.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, the Council again drew attention to the existing land use classifications in the designated area and the need for the approval of a Local Plan and Roads and Services project prior to any development taking place. In his letter to the NIH, the Mayor of Prat also pointed out that "The proposal of the NIH has caused great distress amongst land owners and farmers, not only because of their loss of property, but also because they have not had the opportunity to state their case in a Public Information Stage." (142)

58 Article 22 of the 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act states that land for the construction of 'limited cost' housing can be expropriated by the state if the operation is declared, by Decree, to be in the public good and if "the favourable reports of the Local Councils are obtained beforehand". Whilst Decree 1622 of July 1963 had declared the construction of 6,500 dwellings in Barcelona to be a matter of 'social urgency', at no time had the Council been consulted on the question of expropriation, although they had been informed of the NIH's intentions to proceed with expropriation.

59 Article 165 of the 1956 Planning Act states that "all new building, movement of earth, land redivision, structural modifications, change of use, demolition of buildings, placing of advertisements visible from a public highway" were subject to previous permit cession by the Local Council. Article 167 states that "when the acts referred to in Article 165 are proposed by the state, the state authority will first inform the respective Local Council, who must then inform the state authority of the conformity or non-conformity of the proposal with approved urban plans. If the proposals do not conform with the approved plans, the decision on whether to proceed with the proposal will be taken by the Full Cabinet".

The intensity of Prat Council's opposition to the San Cosme operation (and the strength of their case) clearly had repercussions within the NIH. In mid-March, 1964, the Minister of Housing made a much publicized visit to Prat (PI - 8) to hear the Council's views first hand. In an evening press conference in Barcelona he announced that:-

"having heard the arguments put by the Mayor of Prat de Llobregat, the proposed number of dwellings will be reduced by half". (143)

The Minister stressed, however, that although only 1500 dwellings would be built in Prat in the immediate future, the other 1500 might be built at a later date, depending on housing needs. The Minister also announced that two other overspill estates were to be built in the Barcelona periphery, at Pomar and Cinco Rosas (Figure 44), to house 2000 and 1,500 people respectively.

This qualified concession by the Minister was not enough to placate Prat Council. As expropriation proceedings got underway (PI - 9), the Mayor continued to lobby Central Government authorities, and their local representatives for a greater and more definite reduction in the size of the estate. Between March and July 1964, the Mayor twice visited Madrid to talk with Ministry officials, whilst Council representatives had a series of meetings and exchanges with other locally based authorities - the Civil Governor, the Director of the GBPC and the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, who communicated Prat Council's complaints to the NIH in Madrid (PI - 10). The Council, in fact, had suggested that only a 500-house estate be built; but in June the NIH replied to Prat Council, via the Provincial Delegate, reaffirming that no further reduction in the size of the estate was possible (PI - 11). In July, the Mayor wrote to the Civil Governor of the Province, saying the Council were willing to accept a 1000 house estate, if 500 of these dwellings could be used to house people currently resident in the municipality. Again the letter was forwarded to the Ministry of Housing (PI - 13), but with no further response from the Provincial Delegate or the Civil Governor, Prat Council turned their attention exclusively to Central State authorities in Madrid, finally acting



through a Madrid-based solicitor to challenge the legality<sup>60</sup> of the San Cosme operation, through the courts if need be (PI - 14).

60 The illegality of the San Cosme operation concerned not only the contravention of statutory planning procedure, but also the fact that the NIH had not officially answered the points made by Prat Council concerning these contraventions. On July 13th 1964, the Mayor of Prat wrote to the NIH officially denouncing the fact that no official reply to Prat Council's letters of complaint of March 5th and March 13th, 1964 had been received. This was in accordance with Article 38 of the Administrative Jurisdiction Act of 1956 which states :

"When any complaint is made against the Administration and this is not answered within 3 months, the affected party (ies) can officially denounce this delay and if within a further 3 months there is still no reply, then it can be taken that the complaint has been dismissed. The petitioner may then resort to appeal against this decision".

By September, there was still no official reply from the NIH, and on September 22nd, 1964, the Mayor wrote to the Vice-President of the Government asking for an audience. On October 26th, 1964, Subirachs, legal advisor to Prat Council in Barcelona, recommended that the Council appeal to the Supreme Tribunal (Appeal Court). On October 31st, the Mayor again wrote to the Vice-President, pleading for an audience. On November 5th, with no reply from the Vice President, Prat Council accepted Subirach's recommendation and started to work through Professor Garcia de Enterria, Solicitor and Professor of Law at Madrid University. On November 10th, Mayor Simon again wrote to the Vice-President, this time enclosing full documentation of the sequence of events and complaints of the Council. On December 18th, 1964, Garcia de Enterria wrote to Prat Council saying that he had not made an appeal to the Supreme Tribunal (Appeal Court), because he feared it would be dismissed as out of order. Instead, he chose to continue to press the Ministry of Housing for official replies to the Prat Council's complaints through more informal channels.

Meanwhile, the SHA had completed the plan for the new estate in June 1964 (PI - 12). With the reduction in size from 3000 to 1,500 houses, the SHA had simply decided to build the right side of the 3000 house estate for which plans were then nearing completion (Figure 55), leaving open the option of building the other half of the estate at a later date. In November expropriation procedure for lots 40 and 42 (Figure 53) was officially concluded (PI - 15), and the contract for the construction of 1500 dwellings in San Cosme was awarded directly<sup>61</sup> to 'Colomino Serrano S.A.', an international building contractor, in December 1974 (PI - 16). In early 1965, with the area cleared and foundations being laid (PI - 17), Garcia and Enterria, Prat Council's legal adviser in Madrid, informed the Council that the Ministry of Housing had at last agreed (unofficially) to a definite, permanent, reduction in the size of the San Cosme estate to 1500 dwellings. In March 1965, the NIH officially wrote to Mayor Simon (PI - 18) confirming that "the National Institute of Housing has agreed to permanently reduce the number of dwellings to be built in Prat to 1,500, instead of the 3000 originally programmed". (144)

This marked the end of Prat Council's campaign against the San Cosme designation. Although no Local Plan or Roads and Services Project had been approved as demanded by the 1956 Planning Act, Prat Council seemed to accept the definite reduction in the size of the estate to 1,500 houses as a reasonable compromise under the circumstances. Less than half the 100 hectare site originally designated had, in the end, been expropriated; and from the lay-out of foundations laid by the building contractor, it appeared that only about one half of the expropriated area was to be used for the construction of the estate (Figures 54 and 56). With plan-making and expropriation procedure complete, and construction underway, the rapid implementation of the estate appeared imminent.

61 Normally state contracts are put out to tender but the Law of Administrative Procedure of 1956 makes provision for the 'direct' award of contracts, without going through an officially advertised tendering process, in certain cases. The value of the contract awarded to Colomina Serrano for the construction of 1500 houses (but not the roads or complementary service buildings) was 354 million pesetas (5.29 million US dollars).






Figure 56. Aerial Photograph of San Cosme, May 1965.

The foundations have been laid for the construction of the 1500-house estate, some of which were subsequently abandoned following the objection of the Aviation Ministry. Compare with Figures 60 and 66.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.



### 5.2.2 Re-planning and Implementation 1965-68

With the Council's battle against the San Cosme operation seemingly at an end, and construction of the estate underway, the Prat authorities adopted a more conciliatory approach to the SHA. In March, 1965, Mayor Simon wrote to the SHA's Provincial Office in Barcelona (PI-19) inviting them to discuss the "details of the project and thereby collaborate (with the Council) in the construction of houses and provision of services". (145) In April the SHA replied by sending the Council two copies of their plans for San Cosme (Figures 55 and 57), asking that the necessary Building Permits be granted (PI-20). There were two basic block designs - H-shaped and linear shaped - and




Figure 57. Detailed Elevation of Foundations and Walls sent to Prat Council by SHA, April 1965.

Source : Provincial Office of Syndical Housing Authority, Barcelona, 'Plan Parcial de San Cosme', June 1964.

all blocks were two storeys high, with each dwelling occupying one level only, and an average floor space of 76m<sup>2</sup> per dwelling. Having completely by-passed statutory plan approval procedure in the drawing-up of the San Cosme Local Plan, it was somewhat ironic that the SHA should now be asking Prat Council for Building Permits; and there was a further irony in that, after having fought the development proposal so hard from the start; the Municipal Technical Services Section now reported favourably on the plan and recommended that the Council grant the SHA required Building Permits which they did in May 1965 (PI-22). Possibly, the Council realized that there was little they could do to prevent house construction going ahead anyway, and they reasoned that co-operation was preferable to confrontation. Meanwhile, however, - and in many ways more ironic still - the Aviation Ministry now intervened with an objection that was to hold up implementation of the San Cosme estate for over a year, as the SHA in Barcelona replanned the layout of over half the estate (PI-21).

In October 1963, Prat Council had pointed out that part of the designated area encroached upon land classified as 'Special Airport Zone' in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan (PI-3; Figure 54). In April 1965, the Aviation Ministry wrote to the SHA Central Office in Madrid, pointing out that the house foundations which had been laid encroached on land earmarked for the possible construction of a new runway for Barcelona airport. The Ministry warned that:-

"If it is decided to build this runway, we will have to destroy a recently created settlement; and so we suggest that it would be in the interests of the state if the Syndical Housing Authority do not build in this zone". (146)

Ironically, then, the land-use classifications contained in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, so imperiously ignored by the NIH and the SHA, had been taken at face value by another Central State authority, and it was their objection which brought construction of the estate to a halt in mid-1965 (PI-24). Following consultation with their Barcelona Office, the SHA in Madrid decided to abandon the foundations laid in the 'Special Airport






Figure 58. The Syndical Housing Authority's Revised Plan for San Cosme, May 1966.

Source : Provincial Office of the Syndical Housing Authority, Barcelona, 'Plan Parcial de San Cosme (revisado)', May 1966.

Zone', and to extend the estate to the west where land had already been expropriated (PI-23; Figure 54). By May 1966, the new plan had been completed (PI-25, 26; Figure 58); the south-eastern boundary of the estate in the new plan coincided exactly with the dividing line between the 'Extensive Suburban Development' classification to the north and the 'Special Airport Zone' to the south. The foundations laid in the 'Special Airport Zone' were abandoned, and remain there today (see Figure 47); but the compensatory westward extension of the estate meant that development would now take place in land classified as 'permanent agricultural land' in the Sub-Regional Plan

(Figure 54). Nevertheless, without further consultation with Prat Council, house construction proceeded, more or less<sup>62</sup> in accordance with the revised plan, and was completed by January 1967 (PI-27, 29).

Over the next eighteen months, the SHA's Provincial Office in Barcelona allocated houses to their new owners<sup>63</sup> (PI-30, 42). Whilst some came from shanty towns in other parts of the Sub-Region and



Source: Construccion, Arquitectura y Urbanismo, No. 21, 1973.

Figure 59. Montjuich, the Amusement Park and the Shanty Dwellers.

This cartoon by Puig, cartoonist of the Catalan newspaper 'El Correo Catalan', shows Montjuich in 1965. On the left is the new Amusement Park, and to the right, the temporary accommodation provided by the Council for former shanty dwellers, who view the Amusement Park with bemusement. "I'm sure it was done with the best intentions; but they could have asked us if we'd have liked something else". A year later, they were moved again, most of them to San Cosme.

<sup>62</sup> In fact slight changes in the location of the Sports Complex and the arrangement of some housing blocks were subsequently made, although there seems to be no existing plan incorporating these modifications. (Compare Figures 58 and 66). Why they were made is not clear; it could be that by late 1966, the SHA had already decided that they would subsequently build a further extension to the estate (see Figures 54 and 66) and that the final siting of schools and the Sports zone was made with this in mind.

<sup>63</sup> The terms under which the shanty dwellers from Montjuich were moved to San Cosme are not clear. Initially, residents were asked to pay only 150 pesetas (£1) a month for the upkeep of the area, but in May 1969, the SHA tried to impose 30 year mortgage payments of 500 pesetas (average) per month per house, plus an administration and conservation charge of a further 350 pesetas, totally 1000 pesetas (£7) per month in all. Many residents, in fact, claim that they were never told of these terms and that no contracts of sale were ever signed. In the early seventies the drawing-up of tenancy agreements with the SHA became an important demand of the local Residents Association.

some from Prat itself, over 75% of new residents were from Montjuich, where shanty dwellers had been moved into temporary accommodation (pre-fabs) following the demolition of shanties to make way for a new Amusement Park in 1965 (Figure 59). Meanwhile, between December 1966 and January 1968, separate contracts<sup>64</sup> were awarded, through the tendering process, for the provision of road infrastructure and complementary service buildings in the estate (PI-28, 31, 35, 36), and construction of these elements was complete by mid-1968 (PI-32, 33, 38, 41).

It is important to note, however, that the contract for 'complementary service buildings' was for the construction of the church, some shops and a social centre and that the provision of schools and nurseries included in the 1966 plan (Figure 58) was in the hands of the Ministry of Education and Science with the result that by 1970, only two of the five schools and nurseries originally designated had been built. (Figure 60). The upkeep of road and service infrastructure also posed problems that were not satisfactorily resolved. In October 1967, the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing wrote to Prat asking them to accept responsibility for the conservation and upkeep of the roads, sewerage system, water supply, gas supply and street lighting networks, drainage system and public green spaces in San Cosme (PI-34). Prat Council refused to accept this responsibility, because of the financial burden it implied (PI-37), and following further pressure from the Provincial Delegate and the Civil Governor (PI-39), Prat Council approved a resolution setting their own conditions for acceptance (PI-40). Apart from the fact that no gas supply had been laid on, the Council noted that :-

"Considering that residents will enjoy exemption from the payment of municipal rates and taxes, resulting in a large financial imposition on the Council, it is proposed that a subsidy is granted to this Council to pay for the costs incurred in the conservation of the roads and service infrastructure". (147)


<sup>64</sup> The contract for road infrastructure was awarded to 'Cubiertos y Tejados' in February 1967 and was worth 182 million pesetas (£ 3 million); the contract for the complementary service buildings went to 'Edificios y Obras' in January 1968 and was worth 37 million pesetas (£ 0.62 million).



Figure 60. Aerial Photograph of San Cosme 1970.

By 1970, all 1500 houses in the estate were inhabited. The Jumbo day nursery (A), the Jaime Balmes Secondary School (B), the Church (C), and the Social Centre (D) had been built, but empty spaces remained where a secondary school (E), a day nursery (F), a Junior School (G), Sports Area (H) and Sports Complex (I) should have been.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona. Scale 1:5000.





Prat Council's stand against accepting the responsibility for the upkeep of road and service infrastructure highlights an important problem associated with the management of State housing estates. The 1955 Regulations for the application of the 1954 Housing Act specified that residents in state subsidized housing would :-

"be exempted for a period of 20 years from paying 90% of all taxes, rates or contributions, relating to the houses or associated infrastructure, imposed by the Central State or Local Authorities". (148)

In effect this meant, as Prat Council pointed out, that upkeep of such estates represented a significant drain on the financial resources of the Local Council. In this case, Prat Council adamantly refused to accept responsibility for the estate without some form of aid from the NIH, who, in turn, were not prepared to set such a precedent. By the end of 1968, with over 7000 people living in San Cosme, the 'responsibility issue' had still not been resolved. As we shall see, this was subsequently to cause some confusion in the seventies when attempts were made to ascertain responsibility for the upkeep of road and service infrastructure in the estate.

This, then, concludes the description of the processes involved in the planning and implementation of San Cosme between 1963 and 1968. In section five of this chapter we will concentrate more on using the San Cosme case to develop the research hypotheses; but before moving on to look at the period after 1968, let us summarise the major aspects of planning and implementation described in Phase I and develop our conceptualization of the processes involved.

### 5.2.3 San Cosme 1963-68, Summary Analysis.

The period 1963-68 (Phase I) in San Cosme saw the designation, planning and implementation of the 1500 house estate. With the aid of the decision stage chart (Figure 52), we can further develop conceptualization of this period in the history of San Cosme by identifying 'sub-processes' within the overall flow of decisions, acts and activities. This, then, represents a first step towards subsequent analyses, in which the research hypotheses will be more directly addressed.



1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Designation (and  
opposition of Prat  
Council)

Expropriation

Plan-Making


Building Permit  
Cession

Tendering

Construction

Administration of  
Infrastructure

House Allocation



KEY Decision or Act ○ Activity □ Critical Point ○ Decision Flow →

#### Critical Points

1. Decree 1622, 1963, authorizes the NIH to construct 6,500 dwellings in Barcelona (PI-1).
2. NIH inform Prat Council that 3000 dwellings are to be built in Prat (PI-5).
3. NIH confirm reduction in size of the estate to 1500 dwellings (PI-18).
4. SHA Central Office decide San Cosme must be replanned (PI-23).
5. New plan for San Cosme is completed (PI-26).

Figure 61. San Cosme, Phase I (1963-68) : Process Flow Chart.

#### DESIGNATION

1. NIH did not ask Prat Council for a report on how proposed development conformed with existing urban plan for the area. (Articles 165-167, 1956 Planning Act).

#### EXPROPRIATION

2. Local Planning Authorities not asked for reports on existing plan proposals for area to be expropriated (Article 22 of 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act).
3. No 'State of Urgency' declared to justify expropriation (Article 22 of 1954 Limited Cost Housing Act).

#### PLAN MAKING

4. No Roads and Services Project drawn-up (Articles 63-67, 1956 Planning Act).

#### PLAN APPROVAL (OF LOCAL PLAN)

5. No Initial Approval by Plan-Making Authority.
6. No Public Information Stage.
7. No Audience of Local Corporations.
8. No Provisional Approval by Plan-Making Authority.
9. No Definitive Approval by Sub-Regional Planning Authority. (Article 32 of 1956 Planning Act).

#### BUILDING PERMIT CESSION

10. Building Permits granted by Prat Council when no Local Plan or Roads and Services Project had been approved (Articles 63-67, 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act).
11. No post-construction inspection carried out by Council; no inspection certificates granted (Articles 173, 174, 1956 Planning Act).

#### Table 13. San Cosme Phase I (1963-68): Major Contraventions of Statutory Planning Procedure.

Articles and Acts given in parenthesis represent those pieces of legislation which were contravened.

Some 'sub-processes' or 'activities', encompassing a number of 'dependent decisions' (see Chapter 1.4), were identified as such in the earlier data collection and structuring stages (see Figure 5) and are already marked on the decision-stage chart i.e. two phases of plan-making, in its technical sense (PI 6-12; 25-26); expropriation (PI 9-15); house allocation (PI 30-42) and development on the ground, in four phases (PI 17-24; 27-29; 32-33; 38-41). In addition we can group acts and decisions together into other sub-processes, i.e. building permit cession (PI 19, 20, 22); tendering in three stages (PI 16; 28, 31; 35, 36); transference of administrative responsibility for road and service infrastructure (PI 34, 37, 39, 40); and finally, the designation process (PI 1-5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 21, 23) which comprises the protest campaign of Prat Council, and the upper tier decisions by central state authorities which may also be seen as part of central state policy making.

If we now plot these sub-processes chronologically (Figure 61) we can get an impression of their overlap and interdependence, with decision flows providing linkages between sub-processes. Despite the obvious complexity of the overall process, it is important to emphasise that the statutory planning machinery played very little part in regulating the planning and implementation of the estate. As Table 13 shows, some of the sub-processes identified in Figure 61 involved contravention of statutory procedure whilst the plan-approval process was by-passed altogether. As a result, because various checks and controls had not come into effect the development of San Cosme on the ground was illegal in various ways. Development took place in land zoned as 'permanent agricultural land', ('Rural Land') which, according to the 1956 Planning Act could not be developed under any circumstances; development in the 'urban reserve' residential use zones required the prior approval of a Local Plan and Roads and Service Project; and house construction was sub-standard and did not match the lay-out submitted to Prat Council for Building Permit cession in April 1965. The main perpetrators of these irregularities in planning procedure were the Central State housing authorities whose role in the planning and implementation of the estate is characterized by autonomous, ill-planned intervention that paid scant regard to the procedural requirements of the existing planning and housing acts. It is perhaps also worth noting that if

the SHA had submitted their Local Plan to a Public Information Stage, as required by the 1956 Planning Act, the Ministry of Aviation would have had the opportunity to raise their objection to the encroachment of the estate onto the airport zone at an early stage, thereby avoiding the waste in time and resources incurred in the replanning of the estate and abandonment of some of the original foundations.

The campaign led by Prat Council against the operation can be seen as moderately successful, given that the NIH's initial intention had probably been<sup>65</sup> to construct some 6,000 dwellings in the 100 hectare site originally designated. Again, however, because the statutory planning machinery had been by-passed by the SHA and NIH, Prat's protest campaign similarly followed largely semi-formalized channels (in the main through lobbying Government representatives) which had little to do with formal planning procedure.

Despite the contraventions of planning procedure and the semi-formalized procedural course of decision-making, certain decisions emerge as being of particular significance in the overall flow of events in this period of San Cosme's history. These 'critical points' can be associated with thresholds in the overall process which mark significant stages in the course of the operation as a whole, or the commencement of decision making associated with new sub-processes. Here, it is important to bear in mind the remarks made in Chapter 1.4 concerning the degree of subjectivity which is inevitably involved in such retrospective interpretation. At the same time, however, the process flow chart (Figure 61) is of some value here in illustrating some of the major links between decisions and sub-processes.

The first critical point (PI-1; critical point 1) is the July 1963 Decree which specifically identified Barcelona as an area within which the NIH could promote estate development within the broader framework of the National Housing Plan. Then, the formal notification by the NIH that a 3000 house estate would be built in Prat (PI-5; Critical Point 2) led to the formal commencement of plan-making and land expropriation for the estate, and to an intensification

<sup>65</sup> It was not possible to discuss this with anyone actively involved in the NIH's designation in 1963; but it is the view of Mr Fernandez, then, as now, Prat's Municipal Architect, that the NIH's original intention had been to build in all the 100 hectare site.




of Prat Council's opposition campaign. Over a year later the formal decision by the NIH to officially and permanently limit the size of the estate to 1500 houses in 1965 (PI-18; critical point 3) marked the end of Prat Council's opposition campaign against the designation and the start of a more conciliatory approach by the Council to the SHA, involving the cession of building permits; at the same time prior notification of this decision to the SHA had enabled tendering to proceed and the commencement of house construction in early 1965. Then, following the objection of the Aviation Ministry, the SHA's decision that the estate had to be re-planned (PI-23) led to a halt in the physical construction on the ground and a new phase of plan-making. Finally, the completion of the new plan in 1966 (PI-26) paved the way for the recommencement of house construction and the continuation of associated administrative procedures. It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that all five critical points involved decisions made by central state agencies; and all but the first were associated with irregularities in the formalised planning process. We shall subsequently return to reinforce and complement this brief summary analysis of Phase I; but let us now move on to consider events after 1968.

### 5.3 San Cosme - Phase II (1968-75)

This section concerns the period 1968-75 during which time houses in San Cosme deteriorated rapidly, and following a protest campaign by the local residents, repair and renewal schemes were authorized by Central State authorities. Again a decision-stage chart (Figure 62) is referred to in the text, this time, using the pre-fix PII denoting Phase II.

#### 5.3.1 Interim period 1968-73

We have already noted (Chapter 1.4) that studies of decision making in the planning and development processes can be undertaken at different levels of complexity, and some selectivity of focus by the researcher is inevitable. The period 1968-73 represents a period of relative inactivity in the history of San Cosme in terms of the planning and implementation of change on the ground, between the taking up of residence by ex-shanty dwellers in 1968 and the campaign



KEY



Strategic decision or act



Sub-Process or activity

..... On-going activity



Collaboration on decision,  
act or activity

—————> Decision flow

1. SHA, in collaboration with the NIH plan 801 house extension to the San Cosme estate (1968)
2. Ministry of Education and Science in collaboration with SHA, build 'Jumbo' day nursery and 'Jamie Balma's' Secondary School in San Cosme (1969)
3. SHA introduce 30 year mortgage payments and 'Administration and Conservation' charge for San Cosme residents (June 1969). Some residents refuse to pay.
4. House deterioration begins. Some educational and recreational facilities remain unprovided (1969)
5. Contract for estate extension awarded to 'Constructora Internacional S A' (December 1970)
6. 801 house extension built (April 1971-March 1973)
7. San Damian Residents Association (SDRA) founded (May 1971)
8. SDRA open dialogue with SHA complaining about housing and general living conditions (May 1973)
9. SHA provide football pitch and changing rooms in 'Sports Complex' (January 1973)
10. SDRA petition Mr Tarragona, Local M P, pleading their case (March 1973)
11. SDRA and SHA agree (verbally) on 'solution' to problems: SHA will carry out house repairs (March 1973)
12. Local M P writes (twice) to Spanish Prime Minister, putting SDRA's case (March-May 1973)
13. SDRA ask Provincial Directorate of Health to carry out survey of San Cosme (May 1973)
14. Provincial Director of Health's report supports residents grievances (June 1973)
15. Minister of Work and Labour Relations writes to Local M P confirming that house repairs will be carried out (June 1973)
16. SHA draw up General Plan of Repairs for San Cosme (July 1973)
17. Full cabinet authorize budgetary allocation for repairs in San Cosme (November 1973)
18. NIH award contract for 1st phase of repair scheme to 'Constructora Internacional S A' (March 1974)
19. Disagreements between SDRA and SHA hold-up beginning of repairs (April - July 1974)
20. Ministry of Education and Science build Francisco Franco Secondary School in San Cosme (May-July 1974)
21. SDRA again contact Local M P, complaining that repairs not yet carried out (September 1974)
22. Local M P again writes to Spanish Prime Minister, putting residents case (October 1974)
23. NIH, in collaboration with Full Cabinet, decide to abandon repair project in favour of complete renewal (November, 1974)
24. SHA draw-up draft renewal scheme (November 1974)
25. NIH reject SHA's draft plan and draw-up their own renewal scheme (December 1974- January 1975)
26. SDRA demand that their 'Control Committees' be authorized to supervise the implementation of the renewal scheme (January 1975)
27. NIH propose to rehouse 500 families in houses built 1971 - 3 as part of renewal scheme (March 1975)
28. NIH emphatically reject SDRA's demand for Control Committees (March 1975)
29. SDRA commission consultant planners (Calbet et al) to survey houses built in San Cosme 1971 - 73 (March 1975)
30. Consultant planners report that houses are unsuitable for habitation (April 1975)
31. SDRA refuse to accept NIH renewal proposals. General breakdown in communication between SDRA and housing authorities (May 1975)

Figure 62. San Cosme, Phase II : Decision Stage Chart

by residents to secure house repairs in early 1973, and so relatively little attention has been given to detailed decision making during this interim period. Nevertheless, it is important to note certain events that took place during the period as a prelude to subsequent developments in the case study.




Figure 63. Some of the 801 houses built in San Cosme 1971-3.  
(Photograph : M. G. Wynn)

Despite the assurances given to Prat Council by the NIH in 1965 (PI-18), the SHA, in collaboration with the NIH, planned and promoted an 801-house extension to the San Cosme estate in the late sixties, and this was built by 'Constructora Internacional' between 1971 and 1973 (PII - 1, 5, 6; Figures 54, 63 and 66). Meanwhile, in 1968-9, the Ministry of Education and Science, in collaboration with the SHA, built a nursery and a secondary school in San Cosme to cater for the education of children moving into the estate (PII-2; Figure 60); and in 1973, once the contractors for the 801 house extension were off the site, the SHA provided a football pitch and changing rooms (PII-9) in the 'Sports Complex' area, much of which nevertheless remained as rough terrain in 1978 (Figure 64).






Figure 64. The 'Sports Complex' in 1978.

The football pitch was provided in 1973, but the rest of the 'complex' remained as rough terrain. It was here that construction began in the renewal scheme in 1980. (photograph : M. G. Wynn).







Figure 65. Housing built in San Cosme 1965-7

The repair of cracks in the outer walls was often undertaken by residents themselves.  
(Photograph : M.G. Wynn).



Figure 66. Aerial Photograph of San Cosme 1972

Although a further 801 houses had been built (bottom right), empty spaces remained where the Sports Complex (I), two secondary schools (E & M), day-nursery (F), and Junior School (G) had been planned. A football pitch and changing rooms were provided by the SHA in 1973 in the 'Sports Complex' area, and one of the two schools (E) was built in 1974 by the Ministry of Education and Science. F and M remained as empty spaces in 1978. (Photograph: Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona).





In June 1969, the Barcelona Office of the SHA attempted to introduce 30 year mortgage payments of 500 pesetas<sup>66</sup> a month, and an 'Administration and Conservation' charge of 350 pesetas a month for all households on top of the monthly 150 peseta 'rate charge' which residents were already paying (PII-3). Some residents refused to pay these extra charges, claiming that they had moved to San Cosme on the understanding that they were to be tenants rather than owner occupiers. At the same time many residents argued that it was inappropriate to expect them to buy houses which were already showing signs of rapid deterioration,<sup>67</sup> (PII-4; Figure 65), or to pay 'Administration and Conservation' charges when no house repairs had been undertaken, and schools and nurseries remained unbuilt. (Figures 60 and 66).

In 1971, the San Damian Residents Association (SDRA), representing San Cosme residents was founded (PII-7), and from then on, the SDRA organized a series of surveys, petitions and marches to complain about housing and general living conditions on the estate (PII-8). Things were brought to a head in early 1973 when the river Llobregat broke its banks and flooded the delta area (Figure 48) including San Cosme, inundating house cellars (Figure 57) with flood water that often included sewage effluent. This prompted the SDRA to intensify their campaign for house repairs and general improvements in the estate, which eventually led to the authorization and abandonment of a house repair scheme by the NIH. Let us turn to examine the sequence of decisions and activities involved in this process.

<sup>66</sup> The conversion rate for pesetas in 1969 was 165 pesetas to £1.

<sup>67</sup> In June 1969, Jose Navarro Vilodre, Provincial Delegate of the Syndicate Organization (Ministry of Work and Labour Relations) wrote to San Cosme residents urging them to pay the new mortgage payments and 'Administration and Conservation' charge. In this letter Vilodre noted:- "The Board of Directors, consisting of workers like yourselves, has brought to our attention several problems relating to repairs that need to be undertaken and defects that should be attended to. In good time, these will be put right, and in this respect we must point out that never has the SHA shirked its responsibility". (File Reference : 'San Cosme - 3', Calbet, Elias y Asociados, (consultant planners), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

### 5.3.2 Resident Protest and the Repair Scheme 1973-74.

By early 1973, the vast majority of residents in San Cosme were refusing to pay the 'Administration and Conservation' charge demanded by the SHA Provincial Office in Barcelona, in protest against the failure of the SHA to carry out repairs and improvements on the estate. According to the SDRA, a verbal agreement had been reached in a meeting between representatives of the SDRA and the SHA in February 1972, "whereby the SHA would repair the houses, block by block, and, once done, the 'Administration and Conservation' charges would be paid and arrangements made for backpayments to be settled" (149), but still repairs had not been undertaken.

In March 1973, therefore, the SDRA took recourse to petitioning Mr E Tarragona, a Barcelona-based M.P. (Member of the Spanish Parliament; PII-10). In a letter to Mr Tarragona, the SDRA listed their grievances as follows:-

"1. The San Cosme Housing Area in Prat de Llobregat was constructed by the Ministry of Housing through the Syndical Housing Authority and given over to the present inhabitants just five years ago. There are, at present, 1,500 houses, plus another 800 in construction. 8,000 people live here, the majority of whom are from the shanty towns on Montjuich and other places in Barcelona.

"2. The occupants of these houses, despite the length of time that has elapsed since they moved in and despite what is stated in Article 144 of the 'Regulations for the Construction and Management of State Subsidized Houses',<sup>68</sup> do not have contracts stating the price of the houses, the amount and duration of the mortgage payments and other requirements demanded by the said Decree. The whereabouts of the property deeds of the SHA for the land on which the housing estate is built are not known. Nor has it been ascertained whether the Council of Prat has taken certain responsibility for the upkeep of the estate. Finally it is not known if this construction was approved by the technicians of the Ministry of Housing.

<sup>68</sup> The 'Regulations for the Construction and Management of State Subsidized Houses' were passed by Decree in 1968 and replaced the 'Regulations for the Application of the Limited Cost Housing Act' of 1955. Article 144 stated that the house promoters were responsible for providing house occupiers with legally approved contracts of sale or tenancy. The Regulations are stated in full in Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 216, 7 Sept., 1968.



"3. The Housing Area, after five years of habitation, is in a lamentable state. Its abandonment is total; the zones officially destined for use as parks and gardens are rough terrain, dirty and unkempt; there exists not one proper 'green' area in the large spaces where they should be. A large number of the public street lights do not only not work, but also constitute a constant danger to children who may be electrocuted, as had already happened several times; only one of the two schools planned is in operation and instead the residents are using as temporary schools 14 buildings originally destined for use as shops. These shops are unhygienic with poor ventilation and lighting and fail to comply with any of the demands of the Education Act. There is no kindergarten and only one of the two planned day nurseries exists. Furthermore, the transport service is deficient.

"4. As regards the houses, they are in a state of advanced disrepair. All the upper flats have leaks in the roof and there are transversal and longitudinal cracks in the walls. The walls are consistently damp and the flats, as a whole, are damp to the extent of being a health hazard. The floor tiles are coming up. The cellars are regularly flooded by waste water, producing bad smells, bringing dangers of infection and providing a breeding ground for rats and mice. The badly constructed foundations have been the cause of cracks in the upper storeys, which do not meet the necessary safety demands, having on various occasions collapsed to the great danger of the inhabitants. The outside walls, apart from the cracks, are badly finished, with materials of poor quality, that allow the passage of moisture. The interior is also badly finished, with the interior walls damp and covered with mould and flaking plaster.

"5. The 'Regulations for Construction and Management of State Subsidized Houses' have been broken by the SHA in many ways, theoretically giving rise to very high fines (Article 155). These Regulations specifically state that promoters of State Subsidized Houses are responsible for effecting repairs to houses made necessary by defects in construction within the first five years of houselife (Article 111)". (150)

Whilst the SDRA and SHA held further meetings in which provisional arrangements for carrying out repairs were again verbally agreed upon (PII-11), Mr Tarragona communicated the SDRA's grievances in full (by letter) to the Spanish Prime Minister in March 1973 (PII-12). In May 1973, the SDRA intensified their campaign by contacting the Provincial Director of Health (Home Office), asking that the Directorate

inspect and report upon hygienic conditions in San Cosme (PII-13). The Director of Health's report was forwarded to the SDRA and the Ministry of Work and Labour Relations in June 1973 (PII-14). It is perhaps worth quoting generously from this report because it verifies to a large degree the validity of the SDRA's complaints and provides a vivid account of the desperate living conditions in San Cosme in mid-1973. The Provincial Directorate's Report contained the following observations:-

"Situated some 2 kilometres from Prat de Llobregat, the San Cosme Housing Area houses some 1,500 families. In house numbers 354, 353 and 355, the cellars were inundated with waste water which had escaped from the sewage system, filling the building with foul-smelling gases. In some houses (e.g. No. 185) there were cesspools in the cellars, which had to be emptied every 15 days. (See Figure 67).

The walls of the houses are very damp, even the front walls, through which the rain easily passes. All the walls, interior and exterior, are full of cracks and patches of moss are beginning to appear on the roof of many houses. We have seen this in houses nos. 276, 306, 286, 307 and 309.

Fifty per cent of the houses are in what we would call a very serious condition and the other fifty per cent in a somewhat less serious condition.

We have personally checked that the majority of cellars are closed and that on the floor of these cellars there is a foul smelling sludge of more than 5 centimetres depth.

There is serious danger of short circuits in the electrical system and a constant risk of fire. People who enter the cellars are in danger of being electrocuted.

The gravity of situation is made worse by the fact that we are in a very dry year and because of this the interior walls are warped, the paint and wall-paper peeling off and corrosion has attacked all types of installations.

The rat problem is reaching dramatic proportions; the residents use rat powder to try to keep down the numbers, but the importance of the problem is shown by what has happened in No. 65, where the ceiling is covered with yellow-brown stains with the characteristic smell of rat excreta coming from the uninhabited (by humans) flat above.

The school is very small with less than half the legislated 1.25 m<sup>2</sup> per student, and rooms are less than 4.5 metres high. The school should also be isolated from other buildings, dry and of easy access. There is only one lavatory for all the children, and one wash basin and no drinking water, no playground and the same danger from rats. The inside of the classroom is very cold, the buildings being made of very light material. The children have to play in the street and so run the risk of being knocked down, as happened some days ago when a child suffered serious abdominal injuries. In the whole Housing Area there is not one sign limiting traffic speeds, nor are there any traffic lights.






Figure 67. Houses in San Cosme 1978

The rough holes at the base of walls facing onto the street were made to facilitate periodic suction-drainage of flooded cellars. (Photograph M.G. Wynn).

In front of the school, children who do not attend the school often gather to insult, swear and throw stones at the pupils, there being not the least protection for them (the pupils) from the Prat authorities, although this has been repeatedly requested by the Residents' Association. In fact, I was pleasantly surprised by the civility and maturity of the Residents' leaders, given the desperate situation in which they find themselves and the tactful way in which they presented their justified complaints.

Nevertheless, the atmosphere is tense, approaching crisis point. The residents have not paid rents for two months and they express their reasoning in the following ways: "We will always pay if it is fair and they treat us like human beings", or "My child is asthmatic and the doctor told me I couldn't expect her to get better whilst continuing to live in this atmosphere". But what is notable is the spirit of solidarity of all the residents against a common problem.

### Dangers to Health

The waters that seep into the cellars from the sewage system carry in suspension faecal deposits, bottle tops, bits of material and paper which rapidly decompose, giving off sulphydric acid. Two types of danger come from these waters; first, the pathogenic germs that can lead to epidemics; second, the putrefaction that these waters encourage.

We believe that it is essential to gain an understanding of the geology of the area and the variations in the level of the water table.

The gases can produce nausea, sickness, headaches, giddiness and faintness.

Contamination of water supply is a constant danger, thereby threatening outbreaks of disease (cholera, typhoid, coli bacillus).

The effect of the dampness (katathermometer value of 25%) can give rise to headaches and nausea etc.

The rats constitute a danger in several ways. They can act as vectors for a series of diseases; they bite, they engender deterioration of construction and they are a physical danger to children.

Apart from the essentially biological aspects of health, the effect on the skin of the environmental conditions and constant catarrh, suffered by many, and the decline of the structural and more superficial elements of the houses, there are also the sociological effects of lack of comfort and psychosis, difficult to evaluate, but of prime importance in the life of the community." (151)

The events of the first half of 1973 clearly marked a turning point in the SDRA's campaign for state intervention in the estate. Both a local M.P. and an organ of the Home Office had supported and verified the validity of the residents' case. In the face of this mounting pressure, the Minister of Work and Labour Relations



replied<sup>69</sup> to Mr Tarragona (PII-15) conceding that "it seems there are faults in the construction of the houses" and that "to finally resolve the situation the Technical Services Section of the SHA are drawing up the necessary plans for repairs." (152) In addition, the Minister noted that the SHA had been assured by the Ministry of Education and Science that the construction of a new secondary school in the estate was being planned and would be underway soon. (It was in fact built the following year - PII-20).

In June 1973, the Barcelona Provincial Office of the SHA embarked on drawing up a 'General Plan of Repairs' for San Cosme (PII-16). Repairs were to be undertaken in three phases, beginning with the most urgent cases, and in November 1973, the NIH were authorized by the Cabinet to finance the first phase of repairs in San Cosme, and similar schemes in other SHA estates (PII-17). In March 1974, the contract for carrying out the first phase of repairs in San Cosme was awarded to 'Constructora Internacional S.A.' (PII-18) with a budget of 7.6 million pesetas (\$127,000); it seemed that the repair of housing in San Cosme was, at last, to take place.

The implementation of the repair scheme, however, encountered immediate problems (PII-19). First, some residents had already undertaken house repairs themselves, and the SDRA now insisted that these residents be compensated in full, a claim which the SHA in Barcelona would not agree to. Second, the SHA had made no provision for housing residents in temporary accommodation whilst the builders were on site. By the summer of 1974, no agreement had been reached on either count, and the repair scheme had still not got underway.

<sup>69</sup> In the Minister's letter of Mr Tarragona, it was also agreed that eviction notices served on San Cosme residents for failure to pay the 'Administration and Conservation' charge were to be withdrawn, pending carrying out of repairs. The following year, the Ministry of Housing upheld appeals made by San Cosme residents against eviction notices served because of failure to pay the mortgage installments. In a letter to the SDRA, dated November 6th, 1974, the Ministry admitted that "it is clear that money cannot be demanded for mortgage payments when no contract of sale has been drawn-up". (File Reference : 'San Cosme - 5', Calbet, Elias y Asociados, (consultant planners), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

The SDRA again wrote to Mr Tarragona in September 1974 (PII-21), who again communicated their grievances to the Spanish Prime Minister (PII-22).

In November 1974, the President of the Spanish Parliament (on behalf of the Prime Minister) replied to Mr Tarragona. It was noted that whilst implementation of the first phase had met with delays, the NIH had arrived at provisional estimates for phases two and three. In addition to the 7.6 million pesetas paid to 'Constructora Internacional' for the first phase, phase two of the repair scheme would cost a further 152 million pesetas, and phase three a further 290 million, making a total of approximately 450 million pesetas (\$7.5 million) in all, more than the original cost<sup>70</sup> of house construction. This overall cost was considered by the Cabinet to be "excessive", and "led to a reassessment of the viability of demolition of the entire housing area". (153) The President concluded that the Cabinet, in collaboration with the NIH, had now decided that complete renewal of the San Cosme estate was a financially more viable option, and that the first phase of the repair scheme had now been abandoned; instead, the 1500 dwellings built in the mid-sixties were to be knocked down,<sup>71</sup> and 3000 new

<sup>70</sup> The construction of 1500 houses had cost 354 million pesetas (\$5.9 million) in 1965. Additional contracts for 'Road and Service' Infrastructure' and Complementary Service Buildings had cost 182 and 37 million pesetas respectively (\$3 million and \$0.62 million).

<sup>71</sup> The decision to demolish San Cosme prompted Mr Tarragona to write again to the Spanish Prime Minister asking that "proceedings be opened to determine responsibility for the construction of San Cosme". Tarragona argued that "it is essential to provide the public with answers as to why such drastic action is necessary, as houses were subsidized by the Government using public money, and therefore the public have a perfect right to know who was responsible for the execution of the project, bearing in mind that the drawing up and approval of plans was necessary, as was the subsequent inspection of works." (From letter from Mr E Tarragona to Carlos Arias Navarro, dated 25th Nov. 1974). The President of the Spanish Parliament subsequently replied to Mr Tarragona asserting that there was no case to answer, as the houses were "a way of resolving the urgent need for housing at the time; they were intended to be used for five years only" (from letter from Mr Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcardel to Mr E Tarragona, dated 10th March, 1975). This ruling obviously contradicts the fact that the SHA had imposed 30 year mortgage payments in 1969 and that a repair plan for San Cosme had been authorized in 1973, 5 years after the construction of the houses.

houses built in their place (PII-23).

### 5.3.3 The First Renewal Plans 1974-5

Following the decision of the Ministry of Housing to demolish and renew San Cosme, the SHA in Barcelona drew up a draft proposal for renewal for the San Cosme estate (PII-24). Renewal was to be implemented in two phases; in the first, 500 houses were to be demolished and 1008 built in their place; in the second, the remaining 1000 dwellings would be knocked down and replaced by 2008 new houses. The SHA's report noted that such high residential densities exceeded maximums established in the land use classifications for the area in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan (Table 12), but justified this on the grounds that "they (residential density maximums) were not followed in the original plan for the area". (154)

At this time, however, the SHA were undergoing transition from a house planning and promotion authority to an essentially estate administration body, and within the political melee of this transition, the SHA's draft renewal proposal was never endorsed by the NIH. Instead, NIH architects drew-up their own renewal plan (Figure 68; PII-25) which nevertheless had much in common with the SHA's draft proposal. The new estate was to consist of pre-fabricated star and linear-shaped blocks of five and nine storeys, comprising over 3000 dwellings, which would house over 13,000 people, almost double the existing number of residents.

In considering the difficulties encountered in the implementation of the NIH's renewal scheme, it is important to bear in mind the broader panorama of resident protest in housing estates in Barcelona. As the seventies progressed and the SHA failed to carry out repair schemes, Residents' Associations on different SHA estates realized that a more united front would be more effective in campaigning for repairs and improvements. In 1974, a 'Co-ordination of Working-Class Housing Protest Group' was formed, which at first centred on the three overspill estates at San Cosme, Pomar and Cinco Rosas (Figure 44), but rapidly grew to include all SHA, and some other, housing estates in Barcelona. As the Residents' Association movement became better organized, well-informed, united, and politically active, so their demands became more sophisticated. By early 1975, the Residents' Associations were demanding that their own 'Control




Figure 68. The National Institute of Housing's Plan for Renewal in San Cosme, January 1975.

Source : Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (Delegacion Provincial de Barcelona), 'Plan de Remodelacion de San Cosme', January, 1975.

Committees' be allowed to vet the plans for, and supervise the implementation of, all repair, and renewal schemes in SHA estates. Resident participation in the design of renewal schemes was seen as particularly important. An SHA Residents' Association publication in 1975 set out their reasoning as follows :-

"In the first estates built by the SHA, houses were of such ridiculously small dimensions that they were little more than 'vertical shanties'. In Verdun and Trinidad, flats of 25 m<sup>2</sup> floor space house complete families. Our experience, backed up by studies on housing standards and hygiene, suggests that each person in an averaged-sized family should be allocated at least 14 square metres of floor space. Today, this question is of vital importance as the SHA are now moving towards a policy of house renewal instead of repair.



Now then, is the moment to demand a say in what constitutes a 'dignified home'. To this end, we should attempt to control the renewal plans, and their implementation, through our own Control Committees, to check that basic standards are complied with". (155)

In January 1975, just as the NIH were completing the renewal plan for San Cosme, the Residents' Associations in 11 different estates (including the SDRA) wrote to the Barcelona Provincial Office of the SHA demanding that "all plans, roads and services projects, repair projects, plan reports and economic reports should be submitted to the Control Committees at least one month before the start of works". (156) The SHA Office refrained from replying directly to these demands and forwarded the letter to the NIH in Madrid (PII-26), who subsequently replied, via the Provincial Office of the SHA, refusing to accede to the Residents' Associations' demands (PII-28). It was affirmed that "in no way may persons outside the Administration actively intervene in the implementation of the Administration's programmes". (157)

This stand by the NIH tended to sour the SDRA's attitude to the San Cosme renewal plan. In February 1975, the NIH had announced that 500 residents would be permanently rehoused in 500 of the dwellings built in the 1971-3 extension (PII-27 ; Figures 54 and 63) which still remained empty. The 500 houses dating from the mid-sixties left empty by this transference would then be demolished, and 1000 built in their place to house the remaining residents. This transference, in turn, would pave the way for demolition of the remaining 1000 houses built in the mid-sixties, on the site of which 2000 new dwellings would be built to house new residents from elsewhere in the Sub-Region. Apart from being concerned over the size of the scheme and its impact on community life in the estate, many residents were also not keen to move to houses built in the 1971-3 extension to the estate. In March, 1975, the SDRA employed private consultants (Calbet, Elias y Asociados) to survey the 500 empty houses in the 1971-3 extension (PII-29). In April, Calbet's team reported (PII-30) that these houses had "great structural defects and many are considered uninhabitable" (158). Although

this was subsequently challenged in another consultant's report, commissioned by the SHA, the SDRA adamantly refused to co-operate in getting the NIH's renewal plan off the ground. By the summer of 1975, the relationship between the SDRA and the housing authorities had reached a new crisis point (PII-31).. Many houses remained in a lamentable state of disrepair, the rent strike continued (not just in San Cosme, but in all SHA estates in Barcelona) and the future of the renewal scheme remained uncertain.

In November of the same year, the death of Franco marked a watershed in the history of Spain, with significant repercussions on the structure and functioning of political and planning systems at national and local levels. Before moving on to examine developments in San Cosme in the post-Franco era, let us briefly summarise the 1968-75 period.

#### 5.3.4. San Cosme 1968-75, Summary Analysis

During the period 1968-75, the houses in San Cosme deteriorated rapidly and with some of the planned service infrastructure still missing, the local Residents' Association campaigned for repairs and improvements on the estate. Following the authorization and abandonment of the repair scheme in 1973-4, the NIH drew up a renewal plan, which, because of the opposition of the local Residents' Association was not implemented. If we exclude the 1971-3 extension to the estate, development on the ground in this era is limited to repair work carried out by residents themselves, the provision of a football pitch and changing rooms by the SHA, and the building of schools and a nursery by the Ministry of Education and Science.

Again, as in Phase I, most decision-making took place outside the bounds of the statutory urban planning machinery. Here, however, it was not so much a question of agencies contravening formal procedure as that the planning and procedural mechanisms for effecting house repair and renewal schemes in Spain simply did not exist in the Franco era. This meant that both the SDRA and the housing authorities were forced to pursue semi-formalized, ad hoc, channels in their demand for, and planning of, house

repair and renewal schemes, and this makes it difficult indeed to identify 'sub-processes' or 'analytical categories' within the flow of decisions and activities studied here.

The decision-making process in this period can perhaps best be portrayed as representing the ad hoc, inconsistent response of central state authorities to the increasingly organised and institutionalised campaign of the residents for state intervention to improve housing and general living conditions on the estate (Figure 69). Following the intensification of resident protest after the flooding of the estate in the winter of 1972-3, Central State authorities authorized, and began planning, a repair scheme for houses in San Cosme. Resident protest at the inadequacy of arrangements for implementing the scheme, however, held up the scheme's progress, and by late 1974 the Central State authorities had decided on total renewal rather than repair. Again, however, resident reaction prevented implementation of the scheme with relations between the SDRA and State authorities reaching a new crisis point in the summer of 1975.

Both the repair and renewal schemes failed to be implemented largely because of the continued bungling in decision-making and insensitivity to resident needs on behalf of Central Government agencies, and the increasingly effective organisation and functioning of the Residents Association. Indeed, what really dominates this period as regards inter-agency activity is the emergence of the SDRA as a significant force in the planning and development processes. From an essentially defensive stance in the early seventies, they came to adopt a more activist approach, culminating in their demand that their own Control Committees be entrusted with checking the plan content and supervising the implementation of repair and renewal schemes, and in their employment of planning consultants to give their case a sharper professional edge.

What, then, emerge as the critical points in the decision-making process during this period (Figure 69)? First, the enlisting of the Local MP's support in early 1973 marked an important breakthrough in the SDRA's attempts to get support for their case from


10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

RESIDENT PROTEST  
CAMPAIGN

STATE INTERVENTION

Repair Scheme

Renewal Scheme



KEY      Decision or Act      Critical Point      Decision Flow      →

### Critical Points

1. SDRA petition local M.P., pleading their case (PII-10).
2. Minister of Works and Labour Relations confirms that repairs will be carried out (PII-15).
3. Disagreements between SDRA and SHA hold-up implementation of repair scheme (PII-19).
4. NIH, in collaboration with Full Cabinet, abandon repair project in favour of complete renewal (PII-23).
5. SDRA demand that their Control Committees be authorized to supervise the implementation of renewal (PII-26).

Figure 69. San Cosme, Phase II (1973-75) : Process Flow Chart.



within the Public Administration. It was on Tarragona's advice that the SDRA subsequently contacted the Provincial Directorate of Health, and because of his pressurising of Central Government authorities that the Minister of Works and Labour Relations committed the State, in writing, to the financing of repairs (Critical Point 2). Following the planning of the repair scheme, and with contractors on site, the refusal of the SDRA to allow the State to dictate the conditions under which the scheme would be implemented (Critical Point 3) eventually led to the abandonment of the repairs scheme and authorization of renewal (Critical Point 4). Again, however, the refusal of the SDRA to passively accept State proposals and their demand for 'Control Committees' to supervise implementation (Critical Point 5) led to a breakdown in SDRA-State Communication which prevented implementation of the scheme. Of these five critical points, three involve decision-making by the SDRA and two by Central State authorities; and all five are outside the scope of statutory planning procedure. This would seem to reflect fairly accurately the major aspects of decision-making in the planning and implementation of change in this phase of San Cosme's development. Let us now examine how these trends were continued and extended in the different social-political and planning environments of the post-Franco era.

#### 5.4 San Cosme - Phase III (1976-79)

The death of Franco in November 1975 marked the end of the General's 36-year dictatorship. Subtle changes in the political attitudes of Central State authorities and the subsequent introduction of new planning and housing legislation signified important modifications to the wider political and planning frameworks. In San Cosme, the post-Franco era saw the SDRA's consultant planners<sup>72</sup> embark on an alternative renewal plan for San Cosme which was subsequently approved, financed and implemented by the State.

<sup>72</sup> As previously noted, there is not a planning profession in Spain, and the SDRA's consultants, Calbet, Elias y Asociados, were in the main qualified architects. However, their activities, as consultants, are as much to do with planning as architecture and thus they are referred to as 'planners' in this thesis.

Before examining these developments at local level, let us first outline the major changes in the wider legislative and planning frameworks which are recorded<sup>73</sup> on the decision-stage chart (Figure 70).

#### 5.4.1 A new planning and legislative framework

The end of the Franco era will undoubtedly be seen as a watershed in the history of Spain, and in San Cosme the renewal scheme experienced dramatic new developments after 1975. New planning and housing legislation passed by King Juan Carlos' first governments introduced new planning mechanisms, and sources of finance, for the improvement and renewal of housing areas such as San Cosme. At the same time, the Residents' Association movement, both nationally and in San Cosme, received a considerable stimulus from wider (and more favourable) media coverage, and the more enlightened political attitudes that have prevailed in post-Franco governments (PIII-1). It is nevertheless worth remembering that the seeds of change had been sown and were germinating long before Franco's death; the approval process for the new Planning Act (Chapter 2.4; PIII-3) and the revised Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan (Chapter 2.5; PIII-4) were well underway, and the Residents' Associations had already made considerable political gains, prior to November 1975.

Of particular significance, as regards subsequent developments in San Cosme, was the introduction in the 1976 Planning Act of the concept of Special Plan of Interior Reform (SPIR) to be used for planning "the improvement of the urban and rural environment and the city suburbs". (159) In the revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan the role of SPIR's was also stressed (see Chapter 2.5); and

<sup>73</sup> Again, then, as in the interim period 1969-73, we are examining decision making at different levels of complexity, the differentiation reflecting the local level research focus. Thus, whilst the changes in national legislation and revision of the Sub-Regional Plan are recorded, the decision-making process involved in these changes is not scrutinized here, although broad overviews are provided in Chapter 2.




Figure 70. San Cosme, Phase III : Decision Stage Chart




Figure 71. San Cosme in the 1976 Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan

All San Cosme was given classification 18- 'Previously Replanned Zone'. To the south, some of the old foundations laid in 1965 remain in the Airport Zone (Classification 2).

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, 'Plan General Metropolitana de Ordenacion Urbana', MCB, 1976.

the entire San Cosme estate was classified as 'previously replanned zone' (Figure 71), which as we have seen (Chapter 3.4) was to "cover those areas of urban land re-classified in Local Plans".

(160) Paradoxically, no Local Plan had ever been formally approved for San Cosme and yet the estate existed in contradiction to the 1953 land-use zonings. What the 1976 Revision did was to formally recognize the existence of San Cosme, even if the land zone classification was not strictly appropriate.



Between July and December 1976, a series of Housing Acts<sup>74</sup> were passed changing the administrative and financial basis of State housing policy (PIII-5). The constructor subsidy system which had formed the basis of housing policy in the Franco era (Chapter 2.3) was abolished and new loan facilities, fiscal exemptions and limited subsidies were made available to house buyers in an attempt to increase the house buying potential of the public. Nevertheless, the Act noted that:-

"in exceptional cases, the National Institute of Housing may acquire or construct houses themselves, using their own funds. Such exceptional cases include ... house improvement or renewal made necessary by the deterioration of dwellings".  
(161)

Thus, although the emphasis of state housing policy had switched to aiding the house buyer, rather than the constructor, the door was still left open for direct intervention by the NIH. Let us now examine how these aspects of the new planning and legislative framework operated in practice in San Cosme.

#### 5.4.2 The Plan-Making Process for the new Renewal Scheme.

We have already noted that the SDRA employed consultant planners, led by F. Calbet, to report on the structural condition of houses in San Cosme in 1975. From then on, Calbet's team became increasingly involved with the San Cosme situation. From early 1976 onwards they worked in collaboration with residents in trying to find an alternative renewal proposal that could be implemented within the framework of the new housing and planning legislation, and which was based more on the needs and preferences of San Cosme residents (PIII-2).

<sup>74</sup> The Housing Acts were:- 'Social Housing' Act of 16th July 1976 (Boletín Oficial del Estado 30.7.76); Development of 'Social Housing' System Act of 16th September 1976 (B.O.E. 30.9.76); State Protected Housing Act of 12th November 1976 (B.O.E. 28.12.76); and the Housing Loans and Credits Act of 26th November 1976 (B.O.E. 4.12.76).

The 1976 Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan made reference to publicly financed renewal schemes, specifying that "there may be an increase of up to 12% in the number of dwellings" (162). This meant, then, that some 1700 dwellings could be built in place of the existing 1500 built in the mid-sixties, a considerably smaller estate than that proposed by the NIH in 1975. Working on this basis, Calbet's teams, in collaboration with the SDRA, undertook a series of preliminary surveys in San Cosme in which possible options for house type and urban design were put forward to residents. In July 1976, Calbet presented an outline report of his proposals to the SDRA (PIII-6). He noted that :-

"The calculation of the number and type of houses will be based on present necessities, as the future population will be made up almost entirely of people currently living in San Cosme. Similarly calculations concerning school places, parking facilities etc, will be made accordingly. In the plan implementation stage, the phased transference of Residents to their new houses will be of great importance. In the NIH 1975 proposal two phases of construction were established, but nothing was said about transference of residents. One possible solution could be to construct the first phase of 500 houses on what is now the football pitch. The second phase would then involve the moving of 500 families to their final houses and so enable the start of a cycle of demolition, construction and removal, that would avoid the need for temporary housing for the residents. It would not be very costly to find a provisional football pitch and a permanent one would be provided later." (163)

Additionally, Calbet stressed that because San Cosme was built on a delta it was essential to undertake a geological survey to determine which type of house foundations should be used.

In October, 1976, Calbet's team presented their renewal proposals to San Cosme residents in an exhibition in San Cosme (PIII-7), at which aspects of the scheme were discussed and explained, and general support was voiced in favour of the main elements of the plan. (Figure 72). Quadrangular four storey blocks, enclosing a central 'patio' (Figure 73), constituted the basic unit of development, with new schools and nurseries also being included in the scheme (to complement those already built) as well as new sports zones, an adult training centre, and a pre-university college.




Figure 72. The Draft Plan for Renewal presented to Residents in the Exhibition held in San Cosme, October 1976.

In December 1976, the layout and design basics of this plan were accepted by the Ministry of Housing





Figure 73. Section through the four-storey Housing Block in Calbet's Renewal Proposal. (Photograph of scale model on-show in October 1976 Exhibition in San Cosme).

Source : San Damian Residents' Association Boletín Extraordinario, SDRA, October 1977.

Throughout the latter half of 1976, Calbet had held informal discussions with Ministry of Housing representatives in Madrid and Barcelona, concerning the possibilities of using his plan as the basis for renewal. Following the October exhibition, Calbet formally forwarded the renewal proposal to the NIH in Madrid (PIII-8) and asked that it be officially accepted as a draft Special Plan of Interior Reform for San Cosme, to be financed by the NIH as an 'exceptional case' in accordance with the new housing legislation that had just been passed. In December, the NIH officially acceded to Calbet's request (PIII-9) and invited Calbet to work with NIH planners on finalizing the plan. In February 1977 a State contract was signed (PIII-11) between Calbet and the NIH, whereby Calbet (representing the SDRA) would work with A. Pineda (NIH chief planner in the Barcelona Delegation of the Ministry of Housing) in drawing



up the SPIR<sup>75</sup> for San Cosme, based on Calbet's draft proposal. This, then, was in many ways the culmination of the SDRA's campaign to have a say in the planning and implementation of renewal. Although the SDRA's own Control Committees had no official role in the planning process (as they had demanded in 1975), Calbet was acting as their designated planner, and it was Calbet, working in conjunction with the SDRA, who directed the plan-making process from here on. Pineda, the NIH's planner, who had been the architect of the 1975 3000-house renewal scheme (Figure 68), played very little active part in the plan-making process, acting as an indifferent, if not grudging, rubber stamp authority for Calbet's proposals.

Even before the State contract had been signed, Calbet's team had embarked upon more detailed surveys of resident opinion and preferences and held meetings<sup>76</sup> with relevant local authorities and interest groups (PIII-10). In January 1977, meetings were held with local shopkeepers (who generally opposed the renewal scheme because of the upheaval involved) and with representatives of the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, with whom a provisional figure of 1776 houses<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> The contract signed in February 1977 was for the Special Plan of Interior Reform and Roads and Service Project for the entire estate, plus detailed 'House Designs' for the 1st Phase (see Figure 77). A contract for the 'House Design' plans for phases 2 and 3 was signed in 1979 once the SPIR had been definitively approved.

<sup>76</sup> Minutes of these meetings were kept by Calbet in a 'review diary', which constitutes a valuable data source for determining the sequence of events in this period.

<sup>77</sup> It has already been noted that the 1976 Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan allowed for an increase of 12% in the number of houses in public renewal schemes. In discussion between Calbet and the MCB it was agreed to calculate this percentage on the entire estate of 2,301 houses, even though the 801 houses built in the seventies were not to be renewed. This gave a figure of 276 (12% of 2301), and thus a total figure of 1776 new dwellings (1500 + 276).

for the new estate was agreed. Following the January Assembly<sup>78</sup> of the SDRA (Figure 74), resident committees were set-up on a house block basis to discuss specific design details. A financial economic survey was commissioned by Calbet to establish the possibilities<sup>79</sup>

<sup>78</sup> The SDRA held monthly Assemblies at which all SDRA policy decisions were put to the vote and guidelines for executive policy agreed upon. They also acted as a general open forum for resident information etc., and were regularly attended by Calbet or one of his colleagues.

<sup>79</sup> The commissioned report found that state loans could be repaid on 10, 12, 16, 20 or 25 year mortgages under the following conditions:-

<u>Type of Loan</u>	<u>Duration</u> <u>(years)</u>	<u>Annual</u> <u>Interest</u> %	<u>Maximum</u> <u>Loan: % of</u> <u>price of</u> <u>house</u>	<u>Downpayment</u> <u>% of price</u> <u>of house</u>	<u>% of total</u> <u>loan pay-</u> <u>able in 1st</u> <u>year</u>	<u>Increase</u> <u>in mort-</u> <u>gage</u> <u>payment</u> <u>per year</u> %
I	25	4	94.9320	5.0680	2.896	7.0
II	20	5	92.7202	7.2798	4.1599	7.5
III	16	6	89.5878	10.4122	5.9498	7.5
IV	12	7	84.7928	15.2072	8.6898	7.5
V	10	9	79.7138	20.2862	11.5921	7.5

In San Cosme, where the bulk of houses were to be for 4 or 6 person families, this meant that mortgage possibilities were as follows:-

House Type (a) - 4 persons. Price: 914,760 pesetas

<u>Type of Loan</u>	<u>Maximum Loan</u>	<u>Downpayment</u>	<u>Monthly Payment (first year)</u>
I	868,400	44,360	2,096
II	848,167	66,593	2,940
III	819,513	95,247	4,940
IV	775,651	139,109	5,733
V	729,190	185,570	7,044

House Type (b) - 6 persons. Price: 1,204,290 pesetas

I	1,143,257	61,033	2,759
II	1,116,620	87,670	3,871
III	1,078,897	125,393	5,349
IV	1,021,151	183,139	7,395
V	959,985	244,305	9,274

From L.M. Calbet and F. Navines 'Estudio Economico de San Cosme', Calbet, Elias y Asociados, January 1977, (mimeo).  
(£1 was approximately equal to 140 pesetas in 1977).



**VECINDOS:**  
**DE EXIGIR**  
**COMO PUEDE SER TU CASA**  
**PARTICIPA - CON - TUS - IDEAS - LUCHAMOS - JUNTOS - POR - UNA**  
**VIVIENDA - DIGNA**

**NO - MAS - BARRAQUISMO !!**



Figure 74. Calbet addressing Residents in San Cosme, 1977.

The placard reads: 'Residents: now you can choose the type of house you want. Participate with your ideas, we will fight together for a dignified home.'





Figure 75. Children pose for the camera in front of a section of the Mural in San Cosme, showing the shanty town on Montjuich where some of them were born.  
(Photograph : M.G. Wynn).






Figure 76. A full view of the Mural in San Cosme, showing the shanty town on Montjuich (left), the existing built-up area (centre) and the future estate (right).



of securing state loans so that residents could buy their new dwellings, within the framework of the new housing legislation.

In February, Calbet's team met with representatives of Prat Council to explain the general outline of the renewal plan, and to stress the need to integrate and co-ordinate the provision of educational and recreational facilities in San Cosme with on-going municipal programmes. Meetings were held with school staff and parents' associations and it was agreed that pupils would be introduced to the basics of the renewal scheme in the classroom, whilst children worked with adults on a mural depicting the different types of dwellings in which residents had lived (Figures 75 and 76). Meanwhile, Pineda, the NIH architect, agreed to arrange for a geological survey to be undertaken and to manage negotiations with the Electricity and Gas Boards. Following further consultation with Prat Council technicians, it was found that the Council had no plans of existing water and sewerage networks, and Pineda subsequently agreed to arrange for the necessary surveys to be carried out. This absence of fundamental information on local geology and existing service infrastructure emphasises the illegality of the SHA operation in the mid-sixties when no Roads and Service Project was drawn-up, and the Local Plan was never approved.

By June 1977, Calbet's team had completed work on the SPIR (PIII-12), and in July the plan was 'accepted' (not approved) by the NIH in Madrid in consultation with Pineda and the Barcelona Delegation of the Ministry of Housing (PIII-13). The plan (Figure 77) comprised 1784 new dwellings in 33 four-storey quadricle blocks, each enclosing a central 'patio', two new schools, an infants centre, a pre-university study centre, adult training centre and civic centre, and was to be implemented in four phases (Figure 78), with construction starting on the football pitch, thereby avoiding the problems associated with providing residents with temporary accommodation. Total cost of the scheme was estimated at 2.7 million pesetas (\$45,000) to be financed by the NIH. Let us now turn to examine the sequence of events in the second half of 1977 and after, during which time the SPIR was approved by respective planning authorities and construction on the ground got underway.




Figure 77. The Special Plan of Interior Reform for San Cosme, 1978.

Source of plan : Calbet, Elias y Asociados 'Plan Especial de Reforma Interior de San Cosme'. (mimeo), 1978.




Figure 78. The Phasing of Construction and Demolition in the SPIR for San Cosme.

Construction started on the existent football pitch, enabling residents to move directly into their new homes. Their former homes were then demolished to make way for the second phase of construction.

#### 5.4.3 Plan Approval and the Implementation Process 1977-9

Whilst Calbet's team undertook further door to door surveys of resident opinion, to be incorporated into the Roads and Services Project and detailed House Design<sup>80</sup> studies (PIII-15), the NIH forwarded the SPIR to Prat Council in July 1977 (PIII-14) for the Council "to proceed with the approval process as outlined in Article 41 of the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act". (164) Paradoxically, however, this was not in accordance with the cited act, which (like the 1956 Planning Act) set out a plan approval process in which the plan-making authority (in the public sector) was responsible for Initial and Provisional Approval (see Figure 16). What should

<sup>80</sup> In the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Act, detailed 'House Design' studies had been introduced as a further type of plan to include minute details of house design, which had to be incorporated into all local-level plans.



have happened was that the NIH Initially approve the plan, followed by a Public Information Stage and Audience of Local Corporations, before being Provisionally and Definitively approved by the NIH and the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona, respectively. As Figure 79 shows, however, this was in fact not the case, with the NIH playing no official role in the plan approval process. They were, it seems, bending over backwards to avoid giving the impression of heavy handed central state intervention such as had characterized events in the mid-sixties. But in so doing they were technically not following correct planning procedure.

Planning process according to Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956	Initial approval by Syndical Housing Authority	Public information stage of one month	Audience of local corporations (one month)	Provisional approval by Syndical Housing Authority	Definitive approval by Greater Barcelona Planning Commission
In reality	—— Statutory Planning Procedure By-passed				
Planning process according to Land and Urban Planning Reform Act of 1976	Initial approval by Ministry of Housing	Public information stage of one month	Audience of local corporations (one month)	Provisional approval by Ministry of Housing	Definitive approval by Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona
In reality	Initial approval by Prat Council	Public information stage of one month	No appeals presented in public information stage: provisional approval not necessary		Definitive approval by Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona

Figure 79. The Plan Approval Process in Theory and in Reality for the Local Plan of 1963. and the Special Plan of Interior Reform of 1977.

In October, 1977, following the favourable reports of the Technical Services Section and Committee of Construction and Installations, Prat Council Initially Approved the SPIR for San Cosme (PIII-16). During the ensuing Public Information Stage (PIII-17) no objections were raised by the general public and the Council forwarded the SPIR to the MCB who Definitively Approved the plan in April 1978 (PIII-19). Meanwhile in January 1978,

Calbet's team had completed the Roads and Services Project and detailed House Design studies (PIII-18) and these in turn followed the same approval procedure (PIII-20-22), with Building Permit cession following in September 1974 (PIII-23).

In December 1978, the budgetary allocation for the first phase of renewal was approved by the Central Government (PIII-24) and the contract was put out to tender in January 1979 (PIII-25). Although Calbet had always hoped that a local builder would be given the work (because of the poor quality of construction associated with some of the larger contractors), it was found that local firms could not compete economically with the nationwide builders for such a large scale<sup>81</sup> operation. In March the NIH awarded the contract to 'Dragados y Construcciones' (PIII-26) with construction finally getting underway in May 1979 (PIII-27), by chance coinciding with the first democratic election held in Spain for over 40 years, symbolising the move towards locally based, democratic decision-making that had featured prominently in the planning and implementation of the renewal scheme in San Cosme.

#### 5.4.4 San Cosme 1976-79, Summary Analysis

The SPIR for San Cosme is of considerable significance and interest because it represents something of a pioneer public renewal scheme in a Spanish national planning context, and may be used as a model for subsequent schemes in Barcelona and elsewhere. The use of the SPIR in the renewal of San Cosme showed that this type of plan can successfully be employed in such developmental contexts; and the financing of the scheme by the NIH revealed that the new housing legislation which made provision for the financing of renewal and improvement schemes can work in practice without too many delays or bureaucratic hold-ups.

<sup>81</sup> The first phase contract was for the construction of 486 houses, 16 shops and a day nursery.

On the debit side, however, the initiative for the scheme came entirely from outside the Public Administration, and the success of the operation clearly owes a great deal to the dedication and perseverance of the consultant planners led by F. Calbet. At the same time, the San Cosme case clearly reveals the absence of the necessary mechanisms for systematically incorporating resident opinion within the statutory planning process at local level. Although resident preferences and wishes were taken into account in the plan-making process and in the adoption of the phased implementation arrangements, this was done almost entirely on the initiative of Calbet's team, working in conjunction with the SDRA, and was largely on an ad-hoc, trial and error basis, outside the realm of the statutory planning legislation, which makes no reference to public participation in the planning process, except through the presentation of appeals in the Public Information Stage. Ironically, this was reduced to something of an irrelevant formality in the approval of the SPIR for San Cosme, with not one appeal, objection or letter of support, being forwarded to the Council, who had mistakenly been entrusted with Initial plan approval responsibility anyway. It was, rather, through the series of meetings, surveys and exhibitions held by Calbet's team in San Cosme from 1976 onwards, that the participation of residents in the decision-making process took place.

This is well illustrated by the grouping of decisions into sub-processes in the process flow chart (Figure 80). We can identify three stages in the plan-making process (PIII-2, 6, 7, 8; 10-12; 15, 18) involving constant interaction between Calbet and the SDRA (and individual residents); and the three stages are separated by upper-tier 'approval' (in its general sense) decisions (PIII-9, 13, 19, 22) which marked the progressive formalization of the plan (if not the plan-making process) within the framework of the statutory planning machinery, culminating in the Definitive Approval by the MCB of the SPIR and corresponding Roads and Services Project (PIII-19, 22) and the subsequent building permit cession, budgetary allocation, tendering process and implementation of the first phase.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

CHANGES IN BROAD POLITICAL  
AND PLANNING FRAMEWORKS

PLAN-MAKING (& Resident  
Participation)

PLAN APPROVAL

by Central State  
by Prat Council

by Sub-Reg. Planning Authority

Budgetary Allocation  
Tendering

Construction

KEY      Decision or Act ○      Activity □      Critical Point ○      Decision Flow →

#### Critical Points

1. Wide-ranging social-political reform following Franco's death (PIII-1).
2. SDRA planning consultants draw-up draft report, outlining major aspects of alternative renewal proposal (PIII-6).
3. NIH accept consultants scheme as a draft scheme for the renewal of San Cosme (PIII-9).
4. MCB Definitively Approve SPIR for San Cosme (PIII-19)
5. Budgetary allocation for first phase of renewal approved by Central Government (PIII-24).

Figure 80. San Cosme, Phase III : Process Flow Chart.



The decision-flow in the process-flow chart also suggests which might have been critical points in the decision-making process. First of all, the macro level political change (PIII-1; Critical Point 1) following Franco's death ushered in a new political and planning context to events in San Cosme and this must be considered a critical point, albeit at national level. Then, the drawing-up of the first draft of the renewal scheme by Calbet (PIII-6; Critical Point 2) represented the first critical step towards formalizing an alternative to the NIH's 1975 scheme, and incorporated the recently approved changes in planning housing legislation. Similarly, the acceptance by the NIH of Calbet's draft proposal in December 1976 (PIII-9; Critical Point 3) signified the willingness of the Central State to collaborate with Calbet in a scheme in which resident opinion would be incorporated into the design process and set in motion the alternating sequence of plan making - plan approval of the next 18 months. Although Prat Council's role in the plan approval process was somewhat contrived and of little consequence, the Definitive Approval of the SPIR (PIII-19; Critical Point 4) by the MCB was undoubtedly an important point in the overall implementation of the scheme as the MCB had by then emerged as an effective development control authority working within the framework of the revised Sub-Regional Plan. Following their Definitive Approval, the only seemingly possible stumbling block to implementation was the budgetary allocation by the Central State (PIII-24; Critical Point 5) which was achieved with relatively little delay in late 1978.

#### 5.5 Final Summary Analysis : Development of the Research Hypotheses.

In the summary subsections included in this chapter, we have already discussed the major aspects of planning and implementation which have emerged from the different Phases of the San Cosme case study. Here, however, we are more concerned with using the San Cosme case to develop and discuss the research hypotheses postulated in Chapter 4. Whilst the San Cosme case study as a

whole has some bearing on eight out of the nine hypotheses (the exception being hypotheses no. (6) which relates to private sector development) some of the hypotheses are more obviously related to developments in one or other of the three Phases. As already noted, many of the hypotheses are interrelated and overlapping, but for the sake of clarity and consistency, we shall consider each one individually, unless the need to avoid repetition suggests otherwise. The three sub-sections which follow, then, correspond to the three major areas to which the hypotheses relate i.e. planning and control mechanisms; agency roles and activities; and the decision-making process itself.

#### 5.5.1 Planning and Control Mechanisms

Let us start by re-stating the three hypotheses relating to this area of planning and implementation; these will then be considered in their turn.

(1) That the Local Plan/Roads and Service Project/Building Permit/Industrial Licence mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of new development in the Franco era.

(2) That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Planning Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of road and service infrastructure in the implementation of estate development.

(3) That the Special Plan of Interior Reform has functioned successfully in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal in the post-Franco era.

(1) In the San Cosme case study, the Local Plan/Roads and Service Project/Building Permit mechanisms<sup>82</sup> clearly did fail to perform the planning and control functions set out in the 1956 Planning Act. The construction of the estate went ahead without the prior approval of a Local Plan or Roads and Service project, and although Building Permits were granted, house construction did not take place in

<sup>82</sup> No industry was ever planned or installed in the San Cosme estate and so discussion of the industrial licence system is not relevant here, but is considered in the Molins case study (Chapter 7).

accordance with the plans submitted to the Council, on the basis of which these permits had been ceded; further, the local Council did not carry out post-construction inspection of dwellings to check construction had been undertaken in accordance with permit submissions. As Figure 79 shows, it was really a case of the statutory planning procedure being completely by-passed, and indeed, had not Prat Council written to the SHA inviting them to discuss details of the project, it is unlikely that the SHA themselves would have applied for Building Permits, given the scant regard shown by the authority for planning law up to that point.

The failure of these planning and control mechanisms to come into effect had serious repercussions at two levels. First, it made a mockery of the approved urban plan for the area, with development taking place in 'rural land', and, initially, in land zoned for the expansion of Barcelona airport. The resultant objection of the Aviation Ministry and subsequent need to replan the estate only served to underline the potential perils of such autonomous, ham-fisted intervention. Secondly, houses were constructed on foundations that were proved to be inadequate given the nature of the underlying terrain. In a geological survey<sup>83</sup> - carried out on the insistence of SDRA's consultants in 1977, it was discovered that deltaic deposits extend down to a depth of 40 metres below ground level. The SHA, who had not carried out a geological survey themselves in the sixties, had designed their houses on 'egg-box' foundations reaching only one metre below the surface (Figure 57), which in theory could 'float' in the soft delta clays and thereby support the two-storey apartment blocks above. In practice, however, the movement of the sub-soil was so great that the foundations moved disproportionately, causing cracks to appear in both the inner and outer walls of the housing blocks, which allowed water to pass freely into the cellars below.

<sup>83</sup> Report of INCE (Instituto Nacional de Edificacion) on San Cosme, October 1977. Following the findings of this survey, the houses in the new renewal scheme will have pile-driven foundations reaching some 40 metres below ground level.

Had the local planning authorities and general public had an opportunity to formally examine and report on house design proposals, as would have been the case in the 'Audience of Local Corporations' and 'Public Information' Stages, it is highly likely that such disastrous consequences would have been avoided. It also seems appropriate to reiterate here that the planning and administration (such as it was) of the repair and renewal schemes of the Central State in 1973-5 took place outside the bounds of the statutory planning machinery. No obvious mechanisms existed in the 1956 Planning Act to effect such change, and the SHA and NIH again failed to submit their plans to the statutory plan approval process. As in the mid-sixties the statutory planning machinery was of little consequence when set against the political weight of the Central State.

(2) In the development of San Cosme, the Expropriation 'System of Intervention' was used by the State to obtain 49 hectares of land of which 38 hectares were used for the construction of the 2301-house estate (1,500 in the mid-sixties; 801 in the early seventies), with 11 hectares remaining undeveloped in the Special Airport Zone (Figure 54). Expropriation provided a quick and relatively cheap means for the acquisition of land and implementation of development by the State. In theory, this would seem to provide the opportunity for the effective overall co-ordination of the provision of service infrastructure. In practice, however, the SHA, the estate management authority, achieved only moderate success here.

The social centre, shopping areas and the road and associated infrastructure were all provided in 1968 (Table 14) by different contractors under the supervision of the SHA (see Figures 52 and 61). As regards educational facilities, the SHA had to rely on the Ministry of Education and Science, who provided one school and one nursery in 1968-9, and a further school in 1974, but this still left a Junior School and day nursery which were never built (Figure 66).



The provision of green zones and recreational facilities provided further problems. Normally, the provision and upkeep of these areas, and the roads, would be the responsibility of the Local Council, but as we have seen Prat Council refused to accept this because of the drain on resources that would have resulted because of residents' exemption from the obligation to pay local rates. As a result all the recreational areas remained rough, unkempt waste land until 1973, when following pressure from the residents, a football pitch and changing rooms were installed by the SHA themselves. It is interesting to note that in the Civil Governor's letter to Prat Council in May 1968, asking for their explanation of the disagreement with the NIH, the Civil Governor reported that :-

"The General Director of the National Institute of Housing has written to me as follows:-

'The Councils of Berga, Cardona, Granollers, Igualada, Olesa de Montserrat, Papiol, Manresa, Sabadell, Sallent, Torello, Vich, Vilafranca del Panedes, Badalona and Prat de Llobregat in this Province have not come to agreement with the NIH on the acceptance of roads and service infrastructure in Housing Areas of this Body, constructed through the Syndical Housing Authority.....' " (165)

Clearly, then, Prat Council were not alone in refusing to take on the financial and management responsibilities associated with the provision of Central State housing estates, and the resultant chaos, combined with the multiplicity of central government agencies involved in the provision of macro-level<sup>84</sup> infrastructure, has clearly contributed to the absence or general poverty of service infrastructure and buildings in state housing areas.

<sup>84</sup> We have already noted that the Ministry of Education and Science were responsible for the provision of schools. In addition, the Ministry of Health provided the public hospitals and clinics, and the Ministry of Public Works the major national and urban roadways.

<u>Collective Service Infrastructure</u>		<u>Implementing Authority</u>	<u>Date of Provision</u>
A. Jumbo Day Nursery (640 places).		Ministry of Ed. & Science	1969
B. Jaime Balmes Secondary School (640 places).		Ministry of Ed. & Science	1969
C. Church.		SHA	1968
D. Social Centre		SHA	1968
E. Francisco Franco Secondary School (640 places).		Ministry of Ed. & Science	1974
F. Day Nursery.	}	not built	
G. Junior School.			
H. Sports/Recreational Area.		Prat Council	1977
I. Football Pitch and Changing rooms.		SHA	1973
J. Shopping areas (132 shop 'units').		SHA	1968
K. Roads, pavements, sewerage, street lighting.		SHA	1968

Table 14. The Provision of Service Infrastructure in San Cosme.

The letters A-J are marked on Figure 66.

(3) In the Post-Franco era a Special Plan of Interior Reform for the renewal of San Cosme has been successfully drawn-up and approved, incorporating resident preferences into the plan-making process; and the implementation of renewal is now underway. It can be seen that the SPIR mechanism provides a broad general framework for the planning of such schemes. Reservations must remain, however, on two counts - the incorporation of resident opinion in the plan-making process; and the financing for the implementation of such a scheme.

One of the major reasons why the SPIR for San Cosme has been successfully implemented is because of resident support for the scheme derived from their involvement in the plan-making process. As we have already noted, however, (Chapter 5.4.4.) nowhere in the 1976 Planning Reform Act is reference made to this form of public participation in the planning process. The questionnaires, surveys, exhibitions, meetings and newsletters in San Cosme were used for resident information and participation purely on the initiative of

Calbet's team and that of the SDRA, and there is obviously scope for providing flexible guidelines for the conduct of such participation exercises in any subsequent modification to the 1976 Planning Act.

Another critical point in the implementation of the SPIR (see Figure 80) was the budgetary allocation made by the Central Government to finance the scheme. Here again, the legislative framework seems inadequate to make such moneys readily available for the financing of other, similar, schemes on a large scale. The 1976 Housing legislation makes Central Government finance available for the provision of new dwellings in 'exceptional cases' such as when 'house deterioration' makes renewal necessary. Given the scale of environmental problems in Spain's major cities, again a more systematic method of acquiring finance for effecting such change would seem desirable, and the local rather than distant Central State authorities would seem more ideally placed to administer the financing of renewal and improvement schemes. We will return to consider this assertion subsequently. Let us now move on to develop the hypotheses concerning agency roles and activities.

#### 5.5.2 Agency Roles and Activities

The three hypotheses to be considered here are:-

- (4) That Local Planning Authorities have failed to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions.
- (5) That State Housing authorities have failed to observe statutory planning procedure in the planning and implementation of their estates.
- (7) That Residents' Associations have emerged as an important force in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal schemes in recent years.

(4) We have already noted that the plan-approval process was by-passed in the planning and implementation of San Cosme in the mid-sixties, and this inevitably meant that the Local Council and the Sub-Regional Planning Authority did not have the opportunity to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and development control functions. Nevertheless Prat Council did grant Building

Permits to the SHA in early 1965, but by then all formal planning procedure had been reduced to something of a farce by the illegality of the San Cosme operation over the previous two years, and Prat Council, having just received official confirmation of the reduction in the size of the estate from 3000 to 1,500 houses were reluctant to push their luck too far by querying technical aspects of the SHA's house design.

The plan approval process for the SPIR in 1977-8 reveals something of a contrast. In a new political era, Central State authorities went out of their way to ensure that Prat Council played their part in the approval process, although as we have seen, this again, for different reasons, represented a technical contravention of correct planning procedure. It is interesting to note, however, that the Definitive Approval of the SPIR by the MCB in 1978 is the only one of the 15 critical points identified in the San Cosme case that concerns a local planning authority (Table 15), reflecting the emergence of the MCB as an effective

	Central State Authority	Local Planning Authority	Resident Representatives
Phase I (1963-68)	5	-	-
Phase II (1969-75)	2 (Critical	-	3
Phase III (1976-79)	3 Points 2 & 4)	1 (Critical Point 4)	1 (Critical Point 2)

Table 15. Critical Points in the San Cosme Case Study:  
Decision-making entities.

development control authority in the Post-Franco era; and it is indicative of the impotence of the Sub-Regional Authority in the Franco era that neither the MCB, nor its predecessor the GBPC played any part in decision-making in Phases I and II of the San Cosme case study.



(5) The extent to which Central State authorities have dominated the course of events in San Cosme is indicated by the fact that 10 of the 15 critical points identified in the case study concerned Central State authorities (Table 15). We have already noted that in

	<u>Involving Contravention</u>	<u>Not Involving Contravention</u>
Phase I	4	1 (Critical Point 1)
Phase II	-	5
Phase III	-	5

Table 16. Critical Points in the San Cosme Case Study : Those involving contravention of statutory planning procedure.

both the original construction and the renewal of the estate, the statutory plan approval process did not function as intended in the national Planning Act of the day, and Table 13 highlights the extent of irregularities in plan procedure involved in the NIH/SHA directed operation of the mid-sixties. This is borne out by the fact that four of the five critical points, all involving central state decision-making, in Phase I involved contravention of statutory planning procedure (Table 16).

It is interesting to note, however, that although none of the critical points involving Central State decision-making in Phases II and III involved contraventions of planning procedure, all five of these critical points were made outside the realm of the formal planning machinery (Table 17).

	<u>Outside planning system</u>	<u>Within planning system</u>
Phase I	3	2 (Critical Points 1 & 2)
Phase II	5	-
Phase III	4	1 (Critical Point 4)

Table 17. Critical Points in the San Cosme Case Study :  
Decisions 'outside' the formal planning system.

In this context 'outside' does not necessarily imply contravention of planning procedure, but rather that there was no clear legislative provision for such decisions in the planning acts.

This reflects not only the autonomous nature of Central State decision-making, but also the inadequacy, as discussed above, of planning and control mechanisms to systematically regulate the course of decision-making in improvement and renewal schemes, even in the post-Franco era.

One other aspect of central state decision-making in the Franco era clearly emerges from the San Cosme Case Study. Not only were decisions often made outside the realm of the statutory planning machinery, but central state intervention was also characterized by inconsistencies, changes of face and a general lack of co-ordination between different Central State entities. First of all, a 100 hectare site was designated for the construction of 300 houses, but a few months later the NIH proceeded with the expropriation of only 49 hectares, to be used for the construction of 3000 houses. Then, following assurances by the NIH that the estate was to be limited to a size of 1500 dwellings, the SHA planned and built an 801 house extension. In the implementation of the 1500-house estate in the mid-sixties, the layout was changed following an objection by the Ministry of Aviation that some of the foundations, which had already been laid, encroached upon land classified for extension of the airport. In the seventies, the provision of educational and recreational facilities lagged behind house construction; and, then, having already awarded the contract for the first phase of the repair scheme to 'Constructora Internacional S.A.', the entire scheme was scrapped and both the SHA and the NIH embarked on renewal schemes, which in turn, were subsequently abandoned. Finally, when Mr Tarragona, the Local M.P., pressed the Central Government to determine responsibility for the need for renewal, it was asserted that the dwellings in San Cosme had all along only been 'provisional', with an expected life-span of five years; and yet in the late sixties, the SHA had tried to get residents to pay 30-year mortgage installments for the long term purchase of the houses. The blame for this appalling catalogue of errors and general bungling in decision-making must lie fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the Central State; one might add that if they had elected to work within the framework of the 1956 Planning Act in the first place, much of the subsequent wastage of time and resources might well have been avoided.

(7) The emergence of the Local Residents Association as a major force in determining the success or failure of repair and renewal schemes has been a major feature of Phases II and III of the San Cosme Case Study. This is well illustrated by the five critical points in Phase II and the first three of Phase III, of which four concern decisions made by the SDRA or SDRA representatives, and the other four concern Central State intervention in San Cosme (Figure 81).

We have already noted how these critical points may be considered as representing thresholds, linking different phases<sup>85</sup> in the decision-making process in well-structured planning systems. It is interesting to note, then, that although this decision-making took place outside the bounds of the planning system, (Table 17) it is nevertheless possible to conceptualize the decision-making process as consisting of a series of phases, linked by the critical points, reflecting the alternating dominance of the SDRA and Central State authorities in directing the course of change (Figure 81) in San Cosme. This series of exchanges culminated, in the post-Franco era, in the final acceptance by the State of the SDRA consultant's draft proposal for renewal, and its subsequent embodiment and implementation within the formal planning machinery as a Special Plan of Interior Reform.

It is important to reiterate, however, that although the Definitive Approval of the SPIR by the MCB signified the formalization of the renewal scheme within the statutory plan approval system, resident participation in the plan-making process is not recognized or regulated in the national Planning Act. Thus, although one can discern the progressive institutionalization<sup>86</sup> of resident

<sup>85</sup> The use of the word 'phase' (small 'p') in this context should not be confused with the three Phases (big p) into which the case study as a whole has been divided.

<sup>86</sup> The SDRA was founded in 1971 and gradually began to establish channels of communication with the state housing authorities. In 1973, the support of a local M.P. was secured and through him the SDRA were able to petition the Central Government. The Provincial Directorate of Health were also contacted in 1973 and in 1975, the SDRA employed their own planning consultants.




Figure 81. Critical Points in the Decision-Making Process in the Repair and Renewal Schemes for San Cosme.

The critical points represent thresholds dividing the alternating dominance of the SDRRA and Central State authorities in directing the course of change.



decision-making from the early seventies onwards, their participatory role in the planning process is still not formally recognized in planning and local government legislation. The San Cosme case study underlines just how important resident support is in achieving the successful implementation of such schemes, and it is unlikely that new legislation to formally incorporate resident participation into the planning process, particularly in the sensitive area of improvement and renewal, is far away. Let us now move on to consider those hypotheses relating to the overall flow of decisions in the case study.

### 5.5.3 The Decision-Making Process

In the previous two sub-sections we have already discussed various aspects of decision-making in considering the hypotheses concerning 'planning and control mechanisms' and 'agency roles and activities' in the San Cosme case study. Here, however, examination of the decision-making process in the case study as a whole is summarised through the discussion of two final hypotheses. As most of the ground has already been covered in the above two sections, discussion here is relatively brief; and because they are so closely interrelated in the San Cosme case they will be considered together. The two hypotheses are:-

- (8) That irregularities in the decision-making process have been commonplace.
- (9) That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

The planning and implementation of the San Cosme estate in the mid-sixties was 'illegal' in many ways. The plan approval process was by-passed altogether, whilst the designation, expropriation, plan-making and building permit cession 'sub-processes' (Figure 61) all involved contraventions of planning and housing legislation (Table 13), as did four of the five critical points in Phase I (Table 16). At the same time the protest campaign of Prat Council consisted of desperate lobbying of central government authorities which eventually led to the concession of a (supposedly)

permanent reduction in the size of the estate; and the questions of tenancy agreements and the administration of service infrastructure were never satisfactorily resolved.

The fact that statutory planning procedure had been so blatantly contravened by the Central State authorities meant that the decision-making arena for challenging these decisions was likely to remain outside the bounds of the formalised planning system. In many ways, the residents association in the early seventies took up where Prat Council had left off in the late sixties in their pressurising of Central State authorities, although the motivation for their protest was distinct: whilst Prat Council complained about irregularities in the designation and planning of the estate, the SDRA were more concerned about the resultant rapid decline of housing and general living conditions. Only in the post-Franco era did the formalised planning machinery again play some part in providing the framework for decision-making, but even then critical decisions tended to be made outside this framework, (Table 17) with the early stages in plan approval (supposedly within the framework of the 1976 Planning Act) again involving procedural irregularities (Figure 79). In summary, then, we can conclude that when decision-making has been undertaken within the framework of the formalized planning machinery, irregularities have been commonplace; and that, partly because of this, the majority (12 of the 15-Table 17) of critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside this framework.

#### 5.5.4 Concluding Remarks

This case study has been structured and presented in a way that attempts to provide a comprehensive and comprehensible description and analysis of decision-making in the planning, implementation and renewal of the San Cosme housing estate. The complexity of the case study has warranted its division into three Phases, each with their own summary analysis; and decision-stage and process flow charts have been used as aids to the classification, understanding and conceptualization of the processes involved.

Of the eight research hypotheses considered in this chapter, all eight can be said to have been 'verified', but, as already noted, case study research is concerned with 'developing' hypotheses as much as with 'testing' them, and the foregoing subsections, summarising how these hypotheses have been furthered in the light of this case study, constitute the core of the conclusion to this case study. This, in turn, will be considered subsequently (Chapter 8) in conjunction with findings from the other two case studies. Let us now proceed to examine the second case study - the Can Serra housing area in the municipality of Hospitalet.

## CHAPTER 6

### CASE STUDY 2 - CAN SERRA, HOSPITALET DE LLOBREGAT

Can Serra is a case study of the planning and implementation of private residential development in the Barcelona periphery. Although, in the early sixties, a Local Plan was approved for the development of all Can Serra, the area was subsequently re-planned and developed in a series of Local Plan modifications, each of which affected only a part of the area covered by the Local Plan. This has inevitably added to the complexity of the case study, and the decision-making process has therefore been studied in different Phases, each relating to planning and implementation in spatially defined areas within Can Serra.

The introductory first section of the chapter puts the Can Serra case study in the context of planning and development in Hospitalet. Then, section two examines decision-making in the planning and approval of the Can Serra Local Plan (Phase I) which affected all Can Serra. Between 1962 and 1973, the central section of Can Serra (covering over a third of the entire area) was replanned and developed in accordance with a part-modification of the 1961 Local Plan, and it is this change process (Phase II) which is studied in section three. Section four moves on to examine, in more summary form, the replanning and implementation of development in six other part-modifications to the 1961 Local Plan, approved between 1965 and 1971 (Phases III-VIII). Section five examines the decision-making process in the period 1972-79, when intervention by the Sub-Regional Planning Authority prevented the approval of a further Local Plan modification (Phase IX), and marked the start of dramatic change in the developmental role of the Council, leading to the drawing-up and approval of a Special Plan of Interior Reform to plan and programme environmental improvements in all Can Serra (Phase X). Whilst sections three, four and five contain their own summary analyses, section six uses these research findings to specifically address and develop the research hypotheses stated in Chapter 4.



## 6.1 Introductory Context : Planning and Growth in Hospitalet

Can Serra lies in the municipality of Hospitalet, some 6 kilometres from the Barcelona city centre (see Figure 46). Hospitalet is the second largest municipality in the Sub-Region in population terms, having experienced a 100% increase over the period 1960-72, with in-migration into the area accounting for the bulk of this growth (Table 18). In 1975, the population of the municipality stood at 284,000 (the largest in the Sub-Region excepting Barcelona itself), with an average population density of 20,164 inhabitants per square kilometre, the most densely populated municipality in all Spain.

YEAR	POPULATION	IN-MIGRATION	BIRTHS	OUT-MIGRATION	DEATHS
1955	90.787	2.557	1.110	649	524
1956	96.245	3.162	685	431	206
1957	103.813	7.530	1.488	2.282	675
1958	111.013	8.009	2.065	3.016	675
1959	119.030	6.016	2.831	2.876	843
1960	122.813	7.441	2.703	3.125	606
1961	130.179	6.447	2.972	1.647	793
1962	143.948	13.944	2.285	3.662	1.671
1963	160.119	16.171	3.088	4.262	765
1964	175.482	17.405	1.336	5.653	743
1965	180.140	15.276	1.356	6.064	838
1966	192.087	8.930	4.523	6.324	874
1967	206.512	13.103	4.584	5.689	802
1968	216.435	11.039	4.379	5.711	1.015
1969	225.919	11.088	5.321	6.044	943
1970	241.978	10.086	1.460	5.971	861
1971	243.182	4.285	1.372	3.307	877
1972	246.000	7.024	5.960	5.515	1.343

Table 18. Population Increase in the Municipality of Hospitalet, 1955-72

Source : Hospitalet Council, 'Censo de poblacion anual'.

The population 'boom' of the sixties and early seventies was accompanied by the rapid development of the built-up area in Hospitalet. By the late fifties, the outward sprawl of the Barcelona periphery had begun to encroach upon the eastern margins of the municipality, but the Hospitalet centre remained as a separate settlement, surrounded by largely agricultural land to the north, colonized by small shanty settlements in places, and a zone of scattered industrial development to the south (Figure 82). By the mid-seventies, however, much of the




Figure 82. The Built-up area in Hospitalet in 1958.

Source : Canyellas, Tagarro y Escudero, 'Plan Parcial de Can Serra', Hospitalet Council, 1961.  
 agricultural land to the north had been developed, largely for residential purposes, whilst to the south, the industrial zone had grown to become one of the most important in the Sub-Region (see Figures 38 and 39). In short, Hospitalet had been enveloped in the outward growth of the Barcelona periphery.

The 1953 Sub-Regional Plan had, in fact, provided land-use classifications in the municipality to accommodate a major expansion of the built-up area. The Plan envisaged an increase in population in Hospitalet from the 1953 figure of 80,000 to a maximum 272,000 by the turn of the century to be housed in 57,000 dwellings, with over 300 hectares of land conserved as urban park. This population projection was exceeded in the mid seventies, and, more importantly, changes in land use classifications introduced in Local Plans brought the population potential for Hospitalet in 1975 up to a staggering 575,000 inhabitants (119,000 dwellings), more than double the 1953 projections. The 'urban park' areas have almost entirely disappeared, having been reclassified for residential or industrial development; and, in an essentially working-class suburb, state schools provided education (obligatory and free according to the Education Acts) for only 35% of children aged between six and thirteen in 1975. In addition, there were only two surgeries and no public hospital in the entire municipality.

Miguelé et al have recently commented that "Hospitalet can be seen as a typical growth city, characterizing the type of rapid development that has taken place in Spain over the past two decades" (166). In effecting this change, the Local Plan mechanism has clearly been of importance, with over half the municipal area being replanned for development in 14 Local Plans (10 residential, 4 industrial) approved between 1957 and 1973. One of these Local Plans covered a 32 hectare site known as Can Serra (Figure 82), which was transformed from an area of allotments and large farms in 1960 (Figure 83) to a densely populated dormitory suburb of Barcelona, housing over 17,000 people in 4000 dwellings by the mid-seventies (Figure 84). It is the planning and implementation of change in Can Serra that is the focus of this case study.

Finally, it is perhaps appropriate here to make some brief remarks on the internal structure and functioning of Hospitalet Council. From 1957 onwards, the Council's 21 Councillors<sup>87</sup> served on nine main

<sup>87</sup> Used in this context, the term 'councillors' includes the aldermen and the mayor.



Figure 83. Aerial Photograph of Can Serra 1960.

In 1960, most of Can Serra was still agricultural land, with a consolidated area of shanty development to the north. The black line delimits the area covered by the 1961 Can Serra Local Plan.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.








Figure 84. Can Serra in 1978.

This photograph, taken from across the railway line to the south of Can Serra, gives an indication of the density of development in the zone in the late seventies. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn)




Figure 85. Political-Administrative Structure of Hospitalet Council in 1962.

committees, of which the Development Committee was largely responsible for planning and urban growth (Figure 85); and the Department of Urban Development, comprising a Technical Services Section and Administrative Office (Figure 86) were primarily responsible for carrying out the planning and developmental policy decisions and directives of the Development Committee. In 1973, however, this department was expanded and restructured, and renamed the Department of Public Works and Urban Planning, comprising six Divisions of which the Urban Planning Division was one (Figure 87). This Division, with a full-time staff of 16, was from then on largely responsible for the technical side of urban planning, although some of the other Divisions had their own smaller Technical Services Units. The same year, Committee powers and responsibilities were reorganized; the Development Committee became the Committee of Housing and Urban Affairs which was principally concerned with housing and developmental policy decision-making.




Figure 86. The Department of Urban Development (Hospitalet Council), 1962.






Figure 87. The Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs, and its Urban Planning Division, 1973.

Bracketed figures indicate Divisional Staff numbers. Total Departmental Staff : 79.

## 6.2 The Can Serra Local Plan 1961 : Plan Making and Approval Processes (Can Serra - Phase I).

From the late forties onwards, the area known as the 'Mountain Sector' of Hospitalet, comprising the zones of Can Serra, San Feliu, and Pubilla Casas, to the north of Hospitalet centre (Figure 82), had been an important zone of anarchical, dispersed shanty development (see Figure 32). With the continued flow of migrants into Barcelona in the fifties, landowners in these zones were faced with new demands from potential 'tenants', as in-migrants into the city failed to secure more conventional forms of accommodation.






Figure 88. Land-Use Classifications for the 'Mountain Sector' of Hospitalet in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan.

Source: Comision de Urbanismo de Barcelona, 'Plan General de Ordenacion Urbana de Barcelona y Su Comarca,' CUB, 1953.

The 1953 Sub-Regional Plan classified nearly all Pubilla Casas and San Feliu for residential development, but the southern half of Can Serra fell within a 20 hectare area classified as 'urban park'. (Figure 88). In 1959, the six major landowners in Can Serra jointly employed consultant planners<sup>88</sup> (Canyellas, Tagarro y Escudero) to draw-up a Local Plan for the residential development of the zone (PI-1, Figure 90). On their advice, however, and in unofficial collaboration<sup>89</sup> with Council officers, two separate plans were drawn-up (PI-2). The Local Plan for Can Serra (Figure 89) reclassified most of the area for Semi-Intensive Residential Urban Development, a classification which permitted somewhat higher residential densities<sup>90</sup>

88 As was the case in the San Cosme case study, these consultants were qualified architects, rather than 'planners' in the British sense of the word. As previously noted, no such professional qualification exists in Spain.

89 The extent and nature of this collaboration has been difficult to determine, but the first-hand account of F. Escudero, one of the consultant architects, suggests the decision to set the Can Serra Local Plan within the broader framework of the Draft Local Plan for the entire Mountain Sector was done on the advice of Council officers. Many questions remain unanswered as regards the relationship between the landowners and developers and the Council throughout the Can Serra case study. Interview evidence with Council personnel strongly supports the view that Councillors, and above all the Mayor, Muntadas (Mayor 1957-1972), were keen to get rid of shanties and see Hospitalet developed as one of Spain's major cities. Teran (1967) has recently observed that this obsession 'to appear not as a village' led many Councils to encourage the construction of 'prestigious avenues' and 'elevated architectonic structures' which often contravened planning regulations and urban plans.

90 'Semi-Intensive Suburban Development'. (Classification 6) allowed for a maximum residential density of 400 inhabitants per hectare whilst 'Semi-Intensive Residential Urban Development' (Classification 5), permitted a density of 500 inhabitants per hectare.




Figure 89. The Can Serra Local Plan, 1961.

Source : Canyellas, Tagarro y Escudero 'Plan Parcial de Can Serra' Hospitalet Council, 1961 (mimeo).




Figure 90. Can Serra. Phases I and II : Decision Stage Chart.



than the Semi-Intensive Suburban Development classification that had been given to the northern half of Can Serra and all Pubilla Casas in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan (Figure 88). The urban park area, however, was reduced to a narrow strip bordering the Barcelona-Villafranca railway to the south. The Plan also provided a detailed lay-out of proposed development : 3000 dwellings were to be built in four to six-storey blocks, to house 15,000 people, with a resultant residential density of 500 inhabitants per hectare and a floor-space ratio<sup>91</sup> of  $1.18\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$ . Three schools, a market, a church and a shopping centre were also included in the design, and the 'co-operative system of intervention' was to be used to finance and manage the provision of road and associated service infrastructure. Property boundaries were also redefined in an attempt to ensure that landowners would benefit from the proposed development in accordance with the size of their original estates.

At the same time, however, the consultants also drew-up a Draft Local Plan for the entire Mountain Sector, encompassing San Feliu, Pubilla Casas, and part of Las Planas, as well as Can Serra. It is worth noting that the 1956 Planning Act specified that such plans may :-

"act as a basis for the subsequent drawing-up of final Local Plans; the approval of such draft plans, however, has no executive significance other than for the purposes of the internal administration of Local Authorities".(168)

In essence, the Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector (Figure 91) reclassified tracts of land in the adjoining zones of Las Planas and San Feliu as 'urban park', to compensate, in theory, for the loss of park areas in Can Serra. But as noted above, this type of plan had no executive significance and can largely be seen as an attempt to justify the reclassification and subsequent development of the park area in Can Serra. Indeed, most of the area classified as urban park to the east, in Las Planas, was already developed as a mixed housing and industrial zone (see Figures 83 and 96) and the consultants and the Council, must have realized that there

<sup>91</sup> The floor-space ratio ('coeficiente de edificacion') was the number of square metres of floor space built per square metre of ground space.




Figure 91. Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector of Hospitalet.

Source : Canyellas, Tagarro y Escudero 'Avance del Plan Parcial del Sector de Montana', Hospitalet Council, 1961 (mimeo).

was little chance that the area would be redeveloped as an urban park. What the Draft Local Plan did was to put the Can Serra operation in a wider (if somewhat artificial) planning context, which could be used to defend and justify land use reclassification in Can Serra in subsequent exchanges with the General Public or upper-tier planning authorities.

Following the completion of these two plans by the consultants in 1960, they were sent by the landowners<sup>92</sup> to Hospitalet Council with an accompanying letter dated July 16th, 1960, asking that the Can Serra Local Plan be approved (PI-3). On the same day, the Municipal Architect (Dept. of Urban Development) reported that both plans met the technical demands of the 1956 Planning Act, and the Development Committee endorsed his recommendation that they be Initially Approved and submitted to the Public Information Stage. Four days later, on July 20th, the Full Council Initially Approved both plans (PI-4).

The opening of the Public Information Stage for the plans was announced on the Council Noticeboard and in the Official Bulletin of the Province,<sup>93</sup> in August 1960 (PI-5). In all, thirteen appeals were presented in the Public Information Stage; some were from development agencies (State Railway Company, Catalan Electricity Board) pointing out the repercussions the proposed development would have on energy and transport demands etc, but the majority were presented by the smaller landowners in Can Serra who complained that the reorganization of property boundaries and consequent allocation of land uses in the Local Plan was unfair. The Municipal Architect reported, however, that the redivision of land met the demands<sup>94</sup> of the 1956 Planning Act,

<sup>92</sup> Six landowners had jointly employed the consultant planners and it was they who co-signed the letter forwarding the plans to the Council. Between them they owned over 60% of the land in Can Serra, which meant that, according to the 1956 Planning Act (Article 118) they could legally bring the co-operative system of intervention into force. If other landowners refused to co-operate, the Council were empowered to obtain their land through expropriation and thus facilitate the development of the entire plan area, (once the corresponding Local Plan was approved).

<sup>93</sup> The 1956 Planning Act established procedure for advertising the approval of Plans and opening of Public Information Stages. Announcements had to be made on the Town Hall Noticeboard and in the Official Bulletin of the Province, the Official publication of the Provincial Government.

<sup>94</sup> Article 81 of the 1956 Planning Act stated that, in the reorganization of property boundaries in a Local Plan development proposal, landowners could demand a more equitable property redivision only when more than one-sixth of a person's property was to be used for non-residential development, and then only if this fraction was greater than the corresponding fraction for the plan area as a whole. The Municipal Architect reported that the redivision of land in the Can Serra Local Plan meant that none of the affected landowners would have more than one sixth of their land, following redivision, used for non-residential purposes.

and recommended that the appeals be disregarded (PI-6). His report was accepted by the Development Committee on the 11th February 1961 and both the Can Serra Local Plan and the Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector were Provisionally Approved by the Full Council later that month (PI-7). They were then sent to the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission who Definitively Approved the plans, with the incorporation of minor modifications<sup>95</sup> in November, 1961 (PI-8).

In summary, then, the Local Plan mechanism was used in Can Serra not only to facilitate the detailed planning of new development (as intended in the 1956 Planning Act) but also to increase the potential residential density, and thus the estate value of the zone. The dubious legality<sup>96</sup> of the reclassification of the urban park area in Can Serra was thinly disguised in the compensatory urban park areas introduced in the Draft Local Plan for the entire Mountain Sector, which had no executive significance at all. Nevertheless, with the support of Hospitalet Council, both plans were approved in the early sixties, providing a quasi-legal planning framework for the subsequent development of the zone.

<sup>95</sup> The GBPC made two modifications to the Can Serra Local Plan : Electricity Avenue, the planned northern perimetral road, was to be widened to 40 metres to accommodate the passage of 110 kilovolt electrical cables; and in Isabel Avenue, the eastern perimetral road, slight modifications to the building lay-out were made to allow for the installation of overhead electric cables.

<sup>96</sup> We have already noted (Chapter 2.2.2) that the 1956 Planning Act stated that "if modification to an urban plan results in an increase in the building density of a zone, this will necessitate the provision of greater free space areas in proportion to the increase in building density". In the Can Serra Local Plan an increase in building density was accompanied by a reduction in free space areas. Nevertheless the general vagueness of the Act on the extent to which a Local Plan could modify a General Plan enabled many plan promoters to get away with such reclassifications.



### 6.3 The Replanning and Development of Central Can Serra 1962-73 (Can Serra - Phase II)

Between 1962 and 1973, seven separate modifications (Figures 92 and Table 20) to the 1961 Can Serra Local Plan were drawn-up and approved, all of them further increasing the density of planned residential development. The concept of 'Local Plan Modification' does not directly correspond to any planning mechanism introduced in the 1956 Planning Act, and in several aspects the approval of these modifications, and the subsequent implementation of development in these seven plan areas, contravened planning law. This section concerns the flow of decisions, acts and activities that led to the replanning and development of the largest of these plan areas, which was owned by the developers Alcida, Briseida and Amaltea. Planning and development in the other plan areas will be considered collectively in section four, below.

#### 6.3.1 Hospitalet Council rule that higher Floor Space Ratio can be used in the development of Can Serra.

Following the approval of the Can Serra Local Plan in 1961 some of the major landowners in Can Serra began negotiations with property developers Alcida, Briseida and Amaltea (the ABA group) for the sale of their estates (PII-1, Figure 90). During these negotiations, the agents representing Mrs Badia, one of these landowners, made a seemingly routine inquiry to Hospitalet Council, concerning procedure for drawing-up Roads and Service Projects for the development of different estates falling within the area covered by the 1961 Local Plan (PII-2). Hospitalet Council's reply to this inquiry, in January 1963 (PII-3) included an implicit contradiction of the guidelines for development established in the Can Serra Local Plan, and so set a new framework for the re-planning and development of all Can Serra. The Council's reply, based on the Municipal Architect's report and signed by the Mayor of Hospitalet, read as follows :-




Figure 92. Delimitation of the Seven 'Local Plan Modifications' in Can Serra.

For each of these seven areas, a 'Local Plan Modification' was approved, further increasing the planned residential densities. The landowner/developers were:-

1. ABA group; 2. Avelina Playa 3. Corin S.A.
4. P.U.E.S.A. 5. P.U.E.S.A. et al 6. Inmobiliaria Can Serra S.A.
7. Ferma S.A., Procyt S.A., and Inmobiliaria Can Serra S.A.  
(see Table 20).

- "1. The said estate is situated within the area covered by the Can Serra Local Plan, which was Definitively Approved by the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission on 28th November 1961.
2. The Roads and Services Project for the estate should correspond to the street layout contained in the said Local Plan.
3. The Municipal Building Regulations for Barcelona, which are used by this Council, on the authorization of the GBPC, should be used in the development of the estate.
4. Appendix 12 of the said Regulations states that the Floor Space Ratio for such development (Classification 5) should be between 1.25 and 1.75m<sup>2</sup>/m<sup>2</sup> ... " (author's underlining - 169).

Here, then, Hospitalet Council were setting a new planning framework for the development of Can Serra. The 1961 Local Plan had specified that the maximum Floor Space Ratio (FSR) for the plan area as a whole should be 1.18m<sup>2</sup>/m<sup>2</sup> and yet Hospitalet Council were now saying that, according to Municipal Building Regulations, the FSR for the piecemeal development of Can Serra could be upto 1.75m<sup>2</sup>/m<sup>2</sup>, which would inevitably involve a higher density of development. There is no doubt, however, that this ruling by Hospitalet Council, which was subsequently supported by the GBPC, constituted a blatant misinterpretation of planning law.

The Plan Report of the 1961 Local Plan specifically stated that "only those matters not specified here or in the accompanying plans will be governed by the Municipal Building Regulations used by Hospitalet Council" (170); and in the same Plan Report it was noted that "the Floor Space Ratio will be 1.18m<sup>2</sup>/m<sup>2</sup> in the area as a whole (including roads and green spaces) ... buildings will be a maximum of 6 floors" (171). Similarly, Appendix 12 of the Barcelona Municipal Building Regulations (which were used by Hospitalet Council), stated that the Floor Space Ratios included in the Regulations "may be used only when the building layout and occupation of land has not previously been fixed either graphically or through a Floor Space Ratio" (172). Thus, according to planning law there was no question that the FSR set out in the Municipal Building Regulations could be used in the development of Can Serra; both the FSR and the urban lay-out had already been established in the approved Local Plan for the zone.

Nevertheless, the implications of the Council's ruling further increased the developmental potential, and thus the estate value, of property in Can Serra. In May 1963, the sale of the major estates in the south and centre of Can Serra to the ABA development group was completed (PII-4); the former landowners had reaped the benefits of a series of planning decisions taken over the previous four years which had seen the value of these estates rocket as their potential for development had been transformed from that of an 'urban park' zone to that of a high-rise residential complex.

#### 6.3.2 Local Plan Modification 1 (LPM-1): Plan Making and Approval Processes.

By mid-1963, the ABA group owned over a third of the land in Can Serra (Figure 92). At about that time, the developers started working, unofficially, in conjunction with the Council in drawing-up a new plan for the development of their land (PII-5). The 1961 Local Plan was to be modified, as it affected the ABA group's estates, to take full advantage of the new Floor Space Ratio of  $1.75\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$  (compared with the  $1.18\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$  on which the Local Plan had been based). Only in November 1963, however, did the developers officially write to the Council asking that, in view of the ruling made by the Mayor in January 1963, the 1961 Local Plan should be modified in this manner.


Within 3 days of the posting of the developer's letter (dated 18th November 1963; PII-6), the Municipal Architect had completed the Local Plan Modification for the ABA group's property (PII-7). The revised layout (Figure 93) made provision for the construction of 2,200 dwellings in linear and tower blocks, six to fourteen storeys high, located around Can Serra Avenue, the major new road (included in the 1961 Local Plan - Figure 89) planned to cross the central hill area of Can Serra from east to west. The church and commercial centre planned for the area in the 1961 Local Plan were retained, and the 'co-operative system of intervention' was again to be used to manage and finance the provision of road and associated service



Source: Hospitalet Council, 'Nueva Disposición de Avenidas del Plan Local Can Serra', (193/63), Hospitalet Council, 1963.

Figure 93. Local Plan Modification 1, approved by the GBPC in March 1964.

This modification to the 1961 Local Plan was drawn-up by Hospitalet Council and affected the land owned by the 'ABA group' developers. In all, 2,200 housing units were planned in this modification compared with a total of 3,000 in all Can Serra in the 1961 Local Plan. The public buildings at the top of the plan area comprised a church, shopping centre and market, as in the 1961 Local Plan.



- Residential Blocks
- P Public Buildings
- Private Green Areas
- Public Green Areas

infrastructure. The new plan (LPM - 1) was Initially Approved by Hospitalet Council as a modification to the 1961 Local Plan in December 1963 (PII-8), and by the GBPC in March 1964 having followed the standard procedural course for plan approval (PII-9, 10).

### 6.3.3. Secondary stages of plan-making, and the Implementation of Development.

Following the Definitive Approval of LPM-1 by the GBPC, the developers employed consultant engineers to draw-up a Roads and Services project to plan, programme and cost out the requirements for the construction of Can Serra Avenue (and its side roads) which ran through the LPM-1 plan area (PII-11). By July 1964, the consultants had completed the first stage of the project (PII-12), which contained details of paving and sewerage and drainage systems. This section of the Roads and Service Project was submitted to the Council in September 1964 when the developers applied for Building Permits for the 1,374 dwellings to be built to the south and east of Can Serra Avenue (PII-13). The granting of these permits by the Council the same month (PII-14) again represented a contravention of the 1956 Planning Act, which stipulated that such permits could be granted only when the necessary Roads and Service Project had been approved and the corresponding infrastructure had been laid (see Chapter 2.2.4).

Not until May 1966 was the full Roads and Services Project (including details of street lighting as well as drainage and sewerage networks) for the LPM-1 plan area completed (PII-15) and this was forwarded to the Council for Initial Approval in January 1967 (PII-16). Although the Urban Development Department found the Project generally satisfactory, the Full Council decided in March 1968, after consultation with the developers, that Initial Approval would be withheld until the road was actually built in accordance with the said project (PII-17). In collaboration with the Council, the ABA group thus embarked on the construction of Can Serra Avenue, and the housing blocks adjoining the road, in mid-1978 (PII-18), with the road, sewerage and drainage infrastructure being completed by August 1969 (PII-19). Following inspection of the road by Council Officers and their favourable reports (PII-20), the Roads and Services Project was Initially Approved by the Full Council in September 1969, and after the Public Information Stage, by the GBPC in April 1970 (PII-21, 22, 23).

Whilst the developers had been constructing Can Serra Avenue, they had simultaneously been building the six to fourteen storey linear and tower blocks (Figures 94 and 95) within the 'S' shaped layout of the road, for which Building Permits had been granted by the Council in 1964. By mid-1970 about half of these blocks had been completed, (Figure 96); and in 1971 construction of all these blocks was finalized and the street lighting, pedestrian walkways and green space areas between the blocks were installed the same year (PII-27; Figure 97). In July, therefore, representatives of the ABA group informed Hospitalet Council that all complementary service infrastructure in Can Serra Avenue was in order, and asked that the Council officially accept responsibility for their future maintenance and upkeep (PII -28). Following inspection of the green spaces, paving and pedestrian walkways by Council Officers (PII-29), an Act of Mutual Agreement<sup>97</sup> was signed by representatives of the Council and the ABA group in December 1972, officially handing over the road and associated service infrastructure to the Council and freeing the developers of further financial responsibilities for its upkeep. (PII-30).

The flow of inter-agency decisions considered so far in this sub-section has concerned the construction of Can Serra Avenue, the associated service infrastructure and the housing blocks within and to the immediate east of the 'S' shaped roadway. The area to the north of Can Serra Avenue, for which a commercial centre and church, and more housing blocks had been planned in the 1964 Local Plan modification (Figure 93), remained undeveloped, and its role in the history of Can Serra will be considered subsequently. (Chapter 6.5.1). But to the west, a further three eleven-storey blocks comprising 220 dwellings were planned, and in 1970 the ABA group opened informal talks with the Council on how this area should be developed (PII-24).

<sup>97</sup> An Act of Mutual Agreement was a form of Public Deed drawn-up between two or more parties and signed in the presence of a notary, usually used to legalize the transference of property from one party to another. It was commonly used in the 'co-operative' and 'Cession of Roads' Systems of intervention for the cession of land to the Council used, or planned to be used, for road and service infrastructure.






Figure 94. The southern section of Can Serra Avenue, showing the 6-storey blocks built by the ABA group 1968-71.

Council Officers worked with the developers in ensuring this high standard of road infrastructure and landscaping in Can Serra Avenue.  
(Photograph : M.G. Wynn).



Figure 95. Pedestrian walkways between the 12-storey tower blocks, built by the ABA group 1968-71.

This type of service infrastructure was generally absent from housing block development in the rest of Can Serra - see Figures 98, 104 and 105. (Photograph : M.G. Wynn).






Figure 96. Aerial Photograph of Can Serra, 1970.

By early 1970, the road surfacing, paving and sewerage and drainage networks in Can Serra Avenue had been completed, along with many of the tower-blocks bordering the road. Note the development to the right of Can Serra in the area zoned as 'urban park' in the Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector, approved in 1961 (Figure 91). This new 'urban park' area was supposedly to have compensated for the residential development of the area zoned as an urban park in Can Serra in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.






Figure 97. Aerial Photograph of Can Serra 1972

By 1972, all the tower blocks adjoining Can Serra Avenue, in the LPM-1 plan area, had been completed, and development was underway in several of the other 'Local Plan Modification' areas in Can Serra.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.





Following these discussions, an Act of Mutual Agreement was signed in December 1970 between the ABA group and the Council, whereby 1,537 square metres of land (valued at 2.4 million pesetas - £18,000) in this area were ceded to the Council for the construction of a 'public building' (PII-25). In early 1971 the Council granted a further 220 Building Permits to the ABA group for the construction of these tower blocks, in land lying between Can Serra Avenue and the Esplugas Main Road which forms the western border of Can Serra (PII-26). It seems, again, that there was some sort of bargaining element here, with the Council granting permits in exchange for the free land cession by the ABA group. These extra 220 dwellings were constructed in 1972-3, (PII-31, 32) although their exact location was not the same as that depicted in the 1964 Local Plan Modification (compare Figures 93 and 100); and, unlike the other blocks built by the ABA group, these dwellings were away from Can Serra Avenue and lacked the pedestrian walkways and landscaping that had been provided in the other blocks (Figure 98). Let us now turn to analyse the decision-making process during the period 1962-73 which saw the construction of Can Serra Avenue and over 1,600 houses in the land area owned by the ABA group.

#### 6.3.4 Summary Analysis

The decision-making process in the replanning and implementation of development in the ABA group's property in the period 1962-73 is somewhat complex. Following the approval of the 1961 Local Plan, the developers and Hospitalet Council embarked on a series of rounds of what may be termed 'collaborative bargaining' over the terms and procedures for the replanning and implementation of development. Many of the exchanges between these two agencies took place informally, and often involved technical contraventions of planning procedure, and this in itself makes it rather difficult to get the full picture. Nevertheless, as the process-flow chart shows (Figure 99), it is clear that the Council and developers collaborated in several stages of plan-making in which the design details for development of the ABA group's property were gradually finalised. First, LPM-1 was drawn-up (PII-5, 6, 7, 8) and approved (PII-8, 9, 10), completely changing the lay-out of housing blocks planned for the area in the 1961 Local Plan. Then, the Roads and Services Project for Can Serra







Figure 98. Housing Development in the ABA group's property in Can Serra.

This photograph shows (right foreground) tower blocks built in 1972-3 in rough terrain between Can Serra Avenue and the Espugas Main Road (from where this photograph was taken). The one storey building is a church built in land ceded by the ABA group to the council in 1970. In the centre background are the 11 and 14 storey blocks built by the ABA group on the other side of



KEY      Decision or Act ○      Activity □      Critical Point ○      Decision Flow ———

### Critical Points

#### Phase I

1. Consultants, in unofficial collaboration with Hospitalet Council, draw-up a Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector and Local Plan for Can Serra (PI-2).
2. Both plans are Definitively Approved by the GBPC (PI-8).

#### Phase II

1. Hospitalet Council rule that Floor Space Ratio set out in Barcelona Council's Municipal Building Regulations may be used in the development of Can Serra (PII-3).
2. Hospitalet Council, in collaboration with the ABA group begin drawing up of LPM-1 (PII-5).
3. LPM-1 is Definitively Approved by the GBPC (PII-10).
4. Hospitalet Council find Roads and Services Project generally satisfactory, but withhold approval and permit development to proceed (PII-17).
5. Roads and Services Project is Definitively Approved by the GBPC (PII-23).
6. Council and ABA group sign Act of Mutual Agreement, whereby Council accept responsibility for upkeep of road and associated service infrastructure (PII-30).

Figure 99. Can Serra, Phases I and II : Process Flow Chart.

1. Hospitalet Council's ruling that the Floor Space Ratio of  $1.75 \text{ m}^2/\text{m}^2$ , quoted in Barcelona Council's Municipal Building Regulations, could be used in the development of Can Serra, was false. (A Floor Space Ratio of  $1.18 \text{ m}^2/\text{m}^2$  had already been established in the 1961 Local Plan) (PII-3).
2. There is no provision in the 1956 Planning Act for a 'partial modification' of an approved local plan; yet Hospitalet Council drew-up and approved such a modification (LPM-1), which was based on the fallacious ruling quoted above (PII-5, 7, 8).
3. Hospitalet Council ceded Building Permits to the ABA group for the construction of 1,374 houses before a Roads and Services Project for the area had been approved (PII-14).
4. ABA group, in collaboration with Hospitalet Council, embarked on infrastructure and house construction before the corresponding Road and Services Project had been approved (PII-18, 19).
5. Location of housing blocks between Can Serra Avenue and Esplugas main road did not match that specified in LPM-1; and the Council acquired  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hectares in this zone for construction of a 'public building' for which no provision was made in LPM-1 (PII-24, 25, 31, 32).
6. To the east, in the arm of land owned by the ABA group, the location of housing blocks constructed by the ABA group did not correspond with the design included in LPM-1. (Figures 92 and 100).
7. Hospitalet Council granted a further 220 Building Permits for construction of dwellings when the basic service infrastructure remained inadequate, and their location did not correspond with the approved urban plan for the area (PII-26).

Table 19. Major Contraventions of the 1956 Planning Act in the Planning and Implementation of Development in Central Can Serra 1963-73.



Avenue was drawn-up in stages (PII-11, 12; 15, 16), and Building Permit Cession (PII-13, 14) and implementation of the roads, sewerage and drainage systems, and housing (PII-18, 19, 27) took place in the late sixties before the official approval of the Roads and Services Project in 1970 (PII-23), this representing a blatant contravention of the 1956 Planning Act (see Chapter 2.2.3 and Figure 17). Finally with Can Serra Avenue completed, the Council and the developers entered into a further round of exchanges (PII-24, 25, 26) concerning the development of the area between Can Serra Avenue and the Esplugas Main Road, resulting in a modification to the layout of housing blocks contained in LPM-1 and the cession of an area of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  hectares to the Council, on which a church was subsequently built in 1974.

It is important to note, however, that although this decision-making process involved a series of major contraventions of planning law (Table 19), it did enable the Council to exert a form of development control role that ensured the financing and implementation of a major new road (in a hilly green field site) by private developers, who, in exchange, were allowed to bend the rules in the construction of housing blocks so long as the quality of associated service infrastructure was considered satisfactory by the Council. In this context, the withholding of approval of the Roads and Services Project (PII-17) until Can Serra Avenue was complete (and most of the housing blocks were underway) gave the Council the bargaining power to insist that the developers comply with their demands; for until the Definitive Approval of the Project by the GBPC (PII-23), the whole operation was technically illegal, and the developers could have been required, in theory, to demolish all they had built.

In practice, however, compliance with this series of informal agreements by both sides ensured the relatively smooth implementation of development. Nevertheless it is clear that the statutory planning process and the formalised planning machinery did not regulate this inter-agency decision-making as it should have done, but instead was exploited by both parties, as and when it fitted their developmental objectives. This is reflected in what may be identified as the 'critical points' in the decision-making process.



In the various stages of plan-making in Phases I and II, the unofficial consultation between consultant-planners and Hospitalet Council in 1959 (PI-2) established the initial framework for the development of Can Serra, with both parties agreeing that the 'urban park' area would be reclassified for residential development, and that a Draft Local Plan for the entire 'mountain sector' would be drawn-up as a mock justification for this change. In the subsequent modification of the Local Plan, the most important critical point was the 'illegal' ruling by the Mayor in January 1963 (PII-3) that a different Floor Space Ratio could be used in the development of Can Serra. This led not only to a replanning of the ABA group's estate, but, as we shall see below, to a replanning of the rest of Can Serra as well. In all these Local Plan modifications, as was the case with the Local Plan itself, new plan objectives were worked out informally by Council and developer prior to the start of formal plan-making, and these stages of informal collaborative bargaining (PII-5 in LPM-1) also emerge as critical points when the provisional planning and procedural 'briefs' were established.

As regards formal plan approval, the Definitive Approval of the Local Plan and LPM-1 by the GBPC (PI-8, PII-10) were critical in that they made the two plans executive, even though both contravened planning law and should, therefore, never have been approved. What is significant, however, is that what actually led to the implementation of development on the ground was Hospitalet Council's decision (PII-17) not to proceed with the statutory plan approval procedure for the Roads and Services Project, but rather to hold this up as a form of insurance policy, whilst they embarked on a course of informal bargaining with the developers over the terms under which development could take place. It was not until over 2 years later, once the road, and the sewerage and drainage systems had been completed to the satisfaction of Council officers, that the Roads and Services Project was Definitively Approved (PII-23); and a further two years transpired (during which time housing blocks were completed and landscaping and street lighting provided) before the land exchange arrangement was formally sealed through the signing of the Act of Mutual Agreement (PII-30). Although these were critical points in the formal plan approval process (in its wide sense), the emergent picture is one of a planning system which provided a loose procedural framework for the

planning and implementation of development, but which was manipulated to suit the demands and dictates of a 'collaborative bargaining' policy willingly entered into by both the Council and the developers.

This, then, summarises the decision-making process in the planning and implementation of the ABA group's property in the sixties and early seventies. Let us now turn to examine what was happening in the rest of Can Serra during this period.

#### 6.4 The Re-planning and Development of the Rest of Can Serra 1965-74.

The replanning and development of the ABA group's property set a precedent which was followed by other landowners and developers in the rest of Can Serra in the sixties and early seventies. Whilst the Council were negotiating with the ABA group, they were involved in similar exchanges with other landowners and developers, concerning the re-planning and implementation of development in six separate plan areas in the rest of Can Serra (Figure 100). It is not necessary to individually plot and describe the flow of decisions involved in each of these six Local Plan Modifications (Phases III-VIII) as they all correspond to a roughly similar pattern, graphically represented and summarised in Figure 101 and Table 20.

The six Local Plan Modifications approved by the Council and the GBPC between 1965 and 1971 all included an increase in planned residential densities to exploit to the full the 1963 ruling by the Council that a FSR of  $1.75\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$  could be used in the development of the area. At the same time, the Initial Approval of these plans by the Council was accompanied by Acts of Mutual Agreement in which landowners agreed to cede considerable areas of land to the Council for the construction of public buildings (schools, nurseries, a medical centre) and provision of green zones, as well as for the provision of roads and associated infrastructure on the condition that the respective Local Plan Modification be Definitively Approved by the GBPC (Table 20). Once Definitive Approval was secured, the Council granted Building Permits to the landowner/developers, and by 1974 house construction was underway in all these six plan areas (as well as in the ABA group's property - Figure 100).






Figure 100. The Replanning and Development of Can Serra 1961-74.  
The black lines delimit the seven Local Plan Modifications approved between 1964 and 1971. Darker shading indicates buildings constructed in the period 1968-74.



COMMITMENTS MADE BY PARTIES SIGNING THE ACT	
<p>LPM-1 DU - Council IA - 27/11/63 DA - 2/3/64 Dps - ABA group RSP - DA 21/4/70 BPC - 1964</p>	<p>Signed: 7/11/72. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession of Can Serra Avenue and associated service infrastructure to the Council. <u>Council</u>: Accept responsibility for future maintenance and upkeep of the road and associated infrastructure. (Developers had already financed and managed the installation of this road and associated infrastructure and the Council had secured approval of LPM-1 and the Roads and Services Project). SI - 'Co-operative'.</p>
<p>LPM-2 DU - Council IA - 21/7/65 DA - 3/1/66 Dps - Under Contract to Avelina Playa, landowners. RSP - Incorporated into RSP for LPM-1 BPC - 1969</p>	<p>Signed: 12/7/65. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession of 9,680m<sup>2</sup> to Council for school and road construction. <u>Council</u>: Secure definitive approval of LPM-2; manage and finance construction of part of Can Serra Avenue running across plan area; free landowners from any future land or road taxes. SI - 'Cession of Roads'.</p>
<p>LPM-3 DU - Consultants. IA - 15/12/68 DA - 30/12/69 Dps - Corin SA RSP - Presented to Council 1972; not approved BPC - 1971</p>	<p>Signed: 10/1/69. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession to Council of 504m<sup>2</sup> for a nursery and 6,130m<sup>2</sup> for roads and free space areas. Developers to finance and direct construction of road and free space infrastructure. <u>Council</u>: Secure definitive approval of LPM-3. SI - 'Co-operative'.</p>
<p>LPM-4 DU - Consultants. IA - 19/11/69 DA 18/5/71 Dps - PUESA RSP - Presented to Council 1973; not definitively approved BPC - 1972/3</p>	<p>Signed: 12/6/69. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession to Council of 9,500m<sup>2</sup> for school, 2,236m<sup>2</sup> for church and public building, and land designated for roads, parks and gardens in LPM-4. <u>Council</u>: Secure definitive approval of LPM-4. SI - 'Cession of Roads'.</p>
<p>LPM-5 DU-Council IA 20/6/69 DA - 6/10/70 Dps - PUESA; and under contract to other landowners RSP - Presented to Council 1973; not approved. BPC - 1972/3</p>	<p>Signed: 14/6/69. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession to Council of land for school, health centre, roads and public parks. Financing of free space areas and parking places within residential complex. <u>Council</u>: Secure definitive approval of LPM-5. SI - 'Cession of Roads'.</p>
<p>LPM-6 DU - Consultants. IA - 16/9/70 DA - 18/5/71 Dps - Inmobiliaria Can Serra S.A. RSP - Presented to Council in 1974; not approved. BPC - 1972</p>	<p>Signed: 7/8/70. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession to Council of 800m<sup>2</sup> for public building and 1,106m<sup>2</sup> for roads. Developers to direct and finance provision of roads, free space areas, gardens. <u>Council</u>: Secure definitive approval of LPM-6. SI - 'Co-operative'.</p>
<p>LPM-7 DU - Council IA 8/11/70 DA 18/11/71 Dps - Ferma S.A., Procyt S.A. &amp; Inmobiliaria Can Serra S.A. RSP - Presented 1972 &amp; 1974; not approved BPC - 1972</p>	<p>Signed: 15/6/71. <u>Developers</u>: Free cession to Council of 2,580m<sup>2</sup> for roads, 4394m<sup>2</sup> for public buildings and 4981m<sup>2</sup> for public open space. Finance and direction of private streets, passages and gardens. <u>Council</u>: Direction of construction of perimetral roads. Secure definitive approval of LPM-7. SI - 'Cession of Roads'.</p>

Abbreviations: LPM - Local Plan Modification; DU - Drawn-up by; IA - Initial Approval. (by Council); DA - Definitive Approval (by Greater Barcelona Planning Commission); Dps - Developers; RSP - Roads and Service Plan; BPC - Building Permit Cession. SI - System of Intervention.

Table 20. Acts of Mutual Agreement Signed between Hospitalet Council and Landowners in Can Serra 1965-72.



1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

DRAFT LOCAL PLAN FOR THE MOUNTAIN SECTOR (HOSPITALIER)

PA 15/2 DA 20/11  
PI 24/8  
IA 20/7  
App 16/7

LOCAL PLAN CAN SERRA (HOSPITALIER)

PA 15/2 DA 28/11  
PI 24/8  
IA 20/7  
App 16/7

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-1 (Phase II)

DA 4/3  
PA 25/1  
PI 21/12  
IA 27/11  
App 18/11

Roads and Services Project

App 13/1  
DA 21/4  
PA 3/12  
PI 31/10  
IA 17/9  
AMA 7/11

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-2 (Phase III)

DA 3/1  
PA 14/9  
IA 21/7  
AMA 16/7

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-3 (Phase IV)

PA 21/3 DA 30/11  
PI 17/2  
AMA 10/1  
IA 15/12  
App 16/11

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-4 (Phase V)

PA 24/2 DA 18/5  
PI 8/12  
IA 19/11  
App 20/6  
AMA 12/6

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-5 (Phase VI)

PA 25/9 DA 8/10  
PI 20/8  
IA 20/6  
AMA 14/6

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-6 (Phase VII)

PA 7/11 DA 18/5  
PI 5/10  
IA 16/9  
AMA 7/8  
App 15/5

LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION-7 (Phase XIII)

DA 18/11  
PI 10/12  
AMA 15/6  
IA 10/11

KEY

- App - Official Application for Approval of Plan
- IA - Initial Approval
- PI - Public Information Stage
- PA - Provisional Approval
- DA - Definitive Approval
- AMA - Act of Mutual Agreement

Figure 101. Formal Plan Approval Process in the Seven Local Plan Modifications in Can Serra.

Although Roads and Services Projects were drawn-up and presented to the Council, none of these were Definitively Approved, and so Building Permit cession and house construction in these plan areas was again technically illegal. In plan areas 2 and 6, however, (Figure 100), the Council again worked through ad hoc informal channels (which contravened the 1956 Planning Act<sup>98</sup>) to secure the completion of Can Serra Avenue, which ran through these two plan areas, as well as through the ABA group's property (LPM-1). Clearly, negotiations between the Council and developers in these different plan areas were mutually dependent, and it has proved difficult to entirely unravel the complexity of the behind-the-scenes manoeuvring that took place. In LPM-2, for example, the Act of Mutual Agreement (Table 20) made the Council responsible for financing and managing the construction of the section of Can Serra Avenue that ran through the plan area, (through the 'cession of Roads system of intervention' - see Chapter 2.4); but at the same time, the Council were negotiating with the ABA group about the terms and procedure whereby the developers, (through the 'cooperative system of intervention') would finance and manage the construction of the section of Can Serra Avenue running through the area covered by LPM-1. In the end, following the Definitive Approval of LPM-2 in 1966 and discussions with all parties, the ABA group managed the construction of Can Serra Avenue right the way through the area covered by LPM-2 to Molino Street. (Figure 102) Here then, the fragmentation of land ownership, the financial weakness of the Council and the multiplicity of developers presented the Council with management problems that they could only tackle in a piecemeal, ad hoc manner.

Whilst this worked reasonably successfully in the implementation of Can Serra Avenue, it was less successful in securing the implementation of road and collective service infrastructure in the rest of Can Serra. As Figure 100 shows, by 1974 Can Serra Avenue and the northern section of Molino Street had been completed. But Electricity Avenue (the

<sup>98</sup> Again, as in the negotiations with the ABA group, the Council were negotiating with developers over the construction of Can Serra Avenue, when no corresponding Roads and Services Project had been Definitively Approved. According to the 1956 Planning Act, the Project should first have been approved before implementation on the ground (or Building Permit cession) could take place.




Figure 102. Building Layout. Road and Service Infrastructure and Collective Service Buildings included in the Seven Local Plan Modifications, approved 1964-71. (Compare with Figure 100).




Figure 103. The North West of Can Serra in the area covered by LPM-5, in 1978.

Although some of the housing blocks had been built and were inhabited, the sports centre, public gardens, parking lots, municipal health centre and school included in LPM-5 remained unbuilt. In the post-Franco era, Hospitalet Council prevented further house construction pending the drawing-up and approval of a Roads and Services Project and provision of basic road and service infrastructure. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn)






Figure 104. A housing block in the area covered by LPM-4, in 1978.

According to LPM-4 this housing block (inhabited in its upper storeys) should overlook landscaped gardens and a parochial centre. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn).

northern perimetral road) had not been built, nor had the series of minor roads planned in the approved Local Plan Modifications (Figure 103). And whilst house construction was underway in all the plan areas, only two schools had been constructed, and all the other collective service buildings, green spaces and parking areas designated in the Local Plan Modifications remained unbuilt, with many of the housing blocks isolated in rough terrain (Figures 103 and 104).

In summary, then, decision making in the planning of development in the rest of Can Serra in the sixties and early seventies was again characterized by a bargaining process in which the Council agreed to secure the Definitive Approval of (and in some cases to draw-up) technically illegal modifications to the 1961 Local Plan, and in exchange the respective landowners undertook to get development underway and ceded land areas to the Council for the provision of roads and collective service buildings. The approval of these plans was followed by Building Permit cession and house construction that again were technically illegal, because the necessary Roads and Services Projects were not approved and corresponding infrastructure was not implemented; the resultant implementation of development was fragmentary and piecemeal, and (unlike in the ABA group's property) generally lacked commitment from either the Council or developers to ensure that even the basic road infrastructure was provided to coincide with or precede the construction of housing blocks. In the ABA group's property, basic road and associated infrastructure had been planned and implemented through the co-operative system which made the developers responsible for management and finance. But in the rest of Can Serra, although the Acts of Mutual Agreement made between the Council and landowners (Table 20) involved significant cessions of land to the Council, it was the Council who in the main<sup>99</sup> were made responsible for the financing and management of road infrastructure. Thus, whilst the Council concentrated on getting Can Serra Avenue and Molino Street built to 'open up' the zone, and some, at least of the schools built they allowed developers in the rest of Can Serra to proceed with house

<sup>99</sup> As Table 20 shows, the Cession of Roads System, which made the Council responsible for the management and financing of road construction, was to be used in the areas covered by LPM-2, LPM-4, LPM-5 and LPM-7.

construction regardless of the continuing absence of basic road and service infrastructure. As we shall see below, it was this situation that gave rise to organised resident protest in the zone in the early seventies.

#### 6.5 Resident Protest and the Special Plan of Interior Reform 1972-79

The period 1972-3 was in many ways a turning point in the history of Can Serra, marking the emergence of the Residents Association (supported by the Professional College of Architects of Catalonia) as an action group actively committed to securing improvement of the urban environment in Can Serra. This upsurge of resident protest coincided with important changes in the broader political and planning contexts which tended to work in favour of the residents' demands. Two of the most influential mayors in the Sub-Region, Muntadas (Hospitalet) and Parcioles (Barcelona) retired in 1972 and 1973 respectively, resulting in significant changes in Council and GBPC policy. Whilst these two mayors had notoriously close links with the large property developers and financiers (Chapter 3.5.1 and 3.5.2), their successors, Capdevila and Maso were more closely allied to the, 'neocapitalist' industrialist sector, and were supporters of the new Sub-Regional Plan, which attempted to put stricter controls on development in the Sub-Region (see Chapter 2.5). Within Hospitalet Council, the departure of Muntadas (combined with the emergence of the GBPC as a strict development control authority) brought changes in Council policy and the planning activities of the newly formed Department of Public Works and Urban Planning (Chapter 6.1). These changes generally favoured the adoption of new initiatives which aimed at putting a brake on the anarchical, speculative operations that had characterised the planning and development of Can Serra in the previous decade, and at improving the provision of service buildings and basic infrastructure in the zone. This policy change was formally expressed in the Special Plan of Interior Reform for Can Serra approved in 1977; but the origins of this plan can be traced back to 1972-3 when the ABA group in collaboration with the Council, attempted a further modification of planned development in the LPM-1 plan area. Let us start, then, by examining decision-making in this phase of planning and development in Can Serra.




6.5.1 The GBPC thwart further re-planning and development of  
'La Carpa' 1972-4 (Can Serra - Phase IX).

In this case study, we have so far seen how the collaboration between the Council and the ABA group (Phase II) paved the way for similar collaboration between the Council and other developers in the planning and implementation of development in the rest of Can Serra in the sixties and early seventies (Phases III - VIII - Figures 100 and 101). In this sub-section, we return to examine inter-agency decision-making relating to planning and development in the ABA group's property, but we now move forward to the period 1972-4 (Phase IX).

By mid-1972, Can Serra Avenue had been completed and, within the ABA group's property, only the tract of land to the north of the road was not either developed or undergoing development (Figure 97). This area, known locally as 'La Carpa' had traditionally been used for the siting of fairs and festivals; but in LPM-1, 12 H-shaped residential tower blocks (like those built on the other side of Can Serra Avenue - Figure 95) had been planned, with a church, market and shopping centre planned further to the north, in the apex of the plan area (Figure 93).

In June 1972, however, following informal discussions with representatives of the ABA group (P IX-1 - Figure 105), the Development Committee announced that "in the interests of the city" (173), a new plan would be drawn-up by the Council to increase the provision of public buildings in the zone and accommodate the construction of a new through road, to link Can Serra Avenue with the built-up area to the north (P IX-2). By August 1972, the Municipal Architect had completed the new plan - LPM-8 - (P IX-3), which included two new roads dividing the plan area into quartiles, one of which was to be ceded to the Council for the construction of public buildings, whilst 13 housing tower-blocks, 11-14 storeys high, were to be built in the other three (Figure 106). In September, an Act of Mutual Agreement was signed whereby an area of  $10,142\text{m}^2$  was ceded by the ABA group to the Council for the provision of roads and public buildings in the plan area (P IX-4), and the following week Hospitalet Council Initially Approved the plan (P IX-5).





#### LOCAL PLAN MODIFICATION 8: PLAN MAKING AND APPROVAL (CAN SERRA - PHASE IX)

1. ABA group and Council informally discuss procedure for planning and development of 'La Carpa' (May - June 1972)
2. Development Committee announces that in the interest of the city a new plan for 'La Carpa' should be drawn up (June 6 1972)
3. Hospitalet Council draw up new plan for La Carpa (LPM - 8; July - August 1972)
4. ABA group and Hospitalet Council sign Act of Mutual Agreement, by which 10,142m<sup>2</sup> of land are ceded to the Council (September 15 1972)
5. Full Council initially Approve LPM - 8 (September 23 1972)
6. Public information stage for LPM - 8 is opened (October 1972)
7. College of Architects of Catalonia state opposition to LPM - 8 on grounds that proposed increases in residential density are unjustified (November 1972)
8. Municipal Architect reports that College's appeal is invalid and recommends that Council Provisionally and Definitively Approve LPM - 8 (November 1972)
9. Hospitalet Council Provisionally and Definitively Approve LPM - 8 (December 1972)
10. GBPC annul Hospitalet Council's Definitive Approval of LPM - 8 (April 1973)
11. Hospitalet Council submit LPM - 8 to GBPC for Definitive Approval (June 1973)
12. GBPC Initially Approve Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan (March 1974)
13. GBPC return LPM - 8 to Hospitalet Council for 'reconsideration' in view of classifications contained in The Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan (March 1974)

#### RESIDENT PROTEST AND THE SPIR (CAN SERRA - PHASE X)

1. Can Serra residents (in collaboration with the office College of Architects of Catalonia) hold series of marches and present petitions to Council demanding improvement in service provision (May 1973 onwards)
2. Can Serra Residents Association is officially founded (January 1974)
3. College of Architects, in collaboration with Can Serra Residents Association undertake a survey of service deficits in Can Serra (February 1974)
4. GBPC issue directive advising Councils that Building Permit cession should be suspended in areas affected by change in land zone classifications introduced in the new Sub-Regional Plan (April 1974)
5. College of Architects hold Public Exhibition in Can Serra on extent of service and infrastructural deficits in the zone and make proposals for communal use of 'La Carpa' (May 1974)

6. Hospitalet Council suspend cession of Building Permits in Can Serra for one year and announce their intention to draw up an improvement plan for the zone (July 1974)
7. Hospitalet Council (Department of Public Works and Urban Planning) begin work on drawing up the SPIR for Can Serra (July 1974)
8. House construction in Can Serra is halted (Mid-1974)
9. Public Information stage on suspension of Building Permit cession is opened (August 1974)
10. Developers (ABA group and Procyt) appeal against suspension of Building Permit cession (September 1974)
11. Hospitalet Council dismiss developers' appeals (November 1974)
12. MCB support Hospitalet Council's decision to uphold the suspension of Building Permit cession in Can Serra (February 1975)
13. Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs (Hospitalet Council) complete SPIR for Can Serra (May 1975)
14. Hospitalet Council initially approve SPIR for Can Serra and extend suspension of Building Permit cession for a further year (July 1975)
15. Public Information stage for SPIR is opened (July 1975)
16. Can Serra Residents Association write to Hospitalet Council generally supporting the SPIR (July 1975)
17. Professional Colleges inform Hospitalet Council of their general support for the SPIR (July 1975)
18. Some developers appeal against approval of the SPIR (August 1975)
19. Hospitalet Council's Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs make minor modification to the SPIR and recommend its Provisional Approval (December 1975)
20. Hospitalet Council Provisionally Approve SPIR for Can Serra and lift suspension of Building Permit cession (December 1975)
21. MCB Definitively Approve Revision of Sub-Regional Plan (July 1976)
22. New road infrastructure laid, some schools and other service facilities provided (1976 onwards)
23. MCB Definitively Approve SPIR for Can Serra (March 1977)
24. Council embark on drawing-up and approval of Roads and Service Projects for outer areas of Can Serra (1977 onwards)

Figure 105. Can Serra, Phases IX and X : Decision Stage Chart.




Figure 106. LPM-8, drawn-up by Hospitalet Council in 1972.

This plan, a part modification of LPM-1, was Definitively Approved by Hospitalet Council in December 1972, but this approval was annulled by the GBPC in April 1973. The 13 tower blocks depicted in the plan were 11-14 storeys high.

Source : Hospitalet Council, 'Proyecto de Remodelacion Parcial del Sector Can Serra', Hospitalet Council, 1972 (mimeo).

During the Public Information Stage (P IX-6), the Official College of Architects of Catalonia<sup>100</sup> wrote to Hospitalet Council opposing the plan (P IX-7). The College's opposition was based on their assertion that :-

"The project under study (LPM-8) represents a great increase in the Floor Space Ratio in comparison with the 1964 plan (LPM-1), and in the number of floors in each tower block, without there being any acceptable justification for such increases. The explanation can only lie in the private gains to be made from the development of the area in accordance with these new plan proposals." (174)

The letter of opposition from the College of Architects was the only appeal presented in the Public Information Stage, and in November 1972, the Council's Municipal Architect reported that the College's opposition was "absurd" and merited "no further consideration" (175; P IX-8). In December 1972, the Development Committee accepted the Municipal Architect's report, and, on his recommendation, Provisionally and Definitively approved LPM-8 as a "secondary aspect of planning" (176). Later the same month the Committee's decision was endorsed by the Full Council (P IX-9), and copies of the plan were sent to the GBPC for information purposes.

This attempt by Hospitalet Council to Definitively Approve LPM-8 represented a new departure in their general policy of bending or misinterpreting planning regulations to suit their development proposals.

<sup>100</sup> The Official College of Architects of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands (COACB) is the Professional College to which all qualified architects working in the region belong. They are responsible for maintaining standards in the technical aspects of architecture and urban design and all plans have to be submitted to the College for their stamp of approval, verifying the architect's qualification and the technical merit of the plan. In practice, this was, generally speaking, a mere formality, as the College was not empowered to make judgement on broader urban planning aspects of submitted plans. Nevertheless, the 'Office of Urban Information' (O.I.U.), a small research and publishing unit within the College, did undertake a series of studies on urban planning and development in the Sub-Region, many of which were published in the college's official journal, Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo.

The Council's resolution approving the plan claimed that the Definitive Approval was in accordance with Article 54 of the 'Regulations for the Implementation of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan'. This article reads as follows :-

"The Greater Barcelona Planning Commission can make modifications in the 'secondary aspects' of urban plans. Such modifications fall into three categories :-

- a) Alteration of the course of an access road when land use classifications are the same on both sides of the road;
- b) Readjustment of road alignments and gradients.
- c) Modification of Building Regulations for a particular zone as long as the land use is not changed and there is no increase in building density". (177)

Thus, although, LPM-8 may arguably have been classified as a 'secondary aspect' of planning (although even this is unlikely because of the resultant increase in residential densities) there is nothing in the referred to legislation to suggest that Municipal Councils had the authority to make such changes to approved urban plans. In April 1973, the Manager of the GBPC wrote to Hospitalet Council pointing out that the GBPC, and not the Council, had the authority to approve such modifications, and informed the Council that their Definitive Approval of LPM-8 was invalid. (P IX-10).

This intervention by the GBPC was not only on the grounds of the procedural irregularities noted above, but also because of the plan content. The revision of the Sub-Regional Plan had been completed in 1972 and according to Marti and Moreno (178) its Initial Approval was only held-up because of Mayor Porcioles (Barcelona) strong opposition to the anti-speculationary classifications and regulations contained in the Plan. Following Maso's accession to the Mayorship in 1973, the Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan was Initially Approved by the GBPC in March 1974 (P IX-12); and it was this plan that had been used as the basis for the GBPC's plan approval decisions since 1972.

As regards Can Serra, the new Sub-Regional Plan classified nearly all the remaining non-built-up areas in the zone for the installation of 'collective service infrastructure' (Figure 107). These areas included 'La Carpa', in the centre of Can Serra, which as we have seen was the area covered by LPM-8 which included proposals for the high-rise residential development of most of the area. Here then,



Figure 107. Land Zone  
Classifications in Can Serra  
in the Revision of the  
Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan  
(Definitively Approved 1976).


Key :

7. Collective Service  
Infrastructure  
a - Existing  
b - Planned

13. b - Semi-Intensive  
Urban Development.

18. Previously re-planned  
zone (through Local  
Plan).

Source : Corporacion Metropolitana  
de Barcelona, 'Plan General  
Metropolitano de Ordenacion Urbana',  
CMB, 1976.



for the first time in the planning and development of Can Serra, the GBPC were forcing Hospitalet Council's hand. When the Council re-submitted LPM-8 to the GBPC for their Definitive Approval in 1973 (P IX-11) it was returned by the GBPC (P-IX-13) for "Reconsideration by the Council in the light of the new Sub-Regional Plan". (179) The development proposals of the council and the ABA group were thus thwarted by the GBPC at a time when the authority were beginning to fulfil an increasingly effective development control function in the Sub-Region after almost two decades in which they had been little more than a rubber stamp authority for the planning decisions of the larger Councils such as Hospitalet.

Let us now turn to examine how this development control intervention by the GBPC coincided with pressure 'from below' - from the Residents and the Professional Colleges - and from within Hospitalet Council itself, for the improvement of service provision in Can Serra. It was this combination of factors which eventually led to a freeze on Building Permit cession in Can Serra, and the drawing-up and approval of a Special Plan of Interior Reform (SPIR) to plan and programme the installation of new community service infrastructure in the zone.

#### 6.5.2. Resident Protest and the Drawing-up and Approval of the SPIR for Can Serra, 1973-77 (Phase X).

Following Hospitalet Council's dismissal of the College of Architects' appeal against the approval of LPM-8 in November 1972 (P IX-7, 8), the College set about organising resident protest against the general absence or poverty of service infrastructure in the zone, and spreading awareness amongst residents of the Council's intention to allow the ABA group to build high-rise housing blocks in 'La Carpa'. From mid-1973 onwards a series of resident marches and petitions called on the Council to provide a market, shopping centre and public park in 'La Carpa' for the use of local residents (P X-1- Figure 105). In January 1974 the Can Serra Residents' Association was officially founded<sup>101</sup>

<sup>101</sup> The Residents Associations have no recognition as such in Spanish law, but can be registered as 'temporary associations' within the framework of the General Associations Act of 1964. In January 1974, the Can Serra Residents Association was officially recognised as a 'temporary association' by the Civil Governor of the Province.

(P X-2), and in February, in conjunction with the College of Architects, a study of service deficits in Can Serra was undertaken (P X-3) and findings were presented in a Public Exhibition held in Can Serra in May 1974 (P X-5).

This upwelling of resident protest coincided with the Initial Approval of the revision of the Sub-Regional Plan in March 1974, (P IX-12) which, as we have seen, classified all 'La Carpa' for the installation of new collective service infrastructure (Figure 108). In April 1974, the Public Information Stage for the Sub-Regional Plan was opened and the GBPC simultaneously issued a directive to all Councils in the Sub-Region, informing them that all Building Permit cession should be suspended<sup>102</sup> in areas where new land-zone classifications were proposed in the Sub-Regional Plan (P X-4), pending the outcome of the Public Information Stage.

Hospitalet Council, then, were again forced to conform with GBPC policy and in July 1974, following reports from the newly formed Department of Public Works and Urban Planning and the Committee of Housing and Urban Affairs, the Full Council approved a resolution :-

"To agree, in accordance with the recommendations of the Department of Public Works and Urban Planning, and the directives of the GBPC, to the suspension of Building Permit cession for one year, with the objective of proceeding with the reform of the Can Serra Local Plan. The major objective of the reform will be to improve urban standards and public services and installations". (180; P X-6).

The freeze on Building Permit cession quickly brought house construction in Can Serra to a halt (P X-8) and from here on the Council were actively committed to drawing-up a new plan for Can Serra to improve the provision of services in the zone.

It is difficult to determine the exact origin of this initiative, and it would seem to be the aggregate result of pressure from the GBPC (and the MCB after 1974), the residents and the College of Architects, and from within the Council itself. As already noted (Chapter 6.1) the departure of mayor Muntadas in 1972 was followed by a departmental re-organization and consequent internal promotion of younger, generally more enlightened officers, to head the new

<sup>102</sup> Article 22 of the 1956 Planning Act states that "Planning authorities entrusted with the drawing-up of General Plans may suspend for one year the cession of Building Permits in the area encompassed by the plan, for the purpose of studying or modifying the plan proposals. The suspension may be extended for another year should such an extension be necessary to finalise the Public Information Stage".

Department of Public Works and Urban Planning and its divisional sections, and it was members<sup>103</sup> of this new 'regime' who were subsequently responsible for plotting and charting the course of the SPIR for Can Serra through the plan-making and approval processes.

In July 1974, whilst the Department of Public Works and Urban Planning began work on the Special Plan of Interior Reform<sup>104</sup> (P X-7), the property-developer lobby in Can Serra organised their opposition to the suspension of Building Permit cession in the area. During the Public Information Stage for the Permit Suspension,<sup>105</sup> (P X-9) the ABA group, and Procyt S.A. (developers in the LPM-7 plan area - see Table 20), appealed against the suspension (P X-10) on various grounds including the "lack of specific objectives of Hospitalet Council" (181) in declaring the suspension, and the fact that "it seems odd that the Council should want to reform a plan (the Can Serra Local Plan) that is now in the final stages of implementation" (182). In November 1974, however, Hospitalet Council, on the recommendation of the head of the Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs, dismissed these appeals as invalid (P X-11), and this decision was subsequently upheld by the MCB (P X-12).

<sup>103</sup> These included Snr. P. Caralps, Technical-Legal Director of the Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs, and Dr. C. Ponsa, head of the Urban Planning Division, within the Department. It was these two men who were principally responsible for the drawing-up of the Special Plan of Interior Reform for Can Serra and its defence (against property developer interests) in the Public Information Stage (P X-9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 19).

<sup>104</sup> The potential role of the Special Plan of Interior Reform as a vehicle for improving or renewing the urban environment was stressed in the plan documentation of the Revision of the Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan (see Chapter 2.5) as well as in the Land and Urban Planning Reform Act of 1976 (Chapter 2.4).

<sup>105</sup> Article 22 of the 1956 Planning Act stipulated that decisions to suspend Building Permit cession must be followed by a Public Information Stage of 15 days, during which time appeals against the decision could be made to the appropriate authority.



By April 1975 work on the SPIR for Can Serra was complete (P X-13). The plan had three stated objectives :-

- "1. To use the undeveloped areas in Can Serra for the provision of services and infrastructure.
2. To limit, as far as possible, any increase in residential density in the neighbourhood.
3. To minimise disruption of the resident population" (183)

In accordance with the land classifications for Can Serra included in the Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan, and the minimum standards <sup>106</sup> established in the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, a total of 8.8 hectares (over a quarter of all Can Serra) were classified as 'green zones', and 5 hectares were designated for the construction of schools, nurseries and other public buildings. 'La Carpa', in the centre of Can Serra, which had been the focus of resident protest, was to be used for the installation of a market, an adult training centre and a public square (Figure 108 and Table 21). Implementation of these proposals was to be in three five year phases; and within the framework of the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, the Council took responsibility for managing the provision of new road infrastructure in the zone, which was nevertheless to be financed <sup>107</sup> by landowners. The finance for the provision of new educational facilities was to be provided on an ad hoc basis with Central Government Sources and credit loans to the Council named as the most likely sources.

In July 1975, on the recommendation of the Committee of Housing and Urban Affairs, the Full Council Initially Approved the SPIR for Can Serra, and simultaneously suspended Building Permit cession in the zone for a further year. (P X-14). During the ensuing Public Information

<sup>106</sup> The 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act established minimum service levels of 18m<sup>2</sup> of green space per house and 10m<sup>2</sup> of ground space for educational buildings, per house, in all housing estates.

<sup>107</sup> The Land and Urban Planning Reform Act of 1976 (a provisional draft was approved in April 1975) merged the 'co-operative' and 'cession of roads' systems of intervention (see Chapter 2.2.4). Whilst landowners still had to cede all land to be used for roads, parks and public buildings, the Council (not the developers) took responsibilities for providing road infrastructure, although this had to be financed by the beneficiaries (as in the old 'cession of roads' system) through payments to the Council on a six-monthly budget basis.

1. The 'Rubio y Ors' school will be enlarged to cover  $3,940\text{m}^2$ , to facilitate the provision of a sports area.
2. A nursery will be built on the plot of  $550\text{m}^2$  on the Can Serra Avenue - Molino St. intersection.
3. A new Junior/Middle school will be built along Isabel Avenue, between Can Serra Avenue and Electricity Avenue.
4. Between Faus, Pedro Pelegri and Brisbal Streets and Can Serra Avenue ('La Carpa'), a Market, public square and adult training centre will be built.
5. Alpi (Ox) College, situated between Can Serra Av., Esplugas Main Road and the railway, will be enlarged.
6. 2 other new nurseries will be built in Can Serra Avenue and in Electricity Avenue, alongside the tower blocks of P.U.E.S.A.
7. In the block between Electricity Avenue and Badajoz Street, 2 new Junior/Middle Schools are planned, one of them covering  $6,588.68\text{m}^2$ .
8. Along Esplugas Main Road and Granolers Street, a Municipal Health Centre and school for subnormal children are planned.
9. To the south, between Can Serra Avenue, Isabel Avenue, the Corin development and the railway line, a further junior/middle school will be built; the rest of the area will be used as a sports zone.
10. In Electricity Avenue, between Andorra and Castellbo Streets, a new church is planned.
11. In the tower block owned by F.E.R.M.A. at the junction of Electricity Avenue and Isabel Avenue, the bottom two floors of modules A & B will be used for a social/cultural building, yet to be specified.
12. In the area between Can Serra Avenue, Isabel Avenue and Molino Street, approx.  $250\text{m}^2$  in the ground floor of tower block No. 3 and  $150\text{m}^2$  in the second sub-ground floor, plus the terrace annex, will be used for social/cultural activities, yet to be specified. These are ceded by 'Inmobiliaria Can Serra S.A.'
13. In the Residential Complex promoted by Corin S.A.,  $284\text{m}^2$  of a sub-ground floor with terrace annex will be used as a children's play-area, a nursery or for some similar purpose.
14. In the tower-block on Molino Street, owned by Procyt,  $500\text{m}^2$  on the ground floor will be ceded to the Council for social-cultural use.

Table 21. New Service Infrastructure planned in the SPIR for Can Serra.



Stage for the plan (P X-15), appeals were presented by three major groups. Some developers (Corin, Alcida, Briseida and Amaltea, and Procyt) complained that the new land use classifications contradicted those contained in previously approved plans, and the clauses of some of the Acts of Mutual Agreement previously signed between the Council and developers (P X-18). In the subsequent report drawn-up by the Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs, it was argued that these objections were invalid as the SPIR had to be seen within the framework of the replanning of the whole Sub-Region, which of necessity would contradict previously approved plans and development agreements.

Representatives of the Can Serra Residents Association also lodged an appeal (P X-16) during the Public Information Stage, generally supporting the plan but drawing attention to certain details of development that the plan did not cover (e.g. the need for a tunnel under the railway), and stressing the need for urgent action in the area. Finally, the professional Colleges (Architects', Industrial Engineers', Civil Engineers') all signed an appeal (P X-17) in which the proposals of the SPIR were supported, but which called for greater specificity in the programming of the three phases of plan implementation. This was accepted as valid criticism by planning officers and adjustments made accordingly. (P X-19; see Table 25).

In December 1975, the Committee of Housing and Urban Affairs accepted the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs that the SPIR for Can Serra be Provisionally Approved, and that the suspension of Building Permit cession in Can Serra be lifted, so that construction could proceed in accordance with limitations<sup>108</sup> set in the new plan (P X-19). The Committee's decision was endorsed by the Full Council the same month (P X-20), and the SPIR was forwarded to the MCB who Definitively Approved the plan (with the incorporation of a few minor changes<sup>109</sup>) in March 1977 (P X-23), following the Definitive Approval of the new Sub-Regional Plan in 1976 (P X-21) and the general political and

<sup>108</sup> The SPIR allowed for the construction of a further 920 dwellings in Can Serra, giving a total of 4893 (22, 018 people - 730 inhabitants/hectare) in Can Serra as a whole.

<sup>109</sup> The MCB Definitively Approved the SPIR for Can Serra on the condition that the projected course of the Esplugas Main Road and its junction with Electricity Avenue should be modified to coincide with the road layout included in the revision of the Sub-Regional Plan; and that all high-tension cables be laid underground.



administrative turmoil following the death of Franco in November 1975.

Implementation of the plan in the Post-Franco era (P X-22) had consisted (by 1978) of the provision of new road infrastructure, (in accordance with the implementation programme, see Table 25), the opening of the 'Samonto' school, in Oriental Street, and the provision of a Junior School (Figure 109), children's play area (Figure 110) and nursery in Molino Street. House construction has been limited as the Council have refrained from granting further Building Permits for the construction of the remaining housing blocks,<sup>110</sup> until all the necessary road and associated service infrastructure is laid; to this end the Council have embarked on drawing-up a co-ordinated series of Road and Services projects (P X-24) for each of the plan areas covered by the Local Plan Modifications approved after 1965. Let us now proceed to an analysis of the decision making process involved in the planning and implementation of development in Phases IX and X of the Case Study.

### 6.5.3 Summary Analysis

Decision-making in the drawing-up and approval of LPM-8 by Hospitalet Council (Phase IX) in many ways represented a continuation of the 'collaborative bargaining' - involving contraventions of statutory planning procedure - that characterized planning and development in all Can Serra in the sixties and early seventies. Again, the developers committed themselves to financing a further block of residential development and agreed to cede a 10,000m<sup>2</sup> plot to the Council; in return, the Council drew-up, and agreed to secure the approval of, a further modification to the urban lay-out contained in the 1961 Local Plan (already modified, as regards 'La Carpa', in LPM-1), involving a further increase in the planned residential density.

The decision-making process for LPM-8, however, exhibited two significant differences from that which had characterised previous Council-developer collaboration. For the first time, the new planning proposals were challenged in the Public Information Stage by an

<sup>110</sup> As previously noted (note 108), the SPIR allowed for the construction of a further 920 dwellings in Can Serra.




Figure 109. The Junior School in Molino Street (in plan area IEM-6)  
opened in 1977 as part of the implementation of the SPIR.  
(Photograph : M. G. Wynn).






Figure 110. The Children's Play-area, off Molino Street  
(in Plan Area LPM-3), provided by the Council in 1977.  
(Photograph : M. G. Wynn)

outside authority - the Official College of Architects of Catalonia (P IX-7); and, again for the first time, the GBPC refused to Definitively Approve the Local Plan Modification (P IX-10, 13). These two interventions set the scene for a dramatic change in the status quo as regards inter-agency decision making in Can Serra.

The intensification of resident protest (stimulated and supported by the College of Architects), combined with significant changes in the political allegiance of Council staff and politicians and, above all, outside pressure from the GBPC (and MCB), saw the Council change from an agency actively (and illegally) collaborating with the private sector property developers, to one firmly committed to promoting an improvement plan which attempted to put a brake on such development, and to use the remaining undeveloped areas (including 'La Carpa') in Can Serra for the provision of collective service buildings and infrastructure.

This transformation is illustrated in a comparison of major aspects of the decision making process involved in the planning and (non) approval of LPM-8 and the SPIR, both of which were promoted by the Council (Table 22). In the former, private developers collaborated in the plan-making process, and the plan was formally opposed by the College of Architects and the Sub-Regional Authority, and subsequently by the Residents Association. In the later, the Sub-Regional Authority collaborated in the plan-making process, and the plan was opposed by private developers and supported by the professional colleges and the residents' association. At the same time, the plan-making and approval process for LPM-8 involved major contraventions of the statutory planning procedure, whereas, in the SPIR, inter-agency decision-making observed the guidelines and procedural requirements of the formal planning machinery.

This conceptualization of the change in the Council's role in inter-agency decision making in Phases IX and X is graphically illustrated in the process flow chart (Figure 111), which can also be used to indicate the 'critical points' in the decision-making process. In Phase IX, it was again the informal collaboration between Council and developer (P IX-1) that established the terms



	<u>Local Plan Modification 8</u>	<u>Special Plan of Interior Reform</u>
<u>Plan-making authority</u>	Hospitalet Council (1972)	Hospitalet Council (1975)
<u>Collaborating agency</u>	Property developers (ABA group)	Sub-Regional Planning Authority (MCB)
<u>Public Information Stage</u>		
Opposed by :	College of Architects (COACB) (Dismissed by Council).	Developers (Procyt, ABA group) (Dismissed by Council).
Supported by:		College of Architects (and other Professional Colleges) Residents' Association
<u>Definitive Approval</u>	Refused by Sub-Regional Planning Authority (GBPC)	Granted by Sub-Regional Planning Authority (MCB)
<u>Major Contraventions of statutory planning procedure</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- LPM-8 was a 'modification of a modification' of a Local Plan. No provision was made for this in the 1956 Planning Act.</li> <li>- LPM-8 involved a further increase in planned residential densities without corresponding increase in green space areas.</li> <li>- Hospitalet Council attempted to Definitively Approve the plan.</li> </ul>	

Table 22. Inter-agency decision-making and planning irregularities in LPM-8 and the SPIR for Can Serra.




Figure 111. Can Serra, Phases IX and X : Process Flow Chart.

of reference for subsequent exchanges between the two agencies, which were to approximately follow the quasi-legal procedural course established in the other Local Plan modifications (Phases III-VIII). The opposition of the Official College of Architects (P IX-7) also emerges as a 'critical point', given that it was from the college's intervention that the instigation and organization of resident protest stemmed. Similarly the invalidation of the Council's Definitive Approval of LPM-8 (P IX-10) and the Initial Approval of the new Sub-Regional Plan (P IX-12) signalled the adoption of a new development control policy by the Sub-Regional Planning authority, which provided a new broader planning and political context for the drawing-up and approval of the SPIR.

In Phase X, the Council's decision to suspend Building Permit cession and draw-up a plan to improve the provision of services and infrastructure in Can Serra (P X-6) marked their 'coming into line' with the GBPC policy and reflected the internal change that took place in the Council in 1973. This policy change was expressed in the Council's planning and management role in Can Serra through the drawing-up of the SPIR, and the Provisional (P X-20) and Definitive (P X-23) Approvals of the plan were important milestones in the statutory plan approval process.

In summary, then, decision-making in Phases IX and X of the Can Serra case study reflects significant changes in the broader political and planning frameworks and the consequent transformation of inter-agency relationships. Let us now move on to summarise the planning and implementation of development in the case study as a whole through a consideration of the loose research hypotheses postulated in Chapter 4.

#### 6.6 Final Summary Analysis : Development of the Research Hypotheses.

The research findings of the Can Serra case study can be used to develop eight of the nine research hypotheses, the exception being hypothesis (5) which relates to Central State housing authorities. As in the San Cosme case study (Chapter 5.5) each hypotheses will be addressed in turn, unless the need to avoid repetition recommends otherwise.

### 6.6.1 Planning and Control Mechanisms

The three hypotheses to be considered here are :-

(1) That the Local Plan/Roads and Services Project/Building Permit mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of development in the Franco era.

(2) That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Planning Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of road and service infrastructure.

(3) That the Special Plan of Interior Reform has functioned successfully in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal in the post-Franco era.

(1) The summary analyses contained in this chapter clearly reveal that the Local Plan/Roads and Services Project/Building Permit mechanisms did not function as they were intended to do in the 1956 Planning Act, in the planning and implementation of development in Can Serra. The 1961 Local Plan reclassified a 20 hectare area of urban park for residential development contravening the spirit, if not the letter<sup>111</sup> of planning law. The urban layout and planned residential density contained in the Local Plan were then changed in seven separate, non-coordinated, modifications (a type of plan for which provision was not made in the 1956 Act), which were based on a fallacious ruling by Hospitalet Council. A Roads and Services Project was approved for only one of the seven plan areas covered by the Local Plan Modifications, and yet Building Permits were granted and house construction was undertaken, with only fragmentary provision of road and service infrastructure accompanying the house construction. Finally in some of these plan areas, the actual number of houses built exceeded provisions contained in the respective Local Plan Modifications (Table 23).

What it is important to stress, however, is that these planning mechanisms, along with the Acts of Mutual Agreement, did play a major role in the planning and implementation of development, but it was not the role envisaged in the 1956 Planning Act. In the 'collaborative bargaining' between the Council and landowner/developers, the Local Plan and its modifications, the Roads and Services Projects, and

<sup>111</sup> It is interesting to note here that in 1963, an Act amending the 1956 Planning Act was passed specifically prohibiting the reclassification of Green zone areas through the Local Plan mechanism, except on the authority of the Full Cabinet, thus closing the loophole in the 1956 Act that permitted such operations. See 'Ley 158, 1963. Modificación de Planes de Ordenación y Proyectos de Urbanización cuando afectan a zonas verdes' Boletín Oficial del Estado, No. 291, 5th Dec., 1963.



Plan	Planned Number of Houses	Building Permits Ceded	Houses Constructed
LPM-1	2,200	1,374 (1964) 220 (1971)	1,618 (1968-73)
LPM-2	576	674 (1966 & 1969)	674 (1969-71)
LPM-3	174	202 (1971)	202 (1972-74)
LPM-4	352	462 (1972-3)	352 (1972-74)
LPM-5	388	242 (1972-3)	132 (1972-4)
LPM-6	296	298 (1972)	223 (1971-2)
LPM-7	501	501 (1972)	128 (1973-4)
TOTAL	5,230	3,973	3,329

Table 23. Building Permit Cession and House Construction in Can Serra, 1964-74.

Sources : Hospitalet Council, 'Plan Especial de Reforma Interior de Can Serra', 1977; and Hospitalet Council (oficina Tecnica de Urbanismo), 'Relacion de expedientes de Can Serra', Feb., 1975 (mimeo).

the Building Permits were foremost in the bureaucratic processing of development proposals. But with the bending and misinterpretation of planning law that accompanied their use, the regulatory, control role which they were intended to fulfil was lost; rather, they became pawns in the exchanges between Council and developer that provided a pseudo -legal framework for the rationalisation of capital investment provided by both the private sector and the Council. We will return to further discuss these agencies roles below (hypotheses 4 and 6).

(2) The co-operative system of intervention was successfully employed in the construction of Can Serra Avenue, the major road opened in Can Serra in the sixties and early seventies (Figure 112), which had, in fact, been included in the 1961 Can Serra Local Plan (Figure 89). Decision-making in the implementation of this road and complementary service infrastructure (pavements, sewerage, drainage, street lighting, landscaping) was nevertheless characterized by contraventions of statutory planning procedure, with Building Permit cession, and house and road construction all taking place before the corresponding Roads and Services Project was approved, whereas, according to the 1956 Planning Act, the approval of the Roads and Services Project should have preceded all development on the ground. In practice, however, as noted above, the Roads and Services Project did fulfil a valuable planning role, with Council Officers unofficially supervising the construction of the Avenue in accordance with the Project (presented to them in full in January 1967), even though it was not approved until 1970. Again, the emergent picture is one of a planning system subordinated to the developmental arrangements informally agreed upon by Council and developer.

Elsewhere in Can Serra, however, the provision of road infrastructure was generally poor or non-existent, leaving newly built housing blocks isolated in rough terrain. Although the 1961 Local Plan specified that the co-operative system of intervention would be used for the development of all Can Serra, the Local Plan Modifications changed this to the 'Cession of Roads' system in four of the seven plan areas (Table 20). Thus, in the accompanying Acts of Mutual Agreement, the land areas to be used for roads and collective service buildings were ceded to the Council, who then became responsible for the implementation of this infrastructure. But whilst the Council were prepared to grant Building Permits and let house construction proceed in all the plan modification areas (this again representing a contravention of the 1956 Act), they themselves made only a modest start on the provision of road infrastructure, widening and improving the northern section of Molino Street (which had existed as a minor road in the late fifties - see Figure 83). Under the 'cession of roads' system, the Council could recuperate the bulk of capital expenditure, once the roads were built; but lack of access to such funds in the first place severely hampered road building by the Council, who were thus





Figure 112. Road and Service Infrastructure (dark shading) in Can Serra, 1975. Of the roads planned in the Local Plan Modifications (Figure 102) only Can Serra Avenue and the top half of Molino Street had been completed by 1975, although house construction was underway in all the plan areas.



primarily concerned with collaborating with the ABA group in getting Can Serra Avenue, the major road in the zone, completed, and prepared to leave the construction of lesser roads till later.

Viewing Can Serra as a whole, one can see how the series of Local Plan modifications destroyed the overall coherency of the 1961 Local Plan, and made it difficult indeed for the 'co-operative' system of intervention to function within the estate as a whole. This speculative re-planning meant that the Local Plan area was divided into seven separate units of development, whose size and shape bore close relation to the old property boundaries in Can Serra (Compare Figures 83 and 92). From then on, the provision of road infrastructure by the private sector posed serious problems of management and co-ordination because of the unusual shape and generally small size of the plan-modification areas. Here, then, in the Acts of Mutual Agreement drawn-up to accompany Local Plan modifications 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 (Table 20 and Figure 100) the Council agreed to act through the 'cession of roads' system because of the need for unitary action by one development agency - the Council - in the provision of road infrastructure. The major exception was in LPM-1 where the larger size of the ABA group's plot made the operation of the co-operative system of development possible, even though, as already noted, the Council still had to act as co-ordinating agency in the implementation of the easterly stretches of the road passing through plan areas 2 and 7 (Figure 112).

The Council's preoccupation with getting Can Serra Avenue completed and their failure to build the more minor roads planned in the rest of Can Serra severely hampered the implementation of collective service buildings and green zones in the estate. By 1975, three schools had been built (two on Can Serra Avenue and one on the northern section of Molino Street - Figure 112) by the Ministry of Education and Science, in land ceded to the Council by developers in the Acts of Mutual Agreement (Table 20). But in the rest of the estate, with even basic road infrastructure missing, the planned schools, nurseries and green zones had not been provided (Table 24), a result of the breakdown in the functioning of the statutory planning machinery, which characterized the planning and implementation of development in Can Serra in the Franco era.



Local Plan Modification	Major collective service buildings	
	In plan	Built 'on the ground'
LPM-1	Church, market, shopping centre in 'La Carpa'.	Church built 1974 in land owned by the Council on Can Serra Avenue (see Figure 98). Land originally ceded to Council by ABA group in 1970.
LPM-2	Secondary school designated in 10,000m <sup>2</sup> plot.	'Torres y Bages' Secondary School built by Ministry of Education and Science 1968-70. Land ceded by landowners (Avelina Playa, ABA group) to Council 1965; and by Council to the Ministry in 1968.
LPM-3	504m <sup>2</sup> plot designated for use as Day Nursery.	In 1975, Hospitalet Council and Corin S.A., (developers/landowners) signed an Act of Mutual Agreement agreeing to use the 504m <sup>2</sup> plot for a children's play area (see Figure 110) whilst the ground floor of one of the tower-blocks was used as a day nursery.
LPM-4	Junior/Middle School designated in 9,500m <sup>2</sup> plot; 'religious and other public buildings' designated in 2,236m <sup>2</sup> plot.	Junior/Middle school 'Samonto' built 1974-6 in 9,500m <sup>2</sup> plot ceded by P.U.E.S.A. (landowners/developers) to the Council in 1969. Construction financed largely by Ministry of Education and Science.
LPM-5	School for Sub-Normal Children and Municipal Health Centre designated in 1,989m <sup>2</sup> plot.	-
LPM-6	550m <sup>2</sup> plot and ground floor of one of tower blocks (250m <sup>2</sup> ) designated for use as 'public buildings.'	Day nursery and junior school installed in ground floor of one of housing blocks 1977 (see Figure 109).
LPM-7	Church and social centre designated in 1,100m <sup>2</sup> plot; primary/middle school designated in 3,294m <sup>2</sup> plot.	Primary/middle school 'Rubio e Ors' built 1972-3 by Min. of Education & Science in designated plot ceded to the Council in 1971 by landowners.

Table 24. Collective Service Infrastructure 'planned' and 'implemented' in Can Serra.

(3) The Special Plan of Interior Reform for Can Serra, drawn-up and approved between 1974 and 1977, represented the formal expression of a new policy initiative by Hospitalet Council, brought about (as discussed in Section five above) by both internal and external changes in the planning and political frameworks. After the fragmentary re-planning and development of the sixties and early seventies, the SPIR programmed the comprehensive improvement of the Can Serra estate as a whole, in which (unlike the Local Plan Modifications) precise time projections were established for the implementation of the new service infrastructure and environmental improvements.

The approval of the SPIR has undoubtedly provided the Council with a viable planning document to match its new development control and improvement objectives. The plan's implementation programme (Table 25) is revealing, however, in that it is based on a 3-phase, 15-year time scale in which many of the major elements, notably the market, adult training centre and public square in 'La Carpa', are programmed for implementation after 1985. This reflects the continuing lack of financial resources of the Council.

In the first phase of the programme, school construction and extension have been largely financed by the Ministry of Education and Science, and the provision of road infrastructure is being planned and managed by the Council, but financed by landowners, under the reformed 'co-operative system of intervention' (introduced in the 1976 Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, which empowers councils to work within 6-monthly investment programmes<sup>112</sup> which can then be recovered from the respective landowners). But the plan is rather vague on the sources of finance for other service elements contained in the plan (nurseries, health centre, social cultural centre, market), mentioning 'Central State authorities' and 'Credit loans' as the most likely sources. It is to be expected, however, that future national reform of local

<sup>112</sup> This means that the Council do not have to find the capital investment for the financing of an entire road project all at once (as they had to before under the 'cession of roads' system), but can now work within smaller, shorter term budgets which can be recovered from the landowners on a 6-monthly basis (see also note 107, page 259).

1st Phase - five years (1975-79)

1. Landscaping of surrounds to housing blocks (responsibility of developers).
2. Opening and completion of Isabel Avenue (by end of 1976).
3. Completion of Molino St. (by Dec. 1975).
4. Opening of Electricity Avenue up to Pedro Pelegri Street (by end of 1977).
5. Installation of Junior/Middle School on Molino Street in ground floor of existing housing block.
6. Construction of Junior/Middle School on Oriental Street (by early 1977).
7. Provision of children's play area and nursery in housing blocks endorsed by Molino Street.
8. Opening of Granollers St. from the Esplugas Main Road to Pedro Pelegri Street.
9. Widening of Badajoz Street.
10. Opening and completion of Pedro Pelegri Street.
11. Completion of all other streets in area.
12. Construction of old people's hall.
13. Extension of Junior/Middle School 'Rubio y Ors'.
14. Extension of Special College 'Alpi'.

2nd Phase (1980-84)

1. Flyover on Esplugas Main Road over railway line.
2. Completion of Electricity Avenue.

3rd Phase (1985-89)

1. Completion of all complementary service infrastructure systems in Can Serra.
2. Restoration of streets and squares in deteriorated condition.
3. Construction of other service buildings.

Table 25. The 3-phase Programme for the Implementation of Improvements in the SPIR for Can Serra.

government finances will increase Councils' spending power and enable a speeding up of the implementation of the SPIR. In the meantime, however, 'La Carpa' (Figure 113), still the focus of resident protest in the zone, remains rough terrain, and is programmed to remain so until the second half of the decade.

#### 6.6.2 Agency Roles and Activities

The three hypotheses considered here are :-

(4) That Local Planning Authorities have failed to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions.

(6) That private sector developers have been permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure.

(7) That Residents' Associations have emerged as an important force in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal schemes in recent years.

The first two of these hypotheses will be considered together as they are so closely interrelated.

(4) and (6) From the late fifties up until 1973, Hospitalet Council were actively involved in promoting the residential development of Can Serra, in collaboration with private sector developers. Throughout this period, the planning and control mechanisms with which Councils were armed in the 1956 Planning Act were consistently misused or ignored by both parties. The replanning and implementation of development was undertaken through a series of illegal modifications to the 1961 Local Plan, and both bureaucratic decision-making and development on the ground involved a succession of contraventions of planning law (see, for example, Table 19).

Decision-making in this period is probably best seen within the framework of what we have already referred to as a 'collaborative bargaining' process, in which the statutory planning system was subordinated to the developmental objectives of the Council and the developers. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that the Council were keen to see the residential development of the zone, but were concerned to ensure some form of co-ordination of basic road and collective service infrastructure; private developers, on the other hand, were essentially concerned with maximisation of their





Figure 113. 'La Carpa' in the centre of Can Serra, 1978.

In the SPIR for Can Serra, a market, public square and adult training centre are planned here. To the extreme left, the tower block built by the ABA group in Can Serra Avenue are just visible. In the centre background stand blocks built in the area covered by LPM-4. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn).

capital investment through the construction of as many houses as possible. Thus, whilst both agencies shared the common macro-objective of securing the urban development of Can Serra, the decision-making process also reveals an exchange of concessions by both parties. The Council approved speculative pseudo-legal modifications to the Can Serra Local Plan, guided them through the plan approval process, and turned a blind eye to contraventions of planning procedure. In exchange, the developers financed house construction and, in some cases, the provision of road infrastructure, and handed over large tracts of land to the Council for non-residential uses.

From the developer's standpoint, this exchange process functioned reasonably efficiently, increasing the 'planned' residential capacity for all Can Serra from less than 1000 dwellings in the late fifties to over 5000 in the early seventies; and from the Council's point of view, it ensured the high rise residential development of the zone, which, although somewhat fragmentary and deficient in service infrastructure, was preferable to shanty-type growth and produced the series of spin-off revenues<sup>113</sup> associated with private sector investment. But with a non-democratic Public Administration actively promoting this process, it is inappropriate to view the planning

<sup>113</sup> As noted in the San Cosme case study (Chapter 5.2.2.) private sector residential development was generally preferable to public sector housing because of the rate exemption given to residents in State housing areas. Interviews with Council Staff also suggest that Mayor Muntadas was almost obsessed with promoting the residential and industrial expansion of the municipality in an attempt to put Hospitalet 'on the map' as a major Spanish city. At the same time there are undoubtedly some factors that entered into the bargaining process - corruption, political lobbying etc - that the documented and interview evidence have not uncovered.

The extent of corruption and collaboration between public and private agencies might well, in fact, have been far greater than has been suggested here. In Phase II, for example, it has not been possible to determine the exact motivation of Hospitalet Council's ruling that an FSR of 1.75m<sup>2</sup>/m<sup>2</sup> could be used in the development of Can Serra (PII-3). Was this the first step in a carefully conceived plan hatched by the Council and the developers to facilitate the replanning and speculative development of Can Serra, or was it just an erroneous after-thought by the Municipal Architect included in the Council's outline reply to an estate agent, which private developers were quick to take advantage of, albeit in subsequent collaboration with the Council? And to what extent was the developer lobby represented in the GBPC and able to secure the succession of Definitive Approvals of Local Plan Modifications? The answers to these questions remain, and unfortunately are likely to remain, obscured behind the smokescreen of bureaucratic red-tape and ideological rhetoric which accompanied the official documentation of these decisions.

machinery as part of a control system regulating the development proposals of the private sector on the behalf of the general public. We shall return to further discuss this in the final chapter of the thesis.

In the era after 1973, however, the combination of changes in the internal and external political and planning frameworks brought a dramatic halt to Council-developer collaboration (Figure 111 and Table 26) which had characterized decision-making in Can Serra up to that point. The GRPC's control and improvement directives (embodied in the revision of the Sub-Regional Plan) were keenly taken up by new planning officers in the Department of Public Works and Urban Affairs, many of whom had close ties with the Residents' Association movement in Hospitalet<sup>114</sup>. The drawing-up and approval of the SPIR brought the Council into direct conflict with the property developers, and the new found allegiance between the Council and the Sub-Regional Authority in actively pursuing a control and improvement policy in Can Serra was reinforced after 1975 with the death of Franco and move to democracy. During this latter period, then, both the Sub-Regional Planning Authority and the Council have begun to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions; private sector development in Can Serra has only been allowed to proceed if it has complied with the demands of the SPIR and statutory planning procedure, in stark contrast to the development of the zone in the sixties and early seventies.

<sup>114</sup> We have already noted that the type of planning and development that took place in Can Serra was not an isolated case in Hospitalet. In 1973, there were 58,148 children between the ages of 2 and 13 in Hospitalet, at which time existing State schools and nurseries provided nursery education for only 8.5% of children between the ages of 2 and 5 years, and junior/middle schooling for 35.3% of children aged 6-13 years (compulsory and free according to the law). At the same time, there was less than one hectare of public park in all Hospitalet, whereas the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan had zoned 300 hectares as 'urban park' in Hospitalet; most of this land was reclassified in the 14 Local Plans approved by Hospitalet Council between 1957 and 1973. Whilst the Residents' Association movement in Hospitalet focused on various other issues as well (e.g. indemnity payments, housing defects) it was essentially this deficit in local services and facilities that characterized resident protest in Hospitalet as a whole, as well as in Can Serra.



	Council-Developer Collaboration	Council	GBPC	Arch. Coll Residents
Phase I	1	-	1	-
Phase II	3	1	2	-
Phase IX	1	-	2	1
Phase X	-	2	1	-

Table 26. Critical Points in Phases I, II, IX and X of the Can Serra Case Study : Decision-taking authorities.

Of the six critical points identified in Phase II, it is very possible that all of them involved collaboration with the developers; the decision by the Council to allow a FSR of  $1.75\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$  (PII-3) has been classified as a 'Council' decision, but is probable this was taken in full knowledge of the likely implications for the development of Can Serra, and possibly in direct collaboration with developers. Similarly, we know very little about the power of the developer lobby in the GBPC at the time, and what part they played in the GBPC's Definitive Approval of the Local Plan Modifications.

(7) The Residents' Association undoubtedly played a significant role in the drawing-up and approval of the SPIR for Can Serra, but it is difficult to be sure of their true importance because of the multiplicity of factors involved in the transformation of Council planning policy in Can Serra in 1973.

The Sub-Regional Planning Authority's determination to exert a firm upper-tier development control role and foster improvement initiatives within the framework of the new Sub-Regional Plan and the 1976 Planning Reform Act in many ways pre-empted the sort of mass protest campaign and active involvement in decision-making that were evident in the San Cosme case study. Nevertheless, the Residents' Association in collaboration with the Architects' College and the local Church,<sup>115</sup> emerged as an action group whose continual hounding of the Council (which has, if anything gained impetus with the moves to democracy<sup>116</sup>) for the implementation of improvements and participation in the general public debate can be viewed as an effective counter-weight to the

<sup>115</sup> The Catholic Church in Can Serra Avenue was built in 1974 in the plot ceded to the Council by the ABA group in 1970 (PII-25). The local priest and church-goers were foremost in the foundation of the Residents' Association in 1974, and helped organise a series of community aid projects (legal advice, night schools for adults, general social welfare) in collaboration with the Association.

<sup>116</sup> Even after the approval of the SPIR in 1977, Mrs Gloria Hernandez, president of the Residents' Association, sent a series of letters to the Council concerning the need for the rapid implementation of the plan and protesting about various aspects of the new road infrastructure.



developer lobby's concern to proceed with the residential development of the zone (see note 108, page 262), which the Council have so far refused to allow.

It is also worth noting that resident protest in 1973-4 was based on specific proposals<sup>117</sup> for the use of 'La Carpa' in the centre of Can Serra, which, with the aid of the College of Architects, were graphically displayed in the exhibition held in the neighbourhood in 1974 (PX-3,4). The subsequent decision by the Council to suspend Building Permit cession in Can Serra and draw-up an improvement plan (PX-6) was seen as a great victory by the residents for their plan proposals.

Although this decision was, in fact, clearly influenced by other factors, particularly the pressure exerted 'from above' by the GBPC, Council officers did, nevertheless, take these resident 'counter-proposals' into consideration in the drawing-up of the SPIR, and the planned rehabilitation of 'La Carpa' (adult education centre, market and public square) closely corresponded to the Residents' Association's demands. To a limited extent then, the Residents' Association did positively contribute to the plan-making process for the SPIR in Can Serra.

#### 6.6.3. The Decision-Making Process

Some major aspects of the decision-making process have already been discussed, and here it is intended to provide a brief summary section structured around the two research hypotheses specifically relating to decision-making. These are :-

- (8) That irregularities in the decision-making process have been commonplace.
- (9) That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

<sup>117</sup> In early 1974, the Residents Association undertook a door to door survey of resident preferences on the future functional use of 'La Carpa', and individual needs as regards gas and electricity supply, sewerage and drainage and street lighting. It was the results of this survey which formed the basis of Exhibition held in Can Serra in 1974, in conjunction with the College of Architects, who provided a draft plan for the installation of a market, adult training centre and public parks in 'La Carpa'.

(8) and (9) The decision-making process in the planning and implementation of development in Can Serra up to 1973 is characterized by irregularities and contraventions that had an accumulative effect on the nature of development on the ground. A succession of irregularities (Table 27) within the planning process opened up the way for a series of stages of re-planning, at an increasingly small developmental scale, that resulted in an ever greater divergence from the content of the original plan (Figure 114).

- Draft Local Plan for the Mountain Sector used to 'justify' reclassification of 'urban park' zone for residential development (PI-2, 4, 7, 8).
- January 1963 ruling by Hospitalet Council that a Floor Space Ratio of  $1.75\text{m}^2/\text{m}^2$  could be used in the development of Can Serra was false because a lower Floor Space Ratio had already been established in the 1961 Local Plan (PII-3).
- The Local Plan was modified in 8 separate modification plans. No provision is made in the 1956 Act for such replanning, which completely destroyed the physical structure and management function of the Local Plan. Yet these modifications were Initially and Provisionally Approved by Hospitalet Council, and Definitively Approved by the GBPC. (PII-8, 10; and in Phases III - VIII - see Figure 101).
- Building Permits were granted by Hospitalet Council before the necessary Roads and Services Projects were approved and the corresponding infrastructure had been laid, in Phases II-VIII (PII-14; and see Figure 101).
- Development on the ground took place without the Definitive Approval of the Roads and Services Projects (Phase II - 17, 18; see Figures 97 and 101 and Table 20).
- Development on the ground did not match the building layout contained in Local Plan modifications 1, 5, 6 and 7. (see Figures 100 and 102 and Table 19).
- The number of houses built exceeded provisions made in Local Plan Modifications 2 and 3 (see Table 23).
- Hospitalet Council Definitively Approved LPM-8 (PIX-9); but Municipal Council's have no authority to give such approval.

Table 27. Irregularities in, and Contraventions of, Approved Urban Plans or Statutory Planning Procedure in the Can Serra Case Study.




Figure 114. Conceptualization of the Decision-making Process in the Planning and Implementation of Development in Can Serra up to 1973.

The critical points in this process took place at two levels. First, the informal collaborative bargaining between the Council and developers/landowners defined plan objectives, commitment and concessions by both sides, and the provisional procedural course to be followed. Then, the formalised plan-making and approval processes (usually accompanied by an Act of Mutual Agreement) established a quasi-legal framework within which the bargaining process could proceed. And this alternation between informal collaborative bargaining and its pseudo-legal formalisation concerned generally smaller units of physical development and less significant procedural formalizations as mutual commitment, development on the ground and its bureaucratic processing progressed (Figure 114).

Up until 1973, then, irregularities in the decision-making process were indeed commonplace. After 1973, however, the Council exerted a far stricter development control role, with the result that a brake was put on the type of collaborative exchange and its pseudo-legal formalisation, as discussed above. In the drawing-up and approval of the SPIR, then, decision-making followed a more regular, statutorily controlled course, with critical points occurring with the Council/GBPC initiative to embark on a new policy initiative and the subsequent plan approval stages in the formalised planning process (see Figure 111).



## CHAPTER 7

### CASE STUDY 3 : INDUSTRIAL ZONE NO. 2, MOLINS DE REY

This case study concerns the planning and development of a 34 hectare industrial estate - 'Industrial Zone No. 2' - in the municipality of Molins de Rey (see Figures 31 and 46) over the period 1960-79. The chapter comprises four sections; the first concerns the introductory background contexts of local level planning and administration in Molins de Rey, and national level legislative control on industrial development. Section two then examines the drawing-up and approval of the Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2 in the early sixties, and section three focuses on the implementation of development in the zone during the period 1962-78. Finally, in section four, a final summary analysis is structured around the research hypotheses stated postulated in Chapter 4.

#### 7.1 Introductory Contexts

This introductory section first examines the local level administrative and developmental settings to the case study in Molins de Rey, and then considers aspects of macro-level legislation that have a direct bearing on the planning and control of industrial development.

##### 7.1.1 The Local Level Administrative and Developmental Contexts.

The settlement of Molins de Rey lies some 11 kilometres from the Barcelona city centre on the eastern banks of the Llobregat Valley, and includes within its municipal boundaries a three kilometre stretch of the Llobregat flood plain and a large expanse of the Tibidabo upland to the east (see Figure 38). Although the municipality's population almost doubled during the period 1960-75 (Table 28), it remains one of the smallest<sup>118</sup> in the Barcelona Sub-Region in population terms.

<sup>118</sup> Of the 28 municipalities in the Sub-Region, eight had lower population figures than Molins in 1975. Hospitalet (280,000) and Prat (51,000) had the 2nd and 8th largest populations respectively.

1960	1964	1967	1970	1975
10,191	11,513	11,692	14,456	19,864

Table 28. Population of Molins de Rey, 1960-75.

Source : Molins de Rey Council, 'Censo de poblacion, anual'.

The Council executive consisted of 12 councillors from 1960, and 15 after 1977 (see note 55, page 124), who served on four main Committees - Finance, Administration, Culture and Public Works - with the last named taking major responsibility for policy decisions relating to planning and development. The permanent staff numbered 18 in 1978 (Figure 115) with the Technical Services Section, headed by the Municipal Architect, dealing with all plan-making and approval procedure. Reports from this Section went directly to the Committee of Public Works for consideration and not via a Planning or Housing Department as was the case in some of the larger Councils.




Figure 115. Departmental Structure, Molins de Rey Council 1978.

The departmental structure of Molins Council remained the same over the period 1960-78, although the number of full time staff increased from 13 in 1960 to 18 in 1978.

The case study area - Industrial Zone No. 2 - is situated to the south of Molins town centre on the Madrid-Barcelona Road (the 'NII', Figure 116). In the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan, a small linear tract of land between the NII road and the parallel running railway line was classified for industrial development, but most of the land adjoining the road was zoned for extensive suburban development (residential/industrial), or to remain as permanent agricultural land (Figure 117).

By 1960, the linear extension of the Molins built-up area along the NII road had seen the development of the thin strip of land zoned for 'extensive suburban development' on the north-eastern side of the road; but the small 'industrial zone' to the south remained largely undeveloped, as did the large expanses of agricultural land on the south-western side of the NII (Figure 118). As we shall see below, it was in these tracts of land, on both sides of the road, that Molins Council planned the development of a new industrial zone in the early sixties, to complement the existing industrial zone, on the other side of town (see Figure 116), which by the late fifties had been fully developed.

#### 7.1.2 The Planning and Control of Industrial Development.

The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act established that any new 'estate' development in a green field site required the prior approval of a Local Plan and Roads and Services Project, and that the construction of any edifice, for whatever purpose, required the prior granting of a Building Permit by the local Council. Apart from this, however, the 1956 Act left the land use classifications and accompanying regulations contained in each General Plan, to set the standards for the control and functional use of development.

The 1953 Sub-Regional Plan for Barcelona included three different land use classifications for industrial zones ('Light Industry', 'Heavy Industry' and 'Dispersed and Dangerous Industry'), whilst the majority of primarily residential classifications contained in the plan also allowed for limited industrial development. Micro-level




Figure 116. Location of Industrial Zone No. 2, within the Municipality of Molins de Rey.







Figure 117. Land-use Classifications south of Molins de Rey in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan.

Source : Comision de Urbanismo de Barcelona, 'Plan General de Ordenacion Urbana de Barcelona y Su Comarca', CUB, 1953.



Figure 118. Aerial Photograph of  
Development to south of Molins  
town centre 1961.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation  
of Barcelona.





LOCATION		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C A T E G O R Y	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	3						Power maximum (Horsepower)
		25	200						Maximum ground- space (m <sup>2</sup> )
		40	45						Noise limitation (Decibells)
	2	NO	6	15	25				H/P
		NO	200	400	400				m <sup>2</sup>
		-	45	50	55				Dbs.
	3	NO	15	25	50	100			HP
		NO	600	1000	1500	2000			m <sup>2</sup>
		-	90	70	70	90			Dbs.
	4	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	unlimited	unlimited	HP
		NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	unlimited	unlimited	m <sup>2</sup>
		-	-	-	-	-	100	unlimited	Dbs.

Category 1 - Industry that in no way is unsuitable for installation in or alongside housing.

Category 2 - Industry compatible with housing.

Category 3 - Industry that is in some ways unsuitable for installation alongside housing.

Category 4 - Industry incompatible with housing.

Location 1 - In-house on the 1st floor.

Location 2 - In-house on the ground floor or in an annex to the house.

Location 3 - In workshops or independent buildings, in the backyard or interior patio.

Location 4 - In separate buildings, with frontage onto the street.

Location 5 - In industrial blocks or in buildings isolated by free space areas.

Location 6 - In industrial zones.

Location 7 - Isolated in non-built up areas.

Table 29. Regulations for the Control of industry in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan.

Source : 'Ley de 3 de Diciembre de 1953, sobre ordenacion urbana de Barcelona y Su Comarca', Boletin Oficial del Estado, 26th Dec., 1953, P. 1904, Articles 21 and 22.

control was exercised through the accompanying regulations which specified noise, machinery power and ground space limitations, in a matrix of four industry types and seven micro-locations (Table 29). For each land-use classification allowing for industrial development, the micro-location and category type of permitted industry was specified. In land-use classifications 16 (Heavy Industry) and 17 (Light Industry), for example, categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 in locations 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were permitted, whereas in the primarily residential classifications stricter limits on micro-location and category type were established.

Whilst the Building Permit system could be used to enforce controls on factory size and structure, the 1955 Local Government Act and the 1961 Industries Act introduced an Industrial Licence system to control and regulate the installation of machinery. The 1955 Act established the procedure whereby the 'opening of activities' in industrial or commercial establishments required the prior attainment of an Industrial Licence from the Local Council. The 1961 Industries Act, however, refined this procedure through the introduction of a four-way classification of industries ('unpleasant', 'unhealthy', 'noxious' and 'dangerous') which had previously appeared (in part) in former industrial legislation,<sup>119</sup> and which approximately coincided with the four-way categorization of industry used in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan. In the 1961 Act, however, an attempt was made to consolidate and co-ordinate previous planning and industrial legislation, and the Provincial Technical Services Commissions (organs of the Provincial Governments) were made responsible for upper-tier vetting of Industrial Licence cession. The Act read as follows :-

"Industries Regulated by the Act:-

Unpleasant industries are those that cause a nuisance because of their noise level, vibrations, or atmospheric emissions.

Unhealthy industries are those that constitute a danger to human health because of effluent and/or emissions of any kind.

<sup>119</sup> The 1925 'Regulation and Nomenclature of Industries Act' introduced a three-way classification of industry into 'unhealthy', 'unpleasant' and 'dangerous' industries.



Noxious industries are those that may endanger agricultural or forest areas or livestock or fish populations, on account of effluent and/or emissions from that industry.

Dangerous industries are those that manufacture, treat, handle or store products that give rise to serious risk of explosion, combustion, radiation or other similar danger to man or property.....

#### Cession of Municipal Industrial Licence:-

Once application has been received, the Mayor may adopt the following resolutions :-

1. Refuse the application because of non-compliance with Urban Plans or Municipal Regulations.
2. Instigate, within 30 days, the following procedures :-
  - a) Open a Public Information Stage of 10 days in which complaints or observations relating to the application can be presented to the Council,
  - b) Submit application to the Local Public Health Officer and to Municipal technicians for corresponding reports.

The application, along with reports mentioned above and any complaint presented during the Public Information Stage will be forwarded to the Provincial Technical Services Commission.

The Provincial Technical Services Commission will classify the industry in accordance with these regulations, following consultation with the Civil Governor and relevant authorities.

1. The Provincial Commission will then consider reports from relevant authorities concerning safety measures that need to be incorporated into the proposed installation.
2. The Provincial Commission can accept these or reject them as being unsatisfactory". (184)

In summary, then, the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act provided the machinery for the planning and implementation of industrial estates, but at plant level the installation of industrial machinery was subject to control through Industrial Licence cession, just as building regulations could be enforced through Building Permit cession (and subsequent Certificates of Inspection). Whilst the land zone classification system of the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan contained its own controls on industrial development, the 1961 Industries Act

introduced a complementary control system based essentially on environmental considerations. Let us now turn to examine how these various planning and control mechanisms functioned in the planning and implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2, Molins de Rey.

## 7.2 The 1961 Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2 : Plan-making and Approval Processes.

In 1960 there existed just five industrial establishments<sup>120</sup> along the NII road, south of the Bonet River (Figure 118), attracted by the availability of cheap land, as the long-established industrial zone to the north of the town centre (Figure 116) had become increasingly congested in the fifties. At the same time, the major tract of land classified for industrial development in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan remained largely inaccessible, situated on high ground to the south of the town centre, and cut off from the NII road by the Barcelona-Zaragoza railway line (Figure 117).

As already noted, however (Chapter 3.3), the settlements in the Llobregat valley were ideally situated for the location (or re-location) of light, market-orientated ('footloose') industries in the Sub-Region. Molins lay along the major natural routeway into and out of the Barcelona conurbation, and was sufficiently close to feed on its market and labour supply potential; at the same time, there remained large expanses of undeveloped land in the Llobregat valley, and land prices were relatively low.<sup>121</sup>

<sup>120</sup> These were Jose Carbonell S.A. (brick works - see Figure 131); S.A.E. Wander (Dietic products - see Figure 119); Llopió - Bovilla, now Tercobar Cerámica (ceramics - see Figures 119 and 131); Industrias Potax S.A., now Glucosa y Derivados S.A. (starch production); and SAIDA (food production and canning).

<sup>121</sup> As Figure 40 shows, the price of land classified for industrial development in Molins was about one third of the comparable figure for the Barcelona city centre in 1970. It is also interesting to note that land-prices within Industrial Zone No. 2 increased from 4.25 pts/palm in 1953 (Carbonell S.A.), to 30 pts/palm in 1962 (La Familia) and to 225 pts/palm in 1976 (Esteve Rovira); in a recently undertaken doctoral thesis, Maragall found that the real price of land in the Sub-Region increased by a factor of 40 over the period 1951-78. (P. Maragall 'Els preus del sol, el cas de Barcelona', doctoral thesis, University of Barcelona, 1978.




Figure 119. Pre-1961 Buildings in Industrial Zone No. 2.

On the town side of the industrial zone, S.A.E. Wander (dietic products) and Llopis-Bovilla (ceramics) built factories in the fifties on land that was then classified for Extensive Suburban Development (Figure 117). Although new extensions were built in the sixties and seventies, most of the pre-'61 buildings remain today. In the background is the high ground beyond the Barcelona-Zaragoza railway, zoned for industrial development in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan but reclassified as 'permanent open space' in



Nevertheless, the tracts of land immediately adjoining the NII were not all appropriately classified for industrial development, and although the NII was a major national road<sup>122</sup> on the Madrid-Barcelona-S. France route, the zone was lacking in the basic service infrastructure (street lighting, covered drainage, service roads etc) generally required by industrialists. In January, 1961, therefore, Molins Council approved a resolution by which it was agreed to put the Municipal Architect "in charge of drawing-up a Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2, covering the area between the River Bonet and the Municipal boundary with San Feliu, with the objective of bringing about the full industrial development of the area" (185; PI-1, Figure 120).

By May 1961 the plan (Figures 121 and 122) had been 'drawn-up (PI-2); linear tracts of land on both sides of the NII road were reclassified for the installation of 'light industry' with wedges of 'urban park' isolating the industrial zone from the town centre to the north, and from the San Feliu municipality to the south. The plan also included a major new diagonal road (and a series of service roads) linking the NII with the proposed course of the third ring road round Barcelona. This ring road, and the other two inner ring roads, were included in the Ministry of Public Works road investment programme, and it was the Ministry who were responsible for constructing these major roads. The plan report noted, then, that "it is supposed that the new ring road and the diagonal link road will be built and financed by the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Public Works; but the service roads will be built by landowners under the 'co-operative system' established in the 1956 Planning Act" (186).

As regards new service infrastructure, new sewerage, street lighting and water supply networks were depicted in the Local Plan to run along and under all new roads as well as the NII (Figure 122). The plan report noted, however, that

"At present there exists a series of ditches used for the drainage and irrigation of agricultural land ... The diversion, infilling or modification of these ditches is the responsibility of landowners, but under no circumstances may the interests of fellow users of these service ditches, inside or outside the plan area, be harmed. The Council will facilitate, as far as possible, the installation of a new drainage system within the road network, but the financing of such a project remains with the landowners". (187)

122 The Spanish 'N' roads are equivalent in status (although not in quality) to Britain's 'A' roads.








Figure 121. The 'Plan of Information' from the Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2.

Note existing industries (shaded block) and the extensive network of open drainage and irrigation ditches.

Source : A. Domingo (Municipal Architect, Molins Council) 'Plan Parcial de Zona Industrial No. 2', Molins Council, 1961 (Mimeo).




Figure 122. Land use Classification and Service Provision in the Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2, 1961.

The Planning Regulations accompanying the Local Plan also specified a minimum plot frontage of 20 metres and a minimum plot area of 600m<sup>2</sup>. The Regulations stressed that developers would first have to obtain Building Permits, and, as appropriate, Industrial Licences, from the Council before development could take place; 'noxious' or 'dangerous' industries would, as a rule, not be permitted in the zone although "noxious industries may be allowed, when they meet certain conditions demanded by the Municipal Engineer" (188). Finally it was emphasised that "inspection by the municipal authorities may be carried out at any time to ensure the exact compliance with the corresponding Building Permits and Industrial Licences" (189).

The Local Plan followed the standard statutory plan approval procedure (Figure 120). In May, 1961, on the recommendation of the Committee of Public Works, the plan was Initially Approved by the Full Council (PI-3). During the ensuing Public Information Stage (PI-4), no appeals were presented, and following Provisional Approval by the Council in August 1961 (PI-5), the plan was forwarded to the GBPC.

In March 1962, the Sub-Regional Authority gave Definitive Approval to the plan (PI-6), but only on the condition that certain modifications be made. Most important of these was a reduction in the size of the plan area to exclude the triangular land area between the proposed ring road and the diagonal link road with the NII (see Figure 122); at the same time, the GBPC ruled that the small southern most block depicted in the Local Plan was not to be built up, to "allow for possible changes in the exact course of the link road with the proposed ring road" (190). The minimum plot size and frontage were increased to 40 metres and 2,500m<sup>2</sup> respectively; and Molins Council had to draw-up a 'Plan of Stages', giving precise time projections for the implementation of service infrastructure in the zone. The GBPC noted, however, that although Molins Council had to make these modifications, it would not be necessary to return the revised plan to the Commission for approval.



In summary, let us attempt to identify the significant aspects of the plan-making and approval processes described above. The Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2 reclassified 'permanent agricultural land' (rural land) for industrial development and the approval of the plan thus constituted a technical contravention of the 1956 Planning Act. In many ways, however, this seemed justified by the inaccessibility of the tract of land zoned for such development east of the Barcelona-Zaragoza railway (Figure 117). More importantly, however, and particularly in the light of subsequent events, the plan was non-committal or vague about the means of financing and implementing the service infrastructure systems. The absence of a 'Roads and Services Project' to programme and cost out the provision of service infrastructure in the zone, and the Council's subsequent failure to draw-up the 'Plan of Stages' demanded by the GBPC, was a tacit admission of the Council's laissez-faire attitude to this aspect of development, that was to have major implications for the form of subsequent industrial growth in the zone.

The decision-making process involved in the drawing-up and approval of the Local Plan was simple and uncomplicated, and generally followed the procedural course established in the 1956 Planning Act. The reclassification of 'rural land' for industrial development was a technical contravention of planning law, but as already noted, this was in many ways acceptable given the inappropriate zonings of 1953 Sub-Regional Plan. By reclassifying land for industrial development, Molins Council were really ~~just~~ trying to set the development process in motion, and the Definitive Approval of the plan (albeit in reduced form) by the GBPC emerges as the 'critical point' which legalised and consolidated this first step in the development of the zone. This simplistic, blue-print, form of planning, however, paid scant regard to the need to co-ordinate industrial development with the provision of back-up infrastructural systems, apart from through the enforcement of the Building Permit and Industrial Licence systems, at plot level. Let us now turn, then, to see how these control mechanisms functioned in the implementation of development in the zone in the period after 1962.

### 7.3 The Implementation of Development in Industrial Zone No. 2.

The implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2 proceeded at a steady pace throughout the sixties and seventies, with 90% of the plan area being occupied by 1978. In this section, an overview of the development of the zone during this period is given, and the functioning of the planning and control mechanisms at micro-level is considered. The second sub-section then looks at service provision in the zone as a whole, and focuses on the decision-making process in the planning and implementation of the street lighting project in the period 1970-73, this being the major infrastructural development in the zone over the past two decades. Finally, the summary analysis identifies the key aspects of planning and implementation over the period as a whole.

#### 7.3.1 Factory and Warehouse Development, 1962-78 : Building Permit and Industrial Licence Cession.

Between 1961 and 1978, a total of 31 Building Permits and 23 Industrial Licences were granted by Molins Council for the construction of factories and warehouses, and the installation of industrial machinery, in Industrial Zone No. 2 (Table 30). By the late seventies most of the area classified for industry in the 1962 Local Plan had been developed (Figure 123), and Building Permits had been granted for plant construction in the few remaining undeveloped plots.

Discussion with Council personnel in the Technical Services Section suggested that it was neither practical nor necessary<sup>123</sup> to study in detail the bureaucratic processing of each and every Building Permit and Industrial Licence application to build in the zone. Instead this process was studied in detail as it affected one factory - that was built by SAIDA, a food processing and canning firm - and this is summarised graphically and verbally in the Decision Stage Chart (Figure 124). From this detailed study, and a more general review of Permit and Licence cession in the zone as a whole (combined

<sup>123</sup> In this context, the author is indebted to Sn. Luis Trapero, Municipal Architect, and Sn. Jose Bernis, Municipal Engineer, for their reviews of Permit and Licence procedure in the zone.

<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>BUILDING PERMIT(S)</u>	<u>PRODUCT</u>	<u>INDUSTRIAL LICENCE(S)</u>	<u>CLASSIFICATION BY PTSC</u>
1. Ampresa	21.2.64	Steel Manufacture	5.11.71	Unpleasant
2. Balanzo Textile	16.1.74	Cotton Cloth Manufacture	3.8.71	Unpleasant
3. Carbonell S.A.	Buildings pre-61	Brick Works	-	-
4. Covema Bandero	16.10.63	Machinery Manufacture	17.9.65	Unpleasant
5. Exin Line Bros	(i) 31.1.68 (ii) 5.4.68	Toy Manufacture Toy Manufacture	(i) 3.8.71 (ii) 23.7.72 (iii) 6.5.75	Unpleasant Unpleasant and Unhealthy Unpleasant & Dangerous
6. Felix Esteve Rovira	28.11.77	Tap Manufacture	24.1.74	Unpleasant & Noxious
7. Finsa (Gallisa)	14.10.69	Aluminium Manufacture	25.5.71	Unpleasant
8. Forcadell Fortuny	19.9.74	-	-	-
9. Glucos Derivados S.A. (Nortedux)	Buildings pre-61 (i) 25.9.63 (Extension) (ii) 6.3.72 (Extension)	Starch production Storage tanks and silo	(i) 7.10.65 (ii) 5.1.76	Unpleasant & Dangerous Unpleasant & Dangerous
10. Inmoliario Jac S.A.	(i) 9.1.74 (ii) 26.1.76	-	-	-
11. Intermarks S.A. (Vilamontana)	18.11.68	Alcoholic Liquer (Campari)	7.9.71	Unpleasant
12. "La Familia"	(i) 20.11.63 (ii) 10.7.67 (warehouse)	Pasta Manufacture	14.9.65	Unpleasant
13. Llopis Cervello (Tercobar Ceramica)	Buildings pre-61 20.12.68 (warehouse extension)	-	-	-
14. Macia Vidal	23.12.74	Metal Workshop/ lamp accessories	20.12.74	Unpleasant & Noxious
15. Pevya (Pedro Puig)	22.10.73 2.6.75 (extension)	Pharmaceutical Manufacture and Research Facilities	18.10.69 -	Unpleasant & Dangerous -
16. Pou Puig (Rentisa)	10.10.77	-	-	-
17. Roca Molins	5.6.67	-	-	-
18. S.A.E. Wander	Buildings pre-61 12.6.72 (Extension)	Dietic products Dietic products Pharmaceuticals	6.10.65 (new installation) 17.9.65 11.11.75	Unpleasant and Dangerous Unpleasant Unpleasant
19. Saida	(i) 7.6.61 (ii) 22.5.63	Food Products Mayonnaise production	(i) 23.11.61 (ii) 19.7.65 (iii) 9.3.71	- Unpleasant Unpleasant
20. San Miguel	13.9.67 (warehouse)	Beer and malt products	-	-
21. Serres Bosch	20.11.63	Slaughter House (Poul & Poultry)	19.4.72	Unpleasant and Unhealthy
22. Talleres Monterde	(i) 1.4.75 (ii) 6.7.76 (Extension) (iii) 14.1.76 (Extension)	Construction of machinery for cement industry	6.3.67 -	Unpleasant
23. Valles Llopart	27.11.72	Car repair workshop	20.7.72	Unpleasant & Dangerous
24. Xey S.A.	16.9.74	-	-	-

Table 30. Building Permit and Industrial Licence Cession in Industrial Zone No. 2, 1961-78.

Industrial buildings occupied by the numbered manufacturers are shown on Figure 123.

Data Source : Molins de Rey Council (Technical Services Section).

with first hand accounts from Council staff) certain common features emerged.

Following the approval of the Local Plan, parcels of land adjoining the NII were sold off<sup>124</sup> to industrialists at a steady rate throughout the sixties and early seventies. The majority of firms moving into the zone have been established light engineering or manufacturing companies, seeking new premises outside the Barcelona conurbation. In the processing of Building Permit and Industrial Licence applications, decision-making has generally followed the procedural guidelines laid down in the 1956 Planning Act and the 1961 Industries Act, with Molins Council and the Provincial Technical Services Commission (PTSC) acting as development control authorities to ensure that plant construction and machinery installation complied with the size and safety standards specified in the 1962 Local Plan and 1961 Industries Act. Nevertheless, six industries classified as 'dangerous' by the PTSC (Table 30) were granted municipal Industrial Licences, thereby contradicting the 1962 Local Plan, which stipulated that such industries would not be allowed in the zone. At the same time, the Municipal Architect readily admitted that shortage of the necessary staff meant that only occasionally were post-construction inspections carried out to check that development on the ground had actually taken place in accordance with Building Permits or Industrial Licences.

Despite the steady growth of industry in the zone, basic service infrastructure - service roads, water, drainage, sewerage and street lighting systems - has remained generally inadequate, and this will be examined in more detail below. Here, however, it is appropriate to examine the legal requirements for the cession of Building Permits and Industrial Licences as regards the provision that had to be made for such service infrastructure at individual plot level.

<sup>124</sup> It proved difficult to establish the property boundaries in Industrial Zone No. 2 prior to the approval of the Local Plan, but at least six separate landowners were involved. Equally, it is not easy to be sure of their exact role in the promotion of the Local Plan in the late fifties; officially, the Local Plan was promoted by the Council, but the reclassification of tracts of agricultural land for industrial development on the river-side of the NII undoubtedly increased its developmental potential and market value, despite the absence of basic service infrastructure, and this suggests that informal lobbying by landowners probably played a part in the Council's decision to draw-up the Local Plan.






Figure 123. Factory and Warehouse Development in Industrial Zone No. 2, 1978.

Details of Building Permit and Industrial Licence cession for numbered industries are given in Table 30.

Data Source : Technical Services Section, Molins de Rey Council.




Figure 124. Building Permit and Industrial Licence Cession for the new SAIDA factory, 1962-65 (Molins, Phase II) : Decision Stage/ Process Flow Chart.

We have already noted (Chapter 2.2.3) that the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act stated that "road surfacing and paving, and water, sewage and street lighting systems" (191) had to be planned and implemented prior to the residential development of an area. Article 67 of the Act added, however, that "the construction of buildings to be used for industrial purposes may be authorized, in the appropriate zones, when safety and health considerations are sufficiently attended to, and the landowner accepts the responsibilities and obligations associated with the co-operative system of intervention" (192). Here, then, the Act was, in effect, condoning the installation of industry before the provision of basic service infrastructure, so long as health and safety were not threatened, and landowners had a long-term (theoretical) commitment to subsequently co-operate with each other and the Council in the provision of such infrastructure; what happened in practice, of course, was that much of this service infrastructure was never built, and what was built tended to be rather provisional and generally inadequate.

In Industrial Zone No. 2, it was in many ways inevitable that development would take place in this manner, given the multiplicity of industrialists, the resultant piecemeal development of the area, and the absence of any development agency<sup>125</sup> to finance and manage the comprehensive provision of service infrastructure in the zone as a whole. Throughout the sixties and seventies, factories and warehouses were built in the zone, on a plot by plot basis, and only the most essential and basic services, - i.e. those necessary to guarantee the functioning of the plant (road access, crude loading and unloading facilities, drainage ditch and power supply for manufacturing) were installed.

<sup>125</sup> It is of interest of note here that one of the main functions of the National Institute of Urban Development, founded within the Ministry of Housing in 1959, (see Chapter 2.3) was to provide 'urbanised' estates (i.e. with service infrastructure laid on) for subsequent residential and industrial development by the private sector. Of their 340 'action areas' the majority were located in the Madrid Sub-Region or in the designated growth poles in the south and west of the country; not one was located in the Barcelona Sub-Region. For more detail on the Institute's activities, see INUR, La Creacion del Suelo Urbano, MOPU, Madrid, 1978.

The Building Permit and Industrial Licence applications, in fact, made no pretence as to the likely standard of service infrastructure, and we have already noted the vagueness of the Local Plan on this matter. The SAIDA factory, for example, was located away from the NII road, alongside an open drainage ditch (Riera de Can Pahisa) which cut the plot off from the obvious access way to the NII, via SAIDA's existing plant (Figure 125). Yet in the bureaucratic processing of the Building Permit and Industrial Licence applications, no reference was made to the 'external'<sup>126</sup> requirements of development, such as road access, drainage, street lighting, landscaping, sewerage etc. Instead, as elsewhere in the zone, the industrialist was left to provide and improve these facilities as best he could, sometimes in ad hoc collaboration with the Council and other industrialists. The resultant development of the zone as a whole was haphazard, fragmentary and generally poor in the provision of service infrastructure (Figure 126), and it is this aspect of development which we will now examine in more systematic fashion.

### 7.3.2. The Implementation of Service Infrastructure in Industrial Zone No. 2.

We have seen above how the Building Permit and Industrial Licence controls failed to ensure the provision of the service infrastructure systems depicted in the 1962 Local Plan. Nevertheless some progress, at least, was made on the provision of roads, drainage, water supply and street lighting systems and it is to these that we now turn.

<sup>126</sup> The Building Permit application for the SAIDA factory contained details of factory location, size, height, proposed building materials, foundations, structure and design, ventilation, lighting and cost; the Industrial Licence application provided details of location, type of activity, estimated production, cost of installation, noise levels, lighting, water points for fire emergency, and power requirements. The municipal Technical Services section solicited no further information except that required by the PTSC which concerned the quality of material to be used in the storage of wine vinegar, the purpose of a sterilizing unit and precautionary measures to be taken to prevent contamination of finished and semi-finished goods. All these aspects of development, although important, largely concerned the 'internal' functioning of the plant.






Figure 125. The SAIDA Building Permit Application : Plan of Location.

Apart from this location plan, the Building Permit application contained very little reference to site conditions. In fact, the Riera de Pahisa was subsequently diverted to facilitate more direct access to the NII road.

Source : Ignacio Mas Brosa 'Solicitud de permiso de obras para la fabrica de SAIDA, carretera NII, Molins de Rey', Molins Council (mimeo), 1962.




Figure 126. Industrial Zone No. 2 - Typically haphazard development behind the NII road, 1978. (Photograph : M.G. Wynn).

Improvement in the drainage system in the zone has been restricted (as the Local Plan documentation suggested it would be) by the interdependence and complexity of the pre-existing network of drainage and irrigation channels (see Figure 121). To the east of the NII road, industrialists, working informally in conjunction with the Municipal Engineer, have diverted and straightened the Infanta Canal and some of the more minor westward flowing drainage channels, by and large to facilitate easier plot access and development. In similar fashion, three small service roads have been built although one of these was not included in the 1962 Local Plan (Figure 122 and 127 and 128). In the early seventies, the Council embarked on the covering of drainage ditches running along the NII road as a preliminary to the installation of street lighting along the road, which is discussed below. In general, however, the straightening and covering of drainage ditches was done on a very ad hoc, informal basis that did not correspond to the systems depicted in the 1962 Local Plan, nor to any other bureaucratically processed plan or project. It must be remembered, of course, that the GBPC's reduction in the Local Plan area in 1962 (PI-6) meant that the Ministry of Public Works were excluded as a possible (and very powerful) development agency in the implementation of the proposed service infrastructure systems. In the light of subsequent events, the GBPC's decision was clearly justified, as the third ring road was never built, although a new motorway running up the Llobregat valley, linking Barcelona with Tarragona, was built in the late sixties, several hundred metres further west, nearer to the Llobregat river (Figure 129).

The extension of the municipal water supply system in Industrial Zone No. 2 was carried out in the sixties and seventies on a factory basis by private contractors employed by the Council, with each Industrialist being charged for the extension under the 'Special Contributions' system. In 1977, however, the Council installed a new watertower ('Solera') on the northern side of the Industrial Zone, and the Municipal Engineer is now working on drawing-up a more extensive network to serve the entire zone, which again differs somewhat from the network depicted in the 1962 Local Plan (see Figures 122 and 127).






Figure 127. Service Infrastructure in Industrial Zone No. 2, 1978.






Figure 128. New Service Road, Industrial Zone No. 2.

The road, not included in the 1962 Local Plan was constructed and financed by industrialists Forcadell Fortuny to open-up back access to their two storage warehouses in the mid-seventies. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn).

It was really only as regards street lighting that the service proposals of the 1962 Local Plan have been implemented in a planned systematic fashion. Between 1970 and 1973, the municipal authorities planned and managed the installation of street lighting in the NII road (although not in the side roads as shown in the 1962 Local Plan), and we will now turn to examine in detail the decision-making process involved in this project.

By 1970, although the Barcelona-Tarragona motorway had been constructed, the NII was still used by a large amount of local traffic requiring a more direct route to the Barcelona city centre, as well as lorry traffic coming to and from the industrial zone. An archaic gas lamp system existed on the NII from Molins town centre to the Bonet river (Figure 129), but there was no street lighting at all in the industrial zone. In December, 1970, therefore, the Full Council, on the recommendation of the Committee of Public Works, agreed to put the Municipal Engineer in charge of drawing-up a Street Lighting Project to cover three contiguous stretches of the NII, from the town centre to the municipal boundary with San Feliu (PIII-1, Figure 130).

By February, 1971, the Municipal Engineer had completed the Street Lighting Project. In the accompanying Plan Report, the need for a new street lighting system was argued as follows:-

"The existing street lights in the Madrid-France road are old and unsatisfactory in that they do not comply with existing regulations regarding uniformity and strength of street illumination, and clearly do not meet the needs of vehicles and pedestrians. These lights exist on the NII road from the town centre as far as the Bonet River, but the entire stretch of 1,120 metres that runs through Industrial Zone No. 2 has no street lighting at all. With only one pedestrian subway in the entire stretch of the NII, the crossing of the road at night presents certain dangers for pedestrians" (193).

The Municipal Engineer therefore suggested that new street lighting be installed along the NII road in three stages, one of which covered Industrial Zone No. 2. The Plan Report elaborated as follows :-






Figure 129. Aerial Photograph of the NII road, south of Molins, 1970.

The Industrial Zone (in part) is in the top right hand corner of the photograph; note that new motorway, constructed by the Ministry of Public Works in the late sixties, alongside the Llobregat valley.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona.






Figure 130. Planning and Implementation of the Street Lighting Project in the NII road. 1970-73 : Decision Stage Chart (Molins : Phase III)



"The characteristics and needs of the three sections are different. In the upper section, there is an abundance of commercial buildings, houses and wide pavements, whilst the middle section is something of a transitional zone between the urban and industrial areas. Finally, the lower section, stretching from the Bonet River to the edge of the green zone, runs through an exclusively industrial area, with all industry aligned along the axis of the road. Four new transformer stations will be built to power the new lighting system ....

The proposed alignment of street lighting in Industrial Zone No. 2 interferes with the existing drainage ditch on the River side of the road and a new drainage system will have to be built" (194).

The Plan report also noted that in accordance with the 1955 Local Government Act and the 1956 Planning Act, Municipal Street Lighting projects could be financed through the imposition of 'Special Contributions'<sup>127</sup> to provide up to 80% of the initial capital outlay, once the project had been completed. In March 1971, therefore, the Full Council, on recommendation of the Committee of Public Works, Initially Approved the Street Lighting Project (as a Roads and Services Project<sup>128</sup>) and an estimated budgetary allocation of 3.4 million pesetas (\$56,000) to pay for the works, of which over a third (1.2 million pesetas) was to be used for street lighting in the stretch of the NII passing through Industrial Zone No. 2 (PIII-4). The Public Information Stage was opened the same month (PIII-5) and, as no appeals were presented, the Project was Provisionally and Definitively approved by the Council and the GBPC respectively (PIII-6, 8).

Meanwhile, as the Council's Technical Services Section (and Committee of Public Works) were guiding the Project through the

<sup>127</sup> We have already noted (Chapter 2.2.4) that these 'Special Contributions' could be claimed from beneficiaries as part of the 'cession of roads' system of intervention. Article 49 of the 1955 Local Government Act also specified that Councils could use this system as a means of recouping up to 80% of capital outlay on infrastructural projects, such as street lighting, drainage, water supply etc.

<sup>128</sup> A 'Roads and Services Project' ('proyecto de urbanizacion') did not have to cover all aspects of road and service infrastructure, although when used in the planning and development of a green field site, it invariably did. In this case, then, the use of the 'Roads and Service Project' to plan and cost out only street lighting infrastructure was quite within the terms of the 1956 Planning Act.

statutorily regulated stages of plan approval, the Chief Auditor and Finance Committee members were negotiating with the Provincial Government ('Diputacion') for a one million pesetas interest free loan, to be repaid over a 10-year period, to provide almost one third of the necessary finance for the entire street lighting project. Official Confirmation of this loan was not received until July 1971, (PIII-11) but on the basis of an earlier unofficial agreement<sup>129</sup> between the authorities (PIII-3), 'Special Contributions' to be claimed from landowners directly benefiting from the installation of street lighting were worked out and approved by the Full Council in April 1971 (PIII-7). This approval was in turn submitted to a Public Information Stage of 15 days (PIII-9), in which no appeals were presented, and then Definitively Approved by the Council<sup>130</sup> in June 1971 (PIII-10).

Following a delay of a year in which the drainage ditches immediately bordering the NII road (see Figure 121) were straightened and covered by the Council (Figure 131; PIII-12), the contract for all three stages of the Street Lighting Project was put out to tender in September 1972, through advertisement in the Official Bulletin of the Province and the local press (PIII-13). Within the specified one month time period, seven companies forwarded estimates to the

<sup>129</sup> It proved difficult to ascertain exactly how and when this loan was secured (unofficially) by Molins Council, but it appears that it was taken as agreed by February 1971, when the 'Special Contributions' were estimated; it seems quite likely, in fact that preliminary negotiations were opened with the Provincial Government prior to the Council's Resolution of 1970 putting the Municipal Engineer in charge of drawing up the Project (PIII-1), although no reference was made to this in the text of the Resolution nor in the subsequent Plan Report of the Project.

<sup>130</sup> Articles 451 and 470 of the 1955 Local Government Act established that a Public Information Stage of 15 days should be held for the presentation of appeals during the approval of 'Special Contributions' for infrastructural and service projects. The Act also empowered Local Councils to Definitively Approve such arrangements, although affected landowners (the 'beneficiaries') could subsequently appeal to the Provincial Supreme Tribunal (Appeal Court) if they wished.




Figure 131. The NII road, looking south, Industrial Zone No. 2.

As late as 1972, the drainage ditch running along the NII road had not been covered, and was only done so then as a preliminary to implementation of the street lighting project. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn).



Council in a 'first stage' of tendering, in which the municipal authorities assessed the qualifications and capacity of entrant companies (in terms of machinery, work force, time schedule etc) to undertake the work. On this basis, the Municipal Engineer drew-up a short list of 3 companies, who were then invited to make their final financial bids for the contract ('second stage' of tendering). Of the three bids,<sup>131</sup> that of 'Industrias Iluminacion Rouras S.A.' was the lowest (2.7 million pesetas), and on the recommendation of the Municipal Engineer and Committee of Public Works, the award of the contract to this company was approved by the Full Council in December 1972 (PIII-14).

The contractor's budget represented a 15% reduction on the Council's original estimate, and in January 1973 the Council approved revised (downward) 'Special Contributions' figures which were to be levied from the 'beneficiaries' of the street lighting installation (Table 31; PIII-15). By March, the contractors were on site and following inspection by Council Officers, the completed works were officially 'accepted' by the Council in August (PIII-16, 17), denoting the Council's satisfaction that the terms of the contract had been complied with. Let us now turn to analyse more critically the processes involved in the planning and implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2 during the period 1962-78.

### 7.3.3 Industrial Zone No. 2, 1962-78: Summary Analysis

The implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2 between 1962 and 1978 consisted of the piecemeal growth of industry in the zone and the haphazard, incomplete and non-co-ordinated provision of back-up service infrastructure. This was the product of weaknesses in the form and content of approved plans, and the planning system in general, rather than being directly due to irregularities in the decision-making process that accompanied implementation on the ground.

<sup>131</sup> The other two bids were : Don Pedro Journet Mirabent (3,102,898 pts), and Emtre S.A. (3,263,691 pts).



<u>Proprietor</u>	<u>Frontage to property</u> <u>(metres)</u>	<u>Special</u> <u>Contribution</u> <u>(pesetas)</u>
ROSENDO MITJANS	5.15	2,050
ENCARNACION PENAS GARCIA	4.87	1,939
ANTONIO BELTRAN BELTRAN	10.28	4,092
ANTONIO SABATE MANSANA	7.75	3,085
JAIME CLARAMUNT SALA	7.55	3,006
JAIME CLARAMUNT SALA	15.05	5,991
SALVADOR FORCADELL FORTUNY	122.00	48,567
JOSE CARBONELL CORNEIO	44.00	17,516
ARQUIMEDES MONTERDE DE MIGUEL	97.00	38,614
ANTONIO MASSO URGELLES	56.00	22,293
MIGUEL VALLES LLOPART	19.00	7,564
ROCA MOLINS	58.00	23,089
ESTEBAN OLLE OLLE	71.00	28,264
FRANCISCO MARQUET	31.00	12,341
INTERMARKS S.A. (formerly Jaime Vila Montaffa)	70.00	27,866
ARIDOS SOLER (formerly Dorotea Figueras)	98.00	39,013
D. MOLINS SERRA y R. y T. MARQUET	32.00	12,739
JAIME CLARAMUNT SALA	40.00	15,923
S.A.E. WANDER	37.95	15,107
PABLO LLOPIS FURQUET	13.55	5,394
HERMANOS LLOPIS CERVELLO	171.00	68,073
JUAN SAULA - PASTAS "LA FAMILIA"	80.00	31,847
EMILIO SERRES BOSCH (MATADERO AVES)	19.00	7,564
JUAN SAULA - PASTAS "LA FAMILIA"	24.00	9,554
ACEROS Y MOLDEADOS DE PRECISION S.A. (AMPRESA)	40.00	15,924
EXIN LINES BROS. S.A.	84.00	33,439
FRANCISO MARQUET	87.00	34,634
GLUCOSA Y DERIVADOS S.A. (formerly Potax S.A.)	86.00	34,236
S.A.I.D.A.	99.00	39,411
GLUCOSA Y DERIVADOS S.A. (formerly Emiliana Melchor Perez)	6.00	2,389
CARMEN RIBAS	36.00	14,331
JOSE MONTILLOCH GUITART (formerly F. Claramunt y R. Sala)	48.00	19,108
TOTAL	1,620.15	644,963

Table 31. Revised 'Special Contributions' levied from landowners in Industrial Zone No. 2.

The 'Special Contributions' quotas were estimated on the basis of plot frontage onto the NII road. The total budget for this section of the project was 869,000 pesetas, so 'Special Contributions' financed approximately 75% of the capital cost of the scheme.

Source : Auditors' Report on revised 'Special Contributions' to be levied in Industrial Zone No. 2, 9th January, 1973; approved by Finance Committee on 10th January and by Full Council on 15th January 1973. (File Reference: 'Proyecto de Alumbrado Publico de la Avenida Generalisimo', Intervencion, Molins Council, 1973.)

We have already noted that the approved 1962 Local Plan did little more than reclassify the zone for industrial development and that it made no satisfactory arrangements (as regards sources of finance and management authorities) for the implementation of the schematically depicted service systems. With the area reclassified for industrial development, (and no 'Plan of Stages' drawn-up) the Local Plan played very little further part in determining the nature or order of development. Instead this was regulated at plot level through the Building Permit and Industrial Licence systems which functioned reasonably effectively within the micro-level context of the construction and internal functioning of individual buildings. But as this bureaucratic processing paid very little regard to the 'external' service requirements at plant level, development was allowed to proceed in fragmentary form, leaving service infrastructure in the zone in a lamentable state. Thus, although the Council's approval of Permits and Licences emerge as 'critical points' in the context of individual plant construction (PII-3, 13), the composite picture of the functioning of the Permit and Licence systems is one of a mass of 'localised' decisions which collectively only exacerbated the problems of service provision and the co-ordination and management in the zone as a whole.

The provision of water and power systems was carried out on a plot by plot basis, as was the straightening and covering of drainage ditches away from the NII, and the construction of service roads and loading/unloading bays (Figure 132). Only in the provision of street lighting was implementation undertaken at the level of 'estate' (c.f. individual plot), and in accordance with a bureaucratically approved plan. Here, unlike in the drawing-up and approval of the Local Plan, decision-making was somewhat more complex, reflecting the fact that the Council from the start were actively involved in the financing and management of the project on the ground. Thus, as Figure 133 shows, the plan-making and approval processes were accompanied by negotiations for a loan from the Provincial Government and the estimation and approval of 'Special Contributions' to be levied from landowners ('securing finance'), and followed by tendering and implementation on the ground, with the Council acting as



Figure 132. The Loading/Unloading bay outside the Tercobar Ceramics factory and workshops, on the NII road. (Photograph : M. G. Wynn).

1970

1973


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Plan-Making

Plan Approval

Securing Finance

Tendering

Development 'on  
the ground'.

KEY      ◦ Decision or Act

○ Critical Point

→ Decision Flow

Critical Points

1. Molins Council receive unofficial confirmation of one million peseta loan from Provincial Government (PIII-3).
2. GBPC Provisionally Approve Street Lighting Project (PIII-8).
3. 'Special Contributions' for Street Lighting Project Definitively Approved by Molins Council (PIII-10).

Figure 133. Planning and Implementation of the Street Lighting Process Flow Chart (Molins, Phase III).



supervisory authority. Whilst 'critical points' can be identified within the context of the project itself (Figure 133), it is important to stress that the initiative for the street lighting project had little to do with any directives contained in the 1962 Local Plan, nor was it geared specifically to the progress of development in the industrial zone. Rather, it was one stage in the systematic renewal of an archaic street lighting system that existed in all the municipality and was not, therefore, part of a planned and co-ordinated programme of service provision in Industrial Zone No. 2.

#### 7.4 Final Summary Analysis : Development of the Research Hypotheses.

The Molins de Rey case study is probably the least complex of the three included in the thesis, research findings having a bearing on six of the nine hypotheses postulated in Chapter Four. Let us now turn, then, to consider these hypotheses in three separate sections, concerning, as in previous chapters, 'planning and control mechanisms', 'agency roles and activities', and 'the decision-making process'.

##### 7.4.1 Planning and Control Mechanisms

The two hypotheses to be considered here are :-

- (1) That the Local Plan/Roads and Services Project/Building Permit/Industrial Licence mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of new development in the Franco era.
- (2) That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Planning Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of road and service infrastructure in the implementation of estate development.

(1) In the planning and implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2, the planning and control system as a whole failed to work effectively because of a lack of consistency and interconnectivity between its various component parts, even though individually the various planning and control mechanisms worked reasonably efficiently (Figure 134). Above all, scant regard was paid to the means of




Figure 134. The Functioning of Planning and Control Mechanisms in Theory (above) and in the Molins Case Study.

financing and implementing the service infrastructure systems, to the extent that a Roads and Services Project was not drawn-up to complement the Local Plan, and subsequent Permit and Licence applications failed to satisfactorily attend to such aspects of development.

As already noted, however, (Chapter 7.3.2), the 1956 Planning Act stated that the construction of industrial buildings could proceed so long as "safety and health considerations are sufficiently attended to" (195) and the type of development that resulted in Molins was as much a reflection of the inadequacies and vaguaries of the 1956 Act as of specific contraventions of planning law, although these did play their part (see Table 33). At the same time, the 1956 Planning Act, although vague and open to interpretation in crucial areas<sup>132</sup>, did provide Molins Council and the GBPC with the 'teeth' to have exercised a firmer development control role if they had wished, and the lack of political will (and financial-technical capacity) of Molins Council, particularly, to exert a dominant management and control function also contributed to the ineffective overall functioning of the planning system (Figure 135). We shall return to discuss this below.

(2) The 1962 Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2 put the onus of responsibility on the landowners to finance and manage the provision of new road and drainage systems through the 'co-operative system of intervention'. The plan documentation made no reference, however, to who, when or how the sewage, street lighting and water supply networks depicted in the plan would be implemented, and no complementary Roads and Services Project was drawn-up to provide this information.

<sup>132</sup> We have already noted that the vagueness of the 1956 Act in allowing for the authorization of industrial development so long as 'safety and health considerations' were 'sufficiently attended to'; similarly, neither the 1956 Act nor the 1961 Industries Act specifically stated that Building Permit and Industrial Licence applications had to plan and cost out the provision of complementary service infrastructure (such as drainage, sewage, water etc), and this allowed applications not attending to these aspects of development to be legally approved.




Figure 135. Conceptualization of the Malfunctioning of Planning and Control Mechanisms in the Development of Industrial Zone No. 2.

There was, in fact, no systematic operation of the 'co-operative system' of intervention, in which landowners jointly financed and managed the implementation of road and associated service infrastructure depicted in the Local Plan. As noted above, the phrasing of the 1956 Act meant that landowners only had a vague, theoretical commitment to operate in this way, and without a Roads and Services Project, or the 'Plan of Stages' demanded by the GBPC, there were no specified time projections for service provision. In practice, (Table 32), three service roads were opened as stretches of the open ditch drainage system were straightened and covered, although



<u>Element of Service Infrastructure</u>	<u>Provision in Industrial Zone No. 2</u>	<u>Implementing Authority</u>
Run off and industrial effluent drainage system.	Old irrigation ditches, covered and straightened in places.	Private contractors, financed directly by landowners, with informal collaboration and supervision from Technical Services Section of Molins Council.
Service Roads.	Three new service roads built in conjunction with straightening and covering of old irrigation ditches.	
Sewage system.	Septic tanks only; No sewage works.	Private contractors, financed by individual landowners.
Street Lighting.	Installed along NII road, 1973.	Private company under contract to Molins Council; financed with loan from Provincial Government and 'Special Contributions' levied from landowners. Carried out in accordance with approved Street Lighting Project.
Water supply	Plot by plot extension along NII road as development proceeded.	Private company under contract to Molins Council, with 'Special Contributions' levied from landowners.
Gas Electricity Telephone	Incremental extensions as development of the zone progressed.	Laid on by private companies on request of industrialists.

Table 32. Implementing authorities in the Provision of Service Infrastructure in Industrial Zone No. 2.

as noted above, one of these had not been depicted in the 1962 Local Plan. In general, then, individual industrialists looked after their own needs as best they could, and it was only on the initiative of Molins Council that any attempt was made to provide comprehensive service systems in the zone.

This was done most successfully as regards the installation of street lighting, with the Provincial Government's loan providing sufficient bridging capital for the staged implementation of the project, with 'Special Contributions' being recouped from landowners, once the project was implemented, to finance 75% of capital outlay. The planning and implementation of this project shows how the 'Special Contributions' (Cession of Roads) system can work successfully in practice, but it also underlines the difficulties facing local authorities with such limited financial resources. The securing of the 1 million peseta (£7,000) loan from the Provincial Government (PIII-3, Figure 133) was critical to the success of the scheme, and we have already noted (Chapter 3.5.1) the scarcity of loan facilities available to such small authorities. The installation of street lighting along the NII was a major public works project for the Council's limited staff (see Figure 115), and the possibility of unitary intervention by the Council to provide all service infrastructure systems were precluded by their lack of technical, financial and human resources.

Thus, although both the 'co-operative' and 'Special Contributions' (Cession of Roads) systems of intervention could have worked effectively in the provision of service infrastructure, the looseness of planning law, combined with the multiplicity of developers and the generally pragmatic 'laissez-faire' stance of the planning authorities, meant that their application in the industrial zone was only very limited, with the result that service provision was ad hoc, fragmentary, and of a generally poor standard.

#### 7.4.2 Agency Roles and Activities

Here we will consider the two pertinent hypotheses together, as they are so closely related. They are :-

- (4) That Local Planning Authorities have failed to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions.
- (6) That private sector developers have been permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure.

(4) and (6) In the planning and implementation of development in Industrial Zone No. 2, there is little doubt that the planning authorities could have exercised a stricter control function, but it is debateable whether this was necessarily required by planning law. We have already noted that the 1956 Planning Act exempted industrial development 'in the appropriate zones' from the rigid control system established for residential development (see Figure 17); and the main objective of the Industrial Licence system and the zoning controls introduced in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan was to prevent the growth of 'mixed' zones of housing and industry, that were prominent in the outer zones of the 'ensanche'.

In the Molins case, however, the Local Plan had classified an area of 34 hectares solely for industrial development, isolated from other forms of development by wedges of 'green zone'. All the land (except the road areas) was privately owned, and the Council's role was essentially one of control, rather than developmental, and this was by and large limited to the processing of Building Permit and Industrial Licence applications. From the start, then, given the inadequacies of the Local Plan and absence of a Roads and Services Project, the provision of service infrastructure in the zone as a whole was likely to be unsatisfactory; and, as it was an isolated industrial zone, neither the Technical Services section, nor Committee members, were particularly concerned to impede the growth of industry in the area, which produced both spin-off and direct<sup>133</sup> sources of revenue.

<sup>133</sup> The Local Government Act of 1955 established that there should be a municipal tax of 0.5% of estimated cost of works, for the cession of Building Permits and Industrial Licences. In the SAIDA case, the respective taxes were 18,000 pts (£120) and 20,000 pts (£133) respectively.

In this context can be seen the Council's failure to comply with the Local Plan's directive that industries classified as 'dangerous' would not be allowed in the zone (six such industries were granted Licences) and the general absence of post-construction inspection by Council officers.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, the main objective of the Local Plan was to reclassify land for industrial growth and provide a loose provisional framework for development, with the plan documentation and accompanying regulations being largely irrelevant in the subsequent development of the zone.

It is significant to note, however, that in the past two years, with the zone well established and its extension planned in the 1976 Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan (Figure 136), the newly elected Council have embarked upon an a posteriori service provision programme in which industrialists will be compelled, within the framework of the new 'co-operative'<sup>135</sup> system of intervention (introduced in the 1976 Planning Reform Act), to finance infrastructural projects which the Council themselves are now drawing-up. In May, 1979 the Municipal Engineer wrote that:

"We are now drawing-up a series of infrastructural projects for the installation of drainage and sewerage systems in the zone, which will be financed by the landowners irrespective of whether the land is developed or not, and it is possible that the newly elected executive will favour the drawing-up of a Special Plan of Interior Reform" (196)

<sup>134</sup> This also reflected that fact that the Technical Services Section did not have the necessary personnel to carry out a constant vigil on building standards in the municipality. It is interesting to note that in May 1979, the Municipal Engineer wrote that :

"The main political parties agree that the Technical Services Section is the Department which should be reinforced. I have declared a resolution that I hope will be approved, whereby we will gain a draughtsman and an inspector of works, which will enable us to fulfil a more effective planning and development control role" (197).

<sup>135</sup> The new co-operative system enabled Councils to take the lead in planning and implementing service infrastructure, based on six-monthly budget estimates that could be recouped from the 'beneficiaries' as implementation proceeded. See note 107 page 259.




Figure 136. Industrial Zone No. 2 in the 1976 Revision of the Sub-Regional Plan.

As in the original Local Plan drawn-up by Molins Council, the entire area between the NII and the projected course of the 3rd Barcelona ring road is classified for industrial development. Note also that the main area classified for industrial development in the 1953 Plan (Figure 117) is reclassified as permanent open space, far more appropriate given its inaccessibility from the NII road.

Source : Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona (Corporacion Metropolitana de Barcelona), 'Plan General Metropolitano de Ordenacion Urbana', CMB, 1976.

KEY : 3 - Railway System; 6b - Urban Park (New); 22a - Industrial Development (Existing); 22b - Programmed Industrial Development; 24 - Protected Agricultural Land; 26 - Permanent Open Space.



1. 1962 Local Plan reclassified 'permanent agricultural land' ('rural land') for industrial development (contravention of Article 69 of 1956 Planning Act).
2. No Roads and Services Project was drawn-up, nor was the 'Plan of Stages' required by the GBPC.
3. Six industries classified as 'dangerous' by the PTSC were granted Industrial Licences; this contradicted the 1962 Local Plan which stated that no such industries would be permitted in the zone.
4. Service infrastructure systems depicted in the 1962 Local Plan were not implemented; roads and drainage channels not depicted in the 1962 Local Plan were built.

Table 33. Major irregularities in the Planning and Implementation of Development in Industrial Zone No. 2.

Such Council initiatives, however, are very much a thing of the recent past, and the Council's role in the Franco era is characterized more by a passive acceptance that if industrial development was to proceed in the zone, it was inevitable that service infrastructure would be inadequate given the multiplicity of private agencies and the Council's own impotence to act as a development agency. For their part, industrialists did not have to resort to openly contravening planning law, given the vagueness of the 1956 Act and the 1962 Local Plan, and the general ineffectiveness of the planning and control system as it operated at local level.

#### 7.4.3 The Decision-Making Process

Again, the two hypotheses, restated below, are closely interrelated and will therefore be considered together :-

- (8) That irregularities in the decision-making process have been commonplace.
- (9) That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

Although certain irregularities were evident in the Local Plan content and subsequent development on the ground (Table 33), the procedural course of formalised decision making has, in general, observed the stipulations and requirements of pertinent legislation. The decision-making process has, however, been simplistic and rather superficial in that it has scarcely encompassed the urban management function of supervising and co-ordinating the implementation of development on the ground.

The emergent picture, then, is one of a planning system that really failed to effectively get to grips with the regulation of development at micro-level, in part because of the inconsistencies within the system itself and in part because of the lack of political will of the planning authorities, to exert such control. This was manifested in the flimsiness (and pseudo legality) of the Local Plan, the absence of a Roads and Services Project and the Council's 'laissez faire' attitude to development in the zone.

The identification of critical points in the formalised decision-making process, then, must be viewed with the qualification that the bulk of development in the zone was the collective product of a mass of decisions affecting plot level development only, and none of these decisions, formal or otherwise, had any great individual significance for the development of the zone as a whole. Nevertheless, within the context of the functioning of the statutory planning system, the Definitive Approval of the Local Plan in 1962 (PI-6) was critical in that it established the loose spatial framework for the development of the zone; and in the installation of street lighting along the NII, the Definitive Approvals of the plan-project (PIII-8, Figure 133) and the 'Special Contributions' (PIII-10) were significant hurdles in securing the success of the project, although most critical of all was the informal loan arrangement made with the Provincial Government in early 1971 (PIII-3), which made the financing of the scheme a realistic possibility. Once the 1962 Local Plan was approved, however, the functioning of the formalised planning system in the industrial zone was by and large limited to the token regulation of Permit and Licence applications, and the decision-making process is characterized by its failure to confront the problems of development at estate level, leaving conceptualization in terms of 'irregularities' or 'critical points' somewhat in the background.



## CHAPTER 8

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This final chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, the case study findings are brought together into a synthesis, representing a move towards the formulation of a descriptive theory<sup>136</sup> of planning and implementation at local level in Spain. In section two, the strengths and weaknesses of the research methodology are discussed, and comment is made on the potential of the approach for related research in other planning environments. Finally, in section three, the main points of this chapter are summarised in the form of concluding statements to the thesis as a whole.

#### 8.1 Synthesis of Case Study Findings : the Planning and Implementation of Development in the Barcelona Periphery.

In this section, we are concerned with providing an overview of the planning and implementation of development in the Barcelona periphery, based on the case study findings and the conceptual framework within which the case studies were 'set'. The section is in the form of a paragraphed discussion with margined sub-headings, most of which broadly relate to one or more of the loose hypotheses which the case studies set out to develop. The case study findings, relating specifically to each hypotheses, are summarised in Tables 35-43.

<sup>136</sup> Friedman, amongst others, has made the distinction between 'descriptive theory' - i.e. theorizing about how and why things happened and 'prescriptive theory' - i.e. how a system should function. Here then, although the need for reform of the planning system is discussed, we are in the main concerned with the formulation of 'theory' on an empirical basis. As Friedman has said "Planning theory was formerly little more than an exercise in the logic of rational decision-making. Its reformulation on an empirical basis will involve extensive work in the description and explanation of planning phenomena, and in generalizations derived from these data" (198).



Breakdown in  
the Functioning  
of the Planning  
System in the  
Franco era.

The development of the conceptual framework for the case study research suggested that the poor environmental quality of estate development in the Barcelona periphery was the result of a breakdown in the functioning of the statutory planning system in the Franco era, and this was indeed borne out in the case studies. As Montero's analysis (199) had indicated (see Figure 42), the Local Plan mechanism was used to introduce significant changes in the land-use classifications contained in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan, with green zones or 'permanent agricultural land' being reclassified for industrial or residential development (Table 34). In the subsequent stages of planning and development (which have received little attention in planning research in Spain) the case studies revealed that the smaller scale planning and control mechanisms were either not used at all, or, if they were used, they nevertheless failed to effectively ensure the implementation of development in accordance with the dictates of the respective Local Plans (Table 35), this breakdown in the functioning of the planning machinery was the result of the interaction of a number of factors (Figure 137).

Weaknesses in  
the existent  
planning  
machinery.

The case studies highlighted certain weaknesses in the planning machinery established in the 1956 Planning Act. The review of planning legislation (Chapter 2) drew attention to the vagueness of the 1956 Act and the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan on the Local Plan- General Plan relationship, and it was this that facilitated the changes in land-use classifications, referred to above, introduced in the Local Plans. More important, as regards accounting for the poor quality (c.f. functional type) of estate development, the rigid system of checks and controls which the 1956 Act introduced for the regulation of residential estate development (see Figure 17) proved to be unworkable in practice, given the nature of the major development agencies intervening in the housing sector.

In the Can Serra case study, it was clearly unrealistic to expect all road and associated service infrastructure to be laid on in the entire zone prior to all house construction taking place, given the fragmentation of property boundaries, the

<u>CASE STUDY</u>	<u>LAND-USE CLASSIFICATION IN SUB-REGIONAL PLAN</u>	<u>LAND-USE CLASSIFICATION IN LOCAL PLAN</u>
<u>SAN COSME</u>	5 - Semi Intensive Urban Residential Development (10%). 7 - Extensive Suburban Development (45%). 9 - Intensive Garden-City Development (5%). 37 - Permanent Agricultural Land (40%).	5 - Semi-intensive Urban Residential Development - (100%); in fact, no specific classification was given in the Local Plan - which was never formally approved - but classification 5 matches the planned residential density.
<u>CAN SERRA</u>	6 - Semi Intensive Suburban Development (40%). 30 - Urban Park (60%).	5 - Semi-intensive Urban Residential Development (90%). 30 - Urban Park (10%).
<u>MOLINS</u>	7 - Extensive Suburban Development (17%). 16 - Heavy Industry (35%). 17 - Light Industry (3%). 37 - Permanent Agricultural Land (45%).	17 - Light Industry (95%). 30 - Urban Park (5%).

Table 34. Changes in Land-Use Classifications in the three Case Studies.

Figures in parenthesis indicate the percentage of the plan area covered by the particular classification.




Figure 137. Conceptualization of the Breakdown in the Functioning of the statutory Planning System in the sixties and early seventies.

Hypothesis : That the Local Plan/Roads and Services Project/Building Permit/Industrial Licence mechanisms failed to perform their statutorily attributed planning and control functions in the planning and implementation of new development in the Franco era.

San Cosme

- Local Plan contained detailed urban design for new housing estate; original plan for 3,000 houses, but was subsequently reduced to 1,500 houses and urban lay-out modified; estate was built, in part, in land previously classified as 'permanent agricultural land' - plan was not formally approved.

- No Roads and Services Project was drawn-up.

- Building Permits were granted by Local Council, but as no Local Plan or Roads and Services Project had been formally approved for the area, these permits were legally and technically meaningless, and represented a conciliatory gesture by Prat Council aimed at gaining the co-operation of the SHA in the implementation of the estate.

Case Study Findings

San Serra

- Local Plan included detailed urban design for 3,000 house estate; plan reclassified 20 hectare area of 'urban park' for residential development. Formally approved 1961.

- Local Plan was subsequently modified in seven separate sections through 'Local Plan Modifications' (LPM), approved in the sixties and early seventies, to further increase planned residential densities.

- Roads and Services Projects were drawn up for some of the LPM plan areas; only one of these was formally approved, and this was after development on the ground had taken place.

- Building Permits were granted for construction of 4000 dwellings, prior to installation of roads and service infrastructure, and without prior approval of a Roads and Services Project.

Molins

- Local Plan classified a 34 hectare site for industrial development; land had previously been classified, in part as 'permanent agricultural land'. No detailed urban design was included in plan. Comprehensive service infrastructure systems were depicted in plan, but plan documentation was vague on sources of finance and implementing authorities. Plan was formally approved in 1962.

- No comprehensive Roads and Services Project was drawn-up for programming all service infrastructure in the zone. A Street Lighting Project for MLI road was drawn-up and approved 1970-73.

- Building Permits and Industrial Licences were granted for plot development that collectively covered most of the Industrial Zone; no attention paid to 'external' service requirements in processing of these Permits and Licences.

Table 35. Hypotheses 1 : Summary of Research Findings.



speculationary retention<sup>137</sup> of land by some landowners, and the impotence of the Local Council to intervene as a development agency in the zone as a whole. Some rupturing of the planning system was in many ways inevitable, if private sector development in Can Serra was to take place at all. In San Cosme, ironically, where the estate was developed by an agency with sufficient resources to provide the comprehensive service systems required by the 1956 Act, the SHA chose to by-pass statutory planning procedure altogether and thus the system of checks and controls at local level failed to come into operation at all, with disastrous consequences as regards service provision and the quality of house construction.

The unworkable nature of the planning system in the implementation of estate development by a multiplicity of private sector developers was to some extent recognised in the 1956 Act's 'escape clause' for industrial development. As illustrated in the Molins case study (see Tables 35 and 36), the imprecise phrasing of the Act meant that factory and warehouse development could proceed on a plot by plot basis without any effective regulation of service provision in the estate as a whole. Thus, although the Roads and Services Project, Building Permit and Industrial Licence mechanisms came into play in the planning and implementation of development in both the Can Serra and

<sup>137</sup> Every piece of major planning legislation since the Civil War has made reference to the need to combat the vicious circle of speculation, but none has succeeded in doing so. Maragall's (200) study of land prices in the Barcelona Sub-Region has shown that the real price of land increased an average 6.13% per year during the period 1951-78, or a 40 times increase over the period as a whole. In the Can Serra case, Hospitalet Council could, in theory, have demanded that all landowners co-operate in the simultaneous provision of road and associated service infrastructure in the entire estate, with the threat that landowners not complying with this demand would face expropriation of their land. In practice, however, the Council's lack of finances, and the possibility of long involved legal proceedings generally precluded the Council from embarking on such a course.

Molins case studies, the rigidity of the system on the one hand, and the imprecision of the legislation on the other, made it difficult for the various components of this machinery to function harmoniously in conjunction with each other. This, in part, accounts for the irregularities in plan procedure which characterised the decision-making process in these case studies, which is discussed in greater detail below.

The Systems of Intervention: Dependency on 'external' political-economic factors.

The inadequacy of these planning mechanisms in practice reflects the fact that planning law in Spain was generally incapable, in the Franco era, of regulating the wide range of political and economic variables that play such an important part in conditioning the functioning of the development process. This is of particular relevance in developing an understanding of how and why the 'cession of roads' and 'co-operative' systems of intervention failed to ensure the adequate provision of service infrastructure in estate development. In the Molins and Can Serra case studies (Table 36), these systems of intervention were hamstrung in practice by a series of factors, some of which have been referred to already: lack of local authority finances and scarcity of loan facilities, fragmentation of property ownership and multiplicity of private sector development agencies, local authority-private sector corruption and collusion, and non co-ordination and general inadequacy of schools provision by the Ministry of Education and Science. These case study findings are supported by Clusa's recently published study (201) of local authority finances, in which he suggests that such financial and management problems have precluded the effective implementation of infrastructure through these systems of intervention; and Teran has recently asserted that the developmental potential of most private sector development agencies is also restricted by their financial structure.<sup>138</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Teran notes that "The implementation of development by private sector development firms is hampered by their financial structure which is oriented towards short and medium term operations in the field of housing and public works, and precludes them from making the complex and long term investment that satisfactory new development demands ... The small landowner, as a rule, lacks the necessary finance to act on a scale greater than that of his plot. For this infrastructural management, are needed large scale development agencies, which with few exceptions, don't exist in Spain".(202)

Hypothesis: That the 'systems of intervention' established in the 1956 Planning Act failed to ensure the adequate provision of road and service infrastructure in the implementation of estate development.

### Case Study Findings

#### San Cosme

- Central State housing authority acquired entire 'estate' area through expropriation system.
- Road and associated service infrastructure provided by SHA at time of house construction (1968); some schools and nurseries provided by Ministry of Education and Science; green zones remained inadequate and unkept.
- No satisfactory agreement made with Local Council on responsibility for upkeep of roads, green areas etc.

#### Can Serra

- Landowners financed and managed the construction of Can Serra Avenue and associated service infrastructure through the co-operative system in informal collaboration with Council; worked reasonably effectively, even though involved series of contraventions of planning law. In the estate as a whole, however, the fragmentation of property boundaries and multiplicity of developers made operation of the co-operative system difficult.
- Cession of Roads System was used in many of smaller Local Plan Modification areas, but lack of Council finances and piecemeal nature of development precluded comprehensive road and service provision by Council.
- In post-Franco era, Council have planned and implemented new service infrastructure and levied 'Special Contributions' from landowners under revised co-operative system.

#### Molins

- Fragmentation of development, multiplicity of developers and 'laissez-faire' attitude of Council meant that co-operative system was employed on a very limited and ad hoc basis in the provision of service roads and drainage channels.
- Council installed street lighting through 'Special Contributions' (Cession of Roads) system, but lack of finances precluded comprehensive service provision by Council.
- Council are now drawing-up series of projects for comprehensive provision of service systems; finance to come from landowners under revised co-operative system.

Table 36. Hypothesis 2 : Summary of Research Findings.

Hypothesis : That local planning authorities have failed to exercise their statutorily attributed planning and control functions.

### Case Study Findings

#### San Cosme

- The planning process was by-passed by Central State authorities in mid-sixties; Local Council fought protest campaign against designation by and large through lobbying and petitioning government bodies; only in granting Building Permits did the Local Council enter into the formalised planning process, but this was largely irrelevant because of the absence of an approved Local Plan for the estate.

- In the post-Franco era, the Sub-Regional Authority have monitored progress in the renewal scheme; the MCB's Definitive Approval of the SPIR was an important step in securing its implementation; the Local Council's role in the plan approval process for the SPIR was little more than symbolic, and in fact represented a technical contravention of plan approval procedure.

#### Can Serra

- In the sixties and early seventies, the Local Council blatantly misinterpreted and contravened planning law in collaborating with private sector developers, in the speculative replanning and development of Can Serra. The 1961 Local Plan reclassified a 20 hectare area of 'urban park' and was subsequently modified to facilitate higher residential densities; Building Permits were ceded, and house construction was allowed to proceed, without prior provision of road and service infrastructure. The Sub-Regional Planning Authority gave upper-tier approval to these decisions.

- From 1973 onwards, the Council, under pressure from the CBPC (later the MCB) have put a brake on speculative 're-planning' and development in the zone, guided the SPIR (improvement plan) through the approval process, and managed the early stages of its implementation.

#### Molins

- The vagueness of the 1956 Planning Act meant that industrial development could proceed without the need for extensive service systems to be laid on prior to construction, (as was the case with residential estate development). Nevertheless, the poverty of service infrastructure in the zone was exacerbated by the failure of the Local Council to draw-up a 'Plan of Stages' for service provision (as the CBPC had demanded); and by their generally 'laissez-faire' attitude to the development of the zone.

- Council also contravened stipulations of the 1962 Local Plan in allowing 'dangerous' industries to locate in the zone in sixties and seventies.

- The recently elected Council (1979) are now exercising firmer control on development in the zone; new service systems are being planned by the Council and will be financed by landowners within the framework of the new 'co-operative system'.

Table 37. Hypothesis 4 : Summary of Research Findings.



Hypothesis : That private sector developers have been permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure

### Case Study Findings

#### Can Serra

- Private sector developers were consistently permitted to contravene statutory planning procedure in the planning and implementation of development in Can Serra up until 1973 (Phases I-IX), as part of a 'collaborative bargaining' process, by which the Council secured certain concessions in exchange.
- There was clearly a certain identification of interests between Council and developers: both wanted to see the private residential development of Can Serra (lack of finances precluded the Council from playing a leading developmental role); and we do not know the extent of corruption and collusion between these two parties.
- On the other hand, there was clearly also a bargaining element in their exchanges; for example, developers agreed to cede large tracts of land to the Council, once the respective Local Plan Modification had been approved. The Council's pseudo-legalisation of contraventions and irregularities in planning procedure became one element in this exchange process (formally expressed in the Acts of Mutual Agreement).
- In the post-Franco era, by contrast, a tight control has been kept on development in the zone, with statutory planning procedure being strictly observed.

#### Molins

- Molins Council ceded Industrial Licences for six 'dangerous' industries contrary to the planning regulations embodied in the 1962 Local Plan.
- Undoubtedly, the Council could have exerted a stricter control on the nature of development in the industrial zone, particularly with regard to the provision of complementary service infrastructure; in general however, planning legislation accepted that private development of an industrial estate was likely to be piecemeal and fragmentary, and that as local authorities lacked the necessary finances to provide comprehensive service systems, the provision of such was likely to lag behind factory growth, and be generally ad hoc and provisional in character.
- With the estate now almost fully occupied, the newly elected Council are taking the lead in providing service systems in the zone, to be financed by industrialists through the levying of 'Special Contributions'.

Table 38. Hypothesis 6 : Summary of Research Findings.

The Contravention  
of Planning  
Procedure.

This combination of circumstances meant that the provision of road and service infrastructure through the 'co-operative' and 'cession of roads' systems was unlikely to take place, if it took place at all, prior to house and factory development, and that the statutory planning machinery was unlikely to play a major role in the regulation and co-ordination of development. Once Local Plans had been approved, the local Council and private sector developers embarked on the ad hoc implementation of development, in which behind the scenes collaboration played a major part in directing the course of change (Tables 37 and 38). At the same time, the by-passing of plan procedure by Central State housing authorities (such as the SHA in San Cosme - see Tables 35 and 39), and the lag-time between house construction and school provision (by the Ministry of Education and Science) only added to the lack of credibility given the formalised planning system,<sup>139</sup> and reinforced a status quo in which the local planning authorities openly collaborated with private sector agencies in the 'bending' or open contravention of planning procedure in the planning and implementation of development at local level.

Improvement  
and Renewal  
in the  
Seventies:  
Failure of  
the Planning  
System to  
encompass  
these aspects  
of change.

In the sixties these flaws in the planning machinery were a major contributory factor to the breakdown in the functioning of the planning system in the planning and implementation of new development in the periphery. From the early seventies onwards, however, a new developmental context emerged, demanding change and intervention for which the 1956 Planning Act had made no provision at all. With the implementation of development well underway in many peripheral estates, and with the demand for new

<sup>139</sup> As we have seen (Chapter 2.3) this had its root in the administrative schism between the General Directorate of Urban Planning (part of the Ministry of Housing) and the Local Councils (answerable to the Home Office), which was not rectified until the Ministerial reorganisation of the post-Franco era which saw both come under the jurisdiction of the newly created Ministry of Public Works and Urban Affairs.

Hypothesis : That State housing authorities have failed to observe statutory planning procedure in the planning and implementation of housing estates.

Case Study Findings

San Cosme :

- In the mid-sixties (Phase I), Statutory planning procedure was imperiously contravened by the SHA and the NIH in the planning and implementation of the San Cosme estate; the plan approval process was completely by-passed and development on the ground was undertaken in 'permanent agricultural land'.
- In the improvement and renewal schemes drawn-up by the SHA and NIH in the mid-seventies (Phase II), planning largely took place outside the framework of the statutory planning machinery, which made no real provision for such operations. Nevertheless, the decision making process was similarly characterized by inconsistencies and changes of course.
- In the post-Franco era, the State housing authorities have made a determined attempt to act within the framework of statutory planning procedure in the planning and implementation of renewal. Nevertheless, largely because of the pioneer, one-off nature of the project, certain minor contraventions of plan procedure have taken place.

Table 39. Hypothesis 5 : Summary of Research Findings.

housing slackening off, the need for improvement and renewal in the existent peripheral estates has increasingly become the major aspect of development with which planning and housing authorities have had to deal.

The concepts of improvement and renewal have received very little attention in the evolution of planning and housing legislation in Spain this century, and as dramatically illustrated by Phases I and II of the San Cosme Case Study (Table 39), the legislative frameworks for planning and above all financing such schemes were largely non-existent in the Franco-era. Even with the introduction of the Special Plan of Interior Reform, there is still no adequate provision in planning or housing legislation for the financing of house improvement or renewal, except on the basis of ad hoc collaboration with Central State agencies.

Public participation in the planning process has similarly been given little attention in the development of the country's planning machinery. Although the democratization of the Spanish political system in recent years has led to an acceptance by the Public Administration of the concept of public participation in the plan-making process, there remains no adequate planning machinery for systematically ensuring that resident opinion is taken into account in the planning and implementation of improvement and renewal schemes. In practice, as the Can Serra and San Cosme cases show (Tables 40 and 41), these aspects of planning have been carried out through ad hoc, semi or non-formalised channels, in which the statutory planning machinery has played no immediate part.

Agency roles  
and activities:  
Change in  
the seventies.

Nevertheless, the general picture of agency roles and activities has changed considerably in the seventies as, within revised legislative and planning frameworks, the Sub-Regional and municipal authorities have stuck more closely to statutory planning procedure and generally exercised a tighter control on development at local level (see Table 37). At the same time, as noted above, both local and central authorities have



Hypothesis : That the Special Plan of Interior Reform has functioned successfully in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal in the post-Franco era.

San Cosme

- An SPIR was drawn-up for renewal of 1500 house estate in the post-Franco era.
- It was a pioneer scheme, drawn-up by Resident Association consultants, in conjunction with the National Institute of Housing, who financed the project.
- Resident preferences have been successfully incorporated into the plan-making process, but very much on an ad hoc basis.
- Planning and housing legislation does not provide adequate framework for systematic public participation in such schemes, nor is funding readily available for such initiatives on a large scale.

Case Study Findings

Can Serra

- An SPIR was drawn-up to plan and programme environmental improvements and service provision in 1974-5; resident demands were taken into account in plan-making process; main channel of communication between Council and residents was through informal lobbying and petitioning.
- Implementation is now underway, but progress is hampered by lack of local Council finances.

Molins

- To date, no SPIR has been drawn-up, although this may follow soon to co-ordinate and complement the different service networks now being planned by the Council.

Table 40. Hypothesis 3 : Summary of Research Findings.

Hypothesis : That the Residents' Associations have emerged as an important force in the planning and implementation of area improvement and renewal schemes in recent years.

### Case Study Findings

#### San Cosme

- Emergence of the Local Residents' Association (SDRA) in the seventies as a major force in the planning and implementation of change is an important aspect of the case study.
- From an initial stance of protest against the poverty of the urban environment, and particularly housing conditions, in San Cosme, SDRA activity came to include opposition to Central State authorities' improvement and renewal schemes in the estate, and then positive counter-proposals for renewal.
- This increasing involvement in the decision-making process has been accompanied by a progressive 'institutionalization' of the association's activities.
- In the post-Franco era, the SDRA have actively participated in the plan-making process for the renewal scheme (now underway), through their designated planning consultants; resident participation has nevertheless been somewhat ad hoc and semi-formalised, and existing legislation fails to provide the necessary machinery for the systematic incorporation of resident preferences into the plan making process in such schemes.

#### Can Serra

- Resident protest against poverty of service infrastructure in Can Serra was supported and fostered by the Architects College of Catalonia from 1973 onwards.
- Upwelling of Resident protest also coincided with internal reorganisation of Hospitalet Council, and new control initiatives of the Sub-Regional planning authority.
- Resident protest focused on the use of 'La Carpa', the major remaining green space in the zone.
- The Residents Association played an active 'watchdog' role in the planning and implementation of the SPIR for Can Serra but there was no real direct resident participation in the decision-making process, although their demands were taken into account in the drawing-up of the SPIR by Hospitalet Council.

Table 41. Hypothesis 7 : Summary of Research Findings.

adopted more conciliatory approaches to local resident demands, with the Special Plan of Interior Reform proving a useful framework for planning area improvement and renewal schemes.

Both the initiation and implementation of such projects are still restricted, however, by the continued absence of any machinery to make central state monies available to local authorities on a systematic and consistent basis. Similarly, although the new 'co-operative' system of intervention enables councils to levy 'special contributions' (rates) from landowners on a more flexible basis than under the old 'cession of roads' system, the provision of urgently<sup>140</sup> needed service infrastructure in the peripheral estates remains hampered by the lack of readily available funds, and local authority initiatives are still over-dependent on the non-legislated co-operation and collaboration of central government agencies.

The Need  
for Further  
Reform.

If we broaden the discussion briefly here, it is clear that for local authorities to effectively exercise a planning and management function appropriate to today's urban problems, both their financial and administrative structure, and the planning and legislative framework within which they operate will require substantial reform. Councils such as Molins and Prat remain woefully inadequate in terms of human, technical and financial resources to plan and manage the operational intervention necessary to ensure the provision and maintenance of an acceptable range and standard of services and infrastructure. Technically pluri-disciplinary, as well as politically pluri-ideological local governments are needed, far removed from the air of corruption, collusion, and dependency in which the one or two

<sup>140</sup> As we have already noted (Chapter 3.4), the MCB's 1976 study : showed that rectification of infrastructural deficits in the Sub-Region requires an investment of 30,000 pesetas (£200) per person from the Local Administration (for parks, roads and associated infrastructure, sports facilities) and 34,000 pesetas (£230) per person from Central Government (for schools, hospitals, public works). See : Corporacion Metropolitana de Barcelona, Estudio-Economico Financiero del Plan General Metropolitano, CMB, 1976.

man Committees and elementary Technical Services Sections carried out their planning and management functions in many of Spain's 9000 plus municipalities in the sixties and early seventies. New legislative machinery<sup>141</sup> is also required, primarily for making

<sup>141</sup> In this context the Land and Urban Management Bill which is currently (June 1980) under discussion in the Spanish Parliament is of particular interest. This Bill, which represents the first legislative initiative in the field of urban planning since the 1976 Reform Act, has two principal stated objectives:-

1. To avoid scarcity of land required for urban development.
2. To improve the urban management potential of local authorities.

As regards the first objective, the Bill severely criticises the systems of intervention (expropriation, compensation, co-operation) established in the 1976 Act as unsatisfactory for ensuring that land is suitably developed in urban areas. It proposes that a new 'compulsory development' system be introduced, whereby the Local Administration can force landowners to undertake development (under threat of forfeit of their land), thereby counteracting the speculative retention of land by developers, and avoiding the economic and legalistic problems involved in proceeding through the expropriation system. With regard to the second objective the Bill proposes the introduction of new management bodies and partnerships to help the local authority management function. An initial reaction to the Bill's proposals is that although it touches on some important issues, it fails to address the fundamental problem of local authority finances. Since 1978, the Barcelona Sub-Region has experienced a net loss of population, and scarcity of land for development is not a major problem. Similarly, the absence of management organs is far less important than the financial crisis suffered by local authorities. As Roca Cladera has said in his recent review of the Bill, "today the main problem in our planning system, from a management and legal point of view, is in providing operative mechanisms for the improvement of the already built-up area. To obtain spaces to equip and decongest the city, to conserve and improve the urban environment, and to generally improve the living standards of all the inhabitants of the city, are today's principle needs, in the field of urban management and planning. The inadequacy of the 1976 Act in these aspects is evident and clearly demands reform; similarly, though, the new Bill again diagnoses the problem as being one of land scarcity, as if we were in an era of great city expansion.... The Act lacks any direct reference to the lack of resources of local government and the need for a complete review of the municipal tax system" (203).



finances readily available to local authorities, but also for enabling the consumer public, by right, to play a more participatory role in the design process at local level, without having to resort to the pressured confrontation strategies and ad hoc collaborative channels that epitomised resident action in the San Cosme and Can Serra cases (see Table 41).

The Decision-  
Making  
Process:  
a Framework  
for Analysis.

Let us now turn to consider the nature and characteristics of the decision-making process itself. Case study findings (Tables 42 and 43) suggest that a distinction<sup>142</sup> can usefully be made between the 'formalised' decision-making process and the 'non or semi formalised' process. The former can be defined as consisting of those decisions which correspond to a step or stage in the drawing-up and approval of plans and the implementation of development, by means of the plan mechanisms, systems of intervention etc for which provision was made in the National Planning Acts. The non/semi formalised decision-making process, on the other hand, consists of those decisions made outside the framework of the statutory planning machinery; these decisions may involve central or local government bodies, as well as private sector agencies and residents associations, but they have in common the fact that they are not regulated or encompassed by the statutory planning system. All planning processes will almost inevitably be made up of these two decision-making 'strands', and consideration of the nature and interrelationship of the two provides a useful framework for the study and comparison of the decision-making process.

<sup>142</sup> This distinction is made somewhat tentatively and with the realization that further refinement and testing of its usefulness in other planning environments will be necessary, if such 'categorization' of the decision-making process is to make a bona fide contribution to the study and analysis of planning processes. It is interesting to note, then, that in Masser et al's recently undertaken research into the development process in the Netherlands, their case studies suggested that a similar form of analysis might well be of value. The authors conclude that the Dutch case studies "draw attention to the limited role played by purely formal procedures in the formulation of plans as against informal negotiations and the ways in which the development process was affected by external factors" (204).

Hypothesis : That irregularities in the decision-making process have been common-place.

San Cosme

- Planning and implementation of the San Cosme estate in the mid-sixties (Phase I) involved widespread irregularities in decision-making; statutory plan approval procedure was by-passed, development took place in land classified as 'permanent agricultural' in the 1953 Sub-Regional Plan, and Central State decision-making involved a number of inconsistencies and U-turns.
- In the planning of improvement and renewal schemes in the mid-seventies (Phase II), decision-making by Central State authorities again exhibited inconsistencies, but the planning of these operations and consequent protest by the Residents' Association took place outside the bounds of the statutory planning machinery.
- In the post Franco era, formalised decision-making in the planning and implementation of renewal (Phase III) has involved certain irregularities and contraventions, although not on the same scale as in earlier phases.

Can Serra

- In the planning, re-planning and implementation of development in Can Serra up until 1973 (Phases I-IX), decision-making was characterized by gross irregularities and contraventions of statutory planning process, perpetrated by the local Council and private sector developers, with upper tier approval by the CBCPC.
- Since 1973, however, local planning authorities have exerted a firm control on development in the zone and guided the SPIR (improvement plan) through plan-making, approval and implementation. In general, decision-making in this period (Phase X) has generally taken place within the framework of the statutory planning process and exhibited few irregularities in terms of contravention of planning law.

Molins

- Some irregularities were evident in the drawing-up and approval of the 1962 Local Plan (Phase I) : The plan reclassified 'permanent agricultural land' for industrial development and yet was approved by the Council and Sub-Regional Planning authority; it was not accompanied by a Roads and Services Project, and was generally vague on the means for implementing the service systems depicted in the plan.
- Similarly, Building Permit and Industrial Licence cession (Phase II) paid scant regard to service infrastructure systems in the estate as a whole, and the cession of Industrial Licences for 'dangerous' industries contravened the approved Local Plan's accompany regulations.
- These irregularities in decision-making are, though, rather overshadowed by the fact that the decision-making process failed to satisfactorily encompass the problems of service provision in the industrial zone as a whole.

Table 42. Hypothesis 8 : Summary of Research Findings.

Hypothesis : That critical points in the decision-making process have occurred outside the functioning of the formal planning machinery.

### Case Study Findings

#### San Cosme

- In the planning and implementation of development in San Cosme in the mid sixties (Phase I), and the planning of improvement and renewal in the mid-seventies (Phase II), decision making, in general, tended to take place outside the bounds of the formalised planning machinery, and so did 8 of the 10 'critical decisions' identified in these two Phases.
- In the planning and implementation of renewal in the post-Franco era (Phase III), the ad hoc nature in which the plan was conceived and guided through the formalised plan approval process meant that most critical decisions again occurred outside the bounds of the statutory planning process.

#### San Serra

- In the 'collaborative bargaining' process that characterized the speculative re-planning and development of Can Serra up until 1973, (Phases I-IX), many critical decisions were made outside the framework of the statutory planning machinery, although these were subsequently given formal expression in the Local Plan Modifications, Acts of Mutual Agreement etc; questions also remain unanswered as regards the extent of corruption in the Council and its bearing on decision-making in Can Serra.
- In the drawing-up and approval of the SPIR (Phase X), decision-making has followed a more regular, statutorily controlled course, with critical points in decision-making occurring within the formalised planning process.

#### Molins

- The Molins case study is characterised by the general absence of decisions that have been of critical importance for the development of Industrial Zone No. 2 as a whole.
- Those that have been of importance for the zone as a whole - the approval of the 1962 Local Plan (PI-6) for example - have generally taken place within the framework of the statutory planning process.
- The emergent picture, though, is one of a formalised decision-making process that failed to adequately get to grips with the problems of planning and managing development in the zone as a whole, with the course of change being governed by a mass of non-co-ordinated decisions, taking place within and outside the formalised process, directly concerning individual plot development.

Table 43. Hypothesis 9 : Summary of Research Findings.


The  
Subordination  
of the  
Formalised  
Process in the  
Franco era.

From the three Barcelona case studies, certain common features emerge with regard to these two types of decision making. In the sixties and early seventies, the formalised decision-making process involved contraventions of planning law, to greatest degree in Can Serra and to least degree in Molins. This formalised decision-making, however, was really just the tip of the iceberg, and was generally sub-ordinated to the non/semi formalised process within which the majority of critical decisions were made. What is important here is not that these critical decisions were made outside the formalised framework - as often they are, to some extent, in many planning systems - but rather that these decisions had no formalised counterpart (within the formalised process, as in San Cosme - Figure 79), or that this counterpart constituted a contravention of the statutory planning process, providing a pseudo-legal framework for subsequent decision-making in both the formalised and non/semi formalised processes (as in Can Serra - Figure 114). Under such circumstances, then, the statutory, formalised process played little part in directing or controlling the course of change; rather, it either played no part at all, or, in corrupted form, played a secondary role in the fulfilment of developmental objectives that frequently contravened previously approved plans and planning legislation (Figure 138).

A new model  
in the  
seventies.

In the seventies, however, changes in both the external political and planning frameworks, and in the strategies and activities of agencies intervening at local level, have resulted in a rather different decision-making process. New planning legislation and urban plans introduced somewhat more realistic frameworks and more appropriate plan-mechanisms to fit the new control and improvement objectives of local and central authorities, as, with increasing rapidity in the post-Franco era, they moved from a policy of confrontation to one of conciliation and collaboration with protesting resident associations (see Figures 81 and 111).





- ⊗ Contravention of Statutory Planning Process
- Critical Decisions
- ⊖ Critical Decisions Involving Contravention of Statutory Planning Process

Figure 138. Conceptualization of the Decision-Making Process in the sixties and early seventies (subordination of the Statutory Planning Process).

Irregularities in the formalised decision-making process have become less evident (although by no means non-existent) as local authorities, in particular, have exerted a firmer control on private sector development. At the same time, there has been an increased 'harmonization' of the formalised and non/semi-formalised processes, evidenced in the general increase of 'critical points' occurring within the formalised process and the increased interaction between the two processes (Figure 139). Nevertheless, the continuing failure of planning law to encompass certain aspects of change (e.g. resident participation) and the chronic poverty of local authority resources (and absence of legislative machinery making such resources available) means that a certain number of decisions, some of them of critical importance in the planning and implementation of development, will continue to be made outside the realm of the formalised decision-making process, without any corresponding counterpart within that process. Only when the legislative and administrative machinery is changed to enable the planning authorities to adequately confront the urban management problems of today (and tomorrow) will the statutory planning system be able to encompass and regulate (although not dominate!) the breadth of issues about which decisions are made in the course of planning and implementing local level development.

Finally, it seems appropriate to close this first concluding section with some comment on the 'planning' and 'implementation' debate alluded to in Chapter 1. What the case studies clearly reveal is that to think of 'planning' and 'implementation' as analytical categories within a decision-centred planning process is likely to be inappropriate and unworkable in practice as a framework for analyzing or understanding planning processes.




Figure 139. Conceptualization of the Decision-Making Process from the Mid-Seventies Onwards (Increased Control and Regulation).

Plan making is carried on at a series of levels, scales and stages as development on the ground proceeds, and the general complexity and interconnectivity of decision-making at different administrative levels, affecting spatially differentiated areas at different stages of development (as for example in Can Serra) makes it difficult indeed to distinguish between what constitutes plan-making and what constitutes plan implementation. Although the planner may, in the past, have supposed that his plan, once approved, would be followed by its 'implementation' on the ground, the case studies strikingly reveal that this is unlikely to be the case. Rather 'planning' and 'implementation' are probably best used as loose descriptive terms to jointly cover the multitude of decisions and sub-processes that are responsible for, and part of, development on the ground taking place, in the knowledge that the planner is fortunate indeed if such development bears even an approximate resemblance to that envisaged in the original plan.

## 8.2 Critique of the Research Methodology

This research project has involved the development and application of a case study method to investigate and analyze the processes involved in the planning and implementation of development at local level in an overseas planning environment. The paucity of previously tested case study methods in planning research has meant that the research design has been exploratory, to some extent, and not surprisingly, certain problems have been encountered in its development and application.

The research methodology has centred on decision-making, and because of the nature of this research focus, there has almost inevitably been a certain level of inconsistency in the application of the various analytical tools employed in the case studies. Despite Mesarovich's (205) assertion that decision-making may, in theory, be studied at different levels of complexity, these levels are, in practice, often not apparent enough to enable any clear consistency in the depth of focus. This problem is

'Teething  
problems'  
in the  
application  
of the  
method



compounded by the fact that some decisions inevitably remain hidden behind the facade of formalised bureaucratic processing, in the off-record, behind the scenes, manoeuvrings that clearly played an important part in shaping the course of events in the Barcelona case studies. The researcher is left, then, as Altshuler (206) has pointed out (see Chapter 1, p. 13) with the responsibility of striving to check every possible line of inquiry, and maintaining the quality and internal consistency of his argument and debate, in the analysis of his research findings.

A related problem (as noted in Chapter 1) is that there will always be a degree of subjectivity of interpretation in 'retrospective monitoring' of this type. In practice, the identification of Phases, sub-processes and critical points were all 'imposed' on the mass of case study data by the researcher himself. Importantly, however, the use of these classifications has been argued (and is arguable) within the context of each case study; and the complexity of decision-making suggests that the scientist's tendency to search for concrete 'objective' analytical techniques, consistently applied, must be offset against the need to retain a certain flexibility and openness in the classification and subsequent conceptualization of these processes, especially whilst this form of research remains in its infant stage.

It is also important to stress that although the research method has centred on data-base documentation and the scrutiny of the decision-making process, the research objectives, hypotheses and findings were not restricted to conceptualization about this process alone. The decision-making process was seen as a valuable starting-point from which (in conjunction with insights gained from development of the conceptual framework) hypotheses concerning other aspects of planning and implementation could be formulated and developed as the research progressed. This indeed proved to be so, as the case studies provided research findings relating to the functioning of planning mechanisms and agency roles and activities, as well as to the decision-making process itself. All in all, the methodology has facilitated

Research  
findings :  
The importance of The  
'conceptual  
framework'.

and argued, in-depth investigation of these aspects of the planning and implementation of development in a particular planning environment, and as such the use of the research methodology can be viewed as a considerable success.

It is perhaps worth pointing out, however, that the assembly of the conceptual framework for research is nevertheless likely to have major implications for the scope of research findings. It was noted in chapter I that the case study method is open-ended, that hypotheses can be inductively developed as research progresses, and that new data sources can be identified and pursued. Whilst all this proved to be the case (and this is undoubtedly a considerable advantage in the conduct of such research), it is nevertheless clear that the incorporation of new wide-ranging concepts, possibly involving new types of data and analysis, is likely to be difficult to manage once research is underway (although by no means impossible). It is apparent then, that great consideration should be given in the development of the conceptual framework to identifying which aspects of the development process are to be investigated.

In this research project, the focus has been, essentially, on the functioning of plan mechanisms, the nature of the decision-making process and the changing roles of development agencies and planning authorities, and the research method must be seen in this context. Obviously, there are other aspects of the development process which could figure more prominently in the case studies (e.g. political power networks, behavioural aspects of decision-making, property ownership, financial structure of agencies and authorities); such a change of focus, however, would probably necessitate some modification, at least, to the research methodology used here, and the success of the method must necessarily be seen within the context of the nature and scope of research findings.

If, however, we accept the aspects of planning and implementation researched here as a general frame of reference, then the potential for future development of this method would seem to be considerable in the light of recent discernible trends in the evolution of the planning process. The moves towards

Trends in  
the planning  
process :  
Scope for  
development  
of the case  
study method.

democracy in local government and the incorporation of resident preferences in the planning process (albeit through non or semi-formalised channels) in Spain have been paralleled by similar trends towards a greater openness and 'public accountability' in many other planning systems in the Western World. At the same time, the concentration on macro-level economic planning in the lesser developed World in recent decades, often at the expense of local level environmental considerations, has highlighted the need for monitoring and feedback systems at all levels to continuously assess and adjust plan performance, and recent interest<sup>143</sup> in case study methods and their applications can be seen in this light.

An inter-  
disciplinary  
focus.

These developments in the planning process have been matched by a growing awareness amongst planners and urban managers that the successful planning and implementation of development 'on the ground' must take into account a number of interrelated factors, and it is within this framework of working towards a better understanding of our own and others' planning processes that the potential of case studies can be seen. If we wish to enhance our ability as urban managers, then this form of case study can make an important contribution through providing a research method and analytical framework within which urban management experience can be investigated and understood. Here the exploitation of data-base case studies 'on record' can provide an inter-disciplinary focus for improving management performance, which is of special relevance in planning where executive authority is usually separated from technical

143.

The general interest in the development and application of Environmental Impact Analysis to major development projects, for example, can be seen as part of this general effort to re-assert the importance of social and economic considerations in any planning decision. The application of EIA can produce a valuable range of case studies associated with the implications of major developments and should provide new learning inputs if their potential is fully exploited. For a general review of EIA methods see B. Clark, K. Chapman, R. Bisset, P. Wathern, "Methods of Environmental Impact Analysis", Built Environment. Vol. 4, No. 2, 1978.

management. In a localised context the different Phases of case studies constitute points of reference against which the nature of administrative and legal frameworks, the functioning of planning mechanisms, and the roles and strategies of planning and development agencies can be studied, revised and improved.

Learning by  
example

In a wider context, selected case studies can act as acknowledged examples of 'good' or 'bad' practice to highlight critical points and critical issues for those faced with similar management problems in other planning environments. Here, as the Barcelona case studies show, learning from our mistakes and failures is just as important as providing show-case models for others to copy. As Coghuaill has said:

"It is not only important to consider with pride the show-cases that we as planners have created, and without doubt many exist, but to spend far more time trying to analyse why things have gone wrong and what we could have done about them before that happened" (207).

A framework  
for inter-  
national comp-  
arative  
research.

Similarly, but in a more strictly academic context, this case study method clearly has potential for use in international comparative research, although further refinement and experiment are needed in what remains a relatively undeveloped research area, in which the problems associated with the language barrier are exacerbated by the absence of tried and tested frameworks for analysis. As Faludi and Hamnett have said:

"Planning has yet little to offer in the way of comparative studies, we simply do not have enough tested frameworks for comparison.... We must aim at building frameworks and testing them against selected case studies, recognizing that constructing such languages for comparison involves a measure of socialization into new ways of thinking" (208).

Could we provide, for example, a number of category types (to complement the formalised and non/semi-formalised distinction made here) into which different strands of decision-making could be classified, and study the nature and interaction of these various strands? Could we also study the variance of such interaction with regard to the different Phases or sub- processes identified in specific case studies? Such an analysis could provide scope for making comparisons between different facets of the decision-making process in different planning environments,



to complement the other aspects of the planning process which this case study method can be used to investigate. Whilst we must remain wary of moving towards an over mechanistic and theoretical classification of complex processes, it is these sort of developments that may usefully contribute in the future to a better understanding of the functioning of our own and others planning systems.

In this context, it is interesting to note that Masser et al., who have recently undertaken parallel running case study research in the Netherlands, have similarly stressed "the need for more studies of development processes.... which would enable comparisons to be made, with a view to devising a classification of these kinds of planning processes"(209). It is hoped then, that this research thesis usefully adds to the small number of such studies so far on record, and provides further evidence of the value and potential of such a case study approach. With the cases we already have, there may well be material enough for embarking on the refinement and testing of comparative analytical frameworks, using cases from more than one planning environment. This, however, goes beyond the scope of this thesis, which, it is hoped, has nevertheless made some contribution towards the fulfilment of these broader objectives.

### 8.3 Concluding Statements

In this final section, the thesis conclusions, discussed in some depth in the previous two sections, are set out in summary form, for reference purposes.

#### A. CASE STUDY FINDINGS

1. The planning machinery established in the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act failed to ensure that the implementation of estate development took place in accordance with the dictates of corresponding Local Plans. This breakdown in the functioning of the planning system was the result of the interaction of a number of factors.

2. The planning system was rigid, mechanistic and unrealistic with regard to planning, control and service provision in private residential estate development, and vague and unworkable as regards the provision of service infrastructure in private industrial estate development.
3. The systems of intervention introduced in the 1956 Act failed to work effectively in the implementation of estate development because planning law was incapable of exercising the necessary control over the political and economic variables upon which the functioning of these systems depend. Above all, the lack of local authority finances, and the multiplicity of private sector agencies working within each estate, made it difficult for the 'cession of roads' and 'cooperative' systems to adequately ensure the provision of planned service infrastructure in estate development.
4. In practice, the statutory planning machinery played very little part in directing or controlling the implementation of estate development. Local authorities and private sector developers collaborated in the piecemeal implementation of development within Local Plan areas, which often contravened planning regulations. The by-passing of plan procedure by Central State authorities and the non-coordination and general inadequacy of macro-service provision (schools, hospitals) by other Central State authorities only added to the lack of credibility given the statutory planning machinery.
5. The 1956 Act failed to make provision for the regulation of certain aspects of development, notably the planning and financing of improvement and renewal schemes, and resident participation in the urban design process. The Special Plan of Interior Reform, introduced in the seventies, constitutes a useful mechanism for planning such schemes, but other aspects, notably finance, remain unattended to in existing legislation.

6. Residents Associations have emerged as powerful action groups in the planning and implementation of improvement and renewal schemes in the seventies. As these associations have become increasingly well informed and better organised, the central and local administrations have adopted more conciliatory and collaborative approaches to resident demands. There remains, nevertheless, an absence of any legislative framework to ensure the systematic incorporation of resident opinion within the planning process in such schemes.
7. Changes in the broader political and planning frameworks in the mid-seventies had a major impact on agency roles and activities at local level. The Sub-Regional Planning Authority has emerged as a strict upper-tier 'watchdog' agency, and has coerced municipal councils into adhering more closely to statutory planning procedure and into adopting improvement initiatives to complement and improve services and infrastructure in selected estates. Private sector developers are now being forced to comply, a posteriori, with their responsibilities as regards road and associated service provision; and central state authorities, as noted above, are collaborating with resident representatives in the planning and implementation of improvement and renewal schemes.
8. The planning machinery and financial and administrative structure of local authorities nevertheless remains in need of further reform if they are to play an effective planning and management role in the resolution of local level developmental problems. The technical, human and, above all, financial resources of Local Councils severely limit their developmental role; and the planning mechanisms available for managing and co-ordinating the rehabilitation and renewal of a poor quality urban environment are inadequate. Too much depends on the ad hoc acquisition of central government funds and too many aspects of local level improvement and renewal schemes are not encompassed by the available planning mechanisms.

9. Decision-making in the planning process may usefully be conceived of as consisting of two interconnected strands. The first strand (the 'formalised process') encompasses those decisions made within the framework of the statutory planning system; the second strand (the 'non/semi formalised' process) encompasses those decisions made outside the framework of the statutory planning system.
10. In the planning and implementation of development in the Barcelona periphery in the sixties and early seventies, the non/semi formalised process played the major part in directing the course of change. The formalised process was either by-passed altogether, or involved a series of contraventions of approved plans and planning procedure, providing a pseudo-legal framework for subsequent decision-making at both levels.
11. From the mid-seventies onwards, contraventions in the formalised process have become less evident and this strand of decision-making has played a more significant part in directing and regulating the course of change. Nevertheless, the continuing failure of the planning machinery to make adequate provision for certain aspects of planning and implementation means that some decisions of critical importance will continue to be made outside the framework of the formalised process, with no corresponding counterpart within this strand of decision-making.
12. Research results suggest that it is inappropriate to consider 'planning' (plan-making) and 'implementation' (plan-implementation) as analytical categories within a decision-centred model of the planning process. Planning is undertaken at a succession of levels and stages as implementation on the ground proceeds. 'Planning' and 'implementation' are best thought of as loose descriptive terms jointly encompassing the mass of decisions and activities involved in the development process.



## B. THE CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY

13. A case study method has been developed and applied in a relatively unresearched field, as regards both the object of study and the research method itself; not surprisingly certain 'teething problems' have been encountered in the conduct of research (e.g. inconsistency of focus, standardization of the method, subjectivity of interpretation).
14. The content of the 'conceptual framework' is likely to have a major influence on the scope of research findings, and thus merits careful consideration and attention.
15. A case study method has been successfully employed in this project to research the decision-making process, the functioning of plan mechanisms and the evolution of agency roles and activities. There would seem to be considerable scope for further development in this research area, given current trends towards a greater openness in, and democratization of, the planning process in many parts of the free world. The case study, as a research, monitoring and feedback instrument, can play a significant part in guiding and effecting such change.
16. Similarly, in the field of international comparative research, research findings suggest that the case study method may provide a useful analytical framework within which the decision-making process, in different planning environments, can be researched and compared.

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Letter from Rafael Fusteros Rosua, President of the San Damian Residents Association, to Mr. E. Tarragona, Member of Spanish Parliament, dated March 20th, 1973. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-2', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from General Manager of the National Institute of Housing (Madrid) to M. Simon Perez, Mayor of Prat Council, Ref. No.: F/S, dated March 22nd, 1965 (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Letter from General Manager of the National Institute of Housing (Madrid), to Sn. Anibal Rodriguez, Provincial Director of Syndical Housing Authority (Barcelona), dated 6th March, 1975. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-4', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from J. Lavina Beranger, Sub-Secretary of Ministry of Civil Aviation, to the Director of the Syndical Housing Authority (Madrid), dated April 14th, 1965 (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Letter from Vicente Martorell, Manager of the Sub-Regional Plan, to the Mayor of Molins de Rey, giving Definitive Approval to the Local Plan for Industrial Zone No. 2; letter dated 16th March, 1962; Dispatch No. 339-62. (File Ref : 'Plan Parcial de Zona Industrial No. 2, 1961-2', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Molins Council).

Letter from the Minister of Labour Relations to Mr. E. Tarragona, dated June 27th, 1973. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-3', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from F. Muntados, Mayor of Hospitalet to Mr. Jose Fernandez Pascual, estate agent representing Mrs. Maria Badia, dated 4th January, 1963. (File Ref : 'Expediente 493/63, Nueva Composicion de Volumenes del Plan Parcial de Ordenacion del Poligono Can Serra', Oficina Tecnica de Urbanismo, Ponencia de Urbanismo y Obras Publicas, Hospitalet Council).

Letter from J. Navarro Vilodre, Provincial Delegate (Barcelona) of the Syndical Organization (Ministry of Work and Labour Relations) to San Cosme Residents, dated June 1969. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-3', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from Official College of Architects of Catalonia and the Balearic Islands, to Mayor of Hospitalet Council, dated November 11th, 1972, signed by Luis Nadal Oller (Acting Secretary and Alfonso Mila Sagnier (Deacon-President), letter reference no. 034383. (File Ref : 'Expediente 493/72, Proyecto de Remodelacion parcial del Sector Can Serra', Oficina Tecnica de Urbanismo, Hospitalet Council).

Letter from Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, Barcelona to M. Simon Perez, Mayor of Prat Council, dated 5th August, 1977, ref: PM/nf. (File Ref : 'Expediente del Plan Especial de Reforma Interior de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Letter from Alberto Serratosa, Acting Manager of the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission ('Comision de Urbanismo de Barcelona) to Mayor of Hospitalet Council, dated 12th March, 1974, ref. no: 42-Ho-11-H/mda. (File Ref : 'Expediente 493/72, Proyecto de Remodelacion parcial del sector Can Serra', Oficina Tecnica de Urbanismo, Hospitalet Council).

Letter from M. Simon Perez (Mayor of Prat Council), to J. Chinchilla, Chief Architect of Barcelona Provincial Office of the Syndical Housing Authority, dated March 23rd, 1965. (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Letter from M. Simon Perez (Mayor of Prat Council) to Provincial Delegate (Barcelona) of Ministry of Housing, dated March 5th, 1964. (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Letter from Mr. E. Tarragona to Carlos Arias Navarro, Prime Minister of the Spanish Government, dated 25th November, 1974. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-5' Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from Mr. Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcarcel y Nebrada, President of Spanish Parliament, to Mr. E. Tarragona, dated 10th March, 1975. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-5', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from A. Rodriguez de Valcarcel y Nebrada, President of the Spanish Parliament, to Mr. E. Tarragosa, dated November 9th, 1974. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-3', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Letter from Under Secretary of the Ministry of Housing to Mr. R. Fusteros Rosua, President of the San Damian Residents' Association, dated November 6th, 1974. (File Ref : 'San Cosme-5', Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants), Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona).

Ignasio Mas Brosa, 'Solicitud de Permiso de obras para la fabrica de SAIDA, carretera NII, Molins de Rey', Molins Council, 1962. (File Ref : 'Tramitacion del Expediente de SAIDA', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Molins Council).

Molins Council, 'Acuerdo del Pleno Municipal, 11.1.1961', Internal Dispatch No. 1605, 13th January 1961. (File Ref : 'Plan Parcial de Zona Industrial No. 2, 1961-2', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Molins Council).

Molins Council (Augustin Domingo Ferrer, Municipal Architect), 'Plan Parcial de Zona Industrial No. 2', Memoria, Molins Council, 1961, p. 3.

Molins Council (J. Tort Roca, Municipal Engineer), 'Proyecto de Alumbrado Publico de la Avenida Generalisimo des de la Riera de Bonet, hasta el limite zone verde', Memoria, 1971.

Prat Council, 'Acuerdo del Pleno Municipal (Resolution of Full Council), 8.10.63', (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council.

Prat Council, 'Acuerdo del Pleno Municipal 2.4.68'. (File Ref: (Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servicios Tecnicos, Prat Council).

Prat Council, 'Informe del Arquitecto Municipal sobre la propuesta de la Obra Sindical para construir 300 alberges en Prat', 21st Sept, 1963. (File Ref : 'Expediente de la tramitacion de la Unidad Vecinal de Absorcion de San Cosme', Seccion de Servios Tecnicos, Prat Council.)

Pronouncement of Minister of Housing of 11th March, 1964, quoted in El Correo Catalan, Thursday, 12th March, 1964.

Provincial Office (Barcelona) of the Syndical Housing Authority, (C. Chinchilla et al), 'Plan Parcial de San Cosme', June 1964.



Provincial Office (Barcelona) of the Syndical Housing Authority,  
(J. Pelon Diaz), 'Plan Parcial de San Cosme (revisado)', May 1966.

Provincial Office (Barcelona) of the Syndical Housing Authority,  
(J. L. Ripol Juncadella and I. Alcalde de Dominguez), 'Borrador del  
Plan de Remodelacion de San Cosme-Memoria', November 1974.

APPENDIX I - LETTERS OF SUPPORT

Letters of support included here are from :-

1. Manuel Casteleiro Maldona, Secretary of School of Civil Engineers, Barcelona University.
2. Councillor Albert Serratosa, formerly Professor of Planning in the School of Civil Engineers, Barcelona University.
3. Jose Manuel Merele Palau, Director of Syndical Housing Authority, Madrid.
4. Francisco Paya Agusti, Provincial Director (Barcelona) of The Syndical Housing Authority.
5. Carles Ponsa, Engineer-Director of the Tecnical Planning Office, Hospitalet Council.
6. Luis Trapero, Municipal Architect, and Jose Bernis, Municipal Engineer, Molins de Rey Council.
7. E. Fernandez, Municipal Architect, Prat de Llobregat Council.
8. Francisco Calbet, Director, Calbet, Elias y Asociados (consultants) Consejo de Ciento, Barcelona.
9. Manuel Palao, Director of Post Graduate Planning Course, School of Civil Engineers, Madrid University.
10. Manuel Dargallo, Chief Architect, and Enrique Jordi, Director of Works, Municipal Housing Foundation, Barcelona.
11. Carlos Gomez Pardo, President, Gallecs New Town Corporation, Barcelona.



*Escuela Técnica Superior  
de  
Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos  
de la  
Universidad Politécnica de Barcelona*

MARTIN WYNN - PhD RESEARCH PROGRAMME - THE PROCESS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN  
SPAIN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SELECTED URBAN PLANNING CASE STUDIES

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C E R T I F I C O :

que la Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingenieros  
de Caminos, Canales y Puertos de la Universidad Politécnica de Barce  
lona colaborará en el programa arriba indicado y suministrará to  
dos los datos disponibles, ayudando a Mr. Martin WINN en todo lo -  
que sea posible.

Barcelona, 5 de Diciembre 1977



Manuel CASTELEIRO MALDONADO  
Secretario de la Escuela



*Escuela Técnica Superior  
de  
Ingenieros de Caminos, Canales y Puertos  
de la  
Universidad Politécnica de Barcelona*

Departamento de Urbanismo

Barcelona, 5 de Diciembre de 1977

Dr. John L. TAYLOR  
Trent Polytechnic  
Burton Street  
NOTTINGHAM NG1 4BU

Dear Dr. Taylor

MARTIN WYNN - PhD RESEARCH PROGRAMME - THE PROCESS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN  
SPAIN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SELECTED URBAN PLANNING CASE STUDIES

---

This is to certify that I will be pleased to collaborate on the above programme  
and will supply data and help whenever possible.

Yours sincerely

Albert SERRATOSA  
Profesor de Urbanismo



ADMINISTRACION INSTITUCIONAL  
DE  
SERVICIOS SOCIO-PROFESIONALES

OBRA DEL HOGAR

Director

M. MARTIN G. WYNN  
Department of Town and Country Planning  
Trent Polytechnic Nottingham  
Burton Street  
Nottingham NG1 4BU  
INGLATERRA .-

Madrid  
13, octbr  
1.977

Muy Sr. mio:

En relación a su atenta carta interesándose sobre las actividades de la Obra del Hogar en el campo de las reformas, mejoras y remodelaciones en los Polígonos de viviendas edificádos por esta Entidad, tengo a bien comunicarle que estamos a su disposición para ayudarle en sus investigaciones sobre el tema.

Con este fin, puede ponerse Vd. en contacto con la Subdirección de Construcciones de esta Obra del Hogar en el momento que piense Vd. venir a España.

Le saluda atehatamente,

José Manuel Merelo Palau



(V)

OBRA SINDICAL DEL HOGAR  
DIRECTOR PROVINCIAL  
BARCELONA

3016

Mr. G. Wynn  
Dept. Town and Country Planning  
TRENT Polytechnic  
Burton Street  
Nottingham NG1 4BU  
ENGLAND

Muy Señor mío:

Con relación a su escrito de fecha 29 del pasado mes de Septiembre, tengo el gusto de comunicarle que, esta Dirección Provincial de la Obra del Hogar de Barcelona, colaborará con Vd. en todo cuanto pueda interesarle, a fin de realizar el trabajo de investigación que Vd. desarrolla.

A la espera de su visita, le saluda afectuosamente,

EL DIRECTOR PROVINCIAL

Fdo: Francisco Payá Agustí



AYUNTAMIENTO  
DE  
L'HOSPITALET DE LLOBREGAT

(VI)

L'Hospitalet,

REFERENCIA

ASUNTO

MARTIN WYNN  
PhD. CASE STUDY - CAN SERRA


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DESTINATARIO

May, 1978

I certify that Mr. Wynn has worked here in the months of April and May 1978, using original documents relating to Can Serra. I have read the English versions and consider them to be fair translations of the originals.

Carlos Ponsa  
Engineer-Director of the Technical Planning  
Office, Hospitalet Council.



AYUNTAMIENTO DE MOLINS DE REI  
(BARCELONA)

MARTIN WYNN - PH.D. 1973 MARCH

Case Study: Zona Industrial 2, Molins de Rei.

CERTIFICO que Mr. Wynn ha trabajado aqui  
con documentos originales en los meses de Abril  
y Mayo, 1978.

Senor Luis Trapero  
Arquitecto Jefe Municipal, Molins de Rei.  
Mayo, 1978.

I have read the English versions and consider  
them fair translations of the originals.

Jose Bernis Calatayud  
Industrial Engineer of Council of Molins de  
Rei, 1978





(VIII)

AYUNTAMIENTO  
DE  
PRAT DE LLOBREGAT

MR. MARTIN GEORGE WYNN: PH.D. RESEARCH  
CASE STUDY: SAN COSME HOUSING AREA,  
PRAT DE LLOBREGAT, BARCELONA

---

I hereby certify that Mr. Wynn has worked in  
this Council in March and April 1973 with original  
documents relating to the San Cosme Housing Area.

Mr. Fernandez  
Chief Municipal Architect,  
Prat de Llobregat

(IX)

Calbet, Elias y asociados  
Arquitectos  
Consejo de Ciento, 113-115, 6.º 2.º  
Barcelona-15  
Tel. 243 77 67

MARTIN WYNN: PH.D. RESEARCH

CASE STUDY: SAN COSME

I certify that Mr. Wynn  
has worked here in the archives  
of this office with original  
documents relating to San Cosme,  
in the months of February to  
May, 1973.



Francisco Calbet



(X)

Madrid 77 11 18

3/19

MARTIN WYNN PH. D. RESEARCHS

Dr. John Taylor  
Head of the DEPARTMENT OF TOWN AND  
COUNTRY PLANNING  
Trent Polytechnic  
Burton St.  
NOTTINGHAM NG1 4B4  
INGLATERRA


Dear Dr. Taylor:

This is to certify that we will be pleased to collaborate on Martin Wynn's Ph. D. Research Programme THE PROCESS OF PLAN IMPLEMENTATION IN SPAIN WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SELECTED URBAN PLANNING CASE STUDIES.

Given our common interests we will be glad to collaborate closely on Martin Wynn's work, and even to study further lines of joint research.

Accordingly we are in the best attitude to supply data, help and advice to the extent of our possibilities.

Yours sincerely,

  
Manuel Palao  
DIRECTOR



PATRONATO MUNICIPAL DE LA VIVIENDA  
DE  
BARCELONA

MARTIN WYNN - Ph. D. RESEARCH  
CASE STUDY - 106 VIVIENDAS EN MONTBAU

---

Certifico que Mr. Wynn ha trabajado aquí en los archivos del Patronato Municipal de la Vivienda en los meses de Abril y Mayo de 1.978 con documentos originales, los cuales se refieren a las 106 viviendas, 5 porterías y 13 locales comerciales en Montbau, Barcelona.

PATRONATO

D.Manuel Dargallo Reventós  
Arquitecto-Jefe de Servicio.


D.Enrique Jardí Casany  
Director del Dpto.de Construcciones.

Concerning: Ph.D. Thesis of MARTIN GEORGE WYNN  
Case Study: Santa Maria de Gallecs

---

This is to certify that Mr. Wynn has worked with the relevant documents in Barcelona between January and April, 1978.

I have read the English version and consider it a fair translation of documents that exist in Spanish.

  
Senor Carlos Gomez Pardo  
President-Director of 'Santa Maria de Gallecs'  
New Town Development Company.



APPENDIX II - MATERIAL PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR WHILST  
UNDERTAKING THE THESIS

The following published material is included here :-

1. M. Wynn, 'San Cosme, Spain : Planning and Renewal of a State Housing Area', Journal of the American Planning Association, January, 1980.
2. M. Wynn, 'Barcelona : Planning and Change 1854-1977', Town Planning Review, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1979.
3. M. Wynn, 'Conserving Madrid', Town and Country Planning, February, 1980.
4. M. Wynn and R. J. Smith, 'Spain : Urban Decentralization', Built Environment, March, 1978.
5. M. Wynn, P. Portilla and J. Urena, 'The Port Service Area Project, Santander', Planning and Administration, 1980, No. 1.
6. M. Wynn and I. Haywood, 'The Buildings, Eastwood', Industrial Archaeology, Winter, 1978.
7. M. Wynn, J. L. Taylor, I. Haywood and R. Smith, 'Improving Urban Management : a case study technique', National Development, August 1980.
8. M. Wynn and J. L. Taylor, 'Urban Management Training : the Case Study Dynamic', Journal of European Industrial Training, September 1980.
9. M. Wynn and R. J. Smith 'El tratamiento de vivienda de mala calidad', Ciudad y Territorio 1979, No. 4, IEAL, Madrid.

# San Cosme, Spain: Planning and Renewal of a State Housing Area

Martin Wynn

The San Cosme Residential Estate was built outside Barcelona, Spain, in the mid-1960s by the state-run Syndical Housing Authority to rehouse over seven thousand people, most of them from cleared shanty towns on the Montjuich hill overlooking the city. Within five years of construction the houses began to deteriorate rapidly and San Cosme has since become notorious as an example of the worst aspects of state housing in Spain. This article ex-

amines in detail the planning and construction of San Cosme and the successful campaign of the local residents' association to persuade central state authorities of the need to rebuild the estate. At the same time, the article identifies the major socio-political and planning issues involved in the San Cosme experience that may be of relevance to other state housing projects in both the developed and developing world.

## The Spanish Planning System

The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 formed the basis for urban planning in Spain for the following two decades. The Act established an administrative hierarchy for urban plans at the municipal, sub-regional, provincial, and national levels. Local councils were made responsible for drawing up Municipal Development Plans, although in some cases, particularly in the larger cities, municipal authorities could join together to draw up Sub-Regional Plans, some of which in fact pre-dated the 1956 Act. Such was the case in Barcelona, where a sub-regional plan for Barcelona and the surrounding twenty-seven municipalities had been approved in 1953, when the Greater Barcelona Planning Commission (GBPC) had also been formed to manage urban planning in the Greater Barcelona Sub-Region. The 1956 Act recognized this plan and made the local councils and the GBPC responsible for its enforcement.

*Martin Wynn, B.A., M.A., is involved in full-time research in the Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham. His degrees were awarded by the University of Durham, where he was formerly a student in the Department of Geography, and his current research towards a Ph.D. concerns plan implementation activity in Spain and Britain. This article is based on research carried out in Spain and forms part of this broader research program.*

The 1956 Act, however, failed to provide any effective control over the growth of Spain's major cities for several reasons. Urban planning at the upper-tier levels has been virtually non-existent and has had little bearing on urban growth in the large metropolitan areas<sup>1</sup>. At the lower-tier levels, the municipal and sub-regional authorities, which were entrusted with drawing up and implementing urban plans, lacked the financial and technical resources to actively intervene in urban development and, in many cases, the political will to fulfil any effective development control role. A loophole in the 1956 Act enabled developers (in both the public and private sectors) to draw up "Local Plans," which could change land-use classifications established in approved development plans. At the same time, central state authorities, each with their own investment programs, frequently intervened with non-coordinated developments that sometimes crossed established planning procedures and contradicted approved urban plans. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the activities of the Syndical Housing Authority in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s.

## The Syndical Housing Authority

The Syndical Housing Authority (SHA) was founded in 1939 to provide state subsidized housing for members of the state run trade unions. It became



conomic shipbuilding facility forced workers who could not be assimilated into other operations to relocate to find employment. Now the only use for their public housing is to accommodate Adelaide's welfare population (who are offered immediate placement if they go the 250 miles [400 kilometers] to Whyalla where they will probably never find a job). Some relief may come from a government-sponsored industrial development 50 miles (80 kilometers) away but whether Whyalla houses are as transportable as those of Yallourn is unclear. This is hardly the point; rather, governments, which because of their particular ideology partner private enterprise by supplying infrastructure, should recognize evolution as the ground-rule of business, especially in specialized fields. Government and entrepreneurs may encourage economic diversification as a safeguard but, if this is impossible, public funds would be at less risk with removable buildings and facilities.

Finally, publicizing an unusual and positive relocation in a new setting has intrinsic value. It is recognized that results for either the present or subsequent Yallourn samples may not be stable since there may be fluctuating success over time in relocation. This, and the influence in the study of class similarity, employment stability, reasonable incomes, and the shift into home ownership could interest modellers. Much work remains in a field in which practicalities have often outrun theory and it is gratifying that the few available models are broad and straightforward. Probing the role and focus of the relocation agency over time would complement work on the behavior and characteristics of relocatees and benefit theoreticians, practitioners, and those whom society might uproot in the future.

#### Author's note

The authors thank all who assisted in the work, particularly Mr. J. Penney and the State Electricity Commission's Latrobe Valley division.

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the major national public housing authority in the Franco era, promoting over 300,000 houses in Spain during the period 1939-75, of which over 24,000 were in the Barcelona Sub-Region, where there nevertheless remained a housing deficit of 118,000 dwellings in 1972<sup>3</sup> due largely to the continued massive migration into the region throughout the 1960s and early 1970s.<sup>4</sup>

The SHA was a Madrid-based authority under the wing of the Labour Relations Ministry but it worked closely with the National Institute of Housing (a subsection of the Ministry of Housing), which usually financed and directed land acquisition for SHA activities. The SHA provided, above all, "limited cost" housing<sup>5</sup> for the lowest paid workers and San Cosme was one of three "Overspill Estates" ("Unidades Vecinales de Absorción") specifically built in the mid-sixties to resettle shanty town dwellers (most of them in-migrants from the south and west of Spain) from Montjuich, a hill area overlooking the city.

The SHA estates of the early and mid-sixties are generally regarded as the worst ever built by the SHA in terms of the quality of their construction and design. Following the approval of the National Housing Plan in 1961, the Ministry of Housing put the SHA in charge of the construction of over 170,000 low cost houses in the country as a whole, and quantity rather than quality became the main criterion for SHA operations in the ensuing "boom" period. But although San Cosme was undoubtedly one of the worst SHA estates ever built, the vast majority of the SHA housing areas have experienced similar, if less extreme, problems associated with the poor quality of house construction and inadequate service infrastructure.

## **Montjuich and the residents' associations**

Montjuich has subsequently been developed by the Barcelona Council and private developers as a major tourist and recreational area with an amusement park, sports installations, public gardens, and a variety of museums. Eight hectares were also ceded by the Barcelona Council to the state in 1971 for the installation of a television broadcasting center, and the Council, despite massive opposition from local residents and the Architects' Colleges, has used other parts of the hill area (screened from the city center) as municipal rubbish dumps. Thus, although this article focuses on procedural aspects of planning and development at the local level, it is worth noting that the San Cosme project can also be seen in the context of inner-city renovation of working-class housing areas by the public administration and/or private developers that has invariably involved the rehousing

of residents in the city periphery where land values are much lower and urban services and infrastructure often inferior.


It was precisely this insensitivity to resident needs that gave rise to the residents' association movement in Spain's major cities in the 1960s and 1970s, which, as Borja (1977) and Castells (1978) have pointed out, is one of the most developed movements of its kind in Europe. The San Cosme experience is of interest in this context also, as the struggle by the local residents' association to secure improvement, and then the total renewal, of the San Cosme Housing Estate by central state authorities constitutes one of the most successful and dramatic residents' association protest campaigns in Spain.

## **The San Cosme case study**

### **The designation of San Cosme and local council opposition 1963-4**

In July 1963, the National Institute of Housing (NIH) put other state bodies in charge of the construction of 6,500 houses and complementary service buildings in Barcelona, specifically to house people from Montjuich.<sup>6</sup> On July 29th, the provincial (Barcelona) delegate of the Ministry of Housing notified the Prat Council of the decision of the SHA to build 300 provisional dwellings on a 100 hectare site (247.1 acres) in the municipality of Prat, 12 kilometers from the Barcelona city center. The Council was asked to supply information regarding landownership and estate value so that the expropriation procedure could go ahead. The Prat authorities did this in their reply of October 28th; at the same time, however, they expressed their dismay that a 100 hectare site should be chosen for the construction of only 300 houses and their opposition on the grounds that it contradicted the land-use classifications for the area contained in the 1953 sub-regional plan.

The Prat Council drew attention to the fact that the 1953 plan gave three different classifications to the designated area—"Permanent Agricultural Land," "Extensive Suburban Development," and "Special Airport Zone" (Figure 1)—and that development exceeding the specified limitations could only take place if a local plan was passed to change the land zone classifications as necessary.<sup>7</sup> Further, as the entire area consisted of agricultural land, a Roads and Services Project<sup>8</sup> would have to be drawn up and approved so that the necessary infrastructure and services could be provided before house construction started, as was demanded by the 1956 Act. In addition, it was pointed out that the designated area contained some of the richest agricultural land in the province, which, because of the problems of drainage and of providing adequate foundations, was scarcely suitable for residential development.



**Figure 1. The growth of San Cosme, 1963-1973**

In February 1964, the provincial delegate of the Ministry of Housing again wrote to the Prat Council, this time informing them that 3,000 dwellings<sup>9</sup> were to be built within part of the previously designated area in Prat, and that the state was officially to occupy the land following a hand-over ceremony to take place on March 13th. The Prat Council again strongly contested the legality of the proposals on the basis of the 1956 Act and demanded that, as the local council, they be consulted before expropriation take place, as stipulated in the Law of Limited Cost Housing of 1954.<sup>10</sup>

The Council also pointed out that 3,000 new dwellings in Prat would constitute an increase of approximately 15,000 people, almost as many as the existent population of 16,021, and that "an increase of such proportions would create enormous difficulties in the satisfactory provision of municipal services and government as there will not be the necessary financial compensation for this Council."<sup>11</sup> The Prat Council continued their campaign against the San Cosme proposal throughout 1964 and early 1965, lobbying even the Vice-President of the government for an audience.

This relentless protest by the local authority undoubtedly made an impact on the central state authorities. In March 1965, the NIH informed Prat

Council that it "had agreed to reduce the number of provisional dwellings to be built in Prat to 1,500 instead of the 3,000 originally programmed."<sup>12</sup> The Prat Council, on the advice of their legal advisors, accepted this as a reasonable compromise and the SHA could now proceed with the construction of the new housing estate.

### Construction of San Cosme, 1965-67

Although no Local Plan or Roads and Services Project had been submitted to the Public Information Stage or followed the procedural course outlined in the 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act<sup>13</sup>, the Prat Council contacted the SHA in March 1965, inviting them to discuss details of the San Cosme operation. In April the SHA replied by forwarding copies of their plans and asking that the Prat authorities grant the necessary building permits, which the Council did in May 1965. By this time, the SHA had awarded the contract for construction to *Colomina - Serrano S.A.*, a nationwide building contractor, and the foundations had been laid (Figure 3). In April 1965, however, the Aviation Ministry intervened with an objection that necessitated the replanning of about half the estate. This highlights the incredible lack of coordination between government ministries that was in many ways typical of state intervention in the Franco era.

In October 1963, Prat Council had pointed out that part of the designated area encroached on land classified as "Special Airport Zone" in the 1953 Barcelona Sub-Regional Plan. Now, the Aviation Ministry wrote to the SHA noting that construction was underway in this area, and warning them that should plans for future runway extension be approved, the houses would have to be demolished. The SHA clearly took the warning seriously. By May 1966, a revised lay-out (Figure 2) had been drawn up and construction continued accordingly,<sup>14</sup> leaving almost half the 1965 foundations (those within the Special Airport Zone) to be abandoned. By 1967, construction of the two-story H-shaped and linear apartment blocks was complete and by the end of 1968, 7,200 people were living in San Cosme in the River Llobregat delta area, with over 5,000 of them having been removed from shanty towns on Montjuich.

### House deterioration, 1970-74

In the early 1970s many houses in San Cosme began to show clear signs of deterioration, notably large surface cracks in the outer and inner walls. The San Damian Residents' Association (SDRA), representing the San Cosme residents, contacted the SHA and asked that the necessary repairs be made. In 1970 the River Llobregat broke its banks and flooded San Cosme, filling the house cellars with flood water that

often contained sewage effluent. By now, the majority of San Cosme residents were refusing to pay part or all of the mortgage payments that the SHA had set in 1969 for twenty- to forty-year loans based on the subsidized cost of houses.<sup>15</sup> The SHA had failed to carry out repairs and relations between the SHA and the SDRA were further embittered by the serving of eviction notices on some of the residents.

How was it possible that these houses began to crack and crumble so soon after completion of construction? As already noted, the Prat Council had pointed out in 1963 that the delta soils posed problems for the adequate provision of both drainage and house foundations. In a geological survey subsequently carried out in 1977,<sup>16</sup> it was discovered that deltaic deposits extended to a depth of 40 meters from the surface. The SHA had designed their houses on "egg-box" foundations reaching only one meter below the surface which in theory could "float" in the soft delta clays and thereby support the two-story apartment blocks above. But in practice, the movement of the sub-soil was so great that the foundations moved disproportionately, causing cracks to appear in both inner and outer walls of the apartments. Here one could possibly place some blame on the Prat Council's technical planning office, which had reported favorably on the house design in April 1965, prior to the granting of municipal building per-

mits. But by then all formal planning procedure had been reduced to something of a farce by the illegality of the San Cosme operation over the previous two years and one can suppose that Prat Council, having just secured a reduction in the overall size of the housing estate from 3,000 to 1,500, was reluctant to push its luck. It must also be said that if statutory planning procedure had been followed,<sup>17</sup> Local Authorities and the general public would have had the opportunity to closely examine the plans for San Cosme, and that the technical aspects of the SHA's proposals would have been seriously questioned. In any case, the blame must surely rest fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the SHA which, as a state housing authority, should have ensured that the proposals for foundations were satisfactory before submitting the plans to the Prat Authorities.

Throughout 1973, the SDRA pressed the SHA for urgently needed repairs, while a Barcelona member of the Spanish Parliament (E. Tarragona) took up the case with government authorities in Madrid. Finally, in November 1973, the NIH was authorized to draw up a repair program for San Cosme and in March 1974 *Constructora Internacional S.A.*, an international building contractor, was given the state contract for carrying out these repairs. But failure to arrive at an agreement with residents over what families should do while their houses were being repaired delayed




Figure 2. The Syndical Housing Authority's revised plan for San Cosme, May 1966



the start of operations until October 1974, when Mr. Tarragona again raised the matter in the Spanish Parliament, demanding that the urgent problems in San Cosme be satisfactorily resolved. In a written reply, the President of the Spanish Parliament confirmed reports that because of new estimates<sup>18</sup> on the total cost of repairs, the Government had decided to demolish the 1,500 houses built between 1965 and 1967 and build approximately 3000 in their place. Instead of being repaired, San Cosme was now to be renewed.

### The first renewal scheme, 1974-5

In 1974, the SHA was undergoing transition from a house promotion and management authority to essentially an estate management body within the Syndical Organization, and after that time they played very little part in proceedings. By early 1975, the NIH had prepared its own draft plan for the Renewal of San Cosme (Figure 3). The new estate was to consist of pre-fabricated star and linear-shaped blocks of five and nine stories (c.f. the existing 2 story blocks), to house 13,000 people.

Meanwhile, in January 1975, the residents' associations in SHA estates in Barcelona collectively petitioned the Ministry of Housing, demanding that they be allowed to set up "Committees of Control" to supervise all repair and renewal schemes. In March, the NIH officially rejected the idea, and stressed that "in no way may persons outside the Administration intervene actively in the realization of

the Administration's programmes."<sup>19</sup> This tendency to sour the reception of the NIH's renewal scheme in San Cosme, and relations worsened throughout 1975 as disagreements arose over payment of removal and other costs to be incurred in implementing the project. Further, problems surrounded the 1,500 houses built by the SHA in 1971-3 to the south of the 1500 built between 1965 and 1967; 500 of these remained empty and the NIH proposed to move 1,000 families into these houses as permanent residence to facilitate the phased demolition-construction-rehousing operation of the renewal scheme. The habitability state of these 500 houses was put in doubt by an architect's report commissioned by the SDRA. The report stated that the houses had "great structural defects and many are considered uninhabitable." This was subsequently challenged in a report commissioned by the SHA, but following a series of bitter exchanges in the summer and autumn of 1975, relations between the SDRA and the housing authorities reached a new crisis point. The rent strike continued (not just in San Cosme, but in almost all SHA estates in Barcelona), and the future of the renewal scheme remained uncertain.


### New initiatives in the post-Franco era

In 1976, the first full year of the post-Franco era, a new administration and subtle but significant changes in political attitudes brought new impetus to the San Cosme renewal scheme. New "social housing"<sup>21</sup> legislation placed emphasis on making housing available to house buyers, representing a significant



*Housing in San Cosme, 1977. The repair of cracks in the outer walls was often undertaken by the residents themselves.*





**Figure 3. The National Institute of Housing's plan for renewal in San Cosme, January 1975**



*Houses built in the second phase of construction, 1971-73. These houses were the center of a dispute between the San Damian Residents' Association and the Syndical Housing Authority in 1975, when it was suggested that 500 families from the first phase (1965-67) be permanently rehoused there.*


policy change from the constructor subsidy system which had been the major feature of previous state housing policy. More importantly as regards San Cosme, it was stated that "in exceptional cases, the National Institute of Housing may acquire or construct 'social housing' themselves, using their own funds . . . such exceptional cases include . . . house deterioration."<sup>22</sup> This, then, provided a new legislative framework within which renewal schemes could be financed by the NIH.

At the same time (in July 1976) the Barcelona General Metropolitan Development Plan (GMDP) was definitively approved. This replaced the 1953 sub-regional plan and was of importance to the San Cosme scheme for two reasons. First, it made reference to the role of special plans in the renewal of existing areas. This type of plan had been introduced in the Land and Urban Planning Reform Act of 1976 as having the "objective of carrying out operations in urban areas aimed at decongestion, creation of urban and community services, improvement of unhealthy areas, traffic circulation, and environmental conditions . . ."<sup>23</sup> Second, the GMDP classified all San Cosme as a "previously re-planned zone" This classification was intended for areas for which local plans had been drawn up and approved since 1953, resulting in land uses that contradicted the land use classifications for such areas in the 1953 sub-regional plan. Paradoxically no local plan had ever been approved for San Cosme, and yet San Cosme existed in contradiction to the 1953 classifications. What the 1976 plan did was to recognize formally the existence


of San Cosme, even if the land zone classification was not strictly appropriate. Therefore, by the end of 1976, the GMDP, the new State housing policy, and the Land and Urban Planning Reform Act provided a new legal administrative and planning framework for the renewal of San Cosme.

### The new renewal scheme, 1976-7

Throughout 1976, the SDR continued to pressure local and central authorities for action in San Cosme. At the same time the SDR contracted an advisory team of architect-planners (led by F. Calbet) which became increasingly involved with finding an alternative to the renewal scheme proposed by the NIH in January 1975. In October 1976, Calbet's team presented an alternative plan to San Cosme residents in a public exhibition held in San Cosme. Following a series of minor adjustments, this was accepted as a new draft plan for renewal by the Ministry of Housing in late 1976. This was of considerable significance; it meant that the SDR had effectively won its campaign to have a direct say in the plan-making process. This victory was consolidated in February 1977 when an official contract was signed between the NIH and Calbet stating that architects from both camps would work together in drawing up a Special Plan of Interior Reform and a Roads and Services Project for all San Cosme, and a Building Project (detailed house design) for the first phase of renewal (Figure 4). The NIH was to finance the operation and twenty-year loans would be made available to residents for the long-term purchase of the new houses.



**Figure 4. The four phases of the special plan of interior reform for San Cosme, 1978. Construction will start on the existent football pitch, enabling residents to move directly into their new homes. Their former homes will then be demolished to make way for the second phase of construction.**



**Figure 5. The special plan of interior reform for San Cosme, 1978**

By July 1977, the Special Plan of Interior Reform (Figure 5) had been completed. The 1500 houses built in the years 1965-7 were to be demolished and 1,784 new houses built in their place in four-story blocks enclosing central recreational areas. Construction was to start on the old football pitch as part of a four-phase scheme whereby residents would move directly into their new houses and thereby avoid any enforced temporary residence elsewhere. By January 1978, after a series of meetings and discussions with residents to determine design details and exact community service needs, the Roads and Services Project and Building Project for the first phase was also complete.


### **The plan approval process, 1977-8**

According to Article 41 of the Land and Urban Planning Reform Act of 1976, the Special Plan of Interior Reform (SPIR) for San Cosme should have been initially approved by the Ministry of Housing, then submitted to the Public Information Stage for a month, with a further month for Audience of Local Corporations, before being provisionally and definitively approved by the Ministry of Housing and Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona<sup>24</sup> respectively. But as Figure 6 shows, the SPIR was not formally

approved by the Ministry at all. It was *accepted* by them and then forwarded to the Prat Council for the council "to proceed with the approval process as outlined in Article 41 of the Land and Urban Planning Act of 9th April 1976."<sup>25</sup> Paradoxically, as noted above, this was *not* in accordance with the referred to Act. The Ministry, it seems, was bending over backwards to avoid giving the impression of heavy-handed state intervention (such as had characterised events 1963-5) to such an extent that they were technically not following correct planning procedure.

On October 17th, 1977, following reports by the Municipal Planning Department and the Committee of Construction and Installations of Prat Council, the SPIR for San Cosme was initially approved by Prat Council. Following announcements on the Council notice-board and in the Official Bulletin of the Province, the Public Information Stage was officially opened on November 17th. The Colonel-Director of Barcelona Airport and the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Public Works were asked to forward reports. These reached the Prat Council in January and February of 1978, and stated no objection to the plan. No appeal at all was presented to the Council in the Public Information Stage, and the plan was therefore forwarded<sup>26</sup> to the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona for definitive approval. This was





**FIGURE 6. The plan approval process in theory and in reality for the Local Plan of 1963-5 (above), and for the Special Plan of Interior Reform of 1977-8 (below)**

given on April 21, 1978. Following visits of Ministry officials to Barcelona and to San Cosme itself, the budgetary allocation for the first phase of the renewal scheme was approved by the full cabinet on December 15, 1978, and *Dragados y Construcciones*, a nationwide building contractor, was awarded the contract for the first phase on March 1, 1979. By October of that year, foundations for the new houses had been laid, with the first phase scheduled to be completed by mid-1980. The battle of the residents' association and Calbet's team to get San Cosme rebuilt was almost won.

## Summary

The San Cosme case study illustrates in striking manner some of the worst aspects of state housing in particular and state intervention in general in the Franco era. All along, central state authorities have dominated developments in San Cosme to such an extent that formalized planning procedure has been of little consequence. In 1963-4, the NIH paid scant regard to the objections raised by Prat Council, even though they were quite legitimate according to planning and housing legislation. The San Cosme operation of the mid-sixties typified the heavy-handed central state intervention that did so much to undermine the credibility of the Madrid Government in Catalonia in the Franco era. The NIH also went back on its word, assuring Prat Council that only 1,500 houses would be built and then constructing a further 800 (through the SHA) in the early 1970s.

The bungling in decision-making must also be something of an object lesson. First, over half of the original foundations had to be abandoned because of

the objection of the Aviation Ministry which ironically took as its planning guidelines the land zone classifications of the 1953 sub-regional plan (which had been ignored by the NIH and the SHA). Then in the early and mid-seventies, the change of policy from repair to renewal revealed the absence of a full comprehension of the problems involved, and was also accompanied by an about face by Ministerial authorities on the question of whether these houses were or were not supposed to be permanent dwellings. If, in 1975, these houses were meant to provide "temporary shelter only,"<sup>27</sup> then the same is presumably true of the other two "overspill estates" built at Poble Nou and Cinco Rosas in the mid-sixties, and yet no renewal schemes exist for these estates.

The San Cosme operation of the mid-sixties is perhaps best seen within the context of the political, economic, and social realities of the age. Barcelona had a housing deficit (in the municipality alone) of an estimated 100,000 houses<sup>28</sup> in 1960 and the continued flow of migrants into the city<sup>29</sup> put great strains on the urban structure, with shanty towns springing up in most of the green areas and on wasteland (near railways, cemeteries, industrial installations) in and around the city. With the blessing of the Barcelona Council, which was anxious to exploit the tourist potential of Montjuich, the central state authorities went for a quick, no-nonsense solution to the shanty problem, that in fact had a lot more to do with their desire to rid the Barcelona city center of unsightly shanty towns than any humanitarian housing policy. The shanty dwellers were moved to poorly constructed dwellings in a variety of peripheral locations, including San Cosme on the mosquito-ridden Llobregat delta.

But perhaps what the San Cosme experience shows above all is that housing projects that are totally insensitive to the needs and wishes of residents are unlikely to be successful in the long term. This is well illustrated by the contrast between the attempts of the NIH to effect repair, and then renewal, schemes in the period 1973-75 and Calbet's collaboration with the San Cosme residents after 1975. In the former, implementation was thwarted by disagreement between residents and state authorities over temporary residences, removal expenses, and resident participation in the direction of operations that were to be carried out by an international building contractor employed by a central state authority. In the latter, Calbet, who had been designated by the residents' association to direct the planmaking process on their behalf, drew up proposals that catered as far as possible to individual resident needs and yet met the budgetary restrictions imposed by the NIH. Calbet also insisted that local building contractors be used if possible, but had to concede on this point in the end when it became clear that no locally-based firm could effectively compete with the nationwide builders for such a large contract. But although such compromises had to be made, the residents as a whole were behind Calbet's scheme from the start. Instead the major battles to be fought were with the sub-regional planning authority to approve the Special Plan of Interior Reform (SPIR), and with the central government to actually finance the scheme.

The need to incorporate resident opinion into the planning process is of particular importance now that Spain has democratically elected *local* as well as central administrations. In the drawing up of the SPIR, public participation was organized on a very ad hoc, if successful, basis under the direction of Calbet's team of architect-planners. At local level, the formalized planning process remained somewhat irrelevant, just as it had for different reasons in the original scheme in the sixties (see Figure 6). Prat Council played very little part in proceedings in 1976-8 and the official Public Information Stage held by the council in November 1977 was a mere formality; the real element of public participation had already taken place through the series of questionnaires, public exhibitions, and meetings held by Calbet. But one must hope that this form of resident involvement in the formulation of planning proposals can take place more directly with the new local authorities (dominated by Socialists and Communists in the big cities) now that they are likely to play a far more active role in urban affairs. It can also be supposed that local authorities at municipal and sub-regional levels will be more successful in managing the coordination of service and infrastructure provision than were the central state authorities in San Cosme where empty spaces remained in 1972 where a school, a day-nurs-

ery, and the sports center should have been.

Finally then, what major lessons can be learned from the San Cosme experience that may be of value to planners and politicians in other countries, as well as in Spain? First, the events of the seventies illustrate the value of careful timing and phasing of plan implementation and the need for the general incorporation of resident preferences into the planning and design processes. Second, the role played by Calbet's team of architect-planners reveals the importance of having a planning team committed to the successful implementation of the project, which should ideally work within the public administration rather than outside it. Finally, the San Cosme experience as a whole highlights the potential dangers of heavy-handed central state intervention, particularly in an area like Catalonia which has a long history of anti-Centralist political activity.<sup>30</sup> As a rule, the local authority will be better equipped to manage and coordinate housing project schemes if it possesses the necessary financial and technical resources, and if political power is sufficiently devolved. People involved in the San Cosme experience have learned these lessons the hard way. It is hoped that this account may help others in similar situations to avoid some of the pitfalls.

### Author's note

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### Notes

1. The Barcelona Provincial Plan of 1963 was one of only three provincial plans that were ever approved. This plan, which included proposals for the resettlement of 400,000 in-migrants in southern Spain and 750,000 other Barcelonans in the Catalan Provinces, was only an "advisory document" without the political-administrative back-up to make it a feasible proposition. At the national level, the Central Commission of Urban Planning was never created and the National Urban Plan was abandoned in the early 1960s once the government embarked on the quadrennial National-Regional Economic Development Plans which centered on a growth poles policy in the underdeveloped south and west of Spain and paid little attention to the need for urban planning in the existent metropolitan areas.
2. The loophole was that Article 10 of the 1956 act stated that public or private promoters could draw up local plans for "the development of" municipal or sub-regional plans. This ambiguity permitted developers to use the local plan to reclassify land to suit their development proposals. Thus, an area classified as "green zone" in a municipal or sub-regional plan could be reclassified for residential development in a local plan.
3. According to the Management Commission of the Barcelona Metropolitan Area. Other estimates put the figure as high as



- 225,000. See *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo* No. 21, Colegio de Aparajadores, Barcelona, September-October 1973.
4. In the municipality of Barcelona alone the number of in-migrants averaged between 22,000 and 35,000 a year between 1954 and 1965. By the late 1960s, the population of the sub-region was growing by 100,000 persons a year.
  5. The Law of Limited Cost Housing (*Ley de Renta Limitada*) of 1954 introduced state subsidies and fiscal exemptions for the constructors of housing that complied with dimensional and maximum cost specifications. The Law is stated in full in *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (Madrid) Num. 197, 16 July, 1954, pp. 4834-4841.
  6. Decree 1622 of 4th July 1963; stated in full in *Boletín Oficial del Estado* (Madrid) Num. 167, 13 July 1963, P. 10875.
  7. The land zone classifications of the 1953 sub-regional plan were subsequently grouped into three main generic categories: urban land, urban reserve, and rural land. To develop any land falling within the last two categories, a local plan had first to be drawn up and approved to reclassify the affected areas as urban land. All the land within the designated area in Prat was either "Rural land" or "Urban Reserve" and so a local plan was necessary, according to the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956, before development of the area could proceed.
  8. Article 67 of the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 states: "Urban Land may only be developed when each parcel of land can be classified as a 'plot' in accordance with the stipulations of Article 63 of this act regarding minimum infrastructural and service provision." Article 63 defined these as being "road surfacing, paving, water supply, sewage and drainage system and street lighting." The Act introduced the concept of "Roads and Services Project" to program the provision of these services. The Act is stated in full in *Ley 12 Mayo 1956-Regimen del Suelo y Ordenación Urbana*, edited and published by *Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos de Cataluña*, Barcelona, 1971.
  9. The increase from 300 to 3,000 houses between July 1963 and February 1964 seems to be explained by the fact that the July decree made provision for the construction of 6,500 houses in Barcelona. This could have been interpreted as meaning only the municipality of Barcelona; but in December, a further decree (No. 3681/1963) extended the area of possible location of these houses to include the entire Barcelona Sub-Region. Thus, although the SHA intended to construct 3,000 houses in Prat all along, this was not officially communicated to the Prat Council while doubts remained about interpretation of the Decree of July 1963.
  10. Article 22 of the Law of Limited Cost Housing (see note 4), states:  

The promoters of "limited cost" housing can in exceptional cases, acquire the necessary land through expropriation. In such cases the project will be declared by decree to be of "public utility" . . . such a declaration can only be made following a favourable report from affected Council(s) . . .
  11. Extract from letter to Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, Barcelona, from Mayor of Prat Council (Mr. Maximo Simon Perez), dated March 5, 1964.
  12. Extract from letter to Mayor of Prat Council from General Manager of the NIH, dated March 22, 1965.
  13. The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 established a three-phase approval process for all urban plans drawn up by public authorities. First the plan was initially approved by the plan-making authority (local council, sub-regional or provincial planning authority, ministerial body). It was then submitted to the "Public Information Stage" for one month, during which time anyone could present appeals against the plan. Then, if the plan-making authority was other than the local council, an "Audience of Local Corporations" stage would follow for a further month, during which time the local authorities could state their case. The plan-making authority then *provisionally* approved the plan, incorporating modifications arising from the "Public Information" and "Audience of Local Corporations" stages, and submitted it to the Provincial or Sub-Regional Planning Authority for *definitive* approval.
  14. In fact a few minor adjustments were subsequently made, e.g. location of the sports center.
  15. The gross cost per house (including roads, service infrastructure, etc.) varied between 335,000 (\$5583) and 389,000 (\$6483) pesetas. For each house there was a 30,000 peseta (\$500) State subsidy. (U.S. dollars reflect 1966 exchange rates.)
  16. Report of INCE (Instituto Nacional de Edificación) on San Cosme undertaken on the insistence of architect Calbet in 1977. Following the findings of this survey, the houses in the new renewal scheme will have pile driven foundations reaching some 40 meters below ground level.
  17. See Note 13 above.
  18. In March 1974, *Constructora Internacional S.A.* was awarded the contract to undertake the first phase of repairs within a budget allowance of 7.6 million pesetas. Subsequently the NIH drew up estimates for a second, larger-scale repair phase which alone came to a further 151.9 million pesetas. With a third phase also envisaged, total repair costs were estimated at 450 million pesetas, i.e., 300,000 pesetas per house on average, almost as much as the original cost of house construction.
  19. Extract from letter from Mr. A. Rodriguez, Provincial Director of the Syndical Housing Authority, to residents' association in SHA housing estates, in which the reply of the National Institute of Housing to demands of the Residents' Associations was quoted; letter dated March 7, 1975.
  20. Report by F. Calbet Rebollo and M. Valls Ferrer, April, 1975. Reproduced in full in *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo* No. 107, C.O.A.C.B., Barcelona, 1975.
  21. The term "social housing" was introduced to replace "state subsidized housing" as used in previous legislation. The 1975 and 1977 legislation is stated in full in *Anexos* Nos. 11, 12 and 22, C.O.A.C.B., Barcelona 1976/7.
  22. From Royal-Decree 2278 of 16th September 1976, Introductory and Article 16. Stated in full in *Anexos* No. 11 (see note 21).
  23. Article 23 of Land and Urban Planning Reform Act, approved by Royal-Decree 1346 on April 9, 1976. Stated in full in *Ordenación del Suelo*, Editorial Civitas, Madrid, 1976.
  24. The Greater Barcelona Planning Commission was renamed the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona in 1974, and its internal administrative structure reformed.
  25. Extract from letter to the Mayor of Prat Council from the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Housing, dated August 5, 1977.
  26. As no appeal was presented in the Public Information Stage, provisional approval of the plan was not considered necessary. This common practice among most councils is aimed at cutting out unnecessary administrative procedure.
  27. From a letter from Mr. Alejandro Rodriguez de Valcarlos Nebrada, President of the Spanish Parliament, to Mr. E. Tarragona Corbella, dated March 10, 1975.
  28. According to Borja, J. (1973).
  29. See note 4 above.
  30. Although this Catalan anti-centralist feeling was clearly evident in the campaign against the San Cosme project conducted by the Prat Council in the mid 1960s, it is important to note that the Residents' Association movement of the 1970s in San Cosme (and in most other state housing areas) has been conducted by and large by non-catalans. Of course, their protest campaigns have been anti-Madrid, but in San Cosme the majority of residents are from the south and west of Spain and

Calbet is a Madrileño. San Cosme is not, then, an example of a Catalan nationalist movement fighting repression from Madrid. It is also worth noting that the turnover of residents in San Cosme since it was first occupied in the late 1960s has been negligible.

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# Guide for the Preparation of Manuscripts

1. Any manuscript that represents a significant contribution to knowledge about planning or urbanism is welcome. Ordinarily, submission is unsolicited. In no instance does an author receive payment.
2. Papers should not normally exceed twenty double-spaced pages, typed. Papers grossly exceeding this guideline may be returned to their authors unreviewed, pending a submission of more reasonable length.
3. Submit four copies of the manuscript, keeping a copy for your own files. All copies must be clearly legible.
4. Each manuscript must be accompanied by a 100 word *Abstract*, to appear at the beginning of the article, and a brief *Biographical Sketch* of about 50 words.
5. Place title, author's name, and biographical sketch on a cover page. The title of the article (but not the author's name) should appear again on the first text page as a means of identification. Submitted manuscripts are circulated for review without the author's name or institutional identification.
6. All copy must be double-spaced, including quoted matter, references, notes, captions, and tables. Leave generous margins on all four sides of the  $8\frac{1}{2} \times 11$  page.
7. Submit a self-addressed envelope, in appropriate size and with adequate postage, if you wish your manuscript returned after review and processing. Enclose a self-addressed postal card, containing manuscript title, to receive acknowledgement of manuscript receipt.
8. References should be cited in the text by giving the author's name and the year of publication. For example:

The suggestion has frequently been made that vegetation, particularly trees, may be capable of reducing community noise (Noyes 1969). Harris simply defines noise as "unwanted sound" (1957, p. 18).

References should be alphabetized by authors' last names and typed, double-spaced, beginning on a separate sheet at the end of the manuscript. The following examples indicate style for book and article citations.

- Trewartha, G. T. 1954. *An introduction to climate*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Downs, A. 1970. Alternative forms of future urban growth in the United States. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*. 36, January: 3-11.

For further guidelines, see *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press), pp. 372-75 and 384-88.

9. When necessary for clarification, explanatory notes (not footnotes) may be used. They should be consecutively numbered and typed, double-spaced, beginning on a separate sheet at the end of the manuscript, preceding references. For further guidance, see *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press), pp. 337-370.
10. Tables and illustrations should be titled and numbered with Arabic numbers, and each should be placed on a separate sheet. Indicate appropriate locations in margins of the text, e.g., "Table 1 about here."
11. Authors are encouraged to illustrate their manuscripts with charts, tables, maps, drawings, and photographs. Retain original illustrations until requested but submit page-size copies, which may be in draft form, for circulation to editorial readers. Illustrations submitted to the *Journal* from previously published works are welcome, but it is the author's responsibility to obtain written permission from the original publisher. When the artwork is being developed especially for the *Journal*, it should be designed for possible reduction. Line drawings should be prepared so that detail and lettering will remain legible when reduced. Art type or press-on lettering in bold, simple style and India ink are suggested. Photographs (half-tones) should be submitted as glossy prints, with a caption attached.
12. The *Journal* is guided as to style, spelling, and usage by *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago Press) and *The American Heritage Dictionary* (Houghton Mifflin).
13. Contributors can usually be notified within twelve weeks about acceptance for publication. If it is necessary to return manuscripts for changes, authors are furnished with specific recommendations by the reviewers and the editor. Responsibility for final decisions on editorial revisions remains with the editor.
14. Submission of a manuscript implies commitment to publish in this journal. The rigors of the selection process require a great deal of voluntary time and effort on the part of editorial readers. For these reasons, this journal regards the simultaneous submission of a manuscript to other professional journals as an unacceptable practice.

# The Effects of Traffic Flow on Residential Property Values

D. Gordon Bagby

This article presents an empirical study of the effects of traffic flow on residential property values in the community of Grand Rapids, Michigan. Residential values in two identical neighborhoods are compared over a twenty-five year period. One neighborhood serves as a control for the measurement of the impact of changes in traffic flow upon

residential values in the other. The results show that residential property values exhibit a surprising high elasticity with respect to reductions in traffic flow. The policy implications of these findings for cities laid out in a gridiron street pattern are explored.

The importance of traffic intrusion as a neighborhood detriment has long been recognized. Thirty years ago Reginald Isaacs (1949) observed that uncontrolled traffic streams "undermine the value of individual homes and neighborhoods in a city." More recently, several studies by Anderson and Wise (1977), Gamble et al. (1979, 1974), and J. P. Nelson (1978) have demonstrated the impact of new highways on adjacent properties. This article considers the property value consequences of residential through traffic.

Traffic, with its attendant pollution, noise, and safety hazards,<sup>1</sup> is an externality imposed upon inner-city residents by truckers and commuters. Consequently, any curtailment in neighborhood traffic reduces a cost born by residents which in turn augments the net benefits of their housing services. These additional net benefits, when capitalized, increase home values.

A unique experiment conducted in Grand Rapids, Michigan, during the early 1950s permits a rare opportunity to observe this sequence of events unfettered by the movements of other variables. Both the experiment itself and its results are of interest to planners.

## The community

Until the early 1950s, the community of Grand Rapids, Michigan, fought, rather than accepted, the

automobile. At approximately the same time that Grand Rapids had the highest per capita number of cars of anywhere in the country, the city had one of the lowest per capita expenditures for street improvements. As points of congestion mounted along major traffic arteries, more and more commuters and shoppers chose to take advantage of the city's archaic grid street pattern by taking short cuts through residential districts to avoid congestion and delay.

In two older neighborhoods located in the southern part of Grand Rapids equidistant from the central business district (known locally as the Burton Heights (BH) and Dickinson (D) areas) the problem was particularly severe (see Figure 1.) In 1949, both neighborhoods combined had among the highest pedestrian-vehicle accident rates in the city (twelve accidents, nine of which involved children), as well as a high vehicle-vehicle accident rate.

## Neighborhoods

Besides having similar traffic problems, the Dickinson (D) area and the Burton Heights (BH) area shared other characteristics. At the neighborhood scale, the neighborhoods were adjacent, both were the same size (739 homes in BH, 731 homes in D) and both were bordered on all sides by major traffic arteries (Figure 2). Each single-family residential neighborhood was zoned on the north for industrial and possessed a large commercial area in each corner (Figure 3). Both neighborhoods were served by the same elementary school in the Dickinson area and children attended the same high school located one mile to the north.

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- 20 *Ibid.*, para. 2.7
- 21 Merseyside County Council, *Targets for Merseyside for the 1980s*, Liverpool, 1977
- 22 Letter from the Secretary of State for the Environment to the Chairman of Merseyside County Council, 3 May 1977
- 23 *Targets for Merseyside: A Response by Government Departments*, London, mimeo, 1977, para. 5
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- 25 Merseyside County Council, *Economic Package*, Report submitted to the Policy, Planning and Resources Committee on 31 March 1978, and Resolutions approved by the County Council on 11 April 1978, Liverpool, 1978, mimeo
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- 30 Gentlemen, Hugh, Kirby, *Industrial Estate: Theory versus Practice*, in Lawton, R. and Catherine (eds.), *Cunningham (Eds.) Merseyside: Social and Economic Studies*, London, Longman, 1970, pp. 411-430
- 31 See, for example, West Yorkshire County Council, *West Yorkshire Structure Plan: Second Annual Statement*, Wakefield, July 1976 and Thorburn, A., 'Annual Structure Planning—Three Years Experience (East Sussex)', *The Surveyor*, 20 May 1977. See also Turner, C., 'Progress in Metropolitan Structure Planning', *The Planner*, Vol. 63, No. 6 (November 1977), pp. 175-178, which provides a useful summary of the situation in metropolitan counties.
- 32 Department of the Environment, *Structure Plans*, Circular 98/74, London, DOE, 1974
- 33 Department of the Environment, *Ongoing Review and the Need for Alteration* (Structure Plan Note 1/78), London, DOE, 'these may be practical difficulties ... if proposals are submitted, at intervals of much less than three years' (para. 14).
- 34 Merseyside County Council, *County of Merseyside Bill*, as allowed in the First House, House of Lords, September 1978. Part II of the Bill has clauses relating to advances for land acquisition or building work, loans for industrial purposes, grants for industrial purposes, further powers to assist industry, guarantee of rents etc., of industrial building, and a limitation on the duration of Part II (until the end of 1984).

## BARCELONA: PLANNING AND CHANGE 1854-1977

by

MARTIN WYNN

For some considerable time now there has been a relative dearth of information in English about urban planning in Spain. Studies by economists and geographers have largely concentrated on the national and regional economic aspects of planning, focusing above all on regional differences and country-city migration, but urban planning has received little attention. This paper aims to help redress the balance by examining the evolution of urban planning in Barcelona since the middle of the nineteenth century.

During the period under review there has indeed been a great deal of planning activity in Barcelona. The early plans of *ordenacion* (arrangement, physical ordering) such as that of Ildefonso Cerda, which remained the official Development Plan for the city for almost a century, were concerned largely with the development of all or part of the plain of Barcelona, stretching from the old city on the coast to the Tibidabo mountain inland (see Fig. 1). In the last 25 years, however, a series of more sophisticated plans have appeared as the scale and complexity of urban growth have increased. The first two sections of this article outline the major features of planning and growth in the two periods 1854-1952 and 1953-1977; the final section attempts to assess the value of some of the historical perspectives relating to planning over the period as a whole, which have appeared in Spanish commentaries in recent years.

### Expansion across the Plain 1854-1952

'Like Goethe in his agony, Barcelona asked for more light ... It had the sun and air within reach, from the height of its glorious but military walls, the Barcelonans contemplated the plain that stretched like a fantastic Mesopotamia from the Llobregat to the Besos, protected by an undulating mountainous ridge.' (De la Puerta del Angel a la Plaza de Lesseps by A. del Castillo, Libreria Delmau, 1945)

'Barcelona lost the opportunity of becoming a city that, even today, would be one of the most modern and, what is more, one of the most beautiful in Europe.' (Ildefonso Cerda, su Ensanche y la Satria de Ambos' by J. M. Garrut, San Jorge, No 51 July 1963.)

#### ANTECEDENTS: PLANNING IN THE MEDIAEVAL CITY

Barcelona's mediaeval walls were built in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the physical form of the city remained largely unchanged until the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1717, under the repressive reign of the early Bourbons, over 1350 houses were demolished to make way for the construction of the ciutadella (shown to the right of the old city in Fig. 1). Those left homeless encamped on the spit





Fig. 1. Cerdà's Topographical Plan of Barcelona, 1855, showing the C. (Catalan) and Barceloneta to the right of the Old City, and the outlying settlements on the inland plain. The foothills of the Tibidabo mountain run across the top of the plan (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona).

overlooking the port and it was here that the military authorities built *Barceloneta* (little Barcelona), the first extra-mural expansion, in 1753 (see Fig. 1).

During the second half of the eighteenth century, the Barcelona Council passed a series of regulations restricting the height and overhang of buildings and setting minimum room dimensions, which were by and large ineffective because of the corruption and inefficiency of the municipal authorities themselves. Meanwhile the military authorities, concerned about hygiene and safety, but also about security in a notably nationalist and rebellious part of Spain, opened, widened and straightened streets, particularly in the era of the Conde de Riera (Military Governor from 1767 to 1772). In the last thirty years of the century, however, private initiative began to play an increasingly important role in the development of the city and the plans of Camps (1771) and Bustero (1787) were attempts to establish a rational distribution of housing around newly installed cotton calico factories as the city grew rapidly, outwards and upwards, within the confines of the mediaeval walls. These two plans, along with that for *Barceloneta*, constitute the forerunners to the plans of *Ensanche* (expansion beyond the mediaeval walls) of the mid 19th century.

#### PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENSANCHE

Infilling continued in the Old City in the early years of the nineteenth century, and with population densities of over 1500 inhabitants per hectare in some areas, several plans of *Ensanche* were proposed by military engineers and municipal architects.



Fig. 2. The Plan of Ensanche of Antonio Rovira y Trias, 1859 (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona).

These involved only very limited extensions of the built-up area and only in 1854, when the central government consented to the destruction of the mediaeval walls, did expansion across the plain become a realistic possibility.

The plans of the 1850s—of Garriga y Roca,<sup>1</sup> of Rovira y Trias (Fig. 2) and above all, of Ildefonso Cerdà (Fig. 3)—mark the real step forward to the idea of *ordenación* on a large scale. In the *Plan Cerdà* the whole city was ordered, with all elements—housing, industry, markets, social centres etc.—given their place, in an adaptation of an underlying idealised model to the geographical realities of the plain. Apart from introducing normative controls (e.g. building height and depth), the plan was also fully comprehensive in its global formalisation of the city. In this sense, it was different from anything that had gone before in the planning of the city and arguably puts Cerdà and his urban theories in the forefront of the development of urban planning in the nineteenth century.

The Catalan middle classes developed the plain of Barcelona with scant regard for the dictates of the *Plan Cerdà*. The *manzana* (block) was built up on all four sides (c.f. only on two in the plan—see Fig. 4) and within (Fig. 5). Parks and gardens were encroached upon or disappeared altogether; manzanas destined for schools, markets and social centres in the *Plan Cerdà* were used for house construction and commercial and industrial buildings. Instead of the egalitarian policentricism foreseen by Cerdà, middle class residences tended to be built around the central commercial axis (*Paseo de Gracia*), with the working classes resident in the dilapidated houses in the Old City and in the sub-equipped, poorly connected






Fig. 3 The Plan Cerdà, 1859 (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona)

periphery in and around the old nuclei which included the main concentrations of industry, forming mixed residential industrial zones.

The city grew in radiocentric form, in fits and starts, reflecting the economic and political climate of the time. The main bursts of growth were 1876-86 and 1914-29 when, apart from the increase of building densities in the central Eixample, two new areas of the city were urbanised to pave the way for International Expositions on Montjuich and in the Ciutadella Park (see Fig. 4), where grandiose buildings, exemplifying the bourgeois concept of the city par excellence, were constructed (e.g. the *Arco de Triunfo*, *Palacio Nacional*). A functional and social segregation had been established and the globality of the Plan Cerdà was lost for good.

#### IMPERIAL BARCELONA

Although the Plan Cerdà remained the official Development Plan for Barcelona until 1953, several other urban plans were drawn up for the city, although they never received official approval from local or central authorities. After the turn of the century, the pro-Catalan activist element in local government became increasingly vociferous and the *Lliga Regionalista*, its political arm, made important gains in the 1902 municipal elections. In 1903, an international competition was held to find a plan to link the Eixample with the newly annexed suburbs. The winning plan (Fig. 6), by French architect Leon Jausse, involved a radical remodelling of the Eixample through the incorporation of monumental forms and scenic views into




Fig. 4 The Municipality of Barcelona in 1891. To the right, the Ciutadella has been demolished and a park created in its place; to the left, the Montjuich hill overlooks the Old City (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona)

Cerdà's grid pattern. This plan to create an 'Imperial Barcelona' represented the aspirations of the more dynamic elements of the Catalan middle classes and Jausse's criticisms of the Plan Cerdà were supported by the *Lliga Regionalista* who saw in Cerdà the urban landowner and the centralist spy, neither of which he was.

Jausse's proposals for the remodelling of the Eixample were scarcely realistic and it was only after a campaign by the local newspaper, the *Illustració Catalana*, known as the *Plan Romeu-Parcer* after the two municipal architects who modified Jausse's plan, dropping his proposals for the Eixample and including only the peripheral roads linking the city with the outlying settlements incorporated into the municipality between 1897 and 1903.

This era also displayed certain other advances in the planning and development of the city. In 1916, with the socialist reforming elements for once overcoming the landowning interests in the Council, the *Via Layetana* was constructed cutting through one of the most densely populated areas of the Old City (Fig. 7). Such action was clearly encouraged by the *Anuario Estadístico* (Statistical Yearly) published from 1902 to 1923, which gave extensive statistical information about a






Fig. 5 The infilling of Cerda's Manzana (block). The built-up space in the average manzana increased from 67 200 m<sup>2</sup> in the Plan Cerda (top left) to almost 295 000 m<sup>2</sup> in 1972 (bottom right) (source: *Construcción de la Ciudad*, No. 0, 1972).

wide variety of subjects including population, disease and hygienic conditions in the city.

After 1916, Barcelona was linked with its immediate hinterland by electric train via a mile long tunnel through Tibidabo, the mountain mass backing the city, and buses and the first *Metro* followed in the 1920s. The 1916 Plan by F. S. Pearson to extend the electric train system to all Catalonia is particularly interesting in that it contains a zoning of the Province of Barcelona in which the city is classified as the commercial centre for the whole region and all industry is relocated inland beyond Tibidabo where abundant hydro-electric power, space and efficient links with the rest of Catalonia would make it an ideal location. This concept of an industrial Barcelona beyond Tibidabo reappeared in Rubio i Tuduri's *Barcelona Futura* Plan of 1929 and later in the *Barcelona 2000* Plan of 1970, which similarly foresaw the transformation of Barcelona city into the commercial centre for the Region, linked to its hinterland by a system of express motorways. This is examined in more detail later.




Fig. 6 The Plan Jussely, 1907 (source: Archivo Historico Municipal de Barcelona)

#### THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND AFTER

With the fall of the monarchy in 1931 and the advent of the Second Republic a period of intense, but short-lived, urban activity led by *GATCPAC*,<sup>6</sup> the radical Catalan architect/planning group, in collaboration with similar bodies from other European nations (mainly *CIAM*<sup>7</sup> and *CIRPAC*<sup>8</sup>) and in particular with help from French architect and planner, Le Corbusier, was inaugurated. Their five point plan for reform in the city (Table 1) and its embodiment in the *Plan Macia* (1934; see Fig. 8) found increasing support among the general public, but the reform programme was disrupted by the Civil War (1936-9) and abandoned with the fall of the city to Franco's forces.

Very little of the Plan Macia was carried out. The Old City remained overcrowded with a population density of 1604 inhabitants per hectare in its most crowded neighbourhood. The population of Barcelona passed the one million mark in the early 1930s as the flow of migrants<sup>9</sup> into the city added to the housing shortage. It was largely these immigrant families which lived in the *barracas* (shanty dwellings) that sprang up in the periphery of the *Ensanche* and on the green areas around the city from the late 1920s onwards.

<sup>6</sup> *Grupo de Arquitectos y Tecnicos Catalanes para el Progreso de la Arquitectura Contemporanea*

<sup>7</sup> *Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne*

<sup>8</sup> *Comité Internationale pour la Réalisation des Problèmes de l'Architecture Contemporaine*



TABLE 1 The five point plan of reform proposed by GATCPAC in 1932

1. The sanitation of the old city.
2. Immediate cessation of the growth of 'Ensanche' (i.e. Cerdà's *manzanillas*) and the determination of a new lay-out, more in accordance with the needs of the city.
3. Classification of the city into functional zones—housing, industry etc. and immediate limitation of the so-called 'mixed zones'.
4. The linking of the city, via an extension of the *Gran via*, with the coastal area of Castelldefels, to be used as a large maritime zone for recreation and relaxation.
5. The modification of municipal regulations in whatever way necessary to achieve the above.

The Civil War resulted in a cultural rupture between Madrid and Barcelona, unparalleled since the end of the War of Spanish Succession two centuries earlier. Centralist policy on Barcelona in the 1940s was largely concerned with its potential as a production centre; economic policy aimed at increasing production in the short term by means of a maintenance and reinforcement of established industrial plants, accompanied by a weak but steady growth in services. While post-war reconstruction was concentrated in the *zonas devastadas* (i.e. Madrid and the South) the population of Barcelona increased by 200 000 in the first post-war decade (over half this figure were immigrants) and the housing shortage reached 80 000 by 1950. GATCPAC had been outlawed and dissolved and the effervescent Barcelona of projects and urban reform, popular participation and demographic citizen politics had gone. A series of urban problems was tolerated or ignored by the central



Fig. 7 A section of the Old City at the end of the 1920s, showing the Via Layetana, opened in 1916, running right to left (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona)




Fig. 8 The Plan Mada, 1934 (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona)

authorities. The high density development of the central Ensanche, the deterioration of the Old City and the 'mixed zones' on the periphery of the Ensanche, the housing and service deficits and the shanty towns, all contributed to the grim legacy bequeathed to future planners. While other European cities were being remodelled with new layouts and modern service systems, Barcelona lost the opportunity for post-war reconstruction.

#### Planning and Growth on a New Scale 1953-77

##### THE SUB-REGIONAL AND METROPOLITAN AREA PLANS

Although urban planning was of little importance in Catalonia in the 1940s, Provincial Planning Authorities were created at the end of the decade, producing sub-regional (*comarcals*) plans for Madrid, Bilbao, Valencia and, in 1953, Barcelona. The Plan Comarcal and accompanying law (3 December 1953) created a new administrative unit—the *Comarca*—consisting of Barcelona and the surrounding 27 municipalities and a new authority—the *Comisión de Urbanismo de Barcelona* (CUB) to manage its development.

The plan Comarcal had four principal characteristics: first, the *Comarca* was viewed as a collection of individual nuclei, rather than as one urban continuum; secondly, the plan introduced land zone classifications for the whole *Comarca*, whereby building typology, use and volume could be strictly controlled, reflecting perhaps the most important theoretical undercurrent to the plan (Fig. 9); thirdly,





Fig. 9. The Plan Comarcal, 1953, showing land classification zones in the central part of the city (source: Documentos 1953-71 by C. Teixidor, M. Farrago and L. Brun in *Urbanisme* 1972, 87 (Jan.-Feb. 1972)).

- KEY TO AREAS
- 1 Old Quarter
  - 2 Intensive Development of the Ensanche
  - 3 Semi-Intensive Development of the Ensanche
  - 4 Intensive Urban Residential Development
  - 7 Intensive Suburban Development
  - 9 Intensive Garden City Development
  - 10 Semi-intensive Garden City Development
  - 14 Mixed zones of housing and development
  - 16 Heavy Industry
  - 17 Light Industry
  - 19 Commercial Areas
  - 20 Monuments, historic, artistic or aesthetic buildings
  - 21 Public Area
  - 22 Hospitals
  - 23 Health Service Area
  - 28 Recreational Zone
  - 29 Cemeteries
  - 30 (stippled areas) Urban Park

Cerdà's Ensanche was accepted as satisfactorily providing the principal road axes of the city; lastly, importance was attached to *planes parciales* (local plans) as a means of realising the general dictates of the plan at local level. Herein, in fact, was the Achilles' heel of the plan, giving private (and public) promoters license to change the original land classifications more or less as they liked.

During the revision of the Plan Comarcal after 1962, the CUB recommended that planning should take place on an even larger scale, at the Metropolitan Area level, covering 193 municipalities, about half the total Province of Barcelona. The *Plan Director*, approved by the CUB in 1965, attempted to reorder the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona (MAB) through the decentralisation of manufacturing and service activities within the new city-territory model (Figure 10). The plan found increasing support among industrialists and economists as the dis economies of agglomeration, particularly congestion in and around the city, began to outweigh the external economies. However, it was not until the late 1960s that the central authorities began to acknowledge the importance of the Metropolitan Area Concept,<sup>4</sup> and so, while the Plan Director remained in the archives of the CUB, the boom of the 1960s brought a demographic and spatial expansion of the Comarca, with which the local authorities were incapable of dealing effectively.




Fig. 10. The Plan Director for the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, 1965 (source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona).

#### INVESTMENT AND GROWTH IN THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES

In the early 1950s, the housing deficit in the larger cities, and in the nation as a whole, led the government for the first time to accept the problem officially and take a more active role above and beyond the urban planning legislation of the era. The *Ley de Urgencia Social* (Law of Urgent Social Reform) of 1956 ushered in a series of National Housing Plans by which the government provided financial incentives to private promoters to participate more widely in house construction, while the Central and Local Housing Authorities concentrated on the bottom end of the market, building houses of generally poor quality and of minimum dimensions in residential estates (*polígonos*) which were generally lacking in collective services and were located in the periphery of the Ensanche and beyond.<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, the Barcelona Council followed a policy of investment in road infrastructure (e.g. the *Meridiana* routeway, the ring roads and the Tibidabo tunnels) and basic services (gas, water, electricity) in collusion<sup>6</sup> with the larger economic concerns. In this sense, the activities of the Barcelona Council came to have a very real effect on the development of the city after 1960, when the *Carta Municipal* (Municipal Charter) greatly increased their tax levying powers. The Council's investment policies aimed, on the one hand, at providing the minimum basic necessities to sustain the functioning of the urban system and, on the other, at encouraging the transformation of the city from residential/industrial city to a metropolitan tertiary centre, thus clearly contradicting the policy of decentralising tertiary activities evident in the Plan Director.

These public infrastructural investments provided a framework for large private promoters as capital became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few large



financing groups. This re-orientation of planning was more formally stated in the Barcelona Council's *Barcelona 2000 Plan* of 1970, closely linked with Mayor Porcioles' dream of holding a Universal Exposition on Tibidabo in 1982, through which the city would become the tertiary and representative centre of the region, linked to the interior by rapid lines of communication including the Tibidabo tunnels.

The Plan Comarcal remained in force until 1976, but private developers, through the use of planes parciales and pressure groups within the Council succeeded in changing its original content, it too becoming something of a coordinating plan for what nevertheless remained largely isolated, piecemeal developments outside the Barcelona Municipality. The growth of the city in these years clearly reveals the inadequacy of the Land and Urban Planning Act 1956, which attempted to prevent land speculation and provide a national five-tier planning system, but which, because of its vagueness on certain key issues (e.g. the modification of *Plan Comarcal* by *Plan Parcial*) was widely abused.

#### POLITICS AND PLANNING IN THE 'SEVENTIES

During the late 1960s and early 1970s the central authorities introduced a series of measures to aid the decongestion of the country's large cities. The Plan Director was given limited support after 1968 and the *ACTURS* Law of 1970 gave the central authorities unprecedented powers to short-cut planning procedure for the construction of eight new cities, including three outside the Barcelona Comarca. In 1973, Enrique Maso was appointed Mayor of Barcelona. He represented the 'neo-capitalist' industrialists, supported the concepts embodied in the Plan Director and forced through the revision of the 1953 Plan Comarcal along rationalist decongestion lines similar to those of the Plan Director only to be checked by a series of politically motivated actions from Madrid.

First, in 1974, the CUB was renamed the *Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona*, its executive changed and the Metropolitan Area concept effectively rejected. Secondly, Maso himself was removed in 1975 and replaced by Viola, who, like Porcioles before him, had strong links with the property capitalists. The power struggle within the local authorities had been temporarily resolved through the intervention of the Madrid Government, although the exact motives for this action remain unclear.

The content of the revisions to the Plan Comarcal in 1974 was subsequently modified to favour landed interests and property developers, but here again political change at a national level brought an ironic twist. In November 1975, Franco died; Premier Arias Navarro, the last of Franco's Prime Ministers, was replaced by Adolfo Suárez; and, in Barcelona, Mayor Viola was removed from above (i.e. from Madrid) and replaced by Mayor Socias in December 1976 to pave the way for local administrative reform only six months after the modified revision of the Plan Comarcal had been definitively approved under the name of the *Plan General Metropolitana* (Fig. 11). This plan, despite its modification between 1974 and 1976 and the *ACTURS* Law of 1970, nevertheless provides a viable framework for effective development control, the re-equipment of the inner areas and the periphery and the remodelling of poor quality housing areas. The key factor will be that the



Fig. 11. A section of the *Plan General Metropolitana* of 1976, showing land use classifications in and around the Trass Turons hill area, north of the city, an area of shanty and 'marginal' dwellings. Of particular significance are classifications 6b (new park areas), 14a (public remodelling), 16 (urban renovation/rehabilitation) and 17-6 (urban renovation change of use) (source: *Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona*).

political will should exist in local and central authorities alike to carry these policies through.

#### SUMMARY 1953-77

Stepping back from the interplay of politics and planning in the 1970s and viewing the past twenty-five years as a whole, the two most significant factors in the growth of the city were perhaps the telling weight of private economic interests in the development process and the failure of the local authorities effectively to exercise their attributed control functions. There has been no lack of planning research and legislation since 1953, but the lack of management bodies with the economic and judicial power to make a significant impact on the urban scene has led to an 'urbanism of tolerance' on a large scale.

The central business district has grown rapidly in a disorderly fashion, stretching up along Diagonal to Plaza Calvo Sotelo. In the old city decaying housing has been left to get worse; because of the possibility of expropriation by the local authorities, few landlords have bothered much with maintaining or improving their properties; yet renovation schemes are shelved because of the price of land and fragmentation of property holdings.

In the Ensanche the number of buildings constructed has further increased as a






Fig. 12. The Plan Torres Clavé (1971) (Schematic plan of the plain of Barcelona). In its functional zoning and use of advanced technology (e.g. the new airport extending out over the sea) and 'natural' routes, the plan has many common ground with the Plan Macia and the Plan Cerdà (source: *Construcción de la Ciudad*, No. 9, 1972).

result of operations on the margin of the law (planes parciales, edificios singulares<sup>10</sup>), giving short-term maximisation of profits (proximity to centre, prestige area) at the expense of longer term social-economic costs (degradation of urban habitat, congestion, lack of service installations). In the periphery, the city has overflowed into the Comarcal and beyond where, above all, the immigrant population<sup>11</sup> has encamped in a variety of what may be termed 'marginal habitats' (the old deteriorated urban nuclei, the barracas and recent sub-standard residential estates). Planned, rational development has been replaced by piecemeal speculative activities by both private and public entities alike, that have only served to multiply the problems of congestion and lack of satisfactory infrastructure.

Public outcry against the results of the development process has become increasingly vociferous in the last decade. Above all, local residents' associations have campaigned long and hard for an improvement of living conditions in the peripheral housing estates; with the move towards political liberalisation they have participated directly in plan preparation and implementation processes. At the same time, the sub-regional and municipal authorities are now beginning to take a more important part in the control and management of urban growth. It is perhaps these two elements—public participation and local authority initiatives—that will be of key importance to urban planning in Barcelona in the years ahead.

#### Planning in Historical Perspective: The Present Debate

In recent years much has been written about various aspects of the plans for Barcelona spanning the past 120 years (i.e. since the growth of the city beyond the medieval walls). The 2C group of architects have stressed the 'duality' of these

plans, seeing in the Plans Cerdà, Macia and Torres Clavé (Figure 12) certain common ground, notably their 'profound character of attempting to transform urban reality, their progressiveness, their utilization of the most advanced technological methods available in their epoch, their democratic character and their superior adaptation to the urban, topographical and geographical structure of Barcelona'.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, the Plans of Rovira y Trias, Jausse, Rubio i Tuduri, the Plan Comarcal and Barcelona 2000 follow 'the conservative tradition of a more academic, technical, planning, legalising urban processes already underway, the expression of the bourgeois concept of the city *par excellence*'.<sup>13</sup> The 2C group sees these two groups of plans as constituting 'counter-positioning of plans that see the city in a dominantly directrix form (around the Gran Via—the main cross-town road) with those which see it in terms of radio-centric, oil-slick type expansion'.<sup>14</sup>

Further, it has been argued that the drawing up of the Plan Cerdà (1859) and the Plan Macia (1934) correspond to two periods when the 'hegemony of the dominant industrial/agrarian block was seriously compromised by the upsurge of autonomous intellectual movements, capable of generating programmes of urban reform that implicitly or explicitly contributed to the formation of a complete alternative to the capitalist city'.<sup>15</sup> The first of these two breaks started with the Revolution of 1854\* and ended with the fall of the First Republic in 1874. The second period spanned the years of the Second Republic 1931–9. These periods, it is argued, produced the 'rationalist' plans of Cerdà and Macia.

Sola-Morales, on the other hand, makes little of these supposed breaks in the otherwise unbroken political hegemony of the dominant power block. Instead, he stresses the subordination of planning to the needs of capitalist production throughout the period discussed, e.g. 'Given the predominant mode of production and consequent social structure, planning has been used to favour the dominant classes. Idealism about the independence of planning, as corrector of conflicts, is not appropriate'.<sup>16</sup> Rather, he stresses the changing needs of capital towards some form of coordination of investment.

Carreno Perea, however, emphasises the importance of a form of capitalistic Catalan Nationalism in shaping the urban policy of the local bourgeoisie. He points out that the Catalan middle classes have never been satisfactorily integrated into the power structure of the Spanish State and because of this, have, by and large, followed a policy aimed at furthering the political/economic influence of the city within Catalonia and the country as a whole.

In the period immediately before and during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–29) the Catalan bourgeoisie did not formulate ambitious plans of territorial *ordenación*, conscious of their own inability to implement them. Only in the epoch of the self-government of the *Generalitat* (1932–6), in the Second Republic, were two ambitious plans approved—*Regional Planning* of 1932 and the Plan Macia of 1934.

*Regional Planning* proposed a balanced development for all the Catalan territory, including a decentralisation of economic activities and a brake on the

\* (Compared by Estape<sup>16</sup> with those of 1848 elsewhere in Europe.



macrocephalism of Barcelona within Catalonia. This and the Plan Macia are seen as corrective mechanisms to re-order the imbalances created by the free urban growth of the previous era.

Outside this period (1932-36), Carreno Piera argues that the Catalan middle classes, lacking confidence in the political, administrative and financial instruments to effect such 'rationalist' change, attempted instead to affirm the macrocephalism of Barcelona within Catalonia as the basis of maintaining and furthering the economic power of Catalan industry. Bohigas<sup>10</sup> has also pointed out how this macrocephalism has given the city a certain political importance, not only within Catalonia, but within the so-called *Països Catalans*.<sup>11</sup> In this light one can see the Universal (Metallurgical Industry) Exposition of 1929 on Montjuich and that planned by Mayor Porcillos for 1982 on Tibidabo as attempts to confirm Barcelona as the tertiary and quaternary centre within an ever growing hinterland.

#### THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CERDA

The theories outlined above add to our appreciation of the historical significance of the various urban plans for Barcelona and contribute to an understanding of how the development process has functioned in practice. Many questions, however, remain unanswered. The supposed breaks in the political hegemony of the dominant power block (1855-74 and 1931-39) did not last long enough to show whether the new found allegiance between certain elements of the bourgeoisie and the working classes, which some claim to have existed, would have been strong enough to carry through the 'rationalist' corrective measures such as those contained in the Plan Cerdà and the Plan Macia. In this context, the present debate surrounding the Plan Cerdà is particularly relevant.

Following recent research by Domingo<sup>12</sup> and, above all, by S. Tarrago and Soria y Puig,<sup>13</sup> little doubt now remains about the scientific rigour with which Cerdà approached the urban problems of his time, and the importance of the idealised model, involving a functional specialisation and egalitarian hierarchicalisation of space, on which he based his plan. But it is in his plan itself, in the adaptation of his model to what he considered practically possible (as regards both physical and socio-economic realities), that evidence can be found to suggest doubts about the existence of a new 'cultural hegemony'.<sup>14</sup>

Grau's study<sup>15</sup> of the Plan reveals the significance of the concessions Cerdà had to make: the adjustments to the road pattern in the Ensanche to preserve, in the main, factories, creating a hidden barrier that was later to encourage the spread of industry eastwards towards the River Besòs; the preservation of factories in the old city in an area (San Pedro) vital to the effective connection between the old and new city; and the exclusion of the outlying settlements of San Gervasio and most of Gracia from the Ensanche, these being the main secondary residence areas of the bourgeoisie. Grau's analysis suggests that Cerdà had to give way on these counts in order to impose the basic elements of his plan and that the 'rationalist' measures were rather the product of Cerdà's own egalitarian convictions, lacking wider-based support

<sup>10</sup> *Països Catalans* (Catalan Countries) include Catalonia and the coastal area down to Valencia, the Eastern Pyrenees, Andorra, the Perpignan area of France and the Balearic Islands.

amongst the local bourgeoisie. Indeed, his plan was rejected by the local Council and only passed on insistence from Madrid.

These doubts are supported by the development of the Ensanche after 1860. Cerdà's functional zoning and polycentric development being broken from the start. Further, the period after 1874, when the First Republic fell and the monarchy was restored, nevertheless produced the urbanisation around the Borni market by Fontserè, considered one of the most sophisticated urban spaces in the city. Baixeras's ambitious Plan of Interior Reform for the city of 1880 and accompanying Law of Forced Expropriation and Faria's remarkable 'Project of Drainage and Sewage Disposal for Barcelona' of 1893.<sup>16</sup> Although it is true that the projects of Faria and Baixeras were thwarted by the power of vested interests within the Council, it is still difficult to see any real justification for pinpointing 1874 as a watershed with 'rationalist' proposals (Plan Cerdà) on one side and growth orientated conservatism on the other.

#### THE CONTINUITY OF EVENTS

Other incongruities surround the 1931 'break'. What was the significance of Rubio i Tuduri, *noucentista* (a branch of modernism) architect who produced the *Barcelona Futura* Plan in 1929, seen by the rationalist school as 'expansionist' and who just three years later drew up the *Regional Plan* for Catalonia, seen as ambitious, ahead of its time and generally in keeping with the ideals of GATCPAC? Architect Vilaseca drew up his plan for reform in the old city (based very much on previous plans of Baixeras and Darder) under the Dictatorship (1923-29), presented it in 1932 and although it was harshly criticised by GATCPAC, it was approved by the Council in 1934 and then again after the war in 1943.

Although GATCPAC built the *casas obreras* (workers' houses) and the *Casa Bloc* (a complex of 207 houses in 2 connected 'L'-shaped blocks), it was the *Patronato de la Habitación* (Municipal Housing Authority) who built the first public housing area (Eduardo Aduano) under the full repression of the Dictatorship in 1929. The garden-city concept, first promoted in Spain by the modernist architects in the early 1900s on a large scale (Parque Güell) and later in self-sufficient suburban form, largely under the guidance of Cebria de Montoliu after 1914,<sup>17</sup> was criticised by Le Corbusier and GATCPAC and yet seemed to influence their work. In the *Casa Bloc* scheme, they planned the division of a large orchard, allotting one plot per house. Again, in the 'City of Repose and Vacations' at Castelfeldefels, the same idea reappears.

These facts do not necessarily contradict the historical perspectives previously mentioned, but suggest rather that they mask the full picture. There seems a certain continuity running through most of the period studied, which at times seems more significant than the supposed 'breaks'. In this sense, Sola-Morales' thesis seems more acceptable than that of the 2C group. Perhaps history has been used to try and lend weight to political arguments and so perspectives have been angled in unjustified ways. Note, for example, the criticism of the *Lliga Regionalista* in the 1900s and above all that of architect Puig y Cadafalch, levelled at Cerdà's work. At one stage, hatred reached such a peak that Puig demanded that all remaining copies of Cerdà's *Leonia General de la Urbanización*<sup>18</sup> be burnt. In this case the criticism of Cerdà was



clearly inspired by anti-centralist feeling, the Plan Cerdà having been 'imposed' on the Catalans from Madrid.

Similarly, the views of the 2C group of architects in recent years seems influenced by their desire to associate the Plans Cerdà and Macià with their own creation, the Plan Torres Clavé, and thereby criticise the present urban chaos. Although such criticism seems quite justified, what does seem rather unfair is to group the Plan Comarcal of 1953 in with those of Rovira y Trias, Jaussely and Rubio i Tuduri (1929). What they seem to do, just as the early critics of Cerdà's work did, is to confuse the urban reality of the past twenty five years with the original content of the plan, two totally different concepts.

### Conclusions

There remain, nevertheless, a series of general statements that would seem to be beyond reasonable doubt. The development of the city has been directed by land owning, financial and industrial interests, which have paid little regard to the content of approved urban plans. Planning has been characterised by the lack of effective implementation: ironically, the Plan that has been 'realised' more than any other (but equally, bastardised more) is the Plan Cerdà, probably the most utopian of all the plans discussed. The Plans Cerdà and Macià do seem to have some common ideology, which the other plans do not have. What is lacking, however, is any detailed understanding of how the various strands of planning thought evolved individually and collectively over the whole period discussed and how the development process functioned in practice.

Research into the work of Cerdà has revealed a great deal about his work of over a century ago. Since the centenary of his Plan (1959), a whole era in the history of the city has been re-examined with quite startling results, particularly in the past five years, involving a total re-evaluation of the significance of his work and the era in which he lived. It can be supposed that future research, as much into the development process itself as into the make-up and underlying ideology of individual plans, will throw new light on established theories. A lot more is now known about Cerdà; but from over a century later, the intervening period poses many questions that have yet to be satisfactorily answered.

### NOTES AND REFERENCES

- 1 Garriga y Roca was a municipal architect chosen by lottery in 1857 to draw up the main plan of *Ensanche* for the city. In 1858, however, reservations previously held by the military authorities about preserving the lateral walls of the city were withdrawn and so Garriga y Roca's plan became obsolete. The Council then held a competition to find a new plan, the winner being that of Rovira y Trias in 1859. But to the anger of some of the Catalan bourgeoisie and the municipal architects the central authorities insisted that Cerdà's Plan be approved as the plan *Ensanche* for Barcelona.
- 2 Some of Jaussely's criticisms of Cerdà are clearly unjustified, e.g. Jaussely alleged that the Plan Cerdà was deficient in the provision of collective services.
- 3 Immigration into Barcelona reached a peak of 82 000 in 1924. This, however, was an exceptional year and the annual immigration averaged 5000 from 1925 to 1929 and exceeded 10 000 in 1930, 1934, 1935 and 1937; it exceeded 25 000 in 1938.
- 4 This was clearly indicated in the Third National Development Plan (1972-75), which introduced a hierarchical classification of urban areas (*Vertebración del Territorio*) of which *Area Metropolitana* was the largest.

- 5 For a general discussion of the development of housing policy in Spain, 1956-70, see King, John C., 'Housing in Spain', *Town Planning Review*, Vol. 42, No. 4 (October 1971), pp. 381-403.
- 6 The scandals and rumours of corrupt practice under the mayorship of Porcioles (1957-73) are many. For further details, see Martí, F. and Morena, E., *Barcelona a donde vas?*, Barcelona, Editorial Diosa, 1974 or *La Barcelona de Porcioles* (various authors), *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 21 (September-October 1973).
- 7 The judicial difficulties in getting the *Plan Director* approved lay in the fact that the Land and Urban Planning Act 1956 did not recognise this administrative level (Metropolitan Area) but rather the local/municipal sub-regional, Provincial and National levels. In 1968 the Government approved the Plan as a Plan Provincial for part of the Province of Barcelona.
- 8 There is considerable speculation over the exact reasons for the central government's intervention against Maso, the *Plan Director* and the Metropolitan Area concept after placing considerable emphasis on the Metropolitan Area concept in the Third Development Plan. As Teixidor has said, 'many observers have reached the conclusion that... it has been a political decision—a question of impeding the formation of an administrative entity, that, because of its size and power, would have served as a platform for Catalan Nationalism... Some observers see it as an answer to the bitterness of the class fight that has surrounded the new *Plan Comarcal*, the Central Authority intervening to contain, by decree, this dynamic situation. But there is also another aspect: underlying the whole affair is a determination to keep the local industrial bourgeoisie in place'. Teixidor, C., 'Urbanismo—La Entidad Municipal Metropolitana', *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 27 (September-October 1974).
- 9 Article 10 of the law of 3 December 1953 charged the CUB with 'looking out for infringements of the approved plan [the *Plan Comarcal*]. To such effect, it has the power to order the stoppage or destruction of works and to impose fines of up to 50 000 pesetas'.
- 10 *Edificios Singulares* (Extraordinary Buildings), despite contravening building height regulations, were permitted because of ambiguities in the Land and Urban Planning Act 1956 that made provision for special cases, but was not specific enough about the definition of such cases. This loophole enabled developers to build 15-20 storey buildings in the central *Ensanche* in the late 1950s and 1960s in areas with restrictions of 8-12 floors maximums in the *Plan Comarcal*.
- 11 By 1970 over half the people living in the Municipality of Barcelona were non-Catalans.
- 12 Group 2C, 'Los Planes de Barcelona', *Construcción de la Ciudad*, No. 0 (1972).
- 13 *Ibid.*
- 14 *Ibid.*
- 15 Roca, F., 'Cerdà después de Cerdà', *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 100 (January-February 1974).
- 16 Estape, F. (Ed.), *Teoría General de la Urbanización y Aplicación de sus Principios y Doctrinas a la Reforma y Ensanche de Barcelona*, Barcelona, Editorial Ariel, Editorial Vicens Vives, IEF, 1968.
- 17 Sola-Morales, M., 'De la Ordenación a la Coordinación', *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 22 (November-December 1973).
- 18 Carreno Piera, L., 'Proceso de Suburbanización de la Comarca de Barcelona', *Ciudad y Territorio*, No. 176 (January 1976).
- 19 Bohigas, O., *Barcelona entre el Plan Cerdà i el Barriquisme*, Barcelona, Edicions 62, 1963.
- 20 Domingo, M., 'Consideraciones sobre el Plan Cerdà', *Construcción, Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 19 (May-June 1973).
- 21 Soria y Puig, A. and Tarrago, S., *Ildefonso Cerdà 1815-76*, Barcelona, Colegio Oficial de Ingenieros de Caminos, 1976.
- 22 AHUAD, 'Hacia una nueva cultura hegemónica', *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 100 (January-February 1974).
- 23 Grau, R., 'La Barcelona Industrial en la Obra de Cerdà: Un Ejemplo', *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 100 (January-February 1974).
- 24 Faria is seen as one of the few *continuadores* of Cerdà. He planned a subterranean sewerage system, with automatic cleaners powered by the discharge of large quantities of water that periodically passed through the whole system.
- 25 For further information on Cebria de Montoliu, see Roca, F., 'Cebria de Montoliu y la Ciencia Cívica', *Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo*, No. 80 (January-February 1971) and Wynn, M. G. and R. J. Smith, 'Spain—Urban Decentralization', *Built Environment*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1978).
- 26 Cerdà, I., *Teoría General de la Urbanización y Aplicación de sus Principios y Doctrinas a la Reforma y Ensanche de Barcelona*, Barcelona, Imprenta Española, 1867. In the 1970s, Domingo, op. cit., has claimed that this work reveals Cerdà as the 'founder of an urban science, preceding Baumeister, Stubben, Unwin, Triggs and Haverfield'.



MARTIN WYNN

# Conserving Madrid

**Madrid's historic centre has suffered from confused and contradictory policies in the recent past. What is now being done to protect it, and what hope is there of success?**

With the election of a predominantly socialist council for Madrid in April 1979 — in Spain's first democratic municipal elections for over 40 years — the public debate and political argument that surrounded the Conservation Plan for the city in the run-up to the elections looks like continuing. After decades of systematic renewal, increases in building densities, and drastic functional change in the city centre, planners, conservationists and the general public now await new initiatives from the socialist executive to ensure the conservation of what remains of the city's historical and architectural heritage.

## Historical

Madrid was largely confined within its mediaeval walls until the approval of the Plan Castro in 1860, after which it expanded outwards radiocentrically to fill the area covered by Castro's Plan. It is essentially these two areas — the old mediaeval city, and the 19th and 20th century expansion — that constitutes the focus of the conservationists' concern.

Over the past 20 years this historic core has been subjected to a series of private and publicly promoted Local Plans, Special Plans, and Plans of Interior Reform that have essentially involved reclassifying old residential and industrial zones for high-rise office, commercial, and up-market residential development. The urban landscape has consequently been radically changed, and whole barrios (neighbourhoods), including many buildings considered of architectural and historical value, have been destroyed.

This sad history is symptomatic of a general poverty in the conceptual development of inner city planning, in both Spanish planning philosophy and practice, this century. For


The Corrala in the Lavapiés district, to the south of the old quarter. These two buildings comprise 65 houses in which over 500 people live. Made of adobe brick and based on a wooden structure, these buildings were declared a ruin (thus facilitating demolition) by the owner in 1975 and only saved after a long campaign by residents and the Madrid College of Architects.



example, the emphasis in the City and Metropolitan Area Plans for Madrid has been on city expansion; this is true too, of the national Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 which formed the framework for Spain's urban planning for the next 20 years. The city centre has been treated by a contradictory mix of blind destruction and extreme reverence for grandiose monuments, scenic views, and selected historic buildings. The early Bourbon Conde-Duque barracks, for example, were acquired by the Madrid municipality for conservation and cultural use, but the 16th century Vicalvaro town hall and the Olavide market, a splendid example of Second Republic Rationalist architecture, were dynamited, the latter to make way for an underground car park. In the old quarter, the Plaza Mayor, perhaps the country's most famous square, was not protected against demolition, not even listed as an Historic-Artistic Monument, a long-standing but little-used classification in Spanish planning law.

## Next step

This inconsistency and misuse of resources, combined with the constant threat of expulsion to local residents, led to popular and professional protest culminating, in September 1977, in the approval by the Madrid Council of a Provisional Catalogue in which the city's historic buildings were listed and so protected against demolition. During the approval process for the Catalogue, 377 appeals were presented to the Council,



Plaza Mayor, in the heart of Madrid's old quarter.

194 in favour and 184 against, indicating the relative weight of the city's conservation and demolition-developer lobbies.

In Spring 1978, the Madrid Council commissioned consultant architect-planners, on the basis of the Catalogue of Listed Buildings, to draw up a broader-ranging Conservation Plan for the city centre in collaboration with resident associations, professional colleges, and a range of political parties. Such formal collaboration with interested parties never in fact took place, but press coverage of the consultants' proposals accompanied the public and political debate and ensured a form of indirect popular participation.

The consultants' Madrid Conservation Plan (PEPCUM) was based on new planning regulations to protect those buildings considered to be of architectural, historical or functional value. It also sub-divided the central area into homogeneous sub-units on the basis of buildings typology and functional use, strictly limiting the nature and extent of demolition and redevelopment. Legal-economic measures were introduced to protect residents against indiscriminate eviction and facilitate house improvement where necessary.





Above: The Colon Building. Office Development Proposals in the Local Plan of Interior Reform of the Old City Expansion resulted in high rise development like this one which overlooks Plaza Colon. Below: Corredera Baja Street, in the Malasana neighbourhood in The Old City, showing typical mid-19th century architecture.



## The present outlook

In October 1978, the Madrid Council — led by Conservative Jose Luiz Alvarez, the city's last government-appointed Mayor — rejected this plan, but two weeks later approved a watered-down version. This was a partial victory for the residents and conservationists over the developers, who subsequently threw all their political weight and influence into blocking the plan's administrative course. The Plan approved by the Madrid Council includes milder restrictions on demolition and development and omits the legal-financial-administrative proposals for house rehabilitation and resident participation in such schemes. The protection of individual buildings remains, but private initiative rather than public administration is emphasised. The Municipal Conservation Fund of the original plan was scrapped.

These concessions to the property developers, however, were not enough for their professional bodies, the Urban Property Association and College of Property Developers' Agents, who attacked the plan with all available legal sanctions. At the same time, and rather paradoxically given their usual pro-conservation attitude, the Architects' College of Madrid warned against a mass suspension of building permits in the city; residents' associations generally supported the plan, and so did the political parties of the left in the run-up to the elections last April although with the reservation that it would need reviewing by the new democratic Council.

Now, almost a year after the election, the bitter battle among residents, developers, landowners and local politicians continues. The freeze on demolition and building permits remains while the new Socialist mayor Tierno Galvan and his councillors reconsider the plan. The situation, to some extent, remains in the balance. As one of the authors of the original conservation plan has recently observed: "After this experience, one thing remains clear: a plan of this type which, without trying to get rid of private gain — impossible in a society like ours — attempts to keep it within reasonable bounds, is up against a multitude of opposing forces, which can be counterbalanced only through the continuous participation and pressure of the consumer public." (Moya-Gonzalez et al, 1979). One must hope, with political liberalisation and a democratically elected local council, that the modest objectives of the approved Madrid Conservation Plan, at least, can now be implemented.

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## Planning in the western world

Table 1. A summary of land use planning methods in the United States

**Established planning controls**  
 Zoning  
 Residential, commercial, industrial and agricultural uses prescribed, but open to considerable "variance" and special exceptions  
 Rights of use, interest or privilege in lands, right of ownership, can be conveyed or sold, and sometimes bring tax concessions  
 Subdivision regulations  
 Define local government standards for (inability) residential development

Planning by another name ("growth management")  
 Planned unit development  
 In which density, setbacks and utility costs are reduced  
 not individual lots independent compliance with conventional subdivision standards  
 Planned development ordinance  
 Development permit system, independent of zoning, often combined with a strict capital budgeting programme for water and sewerage  
 Municipal tax assessment  
 For taxing existing use rather than development value, helps to preserve farmland on the urban fringe

Purchase of development rights  
 Especially strong support by local governments, because public lands, wetlands, and cannot be disposed of without voter approval in a referendum  
 Pre-emptive purchase and land banking  
 Governments buy parcels of land in the wetlands to prevent future development  
 Governments buy parcels of land in the wetlands to prevent future development  
 sale in conformity with a comprehensive plan

Based on: Citizens Advisory Commission on Environmental Quality, *How Well America Grows?* USGPO 1976

arranged other things, land use and transportation plans and historic preservation studies. One can envisage greater sophistication in state plan-making with such support, and several states are experimenting with the data yielded from satellite surveys in their attempts to identify areas of critical environmental concern.

In the absence of federal legislation, even the stiff existing legislative controls over air and water pollution and flood prevention might be used to regulate land use change. And there is no doubt that the indirect planning methods listed in Table 1 will become even more widely used, especially at the local level.

Certainly the need for tighter control over land use is becoming more apparent in the United States, although in the early 1970s the desire for more orderly and less changing development lost the legislative battle when confronted with the intransigence of an ethos, and a Constitution which defends an owner's right to use his land as seems befitting to him alone. Within the nation of nations that is the

# Spain: urban decentralisation

M G Wynn and R J Smith examine antecedents to present new towns policy in Madrid and Barcelona

The growth of Spain's cities has generally speaking followed a set pattern: the city remained enclosed within its medieval walls until the mid-nineteenth century, expansion beyond the walls followed in the late 19th and 20th centuries forming the city's "ensanche" (the residential estate) usually based on a development plan; then, the mid-20th century has witnessed the growth of the periphery of "ensanche" and is overflowing into the metropolitan area. In the past 30 years and particularly in the 70s, attempts have been made to limit the peripheral growth of Spain's larger cities and to create new centres outside the suburbs. In 1970, eight "ex-novo" (or "green field") new town sites were demarcated, and the National Institute of Housing ("INUR"), a semi-autonomous body attached to the Ministry of Housing, was put in charge of carrying out the expropriation of land. After a period of uncertainty in the early 1970s, following a series of policy reversals in the Ministry of Housing, and the political reforms of the past two years, the present government now seems set to continue the new towns programme, with limited companies (with some government shareholders) having been constituted in the past two years to develop the new towns of Tres Cantos and Riera de Cardener outside Madrid and Barcelona respectively. It thus seems an opportune moment to examine the earlier attempts to decentralise Spain's cities, in particular because their failure in the implementation stage helps explain the proposed plan.

But apart from this, these early plans and projects are of interest for other reasons. They illustrate how to gain international trends in planning in the early 20th century manifested themselves in Spain, revealing an internationally aware body of planners who adapted the garden city and decentralisation concepts to Madrid in the 1920s, 30s and 40s. And then the later post-war attempts to decentralise Madrid and Barcelona on a far larger scale seem

"original" extensions of these earlier plans, based on a mixture technical appreciation of the different form of decentralisation, even if they were divorced from, or distorted by, the political and economic realities of the time.

The Euro-American international town planning scene experienced something of a revolution at the turn of the 20th century producing an unprecedented intensity of activity and exchange of ideas. Howard's book *Township—later Garden Cities of Tomorrow*—was published in 1898, and Camillo Sitte's *City Planning according to artistic principles* appeared a year later, in Germany. In Europe, a series of international congresses, exhibitions and conferences were held in the first 20 years of the century at which the garden-city concept gradually gained precedence over Sitte's ideas. Not that the two were mutually exclusive—many saw them as complementary, including Unwin, Howard's main English disciple, who was increasingly adopting Sitte's ideas in his plans.

Meanwhile, in Spain, Arturo Soria y Mata's "Ciudad Lineal" (linear city)—partly constructed outside Madrid in the 1890s—was undoubtedly the most significant development in planning in the Iberian peninsula in that era. But, despite the fact that the urban affairs planning magazine *Ciudad Lineal* produced German and English counterparts (1), Madrid remained relatively cut-off from the international exchange of town-planning ideas until after the first World War. Rather, it was in Barcelona, under the direction of Cebrià de Mongüit that the new international planning concepts, particularly the garden-city, were first introduced into Spain.

Barcelona in the early 1900s was dominated by the modernist architecture of Gaudí, Puig y Cadafalch, and Domènec y Montaner. However, after the pro-Catalan "Lliga Regionalista" had made significant gains in the 1902 elections, the municipal authorities embarked on a programme of reform aimed at ridding the old city of its slum areas, and at the same time accepted French architect Leon Joussey's plan to link the "ensanche" with the outlying suburbs. Joussey's plan was more akin to Hausmannian than to Howard's ideas, but on the

Notes and references  
 (1) The United States Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, is abbreviated to "USGPO" throughout.  
 1. In the first Congress (1909-10) 20 000 bills were introduced in the House of Representatives (HR) and 5 000 in the Senate (S), the majority rate is 10%.  
 2. See, for example, E. Culler, D. and B. J. The National Institute of Housing ("INUR"), a semi-autonomous body attached to the Ministry of Housing, was put in charge of carrying out the expropriation of land. After a period of uncertainty in the early 1970s, following a series of policy reversals in the Ministry of Housing, and the political reforms of the past two years, the present government now seems set to continue the new towns programme, with limited companies (with some government shareholders) having been constituted in the past two years to develop the new towns of Tres Cantos and Riera de Cardener outside Madrid and Barcelona respectively. It thus seems an opportune moment to examine the earlier attempts to decentralise Spain's cities, in particular because their failure in the implementation stage helps explain the proposed plan.

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arranged other things, land use and transportation plans and historic preservation studies. One can envisage greater sophistication in state plan-making with such support, and several states are experimenting with the data yielded from satellite surveys in their attempts to identify areas of critical environmental concern.

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## Planning in the western world

fringe of these developments. Cebri de Montoliu introduced the concept of garden-city into Catalonia almost single-handed.

Montoliu was greatly impressed by the works of Howard, Unwin and Geddes, which he saw as the embodiment of a diversity of scientific principles and political attitudes which he wanted to introduce into Catalonia. In 1912 he founded the "Civic Society of the Garden City" with the objectives of decentralising the Barcelona urban agglomeration, re-integrating human work with nature and protecting urban and rural landscapes. Montoliu, who was general secretary, rigorously directed the society's activities, being in constant contact with the international garden-city movement. Conferences and books 2,3,4,5 followed, aimed at inducing private and public bodies to undertake garden-city projects. Montoliu had been greatly impressed by the Universal Exposition at Ghent in 1913, organised by Patrick Geddes. It inspired him to promote the "Exposition of Civic Construction and Working-class housing" in Barcelona in 1916. Whilst the first part of the exposition was dedicated to a variety of history of the city, the second part included a variety of current housing projects from Barcelona and Madrid including Soria y Mata's linear city and the planned expansion of Madrid by Nunez Granes. This project, dating from 1909, proposed to extend the roads of the "ensanche" in radial form and construct new blocks of housing on three sides of the city, forming an inverted "C" around the "ensanche" in similar fashion to some of the late 19th century German projects of expansion. Although the project hardly exhibited the garden-city concept, its presence in the Barcelona exhibition bears witness to the exchange of ideas taking place within Spain. The third and largest part of the exhibition was entitled "The future—the housing problem, cheap houses and the garden-city" and featured the first Iberian garden-city project—almost exclusively from the Barcelona region—along with the great European and North American projects. In 1920, Montoliu entered into voluntary exile, and with him disappeared the Barcelona garden-city movement. The 20s saw a reaffirmation of the "monumentalist city" in Barcelona and in the 30s the new rationalist vanguard of the republic pilloried Sile. Stubben and the garden-city in a re-volt against the traditions of the Spanish architectural school. But in Madrid in the 20s, the garden-city concept grew in strength as criticism of the inadequacy of Nunez Granes project increased. It is possible to argue that Montoliu's activity in Barcelona helped highlight the shortcomings of the peripheral solution to urban growth in Spain and implant the garden-city and decentralisation concepts in Madrid ironically on the eve of their disappearance from

the Barcelona urban scene. In 1924, municipal architects Sallaberry, Aranda, Lortie and Garcia Cascales stated the necessity of overcoming the blinkered peripheral view of planning evident in Nunez Granes' project. They suggested a hand-use zoning of the Madrid area and the location of satellite cities beyond the central nucleus of the city (6). Following their recommendation the Madrid Council held an international competition in 1929 to find a new "plan de extension" for the city. Finally accepting the plan drawn up by the Secundino Zuazo and Herman Jansen, in which Fernando Mercadal also played an important part. He was one of the leaders of the new rationalist architectural school and at the same time had assimilated and synthesised the European garden-city movement. He acted as co-ordinator between Spanish architect Zuazo and German planner Jansen who had been one of the Sile's main disciples in the early 1900s and had won the Greater Berlin prize at the international congress of 1910 that had inspired Montoliu to reaffirm his support for Howard's ideas (3). More recently he had won the international competition for planning Ankara. The "Plan de Extension" of 1929 (Figure 1) was an adaptation of the radiocentric decentralising model that stemmed from Howard's work, consisting of radial and ring roads enclosing the central urban core, surrounded by a green zone, beyond which were situated satellite cities linked by a peripheral ring road. The plan also included reform of the old city, principally aimed at easing traffic congestion. In 1933 under the 2nd Republic, a revised version of the plan was passed, but the Madrid Council, without jurisdiction over other municipalities, could only pass that part of the plan referring to the municipality of Madrid. It was proposed, therefore, to annex the surrounding 14 municipalities and expropriate all non-urban land within the enlarged Madrid municipality.

The importance of an urban management body with the financial capacity and legal jurisdiction to effectively realise such a plan was soon clear. Following the publication of the second report of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee in 1932, the Madrid Council began preliminary studies for a "Plan Regional" for Madrid. Again Mercadal's influence was particularly important along with that of Benítez, president of the "Comité de Reforma, Reconstrucción y Saneamiento de Madrid" that drew up and finally published the plan in the accompanying report, it seems that the above-mentioned references and terminology used in the accompanying report, it seems that the above-mentioned "Comité" collaborated with the Greater London Planning Committee throughout the 30s. The report justifies the Regional approach because of the need to "embrace the extensive zone of influence of Madrid and improve living conditions in the satellite




Fig. 1 "Plan de Extension" 1929: an adaptation of the radiocentric decentralising model that stemmed from Howard's work; radial and ring roads enclosing central urban core surrounded by a green zone with satellite cities linked by a peripheral road beyond. Source: Teran 1976.


Fig. 2 "Plan Regional" 1938: growth of the city here limited by a green ring with industrial/residential satellites including four new nuclei at NEOS; region served by radial and ring roads. Source: Teran 1976.

Fig. 3 "Plan General de Ordenación" 1946: some industrial zones added to the south; attempt made to divide central core into individual units separated by open space. Source: Teran 1976.

cities already existent and create new ones in areas specially chosen for their natural conditions" (8). In the plan, the growth of the city was limited by a green ring beyond which satellite cities of essentially industrial/residential nature were situated, there being four new nuclei (figure 2). The whole region was served by a "functional network of radial and ring roads" and land zone classifications were extended to cover the entire region. The plan also included proposals for the protection and utilisation of the large recreational areas outside Madrid—the Sierra de Guadarrama, and the Jarama River Valley—and finally the Report stressed the need for a management body—"Comité de Plan"—with the necessary authority and capacity to control and develop the realisation of the plan.

In April, 1939, the civil war ended; Madrid lay in ruins, and under the new Fascist regime, planning was initially concerned with reconstructing the "Capital de Imperio" along the lines of Hitler's Berlin and Mussolini's Rome, with long wide avenues for triumphal marches and processions, large assembly areas for military gatherings and symbolic representations of Religion, Culture and the National Party. Elements of the "falangist city" were evident in the "Plan General de Urbanización de Madrid" of 1941 (Fig. 3). The "fachada de Manzanares" consisting of the Cathedral, Royal Palace and new "Vía de Europa", "Vía de Victoria" and "Vía del Imperio" but gradually under the guidance of Pedro Bigador, planning in Madrid returned to the pre-war theme of decentralisation. Bigador, working in conjunction with Zuazo, modified the '41 Plan, and their revised version (Figure 3), passed in 1946, was in many ways an extension of the '29 Plan, with the central core enclosed by a green ring with satellite settlements beyond. Some industrial zones were added to the south of the city and an attempt was made to divide the central core into individual units separated by open spaces. The outline of the '46 Plan is reminiscent of many of Eilid Saarinen's proposals for






"organic decentralisation" in the pre-war era (9), and at the same time has much in common with Abercrombie's London Plan of 1944. There was, however, one new theoretical undercurrent that stemmed more directly from within the Fascist regime—that of segregation and division of the working class. For example, a member of Bigador's planning team explained that "The distribution of industrial zones has responded to the need to localise the working classes in satellite settlements that constitute true defensive nuclei against the invasion by the inactive masses encamped in the periphery, forming the suburban belts of misery against which we fight with difficulty" (10).

If the authorities had difficulty in coping with the immigrant population in Madrid in the post-war, then very little attempt at all was made in the rest of Spain's cities to accommodate their immigrants. Outside Madrid, the "political urbanism" of the time can be described as one of tolerance and abandonment as the shanty settlements ("barracas", "chabolas" and "coreas") spread like a cancerous growth in the periphery (and sometimes the centre) of Spain's large cities, particularly Barcelona, and, despite efforts at post-war reconstruction, Madrid itself. These masses of intermittently unemployed encamped in the suburbs constituted a latent threat to law and order and forced the Government into adopting a more positive approach to the housing problem in the 50s. Public and semi-public bodies promoted the first housing "polignos" in the periphery of Madrid and Barcelona and after the "Ley de Urgencia Social" in 1957 the Ministry of Housing directed a housing policy that aimed at building 3.7 million

new houses between 1961 and 1976. INUR were put in charge of obtaining and preparing land which was then sold to public and private developers. But this "urgent" solution, forced upon the Government by the increasing housing deficit in Madrid, Barcelona and the country as a whole, concentrated on the periphery, where housing "polignos" generally of poor quality and lacking basic infrastructure and services, replaced or more often than not, complemented, the shanty developments.

Whilst the resultant peripheral sprawl was the dominant feature of real growth in the 50s and 60s, there were continued, largely ineffective, attempts to decentralise Madrid. In 1959, five industrial/residential decongestion estates were demarcated outside Madrid and were reinforced in the Madrid Metropolitan Area Plan of 1963 which again aimed at limiting the growth of the capital and stimulating industrial growth in the Tajo and Henares River valleys to the south and east. Madrid was to be transformed from a pole of attraction into a pole of impulsion for the Central Region. The surrounds of the city were to be reforested in an attempt to limit the periphery where new out-of-centre nuclei were to provide commercial, social and cultural services.

Meanwhile, preliminary studies for the "National Plan of Urbanism" proposed as the upper hierarchy of urban planning in the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956—which established the basis for urban planning in Spain and outlined a four-tier hierarchy of plans at National, Provincial, "comarcal" (City Region) and Municipal level—stressed the need to decentralise Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao, and



Above left: "Barraca" (shanty) development on the brachies of Somorostro in the 1920s. Although this "bar-raca" area has now been cleared, over 3,000 such dwellings remain, largely in the periphery of the city. Source: Archivo Histórico Municipal de Barcelona (AHMB). Above: "Montbau", built in 1957 in the northern periphery of the city. This was one of the early "polignos" and is atypical in its spacious layout and its predominantly middle-class inhabitants. This photo was taken in 1960 and the surrounding open spaces have since undergone considerable infilling. Source: AHMB.

Above right: A more typical section of the periphery, showing haphazard construction, "barraca" dwellings (right centre), encroachment on marginal hill land and general poverty of infrastructure. Source: AHMB.

the "Plan Provincial" for Barcelona in 1963 proposed a polinuclear decentralisation of the Barcelona Region involving a resettling of over a million people, half of them outside the Barcelona province.

Then, during the revision of the Barcelona "Plan Comarcal" (covering 27 municipalities), the Barcelona Planning Commission concluded that a Metropolitan Area Plan, covering half the Province, was needed to effectively plan the decentralisation of the city. However, because planning at the Metropolitan Area level was not catered for in 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act (The Madrid Metropolitan Area Plan of 1963 was passed by special law), the Plan Director (or development plan) of the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, begun in 1965, was never given full administrative backing by the Central Authorities. Nevertheless, the Plan is of interest as a technical document that reveals the resurgence of the decentralisation theme in Barcelona after an absence



of almost half a century. It is perhaps worth speculating why this was so, when decentralisation figured so strongly in the plans for Madrid from the 1920s onwards. Undoubtedly, political circumstances explain a lot. Strangely, both the landowning and industrial bourgeoisie of the 20s and the rationalist planners of the 30s tended to oppose decentralisation, the former because they were more intent on establishing the political and economic importance of Barcelona in Spain in an era of centralist repression, and so concentrated on growth policies; and the latter because the garden-city was part of the traditional school against which they rebelled (encouraged by Le Corbusier with whom they collaborated in the drawing up of the Plan Macia in 1934). Then in the 40s, the cultural rupture between Madrid and Barcelona was such that whilst reconstruction was begun in Madrid, planning in Barcelona virtually disappeared from the political scene for almost a decade. But apart from political considerations, the city was less suitable for the application of plans of decentralisation whilst it remained constrained by the Colliera Mountains inland, running parallel to the coast. However, by the 60s most of the flat plain of Barcelona had been filled in, and "marginal settlements" were spreading onto the foothills of the Colliera Mountains. At the same time, the Council's proposal to construct three tunnels through these mountains created widespread speculation as to the future fate of the Valles region inland, which many feared would become a suburbanised extension of the Barcelona periphery.

Although one of the proclaimed objectives of the 1963 development plan for Barcelona was to bring



about residential, industrial, commercial and service activities. In fact, the plan was in fact a compromise between two main "centrality" schools of thought. Where the conflict was cleared was in the location of commercial, service, and administrative centres. On the one hand, the diverse components of these activities, belonging to a general centre on Barcelona, suggested their concentration in one centre. On the other hand, the interdependence of such activities suggested comprehensive decentralisation on all activities. Whilst the first option led to congestion on the grounds of resultant congestion of the centre and high costs of redeveloping, it was in many ways an extension of the decentralisation model that formed the basis of the plan for Madrid. In the 20s, 30s and 40s, the metropolitan fabric comprised of a series of satellite nuclei, each a "core" of a distinct and superior character. In the final version of the Plan Director, the "centro" was not in Barcelona, but beyond the mountain mass of Tibidabo between San Cugat and Sant Joan de Vilatorrada. The plan was closer to the city-territory structural model based on the decentralisation of all activities. It aimed principally at providing secondary poles in the metropolitan system, precisely via the extension of higher levels of "directional" and tertiary services in each centre, some of which were clearly to function as "propulsors" models for their surrounding sub-regions. Some 35 "rehabilitation" centres, aimed at bringing about a restructuring and improvement of sub-equipped peripheral areas, whilst others had certain characteristic functional specialisations (transport, commerce, administration). It was this more radical form of decentralisation, based on the city-territory model, and carrying more for social equity goals, that characterised the Metropolitan Area Plan for Barcelona in the 60s.

By the end of the last decade the urban situation in Spain's cities was reaching a crisis point. The construction "boom" of the 60s had produced land speculation and peripheral sprawl on a greater scale than ever before. The Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 had failed to provide the necessary measures to control private developers and local authorities were frequently dominated by private interest groups. The wheels of government machinery turned so slowly and migration into Madrid and Barcelona continued on such a scale (in the early 70s, the growth of both Madrid and Barcelona averaged 100,000 a year each, constituting almost half the national annual demographic growth), that any public initiative tended to be one of urgency, panic and even desperation. With the continued absence of urban management bodies with the financial and political weight to carry through comprehensive

sive plans of decentralisation, the sectoral, placement relations of the Administrations only added to the anarchic growth of the periphery.

It was this failure of the formalised planning machinery to deal effectively with the problem of peripheral sprawl, city centre congestion and the housing shortage that led the Government to pass the "Law of Urgent Realisations" (ACTURS) in 1970, which introduced a series of measures aimed at shortening the expropriation process and planning procedure in general, so that a "new urban" policy could be effectively realised. The "ACTURS" programme of eight new towns, situated 10-30 km outside Barcelona (three projects, Madrid, Valencia, Seville, Zaragoza and Cadix, covered more than 11,000 hectares with a total population projection of 800,000 people. But following the passing of the ACTURS law, the lack of co-ordination between physical and economic planning that had hampered effective plan implementation throughout the 50s and 60s, was apparent as ever. Whilst the Ministry of Housing promoted the ACTURS new towns, the third National Economic Development Plan (1972-5) drawn up by the "Comisión del Plan", introduced its own measures to decentralise Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao, along different lines (as whilst the ACTURS programme designated three islands of new towns in the Barcelona province, the Development Plan stressed decentralisation southwards towards Tarragona). At the same time, the landowners affected by INUR's expropriations fought tooth and nail against the new town designations, whilst "rationalist" planners complained long and hard. Feasibility studies had been replaced by "explanatory reports" and texts were expressed about the dangers of entrusting private initiative with the realisation of the new towns projects. The form and content of the ACTURS programme led many to believe that it would only encourage peripheral sprawl on a far larger scale.

And so an ironic paradox now surrounds the ACTURS new towns. Faced with the ineffectiveness of previous attempts to syphon off the demographic growth of Spain's large cities, measures were introduced to get the new towns built, even if it did mean cutting across established planning procedures. But because these measures only tackled part of the problem, the ACTURS programme is now threatened with the fate of previous attempts at decentralisation. There is a clear need for more effective and powerful planning authorities and a greater co-ordination of physical urban planning and regional economic planning. In the past three years, there have been attempts to achieve just such reform (eg the Land Law Reform of 1975, Local Regimes Act 1976, merging of the Ministries of Public Works and Housing 1977). But in the short-term, the ACTURS pre-

# German new town development

Bryan Smith contrasts Federal Republic and UK strategies

Since 1945 new town development has become a feature of the settlement strategies of a number of European countries, some of these towns being based upon the British examples built around London. Thus there are examples of new towns in France, Denmark, The Netherlands and Sweden (1), yet strangely there are relatively few in the Federal Republic of Germany. This may seem somewhat unusual given the traditional role of towns in central Europe and the great deal of modern development and civil engineering that has been undertaken in Germany since the second world war.

Witter (2) has suggested that the explanation lies partly in German history where the settlement pattern has been greatly influenced by colonisation in the Middle Ages, the multiplicity of small states created during the period of absolutism and the federal pattern developed under the Empire, the Weimar Republic and finally the Federal Republic. Such factors have led to the growth of a large number of medium size and large cities which, together with numerous small towns, have created an intensive settlement pattern covering almost the whole country. This fragmentation and independence, much reduced in the centralised Third Reich, has been restricted to some degree in post-war Germany where the local authorities, the Gemeinde and Kreis, have considerable planning and financial autonomy.

During the second world war many urban areas were severely damaged and for the first 15 years the emphasis was on rebuilding these towns and cities and replacing destroyed dwellings. Under this emphasis accommodation was first provided in reconstructed housing areas and later in large new suburban

programme remains the most potentially effective mechanism for pulling a brake on peripheral expansion and central congestion. Despite the inherent risks involved in entrusting private initiative with the leading role in the realisation stage, the ACTURS law can be used to achieve a massive public acquisition of land.

This essay has sketched out the evolution of a policy in Spain which attempts to deal with urban congestion and the consequences of urban growth in the major cities through dispersing population and industry into new towns. However, to do this, substantial public intervention is needed, especially in order to acquire the necessary land. This is the challenge of the ACTURS law. The statutory provisions and the technical plans are there. It has yet to be shown whether the politicians have the will to use them.

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CUAD = Cuadernos de Arquitectura y Urbanismo, publication of the "Colegio Oficial de Arquitectos de Barcelona y las Baleares".

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## The Port Service Area Project, Santander: Central State and Local Authority Intervention in the Planning and Development of a Port-Side Industrial Zone\*

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### Introductory


Urban planning in Spain is currently undergoing a period of critical self-examination in a phase of political transition in the country's history. The Franco era of central state repression is over, a new democratic age of political devolution has just begun. Newly elected local authorities are now embarking on urban investment and reform programmes after almost 40 years of powerless inactivity, collusion and corruption<sup>1</sup> in the sphere of urban management.

This case study examines the planning and development of a port-side industrial zone in the Franco era in Santander (where until now, urban planning studies have been limited indeed<sup>2</sup>), and outlines the major features of central and local authority intervention in the area, which may be of value and interest to planners and politicians working in similar politico-administrative situations in Spain and elsewhere in the developed and developing world.

### The Area

Santander, with a population of some 150,000,<sup>3</sup> lies to the north of the Santander Bay, separated from the Atlantic by a series of low ridges which back the city. Over the past two decades, expansion of the port facilities has been

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The Port Service Area, Santander, looking west from the bridge crossing the Santander-Bilbao railway. Development to the left of the railway line is in land classified as 'permanent open space' in the Santander Sub-Regional Plan.

Photo: M. G. Wynn



Dique C Street in the south of the Port Service Area. The value of available (if crude) parking and loading/unloading facilities is obvious. Note also the walled storage area in the centre middle-ground of the photo, revealing the problems faced by the municipal authorities in determining what exactly necessitates Building Permit authorization in an area of essentially storage and distribution industry.

Photo: M. G. Wynn






Figure 1. The Santander Bay 1977, showing major areas of industrial development in the Bay area.

one of the major features of the growth of Santander with total port traffic increasing three-fold over this period.<sup>4</sup> Whilst heavy industry has been developed to the west and south of the Bay (where access by sea is hampered by shallows) the area to the immediate west of the Mallano Dock has been the principal zone of light manufacturing and warehouse development (Figure 1). This area – known as the Wissoq Marshlands – is the focus of this study, which monitors its transformation from empty land in the late 50's to an almost fully developed industrial zone by the mid-70's.

### The Planning Context

Work started on the Santander Sub-Regional Plan in the late 1940's, but the Plan did not become executive until its approval by the Madrid Government in 1955. It was drawn up by a special team set up by the Provincial Planning Commission, which included the Santander Council's chief architect, a con-




Figure 2. Municipalities included in the Santander Sub-Regional Plan, 1955.



sultant architect, and chief engineers from the Ministry of Public Works and the Santander Port Authority. All affected councils and local authorities were consulted during the plan-making process and their recommendations were given due consideration. The Sub-Regional Plan, which is still in force, was intended to provide the basis for the planning and development of the Santander Bay area until the year 2000. It gave land use classifications to the entire Santander Sub-Region, encompassing the municipalities of Santander, Astillero, Marina de Cudeyo, Camargo and part of Ribamontán, all of which adjoin the bay (Figure 2).

In very general terms, the Plan envisaged the consolidation of the Santander town centre as a mixed residential and service area and the development of the north-eastern coastal strip (Sardinero) as a tourist and up-market residential area. Industrial growth was to be concentrated in three main zones to the west and south of the Bay in Nueva Montaña (in the municipality of Santander), Maliano (in the municipality of Camargo; not to be confused with the Maliano Dock) and Astillero, and complemented by new estates of low- and middle-cost housing. Large tracts of the undeveloped coastline to the south of the Bay and on the Atlantic to the north were protected as 'rural areas' of 'permanent open space' with only limited tourist exploitation.

The Wissocq Marshland area was in many ways part of the projected Nueva Montaña heavy industrial zone, yet because of its proximity to the Maliano dock, it was ideally located to accommodate lighter port service industry. The area was zoned for 'factory development' around a wedge of 'permanent open space' between the major rail and road links to Bilbao (Figure 3). Within the 'factory development' classification, there were no restrictions on the size or type of industry, but only very limited residential development<sup>5</sup> was permitted within the 'permanent open space' classification, and it was specifically stated in the Planning Regulations, (approved as a part of the Sub-Regional Plan) that any construction in these green zones required previous approval by the Provincial Planning Commission.<sup>6</sup> It is also worth noting that the Planning Regulations specified that 'No construction of any kind can be undertaken within the area covered by the Santander Sub-Regional Plan without the prior granting of a Building Permit by the corresponding Council'.<sup>7</sup>

#### The Santander Port Authority acquire Wissocq Marshland Area

The Wissocq Marshlands are named after a French engineer, Pablo Wissocq, to whom the Ministry of Development leased the area, along with other parts of the Santander Bay, in 1853, on the condition that they be reclaimed from the sea to provide new land for the growth of Santander. Following the failure of Wissocq's company to carry out all the terms of the lease and a series of similarly fruitless agreements between the Government and other lessees, the area officially reverted to State ownership in 1932. In the 50's the area was bought by Fernando Pereda, President of the Santander Port Authority (SPA<sup>8</sup>) who sold off part of the area to CAMPSA, the State owned petroleum company, to pay for indemnity claims by former lessees, following a 1950 appeal court decision which nullified the 1932 state acquisition. At the same




Figure 3. A section of Santander Sub-Regional Plan, 1955.



time Pereda employed a dredging and construction company to infill the marsh area and make it satisfactory for industrial development.

In March 1959, however, Pereda ceded, free of charge, the land remaining in his possession to the State, along with two automatic derricks in the port-side area. The land then passed into the possession of the SPA, so completing a decade of negotiations between Pereda and various State entities.<sup>3</sup> In the plans that accompanied the official exchange of deeds, the entire ceded area, including land classified as 'permanent open space' in the 1955 Santan-Sub-Regional Plan (Figure 3), was earmarked for the expansion of port service industry. It was with this objective in mind that the SPA drew up plans for the development of the area in 1959.

## The Port Service Area Project 1960

The official acceptance of the land to the west of the Maliano dock by the State took place in March 1959. By October of the same year the Engineer-Director of the SPA had drawn up a Port Service Area Project in which the recently acquired land was divided into 23 blocks to be used for industrial development around new road infrastructure (Figure 4). Given that the Project included proposals for the development of the area between the Bilbao road and rail links which was zoned as 'permanent open space' in the '55 Sub-Regional Plan, the procedural stages in the approved process of this project are of considerable significance.


The Project was without any precise legal definition.<sup>10</sup> The 1956 Land and Urban Planning Act had introduced a plan approval process that was to be binding for both public and private sectors. Theoretically, the only way the land use classifications of the 1955 Sub-Regional Plan could have been changed was through the drawing up of a 'Local Plan' which, because of the vagueness of the law on the content of these plans, could have officially reclassified the wedge of 'permanent open space' for industrial development. But nowhere was it contended that the Port Service Area project was a 'Local Plan', nor did it follow the statutorily required legal course for such a plan.<sup>11</sup>

However, the SPA did send the project to the Provincial Directorate of Ports, the Cantabrian and Santander-Bilbao Railway companies, the High Seas Military Command, the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Housing and the Santander Council, asking for reports on the Project. Whilst the Railway companies asked for certain assurances regarding the fencing off of the railway areas, all the other authorities reported favourably on the Project. The Council's decision to raise 'no objection to the project'<sup>12</sup> was perhaps surprising considering their statutorily assigned role of enforcing the Sub-Regional Plan. But perhaps of greatest significance was the report of the Provincial Office of the Ministry of Housing. The Urban Planning Department of this authority reported that, 'The area covered by the said project includes land classified as green zone one in the Santander Sub-Regional Plan; the disappearance of this zone, however, was envisaged in the report on the Sub-Regional Plan issued by the Santander Port Authority which noted "the incompatibility with the future

The SPA, then, had always intended to develop the 'Green Zone' (permanent open space) along with the rest of the area to the west of the Mallano dock. The Provincial Office of the Ministry of Housing considered this justification enough for reporting favourably on the project, so revealing the irrelevance of the statutory planning machinery when set against contradictory development proposals of state authorities. In February 1960, the SPA sent the project along with the above mentioned reports to the Ministry of Public Works, who approved the project by Ministerial Order in December of the same year.

### Leasehold Agreements and Development Control

In the early 60's, the SPA (through the Provincial Directorate of Ports) began making leasehold agreements with industrialists for the development of the



Source: Aerial Photo. Santander Port Authority

Figure 4. The Port Service Area Project, drawn up by the Santander Port Authority in 1959, and approved by Ministerial order in 1960, showing the state of development (shaded) in January 1967. All blocks were numbered for development in the project; those blocks between the Santander-Bilbao railway and the Santander-Bilbao motorway are located in land classified as 'permanent open space' in the 1955 Sub-Regional Plan.

port service area. Industrialists applied to the Port Authority specifying the area and type of industry they wished to develop. The SPA then initiated a form of plan approval process similar to that followed in the approval of the Port Area Project. The Council were informed of the applications and asked to post official notification on the Town Hall notice-board. Solicited reports from the High Seas Military Command, Provincial Directorate of Public Health etc. were invariably favourable; these were then forwarded to the Ministry of Public Works in Madrid, who ratified the lease agreement. Construction of industrial premises sometimes took place before official approval: by mid-1967, 51 leasehold agreements had been verified by the Ministry, and 55 plots had been developed (Figure 4).

Although the Santander Council had been notified of the leasehold agreements, all development up to 1966 took place without municipal building permits and was therefore technically illegal. In 1966, however, the Inspectorate of the Council's Works Department began an *a posteriori* legalization of the construction of industrial premises in the Port Service Area, in which industrialists were charged the municipal permit tax and corresponding plans for existing buildings were approved, thereby legalizing their existence. Some industrialists appealed against this tax imposition, claiming that no such condition had been included in the leasehold agreement, but appeal court decisions went consistently in favour of the Council. In 1969, however, the legal contradiction underlying these disputes was seemingly resolved by the approval of the Coasts Act.

The leasehold agreements had been granted by the Ministry of Public Works within the legal framework of the 1928 Ports Act. This Act stated that, 'The Ministry of Development (subsequently Ministry of Public Works) may authorize private individuals to build salt works, factories and other establishments on public land'.<sup>14</sup> But as already noted, the 1955 Sub-Regional Plan for Santander (reinforced by the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956) stipulated that no construction of any kind could be undertaken without Municipal Building Permit authorization. Similarly the Ports Law Regulations outlined leasehold cession procedure whilst the Land and Urban Planning Act governed municipal Building Permit authorization. But the 1969 Coasts Act resolved any remaining doubts about the legal necessity of municipal authorization for construction. Article 15 of this Act stipulated that 'the granting of a lease does not exempt the lessee from the necessity of obtaining the legally required licences, permits and authorizations'.<sup>15</sup>

With the approval of the Coasts Act in 1969 a new *status quo* was established for development control in the Port Service Area. Between 1966 and 1968, the majority<sup>16</sup> of existing industrial establishments had been legalized by the Council; but after 1969 most leaseholders applied for, and secured, Municipal Building Permits before, during, or after construction of their premises. It is interesting to note here that none of these permits were for construction in the 'permanent open space' strip of land. But nevertheless, in the period 1966-68, the Council had legalized developments in this 'Green Zone', reporting them 'in accordance with municipal regulations, the *Sub-Regional Plan* and




Figure 5. Industry type in original leasehold agreements (left) and in reality (right) 1979. (Difference 95:77 accounted for by amalgamations of leases and undeveloped areas)




Figure 6. Number of employees per industry in Port Service Area.




Figure 7. 'Pull-Factors' in attraction of industry to Port Service Area.



other relevant legislation'<sup>17</sup> (authors' italics). Whilst the Council had asserted their legal right to claim development revenue (through Building Permit tax), industry in the central section of the zone remained in contradiction to the dictates of the Sub-Regional Plan.

### The Nature and Dynamics of Industrial Growth

In the 1960's most of the leasehold agreements were made for up to 99 years; but despite these long leases, there seems to have been a fairly rapid turnover of industry, with a change of lessee in at least 18 of 95 leasehold areas and a further 22 sub-let. Nevertheless if we make a three-way classification of industry into warehouse (storage and distribution), workshop (car/lorry repair, small-scale carpentry, etc.) and manufacturing industry, we find the overall balance has changed very little, with warehouse facilities constituting the major industry-type in the zone (Figure 5), with over half the establishments employing less than ten men (Figure 6).

Whilst a port-side location has clearly been of importance in attracting some industries to the area (e.g. fish-preserving plant, bulk imports storage and distribution—cereals, tropical wood, fertilizer and animal foodstuffs), proximity to the Santander-Bilbao road has perhaps been of greater importance. The car showrooms, lorry and car servicing areas and workshops—by and large located immediately alongside this main road—were clearly attracted by the roadside location. But questionnaire results (Figure 7) suggest that even for the storage and distribution industries, it was the existence of suitable road access and service infrastructure in an ideal location outside the main built-up area that was the major 'pull-factor'.

This is supported by the high percentage of industries that are 'relocations' from Santander town. Of the 67 industrialists from whom answers were obtained, all but 20 had moved from the town. Further, survey analysis has revealed that industry has relocated from three major areas in the town—from the other side of the Maliano dock, from around the Molnodo dock and from the town centre (Figure 8). It is of interest to note that all three areas were by and large classified for residential development in the 1955 Sub-Regional Plan (Figure 3), and although not one industrialist mentioned planning restrictions as a reason for moving, this may have been a contributory factor. Interviews with members of the Council's Planning Department suggest that whilst the Council paid little attention to the development of land owned by the SPA, they exerted a very firm development control in the town itself. Indeed, the major area from which industry has moved (Zone A on Figure 8) corresponds almost exactly to the area around the Maliano dock *not* owned by the SPA. With the acquisition of the Wiscoq Marshlands in the 1950's, the SPA had the opportunity to provide an ideally located industrial zone, largely out of reach of Council control, where land could be offered relatively cheaply to industrialists and service infrastructure could be provided by the SPA themselves. In return, the SPA received a steady source of income through ground rent and spin-off revenue from the increase in port traffic.




Figure 8. Relocation of industry in the Port Service Area.



## Conclusions

1. *The type of industry* attracted to the Port Service Area has been light manufacturing, workshop and above all warehouse (storage) industry. Clearly, proximity to the port has been an important factor in attracting storage/wholesale distribution activities of imported goods but this has largely been secondary to the availability of relatively cheap, suitably vacant land (or latterly available premises) alongside the primary road axis into and out of Santander.
2. *Industrial relocation* and expansion from other parts of Santander town has been of major importance in the growth of the zone, but this aspect of development poses certain questions of a broader nature that have yet to be satisfactorily answered. Was the desire to renovate areas vacated by industry attracted to the Port Service Area a major factor in the strategy of the Port Authority? Future research into ownership of land in these areas and possible links between the SPA and property developers will hopefully answer this question. But even if it was, it seems clear that the need to provide a new industrial zone near the Mollano dock was as important, if not more so. Between 1950 and 1958 port traffic increased almost two-fold and yet port-related industrial development was hampered by city centre congestion and planning regulations in areas which were by and large classified for residential development and outside the SPA's jurisdiction. The requirements of a growing port traffic (which increased three-fold between 1958 and 1976) strongly recommended the development of a new industrial area, equipped with suitable communications infrastructure. The implementation of the Port Service Area Project by the SPA provided such a zone.
3. As regards *plan implementation*, there are several aspects that seem worth stressing:
  - Development of the Port Service Area involved *contravention of the statutory approved urban plan* for the area and *irregularities in planning procedure*. The development of the 'Green Zone' included in the Sub-Regional Plan between the road and railway links was encouraged by the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and Santander Port Authority and accepted without protest by the Council. Scant regard was paid to correct planning procedure in the municipal development control function which was inconsistent and reflected more the desire of the Council to collect permit taxes than any attempt to bring development into line with the approved urban plan.
  - Nevertheless the development of the Port Service Area has been an *economic and strategic success*. The MPW and SPA successfully planned, managed and financed the development of a much needed industrial zone alongside the major dock facilities and road and rail links in Santander. The fact that urban plans and planning procedure were to a large extent reduced to an irrelevance reflects the incapacity of local councils to provide suitably furnished industrial growth areas as much as it illustrates the unacceptable side of Central State autonomous intervention.
  - This suggests then, that plan implementation could be improved if *plan-making* municipal and sub-regional authorities had the necessary political will

and weight to effectively implement their plans. At the same time, such authorities must have the technical and financial resources to draw up realistic and flexible plans that can suitably respond to changing economic (and other) demands. In the 50's and 60's in Santander none of these conditions existed. The Municipal and Provincial authorities were weak, politically and resource-wise; the 1955 Sub-Regional Plan was a classic blue-print plan that attempted to structure the growth of the bay for the following 45 years. As such, and especially given the minimal (by today's standards) preparatory studies, the plan was bound to become obsolete before long as the projections and premises on which the plan was based changed. As specifically regards the Wissant Marshlands, the Green Zone classification seems largely inappropriate in an area which, because of its road- and port-side location, was ideal for industrial development, and indeed this was remarked upon by the SPA as early as 1952 in their report on the Plan. The Port Service Area case study illustrates, then, some (and by no means the worst) of the likely results when the formal urban planning machinery is so far removed from any political power base and out of touch with the economic realities of the developments amongst industrialists in the zone suggest some are

Preliminary soundings amongst industrialists in the zone suggest some are now contemplating a move further south to the privately owned Raos industrial estate (Figure 1), where longer leasehold agreements or purchase of larger premises may be preferable to the leasehold agreements in the Port Service Area, which the SPA are now renegotiating for 25 year periods only. This development is again in many ways contrary to statutory urban planning - located in an area zoned for 'transport development' in the 1955 Sub-Regional plan. It must be hoped that the revision of the Sub-Regional Plan, now underway,<sup>18</sup> will be flexible enough to adapt to changing economic trends and yet suitably sensitive to the needs of both public and private sectors to facilitate effective overall public management of the growth of industry in the Bay area within the framework of statutory urban plans and established planning procedure.

## Notes and References

1. For detail on collusion between local authorities and private developers in Barcelona, see Martí, F., and Moreno E. *Barcelona - a donde vas?* (Dírosa: Barcelona 1974).
2. Planning issues in Santander are touched upon in the following works: Dalda, J., García-Lagos, M., Gariña, M., et al., *Defensa de la Naturaleza y Medio Ambiente en la ciudad y bahía de Santander* (Fundación Marcelino Botín, 1974); Echegaray, R. E. *Centenario del Puerto de Santander 1872-1972* (Santander, 1973); as well as the annual economic reports of the Santander Port Authority, the major banks, the Syndical Organization and other state bodies.
3. According to the Botín Foundation Study of 1974 (*op.cit.* note 2), the population of Santander municipality was then 150,000.
4. Total Port traffic increased from 750,000 metric tons in 1947 to over 1,500,000 in 1958, and to 4,500,000 in 1976.
5. Article 26 of the Planning Regulations for the development of the 1955 Santander Sub-Regional Plan stated 'Any Building Permit granted for construction in these zones (permanent open space) requires the previous approval of the Provincial Planning Commission. Building permits may be granted for construction of the following build-



ings: one-family houses standing in ground covering a minimum of 5000 square metres; one-family houses in nucleated settlements with a maximum density of 5 houses per hectare ...  
See: Comisión Superior de Ordenación Urbana (Santander), *Plan Comarcal de Santander 1955* (Graficas Ter. Santander, 1967).

6. *Ibid* (note 2).

7. Article 1 of Planning Regulations of Santander Sub-Regional Plan 1955.

8. Within the Ministry of Public Works, the General Directorate of Ports and Light-houses (GDPL) was one of four such Directorates. Within the GDPL there were Provincial Directorates of Ports; the Santander Port Authority was a major sub-unit of the Santander Provincial Directorate.

9. The exact motives for the State-Pereda land exchange in the 50's remain unclear. But personal interviews suggest it was largely to facilitate transactions undertaken by Pereda (as an individual) that would have been more complex if undertaken by the State. Having acquired the land at a nominal cost and sold parts of it off to CAMPSA (in 1954, 55, and 58) to meet compensation claims by former lessees, Pereda handed back the land remaining in his possession and money received from the land sales to the State in 1959.

10. It could be argued that as a 'Land Division' plan the Port Service Area Project met the demands of Articles 165-167 of the Land and Urban Planning Act of 1956 which authorized state authorities to approve such projects after consultation with the Council. But to change land use classifications - which the Port Service Area Project implicitly did by dividing the 'permanent open space' area up for industrial development - a local Plan needed to be approved according to procedure established in the 1956 Act (see Note 11 below).

11. Such a Local Plan would first be initially approved by the Ministry of Public Works. Then a Public Information Stage is opened for one month in which plans are made available for inspection by the public and appeals may be presented to the Ministry. Then an Audience of Local Corporations stage is held for one month, during which time Local Authorities debate the plan with the Ministry. If the Local Authorities report favourably, the Local Plan can then be *Definitively Approved* by the Ministry. If not, it is up to the Full Cabinet to decide.

12. From Resolution of Full Council of Santander, 9.1.60, quoted in a letter signed by Mayor and Secretary to Engineer Director of the SPA, dated 4th February, 1960.

13. From letter signed by Manuel Urbina Carrera, Provincial Delegate of Ministry of Housing, to Engineer-Director of SPA, dated 8.2.60.

14. Article 42 of the Ports Act 1928, see: 'Ley de Puertos' in Ministerio de Obras Publicas, *Legislación Básica, Tomo 2* (MOP: Madrid, 1977).

15. Article 15 of Coasts Act: See 'Ley de Costas' in: Ministerio de Obras Publicas, *op. cit.*

16. A search of municipal records suggests 10-20% of industrial premises in the Port Service Area still lack either a *posteriori* legalization or Municipal Building Permits.

17. From Works Committee Resolution legalizing industrial premises of Mr. Delfin Pintado (in the Green Zone), 15.7.66.

18. In May 1979 the Provincial Planning Commission put out to tender the first stage (for the southern part of the Bay area) of the revision of the Sub-Regional Plan. The contract was to be awarded towards the end of 1979.

L. FRANCES MILLARD

## Problems of Applied Spatial Planning: A Note on the Polish Experience

*Research carried out during a three-year stay in Poland forms the basis of this evaluation of physical planning. Now Senior Lecturer in Politics, Portsmouth Polytechnic, Southampton, England, Dr. Millard is currently engaged in a pilot study of Polish health planning.*

Eastern Europe is a laboratory of planning writ large. Plans embrace virtually every aspect of human experience, whether economic, social, or cultural, in an effort to direct the evolution of society and thus to create conditions of justice and well-being for its citizens. It is the purpose of this paper to focus on a highly specific yet crucial aspect of this holistic approach, namely the administrative difficulties encountered by Polish spatial planners. In one sense this focus inevitably distorts a complex reality: On the one hand spatial planning in Poland has an ideological and intellectual dimension. On the other hand, it needs to be put into the context of the whole, that is, taken in conjunction with its bedmates economic planning and social planning. Nonetheless, it seems illuminating to offer a bird's-eye view of these problems, which provide a most formidable obstacle to urban progress.

In terms of administration it is useful to distinguish between the problems of constructing spatial development plans and those of putting the plans into operation. In practice, of course, both plan construction and plan implementation are occurring simultaneously. The drafting of plans for the next planning period takes place while the current plan is being implemented. There are short-term and long-term plans. All plans involve projection into the future and cannot be assumed to rest on perfect foresight: indeed, some modification is inevitable in the course of execution, and adjustments in one sphere necessitate adjustments in others. So the distinction employed here is an abstraction, a heuristic device, with the problems of plan construction actually overlaid by and feeding into those of plan implementation.

### I. Plan Construction

#### A. The Structures of Planning

The drafting of spatial development plans was first provided for by a decree of 1946, establishing planning offices at national, regional, and local levels. The national plan would outline the general direction of population distribution and define the functional bases of development for the major cities. It was to divide the country into economic regions which were to become the main ad-

# The Buildings, Eastwood

BY MARTIN WYNN AND IAN HAYWOOD

A BRIEF account of The Buildings scheme in Eastwood, Nottinghamshire was given in *Industrial Archaeology* Volume 13, No. 2. This scheme, undertaken by Broxtowe District (now Borough) Council, to improve rather than demolish an area of miners' cottages, reflects the concern for the environment and an interest in the past that have become increasingly evident in Eastwood in the past few years.

Yet to the casual visitor, Eastwood may appear much the same as any other of the small nondescript towns which dot the Midlands. Just discernible behind the new shop facades and modern traffic is the original structure of a small hilltop town clustered around the market place where the Nottingham, Mansfield, Derby and Ilkeston Roads meet (Figure 1). A closer study of Eastwood, however, reveals a number of interesting connections with the past. These include the long association of the town with coal-mining and its claim to be the birth-place of the Midlands Railway; and, above all, perhaps, the fact that D.H. Lawrence was born here, in The Buildings, to become the town's most famous, if not most notorious, son.

This article, then, attempts to outline some of the major landmarks in the evolution of coalmining and transport development in the Eastwood area that seem of relevance as a back drop to the construction of The Buildings in the middle of the last century and the recently completed improvement scheme. This scheme is then considered in its more immediate planning context in an attempt to identify the major planning issues involved.

## ORIGINS OF COAL-MINING IN EASTWOOD

Local legend dates the origins of Eastwood to a Norse settlement in the 9th century, although the precise location of the earliest settlement is not known.<sup>1</sup> It is, however, perhaps more than coincidental that



Figure 1: Eastwood Town Centre 1962, showing the quadrangle layout of The Buildings, just north of the Nottingham Road (A610). Scale 1:5000. Source: Ordnance Survey Plan Sk4046 and Sk4746 and Plan Sk4047 and Sk4747, Edition 1962.



Eastwood is in the centre of a major outcrop of the Barnsley Coal Seam, that is worked today in East Derbyshire and West Nottinghamshire in a twenty mile wide strip from the Yorkshire border to just north of Derby and Nottingham (the East Midlands Coalfield). Traces of bell-pit markings indicate that coal mining in the area may have its origins in pre-Saxon times. The oldest formal records date mining in the area to 1282 when open-cast and drift mining was taking place at depths of up to 50 yards.

By 1774, two shafts some 35 yards deep, had been sunk which were to establish the future of Eastwood as a mining town. At first, however, the exploitation of coal was limited by the lack of adequate transport to carry coal to distant markets. The farmers' carts, used on the farm in summer and for carting coal in winter, could carry only 3 to 4 tons each, which with four horses and two draymen was an expensive and slow means of travel over unmade roads in the winter months.

#### COAL-MINING IN THE CANAL AND RAILWAY AGES

Distances coal could be hauled were consequently limited and mines could serve only the immediate neighbourhood and adjacent cities unless they had access to river or sea. Mine-owners and industrialists were quick to realize the potential of water born transport whereby one or two horses could pull 40 tons of coal in a barge with a crew of three or four men, and the capacity could be increased to 80 tons, if a second barge or 'butty boat' was added.

The value of the Erewash Valley coal reserves and the need to connect Eastwood to Nottingham by a canal was readily apparent. The first canal to be opened was the Erewash canal which linked Eastwood to the River Trent and thus to Nottingham (Figure 2). This canal, some 11¾ miles long, was completed in a little over two years and opened to traffic in December 1779. The new canal provided a great impetus to coal-mining in Eastwood, which until about 1770 had taken second place to framework knitting of hosiery<sup>2</sup>. In 1794, the Cromford Canal was opened, running almost 15 miles from a junction with the Erewash Canal just north of Eastwood to the industrial area of Cromford. In 1796, the Nottingham Canal was opened, providing a more direct route into Nottingham from Eastwood, in competition with the Erewash Canal (Figure 2).

The early 1800s saw the growth of Barber, Walker & Co. as the principal mine owners in Eastwood and the rapid expansion of coal mining. In 1838, they took over a mine, sunk in the early part of the




Figure 2. Major canal, river and rail links used in the Eastwood coal-trade up to 1850.

century by a Dr Manson, to form part of the Eastwood mine. A further mine at Moorgreen within a mile of Eastwood centre, was sunk 30 years later with twin 13 foot diameter shafts to a depth of 286 yards, working the main 'Deep Soft' and 'Deep Hard' seams. The Eastwood mine was later to close in the 1880s, but Moorgreen Colliery remains in production today.

Coal from the early mines was transported to the canals by means of tramways and horse-drawn trucks until private railways were built in the 1830s. In 1832, John Ellis of Leicester opened a new line from Swannington (in the North West Leicester coalfield) to Leicester, so breaking the monopoly of the Leicester market enjoyed by the Erewash coalmasters since the opening of the canals in the late 18th century.

In August of the same year, following a meeting at the Sun Inn in Eastwood, the Erewash Valley coalowners decided to build a new line to connect the Erewash Valley with Nottingham, Derby and Leicester, with Barber, Walker & Co. putting up 30% of the initial capital needed to form a company (The Midlands County Railway Company) and present the necessary bill in Parliament. Owing to pressure of parliamentary business and opposition from canal and other railway

interests, passing of the bill was delayed and the company was subsequently broadened to include financiers from Liverpool and Manchester. When the act was eventually passed, it provided for new lines between Nottingham, Derby and Leicester but excluded the essential link with the Erewash Valley as originally conceived. The Nottingham-Derby-Leicester lines were opened in 1839, and following the amalgamation of the Midland Counties, North Midlands and Birmingham & Derby Railway Companies in 1844 (to form the Midland Railway Company), the Erewash Valley branch line was finally constructed in 1847, so giving modest substance to Eastwood's claim to being one of the originators of the Midland Railway Company (Figure 2).

#### CONSTRUCTION OF THE BUILDINGS

Coal mining affected an area in many ways. Not only was there the physical intrusion of the mines and the railways but also the general need to provide housing and other facilities for the influx of people attracted to mining. The early miner lived in very much the same sort of one-roomed thatched cottage he had inhabited in the rural areas he came from; but as the scale of mining increased and became more demanding in its labour requirements, so it became imperative to make proper provision for the housing of the new urban mine worker.

In the mid-19th century, Barber, Walker & Co., as major mine owners in Eastwood, set in hand a construction programme to build houses for their employees. Between 1854 and 1860, they constructed houses on a 300 x 100 yard site to the north of the main Nottingham Road (Figure 1). The development comprised 213 two-storey terraced houses, each consisting of two or three bedrooms, a living room, kitchen, larder and outside scullery and w.c. They were constructed of red brick made locally from colliery shale with slate roofs and stone lintels.

The new houses were formally known as the 'New Buildings', but were often referred to locally as 'the Squares' because of the way the central terraces were grouped around common courtyards or squares.

#### D.H. LAWRENCE

David Herbert Lawrence was born at No. 8A Victoria Street in the New Buildings on September 11th, 1885. It was a small corner shop where his mother sold haberdashery. Family connections with coal-mining went back to his paternal grandfather, John, who had been a tailor employed by Barber, Walker & Co., making moleskin trousers

and vests for miners. His own father, Arthur, described himself as a 'coalmine contractor'. In practice, he was a 'butty' which meant that he was employed to take charge of a section of the coal face called a 'stall', worked by himself and two or three 'day men'. He was paid by the week for the coal he and his team extracted, and he then paid his 'day men'. It was generally secure, though dangerous, employment, and relatively well paid for a comparatively short working day from 6 am to 4 pm.

D.H. Lawrence had two brothers and two sisters, but none of them went into mining, perhaps as a result of their mother's efforts to steer them into a better way of life. David, anyway, was considered a rather effete and puny child and after gaining a scholarship to Nottingham High School he took up teaching. By the time he started to write in the early 1900s, the family had moved up the social scale and away from 'The Squares'.

As a family they were never really poor in 19th century terms. They came from a respectable working class community with strong traditions of mutual aid. Lawrence drew his inspiration from this community and its harsh existence enmeshed in an industrial working town. There were always problems, whether it was poor wages because the workings were difficult, or the continual conflict between his father as a stolid miner and his mother as a woman with greater aspirations for her children.

Today many of the references to Eastwood in Lawrence's novels are clearly identifiable although much of the industrial squalor has gone. Moorgreen Colliery became 'Minton' in *Sons and Lovers*, and the Moorgreen Reservoir serving the Nottingham Canal appears in his novels as 'Willey Water' and 'Nethermere'. The Squares were described as 'sordid and hideous' although in the alleyways 'children played and the women gossiped and the men smoked'.

#### THE BUILDINGS IN THE 1970s — REDEVELOPMENT VS. REHABILITATION

The New Buildings, or The Buildings as they are now more commonly known, remained by and large unchanged until the 1970s, inhabited by local miners and their descendants. After the nationalization of the coal mines in 1947, The National Coal Board took over most of the dwellings in The Buildings. Although these were solidly built, they lacked basic amenities and the tight layout around The Squares was considered unacceptable by modern standards. In 1970, the area was earmarked for clearance by Eastwood Urban District



Council, which in 1971 and 1972 bought up the miners' cottages from the National Coal Board and private owners. Planning consultants were officially engaged to draw up a redevelopment plan in 1973, by which time 80 of the dwellings, including most of The Squares and one of the chapels had been cleared (see illustration page 337 and Figure 3). The remaining houses seemed destined to be demolished in the wholesale redevelopment of the area.

In April 1973, however, councillors had been elected and staff subsequently appointed to the incoming Broxtowe District Council, which was to take over responsibility for local planning and housing in Eastwood in April 1974, following Local Government Reorganization in Great Britain (see Figure 4). Many of the officers worked in nearby Local Authorities and knew of The Buildings and Eastwood UDC's proposal to redevelop the area. Broxtowe Councillors toured Eastwood in September 1973 to get a first hand impression of The Buildings and, above all, the wishes of local residents who had not been consulted in the formulation of Eastwood UDC's redevelopment proposal. A formal request was made to Eastwood UDC that no further demolition take place whilst the feasibility and desirability of improving existing dwellings was considered as an alternative to demolition and redevelopment. In December, members of the Broxtowe Planning Department carried out a social survey amongst residents of The Buildings; significantly, 63% indicated their preference to stay in their current homes rather than move to new houses.

By February 1974, the incoming Broxtowe Planning Department had drawn up the outline of a fully comprehensive scheme that included proposals for redevelopment of the cleared area and improvement of the majority of the 133 miners dwellings that remained.<sup>3</sup>

In an exhibition held in Eastwood in March 1974, both schemes — that of the planning consultants employed by Eastwood UDC and that of Broxtowe DC — were presented to local residents, 88% of which subsequently indicated their preference for the scheme of improvement and partial renewal drawn up by Broxtowe DC. Following this overwhelming vote in favour of the 'improvement' option, recommendations that the scheme be used as the basis for further action in The Buildings were approved by the full Broxtowe Council in June 1974. The remaining miners' dwellings were to be improved in a scheme that was later to win recognition as one of the best of its kind in Europe.




Figure 3: Major changes in The Buildings in the 1970s.




Figure 4: Administrative boundaries for new Local Authorities 1974.

#### THE BUILDINGS SCHEME IN ITS PLANNING CONTEXT

The two major elements of Broxtowe DC's proposals for The Buildings were the improvement<sup>4</sup> of 90 of the existing council-owned houses and the construction of 96 new dwellings, of which approximately one-third were 5-person family dwellings and the rest one and two person flatlets, (Fig. 5). The scheme, however, also included other important elements. Princes Street was permanently closed to all traffic and paved over to become a pedestrianized zone and a programme of environmental improvements (wall mounted street lighting, provision of planting boxes etc) was carried out (illustrations, pp. 338-339). A one-way traffic system was introduced in Victoria Street, Wellington




Figure 5: Major features of The Buildings Scheme. (Based on figures produced by Broxtowe Borough Council).





ing, replacing doors and windows, installation of central heating, a refitted kitchen, conversion of a bed-

room into a bathroom, injection of a damp-proof course and brick cleaning of the front elevation.

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## Chesterton windmill

BY DEREK OGDEN AND G.M. FULLER

CHESTERTON windmill is of exceptional interest to the architect and engineer. Since the autumn of 1965 the mill has been the subject of considerable restoration work to fabric and machinery. This paper gives a brief account of the restoration and presents some of the interesting historical notes, facts and fallacies.

The windmill stands on a hill top quite close to the Roman Fosse Way and about 5 miles S.E. of Warwick and Leamington Spa. There can be few windmills so ideally sited for the ground slopes away in all directions for many miles, giving panoramic views of Warwickshire and neighbouring counties. The building was erected in 1632 for Sir Edward Peyto or his son Edward, and is supposed to have been originally built as an observatory with conversion to a windmill in the 18th century. However, it is now known to have been a windmill in 1647, the evidence being in the form of a marriage settlement deposited with the Shakespeare Birthplace Trust by Willoughby de Broke, which clearly refers to the building as a windmill for grinding corn. It is thought unlikely to have been built or used for any other purpose than a windmill since erection in 1632.

#### ARCHITECTURE


The structural design appears to be unique and deserves some comment. It is built of local hard limestone, very carefully coursed and generally of ashlar form. The tower is supported upon six semicircular moulded arches on piers, the outer faces of which are arcs of circles radiating from a common centre. A sandstone string course surmounts the six arches and runs round the tower and below the windows. There are four windows in the tower, two small and two much larger, all with external moulding. The larger windows are divided by a cruciform



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NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

# Improving urban management

## A CASE STUDY TECHNIQUE

A basic, local-level monitoring technique has been developed to aid self-learning and facilitate international exchange of urban management experience. The technique is outlined and some implications for Third World planners are discussed.

by Martin Wynn, John L. Taylor, Ian Haywood, and Roger Smith

URBAN MANAGERS working in the Third World are charged with implementing a range of urban policies, many of which will be concerned with the provision of infrastructure and the planning, management, and control of new development. These policies must be carried out in the face of the classic, and often seemingly intractable, problems associated with massive in-migration into cities, the consequent growth of poorly equipped shanty towns, chronic under-employment, corruption and inefficiency in local government, etc. although it is difficult to find much consensus of opinion on how these problems should be tackled, a case study technique has been developed for

### Training methods

One approach increasingly being employed to improve urban management training—particularly among the richer countries of the Third World—is to dispatch the urban manager to an institute of higher education in one of the more developed countries, where he can study urban management, planning, or a similar subject. If such courses are run by personnel with the experience necessary to provide training relevant to a Third World context, the courses can clearly be of value.

This learning method may not always be the most effective one, however; the development of self-monitoring techniques may provide a better, more direct way for urban managers in the developing countries to learn from their own and others' experiences. The case study approach described below, developed through research sponsored by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC),<sup>1</sup> is one such technique. Aimed at facilitating the dissemination of experience throughout the administrative system as a whole—both nationally and internationally—the technique enables managers to learn from the successes and failures of local solutions generated in response to specific urban management problems.

### Program research

To establish a case study program, the ministry, agency, or local authority responsible for urban planning appoints a small team of full- or part-time researchers. While there are no essential qualifications for these researchers, experience in related fields and a proven ability to work well with others will help ensure success. The team may consist of one department, an interdependent group from within the planning organization, academics from a university, or outside consultants. Its responsibilities will include both compiling the case study and exploiting the instructional potential of the

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
When the case study data-base is structured (see figure 1), it can be circulated to all parties represented in the study, different government departments and sub-departments, etc. Individuals are then requested to give their views, based on the evidence presented and their own involvement. They can be asked to identify the key issues underlying

The compilation and structuring of the case study data-base is the first stage in the management education process; performing the study is an individual learning exercise for members of the research team. Another important use as an individual educational tool is the circulation of the structured data-base to all interested parties for their information and feedback. Circulation of the final draft of the case study is the last step in this phase of the learning program.

Although the countries of the developed world share many problems, the exchange of practical planning and management experience has often been limited by the lack of a common framework within which to view planning successes and failures. In the developing world, this situation is often exacerbated by additional factors, including the relatively low status afforded physical planning, as distinct from economic planning; the lack of established institutions

on the interpretation of the basic data, help in the assessment of the value of the collected material, and offer a systematic overview of individual department and agency roles in the development process—an overview usually not available to Third World management. This makes creation of the case study as much a tool for

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT



**Figure 1.** Stages in the development and use of a case study.

At the outset, they consist of authentic documentation of the development process assembled by the research team working in conjunction with the authorities and interest groups involved in the case study development. (See figure 1.)

and interest groups involved in the case study development. (See figure 1.)

This raw data is then structured, ordered, and finally edited in book format to avoid repetition and irrelevant or excessive detail. In general, it has been possible to group documents into stages or "decision-making areas" within the development process, with link commentaries explaining and briefly summarizing the administrative and the processes illustrated by the documentation.

Introductory material, plans, and photographs are added by the research team (working with

data-bases. Compilation and structuring of the case study may be performed by a smaller group within the team.

In the context of this management technique, a "case study" is defined as the recording and analysis of a particular event or series of events, using a systematic method, to facilitate the development of learning and the transfer of experience. To accomplish these ends, the case studies developed according to OECD/SSRC techniques have had the following common characteristics:

- They document recent, local-level projects selected either because they are considered representative of typical development (e.g., a public housing project or industrial expansion scheme) or are worthy of in-depth study because of particular lessons which might be gained (e.g., innovative renewal and shanty im-





Photo courtesy of M. G. Wynne

Figure 2. Ramon Casellas, Barcelona. These shanty dwellings are now being knocked down to make way for new two- and three-story structures that will house the existing community. The Residents Association, consultant-architects, and local and central authorities have collaborated in the scheme. It is this type of problem-focused case study that may provide the most immediate scope for international exchange.

nation of project management, they represent an important means of fostering international exchange at the professional level, with reciprocal benefits to all participants. Case studies with contextual similarities may be exchanged between agencies and ministries to help the developed countries to more clearly understand the problems of the developing world, and to contribute to the creation of appropriate planning mechanisms and processes. More immediately, this exchange can be of immense value in helping each country measure and improve its performance through the individual and group self-learning processes.

Using case studies in this manner can contribute to improvement in three interrelated aspects of planning and development. These aspects are system performance, administrative procedures, and projects and programs aimed at specific problems. Examples of the usefulness of case studies in these areas further illustrate the need for this new technique.

In many countries—both developed and developing—the thrust of development is on the improvement of economic performance, often read as a crude increase in the GNP and balance of payments. Local-level case studies can draw attention to the need for a more realistic assessment of the true costs and benefits of development, which will include social and environmental considerations.<sup>7</sup> Too often, physical planning is seen as an unnecessary, inhibiting mechanism that merely adds to the costs of development. Analysis of the performance of the physical planning system through case studies, however, can demonstrate the importance of seeing physical planning as essential to economic planning. This view can contribute to more effective economic development, particularly in the long term, by providing a context at regional and local levels for development decisions.

To achieve any planning objective it is necessary to have developed procedural mechanisms which will include financial, legal, and administrative powers. This process is complicated by the fact that most countries suffer from ex-

panding and often inefficient bureaucracies. Case studies provide a process whereby the procedural aspects of any planning situation can be defined, isolated, and examined with a view to the refinement and improvement of those procedures. At the international level, case studies can demonstrate the means necessary to achieve specified planning ends and can help in the formulation of appropriate procedures specifically oriented to particular tasks in the developing world.

Within the diverse stages of development of different countries, there are many specific problems that are of common interest and that may have transferable solutions. One such example is the growth of illegal settlements and the resultant shanty developments associated with patterns of rapid urbanization. To help solve these problems, it may be useful to look at case studies in Southern Europe, where the nature—if not the scale—of these problems is similar, and where an established planning machinery exists.

Examples of such innovative NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

schemes currently being documented include the Sexual shanty improvement and reconstruction scheme outside Lisbon, Portugal (Costa Lobo 1977, 1979), where shanty residents have been actively involved in the construction and financing of 500 new dwellings in collaboration with local authorities. A similar but smaller (200 houses) shanty redevelopment scheme is being employed in Ramon Casellas, in the Barcelona periphery (Wynne 1979). (See figure 2.) It is this type of problem-focused case study that provides more immediate scope for worthwhile exchange between the less developed European countries and the Third World.

#### The need for new initiatives

Although one can make a general case for the need to more widely adopt case study techniques, little progress will be made without the development of appropriate and agreed-upon methodologies. The initiative of international organizations, such as the OECD and the International Institute for Environment and Development,<sup>8</sup> in promoting and sponsoring case study research is to be welcomed. Yet there is a need for a much wider sponsorship of work by international agencies, both in increasing the north-south dialogue and in the application of case study techniques at a national level to problems of common concern.

Many agencies are already bridging the developed and developing worlds through their involvement in international aid programs involving technical assistance. While some of these packages now include an element of local employment and sometimes a local training component, too often the expertise and experience developed is taken away with the promoting agency at the conclusion of

the program. The application of case study techniques to such development projects would provide an invaluable method of documenting the process for the development and transfer of experience, and also provide a sound basis for the future evaluation and assessment of the project in relation to its original objectives.

#### Development of the planning profession

Planners, in common with many development agencies, have tended to ignore the need for monitoring systems to continually assess their own performance and to assist in making necessary adjustments. The last 20 years have seen rapid technological growth in the developed world, coupled with economic and social changes that have created problems of unprecedented complexity. Generations of new specialists and sub-specialists have often ignored established social values and have helped shift the emphasis from "democracy" to "technocracy," where technical right is judged as "might." As a result, much of the consensus of support for the physical planner has been eroded to be replaced by a general atmosphere of conflict, doubt, and cynicism. The new emphasis on the implementation aspects of planning, and the interest being shown in the application of case study techniques to physical planning and the management of change, are a part of the effort by planners to improve their performance and develop a wider consensus of support for their actions.

The adoption of case study methodology in the developing world can provide valuable assistance to the growth of the planning profession in ensuring that the difficult position the planner occupies between the politician and the public is made more explicit. At the

same time, this method can serve to monitor overall performance, in response to social and political pressures, and provide opportunities for necessary reassessment and adjustment of urban planning. Such steps can do much to ensure that the planning profession is alive and well as being of direct relevance to the problems of developing countries.

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


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## Notes

1. Following the OECD Athens Symposium on Plan Implementation (October 1977), the Urban Management Unit gave partial financing to Dr. John L. Taylor to head a small team of researchers based in the Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham, United Kingdom. This research commitment by OECD had two broad objectives: (1) to provide a means of exchanging, at an international level, urban management expertise and experience; and (2) to provide a training method in urban management for a wide range of interdisciplinary interests.
2. Further case study research, financed by the Social Science Research Council, London, is currently being carried out under the authors' direction.
3. Some recent developments in urban education are of relevance here. In the past few years, attempts have been made to incorporate more accurate and lifelike definitions of reality into urban planning exercises, moving closer and closer to the case study, and yet striving to maintain the element of choice essential to heuristic and interactive learning. See, for example, Wynn and Taylor 1978, Romanos 1978, and Smith, Taiterhill, and Wynn 1979.
4. Figures were presented at the 1977 Commonwealth Conference of Planners which estimated that the theoretical shortfall of planners in Africa would be some 3360 by 1981, with an estimated figure for the whole of the developing world (excluding Europe) of 24 000 by 1981. See Commonwealth Association of Planners, 1977.
5. The general interest in the development and application of Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA) to major development projects is a part of this general effort to re-assess the importance of social and economic considerations in any planning decision. The application of EIA can produce a valuable range of case studies associated with the implications of major development and may provide a new learning input.
6. The International Institute for Environment and Development in London is sponsoring a series of comparative case studies in Sudan, Nigeria, India, and Argentina, to look at the role of intermediate and small settlements in the socio-economic development of countries. These studies reflect a growing recognition that the benefits of large-scale investment in industrial and agricultural schemes are marginal for the rural dwellers who constitute 80% or more of the populations of many developing countries. The Institute of Development Studies, University of Manchester, is sponsoring the Institute of Development Studies, University of Mysore, India; the Faculty of Environment, University of Lagos, Nigeria; the Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Argentina; and the Sudanese Group for Assessment of Human Settlements, University of Khartoum, Sudan.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT


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# Training for Urban Management: The Case Study Dynamic

by Martin Wynn, Researcher, Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham, UK

and John L. Taylor, Assistant Director, North East London Polytechnic, UK



## Introduction

This article describes a case study research and training method currently being developed with the co-operation of OECD in Great Britain and overseas. It is intended, ideally, for "in-house" use in local authorities, above all with personnel actively involved in the urban planning and development processes. It can, however, be adapted for use in a variety of planning and management environments and contexts. We are essentially concerned, then, with providing the educational technology for helping local authority personnel to achieve a deeper understanding of their developmental role, and so contribute to an improvement in their urban management ability.

The basis of the case study training method described here is the documentation and analysis of a local level planning project (or projects) by a small outside research team, and the exploitation of this material in experientially-based learning exercises undertaken with members of the authority who actually undertook that scheme. These exercises can involve not only those individuals who played leading roles in the case study, but also those more peripherally involved, as well as appropriate representatives of such outside concerns as residents associations and developers. In Britain, this may be increasingly welcomed given the current concern with "public accountability" and "public involvement".

### Action Research and the Case Method

The case study method, of course, is well established as an educational technique in management training [1]. It is of interest to note, however, that Margerison has recently pointed out that "cases are always of someone else's organization and the learner is expected to transfer any learning he gains to his own organization". He goes on to suggest that "we must move towards an action research and action learning frame of reference, where we gather data on the clients and work with these data to try to help the educational process"[2].

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**We are concerned with providing the educational technology for helping local authority personnel to achieve a deeper understanding of their developmental role**

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Here then we are putting forward a relatively simple case study technique that can be used to aid practitioners in learning about their part in recently undertaken or on-going planning projects. As Eddison has suggested, what people need is "a capacity to grasp what's going on around them" [3]. But

in trying to provide this, we suggest that the immediacy and relevance of the case material is of utmost importance. Without this focus management training courses often have to start from scratch in establishing case material, identifying roles and setting new contexts for participants. It is contrived "experience" that provides the basis for experiential learning. On the other hand with a "live" detailed real world case study, participants have a head start, having already "lived" the case study. Exercises drawn from the case material can then lead to a fuller appreciation of the context, meaning and reasoning behind their own and other people's actions in the case study, from which, in turn, more general insights about the functioning of the authority may be gained.

### Case Study Documentation

An essential prerequisite to the case study project is that both the research team and the local authority personnel are clear about the general programme. The data compilation and analysis, carried out by the research team in conjunction with local authority personnel, can take a considerable time in locating and collecting from in-house, field and secondary sources. Then, follow-up structuring seminars and draft case study may take an equal amount of time to set up and refine. The essential point here is that the case study building exercise is often a complex learning process which is in few ways simple or clear cut.

In this context the case study is seen at its best when it covers a local level project—housing improvement or renewal scheme, for example, from which it is felt "lessons can be learnt". Clearly there are a variety of factors to be considered here, but the general "manageability" of the project must be kept in mind with definable space and time limits being advantages and with clearly defined operational roles. Access to the "on file" documents of the procedural course of the project is essential, as this is the starting point for the compilation of the case study data-base.

The data-base is compiled by the research team (this may involve only one person actually working in the authority) working in conjunction with authority employees. Background information, establishing the legislative, administrative, spatial etc contexts, is put together by way of introduction to the authentic documentation of the decision-making processes in the case study, drawn from the local authority files and elsewhere as necessary. This documentation is then structured and coded to form a local framework for subsequent analysis and discussion. One way of doing this is to identify a series of decision-making stages within the administrative process and group documents around these stages, with commentary pages providing a summary narrative of the content and significance of each of the documents. From here, and incorporating interview and other material as necessary, the research team assembles a package that will provide the basis for subsequent development in the training sessions. This package may include the following:




Figure 1. The process-flow chart for the Buildings Case Study, a mixed house improvement and renewal scheme recently undertaken by Broxtowe Borough Council, Nottinghamshire

- The structured and coded data base;
- A brief written summary of the case study, identifying aspects for debate and questioning;
- A process flow chart, in which the separate but often overlapping processes involved in the project are identified (Figure 1);
- A decision stage chart, closely reflecting the structuring of the data base, in which the different

entities involved in each decision-making stage are identified (Figure 2).

#### Feedback and Exploitation for Training

Once the research team have completed the data collection and analyses stages, arrangements for the feedback and learning exercises have to be developed. It is important, as already noted, that the authority commits itself to participating in these exercises beforehand. A start can be made through circulating material by post, but eventually in-

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
Eastwood Urban District Council	○	○	○	○																
BROXTOWE DISTRICT COUNCIL																				
Planning Department			●	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Other Departments			●	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Development Services Committee			●	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Housing Services Committee			○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Full Council			○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Residents and/or Residents Committee			●	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○	○		○	○	○	○	○
Nottinghamshire County Council											○		○				○			
Department of the Environment							○			○				○			○		○	○
Building Contractors		○						○							○	○		○		○
Planning Consultants		○		○	○															
Other Public Agencies	○					○			○											
Other Members of the Public	○										○		○	○						

● KEY DECISIONS ○ IMPORTANT DECISIONS ○ PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION MAKING/ DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

Figure 2. The decision-making chart for the Buildings Case Study



house seminars will be needed to make full use of the material. Whilst the exact design and execution of these seminars remains, of necessity, flexible, the following issues are likely to be central components of the learning experience:

- General discussion of the summary report and, for those who have found time to go through it in detail, the data base itself (several copies will be on hand for general reference). Questionnaires will be used to promote relevant questioning and discussion of points raised in the summary report.
- Group feedback on the process flow chart, to consider: where, in this scheme, did each individual play a part? Were they aware of other simultaneous/overlapping on-going processes? Can "bottlenecks" be identified where the complexity of the process hampered the implementation of the project?
- Analysis of the decision stage chart. Individuals are asked to identify the stages where they were involved; to pinpoint the key decision stages in the success or failure of the project; and to justify their opinions (and their decisions) in the light of ensuing debate and questioning.
- Participation in a partial or full-blown simulation of the case study. This simulation will be designed by the research team and will probably include a somewhat simplified re-enactment of part, or all, of the case study, depending on time limitations and the complexity of the case study itself. All the gaming tool kit may be used—game board, representative pieces, role play descriptions, and game rounds (taken from the "decision-making stages" of the data bases). Some participants may be playing their own real life role in the simulation, although there is much to be said for playing other people's roles and several runs may be attempted. De-briefing sessions can include debate on the game model (was it as it happened in real life?) and on insights gained, by various participants, into the decision-making process in general. This can also be tied up with previous sessions on the process flow chart and decision-stage chart. Further discussion can attempt to link sessions learnt in this case study with the more general functioning of the authority and individual personnel.

### Summary

Several points emerge from this experience and the brief foregoing discussion is but an outline of aspects of urban case work. Given our limited urban management expertise, such efforts to improve our performance in this realm have to demonstrate more immediate relevance. The great advantage of the case study approach is that it is anchored to real life material which has an immediacy that can be readily appreciated. We have argued that the methodology can be exploited much more fully in relation to urban management issues.

For example, cases can do much to focus on critical gates and levers essential to the achievement of a better quality environment. The role of individuals, agencies and decision chains can be dynamically exposed in a way that speeds learning through exploitation of the synoptic view. A great many people can be actively involved in case study activity which can accommodate a variety of levels and types of learning at one and the same time.

Of prime importance in this context is the ability of case studies to generate a continuing interest in self-learning. Once an approach and a related methodological framework is made explicit then there is little to inhibit the individual, group or agency from holding up the mirror to themselves. In other words the operationalising of case study material is in the main stream of action orientated learning and research. It can be seen that the same level of scrutiny and involvement

can be applied beneficially to local situations and individual tasks. The case study can provide a focus for interdisciplinary involvement be it in simple terms of identifying information sources or in analysing complex decision making situations.

Our experience in developing mechanisms of this kind in relation to contemporary urban management challenges is limited. However, we do need to be reminded that case studies are *not* a new way of studying the world and much can be gained from the experience of others. The exploratory work discussed above does break some new ground and if this momentum is maintained in building on the experience of others, it is clear that we have every chance of improving and speeding the learning process which will give better shape to the world about us.

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1. This stemmed from the use of the case study method at the Harvard Business School, Massachusetts. See, for example, McNair, P., (ed) *The Case Method at Harvard Business School*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954. For a recent account of some of the doubts lately voiced about the method, see Ray Drafter "Harvard's Sacred Cow in Dispute", *Financial Times*, 13 June 1979, p. 15.
2. Margerison, C., "Action Research and Action Learning in Management Education", *Journal of European Industrial Training* Vol. 2 No. 6, 1978 p. 23.
3. Eddison, T., *Management and Human Behaviour*, paper presented to OECD Symposium on the Implementation of Urban Plans Milton Keynes, 2-6 July 1979.

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**Data-Base Case Study Series**, available from the Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham. These structured data bases are colour-coded and include introductory material, case study documentation and a summary report.

1. The Buildings General Improvement Area, Eastwood, Broxtowe, Nottingham, GB. (M. Wynn).
2. Cofferridge Close, City Centre Service and Retail Development, Stoney Stratford, Milton Keynes, GB. (P. Totterdill).
3. San Cosme, Construction and Renewal of State Housing Area, Barcelona, Spain (M. Wynn).
4. Port Service Area Project, Santander, Spain, Planning and Development of a Port Side Industrial Zone. (M. Wynn, P. Portilla, J. Urena).

### Acknowledgements

Grateful acknowledgement is made to OECD, Trent Polytechnic and North East London Polytechnic for their support and financial assistance in the development of these case studies.




Gráfico 7: Matriz de jerarquización de acciones.




Gráfico 8: Esquema de relaciones entre acciones.

Finalmente, se destacaron los tiempos de implementación (corto, mediano y largo plazo) y, en especial, las medidas de implementación primordial. Se entienden por tales aquellas con mayor poder multiplicador:

- reestructuración municipal,
- régimen de promoción industrial y regulación ambiental de la misma,
- banco municipal de tierras,
- plan director y código de zonificación y
- regulación de la costa fluvial (hay sumada a embalses que la socavan 80 cms. por año).

#### Estado de avance

Las recomendaciones finales del estudio realizado prevén una serie de acciones realizables a corto plazo por el propio Municipio, y otras, mucho más complejas, a realizar con el concurso de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.




Gráfico 9: Esquema de comunitas y su interrelación.




Gráfico 10: Cadena de efectos multiplicadores del Programa de Desarrollo Agro-Industrial.

A la fecha, la reacción ha sido favorable en ambos niveles: la Municipalidad, por su cuenta, contrató a CEPA para continuar los estudios y llegar a un Plano Director y Código de Zonificación (una de las medidas primordiales antes citadas); además trabaja y administra el Partido adoptando los lineamientos del Plan e implementando pequeñas grandes medidas relativas a turismo, caminos rurales, edificios públicos, esquema organizativo municipal, etcétera.

La Provincia, en tanto, desarrolla a través de SEPLADE y con su supervisión, la idea de constituir el Programa piloto y con el vehicular la aplicación de todos los programas, novedosos, incluso inéditos (en algunos casos) programas y acciones propuestas.

En este enfoque de *planning continuo*, se está sólo en la primera fase. Pero el comienzo es ya sumamente promisorio para el desarrollo y el mejoramiento ambiental del Partido.

## Información Temática

# ALGUNOS ASPECTOS DEL TRATAMIENTO DE LA VIVIENDA DE CALIDAD

por Martin G. Wynn y Roger Smith (1)

### INTRODUCCION

En los últimos veinticinco años, un objetivo importante de las autoridades estatales españolas, en materia de vivienda, ha sido el de proveer suficientes hogares para alojar el incremento masivo de la población urbana, resultado, en gran parte, de la migración rural-urbana. Un elemento fundamental de la política de vivienda ha sido la subvención por el Estado de los promotores de viviendas de «renta limitada» y «protección oficial», en general, para las clases con ingresos más reducidos. El boom subsiguiente se manifestó sobre todo en la periferia de las ciudades donde se construyeron polígonos de vivienda próximos a las zonas de chabolismo y barracas. (Véase figura 1.a.)

Muchos de estos polígonos se encuentran en un estado francamente deficitario, tanto en lo que respecta a la calidad de la construcción como por

la carencia de equipamiento e infraestructura. (Véanse figs. 1.b. y 1.c.) Al mismo tiempo, los cascos antiguos han permanecido en malas condiciones (figs. 1.d. y 1.e.), ahogando, sobre todo, a la clase trabajadora, si bien algunos se han transformado radicalmente por la ejecución de planes de renovación urbana, como en el caso del barrio de Pozas, en Madrid.

En los años 60 y 70, los vecinos de esas zonas de «vivienda marginal», cada vez más organizadas y políticamente activas, han protestado contra estas condiciones a las autoridades locales y centrales. La respuesta de la Administración pública ha carecido de políticas adecuadas y programas integrales. Mientras en Barcelona (2) se han demolido extensas zonas de barracas, en Madrid, en 1973 (3), permanecían más de 35.000 chabolas, la mayoría con servicios e infraestructuras a veces suministrados por las autoridades municipales. En los polígonos construidos por la Obra

(1) Martin Wynn y Roger Smith son investigador y senior lecturer, respectivamente, en el Department of Town and Country Planning, Trent Polytechnic, Nottingham, Inglaterra. En la elaboración de la versión final en español ha colaborado Claudio Beavrin, arquitecto venezolano, también investigador en el mismo Departamento.

(2) Las principales áreas de barracas demolidas en Barcelona estaban en Sornorou y Montjuich. Aun quedan unas 3.000 barracas en la Ciudad Condal.

(3) Según el «Estudio de cinco barrios de la periferia de Madrid. Estado de Urbanismo y Arquitectura», en «Ciudad y Territorio», 23, 1976, pag. 16.





Figura 1.—Aspectos del programa de la vivienda en Barcelona:  
 (a) Zona de barracas Ramón Casellas, en los Tres Turons.  
 (b) Unidad vecinal de Absorción San Cosme, Prai de Llobregat.  
 (c) Bloques residenciales en el polígono Can Serra, Hospitalet.  
 (d) Casa vieja y deteriorada, calle Riera Mota, Casco Antiguo.  
 (e) Viviendas del siglo pasado, calle Joaquín Costa, Casco Antiguo.

(Fotes: M. G. Ryan).



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(Fotes: M. G. Ryan).

Algunos  
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Sindical y el Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda, se han realizado algunos programas de reparaciones, mientras que los Ayuntamientos han elaborado Planes Especiales de Reforma Interior para el reequipamiento de algunos de los barrios residenciales, localizados sobre todo en la periferia (véase fig. 2.a.). Algunos planes más ambiciosos de remodelación total, financiados por la Administración pública, están en tramitación (véase fig. 2.b.), pero se pueden considerar como esquemas pioneros en este campo.

Permanece el hecho de que los conceptos de remodelación y rehabilitación están poco desarrollados en la legislación española y que las actuaciones realizadas por la Administración pública en este sector son muy escasas. Pero está presente la necesidad imprescindible de tal tipo de acciones, necesidad reforzada por el proceso de democratización y la probable devolución de poder a las nuevas corporaciones locales representativas.

Se espera, entonces, que una crítica inglesa en este campo pueda identificar algunos aspectos que son a la situación española. Dado que de la vivienda en España existen suficientes y estudios (4), comenzaremos el resumen del desarrollo histórico de Inglaterra antes de considerar las medidas por la Administración pública renovar y rehabilitar las zonas de vivienda en las aglomeraciones urbanas.

(4) Véase, por ejemplo: Sola-Morales J.; Domingo, M.; Font, A.; Gómez-Ordóñez, S.; Gustavo Gili, S. A. Barcelona. Busquets, I.: «La urbanización marítima II y III. Ed. E.T.S.A.B. Barcelona, 1976». Ramón, F.: «Alojamiento». Informaciones, S. A. Madrid, 1976.


Varios: «La vivienda social». C. A. U. Colegio de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos. Abril 1977, Barcelona.

Figura 2.—  
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en abril, 1978

Fuente:  
Boletín  
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de Asociación  
de Vecinos  
San Damián  
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1977





## 1. RAICES HISTÓRICAS DEL PROBLEMA DE LA VIVIENDA INADECUADA EN INGLATERRA

Las concentraciones más importantes de viviendas inadecuadas en Inglaterra se encuentran en las áreas centrales de las grandes ciudades, reflejando un modelo de crecimiento bastante distinto al que caracteriza las ciudades españolas. En el curso del siglo pasado, muchos de los centros medievales de las ciudades inglesas fueron demolidos para la construcción de estaciones ferroviarias, edificios públicos y comerciales, ampliación de calles y, en algunas oportunidades, fábricas. Al mismo tiempo, nuevas viviendas fueron construidas por pequeños capitalistas en los terrenos circundantes para albergar el sustancial número de inmigrantes que llegaban en busca de trabajo y mejores condiciones de vida. Aunque esas casas fueron, en general, bastante bien construidas, carecían de los servicios básicos (agua, alcantarillado, etc.), y en algunos casos la infraestructura vial no fue construida hasta cincuenta años después. En algunas zonas las densidades residenciales llegaron hasta 2.300 habitantes por hectárea, pero en general, la escasez de capital limitó la construcción a edificaciones de una, dos o tres plantas (15).

La Ley de Sanidad Pública (*Public Health Act*) de 1875 introdujo diversas medidas para controlar la construcción de viviendas para obreros. Se otorgó a las autoridades locales los poderes requeridos para asegurar que la construcción de viviendas se realizara junto con la provisión de servicios básicos y vialidad de sección mínima. También se les otorgó el poder de exigir que las viviendas fueran levantadas en hilera (*terraces*), muchas de las cuales todavía existen hoy, como símbolo de la vivienda del proletariado industrial de la era victoriana (figs. 3, 3.a y 3.b). Si bien las viviendas posteriores a 1875 (llamadas «casas reglamentarias» *by-law housing*) eran mejores que las anteriores, muchas fueron, posteriormente, consideradas inadecuadas, tanto porque las aspiraciones y los estándares fueron elevándose continuamente (baño y lavabo interno, agua potable, mejores sistemas de calefacción e iluminación, etc.) como por la pobreza general del trazado, como por su incapacidad de satisfacer las demandas de la circulación masiva en automóvil.

A lo largo del siglo pasado, la clase media tendía a dejar el centro de la ciudad para vivir en lo que entonces constituían las afueras de la ciudad, pero que fueron arrastradas por la expansión de las «casas reglamentarias». En los últimos veinticinco años, como la demanda de vivienda en las áreas centrales ha aumentado, muchos de esas viviendas, las más espaciales, fueron subdivididas y convertidas en pisos para alquilar, lo que aceleró su

(15) Es interesante notar que tanto en Escocia como en España, por razones de espacio, los edificios de viviendas antiguos, por lo tanto, son antes de la revolución industrial y la industria de la construcción tuvo la capacidad económica y tecnológica para construir tales bloques, los que no se construyeron en Inglaterra. Véase Smith, Roger: «Multistorey Building in Scotland», en *Multi-Storey Living*, A. R. Sutcliffe, ed., Crown House, 1974.



Figura 3: Casas Reglamentarias en The Meadows, Nottingham. Actualmente, todas han sido demolidas, aparte del área señalada, la cual ha sido declarada Housing Action Area. Fuente: Nottingham City Council.

## Algunos aspectos del tratamiento de la vivienda de mala calidad

deterioro y que constituyen otro tipo de vivienda de mala calidad.

Hasta 1919, la inmensa mayoría de las familias obreras vivían en casas alquiladas en el sector privado, pero a partir de 1919, con la promulgación de la Ley de Vivienda y Planificación Urbana (*Housing and Town Planning Act*), se les permitió a las autoridades locales la obtención de subsidios para la construcción (6) de viviendas de buena calidad para alquilar (7). Al mismo tiempo, el sector privado edificaba viviendas de estándares similares para las clases media y obrera. Es así que a fines de los años 30 en las ciudades inglesas podían reconocerse tres sectores de diferente calidad de vivienda correspondientes a los distintos periodos de construcción (véanse figs. 4, 4.a y 4.b).

1) El área central, con el peor alojamiento, y edificaciones construidas antes de 1875.

2) Un primer anillo, constituido por «casas reglamentarias» construidas antes de 1875, de mejor calidad que las del centro, pero deficientes en muchos aspectos.

3) Un segundo anillo de viviendas posteriores a 1919 y de buena calidad, construidas tanto por la iniciativa privada como por las autoridades locales.

A continuación, consideraremos en detalle las políticas adoptadas por la Administración pública para hacer frente a los problemas de la vivienda en Inglaterra, particularmente en el periodo de la segunda posguerra, cuando la demanda de viviendas llegó a ser más aguda que nunca.

## 2. LA DEMOLICIÓN DE VIVIENDAS POR LAS AUTORIDADES LOCALES EN INGLATERRA

La primera pieza de legislación que abordó el problema de la demolición en gran escala de viviendas inadecuadas fue la Ley de Vivienda (*Housing Act*) de 1930. Esta Ley dio poderes a las autoridades locales para que pudieran adquirir y demoler las edificaciones en malas condiciones y recibir del gobierno central subvenciones proporcionales al número de familias realojadas. Esta Ley preparó el terreno para la Ley de 1957 (posteriormente incorporada a las leyes de vivienda de 1969 y 1974), la cual estableció unos criterios generales (8) para la determinación de lo que legalmente constituya una «vivienda inadecuada», redactados en forma tal que permitiera una amplia interpretación por las autoridades locales. La Ley

(6) En los primeros años de la aplicación de la Ley de 1919, la subvención se calculaba en relación con el monto del alquiler, pero en 1925 se fijó en 6 libras por vivienda cada año para viviendas de 1900 o más años de antigüedad, y en 4 libras para las construidas entre 1900 y 1925.

(7) De viviendas de dos plantas, tres dormitorios en el nivel superior, cocina, comedor y estar en el nivel inferior, caldera de agua, para familias de cinco miembros.

(8) La Ley de 1957 establece los siguientes factores a considerar en la declaración de «vivienda inadecuada»:

a) Estado general de mantenimiento; b) estabilidad estructural; c) presencia de humedad; d) espacio interior; e) iluminación natural; f) ventilación; g) disponibilidad de agua potable; h) saneamiento; i) facilidades para la preparación de alimentos.



Figura 4: Etapas en el crecimiento de Nottingham. Véase el área central y los dos anillos correspondientes a las épocas 1845-1877, 1877-1914 y 1929-actualidad. Hasta ahora ha sido demolido y renovado con todo el centro y gran parte del primer anillo mostrados que en los anillos primero y segundo, cerca Housing Action Areas y diez General Improvement Areas.

especifica que cualquier vivienda que en los términos establecidos por la Ley sea definida como «inadecuada», el propietario tiene que tomar a su cargo la demolición o reparación de la casa.

Pero no es raro que las autoridades locales encuentren toda una manzana o hilera de casas inadecuadas, en cuyo caso se declara un «área de demolición» (*clearance area*), acompañada de las correspondientes «órdenes de expropiación» (*Compulsory Purchase Order*) a todas las propiedades del área e incluso fuera de ella si ello era preciso para llevar a término la reconstrucción propuesta.

El valor de la propiedad declarada «inadecuada» tradicionalmente se ha considerado como nulo, y se pagaba compensación únicamente por el terreno, pero en 1973, la Ley de Compensación del Suelo (*Land Compensation Act*) introdujo los pagos de compensación —al valor del mercado— para las casas ocupadas por sus propietarios durante dos o más años. También introdujo otras cuotas de compensación por las mejoras realizadas por los dueños e inquilinos. Aquellas viviendas que estando en buenas condiciones debían ser demolidas para facilitar la intervención en toda el área son pagadas al pleno precio del mercado.





Figura 4a:  
Área de demolición. Colwich, Nottingham, 1935.

Figura 4b:  
La misma área, 1937, después de la remodelación.

El ritmo de demolición de viviendas aumentó rápidamente en la posguerra. De hecho, entre 1945 y 1954, se demolieron 90.000 unidades en Inglaterra y Gales, y entre 1955 y 1974, la cifra subió a 1.165.000 unidades, con una sostenida cuota anual de más de 61.000. Más tarde nos referiremos a las consecuencias sociales de estas actuaciones masivas que significaron la desaparición de muchas de las viviendas construidas en el siglo pasado en las áreas centrales de las aglomeraciones urbanas.

### 3. LA RENOVACION URBANA EN INGLATERRA

Las autoridades locales están constantemente preparando o realizando planes para el desarrollo de áreas demolidas. Como se dijo anteriormente, estos desarrollos son subsidiados por el gobierno central y su participación ha llegado a cubrir más del 50 % del costo de la construcción e interés acumulado. Generalmente, las autoridades han construido casas en alquiler en las áreas de demolición, pero en años recientes algunas autoridades locales han vendido tales terrenos a la iniciativa privada para la construcción de casas en venta.

En los años 30, las viviendas construidas por las autoridades locales en las áreas de renovación total (*Comprehensive Development Areas*, C.D.A.<sup>3</sup>) estaban constituidas por bloques de tres niveles, sin ascensor, agrupadas a lo largo de la vialidad y, a veces, alrededor de un patio central. En el período de posguerra, las densidades residenciales en las C.D.A. se convirtieron en factor crítico en la ordenación del espacio urbano a nivel nacional y regional. Como hemos señalado en otra oportunidad (9), una de las piedras fundamentales de la filosofía de la planificación inglesa fue frenar el crecimiento de las aglomeraciones urbanas, reducir las densidades residenciales en las áreas centrales y crear nuevas ciudades más allá de anchos cinturones verdes. Pero tan aguda fue la demanda

de viviendas, sobre todo en los años 60, que fue necesario realizar esquemas de renovación urbana con densidades residenciales superiores a las consideradas aceptables (llegándose hasta 600 hab./ha.). Se construyeron bloques de vivienda hasta 20 pisos de altura, que ahora son severamente criticados, tanto desde el punto de vista arquitectónico como social. Algunos esquemas presentan desarrollos combinados de edificaciones altas y bajas (Birmingham, Newcastle) y otros se realizaron en base a «bloques horizontales» con corredores horizontales de acceso (Sheffield).

Sin duda, la demolición de muchas de las viviendas deterioradas heredadas del siglo pasado era inevitable en razón de su pésima condición. Pero los proyectos de renovación urbana han sido recientemente criticados, no sólo por su escala inhumana, sino también por los retrasos, incertidumbres y, sobre todo, por la ausencia de consulta con la población afectada. Los críticos han señalado también la necesidad de considerar el apego de los residentes a sus casas y a la comunidad. Muy raramente se ha alojado una comunidad en el mismo sitio que ocupaba previamente a la demolición; normalmente se le ofrece alojamiento disperso en otras partes de la ciudad, ya que las nuevas viviendas que se levantan se otorgan de acuerdo a una lista de espera. En Inglaterra y Gales, la demolición de viviendas exigió la movilización de más de tres millones de personas entre 1955 y 1974, llegándose en los años 60 a un promedio de 100.000 personas movilizadas anualmente. Desde 1951 casi 1.500.000 viviendas inadecuadas fueron derribadas. Fue la acumulación de críticas lo que impulsó, en los años 60, al gobierno central a examinar las posibilidades de la rehabilitación de viviendas a gran escala como una alternativa a la demolición en los procesos de renovación urbana.

### 4. LA REHABILITACION DE VIVIENDAS EN INGLATERRA

Ya desde 1949 disponían las autoridades locales los poderes para otorgar subsidios a los propietarios de casas antiguadas que requirieran repa-

raciones y mejoras, pero fue la Ley de Vivienda de 1969 la que introdujo el concepto de «Área de Mejoramiento General» (*General Improvement Area*, G.I.A.), abarcando normalmente grupos de 200-300 viviendas. El criterio más importante para la declaración de una G.I.A. por parte de las autoridades locales es que los vecinos estén de acuerdo en la realización de la operación, y de este modo, la participación de la comunidad se realiza desde el principio, en contraste con las operaciones de demolición y renovación (fig. 5). La iniciativa para estimular la declaración de una G.I.A. puede ser tomada tanto por organismos gubernamentales, las autoridades locales e incluso los particulares. Uno de los propósitos de la declaración de un área como G.I.A. es la de animar a los propietarios ocupantes a hacer inversiones en la mejora de sus viviendas. Las autoridades locales pueden subsidiar hasta el 60 % del costo de las reparaciones y mejoras; un 10 % más de lo que darían fuera de una G.I.A. Al realizar esto, las autoridades locales ganan indirectamente una subvención del 100 % del gobierno central y también una subvención limitada para llevar a cabo mejoras generales del ambiente en una G.I.A., tal como la dotación de alumbrado público, áreas verdes, aceras, etc., para completar con ello la mejora de viviendas y crear confianza en la permanencia futura de la comunidad.

En 1974, una nueva Ley de Vivienda introdujo otro concepto en el proceso de mejoramiento de viviendas, el «Área de Acción en Vivienda» (*Housing Action Area*, H.A.A.), el cual se aplica a la vivienda deteriorada del sector privado en alquiler, incluyendo no solamente muchas de las viviendas «reglamentarias» del siglo pasado, sino también las casas victorianas de la clase media, subdivididas en pisos y a veces ocupadas por las familias imi-

grantes más pobres. La declaración de un sector como H.A.A. puede lograrse por iniciativa de los mismos residentes, quienes hacen la correspondiente solicitud a las autoridades locales. La intención de las H.A.A. es superar el problema creado por la falta de interés de los propietarios de viviendas en alquilar en aprovechar los subsidios normalmente disponibles para mejoras de viviendas (un 50 % del gasto total), porque una serie de leyes y reglamentos dificultaban en extremo el aumento de alquiler a los ocupantes en razón de dichas mejoras, lo que les imposibilita recuperar el correspondiente 50 % que invertirían en ellas. Por esto, para las mejoras en las H.A.A. el subsidio disponible llega hasta el 90 % del costo total de las reparaciones y mejoras (con un costo máximo de 5.000 libras), el cual es concedido, indirectamente a través de las autoridades locales, por el gobierno central y se hace menos énfasis en la mejora general del ambiente. Si el monto del subsidio aún resulta insuficiente para inducir al propietario de la vivienda a realizar las mejoras, las autoridades locales tienen el poder de realizarlas por su cuenta, expropiando la propiedad.

La Ley de 1974 introdujo también el concepto de «Área de Vecindario Prioritario» (*Priority Neighbourhood Area*, P.N.A.) para aquellas áreas de vivienda de propiedad privada en alquiler con menores necesidades de reparación, y mientras que en las H.A.A. las reparaciones tienen que realizarse en un lapso no mayor de cinco años, a partir de la designación, no hay límites de tiempo para las P.N.A. y los fondos son entregados sólo cuando hay disponibilidad.

Es interesante destacar que la Ley de 1974 dio énfasis a las posibilidades de realizar esquemas mixtos, en parte renovación, en parte rehabilitación, que han facilitado la conservación de algu-





Figura 5  
Ejemplo de la participación de los Residentes en la Redacción del esquema de Rehabilitación en una G.I.A. (General Improvement Area).

(9) Véase Wynn, Martin, y Smith, Roger: «Algunas consideraciones sobre las nuevas ciudades inglesas», en «Ciudad y Territorio», 4 78, I E A I, Madrid, 1978.





## RADFORD BOULEVARD AREA

Figura 6:  
Radford Boulevard Housing Action Area, Nottingham.  
Un esquema mixto, en parte rehabilitación, y en parte  
demolición y renovación (las secciones rayadas).  
Fuente: Nottingham City Council

Figura 7:  
Don, inspector de la General Improvement Area,  
en Footway, cerca de Nottingham



7a) Casas construidas en los 1860, después del proceso  
de rehabilitación.

nas casas (si no de todas) en los sectores no demo-  
lidos del siglo pasado y a veces antes de 1875,  
donde las rehabilitación total no es viable por la  
ausencia de secciones viables de ancho aceptable y  
estado pésimo de reparación de algunas casas  
(véanse figs. 6 y 7). El número de casas mejo-  
radas alcanzó la cantidad de 360.000 en 1973, pero  
ha sido la combinación de remodelación y reha-  
bilitación la que ha contribuido a la disminución  
del número de las viviendas inadecuadas y ca-  
rrentes de servicios básicos, tal como se indica  
a continuación:

CUADRO 1 Casas inadecuadas y sin servicios básicos en Inglaterra		
	1971	1970
Casas inadecuadas	1.147.000	794.000
Casas sin baño fijo	1.148.000	800.000
Casas sin lavabos interior	1.051.000	1.093.000

Fuente: Housing Policy, Technical Volume, Part 1  
Fuente: H.M.S.O., London, 1977

## 5. A MODIO DE CONCLUSIÓN

A pesar de las claras diferencias que existen  
entre Inglaterra y España, tanto en las formas  
de crecimiento urbano como en el carácter de los  
problemas relacionados con la vivienda, consi-  
deramos útil señalar, a modo de conclusión, al-  
gunos aspectos del tratamiento de la vivienda  
de mala calidad en Inglaterra, que pueden ser  
pertinentes a la situación actual española. Esto  
se hace más como un análisis inicial que una  
exposición final y esperamos profundizar poste-  
riormente en algunos aspectos específicos del te-  
ma (10).

## 5.1. El papel de las autoridades locales y la importancia del marco legislativo nacional

La autoridad local ha sido en Inglaterra el  
agente clave en el tratamiento de la vivienda ina-  
decuada. Con este fin se han compilado una serie de  
casos de estudio a nivel local para servir de informa-  
ción de base para la formulación de comparaciones y  
análisis de aspectos específicos. Véase, por ejemplo, M.  
Wynn, «San Coome, proyecto de remodelación» y «The  
Building G.I.A. Nottingham», O.E.C.D. Case Study  
Drafs, Trent Polytechnic (Nottingham iminecogridados).

decuada, si bien ha actuado dentro de un marco  
legislativo nacional que se ha ocupado integral-  
mente de los procesos de demolición, renovación  
y, últimamente, rehabilitación de la vivienda. Esto  
contrasta marcadamente con el caso de España, en  
el cual los conceptos apenas se han desarrollado  
en la legislación nacional y las autoridades locales  
han carecido en general de los recursos técnicos,  
humanos y económicos y del poder político nece-  
sario para intentar estos esquemas.

En España, la Ley del Suelo de 1976 introdujo  
el concepto de Plan Especial de Reforma Interior  
para la realización en suelo urbano por las Enti-  
dades locales competentes, de operaciones enca-  
minadas a la descongestión, creaciones de dota-  
ciones urbanísticas y equipamientos comunitarios,  
saneamiento de barrios insalubres, resolución de  
problemas de circulación o estética y mejora del  
medio ambiente o de los servicios públicos u otros  
fines análogos» (art. 23), mientras que el Real  
Decreto 2278 de 1976, sobre la vivienda social  
estableció «la posibilidad de una financiación ex-  
cepcional (por el Instituto Nacional de la Vivien-  
da) para la construcción directa o bien para adqui-  
rir viviendas terminadas para fines concretos como  
adjudicación a familias afectadas por expropia-  
ción... viviendas ruinosas y otras actuaciones ur-  
gentes». (Real Decreto 2278/1976 del 16 de sep-  
tiembre, por el que se desarrolla el Real Decreto  
Ley 12/1976, del 30 de julio sobre inversión en  
vivienda). En efecto, estas dos piezas de legislación  
le han facilitado al I.N.V. una limitada actuación  
en el campo de la remodelación pública. Pero  
para el logro de una actuación más extensiva, está  
abierto la posibilidad de que la autoridad local  
surja como el agente principal en la gestión de  
tal cambio urbano, quizás en la forma de las «em-  
presas mixtas con participación mayoritaria muni-  
cipal» mencionadas en el Pacto de la Moncloa (11),  
quizá dentro de un marco legislativo modificado  
estableciendo fondos estatales de subvención para  
esquemas de remodelación y rehabilitación de la  
vivienda, tanto en el sector público como en el  
privado.

## 5.2. Los defectos de la remodelación de las áreas centrales en la posguerra

Aunque en la posguerra en Inglaterra fue nece-  
saria la urgente demolición de extensas áreas de  
viviendas construidas en el siglo pasado, no cabe  
duda de que pudo hacerse un mayor empeño en  
evitar la ruptura social resultante del reasenta-  
miento de la población afectada. En el contexto  
español, es bien conocido el fenómeno de la ruptura  
social provocado por el fenómeno de barracas y  
chabolas como por los esquemas de remodelación  
promovida por la iniciativa privada, realizados o  
no (12). Es interesante observar que en algunos de  
los nuevos proyectos de remodelación financiados

(11) Acuerdos de Moncloa. Capítulo V. B-Vivien-  
das, artículo 1º.  
(12) Véase, por ejemplo, Alfonso Alvarez Mora:  
«Aportaciones al análisis de los programas de reno-  
vación urbana», en «Ciudad y Territorio», 4/76, o también  
Sola Morales, op. cit. nota 4.

por el I.N.V. la población existente en las áreas  
afectadas y a quedarse en las viviendas incluidas  
en la remodelación, como en el caso del polígono  
de San Coome de la Obra Sindical del Hogar y de  
la zona de barracas de Ramón Casellas, ambos en  
Barcelona, el primero aprobado y en realización y  
en proyecto la segunda (véanse figs. 1.a., 1.b.,  
2.b.). Esto se ha logrado en Inglaterra solo, úti-  
lmente, en los esquemas de remodelación y reha-  
bilitación combinados, en los cuales se ha puesto  
en evidencia que uno de los factores más impor-  
tantes del proceso es la rapidez y la buena coordi-  
nación de sus distintas fases, requeridos para lo-  
gar y mantener el apoyo del público, esencial en  
un sistema de planificación que es ahora bastante  
sensible a este factor.

Otro aspecto insatisfactorio de las áreas cen-  
trales de las ciudades inglesas ha sido el cúmulo  
de desajustes sociales que han acompañado el de-  
terioro físico de muchas de las torres de vi-  
vienda, un problema bien conocido en España,  
sobre todo en relación con los polígonos perifé-  
ricos construidos por la iniciativa privada y pú-  
blica en los últimos 25 años. Mientras en España  
las campañas de protesta pública va han conse-  
guido el reequipamiento de algunos barrios, a  
veces formalizado en un Plan Especial de Reforma  
Interior, las autoridades locales en Inglaterra do-  
cumentan considerando sus estrategias para tra-  
tar el problema. Hasta ahora, solamente Liverpool  
ha adoptado una solución radical: la venta a  
precios muy reducidos de algunos de sus bloques  
al sector privado, con la esperanza de que me-  
joren las condiciones físicas y sociales de estas  
áreas. Pero, en general, estas torres de habitación  
constituyen un hecho infeliz en la historia de la  
vivienda inglesa y están íntimamente ligados a una  
serie de problemas sociales.

## 5.3. Participación pública y oportunidades de rehabilitación

Los esquemas de rehabilitación realizados en  
los últimos diez años quizás constituyen el mayor  
éxito de la política de vivienda en la Inglaterra de  
la posguerra, aunque sigue planteada la cuestión  
del destino final que tendrán esas viviendas, ya  
que probablemente deberán ser demolidas dentro  
de veinte o treinta años. El mecanismo de los  
G.I.A./H.A.A. ha sido, por cierto, un éxito social  
al ayudar a los residentes a mejorar sus casas  
instalándoles lavabos y baños interiores, sistemas  
de calefacción y realizando una gran variedad de  
arreglos interiores y exteriores. Este proceso no  
solamente ha facilitado la conservación de las  
comunidades, sino también la participación del  
público en la formulación del contenido de los  
planes locales. En España, la participación del  
público ha ocurrido de modo informal y discon-  
tinuo, en respuesta a situaciones *ad hoc* en las que  
ha fallado, frecuentemente, el contacto directo en-  
tre las asociaciones de vecinos y las autoridades,  
mientras que la «información pública» en la trami-  
tación y aprobación de planes urbanísticos se ha  
limitado, a menudo, a la discusión de aspectos  
técnicos y legales de las propuestas ya formuladas,  
y no a su contenido básico.






Figura 8.  
Servicios en la vivienda privada en Barcelona, 1965.  
Fuente original: Estudios para el Plan Director del Área Metropolitana de Barcelona, 1966.

La introducción de un mecanismo parecido al de los *G.I.A.H.A.A.* inglesas en España podría ser útil para la rehabilitación de algunas de las viviendas más viejas, sobre todo las ubicadas en los cascos antiguos y las zonas deterioradas de los ensanches. En Barcelona, por ejemplo (fig. 8), según un estudio realizado por el Patronato Municipal de la Vivienda en 1965, más de 100.000 de las 125.000 viviendas construidas antes de 1914 podrían salvarse mejorándolas en conjunto (cuadro 2). Este puede ser uno de los principales retos que afrontarán las autoridades centrales y locales en el futuro inmediato y en el cual la consideración de la experiencia inglesa podría ser de algún valor.

CUADRO 2 Viviendas construidas anteriores a 1914 en Barcelona	
Viviendas útiles y aceptables	18.750
Viviendas de imposible remodelación y que deben derribarse	3.750
Viviendas que pueden salvarse con gastos para su mejora	102.500
<b>TOTAL VIVIENDAS</b>	<b>125.000</b>

Fuente: La Vivienda en Barcelona, Ayuntamiento de Barcelona, Barcelona, Abril 1973.  
básicos en Inglaterra

## SERVICIO DE AUTOBUSES Y MERCADOS EN GRAN BRETAÑA

por Malcolm Buchanan y Enrique

### 1. INTRODUCCION

#### 1.1. Marco de referencia

A pesar del reciente estancamiento económico, los últimos 10 a 15 años han visto un marcado incremento en los niveles de vida, tanto en áreas rurales como urbanas, en Gran Bretaña. Desde el punto de vista del operador de autobuses, el aspecto más importante de este cambio ha sido el incremento de la renta disponible, lo que se ha traducido en la adquisición, por parte de la unidad familiar, de uno o dos automóviles y en un deseo, por su parte, de viviendas más espaciales.

Esto, a su vez, ha dado como resultado, por una parte, una dispersión general de la población que ha buscado vivir en áreas de menor densidad y, por otra, la descentralización de muchas ciudades. Otros aspectos significativos del incremento en los niveles de vida han sido el desarrollo de supermercados, con la superación del concepto de compra diaria, la muy notable extensión en el número de teléfonos por habitante, un auge espectacular de la televisión, la apertura de universidades e instituciones técnicas y el desarrollo de escuelas de tamaño mucho mayor. Todos estos cambios han tendido a reducir o cambiar la demanda de servicios de autobuses. A lo largo de la última década, el número de pasajeros en autocar-

res y autobuses ha decrecido en anual y el número de pasajeros ha reducido en un 2 por 100 al estos totales globales el descenso regular ha sido aún más severo.

La reducción general en la ciudad, no ha ocurrido sólo mercado del transporte en autobuses ha sido menos inconveniente, horas punta. El máximo de la reducción ha sido en viajes de tipo social, tales se efectuaban por las tardes, horas punta. Además, los días de trabajo se han concentrado en el tiempo de trabajo, lo que ha registrado un cambio en el empleo y especialización.

Al tiempo que la demanda de autobuses ha tendido a decrecer, algo más concentrado dentro de la ciudad y a dispersarse geográficamente proporcionar estos servicios se ha visto incrementado de manera notoria y, lo más significativo, el coste de trabajo necesario para mantener los autobuses ha aumentado considerablemente debido principalmente a los salarios, pero también en parte a los cambios en las horas productivas laborales suponen el 70 por 100