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**(de) CONSTRUCTING HEGEMONY:
A STUDY OF HEGEMONY AND COUNTER HEGEMONY IN THE
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH REFERENCE TO THE
FORMER USSR**

OWEN WORTH

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of The
Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abstract

It is my overall intention in this study to highlight the stability and or instability of hegemony within the global political economy. By drawing on the Cox-inspired neo-Gramscian perspectives within International Political Economy (IPE), this thesis argues that by focusing upon the societal forms of contestation within Russia a greater understanding can be placed on the development of concepts of hegemony and counter-hegemony in IPE.

Whilst this thesis will draw upon the work of Cox, Gill and Murphy (to name but few) as the original 'constructors' of the neo-Gramscian school, it will move beyond their initial insights into how hegemony is perceived at a global level, by identifying firstly their initial theoretical shortcomings and secondly by looking at how hegemony is both super-structurally constructed at a global level and how it is contested in various forms at the local, national and international level. By looking at how counter-hegemonic projects are constructed and what form they take, this thesis provides a wider understanding of not just the potential instabilities that neoliberal hegemony contains, but also of the fragmentation and contradictions that are inherent within different counter-hegemonic projects.

The situation in Russia both compliments and aids greater understanding of the nature of hegemonic stability. Whilst credible studies towards counter-hegemony and contestation have been undertaken within IPE by Rupert, Castells

and Gills, the historical development of ideological resistance to western-inspired global projects demonstrates that in countries such as Russia, moves towards harmonising neoliberal policies so that they contribute and interact with the interests of the global political economy as a whole prove problematic. By using the contested nature of civil society within Russia as a suitable case-study, this thesis argues whilst the global hegemonic order may appear stable, there are a multitude of different social forces that aim to challenge its legitimacy. In addition, these social forces are far more complex and fragmented than any neo-Gramscian study to date suggests.

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Introduction

The end of the Cold War, and the subsequent finale of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations signalled the global consolidation of the neoliberal economic project. After a series of events, struggles, ideological empowerment and re-adjustment, the hegemonic project that most orthodox IPE theorists believed stemmed initially from the oil crisis in the early 1970s¹ materialised into a coherent set of principles, norms and practices that were consolidated through institutionalisation. Subsequently, scholars from different theoretical backgrounds have concluded that the globalisation of neoliberalism has forged a set of conditions that are either irreversible, a triumph of capitalism or an inevitable process of capitalism.² The premise taken in this thesis is that the processes and practices of neoliberalism have been forged from a historically evolved set of social relations, and rather than being one that is irreversible and in any way permanent, it should be viewed as representing a set of relations that defines a particular historical era. It is my view that the dominant politics of neoliberalism are held together by a set of harmonising principles that pacify all classes of society. This thesis aims to demonstrate this, by reviewing the recent upsurge of neo-Gramscian interpretations of order within International Political Economy (IPE), and arguing that neoliberal globalisation should instead be defined by the strength of its hegemonic character. In addition it seeks to illustrate that, by viewing this hegemonic character in a historical context,

elements of contestation can appear to form a diverse set of counter-hegemonic challenges, intent upon de-pacifying its overriding logic.

This thesis seeks to prove several hypotheses. As suggested in both the abstract and in the title itself, the main aim of this study is to analyse the current components that add towards a hegemony within the global political economy, and to demonstrate that although the dominant bloc appears powerful, it is in fact more unstable and more incoherent than may at first appear. This incoherence, I intend to show, creates space and opportunity for counter-hegemonic forces to challenge the existing order, at least in certain respects. Thus, the first objective in this thesis is to demonstrate that neoliberalism is a contested process, and that it is founded upon a sophisticated set of 'norms' and practices that aims to produce a harmonising relationship within society. Any form of resistance to this process either a) leads to a 'crisis of hegemony', that can provide significant room for an alternative social counter-hegemonic project, or b) allows the dominant group to re-group and address the concerns of the disillusioned group, without altering its overall hegemonic ideals. In order to assess this reading of hegemony and hegemonic orders, this thesis draws extensively from a Gramscian analysis of hegemony, and upon those from the neo-Gramscian school of IPE. From this I aim to critique and question conventional readings of IPE, hegemony and of the workings of the current order. Borrowing largely from the work of Robert Cox,³ this thesis will show how Gramsci's logic can be applied to understanding the current stability of

neoliberalism. For, as I will argue in the first couple of chapters, Gramsci's notion of hegemony can be applied to the global arena. There are many concerns that Gramsci, a Marxist theoretician who was writing primarily on the historical transition of the Italian state in the 1920s could not adequately assess the complexities of political economy in the 21st century⁴. I contend that by using Cox's work as a point of departure and not as a divine interpretation of Gramsci, a sophisticated reading of hegemony, counter-hegemony and historic blocs can be brought to aid understanding about the nature of the 'common-sense'⁵ created by the practices of neoliberalism. To facilitate this, I argue that a form of historicism is required in order to comprehend how hegemonic orders are fashioned within a particular historical order. By locating this process, within what Gramsci calls a 'historic bloc,'⁶ one can define the character of particular historical eras, by assessing the way that it is hegemonically constructed. In other words, as I argue in chapter two, in every historical era, there exists an ideological framework (whether it be national-capitalism or mercantilism, liberal capitalism, neo-liberal capitalism, or regulatory capitalism) in which the dominant class aims to consolidate through mutual class consent, and which is fashioned so that it appears static and un-contestable. Seen through this form of historical lens, the hegemonic consolidation of neo-liberalism is both contestable and has the potential to be transformed and replaced.⁷

Having developed the theoretical outline of my argument, I then aim to empirically demonstrate the hegemonic components contained within the present

neoliberal global order. Here I focus upon the economic, cultural and social 'agents' that contribute to consolidate the processes that help to develop the common-sense of neoliberalism. Whilst the large majority of neo-Gramscian theorists (and those who are sympathetic to their overall claims)⁸ focus largely upon the economic and political institutions that have appeared to shape the super-structural foundations of the neoliberal hegemonic order,⁹ I argue that there are also a whole set of secondary cultural and practical agents that complement the more formal economic agreements that are shaped within institutions such as the WTO. In addition, I assess strategies from those nations which sought to contest western modes of capitalism during the cold war, that have now reverted to contribute towards the overall processes inherent within the global economy. Thus it is my attempt here to fully investigate the hegemonic parts that comprise the global order, so that a more comprehensive analysis can be undertaken to both aid the development of neo-Gramscian approaches to IPE, and to overcome some of the short-comings that approaches to date have faced.¹⁰ In doing so I critique as well as develop the work of first generation Gramscians in IPE such as Cox, Gill and Murphy.

The second main hypothesis I demonstrate in this research is that whilst neoliberal hegemony allows space for alternative counter-hegemonic forces to challenge it, at present these forces contain ideological diversities that, rather than provide a coherent form of challenge of the sort that Gramsci himself outlines in the *Prison Notebooks*,¹¹ allow the dominant class to exploit these

weaknesses and adopt strategies of their own of co-option. Gramsci himself acknowledges this process in action, when observing the several factors that contested the development of the Italian state. In order for the dominant class to cement and strengthen its hegemonic objectives, it sought to attack resistance by highlighting its negativity and weaknesses, whilst at the same time addressing some of the concerns that this resistance underlined, to further pacify civil society.¹² Here I will argue that the different ideological counter-hegemonic projects that have built up strategies of resistance have often been too weak, too contradictory and too fragmented to sustain a viable counter-hegemonic challenge to the status-quo.¹³ As often referred to, by mainstream commentators, 'anti-globalisation' has suffered from the lack of any consistent rhetorical alternative that unites its different parts.¹⁴ By examining this further, I also argue that the politics of globalisation has produced a variety of counter-hegemonic challenges that contrast in their ideological forms of contestation. Thus it is contended here that opposition to neoliberal globalisation cannot simply be defined as progressive, as is often argued within the critical Gramscian school of logic.¹⁵ I demonstrate that discontent with neoliberal globalisation has allowed far-right wing groups to exploit forms of alienation, instability and exclusion within societies and have constructed populist organisations that focus upon national-protectionism themes to devise alternative projects. These more subversive reactions also need to be examined within the context of counter-hegemony. For, as Mark Rupert suggests whilst examining forms of common-sense contestation within the US, conservative and nationalist reactions are

based upon a set of ideological principles that seek to critique and transform neoliberalism just in the same way as the more progressive democratic critiques.¹⁶

The different forms of ideological contestation will thus be examined in this thesis, but I aim to further the enquiry into both the instabilities of neoliberalism and the nature of ideological challenges to it by focussing upon the nature of political and civil society within post-Communist Russia, rather than the more orthodox studies within EU and NAFTA countries, that are often undertaken by neo-Gramscians.¹⁷ For it is my contention here that the fragmentation that has grown out of Post-Cold War Russian society can demonstrate a greater understanding of both the instabilities that are inherent within the overall global order and the nature of fragmented resistance towards it.

Why Russia?

The developments by successive governments during firstly the Yeltsin and subsequently the Putin administration to guide the Russian Federation back into the dominant arena of the global economy has led to a continual process of fragmentation, polarisation and instability within the heart of Russian society.¹⁸ Whilst both Post-Cold War presidents have attempted to adopt a middle ground, in order that Russia can gradually consolidate itself within the global economy, whilst building upon a sense of Russian individualism that remained prevalent

during the Soviet era, a whole array of different ideologies, organisations and political groups have emerged to challenge this development. As I argue both in chapter four and chapter six, these challenges may be resolved through a sustained building of *trasformismo*, in the same vein that Gramsci characterised in the building of modern Italy in the late 19th Century, – both Russia (post-Cold War) and Italy (during its independence drives) were after all new political projects, whose primary purpose is its consolidation within the dominant characteristics of international society. The instabilities that this fragmentation has produced demonstrates that within nations where there exists a historical conflict with traditions associated with western enlightenment (in this case liberal democracy), the global (hegemonic) order appears more fragile.

My thesis here does not aim to show either how the Russian state itself is developing its own strategies of nation-building, in the light of the collapse of the USSR, or how the emerging state has struggled to address the ethnic and regionalist diversities contain within the Russian Federation. Nor does it intend to predict or to outline future developments that might develop within Russia itself. It merely seeks to use the micro-study of Russia to help to add greater emphasis to the study of neoliberal hegemony. By placing emphasis on social forces within the Russian state, greater diversity can be given to the neo-Gramscian ontology, as whilst it has often emphasised the role that Russian-inspired state socialism had on the construction of the more regulated form of economics in the west, after the second world war,¹⁹ little attention is given to

the difficulties that these states have had in constructing stable civil societies that adapt to the dominant institutional norms that are being fashioned externally. Russia is, as I will argue, the best example of this. As a nation that symbolically represented resistance to western-inspired global capitalism both during the bipolaric era and further back during periods of 'romantic nationalism' that have been very conscious throughout Russian history,²⁰ the developments within modern-day Russia may tell us far more about the long-term global stability of neoliberalism. For, as Russia has demonstrated throughout different eras of history, its unique sociological struggle within its boundaries can upset the overall practices that western-inspired interests have sought to maintain and consolidate.

The enquiry into counter-hegemony uses the situation within Russia to further demonstrate the diverse nature of resistance against the neo-liberal order and explores possibilities, using knowledge of the social forces that have existed throughout the country's historical growth (as demonstrated by Neumann)²¹, of how this trend might be employed to undermine the spread not just of market forces within Russia, but of the cultural and societal characteristics by which the global order is bounded. Central to the hypothesis of this enquiry is the question of whether the counter-hegemonic forces inherent within Russia have firstly the capability to make a substantial challenge to the market-transitions that have been occurring within its boundaries, and secondly whether Russia is a large enough player on the world stage to challenge the workings of the global

hegemony as a whole (as it contributed to previously, not just in the 20th century with the growth globally of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but also prior to this with historical factors such as the failure of the Decembrist uprisings and continued national and orthodox inspired rejections of the west). In order to discuss this, it is necessary to explore the historical and sociological development of the Russian state. Both the 'semi-asiatic' character of the Russian state,²² and ideological traditions within Russia have historically been formed, with contestation to the dominant features of the West. Thus, I will demonstrate how, since the fall of the USSR, there has been a combination of historically-formed ideologies and social forces that aim to resist and contest neoliberal development. The work on the instabilities within Russian society has been undertaken within this work both through textual analysis and empirical fieldwork.

In terms of International Relations these developments are important. Firstly, they reiterate the notion that the character of the neoliberal global order is not as stable as it may appear; secondly the work on Russia focuses upon a wide range of counter-hegemonic elements, that moves beyond some of the more determinist Marxist-inspired theorists, who focus solely on 'progressive' and 'normative' responses to neoliberal globalisation.²³

Originality of the Research

Whilst the Gramscian-inspired school within IPE has provided a critical edge towards the main features of the global economy, my research is both original and innovative. By bringing the work and philosophies of Gramsci into the discourse of International Relations, an epistemological and ontological framework of critique is deployed against the empiricist and positivist techniques of mainstream theorists.²⁴ This development enables the argument to contest conventional concepts of hegemony, and provides an opportunity for the scholar to construct a theory of historicism which aids both the understanding of the global arena and gives an insight into what global changes may take place in the future. Derived from this starting point, my research project builds a critical form of ontology and an empirical but not empiricist study that provides originality to the fields of IR/IPE in the following ways.

Firstly, the theoretical form of historicism that I construct provides its own original outline, as I locate the characters of the different global orders that have emerged in the past, and similarly look at the social forces that have enabled these orders to cement themselves. I then further this by demonstrating how these global orders, and the differing hegemonic 'rules' and 'norms' which distinguish one order from the other, change and are historically fashioned over time. This theoretical outline of historicism aids an understanding of the nature

of counter-hegemony, and what form counter-hegemony might take towards the hegemonic constraints that make up the current global order. This in turn suggests possible changes that may affect the behaviour of the current order, and could over time transform it. Thus, my form of theoretical historicism, although similar in some respects, does conflict with other theories of historicism that have been put forward by the Gramscian-inspired critical school.

Secondly, this research focuses on the claim that counter-hegemonic forces are not necessarily progressive. While many scholars have focused upon the existence of the possibility of counter hegemony to the current order, many have either vaguely described their possible formations, or commented upon ways in which a globalised form of counter-hegemonic 'class' can unite, socially towards a feasible end.²⁵ These determinist conclusions about the nature of counter-hegemony lack two principles, which this research addresses. First they neglect a comprehensive analysis of the workings of counter-hegemony, based upon their historicist logic, and second they fail to appreciate the strength of the social forces that would hinder global 'social progress'. By concentrating upon the resurgence of other contesting ideologies, such as nationalism, and the possibility that the strength of nationalist identity may spark counter-hegemonic forces, I move my focus away from the optimism of creating a global social democratic bloc, to a potentially negative form of counter-hegemony.²⁶

Thirdly, by focusing upon the relevance and the strength of contrasted and opposing ideological contestations, contained in the formation of social forces within Russia, the argument centres on how the neoliberal hegemonic order can be altered by factions on the relative margins of its construction. As a case study, and as an important area that could be seen as a starting point of counter-hegemony, Russia is original, as it is a move away from studies of forces and potential resistance contained within the dominant areas of Western Europe and North America.

Methodological Grounding

Methodologically, this thesis borrows extensively from the forms of critical and Gramscian theory. Whilst there are great problems with the methodological consistency in recent work that has attempted to apply critical ontology within IPE,²⁷ this thesis is grounded in a set of research procedures and techniques that draws and relates to the broad marriage of Gramscian and critical theory that has emerged within the discipline of IPE in the last twenty or so years. Within IPE there is a sense that both the critical and neo-Gramscian methodology is often guilty of being too conventional, narrative and even deterministic in its research methods, which can sometimes neglect the truths that it seeks to claim. In addition, the forms of empiricism that are used within research projects which claim to be committed to the critical epistemology that they profess to explore, often appear to fall short of the scrutiny that they set up.²⁸ In particular here is the claim that research projects that appear to be grounded, theoretically in the

critical tradition, often fail to re-iterate this claim in their collection and analysis of data.²⁹

The research methods that I use can also attract similar criticisms. Claims can, for example, be made that my assumptions, historical analysis and indeed the role that my interviewing procedures take, neglect the overall 'principles' that both critical and Gramscian approaches seem to promote. Indeed, as this thesis draws largely on a textual and conceptual analysis of Gramsci, and in particular aims to build upon the attempts to convert these conceptions to understand the workings of the global order, it aims to focus far more on building upon the foundations that have been laid by the work thus far by neo-Gramscians³⁰ than by those rooted in the Frankfurt tradition, which have made methodological and theoretical inroads within the more mainstream discipline of International Relations (IR).³¹ Thus in terms of methodology, the forms of historicism and empirical research (both in the form of comparative case studies within the EU and NAFTA and more explicitly with Russia) that I rely upon in order to prove the different claims that I make, are largely consistent with similar strategies within the neo-Gramscian school of IPE rather than the critical discourse within IR as a whole.³² Here, however certain shortcomings should be stressed. Firstly, there are some questions that could be raised concerning the relevance of my empirical work and in particular the material obtained from my various interviews in Moscow.³³ It is *not* contended here that the data and differing opinions gathered from different sources represent a systematic and quantitative

survey of consciousness within Russia, or that the different counter-hegemonic projects that I identify allows for any scientific form of typology that distinctively outlines these groups into any coherent logical structure. Rather, the data that I have obtained through the process of interviewing intends to demonstrate and support my claims concerning the nature of both hegemony and counter-hegemony. Secondly, and more relevant to this enquiry, this similarly applies to possible charges made that this work from the other side of the spectrum, that both my application of history and my empirical material falls into the positivist trap that I set out to theoretically avoid in the opening chapters. Here I acknowledge that whilst some of the historical claims (in chapter 2 and particularly on the nature of the Russian state in chapters 5 & 6) and some of the empirical evaluations I make may draw, at least in some respects on more orthodox accounts, these still remain consistent to a) the overall aims and objectives of the thesis and b) its overall theoretical framework.

Outline of the thesis

This thesis is set out in six chapters, each of which aims to address some of the main enquiries that it is attempting to focus upon. The first chapter assesses the literature within both International Relations and International Political Economy that engages with the processes of hegemony. It aims to critique the positivist logic of hegemonic stability or leadership that is often outlined by the neo-realist school,³⁴ and to introduce both Gramsci's conception of hegemony

and the contributions that Cox and neo-Gramscians have made in converting his theoretical models to the field of IPE. In addition, I address some of the concerns and problems that the neo-Gramscian school has often overlooked when applying these ideas,³⁵ and by drawing on some of the more recent accounts by Hall and Rupert,³⁶ outline how a more sophisticated application can be met.

The second chapter builds upon the theoretical foundations and arguments from the first. It outlines how hegemony and historic blocs have been fashioned through different eras, using Cox's historical framework, formulated in *Power, Production and World Order*, and building upon this, by exploring a wide range of historical and political economic theorists, including Braudel, Polanyi, Hobsbawm and Arrighi. I argue here that it is vital to view any form of hegemonic logic firmly within a consistent and substantial theory of historicism.

The third chapter departs from the historical prelude in chapter two by enquiring how the present neo-liberal order is made up and which components and agents have been constructed to contribute, build upon and consolidate the 'common-sense' of neoliberalism. Thus, whilst chapter two provides a historical background to how present-day class struggles and passivity have been met, chapter three will focus vigorously upon how economic, social and cultural factors have been fashioned to strengthen hegemonic norms and values. It also aims to move beyond some of the attempts produced to date by the Gramscian school, by bringing a more substantial study to the processes that contribute

towards hegemonic common-sense, which are not necessarily entwined around economic institutionalism.

Chapter four examines both the theoretical and the practical potentials of counter-hegemony and contestation. It firstly assesses some of the literature produced to date on the nature of resistance in the era of 'globalisation', and then attempts to move beyond this by looking at Rupert and Castells' identification of the different political movements and ideological contestations that have arisen from the alienation and exclusion of neoliberalism. In particular, chapter four shows how, at least in the west (or more specifically within the regional configuration of the EU and NAFTA), counter-hegemonic projects have revealed a 'janus-faced' appearance,³⁷ in which movements have been created from both the more 'democratically progressive' left and from the more subversive and xenophobic 'national-populist' right. I also demonstrate that contradictions, diversities and fragmentations within these different forms of contestation have also limited the strength of these projects to substantially attack the overall stability of the dominant groups, although the potential exists. I conclude the fourth chapter by comparing these counter-hegemonic trends in the west with those which have grown up in post-Cold War Russia, and argue that whilst scholars may seek to simplify certain elements of counter-hegemony activity in the west, the diversity of contestation within Russia demonstrates that a closer evaluation is necessary to fully understand the stability of the global hegemonic order and the complexities of the potential of transformation.

By using Russia as a case-study to add to the understanding of global hegemony, my fifth chapter looks at both how the Soviet Union was constructed around the historical sociological traditions of 'Russian exceptionalism', and how it was adjusted and altered as a political project to complement the global hegemonic practices of containment, during the bi-polar era. The fifth chapter will assess how Russia has historically been determined by a collection of opposing ideological traditions, and how these traditions have often led to Russia's practice of opposing western-inspired socio-economic projects. The chapter also addresses a collection of critiques of the Soviet Union, from differing Marxist, social democratic and post-modern positions and I argue that the rise and fall of the Soviet Union and the dogma of Marxist-Leninism should be seen from a Gramscian perspective that takes into account both the dialectical processes from within the state, and the overall positioning of social forces at the global level.

Following on from the fifth chapter, the last thesis chapter demonstrates how historical, political and social traditions within Russia have been re-invented and re-discovered since the introduction of *Glasnost* and the eventual fall of the USSR as a whole. Whilst drawing on the work of Jeremy Lester, who sees the rebirth of these traditions as being one which represents a hegemonic struggle at the core of Russian politics and civil society,³⁸ I argue that these struggles have contested the attempts within Russia to build a secure hegemonic project,

compatible with the global framework of neoliberalism. I also argue that the diversities and great fragmentations existing within the boundaries of Russian political society can give greater scope for centrists (such as Putin) to exploit these fragmentations by co-opting them with a project that is compatible with the norms and practices that operate at a global level.³⁹ However, at the same time these moves are still undermined by the continued existence of these counter-hegemonic challenges that demonstrate both the instabilities inherent within Russian society and the social potentials of transformation.

Through this outline, I am able to assess and demonstrate the major aims of my thesis, that 1) the neo-Gramscian analysis of hegemony provides a useful departure point for studies of the norms and practices of neoliberalism, 2) that contestation and counter-hegemonic projects do exist and can confront the dominant norms of the global political economy, 3) that the diversities of these project can strengthen the processes of *trasformismo* and that by 4) by focussing upon the case-study of Russia, more can be given to understanding the complexity of the processes of hegemony and counter-hegemony.

It is hoped that this study will provide greater emphasis for critical and Gramscian-orientated approaches to global order, and will 'open-up' new avenues of theoretical and practical study for the discourse. At the same time it is hoped that the issues that I outline in this thesis will aid the potential for further like-minded research.

- ¹ Edward Morse, 'After the Fall: The Politics of Oil', in Kendell Stiles & Tsuneo Akaha, *International Political Economy: A Reader*, New York: Harper Collins, 1991.
- ² See for example, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Hamilton Hamish, 1992.
- ³ See in particular, Robert Cox, 'Social Forces, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 10 (2), 1981, pp.126-155.
- ⁴ This point is most particularly stated by Bellamy. See R. Bellamy, 'Gramsci, Croce and the Italian Tradition', *History of Political Thought*, vol. XI, (2), 1990, pp. 313-337.
- ⁵ For a neo-Gramscian reading of 'common-sense', see Mark Rupert, 'Globalisation and contested common sense in the US', in Stephen Gill and James Mittelman (eds.), *Transformation and innovation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 138-152.
- ⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, pp. 404-407.
- ⁷ Barry Gills, 'Introduction: Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance', in Barry Gills (ed), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, Basingstoke Palgrave, 2000.
- ⁸ Such as the Amsterdam School.
- ⁹ For example, see Stephen Gill and David Law, 'Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1988, pp. 475-99.
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- ¹¹ Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, pp. 229-235.
- ¹² Ibid., pp. 227-228.
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- ¹⁴ Ibid. See also *The Economist* editorial in reply to the demonstrations in Seattle in December, 1999.
- ¹⁵ See for example Mark Neufeld, 'Democractic Socialism in a Globalising Context: Towards a Collective Research Program', TIPEC Working Paper, www.trentu.ca/tipec/working.html, 02/6, 2002.
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- ¹⁸ Richard Sawka, *Russian Politics and Society*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 166-172.
- ¹⁹ See for example Mark Rupert's analysis on the forming of moderate unionism in the US, in order to stem support from external forces of Communism, Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- ²⁰ See for example the writings of Nesterov, who argues that Russian patriotism stems from a uniquely organic historical struggle with external and western influences, F. Nesterov, *Svyaz' Vremen*, Moscow: Molodaya Gvardia, 1984.
- ²¹ Iver Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London: Routledge, 1996.
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- ²³ For example, G. Arrighi, T.K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, *Anti Systemic Movements*, London: Verso, 1989.
- ²⁴ Robert Cox 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: A study in Method', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 12 (2), 1983, pp. 162-175
- ²⁵ For example, Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Stephen Gill and James Mittelman, op. cit., 1997.

²⁶ In this respect it draws partly from some of the recent work of Mark Rupert. See Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1997; & *Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending visions of a New World Order*, London: Routledge, 2000.

²⁷ Chris Farrands, 'Critical about being critical', in J. Abbott & O. Worth, *Critical Perspectives on International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002; Chris Farrands, Owen Worth and Jason Abbott, 'Critical Theory in Global Political Economy: Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?', Paper presented at the *International Studies Association Annual Convention*, Chicago, 2001.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

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³¹ For a comparative discussion between critical discourse within both IR and IPE, see Richard Wyn Jones (ed.), *Critical Theory and World Politics*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

³² See for example, Stephen Gill, op. cit., 1993; Craig Murphy and Roger Tooze, op. cit., 1991; Mark Rupert, op. cit., 2000.

³³ See appendix I

³⁴ For example, Charles Kindleberger, 'Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25, 1981, 242-254; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

³⁵ See note 9

³⁶ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1997.

³⁷ Owen Worth, 'The Janus-Face of Counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist responses to neoliberalism', *Global Society*, 16 (3), 2002, pp. 297-317.

³⁸ Jeremy Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for hegemony in Russia*, London: Verso, 1995.

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Chapter One: Cox and the Italian School: A Gramscian interpretation of Hegemony and World Orders.

The main objective in this chapter is to set the theoretical grounding of the overall thesis by discussing the contributions made by neo-Gramscians towards conceptualising the theory of hegemony and how it can be applied critically to the global political and economic arena. My main aims in this chapter are firstly, to demonstrate how the Gramscian School has critiqued positivist theories of hegemony and hegemonic stability, to create a more sophisticated perception of hegemony, and secondly, to address some of the problems and critiques that the Gramscian School itself has faced and often fails to address. The chapter will conclude by illustrating how a more complex neo-Gramscian model is required to address the overall question of the nature of hegemonic orders and their susceptibility to contestation.

The recent involvement of a Gramscian interpretation within the fields of International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) has brought fresh enquiries into the analysis of events and the structural environment within global politics. Fuelled by the growth of critical enquiry into the epistemological discourse within the discipline of IR, which contributed to the subject's 'third debate' in recent years, the creation of the 'Gramscian' or 'Italian' school has enabled the philosophies of Vico and Gramsci to be applied, providing a form of acute Marxism unsusceptible to the charges of reductionism

or crude materialism.¹ The school has critiqued those ahistorical positivistic positions involved in the inter-paradigm debate,² instigating literature that provides an altogether differing philosophical mindset on the international arena.

The pioneering work which initiated the school's form of critical enquiry was Robert Cox's 'Social forces, States and World Orders', which appeared in *Millennium* in 1981 and attacked the conservative positive theories in IR (which he calls problem-solving theory) for assuming that the present is everlasting, and brings up the explanatory notion of historical structures. This is worked around a configuration of forces: ideas, material capabilities, and institutions; or in the context of Global Politics: social forces, forms of states and world orders. These forces do not determine actions in any direct mechanical way but impose pressures and constraints so that individuals and groups may move with the pressures, or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore them.³

It is necessary to outline briefly the various positions of mainstream approaches to IPE before demonstrating how Cox's Gramscian theory has developed in recent years and how such a formulated critical theory can be used to aid explanation with greater clarity than positivist logic.

1.1 IPE Theory

In a prologue to her renowned work *States and Markets*, Susan Strange depicts the three key theories existent within the inter-paradigm period as being involved in a desert island shipwreck.⁴ Three lifeboats settle on the uninhabited island and each party believes that they are the sole survivors. Each group follows their own style of political economy. One survivor follows a realist model based on security, stemming from a fear that there are other human life forms on the island. One survivor follows a liberal model that devises a form of monetarism to organise consumer needs. The final model is socialist and thus sets up a commune based on equality and justice. As the three groups begin to realise that they coexist on the island, Strange continues, conflicts begin to set in with each group determined to protect their own ideal and defeat the others. Thus the latter two must decide whether to provide security for their own groups in order to attack and eradicate the other existing ideologies or to try to use diplomacy in some form and peacefully co-exist.

This metaphorical tale reflects the international political arena both in theory and practice. The above tale represents the dilemmas faced by those states whose ideological framework has been that of nationalist, liberal or socialist but have had to compromise their positions due to the existence of the others. It also reflects the case in theory, with the theorist using one of these models, his choice

being rooted in his own subjectivity, and applying it to the global stage.⁵ As Ashley states 'Theory always exists for the purpose of someone or something'.⁶

There has also been much debate about the significance of IPE theory. The traditional way of seeing IPE is as a sub-discipline within the field of IR.⁷ For example, the neorealist structural model of international politics as composed by Waltz, places the economic sphere as part of the interplay of units within the system.⁸ The neoliberal institutional approach on the other hand, equally places IPE well within the parameters, but believes that economic co-operation, leadership and co-operation can lead to a greater stability of the international system as a whole.⁹ Since the 1970s, however, those with academic backgrounds rooted more in economics such as Strange herself, have challenged this traditional viewpoint. Strange argues that the traditional methods of reviewing IPE are problematic because they exclude economic structure from being a powerful determinant of state policy and rely on state centric theory.¹⁰ As I shall argue below however, the pursuit of neo-Gramscian readings within the field of IPE has managed to address vigorously the epistemological and ontological shortcomings and limitations that had been a feature within neorealist and neoliberal readings of IPE.

1.1.1 Neorealism and Neoliberalism

As depicted by Strange's tale, the three models of nationalism, liberalism and socialism have dominated mainstream theories of political economy.¹¹ This is the same within IR/IPE, with the three being similarly reproduced as realism (or neorealism), liberalism (neoliberalism) and structuralism (or world system theorists). The difference between the neorealists and neoliberals is based on the significance placed upon the growth of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and non-state transnational actors. Realists view these factors as being relatively insignificant in terms of power, as non-state multi-national organisations are subordinate to states in that they must operate within governing structures established by states, and so can be restricted in power and prominence and held in check by that governing state.¹² The state is, despite the processes of greater mobility of capital and trade, still engaged in self-help, with its primary concern being to survive (as Martin Wight once wrote¹³) and able to determine its own national policy, albeit with the restrictive guidance of more powerful states (the number of 'powerful states' preferably being small for stability reasons, according to Waltz¹⁴). In contrast, theoretical and normative accounts that stem from the liberal tradition and are encouraged by the deep-rooted philosophies of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant, have long pledged for a neo-capitalist eldorado in which a stable international order could exist under a free economy. They see a cobwebbed form of power with a multi-actor framework¹⁵, with

transnational institutions, whether they be executive or concerned with law and human rights, wielding the same influence as the state, thus challenging the formula of state = main actor that was historically formulated at the Treaty of Westphalia.

The recent rise in international business bureaucracy and technological advances commonly referred to with the buzzword 'globalisation' has produced differing interpretations from the two schools. Realists point to the fact that international regimes were constructed around the principles of American beliefs and relied on American finance to help them run efficiently – thus consolidating the principles behind hegemonic stability theory.¹⁶ More pluralist-minded theoreticians point to globalisation as leading to a recognition of a global community which would be more suitable in containing the problems of the next millennium (such as universal moral consciousness and environmental concerns) than the state-system.¹⁷ Some have even seen the end of the Cold War as a victory for universal liberal democracy, with any ideological alternative being finally defeated, paving the way for the benefits of liberal economics (such as peace, open market, individualism etc).¹⁸

1.1.2 Positivist Theories of Hegemony

Realists, who, despite their doubts for co-operation beyond the existing state-system see the international economy run by the principles of the free market as

preferable;¹⁹ and neoliberals, or scholars from the realist tradition but favourable to cooperation;²⁰ hold different views on the theory of 'hegemonic stability', and on the decline in the direct involvement of the US government in world trading affairs. Despite the differing positions in determining the current international environment, both the positivist schools interpret historical findings and the significance of past hegemonies/non hegemonies in the same methodological vein.

The theory of hegemonic stability gets its origins from the logic of the economist Albert Hirschmann and was later built upon by Charles Kindleberger.²¹ The theory stresses that for an international political economy to perform the liberal attributes of the open market it requires a dominant state to act as a hegemon and stabilise it.²² Thus, periods of hegemony have coincided with peace and stability as the nation acting as the hegemon sets up rules, principles and norms. These rules, principles and norms are internationally accepted and obeyed by the lesser nations. Periods of non hegemony, where more than one nation have shared similar percentages of world trade, have concurred with phases of instability within the global arena. Historically, there is empirical evidence within the last couple of centuries to back up this claim. Both Keohane and Gilpin (despite coming to different conclusions about the current future and validity of the theory) have made detailed studies of the last two periods of hegemony.²³ The first period is the Pax Britannia, in existence during the 19th century, in which Britain made use of its superior sea power to

usher in an era of free trade. The second is the Pax Americana, which arose after the Second World War and was formally institutionised at Bretton Woods.²⁴

The continued use of such a theory has once again separated the positivists into the logical beliefs of realism and pluralism/liberalism. The former can point to Cooper's warnings on the policies of coordination. He cautioned that without a hegemon or an unchallenged international agreement to formulate and enforce the rules of an open world market economy, a high degree of policy coordination would be needed among states,²⁵ or conflicts would occur, resulting in nationalist, or regional bloc estrangement.²⁶ Indeed, since the apparent decline of US hegemony, there has been evidence of a slowing down of effort to co-operate within the international economy.²⁷

Those who are in favour of closer international co-operation and institutionalism reject the realist's pessimism. Keohane feels that despite the logic of the stabilising theory, there is no need to suggest that it is essential for one state to lead and balance international economic affairs, in order to maintain a stable international economy that is based upon market fundamentals.²⁸ There is also (he continues) a lack of definite case studies which hold the true essentials of the hypothesis: the Pax Americana and the Pax Britannia are the only examples, although firm believers of the theory make claims for a 17th century Dutch hegemony, and even give evidence of a Pax Romana.²⁹ Despite this, in empirical terms, only one of these, the *Pax Americana*, can be comprehensively seen as a

viable hegemonic stabiliser. McKeown can back Keohane's assertions. He examines the differences between the hegemonic regimes applied by Britain and the US and claims that the success of the British model was more ambiguous than at first thought. He cites the fact that to act as a hegemon in an open market there is a requirement to actively support multilateral bargaining, drafting several commercial treaties and placing huge economic pressures on countries which do not co-operate.³⁰ However, despite Britain making some effort to secure an open trading system there were slow and reluctant movements towards tariff reduction. Similarly while there was some commitment to reduce other states' tariffs and create international (or Eurocentric) liberal principles, internal pressure from within these states also played a part in encouraging reduction.³¹ This suggests that neoliberals should not just view the positions of Britain and the US as water tight carbon copies of the hegemonic stability theory, but use a broader analysis, which would move to eradicate the pessimism of the realists.

In short, neoliberals feel that the tergiversation of the stability theory can break the theoretical cycle of hegemony - nonhegemony - hegemony = peace - conflict - peace, and lead to an age of institutional co-operation which, in the present globalised and pluralistic-friendly environment, can provide forums for egotistical actors to collaborate.³² Realists, on the other hand, wary of the recent warnings from Mearsheimer and Waltz³³ find it preferable to retreat to the work of Hirschman and his musings of how an economically stronger power can

assert its control over the weaker, and to Kindleberger's ideas on 'dual leadership'.³⁴

The problem with both schools of thought is that, as positivists, they become so entangled with raw data that they confuse themselves with the meaning of their own findings. The hegemonic theory, as both the realists and the pluralists see it, lacks an over riding philosophy and historicism. Both schools are aiming for a cure for their current dilemmas and search for this 'cure' within the confines of the present; the present norms, the present institutional organisations and the prevailing social and power relationship. Before continuing this critique and analysing the roles that critical and Gramscian theory give in providing a better light for the concept of hegemony, I want to mention the role Marxism played in the inter-paradigm debate, within the discourse of positivism.

1.1.3 World-Systems Theories

'World-systems' theories come from a different philosophical position than both the realists and liberalists but ultimately they still fall into the same positivist trap. Being a branch of Marxism, the interest was not to find how a liberal international political economy can be worked to its most effective, but to understand how the world capitalist structure works and what scientific 'laws' it contains which hold the system together. It therefore provides a model of mechanisms which takes its origin from Bukharin's *Theory of Historical*

*Materialism: A Popular Manual of Marxist Sociology*³⁵, and is followed later by Althusser's structural Marxism, which has been described as a 'self-consciously scientific perspective aiming to employ Marxist categories within a structuralist framework to produce theoretical knowledge of the objective structures of capitalist reality'.³⁶

Wallerstein names three laws or 'mechanisms' which exist to enable capitalist world systems to retain political stability: the use of military force, the beliefs and workings of the bourgeoisie, and the three-layered hierarchal structure which props up the mode of production.³⁷ In his transhistorical study he sees the current world-system as being a product of the European industrial revolution, which globalised during colonialism, setting up the three layered system with the conquerors as the core at the top, the economically sound-but lacking in creative expansion in the middle, and the exploited as the periphery at the bottom.³⁸ Thus the change in hegemony from Britain to the US simply translates as the change in the 'core conqueror'. Another aspect of the world-system viewpoint is the continuing presence of the position of the periphery, whose existence the core has to depend upon for its survival.³⁹ As the stage of capitalist development continues in the consolidation stage that it is currently in, more contradictions will creep in and the structure will find it difficult to survive.⁴⁰

The more orthodox form of 'open Marxism' used by world-systems theorists, has been widely critiqued on several counts. Firstly, it remains solely concerned

with the economic base. In other words, both state constructions and the state-system in which they operate remain materialist in their workings. World-systems theories have tended to rely overly upon Marx's later work and upon the infallibility of the capitalist mode of production, whilst ignoring his earlier, more philosophical work. They fail to account adequately for the complexities inherent in the workings of liberal democratic capitalism and for the super-structural constructions that pacify not just the processes involved in maintaining the dominant mode of production, but also of how the societal condition of class relations within a state is moulded together. In this sense both world-system theorists and dependency-theorists alike fall into the same systemic problems that the positivists face, in the sense that at the international level, states appear merely as 'capitalist units' rather than sociological entities.⁴¹ Secondly, whilst a more 'critical' response may attribute a charge of falling into the positivist trap, neo-realists have responded by critiquing world-systems theorists as 'reductionist', in the sense that the international state-system can be merely attributed to the economic workings of class relations.⁴² Thus, the scientific-Marxist explanations contain flaws, as they do not justify fully how and why capitalism continues to exist, and fail to understand the role of the nation state and the socio-cultural formation in which they are contained.⁴³

1.2 Gramscian and Critical Theory

The 'Italian school' emerged in response to both the epistemological problems that concurred with the methodological format of positivism and in reply to the Wallersteinesque form of historical materialism. The birth of the school has coincided with similar critical schools (such as post-modernism, post-structuralism, feminism) that have all contributed to challenging the enclosed ontology of the discipline. These critical schools have combined to challenge the notion that knowledge arises from the subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality and argue that it reflects pre-existing social purposes and interests.⁴⁴ Thus if one stands back from the positivist framework one can question the rules and assumptions that it applies.

1.2.1 Marx and Alienation

In developing a critical position and in providing the background for the social ontology of Gramsci one has to go back to Marx's philosophy on nature and society. In this he separates nature from man in the sense that whilst nature is subject to the laws of natural science, man is free of such conditions and is able to transform society for his own purpose. Through the process of productive labour man does change nature and society but at the same time creates instruments leading to the process of objectification. This is when man creates

'objects' through nature and then becomes alienated from them by the way the production of these objects is socially organised. Thus under the capitalist mode of production Marx states that:

...the worker becomes a slave to his object... Political economy hides the alienation in the essence of labour by not considering the immediate relationship between the worker (labour) and production.⁴⁵

The capitalist system and the laws and morality which its institutions therein determine are perceived to be 'natural' and this produces a 'self-limiting form of human understanding'⁴⁶ in which autonomous structures have been set up that result in the estrangement and alienation of society, preventing it from getting the best from its production.

The state-system and the world economy are all examples of the process of alienation, as they have all been created as 'objects' by human activity, which in turn, have governed and restrained human activity, appearing universal and unquestionable (or natural) in the process. Thus, positivists fail to recognise the historical processes involved in objectification and world-systems theorists ignore the capability of capitalism to reproduce itself under social processes created by the continuing logic of objectification and instead view social change as a scientific transhistorical process.

1.2.2 Gramsci and Hegemony

Gramsci's reading of hegemony differs from the one used as an explanatory factor by the neorealists and neoliberalists. They saw it as a term of dominance which applied to the international arena when one state appeared to be economically more powerful than the rest and used its position to dominate the rest (the full details of which I discussed above). Indeed the official dictionary definition would seem to back this up, describing hegemony as: 'domination of one power or state within a league or confederation'.⁴⁷ Gramsci's hegemony takes on a deeper philosophical role by examining how legitimacy is wielded through economic and socio-cultural formats, which transform over time. Hegemony represents the ruling totality, which is evident within these formats, and its might saturates society to such an extent that it even 'constitutes the limits of common sense for most people under its sway'.⁴⁸ Thus within each sphere of hegemony social consciousness is shaped and the components, which contribute to the hegemonic bloc, add and enhance this consciousness. Therefore Gramsci's definition can be alternatively seen as it is in Sassoon's Gramsci 'dictionary':

It (hegemony) has to do with the way one social group influences other groups, making certain compromises with them in order to gain their consent for its leadership in society as a whole. Thus particular, such sectional interests are transformed and some concept of the general interest is promoted. Hegemony has cultural, political and economic aspects and it is the foundation of Gramsci's argument that the modern state is not simply an instrument of a class which it uses for its own narrow purposes.⁴⁹

Writing in a fascist prison, it was the sociology of the state that fuelled Gramsci's initial interests and the concept of hegemony was therefore applied to achieve an understanding of the social groups that form in the hierarchal structure within a state and how these groups relate to and exist within civil society. To achieve a full understanding of modern day political and social positions it is necessary to have a full understanding of how they were historically fashioned. This can be achieved by analysing how hegemonic groups interact with 'subaltern' groups. In particular, by studying the original position of 'subaltern groups', their transformation and reproduction within the sphere of economic production and how they apply passive affiliation to the dominant political formations, by submitting to the given order of society, but at the same time adding claims of their own, leads to a change in 'common society' and a reproduction of the subaltern groups along different lines.⁵⁰ Using this logic the historical processes that occur lead to a change in civil society and the perceived 'norm' under which man is supposed to live.⁵¹ The change being brought about by a shift in the hegemonic nature can be described as 'passive revolution'.⁵²

Gramsci's definition of the state is drawn from a fundamental critique of Bukharin's scientific materialism. He argues that Bukharin ultimately fails to address the working relationship between the state, class relations and proletarian consciousness. For Gramsci, states are not defined merely as units that are

ultimately determined by their class relations to the mode of production, but are complex constructions that are interwoven through a process of history, economics and politics into organic entities.⁵³ States have thus been constructed around a set of ideological principles and beliefs that historically transform over time, and have compromised their positions by super-structural governmental institutions that enhanced consciousness and societal order. In short the Gramscian position is one that fundamentally rejects both 'scientific socialism' and economic-mechanical Marxism that is inherent within the logic of world-systems theorists. Its primary task is to evaluate the dialogue that exists between the materialist base – the economic workings of the mode of production, the super-structure – the political and institutional constructions that facilitate production, and the consciousness and societal harmonisation that is required to stabilise the relationship. It is this relationship that demonstrates the strength of a particular hegemonic order.

1.2.3 Historic Blocs

The notion of historic blocs (*blocco storico*) provides a further insight into how hegemony is placed and replaces the metaphysical constructions inherent in Bukharin and later followers by using analyses derived from a form of historicism. It refers to the solid structure that is created when a hegemonic order is in place. The formation of a historic bloc is dependent on the hegemony, which in turn binds or 'glues' together all the other parts of society into a

relationship, which recognises homogeneous 'norms' of political and economic practices and culture. Within one historic bloc there exists a set of material circumstances, which include the positioning of social relations and the economic means of production. These interconnect with each other to produce a mutually constructed form of hegemonic relations that is consistent within a framework of history:

...the conception of historical bloc (in) which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.⁵⁴

Thus within each historic bloc the hegemonic character is different, as is the set of popular beliefs and assumptions or 'common sense' formed between the dominant and subordinate classes. For example, the working principles held in feudal times differed from those in the years which followed the Treaty of Westphalia, in which the state and territoriality took on greater significance. The withering away of one historic bloc and the formation of another bloc is dependent upon the formation of the hegemony, and develops over time, so it is important that generalisations are avoided when one is attempting to draw time lines to distinguish blocs. The ideas, material circumstances and overriding hegemonic forces that rule them take time to emerge. This form of historical hegemonic development will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two.

1.2.4 Gramsci and the International

Can Gramsci's assumptions on hegemony and historic bloc be converted to the field of IR? In his *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci does briefly refer to the fact that the international arena should be viewed in the same aspect as the state. In his work on state and civil society, he states:

The international situation should be considered in its national aspect. In reality, the internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is 'original' and (in a certain sense) unique: these relations must be understood and conceived in their originality and uniqueness if one wishes to dominate and direct them. To be sure the line of development is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is 'national' - and it is from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise. Consequently, it is necessary to study accurately the combination of national forces which the international class will have to lead and develop, in accordance with the international perspective and directives.⁵⁵

If we follow the philosophy of praxis, along which Gramsci's work is conceived, then the study of hegemonic social forces can be analysed in both national and international contents. It can also be claimed in different circumstances that hegemonies, which have been developed from social formats within the state, have spilled over national boundaries and influenced cultures and hegemonic forms in other countries. For example in the 'modern Prince' he states:

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too... The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and exploit it...⁵⁶

One possibility in understanding global hegemony is by viewing it as a 'two order alienation process' with the level being formed at the local or national level before being transformed to the global stage. Mark Rupert, in his study of the formation of American neoliberalism looks at how the ideologies of Ford and Taylor initiated the development of 'common-sense' within American society.⁵⁷ The induction of the assembly line production was formulated originally by Ford at the Detroit plant before spreading, after a series of struggles, to become renowned as Americanism or the 'American way'. By the time the US had emerged as the dominant state within the international arena, this 'American way' became globalised due to the cold war, with a mixed-economic labour partnership being constructed in tandem with national-capitalist governments, in order to stem the threat of Communism.⁵⁸ Thus what commenced with the 'paternalist' working philosophy of Ford within the US reached a position of the universal model of neoliberalism by the time the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO) met at the end of the Second World War to endorse a strategy of trade agreements that would lead to a liberalised international economic order.⁵⁹ This was further aided by the Marshall Plan, which, in addition to providing capital, created a culture capable of filtering through society. While the tidy structural notion of the growth of Pax Americana provided by Rupert seems attractive, the flowing notion of local-national-international does provide some overlooked and problematic tendencies. For instance, it is widely noted in the study of industrial relations (and was indeed commented on by Gramsci himself), that the Fordist assembly line mode and the

Taylorite technique of scientific management was borrowed and incorporated in the Soviet Union as a means of mass production, its means being used to aid socialism, a system in direct conflict with the Pax Americana.⁶⁰

What Rupert illustrates in his 1995 study of Fordism is the ability to recreate a case study that remains consistent with the Gramscian logic. In addition, he demonstrates how a hegemonic order formed within a dominant national stage can be used (as stated by Gramsci above) as a point of departure to the international field.⁶¹ By studying the series of class struggles apparent within the US in the 20s and 30s, Rupert demonstrates how the 'new deal' provided a successful compromise, to be used as a 'model' for other 'western' governments during the Cold War.

Stephen Gill offers an even-greater textual ontology of the application of Gramsci.⁶² For Gill a close textual awareness of Gramsci is necessary to engage with the problems of interpreting his work.⁶³ By transferring his studies of IR and IPE, Gill focuses his perceptions of hegemony and the historical relevance of consciousness and social time by carefully and consistently deconstructing Gramsci's initial concepts.⁶⁴ However despite this, both Gill and Rupert are in different ways indebted to the *neo-Gramscian* ontology that was constructed by Robert Cox and which has been the main focus of the growth of Gramscian application within IPE. Here the emphasis is not so much to apply the precise definitions that Gramsci described in his Prison Notebooks, but rather to use his

concepts of the state and to adapt them to the global practices of political economy.

1.3 Cox and World Orders

The most convincing pioneer of neo-Gramscian political economy in IR is Robert Cox. It was his work which first brought attention to the alternative framework of using historical structures as a critical rival to the 'problem-solving' premises which were taken for granted within IR,⁶⁵ and his writings still provide the best guidelines for explanatory uses. He places the concepts of hegemony and historic bloc directly in the practices of the international. Contained within a historic bloc are the fundamental Gramscian principles of material capabilities, ideas and institutions, all of which inter-relate and interact with each other to provide a potential hegemonic base.⁶⁶ This formula can be more practically understood on a global level as a configuration of social forces, forms of state, and world orders; all of which are interrelated, but place pressures and constraints upon each other – thus opening up possibilities for transformation.⁶⁷ Social forces fuel changes to the production process and to the way in which it is organised. Forms of states originate as 'ideas' before being taken as the norm as more and more develop into a state system, producing an identity within the states by their inhabitants. World orders define how a state-system is run, or in Cox's words are 'the particular configuration of forces which

successively define the problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of states'.⁶⁸

Corresponding to the Gramscian view that hegemony is the tool that binds these levels together, a hegemonic global order can be seen as an 'order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production that penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production'.⁶⁹ Global hegemony also contains the social and cultural constraints within its totality. These can be fashioned by forms of international organization; thus when a liberal/neoliberal hegemony is in place institutions are set up (IMF, World Bank, GATT) to incorporate the state-system to the rules of economic liberalism.

In response to the positivist debate concerning the relevance of the theory of hegemonic stability, one can read the Coxian form of explanation in such a way as to redefine the concepts of hegemony within IPE. Rather than viewing the recent history of global economics as a pattern of *Hegemony - Non Hegemony - Hegemony - Non Hegemony*, it should alternatively be seen as a period of constant hegemony, being applied within differing historic blocs. Therefore the hegemonic character and societal 'norms' are changing as one bloc fades and another emerges. In *Production, Power and World Order* Cox sees the same periods that Keohane, Gilpin, and Krasner study (e.g. from the beginnings of British world supremacy to the present day), as being eras of Liberal hegemony (Pax Britannia). They all highlighted the era of 'Rival Imperialism' in which

nationalism and state self-sufficiency made up the common hegemonic practices; and finally the Pax Americana which created a neoliberalist order.⁷⁰ A full examination of this historical outline will be undertaken in the next chapter.

As the Gramscian concept of hegemony relies upon a complex relationship that binds and saturates society towards a common ideology (see above), then contained within each era are components (be they social, political or cultural) that contribute to the overall hegemony. In addition, the character of a hegemonic order transforms gradually and so one needs to reject the more positivist observation that one event (such as the oil crisis and the breakdown of the dollar standard) causes an immediate transformation. For these reasons it is difficult to determine whether the present global situation can be seen as the beginning of a new hegemonic order or a sign that the liberal attributes brought by the Pax Americana are maturing.⁷¹ For despite empirical studies suggesting that the US has retreated from a dominant role in the world economy, the current global set-up, such as the rise of the well documented non-state actors, the emergence of privately owned transnational companies and the move away from national welfare, can be seen as a true reflection of the neoliberal way of life that American influences wanted to achieve.⁷²

1.3.1 The Neo-Gramscian Potential for Counter Hegemony

In tandem with the critical outline created by Cox are his predictions and the future possibilities of change, all contained within the realisation that the hegemonic character of a world order has a strength which its components will continue to exploit so that any resistance to it takes a slow and transformatory nature. This 'realistic' and suspicion of utopian assumptions have fuelled observers to entitle Cox and his followers the 'new realists'.⁷³ The difference between the neo-realist and the 'critical theorist'⁷⁴ concerning future development, is that whilst the former claim that the continuing anarchic nature of the state-system will lead to a continued fragile system of self-help, the essence of the Marx/Gramsci inspired critical theory is that it steered towards enlightenment and an emancipation project.⁷⁵ Within social enquiry, theory that has labelled itself 'critical', commits at least in certain ways, to a set of principles which aids to demonstrate how societal relations can move beyond the limits that are placed on them by positivist evaluations.⁷⁶ Thus in neo-Gramscian terms, 'emancipation' is set firmly within the boundaries of 'counter-hegemony'. This entails realising the potential for a counter-hegemonic struggle that can transcend existing social frameworks, but at the same time is able to critique potential social projects that appear to have ideological attributes that contest existing hegemonic mechanisms. Here then, any neo-Gramscian study of counter-hegemony needs to be reflexive in nature⁷⁷. By this I mean that a project needs firstly to remain consistent and be able to reflect upon the theoretical

enquires that are at first established, secondly to show great caution in defining certain configurations that might seek to be 'emancipatory', and finally to expand upon both Cox's and Ashley's point, made earlier in this chapter, that the project needs to reflect on the idea that theory 'always exists for the purpose of someone or something.'⁷⁸ Thus in discussing counter-hegemony it is necessary to show caution when firstly discussing the nature of counter-hegemony and secondly when promoting projects that are 'deemed' to be 'enlightening'.

How then, is it possible to create social forces capable of challenging the components of the neoliberal hegemony? A large proportion of opinion, both at a scholarly and political level, suggests that the current global order is impregnable; that national and transnational fractions are tied to the mast of a neoliberal market-based system of global economic governance, and that the system has filtered through to its lower stratum with mass consumerism and a growing disposition to investment through all sectors of the workforce. This is considered to point to the notion that any resistance is shrinking.⁷⁹ However, as Gill suggests, the inequalities created by this era have resulted in the experience of more and more alienation as the workplace becomes part of a wider social Darwinist struggle in more polarised societies, providing a type of 'rat race' which could prove unstable as it continues and which in turn, could create space for counter-hegemony.⁸⁰

Other opportunities for counter-hegemony and areas in which they can be exploited, are found in scholars as diverse as Rupert, Offe, Linklater and Habermas.⁸¹ Rupert looks at transnationalism and suggests that the emergence of a globalised form of capital production can lead to a new class struggle which will not be limited by state boundaries and this may be expressed in forms of transnational coalition among workers and other 'subaltern groups' in order to challenge the inequalities.⁸² The rise in global corporate power and the consequential decline in welfare is similarly discussed by Claus Offe, who identifies the current post-Keynesian environment as being one of 'disorganized capitalism' as opposed to 'organized capitalism' which had the appearance of the mixed economic virtues of state owned utilities and the post war 'welfare state'.⁸³ With the breakdown of this structural base and the lack of organization inherent within transnationalism, due to its anarchic nature, a collection of counter-hegemonic social forces may gather (especially at times of economic crisis) within both the state itself and on the global stage, to emphasise the weakness and contradictions which the present order contains.⁸⁴

The 'counter hegemonic' social forces created by this form of 'disorganised capitalism' could quite easily return to those of nationalism.⁸⁵ With national identity under threat there is a great possibility for the public to reunite themselves behind the individual state to which they belong to an extent which could incite a new generation of neo-right groups, bringing racist and xenophobic leanings. This has been apparent in studies of workers, resentful of

companies going abroad in search of cheaper labour and in countries reluctant to adapt to Westernisation and using nationalist cultures as a means of resistance.⁸⁶ In response, Linklater and Habermas have looked at more emancipatory methods. Drawing his social philosophy from a mix of sociological and psychological forms of human interaction, Habermas borrows from Kohlberg in his analysis of the relationship between morality and culture.⁸⁷ For Habermas, an enlightened challenge to organised norms can be constructed within a context of 'discourse ethics' – in which a pluralistic dialogue is required to overcome social, economic and cultural exploitation.⁸⁸ Linklater attempts to convert Habermas' 'discourse ethics', in which a universal set of morals, which exclude no social groups, is required to produce an ethical form of communicative action.⁸⁹ For this to be created at the international level a gradual process of global institution building is required in which societal needs can attempt to democratise the hegemony.

In some respects Habermas' work on discourse ethics and post conventional morality hold resemblance to Gramsci's view of the relationship between hegemony and education. As Habermas sees conventional morality in terms of how one relates to one's social group, Gramsci sees the formation of education as contributing to the continued existence of the hegemony:

...great importance is assumed by the general question of language, that is, the question of collectively attaining a single cultural 'climate'. This problem can and must be related to the modern way of considering educational doctrine and practice... (it) should not be restricted to the field of the strictly 'scholastic' relationships by means of which the new generation comes into contact with the old and absorbs its experiences and

its historically necessary values and 'matures' and develops a personality of its own which is historically and culturally superior. This form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals... Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessary an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations.⁹⁰

Here as well, this tool of education used for hegemony is transformed to the global stage by Gramsci's philosophical nature of 'praxis'. Thus one way of challenging hegemony is to challenge the 'educationary', cultural formations involved in its make up and move to democratise them towards what Cox calls a posthegemonic order, where orders that appear 'natural', or what neoliberals themselves would call the 'best system available', can be metamorphosed.⁹¹ This however needs to be undertaken within the Gramscian and neo-Gramscian discourse. For whilst the contributions of the Frankfurt School and Linklater add to the understanding of hegemonic relationships, they are not rooted in the Gramscian tradition, and their conceptualisations of 'critical knowledge' and 'emancipation' ultimately appear at odds with the Gramscian position. For Habermas, an emancipation project engages with the hegemonic world (or, as he would term 'real' world),⁹² thus risking an alternative project that, far from being counter-hegemonic in terms of ideology, is rather constructed within the overriding logic of the hegemonic order itself – consequently strengthening, rather than challenging its overall totality. Indeed, as Farrands has suggested, Habermas himself has moved towards an increasingly liberal position.⁹³ A

further theoretical and practical example of this can be seen in Giddens' 'Third Way' Project, of which I will go into more depth in chapter 3.⁹⁴

These assumptions from the neo-Gramscian school concerning counter-hegemony have been, as yet, slightly weak. They tend to fall into generalised and sometimes deterministic accounts, which often lack reflexivity and criticism. However before demonstrating later in this project (most noticeable in chapter 4), how more vigorous theoretical and empirical study of counter-hegemony can be applied, within the neo-Gramscian framework, it is necessary to demonstrate the major flaws that are evident within neo-Gramscian scholarship to date.

1.4 The problems and critiques of Cox and the neo-Gramscians

Whilst both Cox and the Italian school have opened up new possibilities in investigating the economic and political set up of the global stage, there are a growing number of critiques towards the neo-Gramscian position that have to be assessed and addressed, before an adequate point of theoretical departure is arrived at for the study of the complex processes of hegemony. The general critiques of the work of the Gramscians within IPE are taken from two positions. The first is that any attempt at applying Gramsci's notion of ideological consciousness to the practices of neoliberalism is problematic in content, as Gramsci himself was not only engaging within a different historical era, but was

also concerned with a different theoretical agenda. Hence any re-evaluation of his work falls into the danger of being misrepresented, and also in the light of his own preoccupation with the rise of Fascism in Italy, dated. The second position is aimed more as a critique of the Coxian application of Gramsci – accepting that Gramsci's mantle has enabled a viable passage into a counter-discourse within IPE, but its form at present is rife with ambiguities. Within the first bracket of critique lies Bellamy, who deems Gramscian-inspired theory as misguided and unacceptable, believing that Gramsci should be left within the historical context of his time and place; his writings insubstantial for the complexity of modern day society.⁹⁵ Burnham, on the other hand, does not attempt to address whether or not any neo-Gramscian interpretation is a correct reading of Gramsci, but rather that the neo-Gramscian approach in all forms of social science is leading towards more of a Weberian model and is thus at odds with the Marxist tradition.⁹⁶ By defining a hegemonic social order as a combination of interrelating factors that serve to uphold its overriding ideology, it falls into a pluralist analysis that fails to recognise the strength of the capitalist mode of production. Furthermore it fails to stress the contradictions of capitalist relations and the nature of competition within the world market that determines the main policies and 'ideas' within States.⁹⁷ In other words the 'real' ideology behind the construction of world orders lies not in a collection of cultural-social factors, but in the economic might of market capitalism. By constructing historic blocs, in order to explain the historical shifting of world order, the neo-Gramscians, continues Burnham, slip towards an 'idealist account of the determination of

economic policy' that undermines the key Marxist principle of economic materialism.⁹⁸

What Burnham fails to comprehend is that Marx and Weber are less contradictory than many people like to claim. They also had a great deal more in common on identifying the complexities and the combination of societal interrelating factors than they did on other theoretical matters. By focusing further on these qualities by constructing the process of 'hegemony', Gramsci further adds to these similarities. However, where Marx and Gramsci do differ from Weber (and this is the crucial factor) is over the structural form of class relations and the nature of work and community that these interrelated factors produce.

The second form of critique is perhaps best summed up by Kenny and Germain's article 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and the New Gramscians'. Whilst they state, partly in common with Bellamy, that the Gramscian writing that Cox focuses on was written in part to aid his own understanding of the nature of politics in the early 20th century, the main focus of the piece seems to point to the ambiguities of converting the concepts of hegemony and civil society within the nation-state to global society.⁹⁹ Doubts are thus placed that these can be defined unproblematically at the global level, as within the Gramscian logic a form of concrete international 'state', based upon the hierarchical formation of the national state, would have to exist to reflect

Gramsci's equation of state = political + civil society. Thus the systematic existence of a global civil society in Coxian terms is rejected as it lacks the governmental and cultural identity found within a state.¹⁰⁰ However, Germain and Kenny are eager to stress that Gramsci's 'mantle' has enabled a passage into a counter-discourse within IPE, but call for a greater revision of the Coxian-dominated analysis that global neoliberal hegemony is saturated via a combination of multinational agencies and hegemonic empowerment. This 'simplistic' engagement, they argue, appears problematic.¹⁰¹ Thus, rather than systemically critique the neo-Gramscians, Germain and Kenny offer an invitation to move beyond the interpretations associated with the works of Cox.¹⁰²

Neo-Gramscian responses to these criticisms have (with a few notable exceptions) been quite shallow. In the case of Bellamy and Burnham, for example, there have been few attempts that deal with the problems of historical setting.¹⁰³ For example, both Bellamy (more explicitly) and Burnham argue that Gramsci belonged in a different era, pre-occupied with the problems of that time and that these concerns place grave theoretical doubts upon on the sustainability of both Gramsci's own philosophical inspirations and the strength of his grasp of historicism.¹⁰⁴ Indeed Bellamy himself has edited a collection of Gramsci's pre-prison writings and has claimed both that these contradict his later work and demonstrate that Gramsci himself appeared much more of a party activist than a Marxist-revisionist.¹⁰⁵ However, it should be stressed here, that whilst much of

his Pre-Prison writings were often centred around his work as either leader or a key figure within the Italian Communist Party,¹⁰⁶ his Prison Notebooks represent a move away from activism of any sort and contain solid theoretical constructions for a critical framework of historicism. Gramsci's own 'modern Prince' perhaps best demonstrates this.¹⁰⁷ Here Gramsci metamorphoses Machiavelli into an abstract theoretician, heightening the need, within his own era, for ideological struggle in order for transformation. His 'Prince' takes the historical form of a *'myth-prince... an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take a concrete form.'*¹⁰⁸ This demonstrates far more than just a re-reading of Machiavelli in order to aid the Socialist struggle in Italy, but indicates a sense of universalism within his conception of historical structures. Whilst it needs to be emphasised that Gramsci (due to his past interests and involvements) did focus primarily on the historical foundations of the Italian nation-state, his theoretical constructions (most notable in his usage of the philosophy of praxis) were devised in a manner that both indicated and promoted a greater scale of application.

This brings us to the major crux of Germain and Kenny's critique which has, in the main, been neglected by the apostles of Cox. This is that because Gramsci formulated his examples of hegemony and civil society within the hierarchical confines of the nation-state, it is problematic to suggest these can be sustained beyond it. In answering this it is necessary to both look at some of the few 'IPE

Gramscians' who are moving away from the Coxian reading and at the same time illustrate a more diverse conception of 'global hegemony'. For scholars interested in applying Gramscian theory towards global civil society, Mark Rupert's work holds more appeal than Cox's does. In response to Germain and Kenny, he outlines that there are many avenues for development in Gramsci's work. Borrowing from Marx's alienation theorem he suggests that as the modern state was made possible by capitalism's abstraction of the explicitly political out of economic life; this was especially evident in the more state-centrist era in which Gramsci was analysing, then, through the processes of free trade and transnational capital, a similar process, although not as defined and thus more fragmented, can be seen at the global level.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Rupert departs from the generalised notion that certain periods in history are defined and fixed by a clear configuration of either hegemonic or non-hegemonic forces, by referring to Stuart Hall's more loosely - bounded, yet more multi-complex interpretation of hegemony. For Hall, hegemony comprises of a multiple set of cultural, social and economic agents that are often complex and contradictory in nature, which serve to construct certain positions and practices in order that they can make consensual 'common sense' of the ideological constraints which characterise them as a whole.¹¹⁰ In turn these agents move to shape and re-shape the dominant ideology on which hegemony is based.¹¹¹ Thus there exist certain movement within a hegemonic order where socio-cultural agencies differ and fragment in character in order to comprise a certain form of 'common-sense'. This is especially evident upon the global stage, or above the nation-state, where

a hegemonic order (which as Cox may point out may be enhanced by certain global institutions) is challenged through different social and cultural formats, dependent upon the historical cultural norms and practices of a particular region (or state).

In simplistic terms therefore, global hegemony takes a super-structural form, which appears more complex than at the level of a state. For example the norms and cultural practises in an Islamic state take on a different character to those in Western Europe. However, these practices are moulded, revised and transformed, through different forms of common sense, which although diverse are still fashioned around the practises of neoliberalism. The different historical, cultural, regional, national and religious are thus recognised, as is their transformative nature to historically adapt. Gramsci in his *Cultural Writings* outlines these observations.¹¹²

To meet the theoretical challenges of the critiques placed towards the neo-Gramscians, it should be stressed and re-stressed that Gramsci's conception of hegemony is one that cannot be defined just solely in terms of the national unit, but one which takes a more complex, fragmentary form.¹¹³ Part of this dynamic is observed by Rupert when he re-iterates Gramsci's words (which I reprinted in full above) that 'Every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educative relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-wide field,

between complexes of national and continental civilisations'.¹¹⁴ Additionally, in order to achieve a greater (critical) understanding of relations within a hegemonic order, all these complex agencies need to be explored:

Critical understanding of self takes place therefore through a struggle of political "hegemonies" and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then that of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one. Thus the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical fact, but a part of the historical process, whose elementary and primitive phrase is to be found in the sense of being "different" and "apart", in an instinctive feeling of independence, and which progresses to the level of real possession of a single and coherent conception of the world.¹¹⁵

To place this back into the context of a discussion of hegemonic orders within IPE, I have demonstrated in this section that whilst Cox has been the 'guiding light' of the 'Italian School', it is also necessary for neo-Gramscians to be more reflexive and to re-explore critically his application of Gramsci. By re-assessing the notions of 'global hegemony', a more complex and intricate formula of world orders can be applied. My strategy in this study will be to concentrate on a critical deepening of the understanding of hegemony, although there may also be risks in a relative neglect of other aspects of Gramsci's conceptions.

1.5 Conclusion

This opening chapter has assessed some of the literature that has emerged from IR/IPE concerning the conception of hegemony. It has critiqued both the

positivist ontology of exploring hegemony and the logic inherent within the 'hegemonic stability' and has argued that the Italian school's usage of Gramsci's hegemony has proved to give a more complex and a less parochial epistemology of IPE than one given by Keohane and his neorealist colleagues. It has also outlined the development of neo-Gramscian and Coxian-inspired readings on hegemony and demonstrated why the 'Italian School' have developed a more acute, critical account of the concepts of hegemony, historic blocs and world orders, that appear more sophisticated than scientific Marxist accounts of class relations. I have also argued here that neo-Gramscians also need to be more precise about how they use the Gramscian logic, in order to stress the potentially rich forms of scholarship and enquiry that such a critical discourse can provide. As Adam Morton states, in a recent article responding to the critiques by Germain/Kenny and Bellamy 'One has to do their work to make Gramsci work'.¹¹⁶

Having outlined the literature and theoretical openings that the neo-Gramscian school has provided to the study of hegemony, I will, in the next chapter, demonstrate how a form of historicism is essential to an understanding of the workings of a hegemonic order and how social forces have historically served to exploit and transform the ideological legitimation contained within the corresponding order. The next chapter advances the theoretical observations explored in this chapter, and develops how these observations can be used to

enhance the historical understanding of hegemony and world orders.

¹ The phrase the 'Italian school' was formally coined by Stephen Gill, in the article 'Epistemology, Ontology and the Italian School', which is the opening chapter of *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, a collection of articles (edited by Gill) written by the former constructors of Gramscian inspired theory.

² Ole Wæver, 'Rise and Fall of the inter-paradigm debate', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds.), *International theory: positivism & beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 149-185.

³ Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 10 (2), 1981, pp.126-155.

⁴ Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, London: Frances Pinter, 1988, prologue.

⁵ In addition to Strange's critique of the three positions, an overall view of the historical fashioning of the three can be found in Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, Ch. 3; Stephen Krasner, 'The accomplishment of International Political Economy', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds.), *International theory: positivism & beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, Ch. 4. Also in the same volume, see Ole Wæver, op. cit., pp. 149-185.

⁶ Richard Ashley, 'Political Realism and Human Interests', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25, 1981, pp. 204-46, Cox reiterates this statement in 'Social forces, states, and World order'.

⁷ For example Robert Gilpin, op. cit., 1987, Chapter 1.

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Theories of International Politics*, Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979

⁹ See for example Robert Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983

¹⁰ Susan Strange, 'Capitalism and the state system', in S. Gill and J. Mittelman (ed), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 242.

¹¹ See note 4.

¹² Stephen Krasner, op. cit., 1996, p. 115

¹³ Martin Wight, 'Why is there No International Theory', 1966, reprinted in J. Der Derian (ed.), *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.

¹⁴ Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., 1979.

¹⁵ The 'Cobweb model', that has become a buzzword, both within pluralistic literature and with advocates of interdependence and free trade, was initially coined by John Burton. See John Burton, *World Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

¹⁶ Two recent accounts that strengthened this position. See Samuel Barkin, 'Constructing Absolutes: The creation of International Economic Leadership', Paper Presented at the *Annual International Studies Association Convention*, Chicago, 2001, & G. John Ikenberry, 'American power and the empire of capitalist development', *Review of International Studies*, 27 (special issue), 2001, pp. 191-213.

¹⁷ For examples of this see, Richard Little, 'The Growing Relevance of Pluralism', in Smith, Booth and Zalewski (eds.), op. cit., 1995; Chris Brown, 'International Political Theory and the Idea of World Community', in Smith and Booth (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today*, Cambridge: Polity, 1995; Michael Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics', *American Political Science Review*, 80 (4), pp. 1151-69, & Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, London: Harper-Collins, 1993.

¹⁸ Here I not only refer to the claims made by Fukuyama, see, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992, but also to the work of scholars such as Doyle, op. cit., and Dahrendorf, the latter having once notoriously uttered the words 'Socialism is dead'. For

Dahrendorf's most recent work on the ideological irreversibility of liberalism, see *After 1989*, London: Macmillan, 1997.

¹⁹ Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981 & 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism' in R. Keohane (ed.), op. cit., 1986.

²⁰ Robert Keohane, for example would find himself in this category.

²¹ Albert O. Hirschman, op. cit., 1945; Charles Kindleberger, *Economic response: Comparative Studies in Trade, Finance, and Growth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978 & 'On the Rise and Decline of Nations', *International Studies Quarterly*, 27, 1983, pp. 5-10.

²² Ibid.

²³ See Robert Keohane, op. cit., 1984; Gilpin, op. cit., 1987.

²⁴ Ibid., & Arthur Lewis, *The Evolution of the International Economic Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

²⁵ Richard Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968 and work in Willem Buiter and Richard Marston (eds.), *International Economic Policy Coordination*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

²⁶ Charles P. Kindleberger, 'Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy', *International Studies Quarterly*, 25, 1981, p. 253.

²⁷ Ibid. Keohane (op. cit., 1984, chapter 2) also observes this, but refutes the conclusions taken from it.

²⁸ Robert Keohane, op. cit., 1984, Ch. 3.

²⁹ Gilpin points to the existence of a Pax Romana, see Gilpin, op. cit., 1981.

³⁰ Timothy J. McKeown, 'Hegemonic stability theory and 19th century tariff levels in Europe', *International Organisation*, 37 (1), 1983, pp. 73-91.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 87-89.

³² Robert Keohane, op. cit., 1984.

³³ See J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, 15, 1990 pp. 5-56 & Kenneth Waltz, 'The New World Order', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, vol.22 (2), 1993, pp.187-195.

³⁴ Albert O. Hirschman, op. cit., Ch. 1, & Charles Kindleberger, op. cit., 1981, pp. 242-253.

³⁵ See N. Bukharin, *Selected writings on the state and the transition to socialism*, Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1982.

³⁶ Richard Ashley, 'The Poverty of neorealism', in Robert Keohane, (ed) *Neorealism and its critics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 253.

³⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge: Polity, 1979, Ch. 1.

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ See for example, A-G Frank, *Dependent accumulation and underdevelopment*, London: Macmillan, 1978.

⁴⁰ Wallerstein, op. cit., 1979, final Chapter.

⁴¹ This indeed is a critique of much of Fred Block's work. See for example, Fred Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

⁴² This is Waltz's classic critic of reductionism. Using Lenin as the main focus of critique, Waltz argues that within International Politics the usage of reductionism is problematic, as it undermines the structural strength of the state-system, see, Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., 1979.

⁴³ For a generalised 'critical' overview of this critiques, see Andrew Linklater, 'The achievements of Critical Theory', in Smith, Booth & Zalewski, op. cit., 1996; and R. Devetak, 'Critical Theory', in S. Burchill et al, 'Theories of International Relations', Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995. For a comprehensive critique of classical Marxism, see the trilogy by Giddens; *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, 1981, *The Nation-State and Violence*, 1985, & *Beyond Right and Left: The future of radical politics*, 1992, Cambridge: Polity Press.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Karl Marx, *Selected Works*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, pp. 79

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- ⁴⁶ Karl Marx, *Contribution to Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 19-22, & Mark Rupert, 'Alienated, Capitalism and the Inter-State System', in Gill (ed), *Gramsci, historical materialism and international materialism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 69.
- ⁴⁷ This definition is from the Concise Collins English Language Dictionary.
- ⁴⁸ Raymond Williams, 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory', in *Problems in materialism and culture: selected essays*, London: Verso, 1980.
- ⁴⁹ Anne Showstack Sassoon, *Approaches to Gramsci*, London: Writers and Readers, 1982, pp. 13-14.
- ⁵⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 52.
- ⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 206-276
- ⁵² Ibid., p. 59.
- ⁵³ Ibid., p. 431.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 377
- ⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 240.
- ⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 176.
- ⁵⁷ Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ⁶⁰ Anne Showstack Sassoon, op. cit., p. 12
- ⁶¹ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1995.
- ⁶² Stephen Gill, op. cit., 1993.
- ⁶³ Ibid.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid. & Stephen Gill, 'Transformation and innovation in world order' from Gill & Mittelman, *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 5-23.
- ⁶⁵ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1981, pp. 87-91.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 101
- ⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 100
- ⁶⁹ Robert Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: A study in Method', *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 12 (2), 1983, p. 137.
- ⁷⁰ Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.
- ⁷¹ These are conceptions forms that I discuss in depth in chapters 2 & 3.
- ⁷² Susan Strange argues from a more economical position that the Structural Power of the US has continued through its multinational investment, despite in terms of domestic production it appears to be in decline. Furthermore she suggests that the domestic and the international cannot be separated analytically. See, 'The persistent myth of lost hegemony', *International Organisation*, 41 (4), 1987, pp. 551-74.
- ⁷³ Richard Falk, 'The critical realist tradition and the demystification of interstate power: E.H. Carr, Hedley Bull and Robert W. Cox', from Gill & Mittelman, op. cit., pp. 39-41; Robert W. Cox, *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, London: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid. Falk's definition of 'critical realism' refers to a tradition in IR, that is noted both in forms of methodological historicism and in its commitment to enlightenment. It is not to be confused with a more philosophical application of critical realism, based upon the scientific realism of Roy Bhasker, see Heikki Patomaki and Colin Wight, 'After Post-Positivism: The Promises of Critical Realism', *International Studies Quarterly*, 43 (2), pp. 213-37.
- ⁷⁵ Andrew Linklater, op. cit., 1996, p. 279
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ To be 'reflexive', as Farrands argues, involves using theory to seek a critical self-understanding that enables one to 'stand outside existing knowledge practices in order to critique

- them', see Chris Farrands, 'Critical about being critical' in J. Abbott and O. Worth (eds.), *Critical Perspectives in International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, p. 25.
- For a further discussion of the world economy and reflexivity see 'The Theory of Reflexivity', by George Soros, delivered April 26, 1994 to the MIT Department of Economics World Economy Laboratory Conference Washington, D.C. See also Mark Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 39-69.
- ⁷⁸ See note six.
- ⁷⁹ See for example, John Blundell and Brian Gosschalk, *Beyond Left and Right*, London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1997; Colin Crouch, 'The Terms of the neoliberal consensus', *Political Quarterly*, 68 (4), 1997; Paul Krugman, *Peddling Prosperity*, New York: Norton, 1995.
- ⁸⁰ Gill, op. cit., 1997
- ⁸¹ Mark Rupert, 'Globalisation and Contested Common Sense in the US', in Gill & Mittelman (eds), op. cit., 1997; Claus Offe, *Disorganised Capitalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Jurgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative action*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990; Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the theory of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (second ed.), 1990
- ⁸² Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1993, pp. 86-89.
- ⁸³ Claus Offe, op. cit., 1985
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ See for example Owen Worth, 'The Janus-face of counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism', *Global Society*, 16 (3), 2002 pp. 297-317.
- ⁸⁶ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1995, final chapter & *Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending visions of a New World Order*, Routledge: London, 2000.
- ⁸⁷ Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice: Vol. 1*, London: Harper Collins, 1981.
- ⁸⁸ Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
- ⁸⁹ See Jurgen Habermas, op. cit., 1990; Andrew Linklater, op. cit., 1990.
- ⁹⁰ Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, pp. 349-350.
- ⁹¹ Robert Cox. 'Towards a Post-hegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun', in J. Rosenau and E. Czemiapl (eds.), *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- ⁹² Jurgen Habermas, op. cit., 1987.
- ⁹³ Chris Farrands, op.cit., 2002.
- ⁹⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
- ⁹⁵ Richard Bellamy, 'Gramsci, Croce and the Italian Tradition', *History of Political thought*, vol. XI, (2), 1990, pp. 313-337.
- ⁹⁶ Peter Burnham, 'Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and International Order', *Capital and Class*, 45 (91), 1991.
- ⁹⁷ Ibid.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹⁹ Randall D. Germain & Michael Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations theory and the new Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, pp. 3-21.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ There has been a greater tendency instead to 'write off Gramsci', or even to move Gramsci back into a greater framework of 'open Marxism'. See Adam Morton and Andreas Bieler, 'Globalisation, the State and Resistance: A 'Critical Economy' Response to Open Marxism', Paper Presented at the British International Studies Association Annual Conference, Edinburgh, 2001. Indeed it could be argued that the 'Amsterdam School', a more recognized sub-set of the Italian School, would argue that their purpose of engaging with Gramsci was to place it back within a greater neo-Marxist framework. See, for example H. Overbeek, *Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in Perspective*, London: Routledge, 1990 & Kees van Der Pijl, *Transnational Classes and International Relations*, London: Routledge, 1998.

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- ¹⁰⁴ R. Bellamy, op. cit., 1990; & P. Burnham, op. cit., 1991.
- ¹⁰⁵ Antonio Gramsci, 'Pre-Prison Writings' (ed. R. Bellamy), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- ¹⁰⁶ Gramsci was leader (or General Secretary) of the Italian Communist Party from April, 1924 until his arrest in November 1926. He was also elected to the Chamber of Deputies in April, 1924. For a more detailed overview of his life see, Fiori Giuseppe, *Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary*, London: Verso 1996.
- ¹⁰⁷ Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and other Writings*, New York: International Publishers, 1957.
- ¹⁰⁸ Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, p. 129.
- ¹⁰⁹ Mark Rupert, 'Engaging Gramsci: A response to Germain and Kenny', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (3), 1998, pp. 427-435.
- ¹¹⁰ Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal*, London: Verso, 1988; see also Stuart Hall et al, *Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall*, London: Verso, 2000.
- ¹¹¹ Rupert, op. cit., 1998.
- ¹¹² Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Cultural Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985, in particular see the section on 'People, Nation and Culture', pp. 196-286
- ¹¹³ Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, pp. 210-218.
- ¹¹⁴ See note 75.
- ¹¹⁵ Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, p. 333.
- ¹¹⁶ Adam David Morton, 'On Gramsci', *Politics*, 19 (1), 1999, p. 7.

Chapter Two: Historicising Hegemony: A historical evaluation of the formation of World Orders

The last chapter discussed the literature and openings that Gramscian and neo-Gramscian interpretations have given to the study of hegemony. This chapter aims to delve further into an explanation of global hegemony by outlining a form of historicism that serves to explain the historical developments and differing hegemonic characters that are formed within respective historical orders.¹ It thus plans to demonstrate that in order to establish a more effective depiction of the workings of hegemony in global terms, an examination of the historical processes that have contributed to the formations of the series of hegemonic orders, inherent within the timescale of modernity is required. In doing so it will draw extensively on Cox's 1987 work, *Power, Production and World Order*, as well as scholars such as Braudel, Arrighi and Hobsbawm to provide both a greater realisation of the construction of hegemony and of the understanding of the nature of today's key hegemonic components.

2.1 Production and Social Hierarchies

Taking the notion which was discussed in the first chapter, that hegemony comprises a binding totality, which in turn is dependent on some kind of class structure/social hierarchy that is accepted by the constituents of society, then to locate a mode of production free from hegemony, one would be forced to retreat

to the primitive form of subsistence. It is under this primitive mode that man retreats to his animal instincts and his only material tools are used for hunting in order to survive. Whilst there has recently been certain economic and anthropological studies which make normative claims upon the benefits of simplistic subsistence,² it has been widely accepted by world-systems theorists and historical materialists alike,³ that this form of production limits the scope of human capability, as it is based on survival, with no excess material existent beyond this. Thus to borrow from Marx, man differs from the animal kingdom as it is a conscious species-being and whereas the animal can only produce for itself and its offspring, man can transform production and produce universally.⁴ Therefore, within subsistence and tribal society, man neglects his potential as he fails to break from the animal ontology.

Whilst this chapter does not intend to focus on the multitude of civilisations in existence prior to feudalism, or indeed the European model of feudalism itself, it is nevertheless important to discuss some of the social and hierarchic relationships that preceded the growth of capitalism. Cox identifies two forms of production relations which are apparent within the timescale of medievalism: the peasant-lord mode and the primitive labour market.⁵ The former was based on the concept that a 'lord' owned the land on which the feudal village was situated, and subsequently ordered the positions and social status of the villagers. For the peasant-lord production mode to be implied a form of state was needed. This 'form of state' initially established its identity as a result of tribal expansionism

and was to materialise into different forms of national medievalism.⁶ For example, the establishment of England before the Norman Conquest arose from centuries of tribal struggle, between Celts, Jutes and Saxons. The leader of the tribe transformed himself over time to the title 'king' and by appointing hereditary lordships, designated to those aides of the king, created a social hierarchal order.

The primitive labour market, noticeable during feudal times, can be seen at the root of modern capitalism. The logic here is that the European model of feudalism developed alongside trade fairs until the territory of the feudal village expanded in tandem with commerce and industry, which the establishment of the fairs spurred on, and thus led, by the sixteenth century, to the growth of modern day capitalism⁷. This however should be taken with some caution.⁸ It ignores the pre-existing civilisations and hegemonic forms that contributed to the global system, prior to the establishment of the Western-centric production system. The progressive format of historicism, as envisaged by the traditional Marxist interpretations of historical materialism and some recent Hegelian-inspired liberals, does not consider that advanced civilisations existed before European feudalism became evident.⁹ At the same time the empiricists, who perceive the growth of a European-dominated world economy during the 16th century as being a finale to feudalism, fail to recognise political economies in other parts of the world. For example Janet L. Abu-Lughod analyses the international trade formations in the twelve and thirteenth centuries and concludes that if a type of world system did exist prior to the system that was emerging by the 16th century,

then its origins were evident in areas further afield than just Europe.¹⁰ Such factors as the circulation of paper money, banking and merchant communication can be traced back to the Orient and the Middle East, whilst the European fairs, seen as the roots of Western capitalism, which emerged over time from the style of a local market to a global one, take their origin from North Africa.¹¹

Thus whilst much is written and assumed from the classical historical materialist and the world systems theory¹² there are irregularities which exist in defining when the systemic time boundaries progressed from medieval feudalism to modern capitalism. In terms of hegemony and the ideological socio-economic culture that is inherent within a mode of production, the transformation did not fully occur until the 'enterprise labour market' began to form; this had the character of urbanised industrialisation which originally developed in Great Britain during the industrial revolution.

2.2 The Treaty of Westphalia and the formation of a European- based global economy

Whilst today's form of urbanised capitalism can be traced back to the industrial revolution, the state-system which was institutionalised at the Treaty of Westphalia brought in a different set of norms and practices than those found in medieval times. Sovereignty and territorial boundaries distinguishing one state from another became more distinct and, as a secular ruler, or institutional set of

rules existed internally within each state, then the public, within civil society, began to identify with it and thus the feelings of nationalism grew up.

The structure of the state-system gave the state legitimacy over the use of violence and allowed it to 'legitimise a system of domestic and external - national and international - relations based on private property and territorial expansion'.¹³ The European states, or 'powers' to borrow from Paul Kennedy¹⁴, adopted a principle of territorial expansion and empowerment and the competition for supremacy led to colonial gains as the individual state looked to boost its economy with materials from lands around the globe, previously unconnected with Europe. Thus the competitive nature which grew up from the European state-system led to the beginnings of the Europeanisation of the world and the further cultural and hegemonic constraints which this process brought with it produced a global economy, with global 'norms'.

Whilst the system of self-help and territorial bounded states had and continues to have great support in theory (one can go back in political philosophical history to Plato's Republic, through to Hobbes and Machiavelli and up to the present day logic within IR of Wight and Waltz), in practice it became vulnerable. The system required a constant balance of power to maintain its fundamental order and this became apparent when other social and political factors came into play. The system fell apart when one of the leading states, France, had a revolution and subsequently built an empire within Europe during the Napoleonic Wars.

Wallerstein and his world system followers view the formation of the State-system as the structural foundation of the set up of the modern Capitalist world economy. The competitive nature of the logic of self-help bred the notion of capitalism - the capitalist accumulators within their respective countries were able to use economic practices to enhance the positions of their states within the world economy. Thus for Wallerstein there is a marriage between the formation of capitalism and the modern state-system, both structures were bound together and under the conditions of the global system since both were able to flourish in unity with each other:

Capitalism has been able to flourish precisely because the world-economy has within its bounds not one but a multiplicity of political systems.¹⁵

Using this mind-set the rise of pluralism through transnational activity and the weakening of sovereignty, which appears to undermine the state formation, should also cause tensions within the foundations of world capitalism. Indeed both Wallerstein and Hopkins are optimistic that new movements (such as the weakening of super-state rivalry, the continual problems of finding a solution to world debt within the periphery and the rise of communications and the 'global village') will cause large cracks in the stability of the system, which could create class struggles large enough to affect the future of the world economy. In fact Wallerstein's and Hopkin's optimistic prophecies go as far as suggesting that a combination of transnational 'anti-systemic movements' could bear greater fruit in the Twenty First Century - that the student demonstrations of 1968 can be seen

as a 'great rehearsal' and that as we enter the new millennium the contradictions which were highlighted in 1968 (inequality, increase in disadvantaged groups etc) will become greater and the loss of sovereignty and the weakening of the state-system will lower the resistance to the demonstrators' demands.¹⁶

The critique of Wallerstein's theory of the historical foundations of the world-economy is two-fold. Firstly he sees his construction of a modern world-system as a structure whose framework and rules have remained in place since the sixteenth century, with the treaty of Westphalia forming an institutional symptom of the international environment which was developing. His totalising system ignores how both the global economy transforms and changes over time. For example as mentioned above, the form of state-system in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries upon which Wallerstein's modern structure is based broke down after the French revolution, to be replaced by the Pax Britannia, which gradually materialised after the 1815 Congress of Vienna. This differed from the notion of self-help and states competing with each other for superiority over socio-political culture as one country constructed institutions and practices which were then adopted by other European states.

Secondly Wallerstein's notion that the modern system of sovereignty and capitalism were entwined together is somewhat ambiguous. This is best noted by Arrighi, who points out that just because the world economy was split into

competing political units, it does not necessarily follow that Capitalism would benefit and vice versa. He explains:

It largely depends on the form and intensity of competition. For example, if inter-state competition takes the form of intense and long-drawn out armed struggle, there is no reason why the costs of interstate competition to capitalist accumulators should not exceed the costs of centralised rule that they would have to bear in a world-empire. On the contrary, under such circumstances the profitability of capitalist enterprise might well be undermined... At the same time, competition among capitalist accumulators does not necessarily promote the continual segmentation of the political realm into separate jurisdictions. If capitalist accumulators are enmeshed in dense transstate networks of production and exchange, the segmentation of these networks into separate political jurisdictions may bear negatively on the competitive position of each and every capitalist enterprise relative to non-capitalist enterprises.¹⁷

Arrighi follows this with a view that borrows, at least in part, from Gramsci's interpretation of hegemony. He argues that for the institutional form of the Capitalist state-system to flourish, a hegemon is required. This appears not in the realist-positivistic sense of the role of the dominant 'leader' (as the disciples of the theory of hegemonic stability, which I discussed in chapter one, believe), but in the sense that historically when there exists an ideology and a set of 'norms' instigated by one country, then the state-system, acting through the processes of capitalism proves stable.¹⁸ Thus for Arrighi, the Treaty of Westphalia was organised by the Dutch, after it had emerged from the 14th century that the growth of the European state was causing the medieval system to disintegrate.¹⁹ It was the Dutch who worked to put down the foundations for the oncoming state-system, by realising that the current chaotic atmosphere that was apparent in conflicts such as the Thirty-Year War needed a set of rules to implement a system to reflect the international environment, and the Dutch, in establishing a strong

state and a strong intellectual and moral leadership in north-western Europe had the potential to dictate such an order, and finally liquidate the remains of the medieval system of rule.²⁰

Arrighi's model presupposes that since the end of medievalism, a hegemonic order has been required to hold the modern-Capitalist form together. The order originates from the state which was the 'leading Capitalist state of its epoch',²¹ and the rise and fall of each hegemony coincides with the stability of the regime which the hegemon had put in place. When one state had been challenged by the economic or military might of others, another order gradually emerged with the state on the international stage having the greatest potential and capability to take the lead in forming another hegemonic order.

Whilst Arrighi's theory gives a detailed and valuable insight into the process of global hegemony, his interpretations of the three 'hegemonies of historical capitalism' require some attention. Although he clearly makes attempts to separate the total unity of the growth of the state-system from capitalism, he confuses the connection between his three orders. Whilst it could be argued that the Dutch emerged as a forerunner that framed the foundations of European trade, it would be difficult to describe the hegemonic period of the seventeenth century as being a product of the Dutch. Similarly the Treaty (or Treaties) of Westphalia did not create any institutions that would influence global economics, but rather instigated conditions that concentrated on international law and diplomacy

between states that reinforced and legitimised the anarchic system. Furthermore in stabilising diplomatic institutions it stabilised a climate for both the growth of trade relations and the management of colonial expansion. As such it allowed states to develop their own form of socio-cultural political economies within their boundaries, without applying it within a universal set of principles. The British and American-led forms of hegemonic order, however, as I explain below, were based on a liberalised, institutionalised form of global economics, which rode above national boundaries. Both the Pax Britannia and the Pax Americana rested upon urbanised modes of mass production, which ultimately stemmed from the industrial revolution and so it would be difficult to compare these definite forms of global order with the weakly constructed case of Dutch hegemony.

Arrighi also fails to account for the period which Cox describes as 'The era of Rival Imperialism'²²; the era when the liberal system of the nineteenth century was in retreat and the global arena reverted back to nationalism. For Arrighi this unstable period was the result of the chaos brought about when one hegemonic order crumbles and another one is yet to form. This takes us back to the positivist notion of the theory of hegemonic stability (see chapter one), in which for a global order to exist there is a need for a leader. However this period, chaotic as it was, did contain certain social forces and cultural strains that produced a separate mind-set, which should be looked at and distinguished from the British and American hegemonies.

2.3 The British Liberal hegemony

Whilst the state system allowed the capitalist system to develop, the Industrial Revolution allowed it to flourish. It would lead to a form of production that, in societal terms, transformed the entire social environment which had previously existed.

The emergence of this social revolution on a global scale was aided by the French revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars. These were to underline the current imbalances that were apparent within the global system and allow a new order to be formed. Whilst diplomatically Britain did gain from the congress of Vienna at the end of the war, it was Britain's trading and naval power that were strengthened in the aftermath of France's defeat, ultimately setting the scene for a process of international economic liberalism.

The first movements towards the liberal era can be found within the domestic policies of Britain itself. The internationalisation of the policy was an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the international field.²³ Whilst the social and industrial conditions of Taylor and Fordism shaped the conditions that formed the Pax Americana, the British route to liberalism can be traced to key acts which removed the obstacles to the principle of the liberal market. These acts allowed the revolutionary middle class movements formed by the industrial revolution to come to the core within central economies.

In his book *The Great Transformation* Karl Polanyi saw the abolition of the Speenhamland System as the main social occurrence in allowing the formation of the Liberal state.²⁴ This system, named after the parish in which it was formed, gave relief to the poor, irrespective of their social status; the relief given depended on the price of bread, and allowed every member of the parish to avoid starvation. Critics using the Adam Smith logic,²⁵ claimed that the system restricted the industrial and entrepreneur potential of Britain as it resulted in workers becoming dependant upon poor relief - as landowning employers realised that they could pay their workers less because the parish would top up their weekly allowance. Also it restricted the process of free movement, as the workforce became tied to its parish. Thus in the oncoming capitalist environment there was a need to force society into the labour market, and to limit reliance on benefit. In achieving this, the controversial Poor Law Amendment Act was passed by the Whigs. The act radicalised the system of poor relief in Britain, by setting up 'workhouses' - institutions made infamous by their inhumane conditions, that aimed to both limit those dependent upon subsidy, and increase the migration to the wealth-creating urban areas. The upshot of the act was that while it created the sort of social injustice that became infamous throughout history, it promoted a considerable increase in urban migration, allowing Britain to become the first industrial capitalist state. Thus the act allowed the liberal market mechanism to be firmly put in place. As Karl Polanyi states:

It is no exaggeration to say that the social history of the nineteenth century was determined by the logic of the market system proper after it was released by the Poor Law Reform Act of 1834.²⁶

By the time the Corn Laws had been repealed in 1846²⁷, further transformatory economic action had been taken by Peel's subsequent Conservative government; the Bank Act gave the legitimate green light for ensuring the strict application of the gold standard and the Companies Act of the same year (1844) helped further regulate private business activity, paving the way for the Laissez-Faire economics of the 50s and 60s.²⁸

From the economic and industrial position of Great Britain in the mid-nineteenth century, the other states within Europe were forced into a position of playing 'catch up'. In 1850 Great Britain was the only European nation in which more than 20% of the population inhabited cities of over 100,000,²⁹ and by opening up their domestic markets, other countries were influenced by the British mode of development and also benefited from such factors as communication networks which arose from this expansion. Thus European powers responded to the British free trade movements by reducing protectionist fortresses of their own, although, as McKeown has commented, empirically these claims are not as conclusive as may first appear. The tariff levels in Britain in the mid 1850s were not as favourable as the levels in Prussia in 1818 and other competing nations, notably France were only interested in lowering tariffs so that they could bring in cheaper goods to enhance French industry.³⁰ However, what was evident was that by the mid-nineteenth century countries consciously followed and adapted to the

practices and societal transformations made by the British. The Industrial Revolution, domestic at first, spread and expanded to the international arena, as the rest of Europe followed in an industrialisation drive that resulted in a significant hierarchal shift within society, as both the middle classes and the urban elite prospered, with the shift in profitable production.

Britain managed to obtain an economic position in the height of its supremacy that allowed it to undersell its competitor states and achieve a unique position in which it could alter the structure of the world economy for its own gains. Despite arguments that competing European powers could have shut off from trading with Britain, thus lowering its financial hold over the world,³¹ potential entrepreneurs and up and coming members of the newly fashioned bourgeois society on the continent could see the material riches being created in Britain and wanted the chance to create this wealth themselves – allowing the British to strengthened their position. Also, despite the fact that the expansion of world commerce was making Britain stronger and stronger, the onset of free trade allowed competing European nations to industrialise, thus strengthening their respective economies. Finally, by using and importing the skills and materials that the British had obtained competing nations took the same route industrially as Britain, and gradually challenged Britain's once seemingly unstoppable superiority. Hobsbawm himself concludes, by observing the increase in British railroad iron and steel and machinery exports in the latter half of the nineteenth

century, that despite the British making extra profits from the exports, they 'did not inhibit the industrialisation of other countries, but facilitated it'.³²

The concept that another power would come to challenge the might of British domination proved to bear fruit by the end of the century, when the Germans began to challenge the British naval power, which was deemed to be vital in order to keep their control of the world economy.³³ However, for a hegemony to wither and another ideological mind-set and historic bloc to form other social changes were required. By implementing a liberal order, there naturally existed a huge increasing problem with inequality and working conditions, and whilst social reform movements were swept under the carpet at the height of its ideological power (as was the case with Chartism), by the time urbanisation had matured and working relationships between others had been set up then the liberal state became more venerable to challenges 'from below'. As Cox states:

When, during the last decades of the century, the majority of the population became concentrated in towns, and when people were brought into durable, compact groups in the factories and in the urban areas where workers lived, political action became more feasible and more threatening to the liberal order.³⁴

Thus the hegemonic order was challenged both at the international level and at the domestic level.

2.4 The Interregnum

For one world order to fade and another one to be replaced, time is required for the full transformation to develop. The first legislation within Britain which ensured that the working classes were not merely regarded as the silent labourers of liberalism, was the 1867 Reform Act. This ensured at least partial franchise for urban workers and political Parties were forced to adapt their ideologies to appeal to the new participants of the democratic process. As a result 'Disraelist paternalism' was born, and with it a move towards worker's rights and welfare.³⁵ The Trade Union movement led to the organisations becoming recognised by the government and workers and Socialist Parties found their way slowly into mainstream politics by the turn of the century. The presence of such groups, pinpointing the problems associated with working conditions and unemployment, made impressions with mainstream Parties - Joseph Chamberlain, a member of the Liberal Party made repeated attacks on the philosophical foundations of the laissez-faire system and the neglect the system showed for social issues; thus radical members of the Liberal Party were pushing for measures to dilute the principles which caused the party to adopt its name.

By the Edwardian era, the debate about protectionism was to appear in tandem with the need for social reform - once more it was the outspoken Chamberlain who proposed the return of tariffs in order to give preferential protection to the British Empire.³⁶ By the start of the First World War the Asquith government had

laid down the first foundations of the welfare state, which in turn created more power for the state in that it was to finance governmental structural bodies that would officiate the welfare system. This emerging protectionist form would also lead to greater state spending on industry. To paraphrase Cox, the welfare-nationalist state was to develop a two-tier structure, with a relatively privileged corporate welfare system supported by the state for the top level and a basic social security administered by the state for the rest.³⁷ Thus from 1909 the annual budget (the Lloyd George 'people's budget' which emphasised the increased use of public taxes to fund the Old Age Pension's Act) grew in significance, as public taxes and tax scales varying on account of earnings, status and class gave the state legitimate power to redistribute finance to different parts of the national community while at the same time enforcing the laws of the market economy. This differed from the liberal policies, which resulted from the shake up of the industrial revolution, as it no longer believed in the laissez-faire idea that the market could regulate itself without state interference.

The trend that was occurring in Britain was similarly occurring in other newly industrialised states. From the latter parts of the twentieth century both Germany and Italy were involved in nation building and unification. This in itself put more emphasis on the requirement of nationalist institution in order to follow and challenge the British nation-state. The first signs within Europe of the development of a welfare system came from Bismarck's new Germany. This was partly due to the state making concessions to stem the growth of radical socialist

groups, but also by setting up such a system within a newly formed Germany it would pacify the state as a whole and provide a domestic mind-set keen to ensure that their new found country would compete with the world. Bismarck, in his time as leader, also established a strong military base that was to place emphasis on the idea of the love of the fatherland.³⁸ The construction of Germany under these conditions provides a better understanding of the historical development of National Socialism and the Nazi Party.³⁹ Similar developments can be mirrored in Italy - the social forces that emerged at time of Italian unification also contained socialist elements, in conflict with the Pax Britannia, and became nationalist in character. Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks makes this point by explaining that by creating the modern Italy in the rising nationalist climate of the 1870s, it was always going to concentrate its assets on building a competitive empire.⁴⁰ Indeed Hitler himself, in *Mein Kampf*, referred to the historic and sociological similarities of Germany and Italy, both in terms of their respective unification and to their political aims and beliefs.⁴¹

Thus the latter part of the 20th century saw growth of nationalism upon the scale not witnessed before. It became, what Hobsbawn referred to as an 'era of flag wavers' and this was reflected by the battle for colonial gains and the subsequent westernisation of the world. It was through colonialism (and in particular the colonisation of Africa) that European powers competed for extended territory and global economic influence. Whilst Germany had 'missed the boat' in terms of the colonial race in Africa, it continued to challenge Britain in economic

circles. For whilst both France and Portugal eroded Britain's global influence, through successful campaigns in Africa, Germany challenged its military and industrial superiority. By the 1890s Germany had surpassed Britain as the main European producer of steel⁴² and its development of military and more noticeably naval power, with the notorious dreadnought saga, put an end to the notion that Britain was the isolated super power. Economically, the British economic model that became synonymous with the works of Smith and Ricardo was also being challenged. Germany's developmental model in the late nineteenth century was rooted in the works of Friedrich List. List believed that free trade aided those countries that relied heavily on overseas commerce, whilst undermined the development of national manufacturing. Thus he believed that by constructing national tariff boundaries to protect national industry from overseas competition, rapid industrialisation could be more effective.⁴³ List's contribution to political economy furthered the decline in liberal economics and moved protectionist policies towards the forefront of domestic economic politics within Europe.

2.4.1 The Rise of Fordism

The rise of nation building, under the ideology of 'welfare-nationalism'⁴⁴ provided a requirement within competing states for a strong domestic capitalist labour market and this brought a further requirement of the return to a style of protectionism. This form of protectionism differed from the protectionism in the days of pre-industrialisation, as urbanisation had led to a form of capitalism

which was dependant upon mass competition. Thus states needed to create national capitalist systems that reflected these characteristics. This was noticeable in the United States and in Germany. In the United States a domestic monetary system was set up and with it a Federal Reserve System, which allowed a regional share of its systematic workings to be spread to different parts of the country.⁴⁵ The American style of social protection relied more within the boundaries of economic liberalism and unlike the European versions, did not engage in social welfare reforms. It was proof, as Polanyi observes, that its 'social protection was the accompaniment of a supposedly self-regulated market'.⁴⁶ By the first decades of the twentieth century it was accompanied by the ideological conditions of Taylorism and the industrial application of the ideal by industrialists such as Rockefeller, the Dulles brothers and in particular Henry Ford. In the USA there had been an absence of the traditional aristocratic class structure that defined European feudalism. Thus the American application of paternalism became unique, as entrepreneurs and self-made businessmen took the role that was still reserved in Europe for the descendants of the ruling classes. Varying decrees of nationalism were also used in the Taylorist/Fordist ideology as it was proclaimed to the workers that this unique style of employer-employee relationship was the 'American way'.⁴⁷

The domestic period of the first half of the twentieth century within the USA provides us with great understanding of the hegemonic formations of the conditions that would become globalised during the post-war Pax Americana.

However the shaping of the 'American way' which took twists and turns over these early years of the twentieth century was entirely an American affair. This is not to be confused with the industrial production technique that Americanism and Fordism produced. The introduction of the assembly line was, as I identified in the previous chapter, transported to various parts of the globe before the Second World War. Both in Europe and within the Stalinist industrialisation programme being carried out in the Soviet Union, representatives were impressed with the competence of the system and made attempts to put such means of production into their respective labour markets. The socio-cultural hegemonic structure remained distant to the Europeans in the inter war period. The initial working conditions of high wages and minimum industrial representation, which Gramsci referred to as a condition that promotes a 'human content of work',⁴⁸ made way to degrees of unionism and workers taking greater interest in their environment by purchasing shares. The belief in the liberal principles of work-ethics and in the collective, hierarchal paternal industrial relationship which were outlined by Taylor still remained, but by the turn of the second world war it had matured into a stronger ideology. The basic elements of Taylorism survived the Wall Street crash and continued through the depression of the 1930s, albeit with the help of Roosevelt's new deal, which brought in state intervention, structured to bolster the liberal state. Kees van der Pijl identifies four stages of development which the New Deal was to generate. These were: the breakthrough of state-monopoly in place of the internationalist liberalism; the formation of a revised social hierarchical system; the containment of working class pressures, by appeasing

and compromising certain demands from workers; and an international phase, taken during the war, which aided Britain against Nazi Germany, but also set the scene for economic collaboration after the war.⁴⁹

2.4.2 The Aftermath of the First World War and the Rise of Extremism

If the run up to the first world war was evidence of the transition from British liberalism to nationalism, then the aftermath of the first world war heightened this. In the aftermath of the global financial crash in 1929, European market economies gave up any hope of attempting to re-assert a free market and used a succession of state intervention policies to attempt to satisfy the needs of a fragmented and disillusioned society. These measures were taken mainly to stem off the forces of Communism and Fascism, and lacked any overall plan, or goal.⁵⁰ They included protectionist policies such as the return of full tariffs and further import restrictions, leaving those 'neutral' Countries, which depended wholly on foreign free trade (such as Scandinavian countries and Switzerland) to dictate free trade agreements among themselves.⁵¹

The 1930s saw the forces of both Communism and Fascism take further nationalist steps. Within the Soviet Union, the dismantlement of NEP and the establishment of Stalin's 'Socialism in one country' process, which was to take the form of mass industrialisation within a set period of time, ended firstly the hope of his theoretical predecessors that revolutionary action in an underdeveloped

country would 'break the capitalist chain at its weakest'⁵² and thus instigate world revolution, and secondly added to the global trends of national economic development and protection.

This period of renewed protectionism and nationalism was to end in a second global war. Most mainstream IPE theorists comment upon the period as one that lacked a hegemon (see chapter one), as no one country controlled the global and institutional economy (see 'theory of hegemonic stability', also in chapter one). This does not only apply to the positivists. Arrighi does not see this period as one which merits a separate evaluation of its own, but rather as a product of the disintegration of one order and the struggle between Germany and the USA, of a nation to lead the next.⁵³ Even Cox himself is reluctant to attach the phrase 'hegemonic' to the inter-war era,⁵⁴ preferring instead to relate the change of international political behaviour that was inherent within the period, to a crisis of hegemony. In terms of understanding the Gramscian notion of hegemony for application here, it is of note to examine how Gramsci himself defined the processes of hegemonic consolidation:

1. The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.
2. The apparatus of the state coercive power which "legally" enforces discipline on those groups who do not "consent" either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed.⁵⁵

For this, there can be claims to suggest, as Arrighi does, that no state provided an adequate super-structural plan (especially after the failure of the League of Nations) for a sustainable hegemonic agenda to thrive⁵⁶. Thus this hegemonic contestation was realised by the outbreak of World War. However a more viable neo-Gramscian reading of this period would suggest that the period from the decline of British hegemony to the start of the Second World War was hegemonic, but its hegemonic character was not directed or inspired by the ideological framework of one particular state. Rather its hegemonic character was moulded around the twin forces of nationalism and protectionism, with the economic objective geared towards nation-building and consolidation. Thus the interregnum period did, as Cox was right to voice, form a global historic bloc, but every such bloc requires in its creation a form of hegemonic consciousness to bind it together and to legitimate it to the subordinate classes. This consciousness was formed around the internal forces of limited national-welfare, imperialism, protectionism and the retreat from the 19th century virtues of free trade.

2.5 The American Liberal Order

Despite the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 signalling, both institutionally and in economic real terms, the beginning of the American Liberal order, ideologically, a long period was required for its implications to be fully recognised, partly due to the strength of nationalist rhetoric that existed during

the first half of the twentieth century. From this perspective, any institutional agreement devised after the war, involving international liberal principles would be hard to implement, not in the practical sense, as Bretton Woods and the subsequent trading agreements were quickly put in place, but in terms of sociological integration. Churchill, who hoped to be involved in the global reconstruction directly after the war (not to be the case after the 1945 election), felt that the pluralisation of French and German industry would be preferable to promote peace. This was not appealing to those nations after such a conflict and a long draw-out process of diplomatic bargaining took place between the two nations (in conjunction with the United States) to reach an economic harmonisation plan that appeared in the form of the ECSC.⁵⁷

Another obstacle to the promotion of economic liberalism after the second world war was the rise of social democracy and the realisation that a regulated form of institutional social democracy and welfare system within the national state was required, not necessarily in the US, whose constitution and history became bracketed with liberal democracy, as opposed to social democracy, but in Europe, where it gained a strong political influence.

In Britain, the 1942 Beveridge report urged the post-war government to build a welfare system, which reflected the need to address the social problems of the day. Similar projects were being applied in the war-tattered economies of France and Italy, while in West Germany plans to revert to a Bismarkian form of welfare

system were preferred. The populations of these European states supported the need for welfare provisions. Nowhere was there a better example of this than in Britain. The Churchillian coalition split after defeating Germany, retreating back to party Politics. The Labour government, led by Attlee, proposed to carry out Beveridge's proposals, while the Conservatives, led by Churchill, opposed them. Labour were to triumph emphatically, demonstrating that the public would rather vote down an extremely popular national leader than forgo the opportunity of a social charter. Thus, while the Speenhamland system had provided the last obstacle to free trade and liberalism (see above and the works of Polanyi), the construction of a fully developed welfare system within Europe provided limits to any form of laissez-faire liberalism of the scale of the mid-nineteenth century. Instead, the Bretton Woods settlement complimented these moves by allowing for both welfare-building, within the nation-state, and for the regulation of monetary transactions.

2.5.1 Bretton Woods Agreements and the Marshall Plan

Whilst the Bretton-Woods system appeared liberal in character, it was at the same time a compromise between the over-competitive liberalism of the British era and the pre-war overtly nationalist economies of the 1930s. Ruggie interprets the agreement:

Unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic intervention.⁵⁸

The institutional formations of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank provided a structural hinge, which the laissez-faire predecessor lacked. Under the new system, exports and imports became more 'predictable', with each state acting as a unit and producing goods and materials, suited to their own potential. The international trade flow was measured by the dollar, which in turn was tied to the value of gold.⁵⁹ The role of the IMF came into play when states ran up debts due to imports outweighing exports. A feature of the agreement, which underlined the confusion of attempting to regulate post-war liberalism, (market principles dictated self regulation) was seen in the treatment of the exchange mechanism. In keeping the market philosophy and at the same time ensuring that it was monitored, exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate 1% from the current rate; this also made allowances for states to adjust their currencies in relation to the dollar, depending on their circumstances.⁶⁰ These conditions were combined with the formation of the World Bank to circulate loans to parts of the world willing to co-operate with this regulatory structure. It was soon realised that the Bretton Woods system was to contain a chiefly ideological purpose - appealing to states that applying to this system would reap more benefits than Communism. It was the first of these loans - the Marshall Plan, designated to Western Europe, which exported the American-led system.

The Marshall Plan was coordinated through the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and funds were distributed according to the decisions of this agency. Industrial relations were aided by the cooperation of labour unions within Western Europe, which detached themselves from their more left-wing radical elements to endorse the plan.⁶¹ In addition, incentives were placed by the US to make sure unions in France and Italy that were influenced by communist elements were denied consulting access with their respective governments in addressing the issues of the new project, leaving the minority groups, who were willing to comply with the rhetorical aims of the industrial powers, with greater influence.⁶²

What followed within Europe was two-fold. Firstly the Marshall Plan had a profound effect on the domestic forces of social democracy, with a compromise arising between these forces and the more liberal application of the mixed economy that was brought from the other side of the Atlantic. This was reflected within domestic politics in Britain. With the basic construction of the welfare system and nationalisation, the framework of the Marshall Plan slowed down this process with the result that a centrist position was adopted, which took in the principles of international trade and complemented the agreement of Bretton Woods on the one hand and ensured that a basic welfare system operated within the state on the other. Britain thus assumed a mixed economy, with major Political Parties, despite never being involved in coalition, forming a 'consensus' around these themes, with left-wingers, favouring a higher percentage of the

domestic economy being spent pursuing more equality, and right-wingers, favouring less state spending, being frozen out.⁶³

The position in Britain was reflected in the rest of Europe. In France and West Germany the American influence was especially noticeable, with a financial package and firm support being given to sectoral integration, so to unify the two former foes in order to fight the threat of Communism. Indeed the Truman doctrine gave a favourable account to the functionalist vision of Monnet and the practical politics of Adenauer and the centre-right Christian Democrats.⁶⁴ In Italy, the anti-Communist action taken by the Americans were so strong that they even threatened to harm the process of democracy. In the 1948 Italian election, the US were planning military action if the strong Communist party won and by the 1950s the campaign against communism had filtered through all other political parties to the extent that a series of anti-Communist multiparty coalitions were formed at the level of central government. This was so that the Communist opposition was frozen out of any governmental power. Any Party which wanted a voice in affairs within the coalition would be forced to distance themselves from the Communists; this was reflected when the only large group, with any association with the Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party, broke any further alliance in the mid 1950s, before joining the government coalition in the early 1960s.⁶⁵

The other effect that the Marshall Plan had on Europe was cultural. By investing aid into the regions the US also promoted the culture of liberal democracy. Here, American-inspired institutions were created that specialised in promoting business ethics that were rooted within the American liberal model. In addition, the training of new recruits at both a management level and at the shop floor, provided an industrial culture that by the end of the late 50s/early 60s materialised within respective national norms within Europe. Thus, what began within a framework of Taylorism and Fordism at the beginnings of the century, finally expanded to shape the socio-economic climate of Western Europe.⁶⁶

The demise of the Bretton Woods system is viewed by nearly all mainstream economists as being linked to the 1970s Oil Crisis and the subsequent inflationary measures that it produced.⁶⁷ This had heightened the problems, which had been inherent within the system since the late 60s. The fact that the dollar became the global indicator of currency had left it unable to cope with the monetary resource pressures that it was placing on itself. Also, whereas previously inflation largely coincided with national spending problems, the global reliance on the dollar had an international effect, leaving the international market unconfident with its role, and this brought in challenges from Europe and Japan, who had rebuilt their economies (with American help) and felt that now they were back 'on their feet' as viable economic units. The price increase in oil, placed by the OPEC countries thus became the final nail in the coffin and led to

the dismantlement of gold parity and fixed exchange rates and a general withdrawal of US economic influence.

Other factors which caused the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system were the social forces in evidence within national boundaries. One motive behind Nixon's decisions to suspend the convertibility of the dollar into gold and introduce a surcharge on US imports was the social pressure within the US, the public charging the American government with concentrating too much on the economy of the world, without responding to problems in their 'backyard'. However the economic statistics in 1971, that revealed the first American trade deficit since 1893, were enough to force the American economy to concentrate its assets more inwardly than outwardly.⁶⁸

In Europe the external inflationary problems played havoc with the mixed-economic strategy that the individual states had adopted. The commitment to public spending and to the notion of 'employment for all', which had been partnered in alliance with the Unions, had furthered the economic problems and the resulting strike actions that following throughout the 70s revealed that the compromise of social and liberal democracy, which had been fashioned by the end of the war was at a crisis.⁶⁹ Either a dismantlement of liberal ideals in favour of a more radical form of social democracy, based on wage restraints at the top and minimum wages at the bottom, which would further unite the state and the unions, or a new hard-edged form of market-liberalism, which would tear up the

social democratic principles that had emerged since the war and replace them with a new era of extreme competitive capitalism, would emerge from the wreckage. Both these solutions seemed unlikely. On the one hand, investors would push against any strengthening of unionism and social democracy and on the other, it seemed unlikely that the historically progressive formation of welfare and social understanding would suffer a backlash. However extreme measures occur at times of crisis, and aided by the coming of the second cold war and the fear of socialism, it was the latter of these solutions that prevailed.

The rise of the Thatcher-Reagan doctrine and the new era of free-trade competitive liberalism was aided by the growth of transnational corporations, which came into prominence when the Bretton Woods system and the dollar were in limbo.⁷⁰ These non-state actors took note of the problems that were occurring in their domestic markets and moved to different territories to further their profit margins in working conditions that employed less restrictions. With the cutting of union power the MNCs found more attractive conditions in which to invest and so further enhanced and expanded upon their own positions.

2.5.2 The Contribution of the USSR and historical emergence of Russia as 'the other'

The Bolshevik Revolution, consolidation of state socialism and the appeal of Marxist-Leninism to a number of developing nations after the second world war,

did much to a) shape the hegemonic norms of the post-war hegemonic order and b) install a consciousness with Russian socio-economic culture of opposition to western projects.⁷¹ This, as I will explain in greater depth in chapters five and six, has been a feature of Russian historical identity for generations. However, it was the success of Marxist-Leninism and the realisation that Russia became the 'Father' and 'leading light' of state socialism that complimented the myth of Russian disengagement with the West. Chapter Five will demonstrate how Soviet society became shaped by both the practices and norms of the external hegemonic world, whilst at the same time creating internally its own hegemonic project that contrasted with societies in the West (see Chapter five).

The post-war Soviet-institutional constructions such as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or COMECON, as it was known in the West), was an attempt, both in social and economic terms, to create an economic response to Bretton-Woods. By constructing a trading zone for state socialist states, it aimed to construct an alternative economic mechanism to that of the dollar system within capitalist economies and also further consolidate the ideals of the central planned economic state.⁷² Whilst constructing a very real economic alternative to the dollar system, it also complimented the global politics of bi-polarity and containment that became features of the Cold War. In addition, and perhaps most apparent to the character of post-war hegemony, was the significant rise in the popularity of communism and in Soviet-backed communist parties in general.⁷³ This restricted any plan to herald in a new age of liberal capitalism, as centre

political parties and the capitalist classes had to respond to the growth of communism and to the realisation that the subaltern classes might be tempted towards communist sympathies. In consolidating capitalism in the west, the mixed economy became accepted by modern western political parties, aiming to offer workers a 'capitalist alternative' to communism.

The bipolar period found its stability not just in the politics of containment and co-existence of alternative ideologies, in terms of security, but also in terms of its political and economic hegemonic construction. Social forces within both Russia (see chapter five), and in other Socialist countries, were constructed around the principles of collectivism, equality and public planning.⁷⁴ In the Soviet Union these were aided by the principles of national-patriotism that were initially constructed through the isolationist policies of 'Socialism in One Country', but became embedded, during the Cold War years, when societal relations within the Soviet Union were geared towards both rivalry with the western mode of production and to the pursuit of spreading the ideological doctrine of Soviet-inspired socialism, through financial initiatives.⁷⁵

Thus the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major power in the post-war era of bi-polarity naturally contributed to the social structures of the defining global order, as at a global level, the role and practices of the Soviet Union and its expansions in Eastern Europe provided a counter-balance to those of Fordism, and mixed-economic welfarism that were being fashioned in the west. By

promoting an alternative form of production relations, the USSR both offered an ideological challenge to western capitalist development and also provided an external threat to western-based hegemonic structures that prompted dominant classes in the west to construct a more inclusive form of capitalism.

2.6 The Post-Bretton Wood Neo-liberal Order

When commenting upon the present hegemonic order of MNCs, privatisation and globalisation, one has to ask whether it is to be viewed within a separate historic bloc, or as just an extension of the Pax Americana; a matured version, working freely from the constraints of Bretton Woods. In the Bretton Woods system, although being considered as being geared towards some form of liberalisation, the social constraints placed upon world trade seemed to contradict both the ideals of economic liberalism and traditional American ideology. What's more, the theoretical virtues of Keynes always contained elements of social democracy, in the mixed economic form,⁷⁶ and so while the whole Bretton Woods construction could be seen as a practical fulfilment of the Keynesian version, it was not grounded in any ideological neo-liberal form, which the rhetoric of Thatcher-Reagan represented. Although, in positivistic terms, the Americans had control of the global economy to a similar extent as the British had in the nineteenth century - one only had to look at the dominance of the dollar for this to be realised, the recent trends of deregulation, free market economics and

flexible labour markets have provided a far more totalising impression of American-inspired forms of liberal economic ideology.⁷⁷

The full implications and structural workings of the current hegemonic order will be taken up in more depth in the following chapter. However it is of note here to demonstrate firstly how finance, external markets, societal relations and work and employment have undergone reconstruction, since the crisis with the Bretton-Woods system in the early 1970s. The rise of multi-national development and subsequent greater freedom of financial and credit markets, led to the emergence of a structure of floating exchange rates, which effectively replaced the dollar system as the working political arrangement of the international economy. This, as Farrands has suggested, resulted largely from the inability of states to control exchange fluctuation and the large influx of diverse private trade, than any attempt by states to construct an alternative.⁷⁸ However by the 1980s, the political projects pursued by Thatcher and Reagan in the UK/US respectively, and to a lesser extent by Kohl in mainland Europe, legitimised this movement and set the political agenda to harmonise and follow the neoliberal policies of privatisation and de-regulation, that resulted in a greater concentration of global financial transactions and a strengthening of private investment. By the 1990s, this climate also led to the growth of private international regulatory mechanisms that further strengthened the role of non-state financial actors within the global market, reducing the capacity of the state to contribute to the workings of the economy as it managed to during the post-war years.⁷⁹

The role that new forms of technology have played, and indeed, how the revolution in information and knowledge-based technology has aided the societal reconstruction of work is another factor that has added to the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony. The revolution in information and communication technologies have displaced, in terms of value and supply and demand, the traditional manufacturing industries,⁸⁰ leaving the corporate relationship between manufacturing industries and the state, insufficient in managing overall national production. Thus, the rise in new technologies has added greater emphasis to trans-national production, further adding a greater power emphasis to non-state corporate actors and indeed limiting the capacity of the state to comprehensively regulate these advances.⁸¹

The overall effects these main players, within the more hard-edged neo-liberal order, have had on the sovereign state-system is difficult to say. On one count strong states have always managed to influence weaker states, in both cultural and economic terms and globalisation is at least indirectly a product of an ideology created within the US state, which has spread, via the mechanics of the MNC's into less dominant states. However the freeing of economics from the state body has allowed non-state actors greater powers to constrain state policy, at least in some respects. I will demonstrate in the following chapter, that rather than a shift of legitimate power, from the state to non-state actors, what has emerged within the process of neoliberalism has been a harmonisation of

interests, between the state and various non-state actors that has led to a creation of a hegemonic order, in which super-structural agents of different forms have been constructed to promote and consolidate these ideological interests.

The weakening of state power/sovereignty and the strengthening of economic corporations has been interpreted in differing ways by Marx-inspired theories. Firstly there is the orthodox belief that any withering of the capitalist state is a sure sign of the contradiction of the capitalist system as a whole, and that the modern system is in the process of being reconstructed, which could over time result in international revolution. In Wallerstein's own words 'we are being called upon to construct our utopias'.⁸² A further Marxist-inspired analysis stems from the work and insight of the regulation school. Stemming largely from an analysis of Fordism, the regulation school has identified that the practices of neo-liberalism are based upon a different class-hierarchical structure than the post-war industrial relations, characterised by Fordism. For example, Lipietz identifies that during the period of Fordism there existed a hierarchy based upon social distinction and upon a guaranteed level of income for workers.⁸³ The crisis of Fordism has led to a move away from collective corporate bargaining to a hierarchic relationship based upon 'individualistic values',⁸⁴ in which economic policies have shifted towards favouring creditors and wealth creators.⁸⁵ As a result, the regulatory framework that has emerged in the 1990s has ambiguously arisen from state de-regulation, allowing greater emphasis for international private capital to take on a far greater role in production and regulate itself.⁸⁶ In

response to these theories, as I will demonstrate in the next chapter, it is paramount to place these transformations within the historical framework and the change in hegemonic relations that I have identified throughout this chapter. Whilst the Wallerstein School remains susceptible to charges of determinism, the regulation school often lacks the main complex factors that contribute to the workings of hegemony. For example, whilst the regulation school engages with the economic and working relations constructed by the forces of production, they lack the Gramscian insight into how social forces have been activated that force passive links between the dominant and subaltern classes. In addition, they do not pursue how hegemonic relationships are forged through a wide range of super-structural agencies.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that to conceptualise a full and viable account of the processes of hegemony, it is necessary to locate it within a historical ontology. Through this, I have demonstrated how different historic blocs have been constructed, eroded and transformed throughout history. It also demonstrates how the practices, norms and the common sense of the present-day hegemonic structure has been historically shaped. Through the financial crisis of the 1970s and with the decline and fall of communism, neoliberalism has built up a hegemonic form of consciousness that to its admirers is infallible. The end of 'communism' and the construction of liberal economies in those former

communist countries, or in the case of China, the construction of a liberal economy under the metaphorical flag of 'communism', have further added to the suggestion that an alternative to the western form of hegemonic normality is flawed.

If however, we are to follow the historical ontology that this chapter has outlined, then counter-hegemonic forces are to be expected within the inequality of the capitalist mode of production. In addition again, as this form of historicism has outlined, these forces can be constructed from a diversity of ideological bases which, as I shall discuss in later chapters, has been most evident within the instabilities of the former USSR, where both the cultural struggles with western practices and the economic failures of transition have produced a whole set of ideological challenges to the marketising policies that have been ushered in by central governments. Before concentrating upon the significance of these counter-hegemonic challenges it is necessary to illustrate exactly how the challenge to hegemony works and what factors exist that complement and strengthen its overall legitimacy.

This chapter has provided a historical point of departure to vigorously deconstruct the working formula of neoliberalism. The next chapter aims to show how this formula is governed, structured and pacified, in order that a super-structural configuration can be sustained so that its over-riding hegemonic principles are harmonised.

¹ By 'historicism' I refer to a form of historical analysis that aims to demonstrate how norms, institutions, material capabilities and cultures have been shaped, moulded and contested within a particular era of history. In terms of methodology, historicism aims to critically demonstrate that historical structures are not ordered by laws of nature, nor can they solely determine political and economic behaviour. Rather, historical outcomes are realised through a multitude of social struggles, that transform and redefine over time. Thus, the need here to historicise hegemony reflects the need to critique both reductionist accounts of historical change and ahistoric, positivist perceptions of hegemony. In addition, and paramount to this study, by historicising the concept of hegemony, a greater, more dynamic understanding can be given to the process of how contemporary hegemonic conditions have been shaped. For an overview of the importance of developing historicism within IPE, see Ash Amin & Ronen Palan, 'Historicising international political economy: The need to historicise IPE', *Review of International Political Economy*, 3 (2), 1996, pp. 209-215.

² For example see Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, London: Tavistock, 1974.

³ For an overview see Robert Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 36-39.

⁴ Karl Marx, *Selected Works* (edited by Davis McLellan), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 160.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-50.

⁶ For a diverse set of readings on pre-industrial society, see Rodney Hilton, 'Peasant Society, Peasant Movements and Feudalism in Medieval Europe', in Henry Landsberger, *Rural Protest: Peasant Movements and Social Change*, London: Macmillan, 1974, pp. 67-94; Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982

⁷ Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life 1400-1800*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967

⁸ In particular see Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *Before European Hegemony*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Also see the works of Wolf, *op. cit.*, & Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London: New Left Books, 1974.

⁹ The Hegelians I refer too are not just centred around Fukuyama, see Chris Brown, 'Really existing Liberalism and International Order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 21 (3), 1992, p. 232-328,

¹⁰ Janet L. Abu-Lughod, *op. cit.*, 1989.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² For a collection, see Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970; Fernand Braudel, *op. cit.*, 1967; London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967; Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press, 1974.

¹³ See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1979; & Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985.

¹⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: Unwin Hyman 1988.

¹⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *op. cit.*, 1979, chapter 2.

¹⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Terrance Hopkins, *Anti-Systemic Movements*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996.

¹⁷ Giovanni Arrighi, 'The Three Hegemonies of Historical Capitalism', in Gill (ed), Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations, Cambridge, 1993, p.153

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 158-166.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Robert Cox, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-210.

²³ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, p.3

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-85.

²⁵ Politically these were to arise out of the 'Whig Party', which from the 1830s onwards became the representation of the new-urbanised middle-class.

²⁶ Karl Polanyi, *op. cit.*, 1944, p. 83.

- ²⁷ Peel's brand of conservatism aimed to banish the 18th and early 19th ideology of 'Toryism', by transforming the Tory Party (which was renamed The Conservative Party in the 1840s) to accept the liberal consensus within parliament. Whilst this transformation proved relatively unproblematic during the early years of the 1841-1846 Conservative government, Peel's application of the Corn Law split the Party.
- ²⁸ Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p.189; and Michael Bentley, *Politics without Democracy*, London: Fontana, 1984, p. 161-177.
- ²⁹ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, London: Abacus, 1962, p.319-320.
- ³⁰ Timothy McKeown, 'Hegemonic stability theory and 19th Century tariff levels in Europe.', *International Organization* 37, 1, 1983, pp.82-90.
- ³¹ As Hobsbawm queries 'Why should (opposing) Countries accept this apparently unfavourable trading', asserting the empirical observations that through trading along, competing Nations had great potential to undermine Britain's fragile position. See, Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital*, London: Abacus, 1975, p. 38.
- ³² Ibid., p. 39.
- ³³ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, p. 153.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 156.
- ³⁵ Disraeli's Paternalism was founded upon a conservative ideology that the 'ruling class' had a duty to protect the lower societal classes, by constructing legislation and minimum welfare programmes, so to reduce the numbers caught in the poverty trap. Indeed this was to emerge into a compatible working ideology for the Conservative Party that continued through to the emergence of Thatcherism, see Robert Blake, *The Conservative Party from Peel to Mayor*, London: Arrow, 1998.
- ³⁶ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, p.154-157, & Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, London: Abacus 1987, p.251.
- ³⁷ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, p. 165.
- ³⁸ See for example, Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire*, London: W. W Norton, 1964; David Williamson, *Bismarck and Germany 1862-1890*, Harlow: Longman, 1997.
- ³⁹ Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political change after Bismarck*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
- ⁴⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebook*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p.53-120.
- ⁴¹ Geoff Eley, op. cit., 1991.
- ⁴² Eric Hobsbawm, op. cit., 1987, pp. 46-47.
- ⁴³ Gary Burn, 'Globalising Capital and the logic of accumulation', in Jason P. Abbot and Owen Worth, *Critical Perspectives on International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 87-89.
- ⁴⁴ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, pp. 151-210
- ⁴⁵ Karl Polanyi, op. cit., p. 202.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.39-207
- ⁴⁸ Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., p.310.
- ⁴⁹ Kees van der Pijl, *The making of an Atlantic Ruling Class*, London: Verso 1984.
- ⁵⁰ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, pp. 167-170.
- ⁵¹ Ibid.
- ⁵² V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The highest form of Capitalism*, New York: International Publishers, 1979 (1916).
- ⁵³ Giovanni Arrighi, op. cit., 1993, pp. 175-180.
- ⁵⁴ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1987, pp. 151-210
- ⁵⁵ Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., 1971, p. 12.
- ⁵⁶ Giovanni Arrighi, op. cit., 1993, pp. 175-179.
- ⁵⁷ See, for example, A.S. Millward, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951*, London : Methuen, 1984
- ⁵⁸ John Gerald Ruggie, 'International Regime, Transactions and change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', *International Organization*, 36 (2), p.379-416.

- ⁵⁹ Ibid., & Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p.131-134.
- ⁶⁰ Armand van Dormael, *Bretton-Woods*, London: Macmillan, 1978
- ⁶¹ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1995;
- ⁶² Cox, op. cit., 1987, p.215.
- ⁶³ The observation of 'consensus' was initially coined by the American political scientist, Samuel Beer, see Samuel Beer, *Modern British Politics*, London: Faber & Faber, 1967.
- ⁶⁴ D. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and Post-War Reconstruction*, London: Longman, 1994
- ⁶⁵ Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, London: Michael Joseph, 1994, p. 238; Ricossa, 'Italy 1920-1970', in Cipolla (ed), *Fontana Economic History of Europe*, vol. 6, pt 1, London: Fontana, p. 240-320.
- ⁶⁶ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1995; Alain Lipietz and David Macey, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crisis of Post Fordism*, Cambridge: Verso, 1987; Bernard Doray, *From Taylorism to Fordism : A Rational Madness*, New York: Free Association Books, 1999.
- ⁶⁷ Albert Berry (ed.), *Global Development Fifty Years after Bretton-Woods: Essays in honour of Gerald K. Helleiner*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
- ⁶⁸ Gilpin, op. cit., 1987, pp. 140-141.
- ⁶⁹ Coined famously by Habermas as a 'legitimation crisis'; see *Legitimation Crisis*, London: Heinemann, 1976.
- ⁷⁰ For an account of their emergence, see Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmons, *The New Sovereigns: Multinational Corporations as World Powers*, London: Prentice-Hall, 1975.
- ⁷¹ Iver Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London: Routledge, 1996.
- ⁷² David Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996.
- ⁷³ In the 1945 General election in France the Communist Party received 25% of the vote, whilst (see note nine) it became rooted in Italian political society. In the UK, the Communist Party fared less well, with the move to the left of the Labour Party and the rise of the Bevanites. It managed just two seats at the 1945 election.
- ⁷⁴ David Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, p. 52.
- ⁷⁵ Quintin Bach, 'A note on Soviet Statistics on their economic Aid', *Soviet Studies*, 37 (2), pp. 269-275.
- ⁷⁶ See Keynes classical text, 'The General Theory of Employment, interest and money', in *The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol.7*, London : Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1974.
- ⁷⁷ This form of greater free market and greater deregulation was made popular by the critiques of the mixed-economic models, by (amongst others) Milton Freedman and the Chicago school in the 50s and 60s.
- ⁷⁸ Chris Farrands, 'Being Critical about Being Critical in IPE: Negotiating Emancipatory Strategies', in Jason Abbott and Owen Worth, *Critical Perspectives in International Political Economy*, London: Palgrave, 2002.
- ⁷⁹ See Timothy Sinclair and Kenneth Thomas, *Structure and Agency in International Capital Mobility*, London: Palgrave, 2001; Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- ⁸⁰ Richard Phillips, 'Approaching the organization of economic activity in the age of cross-border alliance capitalism', in Ronen Palan (ed), *Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories*, London: Routledge, 2000.
- ⁸¹ Ibid.
- ⁸² Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The inner-state structure of the modern world-system', in Smith et al, *International Theory: Positivism and beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 106.
- ⁸³ Michael Dunford, 'Globalisation and the theories of regulation', in Ronen Palen, op. cit., 2000, p. 158.
- ⁸⁴ A. Amin, *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
- ⁸⁵ Michael Dunford, op. cit., 2000, p. 160.

⁸⁶ A. Lipietz, 'The post-Fordism world: labour relations, international hierarchy and global ecology', *Review of International Political Economy*, 4, 1: 1-11, 1999.

Chapter Three: Making Sense of Globalisation: A neo-Gramscian analysis of the practices of neoliberalism

The last chapter illustrated how hegemony has been fashioned throughout history and how historic blocs have been constructed within different eras of history to aid and legitimate the ideological practices of the corresponding hegemonic orders. Through this illustration, the chapter showed how a viable theory of historicism that demonstrates how hegemonic orders operate and how they transform over time could be applied.

Using this logic, this chapter will seek to explain and show how various super-structural institutions have been placed to consolidate the current neoliberal order. This chapter will demonstrate how the phenomenon of globalisation has aided and appears as an ideological companion to neoliberalism, and how certain political, economic and socio-cultural developments have added to its consolidation. In the concluding part of the chapter I will show how, despite its sophisticated totality, neoliberalism is being contested ideologically from various positions.

The numerous analytical debates, both at the practical level of politics and within academic institutions across several continents, about the 'globalisation' of liberal capitalism have prompted numerous arguments concerning its validity as a solution that stimulates development, enhances harmonisation between

states and promotes an irreversible partnership between governmental and market actors.¹ This chapter will attempt to de-mystify some of the myths and claims about the essence of the global political economy, by analysing the ideological transformation of capitalism since the demise of the dollar system and the decline of the Soviet Union, and the growth of superstructural institutions that have complemented this shift. Thus, this analysis will compliment the neo-Gramscian framework developed in the first chapters. The analysis borrows from the work of scholars such as Mark Rupert, Robert Cox, Stuart Hall and Kelley Lee² to demonstrate how neo-liberal economic globalisation has been legitimated through a series of inter-connected agencies that have contained a collection of material, cultural, institutional and political attributes, which each seek to contribute and consolidate the overall ideological structure. In addition, I illustrate how states and political parties, and in particular those parties formed historically as an ideological counter-weight to liberal capitalism, have responded in their acceptance of the norms of globalisation.

Before embarking upon an analysis of the overriding parts that make up the hegemonic neoliberal project, it is of interest to examine firstly how scholars from within both the neo-Gramscian school and from other critical discourses within IPE have understood its development.³ Historically the current global political set-up can be historically interpreted in various forms. However, three different historical perspectives seem to stand out more explicitly. At first

appearance, the current global political set-up can be seen merely as an exhausted end of the post-war contract which, by breaking from its Fordist partnership to embrace the free market has left itself increasingly vulnerable, with cracks providing space for forms of restructuring.⁴ Secondly, the scenario can be viewed more comprehensively as a form of neoliberalism that has managed to shed the regulated forms of post-war Keynesian towards a more globalised form of liberalism. A historic bloc is consolidating under the post Cold War guise of 'the new world order' via international institutions (GATT, World Bank) that were founded in the aftermath of Bretton Woods and built upon with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Thus, by adapting institutions that emerged from Bretton Woods under nouveau free trade institutions, the hegemonic world order is transforming towards a more economically liberal set of social norms that can be seen to promote 'globalisation'. This transformation, as Mark Rupert stresses, is occurring without the collaboration of organized labour institutions, that was prominent in the Keynesian era:

Although it has turned on its erstwhile junior partners in organised industrial labour, and turned from the "productive capital concept" toward the laissez-faire fundamentalism characteristic of finance capital, the historic bloc pushing contemporary transnational liberalism nonetheless retains a fundamental continuity with the political project of the post-war hegemonic bloc.⁵

From this, one could further argue that the foundations laid at Bretton Woods were, if not consciously geared in some way towards a more open form of liberalism, more akin to the vision of Smith than that of Keynes. For whilst the purpose of the Bretton Woods institutions was to combine the principles of

liberal trade within a framework of planning and regulation, the applications of institutions such as the IMF and GATT set a liberal agenda that was always likely to present a conflict, or in Habermas' words a 'legitimation crisis',⁶ in which the expansion of the market and institutional encouragement of private capital would conflict with the corporate-mixed economic form of regulation. Thus, the interpretation of the post-Bretton Woods order can be seen as the continuation or a 'maturing' of a post-war liberalisation project that has historically transformed away from a cautious approach towards a more orthodox application of liberal economics. As Rupert continues:

Whilst the growth-originated "corporate liberalism" of the post-war decade and the hard-edged neoliberalism of more recent times may disagree on the terms of international openness, both share an underlying commitment to a more open world economy based on private ownership of the means of production and generalised commodity exchange.⁷

Thirdly and finally, the 'hyper liberal' form of production that has emerged since the 1970s can be seen as being a distinct break from the post-war order. This notion points to the idea that a new historic bloc has been constructed, which has institutionally and societally consented to a new form of market deregulation and the acceptance that private capital is a more reliable form of wealth production than state intervention. Within this outlook financial transnationalism and 'globalisation' are viewed as both inevitable and irreversible. At the practical level of politics social democratic parties have thus felt the compulsion to embrace the free market conditions which they formerly rejected and now reinvent themselves within the inescapable realities of global liberalism.⁸ Following this scenario, the creation of the WTO can be interpreted

as a sign that a new hegemonic order has been fashioned; one with distinguishably different aims, objectives and norms from that of the post-war age. In other words, rather than a process of reconstruction, a hegemonic transformation has occurred within the last twenty or so years.

Cox discusses some forms of historical explanation for this shift, although unfortunately not in much depth and without clarity. He draws back to the innovations provided by Polanyi, and points to his outline of the rise and fall of the liberal state in the 19th Century to understand the current historical context.⁹ Polanyi depicted the concept of a double movement.¹⁰ In the first stage of a double movement, the state retreats from economic regulation, while in the second stage the state reacts to this from 'below', resulting in a return of the state as an active player in the economy and the development of welfarism. The return of the free market logic can thus be seen in terms of a crisis of this second phrase.¹¹ For Cox, Polanyi's model has now gone full circle and the global economy is currently back at the first phrase of this movement, but with processes such as globalisation this is now being carried at the global, rather than the national level.¹² Whilst these assertions may deviate slightly from the form of historicism illustrated in *Power, Production and World Orders*, it seems to point to the theoretical assertion that a separate historic bloc has emerged, which in character embraces the market to the same extent as Victorian experimenters in the aftermath of the industrial revolution.

Whether depicted as a reconstructional form of post-war liberalism, or a distinct historical transformation from Keynesianism, the structural norms, practices and agencies of the current age differ greatly in character from the corporate and regulatory set-up that emerged after Bretton Woods. In order to assess this character in hegemonic terms it is necessary to take a closer look at these differing super-structural aspects that hold its totality together.

3.1 Globalisation

Observed through the lens of an intertwining of economic and socio-cultural practices between differing states, globalisation has emerged since the cold war as the unique buzzword that describes the widespread process that has resulted from the 'triumph of capitalism'. Such is its supposed might that scholars and governments alike have come to accept its dynamics as a new irreversible phase of capitalism, one to which both states and economic entities need to adapt.¹³ In addition, global institutions have been constructed to aid the realisation of these processes. The conclusion of the Uruguay round, the eighth round of trade negotiations since the formation of GATT, saw the largest commitment to and acceptance of the global free trade agenda that propelled GATT to new heights of global economic importance. Whilst the goals of the Uruguay round were set extremely high by ambitious neoliberal pragmatists, at its inauguration, its final results met well over half of these goals, resulting in perhaps the most extensive set of multilateral negotiations undertaken by any body in history.¹⁴

At its finale the Uruguay Round liberalised the processes of trade in a number of interrelated areas, including a drastic mandate for trade negotiations within services, a multilateral agreement on international property, a higher scrutiny of international trading standards, huge advances in the concentration of 'market access' and, following from that, a general requirement that all countries construct schedules for tariff reduction and global integration.¹⁵ In addition it became noticeable that financial services were to figure for the first time, within the agenda of multilateral trade negotiations, with calls made since for a multilateral agreement for further liberalisation of trade within banking circles.¹⁶ The flagship, however, of the Uruguay Round was the creation of the WTO, which was devised structurally to oversee the practices of global trade. Institutionally constructed within differing councils, the WTO signified not just a new phase of capitalism in terms of trade liberalism, but, by its induction from GATT negotiations, it demonstrated that states realised that the changing economic climate required institutional recognition. Thus the WTO places itself as the 'regulator' of the globalisation process.

Before discussing ways in which the WTO works as an agency to implement the consolidation of the global hegemonic order, it is necessary to assess what impact it has had upon both the nature of the state and globalisation. For as mentioned above, it would seem to follow that the construction of the WTO and its rhetorical commitment towards trade liberation and tariff reduction

demonstrates a willingness, on behalf of the state to accept the 'new realities' of globalisation and to concede some of its sovereign rights in order to recognise these dynamics.¹⁷ Likewise the state, or to use Kennedy's terminology the 'great power', is being transformed as a social entity by the emerging authority of the global market.¹⁸ In Gramscian terms the WTO serves as a tool that enhances and consolidates the overriding hegemonic order. It thus promotes the concept of globalisation towards a higher form of saturated consciousness, which both at the economic and the socio-cultural level appears as the norm. It is within this form that globalisation appears as a 'story' within global political economy.¹⁹ The story is that globalisation is an external natural force that determines and modifies the behaviour of both states and multi-national corporations. On the contrary, globalisation can only be seen as a socio-economic formation, which reinforced by global institutions appears natural, but in reality is a product of the construction of consensual common sense (to use Gramsci's definition) that has emerged between key actors within the global arena. The mythology of globalisation produces the illusion that individual states are unable to challenge its legitimacy and that global institutionalism, market regionalism and co-operation are the only available options to achieve forms of stability and harmony between states and the workings of the market.²⁰ It is within this illusion that states develop their differing forms of policy. In terms of competition, and reiterated by competitive state theorists²¹, states have thus shifted their interests towards the neoliberal global market and to multilateral arenas, where under the banner of G7 and GATT, the hegemonic norms and

rules are realised. The hegemonic character consolidated at the global institutional level is then reflected at the level of domestic policy with social policies, while monetary and fiscal policy increasingly takes on an appearance that reflects the macro conditions of international competitiveness.²²

The complexities of globalisation are therefore not founded within an external economic force to which states are compelled to adapt, but are paradoxically founded upon the construction of a set of common hegemonic norms which states play a substantial part in creating. Once founded states aid and strengthen the norms by supporting the construction of further agents that act as consolidators within the hegemonic process. These agents, some of which (such as trans-media blocs) are located within the cultural realm of civil society, respond by gaining a foothold and with it different forms of hegemonic autonomy within the world order. It is from this development that the 'illusion' of globalisation is created and states adopt the TINA (there is no alternative) strategy.²³

The WTO presents itself as a central agent within this process. Although the WTO is a forum in which states negotiate, it takes on a full-time role as a primary non-state organisation that serves to strengthen the hegemonic projects of globalisation and neoliberalism. Whilst the WTO is an organised, visibly evident, institutional super-structural agent, it is only one of many that exist within the hegemonic set-up. Others exist either as economic entities, or as

socio-cultural entities, both of which promote and reinforce the overall ideology. It is thus essential to outline some of these key non-state agencies to gain a better understanding of the current global order.

3.1.1 The ideological role of the WTO

Since its inception in 1995 the WTO has attracted full membership from 140 nation-states, with 34 (including Russia and China²⁴) taking the role of 'observer' states that are expected to gain full membership within five years. In addition representatives from other key organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank also oversee the institutional processes.²⁵ The WTO not only serves to provide a forum to maintain and aid the continuity of the global free market, but also provides an intellectual platform for free market scholars to construct ideas that aim to demonstrate that free trade is not only the 'correct way forward', but that properly applied, it can be effectively used for poverty alleviation.²⁶ Within the mind-set of the WTO only two forms of trading mechanisms exist, the free trade model, which both promotes freedom of movement and technological innovation, and the protectionist model, that allows governmental intervention to hold up the process of material development. No real gain is taken from the second model, since despite the state subsidisation 'jobs and factories are lost' as companies turn 'bloated and inefficient, supplying customers with outdated, unattractive products'.²⁷ Thus for the actors within the WTO, free trade is the only viable

universal working option that can provide long-term answers both towards development and wealth creation. Dismissed are the mixed-economic models that found popularity after the war, as they were found to hold back the comprehensive liberalisation process. Whilst differing degrees of mixed-economies attempted to provide some form of shield that protected workers from the potentially derogatory effects of trade liberalisation, the hegemonic project that the WTO seeks to promote aims to demonstrate that to achieve the real socially liberating benefits of trade, minimal restrictions and state interference are paramount. Whilst state intervention may serve to provide short-term relief, by protecting employment and by creating welfare services, in the long term, their actions stifle the 'liberating effects' that greater marketisation can provide. Following on from this, the 'neoliberal' logic suggests that greater economic liberalisation allows citizens greater freedom in the workplace, as they are not necessarily confined to 'one job for life'. Greater 'freedom' is thus interpreted in terms of greater self-autonomy that allows the individual more choice of movement, and society as a whole more fluidity from the class boundaries created by the state.²⁸

The working formula within the WTO is geared towards reducing both poverty and unemployment through the application of trade liberalisation. In ideological terms scholars, co-operative think-tanks, and pressure groups who work on behalf of businesses, and policy-advisers who work in tandem with participatory states, all cite examples where trade liberalisation within countries has resulted

in a stronger economy alongside lower unemployment and poverty alleviation. In addition they seek to demonstrate cases in which 'successful' liberalisation projects are undermined by examples where the negative effects outweigh the positive ones. These negative effects, they claim, are often a temporary or transitional phenomenon, which provide a more feasible outcome over time. Furthermore more stark negativities (such as the effects that have resulted from the programmes of 'shock policies' in Yeltsin's Russia) have resulted not from marketisation itself, but from the failure of the State to 'open up' its economy sooner:

It is difficult to generalise about how deep and how durable transition losses will be. One needs to know about the specific circumstances of the affected sectors. It does seem likely however, that costs will be greater the more protected the sector originally was and the greater the shock.²⁹

In this respect the main purpose of the WTO is to act as an 'educatory tool' focussing on 'educating' state participants and members of the public in general that classical economic liberalism is the 'correct' way forward, and any revision through either state intervention or protection merely leads to a step back in developmental and wealth creation. Furthermore the literature and rhetoric surrounding the organisation points to an ideological agenda that hails the wisdom of the classical liberal theories of the 17th and 18th century and critiques any influential theory, that has emerged since, that aims to dilute the benefits which Smith and Ricardo sought to deliver.³⁰

In hegemonic terms the main significance of the formation of the WTO is that it appears as a global agent that has been organically created by neoliberal principles. Whilst other global institutions that have emerged since the Second World War have adopted some flexibility in terms of their ideological practicality, the WTO's mandate has metaphorically heralded a hegemonic shift towards neoliberalism. In turn, its central position to oversee the economic practises of states and its promotion of the global political economy has led these other, more established institutions to fully endorse its project. It also aims to consolidate the legitimisation of neoliberalism by setting global standards and norms to which states are strongly advised to adhere. This is not to stress that the WTO acts as an independent super-national body, geared towards reducing the powers of the state in order that it confirms to its own mandate, as its existence and policy-making structure was a result of state autonomy itself, but that it exists as an entity that both aids the consolidation of the neoliberal order, and cements its hegemonic agenda.

3.1.3 The hegemonic shift in the economic ideology of International Organisations

In tandem with the creation of the WTO and the renewed emphasis upon the GATT regime, other 'democratic' organisations, within the family of the United Nations³¹ have also moved towards a consensual acceptance of neoliberal principles. For, whilst the 1970s provided participating nations (especially those

from the more developing world) a chance to challenge the legitimacy of the post-war consensus that was developed at the end of the Second World War, by the late 1980s, developing nations began to accept the liberalising mandate had swept through the west during the decade.³² Here the differing UN agencies have taken similar developments since the 1970s, but consequently all have resulted in accepting the hegemonic project which economic agencies, MNCs, global financial institutions and states alike have all combined to fashion. In this way these differing global 'cause' agencies are, by accepting and working within the hegemonic confinements, also contributing towards its overall strength and consolidation. They can thus be seen as further jigsaw pieces within the economic liberalising project.

More focus on the recent development of agendas within agencies of the UN can furthermore strengthen the claim that they have added to the overall jigsaw of neoliberalism and re-emphasises Gramsci's own theoretical models of hegemonic consolidation. The contestations of the existing norms and the democratising programmes that were endorsed by the less developed nations inside the UN in the 1970s, intended to place a new mandate upon both the running of the global economy and development, and became diluted by the major industrial nations' hold upon the workings of the global political economy.³³ This became even more important with the increase in transnational business transaction that saw an increase in private western investment in economies of those nations intent upon reform, and the end of the Cold War that

promoted a seemingly universal conception of global liberal democracy³⁴. The results have been that both governments and development agencies increase their democratic power within the UN, in terms of enforcing the one-nation one-vote precedent, but accepting the liberal economic framework of the global economy, and, more importantly, restricting its aims and objectives well within that framework. This move has been aided by the concept and the multi-complexual interpretations of the relevance of globalisation. For new incentives promoted by the World Bank have suggested that globalisation can be used as a mechanism, not just for global poverty reduction and development, but also to promote forms of civil and democratic society.³⁵ The World Bank's structural adjustment programmes have highlighted this strategy for 'progressive globalisation'. Supported by key UN agencies, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), these programmes have focussed upon the need for private investment within their differing developmental strategies.³⁶ In terms of action, it is envisaged that profit-driven multinational firms can work alongside public agencies within the state to combine to both regulate internal markets, and at the same time to maximise competition. Therefore commodities and technology which are seen as essential for developmental purposes (such as medicines and technological machinery etc) can be attainable in lesser-developed countries. UN agencies have moved to embrace globalisation and neoliberalism, forging a working consensus with economic institutions. For example, the WHO proposed a radical mandate for

action in the 1970s, by demanding a global strategy ensuring that health treatment could be accessible to all. Perceived initially as a challenge to the core beliefs and interests that were maintained by western nations, the WHO's 'health for all' programme was conceived and demanded by the less developed countries to promote a genuine alternative towards poverty alleviation.³⁷ The emergence of global neoliberalism and the changing nature of the international political economy however, have propelled the WHO towards a position that favours the support of private actors and marketisation, in the overall application of the 'health for all' strategy. Globalisation is thus viewed by the WHO as a 'better force for global health',³⁸ re-iterating the same positive light that is evident from within the WTO.

We see here, within this overall movement, a reconstruction of Gramsci's own formulation of the building of a historic bloc. For if the key economic institutions within the global arena have been devised to reflect the core ideologies, beliefs and norms that have emerged from the dominant social classes within western society, then its support from lesser developed nations with different agendas (notable towards development), has to be maintained through certain concessions. Equally, if within the UN as a whole, economic action is to be framed around those very principles prescribed by the western-dominated ideologies within these institutions, then these must be made attractive to the lesser-developed countries, in order that they comply with the aims and objectives of the differing developmental agencies. The crisis in post-

war hegemony, in the 1970s thus provided challenges for the less developed and the state socialist nations to use the UN development agencies to construct alternatives. The drive towards neoliberalism however formulated a new economic project within the west, which gained the consent from the lesser developed countries and subsequently from development agencies, when the neoliberalism project was devised in such a way as to be beneficial to the processes of development and universal economic growth. Hence the recent drives by the World Bank and the WTO alike to make developmental projects a top priority, demonstrate that it is plausible to suggest that free trade is essential for improved development and for global stability.³⁹ A fashioning of the cementation of hegemony and the construction of a new historic bloc can thus be observed. For in Gramscian terms, a successful hegemonic order requires the acceptance and consent of the subaltern social classes so that its overall legitimacy is ensured.⁴⁰ Through the shift in policies within development agencies inside the UN, which states have democratically voted towards and accepted, the overall global political economy is being continually legitimised and normalised, which has added to harmonisation within the UN, and an overall strengthening of the neoliberal order.

3.1.4 The Impact of MNCs

The continued rise and subsequent economic involvement of MNCs upon the affairs of both global and domestic markets have sparked considerable debate

amongst scholars within IPE. It is not my intention here however to contribute towards an evaluation of how much power the MNCs have upon political economies, or how much this power has encroached upon national sovereignty. Whilst this debate has drawn attention, since their prominence as a force was recognised by Kindleberger in the 1970s⁴¹ from both positivists and critical theorists alike⁴², their relevance here is merely to place them as hegemonic agents within the world order. For within the discourse of the neoliberal project, the MNC play a critical role, both in terms of its practice and ideology. Multinational investment has a two-fold positive effect according to the orthodox neo-liberal.

Firstly, MNC generated investment provides a 'democratic' action, by lessening the extent the role the state has in determining the economy, thus contributing to democratic processes within a state, and considerably reducing any possibilities of totalitarianism and dictatorship. Secondly, it provides less developed countries greater potential for wealth creation, which in turn provides an improved standard of living for its citizens, aids societal concerns such as health and education (and as mentioned above these sentiments are reflected by participatory international organisations) and provides a real impetus for development. Indeed it has been argued that multinational investment have done a great deal more than states and international aid organisations alike to address the problems of underdevelopment and as multinational firms have sought to move their manufacturing plants to 'cheaper nations' then there are additional

arguments that MNCs have also provided the only 'fair' and 'viable' option for wealth redistribution.⁴³

One of the first apostles that aspired to the positive effects of MNCs was Axel Madsen. Writing in 1980, a year during which there was more optimism that the 'free world' would provide developmental relief through capitalism, Madsen interprets the rise of MNCs as something that has the effect of silencing inward-looking pragmatists; thus reducing national isolationism and increasing global innovation for science and technology. He also stresses that MNCs do play a 'moral' role as they place an equal objective for growth and profit. This, he argues quashes the argument that MNCs merely exist as selfish actors, as the balance (between growth and profit) is a central feature of multinational development, with growth often placed as a priority, suggesting that the societal benefits provided by firms often outweigh the capital gains that individual firms make themselves.⁴⁴

In practice the combined effects of the rise of multinational activity and deregulatory measures pursued by host governments have greatly reduced corporate working partnerships with labour unions, which (at least in Western Europe and the US) became the hallmark of the post-war order. Increased market-driven competition has left unions within nation-states redundant, with governments favouring to break off coalitions with unions in order to encourage MNC investment. Such has been the significance of capital from multinational

investment, that governmental policy and perhaps more prominently for this argument, governmental consciousness has moved to a position that views social welfare and corporate regulation as being detrimental to the overall labour market activity. Labour interests are increasingly seen not in terms of representation of union demands, but as extending the competition of the labour market, that can only be effectively motivated by encouraging more intensive development from MNCs.⁴⁵ The MNC has therefore acted to reinforce a renewal of the Smithian logic that the division of labour is essential for prosperous economic growth and this division of labour is 'limited by the extent of the market', with less limitations on the market providing greater stimulus for a larger division.⁴⁶ Such principles, whether fully adhered to or just partly accepted by governments, depending on their own interpretation, fuel more concentration to extend the global market in order to increase both investment and to stimulate labour opportunities. This marked shift in economic ideology has resulted in a lessening of intervention into the national economy by the state, allowing MNCs to firmly strengthen their position in the world economy and subsequently as an actor within the hegemonic order.

As a form of contributing agent, the MNC also acts as a form of balancer that serves to further 'normalise' both the global economy and greatly aids its expansion. It doing so it provides not only an economic harmony to the uneven workings of the global political economy in general, but also supplies socio-cultural traits, which furthers the debates and conceptions of the nature of

'globalisation'. Economically, they have aided the transition of international market towards a fully integrated global system that has more control, substance and structure than former international economic arenas. Stephen Hymer sums this up:

The multinational corporation, because of its great power to plan economic activity, represents an important step forward over previous methods of organizing international exchange. It demonstrates the social nature of production on a global scale. As it eliminates the anarchy of international markets and brings about a more extensive and productive international division of labour, it releases great sources of latent energy.⁴⁷

Culturally, the relevance of Multinational Corporations has provided a large majority of the hype that is found within the language of globalisation. The global spread of products within the service, fashion and entertainment industries have led to widespread acknowledgements that such products have been homogenised at a global level.⁴⁸ Whilst it is not the place here to discuss the different empirical and theoretical studies of the many cultural factors that MNCs have brought to far reaching places across the globe, any study of the nature of hegemony and a cementation of a neoliberal historic bloc requires some mention of how structural agents strengthen the ideological function of a global order. Thus it should be reinforced that the range of commercial products that have found a global market have forged cultural harmonies. Whilst much has been made within cultural studies of the growing 'McDonaldisation', spurred on by the successful growth of multi-national products, global firms have also increased their growing global recognition by advertising such products through different national television networks, and communication

outlets (which I discuss in depth below). MNCs have also managed to secure various sponsorship deals with certain entertainment and sporting events that have become increasingly global in content, whilst similar deals have been made with an assortment of 'sporting' and 'entertainment' figures, with companies parading these figures in regions where they are best known, in order that greater profit and fashionable appeal can be obtained.⁴⁹

Thus, in terms of hegemony, MNCs have served to bind together the neoliberal ideology, by applying the logic of transnational free trade and exploiting it for their own gain. They have strengthened their own position as an actor upon the world stage even further when state's and institutions have responded in favour for their development, setting down laws and reforms that have encouraged their expansion. MNCs should not be viewed upon as a new phenomenon that has risen from the end of the Second World War, with an agenda to limit the power of the state, as the industrial revolution, the British-inspired era of laissez-faire liberalism and the era of Imperialism all legitimated overseas business expansion in different ways.⁵⁰ Rather MNCs have successfully taken account of the crisis of the post-war Keynesian settlement to increase their position and function within the global economy and to invite governments to forge an ideological and practical coalition with them. As business entities, the MNCs' main aims are to maximise profits and growth, while it is the state and other representative governmental bodies that have made the economic environment more favourable to expansion. This growth has thus greater aided 'globalising' factors, which

have become identifiable with technological and communicative advancements that have added to the 'myth' that the process of globalisation is an irreversible 'natural' phenomenon. However, as a hegemonic agent the triumph of the growth of the MNC has combined to create a core ideological structure, in which no feasible alternative is considered as viable by its ruling strata.

3.2 The Rise of Transnational Media and the Network Society

Any form of hegemonic structure requires a media and communication formation that 1) acts as a communicative agent that functions under and promotes the overall ideological framework and 2) contributes to the practices of that overall framework by strengthening its own commercial and economic position. This formation can be applied to any form of hegemonic global order, whilst the behaviour and action of the media is often dependent upon the nature of the order itself. For example in historical periods, where state protectionism has been a prominent factor, the media has generally applied a more inwardly, nationalist outlook, whilst prior to the development of the printed media, more direct forms of communication, often coupled with educative actions were employed that both served to strengthen the existing order and to form a harmonious relationship with the masses. Indeed, communication theorists have often commented that no form of social and political order would be possible without communication and the media of some kind, no matter what its form.⁵¹

Whilst media coverage provides a democratising action within liberal democracies in the west, pluralists argue that media groups act as pressure groups that work to limit the power of the state. For them, media democratisation, globalisation and the rise of the network society has opened up real opportunities for further democratising movements in more authoritarian states. However, whilst there are definite disparities between the ways in which different nations organise their media, all contribute in some way towards the legitimisation of neoliberalism. For, whilst authoritarian nations such as China use the power of the state itself to communicate to its citizen the need for economic liberalisation, and Putin's Russia wages a property war with independent media companies⁵², the more democratic systems in the west still share the common ideological goal that propels them as additional agents for both the socio-cultural preservation and the transportation of neoliberal hegemony. Whilst there has to be some concession and acknowledgement that dissident voices do find their way into almost all privately-owned media outlets and that diversity does exist to reflect differing evaluative outlooks, the global media as an organising force plays a considerable part in the consolidation of the global economy. This observation was identified by Gramsci himself and has been made relevant to the present-day by many of his modern-day apostles in the field of communication and cultural studies.⁵³ Upon the importance of the media and the press, Gramsci wrote:

A study of how the ideological structure of a dominant class is actually organised: namely the material organization aimed at maintaining, defending, and developing the theoretical or ideological 'front'. Its most prominent and dynamic part is the press in general: publishing houses

(which have an implicit and explicit programme and are attached to a particular tendency), political newspapers, periodicals of every kind, scientific, literary, philosophical, popular etc., various periodicals down to the parish bulletins... The Press is the most dynamic of this ideological structure, but not the only one.⁵⁴

Writing from the perspective of the first half of the twentieth century, Gramsci here sets out a sketch of the relevance of the media to societal relations, which he then places within a more critical and theoretical framework in the *Prison Notebooks*.⁵⁵ What appears of interest here is that by locating media and communication within the structures of a historic bloc, a form of universality is reached that was lacking in some of the more critical aspects of Marx's own works.⁵⁶ In today's world this universality is recognised not just by the emergence of a secure transnational media system, which has heightened its position from the many large-scale media mergers of the 1990s, but by the growth of information technology and in particular the Internet. Any universal theory that applies a certain medium to a unifying form of purpose does have some shortcomings, demonstrated by the fact that both the media and the Internet provide contrasting functions that vary within different parts of the global community. However, as indicated above, Gramsci's own musings aid us to understand how media and communications industries provide a key contribution towards the consolidation of hegemony. Studies also show, and this is particularly relevant to the largely unregulated confines of cyberspace, that the contradictions of the hegemonic order are also exploited. For whilst the Internet adds to the socio-economic formulation of neoliberal practices, it also create a

forum in which dissident views and support can be voiced, leading to possibilities of contestation and avenues for counter-hegemony.

3.2.1 The Global Media and Murdochisation

The upsurge in commercial media mergers in the 1980s and 1990s was reflected in tandem with the general growth of MNCs in that period, and with the more liberal economic agenda that governmental policies were universally undertaking. Whilst, as noted above, states still have the predominant policy-making right to decide upon their own terms for the way that their Media and Communication industry are managed, thus resulting in an unequal spread of the concentration of global communication firms, the general universal trend is towards deregulation and market liberalisation in different forms.⁵⁷ Financial institutions, such as the IMF and WTO, have also encouraged this position, with the IMF endorsing a policy that relates the commercial media industry to the needs of the global market, and the WTO encouraging the move towards a single global market for the commercial media, opposing any arguments to the contrary.⁵⁸ Regional trading agreements also seem to reflect this, with NAFTA in particular determined to open up markets within their respective communities; the EU have generally taken the same stance, although there has been a great deal more reluctance towards further deregulation, with the issue of media concentration attracting concern in certain quarters.⁵⁹

The environment of deregulation and the increase in global competitiveness has led large-scale media firms to increase their significance and size and to exploit technological development, such as satellite communication for their own commercial ends. Furthermore, their reliance upon advertising and commercialism has sidelined those communication firms that were either state-subsidised or run on a non-profit basis. This has led to a double-effect in which the profit-making mode of communication is legitimised and normalised on the global stage and is held up as a model for continued development. The former alternative modes are thus forced to find extra revenue to continue by either forging an alliance with one of the large trans-media conglomerates, or reforming sufficiently so that they are able to compete in some way within the market.⁶⁰ The dominance of advertisement-run systems have also provided an outlet for companies to join, by their advertisements on these networks in forming a hegemonic partnership that provides a major structural component towards the continued ideological success of neoliberalism.

In terms of actual media concentration, Herman and McChesney argue that no more than ten or so media conglomerates hold the vast majority of interest within the global media, which are prominently, based, or formed, within the USA.⁶¹ Perhaps the most ambitious and renowned of these is *News Corporation*. Identified with its figurehead and leading stockholder, Rupert Murdoch, *News Corporation* provides the most useful case study for identifying the spread of the socio-economic and cultural ideology for neoliberal hegemony. With media

holdings in six continents, Murdoch's empire consists of television networks, satellite services, newspapers, publishing outlets and radio stations, that pays the greatest attention to the US, UK, Australia and East Asia. The style and dynamics in which *News* operates demonstrates insights into the workings of a media-based MNC and how it relates to different state regulations and to politics in general. For example, in the US, *News* has successfully 'played the corporate game', by setting out its stall to win over governmental and public officials within Federal government. This has resulted in several favourable rulings that have allowed the further expansion of Murdoch experiments within the US.⁶² Perhaps a greater demonstration of his influence came within the UK. After successfully gaining an enterprising foothold within the UK, and then forming an alliance with Thatcher in the 80s to gain exemption from EU laws so that he could further monopolise *News* position, one of his more notorious publications, the *Sun* Newspaper, unleashed a collection of furious attacks on the Labour Party during the run up to the 1992 general election,⁶³ fearing that if elected such privileges would be harder to obtain and his own interests might be effected through tax increase and a higher scrutiny of regulation. Subsequently, the Conservative Party was re-elected, prompting comments from both Parties that Murdoch's influence became a critical factor in determining the result.⁶⁴ In China, however, where Murdoch has opened up new areas in the emerging market climate, *News* has forged its growing significance through persistence and 'respect' for the Chinese rulers. After filtering in television channels for the Chinese audiences, through its other Asian networks, under the watchful guide

of the Chinese authorities, *News* has furthered its viewing figures by extra entertainment/sport channels, winning the much-needed backing from the Government. One of the most paradoxically bizarre *News* projects, although perhaps not that surprising when looking in general at the contradictions within China of 'controlled neoliberalism under the guise of 'state socialism', is the collaboration of the founding of an Internet site in 1997, with the *People's Daily*, the Communist Party Newspaper.⁶⁵

What remains relevant here is that the global media have managed to combine with other agents, whether they are business, commercial or institutional, to form an ideological alliance that transforms their major purpose as being the socio-cultural communicators of neoliberalism. Murdoch's *News Corporation* provides a telling example of that, for whilst it either consciously or sub-consciously promotes, in differing degrees, the practises of neoliberalism from its variant communicative outlets, as a competing market entity it also reinforces neoliberalism through its various economic transactions.

3.2.2 The Network Society

The rise of transnational telecommunications and in particular the Internet has provided another vehicle for the continuing success of neoliberalism. Furthermore, it perhaps more than any other factor, adds to the societal project

of globalisation of the sort that is hailed by libertarians. It also provides perhaps the most contradictory aspect of the neoliberal project and is proving to be something of an enigma for scholars in general.⁶⁶ In terms of global political economics, increased network communication has led to a marked increase in business transaction and has greatly contributed to the opening up of markets, with budding entrepreneurs from differing regions across the globe eager to get 'connected' to maximise their assets. It has also been the catalyst for the transformation towards the 'new' economy or 'knowledge', signalling a metaphorical death-knell to the dominant industrial-relationship of the post-war Fordist model, and some scholars have even gone as far as to observe that the technological transformation is so great that it can only be comparable to the Industrial Revolution.⁶⁷ Alongside the synopsis that the Internet has greatly homogenised global society are empirical claims that it is increasingly polarising global society with its unequal development, not just being evident on a macro scale, but also within states themselves. This movement has created a so-called 'digital divide' that seeks to further materialist inequality resulting in an increase at the micro level of community disintegration and an increase in instability at the workplace.⁶⁸ At the global level this is even more greatly emphasized; the developed world (and the US in particular) advances technology at such a pace to further alienate those playing catch-up in the developing world.

As mentioned above the Internet remains a paradox ideologically because it allows diverse dissident movements that are discontent with the status quo to

advertise their views, thus giving them access to a wider audience. Authoritarian states in certain areas may attempt to counter this by stemming public access to such 'sites', and Liberal Democracies in the West may attempt to do likewise with subversive right-wing material, but the general trend is for politically-orientated sites to regulate themselves, within the political economy of the net, allowing state authorities to spend time concentrating on policing the more socially derogatory practices that flourish within cyber-space.⁶⁹ Whilst counter-ideological groups can, through the Internet, provide an outlet for expressing their concerns and can organised themselves for demonstrations, protests etc, they still lack real advertising 'clout', as with the depth of information that is contained within the World Wide Web, the only real attention such sites receive is from those already familiar with such concerns.

Whilst deregulation has added towards a rapid expansion of private-firm activity in the global media, the mass deregulation (or in Europe the privatisation) of the telecommunication industry in the 1980s, has had a more marked effect upon the world telecommunication industry, with Internet access being an additional financial incentive to maximise profits, that has allowed leading internet server firms to overtake top media players, at least in terms of sales.⁷⁰ However, societal effects and their contribution towards the hegemonic order are of greatest importance. The Internet is continuing at an increasing rapid rate to provide a suitable and greatly deregulated outlet for business and consumers to trade, further normalising market principles. In response, states are finding it

more and more difficult to provide a mechanism to halt or slow down this process that they or at least the more powerful states themselves prompted, through their original policy-making.

3.3 State responses to Globalisation

Another field of interest that requires some focus is how states and in particular political parties of the centre-left have responded to these transformations. How, for example have the social-democratic parties of Western Europe responded and legitimised this process? In addition, why has Communist Cuba become integrated into the neoliberal system and joined the WTO? Or why has China legitimised extensive market reform that has served to strengthen neoliberal capitalism? How indeed has Russia, in its post-Soviet era responded to the constraints of the global economy? This final section looks both at how major political parties, and former (and current) socialist states, ideologically constructed to contest the rhetoric of liberal capitalism, have adapted themselves towards acceptances of its overall programme.

3.3.1 The Third Way

Within western European states, the US and even in some parts of Latin America and beyond, left-of-centre parties have been turning increasingly to the phenomenon known as the 'Third Way'.⁷¹ Third Way politics can be seen as an

attempt to legitimise neoliberalism, by directing its benefits to those who became increasingly marginalized at its onset. It is thus an attempt to apply the wealth-generating formula, created by competitive big business, to the more left-of-centre virtues of social inclusion, citizenship and poverty alleviation. By attempting to form alliances with big business, third-way-style governments apply public-private incentives towards job creation and public services. In this way, they are not too dissimilar from the aims of some of the global economic institutions (see above), as they attempt to combine the profit-orientated notions of competition with state funding for active results.

The ushering in of Third Way style politics has tended to differ from country to country, dependent upon both the political philosophy and the extent of neoliberal revolution in that country. For example in the US (recognised solely as yet with the Clinton administration), the Reagan policies of tax-cuts and competitive privatisation were welcomed by the Democrats in the early 1990s. Meanwhile in Europe, where centre-left parties have been associated with social democracy since the end of the Second World War, there has been an attempt to redefine the intentions of social democracy itself, so that it appeases the overall economic conditions of neoliberalism. Most prominent here has been the 'Blair-Schroeder' partnership within Germany and the UK, which has been keen to stress the modernising movements within the process of social democracy.⁷² Within both the Social Democratic Party in Germany and the Labour Party in the UK, globalisation and trade liberalisation have become important features in

their respective party policies, with an enhanced belief that market economics with a social conscience can be used as a greater regulatory force in managing the direction of the global market. Indeed, domestically, both have embarked upon welfare reform projects, and have placed an emphasis upon the public-private partnership towards factors such as public services and industrial incentives to aid job creation.⁷³ This, they argue provides both an ideological and practical purpose as social democratic goals such as full employment are being targeted, whilst the norms of the hegemonic order are both accepted and further consolidated. The Blair-Schroeder project has been aided by think tanks both in Germany and the UK,⁷⁴ and Third Way politics as a global project has become rhetorically recognised by the two texts written by Anthony Giddens' *The Third Way* (in 1998) and the reflective follow up, *The Third Way and its Critics* (2000). Here Giddens has moved from the critical sociological positions that he shared with Beck and others⁷⁵ within the field of social enquiry, to embark categorically upon an explicit set of suggestive programmes that clearly define the aims of the 'Third Way'. Within these aims he proclaims Marx and the Keynesian-mixed economy all but 'dead', and presents the Durkheimian interpretations of citizenship, democracy and societal inclusion and equality as viable alternatives for the future of social democracy.⁷⁶ Giddens argues that this switch of focus is vital for parties of the left, as it provides realistic incentives for regulating (but not discouraging) corporate power and for commitments to such factors as ecological concerns and poverty alleviation. Giddens' work has been well-received not just in Europe, where Prodi amongst others has suggested

that his guide-books provide useful insights for the development and future purpose of the EU, whilst in countries outside the G8, such as Mexico (with Fox) and Brazil (with Cardoso) his work has been met with similar acclaim.⁷⁷ Within Giddens' native Britain, Tony Blair has taken to his recent work with great vigour; indeed some of Blair's speeches, particularly those that address welfare reform and globalisation, often seem as if they are being read directly from extracts from two of Giddens' books.

Giddens and an increasing number of Third Way theorists see the 'Third Way' as a global project, both in terms of its political economy and in its force as a democratic agent.⁷⁸ They argue that the Third Way rhetoric is the only method of providing a regulated check on the forces of globalisation, and in turn present a forum in which the positive forces of globalisation can thrive.⁷⁹ Measures devised to protect ecology from the potentially dangerous threats of self-destructive technological advancements and to reform the geo-politics of the state-system have been forwarded, which, they believe, will contribute to the institutional cementation of the ideals of cosmopolitan democracy.⁸⁰ Similarly, the formation of civil society, along the lines devised by the Third Way, has to be formulated as a global project, in order to globalise the aims of promoting citizen solidarity in harmony with global capitalism.

Thus the Third Way endorses the continued construction of democratic global institutions with formations such as the European Union (once condemned by

'old' social democrats as an enemy), universal judiciary rulings, global ecological management and greater economic coordination towards regulation, acting to meet these aims. In practical terms, Third Way-influenced governments in Europe, the US and beyond have proposed a willingness to unify towards greater global cooperation and governance, which have included a proposed new democratic 'vision' of Europe by Blair and Schroeder, and a greater willingness to fight global inequalities by refocusing the aims of GATT and the World Bank. In addition, alternative measures (such as the formulation of the Tobin Tax or an Economic Security Council) have been proposed in order to create a form of regulatory structure for the 21st Century. This would place the problems of inequality as its main concern, and call for the establishment of global and national regulations upon corporations, which apply 'negative capitalism' by attempting to exploit the workings of the free market.⁸¹

Whilst Third Way theorists and especially Giddens have been keen to spell out their visions to their practical contemporaries in a foolproof form, the Third Way itself provides us with little more theoretical and logistic substance than those promoted by the WTO. Whilst the 'Third Wayers' may claim to have invented a unique form of politics that transcends the standard forms of neoliberalism, in hindsight their aims and objectives do not differ very much from those advocates of Smith and Ricardo in the affirmation that global free trade is essential for the aspiration of wealth in developing countries.⁸² In summary, the third-way has merely sought to further legitimise the overall practices of neoliberalism, but has

tried to promote it differently from its more centre-right opponents as a tool that could, if regulated properly, solve some of the social-democratic riddles that have troubled centre-left parties for generations.

3.3.2 (Post) State Socialist Interpretations

Globalisation has given rise to different interpretations and to different reactions in those nations which have had a history of resistance to western projects. Whilst the fall of the Soviet Union also brought an end to the alternative socialist market that was set up between state socialist countries during the cold war, certain states still claim to be socialist, despite their involvement with market economics. Out of these, only North Korea seems to retain the conviction to entirely reject the neoliberal order, having made great steps to maintain high security to stem off any attempts to open up the country to global capitalism. Having rejected any thoughts of entering capitalist global clubs like the WTO, North Korea, while managing to retain some of its trading partners has largely suffered from the lack of support that it received at the height of state socialism. Its response has thus been to shut off from the rest of the world, placing faith in its nationalist planned economy. The case of North Korea demonstrates the humanitarian dangers of ignoring free trade on a micro-level. Whilst its economy has not been helped by the lavish over-spending of Kim Jong Il in terms of propaganda,⁸³ its reliance on self-sufficiency in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union has led to a devastating effect on the livelihood of the North

Korean citizen, with mass famines, starvation and poverty being the ultimate price for the rejection of market reform.⁸⁴

Whilst North Korea has continued to place its trust in the state socialist mode of production, both China and Cuba have entered and contributed towards the neoliberal order but both package this in different ways. Cuba, for example has already gained full membership to the WTO, consequently becoming embroiled within the hegemonic process. The move, whilst accepted by the Cuban government as 'necessary', has not been seen as progressive. Fidel Castro himself has argued that whilst it would be derogatory a la North Korea to ignore and opt-out of such trading forums, the processes of free trade and globalisation themselves are causing profound inequalities, which need to be contested at a macro level.⁸⁵ China, on the other hand, to the delight of the neoliberal activists in the west, views market reform in an ideologically favourable light. The Communist Party welcomes liberal economics and even legitimises it as a stage within the socialist mode of development.⁸⁶ By keeping a form of control on the economy, while opening it up to foreign investment, China has moved towards greatly contributing to the global economy as a whole, but has not placed constraints upon the legitimisation of the Communist regime as a whole.

Finally, Russia's response to globalisation (which I examine in full in chapters five and six) has followed a more problematic path than those states that retain one-party status. In particular, Yeltsin's radical 'economic-shock' programme

initiated in the early 1990s, led to both a series of disastrous economic crashes and resulted in a mass consortium of mafia-led ownership of the economy.⁸⁷ In addition, as I examine later in more depth, both the consequences of these liberalisation policies and the growth of democratic procedures aided a resurgence of neo-Communist and nationalist sentiment within Russia (see chapter six). Combined with the electoral success of the Communists and Nationalists and with the growth of unemployment, Yeltsin made attempts to pacify his western-orientated position by including a greater emphasis of nationalist rhetoric within his policies, without compromising his overall objective of greater involvement within the global political economy. However despite this shift in the Yelstin administration, the chaotic nature of Russian political society during the 1990s provided a collection of ideologically contrasting groups and movements that each sought to construct their own hegemonic projects based upon how they saw the sociological foundations of the Russian state and in its relationship with the world.⁸⁸ These ranged from the nationalist and neo-Communist stance that Russia was fundamentally incompatible with the west and should reject any forms of economic liberalisation and moves towards joining the WTO,⁸⁹ to those who believed that Russia should embark more vigorously towards privatisation and seek to gain rapid entrance of the WTO.⁹⁰ These responses are dealt with later, in more sociological depth.

The Putin administration has found more success in attempting to construct a consensual dominant 'middle-ground' within Russian political society. By initiating a series of political and economic reforms,⁹¹ Putin aims to find a more single-minded vision of Russia, one that both promotes the cultural and national essence of 'Russian exceptionalism', and contributes to the dominant features of the global political economy. Thus, Putin's overall political objective is to adopt a posture that integrates Russia fully into the WTO and to the politics of neoliberalism, without neglecting Russia's historical traditions of 'statism', 'patriotism' and 'social solidarity'.⁹² Putin's plans have been greatly aided from recent developments that saw his *Unity* Party merge with the *Fatherland* bloc (the third most represented political bloc in the Duma), that may provide the impetus to further marginalize any ideological opposition and subsequently harmonise Russia's position towards global neoliberal development.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to 'make sense' of the development of global neoliberalism by adopting a neo-Gramscian analysis to deconstruct the various ideological and practical super-structural agencies that aid its development. In addition it fundamentally rejects the redundant notion that globalisation exists as an irreversible force that appears to exist external to both state and institutional actors. Here, the claim often made that states and institutions need to face up to the realities of globalisation, so that it can be regulated towards a greater, global

purpose. Rather, as I have outlined here, such movements merely preside to strengthen and consolidate the overall ideological legitimacy of the neoliberal project – thus further alienating and disassociating those actors from tackling the problems and inequalities that it provides, and in addition furthering the myth that globalisation appears as a supranational independent force. The main focus of this chapter has thus been to demonstrate how different and diverse economic, political and institutional instruments have both constructed and moved to stabilise the working ideological formula of neoliberalism. This in turn has transformed social and class relations to the extent that they have articulated contrasting sociological mechanisms to pacify the relationship with the changing means of production. As observed by Stuart Hall:

(Articulation) enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to make some sense... of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position.⁹³

The practices of neoliberalism and globalisation have thus provided a set of cultural, socio-economic and political norms that have been articulated towards forms of common sense. Despite this, the paradox of the overall workings of neoliberalism is that it 'both stimulates and weakens the forces of resistance'.⁹⁴ Indeed, the technological transformation, that has become a dynamic feature of globalisation has activated various resistance groups and movements, and allowed a greater forum for them to ideologically contest the economic global order. A variety of 'progressive', 'populist', 'anarchist', 'socialist' and 'nationalist' contestations have all been aired, discussed and digested by

scholars and reporters alike.⁹⁵ The fragmented situation in Russia demonstrates that while the practices, politics and agencies of neoliberalism seem to be built upon relatively stable foundations, its overall ideological base remains far more contentious.

The following chapters examine these forms of contestation in greater detail, firstly from a broad perspective, and then more specifically within Russia, to show how alternative ideological visions of global orders seek to contest and transform the politics of neoliberalism. In addition, it aims to place these contestations within a framework of counter-hegemony, in order to understand both the stability and any viable transformations of today's hegemonic order.

¹ For example, Malcolm Waters, *Globalisation*, London: Routledge, 1995.

² See Robert Cox, *Power, Production and World Orders: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987 & *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 & *Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending visions of a New World Order*, London: Routledge, 2000; Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal*, London: Verso, 1988; Stuart Hall et al, *Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall*, London: Verso, 2000; and Kelley Lee, 'A neo-Gramscian Approach to international organisation: an expanded analysis of current reforms to UN development activities', in J. Macmillan and A. Linklater, *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations*, London: Pinter, 1995.

³ By 'critical discourses' I include a wide range of scholarly positions from the more Gramscian-inspired 'Italian School', the more open-Marxist 'Amsterdam School', the 'Regulation School', and from more diverse positions that draw upon some of the earlier work by Foucault, see, Jason Abbott and Owen Worth, *Critical Perspectives on International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

⁴ Stephen Gill, 'Transformation and innovation in world order' from Gill & Mittleman, *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; Rupert, op. cit., 1995, Barry Gills, 'Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance', in Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.

⁵ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 2000, p. 49.

⁶ Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, London: Heinemann, 1976.

⁷ Rupert, op. cit., 2000, p. 49.

⁸ Perhaps the best example of this is the advent within new social democratic parties of the 'Third Way', that has found theoretical richness in different forms with Giddens.

⁹ Robert Cox, 'Globalisation, multilateralism and democracy', in op. cit., 1996.

¹⁰ Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1944.

¹¹ Cox, op. cit., 1996, p. 528.

¹² Ibid.

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- ¹³ Paul Krugman, 'Enemies of the WTO: Bogus Arguments against the World Trade Organization', *Slate*, www.slate.com/dismal/99-11-23/dismal.asp; Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The renewal of Social Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity, 1998.
- ¹⁴ John H. Jackson, 'Managing the Trading System: The World Trade Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda', in Peter B. Kenen (ed), *Managing the World Economy: Fifty Years after Bretton Woods*, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994, p. 131.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 132-133; for a detailed discussion on intellectual property rights see Christopher May, *The Global Political Economy of Property rights: The new Enclosures?* London: Routledge, 2000.
- ¹⁶ Akyuz, in Peter B. Kenen (ed), op. cit., 1994, p. 64.
- ¹⁷ Peter Drucker, *The New Realities*, New York: Heinemann Professional, 1989; Will Hutton, 'Postscript', in Jonathan Michie and John Grieve Smith, *Managing the Global Economy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- ¹⁸ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988.
- ¹⁹ Ronan Palan, 'Beyond Critical International Political Economy: Revisiting the Post-Structural Moment', paper presented at the 42nd Annual Convention of the *International Studies Association*, Chicago, 2001.
- ²⁰ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press; Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Stephen Krasner, *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- ²¹ See Philip Cerny, *The Changing Architecture of Politics: Structure, agency and the Future of the State* London: Sage, 1990; & 'Towards 'Embedded Financial Orthodoxy'', in Ronen Palan and Barry Gills (eds.), *Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations*; Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1994; Ronen Palan & Jason Abbott, *State Strategies in the Global Political Economy*, London: Pinter, 1996.
- ²² Ronen Palan & Jason Abbott, op. cit., 1996, p. 36.
- ²³ The phrase TINA was initially attributed to the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, during her governments' privatisation reforms in the UK in the 1980s.
- ²⁴ China gained full membership to the WTO in September, 2001.
- ²⁵ World Trade Organisation, www.wto.org, 2000.
- ²⁶ Hakan Nordstrom, 'Trade, Disparity and Poverty: An Overview', *Special Studies 5*, World Trade Organisation, 2000; & Alan Winter, 'Trade and Poverty: Is there a Connection?', *Special Studies 5*, World Trade Organisation, 2000.
- ²⁷ WTO, 'Trading into the Future: The case for open trade', www.wto.org, 2000.
- ²⁸ Margaret Thatcher, in one of her many often quoted statements commented upon how greater marketisation provides one route towards a 'classless society'. This form of logic also attracted many former 'socialist' academic and policy-making converts.
- ²⁹ Alan Winter, 'Trade and Poverty: Is there a connection?', WTO, www.wto.org.
- ³⁰ Perhaps the most notable example of this is found on the WTO website, under the title of 'The Classical Liberalists were right', www.wto.org
- ³¹ By the family here I include the 'development' agencies, such as UNICEF, UNESCO and the WHO, and well as the economic funding suppliers such as the IMF and the World Bank.
- ³² Kelley Lee, op. cit., 1995.
- ³³ Ibid., Stephen Gill, 'Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital', *International Studies Quarterly*, 33, 1989, pp. 475-99; Owen Worth, 'Health For All?, Towards a neo-Gramscian critique of the WHO', in Abbott and Worth, op. cit., 2002.
- ³⁴ Practically framed best by Bush's 'New World Order', academically framed by Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.
- ³⁵ World Bank, *Development Report: 2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- ³⁶ Kelley Lee, op. cit., 1995.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Illustrated by Gro Brundtland recently at a speech at the London School of Economics (LSE) entitled 'Globalisation as a force for better health', (lecture at the LSE, March 16th, 2001);

Kelley Lee, 'The Global Dimensions of Health', *Background paper for the Global health*, a local issue seminar, the Nuffield Trust and Templeton College, Oxford University, 1999; Owen Worth, op. cit, 2002.

³⁹ World Trade Organisation, *Annual Report*, Geneva: World Trade Organisation, 2001; World Bank, op. cit, 2000.

⁴⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p.48.

⁴¹ Charles Kindleberger, *Power and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics*, Basic Books: New York, 1970.

⁴² For a varied selection of material which contributes towards the debate on MNCs, see Abdul A. Said and Luiz R. Simmons, *The New Sovereigns: Multinational Corporations as World Powers*, London: Prentice-Hall, 1975; George Modelski (ed), *Transnational Corporations and World Order: Readings in International Political Economy*, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1979; C. Kindleberger and D. Audresch (eds), *The Multinational Corporation in the 1980s*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press; 1983; E. Brett, *The World Economy since the War: The politics of uneven development*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985; Stefan Robock and Kenneth Simmons (eds), *International Business and Multinational Enterprises*, Homewood: R.D Irwin 1989; Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996; J. Camilleri, and R. Falk, *The end of Sovereignty, The Politics of a shrinking and fragmenting world*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996.

⁴³ This point has been critically explored by Susan Strange in *The Retreat of the State*, op. cit., 1996, pp. 46-58, and in her co-authored book with John Stopford, *Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; see also *The Economist*, 'editorial', November, 1999.

⁴⁴ Axel Madsen, *Private Power: Multinational Corporations and their role in the survival of the planet*, Reading, Abacus, 1980.

⁴⁵ Werner Sengenberger & Frank Wilkinson, 'Globalisation and Labour Standards', in Jonathan Michie and John Grieve Smith (eds.), op. cit, 1995; Frank Wilkinson, 'The Structuring of Economic and Social Deprivation and the Working of the Labour Market in Industrial Countries', *Labour and Society*, 16 (2), 1991.

⁴⁶ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 11-30.

⁴⁷ Stephen Hymer, 'The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development', in Modelski, op. cit., 1979.

⁴⁸ There exist a large variety of work and scholarly writing on this subject. To gain a good insight into the debates and interpretations of the cultural aspects of globalisation see John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism*, London: Continuum, 1991; and for the cultural effects MNCs have had upon the third world, see Armand Mattelart, *Transnationals and the Third World: The Struggle for Culture*, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1983.

⁴⁹ In other words, sports companies such as Nike advertise sports stars in countries where that sport has the greatest marketable appeal. In the US, basketball players are often used in advertisements both in media outlets and on national television commercials, whilst in Europe and South America, football players have greater commercial appeal.

⁵⁰ Richard Kozul-Wright, 'Transnational Corporations', in Michie and Smith, op. cit, 1995.

⁵¹ James Seymour Ure, *The Political Impact of Mass Media*, London: Constable, 1974.

⁵² Putin has had a particular conflict with NTV, an Independent Television Station, which was finally taken over by the State in 2001. NTV was politically backed by the liberal-social democratic Party Yabloko, and portrayed as an ethical news company, but the moral degeneration of the privately-owned press, that concurred with Yeltsin's privatisation plans in the 1990s aided Putin's interception, see *Moscow Times*, 'Media Turns to Blood and Guts', October 26th 1999.

⁵³ Most noticeable here is the research undertaken by the CCCS at Birmingham University in which Stuart Hall played a valuable part. See in particular Hall, Hobson, Lowe & Willis (eds.), *Culture, Media and Language*, Birmingham: Birmingham University, 1980.

⁵⁴ Antonio Gramsci, *Selection from Cultural Writings*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1985, p. 389.

⁵⁵ Antonio Gramsci, op. cit., 1971

⁵⁶ For Marx's comments on journalism, see Karl Marx, *Selected Writings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

⁵⁷ Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Global Capitalism*, London: Cassell, 1997, p. 64.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 50.

⁵⁹ Cees Hamelink, *The Politics of World Communication*, London: Sage, 1994, pp. 172-4.

⁶⁰ A good example here is of the BBC, which decided to go commercial globally, so that it could subsidise its domestic public service. In addition it has forged certain alliances with several companies, including 'News 24', that is broadcasted on the News Corporation-held Satellite broadcasting network BskyB.

⁶¹ Herman & McChesney, op. cit., 1997, p. 104.

⁶² Ibid., p. 72

⁶³ Ivor Crewe and Brian Gosschalk (eds.), *Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1992*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

⁶⁴ These were comments made by the Conservative Party treasurer, Lord McAlpine and in the resignation speech by the leading of the British Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, who was made the subject of much of the *Sun*'s abuse. One of the many 'right-turn' that Tony Blair undertook, when elected leader in 1994 was to contact Murdoch and ensure him that 'New' Labour would be working within his interests.

⁶⁵ Herman & McChesney, op. cit., 1997, p. 74.

⁶⁶ Within the debates upon the relevance of the Internet we see great polarisation, Liberals, Marxists and Neorealists alike unable to find correlations within their own schools. Although the study of the 'Net' is still in its infancy, much debate is given as to how much emphasis is required on its economic activity, as opposed to its potential enlightening/negative societal effects. Questions are also asked of its relevance to spatial politics and its relationship with the nation-state.

⁶⁷ Perhaps the best thesis for this assumption is found within Castells' trilogy, *The Rise of the Network Society*, 1996; *The Power of Identity*, 1997; *End of Millennium*, 1998; Oxford: Blackwells.

⁶⁸ Castells, op. cit., 1996, pp. 216-302.

⁶⁹ The much publicized 'policing' of the Internet in the west are of restricting and banning child pornography sites and attempting to stem the growth of transnational Child Pornography rings. The growth of extremist cults that invite criminal intent have also attracted much attention in recent years.

⁷⁰ Herman & McChesney, op. cit., 1997, p. 114.

⁷¹ Theoretical formulation of the Third Way can be found most noticeably in the works of Giddens, op. cit., 1998 and *The Third Way and its Critics*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000; but also different in the works of U. Beck; *The reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order*, Polity Press: Cambridge, 1997; W. Hutton, *The State we're in*, London: Vintage, 1996.

⁷² Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder, *Europe: The Third Way – die Neue Mitte*, London: Labour Party and SPD, 1999.

⁷³ One of the major buzz-phrases within Third Way politics is 'no rights without responsibilities', in which benefits can be stopped if employment opportunities are not taken up. This move has been condemned by critics as furthering the weathering of the welfare safety net.

⁷⁴ Most notable in the UK through the *Devos* organization and in Germany by future reforming 'Stakeholder' groups.

⁷⁵ See Beck, op. cit., 1997; Scott Lash & John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.

⁷⁶ Anthony Giddens, op. cit., 1998, chapter 1.

⁷⁷ Cardoso's acclaim, which has been reprinted upon the back of Giddens's *Third Way and its Critics*, describes his work as 'providing a major development in the evolution of the left', op. cit. 2000.

⁷⁸ Beck, op. cit. 1997, Hutton, op. cit. 1995.

⁷⁹ There are those who stress the need for global regulation and democratic citizenship who would not necessarily define themselves as 'Third Wayers', but are often used by them for reference. See David Held, *Democracy and Global Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, whose views have influenced Giddens, see 'Taking Globalisation seriously', in Giddens, *The Third Way and its Critics*, pp. 122-162.

⁸⁰ Beck, op. cit. pp. 159-160; Giddens, *The Third Way*, pp. 129-153; John Plender, 'A new Third Way', <http://www.netnexus.org/library/papers/plender.html>, pp. 1-6.

⁸¹ For proposed changes and the potential of the European Union see Mark Leonnard, 'Tomorrow's Europe', in Ian Hargreaves and Ian Christie (eds.), *Tomorrows Politics: The Third Way and Beyond*, London: Demos, 1998, pp. 126-139; Jos de Beus, 'Modernised social democracy and the fundamental democratization of Europe', in Rene Cuperus and Johannes Kandel, *European Social Democracy: Transformation in Progress*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1998. For greater co-operation in the global economy see Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

⁸² Since Clinton, who resided over the formation of NAFTA and who became the international figure for globalisation and free trade, left office, Tony Blair himself has taken over the rein. The position seems to concentrate upon the 'Third Way' belief that greater free trade can lead to poverty alleviation for the developing world. Tony Blair has thus taken up the void left by the defeat of the Democrats in the 2000 US elections and has presented himself in various tours abroad as the new international advocate of the 'internationalist centre-left'.

⁸³ One can argue here that without the mass spending in maintain the 'cult of Kim' the regime itself could collapse, due to a legitimization challenge. McCormack argues that it is indeed the over spending of Kim Jong Il himself, rather than the failure of the planned economy that has led to the widespread economic problems within North Korea. See Gaven McCormack, 'Kim Country: Hard Times in North Korea', *New Left Review*, 198, 1993, pp. 21-48

⁸⁴ For an overview of the problems with the socialist mode within North Korea, see Barry Gills, *North and South Korea*, London: Routledge, 1996.

⁸⁵ Fidel Castro and David Deutschmann, *Capitalism in Crisis: Globalization and World Politics Today*, Melbourne, Ocean Press, 2000.

⁸⁶ Susan Shirk, *How China opened its door: The political success of the PRC's foreign trade and investment reform*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.

⁸⁷ By 1998 it was estimated the mafia controlled up to 80% of private business within Russia; 40% of the nation's wealth. It was also estimated that up to 20% of foreign investment profit was paid to organized crime organizations, see Richard Lindberg and Vesna Markovic, 'Russia is paying for the price of a market economy in blood', *Search International*, 1998.

⁸⁸ Jeremy Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for hegemony in Russia*, London: Verso, 1995. Lester identifies three different hegemonic projects: The Westernisers, The Russophiles and The Centrists, each laying a historical and cultural foundational claim to the sociological purpose of the Russian State. See also Andrei P. Tsygankov, Ideas, Culture, and Moral Responsibility. A Troubled engagement with Fukuyama's World order project, Paper presented at the *International Studies Association Convention*, 2001. These will be major themes of my enquiry of present-day Russian social forces in chapter six.

⁸⁹ Represented most prominently by Zhirinovskiy's LDPR and Zyuganov's CPRF.

⁹⁰ Gaider and the 'Union of Right Forces' currently represent this position at the Party Political level.

⁹¹ Such reforms include the move towards greater flexibility labour markets so that they are more in tune with the economic principles prescribed in the WTO and a reduction in Political Parties eligible for national election.

⁹² David W. Lovell, 'Nationalism and Democratisation in Russia', in Vladimir Tikhomirov (ed), *Russia After Yeltsin*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001, p.47

⁹³ Stuart Hall, 'On Postmodernism and Articulation', in D. Morley and K.H Chen (eds.), *Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies*, London: Routledge, 1996.

⁹⁴ Barry Gills, op. cit., 2000.

⁹⁵ For an analogy of resistance and contestation, see Gills, 2000, op. cit; Rupert, 2000, op. cit; Owen Worth, 'The Janus-Face of Counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist responses to neoliberalism', *Global Society*, 16 (3), 2002, pp. 297-317.

Chapter Four: The diverse nature of counter hegemonic responses to neoliberalism

'Replace Globalisation with something a little bit nicer'. Placard from campaigners outside the World Economic Forum, Davos, January, 2001

Any understanding of contestation and counter-hegemony has to be geared around the forms of historicising logic that I discussed in chapter two. As demonstrated there, counter-hegemony materialised in differing orders, through a succession of political and social contestations that appeared at both the international and domestic level. Two examples from chapter two can be used illustrate these diversities. Firstly, the *Free Trade* era and the ushering in of liberal economic super-structural institutionalisation was precipitated by a revolution in terms of production and by the creation of the industrialist class. These triggered a series of social forces that contributed to the growth of the 'liberal state'.¹ The decline of the liberal order was prompted by a similar series of counter-hegemonic activities, accumulated through a mix of nationalist expansion and the growth of welfare and unionism, that led towards a construction of a historic bloc, geared towards protectionism. It is from these historical explanations that an examination of current contestations and counter-hegemonic trends need to be explored. This chapter thus plans to discuss and analyse counter-hegemonic movements within the present global order and seeks to identify the different ideological forms that these movements contain. In

addition, it will assess critically the viabilities and contradictions within these different movements. In doing so it will identify and analyse four different groups of contestation within the West, (within the dominant boundaries of the EU and NAFTA) and then introduce a more detailed analysis of contestation within Russia that will continue over the next two chapters. The purpose here being that whilst it is necessary to explore the more poignant forms of counter-hegemonic existence within the dominant economic spheres of the EU and NAFTA, a case study within Russia provides a more effective analysis and illustration of the validity and stability of the globalisation project.

4.1 The Nature of Counter-hegemony and Contestation

Before analysing empirically the various movements that contest neoliberalism ideologically, it is necessary to outline and discuss both the theoretical nature of counter-hegemony and how neo-Gramscian scholars have used the notions of counter-hegemony to aid understanding of resistance within the modern-day ethnos of globalisation.

Gramsci's own understanding of counter-hegemony was as an alternative project, both in terms of ideology and in practice. Rather than based solely on the contestation of economic and/or political organisational reform, Gramsci's perception of counter-hegemony entailed a conscious alternative vision of society that would 'counter and replace bourgeois ideas and practices in all

aspects of life'.² The former stresses some of the concerns that Gramsci had with Bukharin's *scientific socialist transition* model,³ that a conscious reform of the super-structural institutions upon which productive relations are legitimised, would merely lead to a strengthening of its overall hegemonic might. This is further reflected by Gramsci's conception of *trasformismo*. This refers to the movement which dominant classes use to address some of the discontent and concerns raised by the subaltern classes without altering the overall hegemonic framework.⁴ In other words, a counter-hegemonic project that either a) does not ideologically distinguish itself from the practices of the hegemonic order or b) attempts to address only certain hegemonic elements, becomes prone to *trasformismo*. This partly can be attributed to the support of Giddens's 'third way' by centre-left governments, that I identified in the last chapter. For, by locating social democratic traditions within the processes of neoliberalism, 'third way' inspired political parties have aided the processes of both *passive revolution* and *trasformismo*.

Thus, according to Gramsci, a successful counter-hegemonic movement requires an opposing and consistent set of principles, capable of contesting the hegemonic order, in order to produce an alternative form of society around which a historic bloc can be constructed.⁵ Gramsci identifies two different types of counter-hegemonic activity; the 'war of movement' or 'manoeuvre' and the 'war of position'. Gramsci metaphorically relates the first of these to a military war and categorises it as a full frontal attack upon the hegemonic state and its

super-structural entities.⁶ The entire legitimacy of hegemony is contested by an ideological attack not just on the major agencies and structures of the order, but also on the complex forms of civil societal common sense that hold the order together. Indeed it is the manoeuvre against common sense that provides the most strategic part of this form of counter-hegemonic activity. The intricate dynamics of hegemonic common sense within civil society mean that for 'war of movement' to achieve any level of success, a tactical and sophisticated frontal assault would be required.⁷ The 'war of position' refers to more subtle forms of contestation that are strategically based towards transforming common sense and consciousness. Gramsci uses 'boycotts' as an example of a 'war of position,' but there exists a multitude of both implicit and explicit factors involved within the war of position.⁸ Its main aim is to contest fundamentally the legitimacy of 'common-sense' within a historic bloc by exploiting its weaknesses, thus destabilising its hegemonic consent. Indeed, the war of position can be seen as a decisive moment in the success of a counter-hegemonic movement. For, if such a project manages to exploit the weaknesses and de-legitimises a hegemonic order, and constructs a feasible and favourable alternative, then the likelihood of its success increases. As Gramsci notes, 'in politics, once the war of position has been won, it has been won definitively',⁹ and as continued by Richard Lester, 'without a successful penetrative war of position in civil society, any kind of offensive aimed at overthrowing the state's institutional apparatus will come to grief precisely on the 'trenches and fortifications' of civil society.¹⁰

How then are Gramsci's insights applied by neo-Gramscian's within IPE, in conceptualisation resistance to neoliberalism and globalisation? Many have, as yet, either neglected or made insufficient studies on analysing empirically resistance movements and placing their significance within any critical framework. Even the more critical theorists within the study of the global political economy, who have used Gramscian logic to determine possible counter-hegemonic challenges, have neglected any real enquiry into the nature of social forces that appear at odds, ideologically, with the neoliberal project.¹¹ Those who have pointed to ideological resistance towards globalisation use examples such as the WTO demonstrations in Seattle in 1999, the various protests at Davos and Prague, the global demonstrations that have been increasingly marked during the May Day holiday and the G8 protests in Genoa, to demonstrate that the inequalities of neoliberalism cannot continue to yield consensual support and that certain structural or systemic social movements will serve to challenge its legitimacy over time.¹² There has also been an almost obsessive concentration of interest in the Zapatistas uprising in Mexico, with some placing faith that the democratising goals of the EZLN will provide a viable case study to demonstrate that progressive forms of change can result from the excesses of neoliberalism.¹³

The scholarly insights that have materialised in recent years, providing useful contributions to the questions of ideological resistance, have included a recent collection edited by Barry Gills and more prominent works by Rupert and

Castells.¹⁴ In particular, in the collection by Barry Gills, Chin and Mittelman engage with Gramsci's analyses of counter-hegemony and place them within contemporary global society.¹⁵ Contemporary forms of the war of movement and position can be seen at different global, national and global levels. For example, while the more explicit protests and demonstrations that have occurred at Seattle may be indicative of a war of movement, there are also more subtle forms of contestation that suggest ideological alternatives, in which neoliberalism can be transformed.¹⁶ It is this strategy that can be interpreted as a war of position and is formed alongside the war of movement, but based more upon exploiting the weaknesses of neoliberalism, in order to contest its common sense at the popular level. As noted by Chin and Mittelman:

A Gramscian reading of resistance would have to explicate the development of counterhegemonic consciousness that informs wars of movement and position, as well as national-popular actions led by organic intellectuals from all walks of life who can meld theory and praxis to construct and embed a new common sense that binds disparate voices and consciousness into a coherent program of change.¹⁷

4.2 The Contradictions of Globalisation as a hegemonic form

In what ways can counter-hegemonic forces move to contest neoliberalism? Firstly Rupert, Castells and Gills all move towards a consensus in which they interpret the process of neoliberal globalisation as one that fails to provide any societal stability.¹⁸ As Barry Gills comments, one of the paradoxical features of globalisation is that it 'both weakens and simultaneously activates the social forces of resistance'.¹⁹ For whilst, on the one hand, it strives to create an

inescapable form of global production, aided by the homogenisation of state economic policy and the creation of institutions which reflect this market-led homogeneity, it also invites a series of challenges from social groups that have become increasingly alienated by the rule of the market and the inability of governments to provide any substantial protection from it. In addition, the consumer culture that has accompanied the drive towards marketisation has created certain outlets for the discontent to voice their concerns. Here I am obviously referring to the rise of global communications and in particular the Internet, which presents the ultimate paradox – a forum created through the advancements of technological innovation, and propelled by the dynamics of deregulation, yet through which resistance movements have been able to stimulate themselves by advertising their concerns and organising protests. It has widely been acknowledged that many of the recent demonstrations against global institutions have been organised through the Internet, with the Zapatistas movement itself being the first such group that successfully used the Internet as a means for support.

The questions remains how and in what ways are these contradictions being exploited by these different groups and equally what alternative world visions do these opposing groups promote and how relevant are they to the future of the hegemonic character of the world order. How indeed can the Gramscian model of counter-hegemony be furthered to explain certain forms of discontent? In

their conceptualisation of resistance, Chin and Mittleman move beyond Gramsci by exploring both Polanyi's 'Counter-movements' and Scott's 'infrapolitics'.

Whilst Gramsci and Polanyi differ greatly from their political and normative backgrounds. Polanyi offers much, as argued in chapter two, to the explanation of how the de-regulation of the market creates a backlash from varying forms of social forces.²⁰ For, whilst observing the free trade rhetoric of the nineteenth century, Polanyi demonstrated that the freeing of the economy by the state to the market creates a counter-movement by social forces disillusioned with the minimalist role of the state. In part, Polanyi's observation of a 'double movement' can be placed in some relevance today.²¹ However, what Polanyi also demonstrates, which is confirmed by historians such as Hobsbawn,²² is that the call for welfarism became coupled with nationalism which not only brought the collapse of the liberal trade movements of the 19th century but also ushered in a dangerous era of 'rival imperialism'.²³ Concerns should also be placed upon how far one can bring the logic of Polanyi into today's formulation of neoliberalism. For, whilst certain similarities can be made between the form of free market economics dominant today and that which was synonymous with the 19th century, the inclusive practices inherent within today's global political economy make it difficult to make any adequate comparisons, especially if one is attempted to locate a form of production capable of transcending it. In addition, states have developed forms of welfarism and installed a more mature form of consensual democracy that remained undeveloped in the Victorian era,

leaving less room for alternatives. Robert Latham, however, argues that Polanyi's work holds far more relevance in today's world than in the some what narrower environment of his time.²⁴ He feels that Polanyi's main focus was to reassert the principle that economics is about man's interchanging relationship with his natural and social environment and critiques the organisation of these around a market system which favours the construction of its own ideological laws and norms that alienate the rest of society.²⁵ Drawing equally from his lesser-known work as well as from *The Great Transformation*,²⁶ Latham feels that Polanyi not only demonstrates, through his example of the 19th century, the dangers of placing economics solely at the mercy of the market, but also shows in his earlier work that a mode of production needs to provide for all aspects of societal concerns.²⁷ This is where he feels that Polanyi has more relevance today. For the struggles that are occurring against the more globalising form of neoliberalism do not see the alternative within the two distinct models of state socialism and welfare corporatism, as they did in the first half of the 20th century.²⁸ A successful challenge then to neoliberalism would exploit all the contradictions inherent within its ideological framework and construct a more pluralized alternative that would not be bound by ideology but instead be more directed towards public life²⁹.

Latham also demonstrates here that Gramsci's and Polanyi's normative strategies of transformation may not be as diverse as some observers may have noted. For, whilst Polanyi can not in any way be regarded as a Marxist, neo-

Marxist or post-revisionist Marxist,³⁰ his anti-ideological framework of progression can be compared, at least in some way, to Gramsci's own conception of progressive counter-hegemony. For whilst Gramsci was concerned with countering the hegemonic consciousness constructed by the dominant class, Polanyi's concerns were located around how (similar) ideologies are carried out and practised, whilst neglecting any democratising alternatives. Indeed, according to Mittelman and Chin the relevance of coupling Gramsci and Polanyi in analysing resistance takes on a greater emphasis when combined with Scott's analysis of 'resistance as infrapolitics'.³¹ This builds upon the counter-hegemonic notion but adds that resistance is often played out within discourses that emerge from various structural levels.³² The main focus here is that of 'hidden transcripts' – areas of ideological contestation that are found at different societal levels which highlight areas in which counter-hegemonic consciousness can be built.³³

Whilst Latham does much to re-assess some of the normative attributions behind Polanyi's work and Chin and Mittelman demonstrate ways in which Gramsci, Polanyi and Scott can be used to conceptualise positive resistance to globalisation, historical examples have demonstrated that when states actively seek to open themselves up to the market a two-pronged movement occurs that, on the one hand, appears to reform the inequalities created by the market, but on the other seeks to restore the importance of the 'nation' and nationalism. This appears consistent when looking at the aims of counter-ideological groups today.

For whilst protest groups exist that campaign for a new world order based upon the more democratic form of production, outlined by Latham, there has been a considerable rise in nationalist-based groups that have not just organised, formed and campaigned for their own agenda, but have also been present at World Trade demonstrations and have also, paradoxically, formed loose coalitions with more democratising groups.³⁴ Whilst this has been noted by many concerned with counter-hegemonic activity (including Latham himself), the significance of nationalism and national populism as a form of contestation itself has largely been neglected. Indeed it is necessary not just to locate such social movements as merely one of the inevitable consequences of global pluralism, but also to include their significance within a wider cross-sectional study of resistance.

4.3 The Janus-like character of Counter-hegemony³⁵

Of those who have researched the nature of disenchantment with globalisation, perhaps the research projects of Rupert and Castells have gone the furthest in offering an in-depth study. Both have demonstrated that counter-hegemonic ideologies appear in diverse forms and both have embarked upon substantial studies to demonstrate this.³⁶ In investigating groups that challenge the American form of neoliberal common sense, Rupert loosely categorises them into what he calls 'progressive' responses and 'nationalistic' responses.³⁷ 'Progressive' responses are depicted as those groups, which include labour unions, consumer groups, environmentalists and citizen activists, who critique

economic globalisation from the premise that it undermines the representation and power of workers, citizens and communities. Their concerns are based around the notion that the spread of market economics greatly reduces the capacity of public participation in everyday social life. In Rupert's own words:

Beginning to frame an alternative vision of global political economy based on democratic self-determination and transnational linkages among working people and citizens- rather than allowing unfettered markets and the criterion of private profit to determine social outcomes – they counterpoised the common sense value of 'democracy' to liberalism's traditional valorization of private property.³⁸

In terms of viable alternatives they see the future of the global political economy as one that provides a more democratising system of 'fair' trade, rather than 'free' trade. This could apply a more multi-dimensional form of corporatism, arranged around the need of the citizen and solidarity, rather than centred on large corporations and consumerism.³⁹

'Nationalist' critiques stem from a belief that both economic institutions and global forums, such as the UN, are not just eroding national sovereignty and culture but also appear as a form of conspiracy, created by the dominant global classes, to seek to exploit their own agenda against those firm-held beliefs of the average citizen.⁴⁰ Whilst Rupert uses pro-constitutional movements in the US, such as the 'Liberty Lobby' and the 'John Birch Society' to show this, the 'conspiracy' fear is equally evident within re-emerging forms of nationalism in other parts of the world, although the narrative inherent within the conspiracy itself differs. For example, the 'Patriot' movement in the US interprets the global

conspiracy as one that threatens the historical virtues of Americanism – free trade itself being a European invention – and fears that a world government is attempting to dilute these virtues.⁴¹ Its greatest fear is that this world government could itself be a smokescreen for the emergence of world socialism.⁴² In Europe on the other hand, similar groups feel equally threatened by the establishment of the European Union and interpret its growth as a plot to undermine the democracy and sovereignty of the nation-state. Here, populist opinion points towards a conspiracy organised by the ‘liberal elite’ which seeks, step-by-step, to lead the nations of Europe into a super-state, against the ‘patriotic’ wishes of its citizens.⁴³ In Russia the form of conspiracy is also apparent but differs, depending upon the ideological position of the nationalist group. Whilst both the official Communist Party and many Nationalist groups share inward looking solutions they differ in their evaluations of conspiracy, with the Communists interpreting globalisation as an ‘Imperialist Capitalist’ plot and the more anti-Semitic nationalist movements identifying it, in ethnic terms, as a ‘Jewish conspiracy’.⁴⁴ Whilst there are different levels of xenophobia within these responses, they all fear a form of global conspiracy in varying degrees and they all seek to defend themselves from this conspiracy by focusing on their individual varieties of exceptionalism within their respective nations’ culture.⁴⁵

Rupert’s analysis provides a useful point of departure for further study. His form of categorisation seeks to unlock some of the problems that frequently occur when applying a balanced account of contestation. However, Rupert’s

typological model, whilst commendable, does require some re-analysis. For, while he emphasises that there is a 'loose' form of coalition inherent within 'nationalist' and 'progressive' critiques, a greater examination reveals that contradiction, fragmentation and the blurring of the boundaries of these categories are more frequent. For example, the term 'progressive' itself provides certain problems within its definition. Whilst demonstration against global institutions has indeed been well-represented by democratising groups, they have also been joined by more 'hardline' ideological groups from the old-style Communist and Anarchist traditions, who favour more violent direct action.⁴⁶ Indeed the aims of those involved with more 'progressive' groups are often diluted in terms of their potency by the diversity of others whose objectives, at times, although not always clearly defined, often find closer similarities with the individuality of nationalism.

Castells' analysis of these social movements moves beyond Rupert's examination by interpreting all varieties of such counter-movements as a single interlinking process, emerging simultaneously as a response to the chaotic social-Darwinist nature of the neo- technological society. As globalisation and mass communications serve to disintegrate the existing mechanism of social control and political representation, an increase of challenging projects of differing forms are likely to emerge:

Following an old law of social evolution, resistance confronts domination, empowerment reacts against powerlessness, and alternative projects challenge the logic embedded in the new global order, increasingly sensed as disorder by people around the planet. However, these reactions and

mobilizations, as is often the case in history, come in unusual formats and proceed through unexpected ways.⁴⁷

Thus Castells moves further than many critical theorists by bracketing all reactions as symptoms of dissatisfaction that are unpredictable in their content. Whilst diverse in purpose they are united in the sense that they impact on social structures that are necessary for the continued advancement of the hegemonic project of neoliberalism. It is also vital not to romanticise the significance of those groups that appear more appealing and seem to have moved beyond the 20th century alternative of Marxist-Leninist. For along with every seemingly 'progressive' movement, there is a chaotic network of opposing movements that explore all variations of ideological alternatives and all of which have to be equally researched in order to understand their relevance as a form of counter-hegemony. Thus one must attempt to be as open-minded as possible when locating elements of social resistance rather than falling into the trap of pre-determining the relevance of groups, movements, organizations and demonstrations that seem to favour a socially more feasible and democratic world order to that of neoliberalism. To further quote from Castells:

Social movements may be socially conservative, socially revolutionary or both or none... there is no predetermined directionality in social evolution, that the only sense of history is the history we sense. Therefore, from an analytical point of view there are no 'bad' or 'good' social movements.⁴⁸

From both Castells and Rupert we can further the conceptualisations of Gramsci's counter-hegemonic by exploring how different social and political movements and projects have contested, through processes of war of movement

and position, the processes of neoliberalism. They have also empirically shown, by illustrating the counter-ideological visions of different groups, how counter-hegemony has appeared in different, diverse and competing forms. From this it can be explicitly stated that the sense of alienation and loss of identity that have coupled the practices of globalisation has resulted in a whole succession of ideological alternatives from the 'fair trade' and democratisation groups, to a dangerous renewal of xenophobia and national exceptionalism. To illustrate this further, I will demonstrate how four different types of counter-hegemonic activities within Western Europe and North America have responded to the politics of globalisation, and how their ideological responses have differed. In addition, an empirical case study will show how contradictions, fragmentations and 'unholy right-left alliances' have become a prominent feature in these responses, thus weakening any potential to substantially threaten the current order.

4.3.1 Against NAFTA and the WTO

1. The American Patriots

One way of demonstrating the diversity of responses towards the processes of globalisation is to show how they have interpreted various regional and global institutional agents that seek to prolong the neoliberal development. In North America, the establishment of NAFTA, just months before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round which gave the green light for the construction of the WTO,

brought all different forms of reactions. In particular, in the US, concerns were placed upon how much these institutions would threaten both the democratic and constitutional function of the American system of government.⁴⁹

Moving from the position taken by Ross Perot and the marginal success of his newly founded 'reform party', the 'populist' wing within American society stepped up its campaign in the aftermath of the establishment of NAFTA and the WTO. Central to this has been the personal campaign of one Patrick Buchanan, a life-long icon of the Republican right and former speechwriter to Nixon and Reagan. Buchanan has condemned globalisation and all its abiding institutions as 'anti-American', because its purpose seems set to erode the constitution, and with it individual liberty. In 1996, Buchanan ran for the republican presidential nomination against Dole, his campaign focusing largely on the need to resist the establishment of a new tyrannical global order, founded primarily to transfer money from the US to other parts of the world, whilst using global institutions to enforce and legitimize these aims.⁵⁰ Acting, therefore, not from a position of global humanitarianism but from a distinct concern that the US and its citizens would suffer the most, Buchanan presented an alternative that has since remained a model for US isolationist groups and has been partially echoed by similar movements in other Countries.

Historically, Buchanan identifies free trade with European Imperialism and subsequently global free trade as paradoxical to Americanism and its

constitutional struggle. As an alternative Buchanan promotes the concept of 'Economic Nationalism' with its objectives being to retain the free-market and individuality at home, but constructing a high national tariff protection, so that foreign competition would be vastly restricted. Buchanan forwards this by locating it, not in an abstract context, but firmly within a historical tradition:

What is Economic Nationalism? Is it some right-wing or radical idea? By no means. Economic Nationalism was the idea and cause that brought Washington, Hamilton and Madison to Philadelphia. These men dreamed of creating here in America the greatest free market on earth, by eliminating all internal barriers to trade among the 13 states, and taxing imports to finance the turnpikes and canals of the new nation and America's dependence on Europe. It was called the American system.⁵¹

After his defeat in 1996, Buchanan stepped up his political battle against the consensual elite by resigning from the Republican Party and accusing the new world order as 'Godless' and by moving instead to a new position at the head of Reform Party. Whilst the 2000 presidential election seemed to suggest a decline in his popularity,⁵² his sentiments have been backed by various notorious American organizations, such as the 'Christian Coalition', various sections of the right-populist wing of the Republican Party that supported Buchanan in '96', the 'Patriot movement', the John Birch Society, the National Rifle Association and several branches of the Militia. These groups all pledge in different ways to defend the US constitution from the threat of the impending 'New World Order' (a phrase that seems to serve as a buzzword for American isolationist – replacing the 'red terror of the Cold War'), and demonstrate considerable distrust with big-global corporations and institutions promoted by the federal government. Supporting the rhetorical outline of the national economic alternative, these

groups label any movement towards political and economic global unity as both unpatriotic and ungodly; a position that calls for the immediate withdrawal of the US from international institutions. International Institutions and Organisations (the most dangerous of which being the UN) are thus tarnished with the same brush, that they all aim ultimately to set up an unaccountable form of global government. As stated by the John Birch Society:

Unlike the US, the UN does not recognize the supremacy of God and views itself as the source of rights. As the source, it can give and take away 'rights' at its whim. In addition any government body strong enough to govern the world would be strong enough to oppose the world.⁵³

Fuelled by the fears that globalisation threatens both the social and civil 'way of life' and the political apparatus that has allowed it to flourish, populist-civilian groups, patriot and militia organisations have, aided by the Internet, been organized to defend the religious and constitutional way of life that had been determined by the American Fore-Fathers. Independent militia groups have grown rapidly during the 1990s.⁵⁴ The first of these being the Montana Militia who legitimised their formation both through the 2nd amendment of the constitution⁵⁵ and legal ambiguity, inherent within federal law over the right to form internal armies outside of government control. The modern-day Militia is committed to providing a 'watchdog' service to protect American traditions from any form of 'global oppression' or 'federal tyranny' which may aspire from the new world order.⁵⁶ Thus, analysed through a neo-Gramscian lens, the militia can be represented as the 'war of movement' here, as their main strategy is formed through a more explicit confrontation of the global order.

The trade liberalisation of the 1980s and 1990s has thus led patriot groups to respond by romanticising the historical development of the American nation. For them the American Constitution acts as a timeless phenomenon, one that appears as a utopian construct around which civil society should be fundamentally built. However, some of the concerns that the far-right have with the legacy of NAFTA, are reflected by labour rights groups and unions. For example, in order to protect American workers from job insecurity, resulting from multinational development, Buchanan is joined by the AFL-CIO American union conglomerate in campaigning for the introduction of a social tariff to be placed upon manufactured goods from the developing world.⁵⁷ The varied collection of campaign groups, labour groups, growing environmentalist groups and citizen rights groups that have emerged in opposition to NAFTA have maximized support through the use of technological developments and have become at times in league with some from the far-right. This has been illustrated in a number of both implicit and explicit ways. For example, some of the work and research undertaken by NGOs in order to exploit flaws within the NAFTA agreement have been cited with great zeal by some far-right groups. Pressure groups such as 'Corporate Watch' and 'Global Trade Watch' have both published research on how NAFTA has both limited job creation and has had a derogatory effect upon the American manufacturing and agricultural industries.⁵⁸ Reports claim that the manufacturing industry has gone from a trade surplus of \$4.6 million with Mexico to a deficit of \$8.9 billion within just five

years of NAFTA's launch, whilst cheaper imports from Mexico have risen 129%.⁵⁹ Similarly, cheaper agricultural imports from both Mexico and Canada have left many US farmers unable to cope with the new rules of competition.⁶⁰ Whilst these critical reports are geared towards highlighting the societal failures within Canada, Mexico and the US as a whole, the far-right have used them to illustrate the dangers that un-constitutional multinational agreements have had upon the more traditional and successful American way.⁶¹

The conservatives have also had more noticeable affiliations with 'left' critiques by listening to, and, at times, even winning support from other opposing quarters. Amidst the coalition of international unionists, human and citizen's rights groups, pro-democratic campaigns and anti-ideological anarchists that gathered at the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle was Patrick Buchanan. Fresh from his resignation from the Republican Party, Buchanan wasted no time in joining forces with other diverse forms of opposition by adding his own brand of populist expression to the proceedings. The buck at Seattle didn't stop at Buchanan either. Many branches of unions that attended the Seattle demonstrations have long had a post-war history of favouring white, 'traditional' Americans, within their inclusive membership, excluding minority races from membership benefits. In addition, such unions, affiliated within the AFL-CIO umbrella, were not at Seattle to highlight inequality or the lack of democracy inherent within the WTO, but were there solely for their own concerns. Many 'conservative' higher-paid higher skilled industrialists or agriculturalists

supported the tax cutting, union curbing regime of Reagan, but stand themselves to lose with further institutional trade liberalisation.⁶² Here we see a distinct blurring of the two categorisational forms, forwarded by Rupert, as many groups may systematically appear as contributing towards a more 'progressive' alternative, but closer analysis suggests a far more fragmented reality.

Further evidence of an 'unholy anti-globalisation alliance' between the right and left in the US has been more publicly noticeable with the growing working relationship between the two figureheads of the American political fringe, Buchanan and Ralph Nader. Nader's relationship with Buchanan dates back to 1994 when his 'public citizen' group joined forces with Buchanan supporters to attack the concluding proposals of GATT's Uruguay Round. Whilst the two did put forward their distinctively different reasoning against GATT's new agenda of liberalisation, they both collaborated to stress how US sovereignty would come under great threat. This unity was strengthened further in the light of Seattle, when both men gave various appearances to media outlets, with Nader announcing a 'co-operation of conviction' between the two of them in order to defend American democracy.⁶³ The run-up to the 2000 election provided further alliances when Lenora Fulani, leader of the 'left-wing' *New Alliance Party*, endorsed Buchanan's presidential bid. Fulani, a black (female) activist, who had previously worked with leftist organisations such as 'The International Workers Party', 'Rainbow Lobby' and the 'Committee for a Unified Independent Party', and thus having all the necessary political and personal traits necessary to be

considered by Patriots as a member of the 'global socialist conspiracy', joined forces with Buchanan, claiming him to be the strongest advocate of American freedom.⁶⁴ Fulani later broke with the Buchanan campaign, having failed to gain any significant position within the Reform Party camp.⁶⁵

The Patriot and neo-Conservative response to institution globalisation represents one avenue for contestation within the US. From the extremist fears held by the Militia conspiracy theorists to the more moderate supporters of the Constitution, concerns have been underlined from a conservative position that, in different ways, de-legitimise the neoliberal process. Similarly, it has received attention and gained sympathy from other disenchanted quarters which appear to be on opposite sides of the political spectrum but, in the persuading process of growing social change, have moved towards collaboration.

2. The Zapatistas

Within hours of the NAFTA agreement coming into effect, a small but significant band of largely indigenous Indian Mexicans took control of four regions in the Chiapas region of Mexico. Discontented with a series of governmental interventions that had fringed the constitutional agreements on land reform that had been greatly speeded up by the Salinas administration, which sought to comply with the World Bank's conditions of structural adjustment loans, the guerrilla revolt was planned to coincide with the start of

the NAFTA, which they saw as the final straw. The NAFTA agreement not only neglected the democratic rights of the native peasantry, which historically date back to the revolutionary years of the early 20th century, but also served to destroy the local economy as industries such as forestry, cattle, coffee and corn, which locals had depended upon for their economic survival, became open to the free market.⁶⁶ The rebels, led by the former academic 'sub-Commandante' Marcos, led a initial armed resistance that quickly subsided when the Mexican government and the guerrillas settled upon a cease-fire. Since then the rebels, known officially as the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation (EZLN), have entered into countless negotiations moving from Salinas, to Zedillo and through to the new Fox administration and have published countless articles and affiliated web-sites that seek to exploit their own indigenous concerns as well as the liberalisation programmes of the Mexican governments and the more macro-organisations of NAFTA and the WTO.

A great deal of attention has been paid to the plight of the EZLN, predominately from left-wing groups and academics, desperate to find progressive alternatives, aimed at transcending neoliberalism. However the Zapatistas act upon concerns at a primarily local level which transform into a dispute at the larger, global level. As stated by Commandante Marcos himself:

Today the North American Free Trade Agreement begins, which is nothing more than a death certificate for the indigenous ethnicities of Mexico, who are perfectly dispensable in the modernisation programs of Salinas de Gortari. Thus the campeneros decided to rise up on this same day to respond to the decree of death that the Free Trade Agreement gives them.⁶⁷

Indeed the history and struggle of the Zapatistas dates back to (hence its name) the actions of the revolutionary leader, Emiliano Zapata. Zapata, a peasant forerunner to Ché Guevara, fought to install the 'Plan of Ayala' and consolidation of the *ejido* land system within the constitutional political structure of the growth of modern Mexico.⁶⁸ The main crux of this action was to ensure the public-ownership of land that the peasantry had gained from private colonisation during the 1911-1919 revolution. This became enshrined within Article 27 of the Mexican constitution, a decree that further ensured that the lands which the state had released to indigenous Indians, would remain free from state intervention.⁶⁹ Here then, we can see definite links with the US Patriots. Both movements seek to defend their national constitutions from the advancement of regional liberalization and the global economy; both fear that their individual societal environment is being infringed upon by forces above. Distinct differences exist between the historical objectives of the two movements; one being rooted in the fear of political plurality conceived by external forces, the other from centuries of struggle against differing modes of capitalism, but they both share a historical sense which encompasses the protection of local autonomy – despite the differences in its interpretation.

The aims of the Zapatistas are two-fold. Firstly, and predominately they stand for their internal struggle, upholding the constitutional amendments that Zapata fought for before his death in 1919, and also look externally, rhetorically

critiquing the nature of the neoliberal order and its totalising and hegemonic construction, with Marcos himself commenting that governmental forces and media outlets have 'proclaimed the victory of liberal capitalism'.⁷⁰ Marcos uses his base in the Chiapas Mountains to link up with intellectuals and sympathizers, mainly in the west, to share convictions and theoretical formulas and to stimulate resistance from further afield. Indeed, protestors gathering at various anti-globalisation protests within Europe and North America (especially the former), have donned masks – a feature that became synonymous with Marcos and Zapatista resistance.

Marcos' commitment towards the exploitation of local and global space has prompted many academics to regard the Zapatistas as a distinctly new form of resistance movement; one that breaks from guerrilla movements founded in Marxist-Leninism as it exploits the post-cold war form of capitalist on different levels and through different diversities.⁷¹ Adam Morton, for instance, cites R.B.J. Walker in claiming that the Zapatistas can be linked to the understanding of 'critical social movements' that appear post-modern in content.⁷² Unlike the Maoist-influenced resistance of the 20th century, critical social movements do not necessarily aim to take over the state but rather express themselves by raising consciousness and establishing the linkage between the global and the local. This, Morton continues, may also provide a formula for a more substantial counter-hegemonic bloc at the global institutional level – one that has, in Gramscian terms, an educative and emancipatory capacity strong enough to

challenge existing hegemonic norms.⁷³ This certainly fits in with the objectives of Marcos himself:

We are talking about making a broad social movement, violent or peaceful, which will radically modify social relationships so that its final product might be a new space of political relationship. I think that the main actor has not been defined. It is what we call "civil society" and which cannot be delimited by the bourgeois, the proletariat, the farmers, the middle class.⁷⁴

However, one can also conclude that as the movement itself stemmed organically from the historic struggles of the indigenous Indians, it remains primarily an ethnic and cultural movement, rooted more within the politics of inclusion and the nation-state.⁷⁵ In hindsight the Zapatistas movement is a symptom of the contradictions and exclusion nature of neoliberalism – and while the dialectical appearance of the EZLN does have tendencies, as Morton observes, to form a loose basis for progressive counter-hegemonic challenge of the sort envisaged by Gramsci, it also has characteristics that are reminiscent of the US Patriot movement. For whilst they appear different in their socio-political temperament they share the same commitment towards the protection of their respective historical rights, which they feel are threatened by neoliberal hegemony.

4.3.2 Against the European Council and the EU

1. The growth of European mass demonstration.

If the events of Seattle firmly established the concepts of globalisation into the minds of the population at large, then it also gave the green light to thousands of dissidents across Europe to advance their individual struggle. For in the wake of Seattle, demonstrations have occurred in London, Nice, Davos, Gothenburg and Genoa, amongst others, each (with the exception of the Labour Day demonstrations in London) occurring in conjunction with institutional summits arranged at the same time. Here we see the strategy of war of movement in its most organic and explicit form, as resistance is geared around a frontal assault upon the institutions that guide the global political economy.

The respective demonstrations have linked together diverse groups and individuals from all over Europe, their organisational action once again reliant upon, perhaps, the most contradictory neoliberal creation – the Internet (see chapter 3). The result has been a diverse-collection of Unionists, Ecologists, Citizen rights and Human rights groups, Socialists, Communists and Anarchists, and Situationists as well as those inter-linked to specific groups but opposed the purposes and practices of the G8, the European Council and the World Bank. The results of the demonstrations have been marred by violent clashes between protestors and the authorities, with both sides blaming the other for the extent of

damage. The respective European politicians have also deplored the actions and motives of the protesters, maintaining the affirmation that globalisation provides the only economic solution for the process of poverty alleviation and wealth creation within both Europe and beyond.⁷⁶ Similarly the mainstream press has generally followed suit dismissing the protests as a whole as being 'misguided', 'misinformed' and even that their actions have 'limited any real possibility the poor have to improve themselves'.⁷⁷ These blunt responses have only served to further the debate on globalisation at a public level, as policy-makers and free market economics have failed to address the critiques that have been put to them. As a consequence, many media outlets, especially the more independent ones, have been obliged to open up significant debates on the nature of globalisation; the intensity of these increasing in the aftermath of demonstrations.⁷⁸

Whilst the various mass protests have opened up neoliberalism to public debate, the aims and objectives of the demonstrators themselves have often made them easy targets for ridicule. Such is the contradictory nature inherent within the diverse range of groups at the protests themselves that it is difficult to see what, if anything, actually unites them all, apart from a distinct dislike of global institutions and multi-national corporations. What they lack is a unifying structural alternative that transcends neoliberalism, opting instead for fragmented objectives that often lack a foundational basis. There are some exceptions to this. For example at the demonstrations that surrounded the

European Council meeting in Nice, the general consensus amongst the bulk of the protestors was that the EU should construct a democratic constitution which was accountable to the citizens of Europe as a whole. In addition, there were numerous demands that the European Social Charter should be included within this constitution and that it should be determined in cooperation with workers representatives. The main crux here was to demonstrate that the proposed social charter was being watered down with unionists, amongst others, being frozen out by European leaders and big business.⁷⁹ Here we see elements that concur with Rupert's definition of progression – a coalition of forces, transnational in appearance, that collectively aim to democratise the neoliberal order. However this only represent one section of the demonstrators. The division of objectives of protestors at large reveals a far more fragmented opposition. Whilst certain dissident sections have merely been active as representatives of their respective citizen or human rights NGO or union, others have favoured more militant tactics – some being grounded in old socialist dogma; others calling themselves 'new age anarchists', schooling themselves in the 'guerrilla initiatives' of direct action.⁸⁰ Groups that have favoured direct-action include Youth members of the Swedish Communist Party (schooled within the distinct principles of Marxist-Leninism), Militant groups from France and the UK (who themselves are theoretically grounded in Trotsky), Anarchist groups from through-out Europe (who argue that Anarchism has replaced the void which state socialism left behind), and varying 'Eco-Warrior' groups (such as the British-group 'Reclaim the Streets'), who lack any dogmatic inspiration, but seem to favour differing

forms of de-industrialisation.⁸¹

In the same way that Buchanan and Nader have founded a united front to tackle the debate on globalisation, large numbers of demonstrators that have attended the various protests across Europe have also come from a position that is distinctly 'nationalist' in character. As one NGO monitoring right-wing action put it:

It's paradoxical that a world-wide campaign that advertises internationalism is more like an alliance of little nationalisms⁸²

Such is the broad and uneasy alliance of anti-capitalist protestors that it is often difficult to make a distinctive examination of the actual motives inherent within each fragmented group. 'Masked anarchists' have joined both socialist 'red brigade' groups and nationalist groups – that date back to anti-capitalist groups such as the German 'Revolutionary Cells' group of the 70s and 80s, who used similar forms of 'direct action'.⁸³ In addition, protests have seen (often eccentric) individuals, unconnected to any organisations, in militant action against the 'combined enemy'.⁸⁴ As a result, whilst the demonstrators have managed to exploit and open-up the weaknesses inherent within neoliberalism their fragmentation as a whole prevents them, at least at the moment, from mounting any sustained counter-hegemonic challenge.

2. The Reluctant European

The marginal success of the British National Party (BNP) at the 2001 general election, in a country where the far right have traditionally failed to register support, sent shockwaves through the bemused media.⁸⁵ However, their success has merely been one of a series of occurrences from nationalist-based groups in Britain, all of which critique the global economy and more explicitly, the European Union, for threatening to endanger British self-governance and the sole determination of its Economy. For the emergence of single purpose groups, such as the 'Referendum Party'⁸⁶ and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the influence of nationalist-based stalwarts within the Conservative Party, the campaigns of rural groups, such as the 'Countryside Alliance' and the transformation of far-right Parties, from a position which condoned street violence into sophisticated and efficient organisations, all, in their different ways, challenge the conscious legitimisation of neoliberal hegemony, from a nationalist and protectionist base.

The populist fears over the creation of NAFTA within the US are almost mirrored in the UK with the EU, and in particular the European Single Currency. This seems to stem not just from a fear of the suppression of national identity, but also from a suppression of individualism and national democracy and from xenophobic fears that the British are being forced to accept a power-axis constructed by former 'enemy' powers and from the sense that the British public

were 'conned' into joining what they were told was nothing more than a trading agreement:

We were told that its purpose was to form a large free trade area. Then we moved on to a scrapping of nations and we, also, were promised that we would retain essential national sovereignty.. the proposal of irreversibility was also introduced, preventing any nation from leaving the EU. And now the trap is being closed. We are being led blindfold into a federal super state...as we see this tragic accident unfolding before our eyes, we are unable to be passive, we have no option other than to fight.⁸⁷

The anti-European cause is aided by popular support, for example the claims that recent polls show that under 30% of the population favour the single currency, 46% believe that Britain should pull out of the EU altogether and that in some rural regions 97% believe that Britain should never consider joining the Euro.⁸⁸ Conversely however, the majority of 'Euro sceptics' that are found within both mainstream politics (with Conservative Party MPs) and the media see the European Union as not contributing enough to the idea of neoliberalism as governmental structures and regulatory action within the EU restrict greater freedom within the market. Many instead, look towards the US and to the possibility of joining NAFTA itself as a solution, which (despite contrary accounts from the US itself) they believe would give the UK government greater freedom to manage its own affairs and further minimise intervention into the economy.⁸⁹ Such is the ferocity of the 'get out of Europe' campaign, that these American-inspired free marketeers have ambiguously welcomed and pledged support to populist and nationalist campaigns that have targeted the EU.⁹⁰ Paradoxically, they have fuelled populist feeling by adding to the often-xenophobic opinions towards the EU and Europe itself.

One example of the contradictions inherent within such responses can be seen within the rural group, 'the Countryside Alliance'. The Countryside Alliance, a motley, rather ambiguous crew of farmers, rural workers and landowners and influential members of the Conservative Party, the majority of whom both welcomed and actively participated in the Thatcher revolution in the 1980s,⁹¹ have campaigned for a variety of rural issues that ultimately place blame upon the European Union's CAP. Whilst many of the Thatcherites popularly involved point to the 'socialist interference' inherent within the European political model, the bulk of the campaigners within the 'Countryside Alliance' have used the various demonstrations orchestrated by the alliance as a forum to underline concerns such as cheap food imports, low governments subsidisation and the interference of the urban elite in the cultural traditions of rural Britain. Indeed many protestors themselves become decorated with nationalist flag-waving and traditional-cultural décor, with the most prominent message being that of 'Buy British', thus reiterating those similar nationalist campaigns in the US.⁹² Traditional landowners and the rural upper classes join the more militant farmers in their condemnation of globalisation, many of who reminisce to the more stable days of paternalism and to social and hierarchal protectionism. This, as one daily British newspaper commented, after an anti-globalisation demonstration in London, affirmed that 'discontent with globalisation comes not only from anti-capitalist protestors, by from old respectable conservative ladies with big hats'.⁹³

The prominence of the BNP at the 2001 election was a further symptom of the national-populist reaction to globalisation. For whilst, as the media have over-emphasised, the BNP did benefit mainly in areas where racial tension was high, the Party itself campaigned upon a variety of issues, with the global economy being at the core of their manifesto. In particular, they campaigned for the selective exclusion of foreign goods from British markets and a comprehensive reduction of foreign imports to protect the internal market.⁹⁴ Here we see further comparisons with the Buchanan campaign in the US. Both point towards a nationalist critique of international homogenisation by arguing that the individualistic and cultural preservation of the nation-state is required for a more feasible form of societal harmonisation. Equally visible is the fact that the growth in support of the fringe party in recent years has followed an uneven trend across the country in which protectionist responses, whether they are from agricultural or fishing disputes, directed explicitly at the EU (UKIP won 2 seats in the 1999 European Parliamentary elections), or from more blatantly nationalistic parties such as the BNP itself or the National Democrats,⁹⁵ have risen as a mounting form of contestation towards British participation in the global economy.

The above examples demonstrate a whole variety of conclusions and evaluations when considering the nature of counter-hegemony. Firstly, it demonstrates that globalisation has not managed to harmonise and passively consolidate its

hegemonic relations and has, through its contradictory market philosophy, allowed space and time for counter-movements to appear. These movements, demonstrated above, have arrived from differing political philosophies and have contrasting agendas. In this instance there is a lack of counter-hegemonic unity and in particular a lack of unifying ideological alternative capable of mounting a substantial attack on the common sense of neoliberalism. What these studies also demonstrate is the diversity of sources and possible contradictions that lie *within* their respective challenges. For example, in the first instance, whilst the American Patriots have set out an alternative agenda of 'economic nationalism' and through various debates and literary publication have successfully embarked upon strategies that encompass both the war of movements and the war of position, they have also forged certain alliances with the left in order to highlight the concerns of globalisation. This in turn has often diluted and problemised their overall goals. In addition, the failure of the Reform Party in the 2000 presidential elections, demonstrates that whilst their national alternatives do provide the public with a conscious alternative, the processes of *trasformiso* can significantly weaken their objectives.⁹⁶ The Zapatistas movement on the other hand has implications that are both local and global and contests the politics of neoliberalism by demonstrating how its policies have affected rural Mexican life. However, despite the Zapatistas having received global recognition and indeed prompted the rise of many western-based protest groups, their objectives remain primarily local in action.⁹⁷ In Europe, the mass diversities of groups that have targeted global and regional institutions have played a large role in

highlighting some of the discontent with neoliberal hegemony but appear diverse, contradictory and fragmented in their ideological nature.⁹⁸ Thus, as a counter-hegemonic unit, they have yet to offer a comprehensive alternative programme of change capable of transforming or contesting viably the status quo, allowing the hegemonic class to exploit this incoherence.⁹⁹ The emergence of the populist-right in the UK is a symptom of a trans-national revival of the Right across both North America and Europe.¹⁰⁰ It further demonstrates that the return of national protectionism and subversive xenophobic politics are one possible alternative to address globalisation. In the case of the anti-European centre-right in Britain – whilst they are committed towards a more Atlanticist form of capitalism, as opposed to the more regulated European model, and so exist to protect and strengthen the ideology of neoliberalism, the populist and often xenophobic campaigning can aid the sort of rhetorical consciousness that the anti-globalisers of the far-right exploit.¹⁰¹

If the above examples demonstrate the contradictory and different forms of resistance that have arisen in conjunction with the institutional cementation of neoliberalism, a closer case study would need to place these individual struggles within both the context of the directions taken ‘above the state’, as these examples have shown, but also from within the sociological and cultural constraint of individual states. As I identified at the end of the last chapter, political parties, traditionally opposed to de-regulated market practices, have ‘re-invented themselves’ to legitimate neoliberal globalisation. However, in parts of

the world, where western-orientated projects have historically contained greater resistance, a greater depth of analysis can be placed in investigating the overall stability of global hegemony. A detailed study of social forces, transformation and counter-hegemony within Russia can add a greater understanding to the study of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Firstly, as I have made continual referenced to throughout this thesis, Russia provides a useful departure point when assessing contestation, due to its significance as a counter to the western-world during the Bretton-Woods dominated era (see chapter two). Here the Russian state was to ideologically provide the stimulus for opposition to western capitalism. Secondly, it was the failure of Marxist-Leninism and ultimately the failure of the 'Russian-based counter' that allowed a unitary economic principle to thrive (see below). Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine the stability (or instability) inherent within Russian society, in order to assess whether or not contrasting Russian social forces can adapt to the stability of the hegemonic order.¹⁰² Thirdly, an assessment of these trends within Russia would also add further invaluable studies about the nature of global hegemonic stability. For whilst the differing examples of the wars of position and movement in the West remain important and relevant, the historical traditions associated with Russia may identify more with the complex and often contradictory nature of neoliberal resistance. Finally, whilst theoretical and empirical studies have considered the relevance of resistance movements (as the above discussions have shown), there is still a lack of literature within Gramscian-inspired critical theory in assessing the significance and diversities of movements that exist outside of EU and

NAFTA Nations, and here again Russia proves a suitable case study, at it appears distant to regional economic projects, yet is still a key actor on the global stage.

4.4 An Overview of Instability within Russia

The above examples all refer to different forms of hegemonic contestation within the core economic continents of North America and Europe. They all reveal certain similarities and maintain certain characteristics that are consistent, to an extent, with Rupert's observations that contestations appear from both the progressive left and the populist right, although within these movements themselves contradictions and fragmentations occur which weaken any substantial alternative transcending model. How do these forms of contestations within NAFTA and the EU relate to movements within states that themselves have been forced to radicalise their own economies as a result of the fall of Communism?

If anything signified the catalyst for globalisation and the totalised global gateway for neoliberalism it was Russia's own entrance into the free market, thus finally involving itself and contributing towards global capitalism. Any significant movements that run counter to these developments provide further evidence of the overall instability of global hegemony. In addition, while it has been acknowledged by both Rupert and Castells that responses to globalisation

may be socially conservative, socially progressive or fragmented between the two,¹⁰³ these social categories become substantially more problematic within Russia. The mass fragmentation and polarisation of Russian society that has occurred since the break-up of the Soviet Union makes it difficult (if not impossible) for comparisons within movements that have become synonymous in the West. The vast fragmentation of political opinion, however, coupled with the traditions, ideology and culture, that have been historically formed within Russia, makes it both a useful and viable case-study to demonstrate the hegemonic instabilities that the legacy of globalisation is built upon. For a greater overall understanding can be given to the nature of hegemony and counter-hegemonic fragmentations when focusing upon a state which appeared as a super-power, at the head of an alternative sub-hegemonic movement of state socialism that became the feature of the Cold War.¹⁰⁴ Not only has the transition from Communism to Capitalism brought vast polarisations to a society, unable to fully comprehend the nature of the changes,¹⁰⁵ but its fall as a super-power, based upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, has also left both a nationalist and communist vacuum within Russia society. Both nationalist and Marxist-Leninist groups have re-emerged as social forces to critique the economic formula of neoliberalism that has been applied, often with disastrous consequences, within Russia, and the cultural transformations that have been associated with globalisation. In addition, a more internationalist, social democratic critique has also gradually emerged¹⁰⁶ consisting of NGOs, think tanks and Unionists, the majority of which are internationalist in their outlook. They hold certain

similarities with Rupert's progressive forces in the West as their main aim is to democratise neoliberalism to allow for adequate citizen, labour and human rights. However, these movements in Russia lack the historical development that similar movements have had in the West and are often more associated with the transitional movement towards what they perceive as western values than a series of movements that objectively confront the status quo.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, such is the nature of governmental politics within transitional societies that citizen and human rights pressure groups will often find more support from those who are economically Thatcherite, while international unionist groups have stronger links with more 'paternalistic' political factions who do not necessarily hold similar faith in internationalism.¹⁰⁸ As observed by Boris Sauvorov, a human rights worker, based in Moscow:

In Western Countries, you look for social and human protection to the left; in Russia there exists a paradox. Those Parties which are economically right are left in terms of human rights, and those which are economically left are right in terms of human rights.¹⁰⁹

Thus, when looking inside Russia for counter-ideologies that challenge the processes of globalisation, one has to stress that any form of political movement has to be viewed alongside the fall of single-party rule, the onset of democracy and the lack of a historical political culture of consensus-building. For while 'superficial similarities' can be made with the privatisation programs in Britain and France that have resulted from neoliberalism, there was not an established domestic capitalist class within Russia capable of taking over and running the state-owned industries.¹¹⁰ Russia had to deal with the 'double-whammy' of

attempting to find a path towards the smooth transition towards capitalism whilst at the same time having to deal with the competitive market of the global economy which was becoming increasingly open and unregulated. Equally, the fall of the Soviet Union also forced Russia to re-engage in a geopolitical and cultural identity debate after the collapse of its own internal hegemonic order.¹¹¹

4.4.1 The Transitional Economic and Political Culture within Russia

The break-up of the Soviet Union may metaphorically have given a green light for the rapid movement of multinational free trade and investment at a global level. However, within Russia itself, the transformation was to spark a series of fragmentations and instabilities at the political, cultural and economic level. These served to widen interpretation within Russia of the role it should play towards its harmonisation within the global community itself. Economically, the series of economic crashes, originating from the initial 'economic shock' policies of privatisation,¹¹² has seen the Russian economy, as a whole, declining drastically since the collapse of the USSR. In 1999, its GNP fell to half of what it was just a decade earlier, ten times lower than the same yearly figure of the US, while five times lower than that of China.¹¹³ The economic environment has provided the background for discontent within Russia whilst the birth of a multi-party democracy has resulted in further societal fragmentation. Lacking the luxury of an established Party system, Russia has been required to construct one rapidly to adapt to the changing and, at times, unstable socio-economic

atmosphere. Under such conditions several parties, groups and movements have emerged, some finding their way onto the parliamentary arena; others more marginalized, but each with its own programme, position and agenda concerning the direction that Russia should take next. A comprehensive study of these positions and their historical relevance will be taken up in more detail in the next two chapters.

In Russia, democratic transition is thus being forged within a global age of economic transition. As such, neoliberalism is being contested upon lines that show marked similarities with those at the global level. NGO's and think tanks operating within Russia, challenge its legacy from a humanitarian and socio-democratic position,¹¹⁴ although their impact has been minimal, compared to the west. More noticeable similarities are found within some of the mainstream opposition political parties that have emerged since the advent of democracy. Both Zhirinovsky's Russian Liberal Democratic Party and Gennardy Zyuganov's Official Communist Party see Russia as incompatible, both historically and culturally, with liberal economics – echoing the same sentiments of the US patriots. Viewed by the Communists, globalisation (or in their own words 'Imperialist globalisation') is being used by 'modern imperialists' as a distinct tool aimed towards the 'destruction of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, national, cultural originality of each nation'¹¹⁵ – reflecting similar views expressed by nationalist groups in Britain.¹¹⁶ In the case of Russia however, due to the effects that have arisen from the freedom of political

participation, further contestations have followed internally. The split-up of the Soviet Union produced a whole catalogue of political parties and movements that sought to compete for popular support in order to sustain political representation. Founded initially in the era of Glasnost, freedom of political opposition has resulted in a mass fragmentation within political ideological positioning with many political parties staking a newfound claim for recognition. Such has been the immaturity of democratic principles within Russia that groups and blocs within the Duma have often been formed at short notice and have either disbanded in equally quick time or have proved to be successful, despite lacking any form of organisational and nationwide structure required for success in mature democracies.¹¹⁷ Some observers close to the governmental set-up would even claim that political party culture within Russia has never really taken off and that the only major party with any form of organisational structure and stability is the Communist Party.¹¹⁸ The Communist Party itself has had a chequered short history since the fall of the USSR. Emerging from the many different Soviet-inspired groups, parties and movements that formed after the Soviet Union disbanded, Zyuganov's 'official' Communist Party only really emerged as a single force throughout the Russian Federation after 1993, with Zyganov at the helm, when it managed to merge the many factions and contradictions within pro-Soviet organisations into an organised, effective oppositional Party, based upon the disciplined Party model of the CPSU. Despite this, there are still a whole range of Communist and Marxist-Leninist inspired movements, highly critical of the positions that

Zyganov's Party has taken, the significance of which I will discuss in detail in chapter six.

The problems arising from the development of party politics and democratic institutions in the Russian Federation have been matched in the transitional labour movement. Freed from the regimented formulation that was enforced during the disciplined era of the Soviet Union by Glasnost, democratic labour unions have been stifled by the influx of transnational neoliberal activity. For whilst union groups in the West have suffered since the 1980s from the weakening of labour power within the post-war corporatist model, in Russia, Unionists have barely had the opportunity to register their participation in the democratic process before the globalising form of neoliberal capitalism has restricted their effectiveness.¹¹⁹ As observed by Kirill Buketov

Under Stalin Unions became a societal structure... a form of state apparatus for the new regime, by the 1980s and Glasnost the Unions had become so engrained within the system that by the time they gained freedom, the culture of organising a movement had to be taught. This lack of union culture has been seized upon by foreign investors.. the new managers have become severe...more 'severe than the Pope of Rome'.¹²⁰

Thus in Russia, new political cultures have been underpinned by the influx of multinational investment and practices encouraged by the Yeltsin revolution of price liberalisation, the minimisation of government intervention and privatisation. Furthermore the rapid processes have brought, on the domestic front, a massive up-surge in crime and corruption,¹²¹ as the quick-fix formula of free market transition that had been devised by a collaboration of optimistic

Russian economists, maverick American advisors inspired by the Chicago School of Economics, and supported and encouraged by the IMF,¹²² failed to install a capitalist class mature enough to develop the liberal democratic form of civil society that had been nurtured in the west, following World War II. In these terms, critics have observed, privatisation has produced catastrophic effects. Domestically it has failed to create effective opposition as uncontrolled and deregulated monopolies have seized upon the void left by the government. This movement, intended to promote market competition and an increase in productivity, has had a reverse effect, with increases in inflation and unemployment, coupled with a boom-and-bust cycle, that became synonymous during the Yelstin years, resulting in a slowing down of foreign investment.¹²³

Both the processes and responses of global liberalisation within Russia therefore have to be seen through the lens of domestic transition. For whilst social transformation has been evident globally with the processes of globalisation and de-industrialisation, the fragmentation and instability that it has produced can be magnified within Russia. Globally it has joined with the many other participating nations around the world in accepting and consolidating the neoliberal hegemonic project; domestically it has undergone a far more radical and revolutionising process to achieve this. As commented by Boris Kagarlitsky:

Privatisation proved to be as extreme a process as the nationalizations that had once created the state-dominated economy. Its purpose was not just to make certain enterprises and institutions private, but to liquidate the very institution of state enterprise and ownership, even selling off economic sectors that many capitalist Countries remained publicly owned...While the Russian economy inherited many problems from the Soviet system,

and the early process of price liberalisation produced a certain economic disequilibrium, it was the privatisation program that turned this crisis into the worst economic catastrophe in world history. In social terms, the years of reforms in Russia have set the country back by decades, eliminating almost all the achievements of the post-Stalin period. The catastrophic fall in production and lowering of living standards during this period has brought Russia greater reverses than four years of ruinous war with Nazi Germany.¹²⁴

4.4.2 The Geo-politics of Russia

In many classical studies on the idea of Europe, Russia, primarily since Peter the Great, has often been regarded as being on the fringes of European culture and due to its territorial size as semi-Europa, semi-Asiatic, with its inclusion within Europe, often dependent upon the outlook of its leadership at the time (these sociological characteristics will be discussed in depth in the next chapter).¹²⁵ Whilst these historical observations seem less relevant in the American-inspired 'globalised world', Russia's problematic geopolitical positioning, coupled with its historical and cultural tradition of isolationism and the exploration of the alternative 'other', suggests that Russian social responses towards neoliberal globalisation maybe more diverse than those from the west. In addition the collapse of the Soviet system was partly attributed to the rediscovery of nationalities which the policies of Glasnost prompted.

As outlined by Castells and by the Sovietologist Helene Carrere d'Encausse the Soviet Union was built upon a contradictory structural framework that both

promoted the concept of regionalism/nationality and at the same time repressed it. At its amalgamation the Soviet Union promoted the governmental form of a confederation of nationalities bound by the collective dogma of Marxist-Leninism. The policies of Stalinisation oversaw the process of redistributing over 100 different ethnic groups across different regions of the USSR.¹²⁶ Like in Yugoslavia, after similar (albeit not as 'hard line') objectives had been carried out by Tito, the break-up saw a diverse multitude of ethnicities within newly-formed sovereign states, with Russia itself lacking any form of constitutional governmental construction that it could use as a starting base after 1991. Paradoxically, whilst other nations (particularly the Baltic Nations) interpreted the Soviet Union as an extension of previous models of the Imperialist Russian Empire, Russia itself became the main target of cultural repression during the Soviet era; politically having less autonomy from the central state than any other.¹²⁷ Thus, when the Russian Federation took shape as a sovereign federation in its own right, a new wave of nationalism, xenophobia and Slavism was unleashed, with many protagonists drawing on the cultural virtues of the Russian Empire within a renewed concept of Russian Nationalism. As observed by a Moscow academic working on the conceptualisation of the Russian nation:

There was an old Soviet saying in which you would ask your neighbour which ethnic race he was from... if he'd say that he was part-French, part-Mogul, part-Germanic, with Jewish Ancestry, you would reply 'Ah a typical Russian'. Since the end of the Soviet Era, the notion of the 'Russian' has been re-invented, or re-born. I not saying that there wasn't any racial tension during the Soviet era, because unmistakeably there was, but in the new Russia, potential racial tension has been very high.¹²⁸

How does this relate to the comparative forms of contestation that I have

demonstrated earlier in the chapter? Within the new Russian Federation globalisation, as an economic entity, has drawn many contesting and contradictory critiques, which differ in character throughout its differing regions (I will explore these critiques in detail in Chapter 6). In parts these interpretations hold many comparisons with those in the west in that they see external forces such as westernisation/americanism as a threat to particular cultural and tradition identities. However in Russia (as outlined above) both the sociological characteristics inherent within its vast and ethnically diverse landmass and its transitional nature make it even more fragmentary and unstable to the contradictory and potentially destructive effects of neoliberal globalisation.

4.5 Conclusion: Counter ideology or Counter-hegemony?

This chapter has demonstrated that despite neoliberalism having become a globalised form of hegemonic project (as argued in the previous chapter), its contradictions have prompted several forms of contestation and challenges from various movements. By comparing counter-ideological movements in both North America and Europe, this chapter argues that certain similarities exist between them and, by building upon Rupert's thesis, forwards the notions that such movements have in general been built upon either an internationalist-progressive position or on a isolationist form of nationalism. However, this chapter has also argued that such is the fragmentation and contradictions

inherent within these groups that it remains problematic to suggest that either of these directions have a unifying set of objectives capable of surmounting a realistic challenge to the principles of neoliberalism and globalisation.

Finally this chapter has illustrated that by, looking at the case of Russia, the nature of counter-hegemony becomes harder to define. Whilst the fall of the Soviet Union has often been seen as the 'victory' of liberal democracy and the last obstacle for the application of free trade, the fragmentary and unstable environment upon which 'democratic' Russia has been built suggest two further observations. Firstly that the neoliberal hegemonic order is not as stable as it may first appear from the west, and secondly and paradoxically, that the lack of co-ordination and affirmation between different movements that ideologically oppose the neoliberal order, strengthen the legitimate position of the hegemonic class. For whilst all forms of counter-movements exploit, in one form or another, the contradictions that are inherent within the hegemonic order, similar diversities and contradictions that these movements themselves display, allow the hegemonic class to critique, exploit and at times ridicule their weaknesses.¹²⁹

By following the Gramsci logic, (and in particular his literature on the wars of movement and position) and the form of historicism that I outlined in Chapter 2, these diverse movements do represent a collection of social forces that can be seen both as counter-ideological and counter-hegemonic. If one, for example, was to follow Hobsbawn's (and to a certain extent Cox's) interpretation of social

forces within different eras in the nineteenth century, then one can suggest that a combination of different ideas and movements can alter, effect and potentially transform a particular hegemonic order.¹³⁰ Such was the nature of social forces in the 19th century that a combination of competitive nation-building, twinned with labour and welfare movement within the state, combined to transform the liberal economic project that was inspired by Great Britain. My argument here, however, is not to suggest that history is pre-determined to repeat itself or that these marginal social movements have the potential to merge into a transformatory alliance capable of challenging global norms and institutions but merely to enquire into the workings and stability of the overriding order. It is from this point of departure that I focus my enquiry into the nature of social forces within Russia. For it is my opinion that by looking deeper into the sociological and historical nature of Russia and by further studying social movements and interpretations of globalisation that have arisen from the transitional Russian state that a deeper understanding can be obtained of the nature and stability of the global hegemonic order and of the nature of discontent with that order.

¹ Polanyi's classic study of the birth of the Liberal state in Britain remains the best account of this, although it should be stressed that Polanyi did not use Gramscian or indeed any form of Marxist analysis to account for the rise of social movements.

² Patrick Dunleavy and Brendan O'Leary, *Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy*, Basingstoke: Macmillan education, 1987, p. 233.

³ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 381-472.

⁴ Ibid., p. 58.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 238-242.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 234-235.

⁷ Ibid., Gramsci refers to a tactical form of assault similar to the military form of trench warfare, in order to contest at different levels the complex layers of common sense within civil society.

⁸ Ibid, p. 229

⁹ Ibid, p. 108.

¹⁰ Richard Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for hegemony in Russia*, London, Verso, 1995, p. 11.

¹¹ Here I refer to the more mainstream Gramscian scholars, who have made certain generalisations of the processes of counter-hegemony, which are often contradictory and often let down the richness of the construction of historicism that has been outlined before. See the two collections: Stephen Gill (ed.), *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993 & Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (eds.), *Innovation and Transformation in International Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

¹² P. Wilkin, 'Solidarity in a Global Age – Seattle and Beyond', Paper given at the annual *International Studies Association Conference*, Los Angeles, 2000; Giovanni Arrighi, Terence K. Hopkins & Immanuel Wallerstein, *Anti-Systemic Movements*, London: Verso, 1989; Barry Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.

¹³ Adam David Morton, 'Mexico, Neoliberal restructuring and the EZLN: A neo-Gramscian analysis', in Barry Gills (ed.), *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000; Neil Harvey, 'Rural Reforms and the Zapatistas rebellion: Chiapas 1988-1995', in Gerardo Otero (ed.), *Neoliberalism revisited: Economic Restructuring and Mexico's Political Future*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996; Iain Watson, 'Rethinking Resistance: Contesting Neoliberal Globalisation and the Emiliano Zapata Army of National Liberation as a Critical Social Movement', in Jason Abbott and Owen Worth (eds.), *Critical Perspectives on International Political Economy*, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002.

¹⁴ Barry Gills, 'Introduction: Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance', in Barry Gills, op. cit., London: Palgrave, 2000 pp. 3-11; Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending visions of a New World Order*, London: Routledge, 2000, Ch. 3, pp. 42-64; Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity*, Oxford: Blackwells, 1997, pp. 1-4.

¹⁵ Christine Chin & James Mittelman, 'Conceptualising Resistance', in Gills, op. cit., 2000, pp. 29-45.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See note 14.

¹⁹ Barry Gills, 'Introduction: Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance', in Gills, op. cit., 2000, p. 1.

²⁰ Vicki Birchfield, 'Contesting the hegemony of market ideology: Gramsci's "good sense" and Polanyi's "double movement"', *Review of International Political Economy*, 6 (1), pp. 27-54, 1999; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our time*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1944.

²¹ Karl Polanyi, op. cit., 1944.

²² See the section on 'the Interregnum' in chapter 2.

²³ Cox, of course provides us with a chapter of how nationalist forces succeeded to successfully challenge the British-inspired era of the 19th century, see Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, Ch. 6.

²⁴ Robert Latham, 'Globalisation and the Transformation of Economic Rights', in Barry Gills (ed), op. cit., 2000.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Latham here refers to Polanyi's collection, edited by G. Dalton, *Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1968

²⁷ Robert Latham, op. cit., 2000, pp. 84-86.

²⁸ Ibid., p.83. This point is made by a whole range of journalists covering differing protests against globalisation. It is also reflected through the chapters within the Barry Gills book, and within the work of Cox, Gill and others.

²⁹ Ibid., p.86-89.

³⁰ Vicki Birchfield, op. cit., 1999.

³¹ Christine Chin & James Mittelman, op. cit., 2000, p. 37.

³² Ibid., pp. 37-40.

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- ³³ James Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, New York: Yale University Press, 1990.
- ³⁴ See the collection from the Anti-Fascist forum, *My Enemy's Enemy: Essays on globalisation, fascism and the struggle against capitalism*, Montreal: Kersplebedeb, 2001, especially the chapters by J. Sakai, 'Aryan Politics & Fighting the WTO' and Tom Burghardt, 'Antiglobalisation: Buchanan, Fulani & Neo-fascist Drift in the US'. The widespread example used here is the discussions and common-ground discussed by Ralph Nadar and Pat Buchanan in the run up to the WTO meeting in Seattle.
- ³⁵ This was used as part of a title presented as the International Studies Association Conference in Chicago 2001, see Owen Worth, 'The Janus-like Character of counter-hegemony: Progressive and Nationalist Responses to Neoliberalism', *Global Society*, 16 (3), 2002, pp. 297-317.
- ³⁶ See in Particular Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalisation: Contending visions of a New World Order & 'Globalisation and Contested Common Sense in the US'*, in Gill & Mittelman (eds.), *Transformation and Innovation in International Studies*, and Manuel Castells, op. cit., 1997.
- ³⁷ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1997.
- ³⁸ Ibid., p. 144.
- ³⁹ Ibid. Perhaps the most obvious 'guidebooks' for 'progressive' campaigners and NGO's are David Ranson and Anita Roddick (intro), *The No-nonsense guide to Fair Trade*, Cambridge: Verso 2001; & Michael Barratt Brown, *Fair Trade*, London: Zed Books, 1993.
- ⁴⁰ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 2000, pp. 94-118.
- ⁴¹ Pat Buchanan, 'Free Trade is Not Free', Address to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 18, 1998 www.theamericancause.org/pjb-speech-chicago-cfr.html
- ⁴² J. McManus, *The Insiders: Architects of the New World Order*, Appleton, WI: The John Birch Society, 1995.
- ⁴³ Obviously, the fears of the European super-state differ in content from country to country. Perhaps the most reluctant European is the United Kingdom, where the populist press and several right-wing Conservative MPs remain wary of the 'threat from Berlin'. In Germany itself, however, the re-emergence of 'Nazi-style' groups remain bitterly opposed to the multiculturalism of the EU, while in France the emergence of Le-Pens Nationalist Party and the patriot movements to protect French culture remains critical of the EU, see Paul Hainsworth, *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, London: Pinter, 2000.
- ⁴⁴ For 'official' Communist responses, see CPRF, 'Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPRF to the 7th Congress and the immediate tasks of the Party: The Alliance of Patriots', www.kprf.ru; for a similar statement from a more extremist Russian Nationalist group see the website of 'Russian National Unity', www.rne.org
- ⁴⁵ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 1997, pp. 146-151.
- ⁴⁶ This has been evident in the May Day protests in London (in 2000), with the emergence of 'organised anarchist' factions intent on violent 'direct action' with authorities. This fact was (both at London and similarly at other mass demonstrations) commented vastly by the media, leaving contributors a platform to defend globalisation, by stressing the negatives of the alternatives.
- ⁴⁷ Manuel Castells, op. cit., 1997, p. 69.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 70.
- ⁴⁹ Mark Rupert, op. cit., 2000, pp. 65-77; E. Hollings, 'Reform Mexico First', *Foreign Policy*, vol. 93, 1993 pp. 91-103; R. Perot and P. Choate, *Save Your Job, Save Our Country*, New York: Hyperion, 1998; AFL-CIO, 'Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive council on NAFTA', 1993.
- ⁵⁰ Buchanan election speech, 1996, quoted in Rupert, op. cit., 2000, p. 112.
- ⁵¹ Pat Buchanan, op. cit., 1998.
- ⁵² Buchanan achieved less than one percent of the national vote in many states, his highest return being in North Dakota, where he polled just over 3%.
- ⁵³ The John Birch Society, www.jbs.org, 2000.
- ⁵⁴ Figures for militia groups in 1995 were estimated to contain around 40,000 members, although this number is hard to predict as numbers and new organisations are adjudged to be growing at an alarming rate, in tandem with an increased use of communicative tools.

⁵⁵ The second amendment to the constitution of the United States of America (ratified 1791) states 'A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.'

⁵⁶ 'What is the Militia', Militia of Montana, www.militiaofmontana.com

⁵⁷ Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalisation*, p. 112; various links, campaigns and articles found on the economics link of the AFL-CIO website, www.aflcio.org/front/cse.html

⁵⁸ Global Trade Watch, 'NAFTA at Five', a report card, www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/humanrts/globalisation/nafta.html; also see www.citizen.org/pctrade/nafta/naftapg.html

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Patrick Buchanan, *The Great Betrayal: How American Sovereignty and Social Justice Are Being Sacrificed to the Gods of the Global Economy*, Boston: Little Brown & Co, 1998; & 'Any Way Out of the Global Crisis?' www.buchanan.org/pa-99-0223.html

⁶² One example here is the ILWU, the Union that represents West Coast Longshoremen, whose union members earn an average of \$60,000 to \$80,000 a year, and were renowned, during the Fordism years for employing Blacks and Latinos on a casual basis, therefore untitled to union membership. See 'Aryan Politics & Fighting the WTO', in Anti-fascism forum, op. cit., 2001, pp. 11-15.

⁶³ www.time.com/time/community/transcripts/1999/112899buchanan-nader.html Some further this claim by added that Nader was actually attempting to reach potential Buchanan voters for the 2000 election.

⁶⁴ Tom Burghardt, 'Anti-Globalisation: Buchanan, Fulani & Neo-Fascist Drift in the US', in Anti-Fascist Forum, op. cit., 2001, pp. 33-47.

⁶⁵ Tom Burghardt, 'The Party's Over', in Anti-Fascist Forum, op. cit., pp. 48-51.

⁶⁶ Manuel Castells, op. cit., 199, p. 74

⁶⁷ Speech by Commandante Marcos, on the first anniversary of the uprising, New Years Eve, 1994.

⁶⁸ For an in-depth narrative on the revolution and consolidation of the Mexican state, see Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbours: A Portrait of the Mexicans*, London: Vintage, 1985; and Frank Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico*, London: Prentice Hall, 1964.

⁶⁹ This was the formula of the *Ejidos system*. Zapata himself wanted a further economic revolution that would extent the processes of the *Ejidos system*, more extensively, see Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors*; and Adam Morton, op. cit., 2000.

⁷⁰ Manuel Castells, op. cit., 1997, p. 77.

⁷¹ Adam Morton op. cit, 2000., p. 267.

⁷² Ibid.; R.B.J. Walker, *One World, Many World: struggles for a Just World Peace*, Boulder Co: Lynne Rienner, 1988.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 267-268.

⁷⁴ Samuel Blixen and Carlos Fazio, 'Interview with Marcos about neoliberalism, the national state and democracy', http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/inter_marcos_aut95.html

⁷⁵ Ian Watson, for instance argues that Foucault analysis of social resistance, in the case of the Zapatistas should be considered, as there main function is to challenge the boundaries of rule that the state seeks to consolidate. See Ian Watson, op. cit., 2002.

⁷⁶ Out of the European Social-democratic 'third wayers', only French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin showed any sympathy for the concerns of the demonstrators. At Gothenburg, both Schroder and Blair greatly condemned the protests – with Blair, himself initially ridiculing their diverse objectives, before later reversing some of his initial comments, confirming the 'right to peaceful protest'.

⁷⁷ See for example The Economist Editorial, 1999 & Michael McCormick, 'Why the Protesters are Wrong', BBC News, www.bbc.co.uk/buisness, 2001.

⁷⁸ For example the BBC run a bi-weekly 'debating globalisation forum'.

⁷⁹ The Guardian, 'Riviera runs red as activists gather', May 9th 2000.

⁸⁰ Within these groups we have witnesses the 'masked anarchist' – the mask derived from the guerilla activities of the Zapitatas, but with a different interpretation. The masked anarchists in

Europe include organized groups from Spain, Italy, France and the UK that, alongside similar dissidents in the US have prepared themselves for direct-action, through organizing combat-training initiatives prior to a demonstration.

⁸¹ P. Wilkin, op. cit., 2000.

⁸² Anti-fascist forum, 'Nationalist resistance to globalisation', www.antifa.net

⁸³ The Revolutionary cells group were a broad terrorist-led group, that were often described as being from the hard-left – but their aims were always centred around anti-Americanism and European Patriotism.

⁸⁴ One of the 'folk heroes' of the anti-globalisation movement has been a French farmer called Jose Bove – who has appeared at Seattle and is a regular at the various organizations across. Bove gained notoriety for driving his tractor through a French McDonalds, and has since declared himself as a spokesman for the demonstrators, even being invited to Marcos' base in the Chapias.

⁸⁵ The BNP won over 10% of the vote in both seats in Oldham and in Burnley, and over 5% of the vote in many seats in East London. This was post-war record in terms of votes. In terms of the percentages gained in the seats in which they put candidates up, they averaged as the 4th leading party in England, far outweighing the UKIP, who lost support due to the Euro-sceptic campaign of William Hague.

⁸⁶ The Referendum Party was the brainchild of the right-wing, stance anti-European Sir James Goldsmith. Seen as the 'British version' of Ross Perot, Goldsmith almost single-handedly funded the Referendum Party at the general election in 1997. Since his death, merely a year later the Party has disbanded – a large number of its members moving to the more organized UK Independence Party.

⁸⁷ Sir James Goldsmith, 'Twenty Five years of British Membership of EU: Twenty-Five years of failure', www.geocities.com/capitolHill/3729/failure.html

⁸⁸ First poll carried out by the Guardian, October, 2000; second by MORI, 1998 and the third a poll by the regional newspaper, *The Western Morning News*, stated by the UKIP website, www.independenceuk.org.uk

⁸⁹ Perhaps best illustrated by the Thatcherite newspaper, the *Daily Telegraph* editorial, September, 2000.

⁹⁰ Both the *Daily Telegraph* and many members of the Parliamentary Conservative Party, including the ultimate guru of the *Adam Smith Institute*, John Redwood, have applauded populist organizations such as the 'low fuel tax campaign' and the 'countryside alliance', and in the case of the latter participating in its actions. See John Redwood, *Stars and Stripes: The Coming Conflicts Between the USA and the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001.

⁹¹ Many Farmers and Haulage workers, who combined in the low-tax Petrol demonstrations, in September, 2000, were themselves active in breaking the blockages during the Miner Strikes, 15 years earlier.

⁹² Tony Hunt, 'Farmers speak out on fuel crisis in UK', www.themilitant.com/2000/6437; Countryside Alliance, 'The Countryside fighting for Liberty', www.countryside-alliance.org/policy-briefs/performance

⁹³ The Daily Telegraph, May 2000.

⁹⁴ The BNP, www.bnp.org.uk/policies

⁹⁵ The National Democrats led by Ian Anderson, broke from the National Front in the mid 1990s to attempt to form a more sophisticated Political base. Having contested the 1997 general election and several local election campaigns they have recently been overshadowed by Griffin's BNP.

⁹⁶ In the 2000 election, the centre-right and the Bush campaign successfully managed to marginalize the potential Buchanan vote, by addressing some of the concerns that conservative voters had, whilst maintaining them within his neo-liberal agenda.

⁹⁷ Iain Watson, op. cit., 2002.

⁹⁸ See for example Owen Worth and Jason Abbott, 'Land of (False) Hope and Tory? The Contradictions of British opposition to globalisation', paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 2002.

⁹⁹ See for example, Andy Tate, 'The politics of anti-politics',

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/uk_politics/newsid_1953000/1953127.stm

¹⁰⁰ Here, Le-Pen's success in the 2002 Presidential elections and Jord Haider's limited success are the obvious examples.

¹⁰¹ See for example John Redwood, op. cit., 2001; Martin Rosenbaum (ed), *Britain and Europe: The Choices we Face*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

¹⁰² For an initial study here, see Jeremy Lester, op. cit., 1995.

¹⁰³ Castells, p. 68; Rupert, op. cit., 1997.

¹⁰⁴ For a greater analysis of the nature of state socialism, and its performance within the post-war global order, see David Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996.

¹⁰⁵ Roger Burbach, Orlando Nunez and Boris Kagarlitsky, *Globalisation and its Critics: The Rise of Postmodern Socialism*, London, Pluto Press, 1997.

¹⁰⁶ For a larger picture of different social forces within Russia, see Andrei P Tsyganov, 'Ideas, Culture and Moral Responsibility. A Troubled engagement with Fukuyama's World order project', paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, 2001.

¹⁰⁷ This view is underlined by many Unionists, NGO groups and human rights campaigns, interviewed in Moscow, from 15-23 September, 2000 & 17-22 April, 2001.

¹⁰⁸ Citizen and Human rights groups have often been supported by the liberal democratic 'Yabloko Party', while Amnesty International, who back anti-globalisation protests in the west, have often been supported by the more right-wing Duma bloc 'The Union of Right Forces'. Unionists groups supported the Primokov group 'Fatherland'.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Boris Sauvorov, leader of the Russian branch of Amnesty International, September, 2000.

¹¹⁰ Roger Burbach, Orlando Nunez and Boris Kagarlitsky, op. cit., 1997, p. 118.

¹¹¹ A useful Gramscian analysis of the historical development of the Soviet Union can be seen within the confines of the world order as a whole, see Robert Cox, 'Real Socialism in historical perspective', in *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 209-237.

¹¹² Yelsin initiated 'economic shock' in 1993. This was backed by several economically liberal politicians and theorists within Russia, and was backed by the US, and in particular the Chicago school of Economics, who provided an advisory body to oversee the policies.

¹¹³ Andrei Melville, 'Russia under Putin: Transition protected or Transition postponed', paper presented at the *International Studies Association Convention, Chicago*, 2001, p. 5

¹¹⁴ Perhaps the greatest example of this is the Gorbachev Foundation. Founded by the former Soviet leader, it provides a base in which internationalist social democratic critiques are voiced in which subsequent associate branches have been set up in the US and beyond.

¹¹⁵ CPRF, 'Resolution of the VII congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation "Concerning the attitude to the Imperialistic Globalisation"', www.kprf.ru

¹¹⁶ For similarities here see the policy statement made by the BNP, see note 74; the rural preservation from globalisation campaigns, initiated by both the CPRF and British pressure groups also use similar language – see CPRF 'Resolution of the VII congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. Save the Village – save Russia', www.kprf.ru and The Countryside Alliance, 'Globalisation and the Intensive Farm Enterprise', www.countryside-alliance.org

¹¹⁷ Yelsin's 'Our Home in Russia', despite obtaining reasonable success at the 1995 parliamentary elections, disappeared alongside Yelsin's popularity within both the Duma and the public. The quick rise of the 'Unity bloc' in the run-up of the 1999 elections, in which it came second in the popular vote, demonstrated the structural immaturities of political culture within Russia.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Kiirill Buketov, Moscow co-ordinator for the IUF, April 19, 2001.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ See note 85, chapter.3. The UN (UNCJIN/UNICRI) reports that the crime rate for common crime has risen from 444.2 per 100,000 in 1971, to 939.3 in 1993, within Moscow.

¹²² The young Russian perpetrators here being Yavlinsky and Gaidar, who later emerged as leaders within party political blocs of Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces.

¹²³ Roger Burbach, Orlando Nunez & Boris Kagarlitsky, op. cit., 1997, p. 119-120.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 118.

¹²⁵ For an overview of classical studies of the 'idea of Europe', see Kevin Wilson & Jan der Dussen (eds), *The History of the Idea of Europe*, London: Open University Press 1993 & Hugh Seaton-Watson, 'What is Europe, Where is Europe? From Mystique to Politique', *Encounter*, 1985; for more contemporary studies of Russia and its place within Europe, see Iver Naumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London: Routledge, 1996; Martin Malia, *Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horsemen to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

¹²⁶ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of Nations*, New York: Perseus, 1993, pp. 100-173; Manuel Castells, op. cit., 1997 p. 33-42.

¹²⁷ Manuel Castells, op. cit., 1997, p. 37; Helene Carrere d'Encausse, op. cit., 1993, Ch. 9

¹²⁸ Interview with Alexei Malashenko, Carnegie Center, Moscow, September 17, 2000.

¹²⁹ A good example of this can be found in several editions of 'The Economist' in the aftermath of the demonstration in Seattle, for an overview, see Peter Wilkin, op. cit., 2000

¹³⁰ Eric Hosbawn, *The End of Empire*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997.

Chapter Five: The Soviet Union in historical perspective

"The first fundamental rule of historical science is to seek a knowledge of the general destinies of mankind. In history the first elementary school-instruction is not merely an important, but an essential condition to a higher and more scientific knowledge." Schlegel, 1848.

"The creatures looked from pig to man, and from man to pig again: but already it was impossible to say which was which." Orwell, 1945.

This chapter aims to further the discussions forwarded at the end of the last chapter by looking at how Russia developed during the Soviet era and how, both sociologically and ideologically, social forces consolidated themselves within Russia. It will be shown that a consciousness was developed that firstly appeared in contrast and to be in competition with developments in western states, and secondly how this consciousness was developed during the Cold War to co-exist and ultimately fit-in with the post-war hegemonic order (see chapter two). Thus, whilst studying the effects that counter-hegemony within Russia can have on the current global order, it is of interest and importance to analyse the nature of the last regime, as the ideological constructions that the Soviet Union was founded upon brought forms of hegemonic stability within soviet society¹ that were to be re-invented in different forms after its collapse.² In addition, this chapter will

also seek an explanation of why the Soviet Union, and in particular the dogma of Marxist-Leninism, ultimately failed to provide a viable challenge to western capitalism. Thus, this chapter's objectives are a) to demonstrate how the sociological characteristics within Russia created an alternative 'other', that both incorporated the principles of Marxist-Leninism and added to the historical myths of nationalism within Russian society, b) to situate the Russian state within the overall confines of the processes of global hegemony and c) to offer an explanation for the development of future post-Soviet social forces, that appear at odds with modern forms of westernisation. This in particular will lead towards the main focus of the final chapter, which will investigate contending ideological and potential counter-hegemonic forces that have emerged since 1991.

The break-up of the Soviet Union presented academics on the left with a further and comprehensive reflection of the failures of state socialism. From the neo-Gramscian school of IPE, Cox, in his article 'Real Socialism in historical perspective' argues that there are two conclusions to these questions that can be seen as 'weak' responses and need to be dismissed by left-wing academics. These are that the events of the 20th century cannot be taken into consideration as they were not the results of 'true socialism' and thus had 'nothing to do with Marx'; this argument runs parallel with the notion that Marxism, like Christianity has never been properly tried out.³ The other is that the failure of socialism was due to personalities; of evil men, who neglected the nature of

freedom and emancipation in their own perverse quest for power. The main culprit here is seen to be Stalin but his regime set the standard for others such as Mao, Castro, and Ceausescu etc to follow.⁴ This latter assumption is embraced by certain Trotskyists⁵ who, armed with Trotsky's critiques of the Soviet Union and biographies of Stalin, believe that their man would have safely brought in the socialisation of the world.⁶

These conclusions avoid tackling certain theoretical issues in which one can examine the fundamental problems associated with the USSR and other areas which adopted 'state socialism'. They tend to fall into the ahistorical trap associated with positivist evaluations and lack a framework of historicism. In Coxian terms such assumptions are 'inconsistent with a socialist view of history and a socialist mode of reasoning'.⁷ What is required instead is an analysis of a number of key factors: these being firstly the nature of the maturity of the Russian Empire at the time of the revolution, and consequently the nature of Leninism – for example why did the concept of Marxist-Leninism only bear fruit in developing states? Secondly, the nature of the World Order and the hegemonic world structure both at the time of the birth and consolidation of the Soviet Union and then after the Second World War when it was presumed to be a threat to Americanism, thirdly the cultural constraints within Russia, and fourthly the historical sociological nature of the state itself. All these can be answered within a logic of historical analysis.

5.1 Russia at the time of the Revolution

One orthodox and oft-quoted neo-Marxist explanation of the failures of the Soviet system stems from the belief that the socio-economic conditions within Russia were too immature to instigate world revolution. This has its origins in Marx, in which he pinpoints that the transition from capitalism to socialism had to occur within the most advanced industrial countries.⁸ The problem with Russia was that it was still in essence an agrarian state, just beginning to experience the early stages of capitalist development, and thus its revolution would, certainly in some eyes, lead to a different form of bourgeois rule.⁹ Here I refer to a number of different schools of thought which outline the plausibility of how the formation of the USSR led to a form of a bureaucratic hierarchy presiding over an industrialisation process, that became steeped in economic state planning, thus creating an alternative to the western model of market economics.

Tony Cliff suggested that the Soviet Union and the post-Stalinist regime emerged into a version of 'state capitalism' in which there existed a bureaucratic ruling class, which worked in a similar fashion to an orthodox class structure. He argues that this bureaucratic class, whilst different from the feudal rulers of the past and the bourgeoisie in the west, produced a form of hierarchy that was geared around the controlled separation of the state bureaucracy from the proletariat. As the Soviet Union consolidated itself and matured, the class

division became a central feature towards organising power relations and – since the birth of the bureaucratic apparatus there was a tendency for state positions to be passed down through family connections:

Every bureaucrat will try more to pass on to his son his connections than he would... Obviously he will at the same time try to limit the number of competitors for positions in the bureaucracy by restricting the possibilities the masses have of getting a higher education etc.¹⁰

Cliff's critique extends to the way the bureaucratic class formulated its economic production arguing that, unlike tradition, state capitalism that 'evolves gradually, organically from monopoly capitalism', the bureaucratic form of controlled economics created a purer personification of a class structure.¹¹ Indeed Cliff stresses that while a definite distinction was evident between western bourgeois capitalism and the Soviet method of bureaucracy they were both forms of capitalism, as both relied upon divisions of labour and were ultimately dependent upon the pressures of world capitalism and the demand to accelerate accumulation.¹² Here the bureaucratic class did not 'overlook the gratification of its own personal desire', thus the quantity of surplus value rose sharply, indicating a healthy version of capitalist society.¹³

Cliff's 'class' analysis was supported in part by the work of the former Yugoslavian Communist, Milovan Djilas. He continues Cliff's arguments that a new social hierarchic class system had grown within the structural formation of the Soviet Union, but distances himself from the Trotskyist position. Djilas's critique takes its basis largely from the notion that the new class had produced

exactly the form of dominant political superstructure which Marx had outlined in his critique of the bourgeoisie, within the capitalist mode of production.¹⁴ For Djilas the process within the Soviet Union blatantly betrayed the fundamental revolutionary principles which Marx himself outlined, as it withdrew into a position that aimed to compete militarily with western capitalism, using imperial expansion to enhance its development.¹⁵

Others who use more textual readings of Marx to criticise the development of the Soviet Union have often followed Bukharin's more scientific reading of the transition of capitalism to socialism.¹⁶ Bukharin argued that it was necessary to retain the New Economic Policy after Lenin's death so that the state could control both the maturing of capitalism and the transition to socialism within Russia.¹⁷ For Bukharin, Marx's economic explanations concerning the contradictions, fallacies and ultimate transition of capitalism towards socialism was vital to the development of the Soviet Union. He believed that if the state could control this transition, then its process would be far smoother. Bukharin's theory provided not just a critique of the Stalinist development of the Soviet Union from western socialists but in some part aided potential strategies for practising socialism in the west. For example, whilst Bukharin's thesis differed from that of Kautsky, as he confirmed that a revolutionary state was required to manage this change¹⁸ rather than a revolutionary party operating within a bourgeois governmental structure, the strength of his arguments did have certain repercussions for the development of post-war left-wing political parties in

western Europe.¹⁹ Taking Bukharin's economic analysis to another level has been the analysis of Bill Warren.²⁰ Warren argues that Lenin's 1916 reading of Imperialism (for more detail see below) was inconsistent with Marx's own formulation of transition. As a result the Soviet Union delayed the development of a capitalist class within Russia which disrupted the trans-historical development of socialism, as for Warren, the transition of socialism can only take place when capitalist production is exploited to the point of explicit contradiction where the system will be run down to the point of collapse.²¹ Warren's more controversial account of the failings of the Soviet Union differs from both Kautsky and Bukharin as he suggests that any attempt to obstruct the historical development of capitalism will paradoxically result in postponing the development of socialism.

There are a number of criticisms that one can attach to these modes of thought. Although diverse in nature, both contain similar flaws. Firstly by placing the failure of the Soviet 'experiment' as the fault of the Stalinist era one immediately falls into one of the two Coxian traps of weak responses which were outlined above. Therefore they lack a fully developed theory of historical analysis . Secondly, (and more explicitly targeted towards Trotskyist readings) by placing their emphasis on a critique of Stalinism, they fail to explain why other areas of the world which have used different forms of socialism, have still ultimately failed to achieve their societal goal. Here I refer to strategies and periods such as the Cultural Revolution and Guevaraian-styled guerrilla

campaigns which themselves have often been associated with a form of Trotskyism. Thirdly, and from a Gramscian reading more importantly in this discussion, these critiques all rely upon deterministic readings of Marx and/or Lenin. They all subscribe to a position that in some ways promotes the fallibility of capitalism and fails to develop its arguments to include factors such as dialectics,²² the hegemonic relationship created within Soviet Russia and the complex nature of the sociology of the Russian state itself.

A more rounded critique or understanding of the Soviet Union would thus delve more vigorously into the economic and sociological development of Russia at the time of the revolution. Perhaps one of the most original insights into the theoretical positioning of the historical materialist logic stems from Wittfogel's socio-economic study 'Oriental Despotism'. This analysed critically the basic notion of the perceived stages of *Feudalism-Capitalism-Socialism* by which Marx's logic is universally recognised and expanded on the 'Asiatic mode of production'. This was a societal formation, which remained outside the boundaries of feudalism and in Wittfogel's opinion is not included in a subsection within it.²³ Marx originally formulated the Asiatic concept of the mode of production in the 1850s when he suggested that agrarian societies could be split into three contrasting forms: classical antiquity, feudalism and Asiatic.²⁴ Whilst the first two categories were associated with European historical processes the social formations in Asia, particularly in India and China had a different historical focus. The 'Asiatic mode of production' stemmed from the

empirical notions that in China the Chinese crown permitted its peasants full entitlement to their lands, whilst in India the climatic and territorial conditions made water irrigation the main source of agriculture and due to the low nature of civilisation, a crown, or central government was born, which directed the construction of the water works. Subsequently, due to the sociological formation of the self-supporting villages and the ways these oriental villages were dispersed, the age-long notion of the Asiatic state was maintained.²⁵ Thus Marx found that the class which was at the top of the hierarchal scale differed between each form: in antiquity it was the slave owners, in feudalism it was the landlords and in Asiatic society, it was the sovereign. This definition for Wittfogel needed further evaluation. He felt that Marx neglected a fuller evaluation of his Asiatic model and that whilst formulating these characteristics he tended just to revert back by placing this mode in comparison with other pre-Capitalist societal forms and even in industrial states, thus ignoring the management functions of the despotic state of the Orient.²⁶

The main feature of Wittfogel's interpretation of the Asiatic state was that it was ruled by a central bureaucracy which became the hegemonic norm, enabling it to mould subsequent generations. This analysis led Wittfogel to argue that Tsarist Russia had a character that could be described as 'semi-Asiatic'. This, for Wittfogel becomes vital when critiquing the Soviet Union; not by drawing upon Marx's observations of geographical positioning (although this is a point that I would like to discuss later), but in the nature of its set-up of isolated

communities, held together by centralised despotism. By 1917, whilst the Russian Empire had linked up with Europe and was viewed as being part of the 'industrialised continent', the Tsarist absolutist position reflected the fact that the basic characteristics of the old system were still in place.²⁷ This was also remarked upon by Lenin, who up until 1905 admitted that Russia had only advanced towards a restricted 'Asiatic' capitalism but ignored such sociological observations, when he came to concentrate on his more renowned revolutionary works.²⁸ This neglect became paramount by the time the Soviet central state began to consolidate. Thus such observations suggest that the form of governance applied by the Communist Party and particularly by Stalin represented a continuation of the Asiatic model. However Wittfogel does not go as far as this; he suggests that the Soviet Union did not represent a full retreat to Asiatic despotism, but claimed the USSR was built on some of its traits. Instead the industrial and bureaucratic hierarchy, which subsequently emerged went further than this; it produced a more sophisticated form of despotism that had an organisational prowess that could only be described as an apparatus state, in which the new 'class' was so totalitarian that it could not be naively categorised as being either one of 'neofeudalism' or 'state capitalism'.²⁹

Whilst Wittfogel's analysis is original and innovative and opens up a greater more sociological understanding of Soviet society, it does lack clarity in places and tends to depend far too much on the notion of the 'Asiatic mode', while making sweeping conclusions about other factors. Firstly he claims that in 1917

Russia was at a 'crossroads' and there existed a 'genuinely open historical situation' in which a new democratic Russia could have been formed.³⁰ By this he means that the westernising forces that existed prior to the Bolshevik takeover could have created a form of social-democratic government that would have been accepted in and contributed to the west. This, he claims, could have been achieved by Kerensky and the combination of Social Democrats and Menshevik, but by the time the Bolsheviks engaged in civil war with the 'whites' the seeds were sown for the establishment of an anti-western government which was then further consolidated by the 'Socialism in one Country' epoch.³¹ Here he failed to appreciate the sociological immaturity of democracy within Russia. It would be quite problematic to suggest that a country which had thrived on the Tsarist absolutism for generations would accept popular democracy with open arms. Secondly, Wittfogel uses his Asiatic formula to critique similar Marxist-Leninist movements in China, but fails to do likewise for countries outside of Asia which adopted 'Communism'. Thus a far wider critique of the Marxism-Leninist dogma and sociological correlations are required from countries that experimented with it, to gain a clearer historical understanding of its relevance.

One post-Sovietologist who looks closer at the nature of states that did 'turn Communist' during the 20th Century is the sociologist David Lane. He feels that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of 'state socialism' became one which had a practical appeal to economically backwards states. With its principle of central

controlled planning it became an alternative way of industrialising from the bourgeoisie capitalist method taken by the countries of Western Countries. "*As the protestant ethic of Calvin provided a legitimation for the formation of capitalism*", explains Lane "*the Communist ethic formulated by Lenin and Stalin did likewise for the advancement of industrialization under state socialism*".³² Thus the nature of 'state socialism' was unique. It differed fundamentally from the nature of state capitalism, both as practised by the bourgeois Western model and from the SU as a form of 'state capitalism', as argued by Cliff and Harman, as at its founding core was the notion that the bureaucratic hierarchy not only controlled the planning of the economy but adopted organizing policies within society. Its principal orders of public property, central controlled effectiveness, collective solidarity, public integration and rule by politics provided a definite alternative to the western liberal principles of private property, democracy, pluralism and rule of law, and this alternative became a new structural framework in which states with a feudalistic background could embark upon an industrialisation programme without using capitalism. This could also fuel the Marxist-Leninist readings of historical materialism in the sense that this alternative provided another route from the conventional Feudalism-Capitalism-Socialism with the second of these taking the form of industrialisation under a Socialist programme.

Lane furthers his examination by evaluating the move from the planned construction of the central economy to the attempt to create a new structural

form within state socialism - that being the mode of 'Market Socialism', which was initiated in Tito's Yugoslavia, before spreading to Czechoslovakia and China by the end of the 1970s. This came from a belief that an economic market could promote the interests and workings of socialism on a more efficient level. This, the 'reformers' claimed, would not contradict the socialist logic, as, if the state retained public ownership while forcing an enterprise-led form of production which in turn would instigate a non-capitalistic market, then it would not contradict the process of socialism.³³ This ultimately led to the reforms adopted by Gorbachev in the 1980s which subsequently closed the ideological chapter of Marxist-Leninism as an alternative to western capitalism. Thus the experiment with markets had the reverse effect to what the socialist reformers had intended, fuelling Lane's conclusion that in essence the market mentality was sociologically destined to produce outcomes that were incompatible with socialism.³⁴ Indeed the processes which were occurring within state socialist structures, reflected the totalising ideology of markets within the global order. Thus the failure of the centrally planned economy was framed by the reality that 'modernisers' could only look to a practice that was the viable force in the west, ultimately allowing the hegemonic ideology to filter into those states that had attempted to provide counter-resistance to it.

In summary, what had emerged was a two dimensional framework of hegemony. Within the domestic sphere, the Communist Party did create a hierarchic construction in which its ideological axis differed fundamentally from that of the

west. This construction, founded on the principles of Marxist-Leninism, became the dominant norm in the parts of the world in which it was practised (despite some regional variations), hence creating a hegemonic form which differed from that at global level.

If it is recognised that the dogma of Marxist-Leninism was at the heart of the process which shaped 20th century Communism or state socialism and it only gained appeal in economically backward states, an analysis of its principles and an explanation into why its development was flawed on a global scale is necessary.

5.2 The nature of Marxist-Leninism

The textual foundations of the Marxist-Leninist dogma can be seen partly in *The Communist Manifesto* but more strongly fixed in Marx's later works, particularly in *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, and in Lenin's principal revolutionary texts, *Imperialism: the highest form of Capitalism*, and *The State and Revolution*. Here the emphasis was overwhelmingly put on revolution and on the contradictory nature of Capitalism. The meaning of the phrase 'revolution' has been one that has received much discussion, not just as a reflective symposium on the nature and failure of 20th century 'Communism', but was also evident on the eve of its instigation. This is historically most

typified by the rift between the Mensheviks, Social Democrats and the Bolsheviks.

Philosophically, Marx's main achievements can be viewed by his collection of structural and systemic critiques of capitalism, arguing that capitalism contains a set of mechanisms (market, class, private property etc) which create a process of 'alienation', thus questioning its existence as a 'natural ruling process'. In addition there is a move towards a mode of production which does not contain such contradictions. This mode of production is seen as the last in a dialectical sequence, in which the process of historical materialism reaches its end. For Marx this social 'utopia' is found within communism.

Communism (is) the positive abolition of private property and thus of human self-alienation and therefore the real reappropriation of the human essence by and for man. This is communism as the complete and conscious return of man conserving all the riches of previous development for man himself as a social, i.e. human being. Communism (is) the genuine solution of the antagonism between man and nature and man and man. It is the true solution of the struggle between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution to the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.³⁵

For the transition process to occur the required nature of the social forces involved would have to be revolutionary. Under capitalism it is unlikely that the ruling class will relinquish its ownership of property, on which its power and privilege rest, so the ascendant class (the proletariat) must undermine and replace it and establish its own power through a series of class struggles.³⁶ What character these revolutionary class struggles should take remains confusing.

Marx and Engels contributed little to the processes of revolutionary development - literature of theirs dedicated to wider readership, such as the 'Communist Manifesto' offers no definite case. Being a manifesto, it lists a set of policy proposals which should be applied within the more developed world, but gives no indication of how a party, intent on implementing these, could gain power.³⁷ Thus a struggle between two viewpoints was to emerge in the years after Marx's death between those who favoured social 'revolution' through democracy and gradual historical change, as the process from feudalism to capitalism had already witnessed, and those who favoured revolution in an absolute sense: the complete over-throw of the bourgeois governmental order, replacing it with a structure able to guide its populace towards a communist society. As a result both positions became preoccupied with searching through the works of Marx to offer interpretations on the 'way forward' and could both be accused of treating his works as a 'dogmatic bible' despite numerous examples of ambiguity and contradiction within them.³⁸

The concept of Leninism arose from a challenge to the traditional concepts of historical materialism and the process of change through unions and social welfare which social democratic and emerging labour parties in the west were advocating. He argued that the development of capitalism occurred unevenly, attaining its fullest form in certain parts of the world, but taking on a weaker more unstable form, more prone to resistance in countries such as Russia where the bourgeoisie had not developed a suitable, legitimate capitalist framework.

Thus he believed that if the proletariat took an active role in rebelling against the remains of the Russian feudal system, it could take the lead in the capitalist phase of development, without building an oppressive governmental apparatus, commonplace in the west. Once more this would alert workers in the west of the development and unite them towards a world order of communism.³⁹

By 1916 Lenin's analysis of capitalist development in Russia had been reconsidered as he now believed it was altogether unnecessary. Instead he formulated a theory which suggested that if revolution were instigated in Russia, world revolution would ultimately follow. He claimed that Imperialism had emerged as the 'highest possible form of capitalism' as it was this policy that the great capitalist nations utilised to divide up the world and monopolise finance capital. Imperialism represented a linkage between state formations and the international capitalist class and Lenin felt that if attacked at its weakest point the chain could break. Thus under imperialism, the core Imperialist countries became dependent on the peripheral countries for materials and so revolution within the periphery (i.e. in Russia) would cause internal strife within the core imperialist countries causing them to collapse, and promoting world revolution.⁴⁰ It is this mindset that strengthens Lane's assertions that the construction of Marxist-Leninism was appealing to the periphery as it gave them a dogmatic sense that their actions could effectively bring about the downfall of the entire system.

Lenin in part could refer to some of the later works of Marx to express a belief that the latter was moving to this mode of thought in the years before his death.

In the Preface to the Russian Edition of the Communist Manifesto he wrote:

The Communist Manifesto had as its object the proclamation of the inevitable impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find face to face with the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and bourgeois landed property develop, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: Can the Russian *obshchina* though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or, on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.⁴¹

This preface adds to the confusions of any concise interpretations of the process of historical development and neglects his sociological enquiries formulated earlier. Furthermore it lacks any historical explanation of the socio-economic conditions in Russia, of the sort displayed by the work of Wittfogel (see above). Such material however inspired Lenin's work on imperialism. For Lenin, Marx's works were to be reconstructed from a critique and a philosophy to a doctrine, in which he would take the appearance as a 'co-author'. This was to be cemented further in his work 'The State and Revolution', written on the eve of the revolution.

Two elements are present in 'The State and Revolution', the first being the interpretation of 'revolution' and the second concerned with the building of

socialism, in the aftermath of the revolution. In the first case he confirmed the need for a 'violent' revolution. This is in contrast to the Menshevik/Social Democratic view on the interpretation of the 'withering away' of the state; a condition expressed by Marx in the historical material transition from capitalism to socialism/communism. The Social Democrats interpreted the 'withering away' of the state theorem as being a period in which social measures are introduced as a counter to the capitalist-dominated ruling elite. Thus over time these measures can be increased, thus slowly 'withering' the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. Followers of Kautsky adopted this vision, but arguably social democratic parties in Western Europe could compare this process to the adoption of and campaigns for social welfare measures in the post-war Keynesian conditions. Lenin was highly critical of this approach; he saw the first process of transition as being a complete overthrow of the bourgeois state, followed by the construction of a socialist state. Only under the conditions set by this socialist state can the 'withering away' process occur.⁴² For Lenin a revolution in the literal, rather than metaphorical sense was essential, as socialist forces working within the bourgeois state could not fully eradicate the hierarchal class structure inherent within it.

This takes us to the other theme discussed in 'The State and Revolution', his interpretation of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', which became a central feature of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This concept was first conceived by

Marx in his piece 'Critique of the Gotha Programme'. Here he comments on the essence of the period between capitalism and communism:

Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.⁴³

Although the piece was used to attack the hegemonic perception of the 'free state', the ambiguous usage of the terminology 'dictatorship of the proletariat' provided a further rift between the social democrats and Lenin. Lenin's belief was that this brief document contained a whole new insight to the concepts of historical materialism and development. He believed that this referred to a requirement of a special state apparatus, to be built after a revolution. This 'state' was to have a unique character in that it would only exist in a temporary form and its purpose would be to eradicate the former class-riddled apparatus and replace it with a structure that would be proletarian-based, and would set the scene for the 'higher stage of communist society', in which this state would historically 'wither'.⁴⁴ For this societal transformation to be achieved a suppressive and disciplined regime would be necessary, which Lenin stresses, would be targeted at ensuring that the ruling class and those who abide by its rules would be transformed:

In the transition from capitalism to communism, suppression is still necessary; but it is now the suppression of the minority of exploiters by the exploited majority...the exploiters are naturally in no position to suppress the people without a most complex machine for performing such a task, whereas the people can suppress the exploiters even with a very simple 'machine', almost without a 'machine', without a special apparatus: by means of the simple organization of the armed masses.⁴⁵

The dictatorship of the proletariat was, for Lenin, a literal dictatorship, working for the proletariat, in which the new ruling elite, in this case being the Bolsheviks, undertook a one-party strategy of socialist construction in order to reach the final stage of historical development: communism.⁴⁶

The combination of these factors was enough to ensure a favourable reception from less developed countries and at the same time an equally critical response from developed countries. Lenin's analyses show two vital flaws, firstly his inaccurate 'imperialist' theory (in the sense that Russia failed to 'break the capitalist chain' and instigate global proletariat revolution) and secondly his failure to recognise the hegemonic mechanisms of the capitalist political system in the west. This was to become even more noticeable by the time it had developed into a dogma which relied on suppression to prevent its populace from establishing routes into the hegemonic culture of the developed west. When the legitimacy of this suppression was challenged, the dogma fittingly collapsed.

5.3 The Soviet Union and World Orders

Having illustrated the theoretical problems identified with Marxist-Leninism, it is necessary to demonstrate how the Soviet Union interacted within the overall global hegemonic framework. Analysed within a neo-Gramscian framework, the hegemonic relations within the Soviet Union need to be assessed both from a

micro and macro position. From a macro position, the Soviet Union needs to be placed around the historical logic developed by Cox and analysed in depth in chapter two.⁴⁷ Global hegemonic forces contributed to the shaping and the formulation of its Marxist-Leninist character, and as these global forces transformed, then the Soviet Union responded to these conditions. This is not to argue that the Soviet Union was merely representing a particular contrasting economic unit that became shaped by ultimate materialist conditions, as world systems-theorists may subscribe to,⁴⁸ but that the Soviet Union dialectically responded to and contributed towards shaping the character and determination of world orders that it was operating within.

From a micro position, hegemonic relations within the Soviet Union were dialectically formed and transformed from the changing relationship of the national and international. As a project, society within the Soviet Union was defined by nationalism, anti-westernisation and the rhetoric of Marxist-Leninism,⁴⁹ but these traits transformed in character during the Soviet era, as the internal hegemonic projects within Russia became increasingly altered by economic activities at a global level. Thus, as I outline below, Soviet hegemonic relations transformed throughout its brief history.

As I outline in chapter two, the social forces evident at the global level at the time of the revolution were very much steeped in nationalism and protectionism. During the USSR's consolidation phase it was mirrored in Europe by a growth

of another form of governance, that was in conflict with the consensual form of national protectionism: fascism. Whilst fascism, as an ideology was based around the concept of race and nation, communism was based on internationalism, but the onset of 'socialism in one country' transformed it to one of national development, that was consistent with political and economic forces around Europe at the time. Thus, whilst these projects were defined and promoted by a quite different set of dynamics and goals, Soviet Union's sociological character was aided and shaped by the nationalistic social forces inherent within European politics and correspondingly its existence further strengthened these nationalist tendencies.

By the time the forces of fascism had been defeated during the Second World War state socialism had emerged as the main alternative to capitalism and, via Bretton Woods, the US institutionally established a renewed liberal global order which further marginised the 'socialist alternative' from the hegemony of the international economy. Thus despite there was an increase in the number of states experimenting with this 'socialist alternative'; the form of Marxist-Leninism that was adopted by the Soviet Union framed their characters (with slight variants). This revolutionary form was, as identified above by Lane, appealing to those states on the periphery of the global liberal order, which felt exploited by the current system and looked to rebel against it.

This fits with the Gramscian logic of hegemony. The struggle for hegemony in the west had provided a liberal democratic 'norm' which the alternative formula of Marxist-Leninism attempted to struggle against, but as the post-war American-inspired world order flourished, the legitimacy of the form of resistance to it was challenged; the triple occurrence of Perestroika, the 1989 revolutions and the fall of the Soviet Union indicated the fallibility of state socialism as a counter-weight to the totalising structure of the global hegemony.

Thus state socialism was forced to be shaped, influenced by (in conscious and subconscious terms), and ultimately infiltrated by the hegemonic totality of the ideological world order, this in tandem with the fact that the dogmatic virtues of Marxism-Leninism were incapable of challenging the hegemonic forces of the world orders. Gramsci's aids this ontology by declaring in his critique of Leninism that:

In the phase of struggle for hegemony it is the science of politics which is developed; in the state phase all the superstructure must be developed, if one is not to risk the dissolution of the state.⁵⁰

This statement can be read on two levels for our explanations here. Firstly on the global level; the global order is developed over time, resulting in a totalised super structural form (see chapter 2). Secondly it explains the development of the Soviet Union itself, a separate state superstructure formed through a series of struggles, which although it was in conflict ideologically with the global order, was further restrained by it. The history of the Soviet Union can be viewed in three stages, all of which were formulated under the dogmatic super-structural

stratum of Marxist-Leninism, but similarly each sociologically differed from each other, due to the internal dynamics within the regime and the external character of the world order. These three stages can be divided into the Stalinist era; which, via industrialisation, drove the Soviet Union to the recognition of the status of 'world power', the process of de-Stalinization, and the move towards market reform. This concentrated economic action towards a slight revision of the central apparatus and finally the era of Perestroika, which, despite opinions to the contrary, still claimed to be attached to the Marxist-Leninist creed.⁵¹

5.3.1 Growth and consolidation of Stalinism and 'Socialism in one Country'

Both Robert Cox and historical sociologists have, in different ways characterised the Soviet Union as a product of the military-political.⁵² Whilst the historical sociologists have pointed to the militaristic characterisation of states within the modern state-system, Cox sees the origins of 'military-political' as a fundamental product of survival.⁵³ Due to the external pressures from capitalist forces, the birth of the 'Bolshevik regime' was fraught with instabilities. The military was needed to maintain its survival during the civil war and internally 'war communism' was set up which tied the state and military together and was seen as a necessity for survival. Whilst at war, particularly at civil war, it is necessary to keep a tight rein over the economy; this was especially true of the Russian civil war, as the Bolshevik government had only just gained power and needed a strong disciplined domestic structure to aid itself against the external

threat. The character of war communism (mass nationalisation, mass rationing, cost free nature of public services etc), although being a necessity of war, brought about idealistic measures, which some Bolsheviks felt were a 'leap into socialism'.⁵⁴ The end of the civil war saw the collapse of war communism and the instigation of the mixed-economic policy, the NEP. The change in policy was for Lenin an indication that there could be no 'quick fix' towards socialism. Whilst the switch of policy underlined the domestic conditions within Russia,⁵⁵ the reintroduction of foreign trade, and subsequently entry into the capitalist world economy, demonstrated that the Soviet Union was making a renewed, but ultimately flawed attempt towards liberalisation. Thus it was the pressure from the practises of the global hegemony that aided the decision to adopt the NEP. Furthermore, if recognised as a legitimate state within the state-system, the developing Soviet Union would enhance its chances of survival.

The rise of Stalin and his 'revolution from above' was devised in different surroundings to that of the NEP. Whilst within domestic circles the growth of the Kulaks and the grain crisis of 1927-28 heightened the need for a change in policy,⁵⁶ the 'socialism in one country' legacy was able to flourish because of the changing nature of the global economy and in parallel with this the rise of nationalist politics throughout Europe. The trends emerging by the late 20s not only saw the emergence of fascism, but (spurred on by the 1929 crash) the return of protectionism in western democratic states. It was within this rising nationalist 'norm' that Stalinism succeeded. This is not to say that global social

forces primarily caused the onset of Stalinism, or to ignore the ruthless manner in which he (Stalin) forced himself into power, but only to say that the path that Stalin took was partly shaped by the structural nature of the world economy.

Stalinization can be seen as an extension of the war communist model,⁵⁷ but can also be looked upon as an interpretation of the dogmatism contained within the 'State and Revolution'. Stalin's regime took the form of a centralised state, with brutal effects, in which the industrialisation programmes and the purging of all opposition was his approach towards the Leninist 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.⁵⁸ Whilst followers of other theoretical models (Trotsky and Bukharin) claim that Lenin's interpretation of 'State and Revolution' and what course the revolution should take, point to the contradictions between socialism and Stalinism, Stalin relied upon the pragmatism contained within the text and especially to the necessity of consolidation a strong revolutionary state. In addition, Stalin relied upon the populist appeal of the 'cult of Lenin'. Fuelled with the appeal of the 'cult of Lenin' that was to become synonymous with the revolution, one can understand how the 'brutish' nature of Stalin triumphed over the theoretically minded ontology of others. Stalin was the only Bolshevik involved within the three governmental bodies (Central Committee, Politburo and Orgburo). It was he who understood the nature of the emerging one-party state and who pragmatically focused on the cult of Lenin, without putting forward his own theoretical model, to play off the left and the right with the help of certain occurrences within the country (such as the grain crisis).⁵⁹

The process and consolidation of Stalinism can also be seen as a form of 'passive revolution'.⁶⁰ This can be expressed by the fact that the forces of Stalinism were restoring Russia's place as a state within the global arena. In the same way as the French Revolution materialised into a strong militarist state, with a key role within the international, the Russian version had produced, albeit through an alternative mode of production (socialism in one country) a similarly strong state, that was to expand its influence after the war. The terror and purges of the 1930s and the successful defence of the regime from Nazism during the Second World War, had paraded the Soviet Union as one half of the bi-polar character of global politics with the characteristics of Stalinism (centralised one-party state, worked through the discipline of a secret police) emerging as the 'norm' of state socialism. Thus Stalinism provided a mind-set which reversed the tendencies of one ideological part of the revolution, as it embraced nationalism and suspended internationalism, that was a prominent feature of the Bolshevik revolution.

5.3.2 Destalinization and the moves towards market reform

Whilst Stalinism set the precedent for the state machinery within the Soviet Union the policies of the late 50s, through to the eve of Gorbachev, provided a weakening of centralisation and of the repression instigated by the secret police. Whilst Khrushchev, in 1961, on introducing a new economic programme

endorsed the advantages of central planning, moves towards decentralisation were already in progress. This became most adventurous, during the beginnings of the Khrushchev era when attempts were made to distance the repressions of Stalin by bringing in devolutionary policies, which would not only regionalist the economy but would also recognize the different nationalities within the SU. This was reflected most prominently by the economic decision-making reform in 1957, when 105 sovnarkhozes (regional economic councils) were set up.⁶¹ In addition to this the suppression of culture was eased, with artists being allowed a measure of freedom of expression of thought,⁶² which it was felt, would distance Soviet society from the Stalinist regime. This fashion was continued by Brezhnev when he undertook a slight reform of the economic mechanism, using elements of 'market' culture to improve on economic management and supply but maintaining the Soviet ideal of central planning.

Whilst this more 'conservative' approach to socialism was taken by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, there are key characteristics which have to be noted. Firstly that the main requirements, which had been put down by Lenin in 'the State and Revolution', that of state centrality and of dictatorship of the proletariat, can be claimed to have been met with a different approach to that of Stalin.⁶³ Secondly that the formation of the 'socialism in one country' theorem which was brutally constructed by Stalin was not reformed – there were no plans to retreat to a mixed economical model, or to move whole heartedly towards a style of 'market socialism', which some socialist countries were experimenting with.⁶⁴ Finally,

while some elements of dissent and opposition was tolerated, the state reacted swiftly to uprisings which were considered damaging to the system as a whole; these were most notoriously observed within the Soviet Union's newly formed satellite states (such as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968) – again (at least in their interpretation) appearing within the Party to validate Lenin's claim that suppression is necessary within the transitional state in order to built communism.⁶⁵

In societal terms, whilst there remained a commitment towards the processes of 'State-led Socialism' and to creating an anti-capitalist alternative to the west, civil society was geared more towards one of socialist consolidation, rather than to that of radicalism that was apparent under Stalin. Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev promoted a State-led form of hegemony that, whilst not altering the sense of anti-westernisation and Soviet-Nationalism that was apparent under Stalin, directed towards one that appeared more conservative and mature in appearance.⁶⁶ It also complemented the global bi-polaric relationship that became a feature of the cold war.

5.3.3 Gorbachev and Perestroika

The final phase of the Soviet Union was seen as a major break from the traditional formation of centralisation and planning but, contrary to common beliefs, it was still held within the dogmatic interpretations of Marxist-Leninism.

For the Gorbachev reformers the Marxist-Leninist interpretation was destroyed by the Stalinist model⁶⁷ and to find an alternative, a comprehensive study of the 1924 Leninist party constitution was undertaken. Here it was interpreted that if Lenin had lived the party apparatus would have been weakened and local government would have been the formulation of soviet rule.⁶⁸ At the same time there emerged a belief that the NEP would have remained the best opinion for building socialism, as socialism could only emerge as a global force; thus the way forward was to learn and join with social democratic forces within western Europe (this being at a time when the forces of Thatcherism were undermining such forces), and to return to a mixed economic form, a sort of modern day NEP.⁶⁹

The ambiguity of the inception of Glasnost and Perestroika as a revised interpretation of Leninism was large enough to spur challenges to the leadership from both sides; the hard line 'Stalinists', challenging the 'liberal' position of Gorbachev on one side, and (with the emergence of such freedom) the anti-socialist liberal democrats challenging the very existence of the Soviet Union as a whole. This was fundamental to its failure. Whilst Gorbachev pointed out (and continues to point out) that the Bolshevik revolution was a genuine 'social' revolution and that its dogmatic Leninist principles had, until the inception of Stalinism⁷⁰, the potential to be built upon, it was the writings of Lenin himself that allowed Stalinism to achieve its legitimacy. For the legacy of Perestroika/Glasnost was a move towards a humanitarian, democratic form of

socialism, which stemmed from the social democratic readings of Marx, the same interpretations of Marx which the followers of Kautsky retained, and for which they were criticised in *State and Revolution*. Thus while Gorbachev attempted to redefine the values of Lenin, his key concepts, that of a centralised state based on dictatorship of the proletariat, of breaking the capitalist chain by instigating revolution on the periphery of capitalism and of building a strong party to create an environment for global communism - in which the Soviet Union was based, were pushed under the carpet, and it was the reform of these key concepts which was to bring down the regime as a whole. Whilst, normatively, it was argued by Gorbachev that it was the moral duty, both in humanitarian and democratic terms to reform these principles⁷¹, they were the main super-structural forces which bound the system together and the changes to these forces led to its downfall.

5.4 Changes of Social forces: from Russian to Global hegemony?

The changes that occurred through the Glasnost/Perestroika era were to open up Russia to western practises and to the global liberal hegemony. During this period the first strides were taken in dismantling the bureaucratic enclosed state formation of the Soviet Union and replacing it with liberal capitalist measures of the west. This was to bring in western social forces, which gradually led to a formation of a new social class, which in turn would dilute the hegemonic relationships contained within the Soviet Union. These western forces, in

addition to bringing in economic liberalism to the USSR, would also bring such liberal democratic forces, such as multi-party democracy that would challenge its legitimacy altogether.

As stated in the last two chapters, global hegemony is tied to certain cultural forces (represented better by Rupert and Hall⁷², as argued in chapter one) – and the introduction of *glasnost* was to allow such forces into the SU. This became apparent through measures such as the widening of public information, which weakened the propaganda element of the state, and the relaxing of censorship allowing popular works both from former dissidents who had been critical of the regime, and from the western world, giving the population the potential to explore the socio-economic dynamics inherent in the west for the first time.⁷³

As pinpointed in chapter three, the industry of media/communications plays a large part in contributing to the totalising effect of a hegemonic form. During *glasnost* the official press were to be extended forms of democracy and plurality. This form of freedom was to be given to the state-owned radio and television with the hope of creating a more informed and objective style of communicative apparatus, a type of soviet-styled BBC. Whilst this move was tending to be seen as a break from the fabrication of information used by the Soviet bureaucracy in the past, it could also be viewed as a necessary measure to restore faith in the Soviet Union. Whilst it had been a Soviet policy to ‘jam’ western broadcasts to Soviet civilian ears, in order to deter the masses from hearing ‘capitalist

propaganda', the advancements in technology had made it impossible to carry this out effectively and it was thought that by the 1970s nearly half the population had the capacity to receive foreign radio.⁷⁴ In addition to this was the expanding technological innovation in satellite broadcasting, and the ongoing dilemma of the emergence of the growing possibility of international direct television broadcasting, in which the Soviet Union had, by the seventies expressed concern over its possible development and had taken some strides to ensure some form of national protection from it.⁷⁵ However by the free market age of the 1980s it was becoming increasingly probable that more and more Soviet citizens would be subjected to western culture and thus in order to keep up with these developments a more democratic form of legitimisation was needed within the state.

The beginnings, under *glasnost*, of the democratisation of the press were matched economically under *perestroika*. The withdrawal of certain state subsidies from the media allowed the communications market to open, but throughout the late 80s many media investors were to suffer economic problems that resulted in the 1990 Press act, which ultimately led to a small concentration of media ownership, centred around a collection of a few sizeable companies. This mirrored the political economy of the media in the west,⁷⁶ but unlike the west, Russia's newly founded privately owned media industry would work from a different ideological perspective from the state. This is not to assume that all newspapers and their editors were in opposition to the continuation of the USSR,

but that the political ideologies of market liberalism in which they emerged was held in great contrast to the Marxist-Leninist dogma and concept of dictatorship of the proletariat, upon which the foundations of the Soviet Union were based.

Thus the dilemma of the modernisation era was that it was unable to move from a position of state centrality to one that uses some traits of the global hegemonic norm. It was unable to strike up a balance between the dominant western practices and retaining the dimensions of the socialist project. Added to this was the shift in concentrated neo-liberalism emerging in global terms in the 1980s in which globalisation and transnationalism have replaced Keynesian mixed economic policies, leaving any idea for Gorbachev's united social democratic European multinationalism in tatters, and allowing the Soviet Union to disintegrate and its parts to join the global hegemony or to retreat once more to find an alternative. These assertions were finally recognised by the August coup.

Whilst perestroika and market reform did not succeed within the state socialist formation of the Soviet Union and its satellites, why did it manage to survive in other countries that attempted market reform? The obvious example here is China, who (see chapter three) managed to successfully adopt market economics without democratising the state apparatus.⁷⁷ Within China economic growth has increased since the reform period and the share of non-state financial transactions has dramatically increased⁷⁸, and due to the vast investment in foreign trade and MNCs it has found itself embedded fully into the neoliberal

global economic order without adopting individual rights that accompany western liberalism. There can be several reasons for the different outcomes for China and the SU. Firstly China was seen in a different light by the west than the USSR during the cold war and strategists in the US seized upon the rift between the two states during the Khrushchev years to use China as a counter-balance to the Soviet threat⁷⁹. Secondly, the dynamics of the neoliberal hegemony places business and free trade higher than human rights or democracy. If, for example, western enterprise is feasible in a particular state and they are 'playing by the free market rules', then the authoritarian aspects of a regime will be overlooked.⁸⁰ Following on from this is the geo-political standings and cultural sociology of China itself. Several 'tiger' economies are existent in South East Asia, which have pursued liberal market economics without adopting wholly democratic and western values. Thus while the 'market' economists have eroded the Marxist-Leninist bureaucratic tradition, the ruling hierarchy has been aided by the fact that states with a similar geographical and cultural background have followed a similar path, albeit without adhering to a 'Communist flag'. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, undertook the market reforms (*perestroika*) with democratic reforms (*glasnost*) in order to attempt to fit in with European traditions. This explicitly weakened the autonomy of the State and allowed greater social forces the time and space to further exploit the democratic openings that *glasnost* provided.

This brings us to the final analysis of the Soviet Union and indeed of the nature of Russia itself, that of its sociological and cultural identity and returns us back to Wittfogel, Marx and the semi-Asiatic characteristics. Whilst the former puts far too much emphasis of its structural foundation as a unique mode of production and the latter contradicts his earlier writings (see above), both do recognise the identity problems emergent within Russia. This, centred around the historical notion and societal split into whether Russia can be considered as a European or a wholly Slavic entity; or more relevant to this study, whether Russia feels inclined to be a consenting part of the global hegemonic order, or if its unique sociological character is one that will always be prone to contestation.

5.5 Russia's cultural identity

Whilst Wittfogel examines the sociological foundations of the Russian State, (see above), other scholars, in recent years have provided a more in depth examination of the cultural forces which have emerged that reflect the identity split within Russia. This is a far more intense enquiry than one of the political economy of the state, and provides more relevance to the formation of dominant social forces.

Iver Neumann provides a detailed historical study into the opposing cultural forces within Russia. He sees the roots of the Russian identity problems as one which initially dates back to the complexities of multi-tribalism, with earlier

settlers being influenced from the Slavic core (notably from the Mogul empire) in the east and from the Europeans in the west.⁸¹ Forces from the both the east and the west were heightened when Christianity reached Russia by the turn of the first millennium, but the 1054 split between the Roman and Byzantine churches placed Russia apart from, or at least on the fringes of, Christendom, while in the following centuries Russia entered the era of the 'Tartar Yoke' when it was ruled by nomadic Mongols, and became estranged from the European world. Thus by the time Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great embarked upon a Europeanisation programme the historical occurrences and social forces had already distinguished Russia's sociological growth from the rest of Europe. Added to this is the often-understated phenomenon of its territorial size; this is especially obvious in relation to the question of identity, with Russia's borders and cultural influences stretching to different lands with contrasting histories/sociological forms, leaving the obvious dilemma of experiencing difficulties when attempting to unite under a single cultural theme. That said, the bulk of the Russian population and its 'influential base' was situated West of the Urals and was always prone to European cultural influence. This was reflected during the Mogul era, when the Russian church still retained links with Christendom, even though both the mogul empire and the Moorish influence in the east was seen in the west as 'barbaric'.⁸² From these historic routes, it was evident that the identity of Russia was divided into two schools: the European school, favouring Russia's inclusion within the European project, and the Slavic school: those social forces which stemmed

from the East, but combined to establish a separate isolationary nationalist goal, which distanced itself from cultures and practices of both the east and the west and showed great distrust towards the aims of Europeanisation.

Within Russian circles, both at scholarly and political level the two distinct separation of these forces have become relevant. They have become recognised as the *Zapadniki* and the *Derzhavniki*, and are seen to date back to the 19th century.⁸³ The *Zapadniki* refers to westerners whose roots derive from the western heritage, which have always existed within the Russian culture, and were transformed by the Tsarist surge of Europeanisation at the birth of the modern state.⁸⁴ The Slavic, or alternative body the *Derzhavniki*, generally represents the romantic notion of Russian nationalism, and longs for a strong and powerful Russian State. Both Neumann and others, who have written in depth on the identity split (such as Leszek Buszynski), have shown how the hegemonic struggle between the two forces has resulted in periods where one social force has gained the ascendancy, only to be challenged and replaced by the other. Thus, while one force has managed to retain some form of cultural superiority it has never succeeded in eradicating the other.

The emergence of the two identity forces as key sociological players dates back (according to both Buszynski and Neumann) to the Napoleonic invasion of 1812. It was here that nationalist doubts about the Russian Europeanisation programme that preceded it were cemented. The following Decembrist uprisings

ushered a new Slavic age that slowed down, and in some cases reversed, the process of Europeanisation of the state. Indeed the strong centralised state and the relevance placed upon the continuation of serfdom adds to the notion of the unique semi-Asiatic state. The renewed calls by the *Zapadniki* to look again towards Europe heightened after the death of the despot Nicholas I, and became realised during the reign of the reformer, Alexander II. The abolition of serfdom and the introduction of democratic free speech once again gave the pro-European forces the upper-hand, with the map of the continent redrawn with Russia very much included within it, but the assassination of Alexander stemmed the tide of such European-styled democratic traits. However the emergence of the 'Russian Empire', and the participation of it as one of the great powers involved in the Great War brought with it a European identity. The 'Russian Empire' was seen as one of the big imperial players until the revolution, despite not being as developed in industrial terms as the others.

The Bolsheviks and the two 1917 revolutions can also be seen as being instigated by predominately European forces. Both the socialist revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks, despite having different interpretations of what course a post-Tsarist government should take, had their philosophical roots set within the Germanic tradition. Both Trotsky and Lenin saw Europe, and particularly Germany, as the fundamental key to world revolution,⁸⁵ but it was the interpretations of Leninism and in particular of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' that led to the resurgence of nationalist forces. For the interregnum

period from Lenin's death to the rise of Stalin saw a clear fight between the forces of European intellectualism and nationalist pragmatism. The result was victory for the nationalists and for the epoch of 'socialism in one country'. Stalinism, operating under the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist tag, was to unite both the Communists, and nationalists and was to view western forces as both counter-revolutionary and capitalist. It was the ambiguities within Lenin's writings, and in particular of his condemnation of any form of social democracy that aided this theoretical split. The alternatives put forward in the 'State and Revolution' for socialist building in Russia greatly aided the movement towards 'socialism in one country', and towards renewed condemnation of Europe and the west.⁸⁶ This process of representing 'the other' in the emerging world of bipolarity continued after the cold war, with it being associated consciously with differing modes of production (capitalism v communism) rather than with pro/anti European process. This was realised by the illegitimate annexation of a large part of mainland Europe, parts of which had previously been key elements of the historical Europeanisation process.⁸⁷

The pro-western reformers of Gorbachev moved to restore Russia's place within Europe and returned Marxist-Leninism to a project of Europeanisation. The subsequent fall of the Soviet Union and its satellite states furthered this shift with the newly created Russian Federation moving to contribute and integrate itself within the western-orientated neoliberal market. How, one must ask, are the groupings of the *Zapadniki* and the *Derzhavniki* recognised in the current

Russian State? Any expectation the westerners had of advancing rapidly towards economic liberalisation and towards a wholly committed player within the neoliberal GPE were issued a setback in the 1993 parliamentary elections, when Zhirinovsky's extreme nationalist party (paradoxically entitled the 'liberal democrats') totalled 23% of the parliamentary vote, underlining the opposition towards the market reforms instigated by Yeltsin and foreign minister, Kozyrev.⁸⁸ What followed throughout the presidency of Yeltsin was a retreat from the westernisation process, and a position adopted which compromised both the nationalist, and the neoliberalist approaches, which has in turn lessened the ultra-nationalist vote.⁸⁹ Similarly, his successor Putin has declared that he endorses a strong state and a clampdown on criminal acts that have been cemented since the introduction of capitalism, but insists that he is also firmly committed towards continued market reform and to the further renewal of relations with the west (see next chapter).

How far the consortium of resistance towards market reform (e.g. the nationalists, the ultra-nationalists, and the official opposition, the Communists) presented by the modern-day *Derzhavniki* will challenge stability of the pledges put forward by Putin will be analysed in the final chapter. In addition the *Zapadniki* - *Derzhavniki* split highlighted by Neumann will be scrutinised further to indicate which forms of counter-hegemonic resistance are active within Russia. As outlined in the previous chapter, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there have been a variety of ideological challenges towards

market reforms that have emerged from both the more internationalist camp of the *Zapadniki* and the more nationalist *Derzhavniki*. Thus a fuller, empirical examination is required to fully understand the stability of the current hegemonic project in Russia and the nature and potential consequences of resistance towards it.

5.6 Conclusion: Modern Russia and the New World Order

This chapter has addressed the flaws inherent within the Soviet Union, why the Marxist-Leninist dogmatic model failed to create a credible alternative to the world hegemonic order and more prominently, the sociological nature and historical composition of social forces within Russia. It has also outlined the role that the Soviet Union played within the differing world orders from which it was operating. The transition from the Soviet era to the post-Soviet era has marked a position in which Russia, as a socio-economic unit has descended from a key global contributor to one in which its role is far more debatable. Furthermore, this transition has seen an assortment of competing historically-formed ideologies that contest the current role Russia should play within the neoliberal global order. The 'free-market modernisers,' for example, see Russia's future involvement as one of harmonisation.⁹⁰ Having failed to sustain an alternative to the west, Russia, it is argued, must adopt Lockean principles within its civil society to allow it to gain greater influence at the international level.⁹¹ For them, the longer Russia takes developing its market principles and integrating into the

global economy, the weaker the State will become at the macro-level. Only through a sustained project of marketisation and interaction with economically-orientated NGOs and global institutions can Russia contribute to the global political economy.⁹² In this way the free-marketeers place themselves firmly in the enlightenment position of the *Zapadniki*.

Competing positions see any engagement with continued liberalisation projects as detrimental to the strength of the Russian State. Rather than moving back towards a more influential player within international society, many nationalists and neo-Communists see Russia falling towards the periphery of the global system if 'imperial globalisation' is speeded up.⁹³ As stated by the official Communist Party:

Russia will either become mired in the Third World where it will be doomed to disintegration and extinction or it will revive on the socialist basis – this is the stark choice today.⁹⁴

Thus in viewing Russia's current place in the global hegemonic order, one can see the traditional ideological rivalry between the State-centrics and the westernisers. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, social forces and social movements have emerged from these traditions to present a whole array of differing counter-hegemonic challenges, that in some way mirror, but in other way remain much deeper than those outlined within the EU/NAFTA nations in chapter four.

This chapter has thus outlined the historical development of Russia, during the Soviet era and has placed its development within the context of global hegemony. It has also demonstrated how Soviet hegemonic orders within the State were ordered and transformed, and as highlighted above, how competing ideologies have emerged from the fall of the Soviet Union to interpret its current socio-economic relationship. By concentrating on the historical development of social forces within the Soviet Union, this chapter has also underlined the presumption (in tandem with the historicism outlined in chapter two) that the totality of the neoliberal order is not as stable and tenable as certain scholars and politicians would like to imagine.⁹⁵ From this point it is necessary to further investigate the extent of the enhanced resistance which exists within Russia to neoliberalism, by outlining the forms of counter-hegemonic projects along the same theoretical lines that I argued in chapter four. The character and nature of these projects can then be assessed alongside those developments in the west to give us a broader framework to analyse the overriding stability of the neoliberal hegemonic order.

¹ David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR*, London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1970

² The uneasy mixture of Stalinist Nationalism and practical Leninism.

³ Robert Cox, 'Real socialism in historical perspective', in *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 209.

⁴ The methodology applied by Mao differed from that of the Strong State theorem, adopted by Lenin/Stalin, but still relied on dogmatic notation, under the title 'Marxist/Leninism', see *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung*, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966, commonly known as the 'little red book'.

⁵ The obvious scholar here being Issac Deutscher, see Issac Deutscher, *The Prophet Outcast: Trotsky 1929-1940*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

⁶ The Trotskyist position became fashionable in the west, during the cold war as an anti-Stalinist defence of the Bolshevik revolution – this became noticeable with the popularity with the works of Issac Deutscher. For recent works on the continuing belief that Lenin and Trotsky were working hand in hand towards a feasible outcome see Ted Grant, 'From revolution to counter revolution', <http://easyweb.easynet.co.uk/socappeal/russia>, parts 1-12. For similar viewpoints on

how the key theoretical viewpoints of Trotsky could have succeeded where 'socialism in one country' failed see works by varied authors on www.trotsky.net

⁷ Robert Cox, op. cit., 1996, p. 209.

⁸ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, London: Penguin Books 1985, p. 21. See also the 'German Ideology', and 'Towards a critique of Hegel's philosophy of rights', in David McLellan (ed), *Selected Writings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

⁹ Indeed this was reflected, from different positions by Trotsky and Bukharin during the 1920s, prompting the former to warn of the potential of a consolidation of a new class under the NEP and Bukharin placing faith in the NEP, affirming this as a State-led form of development towards socialism. See, Michael Haynes, *Nikolai Bukharin and the transition from Capitalism to Socialism*, London: Holmes & Meier, 1985; Leon Trotsky, *The Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects*, London: Mehrings, 1992.

¹⁰ A. Brown, *Soviet Politics and Political Science*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1974, p. 23.

¹¹ Tony Cliff, *State Capitalism in Russia*, London: Pluto Press, 1974, pp. 169-170.

¹² Ibid., pp. 170-172.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Milovan Djilas, *The New Class: An analysis of the Communist System*, London: Harvest, 1982.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See in particular, Donny Gluckstein, *The Tragedy of Bukharin*, London: Pluto Press, 1993; and Anthony Kemp-Welch (ed), *The Ideas of Nikolai Bukharin*, London: Clarendon, 1992.

¹⁷ Michael Haynes, op. cit., 1985.

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ For example, the Bevanities in the British Labour Party and the emergence of Euro-Communism in the late 1970s and early 80s on the continent all presented arguments and critiques of the Soviet Union, that borrowed from Bukharin's observations in the 1920s.

²⁰ See Bill Warren, *Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism*, London: Verso, 1981.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Indeed Lenin once commented that Bukharin never really understood dialectics, see V.I Lenin, *Lenin's Final Fight, 1922-23*, New York: Pathfinder, 1995, p. 183

²³ Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*, Yale: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. 369 – 413.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 373.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 374

²⁶ Ibid., p. 382.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 375.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 394. By the 'more renowned' revolutionary works, I refer to both 'The State and revolution', and 'Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism', which moves away from Russia's sociological nature being problematised. See also David Lane, *The Rise and Fall of State Socialism*, Cambridge: Polity, 1996, pp. 30 – 31.

²⁹ Karl Wittfogel, op. cit., p. 441.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 436-7.

³¹ Michal Reiman, *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the eve of the Second Revolution*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1987.

³² David Lane, op. cit., 1996, p. 54.

³³ Ibid., p. 99

³⁴ Ibid., p. 113.

³⁵ Karl Marx, op. cit., 1977, p. 89.

³⁶ David Lane, op. cit., 1996, p. 24.

³⁷ Karl Marx, op. cit., 1985, p. 104.

³⁸ This is a common complaint among critics of any form of dogmatic Marxism. Within readings of Marx, there has often been a tendency of asking which Marx ? This goes further than assessing the differences and contradictions of the young and old Marx, but rather his writings as a whole, and the dilemma the 'Marxist' has in using his work for their own ideological viewpoint – see David McLellan's introduction in *Selected Writings*, and also the preface and

introduction in Anthony Giddens, *A contemporary critique of historical materialism*, Cambridge: Polity, 1995 (2nd ed), preface and introduction.

³⁹ David Lane, op. cit., 1996, pp 27-30.

⁴⁰ V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest stage of Capitalism*, New York, International Publishers, 1979, ch. 7 & 8.

⁴¹ Karl Marx, op. cit., 1977, pp. 583-4.

⁴² V.I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution*, London: Penguin, 1992, pp. 16-21.

⁴³ Karl Marx, op. cit., 1977, p. 565.

⁴⁴ V.I. Lenin, op. cit., 1992, pp. 82-92

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 81

⁴⁶ This, theoretically is the overall purpose of *The State and Revolution*, in which he makes a scathing attack on Kautsky and any opinion to the contrary.

⁴⁷ Cox, op. cit., 1996 and *Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

⁴⁸ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1979; Christopher Chase-Dunn, *Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy*, Oxford: Blackwells, 1989.

⁴⁹ See David Lane, *Soviet Economy and Society*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson (eds.), *The Soviet Worker: Illusions and Reality*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980; Ernst Gellner, *State and Society in Soviet thought*, Oxford: Blackwells, 1988

⁵⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison notebook*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, p. 404.

⁵¹ David Lane, op. cit., 1996, p. 109; T. Zaslavskaya, *The Second Socialist Revolution*, London: I. B. Tauris 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World* London: Harper Collins, 1987, H. Gelman, *Gorbachev's First Five years in the Soviet Union*, Santa Monica: University of California Press, 1990, Richard Sakwa, *Gorbachev and his Reforms*, Oxford: Blackwells, 1990, Introduction & chapter 1; Martin McCauley, *The Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, (2nd ed), Harlow: Longman, 1993, p. 344.

⁵² The structure of the 'military-political' model is seen not only by Gramscians and Critical Historical Sociologists but also evident in world-systems analysis of the modern capitalist state. For an overview see Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, Oxford: Blackwells, 1988.

⁵³ Cox, op. cit., 1996, p. 212.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 213, Martin McCauley, op. cit., 1993, p. 32, Michal Reiman, op. cit., 1987, pp. 1-10.

⁵⁵ The final act that underlined the discontent with War Communism was the Kronstadt uprisings, which involved a naval group that were previously very supportive of the Bolshevik revolution. See Robert Cox, op. cit., 1996 Martin McCauley, op. cit., 1993 and Carr's revolutionary trilogy (Cambridge), *History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, London: Penguin, 1966.

⁵⁶ James Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia and the crisis of the New Economic Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

⁵⁷ Cox, op. cit., 1996, p. 214; Michal Reiman, op. cit., 1987, Ch. 1, also appendix 3, pp. 128-132.

⁵⁸ Joseph Stalin, *Leninism*, Moscow: Foreign Language Press, 1940.

⁵⁹ The fact that the last testament of Lenin called into question the alarming control Stalin was building up, within the party and that in fact he should be removed from his post as general secretary was ignored by the party leaders after Lenin's death. In addition to this, one of his most scathing personal attacks on Stalin was made while he was still alive, and his feelings were made known to both Kamenev and Zinoviev. See *Lenin's Final Fight*, New York, 1995, p. 255, the last testament being pp 179-185; 199-200. Both Kamenev and Zinoviev made the fatal mistake of ignoring this, in order to gain his (Stalin's) support in defeating Trotsky.

⁶⁰ Kees van der Pijl, 'State Socialism and Passive Revolution', in Stephen Gill (ed), *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 244-248.

⁶¹ Martin McCauley, op. cit., 1993, p. 264.

⁶² Ibid., p. 264.

- ⁶³ David Lane, op. cit., 1996, p. 100.
- ⁶⁴ For example Tito's Yugoslavia.
- ⁶⁵ V.I Lenin, op. cit., 1992.
- ⁶⁶ Iver Neumann, *Russia and the idea of Europe*, London: Routledge, 1996; Roy Medvedev, *Khrushchev*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982; Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and policy toward the nationalities in the Soviet Union : from totalitarian dictatorship to post-Stalinist society*, Boulder : Westview Press, 1991.
- ⁶⁷ The prominent Perestroika scholars were Burlatsky, Butenko and Kurashvili, see Stephen White, *After Gorbachev*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp 227-229.
- ⁶⁸ Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 344.
- ⁶⁹ Stephen White, op. cit., pp. 226-230.
- ⁷⁰ Mikhail Gorbachev, op. cit., 1987; *The August Coup*, London: Harper Collins, 1995.
- ⁷¹ Mikhail Gorbachev, op. cit., 1987.
- ⁷² See in particular, David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (eds.), *Stuart Hall: critical dialogues in cultural studies*, London: Routledge, 1996; Mark Rupert, 'Re (engaging) Gramsci: A reply to Germain and Kenny', *Review of International Studies*, 24 (3), 1998
- ⁷³ Mikhail Gorbachev, op. cit., 1995, pp. 42-48
- ⁷⁴ Stephen White, op. cit., 1993, p.53
- ⁷⁵ Cees Hamelink, *The Politics of World Communication*, London: Sage, 1994, pp. 142-144.
- ⁷⁶ Ellen Mickiewicz, 'The Political Economy of Media Democratisation', in David Lane (ed), *Russia in Transition*, Harlow: Longman, 1995, p. 160.
- ⁷⁷ Susan L. Shirk, *How China opened its door : the political success of the PRC's foreign trade and investment reform*, Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1994; Lowell Dittmer, 1994, *China Under Reform*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994; Hui Wang, *The gradual revolution : China's economic reform movement*, New Brunswick, Transaction, 1994
- ⁷⁸ Ibid.
- ⁷⁹ Bruce Reynolds, 'China in the International Economy', in Harry Harding, *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, Yale: Yale University Press, 1998; & 'Patterns of Interaction in Sino-American Relations', in Thomas Robinson & David Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- ⁸⁰ As we have witnessed with the west's 'business friendly' attitude towards China, since the Tienanmen Square massacre. In particularly *The Times* newspaper have been more and more favourable towards China, since the Murdoch empire has made inroads in its market.
- ⁸¹ Iver Neumann, op. cit., 1996
- ⁸² Ibid., p. 5
- ⁸³ Luszcz Buszynski, 'Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?', *Survival*, 37 (3), 1995, p. 194.
- ⁸⁴ Here I refer to the birth of the modern state as it is traditionally since – e.g. from the Treaty of Westphalia.
- ⁸⁵ See for example, Grant Woods, *Lenin and Trotsky*, London: Wellred, 2000.
- ⁸⁶ V. I. Lenin, op. cit., 1992, pp. 7-21.
- ⁸⁷ Hence there was a feeling in the more Europeanised parts of the Communist bloc that, following both Neumann's and Buszynski's logict they had been colonised by the Russian 'other', and once glasnost had come in, they would rejoin their sociological European partner, to which they historically belong.
- ⁸⁸ Andrei Kozyrev was finally sacked as Russian Foreign Minister in January 1996.
- ⁸⁹ Support for Zhirinovskiy's party has fallen since the 1993 parliamentary success. In 1995, they still managed 51 seats (from 229), but this was cut by over cut to only 17 in 1999. <http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report/2000/01/08-070100.html>
- ⁹⁰ See Yedar Gaider, *Dni Porazhenii I Pobed*, Moscow: Vagrius.
- ⁹¹ See Heikki Patomaki & Christer Pursiainen, 'Against the State, With(in) the State, or a Transnational Creation: Russian Civil Society in the Making?', UPI Working Papers, *The Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, 4 , 1998.
- ⁹² Interview with Eurasian financial group, September, 2000.

⁹³ Gennady Zyuganov, 'Russian Exceptionalism', reprinted in *The Economist*, 15-21st June, 1996.

⁹⁴ CPRF, 'In the vice of Imperial Globalisation', Political Report of the Central Committee of the KPRF to the 7th Congress and the immediate Tasks of the Party.

⁹⁵ See for example the general arguments put forward in one of the first textual analysis to emerge after the fall of the Soviet Union, Michael Hogan (ed.) *The End of the Cold War: its meaning and implications*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Chapter six: Russian Social Movements after the Fall: Russian responses to neoliberal hegemony

The last chapter demonstrated the historical and sociological character of both the Russian state and Russian society, arguing primarily that, due to its geo-political positioning and its historical struggle between the *Zapadniki* and *Derzhavniki*, Russia's relationship to the dominant West has proved to be problematic. In addition, it illustrated how the Soviet Union – originally an expansionist project became (at least in part) to resemble a form of the 'other' in global terms. It also demonstrated that the Soviet forms of internal hegemony, whilst taking a different character to that of the West, became influenced and partly shaped by external forces and the overriding character of the global political system. This chapter intends to examine the different ideological and socio-economic positions that have been taken by different social groups within Russia since the fall of the one-Party system. It aims to show that the different and fragmented positions within Russia are contesting neoliberal hegemony and that these contestations highlight a historical tradition born from a combination of cultural, social and geopolitical traits. Ultimately this chapter seeks to build upon the characteristics of more macro forms of counter-hegemony by focusing upon the contrasting social forces inherent within modern Russian society.

The implosion of the Soviet Union has far from installed Russian society with a triumphant state of 'end of history', envisaged by Fukuyama¹. Neither does the post-Yeltsin form of Russian society suggest any dramatic shift in

the near future towards this harmonisation. Indeed, as discussed in a recent paper by Andrei Tsygankov, the different ideological positions within Russia concerning the essence of neoliberalism make Fukuyama's own claims concerning the lack of any consistent challenge to rhetoric redundant.² Whilst there may be some substance to the claim that Russian society is merely 'in transition', and this has been over-emphasised by various empirical studies of social movements within Russia,³ the historical development of contrasting social forces that has shaped Russian society for generations suggests that its route towards westernisation remains highly problematic. The formation of social movements that have been evident since the fall of the USSR have only reinforced the continuation of the *Zapadniki-Derzhavniki* dilemma discussed in the previous chapter.

The differing ideological approaches within Russian society have been emphasised with the formation of many political groups and social movements, some of which have represented society at the Duma - others appearing at the more regional or local level. What each emphasises however is the contestation of the direction the Russian state should take in the current era of globalisation. By studying the aims and behaviour of a cross-section of social groups and political movements within Russia, more can be revealed about the true nature of counter-hegemony and a more critical perspective can be applied to any progressive, enlightenment programmes, which some Gramscians naively focus upon.

6.1 The re-Birth of the *Zapadniki*/*Derzhavniki* split: The results of Glasnost & Perestroika

Following on from the Neumann thesis discussed in Chapter Five, Russia's development historically has focused around a struggle between Europeanising social forces (expressed by the *Zapadniki*) and isolationist or nationalist social forces (expressed in terms of the *Derzhavniki*). Eras of change and transformation have often allowed these forces to surface⁴ and the re-evaluation of Marxist-Leninism and subsequent reforms taken by Gorbachev allowed these forces back into prominence. The era of Perestroika/Glasnost produced a split over the interpretation of Marxist-Leninism that saw the Gorbachev-backed modernisers supporting a re-evaluation of the work of Marx and Lenin, whilst the traditionalists favoured a continuation of the status quo; some using the threat of reform to re-affirm their Stalinist-inspired credentials. This split, evident from the early part of the Gorbachev era, has led several commentators, especially within the mainstream media in the west, to jump to certain conclusions that these two groups reproduced themselves after the 1991 coup into 'economic liberals' set on a smooth transition towards liberal capitalism and nationalists who favoured a restoration of the old Soviet/Russian empire.⁵ These in fact can fit quite nicely into the *Zapadniki* and *Derzhavniki* framework. However, a more rigorous assessment would demonstrate that the modernisation projects intended by Gorbachev and his associates favoured a redirection of Soviet principles towards social democracy. It was these principles that were attacked by both liberals and nationalists in the late 1980s and, after they

proved unsuccessful within the Soviet system, were themselves reproduced in differing forms within several new parties, groups and organisations. Thus Gorbachev, despite being very much influenced by *Zapadniki* forces, was critical of neoliberalism, placing his logic within traditional European social democratic beliefs.⁶

Whilst the Yeltsin-led forces attacked Perestroika for not moving far enough towards marketisation, the traditionalists focused largely upon a nationalist-patriotic union, which borrowed its ideological outlook from Stalin's 'Socialism in One Country'. Conservatives within the Politburo, the Police and the Army drew their support from figureheads such as Kryuchkov, the chairman of the KGB, Gennadii Yanaev, who became Gorbachev's vice-president in January, 1991 and Valentin Pavlov, who became Prime Minister at the same time.⁷ These were to unite together in August to ultimately reject Glasnost and Perestroika, through the unsuccessful coup that was aided by another recent appointment from Gorbachev's governmental structural reforms, Anatolii Lukyanov.⁸ The Conservative position was to re-invent itself after the break up of the Soviet Union with a number of Stalinist-influenced Parties, the most moderate and successful being Zyuganov's CPRF.

In terms of the re-invention of the *Zapadniki-Derzhavniki* split, the Gorbachev era allowed space for the creation of legitimate challenges to the reformed Soviet regime that he himself was attempting to consolidate. These challenges were also to find significance outside the governmental centre and

institutions. If the Zapaniki gained significantly from the reforming project with the emergence of prominent westernisers such as Yavlinsky, Gaider and Kozyrev and with the opening up of the internal market to foreign investment, then the Derzhaniki benefited from freedom of expression as many (often subversive) underground nationalist movements began to express themselves legally. Indeed both the post-Soviet movements of nationalism and orthodox neo-Communism began to flourish from the discontent with the reform policies initiated by Gorbachev. Conservative Communist Party members began to draw more and more upon the Stalinist model that they believed theoretically was the 'correct model' for the development of the Soviet Union. The revisions to the Soviet model in the 1980s thus sparked a dual movement of nationalist and communist forces, each ultimately using the same patriotic logic but both stressing their contrasting positions. For example, 'old guard' Party members, who had accepted Kruschchev's de-Stalinisation forms and Brezhnev's piecemeal reforms of the central economy,⁹ used the principles of Glasnost to re-assert the more undiluted principles of Stalinism. It was the 'Socialism in one country' formula after all that both defeated the Trotskyist cosmopolitan model and the Bukharin-led mixed economic model and as such a further engagement with the systematic form of national planned economy would dispel any reforms applied since 1953. The critics of Gorbachev's reform programme applied the 'national' content of the Stalinist model here, as indeed Stalin did himself during his criticisms of Bukharin in the 1930s.¹⁰ Whilst both Stalin's initial models and the subsequent forms of re-inventions were 'socialistic' in appearance, especially in terms of aims and

objectives, they became distinctively nationalistic, both in theory and practice.¹¹ Whilst the reformers set themselves very much within the traditions of the *Zapadniki*, by democratising the structure of the Soviet Union in tandem with Western European social democracy, the nationalist backlash responded with a new configuration of neo-communism which found itself historically, within the mould of the *Derzhaniki*.

Whilst the neo-Communist positions of post-Soviet political society find their roots in the *Derzhaniki* tradition and emerged as a contested force during the Gorbachev era, nationalism of a different form was also to find prominence during the same period. This nationalism was not rooted in any form of Marxist-Leninist or Stalinist pragmatism but in a more traditionalist conception. This conception owed more to the romantic cultural identity of Russia rather than founded within the Marxist doctrine. Indeed the main roots of modern nationalism in Russia stemmed from a critique rather than a contribution to any form of state-led socialism. One of the first notable organisational appearances of this type of ultra-nationalism was found within a movement known as *Pamyat*.¹² Formed as a state-endorsed organisation dedicated towards the protection of Russian heritage in the 1970s, *Pamyat* emerged as a counter-movement to the reform projects that were engaged in the 1980s, having transformed from a cultural to a political movement with the advent of Glasnost. The main focus behind the *Pamyat* organisation was one of Slavic, isolationist nationalism that contained elements of both xenophobia and anti-Semitism and was distinctly anti-western in character. Unlike the conservative backlash within the Politburo, the surrounding

principles behind *Pamyat* remained wholly nationalistic; distancing itself from placing patriotic-nationalism within the dogmatic confines of Marxist-Leninism. Instead *Pamyat* served to critique Soviet Communism, accusing both its doctrine and its constructors of anti-Russophilism. As the movement grew in stature as a political force this attack became sharper and increasingly encompassed around prejudice and conspiracy. As observed by Cox and Shearman:

More generally it (*Pamyat*) saw hardly anything of worth coming out of seventy years of Soviet rule. The revolution, in its view, had been an unmitigated disaster for Russia. Lenin, according to one spokesman, 'hated Russia', as did his 'Jewish Bolshevik' colleagues, who had destroyed a once great country and replaced it with an historical abomination in the shape of the Soviet Union – a political system run by those inspired by the credo of Marxism, an evil doctrine that was part of a larger world-wide Zionist-Masonic conspiracy designed to undermine Russia and keep it weak.¹³

Although never large enough to sustain any threat to the governmental structure as a whole, *Pamyat*'s relevance was that it became a strong counter-voice outside the state apparatus as a whole and although small in terms of size and active participation, it had organisational facilities that reached across the Soviet Union as a whole. Its main significance however, was that it became the first substantial nationalist movement that took advantage of the freedom of expression reforms of the eighties and placed itself distinctively outside the neo-Communist perspective. This form of anti-Communist nationalism was also to build upon its foundations, established during the last years of the Soviet Union, to find greater parliamentary prominence within the newly formed Russian Federation.¹⁴

The Gorbachev years set the standards and the foundations for a re-birth of the historical identity struggles that were discussed in depth in the previous chapter. However, when observing social movements and counter-hegemonic ideologies that have grown in post-Soviet Russia, these ideologies have also emerged from different perspectives within these historical traditions. For example, the social democracy that Gorbachev aspired to was not rooted in neoliberalism of any kind and equally was not motivated by the neoliberal transformations being undertaken in the West at the same time.¹⁵ The social democratic position, however, shared its foundational cultural roots with the neoliberals. This being rooted well within the cosmopolitan traditions of the *Zapaniki*. Similarly, the neo-Communist and Nationalist positions share the traditional inspirations evident within the *Derzhavniki* but take opposing directions of how these can be best maintained.

6.2 Opposing ideologies and social movements within Post-Soviet Society

The different positions that have emerged during the transistional period in Russia demonstrate a number of features that can be applied to the understanding of the nature of the global hegemonic project. Firstly, and the most notable is fragmentation. As put forward in chapter 4, Russian opposition to globalisation, although holding certain similarities with movements in the west, is diverse and more fragmented. Secondly, the separate movements within Russia serve to demonstrate two factors that are of key interest to the stability of the hegemonic order as a whole. For

instance, as discussed further in chapter 4, mass movements that challenge neoliberal globalisation contain contradictions as contrasting perspectives have challenged it from different positions. In Russia these contradictions have been far more polarised in character, with both a higher concentration of contestation and instability than in the west. Thus in Gramscian terms, by focusing upon such movements as I will demonstrate below, neoliberal common sense in Russia has failed to substantially consolidate itself.

The study of Russian neoliberal contestation reveals much about the overall nature of neoliberal hegemony. Firstly and of paramount significance, it demonstrates a working that goes far beyond Cox and indeed many of his Gramscian contemporaries and plays very much into the hands of the neo-Gramscian critics such as Germain and Kenny.¹⁶ As I discussed in chapter one, one of the main concerns they have with applying the Gramscian notion of hegemony to global politics is that there is no form of hierarchic state at the international level.¹⁷ Thus it will always remain problematic to affirm adequately that a hegemonic order can be comprehensively moulded at the global level. The societal diversity within Russia both accounts for my reply to this (see chapter one) and also demonstrates that global hegemony and more specifically neoliberal hegemony appears fragmented in nature (see chapter four). For instance, as stated in chapter one, a global hegemonic order takes on a super-structural form that appears far more complex than at the level of the state. Specific cultures and diversities are framed and understood firstly at a national level and then this is transformed internationally, through the norms and practises of the international political

economy. In Russia, neoliberal development was installed from above – through the policies of the Yeltsin administration and foreign investment, whilst democracy from below was intended to supplement this in terms of civil societal activity to achieve a more harmonious form of common sense. As opposed to other states (such as China and to some extent states within the Middle-East) which have implemented and contributed to neoliberal hegemony, whilst still maintaining a tight control upon the levels that they encourage marketisation and upon the role civil society should adapt to it, Russia engaged upon a full-scale experiment, accompanied by a naïve faith that society would harmonise towards the economic transformation that it had embarked upon.¹⁸

The fragmentation and to borrow from Scott Lash, the ‘disorganisation’¹⁹ within Russian society has not withered the Russian state’s commitment towards neoliberal development. Despite a series of economic crashes and complications at the centre of government, Russia has still managed to re-package itself towards neoliberalism. Part of this has been ascribed by some (most notably by activists within the Communist Party), to demonstrate that since the 1980s Russia has moved towards a sort of neo-dependency with the West.²⁰ That since Russia has absorbed itself back into the global economy, western influences and input into the economy have rendered Russian political economy dependent upon the principles and movements of western (and most notably American) influences.²¹ However these claims do not entirely account for Russia’s push, both under Yeltsin and then Putin towards a pluralized economy that will gain entry to the global hegemonic agencies.

Putin, for example, despite fears that his KGB past would render him reluctant to pursue marketisation, is set upon economic recovery and reform that would lead towards full acceptance within the WTO.²²

In Russia then, social movements and interpretations have grown towards challenging the legitimisation of the governmental class, but have also allowed certain space and time for those defending the neoliberalist project to exploit the diversities and contradictions inherent within these critiques to move towards a position that incorporates some of their concerns.²³ This, in Gramscian terms, resembles the process of *trasformismo* – the successful move upon the side of the dominant class to incorporate large elements of potential opposition, in order to stabilise the status-quo. That said, however, any move towards *trasformismo* within Russia is fraught with instabilities, instabilities that reveal much about the weaknesses of the hegemonic order in areas where its logic faces more challenges. To describe these weaknesses it is necessary to explore the many challenges that neoliberalism faces within Russia and equally to explore the historical relevance of these challenging positions.

One Gramscian who has developed this observation has been Jeremy Lester. In his book, *Modern Princes and Tsars*, he argues that the diversity inherent within Russia's civil society has forged a multitude of potential hegemonic projects that have been contesting legitimisation, since the fall of the Soviet Union.²⁴ He argues that the instabilities within the Russian state in the early 90s have led to series of projects from 'westernisers', 'Russophiles' and

'centrists', that all stake a claim within post-Soviet Russia. Lester sees these hegemonic combatants 'battling' for the heart of Russian civil society and common sense.²⁵ Through a series of struggles, contradictions, co-option and harmonisation, a hegemonic medium should be found, as Russia's post-cold war institutions and civil society 'matures' from its Soviet experience. Whilst Lester stresses that the depth of potential hegemonic projects within modern Russia point towards a continuation of the quasi-civil societal formation that has underpinned Russia society since the collapse of the cold war, he feels that there is cause to suggest that through a series of ideological struggles, a form of hegemonic order will be installed back into Russia:

It is clear that the existence of a quasi-civil society; an economic realm subject to perpetual chaos, depression and criminalisation; proto-political parties; a weak sense of nationhood and statehood; a populist President prone to Caesarist solutions and a more politicised military hardly amount in total to the most optimal context in which to observe a genuine Gramscian-based struggle for hegemony. That said, some basic conditions for such a struggle, I would contend do exist somewhere in the chaotic haze that currently envelops Russian social, economic and political life; and there is at least some recognition by most – through certainly not by all – the combatants engaged in a struggle for power in Russia today that it is in their ultimate interest to play by the rules of modern hegemonic politics rather than the pre-modern absolutist rules.²⁶

So how can Lester's analysis add up within a more macro-study of hegemony? Firstly, Lester's analysis is concerned with state, rather than international politics – he thus does not engage with authors such as Cox or Gill, or for that matter, relate to how any hegemonic process within Russia will relate to the global political economy as a whole. However, what Lester does illustrate is that the instability within Russia may create space for a successful counter-hegemonic project that explicitly contests the common sense that has been consolidated from US-inspired neoliberalism. Indeed, in

response to the large majority of 'westernisers', convinced that Russia will undergo a series of progressive 'neoliberal capitalist miracles' by 2010, Lester concludes that these are both unlikely, misplaced and only in the long run going to lead to a heightening of counter-hegemonic alternatives.²⁷

Lester also fails to stress that whilst groups and forces from several ideological positions have contested Russia's movement towards capitalism, both Yeltsin and Putin have maintained a constant move towards integrating Russia within the global economy. Taking both Lester and others (such as Tsygankov) as a departure point I will now discuss how different counter-hegemonic projects have contested this trend, both by drawing upon normative alternatives and using Russian historical traditions as a social base for contestation. From this we can assess both the strengths and weaknesses of these projects and what the implications of them might be.

6.2.1 Russian Social Democracy

The traditions and historical relevance of Marx-inspired social democracy within Russia does not stem merely from the re-interpretations of Marx undertaken during the Gorbachev years, but from the works and activities undertaken by Plekhanov, Martov and the Mensheviks at the turn of the 20th century. In addition, social democrats point towards the provisional government and the reforms of the 'progressive bloc' under Kerensky, after the February revolution.²⁸ Here the historical focus was placed upon gradual socialism, and rested in 1917 upon a belief that the semi-Asiatic form of the

Russian state (see Wittofogel's analysis in chapter 5) needed further development to transform into a democratic and socialistic society. Its 'backward' character, compared to Western Europe, placed it behind in terms of capitalist development and the Kerensky-led government felt that the Russian industrial economy required further capitalist development, so as to build up the country's productive and cultural resources.²⁹ Only then could Russian socialism, in conjunction with the rest of Europe move towards socialist transformation.

The social-democratic renaissance placed Gorbachev not just in the 'mould' of early Lenin and Plekhanov, but arguably within the economic framework of Bukharin. For Gorbachev's vision of social democracy and indeed his interpretations of Marxist development can arguably be intertwined with Bukharin's own programme in the 1920s.³⁰ Most implicit here was the belief that the NEP, adopted by Lenin in the early 1920s, was an important long-term economic necessity. Russian social-democratic approaches thus combine virtues held both by Mensheviks and Social-revolutionaries and those more moderate Bolsheviks, who contributed towards the NEP. In the post-Gorbachev era, social democratic critiques of globalisation could be witnessed in various guises. Some NGO's and think-tanks (the most notable being the *Gorbachev Foundation*) have built more explicitly upon Gorbachev's own theoretical fundamentals, whilst social democratic traits can be found within several political organisations both inside and outside the Duma. In different forms they represent many of the aspects that Gorbachev himself campaigned for during the 1980s – against his traditional

Communist and neo-liberal opponents – that Russia represents an international struggle towards democracy, economic reform and civil participation. Tsygankov emphasised that:

They constituted the core of Gorbachev's vision and played a vital role of meta-theoretical beliefs or assumptions, through which many other issues – foreign policy, economic reform, the socialist theory of formation – could have been debated and, ultimately solved.³¹

In addition Russian social democracy has a duty to formulate principles such as human and civil rights, not just in unity with similar positions within Western Europe, of whom the major players have sought to consolidate the neoliberal position, but rather to look towards global humanity and global democratisation. As Tsygankov continues:

According to the Social Democrats, the cultural community on behalf of which one must speak and whose values maintain is not the West, but global humanity, or civilization, of which the West is merely a part. The West, Social Democrats maintain, does have a great deal to contribute to the world. For example, it was the West that first introduced and approbated the market economy and political democracy...Social Democrats challenge(d) the idea that it is the West that should serve as the model of Russia in solving its problems and argue(d) that the outcome of Russia's relations with the world is not likely to be Russia's passive absorption of outside values and institutions.³²

In other words, social democrats draw partly from the criticisms applied by Mensheviks in their critiques of global capitalism, and also borrow from elements of Soviet history that were distinctly anti-Stalinist in nature. Social Democrats critique neoliberal logic and institutions as undemocratic and western centric, instead forwarding a belief that globalisation can be re-directed towards a democratic civil global society. Yurii Krasin, a leading intellect in modern Russian social democratic thought underlines this, by claiming that recent global developments have led to the 'relevant

infrastructure for establishment of a new democratic world order, which would function on the basis of network, rather than hierarchy, based principles of relations'.³³ There are definite similarities within the bulk of intellectual thought, in the social democratic 'branch' of the Zapaniki with those 'progressive' critiques in the west. For, as argued in chapter 4, civil and societal movements, stimulated by intellectual research have advanced towards a position that favours the democratisation of globalisation.³⁴

In practical terms, social democratic groups, which have been inspired by the Gorbachev Foundation have fared extremely badly in elections. In particular their poor showing has been hampered by the fact that they have failed to construct a Party or bloc that can adequately unify social democratic thought.³⁵ In the 1999 parliamentary election the various competing social-democratic parties could not individually muster one percent of the vote, leaving many observers to suggest that Russian social democracy has little popular support.³⁶ However, social democratic principles have made certain in-roads into other oppositional parties within the Duma. Its scope and historical relevance has also been influential in the building and campaigning of trade unions and NGO's. Both Yabloko and Fatherland have moved to adopt some elements of social democracy if at the time only to serve as a form of protection from western-inspired free market development. Whilst Yabloko was formed initially as a free market Party and have been condemned in the Duma as a party working exclusively from American hands,³⁷ the various economic problems and anti-American feeling emergent in Russia have led certain factions within the party to take certain diluted

social democratic positions. In particular they have moved towards a greater protection of human, civil and democratic rights and have, in least in parts, altered their more comprehensive market reforms that their leader, Yavlinskii has campaigned for the final days of Gorbachev.³⁸ However, Yabloko can only realistically be interpreted as moving towards a more centre-left position and (as demonstrated in chapter 3, with similar centre-left positions throughout Europe) thus should not be seen as a social democratic party that offers a critique or alternative to the practises of the global market. Similarly, Fatherland, the bloc formed around a loose coalition between Luzhkov and Primakov, promoted links with Russian unions in the last (1999) elections. Primakov, a former Prime Minister, under Yeltsin, was championed as a 'statist', who would stabilise Russia from any hegemonic threat from the west.³⁹ His collaboration with the Moscow Mayor, Luzhkov, called for a higher protection for the Russian economy, coupled with democratic unionist partnership. Fatherland thus demonstrated support for a more defined mixed-economy and showed caution towards western-inspired marketisation. This position was constructed in order to promote an effective opposition to both Yeltsin and the new Putin administration. Despite this, Fatherland, like Yabloko, cannot really be classified as 'social democratic', even within the Russian tradition. Whilst their partnership with the unions did, by union leaders own admission, draw upon the momentum of the Glasnost era⁴⁰, Fatherland's general outlook appears rather inwards, as they tended to favour national-protectionist measures to confront challenges to liberalisations.⁴¹ In addition, Fatherland themselves have moved, since 1999 as a bloc towards greater co-operation with Putin's main political support, Unity.

As a tradition, Russian Social Democracy appears strong both in its intellectual foundation and as a framework to confront neoliberalism. However, as yet, transitional Russia has not contained a sustainable movement in which these ideas and traditions can be used for their maximum gains. Instead Social Democracy finds itself either located in fragmented forms within larger groups inside the Duma, or expressed indirectly, within pressures groups and NGO's.⁴²

6.2.2 Russian Nationalism

As argued above, modern Russian Nationalism stems from a critique of the Stalinist-inspired conception of Marxist-Leninism that drew from the romantic form of nationalism of the 19th century. Nationalists look not to the achievements of the Soviet planned economic model but rather to the Slavic-traditions, heralded by Nicolas I and Danilevskii. The former succeeded in creating an autocratic culture within Russia – the failing of the ‘Decembrist uprisings’ presented the new Tsar with an opportunity to exploit Russia as an independent culture that remains incompatible with Europe. Nicolas’s Russia halted the debates that had grown during Alexander’s reign over free trade by adopting a new era of protectionist economics that didn’t show any signs of liberalising until British (hegemonic) intervention in the 1850s.⁴³

Nikolai Danilevskii built upon Nicolas’s own visions of Russia. Emerging as a critic of Alexander II, Danilevskii argued that free trade was a British

invention, which was ultimately designed to serve the best interest of Britain itself. Whilst other western European neighbours may benefit from liberal trade agreements with the British, Russia, he argued was both economically and socially incompatible.⁴⁴ Any engagement with free trade would only lead Russia towards a heavy dependency towards Western European that would incur devastating long-term economic consequences. Danilevskii found notoriety in his advocacy of a Pan-Slavic empire – that would create an alternative autocratic economic model based upon the cultures and traditions of Slavism.

Danilevskii exploited the freedoms that were imposed by Alexander's reforms to gather support for his brand of nationalism in the 19th century. Similarly, the reforms by Gorbachev and subsequent fall of the Soviet Union have allowed his gospels to find a re-birth. Within post-Soviet Russia, Nationalist groups of varying significance have moved to recreate his interpretation of the Russian state to advocate a new era of nationalist-protectionism. Thus, whilst the 'patriot movement' in the US has responded to globalisation by re-interpreting the historical meaning of the constitution, Russian nationalists have, in different and often opposing ways moved to rediscover the essence of Slavic Russia.

Russian nationalism as a political force grew directly after the collapse of the USSR. Building upon the foundations installed by the *Pamyat* movement, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democrat Party (LDPR) became the first nationalist party to organise itself into a political force. Registered as the first

opponents of the Communists months before the August coup, the LDPR favoured a restoration of the Russian Empire, a limitation of both privatisation and foreign ownership of the economy and a strongly authoritarian state.⁴⁵ Boosted by its charismatic leader, and its advantage of being an established party, Zhirinovsky gained over 8% of the vote in the 1991 presidential elections. Furthermore in 1993, with Yeltsin's 'shock therapy' privatisation scheme in full flow and (as demonstrated by the storming of the parliament the same year) insistent to follow it through, the LDPR gained the highest percentage of the parliamentary vote (23%). However, the LDPR were to fall from prominence almost as quickly as they rose – their share of the vote falling to 11% of the vote in 1995, reducing further to just fewer than 6% (5.98) in 1999. Zhirinovsky himself never made serious inroads in subsequent presidential elections, his personal vote slipping to just over 5% in 1996, and to 2.5% in 2000.

Zhirinovsky's campaigns have managed to highlight some of the nationalist tensions that exist within Russia. His many subversive speeches and writings have included explicit anti-semitic references, the importance of tariff construction and an aggressive-isolationist foreign policy.⁴⁶ As a political party and figurehead, Zhirinovsky and the LDPR have become both prone to immense inconsistencies and contradictions and have even become embroiled within the political system to the extent that allegations of corruption and deals with the government have been commonplace.⁴⁷ Indeed, many contemporaries within the Duma have come to regard Zhirinovsky himself as a 'court jester' and a maverick, prone to bribery.⁴⁸ However, the

LDPR represents, at least officially, the historical nationalist role and the quest for the 'supremacy of the motherland'. As stated by party material:

We can't tear the LDPR off our motherland – Russia, because the main goal of our party is our Motherland. Other parties take narrow niches, but our party has the broadest niche – the rebuilding of the former greatness of Russia, the creation of the economy, which enables us to have high living standards.⁴⁹

Such nationalist rhetoric is also placed within the 'romantic nationalist' struggle of the eighteenth and nineteenth century:

Peter I had already joined us to the western civilisation. This led to the split in Russian society. There had been already a split in the Russian church and we know what was the end of it. There were Decembrists and we know what did they: the destruction of the Russian Empire. And there were also the Bolsheviks and we know what did they do from 1917th to 1921st. You will say that you managed to win the victory in 1945. Yes, you did, but you exterminated 26 millions of citizens.⁵⁰

The reinvention of Russian nationalism has therefore deep roots in Russian identity history and in the belief that there is a 'historically-rooted obligation' to protect the cultural identities of the Russian culture, from socio-economical projects from the west.⁵¹ This platform has led to a wide variety of 'nationalist', 'slavic', 'national-patriots' and religious groups that have all grown in abundance since the onset of Glasnost.⁵² Minor nationalist blocs contested both the 1995 and 1999 parliamentary elections, whilst many more subversive movements and organisations have been formed that have linkages with the various blocs. The most notorious of these is 'Russian National Unity', which combines together different factions of neo-paganist, anti-semitic, white supremacist and pro-Christian orthodoxy under a neo-Nazi banner. The RNU articulate their nationalist concerns upon a belief that the Russian nation represents a community that is distinguished by its

'common ethnicity, historical destiny and blood', which is tied by its spiritual orthodox roots. Any external force, whether of religious cultural or economic origin that appears to dilute these traditions are thus considered 'impure' and harmful.⁵³ The RNU participated at the 1993 parliamentary election but were subsequently banned in 1995. However they still manage to maintain a subversive influence within Russian society retaining a membership of 15,000, with a large proportion being recruited from the disgruntled youth.⁵⁴

Contained within the resurgence of nationalism has been the rise of militarised national-patriotic units, the establishment of numerous extremists religious groups and the rise in the culture of 'neo-paganist' sects.⁵⁵ These organisations, although diverse in nature, share many similar subversive characteristics. For example, most share in varying degrees, elements of anti-semitism, believing that some form of 'Jewish-Masonic' conspiracy exists at the centre of Russian and global society, which threatens national cultures. Some also affirm to the belief that the Jewish faith is a long enemy of both the Russian people and the Orthodox Church.⁵⁶ In addition they all contribute a discontent with liberal economics and transnational capital.⁵⁷ However as a whole these organisations cannot be classified within a single movement, as differences exist which, while may appear insignificant to external viewers are organically diverse enough to suggest that such groups would not merge. For these groups materialise from contrasting beliefs and ideologies that appeal to different (regional) sections of society. Anti-semitic Aryan-supremacist groups such as the 'Russian Liberation Movement' and the

'National Front' appeal to working class populist and racist fractions, whilst groups such as the 'Folk National Party' and the 'Pan Slavic Council' focus upon Slavic mythology which borrow neo-paganist beliefs to promote alternative cultures and attract membership from Russian ethno-traditionalists.⁵⁸ Similar movements have attracted an intellectual base; for example the 'Vedic movement', stemmed from the teachings of Victor N. Bezverkhi, who taught at the University of Leningrad in the last decades before the break-up of the Soviet Union – he taught his students within an 'enlightened' Kantian framework the essence of racial Darwinism and consequently sects and Parties such as the 'Union of the Veneds', and the 'National Republican Party' have since been formed.⁵⁹

The Pamyat movement in the late 1980s also led to certain movements, most notably those with links to the Orthodox Church, that are nationalist in character. These groups, which include the 'Union of Orthodox Brotherhood' and the 'Christian Revival Union', identify themselves with the pre-revolutionary traditions within Russia and favour a return to an autocratic monarchist system.⁶⁰ Indeed the Orthodox Church has had a major revival in Russia since the fall of communism, with over 50% of the population identifying themselves as Orthodox.⁶¹ Within the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church the slavophile tradition is drawn upon, whilst any forms of 'liberal-western' morality is rejected. The influence of the Orthodox Church which has been backed overwhelmingly by central government,⁶² has prompted certain contradictions within the building of civil society in post-communist Russia. The nationalist virtues for example, of powerful authority and moral

community have often clashed with the more economic principles of freedom of capital that has concurred with the end of the cold war. Unlike in Victorian Britain, where the Anglican Church adapted its influence so that it contributed to ideological workings of liberal capitalism, Orthodox principles remain rooted within the theological philosophies of Slavic protectionism.

Nationalism in Russia remains a potent force within contemporary Russian politics. In addition it is both explicitly used by political fringe groups both inside and outside the Duma to challenge neoliberal development and also is used implicitly by both the church and governmental officials attempting to continue the process of transition, whilst at the same time placing a nationalist slant to attempt to legitimate it within the transitional form of civil society. Putin and even Yeltsin before him, have used nationalism and elements of nation-populism to order to attempt to consolidate Russia's position within the era of globalisation. Putin himself, whilst committed towards global hegemonic projects such as entrance to the WTO, has used strong nationalist language, and forged links when it has been in his interest, with the LDPR. This indeed seems to indicate both an attempt towards passive revolution – as Putin has used national and patriotic language in a bid to strengthened the consensual shift towards capitalism; and of *trasformismo* – as he similarly attempts to draw in support from nationalist social forces that were disillusioned with Yeltsin.⁶³

Despite the fact that the vote and influence of extremist Political parties such as the LDPR may have declined, the *Derzhavniki* seem to be rooted in

Russian tradition and culture, and while Putin may attempt to pacify parts of it within his own neoliberal agenda, ideologically it remains firmly opposed to any forms of free trade.

6.3.3 Russian Neo-Communism

Russian neo-Communism embodies a wide range of ideological positions and traditions, much of which are often contradictory in their nature. Although post-Cold War Communism within Russia is often rooted in much of the *Derzhavniki* tradition, it should not be misunderstood as just simply another strain of nationalism.⁶⁴ For, as argued by Tsyganov, neo-Communism generally sees Russia as 'an independent socialist civilisation and a great/superpower'.⁶⁵ Whilst there are elements within it that borrow from the nineteenth century Slavism, neo-Communism see 'secessionism, Nazism and consumerism' as the largest evils within both Russian and global society.⁶⁶ Forms of nationalism and conservatism are proposed as a practical solution to direct contest western-imperialism and neoliberal globalisation. For example, Tsyganov, quotes the geopolitical Communist, Dugin, to illustrate how neo-Communists have borrowed from the nationalist tradition to critique globalisation. Dugin argues:

There is no such thing, as cosmopolitan 'common human' values. It is merely a form of geopolitical ideology behind an aggressive Western culture (Anglo-Saksonian one, to be precise) that pretends to be universal, but in reality wants to rule the world... Looking at the geopolitical development of the last two centuries, one can clearly trace the fundamental rivalry of the two continents, America and Eurasia. These two are the opposite geopolitical and geocultural poles.⁶⁷

Neo-Communists however, continue to be rooted firmly within different interpretations of Marxist-Leninism that were used during the Soviet years. The struggle against capitalism has moved to a new level as globalisation moves to not only strengthen the trans-national capitalist class towards global exploitation, but also destructs national sovereignty, cultures and traditions:

The nature of capitalism has not changed. The injurious exploitation of material, labour and intellectual resources of the planet has been rapidly increasing. The capitalistic monopolies have exceeded the national bounds and they are concentrating the international amalgamated capital in the international corporations. And the globalisation, as it is, serves the interests of imperialism of the epoch of trans-national capital. This policy has been implemented through the international economic and financial organizations, through the notorious "seven", a prototype of a world government. It results in the financial-economic destabilization for the majority of states of the planet, in the loss of their independence and security destruction. The active champions of the globalisation strategy have made an attempt to extend their ideology and practice to the UNO activities. Using the slogans of "interconnected and interdependent world" as a cover, the modern imperialism more often disregards the mechanisms of collective solution of most complicated international problems, including the issues of peace and war. It has persistently carried out the concepts of "humanitarian intervention" and "restricted sovereignty" to consolidate the forming unipolar model of the world, with the USA dominating. Such ideology and practice arouse protest of the exploited masses. The communists consider it their mission to lead this struggle, ensuring solidarity of all participants of this process, to reject the predatory and imperialistic nature of globalisation, not to tolerate the destruction of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity, national, cultural originality of each nation.⁶⁸

The attempt to revive the Soviet principles of twinning Marxism (or Leninism, to be more precise) with Russian patriotism as an oppositional force to the transitional administrations of both Yeltsin and Putin, has proved to be popular with voters. This has been reflected with the rise of the major post-Soviet Communist party, the CPRF. At the political core the Communist Party of the Russian Federation has replaced the LDPR as the main focus of the *Derzhavniki* opposition within the Duma. Strongly against the market

policies of 'Yeltsinism', the CPRF has taken much of the edges off the more populist approaches of the LDPR, whilst retaining some of its rhetoric. Led by Zyuganov, who had earlier campaigned for the need of a united Nationalist-Communist front (which became known as the red-brown alliance), the CPRF combines socialism with Russian patriotism by concentrating policy upon the restoration of the public sector and the increase in welfarism, whilst strengthening the Russian military and defence system.⁶⁹ The CPRF has succeeded, where the LDPR has failed, in maintaining a sound structural and organisational base in order to consolidate itself within the mainstream of party politics. Gaining 12.4% of the vote in the 1993 Parliamentary elections, this rose to 22.3% in the 1995, which gave it the highest percentage of all parties, the CPRF consolidated this position in 1999 when it increased its vote to 24.29%. Out of the 439 directly-elected and party list deputies, 113 were from the Communist Party; Unity only managed 72, whilst the Primakov-Luzhkov 'Fatherland-All Russia' bloc received 66.⁷⁰

Officially, the CPRF promotes the theoretical virtues of Marxist-Leninism by borrowing (although non-explicitly) from the Stalinist interpretation of the importance of the Socialist nation-state. Distinctly anti-imperialist in much of their rhetoric, the CPRF draws little from Lenin and ever less from Marx, in terms of organic theoretical ideology, instead concentrating upon the need to intertwine the dual purposes of socialism and patriotism and upon the belief that they both complement each other:

Without the socialist choice Russia would not be able to survive as a community of peoples, as a cultural and historical entity, as a unique

civilisation or as a strong state. Socialism is a modern form of Russian patriotism. Today socialism best meets the objective needs of the country and the people and lends real strength and effectiveness to the patriotic feeling.⁷¹

According to Zyuganov, Russia and the former territories of the Soviet Union exist as a historically different civilisation that is spiritually incompatible with western-orientated global culture. In addition, Zyuganov feels by promoting this stance he is not only promoting the cultural and national identity in Russia, but also demonstrating an awareness of the importance of national-self determinism of other countries across the world.⁷² Zyuganov has also (in tandem with movements such as the US patriot movement) subscribed to certain conspiracy theories both during and prior to his recognition as leader of the CPRF. Having contributed to anti-semitic literature during the days leading up to the break-up of the USSR,⁷³ he has claimed that the West's main aim in Russia is to turn it into a third-world dependency for imperialist means, having already plotted the downfall of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ The inclusion of anti-semitism themes within some of his rhetoric has even won the Party acclaim from certain factions inside the many neo-Paganist groups within Russia.⁷⁵

The official Communist Party thus borrows from the more conservative Soviet critics of Gorbachev that was apparent during the late 80s and in the run-up to the coup by placing the traditional Soviet conceptions of Marxist-Leninism alongside more nationalist dogma. The result is a Party which, despite promoting mandates to work towards an internationalist agenda, remains distinctly inward in outlook.⁷⁶ The Party is also largely reliant upon

the ideological framework of Zyuganov and his vision of a 'People's patriotic Union of Russia'.⁷⁷ It is these observations that have led many to suggest that the Party represent the interest of the 'old guard' within Russian society; those who have failed to come to terms with the ideological adjustments since 1991. Indeed some observers hold the opinion that as time progresses the CPRF will lose many of its older voters and will concede more to 'newer' more moderate blocs.⁷⁸ It could be argued that this process is already beginning – at the last election, for example, the Party lost ground in its traditional 'red belt' heartland to the governmental forces of Unity.⁷⁹ However, the Communist Party is still by far the largest political party in Russia, with a stable membership of 600,000,⁸⁰ and, with public opinion retaining a growing disillusionment with marketisation and international capital, the Communist Party continued to influence 'populist' and 'popular' support.⁸¹

Despite the support for the 'official Communist' Party, the advent of democracy has led to the growth of many challenging forms of neo-Communist interpretations that have appeared in many political Parties and groups. Neo-Communist groups that oppose the positions taken by Zyuganov do so because of contrasting ideological outlooks. Various splits have emerged from within the CPRF (for example the last minute split by former Zyuganov aide, Podberezkin in 1999), but these have not affected the party as a whole. However, amidst the many Communist Parties formed by the old hierarchal Soviet/Red Army members after the break-up of the Soviet Union, two have been significant. Both Viktor Anpilov's 'Stalinist Bloc' and Viktor

Tyulkin's 'Communist Workers Party' offer significant alternatives to the official party. Although entirely different in character both formed a single bloc in the 1995 election, winning just short of the required number for representation (4.53%).⁸² However the inevitable split occurred the following year, with Anpilov's party favouring a more populist stance of 'Stalinist' and 'Soviet' hard line policies; in other words a more concentrated formulation of the policies adopted by Zyuganov. The Communist Worker's Party however, remains one of the only Parties in Russia wholly committed to the reconstruction of Marxist-Leninism. Critical of the nationalist stance taken by other Communist Parties, the RKRP⁸³ (with a membership of around 40,000) see themselves as distinctly internationalist, promoting the revolutionary transformation of capitalism through links with international Parties. Although influenced by Marxism, their reading of Marx is based around the Lenin/Plekhanov interpretation, with much emphasis placed upon the conception of the *Dictatorship of the Proletariat*.⁸⁴ For the RKRP, the Russian Communist project failed largely because of the anti-theoretical positions taken in the 1950s and 1960s. In particular they believe that the direction the Soviet Union took after Stalin's death was misplaced and fraught with contradictions. Whilst Stalin's policies were consistent with the historical virtues of Marxist-Leninism, and thus necessary as a stage towards world revolution, the following Khrushchev/Brezhnev era stabilised, rather than continued the socialist process. This 'static' approach was to cause the inevitable rethink in the late 1980s.⁸⁵ Similarly, they critique the CPRF for being too nationalist, too populist and un-theoretical in their outlook.

Despite their different approaches, neo-Communism in Russia remains a prominent and influential force. Different from Nationalism, it remains committed towards re-kindling some interpretation of Marxist-Leninism and views neoliberalism as a form of capitalist imperialism, intent upon both western-oppression and the suppression of self-governance. Neo-Communist has also benefited from popular support as the continued support for the CPRF has shown. As a tradition it also remains steeped in Russian political culture and remains as a conscious critical project of capitalist development in Russia.

6.2.4 Youth Movements and Anarchism

It has often been heralded by the West that the socialisation of youth movements across Eastern Europe led to the events of 1991, and ultimately the fall of the Soviet Union.⁸⁶ Similar arguments made in the west, most notably in the US, follow this with the hypothesis that liberal democracy has been largely approved by the younger generation and its cementation will strengthen as the older, more conservative generation dies out. This indeed follows the logic that Fukuyama himself applies; that liberal democracy will find an inevitable niche in former Communist states, rendering instability and ideological alternatives, implausible.⁸⁷ However, recent studies and qualitative observations with youth groups in contemporary Russia have revealed a growing discontent with both democracy and the privatisation and globalisation process.⁸⁸ In particular the growth and participation of nationalist, neo-nazi and anarchist youth groups since the 1980s has

indicated a continuation of this trend. Indeed the general assumption from within Russia, is that, whilst the older generations continues to place its faith in the Russian political tradition of exceptionalism, the younger generation has grown cynical and critical to central government and democracy as a whole.⁸⁹ This in itself does not characterise youth movements or consciousness as a whole as 'reactionary'. As far back as 1989, a Russian poll demonstrated that only 15% of young people were at all politically active, whilst 82% favoured a move to the West.⁹⁰ These statistics alone only serve to strengthen Fukuyama's arguments. For similar levels of apathy in the West are often viewed by liberal democrats as the sign of a civil and political content and stability.⁹¹ Thus, by favouring the western form of liberal capitalism and minimum government to their own transitional society, the Russian youth as a whole could be categorised as only being discontent with the slow processes of transition. However, a more vigorous assessment reveals that youth groups are increasingly becoming more politically and socially active, not necessarily within centre or local government itself, but as fringe organisations, ideologically opposed to liberal democracy.

Youth movements have in various ways contributed to the fragmented and ideologically contested socio-economic environment in Russia. They also underline the contradictions of Russian capitalism. For example, the involvement of youth in many of the Nationalist and neo-Nazi groups (see above on section on Russian Nationalism) has been coupled with the resurgence of the national orthodox movement,⁹² whilst the consumerist culture within Russia has led to the rise of anarchism and situationism. The

influence of western-consumer driven concepts such as 'Punk', 'Rock' and 'Hippies', have had a profound societal and political effect. In one sense they've heightened nationalist feeling (as witnessed by the growth of patriotic-anarchist groups), and in another they've stimulated the forces of another cultural tradition within Russian society; that of Russian Anarchism. Although rooted within an intellectual tradition, much of the anarchist groups that have emerged have done so from lawless, working-class urban neighbourhoods that have been twinned with populism and anarchism. As describes by Jim Riordan:

The name 'lyubery' comes from the Moscow industrial suburb of Lyubertsy, some 12 miles south-east of the capital; its teenage gangs have been terrorising neighbourhood urban centres for years. Today they are joined by other 'hurrah-patriots' like the 'Russian Knights' from Khimki, the 'Bolsheviks' from Bolshevo, the Beryozka gang which mug foreign-currency clients of the Beryozka stores, the 'Remont' gang whose aim is to 'repair' the damaged psychology of young people whom they regard as insufficiently patriotic – hippies, punks, Nazis and heavy-metal fans.⁹³

Modern anarchism ranges from groups, which collaborate more with the red-brown alliance (Nationalist and Communist alliance) than with those, which engage with the Russian intellectual anarchist tradition of Bakunin, Bakurin and Serge.⁹⁴ Often however, they appear as a contradictory mix of the two. The 'National-Bolsheviks' are an example of this. Founded by Eduard Limonov, the 'National-Bolsheviks' comprise a mix of intellectuals, students and national-patriots, who mix situationist-anarchist, with Russian patriotic culture. Popular with the intellectual-youth, the 'National-Bolsheviks' have been a feature at both anti-governmental and anti-globalisation demonstrations and have attracted support from the neo-Communist/Nationalist theoretical, Alexander Dugin. As a small, but

significant movement,⁹⁵ the National-Bolsheviks sum up on a small scale, what the large diversity of western anti-globalisation demonstrators (see chapter four) do on a larger scale. There is a lack of any cohesive resistance project capable of challenging the core legitimacy of global hegemony, as its members favour to engage with a whole diversity of ideological, intellectual and cultural influences without defining any particular long-term objective.⁹⁶

The anarchist tradition, like the social democratic, nationalist and neo-communist tradition, gained some sort of revival in the late 1980s, with the formation of the KAS (Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists), and had some impact with the youth.⁹⁷ Indeed, the magnitude of student-based youth groups that grew up in the late 1980s included the 'Young Marxists', 'Young Leninists', 'Young Bakuninists', 'Young Stalinists', the 'Anarchist Alliance', and even the 'Nostalgics'; a group of students, divided into different historical decades, that would meet, dress and practice the philosophies of a particular Soviet or Russian era.⁹⁸ Enhanced by the influx of western-situationist cultures (such as the Punk movement), anarchism has emerged alongside 'romantic-nationalism' as a popular intellectual avenue for young students. For, as the economic crisis deepened in the 1990s, Russian youth movements moved towards a whole variety of possible alternatives – which reflected the ideologically contested image of post-Soviet Russia as a whole. Whilst it remains problematic to place any great emphasis upon these developments, as youth movements tell us little about the overall future of stability within Russia, there is equally little evidence to support the belief that liberal democracy and economics will gain greater

support and become consciously and legitimately 'embedded', as time progresses.

6.3 Putin, Passive Revolution and Trasformismo

What do these above traditions and ideological contestations tell us about the nature of global hegemony as a whole? Firstly, it should be emphasised that there exists a multitude of counter-hegemonic social forces within Russia. The historical traditions of the *Zapadniki*, the *Derzhavniki* and the ideological foundations of 'Social Democracy', 'Nationalist' and 'Neo-Communism' remain strong and contribute to contest any form of marketised common sense, attempting to be exploited within Russia. In addition, the historical capacity of Russian isolationism should not be underestimated. Indeed, in some ways Lenin's observations in 1916 could be transferred to present day. His revolutionary logic in *Imperialism* demonstrated that Russia was a semi-peripheral state, which appeared as the 'weakest chain' of capitalism. Thus, his classic argument concluded with the notion that revolution in Russia would bring the international capitalist system to its knees, prompting world socialist revolution.⁹⁹ Whilst both his and the Marxist-Leninist argument were exposed and exploitation during the period of 'state socialism' was rife, its practices had a profound effect upon the character of international capitalism and upon the nature of the world order. In Gramscian terms (and as Lester has noted¹⁰⁰), the same upheaval of social conflicting social forces and the failure to cement any super-structural hegemonic form that complements the global capitalist order, may lead to a

ideological challenge that could, as in 1917, place great instabilities upon the global order as a whole.

Under both Yeltsin and more noticeably Putin, such possibilities have been held at bay, as the attempt has been made to encompass Russia into the norms and regulations of the global political economy, without losing its traditional political presence. This was seen initially, during the 'anti-western' turn in the mid-1990s, when Yeltsin sacked Andrei Kozyrev, a leading pro-market *Zapadniki*, and in the aftermath of the 1998 economic crisis, replaced Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko with Evgeny Primakov. Initially, Primakov's government was charged with providing a stabilising influence on the economy, but his commitments to protectionism and dislike of further liberalisation prompted a power struggle with Yeltsin. Concerned at both Primakov's potential ideological conflict, especially in light of Yeltsin's continued dependence on foreign loans, and alarmed at the popularity of Primakov and his key appointees,¹⁰¹ Yeltsin moved to attempt to streamline the influence his Prime Minister had over the economy.¹⁰² Primakov and Yeltsin finally parted company in April 1999, leaving the former to become much more focal in his governmental opposition by joining Luzhkov's 'Fatherland-All Russia'.

The failure of the Yeltsin/Primakov pact demonstrated the difficulty within Russian governmental circle in building a form of consensus politics, based around free market ideology. Yeltsin's resignation, the seemingly rapid rise of Unity and the ascent of Putin, have provided a renewed attempt, not just to

form some central consensus between the newly-formed Unity and Fatherland-All Russia groups, but to provide some form of harmonisation between the historically incompatible forces of the *Zapadniki* and *Derzhanviki*. Unlike Yeltsin, Putin was not seen as a great 'westerniser', having being grounded as a political figure within the CPSU and the KGB. Ideologically, he was identified more as a moderate Party appeaser, rather than a radical marketiser. Since his endorsement as president, Putin has maintained viable relations with the west, further modernised political institutions and stabilised the economy at least in part.¹⁰³ These changes have come in part with the government's desire to gain full status within the WTO by 2005. To legitimise this position with the western-sceptics in the Duma, Putin has also emphasised the importance of the Russian nation and of embedded Russian national-culture. Indeed, Putin himself has outlined the importance of the Russian traditions of 'statism', 'patriotism', 'belief in the greatness of Russia' and 'social solidarity'. Furthermore on the subject of the development of liberal capitalism he has been quoted as arguing that:

It will not happen soon, if it ever happens that Russia will become a second edition of, say, the US or Britain in which liberal traditions have deep historic conditions.¹⁰⁴

Putin's embrace of populist nationalism has been evident within certain areas of foreign policy (both notably here being in Chechnya), which has in turn provided certain support from both the Communists and the Nationalists within the Duma. The Putin administration has also succeeded in forging a broad political coalition that Yeltsin failed to secure with Primakov. In December 2001, Unity and Fatherland-All Russia was set up, aimed at providing a unifying centrist force within Russian society, that would

provide both legitimate backing to further reforms adopted by the Putin administration and also give these a majority support within the Duma. Whilst not altogether favouring Primakov himself, the new party organisation united Luzhkov and the majority of Primakov's supporters, who backed the Unions in the 1999 parliamentary elections, with Sergei Shoigu of Unity. The main aim being to attempt to create a dominant Political Party within Russia, capable of bridging both the liberalisation process and the essence of 'Russian exceptionalism'. Just as the CPSU attempted, after the Stalinist era, to create a one-party centrist structure within Russian society, the *Unity and Fatherland* construction aim to install a hegemonic culture within the post-Soviet era. As acknowledged by Shoigu:

The right and left parties unite only 25 percent of citizens. The remaining 75 percent did not know whom to follow... They will certainly know it now.¹⁰⁵

Putin's attempts to consolidate a hegemonic project have been further aided by other developments, aimed at restricting the vast amounts of parties and alliances that stand for election. In July 2001, the Duma passed a law, intended to 'mature' Russia's political institutions, by insisting that in order to qualify for 'paper status', a nation-wide political organisation must have over 10,000 members, with at least a 100 members or more in more than half of the Russian Federation's 89 regions.¹⁰⁶ This, it is hoped, would both drastically reduce the amount of ideologically-opposed blocs that have emerged in recent elections and also harmonise further transition.¹⁰⁷

These measures, coupled with the successful popular endorsement of the Putin agenda, could thus be seen as a move towards consolidating a viable

hegemonic order, compatible with the over-riding global order. Indeed, both passive revolution and *trasformismo* can be equally applied to understand the success of Putin's various projects. Pinar Biedirhanoglu, for example, argues that far from being troubled by deep-rooted ideological contestations, transition has merely represented the processes inherent within passive revolution.¹⁰⁸ Putin's modernisation and revisional programmes would then demonstrate the consent now reached between governmental forces and the majority of the population towards the actions that should be taken to incorporate Russia fully into the global political economy. One can further measure this hypothesis with the two stages of passive revolution that are indicated by Kees van der Pijl. He illustrates that the process of passive revolution can be seen by a) a 'revolution from above' without mass participation, involving small waves of reform and b) a creeping, 'molecular' social transformation, in which the progressive class finds itself compelled to advance in a more or less surreptitious, more compromised position.¹⁰⁹

Thus, one can argue from this that the reforms carried out by Yeltsin (and even from Gorbachev before that) represented an attempt to 'liberalise' Russia and rapidly engrain it within the international system. The latter part of Yeltsin's term was involved with attempting to compromise his initial objectives by forging links with his opponents. Putin's pragmatic approach to politics has taken this to another level by attempting to initiate Russia's own brand of capitalism, viable for entry into the WTO and domestically, flexible enough for general harmonisation.

The observations of Passive Revolution and *Trasformismo* can also, to some degree, tie in with some of Lester's observations. As stated above, he has argued that whilst there has been a history of contested ideologies within Russia and Russian society, some form of hegemonic compromise can emerge that enables Russia to stabilise. However Lester's analysis places greater emphasis on how the Russian political hierarchy has successfully managed to forge some form of consensual relationship, dependant upon its ideological objectives at the time.¹¹⁰ This 'national order' does not necessarily address external relationships with the west, but rather sets down a national agenda that encompasses all forms of Russian social forces.¹¹¹ In addition, Lester's thesis was constructed before Putin came to office, so whilst Yeltsin did move towards a position aimed towards satisfying the concerns of the *Zapaniki* and *Derzhavniki*, Putin's aims have been more explicitly geared towards a form of harmonisation. Rather than Lester's observations that a project may emerge from the different factors within Russia's quasi-civil society, Putin is attempting to create a coherent hegemonic project from the centre that can co-opt the contrasting visions of Russian civil society into one, which adapts to the norms of global neoliberalism.

Whilst some of the recent reforms by Putin reflect this position, it is quite problematic to affirm that Russian political society is moving towards a stable hegemonic order that compliments the global hegemonic project of neoliberalism. Firstly, since the inception of party democracy within Russia, there have been countless Party blocs and alliances, that have attempted to

concur some middle ground to respond to capitalist development, but ideological splits have drastically shortened their lifespan. Whilst the Putin administration may provide a more potent basis for consensus politics, ideological contestation still remains deep. Secondly, the historical forces that I have outlined in this chapter remain extremely significant to the future of Russian politics. These are organically formed ideological traditions that have been rooted in Russian tradition, and are too strong to be glossed over by political and democratic reform. However, movements within these traditions and alternative ideologies are often too fragmented and too inconsistent as entities to mount sustained attacks against the government. A combination of splits, disagreements and contradictions have exploited these weaknesses and giving more emphasis to Putin's hegemonic project. That said the potential and continued growth of social-democratic, neo-Communist, Communist Youth groups and Nationalism within Russian society suggests that Putin's hegemonic projects are fraught with instabilities.

6.4 Conclusion

This Chapter has illustrated the many ideological traditions that have emerged within post-Soviet Russian society which contest the capitalist developments that have been build by Yeltsin and Putin. Equally it has demonstrated that the market liberalisation project in Russia is build upon instabilities due to the strength of these historically formed traditions. The

last two chapters also reveal that sociologically Russia has had a long history of exploring and perusing alternative forms of economic production to that of the dominant west. Thus, the Russian tradition of exploring the 'other' and 'exceptionalism' remain firmly rooted, despite neo-liberal developments.

In terms of understanding the nature of global hegemony this Russian case study offers much in the way of explanation. Firstly, it can be revealed that whilst the global neoliberal hegemonic order has placed certain global conditions (most notably backed by the influx of foreign capital and loans) upon Russia, it has allowed pragmatists to attempt to construct a project that compromises both Russian isolationism and 'globalisation'. In doing so, the Russian state is contributing towards the overall workings of the global hegemonic order, while attempting to pacify opposing social forces at home. However, the numerous forms of counter-hegemonic challenges suggests that it is not just the Russian form of neoliberal restructuring that is built upon unstable foundations, but that of the more macro global project as a whole. For, whilst dominant capitalist states in the West may find it easier to apply the practices of *trasformiso* to those opposition counter-hegemonic forces – especially (as outlined in Chapter 4), they themselves appear weak and fragmented in their opposition, in Russia the concentration of these forces prove more difficult to contain. Whilst, it must be stressed that these different traditions of social democracy, neo-Communism and Nationalism have been, since the fall of the Soviet Union, prone to vast splits, fragmentations and u-turns in policy that undermines those campaigning against regionalism and globalisation in the west,¹¹² it remains to be seen

whether Putin can sustain a long-term capitalist programme, that can hold this opposition at bay.

These six chapters have explored the historical formulation of the nature of global hegemonic orders, and have shown the current agents that comprise the neoliberal hegemonic order. It has also investigated forces and ideological opposition that undermines its stability, paying particular reference to these factors in Russia, a state that has played an historical role of opposition, and of contributing to transformation. In my final conclusion I wish to draw these factors together and summarise the current relevance of these counter-hegemonic forces in relation to the overall stability of neoliberal hegemony.

¹ See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*: London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.

² Andrei P. Tsygankov, 'Ideas, Culture, and Moral Responsibility. A Troubled engagement with Fukuyama's World order project', Paper presented at the *International Studies Association Convention*, 2001.

³ For example see Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (2nd edition), London: Routledge, 1996 & David Lane, *Russia in Transition*, London: Longman, 1995.

⁴ For example, the aftermath of the Decembrist Uprisings in 1825 and the reform agenda of Alexander II.

⁵ For example, 'Time Magazine', Russian Election Special, June, 1996; *The Economist*, July, 2001

⁶ Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World* London: Harper Collins, 1987.

⁷ Stephen White, *After Gorbachev*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 23-27.

⁸ Anatolii Lukyanov was Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, having been elected to the post in March, 1990. Seen initially as a reformer, Lukyanov emerged as the 'chief ideologist' in the August Coup, and was subsequently put on trial for high treason.

⁹ Indeed it has become more frequent in neo-Communist circles in Russia that the revisions implied by Krushchev and Brezhnev sowed the seeds of soviet socialist decline, rather than the criticisms of Gorbachev that were often quoted at the time.

¹⁰ Joseph Stalin, *Sochineniya*, 3 volumes, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.

¹¹ Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The rise of the extreme right in Russia*, New York: Harper Collins, 1993.

¹² Directly translated from Russian, the word 'Pamyat' means memory.

¹³ Michael Cox & Peter Shearman, 'Nationalist Extremism in Post-Communist Russia', in Paul Hainsworth (ed), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, London: Pinter, 2000, p. 229.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 227-231.

- ¹⁵ This point has been well documented by the material produced by the 'Gorbachev foundation' itself.
- ¹⁶ See Germain & Kenny, 'Engaging Gramsci: International Relations theory and the new Gramscians', *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, pp. 3-21.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, and see chapter one.
- ¹⁸ The consequences of this are explored in depth by the work and insights of Boris Kagarlitsky. See *Russia under Yelstin and Putin*, (translated by Renfrey Clarke) London: Pluto Press, 2002.
- ¹⁹ Scott Lash, & John Urry, *The End of Organised Capitalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
- ²⁰ For a useful insight into this perspective, see Tadashi Anno, 'Market Transition or Desert into the Periphery? Liberal and Nationalist Perspectives on Russia's Return to the World Economy', Paper Presented at the *International Studies Associated Convention*, Chicago, 2001.
- ²¹ This form of assertion derives itself from the classical dependency and development formulation, undertaken by Frank in the 1960s. See Andre Gunder Frank. *Dependent accumulation and underdevelopment*, London: Macmillan, 1978.
- ²² In Putin's first year as premier (2000), Russia succeeded in moving towards economic growth, a trend that greatly increased to over 4% the following year.
- ²³ This was evidence in the 1996 elections, when Yeltsin succeeded in using scare tactics against Zyuganov to convince voters that any opposition to his own mandate was a 'step backwards'.
- ²⁴ Jeremy Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for hegemony in Russia*, London: Verso, 1995.
- ²⁵ Ibid., pp. 25-40.
- ²⁶ Ibid., pp. 81-82.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p. 251
- ²⁸ Z. Galili, *The Menshevik Leaders in the Russian Revolution: Social Realities and Political Strategies*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989; V.N. Brovkin, *The Menshevik after the October Revolution: Socialist Opposition and the Rise of the Bolshevik Dictatorship*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- ²⁹ Robert Service, *The Russian Revolution 1900-1927*, second edition, London: Macmillan, 1991.
- ³⁰ R.W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution*, London: Macmillan, 1989.
- ³¹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, op. cit., 2001, p. 11
- ³² Ibid, p.12 & p.19.
- ³³ Yurii Krasin, 'Natsional'niye interesi', *Svobodnaia Misl'*, 3, 3-12, 1996.
- ³⁴ See the argument taken by Mark Rupert in chapter four.
- ³⁵ Interview with Aleksandr Buzgain, Moscow, September, 2000.
- ³⁶ Laura Berlin, 'Communist Party consolidates its position on the left', RFE/RL Russian Election Reports, 2000.
- ³⁷ Eric Shiraev & Vladislav Zubok, *Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin*, New York: Palgrave, 2000, p. 73.
- ³⁸ On-line interview with Grigorii Yanlinskii, April, 2001.
- ³⁹ L. Buszynski, 'Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?', *Survival*, 37 (3), 1995; Andrei P. Tsygankov, op. cit., 2001, p. 10.
- ⁴⁰ Interview with Kirill Buketov, Moscow Co-ordinator of the International Union of Food (IUF), April, 2001.
- ⁴¹ Interview with Aleksandr Buzgalin, Moscow, September, 2000.
- ⁴² NGO's for example – the SMO etc.
- ⁴³ In the 1840s, British officials met with the Nicolas administration, demonstrating the benefits of freer trade. As a result, Finance minister, Egor Kankrin began a programme of tariff reductions, that set-up an ideological turn that Nicolas's successor Alexander II exploited, see David Saunders, *Russia in the Age of Reaction and Reform*, London: Longman, 1981.
- ⁴⁴ Tadashi Anno, op. cit., 2001
- ⁴⁵ Michael Cox & Peter Shearman, op. cit., 2000, p. 232.
- ⁴⁶ For example Zhirinovskiy's article in *Izvestia*, just after the 1993 election, praised the national-socialist ideology of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. He has also gained global notoriety for

asserting that Alaska should be annexed back to Russia, for threatening nuclear war with Japan and for threatening to 'unload radioactive waste in Germany'.

⁴⁷ Michael Cox & Peter Shearman, op. cit., 2000, p.223.

⁴⁸ Interview with Boris Sauvorov, Moscow, September, 2000.

⁴⁹ LDPR, 'About the historical role of the LDPR in modern Russia', www.ldpr.ru

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ This of course includes 'Communism' and 'Bolshevism' of all kinds. Marx, for example was a German-Jew and Lenin, a middle-class intellectual, rooted in western-centric philosophy.

⁵² The two best 'empirical' studies of these diverse formations have been by Victor Shnirelman, 'Russian Neo-Pagan Myths and Antisemitism', *International Centre for the Study of Antisemitism*, 1998, <http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/13shnir.html>; & Alexander Verkhovsky, 'Ultra-Nationalists in Russia at the beginning of the year 2000', Paper presented at the *Institute of Governmental Affairs*, University of California, 2000.

⁵³ Russian National Unity, 'Bases of the social conception of Russian National Unity', www.rnu.org

⁵⁴ Alexander Verkhovsky, op. cit., 2000.

⁵⁵ Ibid., & Victor Shnirelman, op. cit., 1998.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Victor Shnirelman, op. cit., 1998.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Alexander Verkhovsky, op. cit., 2000.

⁶¹ David W. Lovell, 'Nationalism and Democratisation in Russia', in Vladimir Tikhomirov (ed), *Russia After Yeltsin*, Aldershot, 2001, p.46.

⁶² In 1997, the Duma passed a motion entitled 'On freedom of conscience and religious associations'. This placed conditions for the legality of religious organisations within Russia – handed great religious autonomy to the Orthodox Church by rendering all religious organisations invalid, unless they have existed on Russian territory for 15 years.

⁶³ For the relationship between Yeltsin and the 'patriotic nationalists' see the section on 'Russophiles' in Lester's book. Jeremy Lester, op. cit, 1995, pp. 128-166.

⁶⁴ Cox and Shearman seem to come to this conclusion – that Zyuganov's Party have replaced the LDPR as the main Party of nationalist extremist.

⁶⁵ Andrei P. Tsygankov, op. cit, 2001, p. 12.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 14.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.18. Tsygankov cites from Dugin's article in *levraziiskoie soprotivleniie*, 1992.

⁶⁸ CPRF, 'Resolution of the VII congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation "Concerning the attitude to the imperialistic globalisation"', www.kprf.ru

⁶⁹ CPRF, www.kprf.ru

⁷⁰ Laura Belin, 'RFE-RL: Russian Election Report', <http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report/2000/01/08-070100.html>, 1999.

⁷¹ CPRF, 'Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPRF to the 7th Congress and the immediate tasks of the Party: The Alliance of Patriots', www.kprf.ru

⁷² G.A. Zyuganov, *Uroki zhizni, & Geografiya pobedy. Osnovy rossiyskoy geopolitiki*, Moscow: Moscow Publishers, 1997.

⁷³ In the early 1990s, Zyuganov contributed to the notoriously anti-semitic newspaper *Al-Kods*, see S.G. Simonsen, 'Still favouring the Power of the Workers', *Transition*, December, 1997, p. 52-6.

⁷⁴ Cox and Shearman, op. cit, 2000, p. 236.

⁷⁵ Shnirelman, op. cit., 1998.

⁷⁶ Jeremy Lester, 'Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadii Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation', *New Left Review*, 221, 1997 pp. 34-53.

⁷⁷ CPRF, 'On the threshold and at a crossroad', www.kprf.ru

⁷⁸ Laura Belin, 'Communist Party Consolidates its position on the Left', <http://www.rferl.org/elections/russia99report/>, 1999.

⁷⁹ 'Holes appearing in the red belt'. *Izvestiya*, 21 December, 1999.

⁸⁰ Communist Workers Party stats, taken from Interview with Party members, September, 2000.

⁸¹ Mathew Wyman, *Public Opinion in Post Communist Russia*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997, pp. 174-212.

⁸² Laura Belin, 'Early Presidential Campaign secures Duma majority for Putin', RFL/RL Report, 1999.

⁸³ The RKRP were in fact the first Communist Party to emerge in Russia, after the fall of the USSR. They are now the second largest Communist Party in the Russian Federation, gaining roughly 3% of the vote in 1999, after the split with Anpilov.

⁸⁴ Interview with party members of the RKRP, Moscow, September, 2000.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ See most explicitly Paul Sheeran, *Cultural Politics in International Relations*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.

⁸⁷ Fukuyama, op. cit., 1992.

⁸⁸ Jim Riorden, 'Soviet Union', in David Lane (ed.), *Russia in Flux: The Political and Social Consequences of Reform*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992, pp. 149-166; Interview with Kate Horner, Politics Section, British Embassy, Moscow, September, 2000.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Igor Ilynsky, 'Soviet Youth: past and present', in Jim Riordan (ed.), *Soviet Social Reality in the Mirror of Glasnost*, London, Macmillan, 1991, p. 33-7.

⁹¹ Others to make this conclusion include King etc

⁹² Using the same 1989 surveys, 55% of young people were seen as politically active, see Igor Ilynsky, 'Soviet Youth: past and present'. However, it should be pointed out that the revival of the church and of Orthodoxy has not in itself led to a nationalist 'challenge' to reform. For example, as explained by Mathew Wyman, those who have regularly attended church have actually favoured market reform, more than those who don't – despite the Orthodoxy as a philosophy favours strong leadership. The more radical nationalism, that has been borne out of Orthodoxy has largely stemmed from more concentrated, traditional readings. See Mathew Wyman, op. cit, pp. 226-7

⁹³ Jim Riorden, op. cit, 1992, p. 160.

⁹⁴ Whilst Serge became an initial architect of the Russian Anarchist tradition, he was eventually to become a Bolshevik and a supporter of Trotsky.

⁹⁵ Whilst the electoral potential of the 'National-Bolshevik' Party is 'virtually nil', it has functional groups in more than 50% of Russian regions, and has branches in the Baltic States. See Alexander Verkhovsky, op. cit., 2000.

⁹⁶ From interviews with youth members of the 'National-Bolsheviks' (conducted in September, 2000), ideological influences included Bakunin, Dostoyevsky, Lenin and the 'Punk movement'.

⁹⁷ Laure Akai, 'Anarchist Groups in Russia', <http://www.iww.org/~jah/russgroups97.html>

⁹⁸ Jim Riorden, op. cit, 1992, p. 158.

⁹⁹ V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism: The Highest Form of Capitalism*, New York: International Publishers, 1979.

¹⁰⁰ Jeremy Lester, op. cit., 1995.

¹⁰¹ Amongst the deputies that were appointed by Primakov were Yuri Maslyukov and Gennady Kulik, who both held prominent positions within the CPSU and remained extremely sceptical to the pace of privatisation reforms. Self-confused protectionists, they represented an ideological challenge to the market reforms that were being set by the Yeltsin administration. See Evgueni Volk, 'Who's Who in Primakov's New Russian Government', <http://www.heritage.org/library/background/bgl232es.html>

¹⁰² Eric Shiraev & Vladislav Zubok, op. cit., 2000, pp. 111-115.

¹⁰³ Since the economic crisis in 1998, the Russian economy has revived from a single percentage growth in 1999 towards a more substantial growth nearing 4% in 2001.

¹⁰⁴ David W. Lovell, op. cit., 2001, p.47.

¹⁰⁵ Svetlana Smetanina, 'Unity-Fatherland Party is created', *Russian National News Servicestrana.ru*,

<http://www.therussianissues.com/stories/2001/06/06/991820311/1007378680.html>

¹⁰⁶ Gazeta.ru, 'Justice Ministry Reveals Drawbacks in Party Law',

<http://www.therussianissues.com/stories/2001/06/06/991820311/995878144.html>

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Pinar Bedirhanoglu, PhD thesis, University of Sussex – Metu, Turkey.

¹⁰⁹ Kees van der Pijl, 'Soviet Socialism and Passive Revolution', in Gill, S. *Gramsci, historical materialism and international relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 239.

¹¹⁰ Jeremy Lester, op. cit., 1995.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² This is perhaps best demonstrated by Zhirinovsky himself. Ridiculed in public life by much of the media, his extreme xenophobic rhetoric towards the west took a u-turn recent, when, in the aftermath of September 11th he stressed that the Russia nation has 'more in common' with the west, than the east. Critics have claimed that the change in direction has occurred because the LDPR is concerned that the new law on Political Parties may effect his already diminishing Party. See Nazavisimaya Gazeta, 'LDPR changes its bearings', <http://www.therussianissues.com/stories/2001/06/06/991820311/1008324341.html>

Conclusion: Transformation, Contestation or Consolidation of the Status Quo?

This thesis has looked at the historical nature of hegemonic orders and used these conceptions to understand the hegemonic components that facilitate today's neoliberal order. In addition it has looked into its overriding stability and identified areas in which ideological contestation has taken place. In conclusion, I will attempt to draw together the main points that I have argued in each individual chapter and then conclude by exploring in normative terms, ways in which democratising counter-hegemonic social forces need to focus towards, and how further research would aid these suggestions.

In the first chapter I demonstrated that the neo-Gramscian school or more explicitly, the Coxian-inspired Italian School within IPE, has methodologically provided a basis to understand the workings of 'hegemony' within global and economic political society. It provides a more comprehensive and more critical epistemological account of power-relations within IPE and critiques more positivist attempts at explaining the hegemonic orders that had been adopted by the 'hegemonic stability theorem'. However, I also stress that in order to embark upon a research project that focuses upon the conceptualisation of hegemonic relations, greater diversities and reflexivity is required by the neo-Gramscian school. In particular, as I conclude in Chapter one, a far greater emphasis is needed; to engage with the organic and original works of Gramsci himself and with addressing some of the critiques that have supported its relevance as a viable

discourse within the study of global political economy. For example, the observations by Germain and Kenny that global politics, unlike domestic politics, lack a hierarchic super-structure in which a hegemonic order (in Gramsci's own words) is consciously constructed, need to be vigorously addressed by neo-Gramscians to produce a greater understanding of the overall functions and workings of global hegemony. I have suggested throughout this thesis that the construction of a global hegemonic order contains several functional agents which can be both super-structural, in terms of intergovernmental political and economic institutions, and/or cultural. Each of these agents contributes to stabilising and consolidating the hegemonic ideology. Thus, by setting-up and examining the literature in the opening chapter I have suggested that the neo-Gramscian tradition must be maintained and built upon in order to understand global orders and the possibilities of transformation.

As I outlined in the introduction, a form of historicism is required to aid a greater understanding of the development of subsequent historic blocs, and the development and erosion of their hegemonic character. In the second chapter, I outline a trans-historical development of hegemonic orders and argue that to understand fully the historical nature of the contrasting ideological constructions of hegemonic order, it is necessary to retreat back materially to the roots of the development of social hegemony that were to develop within the advent of feudalism and which formulated a form of hierarchal class structure that developed through a series of tribal struggles. From here I argue that the effects and the structural form of the state-system,

fashioned at Westphalia, gave the state legitimacy over the use of violence and allowed it to legitimise a system of domestic and external – national and international – relations based on private property and territorial expansion.¹ The European states, or powers adopted a principle of self-help, and the competition for supremacy led to colonial gains as the individual state looked to boost its economy with materials from lands around the globe, previously unconnected with Europe. Thus the competitive nature which grew up from the European state-system led to the beginnings of the Europeanisation of the world, and the further cultural and hegemonic constraints, that this process brought with it, produced a global economy with global 'norms'. Historically, I argue that whilst the state-system did at least allow the capitalist system to develop (albeit slowly), it was the industrial revolution and the subsequent liberal order that allowed it to flourish. From historical accounts taken by Polanyi, Hobsbawm as well as by Cox, I argue that it was the emergence of the industrial revolution that heralded a super-structural construction, based upon liberal capitalism, initially within Britain, which then aspired over time towards the international arena, that, hence cemented itself to a condition of liberal global hegemony.

Using Polanyi's analysis of 19th Liberal Britain, I then argued that the processes of laissez-faire economics led to a 'counter-movement', in which counter-hegemonic forces were constructed both 'below' the State, due to democratic and social welfare reforms advanced by the emerging working class, and from nationalist and imperialist rivalry at the international level. This historical 'movement' has been built upon in my later chapters, as I

argue that the de-regulatory principles of the neoliberalist project of the late 20th century is prone to a similar variety of ideological contestation. These, as I argue in detail in chapter 4, can, and have developed in recent years, as counter-hegemonic ideologies and have included those which are socially 'progressive' or geared towards democratising hegemonic structures and those which are neo-conservative, or more explicitly focused towards nationalism as socially-constructed forms of critique.

The Stability and instability of the neoliberal order

As I stated in the introduction, this thesis aim to unlock some of the structural parts of a hegemonic order that are often overlooked by other neo-Gramscian scholars and then investigates whether the neoliberal global order contains enough stability to fend off and counter the certain challenges with which it is faced with. In chapter three, I argue that the global political project of neoliberalism has been ideologically constructed around the façade of 'globalisation', and super-structurally bound by institutions that have been reconstructed from the Bretton-Woods agreement. Thus, neoliberal agents such as the WTO, the World Bank (heightened by its structural adjustment programme), the ideological compliments of UN-based International Organisations and the socio-economic and politically cultural programmes of Multinational Corporations, the Global Media and Communications Industries all contribute towards strengthening and consolidating the legitimacy of the hegemonic order. Furthermore, States and mainstream national political parties have largely adopted positions that attempt to 'make

sense of globalisation' by forming their own political strategies around its perceived rhetoric. Thus, any contestation to the global practices would, at least politically, either be marginalised or easily contained within the mainstream. Despite structurally, especially in core-democratically 'mature' states, the neoliberal hegemonic order appears to be rooted upon stability, I stress that the nature and practices of neoliberalism itself facilitates a certain amount of ideological resistance. As concluded by Barry Gills, in his introduction to *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*:

The Paradox of neoliberal economic globalisation is that it both weakens and activates the social forces of resistance²

By focusing my case study for this thesis upon the hegemonic struggles within Russia, I also prove throughout this thesis my further assertions that:

a) whilst neoliberal hegemony has a stable super-structural basis there are competing counter-hegemonic social forces that contest its overall legitimacy. b) these competing social forces are evident within both 'western' and mature 'liberal democracies' and within former 'Communist' States, but are more apparent and appear harder to hegemonically contain in the latter and c) that these counter-hegemonic forces appear too fragmented, too inconsistent and too contradictory to at least, at present, challenge the overall global order, but represent a growing discontent towards it. In addition, the theoretical groundwork that I introduced in the first two chapters demonstrates that by adapting a Coxian-Gramscian historicist framework, these forms of counter-hegemonic contestation prove that the current stability of the hegemonic order is not as secure and as irreversible as political pragmatics as theoreticians have stressed.³

For the first of these, as I explained in chapters three and four, following on from the theoretical departures of the opening chapters, a neo-Gramscian critique of neoliberalism and globalisation can be adequately applied that is consistent textually with Gramsci's later works and with the general methodology applied by neo-Gramscians within IPE. Counter-hegemonic ideologies seek to contest and place strains upon the stability of the overriding order, even though their diversity may be incompatible. This is, perhaps, best summed up by both the 'unholy anti-globalisation alliance' of Buchanan and Nader and by the equally contradictory red-brown (neo-Communist/Nationalist) alliance in Russia.

On the second of these points, I have examined how in the west, within the geo-political arenas of the EU and NAFTA, counter-hegemonic ideologies have facilitated social movements that have been 'janus-faced' in character. Drawing from the works of Mark Rupert and Manuel Castells, I have argued that several notable movements have responded to the alienating effects of neoliberalism and that these promote a differing collection of alternative models for global transformation, many of which do not resemble the optimistic democratising strategies that have been encouraged and reported on by many scholars and campaigners alike.⁴ These have been witnessed in much more intensity within Russia, where the (at times ruthless) application of the free market has precipitated a collection of contrasting and competing social movements that ideologically contain deep roots within Russian cultural history. Indeed, as my research on Russia has demonstrated, the lack of, in Boris Kagarlitsky's words, a bourgeois class⁵, to facilitate and organise

marketised production in the wake of the collapse of the USSR has only sought to re-open and re-explore the historical clash between the Zapaniki and Derzhaniki. Russia, as I have illustrated, remains an important case study in the study of hegemony as it reveals the instability of the overall system. The fact, as explained within Russia by Jeremy Lester, that its domestic structure is finding it difficult to interpret the societal and civil effects of the last ten years⁶, and equally that Russia is far from constructing a harmonising national hegemonic project that will compliment the overriding global one, as its former 'comrades' in China and Eastern Europe look to do, only perpetuates the view that whilst neoliberal global hegemony may appear to have constructed a firm stable base, its overall future stability is far from secure.

The third point that I have proved in this thesis is that the ideological contestation evident within forms of counter-hegemony, appears too weak, too fragmented, and too contradictory and often represents a dangerous and subversive alternative. This, in turn, as I have explained throughout my work, allows space and time for the processes of *trasformismo* to be successfully applied. Again, the instabilities apparent within the socio-economic climate of Russian society demonstrate this well. Whilst Rupert's recent work has illustrated that in the US the magnitude of anti-globalisation campaigning prompted a re-assessment entitled 'globalisation with a human face'⁷ and in both Europe and North America this has been furthered by centre-left parties calling for the reduction of debt, without reforming the overall workings of neoliberal practice⁸; in Russia the immature and often

incomprehensible culture of party politics has prompted Putin to embark upon political reform that will both oversee Russia's own 'nationalist' concerns and consolidate its position within the global economy. Putin's modernisation project is thus attempting to consolidate Russia's own interpretation of the global order by, as I explained in my last chapter, maintaining Russia's drive towards market transition and to entry into the WTO, whilst at the same time, attempting to pacify some of the concerns placed down by nationalists, neo-Communists and social democrats. Both Putin and governments in the core western countries have moved to exploit the weaknesses apparent within the counter-hegemonic discourse and have aimed to strengthen their positions by stressing the immutability of the actions contained within globalisation. However whilst in the west such a move is at least sustainable to a point, in Russia, Putin's double move to facilitate the processes of *passive revolution* and *trasformismo* remain highly fragile and highly problematic.

Future Developments

It has not been my aim in this thesis to predict what possible occurrences may be in store that could in anyway transform the processes of globalisation and neoliberalism, nor for that matter, suggest ways in which a consistent progressive democratising bloc should be constructed. However, in conclusion and to aid further research it is at least necessary to assess the how in future years counter-hegemonic movements may create more substantial contestations. Firstly, it has to be stressed that the events of

September 11th have allowed states to build more upon the principles of liberal democracy and, in addition, to outline the subversive danger of its opposition. This has been extended to the protection of the 'positives' that have arisen from globalisation and has allowed states to align themselves against those who seek to question or challenge the status quo. In this way, the processes of *trasformismo* have been aided and anti-globalisation campaigns from both the right and the left have been further marginalized.⁹

In Russia too, the events of September 11th have resulted in a greater endorsement of the Putin administration and has helped to propel Russia further into the global economic order. Indeed, the continuing aftermath of the September 11th and the subsequent Bush-led 'war on terrorism' may have further consequences in Russia that will promote Putin's programmes. In particular, Putin has responded to such events by exploiting the 'terrorist' situation in Chechnya, thus gaining support from the west and from the Nationalists and some neo-Communists within the Duma.¹⁰ This, the Putin administration hopes, will allow for greater acceptance through-out the opposition for Russia's plans to join the WTO. Even 'hardliners' such as Zhirinovskiy have moved towards a more 'moderate nationalist' position, by stating recently that the west does not pose as large a threat as once thought and Russia has more 'in common' with the liberal democracies of the west than the 'rebel States' that the LDPR had previously endorsed.¹¹

Whilst it can be said that the events of September 11th have served, at least ideologically, to strengthen the neoliberal hegemonic order, it is difficult to predict how long its governmental institutions and their co-operating states

will continue to be able to use this particular tool to promote globalisation, or how, in the long-term, the differing anti-globalisation campaigns will be effected. One could also argue that to some extent the events of September 11th could lead to a greater concentration of more right-wing groups, as cultural distrust and xenophobic-national feeling may usher in renewed calls for greater national-economic protection. Within Russia, which this thesis has used to demonstrate hegemonic instabilities, the future is even more unpredictable. Whether the Putin programmes in Russia will succeed in successfully transforming it into the global political economy depends largely upon its economic sustainability, coupled with a move towards greater political harmonisation. If these challenges are not met then Russia is prone to slide back into creating some form of alternative project – and judging from both my analysis and from the historical foundations within Russia society, it is not very likely that this potential alternative project would be in any way emancipatory. What knock-on effects such a project may have to the overall hegemonic stability is also debateable, but, as has been the case before, any transformation in Russia has certainly the influence to stimulate similar transformations and mass movements in other parts of the world.

I would finally like to draw upon certain possible ways in which a counter-hegemonic project could transform itself into a less-contradictory and more viable alternative. Firstly, I must stress that such a project would be based upon largely normative aspirations, thus contrasting ideological movements may experience great difficulties (as I have explained through-out this thesis)

in the harmonisation of interests. However, one aspect that appears throughout this work is that the more progressive, trans-national forms of counter-hegemony must reinforce their own objectives, in light of potentially subversive ideologies that have emerged from the nationalist right. A pro-democratic counter-hegemony bloc must also be able to distance itself from the more subversive elements that appear within its own movements – as explained in chapter four, various anti-globalisation demonstrations have contained a variety of opposing, often chaotic political groups. More importantly they also must be more vigilant in order to avoid certain ‘partnerships’ that may arise with the right – so as to distinguish themselves from the more nationalist-based critiques. In addition, democratising contestation needs to appear not just at a more explicit global level, but also by more implicit means at the local level – or as Jan Nederveen Pieterse styles, *local empowerment and global reform*.¹² In local terms, this could refer to a multitude of differing forms of action – from more globally publicised disputes against regional and institutional trade regulations to national and local election campaigns that challenge the more dogmatic approaches adopted by the major national political parties.¹³ This form of action also extends to Russia. For despite the resurgence of nationalism and conservative ‘inward’ looking forms of neo-communism, the social democratic tradition is still (despite its lack of success at elections) alive in Russia. Indeed, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been both an intellectual and practical revival within democratic unionism. The more recognisable voice here has come from Boris Kagarlitsky (whose scholarly contributions had been discussed in subsequent chapters), founder of the

Russian Labour Party and author of several works on Russian working class movements,¹⁴ but there has also been considerable input from Buzgalin,¹⁵ Kolganov, Kislyuk and Khramov. Working both at a local and national level, and aided by more internationalist reformers (such as Buketov and Mrost), they aim to build upon a more democratic form of worker self-determination and often draw upon the movements that were challenging the norms and practices set up in the pre-Stalinist years of the NEP. Whilst, recent developments by Putin, such as the new Labour Laws, intended to reduce Union activity, make labour markets more flexible and ultimately prepare Russia's labour market for entrance into the WTO. Despite this however, within the seemingly unstable social environment there remains a large potential of support for democratic socialising projects. As Jeremy Lester explained:

Many activists are slowly, but surely beginning to appreciate that there is a rich legacy in the distinctly Russian socialist tradition that has not been sufficiently tapped.¹⁶

Democratising projects such as these form the basis in which neoliberalism can be exploited and its attributes critiqued. As Robert Latham's study of Polanyi's earlier work (see chapter four) suggests, there is a need to democratise economic doctrines, so that they relate towards citizens, rather to ideology, and future counter-hegemonic contestations need to build upon these different democratic citizen-led projects, rather than construct a Giddens-like project, which consolidates, rather than challenges the hegemonic order.

Finally this thesis has aimed to set a critical agenda, upon which future research projects can be build. In particular, it is hoped that further research will be able to use these analyses to forward and construct ways in which the processes of contestation and counter-hegemony can be perceived, and how future democratising developments can be enhanced. It has also aimed to provide a departure point for future critical and neo-Gramscian analysis of the global hegemonic workings of neoliberalism and globalisation.

¹ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1979; Anthony Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985.

² Barry Gills, *Globalisation and the Politics of Resistance*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000, p. 3

³ For a concise endorsement of the principles of globalisation, see Krugman, *The Economist*, Blair, McCormick.

⁴ Barry Gills, op. cit, 2000; Peter Waterman, *Globalisation, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms*, London: Continuum, 2001.

⁵ Burbach, R., Nunez, O. and Kagarlitsky, B. *Globalization and its Critics: The Rise of Postmodern Socialism*, London: Pluto Press, 1997.

⁶ Jeremy Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for hegemony in Russia*, London: Verso, 1995.

⁷ Mark Rupert, *Ideologies of Globalisation*, London: Routledge, 2000, concluding chapter.

⁸ Indeed this in one of the rhetoric promises of the 'third way'.

⁹ The Guardian, 'Did the left lose the war', 17th January, 2002. Further conclusions have been reached that suggest that September 11th has proved the fallacies of the anti-globalisation movement. See, Joe Klein, 'Its interrogation, not torture', The Guardian, 4th February, 2002.

¹⁰ It should be stressed here that the official Communist Party retain the assertion that the 'war on terrorism' is one of American Imperialism, but do retain the continued support for the Chechnyan campaign.

¹¹ See note 104, chapter six.

¹² Jan Nederveen Pieterse 'Globalisation and Emancipation', in Barry Gills (ed.), op. cit, pp. 189-205.

¹³ One of the many examples of this was seen at the last general election in the UK, where, in a country seemingly dominated by Party Politics, Dr Richard Taylor was returned as Independent MP for Kidderminster. Whilst this was due to the failure of the National Health Service, and so could arguably be viewed as a critique of a publicly-owned service, it nonetheless represents an example of citizen actions against more structurally-organised hegemonic forces.

¹⁴ See for example, Boris Kagarlitsky (translated by Renfrey Clarke), *New Realism, New Barbarism: Socialist Theory in the Era of Globalisation: Recasting Marxism*, London: Pluto Press 1999; *The Dialectic of Change* (translated by Rick Simon), London, Pluto Press 1990; *Reshaping the Left Institutions*, London, Pluto Press, 2000.

¹⁵ Aleksandr Buzgalin is a lecturer in economics at the Moscow State University and has worked, amongst others on the anti-authoritarian movement within Russia and the need for democratic self-determination of Russian Trade Unionism.

¹⁶ Jeremy Lester, op. cit., pp. 237-8.

Appendix : Interviews obtained in Moscow September, 2000 and April, 2001

September 2000

Aleksandr Buzgalin, Trade Union Activist & Professor of Economics at Moscow State University.

Drew, T. Economist correspondent and advisor, British Embassy in Moscow.

Kolotvin, A. Applicant Advisement Coordinator, Eurasia Foundation.

Horner, K. Political correspondent and advisor, British Embassy in Moscow.

Malashenko, A. Carnegie Centre, Moscow.

Sauvorov, B. Moscow Co-coordinator, Amnesty International.

Youth members of the Russian Communist Workers Party (PRPK).

Youth members of the National Bolshevik Party.

April 2001

Buketov, K. Moscow Coordinator, International Union of Food (IUF).

Mrost, A. Regional Secretary for Eastern Europe, International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Union (ICEM).

Radayeva, O. International Coordinator, Yabloko Party.

On-line Interview, April 2001

Yavlinsky, G. Leader of the Yabloko Party of the Russian Federation.

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
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