The mediated representations of Brexit protests in the UK press: a corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis.

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Table of Contents

Tables and figures………………………………………………………………………. vii

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………. ix

1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….. 1

1.1 Structure of the thesis...………….....………………………………………………... 3

2 Literature review………………………………………………………………… 6

2.1 Brexit……………………………………………………………………………….. 6

2.2 News media………………………………………………………………………… 8

2.2.1 Journalistic values……………………...…………………………………… 12

2.2.1.1 Journalistic objectivity……………...……………………………………….. 13

2.2.1.2 News values……………...…………………………………………………….. 16

2.3 Brexit in the news………………………………………………………………… 21

2.4 Protests in the news……………………………………………………………… 28

2.5 Legitimation………………………………………………………………………… 34

2.6 The protest paradigm……………………………………………………………... 38

2.6.1 Protest paradigm frames……...………………………………………………….. 39

2.6.2 Delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation …………………………… 41

2.6.3 Paradigmatic variables…………………………………………………………… 42

2.7 WUNC……………………………………………………………………………… 47

2.8 Research aims……………………………………………………………………… 53

3 Methodology……………………………………………………………………… 54

3.1 Analytical approach………………………………………………………………… 54

3.1.1 Corpus linguistics (CL)………………..…………………………………………. 54

3.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) ……………………………………………… 55

3.1.3 Corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis………..……………………………. 58

3.2 Data collection………..……………………………………………………............. 62

3.2.1 Sub-corpora………………………………………………………………………. 66

3.3 Corpus tools………………………………………………………………………… 69

3.3.1 Word lists………………………………………………………………………… 70

3.3.2 Keyword analysis………………………………………………………………… 71

3.3.3 Key keyword analysis……………………………………………………………. 77

3.3.4 Concordance analysis……………………………………………………………... 78

3.5 Tools for analysing (de)legitimation…..…………………………………………… 81

3.5.1 The system of transitivity … 81

3.5.1.1 Process types … 87

3.5.1.2 Material processes … 87

3.5.1.3 Verbal processes … 88

3.5.1.4 Behavioural: verbal processes … 91

3.6 Tools for analysing the protest paradigm … 93

3.6.1 Defining frames … 94

3.6.2 Identifying and analysing protest paradigm frames … 97

3.6.3 Formulating probes … 99

3.6.3.1 Story frame probes … 99

3.6.3.1.1 Marginalising frames … 99

3.6.3.1.2 Mixed frames … 100

3.6.3.1.3 Sympathetic frames … 103

3.6.3.1.4 The balance frame … 104

3.6.3.2 Reliance on Official Sources and Official Definitions … 105

3.6.3.3 The Invocation of Public Opinion … 106

3.6.4 Delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation probes … 106

3.7 Tools for analysing WUNC … 108

3.7.1 Mapping WUNC and CDA … 109

3.7.2 Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) … 111

3.7.2.1 Social actor representation … 111

3.7.2.2 The interpersonal metafunction … 114

4 Expressions of (de)legitimation in the UK press reporting of pro- and anti-Brexit protesters … 117

4.1 Verbal processes … 119

4.2 Material processes … 121

4.3 (De)legitimating demands in the leave press … 124

4.3.1 Pro-Brexit protests … 124

4.3.2 Anti-Brexit protests … 126

4.4 (De)legitimating demands in the remain press … 129

4.4.1 Pro-Brexit protests … 129

4.4.2 Anti-Brexit protests … 130

4.4.3 (De)legitimating demands: summary … 132

4.5 (De)legitimating discontent in the leave press…… 133
4.5.1 Pro-Brexit protests…… 133
4.5.2 Anti-Brexit protests…… 136
4.6 (De)legitimating discontent in the remain press…… 139
4.6.1 Pro-Brexit protests…… 139
4.6.2 Anti-Brexit protests…… 139
4.7 (De)legitimating discontent: summary…… 141
4.8 (De)legitimating turnout in the leave press…… 142
4.8.1 Pro-Brexit protests…… 142
4.6.2 Anti-Brexit protests…… 142
4.9 (De)legitimating turnout in the remain press…… 146
4.9.1 Pro-Brexit protests…… 146
4.9.2 Anti-Brexit protests…… 146
4.10 (De)legitimating turnout: summary…… 149
4.11 Conclusion…… 149
5 Identifying the protest paradigm in Brexit protest coverage…… 152
5.1 How corpus-assisted CDA can be used to identify frames…… 152
5.2 Using probes to identify frames…… 157
5.2.1 Story frame probes…… 158
5.2.1.1 Marginalising frames…… 158
5.2.1.2 Mixed frames…… 162
5.2.1.3 Sympathetic frames…… 166
5.2.1.4 The balance frame…… 167
5.2.2 Reliance on Official Sources and Official Definitions…… 168
5.2.3 The Invocation of Public Opinion…… 169
5.3 Distribution of frames across both sub-corpora…… 170
5.4 Adherence to the protest paradigm…… 172
5.5 Delegitimisation…… 178
5.5.1 Delegitimisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus…… 178
5.5.2 Delegitimisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus…… 179
5.6 Marginalisation…… 181
5.6.1 Marginalisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus…… 181
5.6.2 Marginalisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus…… 182

5.7 Demonisation………………………………………………………………………….. 183
5.7.1 Demonisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus……………………………………… 183
5.7.2 Demonisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus……………………………………... 184
5.8 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….. 186
5.8.1 Limitations…………………………………………………………………………….. 190
6 WUNC and its representation in the press…………………………………………… 192
6.1 Part one: WUNC as a linguistic framework…..……………………………………………... 192
6.1.1 Worthiness…………………………………………………………………………….. 194
6.1.2 Unity..…………………………………………………………………………………. 198
6.1.3 Numbers……………………………………………………………………………….. 200
6.1.4 Commitment………………………………………………………………………...... 202
6.2 Part two: comparative analysis of politicians' reported speech in the context of the People's Vote Marches……………………………………………………………………………… 205
6.2.1 The reciprocal power of politicians' reported speech in the press………………………… 206
6.2.2 Comparative analysis…………………………………………………………………….. 208
6.2.2.1 Worthiness: referential strategies…..…………………………………………………….. 210
6.2.2.2 Unity: pronouns and determiners………………………………………………………… 215
6.2.2.3 Numbers: aggregation……………………………………………………………………. 218
6.2.2.4 Commitment: modality, reporting verbs and selective quotation……………………… 220
6.3 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………… 222
6.3.1 Limitations…………………………………………………………………………….. 226
7 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………… 228
7.1 Reflecting on the press representation of pro- and anti- Brexit protests…..………………… 228
7.2 Reflecting on methodological contributions……………………………………………….. 231
8 References…………………………………………………………………………….. 235

Tables and figures

Table 3.1: The pro- and anti-Brexit protests used as search terms in Nexis UK and the dates the protests took place………………………………………………………………………… 64
Table 3.2: The newspapers, articles and words that comprise the BPBP………………………... 65
Figure 3.1: The extent of each newspapers' partisanship ranked by the CCRC (2016), where 1 is most supportive of remain and 10 is most supportive of leave……………………………......... 66
Table 3.3: The newspapers, articles and words comprising the Leave/Pro-Brexit, Leave/Anti-Brexit, Remain/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora..…………………………….... 68
Table 3.4: The newspapers, articles and words comprising the PVM sub-corpus….………….... 69
Table 3.5: The 30 most frequent words in the BPBP corpus, ranked by frequency……….............. 71
Table 3.6: The top 30 keywords sorted by effect-size in the BPBP corpus……………….......... 76
Table 3.7: Concordance snippet of 'protesters' in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus, sorted alphabetically……………………………………………………………………………… 79
Figure 3.2: An example of a process, participants and a circumstance in a clause…………………. 83
Table 3.8: Categories of process types……………………………………………………… 85
Table 3.9: Categories of process types and their corresponding participant roles………………….. 86
Figure 3.3: A material process that expresses a concrete action……………………………………. 87
Figure 3.4: A material process that expresses a metaphorical action………………………………. 87
Figure 3.5: A material process that does not include an actor……………………………………… 88
Figure 3.6: A material process that does not include a goal……………………………………... 88
Figure 3.7: A verbal process with a human sayer…………………………………………………... 89
Figure 3.8: A verbal process with an inanimate sayer……………………………………………… 89
Figure 3.9: A verbal process that includes a positively evaluated target…………………………… 89
Figure 3.10: A verbal process that includes a negatively evaluated target…………………………. 89
Table 3.10: All of the keywords in the top 50 that represented protesters, sorted by effect-size…… 91
Table 3.11: The referential strategies that were drawn upon when formulating the linguistic WUNC framework (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37-42)…………………………………………………….. 113
Table 4.1: All of the keywords in the top 50 that represented protesters, sorted by effect-size…… 118
Table 4.2: The distribution of material and verbal processes in the leave and remain press……… 118
Table 4.3: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times pro- and anti-Brexit protesters were positioned as SAYERS, RECEIVERS, TARGETS and VERBIAGE in each sub-corpus…………………… 119
Table 4.4: The categories of verbal processes and the number of times they occurred (NB: asterisks indicate lemmas)……………………………………………………………………….... 121

Table 4.5: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times pro- and anti-Brexit protesters were positioned as actors, goals and circumstances in each sub-corpus……………………………………. 122
Table 4.6: The categories of material processes and the number of times they occurred (NB: asterisks indicate lemmas)……………………………………………………………………………... 123
Table 5.1: The ten sub-corpus fragments and the number of articles and words they comprise……. 153
Table 5.2: The number of concordance hits per key keyword and the sample analysed…................. 155
Table 5.3: The number of concordance lines that were coded as adhering to the protest paradigm, not adhering to the protest paradigm, issue based reporting and miscellaneous in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus…………………………………………………………………………………….. 170
Table 5.4: The number of concordance lines that were coded as adhering to the protest paradigm, not adhering to the protest paradigm, issue based reporting and miscellaneous in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus…………………………………………………………………………………….. 171
Figure 5.1: Frames comprising the concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus……..……………………..……………………………………….. 173
Figure 5.2: Frames comprising the concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus……..…………………..…………………………………………. 173
Table 5.5: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times frames occurred in each group of story frames in the Leave/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora…………………………….. 174
Table 5.6: The raw and relative frequencies of the number of times frames contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus.………………………………………………………….. 175
Table 5.7: The raw and relative frequencies of the number of times frames contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus……………………………………………………………………………………………… 176
Table 6.1: The top 10 politicians in the keyword list, sorted by effect-size………………………. 209
Table 6.2: The Politicians under analysis and their stance on the PVMs…………………………. 210
Figure 6.1: Relative frequency distribution of the three referential strategies in the Leave and Remain press……………………………………………………………………………………… 214

Abstract

In 2016, the UK held a referendum on its membership of the European Union, asking the electorate to cast a vote to either leave or remain. A narrow majority (52%) opted to leave, triggering the biggest political and democratic crisis Britain has seen in generations. Polarising division separated the public, Parliament and the press, and nationwide discontent on both sides of the leave and remain debate led to numerous major protests. Despite this, Brexit-related demonstrations and their coverage in the British press is a hitherto largely neglected area of Brexit research. Using corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, this thesis conducts the first large-scale analysis of these protests by investigating how pro- and anti-Brexit demonstrations were represented in ten national daily UK newspapers. To achieve this, the 'Brexit Protests in the British Press' (BPBP) corpus was compiled, comprising 845 newspaper articles that reported on five pro-Brexit and ten anti-Brexit protests that took place between 2016 and 2019.

The main aims of this thesis are twofold: to investigate how the leave and remain-supporting press discursively represented pro- and anti-Brexit protests, and to develop new methods that complement the corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis of the mediated representations of protests. In demonstrating these aims, Chapter 4 analyses the system of transitivity to uncover how the leave and remain press construct pro- and anti-Brexit protests as either legitimate or delegitimate. Chapter 5 then seeks to shed new light on the protest paradigm. In doing so, it develops probes and incorporates key keyword and concordance analysis to observe the extent a sample of the leave press' coverage of anti-Brexit protests and the remain press' coverage of pro-Brexit protests conforms to McLeod and Hertog's (1999) protest paradigm frames. Lastly, Chapter 6 develops a novel linguistic framework through which the mediated representations of protests can be analysed. By adapting Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999; 1994) sociological conceptualisations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC), the chapter finds that the new linguistic WUNC framework can offer a more nuanced representational picture of pro- and anti-Brexit protests than the protest paradigm can.

The results of these analyses show that the press coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests is quite unlike the coverage of other protests researched in Critical Discourse Analysis, in that the Brexit-related demonstrations were not regularly constructed as violent or deviant. Given the hugely divisive Brexit debate, these findings are surprising. While this could be due to a changing, more ameliorative media landscape, the thesis concludes that this is likely due to the non-radical goals and tactics of the demonstrations. In terms of methodological developments, the thesis advocates for the integration of corpus tools to strengthen sociological research (i.e. the protest paradigm) and the integration of sociological research to help improve qualitative corpus methods (i.e. WUNC) to encourage interdisciplinary research and expand the visibility of corpus methods outside of Linguistics.

1 Introduction

In recent years, the UK has seen a surge in large-scale demonstrations which have been covered widely in the mass media. The year 2020 saw COVID-19 lockdown rallies and Black Lives Matter demonstrations and 2021 saw an abundance of climate change marches, violence against women demonstrations and Kill the Bill. The Kill the Bill protests took place to object to the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill, passed in April 2022 to limit the size, noise and even 'annoyance' of protests (gov.uk 2021). Some years before these various unrests, on 23 June 2016, the UK government held a referendum on European Union (EU) membership, asking the electorate to vote on whether they should stay in (remain) or get out (leave). The referendum won a marginal majority with 52% of voters opting to leave and pursue 'Brexit' – the morphological blend of 'Britain/British' and 'exit' (Mompean and Valenzuela Manzanares 2019: 7) – triggering a wave of large scale demonstrations.

There is nothing as polarising as a yes/no question (Swatridge 2003: 44), and the binary choice to leave or remain divided the public. Those who supported remain marched in opposition to the leave result. In 2016, two *March for Europe* events took place in which demonstrators expressed their anger and called to strengthen the UK's ties to Europe (Press Association 2016; Vulliamy 2016). In 2017, *Unite for Europe* marched to show support for 'the peace, friendships, relationships, rights, business and academic collaborations, economic prosperity and outward-looking attitude that European Union membership delivers' (Sims 2017), and the *People's March for Europe* carried the banner 'unite, rethink and reject Brexit' (Quinn 2017). In 2018, the *People's Vote March* and *People's Vote March for the Future* demanded the government grant a public vote on the final terms of the Brexit deal (Bulman 2018; Busby 2018). In 2019, the *Put it to the People March* saw demonstrators take to the streets to demand a second EU referendum (Stokel-Walker 2019); *No to Boris, Yes to Europe* (also referred to as the *March for Change*) was held to reject Boris Johnson as the next Prime

Minister (Hussain 2019) and 'stop the Brexit chaos' (Best for Britain 2019); *Stop the Coup* took place in protest of Johnson's decision to suspend parliament (Rahim 2019); and *Final Say* (also referred to as *Let Us Be Heard*) rallied for a public vote on any Brexit deal secured by the government with an option to remain on the ballot (Cockburn 2019).

Pro-Brexit protests were also organised, with *Fishing for Leave* assembling against the 'betrayal' of the UK fishing industry in Brexit negotiations in 2018 (Kelly 2018) and again in 2019 in support of leaving the EU without a deal (Meechan 2019). Additionally, 2019 saw *March to Leave* (also referred to as *Leave Means Leave*) march 270-miles against Theresa May's Brexit negotiations (Dalton 2019), culminating two weeks later on the day Britain was supposed to leave the EU in a mass *Leave Means Leave* rally on Parliament Square. *Make Brexit Happen* took place on the same day, with protesters expressing their anger at the UK's delayed and uncertain EU departure (Forrest 2019).

Polarising division was also evident in the British press. *The Independent*, *The Guardian*, *The Times*, *The Mirror* and *Financial Times* explicitly advocated to remain whereas *The Express*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Telegraph*, *The Sun* and *Daily Star* adopted a leave-supporting position. Explicit ideological division also occurred in parliament, where major parties were internally separated on their pro-European and Eurosceptic stances. As such, the political and ideological separation the referendum caused was pervasive in almost every aspect of the public and political realm, up until the UK eventually left the EU on 31 January 2020. That said, the findings of this thesis suggest that the British press did not uphold and reflect this deep fracture in its coverage of Brexit-related protests – despite the fact it was still unclear if and how the UK would separate from the EU during the period in which the demonstrations took place. To examine exactly how the press reported on Brexit-related demonstrations, this thesis conducts the first large-scale investigation of the coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests in national daily UK newspapers.

1.1 Structure of the thesis

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the existing literature. The review begins with an overview of the events that lead to the Brexit vote, providing the socio-political backdrop against which the aforementioned pro- and anti-Brexit demonstrations took place. As the political upheaval that followed Brexit dominated, and was perpetuated by, news media, Chapter 2 goes on to discuss theories relating to news media discourse with reference to journalistic practices and the perpetuation of ideology. The review then turns to the somewhat scarce existing literature concerning the press coverage of both Brexit and protests, showing that not only have Brexit protest largely been neglected in the scholarship, but corpus-assisted approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis have rarely been used in the context of Brexit. Chapter 2 then goes on to discuss the three key concepts that are used to address this lacuna in the subsequent analysis: legitimacy (Chapter 4), the protest paradigm (Chapter 5) and Tilly's (2004) conceptualisation of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) (Chapter 6).

Chapter 3 outlines the various theoretical approaches and methodologies that have been adopted throughout the thesis. It firstly introduces corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, the overarching method employed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 3 then discusses the data collection, dataset (corpus) and the specific corpus tools employed in the analyses. Finally, the chapter explores the various methodological approaches that have been used in combination with corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis. These largely concern Halliday's (1994, 1978) theory of Systemic Functional Linguistics, Entman's (1993) and McLeod and Hertog's (1999) definitions of framing, and Tilly's (2004) sociological theory of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC).

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 comprise the three chapters of analysis. Chapter 4 analyses the system of transitivity to compare the extent to which the leave and remain press use verbal and material processes to represent pro- and anti-Brexit protest(er)s as either legitimate or delegitimate (henceforth (de)legitimate). As the results of this transitivity analysis sometimes mirrored elements of the protest paradigm, Chapter 5 investigates the existence of protest paradigm frames in the leave and remain press' coverage of Brexit-related protests. In doing so, it seeks to identify, for the first time, all of the 22 frames outlined by McLeod and Hertog (1999) as a means to contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in hitherto under-researched protests. Lastly, Chapter 6 draws on Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999; 1994) conceptualisations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) to develop a new linguistic framework through which the mediated representations of protest can be critically analysed. Since developing the linguistic WUNC framework in this thesis, I have applied it in research that has been published in two field-leading journals (Kennedy 2022a; 2022b).

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, and discusses how the findings contribute to knowledge in two distinct ways: firstly, by revealing the representative discourses of pro- and anti-Brexit protests; and secondly, by developing new methods that can be used to perform a corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis of the mediated representations of demonstrations. In uncovering the discursive representations of Brexit-related protests, Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that their coverage is far less polarising than the Brexit debate itself. For example, Chapter 4 shows that the leave press barely reported on the demands of pro-Brexit protesters, dedicating more, mostly legitimating, coverage to the demands of anti-Brexit protesters. Moreover, the remain press barely covered pro-Brexit protests. Instead of publishing ideologically loaded and delegitimating depictions of the Eurosceptic demonstrations, the protests were all but ignored. Moreover, Chapter 5 reveals that the vast majority of analysed concordance lines in both the leave and remain press did not adhere to the violent and drama-centred reporting that is typical of the protest paradigm. Interestingly, however, more negative depictions of the protests were manifest in frames traditionally classed as ‘sympathetic’ (e.g. McLeod and Hertog 1999). In developing new research methods, Chapter 6 provides a comprehensive and thorough formulation of the linguistic WUNC framework, which produces more nuanced observations than the binarity often found in protest paradigm research. The thesis therefore encourages the integration of corpus tools, Critical Discourse Analysis and sociological taxonomies to develop novel methods that enhance interdisciplinary research and the visibility of corpus methods outside of Linguistics.

2 Literature review

This chapter provides an overview of the existing literature, situating the thesis in its scholarly context. The review begins with an overview of the socio-political events that lead to the Brexit vote, then moves on to discuss news media discourse with reference to journalistic practices and the perpetuation of ideology. A review of literature concerning the press coverage of both Brexit and protests is then presented, showing that not only have Brexit protest largely been neglected in the scholarship, but corpus-assisted approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis have scarcely been used in the Brexit context. The chapter then goes on to discuss the three key concepts that are used to address this lacuna in the subsequent analysis: legitimacy, the protest paradigm, and Tilly's (2004) conceptualisation of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC).

2.1 Brexit

Brexit was an 'omnipresent and inescapable news item' (Koller, Kopf and Miglbauer 2019: 2) from the referendum on the UK's EU membership on 23 June 2016 until the UK eventually left the EU on 31 January 2020 – two Prime Ministers, two Foreign Secretaries, three Secretaries for Exiting the European Union, two general elections and two Brexit extensions later (Simpson and Startin 2022: 1). The three and a half years that Brexit dominated headlines reflected a period of crisis and instability, not least because the Leave campaign won by a marginal majority (52%). The final result was so close that only around 600,000 more people would have had to have voted remain for the UK to stay in the EU (Thompson 2017: 436). The choice to leave or remain became a hugely bitter and divisive political question (Copus 2018: 91), and one of the most notable things about the referendum was the 'significant levels of anguish and aspiration' on all sides of the debate (Browning 2018: 350). Although the leave result was surprising to many (Bennett 2019a), Thompson (2017) notes that it may have been the outcome of Britain’s long and tumultuous history with the EU and its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC). Britain became a member of the EEC in 1973 (Thompson 2017: 34), although its application for membership was ‘late and grudging’ and every treaty that has been signed since has been fought over ‘line by line’ (Swatridge 2003: 39).

The first referendum on EEC membership was held in 1975. While the referendum resulted in two-thirds of voters opting to remain, Euroscepticism became a huge part of the UK’s political landscape from the 1980s to 2013 (Koller et al. 2019: 2). In 2013, after decades of internal division in the Conservative Party on the issue of European integration, then Prime Minister David Cameron announced that if the Conservatives won a parliamentary majority in the 2015 General Election, a referendum would be held on whether the UK should leave or remain in the EU (Hobolt 2016: 1261). Consequently, following the Conservative Party’s electoral success, the UK became the first member state to hold a membership referendum after joining the EU (Walter 2019: 211) culminating in the most significant event in British politics since 1945 (Bennett 2019a).

Following Cameron’s referendum pledge, support to either leave or remain came to the political fore. This cut across the usual Conservative/Labour partition, as both major parties had pro-European and Eurosceptic wings (Bennett 2019b: 21). The divide led to the emergence of two official campaign organisations: ‘Vote Leave’ (leave) and ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ (remain). Expectedly, issues polarised the two camps (Levy, Aslan and Bironzo 2016: 33). Vote Leave thought of the referendum as a unique opportunity to ‘take back control’ of British law-making, borders and immigration (Hobolt 2016: 1262) and allow parliament to ‘regain its sovereign powers’ (Ferry and Eckersley 2017: 2). Conversely, Britain Stronger in Europe advocated staying in the EU to avoid economic risk (Hobolt 2016: 1262).

The Brexit referendum attracted the largest participation ever recorded in electoral democracy in the UK (Copus 2018: 97). The final result saw a slight majority in favour of leaving the EU, resulting in nationwide shock. Despite persisting Euroscepticism, the leave outcome was not anticipated (Bennett 2019a). The Conservative Party, though divided on Brexit, mostly campaigned to remain. As did the Labour Party (with the exception of party leader Jeremy Corbyn), the Liberal Democrats, the Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties and most of the Northern Irish parties (Hughes 2019: 248-249). Even leaders of Vote Leave were surprised at the result, admitting that they did not know what Brexit would look like (Hobolt 2016: 1259). The shock result triggered a chain of 'immediate and dramatic' political ramifications (Hobolt 2016: 1259) resulting in the 'gravest' political and democratic crisis for generations (Rogers 2019: 9). David Cameron resigned as Prime Minister, Theresa May emerged unchallenged as his successor, power-sharing in Northern Ireland collapsed, Scotland called for a second referendum on its independence from the UK and two snap General Elections were held in 2017 and 2019 (Wincott, Peterson and Convery 2017: 429). Unsurprisingly, the referendum, its result and the subsequent political upheaval dominated news media, which upheld the explicit divide between support for leave or remain.

2.2 News media

The mass media is '*the* major site' of contest over meaning (Gamson 2004: 243; italics in original) because of its assumed ability to construct dominant consensus and express ideology through language (Söğüt 2018; Van Dijk 1987). Expressions of ideology are representations of who we are, what our values are and what our relationships are with other groups – in particular, those who oppose us and what we stand for (Van Dijk 1998: 69). More specifically, ideology itself refers to the belief system(s) shared by members of a given social group. These shared beliefs provide models of how the world is 'supposed to be' by influencing group members' understandings of what is good and bad, right and wrong, normal and abnormal (Jones 2012:

11). These models construct, limit and afford members' interpretations of the world and their places within it (Van Dijk 2011). Social groups develop ideologies under specific social, political, economic and historical conditions as a means to defend their interest and guarantee the loyalty, cohesion and co-operation of its members, especially in relation to other social groups or classes (Van Dijk 2011: 380). Ideologies can therefore be 'inculcated' by specific groups, such as symbolic elites with privileged access to public discourse and the means to 'manipulate the public at large' (Van Dijk 2011: 381). One of the ways social and institutional elites can reach the public is through news media. News is a 'representation of the world in language' (Fowler 1991: 4) that enables citizens to better understand positions in it (Richardson 2006: 7). Because language is a semiotic code, endowing words (or signs) with meaning (de Saussure 1983), it can be used to impose values (or ideologies) on what it seeks to represent, constructing the objects of which it speaks (Fowler 1991: 4; Foucault 1969). The language used in news media is, like every other discourse, a representation of 'fact', rather than a value-free reflection of some knowable 'truth'. Different linguistic expressions can then be used by various news outlets to construct the same events in different ways. The differences in linguistic expression are not 'random, accidental alternatives', but are used to articulate, justify and explain particular ideological standpoints (Fowler 1991: 4).

Because the British mainstream press is commercial, it operates independently of the government (Firmstone 2018). Instead, it is largely controlled by elite corporations and powerful institutions (Herman and Chomsky 2008) who enjoy enormous control over the mass (re)production of ideologies (KhosraviNik 2009: 479). As a commercial institution existing for-profit, the ideologies journalists build news coverage around is decided against a social and economic backdrop which values the perspectives and ideologies of richer audiences over poor ones (Richardson 2006: 86). The commercial product of news is not then news or newspapers (though both are of course *made*), but *readers* and even *votes* (Fowler 1991: 20; italics in original). Firstly, readers are a commercial product of news because the more readers a newspaper has, the wider the audience the adverts they include can reach. The larger a newspapers' readership, the more money external companies are willing to pay for advertising space, which generates revenue (Richardson 2006: 78). Secondly, votes can be said to be a commercial product of news if the owners of news outlets aim to maintain or vote-in governments that favour their other commercial ventures (Fowler 1991: 20). In this sense, the British press is a political actor in and of itself, trying 'to change the beliefs and policy preferences of mass and/or elite audiences, thus affecting subsequent policy decisions' (Simpson and Startin 2022: 2).

Because the outputs of the press are determined by this social and economic context, news stories are bound to report on the institutions that uphold these values favourably. For example, newspapers are likely to run stories about the Royal Family, as they symbolise hierarchy and privilege, which serves the interest of capitalism. Conversely, they are likely to condemn socialism and trade unionism because they are antagonistic to the business of money making (Fowler 1991: 20). It is no surprise then that the most successful British newspapers have long been, and continue to be, the more right-wing, Conservative-supporting publications. So, to maintain external relationships with stakeholders, appease advertisers and make profit, the news media produce versions of 'reality' in line with the attitudes of the powerful elite, using language as a refracting medium (Fowler 1991: 10) to shape particular interpretations of events that manufacture popular consent and legitimate the status quo (Van Dijk 1991: 42-43). Because the traditional wall separating opinion and news has largely disappeared in many media (Hughes 2019: 250), this version of reality is reproduced in public discourse as factual 'news' where it appears to be natural and unproblematic (i.e. common sense) (Bishop and Jaworski 2003: 247). Indeed, although very few people may have actually witnessed the events covered in the news, it is unlikely that they would believe an event was one of fabrication because the style of the news establishes the status of its content (Street 2001: 40). This representation of reality, when filtered through ideology, then shapes the audience and in turn the society in which it is perpetuated (Söğüt 2018: 163) by promoting and defending a particular way of thinking as the actual state of affairs (Fernández Smith 2021: 97).

This is particularly problematic in the UK because the national newspaper market is highly oligopolistic (i.e. owned by only a few companies) and overwhelmingly right-leaning (Reeves, McKee and Stuckler 2016: 55). In 2015, national newspapers owned by just two companies – Rupert Murdoch's News Corp UK and Lord Rotheremere's Daily Mail Group – accounted for nearly 60% of circulation (Firmstone 2018). Because newspapers are able to promote their favoured party at the expense of their rivals (Hughes 2019: 251), alternative viewpoints and ideologies have little opportunity to compete with hegemonic ideas in public and political realms. This ideological dominance has real-life political consequences. Because policy makers and politicians use the press to gauge public opinion and influence the political agenda (Cotter 2003: 416), governments supported by popular media and large readerships are able to put forward bills 'without too many worried glances up at the press gallery' (Swatridge 2003: 44). Inversely, policy makers can be constrained by the news media. In the context of the Eurosceptic press, Daddow (2012) writes that since Britain joined the EEC in 1973, Rupert Murdoch has convinced politicians on all sides of the political spectrum that they should fear the backlash of the press should they advocate for European integration. This further emphasises the press' role as a political actor.

That said, there is a long-standing debate on whether the press forms or responds to the public's political opinions. Undoubtedly, the relationship between media exposure and public opinion is hard to untangle (Foos and Bischof 2021: 1). On the one hand, because citizens choose which media outlets to consume, what newspapers decide to report on cannot stray too far away from the ideologies of their audiences (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013a: 6).

Because their success relies on their ability to construct themselves in relation to their readership who maintain ‘brand loyalty’ and continue to make the newspaper money (Baker et al. 2013a: 5-6), newspapers always primarily create ‘readers, not news’ (Conboy 2010: 7; Fowler 1991: 20). On the other hand, research suggests that press discourses can shape public opinion, and therefore the voting outcomes of elections and referenda (Wright and Brookes 2019: 79). This was particularly evident in the run up to the Brexit referendum, where leave-supporting coverage was so pronounced in the final stages of the campaign, it is thought to have tipped the balance in favour of the leave result (Simpson and Startin 2022: 2). As such, it seems most reasonable to take Critical Discourse Analysis’ perspective that the relationship between news media and its consumers is dialectical (Richardson 2006: 45). That is, the language used by the media is both ‘socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned’, meaning newspapers influence the public discourse at the same time that the public discourse influences what positions newspapers should take (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Certainly, readers are not passive ‘dustbins’ (Baker, Gabrielatos and McEnery 2013b: 275), ingesting whatever information is thrown at them. Rather, readers ‘decode’ a text’s meaning by drawing on their knowledge and beliefs – which are shaped by the texts they read (Richardson 2006: 45). Meaning is therefore given to news through the interaction between the text and its audience (McIlvenny 1996), which then resides within the social context in which it is (re)produced (KhosraviNik 2009: 494).

2.2.1 Journalistic values

Because of its ability to produce ideologies that are in line with the interests of economic and political elites, news media has been referred to as the ‘consciousness industry’ (Enzensberger 1974). For this reason, journalists are required to adhere to ethics and codes of practice that are built on the basic tenets of objectivity, fairness, truthfulness and accuracy (Bednarek and Caple 2012: 36). Nevertheless, journalists are still able to produce persuasive ideological discourse while adhering to professional standards. One of the main ways they can achieve this is by reporting favourably on the words of elite sources that share similar ideologies. Certainly, journalists incorporate reported speech in their reports to such an extent, Bell (1991: 191) defines news itself as ‘what an authoritative source tells a journalist’. The more elite the source, the more newsworthy the report is thought to be (Jullian 2011: 768). Deciding what is newsworthy (i.e. what reflects news values) is another main way in which journalists can perpetuate ideology. News values refer to the criteria employed by journalists to select, order and prioritise what will be reported on in the news, and what will be neglected (Richardson 2006: 91).

2.2.1.1 Journalistic objectivity

Journalistic objectivity is a ‘key defining value underwriting the practices of modern journalism’ (Richardson 2006: 86). In the context of news discourse, journalistic objectivity is distinct from the dictionary definition of ‘objectivity’ (i.e. the antonym for the subjective feelings or opinions of people). Rather, journalistic objectivity concerns journalists distancing themselves from the truth claims of the article that they are writing (Richardson 2006: 86). This requires that the fact and opinion portrayed in a news report comes from people other than the journalists – not journalists removing or avoiding their subjective, value judgements when constructing news (Richardson 2006: 86). Indeed, even news coverage that upholds journalistic objectivity cannot be said to be neutral; all news is always reported from some particular angle (Fowler 1991: 10). News stories are therefore inevitably value-laden, and occasionally ‘fundamentally biased’ (Richardson 2006: 87) – but are nevertheless objective in the journalistic sense.

One of the ways in which the press can uphold and perpetuate their own values while distancing themselves from the truth claims of the article (and in doing so, shield themselves against any criticism the truth claims they present may attract [Tuchman 1972: 296]) is by incorporating the voices of those that share or symbolise similar values into news stories. These external voices – referred to as ‘accessed voices’ by Hartley (1982) and Fowler (1991) – are chosen because they are ‘allowed’ to speak their minds ‘much more loudly than journalists’ (Jullian 2011: 767). The informants journalists choose to bring into the text and the information they choose to include or exclude therefore carries strong ideological implications, since the mere inclusion of a source reflects who the reporter finds worth interviewing and what they find reportable in the communicative event (Jullian 2011: 767). Although the comments and judgements of these accessed voices are not attributed to the journalist, they ‘certainly tint the story in such a way that readers get the desired view’ (Jullian 2011: 767). Fowler (1991: 22) refers to these sources as ‘accessed voices’ because the words and views reproduced in news stories usually belong to a privileged body of politicians, royals, celebrities and experts (i.e. those that are established by their official authority, social status and commercial success, and possess legitimation by reference to authority [see section *2.5 Legitimation*]). The access these sources are granted in the media forms a reciprocal relationship. The media conventionally expect and receive the right of access to the statements of these individuals. Reciprocally, these people receive access to the columns of papers when they wish to air their views. In contrast, the words and views of ‘ordinary’ people are largely neglected in news coverage and remain ‘unaccessed’ (Fowler 1991: 22). The political effect of the division between accessed and unaccessed voices contributes to ‘an imbalance between the representation of the already privileged, on the one hand, and the already unprivileged, on the other, with the views of the official, the powerful and the rich being constantly invoked to legitimate the status quo’ (Fowler 1991: 22). Reporting on the words of accessed voices in aiming for journalistic objectivity therefore reaffirms the existing power arrangements in society (Hampton 2008: 477).

How reported speech is presented in news stories also has ideological implications. Journalists' skilful presentation and recontextualisation of quotations may also serve to appraise the content of the speech as well as the sources themselves (Jullian 2011: 769). Smirnova (2009) writes that the syntactic structure in which the source's words are presented play an important role in the argumentative and persuasive function of reported speech in news media. Reported speech may take the form of direct, indirect or segmented quotation. Direct quotations are considered 'evidence of authenticity' because they aim at a verbatim reproduction of the source's original speech (Smirnova 2009: 82-83). Direct quotations include quotation marks, the tense and deictics of the original quote, and an explicit boundary between the voice of the source and the voice of the journalist (Fairclough 1992: 107). While direct quotations are often used to obtain credibility (Calsamiglia and López-Ferrero 2003: 153), Harry (2014: 1048) comments that they are almost always used to embrace colourful and contentious views. Maingueneau (1986: 60) therefore states that direct quotations are no more or less reliable than indirect, and should therefore be viewed as the dramatisation of a previous expression, 'rather than a totally similar one'. Indirect quotations take the form of a clause that is grammatically subordinated to the reporting clause, often marked by the conjunction 'that' (e.g. 'Tom said that he laughed') (Fairclough 1992: 107). In indirect quotations, the voices of the source and journalist are less clearly demarcated, the tense and deictics reflect the perspectives of the journalist (Fairclough 1992: 107), and the source's original expressive means can be neutralised (Smirnova 2009: 84). They therefore allow for the reformulation and recasting of the source's original words (Harry 2014: 1050), enabling journalists to present reported speech in line with their argumentative goals (Smirnova 2009: 84). Segmented quotations take the form of indirect quotation – they are fully integrated into the journalist's syntax – but are directly signalled with clear graphic or typographic marking (e.g. quotation marks or italicised fonts) (Calsamiglia and López-Ferrero 2003: 155). Smirnova (2009: 83) notes segmented quotations can be used by journalists to show evaluation, give neutral words evaluative semantics, and highlight 'the foreignness' of certain words. In particular, short segmented quotations and incomplete utterances in quotation marks can imply a range of journalists' attitudes toward the reported speech, including disbelief, ironic rejection and the journalist's wish to not assume any responsibility for the opinion of the source (Weizman 1984: 41-42). How reported speech can be interpreted and understood is also shaped by the use of different reporting verbs (Livio and Cohen-Yechezkely 2018: 702). Journalists can choose to use more neutral speech verbs (e.g. 'said'), which lack 'overt evaluation' of the source's speech (Harry, 2014: 1046). Conversely, more emotionally charged speech verbs can be used (e.g. 'warned', 'cried', 'complained') to add interpretation, and are key to journalists' evaluative revoicing (Harry, 2014: 1044-1046).

The strategic linguistic choices journalists have when reporting on and recontextualising the quoted words of accessed voices emphasises just how distinct 'journalistic objectivity' is from the normative notion of 'objectivity' defined as the avoidance of subjective value judgements. Journalists are therefore able to use elite sources to influence their readers' perceptions of events and 'underscore their own authority' (Ericson, Baranek and Chan 1989: 5), all while shielding themselves from taking responsibility for the ideas and opinions in the reported speech they present (Tuchman 1972: 296) by adhering to the principles of journalistic objectivity. Another way in which journalists can 'objectively' influence their audiences is by only reporting on the events they deem worthy enough to be considered 'news'.

2.2.1.2 News values

News values are the selection criteria journalists apply to an 'event' that has taken place, and whether or not the event is selected as 'news' (Bednarek 2017: 31). In essence, news values are ground rules that are used to determine the 'newsworthiness' of events (Bednarek and Caple

2014: 137; Richardson 2006: 91). The more newsworthy an event, the more interesting and appealing it is to readerships, and the more copies newspapers will sell (Richardson 2006: 91). However, what counts as a news value is not codified by news organisations – rather, 'they exist in daily practice and in knowledge gained on the job' (Harcup and O'Neill 2001: 261). That said, academics have sought to identify and summarise the criteria events need to embody to be selected as news. For example, in an influential study, Galtung and Ruge (1965) set out twelve news values: *frequency* (an event that unfolds at the same or similar frequency as the news medium); *threshold* (the greater the intensity, the greater the impact on the perception of those selecting news); *unambiguous* (a clearly understood event); *meaningfulness* (cultural proximity to the readership); *consonance* (the more consonant the event is with the mental image of what the event is expected to be, the more likely it will be covered); *unexpectedness* (what is rare with respect to what is *meaningful* or *consonant*); *continuity* (once an event has become headline news, it will continue to be covered); *composition* (offering a range of news items within a newspaper to present a 'balanced whole' [Gatlung and Ruge 1965: 67]); *reference to elite nations*; *reference to elite people*; *reference to persons* (e.g. specific, non-elite, individuals); and *reference to something negative*.

More recently, Bednarek and Caple (2014) made reference to news values such as *proximity* (geographical or cultural closeness); *negativity* (e.g. conflict, death, disaster); *eliteness* (people and institutions with elite status); *superlativeness* (e.g. the more X, the more newsworthy); *timeliness* (recent events); *novelty* (unexpectedness); and *personalisation* (involving ordinary people). Harcup and O'Neill (2017) identify similar values, including *exclusivity* (stories available first to the news organisation); *bad news* (e.g. death, injury, defeat); *conflict* (e.g. controversies, arguments, strikes); *surprise* (unusualness or unexpectedness); *audio-visuals* (stories with arresting photographs, video or audio); *shareability* (likely to generate sharing and comments on social media); *entertainment* (e.g.

sex, showbusiness, sport); *drama* (e.g. escapes, accidents, court cases); *follow-up* (stories about subjects already in the news); *the power elite* (people and institutions with elite status); *relevance* (culturally influential groups or nations); *magnitude* (e.g. large numbers of people involved or in potential impact, extreme behaviours, extreme occurrences); *celebrity* (famous people); *good news* (e.g. recoveries, break-throughs, wins); and *news organisation's agenda* (stories that fit with the news organisation's own ideological or commercial agenda).

While these values may differ slightly from study to study, what can be said definitively is that news values are all ultimately ideological in nature (Bednarek and Caple 2014; Hall 1973). Because they are *values*, they are not neutral (Bell 1991: 156), and are instead a product of 'general cultural assumptions' concerning what is important or trivial, fortunate or tragic, good or evil (Martin 1986: 87). News values therefore reinforce ideologies about what counts as news (Cotter 2010: 67). Those stories that are newsworthy enough to be considered news can also reinforce other ideologies (Bednarek and Caple 2014: 137). For example, by choosing to focus coverage on the behaviours and words of elite figures, news outlets are able to naturalise and favour the perspective of the powerful (Herman and Chomsky 2002; Hall 1973). The stories that make it into the news therefore 'articulate and sustain common understandings of what culture deems ordinary' (Ochs 1997: 192), providing readerships with a means of organising and comprehending the world around them (Richardson 2006: 74). The journalistic selection process is therefore just as important, if not more important, than what 'really happens' when it comes to determining whether or not something is 'news' (Westerhahl and Johansson 1994: 71).

Both Brexit and protests more generally are newsworthy events. Brexit in particular was an incredibly newsworthy event from the success of the leave vote in 2016 until the UK left the EU in 2020. With reference to the news values identified above (Harcup and O'Neill

2017; Bednarek and Caple 2014; Gatlung and Ruge 1965), it can be argued that as an event, Brexit satisfied the following news values:

- *Frequency/timeliness*: Brexit negotiations were ongoing.
- *Threshold/magnitude*: large numbers of people voted in the referendum vote, attended protests, and were involved in Brexit negotiations. The impact of leaving the EU on the UK was also huge.
- *Meaningfulness/proximity/relevance*: Brexit was culturally proximate to the UK.
- *Consonance*: the pro-Brexit press expected the success of the leave vote.
- *Continuity/follow-up*: stories about Brexit were already in the news.
- *Negativity/bad news*: the referendum was a defeat for anti-Brexit supporting publications.
- *Eliteness*: politicians were frequently reported on in the context of Brexit.
- *Conflict*: leave versus remain.
- *Drama*: coverage of the Article 50 court appeal, for example.
- *Good news*: the referendum win for pro-Brexit publications.
- *News organisation's agenda*: the British press was divided on its pro-/anti-Brexit stance.

Additionally, while the logics of mainstream media, as status-quo perpetuating institutions, do not always favour social movements (Gans 1979), protests are generally reported on if they are deemed as newsworthy events (Gitlin 1980). It can be argued then that protests have the potential to be counted as news if they satisfy the following news values:

- *Proximity*: protests take place in the geographical (Kilgo and Harlow 2019) or cultural (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005) proximity of the readership. For example, protests that take place in response to a national event or the passing of legislation (Harlow and Brown 2022).

- *Negativity*: protests' aims challenge the status-quo, or the ideology of the news outlet (McLeod and Detenber 1999).
- *Threshold/magnitude*: protests with large turnouts 'signal a relevant social issue journalists cannot ignore' (Harlow and Brown 2022: 379; Wouters 2013).
- *Bad news/conflict/drama*: disruptive and violent protests (Harlow and Brown 2022; McLeod and Hertog 1999).
- *Audio-visuals*: protests take part in visually attractive or symbolic acts that can be captured by image or video. For example, Amnesty International wore orange overalls and imitated torture to call for the shutdown of Guantanamo Bay (but note that meaning of visual and symbolic acts must be *unambiguous* to be covered [Wouters 2013]).
- *Eliteness*: protests are staged by established and professional organisations (McCarthy et al. 2008). For example, by those with political power (Wouters 2013) or those with prominent supporters and office locations (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005).
- *Celebrity*: prominent and influential public figures are involved in the protest (Harlow and Brown 2022).
- *Novelty/unexpectedness/surprise*: protesters engage in direct confrontation or civil disobedience that 'capitalizes on the advantages of novelty' (Beyeler and Kriesi 2005: 97; Koopmans 1995: 149).
- *Consonance*: protests adhere to the journalistic narratives consistent with the protest paradigm (McLeod and Hertog 1999; see section *2.6 The protest paradigm*).
- *Continuity*: protests that were newsworthy in the past may be considered newsworthy again (Harlow and Brown 2022).

- *News organisation's agenda*: protests that are viewed by journalists as championing a legitimate cause (Harlow and Brown 2022).

Again, protests are not limited to the above values, and there are exceptions. Indeed, despite the newsworthy potential of both Brexit and protests, Brexit-related demonstrations were afforded little coverage in the UK press between 2016 and 2019. This does not reflect the coverage of Brexit more generally, which dominated headlines post-referendum (Koller et al. 2019). While Chapters 4 and 5 consider why Brexit-related protests were largely neglected in the media, the following two sections (*2.3 Brexit in the news* and *2.4 Protests in the news*) also highlight the lack of academic attention Brexit-related demonstrations received in scholarship relating to the media coverage of Brexit and protests more generally.

2.3 Brexit in the news

Although newspapers do not have official links to the government and political parties, readerships generally buy newspapers according to their political leanings (Firmstone 2018). While press partisanship is largely fixed and based on the traditional left/right ideological dichotomy, allegiances sometimes shift. Pre-Brexit, this was perhaps most famously evidenced by *The Sun* who, on 11 April 1992, ran the notorious headline 'It's the *Sun* wot won it' the day after the unexpected election of a Conservative government the tabloid supported (Firmstone 2018). This infamous headline also evidences the influence of the press on its readership and the political agenda. During Brexit, a new kind of partisanship took shape, where the binary choice to leave or remain led to polarised media coverage (Walter 2019: 211). The mass media was the site in which both sides of the debate attempted to 'win the battle for public opinion' (Berry 2016: 14). By giving explicit advice on how the electorate should vote in the referendum, the media contributed to the deep divisions in both Parliament and the British public (Levy et al. 2016). While it is true that with the rise of digital and social media, newspaper circulation is in decline, the press still has a ‘supernatural’ influence on the outcome of elections and referenda through its ability to set agendas (Hinde 2017: 80; Levy et al. 2016: 7). Again, this is perhaps best illustrated by the pro-Brexit tabloid *The Sun*, whose editor sent a text message to *The Guardian* newsroom declaring ‘so much for the waning power of the print media’ the morning after the referendum’s leave result was announced (Martinson 2016).

In the decades prior to the referendum, some news outlets were campaigning for Brexit long before it existed (Hinde 2017: 81). Simpson and Startin (2022: 3) note that what distinguishes British and other EU Member States’ media is the British tabloids’ ‘lopsided anti-EU stance’. Eurosceptic newspapers have successively reported on European issues to such a hyperbolic extent that the EU set up a ‘Euromyths’ website with the sole purpose of debunking the often false claims made by the British press (Hinde 2017: 81). Pro-European politicians, news outlets and the European Commission have therefore long criticised the UK press, alleging its coverage is ‘exceptional’ in its anti-European characteristics (Firmstone 2008: 212).

Pre-referendum, much academic attention focused on how negatively the British press reported on Europe and the EU. According to Swatridge (2003: 40), newspapers across the political spectrum ‘lambasted the ‘bureaucracy’ in Brussels’ from the first day of the UK’s EU membership. They were ‘slow to acknowledge’ the membership’s benefits and ‘speedy to mock’ its perceived flaws (Swatridge 2003: 40). Gavin (2001) also argues that the British press give Europe a negative edge, choosing to report on stories about internal institutional brokerage and the tensions of tough negotiations within European institutions and between the EU and the UK at the expense of covering more positive events, such as business cooperation or EU subsidies for British industries. Similarly, Hardt-Mautner (1995) found that anti-European sentiment was increasingly perpetuated by *The Sun*, who conveyed a sense of distance and isolation from Europe, fears that British national identity was under threat from European integration, and prejudice against other European nations in its coverage. Furthermore, Hardt-Mautner (1995: 199) notes that 'the growing chasm' between the discourse of political elites and the lay discourse of the electorate was taken advantage of by *The Sun*, who adopted the role of mediator, 'simplifying, reinterpreting and in fact grossly distorting' coverage of The Maastricht Treaty. Elsewhere, Anderson and Weymouth (1999) conclude that the UK press coverage of Europe has long been persistently critical, often distorted and occasionally xenophobic.

More recently, Copeland and Copsey (2017) analysed the portrayal of the EU in five national daily UK newspapers (*The Daily Mirror*, *The Daily Mail*, *The Guardian*, *The Times* and *Financial Times*) from 1974 to 2013. In doing so, they examined specific two-year time periods that corresponded to Treaty negotiations or high profile events during which the British press' coverage of Europe increased. Such events featured 'intense debates' that revealed the 'fundamental divisions over the process of European integration' (for example, support for deeper economic and political integrations or broadening the scope of integration beyond the Single Market) (Copeland and Copsey 2017: 717). Focusing on two-year periods allowed Copeland and Copsey (2017: 717) to pinpoint whether there was a particular EU event in which Euroscepticism captured 'the domestic debate and set the agenda thereafter'. The five two-year time periods under analysis were 1974-1975 (during which the UK held a post-election referendum on its EU membership), 1985-1986 (during the negotiations and agreement of the Single European Act), 1991-1992 (during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty), 2001-2002 (during negotiations on the Nice Treaty) and 2012-2013 (during which David Cameron pledged to hold a referendum on the UK's EU membership). Examining the coverage and newspaper circulation in each period revealed that negative coverage significantly increased from 24.2% during 1974-1975, to 44.9% during 2012-2013. In turn, positive coverage fell from 25.2% to 10.3%. Copeland and Copsey (2017) comment that this pejorative shift happened when centre-right tabloid newspapers took an increased interest in the EU, producing news that became steadily more negative over time. Negative coverage accounted for 27.5% of articles during 1985-1986, 29.7% during 1991-1992, 34.1% during 2001-2002, and 44.9% during 2012-2013. By the mid-2010s, as much as 85% of EU coverage was negative in *The Daily Mail*. Copeland and Copsey (2017: 721) also note that the negative articles tended to be more explicitly argued than those with a positive slant, and that pro-European articles were 'lukewarm' compared to the 'fiery vituperation' levelled against the EU in the negative articles.

What's more, Copeland and Copsey (2017) found that the newspapers' Eurosceptic bias could not be traced to a particular issue or event, and that it was the absence of positive coverage that led to the dominance of negative articles and the growing anti-EU support over the last 30 years. Following Copsey and Haughton (2014), the authors term the press' consistent and extensive negative coverage of the EU as 'issue capture', which refers to the way in which a political issue can be occupied and dominated by a minority group with strong, deeply-held views. Indeed, Copeland and Copsey (2017: 722) note that (at least at the time of writing) the British debate on Europe had not been 'owned' by a particular party or set of parties, but the terms of debate had been determined by a very vocal Eurosceptic minority in the news media. This vocal minority was so able to influence the EU debate in the political mainstream because of the 'lack of passion' with which the pro-European argument was made in the press (Copeland and Copsey 2017: 723). This deprived the EU debate of balance, making it seem as though there were no real defenders or proponents of the EU. Certainly, while a vocal minority that is able to commandeer support in the press and the political mainstream may be a necessary condition for the emergence of issue capture, alone it is insufficient – what is more important is the lack of effective opposition to the vocal minority (Copeland and Copsey 2017: 724). The absence of a pro-EU counterweight then enabled 'issue capture' by a Eurosceptic minority in the political area, where politicians found themselves constrained:

while indifference to the EU was safer than being perceived as a Europhile by the electorate, those that called for more EU integration were at best unrewarded by the electorate, or at worst punished (Copeland and Copsey 2017: 724). Copeland and Copsey (2017: 724-725) therefore conclude by noting that the 2016 Brexit referendum campaign and the subsequent leave result may then have been a symptom of the failure of the political elite to adequately address and sustain debates that surrounded the complexities of European integration.

While Copeland and Copsey's (2017) dataset ended a few years before the 2016 referendum, much academic attention has turned to the impact UK newspapers had on the success of the leave result. For example, Simpson and Startin (2022) argue that the tabloids *The Daily Mail*, *The Sun* and *The Daily Express* adopted a 'bombardment approach' in its coverage of Brexit in the final stages of the campaign by saturating news stories with anti-immigration narratives. By measuring the salience, intensity and hostility of headlines that focused on anti-immigration, Simpson and Startin (2022) found that the 'bombardment' of the tabloids' unbalanced coverage – paired with its historical 'lopsided anti-EU stance', hard Euroscepticism and reluctance to communicate the case for EU membership (Simpson and Startin 2022: 304; see also Usherwood and Startin 2013) – set the vote leave agenda in the final stages of the campaign and 'undoubtedly' influenced readers 'susceptible to the cues' of Eurosceptic tabloids to vote leave (Simpson and Startin 2022: 307-308). In demonstrating the impact of the 'bombardment approach', Simpson and Startin (2022: 304) show that the percentage of tabloid readers who voted leave was significantly higher than non-tabloid readers, that the issue of immigration was a great motivator to vote leave, and that more tabloid-reading voters decided how they would vote in the final stages of the campaign than non-tabloid voters.

Comparable studies were conducted by Deacon et al. (2016) and Levy et al. (2016). Deacon et al. (2016) analysed the main weekday bulletins on *BBC1*, *ITV*, *Channel 4*, *Channel*

5 and *Sky News* alongside a representative sample of print articles from all ten UK daily national newspapers to measure the extent to which coverage favoured a pro- or anti-Brexit position, the amount of coverage given to the respective campaigns, and the range of issues covered. When analysing balance, Deacon et al. (2016) found that, by subtracting the volume of news items that supported remain from the total that supported leave, 60% of articles supported leave and 40% supported remain. However, weighting these figures by sales, Deacon et al. (2016) found that 80% supported leave, compared to 20% that supported remain. Lastly, Deacon et al. (2016) found that the three issues dominating the media debate in television and print news on both sides of the debate were the economy, immigration and the conduct of the Brexit campaign. While they note that initially, the economy received considerably more attention than immigration which potentially benefited the remain campaign, like Simpson and Startin (2022), Deacon et al. (2016: 34) found that immigration overtook economic issues, giving the leave campaign 'valuable momentum'. Meanwhile, issues including the environment, taxation, employment, agricultural policy and social welfare were largely neglected.

Similarly, Levy et al. (2016) studied all 2,378 articles that were published across nine national newspapers that focused explicitly on the referendum over the four months of the Brexit campaign. Levy et al. (2016) found that 41% of the articles were pro-Brexit, only 27% took an anti-Brexit stance, and that two-thirds of the newspapers included predominantly leave-supporting articles. The strongest pro-Brexit positions were held in the *Daily Express*, followed by *The Daily Mail* and *The Sun*, while *The Daily Mirror* had the highest share of remain-supporting articles, following by *The Guardian* and *Financial Times*. Discussions of the referendum vote and campaign accounted for around half of the headlines monitored, while the remaining arguments and issues involved in Brexit (i.e. the economy, migration and mobility, regulations, security and terrorism, and sovereignty) collectively accounted for just 42% of headlines, and issues concerning sovereignty, terrorism and migration were skewed heavily to supporting the leave vote. Moreover, 64% UK politicians cited in articles were Conservative – only 17% were Labour – and pro-leave campaigners were cited in 74% articles – pro-Remain campaigners were only cited in 26%.

Elsewhere, scholarship has considered how British newspapers supported a 'hard Brexit' (i.e. a total and complete exit from the EU) post-referendum. For example, in her examination of the pro-Brexit press during 2019, the final year of Britain's EU membership, Parnell (2021) focused on discursive constructions of 'the nation'. She found that Eurosceptic newspapers consistently constructed Britain as humiliated, divided between politicians and the public and divided between British citizens with different political ideologies. Parnell (2021: 14) concludes that the pro-Brexit press adopted a populist dichotomy of political elites versus ordinary people to underpin their argument that the 'ineptitude of MPs constitutes a national crisis', threatening Britain's long-standing reputation for democracy. Moreover, Parnell (2021: 14) notes that by depicting a fractured relationship between the remain and leave-supporting public, pro-Brexit newspapers emphasised a public that were 'cleaved apart' by their socio-economic and geographical disparities, nurturing a belief in an 'unjust gulf in British society' and risking a 'deep-rooted bitterness in the UK', and that by depicting a division between politicians and the public, pro-Brexit newspapers shifted the 'balance of power' toward MPs that supported a hard Brexit. Hönnige et al. (2020) found similar results in their study of newspaper bias in Brexit coverage during Theresa May's government. They note that there was a 'clear overrepresentation' of Conservative and pro-Brexit positions in British newspapers, and that extreme right opinions were overrepresented within to pro-Brexit camp, concluding that the British press 'played a crucial part in ensuring the acceptance of a hard Brexit in the British population by overrepresenting hard Brexit MPs in their coverage' (Hönnige et al. 2020: 21).

The research discussed above emphasises the dominance of leave-supporting articles and publications during and after the Brexit campaign, and highlights the lack of coverage concerning the many other issues and implications that surrounded leaving the EU. The attention the press gave to leaving the EU and achieving a 'hard Brexit' may explain why Brexit-related protests were not widely covered. Indeed, as will be shown in Table 3.2 (Chapter 3), the ten national daily UK newspapers only reported on Brexit-related protests in a total of 845 articles from June 2016 to December 2019. Compare this to Levy et al.'s (2016) dataset, comprised of 2,378 articles that focused explicitly on the referendum over a four month period, and it soon becomes clear that the British press paid the demonstrations very little attention. Perhaps this is why research concerning Brexit in the news has overlooked reports of Brexit-related protests. Curiously, given their controversy, the coverage of Brexit-related demonstrations have largely been neglected in protest scholarship, too.

2.4 Protests in the news

As has been discussed throughout this chapter, the media has significant social power that can influence its readership, limiting freedom of action and influencing knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (Van Dijk 1996: 84). This is particularly pertinent in the context of protests, where 'no news is bad news' (Gamson 2004: 252). Certainly, to recruit members, gain public approval and win policy victories, protests must secure support from politicians and policy-makers, the public and the media (Laschever 2017: 359).

As noted in section *2.2.1.2 News Values*, by their very nature, protests have the potential to be newsworthy, dramatic and violent (Greer and McLaughlin 2010: 1041). As such, when researchers have analysed the mediated representations of protest, they have typically found denigrative coverage. However, generally, it is the more radical protests that are chosen as the subject of analysis – possibly because they are more likely to yield interesting findings. For example, Nijjar (2015: 9) found that *The Express* constructed the 2011 English riot participants as ‘the folk devils of society’, interpreting the unrest as ‘an episode of destruction and apocalypse’; Wagner (2008) found that environmental ecotage protests were framed as terrorism; Osisanwo and Iyoha (2020) found that pro-Biafra protesters were represented as unruly terrorists despite describing themselves as freedom fighters; and Hart (2014a) found that in six national daily UK newspapers covering the 2010 student demonstrations against higher tuition fees, only *The Guardian* called into question police violence against protesters. Instead, *The Independent*, *The Times*, *The Telegraph*, *The Express* and *The Daily Mail* legitimated police actions and delegitimated protesters, framing the demonstrations as a ‘deviation from normative behaviour’ that authorities must defend against (Hart 2014a: 180). Moreover, in their Critical Discourse Analysis of the anti-austerity Right to Water protests that took place in Ireland in 2014, Power, Haynes and Devereux (2016: 272) found that there was an ‘uncritical reproduction of delegitimising discourses and discursive strategies deployed by political elites’ in the media. While some protesters were described by political elites as ‘reasonable people’, Power et al. (2016: 270) argue that this was firstly an attempt to fragment the burgeoning social movement into disparate groups (i.e. the ‘reasonable people’ versus the ‘sinister fringe’); and secondly an attempt to garner support for their announcement of a revised water charges schedule (i.e. what political elites perceived to be the ‘middle ground’ between their policies and the protesters). As such, disagreements between the protesters and the State were shown to be ‘external to the realm of reasoned argumentation’ and resultantly delegitimised (Power et al. 2016: 271). The findings of these studies support Ruiz’s (2010: 165) claim that ‘politically productive antagonistic boundaries’ are rearticulated in ‘fundamentally antagonistic terms’. This could be another reason why it is the more radical protests that are mostly chosen as the subject of analysis – particularly in the field of Critical

Discourse Analysis, which has an emancipatory, socially critical approach (Wodak et al. 2009: 8).

That said, similar findings have been gleaned from the analysis of less disruptive demonstrations. Donson et al. (2004: 8) researched the largely peaceful anti-capitalist 2000 May Day protests in London to find that they were portrayed by the media as ‘incoherent, chaotic and dangerous’, possibly to justify the tough tactics the police intended to take to deal with the 2001 May Day protests. Equally, von Zabern and Tulloch (2021) found that the peaceful climate change Fridays for Future protesters – who were all children – were disparaged in the press as ‘truants with dubious motives’ and a threat to the political and socio-economic social order. However, though these protests were peaceful, anti-capitalist and climate change ideologies are indeed threats to the status quo. Certainly, all of the aforementioned protests challenge the systems and structures of the societies in which they took place. As perpetuators of status-quo enforcing ideologies, the media are more likely to include coverage that protects and defends these structures (including the power and authority of the political and business institutions with which they are affiliated) at the representational detriment of dissenters. Dismissing protesters as deviant and dangerous therefore works to facilitate the silencing of alternative voices in both the issues against which demonstrators are protesting and wider debates on citizens’ rights to protest (Donson et al. 2004: 2). By controlling the flow of information in this way, the press are also able to hide information that may harm institutions as a means to prevent further protest (Street 2011: 285). As exposure to just one news story slanted against demonstrations can make audiences more critical of protesters and more supportive of powerful institutions, hostile media coverage therefore has the ability to ‘inhibit the growth of movements, hasten their decline, and hinder their effectiveness’ (McLeod 1999: 43-44).

In this thesis, the protests under study were not particularly radical in their tactics or aims. This is perhaps why Brexit-related demonstrations have been largely neglected in both Brexit and social movement research. For example, Koller et al.'s (2019) book *Discourses of Brexit*, while extremely valuable to Brexit research in the Humanities, does not include research on the media discourses of Brexit activism. Similarly, there have been numerous special issues of journals dedicated to Brexit – *British Politics* (2021); *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis across Disciplines* (2021); *Critical Discourse Studies* (2019); *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (2017) – none of which include studies about Brexit-related protests.

Although the mediated representations of Brexit-related protests have largely been ignored, there are some studies that have analysed aspects of the anti-Brexit demonstrations in fields outside of Linguistics. For example, Fagan and van Kessel's (2023) book, situated within Social Movement Studies, considers how the UK's anti-Brexit movement failed to achieve its aim of keeping the UK in the EU. On this, Fagan and van Kessel (2023: 140) remark that 'citizens openly, noisily, and enthusiastically defending 'Europe' was unprecedented' and that the anti-Brexit movement, 'emerging rapidly [and] appearing to gain momentum against a backdrop of several large London demonstrations but ultimately failing' is a phenomenon worthy of analysis. The authors explain that anti-Brexit activism did not manage to galvanise sufficient support and influence to stop Brexit for various reasons. For example, while the emergence and growth of the movement were largely driven by a disconnect between pro-EU citizens and political elites, the political opportunity to succeed was 'ultimately hostile' (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 143). To become successful, the movement needed links to the power and elites political parties provide, but these links 'proved tenuous at best and non-existent at worst' (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 143). Moreover, the overwhelmingly Eurosceptic press discourse that was echoed by UKIP and the Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party made it ‘extremely difficult’ for activists to mobilise in defence of remaining in the EU (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 144). Because of this, it was challenging for anti-Brexit activists to both formulate a single key message that defended EU membership and gain support from audiences beyond Remainers. Without the active allegiance of political parties and the ability to reach new constituencies of support through resonant messaging, overturning the leave vote, which was widely respected as a democratic decision, and remaining in the EU was always unlikely (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 146). That said, Fagan and van Kessel (2023: 146) argue that the failure of the anti-Brexit movement does not take away from its ‘remarkable’ achievements. In terms of pro-European activism, the movement was ‘unprecedented in scale and intensity’ and never before had such a volume of people marched in defence of EU Membership (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 141; 146). Indeed, the UK’s pro-European movement was ‘the most proactive’ in Europe, and successfully mobilised hundreds of thousands of people to protest (Fagan and van Kessel 2023: 146).

It is the unprecedentedness of pro-EU mobilisation that also led Brändle, Galpin and Trenz (2022) to focus on the activity of anti-Brexit activists on Facebook in their Social Movement Studies research. Brändle et al. (2022) found that online mobilisation on Facebook resulted in the development of movement identities for the pro- and anti-Brexit camps through campaign names (i.e. ‘the 48%’), connected like-minded online communities through shared content, and encouraged low-key political engagement through ‘liking’ and ‘reacting’ to users’ posts. Moreover, the authors found that a transition between online activism to more traditional forms of collective action, such as street protests, was primarily present amongst anti-Brexit activists, suggesting that the large-scale anti-Brexit demonstrations that took place post-referendum were primarily organised bottom-up via social media. Elsewhere, Brändle, Galpin and Trenz (2018) conducted a Sociological study of the anti-Brexit Unite for Europe protesters’ subjective experiences of citizenship through the lens of justice, again noting that mass pro-EU mobilisation is ‘a completely new phenomenon’ (Brändle et al. 2018: 824). Brändle et al. (2018) found that many of the Unite for Europe protesters experienced Brexit as an injustice, and cited concerns about economic downturn, erosion of the NHS, misrecognition of their British identities, and the government, who were seen as ignoring the concerns of the 48% and pandering to xenophobia. Others considered the injustice as extending beyond the nation-state, viewing the EU as a ‘crucial political frame’ that they might be excluded from economically, culturally and politically in the future (Brändle et al. 2018: 824). This triggered ‘existential fears stemming from a lack of agency’, and a want to claim freedom of movement, human rights and principles of inclusiveness as EU citizens (Brändle et al. 2018: 824-825). Moreover, as there were no constitutional requirements regarding the conditions under which referendums are held, Brexit was perceived by the anti-Brexit protesters as democratically illegitimate. They therefore experienced the framing of popular sovereignty as the ‘will of the people’ instead as a ‘tyranny of the majority’ in which substantial parts of the population are not recognised, and even feel marginalised as their ‘claims for justice are excluded from future consideration’ (Brändle et al. 2018: 825).

What motivated the studies conducted by Fagan and van Kessel (2023), Brändle et al. (2022) and Brändle et al. (2018) is the fact that the anti-Brexit protests that followed the referendum were unprecedented and novel. It is surprising then that more academic attention has not focused on the Brexit-related protests, particularly as they fell outside of traditional political affiliations and included huge numbers of new activists who had not previously been engaged with campaigning (Fagan and van Kessel 2023; Caiani and Weisskircher 2022). What’s more, even less academic attention has been given to the pro-Brexit protests. Although Rone (2022) discussed how both pro- and anti-Brexit protests understood and used the concept of sovereignty, studies that analyse both sides of the demonstrations are in the minority of an already under-researched subject matter. This is even more the case in the field of (corpus-assisted) Critical Discourse Analysis, where, to my knowledge, Parnell (2022) has conducted the only study of the mediated representations of pro- and anti-Brexit protests. However, this paper is limited to how the Eurosceptic press covered one pro- and one anti-Brexit demonstration. Although illuminating – Parnell (2022) found that real and imagined pro-Brexit demonstrations are legitimated in the leave press as justified emotional responses to alleged political incompetence, whereas as anti-Brexit protests are framed as immoral, unethical and undemocratic – the limited scope of research on Brexit-related protests provides new and untrodden territory through which to analyse the mediated representations of demonstrations.

Performing a large-scale corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis of the mediated representations of pro- and anti-Brexit demonstrations will therefore contribute to this overlooked area of study. Moreover, analysing protests with less radical aims and tactics will help to see how applicable the findings and methods used in research about status-quo-challenging protests hold up in less disruptive contexts. In doing so, Chapter 4 will analyse the Brexit protests' reported legitimacy, which is often researched in Critical Discourse Analysis. Chapter 5 will then evaluate the Brexit protests' adherence to the protest paradigm and offer a new method of identifying news frames. Chapter 6 will then provide a new methodology for analysing the mediated representation of protests by drawing on Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999; 1994) sociological concept of WUNC.

2.5 Legitimation

It is through media that protests are conveyed to the public and by which wider support and legitimacy for their actions and aims 'can be potentially won – or lost' (Cottle 2008: 853-854). How the public and authorities respond to a protest's agenda is dependent on the dominant perception of their worthiness (Jacobsson 2021: 483; Tilly 1999), meaning that Critical Discourse Analysis is often concerned with the ways in which the lexical items and grammatical structures are used by the media to (de)legitimate protest action (Hart and Kelsey 2019: 4). As such, numerous studies analyse the representations of protests' and social movements' mediated legitimacy (e.g. Brown and Harlow 2021; Valentim 2018; Hart 2017; Harbisher 2016; Power et al. 2016; Gulliver and Herriot 2015; Hart 2014a; Hart 2013; Luther and Miller 2005). Chapter 4 investigates the discursive (de)legitimations of pro- and anti-Brexit protests by drawing on three major categories of legitimation identified by Van Leeuwen (2007; 1995) and Rojo and Van Dijk (1997): authorisation, moral evaluation and rationalisation.

Rojo and Van Dijk (1997: 528) argue that a crucial element of social and political legitimation concerns powerful groups or institutions seeking normative approval for their policies or actions. They do this through strategies that aim to express how their actions are consistent with society's moral order and the principles agreed upon by the majority of citizens. Legitimation can therefore be called upon by reference to authority (Van Leeuwen 2018: 147) – be that institutional authority or the authority of conformity. Firstly, reference to authority answers the implicit question *why should I do this?* with the response *because I say so*, where the 'I' is someone in whom authority is vested (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). For example, in the context of this thesis, it is likely a protest's perceived legitimacy will be enhanced through reference to authorisation if a politician (a powerful authority) endorses a social movement. Conversely, if a politician demonises or undermines a social movement, it is likely the protest's perceived legitimacy will diminish. Secondly, reference to conformity answers the implicit question *why should I do this?* with the response *because everybody else is and so should you* (Van Leeuwen 2007: 97). This is because large groups of people in collective agreement indicate valuable displays of support and endorsement (Van Leeuwen 2007: 96) – key components of legitimation (Reyes 2011: 782). In the context of this thesis, newspaper reports of hundreds of thousands, or even millions of attendees could therefore create a mobilising (conforming) effect on readers. To touch briefly on moral evaluation legitimation, reports of high turnouts also infer an oblique reference to value systems: a large protest characterises its effectiveness, strength and force, and therefore its legitimacy (Tilly 2006). This is particularly pertinent for increased mobilisation, as the greater the perceived legitimacy of a protest, the higher the probability of future participation becomes (Zlobina and Gonzalez Vazquez 2018: 245).

Moral evaluation legitimation is based on moral values: what is good or bad, what is right or wrong – although in most cases, moral discourses are not made so explicit (Van Leeuwen 2007: 97). Rather, what is good, bad, right or wrong is hinted at through adjectives such as ‘democratic’, ‘anti-democratic’, ‘worthwhile’ or ‘time-wasting’. Van Leeuwen (2007: 97) argues that implicitly value-laden adjectives such as these signify the ‘tip of a submerged iceberg’ of morality in that they ‘trigger a moral concept, but are detached from the system of interpretation from which they derive’. In doing so, they convert moral discourses into more generalised motives (Van Leeuwen 2007: 97-98) which are ‘widely used to ensure mass loyalty’ (Habermas 1976: 36). For instance, when undertaking the research for this thesis, I did not come across newspaper reports that regularly stated their opinions of Brexit-related demonstrations in explicitly overt terms (e.g. ‘the People’s Vote March is bad and the March to Leave is good’). However, the implicit moral values particular newspapers held could be recognised by analysing the (often more covert) representational discourses that they ascribed to the protests they supported or opposed.

Lastly, a protest’s legitimation can be realised through instrumental rationalisation (Van Leeuwen 2007: 101) – that is, the expression of purpose and justification. Like legitimations, purposes are discursively constructed to explain why social practices and actions exist (Van Leeuwen 2007: 101). That is not to say that all purposes are legitimate – in order to serve as legitimations, purposes must contain an element of moralisation (Van Leeuwen 2007:

101). For example, implicit moral attributes such as the ‘reasonableness’ and ‘appropriateness’ of behaviours needs to be recognised for legitimation to be effective or persuasive (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 9). Moralisation is also evident when protesters’ motivation for demonstrating negatively evaluates the objects against which they are protesting or when their purpose is shown to be of vital importance (Pérez-Arredondo 2019: 71). This is because rationalisation is rooted in the philosophical traditions from which morality originates as it explicitly argues for purposefulness as a criteria of ethical behaviour (Van Leeuwen 2018: 148). Rational and moral depictions of protesters’ purpose as legitimate is therefore central to their portrayal (Pérez-Arredondo 2019: 71)

That said, there are occasions in which unreasonable and inappropriate behaviour can be mitigated through justification. Justification can occur when interpretations excuse a negative act by constructing it as an outcome of an emotional state, a response to or consequence of a previous negative act, or as a means of achieving something (Stamou 2001: 672). Negative actions are therefore better legitimated when justified because legitimation allows for the attribution of ‘acceptability to controversial actions within the normative order’ (Rojo and Van Dijk 1997: 560-561). As reports of violence can cause a protest’s support to dwindle (Muncie 2020: 476), the justification of negative action is of particular importance in the legitimation of demonstrations.

Because legitimation is key to controversy, critique and conflict (Rojo and Van Dijk 1997: 528), Chapter 4 focuses on the extent to which pro- and anti-Brexit protests were portrayed as (de)legitimate in the leave and remain-supporting press. In doing so, it explores how protesters’ demands, discontent and turnout are represented through verbal and material transitive verbs.

2.6 The protest paradigm

As discussed in section *2.4 Protests in the news*, the news media often dismiss protesters as dangerous, deviant or delegitimate as a means to silence dissenters that protest the structures with which the media are ideologically and commercially affiliated. The cumulative finding that the media consistently portray demonstrations negatively has given rise to the theorisation of the *protest paradigm* (Chan and Lee 1984). The protest paradigm is a heuristic notion summarising routinised and consistent patterns of protest coverage. These patterns offer insight into the ideological motivation for frame choices used by the media, as right-leaning newspapers emphasise social order and the status quo, while left-leaning outlets privilege the protester's standpoint (Chan and Lee 1984). Although Chan and Lee (1984) include left-leaning publications in their conception of the protest paradigm, subsequent research has focused mainly on the right-wing press. Such studies claim that the constraints of news production work against protesters, as pre-defined frames manifest messages of social control (McLeod and Detenber 1999) that often lead to coverage that supports the status quo and disparages protests that challenge it (Boyle, McLeod and Armstrong 2012). This is mostly achieved through focusing on actions, spectacle and drama, omitting coverage of the critique or concern protests raise and the legitimising aspects of the protest paradigm that generally occur in left-wing media (Wouters 2015: 475; Harlow and Johnson 2011: 1359).

According to Kilgo and Harlow (2019: 509) the protest paradigm emerges from the 'symbiotic but imbalanced relationship' between protesters and the press. This relationship is developed in three stages: 1) the media do not report on protests that do not take part in newsworthy activity; 2) protesters stage events to attract media attention, which they need to distribute their message and signal their strength; 3) the media then cover these events, but leave out substantive information about the protest's background and grievances (Kilgo and Harlow 2019: 509-510). This 'paradoxical situation' means that protests must adapt and appeal to media practices (i.e. news values) to receive coverage. However, when they do, they are often demonised and their grievances are under or inadequately reported on (Kilgo and Harlow 2019: 510). As such, the media fail to disseminate the necessary information the public need to understand the root cause of the protests (Xu 2013: 2414). In this context, media framing is particularly pertinent, as it may effect grievance construction and interpretation, attributions of blame and causality, movement participation, mobilisation and recourse acquisition (Benford 1997). Indeed, McLeod and Detenber (1999: 18) argue that it is possible that 'public perceptions of protest as a form of democratic expression may become more hostile over a long period of time' if people are repeatedly exposed to messages packaged within protest paradigm frames.

McLeod and Hertog (1999) extended Chan and Lee's (1984) idea of the protest paradigm as a journalistic template for protest coverage, producing possibly the most widely cited and prevalently used conceptualisation of the paradigm. In this, McLeod and Hertog (1999) state that *story framing*, *reliance on official sources and official definitions*, and *the invocation of public opinion* are quintessential aspects of the protest paradigm. These characteristics then contribute to three processes: the *delegitimisation*, *marginalisation*, and *demonisation* of protest.

2.6.1 Protest paradigm frames

The protest paradigm comprises a number of potential 'protest-story frames' – that is, 'cliches for communicating the events of a protest' (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 312) that produce a function of social control (McLeod 1999: 32). The frame (or 'narrative structure' [McLeod and Hertog 1999: 312]) that is chosen in the coverage of protest-stories has significant implications on how the protest group will be perceived by consumers of media. News organisations train journalists to approach environments as raw material with which they can build news narratives, with particular narratives preferred over others. Once the narrative, or frame, is chosen by the journalist, the process of news gathering seeks to find information to fill the preconceived news template at the expense of generating a deep understanding of the protest (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 312). Many of the potential protest frames differ in the degree to which they produce negative consequences for protests (McLeod 1999: 36), varying between broader narratives of *marginalising frames*, *mixed frames*, *sympathetic frames* and *the balance* frame, each of which may appear as dominant or a sub-frames and on their own or in combination. *Marginalising frames* emphasise the actions over the concerns raised by protests. According to McLeod and Hertog (1999: 314), this protects the illusion of journalistic objectivity because reports of concrete action are 'safe'. Contrarily, reports of protests' issues are less 'safe' because journalists must make decisions about their legitimacy (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 314). *Mixed frames* are generally less biased against protesters and are rarely used in mainstream media. Similarly, *sympathetic frames* contribute to the positive coverage of protests and are usually only found in the alternative press (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 313). Lastly, McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) assert that *the balance frame* consists of a *debate* frame that 'centres on the issues and viewpoints of the various parties to an issue of public concern', in which all issues and sides are represented 'adequately and fairly'. However, despite the fact that balanced coverage 'is given a lot of lip service by the mainstream media, it is not commonly used' (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 313) (NB: the frames that comprise all of these sub-categories are outlined in Chapter 3, section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*).

Outside of story frames, McLeod and Hertog (1999) offer two more aspects of coverage that are typical of the protest paradigm: *reliance on official sources and official definitions* and *the invocation of public opinion*. Firstly, the words of *official sources* are often relied on in protest coverage to add prestige to the story through the sources' legitimacy, increase the efficiency of news production, maintain the illusion of objectivity and lend support to the status quo (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 314-315). The *reliance on official sources* is therefore 'a double-edged sword' – while it can be an efficient way to gain authoritative information, it can also be used to define demonstrations with biased views, as unofficial sources such as protesters are largely ignored (Xu 2013: 2427). Secondly, when assessing public opinion, citizens turn to the media for cues. Protest coverage that *invokes public opinion* can then influence the attitudes and behaviours of the public. Media frames that construe protesters in opposition to the consensus opinion may imbue a 'fear of isolation' amongst readerships, therefore discouraging participation from existing and potential protest members (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 315). The *invocation of public opinion* can be realised variously: through reports of opinion polls and statements that embody public opinion, the public mood, or social consensus (McLeod and Hertog 1999; McLeod and Hertog 1992); through portrayals of protesters violating laws and norms; by using bystanders to 'provide a symbolic reaction from the common or typical person' (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 315); by emphasising the small size of the protest groups relative to the population; and by treating protesters as an 'unsuccessful group contending for power' (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 318).

2.6.2 Delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation

Negative story frames, reliance on official sources and invoking public opinion are said to contribute to three processes: the *delegitimisation*, *marginalisation*, and *demonisation* of protest. *Delegitimisation* occurs when media coverage guided by the protest paradigm often questions the legitimacy of movements (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319), making it difficult for protest groups seeking social change to establish themselves in public discourse. As will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3, section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*, *delegitimisation* can manifest through the journalistic use of judicious quotation marks that call into question the legitimacy of a concept (Tuchman 1972) and phrases such as 'the protesters call themselves…', which question activists' purpose, identity and behaviour by challenging their self-designated labels (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319; McLeod and Hertog 1992). Protesters are also *delegitimised* when they are not given a platform to speak through their own voices. If protesters are quoted directly, ‘they are accorded a degree of legitimacy as a source’ (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319). However, their legitimacy is reduced if their views are only paraphrased or altogether disregarded.

Reporting that adheres to the protest paradigm can also *marginalise* protesters if it accentuates their deviance from the public. When the media do not explain the issues and viewpoints of the protesters, readers ‘overlook the common ground’ in their opinions (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319). *Marginalisation* happens when coverage downplays the size and effectiveness of the protest, and when it fails to recognise the ability of protests to keep institutions in check by preventing future policy changes, create awareness and disseminate information to the public and potential sympathisers, bring like-minded people together, and indicate the existence of a healthy democratic system.

Lastly, coverage can *demonise* protesters if it exaggerates their potential threat and galvanises public hostility toward them (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 320). *Demonisation* can occur through an emphasis on a protest’s radical goals and viewpoints, reporting on protesters’ arguably immoral acts (e.g. flag burning), and the invocation of ‘moral panic’ (Cohen 1972), which can surge public nervousness to such an extent that they call for an increase of police vigilance and controls against protest groups (Thompson 1998).

2.6.3 Paradigmatic variables

While reports that adhere to the protest paradigm ultimately lead to the delegitimisation, marginalisation, and demonisation of protesters, recent studies that have documented changes in coverage show that the level of adherence to the paradigm depends on a number of nuanced factors, and not necessarily on systematic delegitimation as previous research has suggested (e.g. Chan and Lee 1984). According to Cottle (2008: 859), today’s news exhibits a more complex relation to protest than assumed in the past. As such, Cottle (2008: 856; 858) proposes that we ‘recalibrate our theoretical sights’ as the entrenched expectations based on past frame analyses may now prove ‘insensitive to the political contingencies and dynamics at work’ in contemporary protest coverage. Resultantly, in their examination of protests that took place in Hong Kong from 2001-2012, Lee (2014) treated the protest paradigm as a variable, finding it was more likely to predict the coverage if the protests use radical tactics, if the protest’s target responded in the media and if the newspapers were politically conservative. Similarly, Boyle et al. (2012: 139) found that the reporting of protester’s methods are the driving force behind news coverage, and that those that use more extreme tactics are treated more critically than those that use less extreme tactics. The degree to which the ideological position of a protest challenges the political or societal status quo can therefore be considered ‘a key indicator of paradigmatic strength’ (Kilgo and Harlow 2019: 510). While this variable is noted by McLeod and Hertog (1999), Kilgo and Harlow (2019: 523) offer the notion of a ‘hierarchy of social struggle’, in which certain protests are given more precedence and legitimacy, while others are delegitimated or altogether ignored. In their study of protest coverage in Texas newspapers, Kilgo and Harlow (2019) found that as systemic threats to the status quo, anti-Black racism and Dakota Pipeline protests occupied the lowest and least legitimate tier of the hierarchy. Contrarily, the Women’s March occupied a higher and more legitimate tier of the hierarchy because it was not considered a threat to the status quo. Evidence of legitimating coverage therefore shows that not everything can be predicted on the basis of a deterministic view of the media’s presumed general orientation to spectacle, drama, conflict and controversy (Cottle 2008: 864). Similarly, in her analysis of Brazilian news coverage of protests expressing dissatisfaction against the leftist president Dilma Rousseff in 2013, Mourão (2019) found that there was an expansion from the marginalisation toward the legitimatisation of protests in the news over time. This transition occurred as the protests' cause progressed from movement-specific issues (bus fare rates) to generalised opposition to the leftist government. The protests therefore became a political issue within the larger context of the conflict between the ruling leftist administration and oppositional parties, and in doing so, were viewed as more legitimate (Mourão 2019: 67). Mourão (2019) concludes then that her findings add to recent literature which argues that the protest paradigm has less to do with the systematic denigration of protests and more to do with how given demonstrations fit within the larger political narrative.

Elsewhere, Weaver and Scacco (2013: 78) argue that the ideology of the news outlet depends on the extent to which coverage will adhere to the protest paradigm. For example, while research into the protest paradigm has mostly been applied to left-leaning protests, even right-leaning and status quo supporting protests 'may nonetheless be subject to marginalisation from at least some media' (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 78). Likewise, mainstream media that generally supports the status quo can also be critical of powerful groups in particular circumstances (McLeod and Detenber 1999). Indeed, as the various news outlets that comprise mainstream media are not homogeneous enough to represent the news industry as a whole (Rohlinger et al. 2012: 52-53) a 'one-size-fits-all paradigmatic approach' cannot be applied to protest coverage (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 78).

Inevitably, the politics informing protest has evolved since the protest paradigm was first proposed (Cottle 2008: 854). The changing contours of political communication therefore provide new avenues for exploring and understanding the paradigm (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 62) – but what effects these changes have are disputed. On one hand, Milne (2005) found that the British press now often take it upon themselves to promote single-issue causes and campaigns to actively manufacture dissent and Cottle (2008: 857) comments that some protests are actively championed by sections of the news media. During Brexit, this could be seen in *The Independent*, who launched and explicitly advocated for the anti-Brexit Final Say protest.

On the other hand, some argue that the media framing of protests is only becoming more damaging over time (Xu 2013). For example, Gil-Lopez (2021: 693) and Trilling, Tolochko and Burscher (2017) comment that the media's current culture of fast-paced production, fast dissemination and wide reach may have actually reinforced adherence to the protest paradigm through the consistent use of sensational and event-centred stories that increase visibility and sharing on social media. Indeed, recent research does still suggest that in general, mainstream media coverage broadly adheres to the paradigm. In his systematic examination of 53 empirical studies that researched evidence of the protest paradigm in mainstream media, Gruber (2022: 4; emphasis added) concludes that there *is* general agreement that the studied protest coverage contains at least some patterns consistent with the protest paradigm. However, while 32 studies determined that the coverage they examined was in line with the paradigm, 12 found only partial support and eight found contradicting evidence, indicating that mainstream media is not always consistent in its adherence to the protest paradigm.

That said, how the protest paradigm is conceptualised varies between studies, making it difficult to compare research about the protest paradigm and draw reliable conclusions about its existence in the press. Unusually, while a multitude of studies cite McLeod and Hertog (1999), none have applied their protest paradigm – comprising the 22 frames outlined in section *3.6.3 Formulating probes* – as a whole. For example, in their analysis of the 2017 Women's March, de Smaele and Kenis (2020) focus on *appearances*, *behaviour (rational, emotional)*, *numbers*, and *indications of effectiveness*, which are utilised in the analysis of delegitimising narrative structures only. Similarly, when citing McLeod and Hertog (1999), Reul et al. (2016: 901) claim that the protest paradigm outlines only three broad frames: *marginalising story framing*, *reliance on official sources and information*, and *the invocation of public opinion*. Elsewhere, Kilgo and Harlow (2019) claim that McLeod and Hertog (1999) identify four key frames in protest coverage: *riot*, *confrontation*, *spectacle* and *debate*. Even two studies conducted by McLeod (1999; 2007) do not account for all aspects of the protest paradigm; the first omits *official source* and the latter does not discuss *marginalisation*. While it is of course reasonable to assume that not all 22 protest paradigm frames occurred in every study – indeed, not all occurred in Chapter 5's analysis – it seems logical that the protest paradigm as a whole should be applied to uncover how the less often researched frames manifest in discourse and to see if anything is missed by analysis that focuses more on the negative frames. Chapter 5 therefore considers each of McLeod and Hertog's (1999) 22 frames (that is, 20 story frames, *reliance on official sources and official definitions* and *invocation of public opinion*) in the analysis of the remain and leave press' coverage of the respective pro- and anti-Brexit protests as a means to 1) offer a thorough method that can be used to identify protest paradigm frames and 2) contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in the context of Brexit-related demonstrations. As noted, Brexit-related demonstrations are hitherto under-researched protests. This is also true in research concerning the protest paradigm, which has mostly been applied to the coverage of left-leaning protests in right-leaning media (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 78), which assumes that the activists involved are typically left-leaning (Shahin et al. 2016: 146). However, because Brexit cut across the UK's usual right-wing/left-wing divide, accounting for the extent to which the leave and remain press adhere to the protest paradigm in their coverage of Brexit-related protests will help to advance understandings of the paradigm's application in contemporary protests that sit outside of traditional political affiliations. Moreover, the Brexit protests reflected issues that were already being inescapably discussed by both the mass media and the public, and neither side of the Brexit-related protests rallied for especially radical goals or employed particularly extreme tactics. Although less radical protests are less likely to adhere to the paradigm (Kilgo and Harlow 2019; Boyle et al. 2012), McLeod and Hertog (1999: 325) note that it is vital research assesses how strictly the media follows the paradigm across different protests, in different situations and at different points in time. Likewise, Harlow et al. (2017) and Detenber et al. (2007) argue that it is vital that the protest paradigm is better understood as the media's portrayal of protests and protesters is a deciding factor in whether they gain public support; not least because uncovering and raising awareness of the framing strategies employed by the media help us (as researchers, media consumers and members of the public) become 'watchdogs of the watchdogs' (Xu 2013: 2428), critically evaluating media to effectively challenge its manufacture of consent (Herman and Chomsky 2002).

2.7 WUNC

To provide a more robust and contemporary framework through which research can critically analyse the mediated representations of protests, Chapter 6 reformulates Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999; 1994) sociological notion of WUNC – worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment – into a linguistic framework that could be used instead of or alongside the protest paradigm.

Tilly was a prominent researcher of social movements and his work revolutionised our understanding of protests, social conflict and public contention (Collins, 2010: 5; Krinsky and Mische, 2013: 2). Although he mainly contributed to Sociology and Political Science, Tilly was indifferent to 'disciplinary orthodoxy' and his research spanned a multitude of fields (Tarrow 2018: 514). While Tilly's work is expansive, this thesis takes particular interest in arguments from his book *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (2004). In this, Tilly (2004: 3) treats social movements as 'a distinctive form of contentious politics' – contentious because they involve the 'collective making of claims that, if realized, would conflict with someone else's interests', and political because governments feature in the claim making, 'whether as claimants, objects of claims, allies of the objects, or monitors of the contention' (Tilly, 2004:

3). Tilly (2004: 3) also offers a widely-cited criteria as to what constitutes social movements, stating they emerge from a synthesis of three elements:

1. a sustained, organised public effort making collective claims on target authorities (let us call it a *campaign*);
2. employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering (call the variable ensemble of performances the *social movement repertoire*); and
3. participants' concerted public representation of WUNC: worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment on the part of themselves and/or their constituencies (call them *WUNC displays*).

The focus of Chapter 6 is the third element: the worthiness*,* unity*,* numbers and commitment that constitute WUNC displays. Throughout his work, Tilly offers multiple descriptions of these displays, which can be defined broadly as:

Worthiness: elements of protest that construct participants as good and deserving citizens (Wouters 2019: 408). These include sober demeanour, neat clothing, and the presence of 'clergy, dignitaries, and mothers with children' (Tilly 2004: 4). Worthiness can also be displayed by protesters who do not engage in unnecessary disruption or violence (Wouters 2019: 408).

Unity: aspects of protest that represent protesters as a 'solid block' that share a common programme (Wouters 2019: 409). This can be shown through matching badges, headbands, banners or costumes, marching in ranks and collectively singing and chanting (Tilly 2004: 4).

Numbers: vast turnouts, signatures on petitions and messages from constituents (Tilly 2004: 4).

Commitment: qualities of protest that emphasise persistence (Wouters 2019: 409). This can be shown through protesters braving bad weather, resisting repression, their sacrifice, subscription and benefaction, and through visible participation by elderly people and people with disabilities (Tilly 2004: 4).

Presentations of WUNC are often termed as 'displays' and 'broadcasts' because they are a performance – 'something protesters deliberately seek to portray' (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 366). This is particularly so in the media, where protesters can amplify their message to voters and potential supporters (Kirby 2010: 7; Tilly 2004: 84-85) who observe the features of WUNC when they form an opinion about a protest (Wouters 2019: 408). This is because WUNC displays indicate a protest's strength and impact by acting as a theoretical scorecard against which a protest's potential success, strength and impact can be measured (Tilly 2006). Consequently, if any of the four components of WUNC are weak or not present, protests lose their strength; 'entirely unworthy or completely uncommitted participants, regardless of how numerous and/or unified, quite undermine the impact of any demonstration' (Tilly 2006: 291). However, a high display of one component can compensate for a low value of another; 'a very small number of highly worthy, unified, and committed persons can produce a larger impact' (Tilly 2006: 291). Because of this, disputes over protest actions often centre on the components of WUNC. For example, numbers are contested if a protest's advocates provide higher estimates of the number of participants than their critics (Tilly 2006: 291). Notably, Tilly (2006: 292) comments that the frequent fierceness of such disputes indicate that WUNC displays embody effective demonstrations and represent 'serious stakes'. They convey crucial political messages that say 'pay attention to us; we matter' (Tilly 2006: 292).

Tilly (2006) explains that protesters can use WUNC displays to make three sorts of political claims: *program claims* that involve 'stated support for or opposition to actual or proposed actions by the objects of movement claims'; *identity claims* that consist of 'assertions that "we" – the claimants – constitute a unified force to be reckoned with'; and *standing claims* that 'assert ties and similarities to other political actors' such as 'loyal supporters of the regime' (Tilly 2006: 292). When these claims are backed by WUNC displays, they convey the message that 'a distinct political actor has marched onto the scene' and so attention ought to be paid (Tilly 2006: 292).

Despite being the 'bread and butter of social movements' (Harvey et al. 2014: 11), WUNC has rarely taken centre stage as an analytical or methodological framework. Even Tilly himself never operationalised WUNC's components 'beyond exemplary descriptions' (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 366) and this same exemplary use of WUNC can be seen in the successive research of other scholars. For example, many studies only use Tilly's (2004: 3) aforementioned three-part definition of social movements in their research without discussing WUNC's components in any subsequent analysis (e.g. Hodge and Hallgrimsdottir 2020; Rule 2011; Kirby 2010; Chen 2009; Bull 2007). In other studies, only particular elements of WUNC are considered in detail: Brissette (2017) focuses mainly on worthiness, Wada (2014) on numbers and Thorson and Wang (2020) and Hsiao and Yang (2018) on commitment. In short, when WUNC appears in research, it is rarely developed further and is scarcely operationalised as an analytical or methodological framework. Tilly's work has therefore been 'scattered across many publications' that afford it 'little resonance' in research about social movements and protests (Wouters and Walgrave 2015: 112). Nevertheless, a portion of academic attention has turned to the development of WUNC as a theoretical framework in recent sociological research.

To evaluate the persuasive power of protest in Belgian television news broadcasts, Wouters and Walgrave (2015) undertook the first attempt to measure how protest stories are narrated in terms of WUNC. Adding ‘diversity’ as a fifth element to the acronym (dWUNC), Wouters and Walgrave (2015) investigated whether news items present protesters as dWUNC, and if so, how. By developing WUNC as a physical scorecard, coders were able to give demonstrations a numerical score on each dWUNC component, revealing high and low displays of dWUNC in protest coverage. These findings provide evidence that journalists use elements of dWUNC to narrate demonstrations and construct news stories.

Following these findings, Wouters and Walgrave (2017: 363) sought to test the ‘widely cited but untested claim’ that protesters influence powerholders when they exhibit WUNC displays. To that end, they exposed elected politicians in Belgium to manipulated television news items of protests with varying levels of ‘WUNCness’ (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 363). Once the politicians were shown the stimulus, they were surveyed about their attitudes towards the *salience* of the issue, their *position* on the issue and the *actions* they intended to take in regard to the issue (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 363). The results showed that the protesters’ displays of worthiness convinced politicians to agree or sympathise with their claims; high displays of numbers and unity both positively affected the politicians’ *salience*, *position* and *action* beliefs; and high displays of commitment resulted in the politicians feeling that the protesters deserved attention. Consequently, Wouters and Walgrave (2017: 375) concluded that high displays of WUNC can influence politicians’ attitudes in a way that was favourable to the aims of the protest. Most importantly, protests exhibiting high amounts of each WUNC element seemed to universally mobilise the ‘most democratic responsiveness among representatives’ (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 376), affecting politicians’ opinion formation and willingness to undertake action regardless of their political affiliations. Comparable results were gleaned by Wouters (2019), who found that it becomes more likely that the public will form a positive opinion about protests if they are successful in mobilising diverse, worthy and unified crowds.

Similarly, to gauge the effects of WUNC in their research, Freelon, McIlwain and Clark (2018) sought to quantifiably measure WUNC displays in the Black Lives Matter movement on Twitter. While the study is limited to only the last three components of WUNC, it develops Tilly's (2004) framework by measuring social movements on social media. Freelon et al. (2018: 994) quantified unity through the use of hashtags, which indicate 'a unified message'; gauged numbers by measuring the total number of people tweeting; and calculated commitment by computing the proportion of people who regularly tweeted about Black Lives Matter. This adaptation of WUNC found that displays of commitment are strongest in attracting the attention of political elites and that social movements can further 'policy-relevant goals directly through tweeting' (Freelon et al. 2018: 1005; 1007).

Overall, Wouters and Walgrave (2015) demonstrate how WUNC displays are used by journalists to narrate protest coverage, Wouters and Walgrave (2017) and Freelon et al. (2018) show how high levels of WUNC can influence decision makers and policy formation, and Wouters (2019) shows that mediated displays of (d)WUNC can elicit public support. In addition, these studies expand the scope of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment and their original experimental designs yield valuable results that operationalise WUNC as a replicable sociological framework (see also Nunes de Sousa and Canavarro 2018; Laschever 2017). However, while these studies make great contributions to the application of WUNC in sociological research, WUNC is yet to be applied as a framework elsewhere. Indeed, it has never before been employed in Linguistics, let alone been developed as a framework that could be used in (corpus-assisted) Critical Discourse Analysis. Chapter 6 aims to fill this lacuna by providing a replicable linguistic framework that can be used to research the mediated representations of protesters' WUNC displays in the press.

2.8 Research aims

Chapter 2 has sought to provide the scholarly context in which this thesis is situated. In doing so, it has provided evidence that reports of Brexit-related demonstrations have largely been ignored in Brexit and protest literature, and that corpus-assisted approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis have scarcely been used in the Brexit context. Chapter 2 also identified areas in which methods and frameworks of protest-media analysis can be developed and strengthened. By drawing on the concepts of legitimacy, the protest paradigm and WUNC, this thesis therefore seeks to address two broad research aims:

1. To uncover how the British press represented pro- and anti-Brexit protests; and
2. To develop new methods of performing corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analyses of the mediated representations of protests.

The methods through which these aims are achieved are discussed next, in Chapter 3.

3 Methodology

This chapter outlines the theoretical approaches and methodologies adopted in the thesis. The overarching method is corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis, an approach that incorporates, and exploits the strengths of, both quantitative and qualitative analysis (Baker et al. 2008: 283). Once the theories underpinning corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis have been explored, Chapter 3 moves onto discuss the data collection, dataset (corpus) and the specific corpus tools employed in analysis. Chapter 3 then explores the various and eclectic methodological approaches that have been used in combination with corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 4 uses Halliday's (1994, 1978) theory of Systemic Functional Linguistics, specifically the ideational metafunction, to analyse the system of transitivity. Chapter 5 takes a more sociological perspective by interpreting Entman's (1993) and McLeod and Hertog's (1999) definitions of framing in the context of Critical Discourse Analysis, and by integrating corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis into Matthes and Kohring's (2008) three approaches to framing (linguistic, computational and deductive). Lastly, Chapter 6 also adheres to Halliday's (1994, 1978) theory Systemic Functional Linguistics, analysing both the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions in the context of Tilly's (2004) sociological theory of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC).

3.1 Analytical approach

3.1.1 Corpus linguistics (CL)

Corpus linguistics (CL) is largely distinct from most linguistic disciplines, as it is not directly focused on any particular aspect of language (McEnery and Hardy 2012: 1). However, CL is not an end in itself (Kennedy 1998: 1) – rather, it is a field that focuses upon a varied and numerous set of methods and procedures for studying language (McEnery and Hardy 2012: 1). Although the application of CL is not monolithic, it can be broadly defined as the method of using large bodies of electronically encoded machine-readable texts to study a specific set of research questions (McEnery and Hardy 2021: 1).

Though any collection of texts could theoretically be a corpus (Baker 2018: 169), the datasets that make up corpora are generally sizeable and representative samples of a specific type of naturally occurring language, allowing them to be used as a 'standard reference with which claims about language can be measured' (Baker 2006: 2). As the texts are electronically coded, complex calculations can be carried out on data using a computer. This allows researchers to quickly read, search and manipulate the texts (McEnery and Hardy 2012: 2), revealing reliable linguistic patterns and unfailing frequency information that could otherwise take months to uncover manually (Baker 2006: 2). Moreover, as 'unaided common sense and introspection give access to only a very narrow range of facts' (Stubbs 2006: 16), incorporating corpus methods tends to uncover results that run counter to intuition (Baker 2006: 2), broadening the scope of researchers' understanding of a given discourse or topic.

3.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Fiske (1987: 14) defines discourse as 'a language or system of representation that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings'. In Linguistics, discourse analysts use texts (spoken, written, multimodal or otherwise) to research how these meanings are developed. In doing so, they consider language beyond the level of the sentence in an attempt to understand the possible reasons why a text is the way that it is and not some other way (Johnstone 2018: 60).

If this is what is understood as Discourse Analysis, *Critical* Discourse Analysis (CDA) can be defined as the study of discourse '*with an attitude*' (Van Dijk 2015: 466, italics in original). While some scholars prefer the term Critical Discourse Studies, or CDS, to CDA (e.g. Flowerdew and Richardson 2018; Van Dijk 2016; Wodak and Meyer 2016), I adopt the term CDA. Although both CDA and CDS refer to problem-oriented interdisciplinary research (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 3) that studies language by subsuming a variety of different approaches, theoretical models and methods (Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak 2011: 357), 'CDS' denotes the expansion of CDA from purely language-based analysis into a larger transdisciplinary research domain (Catalano and Waugh 2020: 2). CDS is then a broader field of study 'at the crossroads of language, society and other domains of human experience and in which various facets of expansive areas of context are studied and integrated' (Catalano and Waugh 2020: 156; Richardson, Krzyżanowski, Machin and Wodak 2014). Although I view CDA and CDS to be a part of the same overall research domain (Catalano and Waugh 2020) and integrate theories from both Linguistics and Political Sociology into my analysis, I consider CDA the more appropriate perspective in the context of this thesis because of its specific focus on linguistic phenomena. Additionally, as CDA is the 'older' name (and CDS the 'newer') (Catalano and Waugh 2020: 155), CDA seems more fitting here as Chapters 4 and 6 draw on concepts that are considered to be precursors to CDA – namely Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday 1978) and Critical Linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979) (see sections *3.5.1 The system of transitivity* and *3.7.2 Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)*).

CDA is built upon Fowler et al.'s (1979) early theorisation of Critical Linguistics, which was shaped by twentieth-century western Marxism and focused on language and its relation to the ideologies of capitalism (Fairclough 2010: 304; Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Like Discourse Analysis, CDA views language as 'a social practice, both reflecting and reproducing ideologies in society' (Baker et al. 2008: 280). However, situated in 'critical social science' (Fairclough 2010: 304), CDA takes a dissident stance to the study of language, holding that power abuse and inequality can be enacted, (re)produced, legitimated and resisted by text and talk in social and political contexts (Van Dijk 2015: 466). As such, Van Dijk (2015: 466, italics in original) claims that CDA can be considered a '*social movement* of politically committed discourse analysts' as their work explicitly seeks to expose and challenge social inequality. Herein lies CDA's attitude.

CDA holds that language and the social structures in which it is embedded have a dialectical relationship. This is because language is not powerful in and of itself. Rather, language gains power depending on who is using it and how it is used (Baker et al. 2008: 280). People who hold institutional and socially powerful positions (i.e. politicians, journalists, scholars and teachers) have the ability to shape institutional and social contexts. In turn, these contexts shape what we say and how we say it. Language can therefore discursively do things (Austin 1994), such as produce and construct social conditions and legitimise (or delegitimise) and reinforce (or dismantle) the social and political status quo (Wodak et al. 2009: 8). Because CDA seeks to unmask how language is able to create and perpetuate relationships of power based in dominance, inequality and injustice within social and political contexts (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 49), it demands 'politically involved research with an emancipatory requirement' (Titscher et al. 2000: 147). As such, research that does not take a dissident perspective in its approach to social justice is not work that can contribute to solving socio-political problems (Richardson 2006: 2). The application of CDA is therefore fitting in the context of this thesis, which seeks to uncover how protest(er)s (as dissenters of the status-quo) are represented in the news media (ideology-perpetuating institutions).

Because there are numerous ways to carry out CDA, it is considered a 'scholarly orientation' (Locke 2004: 2) or 'general framework' for analysing 'problem-oriented social research' (Baker et al. 2008: 279). Some approaches are rooted in Foucauldian theories of discourse (Jäger and Maier 2015; Foucault 1977), social semiotics (Fairclough 2015), cognition (Van Dijk 2002), and historical dimensions (Reisigl and Wodak 2015). Because these approaches are often multidisciplinary and varied, what unites CDA is not methodology or theoretical orthodoxy, but the common emancipatory goal of uncovering and critiquing the overarching discourses that effect the inequalities, injustices and oppression (Van Leeuwen 2009a: 166) found in institutional, political and media discourses (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). Rather than conforming to one branch of CDA, this thesis takes an eclectic approach by choosing and elaborating theories and methods as far as they are helpful and relevant to understand the socio-political issues under investigation (Wodak and Meyer 2001: 29; Van Dijk 1993: 252).

For example, in Chapter 4, the system of transitivity (Halliday 1994, 1978) was selected to perform a CDA of the representations of (de)legitimation in the leave and remain press. As will be discussed further in section *3.5.1 The system of transitivity*, transitivity analysis lends itself to CDA because it is concerned with how lexical items and grammatical structures are chosen by writers to produce and reproduce 'ideology and the legitimation of action' (Hart and Kelsey 2019: 4). Chapter 5 takes a more sociological perspective to CDA to perform an analysis of the 'frames' typical of McLeod and Hertog's (1999) protest paradigm. Taking the view that 'frames' are congruent with 'discourses', CDA is considered a complementary conceptual framework for the analysis of the protest paradigm as it seeks to uncover how the structure and content of news coverage can delegitimise, marginalise and demonise protesters (see section *3.6.1 Defining frames*). Lastly, Chapter 6 seeks to elaborate various Hallidayan (1994, 1978) theories adopted in CDA to formulate a brand new framework for qualitatively analysing texts about protests. As will be discussed in section *3.7.1 Mapping WUNC and CDA*, this 'linguistic WUNC framework' complements CDA, as both WUNC and CDA seek to influence power-holders and challenge social order.

As well as incorporating a methodologically eclectic approach to CDA, each analysis chapter utilises corpus tools as a means to navigate and observe the data under analysis. So, while CDA as a scholarly orientation is adopted, the overarching method used throughout the thesis is corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis.

3.1.3 Corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis

Neither CL or CDA are methodologies within and of themselves, but rather fields of inquiry that adopt various methods to realise specific aims (Baker et al. 2008: 273-274). That said, recent years have seen an increase in the integration of quantitative corpus tools and qualitative CDA, which have combined to form corpus-assisted CDA as a method of analysis (e.g. Baker 2014; Baker et al. 2008; Baker 2006). Some scholars refer to the integration of quantitative corpus measures in the study of discourse as Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (CADS) (Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013). However, CADS does not have an overarching political agenda (Partington et al. 2013: 10) and is used to answer questions concerning the non-dissenting discursive representations of phenomena (Gillings, Mautner and Baker 2023) as well as the particular features of different discourse types (Partington et al. 2013). CADS has therefore been applied in studies concerning, for example, discussions of climate change in business communication (Jaworska 2018); the pragmatic functions of the lexical item 'respect' in lawyers' courtroom discourse (Wright, Robson, Murray-Edwards and Braber 2022); patient feedback in healthcare settings (Baker, Brooks and Evans 2019); and genre-analyses of disease names in seventeenth-century England (McEnery and Baker 2022). While these studies all incorporate quantitative corpus measures and the qualitative analysis of discourse, they do not normally take the emancipatory, socially critical approach associated with corpus-assisted CDA (Wodak et al. 2009: 8). Corpus-assisted CDA has therefore been adopted in this thesis because its critical foundation takes a dissident perspective to the ideology of the media and their representations of protests.

Corpus-assisted CDA is widely regarded as a 'methodological synergy' in which elements of both CL and CDA contribute 'equally and distinctly' (Brookes and Baker 2021: 33; Baker et al. 2008: 274). This synergy builds on and adds value to traditional CDA approaches (Partington and Marchi 2015: 217), which usually relied on the qualitative analysis of a single or small number of texts over a particular period of time (O'Halloran 2010: 563). According to Partington and Marchi (2015: 216), this analysis used 'few concepts from linguistics proper' and relied on the researcher's knowledge, experience and prejudices of similar texts. However, academic attention turned to the CDA of larger bodies of text in the 1990s and the mainly qualitative methods used previously 'proved less suitable' (Koller and Mautner 2004: 216). It was the 'mismatch' between the framework and the nature of the data that called for the combination of CL's quantitative procedures and CDA's traditional qualitative analysis (Koller and Mautner 2004: 216).

Initially, because CDA's methodological tradition includes a holistic approach to text as well as concern for the interface between discourse and society, it at first did not appear to benefit from computer-aided analysis (Koller and Mautner 2004: 217). However, corpora and their related methods of analysis are becoming increasingly popular ways of carrying out CDA (Johnson 2012; Baker 2009b: 73). It is now well established that applying CL procedures to CDA frameworks 'exploit' both of their strong points (Baker et al. 2008: 283). Corpus methods utilise large bodies of electronically coded text, allowing complex calculations to be quickly carried out to reveal quantitative linguistic patterns and frequency information (Baker 2006: 1-2). CDA's rich theoretical underpinning then allows for the qualitative analysis of these results, interpreting their social relevance through theory-driven and in depth fine-grained analysis (Marchi and Taylor 2009: 3). Important to corpus-assisted CDA then is the 'shunting' back and forth between qualitative and quantitative methods (Rheindorf 2019: 34; Morley 2010: 10) instead of working in purely quantitative and qualitative components (Koller and Mautner 2004: 226).

Another benefit of integrating CL tools and CDA is making use of corpus analysis software, which can handle vast amounts of data and use robust statistical measures to highlight patterns across multiple texts. CL tools can therefore produce results that run counter to preconceived notions and intuitions, and highlight elements of the data that would not usually arouse attention (Baker 2006: 11-12; Koller and Mautner 2004: 218). As such, Baker et al. (2008: 277) note that quantitative CL methods offer ‘a reasonably high degree of objectivity’ in that they enable the researcher to approach the dataset (relatively) free from any predetermined ideas about its linguistic content. Consequently, CL approaches have been celebrated as facilitating higher levels of consistency, reliability and representativeness, leading to more robust findings (Lukac 2011; Marchi and Taylor 2009; Orpin 2005), particularly in the interpretation of qualitative analysis on which CDA studies ‘traditionally depend heavily but not always systematically’ (Rheindorf 2019: 40; Lin 2014: 226).

That said, practitioners of corpus-assisted CDA must avoid the naïve perspective that the incorporation of quantitative CL measures result in objective analysis (Mautner 2016). Subjective researcher input is involved at nearly every stage of CL, including what texts should be included in the corpus, what is to be analysed and what the cut off points and statistical measures will be (Baker et al. 2008: 277). Even once these calculations have been input, the quantified data is still subject to human bias (Rheindorf 2019: 44). And of course, interpretative analysis is necessary when undergoing the qualitative aspects of corpus-assisted CDA – for example, when researchers observe and identify patterns when performing manual concordance analysis (Baker et al. 2008: 277). CL tools should therefore be viewed as offering CDA researchers useful techniques for navigating large dataset and revealing patterns that may have otherwise been overlooked had statistical measures not been implemented. Corpus-assisted CDA is therefore a beneficial methodology for researchers that wish to uncover linguistic patterns that make explicit the underlying assumptions that link lexical items to social practices, and vice versa (Fitzgerald 2017: 2).

3.2 Data collection

The corpus for this research is titled 'BPBP', an acronym for 'Brexit Protests in the British Press'. To build the corpus, articles from every print and online daily national UK newspaper that mentioned any Brexit-related protests in the headline or lead paragraph were collected from the online news database Nexis UK. Any relevant articles published between June 2016 and December 2019 were then downloaded. These were selected as the start and end dates because the Brexit referendum took place on 23 June 2016 and a snap election was called on 12 December 2019 to resolve the 'intractable divisions in parliament over Brexit' (Prosser 2020: 451).

The British press encompasses a wide range of newspapers, characterised by their frequency, political stance, style and coverage (Baker et al. 2013a: 4). Given the UK's large regional discrepancies in the Brexit vote (Blackaby, Drinkwater and Robinson 2020), it would have been interesting to research protest representation in regional newspapers. However, national newspapers were selected because they are readily available to the entire UK population (Baker et al. 2013a: 4) and more likely to cover a broader range of protests. Most importantly, national newspapers are 'powerful and overt political players' (Scammell and Semetko 2008: 74). They are willing and able to shape and push agendas and can better afford the space needed for the comprehensive presentation of issues compared to a medium such as television news (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008: 9). Further, the BPBP comprises both print and online newspaper articles as the availability of online articles potentially extends influence and social power over younger people (aged 16-24) who prefer reading online articles as their source of news (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008: 9; Coleman, Griffiths, and Simmons 2002: 23-24) and are increasingly politically engaged (Pickard 2019).

While it is important to acknowledge the continual decline of print newspaper circulation and sales when conducting research about the press and its possible influence on readerships, the fall has not ‘ended the relevance of the press to political debate’ (Levy et al. 2016: 6). Certainly, what the press report on, and how they report on it, helps to set the agenda for other media such as television and radio (Greenslade 2011; Wring and Ward 2010). This was particularly evident during the coverage of Brexit. Because of the ‘cross-cutting nature’ of the Brexit debate, television broadcasters, who are required to offer due impartiality, likely relied on the press more than they would have in a conventional election campaign to decide how best to balance their coverage (Levy et al. 2016: 7). As such, national daily UK newspapers are the most appropriate data for this research.

The BPBP corpus is aimed at being ‘maximally representative’ of the language under examination (McEnery and Wilson 1996: 22) – that is, the language used in the national daily UK press reporting of Brexit-related protests. To compile the corpus, newspaper articles, Brexit-related campaign websites and protest information websites were read to find the names of as many Brexit-related protests as possible. The protest names were then used as search terms on the Nexis UK database (Table 3.1, overleaf) to find print and online newspaper articles that covered the demonstrations.

Table 3.1: The pro- and anti-Brexit protests used as search terms in Nexis UK and the dates the protests took place.

Leave protest	**Date**
Fishing for Leave	08/04/2018
Fishing for Leave	15/03/2019
March to Leave/Leave Means Leave	16/03/2019
Leave Means Leave	29/03/2019
Make Brexit Happen	29/03/2019
Remain protest	
March for Europe	02/07/2016
March for Europe	03/09/2016
Unite for Europe	25/03/2017
People's March for Europe	09/09/2017
People's Vote March	23/06/2018
People's Vote March for the Future	20/10/2018
Put It to the People March	23/03/2019
No to Boris Yes to Europe/March for Change	20/07/2019
Stop the Coup	31/08/2019
Final Say/Let Us Be Heard	19/10/2019

On occasions in which the same protests were referred to with more than one name (e.g. March to Leave and Leave Means Leave), both terms were searched for. 'Sanity checks' (Wright and Brookes 2019: 64) were then performed to ensure that the search terms related specifically to the protests – not just slogans popularised during the Brexit campaign (e.g. 'leave means leave' and 'people's vote'). Articles that contained at least one mention of a Brexit-related protest were downloaded. Their metadata and indexing information was then removed, leaving only the headline and main body of the articles for analysis (Brookes and Wright 2020: 117). They were then converted from Microsoft Word documents to plain text formats (*.txt*) so that they could be processed by AntConc (Anthony 2019), a corpus analysis software package. Files were saved by newspaper, protest name and date (e.g. 'Guardian March to Leave 01.03.19') so that relevant files could be selected with ease (Ädel 2021: 13). Although similar results on Nexis UK were grouped together to minimise the inclusion of duplicates (Brookes and Wright

2020: 116), a second sanity check was performed to remove any copies of the same article that remained.

Once the data was checked and cleaned, it comprised 845 articles and 662,258 words that spanned ten daily national UK newspapers. Newspapers with daily, online and Sunday editions were subsumed under one name (e.g. *The Daily Mail*, *MailOnline* and *The Mail on Sunday* are all referred to as *The Daily Mail*) (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2: The newspapers, articles and words that comprise the BPBP.

Newspaper name	**Number of articles**	**Number of words**
Leave newspaper		
The Express	197	133,749
The Daily Mail	66	69,825
The Telegraph	52	35,219
The Sun	44	12,950
Daily Star	11	3,698
Total	**370**	**255,441**
Remain newspaper		
The Independent	254	186,010
The Guardian	100	151,240
The Times	54	33,801
The Mirror	49	25,557
Financial Times	18	10,209
Total	**475**	**406,817**
Total for BPBP	**845**	**662,258**

It is important to note here that the BPBP corpus is not equally balanced. Comprising 406,817 words, remain newspapers make up 61.43% of the total words whereas leave newspapers, comprising 255,441 words, make up only 38.57% (Table 3.2). However, this is not necessarily a methodological disadvantage and does not pose an issue for analytical conclusions. The imbalance in the data ‘represents the real-life press landscape’ (Brookes and Baker 2021: 28) which specifically corresponds to the inequity of protest coverage present in each publication.

The division between leave and remain-supporting newspapers was based on data from Loughborough University’s Centre for Research in Communication and Culture (CRCC) (2016). Based on the volume of coverage supporting leave or remain, the CRCC (2016) found that of the ten national daily UK newspapers, *The Express, The Daily Mail, The Sun, Daily Star* and *The Telegraph* were in favour of the leave vote, whereas *Financial Times, The Guardian, The Mirror, The Independent* and *The Times* backed remain (Figure 3.1).

Paper	**Score**	
Financial Times	1	
Guardian	1.5	REMAIN
Daily Mirror	3	↑
I	4	↕
The Times	5	↕
Daily Telegraph	6.5	↕
Daily Star	7	↓
The Sun	7.5	LEAVE
Daily Mail	9	
Daily Express	10	

Figure 3.1: The extent of each newspapers’ partisanship ranked by the CCRC (2016), where 1 is most supportive of remain and 10 is most supportive of leave.

3.2.1 Sub-corpora

The BPBP has been divided into various sub-corpora to accomplish the aims of each analysis chapter. Chapter 4 compares the (de)legitimate representations of pro- and anti-Brexit protests in the leave and remain press. To achieve this, the BPBP was split into four sub-corpora: Leave/Pro-Brexit, Leave/Anti-Brexit, Remain/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit. As shown in Table 3.3 (overleaf), Leave/Pro-Brexit and Leave/Anti-Brexit comprise the leave-supporting newspaper articles that cover pro-Brexit protests and anti-Brexit protests, respectively. Remain/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit therefore comprise the remain-supporting newspaper articles that cover anti-Brexit protests and pro-Brexit protests, respectively. Chapter 5 investigates two of these sub-corpora (Leave/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit) to examine their adherence to the protest paradigm.

Table 3.3: The newspapers, articles and words comprising the Leave/Pro-Brexit, Leave/Anti-Brexit, Remain/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora.

Newspaper name	**Number of articles**	**Number of words**
Leave/Pro-Brexit		
The Express	76	52,306
The Daily Mail	15	21,698
The Telegraph	16	10,463
The Sun	9	2,860
Daily Star	1	118
Total	**117**	**87,445**
Leave/Anti-Brexit		
The Express	121	81,443
The Daily Mail	51	48,127
The Telegraph	36	24,756
The Sun	35	10,090
Daily Star	10	3,580
Total	**253**	**167,996**
Remain/Anti-Brexit		
The Independent	244	178,853
The Guardian	85	137,416
The Times	51	31,551
The Mirror	42	22,380
Financial Times	13	7,758
Total	**435**	**377,958**
Remain/Pro-Brexit		
The Independent	10	7,157
The Guardian	15	13,824
The Times	3	2,250
The Mirror	7	3,177
Financial Times	5	2,451
Total	**40**	**28,859**

Chapter 6 is divided into two parts, the second of which is concerned with the representation of protests organised by the People’s Vote campaign. These protests were reported on more than any other Brexit-related demonstration and include: People’s Vote March; People’s Vote

March for the Future; Put it to the People March; and Final Say. Articles from the leave and remain press that reported on any of these four protests were grouped to create a People's Vote March (PVM) sub-corpus. As shown in Table 3.4, the resulting sub-corpus stands at 572 articles and 469,069 words – 67.69% of the total articles and 70.83% of the total words in the BPBP, evidencing the PVM's salience in the press.

Table 3.4: The newspapers, articles and words comprising the PVM sub-corpus.

Newspaper name	Number of articles	Number of words
Leave newspaper		
The Express	100	68,517
The Daily Mail	36	31,081
The Telegraph	20	10,279
The Sun	29	8,519
Daily Star	7	2,677
Total	**192**	**121,073**
Remain newspaper		
The Independent	219	162,734
The Guardian	78	131,953
The Times	41	29,664
The Mirror	32	18,017
Financial Times	10	5,628
Total	**380**	**347,996**
Total for PVM sub-corpus	**572**	**469,069**

The following section details the particular CL procedures that have been drawn upon in the analysis of these sub-corpora: keyword analysis, key keyword analysis and concordance analysis.

3.3 Corpus tools

Corpora can be used variously to identify the structural patterns that make up language systems, to study variation or diachronic language use, and to show how often and where particular phonological, lexical, grammatical, discoursal or pragmatic features occur in any given sets of texts (Kennedy 1998: 5). The tools that enable practitioners to research such various aspects of language depend on both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Indeed, the creation of quantitative word lists and keyword lists followed by qualitative concordancing are generally understood to be the basic analytical tools in CL (Evison 2010). While there is not space to detail all of CL's many functions here, sections *3.3.1 Word lists – 3.3.4 Concordance analysis* offer an overview of the CL techniques used in this study, underscoring the idea that when qualitative and quantitative approaches are used in combination 'the resulting analysis is invariably stronger and more convincing' (Deacon et al. 2021: 173).

3.3.1 Word lists

Word lists (also referred to as frequency lists) establish how many tokens (words) there are in a corpus and how often they occur (Evison 2010: 124). These lists are automatically sorted to display the most frequent words at the top and the least frequent at the bottom, allowing researchers to observe both the frequency of each word and 'the wealth of vocabulary' in the dataset (Scott 2010: 148). Word lists are often seen as a best first approach to CL, as it is the processing of words and observation of their frequencies that can give a rough indication of the topics and themes that are present in the dataset (Scott 2010: 148). For example, Table 3.5 (overleaf) shows the 30 most frequent words in the BPBP corpus.

Table 3.5: The 30 most frequent words in the BPBP corpus, ranked by frequency.

Rank	Frequency	Word
1	41508	the
2	21205	to
3	16631	a
4	15759	of
5	13269	and
6	11084	in
7	8416	s
8	7554	for
9	7435	is
10	7084	on
11	7056	that
12	6943	brexit
13	6457	it
14	5627	people
15	4788	be

Rank	Frequency	Word
16	4581	we
17	4038	with
18	4013	will
19	3978	as
20	3951	vote
21	3598	have
22	3592	i
23	3513	was
24	3345	deal
25	3321	march
26	3293	said
27	3263	eu
28	3210	this
29	3178	he
30	3174	by

As is to be expected, grammatical words occur most frequently in the corpus. Generally, grammatical words such as the definite and indefinite articles ‘the’ and ‘a’ occur far more in a text of any subject than any given function word. The most frequent function words that occur in this list are *brexit*, *people*, *vote*, *deal*, *march*, *said*, and *eu*, which may point to prominent themes in the corpus.

3.3.2 Keyword analysis

While wordlists are useful, a more ‘statistically robust’ way of finding prevalent words and themes in a corpus is through the creation of keyword lists (Brookes and Baker 2021: 29). Discourse analysis is ‘inherently comparative’ – researchers cannot reasonably make statements about the relevance of any linguistic phenomena that occurs in one dataset unless it is compared to how it behaves elsewhere (Partington and Marchi 2015: 223). In corpus-assisted CDA, creating keyword lists is a popular and widely-used method that can be used to facilitate this comparison (Partington and Marchi 2015: 223). Keyword lists can be produced when a researcher’s wordlist (target corpus) is compared to the word list of another, usually larger, corpus (reference corpus). Reference corpora are reliable repositories that contain substantial amounts of a specific type of language (Tognini Bonelli 2010: 20). Comparing the target and reference corpora produces a list of words that occur with unusual frequency in the target corpus (Scott 2010: 149), making evident the words that are statistically characteristic of the researcher's data. Because of their statistical significance, keywords cannot be merely selected on the basis of researchers' subjective judgements of importance and their prevalence can reveal words that researchers did not think to be important in the first place (Culpeper and Demmen 2015: 90).

When a keyword list is created – that is, when the frequency of each word in a target corpus is compared to its frequency in the reference corpus – a keyness value is calculated. The resulting list of target corpus keywords is then reordered to reflect the keyness values (the statistical significance) of the words that make up the dataset (Rayson and Potts 2021: 121). Those which are unusually frequent in the target corpus when compared to a reference corpus are 'positive' keywords and those which are unusually infrequent are 'negative' (Rayson and Potts 2021: 121). Usually, the keyword lists are ordered in ascending order so that the most positive keywords appear at the top and the most negative appear at the end. This highlighted difference in word frequency is useful as changes to the relative ordering of words can indicate points of interest (Sinclair 1991: 31) and the 'aboutness' of data (Baker 2006: 128). While this method is conceptually simple, complexity arises in the choice of statistics and frequency cut-offs applied to the keyword lists to filter results (Rayson and Potts 2021: 121).

Because the selection of keywords in analysis greatly influences the conclusions of a study, 'the accurate and principled identification of key terms is crucial' (Gabrielatos 2018: 228). To be as accurate and principled as possible, the keyword lists used in this thesis incorporated both statistical significance and effect-size measures. Firstly, the significance test statistic log-likelihood (LL) (Dunning 1993) was selected because it is a widely applied statistical measure (Egbert and Biber 2019: 78-79) due to its consistent accuracy (Rayson, Berridge and Francis 2004). LL identifies precisely the statistical significance of rare events in language use, and measures the extent to which we can trust the difference of an observed frequency (Gabrielatos 2018: 229). LL uses *p*-values (a number between 0 and 1) to indicate the probability of a keyword occurring by chance (Culpeper and Demmen 2015: 98). A word is 'key' if its frequency in the text when compared with its frequency in a reference corpus is such that the statistical probability is smaller than or equal to the *p* value specified by the analyst (Scott 1998: 71). That is, the proposed metric for keyness is not the size of the frequency difference itself, but the extent to which an observed frequency difference can be trusted, irrespective of its size (Gabrielatos 2018: 229). When creating keyword lists for this thesis, the keyword statistic threshold was changed from AntConc's (Anthony 2019) default $p<0.05$ to $p<0.01$. $p<0.01$ was chosen because the smaller the *p*-value, the surer we can be that the keywords have statistically significant differences in their relative frequencies across the target and reference corpora. Generally in CL, the threshold $p<0.01$ is the standard cut-off point (Gabrielatos 2018: 239) as it indicates 99% certainty that a given keyword is statistically significant (whereas a value of $p<0.05$ indicates only 95% certainty that a given keyword is statistically significant [Scott 2015: 235]).

According to Gabrielatos (2018: 229), if a keyword is identified through frequency comparison it should follow that keyness reflects the size of the frequency difference, and that the larger the difference, the more 'key' a word is. However, keyness only refers to the statistical significance, not the size of a frequency difference itself. It can therefore be misleading, as a very significant result may just mean that the sample is large (Gabrielatos 2018: 229; Andrew, Pedersen and McEvoy 2011: 60). Particularly in very large corpora, even weak relationships between words in the target and reference corpora can be significant (Rosenfeld and Penrod 2011: 84). This is because statistical significance does not show the size of difference in frequency – it only reveals the level of confidence we can have that the observed difference is dependable (Gabrielatos 2018: 231). However, effect-size measures do not depend on the size of the corpus (Rosenfeld and Penrod 2011: 84) and can be introduced to measure the 'practical significance' of keywords (Ridge and Kudenko 2010: 272). Effect-size measures indicate the 'magnitude of an observed finding' (Rosenfeld and Penrod 2011: 342) by showing whether the difference between the study and reference corpora is strong or weak (Mujis 2010: 70). Keywords sorted by effect-size are therefore more reliably representative of the target corpus than if they were sorted by their statistical significance alone as effect-size measures prevent claims of statistically significant results that have little consequence (Ridge and Kudenko 2010: 272). In this thesis, the effect-size measure was set to Hardie's Log Ratio (Hardie 2014) to ensure that the words that appeared at the top of the list had a high effect-size.

It is important to note that statistical significance and effect-size measures are not alternatives and that they can be used together to measure different components of frequency differences (Gabrielatos 2018: 231). Incorporating both in the creation of keyword lists shows that the relationship between the two values they indicate is direct: 'the higher the value returned, the higher the significance level' (Gabrielatos 2018: 231). Using both measures therefore ensures that the keywords will be ranked according to the size of the frequency difference and indicate the level of confidence we can have that the keyword is frequent enough and the corpora large enough for the observed differences to be dependable (Gabrielatos 2018: 238).

Once the keyword list is compiled, the words that comprise it serve as a 'point of entry' into the data (Baker 2010: 138) because they are 'especially characteristic' of the corpus (Egbert and Biber 2019: 77). However, the production and identification of keywords is only the first stage of keyword analysis. On their own, keywords do not provide information about how they are used in context. As such, the next step of keyword analysis is to group observable thematic or semantic patterns. These are termed ‘key categories’ and point to the existence of particular prominent discourses in the corpus (Baker 2006: 143). This thematic grouping of keywords is qualitative as it involves researchers making subjective choices about the categories (Baker 2004: 353). Practitioners must then be careful, ensuring that their thematic categorisations are informing their analysis and not constraining it. Preconceived notions of the semantic and grammatical meanings of lexical items can (unintentionally) lead researchers to ignore the various other applications and discourses of words that do not support their biases. Examining keywords in their concordance lines can help to avoid this, as the ‘clues’ provided by the context in which they are embedded help to clarify and explicate the various ways that they are used (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008: 17).

Before beginning any formal analysis for this thesis, I created a keyword list to gain an initial insight into the aboutness of my dataset and to gain an understanding of concepts that were likely to occur throughout the analysis. Table 3.6 (overleaf) shows the top 30 keywords sorted by effect-size in the BPBP target corpus, which was compared to the British English 2006 (BE06) reference corpus (Baker 2009a).

Table 3.6: The top 30 keywords sorted by effect-size in the BPBP corpus.

Rank	Freq.	Keyness	Effect	Keyword
1	6943	+12887.85	14.367	brexit
2	580	+1073.24	10.7856	farage
3	314	+580.95	9.9003	twitter
4	308	+569.85	9.8725	remainers
5	266	+492.13	9.661	brexiteers
6	199	+368.16	9.2423	brexiteer
7	190	+351.51	9.1756	mogg
8	187	+345.96	9.1526	bst
9	181	+334.8	9.1055	remainer
10	164	+303.4	8.9633	sadiq
11	152	+281.2	8.8536	pic
12	150	+277.5	8.8345	soubry
13	598	+1081.76	8.8297	corbyn
14	149	+275.65	8.8249	letwin
15	138	+255.3	8.7142	trump
16	539	+972.98	8.6798	protesters
17	117	+216.45	8.4761	bercow
18	114	+210.9	8.4386	lammy
19	113	+209.05	8.4259	backstop
20	113	+209.05	8.4259	keir
21	892	+1603.58	8.4066	theresa
22	103	+190.55	8.2922	starmer
23	101	+186.85	8.2639	dup
24	97	+179.45	8.2056	izzard
25	97	+179.45	8.2056	tweeted
26	86	+159.1	8.032	alastair
27	82	+151.7	7.9633	raab
28	650	+1158.09	7.95	rally
29	80	+148	7.9276	thornberry
30	75	+138.75	7.8345	tice

This list of keywords gives a more thorough insight into the themes that specifically characterise the BPBP corpus than the word list in Table 3.5 (section *3.3.1 Word lists*) does. Generally, keywords are grouped into semantic or thematic categories which usually form the basis of subsequent analysis. Some of the keywords in Table 3.6 can be grouped into thematic categories, for example: Brexit (*brexit*, *remainers*, *brexiteers*, *brexiteer*, *remainer*, *letwin*, *backstop*); politicians (*farage*, *mogg*, *sadiq*, *soubry*, *corbyn*, *trump*, *bercow*, *lammy*, *keir*, *theresa*, *starmer*, *alastair*, *raab*, *thornberry*, *tice*); and protests (*protesters*, *rally*). Some of the keywords in the Brexit category might also apply to the protest category - *remainers*, *brexiteers*, *brexiteer*, and *remainer* could all be terms used to describe protesters. To gain a clearer picture of how keywords are used, keyword analysis is usually followed by concordance analysis, which contextualises keywords and reveals the ways in which they are used in the texts they occur in.

In order to arrive at the keyword list in Table 3.6, the BPBP corpus was compared to the BE06 reference corpus. The BE06 is a one million word corpus made up of written British English published between 2003 and 2008 (Baker 2009a). In response to criticisms that the reference corpora available at the time inadequately represented contemporary language use in the UK, the BE06 was compiled to make up-to-date corpus research possible (Baker 2009a: 315). The corpus is comprised of 500 extracts of 2000 words that represent general written English (Brookes and Baker 2020: 4; Baker 2009a: 317). The BE06 is a popular reference corpus and is used widely in corpus-assisted CDA (e.g. Baker and McGlashan 2020; Brookes and McEnery 2020; Zottola 2018; Pérez-Paredes, Aguado Jiménez and Sánchez Hernández 2017).

In the context of this thesis, an obvious limitation of the BE06 is that it contains no Brexit-related lexical items. Although there is another, more recent reference corpus available – the British National Corpus 2014 (BNC2014) (Brezina, Hawtin and McEnery 2021) – it still does not contain any reference to Brexit or its associated protests and politics. While arguably, it is always preferable to use the most up-to-date reference corpus available, the BNC2014 was not released until November 2019, six months after the data analysis for this thesis began. Nevertheless, the datasets under study in Baker and McGlashan (2020), Brookes and McEnery (2020) and Zottola (2018) were also all published years after the BE06, so it should not be considered outmoded.

3.3.3 Key keyword analysis

As well as retrieving keywords, corpus analysts can observe key keywords – that is, words that are key in a number of texts of a given type (Scott 1997: 237). To find key keywords, a separate frequency-based keyword analysis is performed to compare multiple corpora or sub-corpora against a reference corpus. Keywords that are continually dispersed across different corpora are key keywords. The more texts a word is key in, the more key key it is (Scott 2016). Consequently, while keywords identify differences in target and reference corpora, key keywords allow for a focus on similarity by identifying characteristics that are shared by other corpora (Taylor 2018: 26). Key keywords are analysed in Chapter 5 to observe repeated patterns across multiple sub-corpora.

3.3.4 Concordance analysis

Concordance analysis is a qualitative, interpretative method in which approaches from CL and CDA overlap (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008: 15). Concordancing is a qualitative analysis technique that allows researchers to monitor a list of all the instances of a particular search term in a corpus (Baker 2006: 71). It allows for both manual concordance and collocation analysis by displaying search terms within their 'real-life contexts' (Weisser 2016: 80). The context in which the search terms occur is often referred to as a span, window or KWICs (key words in context – but note that these are distinct from the keywords discussed in section 3.4.2) (Wulff and Baker 2021: 162). These spans of words are referred to as concordance lines (Wulff and Baker 2021: 162).

Observing concordance lines enables researchers to qualitatively investigate the occurrences and behaviours of words (Weisser 2016: 80) and find patterns that might go unnoticed if they were to read the examples as one running text (Wulff and Baker 2021: 163). This is because the typical layout of concordances positions the node (search term) in the centre of its surrounding text (Wulff and Baker 2021: 162) in all of its contexts across the dataset (Tribble 2010: 171). Context windows can be widened, concordance lines can be arranged alphabetically and words in the node's left and/or right-hand context can be displayed to show clearly how and where a node is used (Wulff and Baker 2021: 163). As shown in Table 3.7, AntConc (Anthony 2019) displays concordances in the following way if the node ‘protesters’ is searched for in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus:

Table 3.7: Concordance snippet of ‘protesters’ in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus, sorted alphabetically.

Left-hand context	Search term	Right-hand context
Blowtorches in Brussels as	protesters	demand a people’s vote
‘Stop the coup,’	protesters	demand after Johnson’s decision to…
LIVE:	protesters	demand Boris Johnson ‘stop the coup…
Pro-Brexit	protesters	demand independence
Human tide of	protesters	demand new vote on Brexit
…off in central London as	protesters	demand resources be directed…
'One million'	protesters	demand second referendum as…
	Protesters	demanded a pause in the Brexit…
… for Europe and Open Britain,	protesters	demanded the public be given a…
…rich thespian tones to fellow	protesters	demanding a second Brexit…

Sorting concordances in this way enables researchers to find patterns promptly. A quick glance at the 10 concordance lines in Table 3.7 reveals multiple interesting themes. For example, the left-hand context shows that the protesters are sometimes collectivised (‘Human tide’, ‘One million’) and the right-hand context shows that transitive verbs concerning protesters’ aims (‘demand’, ‘demanded’, ‘demanding’) immediately follow the node. This presentation of the data allows researchers to analyse the context in which a term is presented in-depth as it provides additional information about the various uses of the node in the corpus (Zottola 2018: 245). Tribble (2010: 179) comments that the process of looking for prominent linguistic and discursive patterns that occur to the left and/or right of the node reveal forms that may be worth focusing on, helping researchers to form a hypothesis that may link the patterns (Sinclair 2003: xvi). However, because concordance lines only show a small span of context either side of the search term, nuances in the data can be overlooked (Wulff and Baker 2021: 169). So, once initial patterns have been identified, a qualitative close reading of the concordance lines can take place by using AntConc's (Anthony 2019) 'File View' function, which expands concordance lines to show how they are used in the text they originally occurred in. This allows for the observation of nuances by inspecting lines that potentially function differently to a first glance (Wulff and Baker 2021: 169). This ensures that interpretations are 'grounded in a systematic appraisal of a linguistic item's typical and atypical uses', guarding against 'interpretative positivism' (Wulff and Baker 2021: 175) – that is, the idea that 'a particular linguistic feature, irrespective of the context of its use, will always generate a particular meaning' (Simpson 1993: 113). Observing and analysing nodes in this way can be particularly revealing in CDA because, as Firth (1957: 11) famously asserts, 'you shall know a word by the company it keeps'. Words do not exist on their own; they are embedded in and influenced by pre-existing notions of cultural, social and political patterns (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 53). Concordance analysis is then the perfect procedure for investigating words in their contexts, as our understanding and interpretation of discourses are evoked through specific and deliberate word choices – especially when the same discourses are embodied through a variety of different patterns of language (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008: 20-21).

When manual concordance analysis eventually exhausts observable patterns, the patterns can be grouped into thematic or semantic categories to form the basis of further analysis. Of course, human error and cognitive bias may lead researchers to 'over-focus on patterns that are easy to spot' (Wulff and Baker 2021: 174). Because manual concordance analysis can be very time consuming, what is noticed first may receive the most attention (Wulff and Baker 2021: 174), causing what Baker (2006: 11) refers to as the 'primacy effect'. In an attempt to overcome this in this thesis, where necessary, concordance lines underwent several rounds of intra-rater reliability to check their accuracy and consistency (see Chapter 5, section *5.1 How corpus-assisted CDA can be used to identify frames*).

To summarise, concordance analysis is a useful corpus tool for performing qualitative CDA because it enables researchers to analyse lexical items exhaustively, allowing patterns to emerge that practitioners would be less likely to observe by reading whole texts or analysing purely quantitative word lists (Wulff and Baker 2021: 175). Consequently, when used together, the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in corpus-assisted CDA have been 'praised as offering a solution to the limitations of the two approaches' (Marchi and Taylor 2009: 2). A combination of these methods have been employed in each analysis chapter alongside various theoretical frameworks and approaches, the specifics of which will be discussed throughout sections *3.5 Tools for analysing (de)legitimation*, *3.6 Tools for analysing the protest paradigm* and *3.7 Tools for analysing WUNC*.

3.5 Tools for analysing (de)legitimation

Chapter 4 explores expressions of (de)legitimation by drawing on the system of transitivity (Halliday 1994, 1978) to analyse how material and verbal processes are used in the leave and remain press to represent pro- and anti-Brexit protesters.

3.5.1 The system of transitivity

Wodak (2001: 8) comments that to properly understand CDA, it is essential that we understand Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). Underpinning SFL are numerous functions, referred to as the three metafunctions of language: ideational, which functions to describe one's experiences in and of the world; interpersonal, which refers to negotiating relationships with others; and textual, which functions to organise text in terms of theme/rheme and cohesion in order to render the expression of the first two metafunctions possible (Krendel 2020: 614; Halliday 1994, 1978). Of particular relevance to CDA is the ideational metafunction because it considers language as a means of conveying the expression of experience of the world

(Alameda Hernandez 2008: 163). This metafunction is achieved through the system of transitivity (Halliday 1994, 1978).

The system of transitivity is a grammatical system that uncovers how types of processes (material, mental, verbal, behavioural, relational and existential), participant roles (actor/goal, senser/phenomenon, carrier/token, behaver, sayer and existent) and circumstances (why, when, where, how?) are represented in discourse (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 177). Once processes, participant roles and circumstances have been identified, transitivity analysis allows for the investigation of how processes manifest in discourse by relating the structural organisations of a given clause to the ideologies embedded within it (Alameda Hernandez 2008: 163).

Van Leeuwen (2015: 141) comments that Halliday's (1994, 1978) theory of transitivity made it possible for researchers to interpret differently worded representations of the same reality as different social constructions of that reality. Halliday (1989: 101) writes that 'grammar goes beyond formal rules of correctness' and can be used as 'a means of representing patterns of experience'. Fowler et al.'s (1979) early work on critical linguistics demonstrated how Hallidayan transitivity analysis can be used and extended for the purpose of CDA (see also Kress and Hodge 1979 and Hodge and Kress 1993). They argued that the 'patterns of experience' Halliday (1989: 101) refers to are not necessarily neutral, and are patterned the way that they are to suit the interests of those who use them. Furthermore, Fowler et al. (1979) considered that different uses of the same language could also encode different 'patterns of experiences', and therefore different ideologies. Following Halliday (1989), they felt that this was not just done through vocabulary, 'but also and especially through different grammatical structures' (Van Leeuwen 2009b: 280). A classic example of how critical linguists analysed the system of transitivity comes from Trew (1979), who researched how the press covered an event in which the Harare police fired into an unarmed crowd and shot thirteen people in 1975 in what was then Rhodesia. In reporting the event, *The Times* used the passive form ‘Rioting Blacks Shot Dead By Police’ as their headline, putting the agents of the killings, ‘police’, in the less focal position. Moreover, because the passive clause focuses on the ones shot, rather than the shooters, describing the ‘blacks’ as ‘rioting’ suggests that those shot were responsible for the situation, further obfuscating the blame of the police (Trew 1979: 99-100). Conversely, the more left-wing *The Guardian* used the active form ‘Police Shoot 11 Dead in Salisbury Riot’, foregrounding the police as the agents of the killings. Trew (1979) concluded that these different ways of wording the same event represent different interpretations of the event, which are grounded in different political views. Van Leeuwen (2009b: 281) notes that with work of this kind, early critical linguists ‘took the fundamental step of interpreting grammatical categories as potential traces of ideological mystification, and broke with a tradition in which different ways of saying the same thing were seen as meaningless stylistic variants’.

As well as analysing grammatical agency, transitivity analysis can be used to further investigate relationships between agents and actions in a clause through a focus on ‘processes’, which involve participants and circumstances (Thompson 2014: 92). To illustrate, I have borrowed Trew’s (1979) example:

Police	Shoot	11	Dead	in Salisbury Riot
Participant	Process	Participant	Circumstance	Circumstance

Figure 3.2: An example of a process, participants and a circumstance in a clause.

From Halliday’s (1994, 1978) ideational perspective, processes are the core of the clause because the clause is primarily ‘about’ the action, event or state that participants are involved in (Thompson 2014: 92). Processes are typically expressed through main verbs (‘shoot’); clauses usually include at least one participant, realised by a noun phrase (‘police’, ‘11’); and circumstances give additional information about the process and express their circumstances, conditions and constraints (‘dead’, ‘in Salisbury riot’), subtypes of which are usually labelled *extent*, *location*, *manner*, *cause*, *contingency*, *accompaniment*, *role*, *matter* and *angle* (Bloor and Bloor 2013: 286). How the participants of processes are described is also of great representational importance. This is exemplified in Figure 3.2, where the victims of the shooting are labelled simply as '11' – not as, for example, '11 people' – through impersonalisation (i.e. they are not represented as human) and aggregation (i.e. they are quantified as a number) (Van Leeuwen 2008: 46; 38). These referential strategies therefore contribute to the dehumanisation of the victims, and in turn to the obfuscation of the police's blame. Nevertheless, Chapter 4 mainly focuses on the representation of action. The analysis of participants and the ways in which they are referred to will be discussed further in section *3.7.2.1 Social actor representation* in the context of Chapter 6.

As noted at the start of this section (*3.5.1 The system of transitivity*), there a various categories of process types that can be used to express action: material, mental, verbal, behavioural, relational and existential. Taken from Halliday and Matthiessen (2014), an explanation of each process type is outlined overleaf in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Categories of process types.

Process type	**Description**	**Example**
Material	Processes of *doing*, which involve physical actions.	Run, kick, bite, catch, throw
Mental	Processes of *sensing*, which involve thinking, knowing or understanding.	Believe, hope, see, hear, like
Verbal	Processes of *saying*, which involves the verbalisation of any kind or manner.	Say, shout, scream, write, tell
Behavioural	Processes of *behaving*, which can denote psychological or physical behaviour.	Watch, breath, cough, listen, smile
Relational	Processes of *being and having*, which involves a relationship between two concepts.	Is, was, has, owns, became
Existential	Processes of expressing the *existence* of an entity.	Usually recognisable through the subject 'there' and the verb 'be'

Each process type outlined in Table 3.8 has corresponding participant roles. Participant roles can be analysed to decipher who is doing what, and to who, in a clause. To take Trew's (1979) example (Figure 3.2), we can see that in the clause 'Police Shoot 11 Dead in Salisbury Riot', the main verb 'shoot' is material (it involves a physical action [see Table 3.8]), 'police' are the 'do-ers' (actors) of the shooting, and the '11' are the 'done-tos' (goals) of the action. However, if we suppose that the headline Trew (1979) analysed read 'Police Thought About Shooting 11 Dead in Salisbury Riot', we can see that the main verb is 'thought', a mental process. While the police are still the do-ers of this mental action (sensers), they have no physical effect on another entity. Certainly, as outlined in Table 3.9 overleaf, not every process can have, or needs to have, a 'done-to' or a 'what'.

Table 3.9: Categories of process types and their corresponding participant roles.

Process type	**Do-er**	**Done-to**	**What**	**Example**
Material	Actor	Goal		Lucy $^{\text{actor}}$ started $^{\text{process}}$ the car $^{\text{goal}}$ Jimmy $^{\text{actor}}$ ran $^{\text{process}}$ away $^{\text{circumstance}}$
Mental	Senser		Phenomenon	Sarah $^{\text{actor}}$ loves $^{\text{process}}$ cake $^{\text{phenomenon}}$ Joe $^{\text{actor}}$ heard $^{\text{process}}$ a noise $^{\text{phenomenon}}$
Verbal	Sayer	Receiver/ Target	Verbiage	Lily $^{\text{sayer}}$ told $^{\text{process}}$ Danny $^{\text{receiver}}$ to leave $^{\text{verbiage}}$ Mark $^{\text{sayer}}$ praised $^{\text{process}}$ Elaine $^{\text{target}}$: ‘well done’ $^{\text{verbiage}}$
Behavioural	Behaver	Receiver	Phenomenon	Anna $^{\text{behaver}}$ watched $^{\text{process}}$ the TV $^{\text{phenomenon}}$ Phil $^{\text{behaver}}$ spoke $^{\text{process}}$ to Andy $^{\text{receiver}}$ Helen $^{\text{behaver}}$ cheered $^{\text{process}}$ loudly $^{\text{circumstance}}$
Relational	Carrier		Value/Attribute	Paris $^{\text{carrier}}$ is $^{\text{process}}$ beautiful $^{\text{value}}$ It $^{\text{carrier}}$ is $^{\text{process}}$ a bargain $^{\text{attribute}}$
Existential	Existent			There he $^{\text{existent}}$ is $^{\text{process}}$

As shown in Tables 3.8 and 3.9, the choice text producers have when they are representing the actions of social actors is vast. Halliday (1994) argues that the choice of process type and how participants (social actors) are described is ideologically significant because language is a network of options from which language users can select specific words to create socio-semiotic meaning. When one particular process type is selected, some other available representational option is supressed (Fowler 1991: 71), meaning linguistic representation always denotes a particular ideological point of view (Fowler 1991: 66). Consequently, the analysis of processes, participant roles and circumstances, the set of three experiential functions, is the foundation of analysing the clause as representation (Bloor and Bloor 2013; Halliday 1985). The system of transitivity is therefore useful for analysing the ideological motivations and effects of the particular grammatical structures and process types the leave and remain press chose to use when representing pro- and anti-Brexit protesters' actions as (de)legitimate.

Using examples from the BPBP, the following section will expand on the information presented in Tables 3.8 and 3.9 to give a more detailed explanation of material, verbal and 'behavioural: verbal' process types, which are analysed in Chapter 4.

3.5.1.1 Process types

3.5.1.2 Material processes

Material processes are transitive verbs that describe processes of doing or happening in the physical world. Usually, these are concrete actions that have a material result or consequence (Figure 3.3), but may also represent abstract or metaphorical processes (Figure 4.3) (Machin and Mayr 2012: 106).

The Telegraph, Fish for Leave			
Protesters	have flung	fish	into the River Thames
Actor	Process	Goal	Circumstance: location

Figure 3.3: A material process that expresses a concrete action.

The Express, People's Vote March		
Left-wing protesters	kicked off	the demonstration
Actor	Process	Goal

Figure 3.4: A material process that expresses a metaphorical action.

The process 'flung' in Figure 3.3 expresses a literal, concrete action, because the act of 'flinging' has a material effect in the physical world, whereas the process 'kicked off' in Figure 3.4 is metaphorical as 'left-wing protesters' did not 'kick off' the demonstration in a literal sense. This process is nevertheless material, as the semantics of the verb 'kick' entails physical action (Machin and Mayr 2012: 106).

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 also show that material processes usually involve an ACTOR (the agent doing something, or the 'do-er') and a GOAL (the entity impacted by the action, or the 'done-to') (Bartlett 2014: 48-51). However, as shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, this is not always the case.

The Mirror, March to Leave			
Five	arrested	at rowdy protest	as masses stop traffic outside Parliament
Goal	Process	Circumstance: location	Circumstance: temporal

Figure 3.5: A material process that does not include an actor.

The Independent, Final Say			
Protesters	gather	outside parliament	for the Final Say march
Actor	Process	Circumstance: location	Circumstance: purpose

Figure 3.6: A material process that does not include a goal.

The clause in Figure 3.5 is an example of passive agent deletion, which occurs when the GOAL occupies the syntactic subject (left-hand) position usually occupied by an ACTOR, and the 'by clause' that lets us know who did what to the GOAL is removed. In Figure 3.6, the protesters' 'gathering' does not impact another entity, so there is no GOAL. Instead, the circumstances 'location' and 'purpose' are used to give additional information about the action.

3.5.1.3 Verbal processes

Verbal processes are transitive verbs that construe ideas and thoughts that are put into words (Bartlett 2014: 66). All verbal processes indicate the passing on of information, the content of which is called VERBIAGE. Verbal processes also involve a SAYER (the agent that conveys the information), which can either be a human (Figure 3.7, overleaf) or inanimate object (Figure 3.8, overleaf).

The Guardian, People’s Vote March			
One man	shouted	“left wing scum, off our streets”	at protesters making their way into Whitehall
Sayer	Process	Verbiage	Receiver

Figure 3.7: A verbal process with a human sayer.

The Guardian, People’s Vote March			
[Protesters hold]	placards	calling	key Brexiteers and media moguls liars
	Sayer	Process	Verbiage

Figure 3.8: A verbal process with an inanimate sayer.

Moreover, as shown in Figure 3.7, verbal processes can involve a RECEIVER, the entity that picks up the information. They can also sometimes involve TARGETS, which require verbal processes that simultaneously construe a verbal act and some evaluative content (Figures 3.9 and 3.10).

The Express, Fishing for Leave					
Fishing for Leave	thanked	the Newcastle protesters	on Twitter	writing:	Huge thanks to those boats who made a cracking effort to take the day to fight for our future
Sayer	Process	Target	Circumstance: location	Process	Verbiage

Figure 3.9: A verbal process that includes a positively evaluated target.

The Express, March to Leave				
Brexiteer Sunderland marcher	in FIERY	attack on	Remain protesters	- 'Accept DEMOCRACY'
Sayer	Circumstance: quality	Process	Target	Verbiage

Figure 3.10: A verbal process that includes a negatively evaluated target.

In Figure 3.9, the process ‘thanked’ encodes positive evaluation, whereas the process ‘attack’ in Figure 3.10 encodes negative evaluation. Following Bartlett (2014: 68), this means that ‘the Newcastle protesters’ and ‘Remain protesters’ are not simply the RECEIVERS of information, but the TARGETS.

Initially, material and verbal processes were chosen as the subject of analysis because they infer greater levels of semantic agency than the other four process types. That is, material and verbal processes are ‘outward-oriented’, making actors and sayers appear more agentive than sensers, behavers, carriers and existents (Koller 2020: 65). In the analysis of the press representation of protesters, it seemed appropriate to focus on these processes, as they account for the ‘outward’ actions that could be observed and subsequently interpreted and reported on differently in the leave and remain press. This is interesting for the representation of how (de)legitimate the leave and remain press perceived these actions, and those performing them, to be. That said, to make sure that my choice to analyse material and verbal processes was not made at the expense of neglecting huge amounts of data (for example, if 90% of the data included mental processes), every transitive verb analysed in Chapter 4 was counted and categorised. To begin this process, I first identified the labels the press used in their coverage of protesters that were engaged in transitive processes. In doing so, I created a keyword list by comparing the BPBP to the BE06. All of the keywords in the top 50 that referred to protesters were used as nodes (Table 3.10, overleaf). While five of the seven keywords are plurals, suggesting protesters are mostly homogenously represented (Krendel 2020: 616), I also included the singular forms of the pluralised keywords that did not occur in the top 50 to offer a more complete picture of the ways in which protesters were represented.

Table 3.10: All of the keywords in the top 50 that represented protesters, sorted by effect-size.

Rank	Frequency	Keyness	Effect	Keyword
4	308	+569.85	9.8725	Remainers
5	266	+492.13	9.661	Brexiteers
6	199	+368.16	9.2423	Brexiteer
9	181	+334.86	9.1055	Remainer
16	539	+972.98	8.6798	Protesters
34	67	+123.95	7.6718	Brexiters
37	64	+118.4	7.6057	Protestors

Each node then underwent manual concordance analysis to ensure that they were all used to represent social actors engaged in protesting. Occasions in which the keywords were not used in this way (e.g. 'Gove and Raab's no deal promise to **Brexiteer**') were removed from the dataset, resulting in a total of 840 concordance hits. Of these, 460 (54.76%) included protesters as participants in material processes, and 211 (25.12%) included protesters as participants in verbal processes. Material and verbal processes therefore accounted for 79.87% of the concordance lines – a large majority – justifying my decision to focus exclusively on these two process groups. That said, any behavioural processes that encoded verbalisation were also subsumed with verbal processes and included in the analysis. These types of behavioural processes, labelled beh:verbal, and my reasoning for their inclusion, are discussed in the following section.

3.5.1.4 Behavioural: verbal processes

While material and verbal processes are fairly straightforward to categorise, the same cannot be said of all process types. Banks (2016: 22) rightly notes that in practice, natural language has the 'habit of being frustratingly untidy', very rarely falling into 'neat preprepared boxes'. Behavioural processes in particular are the 'least distinct' because they 'have no clearly defined characteristics of their own' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 248; Halliday 1994: 139). Behavioural processes are a 'processes of (typically human) physiological and psychological behaviour' (Halliday 1994: 139) that sit on the borderline between material and mental processes (Halliday and Matthiessen 2004: 171). They refer to states, not actions, or something in between the two, like *breathing* or *coughing* (Bartlett 2014: 50). Downing and Locke (2006: 152) comment that such physiological behaviours are typically considered involuntary – our *blinks*, *breaths* and *yawns* are not usually or necessarily deliberate, but are the 'outward physical signs' of mental processes (Thompson 2004: 103). Banks (2016) takes issue with this definition, instead postulating that all processes performed by a conscious actor have some intentional component, so must be material. That is to say, while *coughing* is considered a behavioural process by Downing and Locke (2006), *coughing* is material for Banks (2016). I disagree with Banks (2016) here, and take the view that bodily functions should be classed as behavioural as they do not necessarily encode semantic agency in the same way that material processes do.

Matthiessen (1995) offers a different perspective to behavioural processes, moving them away from the space between the material and the mental. Instead, Matthiessen (1995: 284) suggests that verbal processes can 'alternatively' be interpreted as behavioural if they do not project VERBIAGE. Processes such as *speak*, *talk* and *argue* are then said to be cases of verbal behaviour, occupying space between verbal and behavioural processes. However, Matthiessen (1995: 284) distinguishes these instances of verbal behaviour from 'verbal impact', manifest in verbs such as *accuse*, *blame* and *criticize*. These are said to be on the borderline of verbal and material processes. Conversely, Banks (2016) argues that it makes more sense to describe these behavioural/verbal processes as existing in the space between material and mental, as they externalise mental processes through communication.

Because the categorisation of behavioural processes is such a grey area, Banks (2016) suggests that behavioural processes are not a useful category in the system of transitivity, and should be removed and distributed among material, mental and verbal processes instead. While their complete eradication is perhaps extreme, I do agree that the boundaries of behavioural processes are particularly fuzzy. As such, any processes that sat between the behavioural and the verbal were subsumed as verbal processes in Chapter 4. This decision was guided by Matthiessen's (1995: 284) view that categorising these processes as verbal is an alternative to classifying them as behavioural. The categorisation was achieved by adhering to Bartlett's (2014: 72) definition of 'behavioural: verbal' (or 'beh:verbal') processes as a sub-group of behavioural processes, which include verbs such as *speak* and *converse*. Furthermore, while what strictly separates purely verbal and beh:verbal processes is that verbal processes project VERBIAGE and behavioural processes do not, it can be argued that information is transferred when beh:verbal processes include the circumstance 'matter'. Matter is typically associated with behavioural processes, or 'verbal processes as forms of behaviour' (Halliday and Matthiessen 2014: 302), and refers to the communication of topics or subject matters. For instance, in the clause 'David spoke to me about football', 'about football' is the circumstance as it describes the subject matter, whereas in the clause 'David told me that he watched the football', 'he watched the football' is considered VERBIAGE. Because Halliday and Matthiessen (2014: 306) consider matter and VERBIAGE to be very close in meaning, I have termed the matter identified in beh:verbal processes (subsumed under verbal processes) VERBIAGE.

Now that the theoretical frameworks and approaches used in Chapter 4 have been discussed, I will turn to those used to analyse the protest paradigm in Chapter 5.

3.6 Tools for analysing the protest paradigm

Chapter 5 seeks to contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in the context of Brexit-related demonstrations by observing the extent to which a sample of the leave and remain press' coverage of the respective anti- and pro-Brexit protests adheres to the negative coverage typically associated with protest paradigm frames. It also aims to offer a thorough method for identifying the protest paradigm. Taking the view that ‘frames’ are congruous with ‘discourses’, Chapter 5 employs a corpus-assisted CDA of the data, incorporates the linguistic, computational and deductive approaches to frame analysis (Matthes and Kohring 2008), and develops ‘probes’ (questions that can be asked of the data) to show transparently how protest paradigm frames can be identified and categorised.

3.6.1 Defining frames

An integral part of how information will be interpreted and perceived by audiences is how that information is framed (Card et al. 2015: 438). Framing is rooted in symbolic interactionism, a theoretical sociological perspective that states that the meanings that we give signs (words) are derived through social interaction, and are therefore subject to alternative interpretations that allow meaning to be negotiated, contested and modified (Benford 1997: 410; Mead 1934). In linguistics, frame analysis came to prominence during the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in the social sciences (Hope 2010), during which there was a receptivity toward poststructuralism, linguistic theory and philosophy, signalling a new view of language as constituting social reality rather than simply reflecting it (Toews 1987). Largely, frame theory argues that the media offer conflicting perspectives on contested issues that compete to attract the attention of and influence the opinion of their audience. Any mediated communication about the issue is then ‘fraught with decisions’ about how it should be defined and presented – that is, how it should be *framed* (Card et al. 2015: 438-439; emphasis added).

There is no prescriptive method for defining frames (Muncie 2020: 470), so what exactly constitutes frames is conceptually open and variously defined. While some studies conduct framing analysis without defining frames at all (e.g. Sahlane 2015), which could indicate that their meaning is well-known or assumed, different definitions have been provided by a number of scholars. The term ‘frame analysis’ was first coined by Goffman (1974: 10-

11), who aimed to isolate some of the basic frameworks of understanding available in society for making sense of events and to analyse the 'special vulnerabilities' to which these frames of reference are subject. In doing so, Goffman (1974: 10-11) assumes that the definitions of a situation arrive in accordance with the principles of organisation that govern social events and our perception of them. For Goffman (1974: 10-11), frame analysis then refers to the examination of the organisation of experience.

Writing nearly 30 years ago, Johnston (1995: 217) commented that framing concepts have become more open, moving away from the individual cognitive organisation of perception, to now 'blur the distinctions between frames and other ideational factors' such as values, norms and identity. This is reflected in Entman's (1993: 52) oft-cited definition that states:

> to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.

Elsewhere, Reese (2007: 150) considers frames 'as structures that draw boundaries, set up categories, define some ideas as out and others in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net in an active process'. For Hertog and McLeod (2001: 140), frames are 'structures of meaning made up of a number of concepts and the relations among those concepts'. In the context of the protest paradigm, McLeod and Hertog (1999: 312) define framing as the application of narrative structures used by journalists to assemble facts, quotes and information into a news story.

These descriptions of frames are seemingly interchangeable with the notion of 'discourse'. Like discourses, frames also relate to the ways in which sentences connect and relate to each other to create meanings and facilitate interpretation (Gee 2014: 18) and can be analysed to study the way a text reflects the ideologies of its producer (Caldas-Coulthard 2015: 466). Moreover, Marron (2017: 284) comments that Entman's (1993: 52) aforementioned definition of framing stresses that the mass media do not act as a mirror for society, passively transmitting 'facts'. Rather, producers of media are always actively involved in shaping and defining what constitutes events and how we should think about them. This interpretation of frames is parallel to the conceptualisation of CDA, which, as noted in section *3.1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)*, views language as 'a social practice, both reflecting and reproducing ideologies in society' (Baker et al. 2008: 280). Similarities between frames and discourses are also exemplified by Tankard (2001: 95-96), who comments that media framing can have subtle but powerful effects on audiences by eliminating voices and weakening arguments, framing issues that favour a particular side without making explicit their biases. This perspective is also taken in CDA, which views language as encoding ideologies in quite subtle ways, and as having an incremental effect on audiences' understandings and perceptions of the events that are represented in the media (Baker 2006: 13-14). Guzman (2016) also argues that CDA is aligned with framing theory. As well as situating discourse as both socially constructed and imbued with power, framing complements CDA as it focuses on language and form, which coincides with the loci of frames in media texts (Guzman 2016: 85).

The conceptual framework guiding the analysis of frames in Chapter 5 is therefore CDA. Both Entman's (1993: 52) and McLeod and Hertog's (1999: 312) definitions of frames were interpreted in this context. To reiterate, Entman (1993: 52) notes that framing involves making 'some aspects of a perceived reality' more salient in text to promote a definition, interpretation, or moral evaluation of a particular issue or event. Similarly, McLeod and Hertog (1999: 312) write that frames are narrative structures used by journalists to assemble facts, quotes, assertions and other information into a story. While these notions of 'frames' are, to me, congruent with ‘discourses’, I have adopted the term ‘frames’ to align Chapter 5 with McLeod and Hertog’s (1999) protest paradigm, which is the focus of its analysis.

The protest paradigm comprises a number of ‘story frames’, which have ‘important implications for the protest group, especially in terms of how it is perceived by the audience’ (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 312). When journalists construct and assemble news, they do so by choosing preferred narratives over others and gather news to fill the story template, ‘rather than gathering a deep understanding of relevant viewpoints’ (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 312). This can lead to the focus of the story to orient more around the actions and spectacles of protest and less around the critique or concern protests raise (Wouters 2015: 475). Depending on the ideology of the media outlet and the protest they are covering, constructing news through predetermined protest paradigm frames can also lead to the omission of legitimising aspects of the protest (Harlow and Johnson 2011: 1359). This makes CDA a complementary conceptual framework for the analysis of the protest paradigm, as its dissident stance seeks to uncover how the language of the media can uphold and reproduce power imbalances by negatively representing groups that object the status-quo.

3.6.2 Identifying and analysing protest paradigm frames

As noted in section *3.6.1 Defining Frames*, frames are variously defined. It is also true that there is no consensus on how to identify and analyse frames, contributing to their ‘extreme conceptual openness’ (McLeod and Hertog 2001: 92). On the one hand, Hertog and McLeod (2001: 92) contend that this ‘openness is a blessing’ because it gives way to creative frame analysis. On the other hand, frame analysis has been criticised for lacking both systematic analysis and the explicit presentation of what analytical procedures have been followed (Deacon et al. 2021: 199; Johnston 1995: 217). To illustrate this, in their survey of communication research, Matthes and Kohring (2008) found that rather than providing explanations as to how frames were extracted, some researchers opted instead for claims that frames were merely ‘identified’ (Meyer 1995: 178) or ‘found’ (Haller and Ralph 2001: 412) after simply ‘emerg[ing] from the analysis’ (Hanson 1995: 384). Similarly, qualitative CDA has been criticised for lacking systematic analysis (Rheindorf 2019: 40), but praised for its interdisciplinary orientation and eclecticism (Reisigl 2013: 76).

As previously noted, Chapter 5 considers frames as congruent with discourses and thus adopts a CDA perspective in its analysis. In the interest of both aligning CDA more closely with traditional frame analysis and ensuring that the analysis is as systematic as possible, Chapter 5 combines the three framing approaches identified by Matthes and Kohring (2008): the linguistic approach, the computer-aided approach and the deductive approach. Firstly, in the linguistic approach, researchers clearly determine the linguistic elements that signify frames, holding that frames are manifest in the use of specific words (Entman 1993). Secondly, computer-aided approaches utilise quantitative computational methods to increase objectivity in frame extraction. Although the computational approach used in this chapter departs from the usual computational ‘frame mapping’ procedures used by, for example, Miller, Andsager and Riechert (1998), it includes corpus tools in an attempt to locate the specific words that frames may be structured around, and to reduce the subjectivity that frame identification entails (Touri and Koteyko 2015). Thirdly, the deductive approach takes pre-defined frames established in existing framing research and applies them to new contexts (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 262). The existing frames analysed in this chapter are McLeod and Hertog’s (1999) 22 protest paradigm frames (outlined in section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*). Matthes and Kohring (2008: 275) argue that deductive coding is valid ‘depending on how the frames are defined and how they are theoretically derived’ – but McLeod and Hertog (1999) offer little methodological explanation as to how they identified protest paradigm frames. I have therefore developed ‘probes’ (questions that can be asked of the data) to explicate how I identified protest paradigm frames. Chapter 5 relates to the linguistic and computational approaches by using key keyword analysis to reveal prominent concepts in newspaper articles, and concordance analysis to uncover the journalistic narratives in which the key keywords occurred. It then uses the deductive approach to 'probe' whether concordance lines adhere to protest paradigm frames. How such probes were formulated is outlined in the following section.

3.6.3 Formulating probes

I formulated probes to explicate how I identified protest paradigm frames in the data. Such probes were informed by McLeod and Hertog's (1999) conceptualisation of paradigmatic frames, my own interpretation of these frames and the ways in which these frames emerged from the data. Although the development of some probes are self-explanatory, more justification has been given to those that were not so easy to uncover or categorise. Probes are not provided for five of McLeod and Hertog's (1999) protest paradigm frames (*riot*, *moral decay*, *trial*, *creative expression* and *unjust persecution*) as they were not evident in the data. While some frames have multiple probes, data need only satisfy one to be considered as adhering to a particular frame.

3.6.3.1 Story frame probes

3.6.3.1.1 Marginalising frames

Violent crime

McLeod and Hertog (1999: 312) define the *violent crime* story frame as emphasising the violent acts of protesters. While this definition does not explicitly mention verbal abuse, it has been considered here as contributing to the *violent crime* story frame. Using the following probes, concordance lines were coded as *violent crime* if they included violence at any scale, be that verbal or physical:

i. Are protesters reported on as actors engaging in physical or verbal violence?

ii. Are the police reported on as trying to apprehend the perpetrator(s)?

Property crime

iii. Are protesters reported on as actors engaging in activities such as vandalism or blocking roads?

iv. Are the police reported on as trying to apprehend the perpetrator(s)?

Carnival

v. Are protesters reported on as behaving in a carnivalesque or theatrical way?

Freakshow

vi. Are protesters reported on as being graphically deviant or odd? For example, does reporting emphasise strange or norm-breaking clothing or behaviour?

Romper room

vii. Are protesters reported on as engaging in immature and childish antics?

Storm watch

McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) define *storm watch* as warning society about 'the possible threats posed by the protesters'. Such threats have been interpreted here to form the probe:

viii. Are protesters reported on as posing a possible threat to other people, society or the status quo?

3.6.3.1.2 Mixed frames

Showdown

ix. Does reporting cover a confrontation between groups without a designated 'bad guy'?

Protest reaction

McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) write that *protest reaction* frames the protest as a response to a previous event. This particular story frame was initially difficult to interpret as it is unclear what it encompasses. For example, some coverage gave the *reason* for a protest (e.g. '…to protest Brexit') which posed the question: can reason be considered synonymous to reaction? Surely, the *reason* for engaging in any protest is a *reaction* to some prior event. Indeed, some protest paradigm research codes for *cause* rather than *protest reaction* to uncover a protest's goals and motivations (e.g. Kyriakidou and Olivas Osuna 2017; Shahin et al. 2016). As McLeod and Hertog's (1999) definition is somewhat restrictive, the following probe was used to identify *protest reaction*:

x. Does reporting cover protesters' reaction, reason or motivation for protesting?

Dissection

McLeod and Hertog's (1999: 313) description of *dissection* as 'an analysis of the components and practices of a protest group, social movement or subcultures' seems particularly broad. To give this frame more focus, 'analysis' has been rephrased as 'evaluate' to form the probe:

xi. Does reporting evaluate the components and practices of the protest group?

Negatively evaluative names ascribed to protesters in reporting were also labelled *dissection*. Although McLeod and Hertog (1999) argue that coverage that denigrates the name of protest(ers) leads to delegitimisation, they do not outline a story frame that can identify such coverage. In the context of this chapter, *dissection* seemed to be the most appropriate story frame through which to extract such delegitimising evaluations.

Psychoanalysis

xii. Does reporting examine the psychological or social roots of the protesters?

Association

The *association*, *our story*, *official source* and *we are not alone* story frames were difficult to create probes for as they were not easy to differentiate. According to McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313-314), *association* delineates links between the protest group and some other group in order to bestow legitimacy or deviance; *our story* allows protesters to give their views in their own words; *reliance on official sources and official definitions* relies heavily on the information given by elite and authoritative groups; and *we are not alone* draws connections between protesters and other like-minded groups to show that the protest group is not an isolated phenomenon. These story frames have the potential to overlap. For example, there were many celebrities and politicians who endorsed, attended and spoke at the Brexit-related marches, such as Nigel Farage who organised, led and participated in the March to Leave. Because of his participation, are his spoken words indicative of *our story*? Or, as a politician, is he an *official source*? As leader of the Brexit Party at the time, does his presence fall under *association* or do his strong Eurosceptic views indicate that the protesters *are not alone*? As in any frame analysis, decisions had to be made about how to distinguish these frames. While the others will be subsequently outlined, the following probes were used to identify *association*:

xiii. Are associated groups reported on as attending the protest as a means to bestow legitimacy or deviance?

xiv. Is the verbiage of associated groups reported on as a means to bestow legitimacy or deviance?

Comparison

xv. Does reporting compare protesters to another group as a means to bestow legitimacy or deviance?

3.6.3.1.3 Sympathetic frames

Our story

As noted, this frame was not always clear to define because of the presence of politicians and celebrities at Brexit-related protests. After much thought, it was concluded that the politicians and celebrities that addressed protests should not be classed as *our story* as the reported words of elites hold different ideological weight to the reported words of protesters. McLeod and Hertog's (1999) definition of *our story* was then expanded to include the following probes:

xvi. Are the words of (non-elite) protesters reported on?
xvii. Are the words of a protest's organisers, treasurers and spokespeople reported on?

Moreover, because the placards and banners held at demonstrations are a 'legitimate, bottom-up, counter-power' (Shiri 2015: 241) that can give a 'visual voice to suppressed narratives' (Ku 2020: 157), their coverage has been included here, forming the probe:

xviii. Are the words on placards and banners reported on?

It is important to point out here that subsequent story frames were not looked for in the content of speech or protest signs. While this may have given way to more story frames embedded within verbiage, attention was instead paid to the ways in which speech was structured. For example, was it reported on legitimately or did it contribute to processes of delegitimisation?

We are not alone

As noted, this frame 'draws connections between protesters and other like-minded groups to show that the protest group in question is not an isolated phenomenon' (McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313). The following probes were formed to extract this story frame:

i. Are other people (including elites) reported on as showing support for a protest?
ii. Are citizens or bystanders reported on as showing support for a protest?

iii. Are protesters reported on as travelling far distances to participate?

iv. Does reporting cover other similar protests that are also taking place?

While these probes speak to McLeod and Hertog's (1999: 313) definition, *we are not alone* has been expanded here to include the coverage of a protest's numbers. Although there is no explicit mention of turnout in the paradigm, McLeod and Hertog (1992: 265) note that reports that place emphasis on small turnouts highlight the minority status of demonstrators, accentuating their deviance from the general public. Coverage that focuses on a protest's high turnout therefore provides a 'haven from fear of isolation' and contributes to the *we are not alone* story frame (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 271). The following probe has therefore also been included:

v. Are protesters reported on as gathering in large numbers?

3.6.3.1.4 The balance frame

Debate

The *debate* frame was initially difficult to characterise because often, key keywords such as 'EU', 'deal' and 'MPs' gave way to concordance lines that focused only on issues relating to Brexit and its ongoing negotiations. When these concordance lines occurred in the context of protest – for example, to give context to protesters' grievances – they were coded as *debate*. However, reports of Brexit-related issues that did *not* mention protest in the surrounding concordance lines were prevalent in the data. Because this type of coverage occurred so frequently, it seemed reasonable to group these concordance lines together. These concordances were labelled *issue based reporting* and will be discussed in more detail in the section *5.3 Distribution of frames across both sub-corpora*.

Differentiating *debate* and *issue based reporting* frames was taxing when coverage referred to 'remain campaign(ers)' and 'leave campaign(ers)'. These labels do not always necessarily relate to protesters and were often used to discuss the affiliations of politicians. Likewise, it was tricky at times to distinguish whether the phrase 'people's vote' was being discussed in terms of a protest, a campaign or as a synonym for 'second referendum'. Everything considered, the following probe was used to identify *debate* frames:

vi. Does reporting include context about the issues related to the protest?

Because *debate* can also emerge when all sides of a particular viewpoint is represented 'adequately and fairly' (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 313), it can be extracted using the following probe:

vii. Does reporting cover opposing views equally? (NB: if reporting covers two opposing sides engaging in confrontation or argument equally, this is *showdown*).

The following two frames, *reliance on official source*s *and official definitions* and *the invocation of public opinion* are not story frames, but are also considered a part of the protest paradigm.

3.6.3.2 Reliance on Official Sources and Official Definitions

As noted, *reliance on official source*s *and official definitions* (henceforth *official source*) was sometimes difficult to delineate. After much thought, *official source* was identified through the following probes:

viii. Are the words of elite, official and authoritative people reported on as addressing a protest?

ix. Are the words of elite, official and authoritative people reported on as talking about a protest?

3.6.3.3 The Invocation of Public Opinion

Again, this frame was hard to code for as there was some overlap. According to McLeod and Hertog (1999: 316-317) public opinion can be invoked when protesters are involved in norm and legal violations such as violence – but there is already a *violent crime* story frame. However, *invocation of public opinion* can also include sweeping generalisations, the hostile words of bystanders and generalised conceptions of public opinion. As such, the following probes were formed to identify *invocation of public opinion*:

x. Does reporting include statements of public opinion that show the majority of the public to be in opposition to the protesters?

xi. Does reporting cover violations of social norms to comment unfavourably on protesters?

xii. Does reporting cover violations of legal norms to pit protesters against the police instead of their intended targets?

xiii. Does reporting include the hostile words of bystanders?

xiv. Does reporting cover the small size of the protest relative to the larger population?

3.6.4 Delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation probes

McLeod and Hertog (1999: 319) argue that the characteristics of the paradigm contribute to delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation – although this should come with a caveat, as surely it is only the negative story frames that can contribute to these processes. Consequently, once concordance lines were coded by story frames, *invocation of public opinion* and/or *official source*, the following probe was asked of the data:

xv. Do the use or combination of frames contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation?

What constitutes these three processes and the probes that were used to identify them are unpacked further below.

According to McLeod and Hertog (1999: 319), protest groups are delegitimised if quotation marks are used judiciously and if protesters' words are paraphrased or disregarded. As such, the following probes were used to identify delegitimisation:

xvi. Does reporting use judicious quotation marks to refer to the name of the protest or number of those in attendance?
xvii. Does reporting denigrate the name or purpose of the protest or protesters (e.g. 'the so-called People's Vote March' or 'remoaners')?
xviii. Does reporting disregard protester's speech directly or indirectly (e.g. through negatively evaluative reporting verbs)?

It is important to note that the analyst's interpretation is necessary here; just one instance of quotation marks, for example, does not automatically indicate delegitimisation. Indeed, curiously, preliminary analysis revealed that both leave and remain newspapers used quotation marks when referring to the names of the protests they both support and oppose. Similarly, paraphrased speech did not always produce a delegitimising effect. The repeated use or combination of these techniques may therefore be more reliably coded as delegitimising.

Marginalisation occurs when protesters are shown to deviate from mainstream norms, if coverage fails to explain the issues and views of the protesters and if the size and effectiveness of the protest is downplayed. The following probes were therefore used to identify marginalisation:

xix. Does reporting represent protesters as deviating from mainstream norms?
xx. Does reporting omit the issues and views of the protesters?
xxi. Does reporting underreport or undermine the size of the protest?

xxii. Does reporting undermine the effect of the protest?

Demonisation galvanises hostility toward the protesters by exaggerating their potential threat and can be uncovered through the following probes:

xxiii. Does reporting represent the protesters as a threat to the public, society or otherwise?
xxiv. Does reporting emphasise protesters radical goals?
xxv. Does reporting construct protesters as violent or deviant?

Once all of the concordance lines had been checked against the probes, they were categorised as ‘adhering to the protest paradigm’, ‘not adhering to the protest paradigm’, ‘issue based reporting’ and ‘miscellaneous’.

To conclude this section, incorporating Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) three approaches to framing, a CDA perspective and developing probes were all used to analyse the leave and remain press’ adherence to the protest paradigm in their coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests. This combination of methods was also employed in an attempt to offer a systematic method for conducting research of this kind, as well as to suggest probes that might aid future studies in identifying, labelling and analysing elements of McLeod and Hertog’s (1999) protest paradigm frames. Now that Chapter 5’s methods have been explicated, I will turn to those used in Chapter 6 to develop the ‘linguistic WUNC framework’.

3.7 Tools for analysing WUNC

Chapter 6 proposes a brand new framework through which the mediated representations of protests can be analysed. In doing so, it maps Tilly’s (2004) notions of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) onto theories rooted in Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Halliday 1994, 1978) to develop a ‘linguistic WUNC framework’ that can accompany qualitative corpus-assisted CDA.

As well as wanting to develop a robust and contemporary framework that can be used to analyse the mediated representations of protests, an additional motivation for formulating the linguistic WUNC framework was to address a consistent criticism of manual concordance analysis – and CDA as a theoretical framework more generally – that states the means of its descriptive claims are often ambiguous or undocumented. For example, Stubbs (1997: 103) claims that practitioners read meanings into texts 'on the basis of their own unexplicated knowledge', and Rheindorf (2019: 33) notes that manual concordance analysis is often carried out 'without explicating the qualitative method involved' (that is, if any has been used at all). In short, it is understood that practitioners of CDA should use identifiable and accountable methods, procedures and categorisations often missing in qualitative corpus analysis (Rheindorf 2019: 33). Accordingly, Chapter 6 seeks to provide identifiable, consistent and transparent linguistic categorisations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment that can be used as an analytical framework in the qualitative (corpus-assisted) CDA of protests.

3.7.1 Mapping WUNC and CDA

Tilly's (2004) sociological notion of WUNC lends itself as an additional critical lens to CDA because WUNC displays are a 'performance' that influence power-holders and challenge social order (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 366). Equally, that language is a 'performance' is a well-established tenet in linguistics, most traditionally linked to Austin's (1994: 12) Speech Act Theory that claims 'by saying something we are doing something'. This is maintained in CDA as it 'promotes a study of discourse-in-action that poses questions of how talk and text create, perpetuate, and counter relationships of power based in dominance, inequality, and/or injustice within social and political contexts' (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 49). In doing this, CDA connects micro-levels (language, communication, text and verbal interaction) and macro-levels of social order (power, dominance, inequality between social groups) to 'understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality' (Van Dijk 2001: 352-354). CDA therefore complements the study of WUNC, as WUNC displays are utilised by protesters to influence power-holders and challenge macro-levels of social order. Despite this, to my knowledge, WUNC displays have never before been utilised in the field of linguistics. Chapter 6 therefore proposes that WUNC displays need to be extended and further operationalised so that they can be applied to linguistic data. Using examples from the BPBP, it illustrates how WUNC can be thematically mapped onto a framework rooted in SFL and CDA as a means of uncovering the patterns and ideological motivations behind the inclusion (or omission) of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment in newspaper reports of protests. To reiterate, worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment can be understood as:

Worthiness: elements of protest that construct participants as good and deserving citizens (Wouters 2019: 408). These include sober demeanour, neat clothing, and the presence of 'clergy, dignitaries, and mothers with children' (Tilly 2004: 4). Worthiness can also be displayed by protesters who do not engage in unnecessary disruption or violence (Wouters 2019: 408).

Unity: aspects of protest that represent protesters as a 'solid block' that share a common programme (Wouters 2019: 409). This can be shown through matching badges, headbands, banners or costumes, marching in ranks and collectively singing and chanting (Tilly 2004: 4).

Numbers: vast turnouts, signatures on petitions and messages from constituents (Tilly 2004: 4).

Commitment: qualities of protest that emphasise persistence (Wouters 2019: 409). This can be shown through protesters braving bad weather, resisting repression, their sacrifice, subscription and benefaction, and through visible participation by elderly people and people with disabilities (Tilly 2004: 4).

Now WUNC has been outlined, the following section will turn to the theories and discursive strategies that complement WUNC as a linguistic framework.

3.7.2 Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

To develop the linguistic WUNC framework, concepts from both the ideational and interpersonal metafunction were drawn on. As noted in section *3.5.1 The system of transitivity*, the ideational metafunction views language as a vehicle through which to describe one's experiences in and of the world, and the interpersonal metafunction refers to the ways in which language can be used to negotiate relationships with others. The ideational metafunction is most regularly explored through the system of transitivity, which can be used to analyse how participants (social actors) and processes (actions) are represented in discourse. As sections *3.5.1 The system of transitivity* and *3.5.1.1 Process types* largely dealt with process types, the following section will discuss social actor representation.

3.7.2.1 Social actor representation

The linguistic WUNC framework draws on the principles set out by Van Leeuwen's (1996) social actor representation taxonomy. While Van Leeuwen (1996) takes Halliday's (1994) view of grammar as a 'meaning potential' – concerning what *can* be said, rather than what *must* be said (Van Leeuwen 1996: 32; italics in original) – he departs from the Hallidayan view of representing social actors through, for example, activisation and passivisation (explored in *3.5.1 The system of transitivity*). Instead, Van Leeuwen (1996: 32; italics in original) offers a '*sociosemantic* inventory' of the ways in which social actors can be represented and categorises referential strategies that are employed in discourse. Van Leeuwen (1996) focuses primarily on sociological categories, such as 'nomination' and 'agency', whereas Halliday (1994) focuses on linguistic categories, such as 'nominalisation' and 'passive agent deletion'. Indeed, Van Leeuwen's (1996: 34) system of social actor representation ranges over a variety of linguistic and rhetorical phenomena, finding its unity in the concept of 'social actor' rather than a purely linguistic concept such as 'the nominal group'. This system includes a wide range of representational categories in which social actors can be referred to. Those that were drawn upon when formulating the linguistic WUNC framework are outlined in Table 3.11 overleaf (for a further discussion on all of the categories in Van Leeuwen's social actor taxonomy, see Van Leeuwen 2008, 1996).

Table 3.11: The referential strategies that were drawn upon when formulating the linguistic WUNC framework (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37-42).

Referential strategy	**Definition**	**Example**
Individualisation	Realised when social actors are referred to singularly, as an individual.	Joe walked the dog.
Aggregation	The first of two major types of assimilation. Aggregation is realised by definite or indefinite quantifiers of groups.	Millions attended the ceremony. 40% of Australians were born overseas.
Collectivisation	The second of two major types of assimilation. Collectivisation is realised by mass nouns or nouns denoting groups of people.	Gangs fought back. The nation under threat.
Nomination	Realised by proper nouns which can be formal (surname only, with or without honorifics), semiformal (given name and surname), or informal (given name only).	Mr. Jones. David Jones. David.
Titulated nomination	Nominations may be titulated in the form of honorification (e.g. 'Dr') or affiliations (e.g. 'chairperson').	Dr. Coffey-Glover. Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.
Functionalisation	Realised when social actors are referred to in terms of something like do (e.g. an occupational role).	The lecturer began her presentation.
Classification	Realised when social actors are referred to in terms of the major categories a given society uses to differentiate between classes of people. This includes categories such as age, gender, race and religion.	An old man needed a walking stick. The Buddhist spoke about nirvana.

The referential strategies outlined in Table 3.11 relate to many of WUNC's components. For example, the mediated worthiness of a social actor could increase if they were referred to with titulated semiformal nomination, or functionalisation that emphasised their authoritative role in a respected institution. The worthiness of such social actors would be further emphasised if they were shown to be engaging in transitive processes that highlighted peaceful and legitimate behaviours. High displays of numbers can also be manifest in text through aggregation and collectivisation, as these referential strategies usually infer large groups of people. Mediated displays of commitment may also be evident through classification that describes elderly people or people with disabilities engaging in protest (Tilly 2004: 4). As well as referential strategies, social actors can also be attributed predication strategies. Predication strategies refer to the adjectives, prepositional phrases and relative clauses that qualify social actors through pre- and post-modification (Hart 2010: 65-66). As will be discussed in Chapter 6, these can also be employed in discourse to increase (or decrease) mediated displays of WUNC.

3.7.2.2 The interpersonal metafunction

While social actor representation and the system of transitivity, as components of the ideational metafunction, are concerned with the clause as representation, the interpersonal metafunction considers the clause as exchange (Halliday 2013). It is through the interpersonal metafunction that language is used to establish and maintain relationships, express viewpoints, and influence the behaviours and opinions of others (Ye 2010: 147). Two of the main ways this can be achieved is through the manipulation of pronouns and modality (Ruize 2011).

Firstly, pronouns possess interpersonal meaning because they establish a social relationship between the producer of language and their audience (Halliday 1994). Collective pronouns are of particular relevance to unity in the context of WUNC. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 (section *6.1.2 Unity*), the use of first-person plural pronouns 'we' and 'our' can be used to discursively build an ‘in-group’, unified in consensus and solidarity. Opposingly, third-person pronouns such as ‘they’ and ‘them’ can be used to symbolise an out-group, whose wants challenge the unified demands of the in-group (Van Dijk 2002). The use of collective pronouns can then impact mediated representations of unity.

Secondly, in the context of the interpersonal metafunction, Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 526) explain that modality is:

> a rich source for speakers to intrude their own views into the discourse: their assessments of what is likely or typical, their judgements of the rights and the wrongs of the situation and of where other people stand in this regard.

While modality covers a range of meanings that reflect judgement – from subtle expressions of doubt (‘I *might* leave early’, ‘I will *perhaps* leave early’) to explicit indicators of certainty (‘I *will* leave early’, ‘I will *certainly* leave early’) (Fontaine 2013: 119-120) – they all concern relative expressions of commitment. As will be discussed in Chapter 6 (section *6.1.4 Commitment*), modality can indicate varying levels of commitment to trust (epistemic modality) and commitment to obligation (deontic modality). Expressions of modality can therefore contribute to mediated displays of commitment in the context of WUNC.

To summarise, four key elements of the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions were drawn upon to formulate the linguistic WUNC framework: process types (transitivity analysis), social actor representation, pronouns and modality. Using concordance lines taken from the BPBP, part one of Chapter 6 details how these linguistic features can contribute to WUNC as a theoretical methodological framework in CDA. Then, to demonstrate how the linguistic WUNC framework can be used in practice, part two applies the framework to the analysis of the reported speech of politicians to compare how similar quotations were reported on differently in the leave and remain press. In doing so, the chapter demonstrates how combining WUNC and CDA can provide a fruitful analytic framework.

4 Expressions of (de)legitimation in the UK press reporting of pro- and anti-Brexit protesters

This chapter uses transitivity analysis to examine how representations of legitimacy are manifest in verbal and material processes used by the leave and remain press in their coverage of both pro- and anti-Brexit protests. Inherent to the system of transitivity is the notion of choice. Because language choice is ideological, the specific grammatical and linguistic choices newspapers make in the reporting of protests can indicate their point of view (Fowler 1991: 71). This can have implications on the representations of protests as sites of legitimate political action. As such, this chapter seeks to:

Aim 4.1: Compare how the leave press use verbal and material processes to represent pro- and anti-Brexit protest(er)s as (de)legitimate.

Aim 4.2: Compare how the remain press use verbal and material processes to represent pro- and anti-Brexit protest(er)s as (de)legitimate.

To recap, in order to begin the analysis, a keyword list was created by comparing the BPBP to the BE06. Any keywords in the top 50 that represented protesters were used as nodes in the ensuing analysis (Table 4.1, overleaf). While five of the seven keywords are plurals, suggesting protesters are mostly homogenously represented (Krendel 2020: 616), singular forms of the pluralised keywords were also included in the data analysis to offer a more complete picture of the ways in which protesters were reported on.

Table 4.1: All of the keywords in the top 50 that represented protesters, sorted by effect-size.

Rank	**Frequency**	**Keyness**	**Effect**	**Keyword**
4	308	+569.85	9.8725	Remainers
5	266	+492.13	9.661	Brexiteers
6	199	+368.16	9.2423	Brexiteer
9	181	+334.86	9.1055	Remainer
16	539	+972.98	8.6798	Protesters
34	67	+123.95	7.6718	Brexiters
37	64	+118.4	7.6057	Protestors

Each node underwent manual concordance analysis to ensure all of the terms displayed in Table 4.1 represented social actors engaged in protesting. Occasions in which the keywords were not used in this way (e.g. ‘Gove and Raab's no deal promise to **Brexiteer**’) were removed from the dataset, resulting in a total of 840 concordance hits. Manual concordance analysis showed that the nodes were frequently reported on as engaging in material and verbal processes in clauses – on 54.76% and 25.12% of occasions, respectively. As shown in Table 4.2 below, material processes were used more than verbal processes in both the leave and remain press.

Table 4.2: The distribution of material and verbal processes in the leave and remain press.

Division of newspapers	**Verbal processes**	**Material processes**
Leave press		
Reporting of pro-Brexit protesters	28 (19.18%)	78 (30.83%)
Reporting of anti-Brexit protesters	118 (80.82%)	175 (69.17%)
Total	**146**	**253**
Remain press		
Reporting of pro-Brexit protesters	5 (7.69%)	32 (15.38%)
Reporting of anti-Brexit protesters	60 (92.31%)	176 (84.62%)
Total	**65**	**208**
Total processes	**211**	**461**

In the leave press, material processes occurred 253 times and verbal processes occurred 146 times. In the remain press, material processes occurred 208 times and verbal processes occurred

65 times. This suggests that overall, both the leave and remain press chose to report on the protesters' physical actions rather than their voices and opinions.

4.1 Verbal processes

To recapitulate, verbal processes are transitive verbs that involve a transfer of information in the form of spoken or written words (VERBIAGE). They involve a SAYER (the agent that conveys the information), can involve a RECEIVER (the person who picks up the information) and sometimes involve a TARGET (a verbal process that simultaneously construes a verbal act and some evaluative content, e.g. 'praised' or 'criticised'). As shown previously in Table 4.2, in the leave press, 19.18% of verbal processes occurred in the coverage of pro-Brexit protests and 80.82% of verbal processes occurred in the coverage of anti-Brexit protests, showing that the leave press covered the protests they oppose more than those they support. In the remain press, 92.31% of verbal processes occurred in the coverage of anti-Brexit protests and only 7.69% of verbal processes occurred in the coverage of pro-Brexit protests. In contrast to the leave press, the remain press report on the protests they support more than those they oppose. Moreover, as shown in Table 4.3 below, the remain press barely give pro-Brexit protesters a voice – they are only positioned as SAYERS three times – possibly because they did not want to give pro-Brexit protesters the opportunity to air their demands.

Table 4.3: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times pro- and anti-Brexit protesters were positioned as SAYERS, RECEIVERS, TARGETS and VERBIAGE in each sub-corpus.

Position in clause	**Leave/Pro-Brexit**	**Leave/Anti-Brexit**	**Remain/Anti-Brexit**	**Remain/Pro-Brexit**
SAYER	17 (60.71%)	56 (47.46%)	31 (51.67%)	3 (60%)
RECEIVER	3 (10.71%)	15 (12.71%)	9 (15%)	1 (20%)
TARGET	4 (14.29%)	18 (15.25%)	3 (5%)	0 (0%)
VERBIAGE	4 (14.29%)	29 (24.58%)	17 (28.33%)	1 (20%)
Total	**28**	**118**	**60**	**5**

Overleaf, Table 4.4 displays all of the verbal processes that the nodes were involved in. Analysing the concordance lines in which these verbal processes occurred allowed for the classification of six thematic categories: *discontent*, *wants/demands*, *number of protesters*, *protest chants/songs*, *jubilance/hope* and *personal stories*. *Discontent* includes verbal processes that expressed protesters' discontent toward the government, against Brexit and against the media. They also include others' discontent (i.e. the government's) toward Brexit-related protesters. *Wants/demands* include processes that relate to the wants of protesters and what others (i.e. the government) want protesters to do. *Number of protesters* relates to verbal processes that express the size of the turnout. *Protest chants/songs* cover the processes used by protesters in their collective chanting and singing. *Jubilance/hope* include processes that express positive sentiments toward the protest(ers). Lastly, *personal stories* are those in which protesters talk about why they have joined the protests.

Table 4.4: The categories of verbal processes and the number of times they occurred (NB: asterisks indicate lemmas).

Thematic category	**Verbal processes**	**Number**
Discontent	say* (22), shout* (11), round (6), told (6), mock* (5), blast* (4), heckle* (4), rage (3), rants (3), spoke (3), take* (3), branded (2), claim* (2), declare* (2), dismiss (2), ripped (2), scrawled (2), slammed (2), taunting (2), abused (1), accuse (1), alleged (1), announce* (1), arguing (1), attack (1), blame (1), call* (1), chant* (1), criticised (1), delivers (1), drew (1), identifying (1), retorted (1), screaming (1), snap (1), tweeted (1), warns (1), wrote (1)	105 (49.76%)
Wants/demands	demand* (18), call* (14), claim* (2), urged (2), announce* (1), appeal (1), asking (1), explain (1), egged (1), insisted (1), ordered (1), say* (1), vowed (1)	45 (21.33%)
Number of protesters	claim* (14), say* (11), demolished (2), describing (2), added (1), thank* (1), told (1)	32 (28.83%)
Protest chants/songs	chant* (9), sing* (8), cry (1), shout* (1)	19 (9%)
Jubilance/hope	thank* (2), cheered (1), remarked (1), say* (1), told (1)	6 (2.84%)
Personal stories	say* (2), announce* (1), say* (1)	4 (1.9%)
Total		211 (100%)

4.2 Material processes

To recapitulate, material processes are transitive verbs that have an effect on the physical world. They usually involve an ACTOR (the agent doing something) and a GOAL (the entity impacted by the action) (Bartlett 2014: 48-51). There are more than double the amount of material processes than verbal processes in the dataset (461 material processes and 211 verbal processes, Table 4.2). As shown in Table 4.5 overleaf, protesters are positioned as ACTORS most frequently in each sub-corpus. Because ACTORS in material clauses are attributed maximum responsibility for their actions (Dreyfus 2017: 378), this active construction may have been used as a tool to focus on the actions of protesters instead of their social criticisms

(McLeod and Detenber 1999). This could be why the leave press again reported on the actions of anti-Brexit protesters more than the actions of pro-Brexit protesters. That said, the remain press afforded pro-Brexit protesters very little coverage (7.81% [36/461] of the total material processes). Again, perhaps the remain press underreported pro-Brexit protests as a means to limit the impact they had on the political agenda (Giugni 2004).

Table 4.5: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times pro- and anti-Brexit protesters were positioned as actors, goals and circumstances in each sub-corpus.

Position in clause	**Leave/Pro-Brexit**	**Leave/Anti-Brexit**	**Remain/Anti-Brexit**	**Remain/Pro-Brexit**
Actor	61 (79.22%)	157 (86.26%)	143 (86.14%)	26 (72.22%)
Goal	15 (19.48%)	18 (9.89%)	17 (10.24%)	8 (22.22%)
Circumstances	1 (1.3%)	7 (3.85%)	6 (3.61%)	2 (5.56%)
Total	77 (100%)	182 (100%)	166 (100%)	36 (100%)

Overleaf, Table 4.6 shows all of the material processes that the nodes were involved in. Analysing the concordance lines in which these material processes occurred allowed for the classification of three thematic categories: *protest activity*, *movement* and *assembly. Protest activity* includes material processes that involve protesters participating in protest (e.g. holding placards), participating in disobedient or violent acts of protest (e.g. blocking roads and clashing with police) and organising protest (e.g. funding protest). *Movement* covers material processes that relate to the ways in which protesters are moving (e.g. marched). Lastly, *assembly* includes processes that relate to protesters attending protests (e.g. gathered) and assembling in large quantities (e.g. crammed).

Table 4.6: The categories of material processes and the number of times they occurred (NB: asterisks indicate lemmas).

Thematic category	Material processes	Number
Protest activity	hold* (18), waved (17), bring* (9), clash* (9), show* (9), carry* (8), blocked (5), break* (4), stopped (4), unfurl* (4), chartered (3), fund* (3), hit (3), separate (3), ambushed (2), confront (2), demonstrate* (2), followed (2), handing (2), hurl* (2), line* (2), paid (2), pictured (2), plastered (2), pulled (2), set (2), take* (2), voted (2), wear* (2), banging (1), brandishes (1), burn (1), charged (1), clutched (1), crashes (1), created (1), dealing (1), disrupt (1), dogged (1), fight (1), flung (1), grappled (1), greets (1), hang (1), helping (1), inflicted (1), launch (1), let* (1), protest (1), raise (1), reproduced (1), rioting (1), sat (1), scraps (1), shared (1), square (1), stage (1), surrounded (1), swiped (1), tweeted (1), unloaded (1), ushered (1), using (1), wheeling (1)	164 (35.57%)
Movement	march* (41), take* (24), descend* (19), set (7), arrive* (6), travel* (6), continue* (4), lead* (4), head* (3), make* (3), move* (3), trudged (3), walk* (3), begin* (2), left (2), pass* (2), ushered (2), followed (1), ended (1), enter (1), pour (1), proceed (1), streamed (1), storm (1), snaked (1), ran (1), whisked (1), went (1), commence (1), launch (1), kicked (1), hit (1), let* (1), pounding (1), appear (1), drive (1), approached (1)	154 (33.41%)
Assembly	gather* (40), join* (16), flood* (9), take* (7), assemble* (6), came (5), draw* (5), out (5), packed (5), rally* (5), massed (4), crammed (3), fill* (3), shared (3), surrounded (3), swamped (3), attended (2), line* (2), rammed (2), show* (2), turned (2), attracted (1), camped (1), clogged (1), congregated (1), dwarfed (1), got (1), kept (1), met (1), participating (1), popped (1), staked (1)	143 (31.02%)
Total		461 (100%)

Once the verbal and material processes were thematically categorised, the categories were compared to observe any similarities. The following three broad themes emerged across both sets: 1) demands, 2) discontent and 3) protester turnout. Firstly, the verbal thematic categories *wants/demands* and *protest chants/songs* as well as the material thematic categories *movement*, *assembly* and the processes relating to protest participation in *protest activity* all largely point to protesters' 1) demands. Secondly, the verbal thematic categories *discontent* and some of the more hostile processes that contributed to *wants/demands* as well as the violent material processes that contributed to *protest activity* broadly construct protesters' 2) discontent. Thirdly, the verbal category *numbers of protesters* and the material processes that relate to protesters *assembling* in large quantities both contributed to 3) protester turnout. It is unsurprising that these three themes emerged as the overarching themes of the dataset. It seems reasonable to suggest that the leave and remain press would want to report on the demands of the protesters they support to construct the demonstrations as legitimate political action. Further, the media tend to cover stories that have negative overtones, particularly when they focus on 'conflict or controversies, with large numbers of people involved' (de Smaele and Kenis 2020: 185), explaining the presence of discontent. Lastly, the reporting of turnout is an 'almost indispensable aspect of protest coverage' (Wouters and Van Camp 2017: 459). The processes that express these three broad themes, and the extent to which the leave and remain press construct them as (de)legitimate, will be analysed in the following sections.

4.3 (De)legitimating demands in the leave press

4.3.1 Pro-Brexit protests

This section explores how the leave press represent the demands of pro-Brexit protesters. In doing so, every instance in which pro-Brexit protesters are positioned as SAYERS of the verbal processes *demand** and *call** are considered here. These verbal processes have been chosen as the subject of analysis because they are evident in both the leave and remain press and are the most numerous verbs used in the *wants/demands* thematic category.

In the leave press, the verb *call** is used twice in relation to the wants of pro-Brexit protesters. For example:

1. Brexit protesters **called** on Theresa May to resign and leave with no deal [The Express, March to Leave]

While extract 1 makes the March to Leave protesters' demands clear, overall, when pro-Brexit protesters' demands are expressed in the leave press, very little attention is paid to them. As previously noted, only 19.18% of verbal processes occurred in the leave press' coverage of pro-Brexit protests (Table 4.2). More often, protesters' demands are included as circumstances in material processes:

2. BREXITEERS have **continued** Nigel Farage's March to Leave by making their way from Hartlepool in County Durham to Middlesbrough demanding Britain leaves the EU as scheduled. [The Express, March to Leave]
3. Brexiteers **continue** 270-mile BETRAYAL rally against May's deal [The Express, March to Leave]

In extract 2, 'demanding Britain leaves the EU' is constructed as a legitimate request because it has already been agreed upon ('as scheduled'). Moreover, extract 3 negatively evaluates the object against which the protesters are demonstrating by inferring May's deal is a 'betrayal'. Although these reports of pro-Brexit protester's demands are represented as legitimate, similar coverage is few and far between. There are 39 instances in which the leave press report on pro-Brexit protesters' demands through material processes. Of these, only 12 (30.77%) contain purpose, including eight (20.51%) that state the protesters' demands as their motive for protesting. Because a protest's effect is facilitated by the attention it is given in media coverage

(Vliegenthart et al. 2016: 838), it is surprising to find that the leave press did not include more coverage of the pro-Brexit protesters' demands.

4.3.2 Anti-Brexit protests

When anti-Brexit protesters are positioned as SAYERS of *demands* and *calls*, the leave press report on them more frequently. Of the 11 times this occurs, seven (63.64%) cover their aims objectively, indicating fair reporting:

4. THOUSANDS of Brits are on the streets in several "March for Europe" rallies in five major UK cities with protestors **demanding** a second EU referendum. [Daily Star, March for Europe]
5. Organised by the People's Vote, Britain for Europe and Open Britain, protesters yesterday **demanded** the public be given a final say on Brexit. [The Sun, Put it to the People]
6. Protestors are **calling** for a vote on the finale Brexit deal [The Express, People's Vote March]

These demands accurately reflect the aims of the March for Europe, Put it to the People and People's Vote March protests, suggesting that their demands are reasonable, and therefore legitimate. However, there are some instances (the small total of four [36.36%]) that suggest the anti-Brexit protests are somewhat undemocratic. For example:

7. The protestors **demand** a "pause" to exiting the European Union despite June's Brexit vote. [Daily Star, March for Europe]

8. Thousands of anti-Brexiteers join 'No to Boris, yes to Europe' march across London and **demand** a reversal of the EU referendum result [The Daily Mail, No to Boris Yes to Europe]
9. How unlike our own piddling protesters; both the XR nutters and the People's ('People Like Us') Vote plodders are, grotesquely, about the over-privileged reasserting their right to tell the oiks how to behave - to **demand** that the working class give up even more of their scarce pleasures and rights, be it to go on holiday or have their vote counted. [The Telegraph, People's Vote March]

In extracts 7 and 8, the anti-Brexit protesters' demands are shown to be delegitimate because they are constructed in opposition to consensus agreement and the status quo ('despite June's Brexit vote', 'reversal of the EU referendum result'). Moreover, extract 9 inaccurately reports on the wants of anti-Brexit protesters; although they are actually demanding a second referendum, *The Telegraph* claim the protesters want to take away the 'scarce pleasures and rights' of the working class – including their right to 'have their vote counted' – thereby positioning leave-voters as victims of anti-Brexit protesters. The anti-Brexit protesters' demands are therefore delegitimated through negative moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen 2007).

Reporting also seems to be divided in the context of material processes. Anti-Brexit protesters' wants are represented as reasonable on one hand and unfavourable on the other. Of the 117 times the leave press report on anti-Brexit protesters' *movement* and *assembly*, 64 (54.70%) contain protesters' purpose, including 32 (27.35%) that contain their demands as motive. Perhaps surprisingly, 27 of the 32 (84.38%) instances report on the anti-Brexit protesters' demands in a balanced way. For example:

10. ONE million protesters **marched** through the capital to call for a People's Vote on Brexit. [Daily Star, People’s Vote March]
11. A rally of Remainers **descended** on London to call on the government for a second Brexit referendum [The Express, People’s Vote March]
12. MORE than half a million protesters **take** to the streets to demand a 'People's Vote' on the final Brexit deal. [The Sun, People’s Vote March]

The coverage of anti-Brexit protesters’ demands in extracts 10-12 is balanced, suggesting that their motives are reasonable, appropriate and therefore legitimate (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 9). However, 10 instances (15.63%) report on the protesters’ purpose negatively. For example:

13. Protesters have **taken** to the streets calling for a 'People's Vote' on the UK's final deal after Brits voted to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum [The Sun, People’s Vote March]
14. 100,000 Remainers **march** on London in bid to THWART Brexit [The Express, People’s Vote March]
15. EU STILL GOING? Thousands of anti-Brexit protesters **march** on Westminster in desperate last-ditch plea for second referendum [The Sun, Final Say]
16. THOUSANDS of furious Remainers have **taken** to the streets up and down the UK to protest Boris Johnson's prorogation of Parliament, in a desperate bid to stop a no deal Brexit from taking place on October 31. [The Express, Stop the Coup]
17. EU MUST BE JOKING Brexit march: Thousands of protesters **pour** into London for People's Vote march in desperate bid to kill Brexit [The Sun, Put it to the People]

Extract 13 implies that the wants of the People's Vote March are in opposition to the wants of 'Brits'. This creates an in-group/out-group dichotomy, in which remain voters are othered and shown to be in opposition to the consensus of the in-group (namely, leave-voting Britons). Parnell (2021: 11) notes that excluding Remainers from the British in-group legitimates 'intolerance towards political positions that diverge from the (slight) majority'. Similarly, extract 14 pits anti-Brexit protesters against leave-voters by claiming that they want to *thwart* the wishes of the majority of the electorate, delegitimating their demands. Extracts 15-17 are different in their delegitimating approach; the demands of the anti-Brexit protesters are constructed as *desperate*. The semantics of the adjective *desperate* encode helplessness and futility, implying that the protest will be unsuccessful. The demonstrator's wants are therefore delegitimated through negative moral evaluation.

4.4 (De)legitimating demands in the remain press

4.4.1 Pro-Brexit protests

The remain press grossly underreport on the demands of pro-Brexit protesters; the verbal processes *demand** and *call** are not used at all. Similarly, in the 24 times the remain press reported on pro-Brexit protesters' *movement* and *assembly*, their purpose for protesting is only given 8 times (33.33%) including 4 instances (16.67%) that feature their demands as their motive. For example:

18. Tens of thousands of pro-Brexit protesters **descended** on parliament on Friday, the day the UK was supposed to leave the EU, to voice their frustration with the delay to the process. [Financial Times, Leave Means Leave]
19. Thousands of protesters **crammed** into Parliament Square to voice their anger at what they claim is Brexit being betrayed. [The Mirror, March to Leave]

Although extract 18 reports on the pro-Brexit protesters' demands without overtly positive or negative evaluation, extract 19 is more delegitimising through the inclusion of the cynical reporting verb 'claim'. This verb is used three of the four times (75%) pro-Brexit protesters' demands are reported on in the remain press. The reporting verb *claim* casts doubt, suggests fabrication and indicates that the journalist takes a negative stance toward the words that are introduced (Chen 2005: 37, 43). The remain press may then have used *claim* to undermine the idea that Brexit is being betrayed, implying that the pro-Brexit protesters' purpose is delegitimate. Consequently, while the demands of pro-Brexit protesters are delegitimated on three occasions (75%), it is perhaps more of note that their demands were only included as their purpose for protesting a total of four times. According to Koopmans (2004), it is only through the mass media that protests are able to affect the behaviour of political elites. Perhaps this is why the pro-Brexit protesters demands are so frequently ignored by the remain press; if they are not reported on, it is harder for them to influence the political agenda.

4.4.2 Anti-Brexit protests

Expectedly, the demands of anti-Brexit protesters in the remain press are reported on accurately and objectively through the verbal processes *demand** and *call** on all 7 occasions in which they are used. For example:

20. Protesters **demand** Boris Johnson 'stop the coup' as thousands march across UK against parliament shutdown [The Independent, Stop the Coup]
21. Protesters were **calling** for a second referendum after a poll at the weekend suggested 86 per cent of Labour members wanted a "people's vote" over Britain's leaving the EU. [Financial Times, People's Vote March]

The anti-Brexit protesters' demands are represented as legitimate; extracts 20 and 21 include coverage of their number ('thousands march') and an opinion poll which suggests a second referendum has the overwhelming support of Labour politicians. Legitimation is thereby inferred by reference to consensus and authority (Van Leeuwen 2007; 2008).

In the context of material processes, the remain press report on anti-Brexit protesters *movement* and *assembly* 112 times. Of these, their purpose is reported on 64 times (57.14%), including 23 (20.54%) that feature their demands as their motive for protesting. These instances include positive moral evaluation (Van Leeuwen 2007; 2008) which further legitimates their motives:

22. Led by mayor Sadiq Khan, around one million protesters **gathered** to demand a fresh referendum [The Guardian, People's Vote March]
23. Around 400 protesters made up of British expatriates living in Europe, some of whom travelled from Italy and France, and EU citizens residing in the UK have **gathered** in Hyde Park to call for the right to vote in a final referendum. [The Guardian, People's Vote March]

Extract 22 refers to a second referendum as 'fresh' and extract 23 labels voting in another referendum as a 'right'. Both of these terms are value-laden. For example, what is 'fresh' is modern and unimpaired; what is a 'right' is a moral and ethical principle. Therefore, what is not 'fresh' is stale and outdated; what is not a 'right' is not a just entitlement. The invocation of positive moral evaluation manifest in these extracts therefore works to legitimate the protesters' demands because a second referendum is shown to be a good thing.

4.4.3 (De)legitimating demands: summary

This section of analysis has found that (surprisingly, given their Euroscepticism) the leave press neglected coverage of pro-Brexit protesters demands – however, when their demands were reported on, they were represented as legitimate. More unexpectedly, the leave press dedicated more coverage to anti-Brexit protester's demands and reported on them as (not always, but mostly) legitimate. Because North, Piwek and Joinson (2020: 186; 195) comment that the division of Remainers and Brexiteers is 'reminiscent of tribes' and that 'Brexit tribalism' was widespread in the media and public discourse, the expectation was to observe more instances in which the leave press represented anti-Brexit protesters' demands as undemocratic. However, in the context of Brexit protests, it seems that the leave press does not adhere to strong 'political and social fault lines' (Kelley 2019: 13). That said, the acknowledgment of demands does not necessarily equate to endorsement (Laschever 2017: 363); as we shall see, this often reasonable and legitimating coverage of anti-Brexit protesters is not exhibited by the leave press throughout the rest of the chapter.

Interestingly, the remain press took a very different approach to their reporting. While expectedly, they represented the anti-Brexit protesters' demands as legitimate, they did not actively delegitimate pro-Brexit protesters' demands in their coverage. Instead, they barely reported on pro-Brexit protests at all. Because media coverage of protests triggers media attention, which subsequently effects the political agenda (Vliegenthart et al. 2016: 842), perhaps the remain press did not want to give the pro-Brexit protesters any opportunity for their demands to be heard by political representatives – particularly because the political agenda was already in favour of leaving the EU.

4.5 (De)legitimating discontent in the leave press

4.5.1 Pro-Brexit protests

When pro-Brexit protesters are positioned as SAYERS in the leave press, they express their dissatisfaction with how the government have handled Brexit on 53.85% of occasions. Specifically, their discontent is aimed at MPs extending the date the UK was set to leave the EU. As such, MPs are the recipients of their verbal actions. Although it is a consistent finding that positive media coverage of peaceful protests garners support and sympathy (e.g. Power et al. 2016), many of the below verbal processes are aggressive and express hostile evaluations in their VERBIAGE. Because of their volatile nature, the verbal processes in extracts 24-27 can be classed as what Stamou (2001: 672) terms 'negative action':

24. 'We didn't vote to be STITCHED UP' Marching Brexiteers **SNAP** at MPs betrayal – 'LEAVE now' [The Express, March to Leave]
25. 'She's a pathological LIAR!' Brexit protesters **call** for May to resign IMMEDIATELY at demo [The Express, March to Leave]
26. Marching Brexiteers **ripped** into MPs thwarting Britain's EU exit [The Express, March to Leave]
27. At the news, protesters **told** Express.co.uk they felt "cheated" by the Prime Minister and called on Mrs May to resign immediately [The Express, March to Leave]

Although often aggressive, the pro-Brexit protesters' verbal processes are justified and mitigated in each of these extracts. For example, the Brexiteers' verbal processes are constructed as a response to previous negative acts: 'MPs betrayal' (extract 24), May being a ‘pathological liar’ (extract 25) and MPs ‘thwarting Britain’s EU exit’ (extract 26). In extract 27, protesters calling on ‘Mrs May to resign immediately’ are justified because their VERBIAGE is constructed as an outcome of an emotional state (i.e. the protesters feel ‘cheated’ by May). This is unsurprising, as May and her handling of Brexit negotiations were frequently treated as ‘a national embarrassment’ in the leave press to establish grounds for May’s removal as prime minister (Parnell 2021: 9). The MPs are therefore constructed as delegitimate through the negative moral evaluation attributed to them through the protesters’ aggressive verbal processes. Moreover, because the VERBIAGE emphasises the protesters’ outrage as their motivation for demonstrating, their negative acts are legitimated and can be excused as reasonable expressions.

In the context of material processes, of the 13 times aggressive protest activity takes place during pro-Brexit protests, both pro- and anti-Brexit protesters are shown to be clashing on five occasions (38.46%) (extract 28). Moreover, anti-Brexit protesters are positioned as the initiators of aggression on four occasions (30.77%) (extracts 29 and 30):

28. Leavers and Remainers **CLASH** on Nigel Farage Brexit march [The Express, March to Leave]
29. They are already being **dogged** by a group of counter-protesters, including anti-Brexit grassroots campaign Led By Donkeys. [The Sun, March to Leave]
30. Brexiteers in Sunderland were **ambushed** by pro-Europe protesters carrying hearts, during Nigel Farage's Brexit betrayal march. [The Express, March to Leave]

In extract 28, both pro- and anti-Brexit protesters are the ACTORS of the process, sharing responsibility for the *clash* and leaving no GOAL. Dreyfus (2017: 378) argues that construing events in the clause construction ‘Doer + Process + Done-to’ attributes maximum responsibility to the ‘Doer’ (ACTOR). This is because transitive clauses have an archetypal structure of ‘intentional goal-directed action’ in which an ACTOR intentionally puts an action onto a GOAL (Davidse 1992: 111). Here then, responsibility is obscured – it is not clear who initiated the negative action. Conversely, in extracts 29 and 30, it is made explicit that anti-Brexit protesters are the sole initiators of the negative action and that Brexiteers are the GOALS. It is also interesting to note that extracts 29 and 30 are passive constructions; the position of the ACTORS (‘counter-protesters’ and ‘pro-Europe protesters’) is not foregrounded at the start of the clause. While this places less responsibility on the anti-Brexit protesters for *dogging* and *ambushing* (Dreyfus 2017: 378), Fowler (1991: 78) notes that passive constructions such as these reorient the story. As such, in extracts 29 and 30, the story may have been reoriented to focus on the victimisation of the pro-Brexit protesters (GOALS).

It is worth mentioning that the articles from which extracts 29 and 30 are taken do not expand further on the anti-Brexit protesters’ negative action. For example, there is no additional mention of anti-Brexit protesters, suggesting the brief inclusion of the confrontation is an opportunistic attempt to deride them. Moreover, extract 30 perhaps overstates the extent to which pro-Europe protesters *ambushed* Brexiteers. While the verb *ambushed* carries the implication that anti-Brexit protesters were violent and intimidating toward the March to Leave, the rest of *The Express* article reveals that this is not the case at all:

> Footage shows Remain protestors holding hearts that read "we love regional investment" and "we love workers' rights". The protestors hold up the hearts and announce "this is what you are going to lose", while a marcher declares "no we are not". [The Express, March to Leave]

This extract shows that the anti-Brexit protesters were engaged in activities incomparable to *ambushing*, suggesting that the coverage was again dramatised to position pro-Brexit protesters as victims. Evidently, coverage of anti-Brexit protesters' discontent is not afforded the same mitigation as pro-Brexit protesters'.

4.5.2 Anti-Brexit protests

Anti-Brexit protesters are also constructed as the SAYERS of hostile verbal processes toward MPs. While this occurs 16 times in the dataset, only one of the anti-Brexit protesters' negative actions is justified (6.25%) (extract 31) and only one is explained (6.25%) (extract 32):

31. 100,000 Remainers take to the streets of London to demand a vote on the final Brexit deal and **accuse** the government of 'peddling a fantasy' [The Daily Mail, People's Vote March]
32. Many protesters gave up on any attempt at wit or wisdom and simply **scrawled** the F-word next to a photo of Boris Johnson [The Daily Mail, People's Vote March]

In extract 31, the anti-Brexit protesters' *accusations* toward the government are justified because the act is a response to a previous negative act (the government 'peddling a fantasy'). While some reason is given for anti-Brexit protesters *scrawling* the 'F-word' in extract 32, it is because they 'gave up on any wit or wisdom'. Because this explanation does not entail rationalisation, the action is construed as 'absurd' (Stamou 2001: 674) and therefore delegitimate. The remaining 14 instances (87.5%) of negative action are also not legitimated through explanation or justification. For example:

33. The protesters carried anti-Boris placards, waved EU flags and **mocked** Johnson and several other politicians [The Daily Mail, No to Boris Yes to Europe]
34. Remainers **take aim** at Dominic Cummings [The Express, People's Vote March]
35. Rees-Mogg and his son need police escort as Remainers **shout** vile abuse [The Express, People's Vote March]
36. You're a dangerous man Nigel! Furious EU protester **rants** at Farage [The Express, March for Europe]
37. The Commons Leader and his son Peter needed a police escort after People's Vote protesters **heckled** as they left Parliament on Saturday [The Sun, People's Vote March]

No reason is given as to why anti-Brexit protesters are *mocking*, *taking aim*, *shouting*, *ranting* or *heckling* MPs in the above extracts, so the protesters' acts of hostility are not justified. While both pro- and anti-Brexit protesters are antagonistic toward MPs in the leave press, the negative actions of the in-group (pro-Brexit protesters) are mitigated, whereas the negative actions of the out-group (anti-Brexit protesters) are emphasised, representing those responsible as deviant (Stamou 2001: 673-674). By omitting justification for the anti-Brexit protesters' negative action, the leave press adhere to a 'discourse of deviance' by focusing on the disruptive elements of protests rather than addressing the causes that motivated the action (Hart and Kelsey 2019: 1).

However, different patterns emerge when elite sources are positioned as SAYERS expressing hostility toward anti-Brexit protesters:

38. Tory Brexiteers **ROUND on** 'hypocritical' Remainers marching in London to override DEMOCRACY [The Express, People's Vote March]

39. Rees-Mogg **MOCKS** marching Remainers trying to THWART Brexit [The Express, People’s Vote March]

Similar to how pro-Brexit protesters’ negative verbal actions toward MPs are mitigated, so too are pro-Brexit MPs’ when anti-Brexit protesters are the TARGETS of their negative verbal actions. Brexit-supporting MPs *round on* and *mock* the protesters in response to their want to ‘override democracy’ and ‘thwart Brexit’. Not only do these justifications diminish the MPs’ negative actions, but their negative moral evaluations of the protesters’ motivations simultaneously delegitimate their purpose and legitimate the pro-Brexit MP’s criticism. The criticisms are further legitimated (and protesters further delegitimated) because politicians are the SAYERS and are likely viewed by *The Express* as having ‘personal authority legitimation’ granted through their institutional roles (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). This vested authority is reason enough to listen to and believe claims from such authorities – we must do so because they say so (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94).

Of the 20 times anti-Brexit protesters’ discontent is reported on through material processes in the leave press, 11 (55%) position the police as ACTORS or include them in CIRCUMSTANCES:

40. Police, including officers on horseback, **clashed** with anti-Brexit protesters in Parliament Square and 16 people were arrested. [The Express, March for Change]
41. Police on standby as Remainers **square up** to Brexit supporters [The Express, People’s Vote March]
42. POLICE had to intervene last night as Remainers **grappled** with two people carrying a "Brexit Now" banner at a demonstration in Westminster. [The Express, Stop the Coup]

The inclusion of police control is a key part of protest coverage, not least because the press' reproduction of stories about antagonistic events 'allows for the reproduction of specific political agendas' (Sanz Sabido and Price 2017: 144). This can enable the transfer of focus from the protesters' intended opposition target (Brexit-supporters and MPs) to the police, shifting protesters away from discourses of politics to discourses of criminality (McLeod 1995: 6). It is of note that again, there is no justification for why anti-Brexit protesters are clashing, squaring up to and grappling with others, leaving their negative actions unjustified and delegitimated.

4.6 (De)legitimating discontent in the remain press

4.6.1 Pro-Brexit protests

Intriguingly, the remain press did not report on any instances of pro-Brexit protesters' discontent through verbal and material processes. However, the remain press only dedicated 13.55% of their coverage to pro-Brexit protesters' material and verbal processes. The representation of pro-Brexit protesters is therefore extremely restricted in the remain press. Again, this omission may have been a tactic to limit the pro-Brexit protesters' message influencing the political agenda.

4.6.2 Anti-Brexit protests

In all eight instances in which the remain press report on anti-Brexit protesters' hostile verbal acts toward MPs, no justification is given for their negative action. This is surprising, as sympathetic coverage of a protest can increase its mobilisation (Rosie and Gorringe 2009: 36).

43. The business secretary, Andrea Leadsom, was escorted by police as she left the House of Commons to the sound of protesters on the People's Vote march **shouting**: "Shame on you." [The Guardian, People's Vote March]
44. Business Secretary Andrea Leadsom has alleged she received **"frightening" abuse** from anti-Brexit protesters as she left Parliament shortly after MPs voted to delay a vote on Boris Johnson's deal [The Mirror, People's Vote March and Final Say]
45. But there were ugly scenes later as Tory MPs, including Jacob Rees-Mogg, who was with his 12-year-old son, and Andrea Leadsom, were **verbally abused** by People's Vote protesters as they left Parliament under police escorts [The Mirror, People's Vote March and Final Say]
46. However, the upbeat atmosphere soured after the MPs' vote when the prominent Brexiters Andrea Leadsom and Jacob Rees-Mogg, walking with his son, were **aggressively heckled** by protesters despite a heavy police presence [The Guardian, People's Vote March]

Although the protesters' hostility is not explicitly legitimated in the same ways the analysis has seen so far, there does seem to be some subtle attempts by the remain press to put discursive distance between the protesters and their negative actions. For example, in extract 43, while it is implied that the protesters are shouting at Andrea Leadsom, Leadsom is not the RECEIVER in the grammatical construction of the verbal process. In fact, there is no RECEIVER at all:

Leadsom […] left the House of Commons to the sound of [protesters on the People's Vote march $_{\text{SAYER}}$] [shouting: $_{\text{VERBAL PROCESS}}$] ["Shame on you." $_{\text{VERBIAGE}}$]

The way that the clause is structured backgrounds the protesters' negative action as their shouting is not shown to have an effect on another entity (i.e. Leadsom). Whether the protesters are purposefully berating Leadsom or whether they just happen to be shouting at the same time she is leaving the House of Commons is ambiguous. The negative action is implied, but not explicit. In extract 44, Leadsom is the SAYER and her VERBIAGE details the '"frightening" abuse' she received from anti-Brexit protesters. However, the reporting verb *alleged* implies that her assertions might not be true. The fault of the protesters is made more explicit in extracts 45 and 46. There is no ambiguity as to whether the protesters did or did not *verbally abuse* and *aggressively heckle* Leadsom, Rees-Mogg and his son. However, these negative actions are described as 'ugly scenes' (extract 45) that 'soured the upbeat atmosphere' (extract 46). This suggests that the remain press do not condone the negative behaviour and want to separate themselves from it – after all, 'in-group deviance is embarrassing' (Cohen 1972: 195). Nevertheless, the 'ugly scenes' are reported on as arriving 'later', and the atmosphere 'upbeat' before it was 'soured', suggesting that the protesters were reasonable, appropriate and therefore legitimate (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 9) before the negative verbal action took place.

4.7 (De)legitimating discontent: summary

When reporting on discontent, the leave press legitimated pro-Brexit protesters' hostility toward MPs by justifying their negative verbal action and attributing negative moral evaluation to the MPs they were protesting against. This is not surprising, as politicians' poor handling of Brexit was frequently derided in the leave press (Parnell 2021). The leave press also abandoned the previously (mostly) reasonable representation of anti-Brexit protesters seen in the reporting of demands. Anti-Brexit protesters' victimisation of pro-Brexit protesters and MPs was not justified, nor were their interactions with police.

When it comes to strategies of protest, Della Porta (2016: 15) notes that 'the aims do not justify the means' and aggressive acts can alienate sympathisers. It was therefore surprising to discover that the remain press did not provide justification or motivation for the anti-Brexit protesters' aggression toward MPs. Although some attempt is made to obfuscate the protesters' hostility, the protesters were not completely absolved of their negative action. More surprising still was the finding that the remain press did not report on any instances of pro-Brexit protesters' discontent through verbal and material processes in the dataset. While it seems unusual that the remain press would choose to report on the (albeit limited and somewhat excused) instances of discontent from anti-Brexit protesters, but not at all on pro-Brexit protesters' negative acts, this again points to the constrained representation of pro-Brexit protesters in the remain press.

4.8 (De)legitimating turnout in the leave press

4.8.1 Pro-Brexit protests

The leave press do not report on the turnout of pro-Brexit protests through verbal or material process in the dataset at all. Initially, it seemed unusual that a protest's advocates would not want to emphasise its numbers. However, a protest's size is the most important characteristic determining the likelihood of its coverage (de Smaele and Kenis 2020: 186) and far fewer people attended the pro-Brexit protests than the anti-Brexit protests. For example, while the People's Vote March is thought to have stood at around 670,000 people (ITV News 2018), the March to Leave was made up of a mere 200 (ITV News 2019). Perhaps the leave press did not cover the pro-Brexit protests' small turnout to avoid emphasising their low level of support.

4.8.2 Anti-Brexit protests

The leave press' coverage of anti-Brexit protests was often sceptical toward the number of demonstrators in attendance. Scepticism is realised when protesters are included in VERBIAGE that is introduced by the reporting verb *claim**. This occurs in 12 out of 29 instances (41.38%) in which anti-Brexit protesters are positioned in VERBIAGE. For example:

47. People’s Vote **claim** million protesters marched through London demanding public be given final say on Brexit [The Telegraph, Put it to the People]
48. Organisers **claimed** 670,000 anti-Brexiteers marched through central London from Park Lane to the Houses of Parliament [The Sun, People’s Vote March]
49. Anti-Brexit campaigners **claim** ‘up to one million’ protesters flooded the streets of London for a mammoth demonstration to coincide with Parliament’s ‘Super Saturday’ crunch vote on Boris Johnson's withdrawal deal [The Daily Mail, Final Say]

While allowing protesters to speak for themselves can ‘contribute to a more objective narrative’ (Kilgo and Harlow 2019: 522), this is not the case here. Extracts 47-49 delegitimate the protesters’ speech through the attribution of the cynical verbal process *claim**. As previously discussed (*4.4.1 Pro-Brexit protests*, this chapter), *claim** casts doubt on VERBIAGE, making clear what is being said is not necessarily fact and demonstrating a ‘negativity of feeling’ on part of the journalist towards the words that are introduced (Chen 2005: 37, 43). The dubiousness inherent in the semantics of *claim** therefore indicates that Remainers could be lying about the number of protesters that ‘marched’ or ‘flooded’ the streets. Doubt is further emphasised typographically in extract 49 through scare quotes – a marker frequently used by journalists as a ‘distancing mechanism’ to express ambiguity (Ekström, Patrona and Thornborrow 2021: 11). This therefore implies that the anti-Brexit protesters are not telling the truth about the number of participants, delegitimating them through the negative moral evaluation attributed to lying.

Elsewhere, anti-Brexit protest turnout is delegitimated when elites are positioned as SAYERS. While this happens less (2/18 (11.11%) occasions in which protesters are TARGETS and 1/29 (3.45%) occasions in which protesters feature in VERBIAGE), they nevertheless contribute to the delegitimation of anti-Brexit protests’ turnout:

50. EU SAID MILLION People’s Vote march claims that a million protesters joined in London ‘**demolished** by experts’ who predict it was actually 400,000 [The Sun, People’s Vote March]
51. Brexiteer Tory Peter Bone **added**: “I’m not really sure it can be called a People’s March – it’s hardly a march and more of a social gathering. “I very much doubt the turnout figure is correct given they got their numbers wrong before. “There were 17.4 million people who voted to leave the EU, so the protesters don't represent the country as a whole.” [The Express, People’s Vote March]

In extract 50, the SAYERS are ‘experts’ whose validity and believability is fundamental to their expert status (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). ‘Experts’ are attributed the reporting verb *demolished*, which carries the semantics of total and absolute destruction. This therefore suggests that had there been any truth to the People’s Vote March ‘claims’ they could not be so completely falsified. Similarly in extract 51, the SAYER is Peter Bone, whose legitimacy is intrinsic to his governmental authority (Van Leeuwen 2007: 94). Again, this is mirrored by the lack of scepticism and doubt in his assertions. The People’s Vote March is delegitimised through Bone’s oblique reference to negative moral evaluation. For example, his statement ‘they got their numbers wrong before’ implies that the protesters are either unreliable (i.e. their estimations are not dependable) or untrustworthy (i.e. they purposefully fabricated their level of support). Delegitimation by reference to conformity is also invoked to convey that the People’s Vote March does ‘not represent the country as a whole’ and that the protest was ‘more of a social gathering’ than a demonstration. Bone’s VERBIAGE therefore delegitimates the protest by suggesting that its turnout was small. Again, there is the assumption the protesters have tried to lie about their level of support, evoking negative moral evaluation.

Of the 12 times material processes are used to convey a large amount of anti-Brexit protesters in the leave press, verbs that encode water metaphors are used in nine occasions (75%):

52. Thousands of protesters to **flood** streets across UK [The Express, Stop the Coup]
53. Thousands of pro-Europe protesters **flooded** Britain's cities today - leading to counter-demonstrations from Brexit voters. [The Daily Mail, March for Europe]
54. Organisers of People's Vote protest claim huge turnout as London is **flooded** with banner-waving Remainers - and petition to cancel withdrawal hits 4 million [The Daily Mail, People’s Vote March]

While coverage of large numbers can imply consensus (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37), big groups of people can also be associated with ‘problems and threats’ (Van Dijk 2000: 45). Research in CDA has long documented how using water metaphors to describe groups occupying space has adverse effects on how the groups are perceived. These metaphors are frequently used in the reporting of refugees and asylum seekers to symbolise loss of control (van der Valk 2000: 234), threat (Gabrielatos and Baker 2008), disaster (Abid, Manan and Rahman 2017) and apparent powerlessness against their size (Van Dijk 2000: 45). The water metaphors in extracts 52-54 may then have been used emphasise the sheer number of those engaged in protest. This is unexpected, as the verbal processes used in extracts 47-51 are used to cast doubt on the number of protesters in attendance. However, because water metaphors generally carry negative connotations when they are used to describe groups in the press, they may have been employed here to suggest that the protests are a threat. It seems then, that when it comes to the leave press’ coverage of turnout, the anti-Brexit protesters are representationally stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea: on one hand, there is not enough of them to be taken seriously and on the other, there are so many of them that they are a threat.

4.9 (De)legitimating turnout in the remain press

4.9.1 Pro-Brexit protests

The remain press do not report on the number of pro-Brexit protesters through verbal processes at all in the dataset and only use material verbs to cover turnout on three occasions:

24. Thousands of protesters **crammed** into Parliament Square to voice their anger at what they claim is Brexit being betrayed. [The Mirror, March to Leave]

Although all three instances (100%) include the process *crammed* to portray high numbers, it again appears that the remain press have chosen to underreport on the pro-Brexit protests. While this could again be because the remain press want to limit the pro-Brexit protests' impact on the political agenda, their turnout may not have been reported on because small protests are less likely to receive coverage (de Smaele and Kenis 2020: 186).

4.9.2 Anti-Brexit protests

By contrast, the remain press highlight the legitimacy of anti-Brexit protests through their coverage of the numbers of protesters in attendance. Unlike the leave press' coverage, when anti-Brexit protesters are positioned in VERBIAGE, neutral reporting verbs such as *said* appear regularly (58.82%). Such reporting verbs lack 'overt evaluation' of a source's speech (Harry 2014: 1046) and give the impression of objective reporting (Sclafani 2008: 514). For example:

25. More than a million protesters crammed into the streets of central London to fight for a second EU referendum as Boris Johnson suffered another humiliating defeat, **say** organisers [The Mirror, People’s Vote March and Final Say]
26. An estimated one million protesters have marched through London to demand a second referendum on Brexit, organisers **said** [The Independent, Final Say]

The grammatical construction of extracts 55 and 56 also allude to the impression of objective reporting. Because the VERBIAGE occurs before the SAYERS, both clauses take the passive form *y was said by x*, meaning *y* (VERBIAGE) is foregrounded and *x* (SAYER) is backgrounded. It is therefore not immediately obvious that the VERBIAGE is part of a verbal process because its content takes the form of a material process. The material part of the clause may have been foregrounded to give the impression the reports of ‘a million protesters’ attending the protests are fact, not just the opinion of the (backgrounded) organisers. Emphasising the quantification of protesters through foregrounding the VERBIAGE then has the effect of underscoring the protests’ popularity, support and legitimation. Moreover, both instances of VERBIAGE further legitimate the protesters by including their purpose: they are demonstrating to ‘to fight for a second EU referendum’ and ‘to demand a second referendum on Brexit’.

Surprisingly, when material processes are used to report on protester turnout, some water metaphors are included:

27. UP to a million protesters **swamped** Westminster yesterday to call for a "final say" vote on Boris Johnson's Brexit deal. [The Mirror, Final Say]
28. Brexit protesters **flood** streets to demonstrate against Parliament suspension [The Mirror, People’s Vote March]

Although these same verbs are used by the leave press in their coverage of the anti-Brexit protests' turnout, the remain press only use water metaphors to describe large quantities of protesters in three of 29 occasions (10.34%) (compared to 75% of occasions in the leave press). Moreover, all three instances include the protesters' purpose. This suggests that while generally, water metaphors are used to negatively describe large quantities of people, they are used in the remain press to highlight the protesters numerical power and legitimacy. The remaining 26 (89.66%) material processes that describe the anti-Brexit protests' turnout also use verbs to express the sheer number of protesters in attendance:

29. The streets of central London were **clogged** with protesters from across the country, urging politicians - faced with the country potentially crashing out of the EU in just three weeks' time - to hand the decision back to the people. [The Independent, Put it to The People]
30. Protesters bearing banners stating "Bring down Boris", "No Mandate for No Deal" and "Defend our Democracy" **massed** at the entrance to Downing Street. [The Times, Stop the Coup]

Again, protesters' purposes are included in extracts 59 and 60: protesters are *clogging* the streets to urge politicians to hand the decision back to the people and are *massing* at Downing Street to defend democracy. The oblique references to moralisation encoded in these purposes thus imply that the aims of the demonstration are democratic and legitimate. The results of this section therefore suggest that the leave and remain press both use similar discourses to describe the turnouts of anti-Brexit protests. However, while the leave press use expressions of large quantities to delegitimate anti-Brexit protesters, the remain press use the same expressions to instead legitimate them.

4.10 (De)legitimating turnout: summary

When reporting on turnout, the leave press continued to delegitimate the numbers of anti-Brexit protesters by using sceptical reporting verbs to cast doubt on their testimonials. Elsewhere, elites were positioned as SAYERS to invoke negative moral evaluation by suggesting that the anti-Brexit protesters were unreliable and had lied about their level of support. This reflects Kilgo and Harlow's (2019: 523) finding that 'newspapers present official perspective as more valuable, credible, and accessible than the protesters' views'. Paradoxically, the leave press also included water metaphors in their coverage of anti-Brexit protesters, suggesting that the protests were indeed numerous – but to a threatening extent. The representation of anti-Brexit protesters in the leave press was then found to be contested – on one hand, they suggest that the protesters are lying about their high turnout, and on the other hand, they suggest that the protests are overwhelmingly numerous. Although the leave press paid attention to the size of anti-Brexit protests, they did not report on the pro-Brexit protests' turnout through verbal or material process in the dataset at all – perhaps because their attendees were so few.

By contrast, the remain press emphasised (and legitimated) anti-Brexit protests' large turnout through the use of verbs that express large quantities, neutral reporting verbs and passive verbal processes. Once more, the remain press offered an extremely limited representation of pro-Brexit protests, only reporting on their size three times.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter investigated how the leave and remain press constructed pro- and anti-Brexit protests as (de)legitimate through the reporting of verbal and material processes in the context of protesters' 1) demands, 2) discontent and 3) turnout. The chapter found that the representation of protesters was varied and that both protests were delegitimated in different ways.

It is of note that the leave press gave more coverage to anti-Brexit protests than pro-Brexit protests and that the remain press barely covered pro-Brexit protests at all. Investigating these differences suggested that the leave and remain press employed different strategies to delegitimate the protests they opposed. In the leave press, it seems that the large proportion of reporting dedicated to anti-Brexit protests (73.43%) was used mostly as a platform for delegitimation. Delegitimation frequently occurs in the press when protests challenge the cultural hegemony, particularly if they have extreme system-changing objectives and militant norm-violating tactics (McLeod 2007). While the anti-Brexit protests challenged the political and societal status quo to some extent (the (albeit marginal) majority leave result) their objectives were not particularly radical as 48% of the electorate voted to remain and organisations such as the People's Vote campaign had the support of numerous celebrities and politicians. The delegitimation of the anti-Brexit protests could therefore have been a response to the realistic chance that their goals would be successful. At the time the protests took place, it was unclear if and how the UK would leave the EU (Koller et al. 2019: 1), meaning that a second referendum was, for some politicians, a viable option. Ultimately, protests are about electoral threat (Tilly 2006; Lohmann 1993), and the leave press may have viewed anti-Brexit protesters as a threat to the security of the leave result. That said, this does not explain why the leave press chose to represent the demands of the anti-Brexit protests as largely legitimate in some of their coverage. Perhaps coverage of Brexit-related protests in the leave press was not as polarising as the Brexit debate itself.

Conversely, it seems that the remain press' strategy of delegitimation was to give pro-Brexit protesters practically no platform at all. This could be due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the pro-Brexit protests were uneventful and had a small turnout. Such protests are not generally covered by the news media as they ‘do not engage in newsworthy activity’ (Kilgo and Harlow 2019: 509). The remain press may then have not afforded pro-Brexit protesters column inches because they did not deem them interesting enough to report on. Secondly, because without media attention protests have little to no direct impact on policy change (Giugni 2004), if a protest is not covered ‘it basically does not exist’ (Vliegenthart et al. 2016: 840). Perhaps the remain press underreported on the pro-Brexit protests as a means to stifle their plans to leave the EU immediately with or without a deal – particularly because news media favoured the Leave campaign before and after the referendum (Levy et al. 2016). Moreover, the lack of coverage could also be due to the fact that there were only five pro-Brexit protests, four of which took place in the space of 13 days. By contrast, there were ten anti-Brexit marches over the space of three years and three months, giving the remain press less opportunity to report on (and delegitimate) the pro-Brexit protests.

Lastly, it is of note that the overarching themes in the data (demands, discontent and turnout) relate somewhat to protest paradigm frames. For example, discontent could contribute to McLeod and Hertog’s (1999) *violent crime* frame and low turnout could contribute to the *invocation of public opinion* frame. Gleaning a more complete picture of the extent to which coverage adhered to the protest paradigm could therefore add weight to this chapter’s findings and provide more detailed explanations as to why these patterns of (de)legitimation occurred. The extent to which the coverage of Brexit-related protests adhered to the protest paradigm will therefore be the focus of the next chapter of analysis.

5 Identifying the protest paradigm in Brexit protest coverage

This chapter investigates the existence of protest paradigm frames in the leave and remain press' coverage of Brexit-related protests. As noted in section *2.6.3 Paradigmatic variables*, changing contours of political communication have provided new avenues for exploring and understanding the protest paradigm (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 62). This chapter therefore returns to McLeod and Hertog's (1999) original conceptualisation of the protest paradigm and seeks to identify, for the first time, all of the 22 frames they outline to contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in hitherto under-researched protests and offer a thorough method that can be used to identify protest paradigm frames. In doing so, the chapter relies on corpus methods and formulates probes (questions that can be asked of the data) to satisfy the following aims:

Aim 5.1: Demonstrate the ways in which corpus-assisted CDA can be used to identify and analyse frames.

Aim 5.2: Observe the extent to which a sample of the leave press' coverage of remain protests adheres to the protest paradigm.

Aim 5.3: Observe the extent to which a sample of the remain press' coverage of leave protests adhere to the protest paradigm.

5.1 How corpus-assisted CDA can be used to identify frames

This section will demonstrate how corpus-assisted CDA can be used to identify and analyse protest paradigm frames in the press. The data used in this chapter comes from the Leave/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora. These datasets comprise the leave press' coverage of anti-Brexit protests and the remain press' coverage of pro-Brexit protests, respectively. Multiple keyword lists were created by dividing the Leave/Anti-Brexit (henceforth Leave/AB) and Remain/Pro-Brexit (henceforth Remain/PB) sub-corpora into ten smaller units: the five newspapers that comprise Leave/AB and the five newspapers that comprise Remain/PB. Here, the ten newspapers that make up both sub-corpora are considered datasets in their own right and are henceforth referred to as *sub-corpus fragments* (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: The ten sub-corpus fragments and the number of articles and words they comprise.

Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus fragments	**Number of articles**	**Number of words**
The Express	121	81,443
The Daily Mail	51	48,127
The Telegraph	36	24,756
The Sun	35	10,090
Daily Star	10	3,580
Total	**253**	**167,996**
Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus fragments	**Number of articles**	**Number of words**
The Independent	10	7,157
The Guardian	15	13,824
The Times	3	2,250
The Mirror	7	3,177
Financial Times	5	2,451
Total	**40**	**28,859**

Each Leave/AB sub-corpus fragment was compared to the BE06 to create five keyword lists. If keywords appeared in at least four of the five sub-corpus fragment keyword lists, they were classed as key keywords. This step was repeated for the Remain/PB sub-corpus fragments. To avoid ‘isolated spikes of data’ (Taylor 2018: 27) and ensure that the words under analysis were truly key, the two Leave/AB and Remain/PB key keyword lists were surveyed to find any terms that appeared in both. Resultantly, the following 15 key keywords were identified (sorted alphabetically): *Brexit*; *deal*; *EU*; *Farage*; *leave*; *march*; *MPs*; *Nigel*; *parliament*; *pro*; *protest*; *Theresa*; *vote*; *voted*; *we*. These 15 key keywords are incredibly key because they have a high dispersion across datasets. Although on their own keywords do not immediately reveal frames, they do flag important concepts in a dataset that may help ‘diagnose’ and ‘nominate’ the fundamental ideas around which the frame is constructed by identifying words that are central to the culturally driven judgement of the journalist and to the meaning of an article (Touri and Koteyko 2015: 605). Key keywords therefore go one step beyond this by highlighting a particular word's breadth and prominence, more reliably evidencing the concepts that may reveal frames.

Once the key keywords were identified, concordance analysis was used to uncover journalistic narratives and their social, cultural and ideological underpinnings. Concordance lines for all 15 key keywords were generated, returning a combined total of 11,105 hits. Because the manual analysis of this many concordance hits would be unfeasible for one analyst a sample was calculated to make the data more manageable. While many framing studies use sampling (e.g. Gil-Lopez 2021; Kyriakidou and Olivas Osuna 2017; Shahin et al. 2016), the number or percentage of articles that are extracted varies widely across studies. Because very few framing studies utilise corpus methods, the sampling method used here follows the procedure offered by Turner et al. (2018) in their corpus-assisted CDA of newspaper debates about same-sex marriage. As shown in Table 5.2 overleaf, concordance lines were reduced by 50% and a maximum of 200 and minimum of 50 concordance lines were analysed per key keyword. This created a sample of 3,248 concordance lines (NB: if the number of hits for a given key keyword was less than 50, all instances were analysed).

Table 5.2: The number of concordance hits per key keyword and the sample analysed.

Remain/Pro-Brexit		
Key keyword	**No. of hits**	**No. of lines analysed**
Brexit	207	104
Deal	68	50
EU	154	77
Farage	94	50
Leave	219	110
March	124	62
MPs	37	37
Nigel	44	44
Parliament	90	50
Pro	38	38
Protest	43	43
Theresa	32	32
Vote	48	48
Voted	24	24
We	239	120
Total	**1,461**	**889**
Leave/Anti-Brexit		
Key keyword	**No. of hits**	**No. of lines analysed**
Brexit	2,048	200
Deal	788	200
EU	880	200
Farage	140	70
Leave	422	200
March	978	200
MPs	428	200
Nigel	98	50
Parliament	578	200
Pro	139	70
Protest	229	115
Theresa	265	133
Vote	1,303	200
Voted	242	121
We	1106	200
Total	**9,644**	**2,359**

Viewing the key keywords in their concordance lines allowed for the efficient and systematic selection of extracts for frame analysis. The sentence containing the key keyword (node sentence), the preceding sentence and the following sentence were included in the analysis 'in order to extract meaningful frames' (see Touri and Koteyko 2015: 607). However, if any concordance lines comprised speech that was made up of multiple sentences, all of the verbiage was included, and if the concordance line was a headline, only the headline was included. Appling a binary yes/no coding technique used by Xu (2013) and Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), concordance lines were coded 'yes' if they related to any of the 22 predetermined protest paradigm frames and 'no' if they did not, allowing for the observation of a particular frame's frequency and prevalence in each sub-corpus.

It is a standard procedure in frame analysis that multiple analysts identify frames separately and then come together to examine and reconcile discrepancies (e.g. Vu and Lynn 2020; Du et al. 2018; Card et al. 2015; Tourie and Koteyko 2015). However, as this frame analysis is part of a single-authored PhD project, inter-coder reliability was not possible. In lieu of this, several intra-rater reliability steps were undertaken to ensure that the analysis was as reliable as possible. Firstly, a preliminary analysis was conducted in which all 3,248 concordance lines underwent initial yes/no binary coding to observe the extent to which they adhered to the protest paradigm. If any of the paradigmatic frames were evident in a concordance line, they were evaluated to decipher whether they contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation. Initially observing the concordance lines and frames in this way allowed for the development of a codebook. These are traditionally developed in frame analysis to carefully delineate the boundaries between different frames (Card et al. 2015: 439-440). Secondly, many of the key keywords featured in the same concordance lines which produced duplicates. For example, the concordance line 'Hugo Dixon, deputy chairman of the People's **Vote** campaign, told me they were putting on a show of force to influence all the forthcoming critical votes in **Parliament** so that **MPs** gave the electorate the final say on **Brexit**' occurred four times because it contains four key keywords (emboldened). Three of the four duplicate concordance lines were therefore removed. All duplicate concordance lines underwent this process, leaving a total of 2,414 concordance lines (1,892 in Leave/AB and 522 in Remain/PB; 74.32% of the total sample). Thirdly, to strengthen replicability, the aforementioned codebook was developed into probes. As detailed in Chapter 3, section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*, probes were formulated as questions that analysts can ask of a text to help them distinguish between different frames. Such probes were informed by McLeod and Hertog's (1999) conceptualisation of paradigmatic frames, my own interpretation of these frames and the ways in which these frames emerged from the data (see also section *5.2 Using probes to identify frames*). Fourthly, all 2,414 concordance lines were checked against the probes to increase accuracy and consistency. The checked concordance lines were then grouped depending on whether or not they adhered to the protest paradigm. Fifthly, once grouped, all of the concordance lines that did adhere to the protest paradigm were checked a final time to increase precision and reliability across the sub-corpora.

5.2 Using probes to identify frames

Using examples from the analysed sample of concordance lines, this section will explicate some of the ways in which the probes outlined in section *3.6.3 Formulating probes* served as traces for the various protest paradigm frames. While some of the examples analysed below often allude to multiple protest paradigm frames, only one frame will be discussed per extract in an attempt to make clear how particular frames were identified and categorised. This means that while an extract used to exemplify the *violent crime* frame may also contain, for example, the *official source* frame, only the discursive elements that evoke the *violent crime* frame will be discussed in the context of that extract. As noted in section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*, examples are not provided for the *riot*, *moral decay*, *trial*, *creative expression* and *unjust* *persecution* frames as they were not evident in the data. It is also worth point out that while some frames have multiple probes, they may not all be discussed here (see *3.6.3 Formulating probes* for a discussion of all of the probes I developed), and that extracts need only satisfy one to be considered as adhering to a particular frame. The below extracts were therefore selected as representative traces for frames as they are particularly representative of their corresponding probes.

5.2.1 Story frame probes

5.2.1.1 Marginalising frames

Violent crime

The following two extracts exemplify the *violent crime* frame, which can be identified through coverage of protesters engaging in physical or verbal violence.

1) The situation turned nasty when **Geldof and an assortment of Remain activists in dinghies used a loudspeaker to hurl abuse at Mr Farage and Brexit supporters**. Later, Pro-EU Labour party activist Bethany Pickering said Geldof had "harmed" the Remain campaign after the multi-millionaire hijacked a Brexit promotional campaign down the Thames and **taunted Leave campaigners**. Ms Pickering said she was forced to walk off the Remain boat to distance herself from Geldof's actions

[The Express, People's Vote March]

Extract 1 alludes to *violent crime* because 'Geldof and an assortment of Remain activists' are positioned as the ACTORS of the material processes 'hurl' and 'taunted'. The abhorrence of these actions is emphasised through Pickering, a Brexit-opposing *official source*, who says that she left the scene to distance herself from Geldof's actions. This frame therefore contributes to processes of demonisation.

Property crime

The *property crime* frame can be identified through coverage of protesters engaging in activities such as vandalism or blocking roads and reports of police reported trying to apprehend the perpetrators.

2) **Several officers pinned down and arrested a man who was believed to be trying to get into the Parliamentary estate**. Today's rally was organised by the pro-Remain group as a last-gasp effort to persuade MPs to vote against Mr Johnson's deal and instead swing behind a fresh Brexit poll. On a historic day, the Commons is sitting on a Saturday for the first time since 1982 to debate Mr Johnson's eleventh-hour Brexit agreement which he struck with the bloc on Thursday.

[The Daily Mail, Final Say]

Here, a protester is engaging in *property crime* by attempting to unlawfully enter Parliament. Moreover, as the police are reported on as apprehending the protesters by 'pinning down' and 'arresting' them, the extract presents the protester as a threat, evoking demonisation.

Carnival

The *carnival* frame can be seen when protesters are reported on as behaving in a carnivalesque or theatrical way.

3) Shortly before 4.30pm, **the crowd cheered as a number of loyalist marching bands made their way into the square, their drums emblazoned with the slogan "true blue defenders".** A group of four men milling around on Parliament Street in the afternoon said they had attended the protests because they believed in freedom. Although initially confrontational at being approached by a reporter, they were happy to talk about politics.

[The Guardian, Leave Means Leave]

Extract 3 evokes the *carnival* frame because it reports on crowds cheering and protesters participating in ‘loyalist marching bands’, which are akin to theatrical parades and performances (Ramsey 2011). However, despite McLeod and Hertog (1999) noting that the *carnival* frame is marginalising because it focuses on the action, not the issue, of protest, I did not code this extract as contributing to marginalisation because it includes coverage of protesters (‘a group of four men’) saying why they attended the demonstration.

Freakshow

The following extract constructs protesters as being graphically deviant or odd, evoking the *freakshow* frame:

4) **Pursued by a toilet**, Farage's foot soldiers slog 270 miles for Brexit.

[The Independent, March to Leave]

The inclusion of the premodifying verb phrase ‘pursued by a toilet’ shows that the March to Leave are deviating from mainstream norms through graphically odd acts of protest. As such, the protest is marginalised through the *freakshow* frame.

Romper room

The *romper room* frame is evoked when protesters engaging in immature and childish antics.

5) Difficult really to think how the whole enterprise could tip more into the theatre of the absurd than all detailed above, except that the Brexiters were followed by vans organised by the pro-EU collective Led By Donkeys, adorned with their now customary giant posters of hypocritical Brexiter tweets. ("In a 52-48 referendum this would be unfinished business by a long way" - Nigel Farage.) **Really this weekend ramble was the silliest Leave-Remain face-off since Farage and Bob Geldof yelled at each other through megaphones in flotillas on the Thames**.

[The Guardian, March to Leave]

Here, the March to Leave's events are described as the 'silliest Leave-Remain face-off since Farage and Bob Geldof yelled at each other through megaphones'. The premodifying adjective 'silliest' evokes connotations of childishness, suggesting that both the March to Leave and the Farage-Geldof 'face-off' were displays of immaturity. Following McLeod and Hertog (1999: 314), this extract was considered as contributing to processes of marginalisation as it focuses on spectacle while omitting the issues and views of the protesters, and because the coverage of trivial and silly antics highlights deviance from mainstream norms.

Storm watch

The *storm watch* frame can be identified when protesters are reported on as posing a possible threat to other people, society or the status quo.

6) The Jo Cox Foundation, which was set up in the wake of the Labour MP's murder in 2016, **warned that anger over Brexit should not spill over into something more dangerous**'. In a statement, the foundation said: People have an absolute right to protest, whether in Parliament, on demonstrations or in the media. We believe strongly in freedom of speech**. But we would urge everybody to avoid saying or doing anything that could incite or lead to violence**.' The threat of protests has also forced the cancellation of the Westminster Dog Of The Year competition next Thursday.

[The Daily Mail, Stop the Coup]

In extract 6, possible threat is communicated by the Jo Cox Foundation, who are attributed the evaluative verbal process 'warn' in the indirect quote 'anger over Brexit should not spill over into something more dangerous'. It is particularly of note that this warning came from the Jo Cox Foundation, which was set up following Cox's murder by Thomas Mair, who saw Cox's defence of immigration and the remain campaign a threat to his far-right vews (Cobain, Parveen and Taylor 2016). The use of the Foundation's reported speech in the context of the news report therefore implies that the anti-Brexit protesters have the potential to behave in a similarly violent way, contributing to processes of demonisation.

5.2.1.2 Mixed frames

Showdown

In the following extract, neither pro- nor anti-Brexit protesters are shown to be the sole 'bad guy', evoking the *showdown* frame.

7) She said: "As long as we can suspend Article 50 and have another referendum." Opposite the main entrance to parliament, there were tense scenes as **Leave and Remain supporters traded chants with one another** after the vote was announced. Lines of police officers kept a close eye on proceedings as **rival cries of "We are the people" and "b******s to Brexit" rang out.**

[The Express, People's Vote March]

Extract 7 does not position just one actor as the perpetrator of unfavourable behaviour; it is both Leave and Remain supporters that are the ACTORS of the transitive processes 'traded chants' and SAYERS of 'rival cries'. As there is no designated 'bad guy', neither protest groups are constructed in ways that contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation. This extract was therefore categorised as not adhering to the protest paradigm.

Protest reaction

The *protest reaction* frame can identified if reporting covers protesters' reaction, reason or motivation for protesting. While McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) argue that this frame is less biased against protesters, I found that it can also be used to delegitimise protesters.

8) About 100 people turned out for the March to Leave, organised by Leave Means Leave, which over the course of two weeks and different "legs" will see disaffected Brexiters **on a kinetic protest against their apparent "betrayal"**, culminating in a demonstration in Parliament Square on 29 March. Heading up the march was Nigel Farage, described by an acolyte as a great statesman and fantastic leader. Farage is a man who has seven times failed to be elected to parliament and resigned and then unresigned as leader of a political party numerous times.

[The Guardian, March to Leave]

While the protesters' motivation is included in extract 9 ('on a kinetic protest against…'), *The Guardian* denigrate the purpose of the demonstration. This is accomplished through the premodifying adjective 'apparent' and the judicious quotation marks around the term 'betrayal'. As argued by McLeod and Hertog (1999: 319), these linguistic devices can be used by the press to question the legitimacy of protest groups' purpose, and therefore contribute to processes of delegitimisation.

Dissection

The *dissection* frame can be identified by considering whether reporting evaluates the name and/or the practices and components of the protest group.

9) **THOUSANDS of Remoaners** have flooded London to protest against Brexit two years after the EU referendum. Campaigners are calling for a second vote - **dubbed the "People's Vote"** after Britain opted to leave the European Union on the UK's final deal. The march across the capital started at midday - with up to 80,000 people expected to take to the streets.

[The Sun, People's Vote March]

Here, *dissection* is evoked through the coverage of anti-Brexit protesters as ‘Remoaners’, a (negatively) evaluative functionalised referential strategy (Van Leeuwen 2008), and the use of the premodifying adjective ‘dubbed’. As the name of the protesters is denigrated, and their purpose called into question, delegitimisation is evoked.

Psychoanalysis

The following extract exemplifies the *psychoanalysis* frame because it examines the psychological or social roots of the protesters.

10) No one had turned out to see them, apart from me and a bloke in a Human League T-shirt, and though there were occasional supportive car-horn toots, a pointedly positioned EU banner at the marchers' next mobile toilet layby provided more editorial balance than any edition of the Today programme since Sarah Sands took over. Farage's friendly flag Wombles looked like any random group of affable English eccentrics, a flock of Fairport Convention fans or a gaggle of real-ale enthusiasts. **It was just that these hale fellows had voted to leave after the unveiling of that Breaking Point poster, had assembled here in Buckinghamshire at the behest of a man busy building alliances with far-right leaders all across Europe, and were marching to a drum that inspired neo-Nazis worldwide**, irrespective of Tim Wetherspoon's landlordly bonhomie.

[The Guardian, March to Leave]

By claiming that those on the march voted to leave the EU in response to the Breaking Point poster, which depicts a long line of refugees walking toward EU countries and was widely criticised for inciting racial hatred against migrants (Steward and Mason 2016), suggests that the protesters hold similar xenophobic values (or psychological roots). Moreover, describing the protesters as assembling at the behest of a man ‘busy building alliances with far-right leaders' and marching to a drum that 'inspired neo-Nazis' also suggests they share the same far-right, neo-Nazi beliefs, showing the protesters to be radical, deviant and demonised.

Association

One of the ways in which the *association* frame can be uncovered is by identifying any associated groups that imbue the protest with either legitimacy or deviance.

11) He was also a prominent figure in the 2010 student tuition fee protests which ended in a mob of protestors breaking into Conservative Party HQ at Millbank Tower against the wishes of the NUS. The protests also involved rioting in Parliament Square and the ambush of the Prince of Wales's car. Speaking yesterday, **Mr Chessum**, said that 'disruption is the only form of leverage protesters can rely on' and added: 'We would go further than anticipate (civil disobedience). We would defend it.'

[The Daily Mail, Stop The Coup]

In extract 11, Mr Chessum, a member of the activist group Momentum, is reported on as associating with the Stop the Coup protest. *The Daily Mail* describe Chessum's previous (unrelated) acts of protest through the negatively charged transitive processes 'breaking into', 'rioting' and 'ambush'. They then include a direct quotation of him defending disruption, which may have been strategically placed following the description of his past civil disobedience to evoke fear in the readership that similar events could occur at the Stop the Coup demonstration, demonising the anti-Brexit protest through its association with an oft-disruptive protester.

Comparison

The *comparison* frame is evident when coverage compares protesters to another group to bestow legitimacy or deviance.

12) It claims "Brexit can be stopped", despite the fact nearly 52 per cent of Britons voted to give Brussels the boot. The organiser of the march, Peter French, believes the march will be the "biggest march the capital, or country, has ever seen". **A march protesting the Iraq war in 2003 attracted the biggest crowds the UK has seen to date, with an estimated 750,000 shouting down then-Prime Minister Tony Blair**.

[The Express, Unite for Europe]

Extract 12 compares the Unite for Europe to the 2003 anti-Iraq war to disprove French's claim that the anti-Brexit protest is the biggest march the UK has ever had. This is an attempt to emphasise the anti-Brexit protests' small turnout, evoking marginalisation.

5.2.1.3 Sympathetic frames

Our story

One of the ways in which *our story* can be identified is when coverage includes the words of protesters.

13) In any case, what do the People's Vote campaigners actually want? **They claim they 'want a vote on the deal', but this is blatantly not true**. If they were honest, which they are not, they would admit that they really want to re-run the 2016 referendum.

[The Daily Mail, People's Vote March]

Although McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) argue that *our story* is a sympathetic story frame that usually contributes to positive coverage, it contributes to processes of delegitimisation in extract 13. The People's Vote March protesters' speech is indirectly denigrated through the dubious reporting verb 'claim' and the use of scare quotes surrounding their verbiage. Their speech is then directly denigrated through the inclusion of the clause that labels their claims 'blatantly not true'.

We are not alone

There are numerous probes for the *we are not alone* story frame, including 'are other people (including elites) reported on as showing support for a protest?'.

> 14) People's Vote claims to be neutral on the question of membership of the EU, insisting it wants to take the decision about the future relationship away from Westminster politicians and give it to the electorate. **Yet the organisation is an alliance of pro-EU groups including the European Movement, Britain for Europe and Scientists for the EU. All the speakers today, including London Labour Mayor Sadiq Khan, his party colleague Chuka Umunna, Tory MP Anna Soubry and Lib Dem leader Sir Vince Cable are longstanding Remain campaigners**.
>
> [The Express, People's Vote March]

Here, numerous People's Vote March supporters are listed ('pro-EU groups' and politicians who are 'longstanding Remain campaigners') evoking the *we are not alone* frame. In the context of extract 14, indicated by the conjunction 'yet', the frame is used to falsify the People's Vote claim that they are 'neutral' on the question of EU membership, thereby contributing to processes of delegitimisation.

5.2.1.4 The balance frame

The *debate* frame is evident in the following extract as it includes contextual information about issues related to the demonstration.

> 15) Ms Hartley-Brewer pointed out: "Yes, and votes count more than marches. "That's how democracies work." While the People's Vote March raged outside, MPs were set to vote on Boris Johnson's Brexit deal inside the House of Commons. **However, due to an amendment submitted by Sir Oliver Letwin, MPs voted by 322 to 306 to withhold approval of the withdrawal agreement.**

[The Express, People’s Vote March]

Here, the coverage of MPs voting to withhold approval of the Letwin agreement does not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation –the *debate* frame is simply give information about the context in which the protests took place.

5.2.2 Reliance on Official Sources and Official Definitions

The *official source* frame can be identified when elite people (for example, politicians, experts and police) are included as the SAYERS of verbal processes.

16) **"Our officers are well trained to maintain public order and stand ready to share resources across the country if any disorder breaks out. We will not hesitate to take necessary action against anyone who deliberately chooses to act outside the law."** Members of the UK "yellow vests", a conspiracy-driven group of Brexiteers, were sharing a meme on social media that threatened: "If you stop Brexit, we'll make the Paris riots look like a fucking tea party." Supporters were due to meet near the Shard this afternoon, at the same time several other demonstrations were due to take place on the other side of the Thames.

[The Independent, Leave Means Leave]

As the *official source* in extract 16, the Metropolitan Police are quoted saying that they will take action if disorder breaks out and if people choose to act unlawfully. As the focus of this reported speech is of potential violence and disruption, the inclusion of an *official source* contributes to the demonisation of protesters.

5.2.3 The Invocation of Public Opinion

One of the various ways in which *invocation of public opinion* can be identified is through the coverage of low turnouts, which emphasise the small scale of protesters relative to the larger population.

17) Not until the marchers approached the Merry Go Round pub almost 20 miles away in Hartlepool, the end of stage one, would the weather begin to relent. It is hard to tell what might constitute a respectable turnout for the forthcoming stages of the march, and how Leave Means Leave, the organisers, might thus gauge its success. **At most there were a few hundred people on the early stages of the route, including police and reporters, and after several miles in the pouring rain the number of those marching had thinned out considerably.**

[Financial Times, March to Leave]

Here, reports of the aggregated 'few hundred people' attending the March to Leave, that later 'thinned out considerably' highlights the small size of the protest, contributing to processes of marginalisation.

In summation, the 17 extracts presented in this section were selected to provide traces for some of the ways in which protest paradigm frames can manifest in discourse. Due to space constraints, these examples do not represent an exhaustive list of all of the different probes outlined in section *3.6.3 Formulating probes*, but the hope is that they offer a practical framework that demonstrates how I identified and coded at least some of the frames in the Leave/AB and Remain/PB concordance lines. In presenting these extracts, I also hoped to show here that not all of the frames McLeod and Hertog (1999) term 'marginalizing' necessarily contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisition. Similarly, those frames McLeod and Hertog (1999) term 'mixed' and 'sympathetic' can also at times contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation. The following section will discuss this observation in more detail, and outline how protest paradigm frames were distributed across the Leave/AB and Remain/PB sub-corpora.

5.3 Distribution of frames across both sub-corpora

This section will seek to demonstrate the extent to which the sample of remain and leave press' coverage of the respective pro- and anti-Brexit protests adhered to the protest paradigm. Tables 5.3 (below) and 5.4 (overleaf) show the number of times key keywords featured in concordance lines that were coded as *adhering to the protest paradigm*, *not adhering to the protest paradigm*, *issue based reporting* or *miscellaneous* in each sub-corpus (as noted in section *3.6.3.1.4 The balance frame*, *issue based reporting* was distinguished from the *debate* frame as it covered the issues surrounding Brexit rather than the protests themselves).

Table 5.3: The number of concordance lines that were coded as adhering to the protest paradigm, not adhering to the protest paradigm, issue based reporting and miscellaneous in the Leave/AB sub-corpus.

Leave/Anti-Brexit				
Key keyword	**Adhered**	**Did not adhere**	**Issue based**	**Miscellaneous**
Brexit	36	69	76	4
Deal	12	61	70	6
EU	35	39	61	14
Farage	15	11	34	6
Leave	40	33	64	6
March	62	84	6	10
MPs	11	40	98	1
Nigel	4	7	15	2
Parliament	46	51	62	6
Pro	25	31	7	6
Protest	42	47	2	8
Theresa	24	33	67	6
Vote	48	62	27	11
Voted	44	32	28	7
We	26	60	42	10
Total	**470 (24.84%)**	**660 (34.88%)**	**659 (34.83%)**	**103 (5.44%)**

Table 5.4: The number of concordance lines that were coded as adhering to the protest paradigm, not adhering to the protest paradigm, issue based reporting and miscellaneous in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus.

Remain/Pro-Brexit				
Key keyword	**Adhered**	**Did not adhere**	**Issue based**	**Miscellaneous**
Brexit	25	19	15	2
Deal	3	9	10	0
EU	13	15	29	2
Farage	27	4	2	1
Leave	23	11	10	3
March	16	6	4	8
MPs	10	6	6	1
Nigel	14	8	3	0
Parliament	13	12	5	1
Pro	11	7	4	2
Protest	16	4	0	2
Theresa	4	3	8	0
Vote	**7**	11	12	3
Voted	3	4	1	0
We	11	30	34	9
Total	**196 (37.55%)**	**149 (28.54%)**	**143 (27.39%)**	**34 (6.51%)**

Frames were classed as adhering to the paradigm when they contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation. As shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, only 470 (24.84%) and 196 (37.55%) concordance lines adhered to the protest paradigm in the Leave/AB and Remain/PB, respectively. This means that in both sub-corpora, the majority of the sample cannot be accounted for through processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation, suggesting that, contrary to Boyle and McLeod (2018: 296), the protest paradigm does not remain ‘a fundamental normative position’ through which the news media distort the representation of demonstrations. Frames were classed as *not* adhering to the paradigm when paradigmatic frames were evident but did not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation. This occurred in 660 (34.88%) and 149 (28.54%) concordance lines in the Leave/AB and Remain/PB, respectively. *Issue based* *reporting* was evident in 659 (34.83%) and 143 (27.39%) concordance lines in the Leave/AB and Remain/PB, respectively. Notably, *issue based reporting* occurred 9.99% more than concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Leave/AB, suggesting that deductively identifying and extracting protest paradigm frames neglects a large portion of the data. That said, the presence of *issue based reporting* is interesting; it suggests a departure from the protest paradigm through a focus on the wider political discussions and concerns in which the protests were situated. While such *issue based* coverage could contribute to a more balanced and informed – or possibly more negative – picture of the issues leading to demonstrations, more thorough inductive framing analysis would need to be carried out to find what the *issue based reporting* covers and how. Lastly, concordance lines coded as miscellaneous, contributing to 103 (5.44%) and 34 (6.51%) of concordance lines in the respective Leave/AB and Remain/PB sub-corpora, mostly comprised article recalls, coverage of protests that were not related to Brexit or coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests in the leave and remain press respectively.

5.4 Adherence to the protest paradigm

The 470 concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Leave/AB comprised 1,313 paradigmatic frames (Figure 5.1, overleaf) and the 196 concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Remain/PB comprised 693 paradigmatic frames (Figure 5.2, overleaf).



Protest paradigm frames evident in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus and the number of times they occurred (raw frequency and relative frequency in paranthesis)

Figure 5.1: Frames comprising the concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus.



Protest paradigm frames evident in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus and the number of times they occured (raw frequency and relative frequency in parenthesis)

Figure 5.2: Frames comprising the concordance lines that adhered to the protest paradigm in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus.

Interestingly, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the frames that McLeod and Hertog (1999: 313) term ‘marginalizing’ (*violent crime*; *property crime*; *carnival*; *freakshow*; *romper room*; and *storm watch*) do not appear particularly frequently. These marginalising story frames occur less than mixed and sympathetic story frames in both datasets (Table 5.5). This is surprising, particularly in the Leave/AB, as Chapter 4 showed that the leave press emphasised the anti-Brexit protesters’ negative action and hostility.

Table 5.5: The raw frequencies (and percentages) of times frames occurred in each group of story frames in the Leave/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora.

Story frames	**Leave/Anti-Brexit**	**Remain/Pro-Brexit**
Marginalising frames	92 (7%)	99 (14.27%)
Mixed frames	441 (33.58%)	283 (40.82%)
Sympathetic frames	309 (23.54%)	167 (24.1%)
The debate frame	34 (2.59%)	20 (2.88%)

Moreover, as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the three most frequent frames in each sub-corpus were *official source*, *we are not alone* and *protest reaction* (Leave/AB) and *dissection*, *our story* and *official source* (Remain/PB) – a combination of mixed story frames, sympathetic story frames, and perhaps more expectedly, the *official source* frame. Initially, the prevalence of *official source* in the dataset seemed dubious; quoting official sources is a standard journalistic practice, no matter the news story. However, certain professional practices and norms can sometimes relate to protest paradigm mechanisms (Reul et al. 2016: 911), and they do in this context – to an extent. Because multiple frames the mere presence of these frames does not necessarily mean that they contribute to delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation (Gruber 2021: 25), the amount of times that they did contribute to these processes was calculated. To do this, the number of times a particular frame contributed to processes of delegitimisation was divided by the number of times it occurred to determine its relative frequency. This step was repeated for marginalisation and demonisation in both the Leave/AB and Remain/PB. The relative frequencies of the times each frame contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation is displayed in Tables 5.6 (below) and 5.7 (overleaf). In each table, the three frames that most frequently contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation are highlighted in shaded cells.

Table 5.6: The raw and relative frequencies of the number of times frames contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus.

Leave/Anti-Brexit			
Frame	**Delegitimisation**	**Marginalisation**	**Demonisation**
Marginalising frames			
Violent crime	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	13 (6.81%)
Property crime	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	3 (1.57%)
Carnival	0 (0%)	26 (6.86%)	1 (0.52%)
Freakshow	0 (0%)	7 (1.85%)	0 (0%)
Romper room	0 (0%)	12 (3.17%)	0 (0%)
Storm watch	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	12 (6.28%)
Total	**0 (0%)**	**45 (11.88%)**	**29 (15.18%)**
Mixed frames			
Showdown	0 (0%)	6 (1.58%)	2 (1.05%)
Protest reaction	17 (7.46%)	38 (10.03%)	5 (2.62%)
Dissection	41 (17.98%)	47 (12.4%)	18 (9.42%)
Psychoanalysis	1 (0.44%)	8 (2.11%)	1 (0.52%)
Association	23 (10.09%)	6 (1.58%)	19 (9.95%)
Comparison	2 (0.88%)	13 (3.43%)	2 (1.05%)
Total	**84 (36.85%)**	**118 (31.13%)**	**47 (24.61%)**
Sympathetic frames			
Our story	38 (16.67%)	21 (5.54%)	14 (7.33%)
We are not alone	43 (18.86%)	5 (1.32%)	14 (7.33%)
Total	**81 (35.53%)**	**26 (6.86%)**	**28 (14.66%)**
The balance frame			
Debate	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Total	**0 (0%)**	**0 (0%)**	**0 (0%)**
Official source	57 (25%)	132 (34.83%)	67 (35.08%)
Invocation of public opinion	6 (2.63%)	58 (15.3%)	20 (10.47%)

Table 5.7: The raw and relative frequencies of the number of times frames contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus.

Remain/Pro-Brexit			
Frame	**Delegitimisation**	**Marginalisation**	**Demonisation**
Marginalising frames			
Violent crime	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	12 (10.81%)
Property crime	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	13 (11.71%)
Carnival	0 (0%)	4 (2.47%)	2 (1.8%)
Freakshow	0 (0%)	11 (6.79%)	0 (0%)
Romper room	0 (0%)	11 (6.79%)	0 (0%)
Storm watch	0 (0%)	2 (1.23%)	14 (12.61 %)
Total	**0 (0%)**	**28 (17.28%)**	**41 (36.93%)**
Mixed frames			
Showdown	0 (0%)	3 (1.85%)	0 (0%)
Protest reaction	13 (15.85%)	3 (1.85%)	1 (0.9%)
Dissection	24 (29.27%)	62 (38.27%)	20 (18.02%)
Psychoanalysis	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	5 (4.5%)
Association	6 (7.32%)	4 (2.47%)	1 (0.9%)
Comparison	0 (0%)	18 (11.11%)	5 (4.5%)
Total	**43 (52.44%)**	**90 (55.55%)**	**32 (28.82%)**
Sympathetic frames			
Our story	27 (32.93%)	4 (2.47%)	10 (9.01%)
We are not alone	0 (0%)	1 (0.62%)	10 (9.01%)
Total	**27 (32.93%)**	**5 (3.09%)**	**20 (18.02%)**
The balance frame			
Debate	2 (2.44%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Total	**2 (2.44%)**	**0 (0%)**	**0 (0%)**
Official source	9 (10.98%)	13 (8.02%)	14 (12.61%)
Invocation of public opinion	1 (1%)	26 (16.05%)	4 (3.6%)

As shown in Table 5.6, the three most frequently delegitimising frames in Leave/AB are *official source* (25%), *we are not alone* (18.86%) and *dissection* (17.98%); the three most frequently marginalising are *official source* (34.83%), *invocation of public opinion* (15.3%) and *dissection* (12.4%); and the three most demonising are *official source* (35.08%), *invocation of public* *opinion* (10.47%) and *association* (9.95%). As shown in Table 5.7, the three most frequently delegitimising frames in Remain/PB are *our story* (32.93%), *dissection* (29.27%) and *protest reaction* (15.85%); the three most frequently marginalising are *dissection* (38.27%), *invocation of public opinion* (16.05%) and *comparison* (11.11%); and the three most demonising are *dissection* (18.02%), *official source* (12.61%) and *storm watch* (12.61%).

It is interesting that *official sources* were not immune from delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation in the Leave/AB. The prevalence of this frame challenges McLeod and Hertog's (1999: 315) claim that *official sources* are usually included in coverage to lend support to the status quo and chastise challengers. However, Brexit-related protests are unique in that they drew wide support from politicians and celebrities who organised, participated in and addressed the protests, leaving themselves (and their quoted words) open to scrutiny from those who opposed them. It is also noteworthy that aside from the *storm watch* frame in the Remain/PB's demonisation category, each of the top three frames comprise mixed and sympathetic story frames. This suggests that McLeod and Hertog's (1999) distinctions between marginalising, mixed and sympathetic story frames lack nuance. Future studies using frequency analysis to identify frames should therefore not take results at face value – frames that initially seem sympathetic, for example, must be analysed in context to decipher the extent to which they actually are.

Now that the extent to which the sample of remain and leave press' coverage of the respective pro- and anti-Brexit protests adhered to the protest paradigm has been investigated, the following section will perform a CDA of some of the extracts that contributed to the protest paradigm in the Leave/AB and Remain/PB respectively. Due to space constraints, only the top most frequently delegitimising, marginalising and demonising frames in both the sub-corpora will be examined in depth. In Leave/AB, the most frequently delegitimising, marginalising and demonising frame was *official source*. In Remain/PB, the most delegitimising frame was *our story* and the most marginalising and demonising frames were *dissection*.

5.5 Delegitimisation

5.5.1 Delegitimisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus

In the Leave/AB, the delegitimisation of anti-Brexit protests was often evoked through the speech of Brexit-supporting elites who were used as *official sources*. The below extract is an example of how both the words of an *official source* and the journalist's 'semantic gloss' (Harry 2014: 1050) were used to delegitimise the People's Vote March in *The Express* (NB: the frames that occurred in each extract have been italicised in square brackets):

1. They condemned the move as an "undemocratic con" and an attempt to "thwart" the decision of the vote in which 52 per cent of votes cast backed leaving the bloc. More than 17.4 million people voted to leave in the referendum. **EU Exit Secretary Dominic Raab has insisted that the "silent majority" in Britain wants the Government to press on with delivering Brexit in contrast to the noisy, publicity grabbing campaign for a second referendum**.

   [official source; invocation of public opinion] [The Express, People's Vote March]

In extract 1, Raab is quoted as referring to the People's Vote March as a 'noisy, publicity grabbing campaign for a second referendum', delegitimising the protest through the pejorative adjectives that denigrate its purpose. However, while the structure of the sentence follows a SAYER + VERBAL PROCESS + VERBIAGE structure, it is unclear whether this part of the quotation is a verbatim part of Raab's speech as it does not include quotation marks. The words therefore take the form of an indirect quotation in which the voice of the source and journalist are less clearly demarcated. This allows the journalist to reformulate the source's original words in keeping with their (delegitimising) argumentative goals (Smirnova 2009: 84).

Additionally, the *official source* and *invocation of public opinion* frames in the extract also contribute to processes of marginalisation. For example, the journalist includes coverage of the '17.4 million people [who] voted to leave in the referendum'. This implies that the support for the People's Vote March is small relative to the population, invoking the *invocation of public opinion* frame. Raab's direct quote (*official source*) also indicates that it is the 'majority' of British people who want the government to deliver Brexit, again suggesting that those supporting the People's Vote March are in the minority (*invocation of public opinion*).

5.5.2 Delegitimisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus

In the Remain/PB, the seemingly sympathetic *our story* frame contributed to processes of delegitimisation largely through the employment of evaluative reporting verbs; referential and predication strategies; segmented quotations; and the journalistic refutation of protester's speech. The below extract demonstrates how doubt was cast on protesters' claims through the use of evaluative reporting verbs:

2. They are doing it, **they say**, as a physical representation of the 17.4 million people who voted for Brexit in 2016, and whose vote, **they reckon**, is being undermined by ongoing delays. Think part political protest, part slightly surreal walking holiday, and you have the right vibe. And, today, here in Aldfield - with the sun shining, free Tesco sandwiches for breakfast and the promise of a Wetherspoon pub at the finish line - spirits are high.

[dissection; our story] [The Independent, March to Leave]

Here, the verbal and cognitive processes ‘say’ and ‘reckon’ are used to report on the March to Leave protesters’ speech. Although ‘say’ is a neutral reporting verb, its syntactical position entails delegitimisation. Rather than the standard reporting structure SAYER + VERBAL PROCESS + VERBIAGE, the clause is structured VERBIAGE + SAYER + VERBAL PROCESS + VERBIAGE. This syntactic choice may have been made as a means to draw the readers’ attention to the specific part of the speech that the journalist is expressing scepticism toward, imbuing the protester’s speech with doubt. The same can be said of the mental process ‘reckon’, which takes a similar structure (PHENOMENON + SENSER + MENTAL PROCESS + PHENOMENON). According to Fairclough (2003; 1992) cognitive verbs that take a medial clause position infer subjectivity, implying what the protesters ‘reckon’ cannot be taken as fact. Moreover, in both clauses, the indirect structures mean that the utterances are rendered from the viewpoint of the journalist, not the protesters (Smirnova 2009: 84). This is emphasised through the inclusion of the third-person pronoun ‘they’, providing discursive distance between the protesters (out-group) and the journalist/readership (in-group). The use of the *our story* frame here therefore relates to a ‘damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don’t scenario’, described by Boyle et al. (2004: 49) as the catch-22 problem of protesters wanting their opinions to be heard in the media, but having their voices subject to derision.

Marginalisation is also evident in extract 2. It is evoked through the *dissection* frame when the protest is described as a ‘slightly surreal walking holiday’ and through the suggestion that the protesters are there for the ‘free Tesco sandwiches’ and ‘the promise of a Wetherspoon pub’. Here, the practices of the protest group are trivialised and their real motivation is undermined, marginalising the effect of March to Leave.

5.6 Marginalisation

5.6.1 Marginalisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus

In the Leave/AB, marginalisation was largely invoked through the *official source* frame when pro-Brexit politicians were quoted. The speech of *official sources* often misrepresented the protests' goals, implied the protests were a waste of time, and as shown in the following extract, emphasised the small number of those in attendance:

3. Let's not forget the second Brexit referendum march in October 2018, **which organisers claimed had more than 700,000 marchers, when the Greater London Authority put the number at a far more realistic 250,000**. **Sophisticated analysis** by the website countingcrowds.co.uk, using images of October's march, suggested the **true number** was closer to 82,000. Should the same apply to yesterday's rally, there might have been as few as 120,000 on the streets.

[comparison; our story; official source] [The Daily Mail, People's Vote March]

In extract 3, the Greater London Authority (*official source*) directly refutes the claim that the 2018 People's Vote March had 700,000 marchers (*our story*) by putting the number at 'a far more realistic 250,000'. Here, the *official source* is legitimised as a means to convincingly marginalise the size of the protest in various ways. Because the Greater London Authority has vested institutional authority, its estimate is more believable – particularly when it is paired with the moral evaluation 'more realistic'. Reference to moral evaluation is also evoked through the 'sophisticated' analysis that suggested the 'true' number was also less than the People's Vote March claimed. Though authorisation and moral evaluation are (de)legitimatising discursive strategies (Van Leeuwen 2007), they have a marginalising effect in this context as they are employed to undermine the size of the protest.

5.6.2 Marginalisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus

In the Remain/PB, *dissection* was largely used to humorously evaluate the effect of pro-Brexit protests. Reporting often followed a similar discourse structure to SETUP + PUNCHLINE jokes. In these, setups establish context and punchlines deliver humour (Cattle and Ma 2018: 1850), as shown in examples 4 and 5, where bold text denotes the SETUPS and underlined text denotes the PUNCHLINES:

4. Brexit: National Trust bans Nigel Farage's march from its properties; **Plans for walkers to meet at picturesque Nostell Priory had to be abandoned -** and a pub car park used instead.

[dissection; official source] [The Independent, March to Leave]

5. […] Still, I would say that **I have a level of respect for these ardent Brexiters who came out in the worst weather** - apparently the beginning stages of Storm Hannah (I offer no apologies) - **imagining themselves for all the world as the haggard soldiers in Wilfred Owen's Dulce et Decorum est,** but giving off more of a vibe of a Duke of Edinburgh bronze award for seniors.

[dissection; psychoanalysis] [The Guardian, March to Leave]

In extract 4, the subordinate clause ‘and a pub carpark used instead’ would not be in anyway humorous without the preceding main clause ‘plans for walkers to meet at picturesque Nostell Priory had to be abandoned’. Humour is increased through the common cultural understanding that carparks are far less remarkable (or ‘picturesque’) than National Trust buildings, further ridiculing – and thereby marginalising – the March to Leave. As well as referencing common cultural understandings (Kukovačec et al. 2017), humour can be invoked by establishing then subverting an expectation (Cattle and Ma 2018: 1852). This is evident in extract 5, where the idea that the protesters deserve war-hero-like respect is established through premodifying adjectives (‘ardent’ and ‘haggard’) and reference to protesters’ imagined selves as the ‘soldiers in […] Dulce et Decorum est’. The subordinating conjunction ‘but’ then subverts the expectation, ridiculing the protesters through the suggestion that their protest is comparable to an activity schoolchildren are awarded for completing. The ridicule evident in both extracts gives the overall impression that the March to Leave is underwhelming, invoking marginalisation by undermining its effect.

5.7 Demonisation

5.7.1 Demonisation in the Leave/Anti-Brexit sub-corpus

The speech of pro-Brexit politicians, celebrities and police were used as *official sources* to demonise anti-Brexit protests – however, surprisingly, police were only used as *official sources* on five out of 67 occasions (7.46%). In the remaining concordance lines, demonisation was largely evoked through politicians, whose verbiage constructed protesters as a threat to democracy:

6. […] John Longworth, co-founder of the Leave Means Leave pressure group and a former chairman of the British Chambers of Commerce, said: **"This is an utterly undeliverable and undemocratic con.** […] **"The entire thing is a grotesque deception and an appalling and wilful disregard for the general public who should be rightfully outraged by this attempt to trash their right to choose and be represented."** Jane Adye, director of the crossparty campaign Get Britain Out, said: "For the People's Vote to be

> demanding another vote by the people is ridiculous. This would not be a vote initiated by the public, this would be to satisfy Remain politicians and people and businesses which profit from the EU, using funds from Remain billionaires."
>
> *[official source]* [The Express, People's Vote March]

Longworth's verbiage in extract 6 includes high degrees of epistemic modality. His belief that the People's Vote March 'is an utterly undeliverable and undemocratic con' and 'is a grotesque deception' encodes a high degree of certainty through the repetition of the categorical relational process 'is', which ascribes the protest these undemocratic attributes. Demonisation is further increased through the use of the deontic modal adverb 'should' which obliges the general public to also become 'rightfully outraged'. The inclusion of the adverb 'rightfully' suggests that outrage is a reasonable reaction to the protest and works to further emphasise its threat.

Additionally, the verbiage of the second *official source* in the extract, Adye, contributes to processes of marginalisation. Her verbiage omits the views of the protesters and undermines their support though the suggestion that a second referendum would only 'satisfy Remain politicians and people and businesses which profit from the EU, using funds from Remain billionaires'.

5.7.2 Demonisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus

In the Remain/PB, *dissection* was used to negatively evaluate the components and practices of pro-Brexit protests – including the pro-Brexit politicians and celebrities that supported them:

7. The demonstration was lively - circling fishing boats sounded horns; red smoke from flares drifted across the sky; crowds gathered; and a carnival-like atmosphere prevailed. **But then, most alarmingly, something horrible and hideous began emerging from the**

> **water - ex-Ukip leader Nigel Farage, in a boat**, wearing an inadvisable anorak-and-tie combo and his customary smug grin. To add insult to injury, another ex-Ukip leader (is there any other kind?) Henry Bolton and his "racist text girlfriend" - the Daily Mail's words, not mine - came along too, for the fun of it.
>
> *[carnival; freakshow; dissection; association]* [The Guardian, Fish for Leave]

This extract follows a similar structure to the marginalising *dissection* in section *5.7.2 Marginalisation in the Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpus*. There is a set up ('the demonstration was lively […] and a carnival-like atmosphere prevailed') followed by the subordinating conjunction 'but' that subverts expectation of a jubilant protest through a humorous punchline ('most alarmingly, something horrible and hideous began emerging from the water - ex-Ukip leader Nigel Farage'). While the pejorative adjectives 'horrible' and 'hideous' are undoubtedly used to imply Farage is hostile and has ruined the protest's joyful atmosphere, the description of his appearance (evoked through the *freakshow* frame) is tongue-in-cheek, softening the demonisation through marginalising ridicule.

Because this demonisation is not particularly unforgiving, it is important to note that the categorisations of coverage as delegitimising, marginalising and demonising are relative. Coverage that may seem demonising in the context of Brexit protests may be considered tame if compared to the coverage of more radical and violent demonstrations. As shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, demonisation occurred the least in the Leave/AB and second in the Remain/PB. Perhaps if the coverage was more frequently demonising, extract 7 would have been classed as only contributing only to processes of marginalisation (rather than contributing to processes of both demonisation and marginalisation as it has been here). Nevertheless, this realisation would not have been gleaned without performing a CDA of the concordance lines in which the key keywords were manifest. This qualitative step has therefore helped to capture the variation and nuance that is often missed in protest paradigm research that simply codes coverage as either favourable or unfavourable (Laschever 2017: 376).

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at offering a thorough method that can be used to identify and analyse protest paradigm frames, and contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in the context of Brexit-related demonstrations.

Firstly, corpus-assisted CDA was used to offer a thorough method that can be used to identify and analyse protest paradigm frames. Key keywords were calculated to identify words that were central to the culturally driven judgement and meaning of an article. A sample of concordance lines was then critically analysed to uncover the journalistic narratives surrounding the key keywords. To identify and analyse any protest paradigm frames embedded in these concordance lines, I formulated probes as questions that could be asked of the data to help me to distinguish between different frames. Such probes were informed by McLeod and Hertog's (1999) conceptualisation of paradigmatic frames, my own interpretation of these frames and the ways in which these frames emerged from the data. Although I aimed at analysing, for the first time, all 22 protest paradigm frames, the *riot*, *moral decay*, *trial*, *creative expression* and *unjust persecution* frames were not evident. Nevertheless, probes were developed for the remaining 17 frames, explicating how they can manifest in discourse. Once the sample of concordance lines were checked against the probes, they were grouped depending on whether or not they adhered to the protest paradigm, whether they were indicative of issue based reporting, or whether they were miscellaneous. Then, the relative frequencies of the number of times the frames that adhered to the protest paradigm contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation were calculated to reveal the extent to which the samples from the Leave/AB and Remain/PB adhered to the negative processes associated with the protest paradigm. Following this, a qualitative CDA of some selected examples of the most delegitimising, marginalising and demonising frames for each sub-corpus was performed. The chapter therefore outlined a detailed, multi-step analytical procedure an, demonstrating how corpus-assisted CDA can be used to robustly identify and analyse protest paradigm frames in newspaper discourse.

Moreover, the chapter's results suggest that seeking to investigate all 22 frames helps to advance understandings of the protest paradigm's application and relevance to contemporary demonstrations. As research has never before accounted for the protest paradigm as a whole, studies could have missed instances of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation manifest in the more seemingly sympathetic frames. For example, the 'sympathetic' *our story* was actually the most frequently delegitimising frame in the Remain/PB sub-corpus. This finding is at odds with Boyle et al.'s (2004: 49) argument that it is unlikely that the words of less radical protesters will be vilified in the media. Observing the behaviour of the sympathetic frames was therefore worthwhile as it lends support to Gruber's (2022) suggestion that paradigmatic frames need to be re-evaluated. Furthermore, studies that do not investigate all 22 of McLeod and Hertog's (1999) frames could miss instances of positive or neutral protest coverage. Certainly, as this chapter has shown, frames that contribute to positive or neutral representations of protesters are not just apparent in alternative media as McLeod and Hertog (1999) suggest (although it must be acknowledged that media, demonstrations and the political landscapes in which they take place have evolved in the last 23 years). In the Leave/AB sub-corpus, 34.88% of concordance lines included protest paradigm frames that did not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation, which is 10.04% more than concordance lines that did. This is even more surprising given that the leave press is mostly comprised of right-leaning newspapers (with the exception of the *Daily Star*) which are traditionally thought of as emphasising social order to protect the status quo. Opposingly in the Remain/PB sub-corpus, 28.45% of protest paradigm frames did not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation or demonisation, compared to 37.55% that did. Again, this is unexpected as left-leaning outlets traditionally privilege protesters' standpoint more than right-leaning publications (Chan and Lee 1984). These findings possibly provide further evidence that the Brexit debate cut across the UK press' typical left/right-wing divide. Alternatively, instead of seeking out all 22 paradigmatic frames, future research could use inductive frame analysis to observe which protest paradigm frames are evident in a dataset (e.g. Gruber 2022). Inductive surveys could better account for the emergence of frames that were not related to the protest paradigm, such as the ones grouped as *issue based reporting* in this chapter.

Secondly, Chapter 5 sought to contribute to literature about the paradigm's prevalence in the context of Brexit-related demonstrations, hitherto under-researched movements. As only 24.84% of analysed concordance lines in the Leave/AB and 37.55% in the Remain/PB adhered to the negative processes associated with the protest paradigm, it is clear that the sample does not adhere to the paradigm to a great extent. This could be because the paradigm is a variable (Lee 2014): the more radical a protest's goals and tactics are perceived to be, the more closely journalists' coverage will conform to the paradigm (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Shoemaker 1984). Perhaps then, 75.16% and 62.45% of concordance lines in the respective Leave/AB and Remain/PB sub-corpora did not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation because the goals and tactics of both pro- and anti-Brexit protests were not particularly radical. Neither group of protests presented a serious threat to the status quo; particularly pro-Brexit protests, which advocated for something the electorate had already voted for. Although the anti-Brexit protests did pose a certain amount of threat to the political system, it was not at a structural, systematic or societal level – underscored by the prevalence of white, middle class protesters and support of numerous celebrities and politicians across the political spectrum. Compare this to anti-racism protests in the USA that challenge the asymmetrical systematic power imbalances that have persisted throughout American history, and it is fair to say that Brexit-related protests occupy a high tier on the hierarchy of social struggle (Kilgo and Harlow 2019) so do not require the protest paradigm's 'social control messages' (McLeod 1999: 32).

Furthermore, while an emphasis on violence is a key aspect of the protest paradigm (Gruber 2022: 10), the tactics employed by the protesters were not consistently violent. The *violent crime* and *property crime* frames only collectively contributed to processes of demonisation 16 times (8.38%) in the Leave/AB and 25 times (22.52%) in the Remain/PB. Certainly, protesters may not have needed to employ newsworthy tactics to amplify their message because Brexit was reported on so prevalently in the UK mass media during the years under analysis. That said, coverage of the protests themselves was not particularly prevalent, amounting to a combined total of 845 articles covering 15 protests over the space of three-and-a-half years.

The lack of the Brexit-protests' adherence to the protest paradigm could also be due to a shift in the UK media's practices. Undoubtedly, the media ecosystem in which the protest paradigm was originally theorised has evolved since it was first proposed (Kilgo, Mourão and Sylvie 2019: 418). In a recent survey, Gruber (2022) found that delegitimising coverage did not dominate any protest reported on in the mainstream UK press between 1992-2017. While this might be due to the normalisation of protest as a method of political participation (Gruber 2022: 15), it will be interesting (albeit lamentable) to observe whether this pattern continues in UK media now that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 has been implemented (legislation that limits Freedom of Assembly and Freedom of Expression rights).

In conclusion, it seems most likely that the analysed sample of Brexit-related protests did not strongly adhere to the protest paradigm due to a combination of the above: its lack of systematic threat, its non-radical tactics and the media's current (but possibly time-sensitive) ameliorative protest coverage.

5.8.1 Limitations

It is important to note that Chapter 5 only analysed a sample of coverage in the BPBP, so its conclusions about the (lack of) delegitimising, marginalising and demonising frames are not necessarily generalisable to the coverage comprising the entire BPBP corpus. That said, the analysed sample does reveal interesting results that are consistent with Chapter 4's findings – that the coverage of Brexit-related protests in the press was not as polarising as the Brexit debate itself.

A further limitation is that although key keywords were used to indicate concepts that had the potential to reveal paradigmatic frames, using other methods of identification may have alluded to a different picture of reality. Creating and analysing two separate keyword lists for both the Leave/AB and Remain/PB sub-corpora, for example, may have revealed terms that were more characteristic of each dataset, showing more immediately the different ways in which paradigmatic frames manifest. However, with keyword analysis comes arbitrary cut-off points, and as inter-coder reliability was not available, key keywords were used with the aim of removing some subjectivity from the frame identification process. That said, this step may have merely delayed researcher bias as mapping key keywords onto the protest paradigm and developing probes still required much interpretation. To ensure maximal consistency across the datasets, multiple intra-rater reliability checks were also carried out, but this was an incredibly time-consuming process that would not have been (as) necessary if inter-coder reliability was possible. In short, while every effort was made to ensure the methods and results were dependable, this study would have undoubtedly benefitted from the scrutiny that comes with group coding.

Lastly, it was at times very difficult to formulate the probes. This was particularly challenging because McLeod and Hertog's (1999) explanations of protest paradigm frames are not especially specific or nuanced. It was also taxing to untangle and interpret the frames not usually analysed in protest paradigm research (for example, the similar *association*, *our story*, *official source* and *we are not alone* frames). Again, while these probes were introduced to better explicate and make transparent frame categorisation and reasoning, they were open to much subjective interpretation. Nonetheless, probes were developed for 17 frames with the hope of helping future studies to identify some of the ways the protest paradigm can manifest in discourse.

Everything considered, it is reasonable to suggest that the corpus-assisted CDA protest paradigm framework developed in this chapter could help future studies to identify and analyse frames using corpus methods. In the interest of providing further contemporary corpus-assisted CDA methods that can be implemented in social movement research, the following and final chapter of analysis presents a brand new framework that can be applied in the critical analysis of the media representation of protests.

6 WUNC and its representation in the press

This chapter seeks to formulate a robust and innovative framework through which protest coverage can be critically analysed by operationalising Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999; 1994) conceptualisations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) as a linguistic framework. This linguistic WUNC framework was theorised to remedy some of the aforementioned criticisms of concordance analysis by providing an identifiable and accountable method for qualitative analysis (Rheindorf 2019: 33), and to offer a new and more nuanced framework that could be used instead of (or as well as) the protest paradigm. In doing so, this chapter will demonstrate how practitioners of corpus-assisted CDA can employ WUNC as an additional critical lens by drawing on theories grounded in CDA. To achieve this, the chapter is divided into two parts. Part one will:

Aim 6.1: Explain how linguistic features can contribute to WUNC as a methodological framework in CDA.

Aim 6.2: Demonstrate the ways in which WUNC can be applied as an additional critical lens when analysing the press representation of protests.

Part two will:

Aim 6.3: Demonstrate how the linguistic application of WUNC can be used in a corpus-assisted CDA.

6.1 Part one: WUNC as a linguistic framework

As discussed in Chapter 2, section *2.7 WUNC*, this chapter takes particular interest in the third element of Tilly's (2004: 3) social movement criteria: WUNC displays. To summarise, Tilly (2004) argues that decision makers are responsive to protests and social movements when they exhibit displays of worthiness (credibility), unity (affirmation of a common goal), numbers (high turnout) and commitment (dedication). It also departs from the typical application of WUNC, expanding its use to the analysis of mediated representations of WUNC displays in the coverage of protests. It seems unusual that WUNC displays have scarcely been investigated through this perspective (see Wouters 2019 for exception), as current literature recognises that protesters broadcasting worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment increase protests' attention in the media (Wong and Wright 2018), the medium through which the majority of the public observe demonstrations (Wouters 2019).

As noted in section *2.7 WUNC*, WUNC has taken centre stage as an analytical or methodological framework in very few studies. That being so, WUNC displays have never before been utilised in the field of linguistics, in CDA, corpus-assisted CDA, or otherwise. This chapter therefore operationalises WUNC displays as an additional critical discursive lens through which to analyse how descriptions of protests in the press manifest to create, perpetuate, and counter relationships of power in the social and political context of protest (Gasaway-Hill 2018: 49).

To consider how linguistic features can contribute to WUNC as a methodological framework in corpus-assisted CDA, it is necessary to draw on prominent theories and methods previously established in CDA and interpret them through the lens of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. Thus, to formulate a CDA-specific WUNC framework, this section seeks to join CDA concepts to elements of WUNC by highlighting how they can manifest in language and grammar and be applied in the analysis of the mediated representation of protests. The extracts used to illustrate how WUNC can manifest linguistically were manually extracted from the BPBP.

6.1.1 Worthiness

Tilly (2004: 4) notes that worthiness is displayed when protests are attended and supported by 'clergy', 'dignitaries' (Tilly 2004: 4) and 'moral authorities' (Tilly 1999: 261). This is because displays of worthiness provide decision makers with information about what kind of category or class of people the protest signal comes from (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 367). As Brissette (2017: 235) notes, worthiness is a moral evaluation, not equally available for all social actors to embody and demonstrate. Rather, worthiness depends on prior recognition as one deserving of regard or on successfully expanding the boundaries of those recognised as worthy (Brissette 2017: 235). To formulate the linguistic categorisation of worthiness, the presence of dignified and elite people will be explored first by drawing on 'authorization' – one of Van Leeuwen's (2007: 92) major categories of legitimation – which is exhibited by those with 'position based' institutional authority (Vaara 2014: 506-507).

An authority figure's power and credibility (i.e. their social standing) can be formed, sustained and reinforced by reference to systems of address (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 74). Van Leeuwen (2008) offers a social actor representation taxonomy that helps to categorise these systems. For example, Van Leeuwen (1996) notes that the press tend to personalise powerful social actors (refer to them as specific individuals) and collectivise ordinary people. When social actors are personalised, they can be nominated, meaning that their unique identity and human characteristics are emphasised (Van Leeuwen 2008: 40). These are typically realised through proper nouns, which can vary in levels of formality. The most, formal nomination, occurs when only a surname is given (with or without honorifics); semi-formal nomination occurs when a first and surname is given; and the least formal, informal nomination, occurs when only a first name or nickname is given (Chaemsaithong and Kim 2018: 291; Van Leeuwen 2008: 41). Nominations can also include honorifics (e.g. 'Dr') or affiliations (which often specify a functional role in a particular institution, e.g. 'president')

(Hart 2014b: 35). These ‘titulated’ nominations can be used as a means to legitimate and empower a given social actor (Chaemsaithong and Kim 2018: 291; Hart 2014b: 35). Opposingly, informal nominations that omit honorifics and affiliations can deauthorise and delegitimate status (Hart 2014b: 35). Consequently, referential strategies play an ideologically significant role in the representation of social actors. In the context of protests, the press can imbue a protest with worthiness with reference to these strategies, for example:

1. The march, dubbed the People's Vote March, attracted **TV chef** Delia Smith, **presenter** Richard Bacon and **former Dragon's Den star** Deborah Meaden. [The Daily Mail, People’s Vote March]

Here, *The Daily Mail* include the various celebrities that joined the People’s Vote March in their reporting. Celebrities, or ‘dignitaries’ (Tilly 2004: 4), are premodified with the functional affiliations ‘TV chef’, ‘presenter’ and ‘former Dragon’s Den star’. This draws attention to the celebrities’ fame, reinforcing their social standing as authorities and signalling that the protest is worthy as it has their support. It follows then that if the legitimating referential strategies and the attendance of dignitaries indicates a protest’s worthiness, their absence must indicate that a protest is unworthy:

2. Led by **Remoaner-in-Chief Vince Cable**, The People's March For Europe carried the message 'unite, rethink and reject Brexit'. [The Daily Mail, March for Europe]
3. ANTI-BREXIT activists chanted "where's Jeremy Corbyn?" after the Labour leader **failed to turn up or acknowledge today's march** in London which called for a "People's Vote" on the final EU exit deal. [The Express, People’s Vote March]

While Cable is premodified with functional affiliation in extract 2, the inclusion of ‘Remoaner’ – a pejorative term for anti-Brexit protesters – undermines his legitimacy. Moreover, extract 3 reports on Corbyn’s non-attendance. As Labour Party leader at the time, Corbyn occupied a high-authority institutionalised role. The reporting of his failure to ‘turn up or acknowledge’ the protest could therefore lessen its mediated displays of worthiness.

As well as dignitaries, the presence of good citizens who show decision makers that they deserve to get what they want also indicates that a protest is worthy (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 366). These good citizens include ‘mothers with children’ (Tilly 2004: 4) and other such reputable protesters (Tilly 2006: 291):

4. They [the protesters] were **charity assistants, health professionals, teachers and parents** ... all demanding a final say in their future [The Guardian, People’s Vote March]

Here, the protesters are functionalised – they are categorised by what they do (Van Leeuwen 2008: 42). While it is doubtless protesters with other jobs also attended the People’s Vote March, *The Guardian* chose to report on those with decent, selfless and caring occupations, constructing the protesters as good and worthy citizens.

Another key part of worthiness is the protesters’ ability to have ‘decorum’ and be ‘disciplined’ (Tilly 2008: 121; 144). This can be achieved by avoiding unnecessary violent activity and making demands legitimately through peaceful protest. According to Wouters and Walgrave (2017: 367), protesters that behave non-violently ‘gain recognition as respectable players who should be listened to’. In this context, transitivity analysis can be implemented to uncover the ways in which protesters are reported as behaving appropriately. For example:

5. They [protesters] came bearing balloons and banners, face paints and flags - and, above all else, **smiles and good humour**. [The Independent, Put it to the People]
6. The vast majority [of protesters], it must be said, were **friendly and polite**, even when two dozen kamikaze Brexit Party ultras attempted a counter-march against the flow. [The Daily Mail, People's Vote March]

Extracts 5 and 6 both represent the protesters as worthy. In extract 5, the protesters are the ACTORS of a material process. The CIRCUMSTANCE: MANNER in which they 'came' refers to 'smiles and good behaviour', suggesting that the protesters are making demands decorously. Similarly, the protesters' gentility is highlighted in extract 6, where the ('vast majority of') protesters are the CARRIERS of the ATTRIBUTES 'friendly and polite'. Their worthiness is emphasised further through the implication they were gracious in the face of counter-protesters, showing their discipline. However, transitivity analysis can also be used to show instances in which protesters are *not* behaving appropriately, for example:

7. Remainers on the People's Vote march **SLAMMED** for sick suicide joke [Daily Star, People's Vote March]

Here, the Remainers are the TARGET of the evaluative verbal process 'slammed'. The negative moral evaluation of the verb suggests that they have been subject to heavy criticism as a result of their 'sick suicide joke' – humour not readily associated with decorum. It is not clear who the criticism came from as the SAYER is not included. This obfuscation makes the clause passive, reorienting the story (Fowler 1991: 78) to focus on the Remainers' bad behaviour (not those criticising it) and taking away from the protest's mediated worthiness.

Overall, displays of worthiness signal that a protest is credible and its protesters deserve to get what they want. Drawing on the theories and methods explored above, the features of language and grammar that can be harnessed to analyse the representation of this credibility in the press include authorisation, referential strategies that emphasise functionality and transitive verbs.

6.1.2 Unity

Tilly (1999: 261) argues that unity is displayed by protesters who express ‘direct affirmation of a common program or identity’, who wear matching dress, and who march, dance, chant, sing and cheer in unison. Firstly, direct affirmation of a common goal could be represented through the use of collective pronouns and determiners as people speaking as members of ideological groups typically use ‘we’ and ‘our’ to refer to themselves and fellow group members (Van Dijk 2002: 73). The semantics of the collective first-person pronoun ‘we’ and determiner ‘our’ entail collectivity, solidarity (Fetzer and Bull 2012: 132-133) and consensus (Fowler 1991). These complement displays of unity, which imply protesters are part of a collective that signify a ‘oneness in pursuit of specific goals or demands’ (Campbell 2011: 44). The following extract exemplifies how unity can be represented in the press through the use of pronouns and determiners:

8. **They** will be marching for a Final Say on Brexit through a People's Vote in London today because it's crucial this government knows that **we** will fight for **our** right to be heard. [The Independent, People’s Vote March]

Here, *The Independent* express a oneness with the protesters. While the third-person pronoun ‘they’ shows that the journalist writing the article will not actually be marching alongside them, the use of the pronoun ‘we’ and determiner ‘our’ display an alignment with the common goal of the in-group (NB: ‘our’ can also be used as a pronoun to the same unifying effect). In this context, ‘they’ and ‘we’ can be viewed through meronymic reference, as the relationship between the pronouns suggest ‘they’ are part of a whole (‘we’) who are fighting for their right to be heard. This meronymy could therefore indicate that a unified group are in favour of a vote on the final Brexit deal.

Another component of Tilly’s (2004: 4) definition is that unified protesters wear ‘matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes’. Predication strategies – the adjectives, prepositional phrases and relative clauses that ascribe particular qualities to social actors (Hart 2010: 65-66) – can therefore contribute to the representation of social actors as unified. These qualities can describe what demonstrators are wearing or holding, for example:

9. The sunny square was filled with protesters, **many draped in the European flag** and waving banners aloft, including a number declaring: "We are not afraid". [Financial Times, Unite for Europe]
10. **Clad in the Union Jack and holding signs demanding a no-deal exit**, they [protesters] will come face to face with the People's Vote marchers who are making their way towards Parliament. [The Express, People’s Vote March]

In these extracts, the predication strategies show that the protesters are unified in their dress (‘draped in the European flag’, ‘clad in the Union Jack’) and in their demands (‘holding signs demanding a no-deal exit’). Unification can also be realised through collective ‘singing and chanting’ (Tilly 2004: 4). Here, transitivity analysis can again be drawn upon in the analysis of verbal processes:

11. **Mrs Thornberry and others** could be heard chanting: "What do we want? People's Vote! When do we want it? Now!". [The Express, People’s Vote March]

In extract 11, the CIRCUMSTANCE: ACCOMPANIMENT ‘and others’ suggests that Thornberry and the protesters are chanting as a collective, signifying unity. In contrast, a protest is shown to be ununified when its protesters are reported on as not wearing matching dress, holding banners that do not express affirmation of a common goal and speaking or chanting alone, for example:

12. Another **chap, waving a flag reading "Remainers Are Traitors"**, strolled through the Remain rally, **shouting, "Remainers Are Traitors".** [The Independent, People’s Vote March]

In this extract, the counter-protester is reported on as being alone – he is referred to singularly as ‘chap’. As such, his flag and his chants are not reported on as being in direct affirmation of a shared goal with other protesters.

In summary, displays of unity signal that a protest’s supporters share solidarity in pursuing a shared goal. Mediated expressions of a protest’s unity can be analysed linguistically by drawing on the use of possessive pronouns and determiners, predication strategies and transitive verbs.

6.1.3 Numbers

According to Tilly (2006: 291; 2004: 4), a protest’s numbers are displayed through filling streets and signing petitions. Because ‘numerical strength aligns with the majoritarian logic of representative democracy’, a protest with an abundance of participants suggests that a large portion of the public support its views (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 367-368). A protest's numbers can be shown through explicit references to assimilation (ways to refer to groups of people) (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37). Assimilation can be realised through numerical quantification and collective nouns.

Firstly, numerical quantification, or aggregation, can be used to report on a protest's turnout:

13. **MORE than a million Remainers** showed their true colours as they painted themselves, wore blue and yellow berets, and waved flags and placards to march on Westminster yesterday and demand a People's Vote on Brexit. [The Mirror, People's Vote March]

Often, groups of people are aggregated ('more than a million') because in society 'the majority rules' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37). As such, newspapers can employ aggregation as a 'powerful tool of social control' to regulate practice and manufacture consensus opinion (Van Leeuwen 2009b: 283; Van Leeuwen 2008: 37).

Secondly, collective nouns, or collectivisation, can also be used to indicate how numerous groups of people are (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37). In opposition to assimilation, social actors can be described through individualisation, in which they are referred to singularly (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37). While assimilation (aggregation and collectivisation) is realised through plurality, individualisation is realised through singularity (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37):

14. As the People's Vote rally got under way and Parliament Square became **a sea** of blue and yellow flags, **a lone Leave supporter** walked among them, taunting **the ranks of Remainers**. [The Times, People's Vote March]

In extract 14, *The Times* use collectivisation to refer to anti-Brexit protesters ('a sea', 'the ranks') and individualisation to refer to 'a lone Leave supporter'. These naming strategies imply that those on the People's Vote March are more numerous, and therefore more powerful, than those who support the leave vote.

In summation, aggregation, collectivisation and individualisation can contribute to the linguistic analysis of the press coverage of a protest's numbers. That said, this should come with a caveat: as shown in Chapter 4 (section *4.8.2 Anti-Brexit protests*), large numbers can be associated with danger. While this has mostly been found in the media representations of refugees and asylum seekers, von Zabern and Tulloch (2021: 37) note that aggregation can de-individualise protesters and limit the transference of sympathy.

6.1.4 Commitment

Displays of a protest's commitment can be defined by persistence in costly or risky activity; declarations of readiness to persevere; resistance to attack; braving bad weather; visible participation by elderly people and people with disabilities; resistance to repression; and ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction (Tilly 2004: 4; Tilly 1999: 261). Fairclough's (2003) notion of modality can be drawn on to explore how these displays may manifest linguistically in the press reporting of protests. Modality can be seen in terms of what speakers commit themselves to 'with respect to what is true and what is necessary' (Fairclough 2003: 164). Expressions of modality indicate different levels of commitment to truth (epistemic modality) and commitment to obligation (deontic modality) in that 'some are higher in terms of degree of commitment than others' (Fairclough 2003: 170). In the context of protests, modality can be used to analyse 'declarations of readiness to persevere' (Tilly 1999: 261) and 'resistance to repression' (Tilly 2004: 4). For example, the illocutionary force of declaring readiness to persevere is boosted by the utterance 'I absolutely will', in which the epistemic modal adverb 'absolutely' intensifies the truth commitment. In contrast, the illocutionary force of the declaration is lessened by the utterance 'I perhaps will', in which the epistemic modal adverb 'perhaps' weakens the truth commitment (Fetzer 2008: 385). In addition, modal verbs that omit modal adverbs but indicate a high degree of certainty and/or obligation can also convey high displays of commitment. For example, in extract 15 the epistemic verb 'will' expresses a strong commitment to being 'angrier and more determined', and therefore to readiness to persevere:

15. This march will be bigger than October's, and given the events of the last couple of days **we will be angrier and more determined**. [The Guardian, People's Vote March]

Similarly, the illocutionary force of an obligation to resist repression can be boosted by the deontic modal adverb 'must' which intensifies obligatory commitment. In contrast, the illocutionary force of resistance would be lessened by the adverbs 'could' or 'should' as they express weaker levels of obligatory commitment. As such, extract 16 expresses high levels of obligation to 'come together' through the deontic 'must':

16. **We must come together** to make the call for democracy loud and clear [The Independent, People's Vote March]

Elsewhere, transitivity analysis can again be employed in the analysis of the press representation of commitment by considering CIRCUMSTANCES, for example:

17. Standing on an open double-decker **despite the pouring rain**, the Lambeth MP said: "We are here together, Andrea from the Conservative Party, I'm a Labour MP and we're here with Nigel Farage. "We are determined today is the beginning of the fightback of the people who are not going to be restrained by politicians in Westminster." [The Express, March to Leave]

Extract 17 includes CONCESSION, a CIRCUMSTANCE that shows something might have led to a particular outcome but did not (e.g. 'despite') (Thompson 2014: 116). The inclusion of this type of CIRCUMSTANCE relies on the shared assumption that people do not usually gather in 'the pouring rain', showing that the protesters were committed enough to protest in bad weather (Tilly 2004: 4).

Lastly, referential and predication strategies can be used to represent commitment through reference to visible participation by elderly people and people with disabilities (Tilly 2004: 4):

18. I had a very touching letter today from a **97-year-old** soldier **who was in a wheelchair at the march**, expressing just those thoughts. [The Guardian, Put it to the People]

Here, the protesting soldier's commitment is represented through classification and predication. Classification, a referential strategy that refers to the categories that we use to differentiate between groups of people (e.g. age) (Van Leeuwen 2008: 42), is realised through the premodifier ‘96-year-old’ and predication is evident in the relative clause ‘who was in a wheelchair at the march’.

There are therefore a multitude of different strategies relating to language and grammar that can be used to analyse press representations of commitment: modality, transitive verbs, and referential and predication strategies.

To summarise, part one of this chapter has aimed to provide a comprehensive and thorough formulation of the linguistic manifestations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment that can be used to analyse the press coverage of protests. It will now move on to demonstrate how this framework can be used in a specific case study: a comparative analysis of politician’s reported speech in the context of the People’s Vote Marches.

6.2 Part two: comparative analysis of politicians’ reported speech in the context of the People’s Vote Marches

Part one sought to demonstrate how linguistic features can contribute to WUNC as a methodological framework in CDA and the ways in which WUNC can be applied as an additional critical lens when analysing the press representation of protests. This section will demonstrate one way in which this framework can be employed to satisfy Aim 6.3, which will illustrate how the linguistic application of WUNC can be used in a corpus-assisted CDA.

Part two analyses a case study of politicians’ reported speech in the press coverage of the People’s Vote Marches. In doing so, it applies WUNC as a linguistic framework to interpret how similar instances of politicians’ speech are constructed differently in the pro- and anti-Brexit press, depending on whether the sourced politician is in support or opposition of the People’s Vote March protests and campaign. The PVM campaign was founded in April 2018 in response to the UK’s decision to leave the EU and organised four major protests: People’s

Vote March, 23 June 2018; People's Vote March for the Future, 20 October 2018; Put it to the People March, 23 March 2019; Final Say March, 19 October 2019. The People's Vote March (henceforth PVM) protests largely rallied for a second referendum that would include an option to remain in the EU on the ballot and a public vote, or 'people's vote', on the final Brexit deal. The PVM protests were divisive and incredibly provocative among those who considered a second referendum profoundly undemocratic. The marches also made up the largest protests in British history, with some statements reporting that more than one million protesters attended the Put it to the People March (BBC 2019). As such, the pro- and anti-Brexit press covered the PVM protests more than any other Brexit-related demonstration, and in doing so, used politicians' quotations to aid their reporting.

6.2.1 The reciprocal power of politicians' reported speech in the press

Because newspapers are intrinsically persuasive and argumentative (Smirnova 2009: 79), this section draws on Smirnova's (2009: 80) assumption that 'all functional aspects of reported speech are determined by the overall task of persuasion'. Often, newspapers use reported speech as ideological tools of persuasion to 'manipulate readers' perception and interpretation of people and events' (Teo 2000: 20). Reported speech is all the more ideologically powerful when the words belong to an elite source, such as an expert, business representative, or in the context of this chapter, a politician. As politicians occupy a high rank in the social system, their authority gives them the ability to shape the public's perception of issues which 'can have a significant impact on future policy and the public's support or rejection of these policies' (Fernandes and De Moya 2021: 8).

The power of politicians' reported speech in newspapers is reciprocal. As discussed in Chapter 2 (section *2.2.1.1 Journalistic objectivity*), newspapers use politicians as sources to influence their readers' perceptions of events and 'underscore their own authority' (Ericson, Baranek and Chan 1989: 5). At the same time, politicians ‘ascribe a great deal of importance to making the news’ (Conway 2021: 3) and use it to gain access to, and shape the preferences of, citizens whose opinions shape electoral outcomes and guide policy decisions (Druckman 2011: 289; Chong and Druckman 2007). Because of this, both newspapers and politicians benefit from reported speech as a means of achieving their argumentative and persuasive goals.

The employment of politicians’ reported speech in the pro- and anti-Brexit press is particularly pertinent in the context of Brexit-related protests. Firstly, as gatekeepers of public policy and social norms, politicians have considerable power in (de)legitimating demonstrations. During the period in which the articles under analysis were written, it was unclear whether Brexit would take place at all, despite the (albeit marginal) majority leave result (Zappettini and Krzyżanowski 2019: 381). There was therefore a lot at stake for those that opposed and supported PVMs, fuelling both negative and positive media portrayals of the protests in the pro- and anti-Brexit press respectively. Secondly, discourses have their greatest effect ‘where first-hand experience does not exist’ (Van Leeuwen 2018: 146). It is unlikely that everyone who read a newspaper article about PVMs actually attended the demonstrations or personally heard the politicians discussing their stances. Readerships will therefore only learn about these experiences when journalists reproduce – and revoice – them in the press. Analysing the mediated representation of reported speech is also important then, as how the politician’s words are packaged can be interpreted and retold differently according to a particular journalist’s point of view (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 295). Journalists who report speech are therefore ‘extremely powerful’ – they can reproduce elements of speech that are most significantly aligned to their ideological goals (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 303).

6.2.2 Comparative analysis

In his critique of CDA methods, Stubbs (1997: 111) notes that for linguistic interpretations to be strengthened ‘individual texts must be compared with each other and with data from corpora’. In order to strengthen part one’s formulation of the linguistic manifestations of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment, this section demonstrates a comparative WUNC analysis. Additionally, this analytical comparison highlights how applying the linguistic WUNC framework can help to uncover the different ideologies of newspapers – specifically, to interpret how politicians’ reported speech, and the context in which they are embedded, can contribute to newspapers’ PVM-backing and PVM-opposing ideologies.

To begin the analysis, a keyword list was created by comparing the PVM sub-corpus to the BE06. The top 10 politicians in the keyword list were then selected for analysis (Table 6.1, overleaf; NB: the politician’s roles were correct at the time data was published):

Table 6.1: The top 10 politicians in the keyword list, sorted by effect-size.

Rank	Freq.	Keyness	Effect	Keyword	Politician	Role (at the time)
5	185	+424.41	9.6347	Farage	Nigel Farage	Leader of the Brexit Party
6	158	+362.46	9.4071	Sadiq	Sadiq Khan	Mayor of London
10	133	+305.1	9.1586	Soubry	Anna Soubry	Conservative MP until February 2019; Leader of the Independent Group for Change
11	132	+302.81	9.1477	Mogg	Jacob Rees-Mogg	Conservative MP; Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons
12	461	+1033.52	8.9519	Corbyn	Jeremy Corbyn	Leader of the Labour Party
15	108	+247.75	8.8582	Keir	Sir Keir Starmer	Labour's Shadow Brexit Secretary
17	96	+220.22	8.6883	Lammy	David Lammy	Labour MP
20	78	+178.93	8.3887	Thornberry	Emily Thornberry	Labour MP; Shadow Foreign Secretary
23	593	+1315.78	8.3152	Theresa	Theresa May	Prime Minister
24	73	+167.46	8.2931	Bercow	John Bercow	Speaker of the House of Commons

Qualitative concordance analysis was then used to examine each keyword in its context to find whole text samples in which the same or very similar instances of the politicians' speech occurred in both the leave and remain press. This revealed that the speech of Khan, Soubry, Rees-Mogg and Thornberry were not reported on comparably and Corbyn and Bercow were not used as sources of reported speech in the context of the PVMs. The politicians whose speech was reported on comparatively in the leave and remain press were included in the subsequent analysis, and are shown in Table 6.2 (overleaf) alongside their position on the PVMs. Rather than analysing short concordance lines containing speech, concordance lines were generated to identify instances of lengthy and comparable reported speech to best demonstrate how WUNC can be used to interpret how the content and context of politicians' quotations can contribute to a given newspapers' ideology.

Table 6.2: The Politicians under analysis and their stance on the PVMs.

Politician	**Position on PVM**
Sir Kier Starmer	Support
David Lammy	Support
Nigel Farage	Oppose
Theresa May	Oppose

To illustrate one way in which the linguistic WUNC framework can be applied, the following analysis classifies extracts of each politician's reported speech as contributing to the linguistic categorisations of either worthiness, unity, numbers or commitment. It is important to note that while multiple displays of WUNC may be evident throughout each extract, the analysis seeks only to show how *some* elements of the linguistic WUNC framework *can* be applied in the context of this case study.

As noted in *2.7 WUNC*, Tilly (2006) argues that there are three sorts of political claims that can be made by protesters through WUNC displays: *program claims* that involve 'stated support for or opposition to actual or proposed actions by the objects of movement claims'; *identity claims* that consist of 'assertions that "we" – the claimants – constitute a unified force to be reckoned with'; and *standing claims* that 'assert ties and similarities to other political actors' such as 'loyal supporters of the regime' (Tilly 2006: 292). How the linguistic manifestations of WUNC relate to these claims is also considered throughout the analysis.

6.2.2.1 Worthiness: referential strategies

Extract A (*The Express*) and extract B (*The Independent*) report on Theresa May refusing to allow a people's vote (second referendum) on the UK's EU membership. In both extracts, May is making program claims – she is stating opposition to the action of the PVM (NB: each extract in the analysis uses superscript numbers ([1], [2], [3], and so on) to refer to the specific examples that will be discussed in detail).

Extract A [The Express, PVM, 25.10.18]

Prime Minister Theresa May[1] has clearly outlined there will not be another referendum on cutting ties with the EU, saying it would be a "betrayal" of British voters. At the Tory Party conference earlier this month, Mrs May[2] said: "There are plenty of prominent people British politics, in parliament and out of it, who wants to stop Brexit in its tracks. "Their latest plan is to call a second referendum. They call it a 'people's vote', but we had a people's vote and the people chose to leave."

Extract B [The Independent, People's Vote March for the Future, 31.10.18]

Theresa May's[3] latest ruse to deny the British people a Final Say on the outcome of her shambolic Brexit talks is to deem the People's Vote campaign a "Politician's Vote". That's been a laughable response right since the start of this campaign, but has become even more so with the fantastic news that *The Independent's* Final Say petition has reached one million signatories. Often dismissed as mindless "clicktivism", the passing of this landmark in fact shows the width and depth of feeling across the country in favour of the people - not politicians in Westminster - being able to decide on their own future.

Protests are said to be worthy when they are attended and supported by politicians, celebrities and other elite authorities. An authority figures' social standing can be formed, sustained and reinforced by reference to systems of address (Barker and Galasinski 2001: 74). It follows that the more credible elites are shown to be, the more worthiness they can imbue a protest with.

By considering social actor representation and legitimation by reference to institutional authority (Van Leeuwen 2007; 2008), this section analyses the representations of May as a (un)worthy figure in the leave and remain press to demonstrate how these representations can be used to contribute to the press' broader ideological goals. While the (un)worthy representation of May is analysed here, the point is not how worthy May is per se, but how the press representations of her worthiness contributes to (or takes away from) the worthiness of the PVM.

In extract A, *The Express* use affiliation to refer to May, highlighting her functional, governmental role as Prime Minister. Foregrounding occupations helps to present social actors as authentic (Osisanwo and Iyoha 2020: 640) and increases their legitimation by reference to authority. Further, example 2 uses formal nomination with honorifics to refer to May as ‘Mrs May’. Because if something is formal, it carries the semantics of being official and legitimate, referring to May using formal nomination suggests that she is worthy. These referential strategies emphasise May's authority, constructing her as a worthy source whose program claims against having a people's vote should be listened to. The implication here is that the worthiness of the PVM is lessened as it does not have the support of a worthy politician.

In extract B, example 3 refers to May as ‘Theresa May’ through semiformal nomination. Both May's role of Prime Minister and honorifics are omitted, deemphasising her authority and legitimacy. This may have been a strategy to construct May as an unworthy source, delegitimating her program claims against a people's vote. Her authority is further delegitimated throughout the extract. Her rejection of a people's vote is described as a ‘ruse’, her Brexit talks are deemed ‘shambolic’ and her suggestion that a people's vote is really a politician's vote is ‘laughable’. As such, no worthiness is taken away from the PVM here. Rather, the PVM is imbued with credibility as it is constructed in opposition to the unworthy representation of May.

While Mohd Don and May (2013: 748) note that choosing the degree of formality of nominations and (not) including honorifics is an important factor in the representation of social actors, it is difficult to draw conclusions about the ideological underpinnings of three referential strategies in two short extracts. To add weight to the claim that affiliation and honorification increase May's worthiness and semiformal nomination (without honorifics) decreases it, we can see whether these patterns are consistent. Using AntConc (Anthony 2019), the terms 'Prime Minister Theresa May', 'Mrs May' and 'Theresa May' were searched for in articles that were published during May's time as Prime Minister in the PVM sub-corpus. The search returned a total of 193 concordance hits in the leave press and 320 in the remain press. As shown in Figure 6.1 (overleaf), of the 193 concordance hits in the leave press, 'Prime Minister Theresa May' occurred 31 times (16.06%), 'Mrs May' occurred 77 times (39.9%) and 'Theresa May' occurred 85 times (44.04%). Conversely, of the 320 concordance hits in the remain press, 'Prime Minister Theresa May' occurred 10 times (3.13%), 'Mrs May' occurred 51 times (15.94%), and 'Theresa May' occurred 259 times (80.94%).



Figure 6.1: Relative frequency distribution of the three referential strategies in the Leave and Remain press.

These results substantiate the initial observation that the leave press use affiliation, honorification and formal nomination to refer to May more than the remain press do. Although the leave press refer to May through affiliation in only 16.06% of occasions, this is over five times more than remain press, who use affiliation in a mere 3.13% of instances. Moreover, while the leave press use ‘Mrs May’ and ‘Theresa May’ fairly equally (39.9% and 44.04% respectively), the remain press use the latter almost twice as much (80.94%). This indicates that the remain press have an ideological interest in backgrounding May’s vested legitimation and authority, undermining her worthiness. As an unworthy social actor in the remain press, May’s program claims against the PVM are delegitimated. However, as a worthy social actor in the leave press, May's program claims against the PVM are legitimated, lessening the PVM's mediated display of worthiness in *The Express*. A potential caveat to this argument is that it is possible some of the more conservative newspapers comprising the leave press may, as a rule, refer to politicians with titles. Nevertheless, the point remains that the more liberal newspapers that largely comprise the remain press could have chosen to use affiliation, honorification and formal nomination more frequently, but did not.

6.2.2.2 Unity: pronouns and determiners

Extract C (*The Express*) and extract D (*The Independent*) report on Labour MP David Lammy's address about the Final Say protest before it took place. Here, Lammy makes identity claims; his reported speech consists of assertions that he and fellow PVM-supporters constitute a unified force.

Extract C [The Express, Final Say, 16/10/19]

Tottenham Labour MP David Lammy said: "On Saturday 19th October the people of the United Kingdom will come together to tell Boris Johnson loud and clear he must seek our consent before he inflicts his Brexit on our country[4]. "Whether it's a deal or no deal, the Brexit the Prime Minister is planning bears no relation to the promises made back in 2016 and it threatens immense harm to our economy, our prosperity, our young people and our United Kingdom[5]. "Support for a People's Vote is growing, and on Saturday 19th a fleet of buses and coaches from all parts of the UK will bring people to London to have their say. "It will be a huge democratic moment for our country[6] as we say loud and clear that, whatever you think about Brexit, the only clear way out of this mess is to give the people the final say." In a poll of 26,000 adults surveyed by ComRes across the UK, it was found that 54 percent of Britons still supported the referendum result[7]. The 2016 Referendum saw 51 percent vote to Leave, while 48 percent voted to stay in the EU. More people's preferred outcome is now for the UK to leave the European Union at 50 percent against 42 percent to remain[8]. Those who answered with "don't know" were excluded, however, more than half say their preferred outcome is for the UK to leave the EU compared to less than half who say their preferred outcome is for the UK to remain in the EU[9]

Extract D [The Independent, Final Say, 15/10/19]

David Lammy, the Labour MP and a leading supporter of the Final Say campaign, has said the march will be a "huge democratic moment for our country[10]". "On Saturday 19 October the people of the United Kingdom will come together to tell Boris Johnson loud and clear he must seek our consent before he inflicts his Brexit on our country[11]," he added. "Whether it's a deal or no deal, the Brexit the prime minister is planning bears no relation to the promises made back in 2016 and it threatens immense harm to our economy, our prosperity, our young people and our United Kingdom[12]."

The content of Lammy's speech in both extracts is largely the same. In these, there are numerous displays of unity – but these are not upheld in both of the extracts' context. This section therefore seeks to explore how unity can be used to interpret how PVM-backing politicians' reported speech and the context in which it is embedded can contribute to newspapers' broader ideological goals.

In both extracts, positive presentation of in-groups and negative presentation of out-groups can be realised through the use of personal pronouns and determiners. Those not included in the deixis of 'our' are depicted as outsiders, establishing a contrast between 'us' and 'them'. Lammy is able to uphold an us/them dichotomy by aligning himself with the people of the UK through the frequent use of the collective first-person determiner 'our' (examples 4, 5, 6, 10, 11 and 12). This presents a communal ‘us’ unified in collective agreement that there should be a public vote on the final Brexit deal. PVM-opposing Boris Johnson is constructed in opposition to the consensus of the in-group through the third person determiner ‘he’ and ‘his’. In particular, the contrast between the third person determiner ‘his’ and collective first-person determiner ‘our’ in examples 4 and 11 (‘Boris Johnson […] must seek *our* consent before he inflicts *his* Brexit on *our* country’) emphasise that the in-group are unified against Johnson’s Brexit and in support of a final say.

However, the frequent displays of unity are undermined in the context of extract C with *The Express’* inclusion of poll results. Opinion polls are ‘explicit representations of public opinion’ (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 261) and are often used to communicate protesters’ deviance from the norm by depicting them as ‘an isolated minority’ (McLeod and Detenber 1999: 6). Because it shows that 54% of the public still support the leave result, the opinion poll was perhaps included to show that the people of the UK are not unified in pursuit of the same goals and demands. The statistics and numbers (aggregation) in examples 7, 8 and 9 may have also been included as a strategy to regulate a PVM-opposing ideology despite being presented ‘as merely recording facts’ (Van Leeuwen 2008: 37). The context of Lammy’s reported speech in extract C therefore goes against the identity claims that PVM-supporting people ‘constitute a unified force to be reckoned with’ (Tilly 2006: 292). Because unified groups are effective in influencing the beliefs of policy makers and elected officials (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 367), the context of extract C contributes to *The Express’* PVM-opposing ideology. In contrast, the context of Lammy’s reported speech in extract D does nothing to undermine his displays of unity. Those reading it are therefore more likely to believe the UK is unified in consensus, contributing to *The Independent’s* PVM-supporting ideology. So, while extracts C and D feature nearly identical elements of Lammy’s speech, their different contextual framings allow them to be heard in different ways (Buttny 1998: 55).

6.2.2.3 Numbers: aggregation

Extract E (*The Express*) and extract F (*The Guardian*) are taken from articles comparing the PVM and the pro-Brexit March to Leave protests' turnout.

Extract E [The Express, PVM, 23.03.19]

Mr Farage said: "What has happened this week is not only a national humiliation but it is an outright betrayal, because Mrs May now tells us we're not leaving next Friday despite telling us over a hundred times that we would be, despite putting a piece of law in place supported by 500 MPs. "So there is something going on here that I believe to be one of the saddest chapters in the history of our nation and we will not take this lying down." And asked about the March to Leave supporters being outnumbered today by the People's Vote March in London, he pointed to the 200 plus cheering marchers gathered in a pub car park and said: "There are 17.4 million here, can't you see them?"[13]

Extract F [The Guardian, PVM, 23.03.19]

It was impossible watching that sight [the PVM] not to make some comparisons with those few stubborn souls[14] on the ill-fated "March to Leave", moved to trudge along lonely hard-shoulders by Nigel Farage, only to find that he had turned up for the photo opportunity and left them to fend for themselves. Farage, alive to BBC requirements for "balance", had returned to preach on Saturday to his handful of leaderless footsoldiers[15] at a pub car park in Linby, Nottinghamshire: "You are the 17.4 million," he told a crowd of 150.[16] As the thousands upon thousands[17] [of PVM protesters] flowed down towards Parliament Square there was, contrarily, a spirit that the Brexiters have failed over the past three years ever to begin to convey: that of creative optimism.

In extracts E and F, Farage is making identity claims by suggesting that the March to Leave (henceforth MtoL) constitutes a force to be reckoned with. In doing this, he emphasises the MtoL's numbers and suggests that the PVM's turnout does not represent consensus opinion. Because a protest's critics usually provide lower estimates of the number participating in a demonstration than their advocates do (Tilly 2006: 291), this section seeks to explore how numbers can be used to interpret how PVM-opposing politicians' reported speech and the context in which it is embedded can contribute to newspapers' broader ideological goals.

Although *The Express* report on Farage being asked about the PVM outnumbering the MtoL, Farage responds by implying the '200 plus cheering marchers' at his protest represent the '17.4 million' that voted to leave the EU (example 13). This meronymic reference implies that the protesters are a *part* of the *whole* (i.e. the entire leave-voting population) so have more supporters than the PVM. Drawing on the public's preferences in this way reinforces the boundary between what is and is not acceptable, deeming those that do not support the MtoL 'outside the bounds of consideration' (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 262).

Conversely, in extract F's comparison of the MtoL's and PVM's turnout, the MtoL's numbers are mocked. Although collectivised, the quantifiers 'few' (example 14) and 'handful' (example 15) emphasise how small the groups of protesters are. While extract F also includes Farage's claim that the MtoL protesters 'are the 17.4 million', it is followed with the ironic 'he told a crowd of 150' (example 16), suggesting that his protest does not have the support of the majority. Extract F also ends with coverage of the 'thousands upon thousands' of protesters that attended the PVM, highlighting how numerous the support for the PVM is in comparison to the 'handful of leaderless footsoldiers' that attended the MtoL. As such, extracts E and F add weight to the idea that 'power is in numbers' (Wouters and Van Camp 2017: 464) as both *The Express* and *The Guardian* attempt to construct the protest they support as larger than the one they oppose.

6.2.2.4 Commitment: modality, reporting verbs and selective quotation

Extract G (*The Express*) and extract H (*The Guardian*) are taken from articles about an interview about the PVM between Sir Keir Starmer and Andrew Marr on Marr's political talk show. In these extracts, Starmer is making program claims by stating his support of the PVM.

Extract G [The Express, PVM, 24.03.19]

BBC presenter Andrew Marr clashed with Labour's shadow Brexit secretary Sir Keir Starmer during an extremely heated debate about Britain's departure from the Brussels bloc. BBC host Andrew Marr instantly quizzed[18] the Labour Party frontbencher about why he did not attend the People's Vote march in London on Saturday which saw an estimated one million people travel to the capital to demand another say on Brexit. As the Labour Party's shadow Brexit secretary said he was focused on "winning the argument", it promoted host Marr to quickly reply[20]: "Where are you winning". Sir Keir said[21]: "I wasn't on the march[22] but it was a significant march. The numbers were huge. "It was a very powerful message and although the numbers themselves were high, I think[23] it represents an even bigger number who are anxious about the situation and the position the Prime Minister has got us in to."

Extract H [The Guardian, PVM, 21.10.18]

Sir Keir Starmer, the shadow Brexit secretary, described[30] Saturday's march as significant and argued[31] that both leave and remain supporters were "utterly losing confidence in the prime minister, and that reflects a much bigger concern about where this is going". Appearing on the BBC's Andrew Marr show on Sunday, Starmer reiterated[32] that if May's Brexit deal was voted down then one of the options would be another "public vote" in which "remain has to be an option[33]

While some elements of Starmer's reported speech are the same in both extracts, they exhibit varying displays of commitment. This section will therefore explore how commitment can be used to interpret how PVM-backing politicians' reported speech and the context in which it is embedded can contributes to newspapers' broader ideological goals.

Extract G is constructed as an 'extremely heated debate' in which Marr challenges Starmer's commitment to the PVM by questioning him about 'why he did not attend the People's Vote march' and where he is 'winning' the argument for a second referendum. The different types and designation of reporting verbs here help to determine who is constructed as having the power in the debate. This has interesting implications for the representation of Starmer's commitment. For example, while *The Express* attribute evaluative reporting verbs to Marr in examples 18 and 20 that suggest he is combative in his approach ('instantly quizzed', 'quickly reply'), Starmer is ascribed a neutral reporting verb in example 21 ('said'). Evaluative reporting verbs add interpretation and allow for revoicing, whereas neutral reporting verbs lack overt judgement of the source's speech (Harry 2014: 1044; 1046). This indicates that *The Express* present Marr's reported speech in such a way to construct him as the more powerful social actor in the confrontation. The lack of evaluation in the reporting verbs attributed to Starmer therefore imply that he not resistant to Marr's attack and is thereby not committed to supporting the PVM (Tilly 1999: 261).

Starmer is quoted saying 'I wasn't on the march' (example 22) and the entire interaction between Marr and Starmer is built on this. Here, choosing to include this segment of Starmer's speech implies that he is completely uncommitted to the PVM through the suggestion he does not care enough about it to attend it. Moreover, while Starmer asserts categorical epistemic modality by not including modals that indicate varying degrees of commitment (e.g. 'might' or 'could') in the utterance 'It was a very powerful message and although the numbers themselves were high, I think it represents an even bigger number…', he includes the cognitive verb ‘I think’ in a medial clause position (example 23), expressing a low degree of affinity to the claim through ‘subjective marking’ (Fairclough 2003: 169; Fairclough 1992: 159).

It is of note that the interaction between Marr and Starmer is not framed as a debate or confrontation in extract H. Marr is not quoted at all, constructing Starmer’s speech as unimpeded on and unchallenged. The reporting verbs *The Guardian* attribute to Starmer also emphasise his commitment to the PVM. Although example 30 is more neutral (‘described’), the evaluative ‘argued’ and ‘reiterated’ (examples 31 and 32) emphasise that Starmer is resistant to attack and ready to persevere. Additionally, Starmer’s speech includes a high degree of commitment to implementing a second referendum through the deontic modal ‘has to’ in example 33. By being selective with the inclusion of Starmer’s reported speech and contextualising it with evaluative and neutral reporting verbs, extracts G and H are able to construct Starmer as having varying levels of commitment to the PVM.

6.3 Conclusion

The (often praised and increasingly used) combination of qualitative corpus methods and CDA have recently been criticised for not incorporating identifiable and accountable methods in their analyses (Rheindorf 2019: 33). In response, Chapter 6 outlined how Tilly’s (2004) WUNC framework can be utilised as an additional qualitative methodological intervention to critically analyse protest coverage. In doing so, it sought to explain how linguistic features can contribute to WUNC as a methodological framework in CDA, demonstrate the ways in which WUNC can be applied as an additional critical lens when analysing the press representation of protests.

Part one related Tilly’s (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999) various definitions of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment to theories and methods established in the field of CDA to formulate manifestations of WUNC grounded in lexis and grammar. Firstly, to formulate the linguistic expression of worthiness, part one demonstrated how Van Leeuwen’s (2008; 2007) social actor representation taxonomy and definition of authorisation can contribute to the representation of a protester as credible, legitimate, and therefore worthy. In particular, formal nomination, the inclusion of honorifics and affiliations, and functionalisation can imbue a protester with a high degree of worthiness by sustaining and reinforcing their social standing. Tilly (2004: 4) also notes that protests are worthy when its participants behave appropriately. Transitivity analysis can be used to deduce the appropriateness of behaviour through the analysis of process types. If a protester is shown to be engaging in a process that has negative, immoral or violent semantics, it can be said that they are not behaving appropriately. Conversely, if a protester is shown to be engaging in a process that has positive, moral and legitimate semantics, it can be said that they are behaving in a worthy manner.

Secondly, to formulate the linguistic manifestation of unity, part one considered how collective first-person pronouns and determiners can signify collectivity, consensus and a 'oneness' in pursuit of demands (Campbell 2011: 44). Collective first-person pronouns and determiners such as 'we' and 'our' can indicate a shared common identity and the discursive construction of an in-group. Opposingly, third-person pronouns such as 'they' and 'them' can be used to symbolise an out-group, whose wants challenge the unified demands of the in-group. Predication strategies can also be used to analyse unified dress and banner holding, and transitivity analysis can be used to uncover unified singing and chanting.

Thirdly, to formulate the linguistic manifestation of numbers, part one illustrated how Van Leeuwen's (2008: 37) notions of assimilation and individualisation can be used to quantify protesters. Assimilation is comprised of two components: aggregation and collectivisation. Aggregation refers to numerical quantification (e.g. numbers and statistics) and collectivisation refers to collective nouns (e.g. 'many' or 'few'). In contrast, individualisation refers to singularity. Together, these strategies can be used to refer to both large and small groups of people. Conveying these numbers is particularly pertinent in the context of protests; because the majority rules, demonstrations with numerous turnouts are more likely to influence the political agenda (Wouters and Walgrave 2017: 368).

Fourthly, to formulate the linguistic manifestation of commitment, part one showed how modality, evaluation and cognitive verbs can contribute to varying displays of dedication. High levels of epistemic and deontic modality, realised though modal verbs and adverbs, can indicate how committed a protester is to their claims of truth and obligation – that is, to their 'readiness to persevere' and 'resistance to repression' (Tilly 2004: 4; 1999: 261). Transitivity analysis can again be drawn upon to show that participants have attended demonstrations in spite of something, such as bad weather or illness. Lastly, commitment can also be demonstrated in referential and predication strategies that give information about a participants' old age, poor health or disability (Tilly 2004: 4). Put plainly, the framework suggests high levels of WUNC can manifest linguistically through:

- **Worthiness:** formal and titulated semiformal nomination; inclusion of honorifics and affiliations; functionalisation; transitive processes that express decorous and dignified behaviour.
- **Unity:** collective pronouns and determiners; referential and predication strategies that indicate uniformity of dress and message amongst multiple protesters; multiple SAYERS or ACCOMPANIMENTS involved in a verbal process.
- **Numbers:** assimilation (aggregation and collectivisation); collectivisation that indicates a large number.
- **Commitment:** high levels of epistemic and deontic modality; referential and predication strategies that express old age or illness; evidence of the CIRCUMSTANCE CONCESSION.

Low levels of WUNC can therefore manifest linguistically through:

- **Worthiness:** untitulated semiformal and informal nomination; omission of honorifics and affiliations; lack of functionalisation; transitive processes that express aggressive or inappropriate behaviour.
- **Unity:** exclusion of collective pronouns and determiners; predication that indicates differing dress and message; singular ACTORS and SAYERS.
- **Numbers:** individualisation; collectivisation that indicates a small number.
- **Commitment:** low levels of epistemic and deontic modality; transitive processes that express apathy.

Once the linguistic application of WUNC was formulated, part two applied it to the corpus-assisted CDA of politicians' reported speech and the context in which it is embedded. The results showed that mediated displays of WUNC were manipulated by the press to support ideologies that encouraged conformity to specific political goals; to either stop (leave press) or encourage (remain press) a second referendum that would include an option to remain in the EU and a public vote on the final Brexit deal. Performing a comparative analysis of similar quotations also revealed that journalists can choose to lessen or heighten a protest's mediated displays of WUNC – even if such displays were not exhibited in reality.

Lastly, because specific lexical and grammatical choices can either be accentuated or concealed to express gradient levels of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment, it seems that WUNC as a linguistic framework offers more nuance than other taxonomies often used to analyse the mediated representation of protests. For example, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5, analysing a demonstrations' legitimacy or adherence to the protest paradigm only uncovers binary results. A protest either is or is not legitimate and a protest either does or does not conform to the paradigm. By existing on a scale, the linguistic WUNC framework has the potential to paint more nuanced representational pictures of demonstrations. That said, WUNC could feasibly be used to complement or enhance existing frameworks. For example, high levels of worthiness could manifest in McLeod and Hertog's (1999) *creative expression* and *unjust persecution* protest paradigm frames, while low levels of worthiness could be evident in the *violent crime*, *property crime*, *riot*, *storm watch* and *moral decay* frames. High and low levels of unity could also relate to *freak show*, *association* and *comparison*; numbers to *we are not alone*; and commitment to *romper room* and *our story*.

6.3.1 Limitations

While overall, Chapter 6 has effectively demonstrated how the linguistic manifestations of WUNC can be used in qualitative corpus-assisted CDA, it should be noted that quantitative corpus methods were required to verify observations in section *6.2.2.1 Worthiness: referential strategies*. Moreover, because each section only dealt with one element of WUNC and a total of four politicians, the analysis would have undoubtedly yielded richer and more reliable interpretations if the entire linguistic WUNC framework was applied to all eight extracts, to more instances of different politicians' speech and to examples that included standing claims (as well as program and identity claims). Relatedly, while part one sought to demonstrate a neat fit between WUNC and the linguistic elements it can manifest *in theory*, more research will need to be carried out to see if they definitively fit *in practice*. As shown in part two, not every linguistic manifestation of WUNC theorised in part one was evident in each extract.

Additionally, because 'there is no neat fit between sociological and linguistic categories' (Van Leeuwen 2008: 24), more research will need to be carried out by scholars researching different protests in different contexts to expand the linguistic scope and categorisation of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment. Certainly, there might be more linguistic features not explored here that could also be representative of WUNC. It is therefore important that future studies do not bind themselves too closely to specific categorisations of WUNC lest other relevant linguistic manifestations be overlooked. Subsequent research could also use more quantitative corpus methods to assess the effects of WUNC. Almost all of the linguistic features identified in part one are observable in quite simple ways using corpus tools. Referential strategies, pronouns, determiners, transitive verbs, numbers and modals verbs could all be examined quantitively using frequency, keyness and collocation analysis. However, while expansion upon the framework is encouraged, the hope is that the application of WUNC outlined in this chapter could be used as it currently stands in research of a similar nature.

7 Conclusion

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 combined corpus-assisted CDA with the concepts of legitimacy, the protest paradigm and WUNC with the purpose of addressing two broad research aims:

1. To uncover how the British press represented pro- and anti-Brexit protests; and
2. To develop new methods of performing corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analyses of the mediated representations of protests.

Reflections on the extent to which these aims have been satisfied throughout the thesis will be discussed in this concluding chapter.

7.1 Reflecting on the press representation of pro- and anti- Brexit protests

Throughout this thesis, results have shown that the press coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests is quite unlike the coverage of the polarising Brexit debate and the demonstrations usually researched in CDA. Chapter 4 investigated the mediated representations of legitimacy manifest in protester's demands, discontent and turnout in the leave and remain press' coverage of Brexit-related demonstrations. The results of this analysis were often unexpected. For example, the leave press dedicated most of their column inches to the coverage of anti-Brexit protests, in which the reporting of their demands was mostly legitimate. More surprisingly, the leave press neglected coverage of pro-Brexit protesters' demands and turnout. In the remain press, there was no coverage of the pro-Brexit protesters' discontent – in fact, pro-Brexit protests were all but ignored. Most unexpectedly, the remain press did not justify or absolve anti-Brexit protesters when they reported on their negative actions.

Because the more negative coverage of demands, discontent and turn out seemed to mirror some aspects of the protest paradigm, the next chapter of analysis investigated the extent to which the Brexit press conformed to this 'routinised and consistent' coverage (Chan and Lee 1984). The results of Chapter 5 of analysis found that the sample of the leave and remain press' coverage of Brexit-related protests scarcely adhered to the protest paradigm. Indeed, 75.16% and 62.45% of analysed concordance lines in the respective Leave/Anti-Brexit and Remain/Pro-Brexit sub-corpora did not contribute to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation, meaning that the majority of the sampled coverage was at worst neutral and at best positive. Chapters 4 and 5 therefore demonstrated that while ideologically motivated coverage was evident in some cases, 'Brexit tribalism' (North et al. 2020: 195) was not particularly pronounced in the leave and remain press' coverage of pro- and anti-Brexit protests. This may be due to overwhelmingly negative coverage usually occurring in the media when protests challenge the cultural hegemony through extreme system-changing objectives and militant norm-violating tactics (McLeod 2007). As discussed throughout the thesis, although anti-Brexit protests challenged the socio-political status quo to a small extent, neither their objectives nor tactics were particularly radical. Indeed, 48% of the electorate also wanted to remain in the EU, pro-European organisations such as the People's Vote campaign had the support of numerous celebrities and politicians across the political spectrum, and the demonstrations were largely peaceful. Because during the period in which the protests took place it was unclear if and how the UK would actually leave the EU, any negative coverage of the anti-Brexit protests may have been a response to the realistic chance that their goals could be successful. As noted in Chapter 4, this may explain the leave press' emphasis on anti-Brexit protesters' turnout in – high numbers can indicate legitimate political threat.

Similarly, the pro-Brexit protests were not status-quo challenging – they supported what the (narrow) majority of the electorate voted for. Again, these protests did not engage in particularly newsworthy activity; the marches were small and largely uneventful. Although the results of the frame analysis showed that the sample of the remain press' was slightly more denigrative (by 12.71%) than the leave press', their choice to underreport the protests may have been an attempt to stop them having any impact on the political agenda (i.e. leaving the EU immediately with or without a deal). As such, it must be remembered that the degree to which the Brexit-related protests were (de)legitimated or adhered to the protest paradigm are relative; their representations are only disparaging to the extent that they are as isolated phenomena. That is to say, if these findings were compared to the representations of the system-challenging Black Lives Matter or Extinction Rebellion protests, they might not appear to be delegitimising, marginalising or demonising at all. Perhaps this is another reason why Brexit-related protests have not been researched through CDA's emancipatory and socially critical approach; pro- and anti-Brexit protesters did not need liberating from societal marginalisation and oppression.

That said, Chapter 6 did uncover more ideologically motivated instances of language utilised by the leave and remain press. High levels of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment (WUNC) were included in coverage of the protests that they advocated for and low levels were included in coverage of the protests that they opposed. Because WUNC and its linguistic manifestations exist on a scale (high to low levels), they allow for a nuanced evaluation of protest coverage. It is therefore possible that the (more polarising) results of this analysis hold more weight because they revealed less generalised and binary depictions of the protests. Even so, the examples and extracts in Chapter 6 did not emphasise violence or deviance, suggesting that even with a more nuanced perspective, coverage still did not adhere to the disparaging representations of radical protesters seen in other CDA research (although it is important to remember that only eight extracts were analysed in depth). While the lack of harsh and unforgiving representations of Brexit-related demonstrations are in line with research that suggests protest coverage is becoming more ameliorative (e.g. Cottle 2008), it seems more likely that Brexit-related protests were not afforded incredibly derogatory coverage because they were not eccentric or system-shifting. It will be interesting to observe whether less radical protests are afforded similar media attention in the UK now that the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 has passed.

7.2 Reflecting on methodological contributions

As well as investigating how the press covered Brexit-related protests, the thesis applied and developed different methods of analysis. Chapter 4 utilised transitivity analysis to investigate mediated (de)legitimation. While this method is traditionally associated with CDA, its results went toward remedying a sharp criticism of CDA that states ‘analysts find what they expect to find’ (Stubbs 1997: 102). As the findings of this chapter were often counterintuitive, they hopefully demonstrate that surprising findings can still be found in research that takes a CDA perspective. While this observation is important, the thesis aimed at developing new methods in the corpus-assisted Critical Discourse Analysis of the mediated representations of protests. As such, its two main methodological contributions were the integration of corpus tools and the formulation of probes in Chapter 5, and the development of the linguistic WUNC framework in Chapter 6.

Firstly, in recognising that the paradigm outlined by McLeod and Hertog (1999) has never before been applied as a whole, all 22 protest paradigm frames were searched for to uncover how frames that are not frequently researched manifest in discourse, and to see if anything is missed by analysis that focuses on purely negative frames. To do this, key keyword analysis was used to identify the fundamental ideas around which frames might be constructed. A sample of concordance lines was then critically analysed to uncover the journalistic narratives in which the key keywords were embedded. I then formulated probes (questions that can be asked of the data) to better distinguish between McLeod and Hertog’s protest paradigm frames. Although I aimed at analysing all 22 protest paradigm frames, the *riot*, *moral decay*, *trial*, *creative expression* and *unjust persecution* frames were not evident in the dataset.

Nevertheless, probes were developed for the remaining 17 frames, explicating how they can manifest in discourse. Once the sample of concordance lines were checked against the probes, they were grouped together depending on whether or not they adhered to the protest paradigm. In response to Gruber's (2021: 25) claim that the existence of protest paradigm frames does not necessarily equate to negative coverage, the relative frequencies of the number of times the frames that adhered to the protest paradigm contributed to processes of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation were calculated, revealing the extent to which samples from the Leave/AB and Remain/PB adhered to the negative processes associated with the protest paradigm. Following this, a qualitative CDA of some selected examples of the most delegitimising, marginalising and demonising frames for each sub-corpus was performed to show how the more representationally damaging aspects of the paradigm can manifest in discourse. Chapter 5 therefore provided a method, grounded in corpus-assisted CDA, that could be used in future research as a robust method of identifying and analysing protest paradigm frames in newspaper discourse. An additional methodological contribution was the finding that the frames traditionally considered positive or neutral did have the potential to manifest discursive instances of delegitimisation, marginalisation and demonisation. This finding would have gone unnoticed if the analysis had only observed the more disparaging frames that are usually associated with the protest paradigm.

Secondly, in acknowledging that qualitative corpus analysis has received criticism for lacking systematic analysis (Rheindorf 2019: 40) and recognising that Tilly's (2008; 2006; 2004; 1999) sociological conceptualisations of WUNC complement CDA's dissident perspective, Chapter 6 operationalised WUNC as a linguistic methodological intervention. The resultant linguistic WUNC framework suggests the following:

Worthiness: high levels of worthiness can be displayed by referring to protesters and authoritative figures through formal nomination, the inclusion of honorifics and affiliations, and functionalisation. Well-behaved protesters can also imbue a protest with worthiness if their actions display decorum and discipline. Low displays of worthiness can therefore be displayed through the inclusion of informal nomination, omission of honorifics and affiliations, and transitive verbs that convey inappropriate behaviour.

Unity: high levels of unity can be displayed through predication strategies that detail unified dress or transitive verbs that show multiple agentive participants performing the same process. The use of collective pronouns and determiners can also indicate consensus agreement, a shared common identity and construction of an in-group. Opposingly, third-person pronouns such as 'they' and 'them' can be used to symbolise an out-group whose wants are at odds with the in-group. Such pronouns display low levels of unity.

Numbers: assimilation (aggregation and collectivisation) that coveys large groups of people can indicate high displays of numbers. In contrast, individualisation and collective nouns that infer small groups of people display low levels of numbers.

Commitment: high levels of epistemic modality, deontic modality and positive evaluation can contribute to high displays of commitment and low displays of each can contribute to the inverse. Again, transitive verbs can manifest varying levels of commitment – for example, if they indicate that protesters have braved bad weather or illness to participate. Lastly, referential and predication strategies that give information about a participants' old age, poor health or disability can also demonstrate high levels of commitment.

Because specific lexical and grammatical choices can either be accentuated or concealed to express gradient levels of worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment, it seems that WUNC as a linguistic framework offers more nuance than the binary representations offered by researching legitimation or the protest paradigm. That said, the frameworks advanced in this thesis could be feasibly used to complement or enhance existent taxonomies.

As noted, legitimacy is a key aspect of worthiness and many protest paradigm frames map on to WUNC. Moreover, because the protest paradigm is grounded in sociology and media studies and WUNC was borne from sociology and political science, the potential applications of the frameworks developed here extend beyond purely linguistic investigation. In particular, the use of corpus tools, which are scarcely used in fields outside of linguistics, may expand the efficacy of future sociology, media and political studies. This would also improve corpus linguistics' visibility in the academy. As Brookes (2020) notes, corpus linguistics has a 'branding issue' – its applications are not particularly transparent. This thesis' methodological contributions could therefore be a step toward lessening the separation between corpus tools and non-linguistic fields in the context of protest research.

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