FROM 'LESBIAN AND GAY PSYCHOLOGY' TO A CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUALITIES

Pam Alldred and Nick Fox

This chapter describes and critiques lesbian and gay psychology as an important but limited move to remedy psychology's complicity with oppressive heteronormative and homophobic cultures, and sets out an alternative critical psychology of sexualities. We begin with a brief overview of 100 years of mainstream psychology's varied engagements with sexuality, and how this has led to the emergence of LGBTQ psychology (Clarke and Braun, 2009). We will consider why lesbian and gay psychology is constrained by its psychological underpinnings, and show how critical psychology has challenged the individualisation of sexualities, the location of sexuality within the body, and the side-lining within mainstream psychology of explorations of social processes and power in the production of sexualities. We set out the main elements of a critical psychology of sexualities, and conclude by assessing how critical psychologists may engage with the struggles of LGBT people.

Psychology and Sexuality

The conventional history of psychology's engagement with sexualities describes the gradual progression from the darkness of unscientific prejudice, in which psychology theorised homosexuality as sick and/or perverse, to the sunny uplands of rigorous, evidence-based research (Kitzinger, 1987: 8). Using sound data, testable theory and more enlightened attitudes, psychologists now value people with differing sexualities as normal and healthy members of a pluralistic society, with LGBTQ psychology committed to sexual emancipation, self-affirmation and the eradication of homophobia.

Informed by post-structuralist, feminist and queer theory, and science and technology studies, critical psychology rejects this history of psychology's enlightenment. It is a truism that all psychological knowledge, indeed all scientific knowledge, is a product of human thought and consequently constructed rather than absolute (Gergen, 1985; Kitzinger, 1987: 2). But, as Rose (1998: 55) notes, 'truth' emerges not only from social construction, but also from social contestation, in which 'evidence, results, arguments, laboratories, status and much else are deployed as resources in the attempt to win allies and force something into "the true"'. Consequently, the history of the psychology of sexualities must be seen not as a gradual refinement of understanding, but as a continual struggle to deploy resources (though we might add to Rose's list other material contexts (Braidotti, 2006: 137) and technologies (Gordo Lopez and Cleminson, 2004) that contribute to the production of knowledge).

This contested theorising of human sexuality can be seen in its different treatments by psychology over the past 150 years. In the nineteenth century, psychiatry's medical model of homosexuality established sexuality within an individualistic framework of normality/pathology (Weeks, 1989: 128-9), against a backcloth of societal prejudice, punitive laws against homosexuality vigorously policed, and a fundamentalist Christian establishment that regarded all sex outside (heterosexual) marriage as sinful. During this period, homosexuality was seen as an organic disorder to be treated by a variety of interventions, a perspective reflected until 1973 in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and as a mental disorder until 1990 in the World Health Organisation`s International Classification of Diseases.

A liberal-humanist perspective on different sexualities emerged early within psychology, marking a decisive break with these medicalised approaches in psychiatry. The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, founded in 1913, was a talking shop for social philosophers, feminists, liberal and free-thinking medical professionals to debate a range of issues concerning sexuality (Hall, 1995, Weeks, 2012: 233). In 1921, the Association for Moral and Social Hygiene advocated legalising homosexual acts between consenting adults, re-defining homosexuality as delinquency rather than degeneracy, and emphasising its psychological causes and hence the possibility of psychological treatments (ibid: 280).

Liberal humanism shaped two threads in the psychology of sexualities: a 'scientific' psychology that (supposedly) stepped back from moral judgements about sexual choices or behaviours, to apply value-free scientific research approaches to 'explain' these patternings; and an 'affirmative' psychology that modelled homosexuality as a 'normal, natural and healthy sexual preference or lifestyle' (Kitzinger, 1987: 33). The former produced developmental, social and health psychologies of sexuality. The latter, affirmative trend produced 'lesbian and gay psychology' (Kitzinger, 1999), and more recently 'LGBT' (Clarke and Peel, 2007) psychology and 'gay affirmative' therapy (Langdridge, 2007).

LGBT psychology provided a resource for thinking new subject-positions associated with different sexualities, and as such, was important in contributing to an emergent identity-politics around LGBT sexualities (Clarke and Braun, 2009: 238-9; Rich, 1980), often in quite vehement tones, as Wilkinson (1997: 188) has noted. Within this affirmative psychology, studies documented the experiential character of LGBT lifestyles (Clarke and Spence, 2012; Lucas-Carr and Krane, 2011, Nadal and Corpus, 2012), supplying a basis for political and cultural opposition to heteronormativity and homophobia, based upon shared identities that reflected sexual orientation (Garnets and D'Augelli, 1994). LGBT health psychology, in contrast with medicalised perspectives on sexuality, has sought to make different sexualities 'healthy' or good experiences (for a review, see Fish, 2009), and to identify the health and social care support needs of LGBT people (Pitts et al., 2009).

Psychology and Sexuality: a Critical Perspective

Critical psychology has criticised mainstream psychological research on sexualities on three grounds: that it individualises sexuality; that it downplays the importance of social, economic and political context in how sexuality manifests; and perhaps most importantly, that it obscures the part that psychological knowledge itself had in producing individualised and individualising LGBT sexualities and sexual identities in the contemporary West. Kitzinger's (1987) account of the production of psychological knowledge of lesbianism began with the medicalised model that emerged in the 19th century, but continued into the present, with a profound critique of the liberal humanist discourse on sexualities, a perspective that was 'widely applauded by the gay and parts of the feminist movements' as a means to counter anti-gay sentiment and as an affirmation of gay and lesbian cultures (ibid: 33).

Kitzinger's critical history showed how the earlier disease terminology described lesbians either as products of disturbed childhoods or genetic mishap. By constructing lesbianism as pathology, the human sciences supplied a means to control and manage this sexual orientation (Kitzinger, 1987: 39-40). Turning to the humanised, 'affirmative' lesbian and gay psychology that later emerged, she then argued that -- despite the identity-political uses to which this affirmative model has been put, like the pathological model, it continued

to individualise sexuality, removing it from its social and political context. This concealed the structures and processes of power that produce privilege and oppression in relation to gender and sexuality, handing responsibility for any problems faced by women firmly back to them rather than assessing the social forces at work (ibid: 34-35). Kitzinger suggested that liberalism and humanism both played a key part in emphasising the self over the social, and de-politicising many aspects of social life. Since she wrote her critique, neo-liberal political ideology has ratcheted up this individualism, including the manifestation of right-wing libertarian gay identity-politics and a 'new homonormativity' in the US (Duggan, 2002), and the projection of homophobia onto the 'liberal' West's racial other (Jivraj and de Jong, 2011; Rothing and Svendsen, 2011; Rasmussen, 2012).

Another insight into psychology's individualisation and de-politicisation of sexuality may be found in Foucault's genealogical approach, which regarded the history of knowledge not as a continuous process, but comprising discontinuous 'epistemes' or systems of thought, each with its own internal logic, underpinned by specificities of power, and enabling particular ways of thinking about topics. Foucault wrote extensively about the discourses that have produced different sexualities in various contexts and historical periods, providing a valuable resource for a critical history. His approach revealed the social, economic and political forces that produced different manifestations of human sexuality, and exposed the contribution of the human sciences in establishing how contemporary sexualities are understood. Effects of power, for Foucault (1982: 781), are 'linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification', but also to 'secrecy, deformation, and mystifying representations imposed on people.

In his history of sexuality, Foucault (1981, 1987, 1990) showed how in different cultures, sexual conduct was defined within strict, though entirely contingent limits, ranging from the institutionalisation and celebration of paedophilia in ancient Greece to today's revulsion toward it. He described four discourses on sexual bodies that emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century: the recognition of the female body as 'saturated with sexuality' and thus prone to psychiatric disorder; the discovery of an immature sexuality in children that must be regulated; the economic and political problematisation of reproduction that made child-bearing an issue for society, and thereby 'responsibilised' couples; and the view that sexual instincts were separate from other biological or psychological drives and subject to specific anomalies and specific corrective technologies (Foucault 1981: 103-5).

Together these discourses established the possibilities for modern normative perspectives on gender roles, child sexuality, sexual identity, monogamy and mental health. The very familiarity of these discourses for the reader today suggests that what Foucault has offered here is an alternative understanding of the foundational premises of the psychology of sexuality. This foundation underpins the differing perspectives that psychology has brought to its understanding of sexuality, from the early pathological models grounded in Victorian moralistic fear of sexual deviance, through Freudian and subsequent models of sexual development, to the emergence of liberal-humanistic *laissez-faire* concerning sexualities and genders in the latter part of the last century.

For Foucault, the 'liberalisation' of attitudes to sexuality in the last century did not mark a progressive move away from repression. Rather, this represented continuity with the earlier repression, within a 'new technology of sex' that since the 1800s established sex not only as a secular concern, but also a concern of the state and of all individuals within it (Foucault, 1981: 116). Instead he argued that successive scientific and psychological theories

of sexuality were simply further manifestations of a '*scientia sexualis*' (ibid: 52) that subjected sexuality to a proliferation of discourses and interventions. These have, if anything, increased surveillance and disciplining of sexual activity and desire (Foucault, 1981: 36; Henriques et al., 1998: 220-222, Rasmussen, 2006).

From this perspective, the individualised model of sexuality promulgated by the 'psy-disciplines' (Rose, 1998) have contributed to the disciplining of sexualities, and are complicit in producing the Western understanding of what sexuality is, and the limits of what may be thought 'sexual'. It follows that liberal humanism, despite its best intentions to acknowledge and affirm differing sexualities (hence 'LG', then 'LGBT' psychology), has actually conspired to expose the darkest corners of sexuality to observation, codification and therapeutic interventions. Rather than being a positivistic exercise in exposing the truth about human sexuality, the sexuality knowledge-production process in psychology and the other human sciences is itself productive of how sexualities are understood more widely by people and by social organisations and institutions.

Critical psychology has analysed contemporary perspectives on sexuality as revealed in scientific and lay texts and accounts (including interview transcripts). These studies have sought to elucidate the social forces that surround sexualities, based on the view that the concepts people use in their language and communication 'do not simply spring from our heads, but come from the surrounding social institutions and relations in which they are embedded' (Spears 1997: 5). Studies have examined the underlying premises in psychological theories of sexuality, while others explored the discursive production of sexual identities and conventions of sexual conduct arguments in lay understandings of LGBT sexualities. Many but not all of these studies have used discourse analytic approaches.

Studies of professional discourses on sexuality include Burman's (2008) analysis of 'child-centred' guidance for professionals working with children in residential settings. This revealed an underlying disease model for understanding homosexual behaviour that reflected a naturalised and essentialised, biological view of gender and sexuality and orchestrated a normative regime of care. Clarke (2002) identified four discourses concerning lesbian and gay parenting in psychological theory, and assessed the logic underpinning the specific relations of sameness and difference from heterosexual parenting that these discourses reflected, and the interests each served. A discourse on parent-child relationships undermined the potential to construct a psychology of any particular gendered/sexual identity category (Alldred, 1999), while the rhetorical force behind criticisms of lesbian mothers came not from any psychological theory but in one instance from class-hatred and xenophobia (Alldred, 1998).

Among studies that have analysed sexuality discourses in people's contemporary accounts, Hollway (1998) extracted three co-existing but competing and contradictory discourses from interviews and media reports, around: the male sexual drive, monogamy and family life, and sexual permissiveness. These, she suggested, together produced the subject-positions of heterosexual men and women in their interactions, and were co-opted in struggles to re-define subjectivities. Barker (2005) identified two discourses on polyamorous identities: one that constituted polyamory in relation to monogamy, and a second that regarded it as either a 'natural' human behaviour or founded upon a personal choice. In an assessment of the anti-normative premises of gay liberation in the 1960s, Weeks (2012: 365) argued that 'narratives around coming out, sexual pleasure, identity and relationships stimulated by gay liberation created new communities of meaning and communication, and a dynamic for self-transformation'. Kitzinger's (1987) Q-sort factor

analytical methodology found that lesbian women's accounts of the provenance of their sexual identities could be differentiated into five distinct factors: personal fulfilment, consequence of romantic attachments, private sexual preference, conscious/unconscious reaction against patriarchy, and due to inadequacy or failing.

The Subject, Anti-humanism and Resistance

These social constructionist and post-structuralist analyses of psychological and lay discourses have demonstrated how sexuality, sexual subjectivity and sexual orientation have been shaped by socially-contingent systems of thought, to produce both specific knowledgeabilities, and subjectivities and sexualities in bodies. They point to the part that social, economic and political contexts play in producing sexual conduct, sexual identities and even sexual desire. They also revealed how liberal humanist psychology established two associated psychological discourses on sexualities. The first, which might be labelled positivist or 'scientific' (and is perhaps more 'liberal' than 'humanist'), regards sexualities as facts to be unpacked by scientific methods, to provide findings that can better inform understanding of sexuality and potentially inform either policy or therapy, for instance, in relation to homophobia and associated bullying. The second is a more self-conscious LGBT affirmative psychology that majors on the humanism, and while still using scientific methods, has a stronger orientation to producing outputs that can be used to meet the needs of LGBT people, individually and collectively.

Critical psychology argues that both discourses have been complicit in producing individualised notions of sexuality and sexual identities, a perspective that actually begins to come unravelled when studying sexuality empirically and reflexively. 'Sexual orientation' (even with categories pluralised beyond a binary) cannot serve as an essential identity to guarantee anything about experience, subjectivity, desire or behaviour: sexual desires that might be taken to define a category of self may not be exclusive, may shift over time, may reflect actual (perhaps shifting) relationships, do not circumscribe behaviour and occur in the context of what is imaginable in a particular society and time. Indeed, a stable or coherent psychological self must be questioned by narratives of 'coming out', some of which might shore up the notion of authentic desire or might disrupt this by multiple coming outs and re-identifications (e.g. Plummer, 1995). Imagining a psychology of bisexuality – of commonalities in the psychic investments, emotional and sexual patternings of bisexual men and women may be particularly problematic. What might be common to that identity if neither hetero or homo sexual object choice can be excluded from this psychological subject?

A critical psychology perspective also questions the individualising underpinning of LG/LGBT psychology's other principle terrain: the societal treatment of different sexualities. Experimental studies that have revealed, for example, that students' homophobic reactions occurred when all they knew of another student was her/his sexual orientation, individualises homophobia, bullying and the type of solutions envisaged. Homophobia cannot be seen simply an irrational fear in the minds of sexual majorities, but as produced by cultural discourses, practices and social formations. Monk (2011) points to three discourses underpinning reformist responses to homophobic bullying: 'child abuse', 'the child victim' and 'the tragic gay'. These are used to mobilise compassion and inclusivity within education, but at the same time individualises and de-politicise homophobia and adolescent sexuality. Similarly, UK sex education policy includes coverage of sexual

orientation under the (special) needs of pupils of different sexual orientations, rather than as an educational need of all pupils or addressing it as a social justice issue that schools must embrace (Alldred and David, 2007).

These critiques are underpinned by a more foundational difference between critical and LGBT affirmative psychologies concerning the social component of sexualities. Affirmative LGBT psychology is keen to acknowledge the oppressive forces of the social, but might view these as constraints upon some irreducible essence of human sexuality that sparks desire for the other, whoever or whatever that other might be. This 'anthropocentric' (Braidotti, 2006: 40) view accepts uncritically the human body and human 'individual' as the privileged locus where sexuality happens (along with other aspects of human 'being'), supplying the foundation for claims for the authenticity of how sexual identities are experienced. This view is quite pervasive: sexual desires seem so personal, so 'internal' to a body, that it may appear self-evident that human sexuality is an individual attribute, albeit one that is subject to all kinds of discipline, coercion and control by social forces.

Critical psychology sees this interaction between 'sexuality' and social context differently, rejecting sexual essentialism, and regarding the manifestations of sexuality as products of historically and culturally specific systems of thought and practices. Discourses on sexuality have shaped sexual conduct and disciplined sexual desire; even the limited categories by which sexualities are differentiated may be called into question (Lambevski, 2005: 580). These categories, rather than teasing out difference, in fact deny difference in order to typify a body in terms of a single narrow characteristic: the object of its sexual desire. Sexuality, along with other social stratifications such as class, gender and race, aggregate dissimilar individuals 'only by repressing the highly complex differentials that compose any being' (Colebrook, 2013: 35, see also Rose, 1989: 123).

Ontological non-essentialism necessarily dissolves any conception of an 'internal' or prior sexuality or sexual identity, seeing these instead as epiphenomena of the constructive work of discourses in producing subjectivity (Henriques et al., 1998: 117) and the 'effect of an internal core or substance … on the surface of the body' (Butler, 1990: 136). Taken to its logical conclusion, this socialised ontology would imply humans and bodies buffeted by social forces (Burman, 2008) into a range of arbitrary sexualities and sexual desires constituted by lay and professional discourses, leaving in doubt any ontological basis for resistance, as well as undermining the foundation for sexual identity-politics. Theorising resistance through a notion of a sexual energy or even a biological drive that escapes or is prior to discourse merely re-introduces essentialism, while Butler (1999) notes that the Foucauldian project of inaugurating 'bodies and pleasure' as a counter-discourse and rallying point for resistance to the discourses of sexuality and sexual desires marks either a utopian return to the pre-modern, or a fetishisation of the 'break' from discourse as itself the source of pleasure. This debate has been pursued in recent queer and feminist theoretical debates (Allen and Carmody, 2012; Jagose, 1996).

In an effort to overcome the theoretical limitations of both essentialised and deterministic understandings of sexuality and sexual desire, some feminist and queer theorists have consequently sought an alternative, *materialist* approach to bodies and desire, often drawing upon the work of Deleuze and his sometime collaborator Guattari. While broadly cognate with Foucault's materialist historiography, this ontology offers some advantages in the ways it theorises resistance (Conley, 2000: 35). Agency is replaced with a focus upon 'affects' (which in this context simply refer to the ability to affect or be affected), assessing what a body does and what capacities to act, to feel or to desire affects produce in

the body or other entity that is affected (Deleuze, 1988: 123-129). Affects draw human, physical, social, cultural and abstract entities into assemblage with each other, though these assemblages are continually in flux: a 'web of forces, intensities and encounters' (Braidotti, 2006: 41). Aggregating flows of affect produce systems of social or economic organisation, discourses, orthodoxies, evaluative categorisations, codifications and cultural norms, many of which have a bearing on how sexuality is manifested. However other affects are singular their effects, on occasions enabling bodies to resist aggregating or constraining forces, opening up possibilities for what bodies can do or desire.

Those affects (including desires) that produce capacities conventionally regarded as 'sexual', may be characterised as constitutive of a 'sexuality-assemblage' (Fox and Alldred, 2013). Sexuality, in this anti-humanist formulation, must be understood not as an attribute of a body, nor as an 'energy' or the 'infrastructure' for desire (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 101), but as a productive flow of affects within a sexuality-assemblage. This formulation means that sexuality is non-human, impersonal, non-genital, and may produce 'subversive and unforeseeable expressions' (Beckman, 2011: 11). Deleuze and Guattari (1984: 293) claimed that 'sexuality is everywhere': in political movements, in business, in the law and in social relations that produce 'any and all capacities in bodies, different sexual desires, attractions and identities, and those not normally considered sexual at all'. However, at the level of human bodies, this affective flow manifests itself in a relatively narrow range of sexual capacities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 294). Powerful aggregating social forces in many sexuality-assemblages limit how elements affect and are affected, constraining and codifying sexual conduct, desire and identity-positions. Social institutions such as religion, medicine and the State play a part, as do ideas and ideologies such as love, monogamy, chastity and sexual liberation, social prejudices and biases, as well as the scientific knowledges of sexuality described earlier.

We have devoted some space to this different perspective because it opens up ways to think through a non-essentialist sexual ontology. A Deleuzian perspective radically undermines an anthropocentric model of sexuality, and shifts the critical emphasis away from texts and accounts, toward a materialist analysis of the human and non-human elements that produce sexuality. While the concepts used differ from those presented earlier, the analysis offers an analytical advantage in its ability to theorise both power and resistance to power. While Foucault's understanding of a progressively totalising regime of power/knowledge denies a possibility of 'sexual liberation', the Deleuzian model holds open the potential for the aggregative shackles of the sexuality-assemblage to be loosened, and a body to achieve a sexual 'line of flight' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 9) from a stable state or identity. We discuss how this capacity for resistance informs a critical politics of sexuality in the final section of this chapter.

Critical psychology and the politics of sexuality

A critical psychology of sexualities can be regarded either as a swingeing attack on the mainstream, including the affirmative LGBT psychology that has emerged over the past thirty years, or as the next step in the development of a progressive psychology that seeks not only to understand the world but also to change it for the better. On one hand, the critiques offered earlier implicate psychology in its liberal humanist manifestation as both establishing an apparently value-free 'scientific' discourse on human behaviour and human thought, and in colluding in the production of individualistic identity-positions based upon

discrete sexual orientations. On the other hand, for some writers, the addition of these critical perspectives deriving from feminism, post-structuralism and anti-humanism can queer LGBT psychology, establishing an LGBTQ psychology that deconstructs its earlier liberal humanist commitments (Clarke and Braun, 2009: 238). However, as Clarke and Braun (ibid: 245) go on to note, feminist and LGBTQ psychologists have sometimes doubted the contribution critical psychology can make to social change.

As has been seen, critical psychology mounts two challenges to the mainstream, including LGBT psychology. Firstly, it rejects a view of psychological science as a neutral approach to explaining sexualities; rather, psychological theories of sexuality are shot through with socially constituted and historically-specific concepts. Secondly, it undermines essential and non-social understandings of human sexuality and sexual identity, revealing that the apparent emancipation and self-actualisation of a range of sexualities and sexual identity-positions following earlier repression is actually a sexual subjectification that has produced reflexive and self-governing sexual subjects (Foucault, 1987: 5; Rose, 1989). The emergence of subjectivities as lesbian, gay, bi, polyamorous and so forth, is not a cause for uncritical celebration, but an indicator of the anonymous workings of power upon the actions and thoughts of humans.

These conclusions suggest that critical psychology can neither fall back upon science and rationality as the basis for struggles against oppression and discrimination, nor can it uncritically support struggles for liberation or assertion of 'rights' for people holding different sexual identity-positions assumed to be stable, essential, and so guaranteed. While seeking to question heteronormativity and challenge homophobia, its analysis does not consider sexual identities as reflections of an individual's authentic sexuality, to be encouraged to full actualisation through political activism and/or personal growth. 'Liberatory' struggles are illusory, simply producing subjectivities that are ever more imbued with discourses that mediate technologies of power and authority, for example, of a 'rescued' identity marked by its otherness while kindly regarded with tolerance and compassion.

This analysis places critical psychologists in a quandary. Affirmative liberal humanism embraced essentialist ideas of the location of sexuality within human bodies, and used this as the basis for radical criticism of societal imbalances and prejudices in relation to both women and to non-heterosexualities. Critical psychology, informed by discourse analysis and especially by the pessimism of Foucault's genealogical conclusions concerning sexual 'liberation', rejected essentialism, but as a consequence lost purchase in terms of engagements with people's struggles against discrimination (Kitzinger, 1999). One solution has been Spivak's (1990) advocacy of 'strategic essentialism', which effectively bracketed issues of ontology (for instance of gender or sexualities) in order to build strategic alliances around essentialist notions such as 'woman' or 'lesbian', in order to advance a common cause such as challenging patriarchy or heteronormativity. Butler (1993: 222) advocates a double move when we provisionally institute the categories 'without which one cannot move' at the same time as opening the category 'as a site of permanent political protest'.

Earlier we introduced an anti-humanist, materialist perspective that we feel suggests a way forward, which offers a means to think sexuality without the 'humanist enticements' (Grosz and Probyn, 1995: xiii) that have associated sexuality with notions of agency, individualism and free will. This materialist ontology of sexuality shares Foucauldian understandings of the action of power, but crucially sees a more dynamic interplay within assemblages that opens up the possibilities for aggregative forces to be resisted, enabling

new capacities and desires to emerge, for bodies to affect and be affected in ways that they have never done before, and in ways that may not even be considered 'sexual'. It replaces Foucault's pessimism about the possibility of resistance to discourse with an optimistic recognition that this 'affect economy' (Clough 2008) of power and resistance is going on all around, investing the daily sexual lives of us all with possibilities for new sexualities and genders. Queer theorists such as Grosz (1994) and Braidotti (2006) have given a cautious welcome to Deleuzian anti-humanism, as a means to 'clear the ground of metaphysical oppositions and concepts' and invoke 'a difference that is not subordinated to identity' (Grosz, 1994: 164).

A non-anthropocentric approach to the study of sexualities shifts attention from accounts of sexual identities to exploration of the human and non-human elements and affective flows in sexuality assemblages, the aggregative and the singular affects, and the capacities for action, feeling and desire that affective flows produce. Methodologically, it augments critical psychology's focus upon texts, allowing studies to use a wide range of sources and a variety of methods, including observation, interviews and survey methods. But, perhaps significantly, it reintroduces a new politics of sexualities, in which the aggregative actions of power can be challenged and the dis-aggregating possibilities of resistance to power fostered. This materialist perspective opens up possibilities for sexual subjects to find a 'line of flight' away from the constraints of particular sexual identities, and into a new politics of sexualities.

Further Reading

Clarke, V. and Peel, E. (2007) From lesbian and gay psychology to LGBTQ psychologies. A journey into the unknown (and unknowable)? In: C and P (Eds.) *Out in Psychology,* Chichester: Wiley.
Kitzinger, C. (1987) *The Social Construction of Lesbianism*. London: Sage.
Kitzinger, C. (1999) Lesbian and gay psychology: is it critical? *Annual Review of Critical Psychology,* 1: 50-66.

References

Alldred, P. (1999) *'Fit to Parent': Psychology, Knowledge and Popular Debate*, PhD: University of East London, UK.
Alldred, P. (1998) Making a mockery of family life? Lesbian mothers in the British media, *Journal of Lesbian Studies*, 2 (4): p9-21.
Alldred, P. and David, M. (2007) *Get Real about Sex. The Politics and Practice of Sex Education.* Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Allen, L. and Carmody, M. (2012) 'Pleasure has no passport': re-visiting the potential of pleasure in sexuality education. *Sex Education,* 12 (4): 455-468.
Barker, M. (2005) This is my partner, and this is my … partner's partner: constructing a polyamorous identity in a monogamous world. *Journal of Constructivist Psychology*, 18 (1): 75-88.
Beckman, F. (2011) Introduction: what is sex? An introduction to the sexual philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. In F. Beckman (ed.) *Deleuze and Sex* (pp. 1-29). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Braidotti, R. (2006) *Transpositions.* Cambridge: Polity.

Burman, E. (2008) *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology.* London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1990) *Gender Trouble,* London: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1993) *Bodies That Matter: On the discursive limits of 'sex'.* New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. (1999) Revisiting bodies and pleasures. *Theory Culture Society,* 16: 11-20.

Clarke, V. and Spence, K. (2012) 'I am who I am'? Navigating norms and the importance of authenticity in lesbian and bisexual women's accounts of their appearance practices. *Psychology of Sexuality*, 4 (1): 25-33.

Clarke, V. (2002) Sameness and difference in research on lesbian parenting. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*. 12: 210-222.

Clarke, V. and Braun, V. (2009) Gender. In: Fox, D., Prilleltensky, I. And Austin, S. (eds.) *Critical Psychology: An Introduction*. London: Sage.

Clarke, V. and Peel, E. (2007) From lesbian and gay psychology to LGBTQ psychologies. A journey into the unknown (and unknowable)? In: C and P (Eds.) *Out in Psychology* Chichester: Wiley.

Clough, P.T. (2008) The affective turn: political economy, biomedia and bodies. *Theory, Culture and Society,* 25: 1-22.

Colebrook, C. (2013) 'Face Race', in A. Saldanha and J.M. Adams (eds.) *Deleuze and Race.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Conley, V.A. (1990) Becoming-woman now. In Buchanan, I. and Colebrook, C. (eds.) *Deleuze and Feminist Theory*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Deleuze, G. (1988b) *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy.* San Francisco: City Lights.

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1988) *A Thousand Plateaus*. London: Athlone.

Deleuze, G. and Parnet, C. (2002) *Dialogues II.* London: Continuum.

Duggan, L. (2002) The new homonormativity: the sexual politics of neo-liberalism. In: Castronovo, R. and Nelson, D.D. (eds.) *Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics.* Duke University Press.

Fish, J. (2010) Our health, our say: Towards a feminist perspective of lesbian health psychology. *Feminism Psychology*, 19 (4), 437-453.

Foucault, M. (1981) *The History of Sexuality Vol.1: The Will to Knowledge.* Harmondsworth: Pelican.

Foucault, M. (1982) The subject and power. *Critical Inquiry*, 8 (4): 777-795.

Foucault, M. (1987) *The Use of Pleasure (Vol. 2 of the History of Sexuality).* Harmondsworth: Peregrine.

Foucault, M. (1990). *The Care of the Self (Vol. 3 of the History of Sexuality).* Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fox, N.J. and Alldred, P. (2013) The sexuality-assemblage: desire, affect, anti-humanism. *Sociological Review.*

Garnets, L.D. and D'Augelli, A.R. (1994) Empowering lesbian and gay communities: a call for collaboration with community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology,* 22 (4): 447-470.

Gatens, M. (1996) Through a Spinozist lens: ethology, difference, power. In Patton, P., (ed.), *Deleuze: a Critical Reader*, Oxford, Blackwell: 162-187.

Gergen, K.J. (1985) The social constructionist movement in modern psychology. *American Psychologist,* 40 (3): 266-275.

Gordo Lopez, A.J. and Cleminson, R.M (2004) *Techno-Sexual Landscapes: Changing Relations Between Technology and Sexuality*, London: Free Association Books.

Grosz, E. (1994) *Volatile Bodies.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hall, L.A. (1995) Disinterested enthusiasm for sexual misconduct: The British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology, 1913-47. *Journal of Contemporary History*. 30 (4): 665-686.

Henriques, J., Hollway, W., Urwin, C., Venn, C. and Walkerdine, V. (1998) *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity*. London: Routledge.

Hollway (1998) Gender difference and the production of subjectivity. In: Henriques, J. et al. (eds.) *Changing the Subject: Psychology, Social Regulation and Subjectivity*. London: Routledge.

Jagose, A. (1996) *Queer Theory: An Introduction*, New York: New York University Press.

Jivraj, S. and de Jong, A. (2011) The Dutch homo-emancipation policy and its silencing effects on queer Muslims. *Feminist Legal Studies,* 19 (2): 143-158.

Jordan, T. (1995) Collective bodies: raving and the politics of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. *Body and Society,* 1 (1): 125-144.

Kitzinger, C. (1987) *The Social Construction of Lesbianism*, London: Sage.

Kitzinger, C. (1999) Lesbian and gay psychology: is it critical? *Annual Review of Critical Psychology,* 1: 50-66.

Lambevski, S.A. (2005) Bodies, schizo vibes and hallucinatory desires – sexualities in movement. *Sexualities,* 8 (5): 570–586.

Langdridge, D. (2007) Gay affirmative therapy: a theoretical framework and defence. *Journal of Gay and Lesbian Psychotherapy*, 11 (1-2): 27-43.

Lucas-Carr, C.B. and Krane, V. (2011) What is the *T* in LGBT? Supporting transgender athletes through sport psychology. *The Sport Psychologist*, 25: 532-548.

Monk, D. (2011) Challenging homophobic bullying in schools: the politics of progress. *International Journal of Law in Context*, 7 (2): 181-207.

Nadal, K.L. and Corpus, M.J.H. (2012) 'Tomboys' and 'Baklas': experiences of lesbian and gay Filipino Americans. *Asian American Journal of Psychology*. doi: 10.1037/a0030168

Peel, E. and Thomson, M. (2009) Editorial introduction. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer health psychology: charting the terrain. *Feminism and Psychology,* 19 (4): 427-436.

Pitts, M.K., Couch, M., Mulcare, H., Croy, S. and Mitchell A. (2009) Transgender people in Australia and New Zealand: health, well-being and access to health services. *Feminism and Psychology,* 19: 475-495.

Plummer, K. (1995) *Telling Sexual Stories: Power, Change and Social Worlds*. London: Routledge.

Rasmussen, M.L., (2006), *Becoming Subjects: Sexualities and Secondary Schooling*. London: Routledge.

Rasmussen, M.L. (2012) Pleasure/desire, sexualism and sexuality education. *Sex Education,* 12 (4): 469-481.

Rich, A. (1980) Compulsory heterosexuality and lesbian existence. *Signs*, 5 (4): 631-660.

Rose, N. (1989) *Governing the Soul.* London: Free Association Books.

Rose, N. (1998) *Inventing Our Selves: Psychology, Power, and Personhood.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Spears, R. (1997) Introduction. In: Ibanez, T. and Iniguez, L. (eds.) *Critical Social Psychology.* London: Sage.

Rothing, A. and Svendsen, S.H. B. (2011) Sexuality in Norwegian textbooks: constructing and controlling ethnic borders? *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 34 (11): 1953-1973.

Spivak, G.C. (1990) *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*. London: Routledge.

Ussher, J.M. (2009) Heterocentric practices in health research and health care: implications for mental health and subjectivity of LGBTQ individuals. *Feminism and Psychology,* 19: 561-567.

Weeks, J. (1989) *Sex, Politics and Society.* Harlow: Pearson.

Wilkinson, S. (1997) Prioritising the political: feminist psychology. In: Ibanez, T. and Iniguez, L. (eds.) *Critical Social Psychology.* London: Sage.