Counterinsurgency Rhetoric and Human Rights Abuse in Nigeria

By

Adenike Olubunmi Olasanmi

Supervisors: **Dr Sagarika Dutt**

Dr Jonathan Gorry

October 2024

A thesis submitted to Nottingham Trent University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Protection of citizens' lives and properties is undoubtedly the responsibility of government. However, the rise in activities of insurgents around the world, including Nigeria, has significantly impeded existing peace in many countries, thus, weakening government's structure and territorial control. In the North-Eastern part of Nigeria, the government introduced various counterinsurgency approaches and strategies, among which was the utilisation of counterinsurgency (COIN) rhetoric, to combat Boko Haram insurgency. Nevertheless, there is still a gap in literature that needs to be filled- this is to critically analyse the rhetoric used in the TPA (Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013) vis a vis the examination of the speech delivery techniques used by former President Goodluck Jonathan in selected COIN speeches to ascertain the extent to which COIN rhetoric may have impacted the Human rights abuse debate in Nigeria. Findings from the investigation stirred the stardom of inclusivity- that is, an inclusive approach is essential in moving the COIN train forward in Nigeria. Anchored on Rhetorical theory, the study shows how the rhetoric have impacted Human rights abuse during COIN operations to a certain degree. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and survey were adopted as research methods. Instrument of data collection employed are as follows - interview guide and questionnaires (230 respondents) while the sampling technique employed are censor and purposive sampling techniques (TPA and some selected COIN-related speeches). Upon investigation, the thesis through its findings tends to build on the existing knowledge by showing that text composers in the TPA and the selected COIN-related speeches used *logos* to create logical reasoning in their arguments, while *ethos* and *pathos* were used to prove that the Nigeria government is knowledgeable about the situation in the North-East and wanted the people to support the COIN operations. The study, however, recommends that the government should be consistent with the utilisation of COIN rhetoric, re-orientate Nigeria security personnel, adopt integrated COIN communication

strategies, work in collaboration with NGOs and CSOs, establish special courts and amend the TPA to protect Human Rights during COIN operations.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this PhD thesis to the Almighty God, the one who gives life, the one who sustains and has decided to support me throughout this journey. It has been a bit of a roller-coaster for me, but I finished this programme only by your special grace and your uncommon favour. Which of your mercies can I deny? You gave me strength when I yearn for it and gave me wisdom and knowledge when I feel empty.

I sing and shout 'Halleluiah Hosanna'!

I sing and shout 'No one like you'!

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

man to our three children. You were there for me, and I appreciate it. The PhD journey would have been humdrum without you, because you made me see reasons to thrive on in periods of low ebb. You support my dreams when it is not even convenient for you financially, thank you for all the pocket money when I am at Uni. Words cannot describe the way I feel, but I cheered for our fears, hope and faith. I pray we see more beautiful achievements together. I celebrate this outstanding achievement with our wedding anniversary. My sweetheart, happy tenth wedding anniversary to us.

To my children, thank you for always asking - 'mummy, are you okay?' It is an excellent well-being check, thanks again. For all your missed bed story time, for all your missed hugs and bedtime kisses, 'I am sorry'. To Smith Olatokunbo, my first child, Thanks for being a very understanding kid. Daniel Jesutofunmi, thanks for being so kind and calm. To my lovely daughter, whom I call 'my PhD baby', your smiles melt my heart. Thanks for coming at this spectacular time and blessing us with your presence, you are one of the milestones I count on twice in this journey, my adorable daughter, Joanna Mofeoluwa, thanks for choosing us.

To my beautiful parents, Late Comrade Adedayo Emmanuel Fadahunsi and Mrs Idowu Folarin Fadahunsi, thank you for your prayers and financial contribution towards my tuition fees. 'Maami owon' (precious mother), thank you for your help and show of love for my young family, thank you for your consistent prayers. Thank you for leaving your business back in Nigeria to take care of my children when I needed to study. I am so proud of myself that as your first child and only daughter, I have not disappointed you in any way. I am happy that I have always brought honour to the family name, and now this is yet another remarkable achievement.

'Daadaa' (Daddy) my first word, I have come to say thank you for all your WhatsApp messages of encouragement and good luck messages when you were on the sickbed with a series of

surgeries. We saw your strength at each episode of chemotherapy and we prayed to God to make you see more years in good health and not in pain. Unfortunately, Dad, you left us on the 3rd of November 2020 at 0020 hours. Your passing on was a very painful exit, Dad. I find solace in the fact that you have gone to rest in heaven and hopefully we will see again. Rest in peace Dad, I love you and I will surely miss you.

To my trio siblings, Adeyinka Fadahunsi, Adebola Fadahunsi and Adedayo (Jnr) Fadahunsi, thank you for your patience for all these four years. A lot of times, I have missed your birthdays, your landmark celebrations, i.e., Adeyinka's wedding, please accept my apologies. Here is your proud sister saying I have come and I have conquered. I made it I am now a doctor.

To my sister-in-law, Eniola Fadahunsi and nephew Alvin Fadahunsi, love you endlessly. To my wonderful parent-in-law, Chief Olasanmi Osanyinlusi and Chief Mrs Tayo Osanyinlusi, I appreciate your endless calls of wellbeing. Sometimes I do not get to pick my phone calls; you were never at once angry with me, thank you for your understanding. 'Mummy Ayedun' (my mother-in-law), your constant prayers for me proved worthwhile in the end and I thank God for this success, it is our success.

'Baba' (my father-in-law), a retired principal, will always ask 'how is your course?', thank you, sir, these calls mean a lot to me and I am grateful for all your care during this past four years. To all my husband's family, thank you and I am sorry for not calling and checking on all of you enough for these past years. This is our JOY and I'm glad.

To my Nigerian military contact, who has decided to remain anonymous, I say thank you! To all my Coventry big sisters - Mrs Adenike Kuku-Ogunfeibo, Mrs Asta Reuben, Aunty Olaitan Adeusi; my place of worship (RCCG-Jubilee Christian Centre Coventry)- Pastor and Pastor (Mrs) Olumuyiwa Kolawole. My mentors, Dr Femi Abikanlu, Dr Justin Okoli, Dr Magret Olarewaju and Dr Oyedele Ogundanna; my Nottingham families- Sister Pauline Odeyemi

(RN), Sister Bunmi Makanjuola and Dr Ruth Duniya; my friends Barrister Ronke and Barrister Adeola Bamisile, Clara Lawrence, Remi Ogunderu (RN), Olaoluwa Adeniranye (RN), Cynthia Ajayi (RN), Cynthia Asare, Stella Ngerem, Yinka Akinyemi, Oyinkansola Odiase, Adebowale Omotosho (RMNed), I appreciate your words of encouragement and support. We made it! Thank you!

DECLARATION

I declare that this work is entirely the result of my independent research and investigation and has not been submitted elsewhere for any other degree or examination.

This work is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy Degree at Nottingham Trent University.

I now give consent for the thesis to be made available at Nottingham Trent University's library repository for research purposes.

Adenike Olasanmi

21/10/2024

TABLE OF CONTENT

INDEX OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACHPR- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

AI- Amnesty International

AUNCDP- Africa Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact

BH- Boko Haram

CCTV- Closed-Circuit Television

CDA- Critical Discourse Analysis

CJTF- Civilian Joint Task Force

COIN- Counterinsurgency

CT- Counterterrorism

DA-   Discourse Analysis

FAO- Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations

ICCPR- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

ICESCR- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

ICRC-   International Committee of the Red Cross

ICT-   Information and Communication Technology

IDPs- Internally Displaced Persons

IPOB-   Indigenous People of Biafra

ISIS- Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ISR- Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

ISWAP- Al-Qaeda, Islamic State's West Africa Province

JTF- Joint Task Force

MASSOB- Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MEND- Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OHCHR- Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights

OIC-   Organisation of Islamic Countries

ORO-   Operation Restore Order

TPA- Terrorism Prevention Act

UAV- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UDHR- Universal Declaration of Human Rights

US-   United States

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The protection of citizens' lives and properties is undoubtedly the political state's primary function. This explains its theoretical monopoly of legitimate use of force, which sets it apart from other organisations. However, the rise of violent organisations globally, following the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America, has challenged the state's monopoly of violence. In the same way, Nigeria has faced insurgency, particularly in the North-Eastern part of the country where the government perceived the activities of insurgents as becoming increasingly violent and swiftly responded with several forms of counterinsurgency operations (Howell and Jamal, 2009).

Going forward, counterinsurgency can be described as the comprehensive and the joint efforts of local and military personnel to defeat an insurgency, secure infrastructures/lives of innocent persons and address complaints of revolutionists. It is a deliberate act targeted at creating long-term and short-term solutions to an issue by providing adequate manpower and security for the affected populace. It can therefore be described as a tactical approach to resolving issues affecting a sector of a state or a nation (NATO, 2017).

In Nigeria, counterinsurgency operations can be traced to mitigating the large-scale violent acts that have been started and perpetrated by a group of violent Islamic extremist group since 2009. This group, *Jamaat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da'awah wa al-Jihad,* popularly known as *Boko Haram (westernisation is sacrilege*), launched a series of aggressive attacks against the federal government of Nigeria and its citizens, killing and displacing thousands of people in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria (ACAPS, 2015; Meagher, 2014 and Dunn, 2018). Office of the Vice President of Nigeria reported in 2016 that the extremist group has caused $9billion of damage in six northern Nigerian states (Ogbondah and Agbese, 2018). It has killed at least 20,000 people and displaced about 2.3million people in the northern part of Nigeria, with a large

number of them presently living in Internally Displaced Camps (Africanews, 2016; Tofe, 2020; Agbiboa, 2013b; Brechenmacher, 2019).

Amnesty International (2018) further noted that 80 per cent of the over 2 million people displaced by the organisation has been relocated to neighbouring communities, while others are still residing in Internally Displaced Person camps. Boko Haram is, thus, responsible for several deadly attacks in the country's North-East geopolitical zone and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja.

The primary objective of the group when it was founded by Muhammed Yusuf in 2002 was to fight injustice and corruption in Nigeria, maintaining that they were acts that infiltrated the country as a result of western influence. It then vowed to impose sharia law (Islamic law) across Nigeria territory, however, the leader of the group was killed by Nigeria security agents in 2009, and since then the group has begun a massive violent onslaught against the Nigerian government; affiliated itself with global terror organisations like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP), among others.

As Boko Haram attacks on human and infrastructural resources in the northern part of Nigeria continue to increase on a daily basis, the Nigerian government, as part of measures to curtail the crisis, decided to provide a legal framework for the fight against insurgency (counterinsurgency operations) by enacting the Terrorism Prevention Act, (2011), which was later amended as Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013)- (see appendix F). This Act extends and empowers the state on intelligence, police, military, political, and judicial matters related to insurgency. The Act empowers security personnel to use force as may be necessary for any purpose in the course of counterinsurgency operations, while at the same time granting them immunity from civil or criminal liability (TPA- appendix F).

Furtherance to the above COIN tactic is the initiation of amnesty programme at the same time (April 2013) by the administration of former President Goodluck Jonathan, this was shortly

before the amendment of the TPA. The amnesty programme is to grant pardons to repentant members of the group who are ready to drop their weapons; an act which was greatly rebuffed by the organisation. As a result of both failed tactics, the government decided to implement full-scale counterinsurgency operations against the group, involving the military, police and civilian volunteers in order to end insurgency in the northern part of Nigeria. The Government of Nigeria carried out a crackdown on the group by arresting and killing many of its members, while various weapons, including improvised explosive devices, were confiscated. However, it is worthy to note that in spite of numerous counterinsurgency operations, Boko Haram has not desisted from carrying out offensive attacks, both on large and small scales.

UNHCR (The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) also observed that the counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria are not an uncommon tale that the federal government security forces most times perpetrate extrajudicial killings and had deliberately refused to disentangle civilians from members of the group. This act also heightened tension among the people who are supposed to be protected by security personnel (in this case, the forces, those in charge of fighting terrorists). This has led to a wide condemnation of the operations by local and international organisations like the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, the Office of UNHCR for Human rights, AI (Amnesty International), civil society organisations, the media, and Human Rights activists, among others. However, it is essential to note that this study is not trying to point fingers to the government or stating that its approach to counterinsurgency is directly triggering Human Rights violations. Further put, an actor might not know that he or she is a culprit, but in this case, the Nigerian government is indirectly inflicting hardship on its citizens than it is protecting them (Fieldwork, 2022). The study's focus is on how well the COIN rhetoric have enhanced COIN as a whole in Nigeria, in terms of effectiveness, successes or failures and specific abuse.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian government as part of its counterinsurgency operations has continued to be criticised about several incidents of abuses related to Human Rights during its counterinsurgency operations. Conversely, the Nigeria government has introduced several actions which includes the dissemination of speeches to dissuade Human Rights abuse from occurring, the provision of a legal framework to guide counterinsurgency operations, among other things, but Human rights abuse reports in the nation has not come to a halt. It is thus expected to note that the language and texts used by the FGN (Federal Government of Nigeria) to propagate counterinsurgency operations basically, have not in any way reduced the negative impact of various cases of Human Rights abuse related to the operations. It is in line with this perspective that this study investigates the use of rhetoric in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 – (see appendix F) and counterinsurgency-related speeches (2011-2015)- (see appendix E), speech delivery technique used in the speeches related to counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, as well as the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East Nigeria.

The research, therefore, dwells on CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis)- Norman Fairclough's version. This version is adopted to critically analyse the rhetoric used in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and counterinsurgency speeches between 2011 and 2015; determine the speech delivery technique used in the Act and speeches related to counterinsurgency and ascertaining the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria (the North-Eastern part).

The Terrorism Prevention Act

In its bid to instil peaceful coexistence among its populace, the federal government of Nigeria undertook far-reaching measures by putting in place a law to cater for the prevention, proscription and fighting acts of insurgency or others related thereto. Prominent among these measures is the enactment of the TPA (Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013,) and it

is believed that the TPA is capable of strengthening the country's counterinsurgency operations and ensuring it is in tandem with global best practices. The law is therefore aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations (Nwankpa, 2017).

TPA is, thus, the authorised document that the Nigerian Government enacted to aid in fighting insurgency. It forms the legal bedrock that counterinsurgency operations leveraged to curb acts of insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria. The Act made statutory guidelines for any offences committed that are insurgency-related, or any provisions that relates to carrying out insurgency activities, as such, the TPA remains a major element in the Nigeria government's response to this particular insurgency and has helped to furnish the understanding and concept around examining the goals of this study (TPA-appendix F).

The introduction of TPA in Nigeria is, therefore, intended to make countering insurgency produce a better tale. The Act prohibits the funding of insurgency in Nigeria and upholds actual application of the agreement on the deterrence and contending of insurgency and the resolution on the suppression of the financing of insurgency. It prescribes penalties if any part of the stated provisions in the Act is violated and also empowers the State intelligence agencies, police, military, political, and judiciary to intervene in matters related to insurgency. The Act empowers security personnel to exert violence (or use force) as may be necessary for any purpose in the course of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, while at the same time granting them immunity from civil or criminal liability (TPA-appendix F).

The Act classifies the actions of the BH (Boko Haram organisation) as illegal. This is an in-depth justification for the killing of women and children in a vulnerable society like Nigeria. In this regard, state actors rely on the law to prosecute insurgents and terrorists in Nigeria. In relation to this study, each section in the Act is assessed and examined for logos (enthymemes, example), ethos (apparent wisdom, excellent behaviour, benevolence) and pathos (anger, calmness, friendship, detestation, fear and confidence), in order to determine the dispositional

properties that make up the discursive phenomenon that is represented in this emblematic symbol (TPA) by the Nigerian Government (TPA-appendix F).

The TPA is, thus, a significant material examined in the thesis. It is an emblematic symbol on which this thesis builds its background of knowledge and upon which it hinges its submissions. The TPA is an integral part of the case study and provides the legal framework for assessing COIN in Nigeria, after its introduction in 2011 and the ills that led to its amendment in 2013 (TPA-appendix F).

Language, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

The aftermath of 9/11 has led to the emergence of a plethora of literature on unrest, including insurgency and COIN (counterinsurgency); and scholars have been relentless in examining the diverse aspects of it. For instance, Malande and Masiolo (2003) examined both the language and the vocabulary of war and how wars are fought over those vocabularies; whilst Hussein (2007) noted that language is central in any communication process. They further explained that language is used to generate 'meanings'; and the procedure of 'meaning-making' is traced back to politics because it is infused with relations of power that come together to manoeuvre, dispute and confer the meaning at stake (Malande and Masiolo, 2003; Hussein, 2007).

Therefore, since language is the medium through which questions on meaning and meaning-making are answered, focusing on and examining the language used in counterinsurgency operations will enhance our understanding of how (or ways) discourse forms and in turn, is moulded by socio-political reality, that is, insurgency and counterinsurgency. Language does not randomly describe things, and at best represents an expression of struggle espousing the interests of those employing it. Jackson (2014:2) asserts "language is never neutral; words do

not just describe the world; they actually help to make it. As such, language can never be employed in a purely objective sense".

Counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria and the resulting discourse is one such venture where language is deliberately employed to make sense of, while at the same time enlisting the assistance of the Nigerian populace to the course. The underlying architecture of language embodies a binary that presupposes the absence/presence of certain properties which, necessarily, possess its direct opposite (Hussein, 2007). Linguists, anthropologists and scholars concerned with power have identified the inclusion of seemingly 'natural inequality' in words that uplift and or downplay one another without directing much of our attention to them, for example, love/hate, good/evil and primitive/modern.

Jackson (2014) puts this binary logic and the connotative role of language in use when he noted that, insurgency threatens our civilisation, he further maintained that it is impossible without bringing to mind the concept of barbarism as its negative opposite. Here, the mere mention or attribution of civilisation to a given phenomenon immediately invokes its opposite and negative connotation barbarism to mind so that both apply to mutually exclusive events that are either this or that, good or evil, but certainly not both. In addition, the suggestive meaning words carry is not unconnected to the histories surrounding their usage. What this means is that words do not have inherent meaning in and of themselves but acquire meaning in their respective discursive setting (Jackson, 2014).

Thus, a word such as civilisation and its negative connotation barbarism makes sense more in the context of use and understanding - in Christian Europe in the Middle Ages and imperialism, then colonialism in the nineteenth century (Jackson, 2014). However, more importantly, because words have histories outside which their meaning becomes opaque and through which their usage in contemporary context convey or might convey new meaning, words are

derivative of socio-political context that is usually highly charged and espouses not just power to name things (as one pleases) but also to make a judgement on the things named.

For instance, to "call an act of political violence insurgency is not merely to describe it but to judge it" (Jackson, 2014:3). Judgement, in itself, involves a moral statement suggesting right or wrong, commands, approval or disapproval and in so doing elicit a response from members of society. The default is for the public to show approval for things adjudged to be right (e.g. civilised) and disapproval for things adjudged to be wrong (e.g. barbaric).

In other words, naming or ascribing moral title to things, even the same event or phenomenon differently worded, would most likely elicit different responses from the public. What this means is that not only do we get to understand how 'enemies' are defined and identified, but we also come to term with how members of a society are made to perceive or understand a given phenomenon, mobilised in support of, and/or react against a given course of action, and more importantly, define/determine how members of a society see their position in relation to others - in this case, insurgents. Often, a historical background is provided by the author of the discourse to the target audience. In this case, the author is government, and the audience is the citizens, and the former furnishes the latter with a background that is embedded and/or shrouded in the discourse of the policy objective it seeks to pursue.

Alvarez and Rodriguez (2010), Taylor (2013) and Rogers (2015) noted that this process involves three predications. The first, *presupposition*, includes the deliberate exertion of individuals to create expressive interpretations so as to inspire, and produce legitimate communal accomplishment. Apparently, this may be done (as usually is the case) by constructing a version of history that is not only appealing and appears to justify exclusion in reference to past conflicts, but implicitly renders current/prospective action both desirable and appropriate. Here, actions refer to the government's predisposition to military engagement

which is hinged on and preceded by the construction of discourse that 'coerces' a certain kind of knowledge into its (target) audience, with a view to constructing a particular kind of world around them, where the discourse being espoused appears as true. Hence, the historical approach usually adopted in the discourse of insurgency, in this case, Boko Haram, seeks to place its evolution, as a sect, as a radical departure from 'orthodox' Islam becomes intelligible. In this study Boko Haram will be tagged as a group or organisation. For instance, Boko Haram is reported as a splinter cell of the "Taliban" founded by Mohammed Yusuf who, isolating himself from the society, built a sacred building comprising a school and a mosque between 2001 and 2002, first in Maiduguri and later moved to his hometown, Kanamma in Yobe state (Omale, 2013; Oyeniyi, 2010). The point is that discourse of this kind provokes, or more appropriately, coerces a form of knowledge onto and into audiences making or guiding them to begin to think of Yusuf (and Boko Haram) as an isolationist that seeks to have nothing to do with a conventional social setting. The object of such discourse is to paint the antisocial imagery of its history and compel its recognition as evil and incompatible with contemporary social lifestyle.

The second, *predication*- this involves the connecting of evident potentials to specific subjects through the use of predicates including the adverbs and the adjectives that transform (or modify) them. The objective of the 'creation' process at this point is to "eliminate alternative points of view" through the use of metaphor (Sowinska 2013: 797). Here, the discourse is delivered in ways that do not only favour but empower certain dialogues over others; negate opposing viewpoints and envelop or totally exclude arguments that do not further the discourse intended. The third, *subject positioning,* gives effect to the discourse by "linking actual subjects and objects to one another… texts [therefore] work to create a reality" (Roger 2015: 4). According to Roger (2015), the subject positioning "is the effort to trace the subject to a locus, which produces a link between them and the audience, serving to convincingly appeal to the

receiver of the discourse." This phase of the 'creation' process is very important if the discourse must be effective because it links up the subject and object to one another and foists a 'regime of truth' on its audience that facilitates the calls for potential action, where a 'regime of truth' refers to the narrative built around a given phenomenon that seeks to propel and teleguide its audience in a specific direction. This linguistic construction of reality echoes the work of Michel Foucault, especially in relation to power and ideological discourse. Similarly, it has been noted that the "Foucauldian concepts of ideology, discourse, truth and a regime of truth are useful to understand the significance of the discourse and subsequent policies aimed at 'fixing' the problem" (Foucault 1980 in Rothe and Collins, 2011:335-6).

However, it is worthy of note to state that it is not the declaration of 'truth' that chooses the functionality, recognition and/or effectiveness of definitional powers, it is the 'material reality of a societal 'regime of truth' (Rothe and Collins, 2011). Thus, the language used by the government or its agents in disseminating output to the masses preceding counterinsurgency is as, if not more, important as the statement of truth that seeks to establish the activities of a group as inimical to the effective functioning of the political community. Below extract, according to Channels Television (2014), is from the Spokeswoman of some set of protesters urging the Nigerian government to do more regarding BH, on the phenomenon of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls:

> Those children were on national assignment. They wanted to contribute to
> national development; that was why they decided to go to school by all means
> under all security threats to do something. It would have been easy to not do
> anything and decide to be a nuisance to society. But they said no; they wanted
> to be somebody. Honestly, if I was to be abducted 23 years ago and nobody

did anything, I will not stand before you today and talk (Channels Television, 2014).

Outputs of this kind are not merely statements of truth; they are the early phase of the production process aimed at grounding the audience in a regime of truth. However, more important to note is how systematically 'fixing of the problem' is being ideologically advanced by the use of discursive signifiers such as "nobody did anything" which is calling on the government to act decisively. Here, the idea of presupposition is deployed to suggest, that there was a period, not quite long ago, when going to school was normal and cherished by all, now it is the exception, the abnormal; a phenomenon with the potential of, or capable of landing its adherent in danger. Education, hitherto the norm, is now not only the abnormal but one that potentially exposes one to the possibility of abduction, kidnap, rape, and ultimately, death. Then comes the predication which presupposes, perhaps more appropriately, predisposes the audience to think that children attending school are innocent and objective endeavour, undeserving of chiding, how much more threat of death, and more so, those aimed at interrupting this objectively innocent endeavour are either inhuman and/or acting unjustly.

At this point, the audience, the masses, are presented with a reality that fits the regime of truth envisaged by the actor, the government. This regime of the truth underpins the make-belief imagery, or what is referred to in Gramscian parlance as hegemony, of what the government wants to be seen; and then, the process is finalised by the subject positioning, which points to a relative distance between the 'ordinary' and 'other', the 'normal' and 'abnormal', and the everyday mundane activities (that is, going to school) and the unusual exception (that is, avoiding or not attending school), in relation to time, that is, before and after the actions of BH. The objectives of subject positioning are to create and widen the chasm between an ordinary

daily activity and the 'other', that is, the alternative being sought by Boko Haram as espoused in the discourse.

From the foregoing, what becomes obvious is the extent to which discourse is grounded in the perpetuation of the regime of truth at every given instance - espousing self-benefiting and personal truth – as opposed to the genuine reality, with the objective of coercing the target audience to kowtow the preferred or desired policy of the actor, in this case, the government. Counterinsurgency, thus understood, is a discourse, where discourse is taken to mean: connected arrays of notions, that is utilising a distinctive arrangement of symbols, assumptions, various forms of social action, rules, labels, narratives, and vocabularies, which categorically determines what is possible to say and what is not possible to say about a certain topic, what sums as normal, what is seen as common sense, and what is acknowledged as legitimate 'knowledge'. In the public policy context, possibilities, discourses establish the parameters, including the interests of policy formulation. Significantly, discourses do not begin from a vacuum, rather, they draw upon current discourses and plots, which then form them in significant ways. This procedure is predominantly perceptible in the case of political discourses (Jackson, 2006).

In a similar vein, Rogers (2015) concludes thus: it seems that when the discourse is produced, it is initiated with a particular drive-in mind: to persuade an audience of the antiquity of the situation, the virtues the subject has, both negative and positive and what the connection should be towards the 'other'. In the context of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, the discourse emanating from the government is, perceived, to mobilise the citizens against the sect by legitimising the use of force, even though such force inflicts more harm on the citizens than it does in achieving its goal.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The literature on COIN operations against BH and other violent organisations like MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) dealt with the successes and failures of each operation more than the lack of collaboration of CSOs and NGOs. To buttress the above, it is important to note that there has been a plethora of critical terrorism studies that highlighted the adverse effects of counterterrorism on individuals and groups (CSOs and NGOs) right in various ways which can be traced to their exclusion in policy making in many instances with special reference to this case study (Bolleyer and Gauja, 2017; Howell, 2014; Howell and Lind, 2009, Njoku and Martini, 2017; Njoku, 2017; Boyle, 2010). For instance, Ogoloma and Sampson (2015) analysed a series of violent attacks perpetrated by insurgents between 2010 and 2014. Whilst the title of the study glaringly showcased defilements of Human Rights by BH against women, children and mostly innocent men, the analysis failed to show the consequences of Nigeria's counterinsurgency approach on the Human Rights of the same citizens it seeks to protect.

In the same vein, UNHCR (2015) noted that the states owe an obligation to their citizens to protect their rights, lives and prevent the commission of any offence against them. It however observed with concern that the Nigerian government abused these rights of protection by (1) not deploying security agents in places where civilians are attacked by insurgents; (2) over-stretching and not adequately equipping security agents to provide adequate defence for the people; and (3) being negligent to reports of security forces deliberately shooting, raping, battering, torturing, illegally detaining, displacing and summarily executing thousands of civilians in troubled states. In furtherance of this, Aiyede (2015) posited that human rights abuse in counterinsurgency operations undermines soldiers' professionalism, it is useful to note that the TPA has led to abuse which in this case has put the professionalism into further dilemma. This is because it has currently led to a lack of clear policies to protect civilians, and

poor community relations, perceived corruption in the fight against insurgency and poor intelligence gathering. In other words, when soldiers carry out massive killings of unarmed civilians where insurgents have strongholds, it discourages members of the affected communities from divulging critical information about insurgents which invariably hinders a well-coordinated counterinsurgency operation.

By implication, military attacks on harmless families often build anger and resentment among the young ones in the families who are easily recruited by insurgents (UNHCR, 2015; Aiyede, 2015). These actions consequently encourages more violence rather than subdue it; that is, Human Rights abuse related to counterinsurgency operation fuels insurgency and forms the basis for the recruitment of more insurgents. In reflection on this, Dunn (2018) posited that the Nigerian government must establish an ethos of admiration for due process in regards to individual rights in the face of a counterinsurgency operation.

In a related development, Oni (2015) noted that no usage of language by politicians is neutral, in essence, it is important to take into cognisance that in any situation, including counterinsurgency operations, the choice of any word or rhetoric by a political office holder is embellished with political interest. Van Djik (2003) further noted that language in speech or in the context of a legal document is speculated towards a particular direction to be in the government's interest. The implication of the usage of language, according to Van Djik (2003), is that it affects our social cognition. That is, there is always an interaction between how language is utilised and the politics behind the usage of the language, thus, it could stimulate the general populace to ponder ignorantly or act in a certain manner, as orchestrated by the text composer(s).

Going forward, researchers, Human Rights bodies and activists have published a series of studies on counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, various violations carried out by security personnel and those of BH (Kienscherf, 2011; Aghedo and Osumah, 2012; Watts, 2013;

Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme, 2012; Ogoloma and Sampson, 2015), but there is still a dearth of literature that needs to be filled. This is with specific reference to investigating the rhetoric used in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and counterinsurgency speeches delivered by the former President Goodluck Jonathan or the speech delivery techniques utilised in countering insurgency in Nigeria as well as the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria.

It is worthy to note that there is extensive documentation of how CT (counterterrorism) laws have continuously impact human rights vis a vis civil liberty in the Human rights debate in Nigeria (Njoku and Martini, 2017; Njoku, 2017; Boyle, 2010). Njoku (2017) further asserted that the review of CT laws needs to be done as a matter of urgency as it is one of the factors that have impacted the negative outcome in CT implementation in Nigeria. Thus, study tends to build on the knowledge by identifying the specific rhetoric that has hindered the success of COIN operations in Nigeria.

After thorough investigation on how various CT and COIN scholars have examined counterinsurgency rhetoric and human rights abuse in Nigeria (Njoku, 2017, 2022: Njoku and Martini, 2017) particularly with the issue of making their laws, practices and policy processes to be as inclusive as possible for the NGOs and CSOs to take part in, this study tends to build on the existing rhetorical scholarship in the field.

1.3 Objectives of Study

This study's major goal is to critically analyse the usage of text in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013) and the influence of speech on counterinsurgency related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria. The precise objectives were:

i. To critically analyse the rhetoric used in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013) and counterinsurgency speeches presented by the former President Goodluck Jonathan, as retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja;

ii.   To determine the speech delivery technique used in the speeches related to counterinsurgency operations; and

iii.   To interrogate the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in insurgency prone areas in Nigeria

1.4 Research Questions

The following were questions designed to guide the study:

i.   What is the rhetoric utilised by the text composers in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013) and counterinsurgency-related speeches presented by former President Goodluck Jonathan?

ii.   What are the speech delivery components used in the speeches related to counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria?

iii.   To what extent has the counterinsurgency rhetoric impacted Human Rights abuse in the implementation of counter-insurgency operations in northern Nigeria?

1.5 Significance and Scope of the Study

This investigation is vital in various ways. The thesis is significant to Researchers, Policymakers, Security personnel and Students, as it provides information on the rhetoric utilised by text producers in TPA, as well as speeches related to counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. Thus, it is an ample opportunity to re-assess the TPA, and speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan when insurgency and counterinsurgency operations were at their peak in North-East, Nigeria.

It also provides information on the speech delivery techniques utilised by the Nigerian government in the TPA and speeches related to counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. The study, therefore, strengthens the relevance of rhetorical theory, as it provides ample opportunity

to evaluate the contents of the TPA and selected speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan.

Another significance of this study is that it is a timely intervention that interrogated the discourse of COIN operations, especially the influence of COIN rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria (North-Eastern part). Hence, this study is timely and useful because it furnishes scholarly insights into the discursive construction of COIN operations in Nigeria.

The focus of this research is to critically analyse the rhetoric used in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013) and counterinsurgency speeches presented by the former President of Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan, as retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Information Abuja, Nigeria as well as speech delivery techniques adopted in the Terrorism Prevention Act and counterinsurgency speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan between 2011 and 2015, because in line with the Institute for Economics and Peace (2022), this was the period that the Boko Haram insurgency and that of COIN operations were at their peaks in some states in Nigeria (North-Eastern states- Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe); while the questionnaire and interview guide administered on respondents covered the influence of counterinsurgency rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria (North-Eastern part).

Nigeria, predominantly the Northern region, is presently besieged with security challenges as a consequence of the violent activities of the BH group, together with those of other groups like the herdsmen. Resultantly, a violence engineered by Boko Haram, the negative effect on the lives of the citizenry has compelled the Nigerian Government to respond accordingly in the name of counterinsurgency operations. However, Government's response has been fraught with allegations of violence, and Human Rights abuse and further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in the region.

This study, therefore, contributes to knowledge in two ways. The study contributes theoretically to the understanding of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, specifically, regarding the discursive rhetoric and speech delivery techniques utilised in the composition of texts against insurgency in the North-East, Nigeria. It does this with the consideration given to the unique Nigerian situation as it is affected by diverse culture, poor economy and varying religious outlooks. Thus, this research contributes to the debate on the transient nature of the social phenomenon and changing landscape of violence in security studies.

Practically, it contributes to the repository of knowledge for political actors and Policymakers, by laying bare the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse. It, thus, aims to remedy the poverty of literature on rhetoric and speech delivery techniques utilised in the Terrorism Prevention Act and counterinsurgency-related speeches presented by former President Goodluck Jonathan during the peak period of insurgency in Nigeria. It takes into deliberation the fact that the military aspect of this conflict is not conventional and therefore other methods of approach must be considered in order to make significant progress that does not essentially require physical force.

As a result, this thesis draws inferences from different fields and concepts. It ends with an understanding that achieving success in the quest to end insurgency in Nigeria, and in wider perspective, the world is dependent on a holistic approach.

1.6 Operational Definition of Terms

Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Human Rights, Human Rights abuse, Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Human security and IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) are the keywords that is germane to the understanding of this study. These words are contentious but, in this case, emphasis will be made on some relevant definitions which will be the working definition for the study. They are defined as follows:

i. **Insurgency:** This can be described as an organised crime, with political or religious backup targeted at utilising arms or violent means to achieve its goal or a set of agenda for a particular territory (Hassan 2014). Also, Hassan (2014) further buttressed that insurgency is a political conflict rather than a military one. He noted that insurgency is targeted at gaining political influence and control of resources or territory; it is partially immune to military solution; while Ukpong-Umo (2016) stated that insurgency is an organised movement with the sole objective of destabilising an instituted authority or administration, using force, or armed conflict.

Central to this conversation is the introduction of The United States Government's definition of insurgency, it defines insurgency as a prolonged political-military battle aimed at weakening a constituted authority in power, totally or partly, and then by controlling the resources of a terrain through the use of irregular military forces and unlawful political organisations (United States Government, 2012). It noted that the popular denominator for the majority of the rebellious organisations is to possess domination (sometimes partly) of a country, together with its resources. Also, the British Army, in Mackinlay (2013: 12) defines insurgency as the "activities of a marginal group inside a state who are determined on compelling political change by means of a mixture of political pressure, propaganda and mutiny, aspiring to coax or intimidate the larger community to accept such a change". The meaning of insurgency by United States Government (2012) and British Army in Mackinlay (2013) are the operational definitions that has been adopted in this study. Also, as provided above, in particular, the position of the United States Government about insurgency explains the fact that what Nigeria is currently experiencing in its North East Geopolitical zone is insurgency. The Boko Haram group are insurgents using terrorism tactics (the thesis would be using this as the basis of its argument). More detailed critique about

insurgency and the clarification of the concepts of Terrorism, Insurgency and Guerrilla warfare is in the subsequent chapters (pages thirty- two to thirty-four).

ii. **Counterinsurgency:** This is the deliberate use of all components of a state's resources and strengths, including military, political, economic and social strategies or tactics to quench insurgency. This can also be termed as an intellectual operation (more elaborative discussion is in subsequent chapter). Counterinsurgency operation is a hybrid warfare and it can be described as a way of curbing civil war in the 21st century (Okoli and Iortyer, 2014). It is the attempt and efforts of the Nigeria Government to stop a protracted violent struggle deliberately and tactically designed to destabilise the government (Kilcullen, 2005, Byman and Kreps, 2010). In this study, the case study that has been chosen (the Nigerian government's response to countering BH insurgency) has publicly noted that it utilised this strategy through the use of military tactics. So, in operational terms this study will stick to the definition of COIN from the perspective of the renowned writer, David Kilcullen. Going forward, the focus of this study is that there are other tactics aside military that are not excessive and would reduce the surging humanitarian chaos that the BH threat has caused over the years.

iii. **Radicalisation:** Radicalisation, is fraught with conceptual contestations. Radicalisation is a "process through which persons and groups adopt violent tactics – or threaten to do so – to accomplish political ambitions" (Olesen, cited in Schmid 2013:17). Similarly, Borum (2011) and Hoeft (2015) concurred that radicalisation refers to the procedure of acquiring and making extremist or fanatical ideologies. This process, they argue, may involve, but is not limited to, orientation, manipulation, coercion, brainwashing, and indoctrination. Therefore, while these are common means of being radicalised, they need not all be present to ensure successful radicalisation; one or a combination of two

or more is sufficient to effect radical behaviour towards the extant condition (Baker-Beall, *et al.*, 2014).

It is essential to point out at this juncture that radicalisation is synonymous with insurgency or sometimes automatically leads to insurgents' activities, rather, it could pave way for additional violent activities such as protest, destruction of community properties or syndicalism and guerrilla warfare (Schmid, 2013). Moreover, one does not need to be radicalised to participate in any of these forms of violence. Again, radicalisation can be defined as a means of ideological transformation in pursuit of specified objectives. In the context of this thesis, radicalisation means any orientation which predisposes an individual to the potential of violence or violent behaviour capable of widespread threat, but not necessarily terrorism. In other words, while all terrorists might have been radicalised, not all radicals are terrorists (Baker-Beall, *et al.*, 2014).

iv. **De-radicalisation:** Schmid (2013:20) defines de-radicalisation as simply "averting and de-programming those that have been radicalised" so that it becomes a response to radicalisation. De-radicalisation refers to the process of undoing the programming, indoctrination, or re-orientation of a person or group of persons. De-radicalisation is a term commonly used in the United Kingdom; part of such programmes is the 'prevent strategy' (Elshimi, 2017). According to Elshimi (2017:4), he defines "de-radicalisation as a 'support' programme aiming to 'dissuade' radicals from supporting violence". This study adopts Schmid's definition as it reflects on the Nigerian government's disposition towards de-radicalisation. Generally, it sees de-radicalisation as the general efforts of government, working through official and unofficial inclusive of state and non-state actors to ensure prospective radicals are disoriented from radical behaviour, with a view of reintegrating them back into the society (Horgan, 2008; Schmid, 2013).

v.   **Human Rights and Human Rights Abuse:** United Nations (2021) defines Human Rights are the total rights inherent to all individuals, irrespective of nationality, race, language, sex, ethnicity, religion, or other status. Similarly, Human Rights incorporate the right to life and liberty, liberty of opinion together with expression, self-independence from slavery and torture, the entitlement to education together with work, and other legally binding choices that makes life worth living. Accordingly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2021) states that every individual is entitled to these rights without discrimination. Meanwhile, education and awareness creation are the main building blocks to elevate and sustain total rights accrued to individuals as citizens of the country. These rights include the right to vote, education, economic rights and social rights. Also, Human Rights abuse is a breach of the fundamental rights including choices that belong to all individuals globally. It is regardless of race, language, status or position. Abuse of rights has cumulated in a situation where Nigerians no longer value their rights or that of other fellow citizens. Acts of Human Rights abuses as a phenomenon have never been more pronounced in the history of Nigeria than during the '*#EndSars*' - (Special Anti-Robbery Squad) protest in the year 2020. The protest was against police brutality, extortion, rape and other Human Rights abuses by the police in Nigeria. Yet, more brutality and rights abuses were carried out against the protesters. Their right to life, right to justice and right to the public gathering were denied without recourse.

vi.   **Human Security:** For decades, human security: has been the subject of many international fora and this has culminated in the emergence of several international instruments espousing the imperative of human security as well as the duty and obligation of states in that regard. Prominent among these are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

(ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR or African Charter). These instruments have been ratified, and the Nigerian State has domesticated the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The ICCPR and ICESCR expanded and reinterpreted the civil and social rights contained in the UDHR, with the understanding that changing political landscape requires a more robust and composite rights regime to protect the human person. Liberal scholars like Marcin Lewinski have reasoned that the inalienability of the right to life, as espoused in the UDHR is insufficient to guarantee life itself if it is not accompanied by corresponding economic, social, cultural and political rights. The contention is that safeguarding the right to life requires the provision of or securing quality and enabling environment for the nourishing and flourishing of human life. The right to economic, physical, social and mental wellbeing is inextricably intertwined with the right to life itself and a precondition for the exercise and enjoyment of that right. Here, it raises the concern that negative consideration for physical security, mental health or wellbeing, environmental safety, and political servitude automatically undermines the exercise of the freedom to live. This implies that mental and psychological wellbeing, freedom from economic starvation and a healthy environment, forms an essential segment of the fundamental entitlement to life.

The foregoing notwithstanding, in Nigeria, human security is in a near state of jeopardy as most of these rights articulated above are, in practice, more or less a privilege than a right. This is part and, perhaps more importantly, fore grounded by the authors of the document or constitution that serves as the foundation of Nigeria's current democratic experience - the 1999 Constitution. The Nigerian constitution composers consciously recognised the significance of these rights, the constitution highlighted some of them

and outlined this entitlement under the fundamental objectives and directive principle of state policy. It is important (with this thesis) to fraught one of the sections of the constitution, a section that contains items that are non-justiciable, this has been held to be relevant and central to the arguments of the thesis (see recommendations section on page 267). The implication is that the state is automatically absolved of the responsibility to provide the necessities required to lead a decent and secured life and the failure of the government to provide those necessities cannot be adjudicated upon by a competent court. Comparably, the state has, in a way, eschewed its responsibility, leaving its citizens helpless and vulnerable.

vii.   **IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons):** these are individuals who were displaced due to armed conflict, or natural or artificial disasters. They are internally displaced because the shift in their various settlement or abode lies within the territory of their country of origin. The difference between IDPs and refugees is that IDPs are still within their country of origin, while refugees are compelled by the same reasons to cross the border(s) into a different country or continent (Centre for Disaster Philanthropy, 2022). The dichotomy between these two concepts is that one receives attention, and the other does not receive sufficient scholarly devotion. The lack of substantial literature on IDPs is sometimes because internal displacement overlaps with other forms of population movement, like internal migration and refugee flows. IDPs are a relatively new concept when compared with refugee flow.

Moreover, the rights of IDPs in Nigeria are often abused. The internally displaced persons, just like any other Nigerian, experience Human Rights abuse in various areas like health, economics, education, security, and health, among others. The government's inability to protect these rights has led to other rights violations in the

IDP camps. The economic right and right to education are neglected when people are in IDP camps.

Consequentially, there is a need to distinctively conduct research on internal displacement as a product of armed conflict, in this instance, a thesis. Facts picked from fieldwork revealed that the response that the IDPs receive in their camps cannot be compared to the type of attention that refugees get worldwide. IDPs are mainly seen as the responsibility of the government of a country, while refugees are accepted worldwide as the responsibility of more than one government.

In Nigeria, there are 248,000 IDPs (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020). In some cases, non-governmental organisations in Nigeria and the Nigerian government have handled the bulk of their needs. IDPs are usually from poorer zones, most times with various conflict clusters; that is, most IDPs were often poor before displacement and tends to have suffered direct exposure to violence shortly before being displaced (Centre for Disaster Philanthropy, 2022). The line of argument here is that there is a presence of a dichotomy between IDPs and refugees that can reduce the potential of those seeking asylum. Countries that are obliged to receive refugees can decide that certain people do not qualify as refugees and, therefore, do not meet the requirement of acceptance.

For instance, if, by any chance, a person who has been documented as an IDP finds himself or herself crossing the border, his status as an IDP instead of a refugee may hinder the individual from crossing as an asylum seeker. Practically, a documented refugee will be given priority over a documented IDP. This may be a reason for the lack of interest in researching on IDPs. Still, lack of research can also lead to a shortcoming in understanding their situation and even in their need for asylum when the case presents itself or when it becomes necessary. To this end, researching more on IDPs

leads to more awareness of its definition and may create a clear difference between the 'two displaced' people's status. Hence, this thesis has taken a step further to make findings on IDPs and then lays bare the importance of stopping the neglect that they are currently facing in Nigeria.

Summarily, this chapter has started with an edge by situating the context of the study, it has succinctly described the statement of the problem that initiated the project, the chapter continues by stating the objectives of the study followed by the research questions. The chapter successfully identified certain words that are germane to the understanding of the thesis. The next chapter will discuss the theoretical framework of the study.

2.0 CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

Etymology of theory was drawn from a Greek term "contemplate". It can be defined as a group of assumptions organised by a relation of implication or interference. A theory can be said to be the analysis of a problem and examination of factors responsible for its nature in order to predict and describe the claim. It is also a systematic organisation of knowledge that can solve a problem (Stam, 2007; Gelso, 2006). This chapter introduces the relevant theory and reviews some of concepts utilised throughout the course of this study. First, it discussed the compatibility of the rhetorical theory for the study, with the review of other related theories towards the end of the chapter.

Rhetorical theory

A theoretical framework is a single formal theory. Rhetorical theory is one of the most acceptable ways for the demystification of a research problem and how it is to be examined. As a concept, the theoretical framework can be used for both qualitative and quantitative research.

To give impetus to this study and ensure it contributes meaningfully to the body of knowledge, the rhetorical theory was adopted as the theoretical framework. The rhetorical theory deals with the forms, effects, functions, composition, production, means, venue, audiences and criticism of discourse. It can further be described as advancement through a practical examination of discourses and consequential effects. Practically, it deals with the use of creative persuasive writings to convince audiences. It is therefore predominant in our day-to-day operations and remains a leading counterinsurgency skill utilised in combating insurgency in North-East, Nigeria. Both the Terrorism Prevention Act and speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan during the heat of insurgency in Nigeria adopted rhetorical strategies in dealing with the Nigerian populace about the long-lasting issue.

There are various levels of rhetoric, the first is the precepts for discourse, the second is making discourse, while the third is the criticism of discourse. According to Aristotle, rhetoric involves the ability of a speaker to persuade an audience, and this is subject to the message convener's understanding of the logos, ethos and pathos of rhetoric. Lutzke and Henggeler (2009) posit that logos, ethos and pathos are significant to writings. They noted that the understanding of the trio aids the compositions of texts that appeal to readers at various levels. Lutzke and Henggeler (2009) noted that Logos appeals to reason. It is also said to be the text of argument and how well a writer has argued his idea. Likewise, Ethos appeals to the attitude of the author. Ethos is concerned with the responsibility of the writer in the discourse and how genuine his claims are, while pathos deals with emotions and psychological beliefs and values, including the role of the audience in the discourse. This study adopted this theory as the theoretical framework of this study because text composers of TPA and speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan, during this period of study, adopts logos, ethos and pathos in their writings. In the speeches, Goodluck Jonathan was able to use rhetoric to appeal to the reasoning of the audience to agree that the Nigeria government is not folding its arms in efforts to curb insurgency, whilst texts in the TPA also posit determination of government to prosecute insurgents or their sponsors. Therefore, the rhetorical theory is related to this study because the contexts of materials to be investigated are embedded with logos, ethos and pathos.

Again, it is adopted as the theoretical framework for the study because it focuses on pragmatics which involves the analysis of texts to critically account for the interaction between the rhetoric strategies employed, the text composer and the readers/audience. The theory is therefore imperative to this study because it distinguishes structural arrangements in text, by describing the relationship between text parts in functional terms, recognising the source of the message and its effects on the destination. Thus, based on the fact that this study's aim is to provide a non-selective commentary but a comprehensive analysis of TPA and the speeches of former

President Goodluck Jonathan during the peak of insurgency in Nigeria, it is the most appropriate theory.

Furthermore, the theory applies to this study because rhetoric is often conceptualised as a powerful tool of communication. It involves the deployment of organised ideas like persuasion, ideology, power, manipulation and argument in a discourse. Specifically, rhetorical theory in this study is concerned with languages used in different dictums towards tackling insurgency in Nigeria, thus, it is used to illustrate the manner in which identified features of communicative practice are used in a narrative sequence. As such, this theory remains a persuasive dimension of language in Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), nevertheless, it is sufficient to state that the Nigerian government has adopted rhetoric strategies in manipulating the abuse of human rights during counterinsurgency operations. Hence, this theory is relevant to this study (Feldman and Skoldberg, 2002; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Hartelius and Browning, 2008).

Just like a human resource manager, the Nigerian government uses language to communicate its efforts at combatting insurgency to the people. It adopted rhetorical tactics to construct persuasive messages that appeal to the people's sense of reasoning and further help in gaining their support to achieve its goal (defeating insurgency). To efficiently achieve this, the Nigerian government utilises various arguments, imageries and argumentative skills. Green (2004) describes this kind of rhetorical approach as innovative and marriage of several skills to achieve a goal. He noted that rhetorical perspective indicates social actors play active roles in the diffusion process, as what they say and how they say it is of importance.

The rhetorical theory is a theory that has been adopted for a study of this nature. The first formal rhetorical theory was linked to Corax of Syracuse when he wrote a Treatise called "the art of rhetoric", to help those involved in a land dispute in ancient Syracuse, Island of Sicily. The theory was given its desired makeover through the efforts of Professor Fred Newton of the University of Michigan, who exclusively committed himself to rhetoric as his field of

investigation and instruction (Hauser, 2007). The theory was noted for its prominent role in legitimating the teaching of speech and writing. As such, rhetoric was embraced in philosophic dispute, argumentation and reasoned discourse across cultural and intellectual differences (Hauser, 2007).

Thereafter, Johnstone, a professor at Penn State provided micro contexts for the expansion and institutionalisation of rhetorical theory. He establishes the fact that rhetorical theory deals with any symbol of influence on values, attitudes, beliefs and actions (Ashcraft and Simonson, 2016). Similarly, rhetorical theorists believe that social actors are to argue generally, without bias, or establish a well acceptable presentation to convince the people on why they should subscribe to their arguments. Impliedly, these are some perspectives presented by the Nigeria Government in both the TPA and selected COIN-related speeches against insurgency in North-East, Nigeria. This theory is, therefore, relevant to this study because it looked into language and how it works at the micro-level to establish or correct misgivings and present facts to Nigeria's audience in order to enhance understanding of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria vis-à-vis Human Rights abuse.

Again, rhetorical theory involves studying every kind of context, that is, studying every interpersonal and intrapersonal public issue to societal actions and mediated discourse. It talks about what makes up public and individual diaries as rhetoric, while it as well incorporates the study of visual and non-verbal elements. In effect, nothing is part of human understanding or daily engagement that cannot be investigated from a rhetorical point of view. The theory brought about a paradigm shift from persuasion to a situation whereby scholar investigation is launched into what is said and how it is said. Accordingly, many of the proponents of this theory believe all human symbol used are fundamentally influential, irrespective of why it was used that way, written that way or said that way, intentionally or not, and they affect those in

our domains. It is important to note that Rhetorical theory is applicable to the experience or daily engagement of human existence (Foss, 2012; Handa, 2004; Kim, 2002).

2.2 The Concept of Insurgency

Security experts, scholars and researchers across the globe have at various times credited different interpretations to insurgency, owing to its frequent and continual occurrence, not only in Nigeria but around the world. Its emergence can be traced to a new sophistication model adopted by rebels to register their grievances and actions against the government. It is also adopted by some groups of people or religious bigots to pursue religious ideologies, personal goals or objectives. It is also a political strategy to stir unrest and cause disharmony within the government. Accessible literatures have also revealed that insurgents, perpetrators of insurgency, adopt different approaches to causing unrest, part of which includes guerrilla warfare, armed struggle, rebellion, conflict and insurrection (Igbini, 2020; Omeni, 2018; Abdu and Shehu, 2019; Abolurin, 2011; Hassan, 2014).

An insurgency is an act perpetrated by insurgents. Omeni (2018:1) stated that insurgents are directly or indirectly associated with "guerrilla warfare, often a necessary amalgam of tactics" involving pseudo military forces and state forces that possess superior firearms and capabilities. Abdu and Shehu (2019) described insurgency as an uprising against the government or constituted authority, to attain a corporate or personal goal. Likewise, Abolurin (2011) mentioned in Abdu and Shehu (2019) stated that it is a mutinous or rebellion act(s) carried out by those that can be referred to as a rebel group, to cause hostility and mutual unrest in a community or section of the society. In the view of Hassan (2014) insurgency can be compared to a political conflict instead of a military conflict. He noted that insurgency is targeted at gaining political influence and control of resources or territory; it is partially immune to military solution; while Ukpong-Umo (2016) stated that insurgency is an organised movement

with the sole objective of weakening the government or the leadership structure, through the use of force, or armed combat.

The United States Government (2012) described insurgency as a long-standing political-military struggle aimed at subverting an existing government, by taking charge of its resources and part of its territory through the use of rebels and/or illegal political organisations. It noted that the most shared strategy of these insurgent groups is to be in control of a population or territory and all that lies within it. The definition of insurgency as provided above, in particular, the position of the United States Government about insurgency explains the fact that what Nigeria is currently experiencing in its North East Geopolitical zone is what that has been described by these renowned authors- Boko Haram are insurgents using terrorism tactics which includes guerrilla warfare. The following are the common features of insurgency, according to the U.S. Government (2012), first, it ridicules the capability of the administration to make available adequate security and public services to the affected population or territory. Such public services may include utilities, and education, among others. One of their strategies as a group is to make the administration looks incapable to its citizens by alleviating the citizen's problems or exposing them to messages that would portray the government as incompetent of supporting the people. Second, it acquires the interest of the population, actively or passively, through genuine or crude means; fear or intimidation. Third, it provokes the government to carry out operations that are capable of misleading it or prompting it to carry out actions that would call for sympathy towards the aggressors, whereby innocent citizens will be tempted join the protesters in order to gain stronger assistance from a bigger percentage of the population. Lastly, it frustrates external funding for the government, while possibly establishing internationally relationships or alliances for the group. All the above are applicable to the current case study (Boko Haram and Nigeria), it reiterates the relevance of the study.

Clarifying the concepts of Terrorism, Insurgency and Guerrilla warfare

This section will provide a clearer boundary for the following concepts: terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare.

Terrorism

Over the years, defining terrorism has increasingly become more contentious, and this is not unjustifiable, especially given that its definition not only affects how society sees and relates with those associated with it, but also because its meaning determines the response it elicits from society particularly from the state. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism.

Instead, what is rampant is debates and contestations of what constitutes terrorism (Crelinsten 2009). It is in this sense that Griest and Mahan (2012) postulated that conceptualising terrorism is a somewhat subjective exercise since attempts to define it is usually laden with idiosyncrasies ranging from religious motivation to hate, from sympathy for to belief in as well as disbelief in the system or extant or current scheme of things, etc., Despite the transformations in meaning and difficulties in defining the concept, there are, however, common grounds that are generally shared among scholars. Besides the obvious target of terror acts, the act or acts of terrorism are usually intended to stir or cause fear and evoke responses from a broader audience beyond the immediate victims (Kielsgrad 2006). At its 5053rd meeting, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1566 (2004) which defines terrorism as:

> *Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause*
>
> *death or serious bodily injury or taking of hostages, with the purpose to*
>
> *provoke a state of terror in the general public or a group of persons or*

particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an

international organisation to do or to abstain from doing an act, which

constitutes offences within the scope of and as defined in the international

conventions and protocols relating to terrorism……grave nature (United Nations

2004).

The foregoing notwithstanding, establishes the fact that terrorism is deployed in the context of this study to refer to the broad spectrum of violence, both structural and contingent, predisposing citizens not only to physical harm but mental and physiological harm resulting from the actions of state or the failure of state to act responsibly in preventing harm to its citizens. This study builds on and expands the conventional notions of terrorism to account for unconventional forms of violence that usually go unnoticed. In other words, this study refrains from application of the term terrorism as a fixed category describing fear-inducing activities from non-state actors alone. Rather, it refers to any category of activity, action and or conduct resulting from state and non-state actors, capable of or causing fear, trauma and or harm, be it physical, physiological, mental and or psychological.

Schmid (2023) emphasised in his recent report for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) on the submissions around getting an acceptable definition for terrorism. Schmid (2023) conducted extensive research on how notable scholars have previously attempted to define terrorism. He concluded that a narrow definition should be adopted by all (Schmid, 2004, 2013, 2023).

Consequentially, literature on counterterrorism is littered with suggestions on the imperative of violence as the panacea to address alleged terrorism. Bruce Hoffman's *Inside Terrorism* (1998); Marc Sageman's *Understanding Terror Networks* and Crelinsten's book

Counterterrorism (2009) basically, describe and prescribe methods to counterterrorism based on the criteria of effectiveness, where effectiveness is judged, akin to realist thought, based on the preservation or survival of the state against all odds. Minimising terrorist attacks, for these scholars, is all about protecting the state, and not necessarily the citizens of the state. What this means is that injury and death of innocent citizens are thought of as 'collateral damage' in the course of protecting the state, while the safety of and human rights concern of the citizens' take the back seat. It is in this context Ted Gurr posits that "most of the literature [on counterterrorism] consists of naïve description, speculative commentary, and prescription for "dealing with terrorism" (Gurr in Jackson *et al.* 2009; 13) The above definition of terrorism and counterterrorism forms a bedrock of why the thesis is investigating the Boko haram group and the rhetorical strategy that have been employed by the Nigeria government (The TPA and selected speeches).

Insurgency

This section is going to be a short conclusive segment just as discussed on page thirty to thirty-one of this thesis, the study is establishing its grounds on the standings of the United States Government (2012), Abdul and Shehu (2010) and British Army in Mackinlay (2013). Boko Haram are insurgents using terrorism tactics which includes guerrilla warfare. Boko Haram can as well be called Terrorists, this is not only based on how they operate but also on the basis of their association with ISIS, ISWAP and AL-Qaeda (Martini and Njoku; 2017). Also, they were labelled/listed as a terrorist group by the United States Government in November 2013. This is in tandem with notable scholars such as Bruce Hoffman (2006) and Michael J. Boyle (2010). Also, as stated on page eighteen-nineteen under subsection 1.6, insurgency is a deliberate act of violence by a group of people to subvert a constituted authority and also challenge them in

other to compulsory engage in certain doctrine that may be sometimes religiously inclined or sturdy representation of an extremist ideology.

Guerrilla warfare: As perceived initially by renowned scholars in small wars and insurgencies journals and nineteenth-century thinkers like Clausewitz, Jomini, Marx and Engels championed the examination of guerrilla warfare role during the Napoleonic Wars, further put, the Napoleonic events led to its growth (Ibrahim, 2004). As seen on page twenty of this thesis, guerrilla war is another height of insurgents or terrorist's activities, this is supported by Schmid (2013) and Schmid (2023).

The Boko Haram (BH) group uses several tactics to carry out their grave intentions in the Nigeria communities. Falode (2016) posits that guerrilla means protracted conflict, provoke overreactions. Okoli and Lenshie (2022) further buttressed that guerrilla tactics are linked to suicide operations which is a common tactics that has been used by the BH group since its inception. Again, Okoli and Lenshie (2022) argued that BH group uses or has combined guerrilla and suicide operations with some sort of conventional tactics of warfare both in the past and now (Falode, 2016; Okoli and Lenshie, 20220. This model also includes suicide terrorism and other modes of combat which are all attributed to BH's modus of operandi.

'Guerrilla warfare can be defined as subverting the will of the attacker through indirect confrontation such as infiltration, sabotage, armed vandalism, ambush, territorial occupation, etc'. Arreguin-Toft (2001, pp. 100–103)

According to United States Government 2012:1

'*Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare in which small, lightly armed groups use mobile tactics against a stronger opponent. Guerrillas employ small-scale attacks, such as* ambushes *and raids, to harass their enemy rather than to win a decisive victory in battle'*

Further clearer justification is on page one hundred and thirty-six of this thesis, this is under the section of Asymmetric strategy of Insurgents in the North-Eastern Part of Nigeria, this

explains the rationale behind the concept of guerrilla warfare in the context of the Nigerian fight against insurgency. This thesis tends to add to the existing knowledge in this context.

Insurgency Organisational Structure

Even though each insurgent group has its own organisational structure, there are generalised organisational characteristics that provide a universal institutional framework for all insurgent groups. This is because insurgents initiate functioning methods after considering different dynamics and systems. They formulate and implement their operational approaches and organisational structure to the existing circumstances of their operating environment and this is based on the capacity and resources of the government's security forces. Findings have revealed that if the government security forces are resilient, the insurgents will be more careful, secretive and selective in the structure and operations, but if the government security forces are feeble, the insurgents tend to be more conspicuous in their operations, bolder and confrontational (David, 2013).

Moreover, Tomes (2004) and Hoffman (2007) note that insurgence may commence in an organised units connected by leaders and these units may later come together to form a strong alliance that would become large and popular. For instance, insurgency groups that are politically motivated would develop into a quasi-political structure before or at the same time they begin undertaking violent rebellious activities against the government. They would form an opposition government within the territorial control of existing government, without any military approach. Meanwhile, the insurgents have a military unit responsible for carrying out attacks, but the unit is a subordinate of the political unit. As such, insurgency groups form with the aim of provoking violence emphasise military action against the government. It believes the number of violent attacks carried out successfully against the government would weaken the government and persuade the people to support its cause. Such groups usually begin with

micro, feeble, ill-defined political structures, often dominated by military veterans. However, a militarily organised insurgency does not imply all its members are fighters (Tomes, 2004; Hoffman, 2007).

Also, Tomes (2004) and Hoffman (2007) observe that insurgencies that are formed to promote traditional beliefs dwell on previous identities through tribal, clan, ethnic, or religious affiliations. In such groups, recognised social and/or traditional titles are substituted for political and military titles in such insurgency group; while cellular organised insurgency groups metamorphose rapidly and are found more in urban cities. They have no well-known political and military hierarchy or leadership structures, instead they set up micro, semi-autonomous cells not far from one another, within their urban location. This group of insurgents generally rely on heavy attacks than other strategies utilised by insurgents. This strategy and their microscopic nature have, however, limited their ability to mobilise popular support (Tomes, 2004; Hoffman, 2007).

Meanwhile, the civil as well as the military arms of the insurgents' organisational structure carry out both covert/underground actions and overt military actions. Those in the civil arm are to take part in the political activities of a constituted authority, by partaking in the political process of the government they intend to attack in order to strengthen the objectives of the insurgency, undermine the system, or fight the system. They build public sympathy and acceptability for the insurgency group within the population, in order to harness the objectives of the group; whilst they use avenue to canvass for international support, for the group. They deflate the potency and viability of the government or constituted authority in place and its allies, while creating/establishing public knowledge, understanding and support for the insurgents demands (Fearon, 2003).

Gelso (2006) and Celeski (2005) observe that the civil structure of the insurgents usually downplays their violent and rebellion attributes, to the extent of deceiving the people outrightly.

However, any move by the government, indirectly or directly, to disintegrate this unit usually escalates the state of affairs and create complex phenomenon and disrespect for a legitimate structure. Hence, it creates another pointer that strengthens the arguments and actions of the insurgents. Here, it can be argued that the diversity of insurgents groups with particular reference to economic-driven or motivated ones in this case-study- the Boko Haram group is seen in how it operates in terms of organisational structure. In an organisational structure of the insurgents, the civil unit is also responsible for creating a shadow government, by creating an alternative government to challenge the authorities of the existing government or constituted authority (Gelso, 2006; Celeski, 2005). This shadow government at times meet the masses at their points of needs or areas the government has neglected them. The shadow government will try to meet the yearnings of the people and shift the blames for their sufferings on the government or any constituted authority in the locality. For example: they may distribute palliatives like, foods and provide education and health care service, security and decide legal issues. Through this, they gain more popular attention (Gelso, 2006; Celeski, 2005).

The civil unit also creates and serves as support group to the insurgents. They seek the concurrence of an opposition political group to support their agitations; and they may form a political association that supports their struggle. This political group may become the insurgents' conduit for diplomacy and political reconciliation. In some cases, the political group might be made up of former insurgent strategic leaders, thus, serving as a veritable avenue for reconciliation, settlement and achievement of their demands.

Nevertheless, members of the military unit of the insurgent group are the fighting arm of the movement. The military unit may be made up of guerrilla or conventional tacticians or their combination. It is customary for insurgent groups to have few soldiers at the start, but insurgent groups that concentrate on violence in a large scale, like the Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria, usually build up a very strong military unit capable of carrying out open attacks before

going into hiding to survive. As the insurgents grows in relative strength, the best guerrilla units could be converted to conventional insurgent forces. This does not mean all the guerrilla units are disbanded; rather, both can exist and conduct irregular warfare and traditional warfare in concert with each other. Thus, if government security forces are weak or the insurgents have become powerful relative to the government's security forces, the military elements may exist openly, but if the State maintains an effective security presence, some parts of the military unit will likely maintain a secret existence (Byman, 2007).

In order to successfully carry out their operations, Collier, Anke and Roehner (2009) reveal that these insurgent groups are habitually made up of different units that carry out complementary but distinct roles. Some elements openly challenge the government through public actions, guerrilla activities, and massive violence attacks. Other elements operate through covert or clandestine method, subverting existing political and civil institutions to support the insurgents or damage the legitimacy of the government. The proportion or presence of each element relative to the larger organisation depends on the strategic approach the insurgents' uses and the opportunity, motive it adopt. Often times, they overlap and individuals may shift between them as the conflict and the insurgency evolve. This is especially true where insurgencies are based on existing social networks such as tribes and clans (Collier, Anke and Roehner, 2009).

Collier, Anke and Roehner (2009) highlights the following categories as illustrative and that insurgency should be prudently examined to determine the open and undercover units within its organisational structure: First, **military and political leadership**: In any clime, frontrunners are expected to take the lead and should take the responsibility of the strategic formulation of policies and implementation, thus, the leaders determine the narratives about insurgency. In the case of insurgents, the use of force, intelligence, dignity, self-respect and charisma usually determine who is to be the leader; and in the same way, they are strategies adopted by the

leaders. However, in some insurgent groups, leadership is usually adopted considering religion, tribe or clan. If religion is considered before determining the leader, the insurgent who emerged as the leader may be a religious personality (Collier, Anke and Roehner, 2009). In loosely organised insurgencies, authority may be distributed across the leaders of various smaller units within the group that share similar or overlapping goals. Within an insurgent group, a person may be responsible for both the political and civilian leadership role, while in some groups it may be divided among the leaders of the insurgent group (Collier, Anke and Roehner, 2009). The political leader would be responsible for developing, spreading, and enforcing insurgents' ideology. He seeks to acquire local and international back-up for the group, through the use of propaganda as a tool. Political leaders play a key role in coordinating guerrilla operations with other subversive or violent activities to promote the insurgency narratives (Collier, Anke and Roehner, 2009).

Second, **the element of change**: This is also known as the covert element, this is the unit of insurgents' organisation that carries out activities in areas the military unit finds difficult to penetrate. It is a micro unit of insurgents' organisation that executes underground and secret activities that were classified. This secrecy is usually circumstantial. Most of their operations are in conspicuous and highly populated locations held by government counter-insurgent security forces. Covert members of an insurgent group often fill leadership positions, overseeing specific functions that are carried out by the auxiliary. The convert elements provide coordinated capabilities for the insurgent movement. The key distinction between them and others is that they operate secretly in areas denied to the guerrilla force. Members of the covert often control cells used to neutralise informants and collaborators from within the insurgency and the population.

Third, **the guerrilla component:** This element is made up of members who are part of the military unit of the group. They are quasi military groups within the insurgents' organisation

that carry out restricted attacks, raids and ambushes. Ideally, guerrillas can carry out mass attack on counter-insurgency forces that are isolated, small in size, or utilise other circumstances that aid the guerrilla force and place it at an advantageous position. This element is a prominent attacking tactics of the Boko Haram in North-East, Nigeria. A times, the Guerrilla element collaborate with the main violence unit of the group to carry out offensive attack on a target, whilst they also serve as back up and rear defence for the military unit. Other duties performed by the element are to guard insurgents training camp, facilities and links that aid the supply of foods, money and other logistics, including mercenaries (Collier, Anke and Roehner, 2009; Omeni, 2015).

Fourth and the last of them, **the additional component:** This is the insurgents support element. It is made up of cells and external elements. Cells ranges from intelligence, counterintelligence, logistics, population control, propaganda. It also covers sympathetic individuals who store arms or warn major insurgents' financiers of the activities of government security forces. The duty of this element is not to cause violence, but to provide logistic and other necessary support that would let insurgents achieve their goals. However, it must be stressed that members of the insurgents' group might belong to numerous elements within the same group. Insurgents who are contracted and trained for combat may also be involved in intelligence gathering on some occasions. Numerous among the activities of the auxiliary element are providing intelligence, ensuring domestic safety, providing forged or stolen documents, storage weapons and supplies, courier services, funding from lawful and unlawful sources and searching for prospective supporters (Collier, Anke and Roehner; 2009). Here, the significance of dwelling on the understanding of how the insurgent operates is useful, which is to critically study the state's response (heavy-handed response). To check if the state's response is suitable and to examine the COIN rhetoric as drafted in one of the objectives-to what extent has COIN rhetoric impacted COIN-related Human rights abuse.

Stages and Life Cycle of Insurgency

The structure, shape and transformation of insurgency varies from one group to another, however, there are some patterns and observations that are regular to all insurgents' groups. As we are aware, insurgency may develop through mutiny and radicalisation, localised guerrilla activity, civic unrest, public defiance and widespread guerrilla operations, among others. Alternatively, they may be eradicated through inactivity, if they are effectively countered or if they fail to get enough public backing (Rosenau, 2007).

Smith-Bingham (2005) and Rosenau (2007) maintain that in a country affected by insurgency, one or more distinct stages may emerge in different areas simultaneously. Similarly, different insurgent groups or different factions of the same group operating in a given country may have evolved through different operational approaches and may be at different operational stages. An insurgency may succeed in gaining control of a contested region, force the government into political accommodation (a more common outcome), overthrowing the government, be co-opted by the government and cease fighting (a common outcome), or ultimately be defeated. In general, insurgencies are typically lingered conflicts.

Insurgents' group(s) may be absorbed by local, national or transnational terrorist organisations, convert into organised criminal networks, or wither into irrelevance. Methods that succeed against embryonic insurgencies often differ greatly from those that are effective in foiling mature or declining insurgencies (Smith-Bingham, 2005; Rosenau, 2007). Conflicts may be pushed towards resolution, either on the battlefield or through negotiation where either of the side experience exhaustion and errors. Thus, it is pertinent for planners and decision makers to clearly understand the stages the insurgency has reached in order to develop appropriate responses which will in turn thwart its overall progression. The following are stages of insurgency, according to Smith-Bingham (2005):

First, **the phase before the conflict**- at this phase, an insurgency is arduous to notice because it has yet to make its presence felt through the use of acknowledged acts of violence. Most activities at this stage are carried out secretly by the guerrillas. Moreover, some openly taken activities can simply be written off as political (nonviolent) activity. An insurgent movement is currently taking shape, a clear leadership is forming, and the insurgents are mobilising behind a complaint and a sense of collective identity. Along with storing weapons and supplies, they also start to gather members and train them. The next stage is the commencement stage.

Second, **the beginning (or commencement) phase** is when rebels begin to employ violence in the form of initial attacks, an insurgency is in the early stages of a battle. Analysts are typically initially made aware of a prospective insurrection by initial strikes. The most perilous period for insurgents is the beginning; although they have established their existence via violent acts, they are still minor and still organising. At this point, insurgents typically have to develop themselves in terms of visibility (or focus), promote their ideas, recruit sympathisers, secure illicit money, elicit strong reactions from the government, and do all of this while avoiding exposure to security personnel (Byman, 2007). Raids, guerrilla attacks, ambushes, intimidation tactics such sending threatening letters, kidnappings, and assassinations are all possibilities during this stage of the conflict. The next phase, the third, is the open conflict phase.

Third, **open conflict phase**: Here, the administration is aware of the impending challenges and dangers posed by the insurgency, which has been proven to exist in the nation. At this point, the insurgents publicly oppose the government or any other legitimate authority, therefore they try to degrade it by assuming sovereign control over some conquered territory. Additionally, they will combine them with the rebel traditional military force and launch more regular guerrilla strikes. If there is external nourishment for the militants, it might become more obvious as the rebellion grows more violent.

Fourth and the last phase of an insurgency is **the resolution phase**: Research have revealed that some insurgents develop steadily and run through the entire life cycle. Whilst some experience retrogression and find themselves back in the previous stage, others may not progress from a stage for several years, nevertheless, every insurgency uprise must definitely come to an end - whether it is a victory for the insurgents, or they reach an amicable settlement with the government, or it is a victory for the government security forces. In a simpler perspective, it is insurgent victory if the insurgents were able to defeat the government counterinsurgency forces or they were able to arrive an agreement with the government that resolves their grievances.

At this stage is the implementation of the agreement which has been outlined in the previous phases and they are to be implemented accordingly. However, the agreement may contain some unclear or false promises and its execution may be delayed due to political interest or bureaucratic bottlenecks. As such, this is usually a period that there could be a renewed agitation by the original insurgents who suspect the government is planning to dump the agreement; or agitation by another group who may likely protest some claims in the agreement and this may take some years after they have ceased to attack.

Nevertheless, it is also a stage for the insurgents to regroup, re-activate their cells and recover from their losses and prepare for another round of violent operations. However, if the insurgents were actually defeated by the government forces, they are more likely to abide by the agreement.

Often times, empirical analysis have revealed that insurgents do not usually compromise until they fight for a very long time (omeni, 2015; Omeni, 2018). Therefore, it can be said that insurgents will most times complete its cycle before they would show interest in any negotiation. Available records have shown that before insurgents consider negotiation, they must have been weakened by the government counterinsurgency forces. Thereafter, there will

be an intermediate agreement, concessions, ascensions of highly revered leaders, and often, a guarantor. During the negotiation, ceasefire may be broken occasionally by either party to force changes in some of the terms of the negotiation (omeni, 2015; Omeni, 2018).

In a case where the Government forces were victorious, there will be decline in the violence perpetrated by the insurgents, because they would have lost many logistics, manpower and other vital needs, including external support and acceptability by the people. However, the insurgents may continue to perpetrate evil on a down scale and would gradually fade off. Nevertheless, in a situation where the insurgents are involved in other criminal activities like kidnapping, armed robberies, drug trafficking and other illegal activities, it might be very difficult to extinguish them (omeni, 2015; Omeni, 2018).

Furthermore, it is government's victory if daily life continues to return to normalcy. In such situation, government's institutional structures will be fully operational, children will return to school and government security strategies in the area have been relaxed in the areas once overran by insurgents. This, therefore, suggests that the government has contained the insurgents. Other indices that show victory for the government sides are rise in commercial activities, markets and shops reopening, businesses are resuming operations, no restriction of movements even at night, internally displaced persons happily return to their homes. The winning factor for the government also includes civilians openly cooperating with security force personnel, civilians promptly alert security forces of the presence of insurgents, officials travelling with minimal security and can spend their nights in areas that were formerly unsafe (omeni, 2015; Omeni, 2018).

The use of Violence and Propaganda by Insurgents

The concept of insurgency cannot be debated without an excessive deliberation on one of its numerous schemes or modus of operandi, this in essence, is in particular reference to Nigeria. To spread their ideology, reach a wider audience, and draw other radical groups outside of

Nigeria, insurgents have used violent propaganda. Insurgents need to be media professionals (meaning to be competent in the digital age) because they will stop at nothing to disseminate their ideology, instil fear, and bring the government as well as its security personnel into shame. Throughout their activities, the militants in Nigeria's northeast have used propaganda techniques. In order to showcase videos of its successful strikes on military targets, prison breakouts, attacks on police stations and government facilities, the group has successfully used the internet, YouTube, cable news, and other social networks, just to mention a few examples. They keep up their propaganda campaigns to sow terror, demonstrate their presence everywhere, and demonstrate their ability to attack specific targets. BH routinely featured the kidnapped schoolgirls from the Chibok communal area on social media, and cable news, YouTube to further its propaganda objectives (Gilbert, 2014).

The use of violence is one of many ways or methods to propagate fear and dread. Violence is used by insurgents to show the public that they are always able to take out both the movement's opponents and the enemy. Fear among the Nigerian security forces, civilian population, government officials and worldwide was disseminated by violence on the part of militants in the northeast. They terrorised entire towns, terrorising residents into fleeing their homes and property for protection while they attacked numerous people and buildings and set thousands of houses on fire. They terrorised entire towns, terrorising residents into fleeing their residences and possessions for protection while they attacked numerous people and buildings and set thousands of houses on fire. The rebel additionally committed terrorist acts by detonating suicide bombers near persons and facilities (David, 2013). The insurgent carried out assassinations of influential leaders and Islamic scholars who were opposed to their movement. Several important Islamic individuals, including government officials and major figures, remained muted due to security reasons.

Severally, the group has targeted worshippers of all faiths, including Muslims and Christians, on numerous occasions in an effort to scare them away from their worship location, this is done by restricting their right to practise their religion. Former President Goodluck Jonathan proclaimed a state of emergency in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states in 2012 in response to an increase in BH activities. Former President Goodluck Jonathan established a combined task force, this includes the police force, the Nigerian Army as well as other security agencies to lead operations against insurgents under the state of emergency, which gave the security forces too extensive emergency powers (Idowu, 2013). However, in August 2013, the army assumed complete command of the operations against the militants. In order to cooperate with the Borno state's security personnel, the above trio did their primary assignment by locating and assisting with the arrest of militants. Also, the authorities established a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). CJTF participate in arbitrary mass arrests and operations where informants identify potential offenders (Idowu, 2013).

Conclusively, insurgents frequently employ unconventional methods, this includes bombing, kidnapping, ambushing, assassination and killing in order to instil fear, confusion, and assert control over the tool of violence. In order to strengthen their network and raise their profile, the rebel group further declared their allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 (Almukhtar, 2015). For the past few decades, the group has waged guerrilla war against the Nigerian authority as well as its people. The insurgency in the country's North-East has been combated by the Nigerian government and its allies, but the group still poses a threat and a challenge to the authority of Nigeria as well as its allies.

The use of Intelligence by Insurgents

Another major tactic used by BH is the use of intelligence similar to guerilla warfare; basically, this is heavily dependent on intelligence, which is an important consideration while planning operations. Before launching an attack, insurgents do a thorough analysis and assessment of

the national security apparatus. They take advantage of the military's weakness. For instance, rebels in the North-East of Nigeria seek out information about the size, condition, deployment, mobility, and supply routes of Nigeria's security forces as well as their troop discipline, level of dedication, training, and leadership capability (Liolio, 2013). Before launching an attack, all factors are considered.

The activities of BH members over the past ten years demonstrate that they have access to sufficient and reliable intelligence. They strike as soon as they have the chance to launch any attack, acting as though they are aware of all military actions in Nigeria. Additionally, their mobilisation against the security forces is typically more than sufficient, indicating that they have intelligence regarding the military's strength at that particular moment. Their intelligence network is well ingrained, and everyone can operate as an agent and an informant, creating a trustworthy and potent communication system.

It is exceedingly challenging for Nigerian security forces to comprehend the insurgents' strategy at any given time since the insurgents' circle rigorously upholds the oath of secrecy, quickness, and surprise. It is nearly impossible to ascertain the precise specifics of the insurgency's operations, scale, and structure due to the militants' stringent information security regime. As a result, there is no clear way to defeat the group (Azama, 2017). The group has also used social media, hackers, technological gadgets, and local residents to gather information on government personnel (Azama, 2017). As a result, the insurgents are increasingly conducting coordinated operations targeting government personnel, infrastructure, and sites. This reveals the volume of inquiries and observations made regarding the activity of the Nigerian security forces. The rebels have often used information to trick security forces, demonstrating a stronger familiarity with the volatile areas. They use the assistance of locals who can give them precise information about government forces. Also, the group has the backing of sympathisers who don't necessarily participate in the conflict but

nonetheless assist the insurgents with information since they no longer have confidence in the authorities (Azama, 2017).

Conclusively, the insurgents use their understanding of the local area to take the initiative and conduct operations where they see fit. When circumstances are not favourable, they strike at vulnerability and retreat. Intelligence instincts have taught insurgents to withdraw from major confrontation because their aim is to exhaust security forces and prolong the struggle. In Contrast to the Nigeria security forces' tactics, the insurgents efficiently engage the locals and recruits from the communities, persons who are well grounded in the topographical awareness or understanding of the environment, this heighten their alert levels which allows them to be adept at detecting any odd movement(s) inside their area of control. (Azama, 2017).

2.3. The Concept of Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency (COIN) can be defined as a combination of military and civilian efforts to combat insurgency or rising unrest in a section of society. It can also be said to be the government's means of addressing the grievances of a group of people using a civil/military approach or force. This definition is relevant to the understanding of COIN in Nigeria, where in this case the Nigerian government is only fulfilling a part of the definition which is the military effort (Siollun, 2018). Brechenmacher (2019) noted that counterinsurgency is a large scale and all-evolving solution to a social, political, or economic phenomenon, part of which included providing security and social needs for the targeted population.

In the same vein, counterinsurgency involves deliberate planning and implantation of long-term operations to curb unrest. This same process involves refining peoples' welfare, injecting incentives into the system to give room for economic development and re-establishing crucial services. These tasks are carried out by relevant government agencies, both indigenous and international. A counterinsurgency is therefore a holistic approach to resolving crises. It

involves many social and non-social act. It, therefore, embraces local and foreign military as well as civilian agencies to create and maintain a peaceful society. According to NATO, its essential that counter-insurgency forces adequately strategise to defeat the insurgents and thereafter ensure the people and public facilities are adequately secured (NATO, 2017). Counterinsurgency can therefore be said to be a very rigorous exercise that involves the use of constitutional power to guarantee socio-political, economic and religious stability, using all strategies and tactics that would lead to a safe, serene and secured environment.

It, therefore, involves putting in place a combination of measures to legitimately curtail the undertakings of the insurgents' groups. The interpretation of this denotes that counterinsurgency requires suppressing the aggressors and preventing them from overthrowing a constituted authority. Security personnel who engage in COIN operations possess a stronghold on the use of force, legitimacy, and other manuals frequently only available to nations. These reasons further emphasised the importance of counterinsurgents maintaining law and order, which essentially restricts their ability to engage in combat against insurgencies. Albeit, in the case of a developing country like Nigeria, the Security Personnel have the strong backing of the political actors who has directed them to go for the COIN operations, with the inkling that any crime committed will be counted as an oversight. There will be no consequences whatsoever because little number of persons or no one have been brought to book by the law since several reports of rape of IDPs, COIN-related human rights violations, stealing as reported by Amnesty International (2015). From time in memorial, the culture in corrupt countries has been to manipulate the law to suit certain individuals in the society.

According to the US Government, before insurgents' activities can be mitigated there is need for government institutions, like security, legal, education and others, to synergise and form an alliance that would prepare and implement a holistic strategic plan that would counter insurgency. Thus, counterinsurgency is a concept that is all-inclusive, as it involves political,

military, psychological, paramilitary, economic and civil engagements. All the sectors are to be reviewed if an authority needs to overthrow an insurgency. David Kilcullen cited in Akanni (2019) that counterinsurgency is the complete variety of effective ways in which a government takes to defeat insurgency.

Approaches to Counterinsurgency

From the literary point of view, there are different approaches to countering insurgency. According to Akanni (2019), some of them are, First, **the 'enemy as its central' tactic** - it sees counterinsurgency as an encounter with organised agitators and stresses loss of the agitators as the main goal of the mission, while it considers other events as insignificant. Further put, target of this approach is to extinguish insurgents and their quasi-military units. Other tactics adopted in this approach include implementing the soft vs hard, direct or indirect, violent or non-violent strategies. Based on the strategies adopted by this method, it is popularly described as first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow (Akanni, 2019). Empirical findings have revealed that government usually adopt this approach in contemporary times like this (Akanni, 2019). Going forward, it has been observed that execution of this approach to the fullest usually favour the government, as it crushes insurgents sponsored by external bodies or powerful individual or groups, hence, making them powerless and less influential.

Second, **the 'populace at its central' tactic**- there, the government concentrates on safeguarding the lives of its citizenry and ensuring insurgents do not will their goodwill. Though, many investigators have suggested that open battle is the best way to tackle insurgency, but this tactic do not prioritise confrontation, rather it seeks to protect the people from aggressor, then other things will follow (Akanni, 2019).

Third, **the tactic named 'carrots and sticks, hearts and minds'** - this is one of the oldest approaches in counterinsurgency. Its style of operation is logical and very reasonable. It believes if the government performs its core responsibilities and the people are pleased with

the government, there will not be upsurge of insurgency. It therefore focuses on establishing public confidence in the government, execution of public-friendly policies that would promote transparency, development and infrastructure. In this method, the government would do everything is to make the population happy, as such, they have no reason to support or consider the agitation of insurgents (Akanni, 2019).

Fourth, **the tactic named 'weed and seed; clear-hold-build'-** this approach was introduced in 1991(Omeni, 2015). However, it became very popular when four Los Angeles cops who were facing trial for harassing and battering Rodney King, a black motorist, were discharged and acquitted (Omeni, 2015). Following the court decision, there was a violent protest, thus, the weed and seed approach was adopted by the federal government to calm the situation. This method involves (1) collaboration among residents, criminal justice officials and law enforcement agencies to weed out criminals in a particular area; and (2) the government introduces infrastructures and developments programmes or projects that would change and improve the lives of the people in the area, such that their way of thinking and action will change for better (Omeni, 2015).

This method is a replica of "clear-hold-build" military strategy which involves a situation where the military fully take charge of a troubled area and re-establishes government's presence and control of the territory (Omeni, 2015). By doing this, the government extinguishes all insurgents in the area and support the people in their area of needs which may include re-building their infrastructures, sending support funds to them and providing special intervention programmes to improve their standard of living (Omeni, 2015).

Different Counterinsurgency Operations Adopted in North-East, Nigeria

Alex (2016) and Beckett (2007) observe that the federal government of Nigeria introduced counterinsurgency operations as quick response to threats of insurgency in North-East, Nigeria.

They state that since 2009 when it started as a Joint Taskforce operation, it evolves, as explained below:

First, **Joint Taskforce (JTF)-** the Nigeria Government at first concentrated its counterinsurgency operation efforts in the North-East on the creation and posting of the Joint Taskforce to troubled States. The first JTF established was tagged Operation Restore Order (ORO) I, II and III, with personnel drawn from the Nigerian military, Nigeria police, Department of State Services and other security agencies. It was established in June 2011 and was later transformed to Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA and later Operation LAFIYA DOLE. These JTF relied on conventional military strategy for the counterinsurgency operation. The JTF was later supported by the Civilian Joint Taskforce (CJTF), established to provide intelligence gathering and tracking the terrain of insurgents in North-East, Nigeria (Alex, 2016; Beckett, 2007). The JTF established check points in various strategic locations and conducted raids on the locations suspected to be harbouring the insurgents. The operations led to the capture of some members of the insurgents but raised a lot of Human Rights issues (Alex, 2016). During this period, between 2009 and 2014, the Nigeria security operatives relied heavily on hard power approach, using lethal weapon technologies (Alex, 2016; Beckett, 2007).

Second, **Nigeria Army 7 Division**- the Nigerian Army 7 Division was established as a permanent structure to mitigate the inherent challenges experienced by JTF in counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria. The 7 Division with its headquarters in Maiduguri, became the building block for a more permanent structure for Nigeria's counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria. The headquarters of 7 Division established a combat Motorcycle Unit as part of its 25 Task Force Brigade to secure roads in Yobe and serve as a force multiplier in counterinsurgency operation. It also has a Specialised Counterinsurgent Squad that filled the gap of lack of capacity exhibited by the JTF. The

Motorbike Battalion was able to respond faster to threats, unannounced and cut-off the retreating insurgents (Omeni, 2017; Onuoha, Nwangwu Ngwueze, 2023). The main challenge the 7 Division faced, just like the JTF, came from Nigeria's porous borders in the North-East with neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon and Chad. The borders were exploited by the insurgents to move foods, ammunition and narcotic drugs to the region. Porous borders made the insurgents threat to assume a regional dimension (Omeni, 2017; Onuoha, Nwangwu and Ngwueze, 2023). This subsequently led to military cooperation through the Multinational Joint Taskforce.

Third, **Private Military Contractors**- during the tenure of former President Goodluck Jonathan, in 2015, the federal government of Nigeria engaged the services of a private military company, a South African based mercenary group who are known for carrying out Specialised Tasks, well-trained, Equipment and Protection to boost the counterinsurgency operations against insurgents in North-East, Nigeria (Varin, 2018). Specifically, the aim was to assist in the rescue of the 270 kidnapped Chibok girls. The private military company was also engaged to train personnel of the 7 Division on counterinsurgency operations. The military contractors consequently introduced "aggressive strike force" responsible for pushing insurgents on the back foot and containing the insurgents. Using the policy of relentless pursuit, the military contractors made significant impact, essentially regaining territories overrun by insurgents and ensuring they retreat over the course of three months. The government provided all needed logistics, fund and equipment for the military mercenaries and they worked both day and night. The military contractor collaborated with the Nigerian military to achieve joint operations and coordinated communication (Varin, 2018).

Fourth, **Transnational JTF**- in consolidating the military cooperation mechanism, the Nigerian government in conjunction with neighbouring countries co-established a Multinational Joint Task Force. It comprises security officers from Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

The Multinational Joint Taskforce was to counter the challenge of cross-border crimes and arms in-flow perpetrated by illegal migrants who took advantage of Nigeria's porous borders. The Multinational Taskforce synergised with the JTF in Borno and other North-Eastern states. It was structured in four national sectors: Sector one was Cameroon with headquarters at Mora; Sector two was Chad with headquarters at Baga-Sola; Sector three was Nigeria with headquarters at Baga; and Sector four was Niger with headquarters at Diffa. They conduct artillery and air interdiction in Lake Chad Basin. A current assessment of the military cooperation revealed that it has tremendously helped to decimate insurgents' groups from the Sambisa Forest and the Lake Chad Basin (Mutah, 2021).

2.4 Tenacities of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations

Lowenthal (2009) opines that intelligence is a timely and strategic information about an issue of interest or a topical issue. It involves the gathering, processing and interpretation of a hint to meet the information needs of policy makers. Intelligence gathering is therefore pertinent to security personnel because it enables them to professionally advice government officials, including civilian heads on how to counter a war or insurgency. Records have revealed that there are some features attributed to intelligence before it can be useful to the government or military. Part of the feature is that intelligence is usually obtained through technical gathering system and it is sacrosanct to protect the source of the information (Lowenthall, 2009).

In a bid to gather intelligence about a nation or a group in a particular region, the targeted area is naturally bounded by political borders. The interstellar within those territorial areas usually deny access to information within their circle, thus, the need for professionals in intelligence gathering before such information could be collected or the territory could be accessed. Findings have revealed that conventional warfare against any industrial, technologically advanced military depends heavily on professional information gathering (intelligence). This is because part of the prerequisite for a successful military encounter is adequate intelligence

gathering about the opposing side. Therefore, in a counterinsurgency operation, the government dwells more on intelligence gathering about the insurgents before deciding the approach it would use to counter its activities.

Flowing from the above, Viotti (2008) explains that intelligence gathering is dominant in a counterinsurgency or any military operation because every nation guards its vital information carefully. Such information includes number of its military personnel, details of weaponries and other logistics because they serve as a guard for external forces to easily attack them. Therefore, information about advanced weapons programme details, government plans or strategies, foreign policy intentions are carefully guarded and not made public. The main objective of the intelligence syndicate is therefore to access this information discretely and ensure it can access any other information in the same circle without any encumbrances. Based on the foregoing, government at all levels endeavour to protect its intelligence sources and methods because it serves as the foundation for formulation and implementation of policies and strategies (Lowenthall, 2009).

However, in counterinsurgency operations, the style of intelligence gathering is different from conventional war. This is because in a conventional war intelligence are gathered about industrial wealth of the nation and its armoury, while in counterinsurgency operation intelligence are gathered about all tangible and intangible details about the insurgents and the population. Thus, Teamey and Sweet (2006) identified some principles on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations and they note that the principles are used beyond the targeted area of military intelligence, as it focuses on the following areas:

First, **to concentrate on the general populace**- here, as opposed to the military strength political objectives of an adversarial government or conventional warfare, the general populace is the primary focus of counterinsurgency operations. A population-centric counterinsurgency strategy cannot be efficacious without population-centric intelligence. As Teamey and Sweet

(2006) emphasised that COIN is a war of intelligence, and COIN intelligence is about people. Considering the above, the significance of the general populace cannot be underestimated, because the results of the conflict will largely depend on their perception, worries and hopes. Therefore, in counterinsurgency operations, the focus of intelligence gathering centres on understanding the perception of the people affected by the acts of the insurgents, while other aims of intelligence gathering are in addition to this. When the stakeholders (policy makers and security forces) clearly understood the perception of the people they would be able to identify ideologically motivated extremists, accidental guerrillas and sceptical civilians in the area (Kilcullen, 2009b).

Thereafter, operational planning would separate the civilians and reconcilable insurgents from irreconcilable insurgents through integrated efforts of the military and political class, instead of directing their strategies towards a large and undefined audience.

One of the loop holes of Nigeria COIN operations is that it does not take to note relevant secret information as recommended by David Kilcullen, situational awareness based on unclassified but incredibly hard information may be more important than secret intelligence (Kilcullen, 2009a). Investigations have shown that public opinion and other counterinsurgency supporters are the most important sources of information for counterinsurgency operations, as opposed to covert sources and techniques (Gompert and Gordon, 2008).

Population-centric nature of counterinsurgency operations is no doubt related to this change in narrative because information that is very important to counterinsurgency forces lies with the people who makes up the population (ideas and insights of the populace). It might be difficult to retrieve it from the sources, but they do not genuinely guard it or make it unknown. Over times, it has been discovered that insurgents may lie about their location and intention, but once the minds of the people are gotten, their intention or location or whatever perception they conceal is secondary. Therefore, the views and observation of the people is paramount to the

success of counterinsurgency operations and thus it is regarded as a vital part of counterinsurgency intelligence. When genuinely successful, the alienation of insurgents from the people will compel them into combat with counterinsurgent forces. Successful population-centric counterinsurgency will create its own intelligence on the identities and locations of insurgents. (Kilcullen, 2009b).

Second, **the usage of local intelligence** - in counterinsurgency operation, intelligence gathering requires dealing directly with the local people. Therefore, an Intelligence Officer must understand the leadership structure of the people in the troubled area, their identities, culture, needs, fears and pattern of operation in order to access needed information. Intelligence gathering in this case has nothing to do with reading literature or observing what happened during the Soviet Union in order to understand the situation at the operation environment. According to Teamey and Sweet (2006), the insurgents themselves are local, differ significantly in space, as well as time, and are mosaic-like. Counterinsurgency intelligence must be mounted to various and dynamic local veracities inside the wider platform of the operations.

Third, locally-sourced intelligence and global element- despite understanding the fact intelligence in counterinsurgency needs to be localised, it is necessary to also emphasise that intelligence gathered from the locals cannot work in isolation without support from global intelligence, thus, the emancipation of global-local intelligence. Though, it may sound paradoxical to state that, is it possible that intelligence in counterinsurgency could be local and global at the same time? but the truth is that it is the contemporary way of countering insurgency. The local intelligence gathered is necessary in order to understand the operation's environment and know how better to prosecute the operation, but the global intelligence has to do with information about the sponsorship, training and external support given to the insurgents from around the world (Kilcullen, 2009b). Equally, local events in the war-front, such as

collateral damage that results in loss of life, can be easily and cheaply transmitted throughout the world by rebels via the internet and international mainstream press.

Therefore, COIN intelligence must aim to foresee the unintended effects of counterinsurgent measures. In every decision-making process, this is a crucial and responsible factor to take into account, but given the nature of insurgency, it becomes a need. (Kilcullen, 2009b). If the security forces overreacted to violent acts perpetrated by the insurgents and there were civilian casualties, it will definitely lead to extensive condemnation and undesirable impact on the COIN operation. As a result, the operators are advised by a blend of local and worldwide intelligence to be adaptable and to always consider unintentional collateral harm in their missions before acting. This must be acknowledged by intelligence, which must aim to foresee the effects of counterinsurgency operations on the natural world, whether nationally and internationally.

Lastly, **comprehensive information**- similar to how counterinsurgency must be comprehensive, the intel aiding counterinsurgency also requires full spectrum management and integration of all parties involved. The coming together of multinational forces, national, military and civilian forces must be to strengthen the security of lives and property and counter insurgency. Thus, the pattern of operation must be flexible, symbiotic in nature so that intelligence can be networked for the overall benefit of the operation. As was already indicated, the limits were acceptable because Cold War brainpower competences were established in stovepipes in order to safeguard them. Several organisations gathered various kinds of intelligence, and multi-source organisations like the Defence Intelligence Agency forwarded the finished information to the President and other political and military figures who required it for decision-making. The military's tactical and theatre intelligence capabilities were mainly kept apart from the country's international intelligence operations. The intelligence community has never placed a high focus on national-tactical integration (McConnell, 2007).

During COIN operations, national-tactical synergy is significant, because they all immediately profit from each other's intelligence activities. Teamey and Sweet (2006) contend that inside a military intelligence unit, all strata must operate at espionage in a joint-combined setting. As most modern insurgencies do not follow strict control and command hierarchies, it is also impossible to organise surveillance programs in this manner. Information must be networked horizontally and vertically with as much adaptability as the insurgency it is intended to counter.

Relationship between Technology and Counterinsurgency Operations

Technology is diverse in nature and can be gratified for various uses, including but not limited to industrial value. Industrial objects like axes, water reservoirs arrowheads, buildings, and their modern equivalents can be made through technological skills and equipment. Here, the use of rhetoric in addressing COIN is somewhat related to technology. This includes the presentation techniques which will be analysed in chapter six. Exploring these technology options makes human works easier, enhances human functionality and enables them to perform tasks that they could not perform. Clearly, it became clearer over the years that it is human knowledge, experience and skills that determines how well technology can be utilised. For instance, human knowledge and skills play a key role in the making of aeroplane, cars, other mobile gadgets, despite the availability of technology. Also, human knowledge is needed to teach or learn how to drive a car or operate an industrial machine. In essence, technology does not have to do with manufacturing of modern equipment alone, but the application of scientific knowledge to create inventions that aids human capabilities and activities.

Volti, (2009) described technology as an innovation institution established by man through the use of knowledge, skill and available equipment to produce objects that aid the achievement of certain goals. Simon and Yesilada (2011) supported Volti (2009) by revealing that technology was developed as a result of new knowledge and ideas acquired by man, as well as an

improvement of an already acquired knowledge. These views identify value attributes of technology in support of man's endeavour.

Analytically, technology has been found to be a very useful tool in reducing insecurity of lives and properties, as such it remains pivotal in the fight against insurgents. Gianluca (2018) opines that the use of technology in such operation has drastically reduced the incident of fatality during military operations. He classified technologies used during counterinsurgency operations into two categories - lethal and non-lethal technologies. According to him, non-lethal technologies are those systems that are designed by humans and primarily employed so as to incapacitate rather than cause permanent injury. Deployment of this technology helps to win the hearts and minds of the populace. For instance, the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) gadgets helps life to restore back to normal as quickly as possible including the living condition of the people in the troubled areas. It also serves as a means to obtain intelligence about the insurgents. The ICT tools could therefore be utilised for gaining goodwill from the populace.

Therefore, it can be said that a noteworthy counterinsurgency operation relies heavily on effective use of non-lethal technologies. Hence, non-lethal technology is highly appropriate in counterinsurgency operation when it is aimed at winning the heart of the people. The relationship between technology and counterinsurgency operation indicates that when non-lethal technology is utilised it can help to reduce incidence of destruction of human lives and properties. Additionally, it impacts positively on the life of the people. This is because deployment of non-lethal technology is based on human consideration, thus, there is a robust connection between technology as well as counterinsurgency operations.

Likewise, utilisation of technology by government security forces in the North-East, Nigeria, led to both positive and negative effects. For example, through technology, counterinsurgency forces utilise superior firepower. The Nigerian military deployment of firearm equipment is to

accomplish awesome superior firepower against insurgents in North-East, Nigeria. The JTF, Nigerian Army 7 Division, Multinational Joint Task Force and private military contractors have always relied on superior firepower technologies to neutralise insurgents (BH group) in North-East, Nigeria. Below is the list of some of the sophisticated weapon organised and exported to North-East, Nigeria:

Table 1: List of Selected Equipment/Weapon Technologies for COIN Operations

S/N	Equipment/Weapon	Technology	Impact
1.	40MM/L70 AA Gun	Lethal	Highly potent
2.	35MM AA Gun	Lethal	Highly potent
3.	Skyguard Radar	Non-lethal	Force multiplier
4.	Super Fledermaus Radar.	Non-lethal	Force multiplier
5	ZSU 23-4 M (Shilka)	Lethal	Highly potent
6.	40MM/L70 Anti-Aircraft Gun	Lethal	Highly potent
7.	35MM Anti-Aircraft Gun	Lethal	Highly potent
8.	Mi-35 and Mi-171Sh terminator helicopters	Lethal	Force multiplier
9.	BTR APCs	Lethal	Highly potent
10.	T-72 Armour Tanks	Lethal	Highly Potent

Source: Mahmud (2021)

Away from the above stated equipment, it is not out of fact to state that in contemporary world, technology and counterinsurgency are Siamese twins, as such, counterinsurgency forces also adopted the use of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance technologies to execute its mission in North-East, Nigeria. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies have been universally recognised as a very good equipment to prosecute a warfare or counterinsurgency operation based on its ability to achieve numerous activities at the same

time and this has greatly helped in the planning and operation of information technology gadgets that collect, process, and disseminate data in support of current and future military operations (Alex, 2016). Meanwhile, ISR, meanwhile, needs fusion and ongoing observation. Fusion is the integration of all intelligence received during a counterinsurgency campaign to produce a comprehensive picture of the situation and threat in the insurgency-affected region. Each bit of intelligence information is acknowledged there, regardless of where it came from (Krepinevich, 2002). Thus, the security forces continue to carry out consistent surveillance so as to know and understand every move by their target and provide immediate assessment of changes to it. Thus, fusion and continuous surveillance are still crucial elements of COIN operations.

This is effectively achieved through the use of cameras, Closed-Circuit television (CCTV), drones and other technological gadgets. In North-East, Nigeria, these gadgets have been successfully deployed to enhance the success of COIN operations in the area, while the Nigerian Air Force continues to deploy its aircrafts to carry out aerial survey and sorties as part of the general counterinsurgency operations in the troubled area. The Nigeria Air Force uses its Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) named Tsaigumi for surveillance of North-East, Nigeria. Nevertheless, based on the large land mass in affected areas in northern Nigeria, an area with over 100,000 sqkms, and insufficient number of functional aircraft deployed for the exercise in the region, the Nigerian Air Force finds it hard to reasonably impact on the military operations in the zone (Mahmud, 2021).

2.5 An Overview of Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and its Implication on International Humanitarian Law

Combatants' weakness and whims do not determine the outcome of war. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) regulates and limits how armed combat is conducted. International rules, established by treaties or customs, that limit the ability of parties to a conflict to use the

methods or means of warfare of their choice or that defend nations that are not parties to the conflict or entities that are, or may be affected by, the conflict is known as IHL (David, 2013). As a branch of international law, IHL's fundamental principles are binding on all states (Ogbodo, 2010). IHL is a component of the law of war, it serves the interests of those who have been harmed by hostilities rather than just defining the rights and obligations of parties in conflict (Ibanga, 2002). It is founded on the idea that everyone has the right to a minimal set of rights, including protection, security, and respect, whether there is peace or conflict. He has a right to care and fair treatment if he is hurt or taken prisoner; if he dies, his body has a right to respect (Ezema, 2013).

The definitions of IHL offered by scholars vary. According to Blank (2004), it is the human rights elements of the law of war and that a sizable portion of international law is predominated by the sense of humanity and is intended to safeguard individuals. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a significant impact on how this area of international law is developed and improved. ICRC described IHL as those norms, established by treaty or custom, that are specifically intended to address humanitarian issues directly resulting from non-international or international armed conflicts. Also, it further clarifies that, for humanitarian reasons, restrict the ability of parties to a conflict to use their preferred methods and means of warfare or to safeguard individuals and their belongings that are, or may be damaged or destroyed by, such conflicts (Clairede and Edwin, 2003).

Hence, this area of law aims to guide how war is fought while also attempting to lessen the suffering brought on by the start of hostilities. In other words, it sets boundaries and restrictions on the options available for carrying out military operations while also providing for the safety of people who choose not to participate in or who have stopped doing so. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Additional Protocols, and other documents provide substantial

codifications of the principles of international humanitarian law. In fact, some of the 1949 Geneva Conventions have more ratifications than the UN Charter (Clairede and Edwin, 2003). According to Clairede and Edwin (2003), the fundamental laws of IHL can be stated as follows: i); in order to protect civilians and civilian property, the participants to a war must always make a distinction amongst the general populace and fighters. It is forbidden to assault either the general populace as a whole or specific citizens. Attacks are only permitted against military targets; ii) those who choose not to participate in the fighting or are unable to do so and are considered to have a right to respect their life as well as for their physical/psychological wellbeing. Such individuals must always be safeguarded and treated with humanity, excluding any form of discrimination; iii) an enemy who concedes defeat or who is unable to continue attacking cannot be killed or injured; iv) the fighting parties and the commanders of their armed forces do not have unrestricted discretion over how to wage war. The use of weapons or tactics that are likely to result in severe pain or needless loss of life is prohibited; v) the party to the fight with control over the injured and ill must gather them and provide for their needs. It is necessary to spare medical staff, facilities, vehicles, and equipment. The recognisable symbol suggesting that such people and things must be honoured is the Red Cross, Red Crescent, or red crystal on a white background; vi) captured fighters and civilians who are placed under the control of the opposing party have a right to respect for their life, dignity, individual rights, religious, political as well as related convictions. They must be shielded from any acts of retaliation or violence. They have the right to obtain assistance and communicate with their families. They must be granted fundamental legal protections.

In apparent contravention of IHL, insurgents' group(s) in North-East, Nigeria, polluted water installations and has attacked citizens as well as non-combatant objects secured by this legal administration, such as schools, churches, mosques, jails, hospitals, including shopping centres (Clairede and Edwin, 2003). Those who are not involved in hostilities, such as civilian

objects, civilians, prisoners of war, as well as those who are declared hors de combat, are expected to be safeguarded from all forms of confrontation and have a right to respect for citizen's lives and moral and physical integrity, here, citizens on the contrary, were all attacked and treated inhumanely without any distinction.

However according to Clark (2007), these infractions are not just committed by insurgents. There have been reports of security force attacks that resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties, most notably in Baga, Nigeria, in April 2013, when 642 people were said to have been displaced and civilians shot by security personnel. Reliable national sources conducted investigations into the incident and found that national security forces had been involved in cases of extrajudicial and summary killings, torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and sexual violence cases (OHCHR 2015; Mbah and Nwangwu 2014). In addition to defending these individuals, IHL controls and restricts a conflict's parties' ability to select their own tactics and weapons. The use of weapons or tactics that are predicted to result in unneeded casualties or undue suffering is prohibited. In this regard, it is forbidden to use weapons that have the potential to have unintended and unwanted side effects. It is undeniable that militants and Nigerian government troops have used these calibres of weaponry in serious breach of IHL in North-East Nigeria.

The employment of explosives adept of, is always aimed at producing excessive effect, this is the insurgents' current approach (Omenma et al 2023). This is demonstrated by the insurgent group's horrifying and ongoing use of women and children in suicide bombing (Omenma et al 2023). To get by government security networks and reach their goal unnoticed, the use of women and children is justifiable. Typically, it is exceedingly rare to think that women or children would be a threat in an armed conflict situation, allowing them to avoid security personnel's examination. Due to the fact that females are less frequently questioned or probed as assailants, women and girls can approach targets more easily (Zenn, 2014). This

is particularly true in Islamic nations because there are significant societal obstacles to security personnel, who are primarily men, exposing Muslim women to inspections (Cook and Allison, 2008). In light of the fact that security forces can and do adjust, this eventually helps to reduce the exploitation of women and children, this in itself is a notable strategy (Ajey, 2014). These trends are in line with organisational-level examination that describes how a terrorist movement uses women and children to its strategic as well as tactical advantage (Robert, 2003). First, using female assailants initially may garner notoriety and have a propaganda effect due to their shock value (Pearson, 2018). Second, in times of desperation when there is a lack of male recruits due to factors like increased external pressures, militant groups may turn to using women and children (Schmid, 2012). Third, using women and children to humiliate and inspire men to engage in combat (Mia, 2007). Several women and children who participate in carrying out violent activities, do so out of ignorance and frequently while being subjected to intense brainwashing. People are typically taken and forced to act without the use of their own free choice. Lots of ladies and children claim that the terrorists assured them of safety, even after carrying out the attack. Also, female suicide bombers are offered as little as two hundred naira (£0.36- as at 15/10/2023) to act as muse in other to carry out an attack; unfortunately, this will be the case because of their high level of illiteracy and poverty (Stuart, 2014).

Nevertheless, with both hypnotism and imposed drug usage, members of the Operation Lafiya Dole command as well as the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) established that some citizens (mostly female) have experienced both methods before becoming bombers. A woman who was kidnapped in Maiduguri in 2016 expressed how she and two other victims were given tranquiliser injections prior to actually having explosives tied to them (Dionne, 2016). Men have reportedly been seen escorting female suicide bombers to guarantee they complete their duty, according to eyewitness accounts (Dionne, 2016). Extorted secluded bomb blast is possible, although UN reports indicate that it is uncommon, as images of deceased

bombers shows self-detonation via these wristbands (Dionne, 2016). The prosecutor's office of the International Criminal Court started an initial investigation into Nigeria's situation in November 2010 and examined crimes allegedly committed since 2004 out of terror and concern over the serious violations of IHL in the North-East of Nigeria. After two years, the Prosecutor's office announced that it believed rebels had committed murder as crime against humanity since July 2009. The research identified many group-related assaults on the general populace. Additionally, it stated that these violent activities were systematic and pervasive, affecting not only the entire North Eastern region but also the states of Plateau, Bauchi, Kogi, Kaduna including Kano. Also, the Prosecutor's office stated in December 2014 that it had found evidence of crimes perpetrated by the Nigerian security personnel, as well as the alleged use of torture and the extrajudicial killing of more than six hundred persons following the attack on Giwa Barracks (Gilbert, 2014).

2.6 Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

Although many scholars described insurgency as terrorism, this is incorrect. It is however called terrorism when every strategy adopted by the government to pacify insurgents or regain control of the area, with the use of force and other military strategies, proved abortive, only at this stage can it can be described as terrorism. In the view of Amalu (2015), insurgency is not terrorism, even though some insurgents have adopted the strategies of terrorists in perpetuating their acts.

Pratt (2009) noted that counterterrorism consists of actions or strategies targeted at averting and mitigating terrorism attacks and at the same time totalling eradicating terrorism. He further stated that counterterrorism can be categorised as defensive, reconciliatory, criminal-justice and war; with each category possessing varying threat perception, strategies, framing and legal framework. Also, Pratt (2009) observed that COIN is a collective effort to tackle rebellious group(s) within a government, who uses violent means to express their grievances and

demands. He noted that David Galula, a French officer, conflicts veteran and who is considered the intellectual God Father of COIN studies identified the following COIN models: unswerving deed against insurgent headship, action against the circumstances that led to insurgency, penetration of insurgents' movement in order render in inactive or uncoordinated and insert government's interest into their plans (Pratt, 2009). Thus, the goal of COIN is to utilise favourable groups to solicit neutral group(s) so as to defuse the danger posed by an unreceptive marginal group.

Neumann and Smith (2008) also note that counterterrorism centres on combatting the strategies and methods of terrorism as well as its actors, while COIN is a response to political agitation or political violence launched by a section of the population. In the view of Rineheart (2010), COIN involves the use of military, political, paramilitary, economic, civic and psychological actions to curb insurgency. Thus, it can be described as a holistic approach to countering insurgency. It sees the military approach as not the only solution to the conflict, but a collective effort involving all strategic sectors. Strategically, counterterrorism can be described as a warfare which requires detaching, fighting and extinguishing terrorists' group and its membership. It also has a tendency to cause unintended civilian casualties. As such, it can be said that the two concepts represent two different strategic doctrines.

In a practical sense, Chaudhary (2009) stated that COIN requires efforts by a constituted authority to overpower an insurgent group. For example, Gen. Stanley McChrystal's report to former President Obama recommended a COIN tactic to accomplish the assignment (mission) of the United States of America in Afghanistan. To carry out a COIN operation in Afghanistan, therefore, involves the deployment of the military to guarantee the security of the people as well as establish self-assurance that the constituted authority will make adequate provision for security, social needs as well as justice already provided by the insurgents. To be successful in the counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan, therefore, requires the ability of the NATO

forces to eliminate the Taliban and establish a democratic, trusted and reliable government for the people of Afghanistan. Conversely, counterterrorism can be described as decisive action implemented by government to halt terrorists' activities. In Afghanistan, the terrorists are members of Al-Qaeda and its supporters had alliance with the Taliban. The aim of Al-Qaeda is to support the Taliban to overrun the Afghanistan government and efforts of USA (United States of America) in the region, as part of attacks against the West. The counterterrorism approach in this regard involves the utilisation of increased intelligence gathering for security forces to locate and eliminate the terrorists.

Therefore, in the case of Afghanistan, the counterterrorism approach requires preventing extremist clusters from preparing any attack against the government. It does not necessitate the elimination of the Taliban, due to American's belief that it does not constitute a risk to their homeland. Thus, it will only require a rise in intelligence and police activities; thus, mitigating the presence of the United States of America military; whilst the counterinsurgency approach would involve the elimination of the Taliban and establishing Afghanistan constituted authority that prioritises security, justice and other social needs. Thus, it would require a considerable increase in soldiers and support from the United States troops would be needed.

Review of relevant theories: Argumentation theory, Framing theory, Human Needs theory- a critical discussion.

One of the notable theories related to this study is argumentation theory. It is one of the dominant theories surrounding the field of social discourse. The tenets of the theory can be deduced from the arguments that usually engulf verbal communication. The implication of this is that the underlying aim of any speaker while addressing a person or group is to modify his illustration of the adjoining world. It stresses that with a well-established argument, orators select precise words to characterise their thoughts and further transform the listener to accept their position on the issue (Kalemaj, 2014).

Further put, argumentation theory believes that arguments are used to resolve different shades of opinions, such that both the addresser and addressee agree on the same point of view. This theory is related to this study because the Nigerian government in several forums had to argue with the opposition parties and critics on efforts of the government to curb the Boko Haram insurgency. Likewise, former President Goodluck Jonathan in his speeches argued that the government's counterinsurgency operations in North-East are yielding desired result and made the people believe the Government is doing something to ameliorate their plight. For example, when the Chibok girls were kidnapped, the speech delivered by Ex-President Goodluck Jonathan then relaxed the nerves of the girls' parents and assured them that their children will be rescued. Even though the pupils continue to spend months in the insurgents' den, statements from the Presidency continue to argue that the government is overpowering the insurgents. As such, Nigerians were optimistic that the children will be rescued (Oke and Labeodan, 2015). Interpretatively, argumentation theory as a rhetorical procedure applied in public persuasive discourse is a very prominent tool in the hands of the government. Further put, different analysts have previously used the argumentation theory to explain what and how the government uses discourse in different perspectives. It is therefore worthy to note that argumentation theory applies to understanding the rhetoric in counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, to employ persuasive mechanisms in making the people understand and believe in the government of Nigeria. Similarly, Kane and Patapan (2010) opine that public debate is crucial to the development of democracy, leaders have a duty to govern the society through continuous encouragement, and hence, rhetoric is dominant.

Going by the view of Lewinski and Mohammed (2013), the above position corroborated the analysis of Aristotle in his well-known Rhetoric technique. Therein, it was stated that dialectical and rhetorical study of argumentation theory's concern is on basic procedures of cognitive and persuasion on all kinds of subjects in any circumstance, aside from persons who

possesses specific knowledge of where logic applies. It can therefore be observed that argumentation theory requires shared understanding of both methods and contents of arguments, thus, scholars must take cognisance of the rational, dialectic and rhetoric methods of arguments, as applicable to all fields (Lewinski and Mohammed, 2013).

Further put, Lewinski and Mohammed (2013) posited three levels of argumentation theory: one, discussants demonstrate their hypothetical research into series of arguments with instances derived from various discourses. Two, discussants provide academic analysis for a methodical investigation of argumentative context and deliberate on issues prominent therein. In this case, rather than concentrating on descriptive purposes, premeditated issue becomes an object of unswerving analysis into the circumstances it creates for argumentative communication. This level of argumentation theory also indicates that rather than being utilised mainly for descriptive purposes, expository issues become an entity of continuous investigations into situations and therefore generates an exchange of arguments.

Eemeren (2010), Eemeren and Garssen (2010) and McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2006), therefore, suggested a model of argumentation in premeditated context, which could be predominantly on empirical or normative ground. With this model, there was an introduction of some fallouts into the theoretical and methodological framework of the theory. This is more so that researchers in politics, international studies, communication, administration, defence and discourse analysis use this method of argument analysis and assessment to examine the workings of concrete debates. Based on this, argumentation theory is adopted as one theory related to this study in order to analyse and evaluate deliberative activities like speeches and laws related to counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, as they are very important to theoretical and empirical accounts of deliberations and accounts obtainable by political and social actors.

Again, argumentation theory is related to this study because Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) noted that the theory aligns with the Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis approach which integrates critical discourse analytic concepts with the analytical framework of argumentation theory that is divided into hands-on perceptive, negotiation and dispute assessment using dialectic methods.

Explaining these categories, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) contends that practical reasoning develops in response to problems we are confronted with as worldly actors. It involves arguing in favour of an issue and persuading people to act in a way to achieve some needed goals or end. Essentially, practical reasoning entails attaining a major premise and other supporting goals. In achieving such goals, argumentation theory requires actions that would lead from undesirable circumstances, needing transformation to the desired circumstance. The premise of this theory, therefore, lies in describing a problem and finding a solution to the problem, by involving all contexts that could influence the circumstance to the desired goal.

To this end, the theory has been adopted as a suitable model for political discourse analysis, because politics centres on decision-making. Other features of practical reasoning are- first, claim for action: here, it is presumed that an agent should act in a way; second, the agent's goals: at this instance, the agent's actual concern or commitment is achieved; third, the circumstance: agent's context of action is made up of significant issues like natural facts, agent's value commitments like promises, resultant moral values and duties; fourth, the value: this is the major concern of the agent. Likewise, it can be said that this should be the major concern of the agent; which represents the agent's major concern; and lastly means value: this is the process the agent intends to utilise to achieve his/her goals (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012).

Going further, practical reasoning is followed by deliberation, during which the agent must analyse the claim for action to determine whether it is the proper course of action because, in

most cases, it takes into account the unfavourable outcome of such action. According to Fairclough and Fairclough, deliberation has the following structure:

(a) Request for action: Here, the agent is required to actually do something, and it is assumed that this is the proper action to take.

(b) Counterclaim aim: this is the opposite of a "claim for action". It speaks about what the agent is not expected to do or what is not right.

(c) Goal: is the fundamental desire of the agent. It is a future state of affairs and the wish of the agent to get it achieved, that is, achieving it through the implementation of the core values.

(d) Negative consequences: Here, it is considered that the action of the agent will have a negative effect that will make achieving the goal a very difficult or impossible task. A commission of action at this level will lead to the detrimental to the goals.

(e) Value: This involves ultimate concern and strategies towards the realisation of the goals.

(f) Circumstances: This is when an agent is acting in a particular way or context, subject to the predominant environment he finds himself, like social institutions and political actors.

The third category of the argumentation theory is the argument evaluation which involves enquiring about perilous details that would unveil the structure of power and ideologies entrenched in taking an action. Questions may therefore arise in the following areas: crucial inquiries that queries the story's logical adequacy or truthfulness; crucial inquiries that can refute the claims; inquiries that can thwart the reasoning. At this level is the significance of argumentation theory to this study, because in investigating this study through critical discourse analysis, critical questions will be raised on how speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan and the contents of TPA influence COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria, vis-à-vis its impact on Human Rights abuse during the operations.

Similar to the above and related to the study is the framing theory. Framing theory was proposed by Erving Goffman in 1974. It considers frame as a social context as well as a mental

representation that eases the arrangement of skills and practices by users. Goffman while explaining the theory observed that it transcends individual concepts to the holistic concept with a keen consideration of both sociological and psychological significance. It also provides representations of existing realities in society. Going further, framing extends to linguistics when scholars established the understanding that the use and words or texts in speeches or messages significantly change the way such messages are interpreted or considered by the recipient (Weaver, 2007). Therefore, this theory aligns with this study that evaluates rhetoric strategies employed by the former President Jonathan's administration in tackling insurgency. The framing was first used in a communication research article in 1980 (Weaver, 2007). At this early stage, López-Rabadán and Vicente-Mariño differentiated the evolution of framing theory into trio: the first was noted for instrumental application of the sociological definition of terms and the period covered 1974 to 1990. During this period, framing theory gains acceptability in communication (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). The second (in the 1990s) was when text composers begin to utilise framing in the construction of sentences. It was a period analyst too begins to analyse the frame utilised by text composers in their writings. Likewise, there was a time there were heated arguments that framing is the same as the agenda-setting theory of the media, while other scholars were of the view that it is different but with a thin demarcation line (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). The last stage was in the 21st century and it was a time of re-organisation and practical advancement of the theory. There were a series of definitions development; related concepts and methodologies relating to framing were upheld and this was achieved through the harmonised relationship among researchers and scholars who are interested in the theory.

Researchers and Policymakers have further argued that framing a speech is significant to both the sender and receiver of the speech and this led to the categorisation of framing, by scholars, as actor framing and audience framing. By this explanation, several factors like political

interest, human needs, societal demands, intergovernmental relationships and expected public reaction and many more are responsible for the text composer's decisions on the kind of frame adduced to a particular law like the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and former President Goodluck Jonathan's speeches. Different frames initiated by the speechwriter are therefore fundamental to ideas or stories generated in the speech and it helps the writer to connect the speech and mind of the reader to the existing reality in the society (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015).

This theory is related to this study because framing affects human reasoning about Nigeria's efforts at countering insurgency, though people tend not to pay serious attention to it this does not mean it is jettisoned in the governance parlance, as it unconsciously affects the peoples' thoughts and perception.

Moreover, the theory of Human Needs is one of the numerous theories relevant to this study. Just as Abraham Maslow propounded the hierarchy of needs theory, John Burton was one of the key theorists that propounded the Human Needs theory and over time he has been closely identified with Human Needs theory, a tactic to comprehending long-standing social unrest (Burton, 1990). Findings have revealed that Burton is not considered the sole inventor of Human Needs theory, but he gave semantic beautification to the concept and posits that existence of some universal needs have to be met to prevent individuals from engaging in violence or destructive conflicts (Burton, 1990). This theory therefore subsists based on the fact that every individual has a desire or what they need from the society or constituted authorities and when these needs are not met, there is a high possibility of unrest or violence between the people and the government or constituted authority (Burton, 1990). Burton, therefore, advanced the theory to provide an understanding of the concept of contemporary human needs by providing a way of preparing the fields of conflict analysis and resolution (Danielsen, 2005; Burton, 1990).

In terms of COIN operations, this theory offers a common understanding of the strategies that, in the context of a social together with political setting, could deter people from resorting to violence as a form of protest or as a means of satisfaction. This is because intense struggles arise following the failure of people to meet their needs. Therefore, in employing the Human Needs Theory to the study of insurgency in Nigeria, it is observed that the insurgents' resort to violence to seek redress for their grievances.

In the view of another scholar of Human Needs theory, Rosenberg and Chopra (2015), opines that all human behaviours are attempts to meet such wants. He claims that violence can be seen as the catastrophic manifestation of unfulfilled human desires. Impliedly, it can be said that insurgency occurs in Nigeria when government failed to satisfy people's needs and there was no other means of achieving it. Likewise, violence may erupt if the people are not receiving government's attention or those in authority refuses to support the people in their areas of needs. Human Needs theorists, therefore, believes that one of the major reasons for a long-standing violence is people's determination to accomplish their physiological needs. When the constituted authority continually fails in this area it would lead to frustration which eventually results in hostility. Meanwhile, psychologists are of the opinion that most frustrations lead to aggression and acts of aggression lead to violence. They, therefore, argued that insurgents act due to frustration emerging from failure of constituted authorities to meet the social, economic, political, religious and general demands of the populace (Adibe, 2012).

Agbiboa (2014) also argued that the Human Needs Theory in dealing with political or social violence posits that everyone has basic needs he or she wants to be fulfilled and the inability to fulfil these needs generates prolonged massive violence which could invariably lead to crisis. According to researchers, the inability of Nigeria's government to provide good governance, create and sustain a viable economy for the nation, ensure political stability, wipe out corruption and other abnormalities have situated a path for the emergence of the insurgency in

North-Eastern part of Nigeria, where violence is on its large scale. As such, the aim of insurgent group is to overthrow Nigerian government and enact stern Islamic Sharia law on the Nigerian citizens (Onyebuchi and Chigozie, 2013; Zenn, et al., 2018).

To justify this relationship between counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria and Human Needs Theory, Ozumba (2014) opines that the government must be technically, administratively, financially and politically viable to surmount any form of pressure, agitation or violence, emerging within its constituents. As a result, this theory is related to this study because it concurs with Burton's theoretical footings to identify rhetoric approaches implemented by the Nigeria's constituted authority in the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013) and former President Goodluck Jonathan's speeches in the fight against insurgency. A genuine approach to counterinsurgency operations through the protection of Human Rights must try to facilitate and endure a culture with active alert arrangement that is a genuine tool to aggressively sensitise, caution and protect the people.

Going forward, this theory entrenched the fact that counterinsurgency operations are not only about militarisation but satisfying the needs of the aggrieved members of the political system. This is because the environment comprises of all those settings and happenings that are not distinctly related to boundaries of political system, while demands are the claims made by individuals and groups on the political system. These demands and the inability to respond to them will invariably establish the Human Needs Theory's efficacy in countering insurgency, vis a vis the violent conflicts, reconciliation efforts and other efforts that are being used to restore justice globally (Ekong, 2016; Eneanya, 2013; Creswell, 2009; Danielsen, 2005).

Review of relevant theories: Ideological square theory, Speech act theory, Positive theory of Law, critical theory-a critical discussion

First, ideological square theory was postulated in 1993 is another theory related to this study. According to Van Dijk (2006), the Ideological Square theory is a theory that looks into the

interconnection between society, social cognition and discourse. Van Dijk (2006) states that it involves a model representing all discursive strategies utilised by text composers to describe an issue or a social phenomenon and its relationship with the social actors. According to Van Dijk's Ideological Square, these four maxims guided the theory, as shown below:

Ingroup emphasising positives;

Outgroup stressing negative aspects;

Ingroup destressing negative aspects; and

Outgroup de-emphasising bad things (Van Dijk, 2006).

By implication, this theory shows that the Nigeria government in the fight against insurgency through the use of speeches and laws formulated will continue to emphasise good things about its strategies, while it would use every government's architecture to play down negative things attributed to its counterinsurgency operations, like Human Rights abuse. This also implies that the Government, as part of counterinsurgency warfare will continue to portray the insurgents in a bad image among citizens, while de-emphasising the positive implications of insurgency in Nigeria. That is, how insurgency has uncovered the lacuna and corruption in the Nigerian security structure.

Second, speech act theory, Jarasch, Jamai and Gumus (2014) defined speech act as an utterance that serves a function in communication which involves greetings, complaining, requesting, apologising or arguing a thought. A speech act may be performative or consultative. It is performative when it is used to undertake an action which is rather felicitous or infelicitous, while is it consultative when it is used to make a just account of events. Also, Baktir (2012) notes that the Speech Act theory is a theory that centres on the main communication attributes of diction and tries to react to objective interface between speakers. John Langshaw Austin propounded the theory in 1955, the same theory was later developed by John Searle, his pupil.

They believe that the sequence of the words has its true significance and clearly relates to the speaker's message (Baktir, 2012; Austin, 1975; Searle, 2014).

According to Drid (2018), the use of language in communication transcends employing its formal units for the description of reality. He noted that speech act theory sees language as an instrument for performing social acts. It postulates that the smallest element of social communication is not the sentence as a syntactic unit. It however suggests entities like making statements, asking questions, giving orders, describing phenomena, and others regardless of their linguistic forms as basic communicative units. This concept birthed the speech act where speakers do things in the real world.

In speech act theory, there are three levels of categorisation of simultaneous acts that one can do when making a speech (Austin, 1975). The three levels are: the locutionary act, the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act. This classification applies to all utterances. It is the elocutionary act when it performs the propositional or literal meaning of the utterance, as conveyed by lexicon-grammatical components (Drid, 2018). That is, the intent of the speaker or social actor who canvassed for a law can be found inside the linguistic structure of the said legal framework or speeches or utterances themselves. It is an illocutionary act when the doing or performative element of the utterance as intended by the speaker is governed by social conventions. It is perlocutionary when it the utterances are accompanied by the first two levels. That is, utterances seen as actions usually leave an impact on hearers because they are viewed as John Langshaw Austin's interactive framework for interactional bits of language (Crystal, 2008; Sadock, 2004; Austin, 1975).

Conversely, Searle (2014), who helped to develop the theory to what it has become today, does not look at speech act theory from the elocutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts but prefers a complex method to the explanation of the illocutionary acts. He, therefore, used the knowledge of illocutionary as the dominant theme of his argument for the theory. Going

forward, Searle (2014) affirmed four directions of fit in diction. They are: first, if what is being said directly relates to a global issue, then it is World to World. A statement of facts demonstrates this direction of fit, to put it simply; second, in World to World, the World is changed to meet the argument's propositional substance. A directive speech act, such as an order, would be an illustration of such an act. third, when the universe is altered to fit the intended meaning of the expression by being portrayed as such altered, this is known as the twofold direction of fit; and lastly, the null direction of fit, when there is no doubt that the fit between the world and the written word will be successful (Baktir, 2012; Austin 1975).

In essence, Searle's speech act theory was based on the fact that language lies on a two–way drive: the world and the word uttered. Thus, the theory deals with the usage of language; and over time, it has been used within a broader context of phonology and other fields. Unarguably, Austin and Searle agree on the illocutionary act through illocutionary force in the speech act (Austin, 1975; Searle, 2014). They, therefore, classified it into the following groups - illocutionary point: which is the objective of a specific act; strength of elocutionary point, which is likely to be tougher for some kinds of speech acts unlike others. The method of accomplishment which separates a request from a command; criteria for propositional content, which are limitations placed on the speech act by the propositional content; preparatory conditions, which relate to some presuppositions peculiar to elocutionary strength; sincerity conditions, which confirms that the speech act achieved what it is meant to achieve, that is, the speaker's views, intents and moods; and strength of sincerity conditions, which entails some acts that have stronger sincerity conditions attached to them (Baktir, 2012; Searle, 2014; Austin, 1975).

The speech act theory, therefore, observes that in the society, speech can be described as processing of ideas and interacting with one another. However, clarity of a speech depends on the grammatical and phonological ability of the originator. If a speaker clearly understands a

language, he can fluently speak, write or communicate to the audience. However, there are specified guidelines that governs speech presentation and our communication process, thus, the sender of the message or the communicator needs to be careful about the kind of meaning he gives to each statement, because a statement must be informative as much as possible. Practically, the onus of this theory is that speech acts control people's behaviour it influences the thoughts instead of the actions of the listener. The theory also notes that speech establishes a social relationship to recognise the presence of each other (Baktir, 2012). In essence, speech act theory posits the idea of using speech to direct a performance or a task, acquire information for the purpose of expressing it (Baktir, 2012).

Austin (1975) further observed that speech act theory contains a functional speech classification, that is; speeches are used to perform various functions, depending on the intent of the speech composer/writer. He noted that linguistic in speech performs many roles like, making promises, conveying invites, making a request and giving an assurance (Baktir, 2012). This view of Austin (1975) shows that this theory is related to this study because former President Goodluck Jonathan's administration uses speeches to assure Nigerians of the determination of his administration to rescue the kidnapped Chibok girls. Whilst effects of speech is also reflected in various presentations of the former Nigerian President assuring citizens that the government is countering insurgency. Speech act theory, therefore, affirms that utterances perform an act without explicitly stating the act. As such, speech act theorists maintain that words have illocutionary force when they are construed as distinct types of acts. Third, the positive theory law, this theory notes that the relevance, application and obeisance to any law is subject to its source. It observes that enforceable laws are those that emanate from the legislative arm of any government, whose core responsibility is making laws. This theory could be traced to England, around 16th and 17th centuries when there were series of socio-political, economic and religious unrest in the English land. During this period, natural law

could not meet up with existing challenges and crises, as such; there was a need to develop a theory that combines justice and law, as a concept. In order to restore peace in England, Famous scholars led by Thomas Hobbes and John Locke propounded the Positive law–a law that believes that laws are formulated by the State for the advantage of the State. This is necessary to secure infrastructure of the State and to safeguard its citizens (Akanni, 2019).

As such obedience to the law was no longer an issue of conscience, but a matter of compulsion, and deviants are made to face the punishment. Therefore, obeying a law was no longer a matter of choice to the English people, and this ended the debate of whether the church or the State is to govern the law because the State took full custody of the society through the legal instrument (the law). The Church, therefore, became accountable to the State which superintends over all affairs. Relating to this study, the positive theory of law posits that government makes laws that control human conduct and guarantee that there is a decent social order. Government enacts laws to counter any kind of illicit activities, and this includes insurgency. The TPA was formulated to curb insurgency, just as it was set up to proffer punishments for those guilty of insurgency acts. This is because insurgency undermines the state's and its residents' ability to survive, which the government must always ensure.

For instance, in Nigeria, according to the TPA, it is unlawful for anyone to threaten, commit, promote, aid, or enable any act(s) preparatory to, in promotion of, or the successful implementation of any act(s) of insurgency or terrorism (TPA-Appendix F). Any individual or collective of individuals who take, imprison, seek to seize, or threaten to kill or harm another individual (or their property) in order to persuade them to release an insurgent or terrorist, advance their cause, or have the authorities condone such an offence are also guilty of a crime. For these crimes, the maximum sentence for conviction is ten years in jail (TPA-Appendix F). This is unlike natural law where obedience to law is grounded on human conscience and capability to distinguish between what is right and wrong. As opposed to the natural law, where

adherence to the rule is founded on one's conscience and capacity to distinguish between what is moral and immoral. Insurgents view their actions as morally legitimate under the natural law despite the fact that general society views them as wrong. In contrast, according to the positive theory, laws are forced on individuals and must be strictly followed or respected.

Again, TPA and rhetoric strategies used in speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan are COIN strategies carried out by the Government of Nigeria as a method, this method involves going after those who have flouted the law against insurgency and threatening the existence of peace in the Nigeria state. The positive theory of law, therefore, an essential theory that specifies the need for positive laws by the State to make sure its citizens are alive and safe (Nbete, 2012; Nwogwugwu, Alao and Egwuonwu, 2012).

Lastly in this sub-section is the critical theory, which is one of the theories related to this study. The central argument in critical theory is that society needs radical transformation and reform (Toros, 2016). In effect, this means accepting dominant categories hook, line and sinker is not only unproductive but also intellectually impoverishing. Therefore, engaging with insurgency studies implies not taking for granted categories such as insurgency, security and order, rather it means investigating not only the assumptions underlying them but also the effects of these assumptions. This brings us to two key themes in critical theory–ethics and emancipation–as paramount to understanding insurgency and the response it elicits from society, especially state-sanctioned responses, and counterinsurgency. Ethics concerns itself with how we study insurgency, while emancipation concerns itself with the why–the purpose of studying insurgency. The question of why do we study insurgency, how do we study insurgency and to what extent do we study insurgency? are critical to scholars who derive inspiration from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, in particular (Toros, 2016).

Ethics in critical theory examines the dominant or orthodox approaches to the study of insurgency and interrogates the dangers of what can be provisionally termed, adherence to

statism and historicism (Toros, 2016). Statism refers to the proclivity to always put the state at the centre of insurgency issues and as the basis of which all things are measured, and as if every insurgency act is targeted at the state alone, not considering the fact that the state itself could exhibit conducts likely to cause unrest. Additionally, historicism here refers to the (excessive) penchant for history that eschews and excludes narratives other than those favoured by mainstream approaches, that is, state-centred approaches. In particular, it refers to a deliberate attempt to marginalise histories of violence by state actors and to associate insurgency with the exclusive activities of non-state actors. Critical theory is therefore critical of the notion of insurgency, especially its corresponding invitation–counterinsurgency, as a privileged category which heightens one form of violence from a broad spectrum of political violence. This critical attitude towards counterinsurgency does not deny the existence of violence, with an impact on a large audience beyond its immediate target (Toros, 2016); rather it invites careful reading and interrogation of the vast corpus of political violence undergirded by economic, historical, social and political contexts as a way of understanding the changing landscape of violence.

The point, therefore, is to unearth the array of violence and its manifest forms rather than marginalising some forms of violence while emphasising others as insurgency. This means problematising the concept of insurgency to free the people who suffer the effects of the assumptions of insurgency (and counterinsurgency) taken for granted. The contention of critical theory is that the sequence of narrative: insurgency is an objective fact; acts of insurgency are associated with non-state actors, and states are protectors of all that is "good" and always acting in the interest of the collective, explicitly calls for and naturally invites states' use of immeasurable force. This legitimisation of unlimited violence by states is a phenomenon that is largely ignored in the array of Human Rights abuses, especially in insurgency discourse. To this end, Toros (2016) argued that the starting point of any emancipatory project, which critical theory champions, is to establish a link between emancipation and violence, both

contingent and structural violence. He points out that a viable means of giving an edge to emancipation is to attribute it to violence. Emancipation through violence therefore remains the foremost way of decoding the relationship. Simply put, emancipation from insurgents' violent act and in a broadening move, emancipation from counterinsurgency operations.

Going forward, critical theory's refusal to uncritically accept blanket notions of insurgency is directly linked with its discomfort with the level of violence being exerted in the name of counterinsurgency. Indeed, critical theory is opposed to state-centric violence, as well as other forms of violence, especially under the guise of large-scale counterinsurgency operations wherein supposed insurgents and non-insurgents suffer the same immeasurable violence at the behest of state actors supposedly liberating the people from the insurgency. This sentiment has led scholars to question the rationality of counterinsurgency especially states' claim to be 'protector of the good' and waging counterinsurgent war on behalf of society, while simultaneously occasioning untold suffering on members of the society. The contention here is that the Nigerian state can itself constitute an agent of violence to its citizens vis a vis the society as a whole.

The impulse of this theory to this study is the argument that militarising counterinsurgency operations is not only unproductive, rather, but it is also devastating in practice/consequence and constitutes a lot of human agonies translating into Human rights abuse. Thus, the relevance of rhetoric strategies in counterinsurgency operations to manipulate the mental state of members of the society, including insurgents, is non-negotiable.

Summarily, this theoretical framework chapter explored several related theories and has justified the importance of sticking to the chosen theory which is the 'rhetorical theory'. The chapter buttresses the importance of adopting a working theory that will assist in achieving all objectives of the thesis. Subsequently, this second chapter discussed the concept of insurgency and COIN this includes the tenacities of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations, an

overview of insurgency, COIN and its implications on International Humanitarian Law. All these gave a concrete bedrock of understanding for the thesis. The next chapter will elaborate on the selected methodology (a qualitative method).

3.0 CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Chapter three discusses the choice of the research method adopted for this study. It explains how the researcher gathered the necessary data and elaborates on the data analysis techniques utilised. The chapter equally explains the choice of methodology for this study. It defines Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and explains the rationale behind the adoption of Norman Fairclough's approach to CDA for the study. The uniqueness of Norman Fairclough's approach to CDA is established and its distinctiveness as it aligns with this study is demonstrated. Also, the chapter defines discourse and explains the notion of discourse and the constitution of discourse. Also, it explores the concept of critical in CDA. The chapter introduces the empirical basis of language and presents the toolbox of CDA highlighting the eight tools among other issues that are also discussed in this chapter.

What is Discourse?

Discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary field of endeavour that cuts across different fields or subjects. Its submissions outspread beyond linguistics (or language) representation to the report of actual language tradition in cognitive, situational and cultural contexts. Further put, the examination of any given text must include both linguistic and contextual descriptions (Drid, 2010). The comparative originality of discourse analysis is embedded in two important factors: First, its encapsulation of formal and functional parameters of traditional models; Second: modern grammatical models. These factors have unquestionably propagated its grandiosity and multifariousness in the academic community, with academics constantly reconnoitring its breath, profundity and submissions within various disciplines (Drid, 2010).

"Discourse" is a term that can be etymologically drawn to the Latin word "discursus" which means a "conversation" or a "speech" (Drid, 2010:20). An acceptable definition of discourse

can therefore be known as communication (or a unit of expression) which can either be in oral (verbal) or printed (written) mode (Drid, 2010). Concurring to the above definition, Cameron (2001) added that discourse is also known as language in use this means a language that is used to do a thing and means a thing, language that is created and decoded in a real-world situation. The above recapitulates the fact that a single word or a phrase like "GENTS" or "GENTS ONLY" regularly seen or written on the entrances of community lavatories is a form of discourse; and an alphabet like "i" used in Britain to signal a tourist information also represents discourse (Cameron, 2001). This can be typically linked to the speech act theory from chapter two.

Similarly, Brown and Yule (2003) define the term discourse as 'language in use'. This definition in line with Cameron's thought suggests that language can be utilised in various ways, and these are shaped by the situation or context in which they are being utilised. The situation in question might be determined by various factors i.e., purpose/function, participants, activity type, the topic, place, and time in which the particular language is being utilised. More determinants involve language as meaning in interaction, and language in cultural and situational situation. The majority of scholars would concur that these determinants of discourse reflect linguists' pre-occupation with the analysis of language as a semiotic mode for denoting meaning.

Van Leeuwen (2005), on one hand and in a related development, defines discourse as engaging the term language and all other semiotic modes such as facial expression, gesture and other forms of graphic (or visual) communication employed for insight and illustration of the real-world. Tannen, Hamilton and Schiffrin (2015) on the other hand, speak of the count form of discourses, they further added that a wide-ranging accumulation of linguistic and non-linguistic

social practices and ideological assumptions rather works hand in hand to reinforce power or identity among others.

Again, to Deborah Cameron, discourse is not just language above the sentence or beyond it, it is described as language in use. This highlights the inherent view that discourse is language and vice versa (Cameron, 2001). Drid (2010) also supports this view by adding that discourse expresses a number of denotations for an array of reasons, nevertheless in all circumstances, it connects with language and it portrays it in some way. Consequently, any type of communication conveyed through extra-linguistic (or linguistic) method can commonly be termed as discourse. Subsequently, discourse is limited to words or non-verbal exchanges between two or more conversers, yet its broader construction covers extra-linguistic and intra-linguistic areas. Consequently, the below components form the language materials or data for a discourse analysis study. All components of language, this includes phrases, single letters, clauses, words and sentences. Also, this includes government documents and media productions (news broadcasts, news reports, feature articles, speeches, interviews, laws, opinion columns, editorials, periodicals, advertisements); all wider textual units like conversations and speeches; all demeanours of paralinguistic communication (gestures, body positions, dress codes, facial expressions, voice quality); literary works (plays, novels, poems, and short stories); semiotic modes; and cyberspace columns with all their linguistic particularities, and more, fall in the horizon of discourse (Suciu, 2019; Tincheva, 2015).

Going forward, discourse analysis participates in the examination of discourse in various discourse fields. This is dependent on what the specialist (or the researcher) is investigating, it scrutinises texts to uncover the concealed itinerary in particular or selected texts. Hence, academics observe and label the phenomenon distinctively which is usually based on their chosen method of analysis. The word 'discourse' inclines to propose the idea behind a written or unwritten communication. Nonetheless, linguistically, discourse has been defined as

language above or beyond the statement which could be in verbal or printed forms (Weiss and Wodak, 2003).

It is central to this conversation to ascertain that a portion (a piece) of discourse could be made up of one statement. Nevertheless, disagreements are in favour of linked sequential statements, which are observed as proffering a solid foundation for the analysis of the comparative dissemination of rudiments of a stretch of dialogue or script (Weiss and Wodak, 2003).

Arising from the above, discourse remains a contextualised language and it forms the substratum of how people make sense of the world they dwell in, it also defines their personalities and helps to rather engage or disengage in meaningful relationship with one another.

3.2 Choice of Methods- Critical Discourse Analysis and Survey

To conduct this study, critical discourse analysis (CDA) and survey research methods were adopted as research methods. CDA was adopted to enable the researcher to examine manifest contents in TPA and speeches of the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan relating to Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations, as retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, to capture the rhetoric and speech delivery technique utilised by the text composer(s) and former President Goodluck Jonathan; while the survey was adopted to get the opinion of respondents about the extent to which counter insurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria.

Accordingly, the CDA method was used in responding to research questions one and two, while the survey method was utilised in answering research question three. The methods were deemed appropriate as the study is concerned with the examination of rhetoric and speech delivery techniques used in TPA and counterinsurgency speeches as well as the extent to which

counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria.

Wodak in Kendall (2007) stated that the concept of CDA started in 1991 in a get-together organised by Van Dijk in Amsterdam. In his opinion, critical can simply be defined as

> *not taking a case for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, being self-reflective in research and through these processes the structure of power relations and ideologies manifest (2007, p. 5).*

Moreover, it does not suggest its literary connotation of being sceptical. Wodak observes that CDA is a novel approach to understanding a social phenomenon from a critical social point of view, through identity politics, social politics, and linguistics analysis, thus making CDA an interdisciplinary case study (Wodak in Kendall, 2007).

Ulinnuha et. al (2013) posits that CDA is a tool used to analyse linguistic and social phenomena. They note that it is necessary to understand how individuals express themselves in cultural and social discourse to achieve productive communication. In the same vein, Fairclough (2002) observes that it is impossible to take the responsibility of discourse for granted in our social undertakings, thus, it must be ascertained through analysis. He states that CDA is divided into three in social practice: it appears as a part of communal endeavour within a practice, and as such, it consists of various genres that display diverse forms of acting and creating social life, in the semiotic mode. Similarly, Fairclough (2002) further opines that discourse is a form of representation, in social practice, because social actors in the social setting produce their representation as well as representations of other practices, in their day-to-day engagement. Fairclough (2002) maintained that CDA in the social context consists of

techniques of being, in the establishment of identities, that is, the distinctiveness of a political forerunner.

In the view of Van Dijk (2010), CDA focuses on elementary ideas like macro, micro and power as being in-charge. In his analysis, the micro-level of the social order consists of discourse, communication, language and verbal interaction, while on the macro level it consists of dominance, inequality and power among social clusters. The implication of this is that CDA theoretically bridges the gap between macro and micro approaches in a social phenomenon. Going forward, it can be said that CDA refers to a broad array of approaches to discourse analysis which share a basic assumption. It is usually used as a label to designate either of several contexts, that is, (a) describe a collection of approaches concerned with language use as part of a broader movement within discourse analysis and (b) Norman Fairclough's version of discourse analysis within that broader movement. The implication of this is that it can be said that Norman Fairclough's CDA approach is a unique and distinct aspect of CDA (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:1) define discourse as "a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world) such that our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations but play an active role in creating and changing them". At the core of this is the consensus that language is not a passive agent, but an active agent in shaping social reality. The common understanding binding CDA together is that the use of language does not reflect some neutral and objective material reality out there; rather, language is the building block that helps shape social reality and is in turn shaped by that reality. Hence, CDA deals with empirical studies of language that concretely manifest as texts, which facilitate a better understanding of how ideas (articulated) or knowledge of the

social world influence or determine discursive practice and manifest as social behaviour or patterns.

Corroborating his view, Richardson (2007) argues that CDA deals with investigating the content of a text how it is actioned or discursively practised and how the contents are described. Thus, investigating the discursive analysis of counterinsurgency rhetoric and the influence of speech on the practice of COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria with the use of CDA is essential to the body of knowledge, as the study will look into the socio-historical and political ramifications and processes of the issue.

The selection of CDA as the method of choice is not simply because it is found to be useful, but because it possesses the necessary tools to decipher the multiple aspects of the discourse involved in the conception and execution of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. CDA helps bring into focus the various aspects - social, political, cultural and institutional - that affect discourses and, how the various aspects are in turn affected by the discourse. Further put, the concern of CDA is to unravel the dialectical relationship between discursive events and the situations, structures, and institutions that shape them as well as how they are shaped by the discursive event which coincides with the broader objective of this study, that is, bringing the discourse of counterinsurgency into question as opposed to accepting it as a fixed and objective category out there.

The Notion of Discourse

The notion of discourse in CDA suggests the social character of discursive practices by which "texts are produced (created) and consumed (received) and interpreted" (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:61). It means the discursive processes through which texts are produced in everyday life, received and interpreted (or consumed) form part of the broader social and cultural production underlying social change in society. Thus, it follows that discourse is part

of our everyday sociability of which text production and consumption is an invaluable part of the discourse. Hence, CDA incorporates not only written and spoken language or visual images, but includes what can be seen and, from which, meaning can be deduced. It, therefore, seeks to draw a relationship between texts – both written and spoken – and visual images, especially resulting from or as outplay of interpretation or interaction of a given discursive practice.

The notion of discourse helps to inform CDA to elaborate on the linguistic dimension of socio-cultural procedures of any social phenomenon in a society without undermining or downplaying the non-linguistic, discursive dimension. However, the notion of discourse, as applied in this study, conforms to Fairclough's use of the concept which sees it in three different ways or dimensions: text, discursive and social practices. There are further thoughts below on the three models or dimensions of discourse which in turns informs the notion of discourse in this study.

1. The constitution of discourse: CDA sees discourse as both constitutive and constituted. It sees discourse as a social process in a "dialectical relationship with other social dimensions" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:61). As a form of social practice, discourse for CDA is in a constant state of dialectical struggle with additional discourses which shapes it and are reshaped by it, so that it is both an object and a subject of social discursive processes. CDA in this study considers that every discourse is an active part of a series of discourses engaging in a discursive struggle for meaning and dominance. Thus, CDA is adopted to examine notions of counterinsurgency as a discursive practice whose struggle for meaning cannot be dissociated from its enabling texts and discursive processes. Fairclough observes that "the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas in people's heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material, social structures"

(Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:66). The concern with discourse as an intrinsic part of CDA is that social structures are not independent; they are part of, delimited by, and discursively altered by other discourses or social processes around them. This study builds on this understanding to argue that COIN, as a social structure, is not a mere reflection of ideas cast upon stone or pursued for its own sake, but a continuing process of practical appreciation of a phenomenon within the historical cum political setting of society.

2. The empirical basis of language: CDA holds that language is a fundamental, an essential and invaluable component of how social reality is constituted; it is one of the most significant building components of the process. Language, either as written or spoken text, is one of the means through which the social world is produced, appropriated, interpreted and consumed (Fairclough 2000; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). The emphasis on the empirics of language in CDA does not in any way downplay non-linguistic aspects of social reality. Rather, it encourages an examination of both linguistic and non-linguistic dimensions of discourse as quintessential to understanding the broader practices of a discourse. However, the empirical basis of language is a key distinguishing feature of CDA that sets it apart from other discourse analytical approaches. The emphasis here is on the important role of text in facilitating a systematic analysis of social practices and processes. With this element, CDA distinguishes itself from Discursive Psychology (DP) which emphasises rhetoric and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's Discourse Analysis (DA or discourse theory) which concerns itself with the signification of language than the empirics of its use (Carpentier, 2010).

CDA maintains that the inter-textual nature of text gives it a historical and synchronic effect that connects it with other texts (or discourses) and different texts (or the same discourse) over time. In this context, Fairclough (2000) and Wodak (2001) note that expressions are only evocative if we reflect on their use in a certain circumstance. If we know the fundamental

agreements and procedures; if we identify the embedded terms in a particular culture and ideology; and if we are aware of what the discourse conveys to in the past. The empirical basis of linguistic analysis in CDA thus means that it is concerned not only with the text as they are or exist in isolation but about other texts or bodies of texts, as well as their link and connection over time and space. In other words, CDA concerns itself with both the historical and transformational basis of language and how it is being used and/or deployed to convey and produce new meaning (Fairclough, 2000; Wodak, 2001).

3. The idea of critical: the idea of critical in CDA is not an express acknowledgement of itself as a critique of dominant models for its claim to political neutrality; rather, it recognises itself as not just being apolitical (but always engages with its subject) and poised to take a clear stand against dominant models that seek to marginalise other grounds that they are not politically neutral. The concern of this critical element of CDA is that the assumption that textual presentation and analysis are the neutral representation of reality is fundamentally flawed. Rather, as Richardson (2007) argues, CDA holds that from the content of a text to how it is actioned or discursively practised and how the contents are described, social analysis is the result of choice, and one choice over other choices (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). In other words, CDA debunks the myth of politically neutral research endeavour and identifies itself as politically interested in the discourse that forms its research. Thus, CDA is not merely concerned with analysing a given social phenomenon but practically committed to unearthing hidden meanings and patterns of power relations that are embedded in such discourse. As a result, CDA does not see itself as politically neutral, but rather as a critical approach that is politically committed to social change. Critical discourse analytical approaches advocate for oppressed social groups in the name of emancipation. The goal of critique is to uncover the role of discursive practise in the perpetuation of unequal power relations (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002). Although the concern of CDA is not to indict or implicate anybody, institution

or group of bodies or institutions for social malaise ravaging a society; it nonetheless concerns itself with a positive critique of what is represented by and presented as dominant modes of engagement as problematic and, by extension, offers new ways of engagement and emancipation from the dominant imaginations. This critical attitude, applied to insurgency studies, directs our attention to the non-neutral character of (counter)insurgency discourse and provides an alternative sense of interrogating insurgent threat beyond the limits of positivist-sanctioned understanding of the insurgency as a product of non-state actors.

Thus, examining counterinsurgency in Nigeria without a critical attitude to the discourse - its socio-historical and political ramifications and processes- might be merely sustaining the existing order. Moreover, without such critical disposition, examining counterinsurgency might not only end up reproducing insurgency, albeit in new forms but might also advance stories that suppress other narratives of what the discourse is or seeks to accomplish.

4. Ideology: this element of CDA links it with Marxism or demonstrates its ancestry to Marxian tradition. Like Marxian thought, CDA argues that discourses are never neutral and dominant discourse, in particular, subjugates other discourses. The subjugation of discourses reveals that one social group strives to maintain dominance over other social groups and, as such, discourses are ideological. The ideological element of CDA draws directly from its critical stance, which acknowledges itself as a critique of dominant forms of representation privileging particular discourse over others. Thus, the focus of CDA here is on the discursive practices through which dominant representation is advanced in favour of particular social groups over others in society (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

As part of its commitment to unravelling the ideological basis of discourse, CDA is keen on systematically investigating: "the often opaque relationship of causality and determination between (a) discursive practices, events and texts and (b) broader social and cultural structures,

relations and processes; ...how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles overpower [and]; ...how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony" (Fairclough, 1993:135). The concern here is that beyond the structuring and restructuring role of discourse, discourse also functions to further certain interests. The ideological element of CDA positions it to systematically investigate and unearth the embellishment of unequal power relations that determine and maintain extant social order. From this understanding, CDA furnishes the theoretical lens to examine the discursive representation and presentation of insurgency; the privileging of a particular form of insurgency over others; the heightening of the threats of insurgents resulting from the privileged and acknowledged form; the implication of this representations to the broader socio-cultural practice and mobilisation of efforts towards mitigating it; and the consequences of such practices in the everyday lives of the people and how these processes serve to privilege one group, subject, or position over the other.

Ideology functions to create subjects and categories and ascribe different values to them. The effect is that associating a subject to a category automatically ascribes them with certain rights, privileges, obligations and responsibilities so that social identities and their values appear natural or naturalised. It does this by way of organising and patterning individual thoughts along specific lines of reasoning, making them appear as a common-sense, while simultaneously making alternatives appear subversive and incongruent to common sense. The thesis's context portrays the characterisation of state-sanctioned violence, which is widely accepted as a privileged form of violence, and this, as a positive value can be easily contrasted with that of the insurgents, an underprivileged form of violence, as a social vice, to engender cognition to follow pattern akin to common sense. The dominant framework of social cognition, no doubt, sustains the belief that the state is an ally of good positive action, such that, the common-sense cognition is to follow or support state-sanctioned violence, regardless

of the circumstance. Thus, from the structuring of the social world, the worldview which normalises social relations, including counterinsurgency takes root through the ideological functioning of the discourse.

5. Discourse, power and social change: in CDA, the traditional association of power with the use of force is acknowledged as true but considered narrow and limited. For CDA, this notion of power is archaic because modernity has made a forceful exercise of power brutal and cruel. To this end, power has not only transformed over time from naked use of force and coercion to subtle manipulation; it has democratised in forms to allow for much more subtle and effective control, with little or no resistance. Here, to be democratised means it has been manipulated to suit various purposes including and not limited to personal or collective motives. Further put, it means power has taken different forms or it has been used in different forms for personal gains. One of the democratised and accepted forms of power has formerly explicated and elaborated by Antonio Gramsci (1971) now manifest is hegemony or hegemonic power, refers to the exercise of power through manufactured consent whereby, victims of power have been manipulated to believe or accept that compliance with certain dictates or that by behaving in certain ways they are benefiting themselves (Fairclough, 2001). Thus, rather than coercion, hegemony relies more on or is accomplished through manufactured consent, with victims believing their acting in a certain predetermined way is their volition (Fairclough, 2001). Acknowledging this Gramscian notion of power as invaluable to critical discourse analysis, Fairclough (2001:360) observe that "the maintenance of contemporary power rests not only on coercive force but also on hegemony", where hegemony means winning the majority's consent in the society through cognitive control facilitated by established social institutions, that is mass media, schools and family for effective control. Hegemony, which rests on manufactured consent, relies on cognitive control, which is, controlling the way people think, rather than directly controlling their actions or how they act. The latter (controlling how

people act) is the domain of traditional exercise of power, whereas the former, that is, controlling how people think – as a predisposing factor of how they (will) eventually act – is the sphere of influence of modern exercise of power, hegemony.

In other words, hegemony is a subtle and indirect form of control over society. Thus, to accomplish effective control over society, consent has to be manufactured through a carefully constructed worldview using ideology. The discourse of counterinsurgency has to be rendered in such a way that society naturally sides with the state, with its privileged violence, whose motive is to enforce social good against the insurgents, with its underprivileged violence, and whose proclivity for violence is primarily motivated by base desires to inflict pain and cause fear. Simply put, the power relations which underlie the privileging of certain forms of violence over others are discursive. Power relations are therefore mirrored, mediated, enacted, and reproduced by discourse.

Concept of Common Operational Picture in a Counterinsurgency Operation

Investigations have revealed that one of the prominent means commanding officers of various units in a counterinsurgency operation take charge and become aware of happenings in the operational environment is through common operational picture. In a counterinsurgency operation, a common operational picture is an identical set of information/data shared by more than one command or unit that is used to display an operational picture containing the information relevant to the Commander's needs to facilitate collaborative planning and decision making, assisting all ranks to achieve situational awareness. (Kilcullen, 2009b).

The common operational picture is not a real-time common presentation but is developed on parameters approved by the Commanding Officers for joint, and if possible, inter-agency and multinational partners, to understand relevant aspects of the operational environment. It provides a shared understanding of the operational environment from which to diagnose the

nature of the operational problem(s) that counterinsurgents are attempting to resolve, and it assists counterinsurgent operatives in planning solutions in real time and space. A common operational picture should include significant inter-agency partners, multinational partners, key stakeholders in the nation's government, and NGOs to be successful (local and international) (Hammes, 2006).

Nonetheless, due to the sensitivity of some operational information, combat information and intelligence, and Commanding Officers' information-sharing processes, a comprehensive, predominant common operational picture may be difficult to achieve, because it evolves as the operation or campaign progresses. This necessitates agreed-upon processes for incorporating new information, updating previously accounted-for information, and removing outdated and/or inaccurate information. Going forward, Kilcullen (2010) states that the common operational picture is significant in any counterinsurgency operation because it enhances decision making and unity of effort which remains one of the cardinal points of any counterinsurgency operation. Exclusive of a shared situational awareness of significant features of the operational environment by different members of the counterinsurgency forces, separate entities within the COIN force will likely analyse problems differently, resulting in inept efforts at curbing insurgency and could also lead to clash of interest of issues among counterinsurgency forces. In a situation where common operational picture is not shared, it would diminish accord of efforts, which dilutes the richness of the COIN narrative, as projected by the COIN force's actions and messaging, and leads to the inefficient or even counterproductive use of resources. Whilst common operational picture is normally maintained by the Commanding Officer, subordinate commanders and leaders may also maintain their common tactical pictures which is an accurate and complete display of relevant tactical data that integrates tactical information from the multi-tactical data link network, ground network, intelligence network, and sensor networks. At the tactical level, the common tactical picture is

a source of situational awareness and can serve as source of information for the common operational picture.

Counterinsurgency and Discourse

The use of repression by law, which is, violence or force as a basic tool for countering insurgency has been one of the major sources of debate among scholars like Liddell Hart, David Galula, David Kilcullen, and Lorenzo Zambernardi, among others. Several scholars have argued that brute force in the course of counterinsurgency is normal (Lacquer, 2000). For them, there are compelling reasons to use any means necessary to combat the insurgency (Jackson et al., 2006). However, the area of contention is that the violent nature of insurgents' activities requires the corresponding measure from the State since the latter is the primary repository of force and the only one with the monopoly and legitimacy to use violence to ensure order in society. Thus, the inevitability of forces in counterinsurgency is necessitated by "the severity of modern insurgency and the causalities and damages it causes [which] require the constituted authority to do all within its power to defend its citizens, including the use of the military measure", even if this means suppressing the rights of few (Jackson et al. 2011:35).

Explicit force, however, has proved ineffective and several empirical research works have suggested that it is counterproductive. Richardson (2007) puts the disparaging effect of excessive force as counterinsurgency tactics when he notes that the well-defined message of the British case study is that of regardless of moral repulsion, in this case, it is better to have conversations with the insurgents. Richardson (2007) argues that "talking" with insurgents, as opposed to the use of brute force, does not equate to weakness on the part of the government. If anything, he argues, it demonstrates a sense of responsibility on the part of the State to the concern and grievances of citizens.

A similar position has been advanced in the case study of the Israeli state's usage of force in response to terrorist activities. David (2002), Hafez and Hatfield (2006) together with Cole (2008) concurred that the Israeli state's use of targeted assassination as counterterrorism tactics has not only proved ineffective but that the state has also witnessed a significant rise in terror activities following its use of targeted assassination. The contention is that rather than diminish the capacity of its targets to inflict horror on the State and its population, excess force usually incites the population against the State as a way of sympathising with the target group. The ineffectiveness of targeted assassination as a strategy was further emphasised by Cole (2008), noting that approximately one in three victims of targeted assassinations were innocent civilians, and in most cases, these are children and women.

In Nigeria, over-reliance on the military's explicit use of force has been questioned, and Zagga (2012:51) puts it rhetorically thus: "is there a military solution in dealing with a man who is ready to die for his course?" Response to this rhetorical question is usually the negative and the sudden rise in insurgents' activities in Nigeria's North-East has been ascribed to the failure of the repressive approach initially adopted by Nigeria's security operatives. The argument is that a political approach that seeks to tackle the fundamental problems that gave rise to grievance and insurrection will not only be appropriate but more likely give room to and show concern for Human Rights issues in its course of action (Zagga 2012; Ebijem 2011). Thus, what is worthy of note is that the core of contestation against the usage of explicit force in combating the insurgents is to emphasise the importance of dialogue and or negotiation in the face of violence. This is not because the dialogue is the only way, but because, so far, the military option alone does not appear to have been able to achieve much. It is this understanding that underscores Nigeria's Senate President, David Mark, submissions for dialogue as an alternative path:

There is no government that would fold her arms and watch innocent citizens being murdered in schools, markets, churches as well as mosques. This carnage must stop. As brothers and sisters, we must listen to each other's grievances. I believe that the government in line with this has expressed readiness for dialogue and I urge members of Boko Haram, their representatives, sponsors or sympathisers to key into this dialogue

(Mu'azu, 2011:3).

The acknowledgement of lives being lost in the name of the fight against insurgency informs the call for dialogue as a more viable approach to counterinsurgency. However, the premium placed on military and forceful means has not been equalled by a non-military approach. While in speech, there appears to be a commitment to a non-military approach, and in conduct, the government appears not to falter in its increasing military expenditure.

Discourse versus Text

According to Mammadov (2018), discourse was primarily used by the English-speaking linguistic tradition and text by the German-speaking and other continental linguistic traditions to capture language units above the sentence level in previous decades. Likewise, scholars like Tincheva (2015) opines that text linguistics and discourse analysis share structural and analytical tendencies; though, several scholars maintain the text or discourse dichotomy.

Sanders and Spooren (2012) point out that discourse refers to both spoken and written language, whereas text is limited to phenomena associated with written language. They consider discourse to be an umbrella term that encompasses all units of syntactic analysis and how they relate to meaning in context. To them, discourse is thus formal, functional, and cognitive. Text, by extension, is a fragmented integrated component of discourse, whereas

discourse is an increasingly broad stretch of text. Thus, discourse is an omnibus box that houses text as well as all of the lower levels of the grammatical hierarchy and links them to their situational contexts. It extends beyond linguistic boundaries into a broader range of non-linguistic domains (Alba-Juez, 2009).

Arising from the above, it can be said that discourse can be defined as a type of human engagement rather than merely a different unit of study of language. Hence, discourse comprehension encompasses the following: the cultural contexts; the syntactic system of grammatical structures; and the feature of cognitive (intention). Consequently, text should not be confused with discourse; rather, it should be regarded as a component of the main unit of discourse. Discourse's inherent broad or expanded intrinsic nature makes its scope far more complex than text. This deep understanding of discourse extends far beyond the sentence and even further beyond the contexts of speech situations, speech act, and speech event. It makes it unambiguous that our communicative proficiency – our understanding of the usage of language in our day-to-day activities (Mammadov, 2018).

Discourse can, in principle, be either spoken or written, and both have distinct functional processes that are apparent. Verbalisation (expressing ideas, thoughts, and feelings through the use of language and non-linguistic means), exchange (organising and managing sequences of conversation between two or more interlocutors through the conversational techniques of turn-taking, insertion sequence, overlapping, sentence-fillers, repair mechanisms), and participation (organising and maintaining relational roles between the speaker(s) and the listener) are the typical processes that lead to spoken discourse (Gumperz, 2015). Speech is characterised by these embedded processes as being expressive, role-alternating, participative, and negotiatory in function, but spontaneous, fragmentary, error-prone, repairable, and largely unsystematic in structure.

The following processes are used in written discourse: textual process (using graphic conventions to represent ideas, thoughts, information, and feelings); regulatory process (organising textual practises in accordance with the standards of appropriateness and correctness of speech events/situations); integrative process (assembling disparate ideas into a coherent whole); systematic process (organising textual units in a planned and logical manner); participatory process (organising texts by anticipating reader needs); and (shaping and maintaining texts for future references). Similarly, the aforementioned writing processes give writing its distinctive qualities, which include being textual, pre-planned, regulatory, organised, laborious, rule-governed, and primarily integrative and systematic in both structure and function. These embedded processes define speech as evocative, alternating in roles, communicative, and negotiating in functionality, but impulsive, disjointed, prone to errors, reparable, and mainly unsystematic in structure.

For instance, delivering a speech, also known as public speaking, is a hard and planned process of writing brief notes or a manuscript to be spoken aloud to a specific audience either word-for-word or conversationally (Nikitina, 2011). Inferentially, the operational frameworks of such speech occurrences frequently incorporate both written and spoken discourses. Additionally, speech settings such as interviews, news reporting, and classroom discourses all call for the merging of written and spoken discourse.

On one hand, discourse kinds have also been thematically and denotatively defined. As a result, discourses can now be divided into groups such as media discourse, ethnic discourse, gender discourse, political discourse, cultural discourse, internet discourse, religious discourse and educational/academic discourse (Nikitina, 2011). These discourse subcategories are what Tincheva (2015) refers to as several spaces and practises of communication that are occasionally contextualised according to their thematic perspective or viewpoint. Discourse themes frequently inform these subcategories of conversation. Interdiscursivity, on the other

hand, is the result of discourse being a combination of two or more themes. When elements of two or more discourse types are woven together in a socially situated text or speaking, discourse is said to be interdiscursive. For example, if a component of discourse combines elements of discourses which can be economical or political. A discourse analyst will need to conduct an inter-discursive analysis of the discourse while keeping an eye out for all the characteristics of the two discourse categories to arrive at a significant elucidation.

Why it is Necessary to Analyse Discourse?

The question posed above is comparable to the one posed when considering why it is necessary for us to interpret or make meaning of what we experience every day in our interactions and activities. We engage in discourse analysis every time we try to make sense of and understand what we read, see, and hear. The ability of humans to understand one another's language and paralinguistic codes is crucial for the meaningful coexistence of species. Language-based norms, which are divided into phonological, morphological, syntactic, and semantic components, as well as their predictabilities in understanding utterances, are the main focus of linguists (Bamisaye, 2007).

Yet, a grammatical statement might be understood whereas one that isn't could be difficult to understand. This is due to the fact that we are able to understand the pragmatic goal of the writer in every statement thanks to our worldview (contextual knowledge). So, the ability or aptitude of the participants to engage in discourse analysis greatly influences the outcome of human interactions, talks, or endeavours. Here is where discourse analysis' main focus resides, underscoring the importance of this technique in academic research. The need to comprehend how language users interpret both what other people say and things that are implied but not spoken then becomes crucial. Everyone is involved in this endeavour of discourse analysis since we are all (sub)consciously translating the many (in)coherent riddles, terms, mysteries,

words, signs, codes and experiences around us into something that makes sense. So, the foundation of a society and the driving force behind the interpretation and transfer of knowledge, values, beliefs, ideas, cultures and information are discourse interpretation and discourse transmission (Shen, 2012).

According to Schiffrin (2006), discourse allows people to: (a) convey their identities and relationships; (b) communicate communicative intentions; (c) engage in actions and interactions with one another; (d) arrange information so that it is accessible to others; (e) engage in actions and interactions with one another; organise thoughts into communicative actions; and (f) represent the world. Understanding language's use in all contexts is therefore crucial for human survival as long as they coexist with one another. Engaging in an academic study with a focus on discourse is worth investing on because the requirement for discourse analysis has been made absolutely necessary by the acknowledgment of discourse as the highest unit in the hierarchical structural elements of language.

To this end, discourse analysis is associated with a variety of fields that can benefit from the study of language in relation to contextual factors (Drid, 2010). Theoretical paradigms with roots in linguistics, psychoanalysis, philosophy, sociolinguistics, sociology, international relations, mass communication, anthropology, teaching foreign and second languages, translation studies, artificial intelligence and cultural studies serve as the foundation for the linguistic, cognitive, and discourse processes of discourse analysis. Hence, discourse analysis's combination of theoretical methods from all three disciplines based on the perspective from which language is generated informs the discipline's variety (Drid, 2010; Suciu, 2019). As a result, discourse analysis can be thought of as a hybrid discipline that combines methods from several academic fields (Mammadov, 2018; Herring and Androutsopoulos, 2015; Herring, 2001).

3.3 What version of Critical Discourse Analysis are we adopting and why?

This study adopts Norman Fairclough's version of CDA, mainly because of the comprehensive cover this model offers to social analysis. Fairclough's CDA sees discourse, as has been noted earlier as, 'both constitutive and constituted' and 'embedded in the text' and examines it at three-dimensional levels–as a text, a discursive practice, and social practice (or process). Language as a social practice not only gives meaning to social reality in the way it is used within a specific social context or field but also in "a way of speaking which gives meaning to experiences from a particular perspective" (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002:66-7). In other words, discourse in Fairclough's CDA constitutes social identity formation, social relations, and general schemes of acquaintance and meaning-making of underlying social events or a given social phenomenon.

Whilst Fairclough (1992:4) insists all three dimensions, "text (speech, writing, visual image or a combination of these), a discursive practice which involves production and consumption of texts, and social practice" be covered in any specific discourse analysis, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:68) maintained that all three needs to be separated analytically for clarification. This study, therefore, appropriates Fairclough's framework to examine the three dimensions of counterinsurgency in Nigeria. The **"texts"** of counterinsurgency discourse in Nigeria refer to the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013) and selected official speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan that are related to countering insurgency (2011-2015).

The **"discursive practice"** refers to the actions and conducts of security personnel and judicial interpretations of the legal instruments relating to insurgency and counterinsurgency which draws from these texts (except for interviews, which are expressions of, reflections on, and responses to, the practical outcome of the discursive practices). The **"discursive practice"** also encompasses how these texts are understood and consumed in terms of their acceptance, reception and or rejection, by the institutions directly responsible in particular and the people

in society in general. Whilst the **"social process"** refers to the broader outcome of counterinsurgency processes in society in terms of human safety and security, protection of lives and property, displacement of persons as a result of security operations, dislocation and disruption of means of livelihood.

Having said the above, CDA is chosen for this study due to its depth of exploratory power which aligns with the objective of this study. CDA besides being able to explain why the specific choice of language in a discourse is preferred over others; explains why certain languages are embedded within specific discourses. It can explain how language is categorised and ordered in line with specific ideologies to frame or construct a given discourse. Also, it can guide understanding of how the use of certain languages or choice of language is intentional and deployed to reproduce and/or maintain power through social interaction.

The interaction of the three dimensions has been conceptualised by Fairclough (2001), with the aid of a diagram below:

Figure 1: Fairclough's Three-dimensional model (Fairclough, 2001)

The diagram above shows the three levels between text and its manifestation in a social context. At the first level, represented by the inner box i.e., text, focuses on the grammatical features of the text. This requires an objective reading and description of the syntactic elements of the discourse. According to Fairclough (2001), the first level is a descriptive exercise of the object of analysis. In the second level, represented by the second-inner box, that is, interaction, the focus is on a semantic analysis of the discourse of counterinsurgency. This is an interpretive level, it includes the interpretation of the meaning of the text in its communicative situation, that is, how knowledge as (counter)insurgency is produced, interpreted and consumed by way of interaction between its source and the receiver or receiving end (society). The level three is represented by the outer box, that is, context, concentrates on placing the text in a sociocultural and historic condition of production and interpretation. This is done, according to Fairclough

(2001), by synthesising the analysis of the data from the previous two levels - text and interaction, to explain their significance contextually. Nevertheless, below is an attempt to usher in some sense of analytical distinction among the three dimensions of discourse as it relates to counterinsurgency in Nigeria.

The object of analysis (text-analysis-description)

Counterinsurgency discourse as a text emphasises textual representation and analysis, written or spoken (both are represented in this study), of the discourse. It focuses on the embedded meanings in the text, especially legal instruments and documents relating to insurgency and countering insurgency. The textual dimension of discourse focuses on linguistic properties such as wordings, grammar, syntax, vocabulary, sentence coherence, ethos, metaphors, and interactional control or set to gain insight into how the agenda is set within a discourse, how social identities are constructed, how relationships between the object(s) and subject (s) are established and how all these are ordered to give structure and shape to the discourse. The emphasis here is mainly on the formal features of the language usage. In Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, as with most versions, textual representation is considered important not only because language forms the building block of social reality, but the choice of word (or privileging of one word over another) and grammar structure are part of carefully articulated processes that do not just happen haphazardly.

Counterinsurgency discourse as a text concern itself with both the choice of word (and grammar structure) and its ordering as an intrinsic part of the meaning-making process embedded in texts, so that "textual analysis involves the analysis of the way propositions are structured and the way propositions are combined and sequenced" to give meaning to a discourse (Richardson, 2007:38). Thus, counterinsurgency discourse as texts focuses on the micro-level discursive formation, mediating abstract social concepts to give rise to concrete social practices or processes. Exploring the micro-level basis of how insurgency is conceived,

conceptualised and operationalised, and how the need for it to be addressed, mitigated and/or countered are articulated helps garner a broadened perspective of the counterinsurgency campaign in Nigeria.

Discursive practice–interpretation and consumption (process-analysis-interpretation)

Insurgency and counterinsurgency as a discursive practice relate to how texts are produced and consumed - how they interact. At this discursive level, the focus of CDA is the examination of how notions of insurgency are generated, conveyed and understood more generally. This intersection is important to understand a discourse, but to appreciate the intersection requires interrogation beyond representation to the level of interaction. Analysis of interactions evoked by text, beyond the textual representation, is the focus of discursive practice in CDA (Van Leeuwen 2008). Van Leeuwen (2008) concurred that the control of knowledge not only shapes how individuals perceive and interpret the world; it structures how they interact with each other, and the (course) of action individuals may engage in.

Similarly, Mason and Platt (2006) argue that language as the primary means of social interaction is a germane evaluation tool and judgmental as it transfers propositional contents implicit in texts. Thus, understanding the representation of text alone is itself insufficient; it has to be complemented by an understanding of how texts are mediated through actual practice. Examining the discursive practice of (counter) insurgency is significant to critical discourse analysis because the examination will reveal knowledge of how texts/concepts are formulated, how their contents and structures are formed and transformed, and how the conditions of their production (may) impact or affect the meaning they convey in practical terms (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Discursive practise, according to Jorgensen and Phillips (2002), devote attention to the ways in which authors of texts utilise pre-existing discourses and genre to construct a text as well as the ways in which readers use pre-existing discourses and genre in the reading and

interpretation of texts. Texts can only have concrete meaning via influencing and being impacted and constituted by social practise when they are produced and consumed through discursive activity, which is a setting in which individuals use language to do both. Hence, the discursive practice of discourse serves a relational purpose between ideas and their concrete manifestation as a social practice.

By adoption of Fairclough's CDA, the study can explore how counterinsurgency is conceptualised and represented in texts; how the texts draw on other texts inter-textually and identify what discourse(s) they draw from inter-discursively. Although intertextuality is defined as "the condition whereby all communicative events rely on preceding occurrences," interdiscursivity is defined as "the articulation of several discourses and genres in a communicative event" (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 73). The discursive practice of a discourse, inter-textually, exposes the influence of socio-historical processes on a given text and vice versa, while interdiscursivity, suggests how a discourse re-articulates itself through specific discourse or discourses. Examining counterinsurgency in Nigeria at this level helps to shed light on how the discourse on insurgency relies heavily on or remains fixated on traditional notions of security even when it appears to undermine the security and wellbeing of citizens.

 Socio-cultural practice–situational context (social-analysis-explanation)
The third dimension of discourse, which is a social practice, is the manifest level which is the mediated outcome of the interaction of the texts and discursive practice. The conception of discourse as a social process involves two main characteristics: language as an integral part of society and language as a performative tool of social structuration. This means that language constructs even as it is being constructed by society.

3.4 Toolbox for Critical Discourse Analysis: The Analysis of the Fundamental Element of CDA as Applicable to Nigeria.

As noted earlier, Fairclough's CDA is employed to analyse the texts. Though Fairclough (2003) presented twelve tools, eight are selected based on their analytical utility and explanatory relevance to the texts under consideration, and in tandem with a scholarly requirement for the selection of tools according to the nature and purpose of each research (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).

Table 2: List of selected analytical tools adopted from Fairclough (2003)

ANALYTICAL TOOL	QUESTIONS	EMPIRICAL ASSUMPTION(S)
Social events	What social event forms the discourse, or what chain of social events is the text a part of? What social practice or network of social practices can the events be referred to, and be framed within? Is the text part of a chain or network of texts?	Counterinsurgency in Nigeria is not an original phenomenon; it belongs to a long trajectory of political events, especially anti-state protests and expressions which date to the pre-independence era. Though unique in itself, counterinsurgency belongs to a chain of events bordering on state violence, police brutality and unprofessional conduct of security personnel.
Difference	Which (combination) of the following scenario characterises the orientation to the difference in the text? An openness to, acceptance of, recognition of difference; exploitation of difference, as in 'dialogue' in the richest sense of the term; An	The discourse of counterinsurgency in Nigeria is primarily polemic. It accentuates differences by not only emphasising the "good citizen/government' versus "insurgents" narratives but also

	accentuation of difference, conflict, polemic, a struggle over meaning, norm, power; an attempt to resolve or overcome difference; bracketing of difference, a focus on commonality, solidarity; consensus, a normalisation and acceptance of differences of power which brackets or suppresses differences of meaning and over norms.	propositions with a particular meaning of violence over others. It normalises differences, not in recognition for or with a view of dialoguing with or bridging it, but instead to normalise the use of force over it to suppress it.
Intertextuality	Of relevance to other texts/voices, which are excluded, which are significantly excluded? Where are other voices included? Are they attributed, and if so, specifically, or non-specifically? Are attributed voices directly reported (quoted), or indirectly reported? How are other voices textured about the authorial voice, and about each other?	Socioeconomic issues such as wanton poverty, gross neglect, the chasm between government and the governed, and the total absence of basic social infrastructures and amenities such as potable water and basic healthcare, housing. Discussions of minority rights have been significantly marginalised, if not completely excluded.
Assumptions	What are the existential, propositional, or value assumptions that have been made? Is there a case for seeing any assumption as ideological?	The case study for the thesis is Boko Haram in Nigeria: with the timeframe of 2011-2022. It indicates zero representation of good governance.
Discourses	What discourses are drawn upon in the text, and how are they textured together? Is there a significant mixing of discourses? What are the features that characterise the discourses which are drawn upon?	Significant responses from the government. Several tones in one speech (see appendix E). Speeches: this symbolises one of the major responses to Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria. Significant

		mixing in terms of anger in the tone of responses, same tone, and aggression, amongst others.
Representation of social events	What elements of represented social events are included or excluded, and which included elements are most salient? How abstractly or concretely are social events represented? How are processes represented? What are the predominant process types (material, mental, verbal, relational, existential)? How are social actors represented (activated/passivated, personal/impersonal, names/classified, specific/generic)?	The most common technique is quick reactions in words and not in action. This includes speeches on-air (television, radio and internet) and those retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja. Vague-unrelated storylines of kidnapping cases. Verbal processes are not clear and can be described as a hide and seek game. Here are the features of Nigerian Government responses: passive, impersonal, names, generic and above all it does not sound or look intentional.
Modality	What do authors commit themselves to in terms of truth (epistemic modalities)? Or in terms of obligation and necessity (deontic modalities)? To what extent are modalities categorical (assertion and denial), and to what extent are they modalised (with explicit markers of the modality)?	There are many ways in which attitudes, statements, utterances, or texts can be expressed regarding the factuality, certainty, degree of certainty, or even doubt, about a given situation or phenomenon. This is equally the case in terms of what is written; there are numerous ways in which to express doubt about, vagueness in, the possibility of, the necessity to, and even permission of and commitment or obligation to a

		phenomenon. Thus, the implication is that, whatever stance speakers, authors, writers or drafters take towards representation or presentation of their position, at once reveal not only their relationship with the given discourse but also their degree of affinity with them.
Evaluation	To what values (in terms of what is desirable or undesirable) do authors commit themselves? How are values realised – as evaluative statements, statements with deontic modalities, statements with affective mental processes, or assumed values?	Evaluative statements are statements about desirability and undesirability. As a blatant case, they are judgmental statements about what is good and what is bad and, at a subtler level, suggestive statements realised as relational processes where desirability is assumed. In the most obvious case, evaluative statements are expressions of values or value statements about a given phenomenon, expressing importance, usefulness and so forth. By implication, it means evaluative statements express one's values and preferences, and, more generally, suggest what we believe should be the case or not the case. They convey subjective meanings as explicit remarks.

3.5 Survey Research Method

According to Sobowale (2008), surveys are the most typical type of research (in terms of the methods involved) that behavioural scientists conduct. He claims that the method entails creating a series of questions on various topics or facets of a topic and asking a group (or focused group) of people in the population to respond. Similarly, the survey method is recognised by scholars like Floyd J. Fowler, John W. Creswell and J. David Creswell, among others as the most appropriate for studying the work that involves human beings i.e respondents.

Likewise, Tejumaiye (2003) defines a survey as a research method that involves interviewing people in other to analyse and report what has been recorded and transcribed. Tejumaiye (2003) buttressed that a survey as a research method involves drawing questions on a series of issues whereby a certain group from the population are obliged to serve as respondents. Concurring with Tejumaye (2003), Berger (2000) affirmed that survey research method involves several activities like sampling of respondents, interviewing participants, processing data, and analysing the collected information and ends with formal or informal writing of the same which in turns is used for report purposes, study or more. It is said that it deals with the collection, and analysis of socio-economic, political, technical, psychological, and other forms of documents/data (Berger, 2000; Tejumaye, 2003). It is done with a representative sample out of the population of the study; thus, all information gleaned from a survey's sample is applicable to the entire population (Berger, 2000).

Considering the above assertions, it can be generalised that in analysing data from respondents, the survey method is the most appropriate and it is suitable for this study to get the opinions of Human rights lawyers, Humanitarian Workers (local and international), Security Personnel, Internally Displaced Persons Camp Managers, Journalist, Policymakers and Traditional rulers on the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted or COIN-related Human

Rights abuse in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. Therefore, through the questionnaire and interview guide, the survey helped the researcher to get the opinions of the contacted respondents. The survey method has been considered relatively suitable for this research to gather current information from the respondents- more details about the selected respondents can be seen in chapter six.

Population of Study and Sample Size

Two hundred and thirty respondents, the legal document- TPA and selected COIN-related speeches were used for this study. The respondents are made up of a cross-population of literate people who are knowledgeable about counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, while the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and COIN-related speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan were the materials used for the rhetorical aspect of the study, this represents the appendix E and F respectively.

For this study, some selected speeches that are related to the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, were purposively retrieved from the archives of the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja. The respondents, a cross-population of two hundred and thirty (230) respondents who are critical stakeholders, knowledgeable about counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, were purposively selected and administered questionnaire and interview guide, because the list of people living in North-East, Nigeria is not available to the researcher. Seventy-five respondents (Journalists and Humanitarian workers) were administered a questionnaire each, while one hundred and thirty-five respondents comprising IDP Camp Managers, Security personnel, Traditional rulers, Human Rights lawyers and Policymakers were administered interview guide. These categories of informants are critical stakeholders in the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria and are therefore considered suitable to represent the population of the study, owing to their strategic positions and the peculiarity of the area.

Humanitarian workers (local and international non-governmental organisation staff) consist of those who work for local and international civil society organisations like Amnesty International Nigeria and the International Committee of Red Cross, to provide aid to victims of counterinsurgency. Security personnel consist of those at the forefront of counterinsurgency operations. They are military personnel, personnel of the Directorate of State Services and personnel of the National Intelligence Agency. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camp Managers consist of those who cater for the well-being of those who have been displaced from their homes as a result of both insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. Policymakers are representatives of government, lawmakers and other public servants who are responsible for laws or policy formulation as it relates to counterinsurgency operations. They are mostly top civil servants and legislatures. Traditional rulers consist of the Emirs from the Emirate Councils (Borno, Damboa, Dikwa, Biu, Askira, Gwoza, Shani and Uba) who resides in Borno State in North-East, Nigeria but the exercise took place in Abuja when they attended a popular function- see further details in chapter 6-table 6.0.

3.6 Sampling Technique, Instruments and Methods of Data Collection

The study adopted the census method and purposive sampling technique. The researcher conducted a census of all the sections in the Terrorism Prevention Act- all of the Terrorism Prevention Act's parts were critically looked into by the researcher, while the purposive sampling technique was used to select counterinsurgency-related speeches and respondents that attended the questionnaire and interview guide. The researcher purposively chose respondents who are critical stakeholders, literate enough to understand the items in the questionnaire and interview guide and are exposed to how counterinsurgency rhetoric may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria. Simply put, purposive sampling involves selecting a sample based on specific characteristics or attributes, while the researcher leaves out those who did not meet the criteria. This is in line with the opinion of Lavrakas (2008) who

posited that purposive sampling is capable of producing a sample that can be logically assumed to be representative of the population. Thus, in this study, the characteristics and attributes of each element of the population gives it a chance of either being selected or not, for the study. The researcher adopted this sampling technique because researchers believe it is more logical and acceptable.

The instruments of data collection utilised for this study were questionnaires and interview guide (these were questions that were used to initiate a discussion with the respondent). At the initial stage the researcher read the TPA word for word, to identify the use of rhetoric in the entire text. The identified ones are contained in the analysis chapter of the research work- see chapter five. The researcher gathered, sorted, recorded all useful and related data from the Terrorism Protection Act and the selected counterinsurgency speeches, while the questionnaire was used to elicit facts from Journalists, Humanitarian workers, IDPs Camp Managers, Security Personnel, Human Rights Lawyers, Traditional Rulers and Policymakers.

The interview guide was used to elicit information from critical stakeholders that form part of the respondents– Journalists, Humanitarian workers, IDPs Camp Managers, Security Personnel, Human Rights Lawyers, Traditional Rulers and Policymakers.

The method of this research is qualitatively and quantitatively driven because the study involves critical analysis of texts in TPA and counterinsurgency-related speeches, also includes statistical analysis and discussion of items in the questionnaire and interview guide.

To investigate the TPA, the researcher visited the Nigeria Military headquarters in Abuja, to obtain a copy of the TPA and thereafter begin the process of reading, re-reading, coding and analysing. In the case of the counterinsurgency-related speeches, the researcher visited the archives department of the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, accompanied by two research assistants to obtain copies of counterinsurgency-related speeches, these two research assistants also assisted with making initial contact with all respondents, assisted in making

research-related interview appointments with respondent and helped to prepare necessary paperwork prior to the researcher's arrival to Nigeria. Though it was a tedious job going through all speeches delivered by former President Goodluck Jonathan to identify counterinsurgency-related speeches, eventually the researcher was able to purposively selected relevant counterinsurgency-related speeches (see appendix E); read, code and analyse their manifest contents.

For the questionnaire and interview guide, the data collection process can be partitioned into three phases, as follows:

PHASE ONE

Preliminary review;
Literature review;

July 2017

1st phase of field work.

PHASE TWO

Interviews (face to face)

Oct. 2019 (2 months)

And

March 2022 (3 months)

PHASE THREE

Analysis of texts;

Transcription and coding;

Data analysis and Discussion

Figure 2: Data collection and collation

Source: Principal Investigator (Author).

Phase One

The beginning of the first phase of this research started in July 2017 in London and Nigeria, and it involved the pre-testing of the items in the questionnaire and interview guide prepared. The prepared questions were tested on a sample population of thirty respondents, consisting of Researchers, Students, Journalists, Humanitarians (including local and international NGO staff), Human Rights Lawyers, Security Personnel, IDP Camp Managers, Policymakers and Traditional Rulers drawn from the Federal Capital (Abuja) and three states mostly hit by the Boko Haram insurgency activities.

The selection was purposeful; familiarity with Nigerian terrain and, in particular, individuals engaged in one form or the other with the ongoing security challenges in Nigeria's North-East region. A Major of the Nigerian Army facilitated access to thirty security personnel of Nigerian security forces, whom I had met at an academic conference in London. He had earlier linked me up with the Centre for Democratic Research, Kano state (a State in Northern Nigeria), whose array of networks helped me secure access to IDP camps (Lugbe IDP camp, Area One IDP camp, New Kuchingoro IDP camp and Kuje IDP camp) in Abuja in the latter phase of the data collection in 2019 and 2022. In 2017, which was the first phase of data collection, the exercise involves observation and recruitment of research participants for the administration of the questionnaire and interview guide that was later conducted face-to-face after the successful application of research ethics approval.

Also, at this stage, shortly after the successful ethical approval, the preliminary questions were administered to the recruited respondents using google forms. The questions addressed several themes, and the results helped to streamline subsequent questions and also frame the context of the study. This phase took about six weeks, during which I collated the results, fine-tuned the questions and analysed the findings for submission for my upgrade to PhD stage in 2018 (called the transfer application at NTU).

Phase Two

The second stage was the administration of semi-structured, open-ended and closed-ended questionnaires and interview guides. Two hundred and thirty (230) respondents were handed the questionnaires and the Researcher conducted interview with respondents; the questions were based on refined and updated questions developed from the first phase. The respondents were contacted face-to-face in and around Abuja (Federal Capital Territory), albeit there were a few methodological limitations- some of the scheduled interview did not go as planned, especially for the government officials, to the extent that in some instances, some of the scheduled appointments had to be re-arranged this happened on several occasions and it was difficult for the Principal Investigator to accommodate most of their changing schedules. The interviews were recorded and transcribed.

Phase Three

In the third phase, I employed Braun and Clarke's (2006) simple steps in thematic analysis which involves (a) getting familiar with the data (b) generating initial codes (c) searching for themes (d) reviewing themes (e) defining and naming themes and (f) producing a report or report writing. To begin, this phase involves gathering data, reading and re-reading the data to get familiar with it. Re-reading through the data and getting familiar with it helped in grouping them into sub-sets, which eventually served the purpose of aligning them into themes. The organised data were then analysed in the context of the study. The resulting overarching themes were:

Professionalism;

Rape and sexual abuse;

Military presence/response;

Human Rights;

Safety, security and effectiveness;

Victims' safety;

Innocent deaths and casualties;

Primary threat;

Stealing and corruption;

Strategy;

Conditions of victims; and

Effectiveness of government's approach.

Again, for the sake of clarity and understanding, it is necessary to state that this study combines primary and secondary methods of data collection. A questionnaire and interview guide, with closed-ended and open-ended questions, forms the primary data, while the Terrorism Prevention Act (2013), counterinsurgency-related speeches constitute the secondary data for this study, and they formed the rhetorical part of the study. This position is in line with the view of Bryman (2015) and Braun and Clarke (2006).

Test of Reliability and Validity

This refers to the level of consistency across the respondents, especially in the questionnaire and interview guide. From the preliminary research conducted with thirty respondents in the first phase of data collection in 2017, the responses that were provided were consistent, which is an indication that the questions were worded in a way that was clear and easy to understand. Though the responses were not the same, which of course was not part of the effort or goal of this research, the consistent manner in which the different respondents answered the questions indicate that if the instruments were to be used across the different population with similar characteristics in Nigeria, similar results would be obtained.

For this study, the validity of instruments was conducted via face-to-face contact. In achieving this, items in the research instruments were submitted to the director of studies and the ethics teams for approval as well as some scholars outside the University, for appropriate examination before it was utilised.

Conclusively, the third chapter have been able to set the methodology pace, it introduced different concepts around CDA, discourse itself, choice of methods (CDA and Survey), its justification of choice and established the understanding of the eight different tools of Norman Fairclough's analysis. Hence, data gathered from the investigation into the TPA and counterinsurgency speeches were analysed and discussed using Norman Fairclough's CDA approach which stated that language should be analysed as a social practice through the crucible of discourse in both speaking and writing. Similarly, data gathered from the questionnaire and interview guide were presented using simple frequency percentage tables. These tables helped the researcher in meeting up with the objectives set out for this study. Subsequently, the data presented were interpreted and discussed for better understanding to enable those who are not statistically inclined to understand and appreciate the study.

The next chapter will give some conceptual/historical interrogation into the study, it will discuss in an elaborate sense all that are germane to the understanding of the study.

4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA AND ITS STATE RESPONSE

4.1 Emergence of Insurgency in Nigeria

Existing literatures on insurgency in Nigeria have misconstrued rise of insurgency in Nigeria as emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, just as Iyekekpolo (2019) puts it, these scholarly works have tried to unravel evolution of Boko Haram Islamic sect in North-Eastern part of Nigeria by tracing it to immediate and remote issues. However, they have not been able to track root cause of insurgency in Nigeria. According to them, some scholars attributed the cause of insurgency to the poor economy, youth unemployment, religious fanaticism, corruption, mass abuse of Human Rights and other factors (Iyekekpolo, 2019).

However, Pearson and Zenn (2021) and Iyekekpolo (2019) noted that advent of insurgency in Nigeria can be traced to 1804 during the period of Usman Dan Fodio jihad and creation of Sokoto Caliphate in northern part of Nigeria. This event was followed by recognition and support given to it by the colonial masters, through implementation of indirect rule system that was utilised till Nigeria got its independence on 1st October 1960. It is clear to say that the British rule saw the rise of Christian converts and this, it has been argued, was the direct logic of British "divide and rule" tactics to divide the Islamic community and maintain a strong grip of the predominantly Muslim northern population.

It is on record that these events sowed the seed for resentment and discord deeply in the consciousness of the people who either want a return to the old ways or the new ways heralded by Dan Fodio and his followers. Both ways, these sentiments find favour with the people and this has been a constant source of contestation and conflict between groups, within the state, society, and religious movements. Arguably, effects of this sectional group is still felt in this

post-independence era, because governments at various times have failed to properly manage the ethnoreligious diversity in the country (Cook, 2011). There were contestations and conflicts not only among Muslims but between Muslims, Christians and Traditionalists. These unrests laid the foundation for radicalisation in theology and ideology, as well as the proliferation of radicalised religious and social movements.

With the rise of traditional Sufi elites, the modernist Tijaniyya, the Yan Izala led by Abubakar Gummi, the Yan Tastines led by Muhammad 'Maitasine' Marwa and other more radical groups that draw inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and advanced Islamic world, there was the determination to implement the forceful conversion of Christians and non-Muslims in the north, to increase the chasm in the already divided northern communities in Nigeria. The Muhammad Marwa led Yan Tastines, for instance, was said to have been heavily funded by donors in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the 1970s, and successfully launched a major riot that cut across many northern states of Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s - the infamous Maitasine Riots (Taylor, 2001; Cook, 2011; Aderonke, 2015). These riots met the wrath of Nigerian state under the command of military dictators. The quashing of the riot led to the death of Marwa in 1980.

Notwithstanding Marwa's death, the Yan Tatsine was not derailed but appeared rather obstinate to pursue Marwa's goal of reforming northern Nigeria along strict Sharia law. According to Taylor (2001), the Yan Tastine unrest continued relentlessly into the 1990s with plenty of emboldened reformist Muslims who considered the implementation of Sharia law a way to confront Nigeria's political and economic social ills. The already tense atmosphere received a further boost when Nigeria's erstwhile ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida enlisted Nigeria in the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) (Egbue, et al., 2015). This, along with the rise of traditional Sufi elites, the Tijaniyya, the Yan Tastines, and other radical religious movements coupled with the coincidence of the Iranian Revolution and the drafting of Nigeria's

constitution, the 1979 Nigerian constitution, has led some scholars to argue the basis of tilting the country's constitution in favour of the Muslim north.

Taylor (2001), for instance, specifically argued that the success of the Iranian Revolution resounded in Nigeria with the granting of "state-level appellate status" to the Sharia court, which represents a significant milestone for the Islamists for official recognition in Nigeria's political landscape. The contestation for power, space and Islamic agency further gained momentum with the demise of General Sani Abacha in 1998 and emergence of General Abdulsalam Abubakar, marking the end of military rule. Subsequently, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian of southern extraction was elected as President of Nigeria. The emergence of a Christian at the helm of affairs aggravated the religious tension, especially in the north, where it is believed to be a perversion for a Christian or, more appropriately, a non-believer to lord over the Islamic faithful (Oyeniyi, 2010; Aderonke, 2015; Egbue, et al. 2015). Obasanjo, an erstwhile general and former military Head of State, reputed for his aversion for fundamentalism, became unattractive to the bourgeoning forces trying to revive the Wahhabi-Salafi ideology of Dan Fodio's fame, thereby widening the polemic of already divided northern Nigeria. The action, however, led some scholars to insinuate that religious uprising in the north usually takes an upward turn whenever a non-Muslim head the centre or federal government. In other words, the religious sentiment became more glaring when political power slips off the hand of the Muslim-dominated north. This dissatisfaction alongside disaffection from the Christian community, in some quarters, led to divisions and contests for control, struggles for supremacy, and routine violence between different groups (Taylor, 2001; Omale, 2013), and Christian-Muslim riots continuing till date but merely changing in rate and scope (Egbue, et al. 2015).

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, Muzan (2014) opined that the evolving unrest was not only present in the Northern part of Nigeria, because various groups in the West were also

unleashing mayhem that is threatening the nation's unity, at that time. Whilst the north was bothered by religious bigotry, the West was fighting corruption, nepotism, tribalism and marginalisation. As such, Muzan (2014) further noted that the earliest occurrence of insurgence in Nigeria was when people of the Niger Delta (a minority ethnic group in Nigeria) led by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro attempted to liberate Niger Delta region, through the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, a militia group made up of Boro's Niger Delta people. Available records revealed that the Niger Delta Volunteer Force in February 1966 professed Niger Delta Republic, but it was later defeated by the Nigerian Army and leader of the group was arrested. Likewise, shortly after the civil war, another group emerged in Eastern part of Nigeria, Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) led by Ralph Uwazurike. Nationalia News (2020) described the group as aftermath of failed Biafra civil war because it calls for the secession of the Eastern part of Nigeria as the Biafra Republic. Aside from the above, Nigeria has also experienced other insurgent groups like MEND (Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta), and Indigenous People of Biafra; whilst Northern part of the country was contained with violent crimes as a result of inter-religious unrest between diverse Islamic groups that refuse to accept each other's doctrine (Muzan, 2014; Akubo and Okolo, 2019; Nte, 2011).

These divisions, contestation, conflicts and struggles provide fertile ground from which Boko Haram was nurtured and flourished (Omale 2013; Aderonke 2015).

Overview of Jama at Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da'awah wa al-Jihad (Boko Haram) Activities in Nigeria

The *Boko Haram* group cannot be referred to as the earliest insurgent group in Nigeria. Based on earlier analysis, Nigeria has, at various times, faced an insurgency in either of its six geo-political zones (Amalu, 2015). Abolurin (2011) posited that the group, *Jama at Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Da'awah wa al-Jihad* means *people committed to propagating the Prophet's teachings and*

Jihad. It was founded in Maiduguri, Borno State, 2002, as a revolutionary Islamic movement, to abolish westernisation (Boko Haram). Gilbert (2014) and Idowu (2013) further affirmed this when they noted that Boko Haram means *western education is forbidden*.

They, thus, maintained that the group begun as a fundamental Islamic sect that seeks to create an Islamic doctrine, further put, to create institutional and technical frameworks that politicised, infiltrated and bastardised suitable operation of sharia in Northern, Nigeria; and to bring on board an Islamic government that sharia law is enforced indiscriminately.

Walker (2012), however, observed that the objectives of Boko Haram in Nigeria remain undefined and over time activities of insurgent group have greatly caused instability in some parts of the country. He noted that over time, the activities of the group contradicted what it is said to stand for, that is, opposing western education. He stressed that the group has consistently confronted Nigeria's security forces, carried out massive killings, displaced individuals and damaged properties worth millions of naira.

Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria can therefore be linked to tribal and religious intolerance as well as socio-economic and political challenges. The most radical and insurgent activities of Boko Haram began in 2009, when Nigerian government introduced an onslaught against insurgents in northeast, Nigeria. It arrested several members of the group in Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states in Nigeria, where its members engaged in a gun duel with Nigeria security forces. At that time, its leader, Muhammed Yusuf was arrested by Nigeria Army and he was handed over to Nigeria police but was reportedly killed while in police custody. The movement then appointed his second in command, Abubakar Shekau, as the head of the sect (Omolewa, 2010; Adedoyin, 2013). The terror reign of Shekau began when the group carried out massive killings and bombings of some notable places in the Northern part of Nigeria. It seized large areas in North East, Nigeria and its insurgency activities got to a peak in 2014 when over 10,850 deaths were recorded as related to the Boko Haram crisis. During this period,

the group attacked many police stations and public facilities (Omolewa, 2010; Adedoyin, 2013).

On 7th September 2010, it attacked the Nigeria prison in Bauchi, Bauchi state, Nigeria and freed over 700 Boko Haram members undergoing incarceration in the prison. On 24th December 2010, the group also killed dozens of persons in serial attacks against churches in Borno state, Nigeria and bombed thirty-two (32) persons in Jos, Plateau state, Nigeria (Olojo, 2013; Idowu, 2013). In 2011, the organisation carried out a series of bombings on personal and public infrastructures, killing dozens of persons and injuring thousands. Likewise, on 16th June 2011, it allegedly bombed the Abuja police headquarters, hence, marking the beginning of a suicide attack in Nigeria. Not too long after this incident, the organisation for the first time bombed an international outfit, United Nations Building in Abuja, while it continued killings of hundreds of persons in various parts of the North East, Nigeria (Olojo, 2013; Idowu, 2013). As a result of these killings, in June 2011, federal government of Nigeria launched its counterinsurgency operation against the group. The 21 Armoured Brigade of Nigeria Army was described as nucleus of the counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram (Olojo, 2013; Idowu, 2013). In 2012, the group had been responsible for over 900 deaths, displacing and kidnapping several persons, as a result of its insurgency activities. It also killed a Briton, Chris McManus and an Italian, Franco Lamolinara who were kidnapped and held hostage in Sokoto when the Nigeria Army and a small Special Boat Service Team attempted to rescue them; however, the Nigeria Army reported that it killed all members of Boko Haram that partook in the hostage. Despite the counterinsurgency operations, Boko Haram continues to wreak havoc in Nigeria's North-East. It killed over ten (10) health workers in Kano in February 2013; bombed motor park and killed dozens of civilians; carried out a massive shooting at worship centres and killed hundreds of persons; abducted 276 teenage female pupils at Government Girls Secondary School, Chibok, Borno State on 15th April 2014; killed several people in Baga and Bama communities,

Borno state and seized its control; among others (Hassan, 2014; Musa, 2015). Flowing from the above, it is evidently seen that Boko Haram massively killed, displaced, kidnapped and abused millions of persons in North-East Nigeria, while numerous public and private properties have also been vandalised (Hassan, 2014; Musa, 2015). The group has also extended its tentacle to Nigeria's bordering republics like Cameroun, Chad, Mali and Niger.

Records have also shown that in 2015, more than 1.5 million people were seemingly exiled by Boko Haram and many communities, around the troubled areas of North-Eastern, Nigeria, were under the control of insurgents. Boko Haram combatants were reported to be more than 10,000, that is, greater in number than an entire Nigerian Army (NA) Division. As such, amongst al Qaeda linked militant clusters in the world, aside Daesh, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, Boko Haram has the highest number of soldiers (Blair, 2015). Without further ado, with the above insurgent's insight and data gathered from this study's fieldwork, it can be stated that BH is an insurgents group using terrorism tactics (Fieldwork, 2022).

Asymmetric Strategy of Insurgents in the North-Eastern Part of Nigeria

Insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria, is noted for asymmetrical warfare which could be referred to as armed conflicts that aims at achieving political objectives. In real sense, asymmetric warfare deals with uneven allocation of power to subsidiaries or groups (David, 2020). This, therefore, practically, occurs when there is a war between two sides that are unequal in combat and size. In most times, it usually occurs between a rebel group and army of a nation. Therefore, a combat encounter between soldiers of a nation and a rebel group that is not as armed as the soldiers can be described as asymmetric warfare.

In a conventional war, there are well trained armies on both sides. They possess the same military training, expertise and exposure; however, their area of differences lies in the strategies each adopts to prosecute a war or the political will to fight the war. In this case where the two sizes have equal capability and gadgets, it is called symmetrical warfare (Tomes, 2004). An

example of a symmetrical warfare is the war between Ukraine and Russia because it is a conflict between two sovereign states, involving two professional armies who had undergone similar trainings. In the case of the asymmetric warfare, the disadvantaged group, often times a small group of rebels or group of activists, does not possess the expert skills, equipment and gadgets that are required to fight the war. Therefore, the national army, according to the International Humanitarian Law (IHL), is permitted to thread with caution with its combat against the group or use different professional strategies to help with the situation at all times. Additionally, the national army should adopt various guerrilla tactics to dissuade the group from fighting further; stress or intimidate them. It is also important to ensure that the Nigerian state in its combat against the BH group should always adhere to the rudiments of IHL (Blank, 2004).

However, the findings revealed that the Nigerian military operation in northeast, Nigeria, did not align with the position of International Law, the insurgents therefore resorted into destroying public infrastructure, kidnapping and laying siege for military and innocent persons, among other guerrilla tactics as a way of threatening the military and weakening the infrastructural base of the Nigerian government in the area (Clark, 2006). At this time, the aim of the insurgents was not to override the military, but to embarrass and coerce the public against the government. As such, the government will be tempted to relax it punitive measures against the insurgents.

This guerrilla approach adopted by insurgents has been designed in such a way that it will not be beneficial to the Nigeria security forces. It becomes very difficult to assess the insurgents and know their next target. The approach placed the insurgents at a vantage position over the counterinsurgency forces, as such, the military and civilians became soft target of the rebels. The attack on public places, including markets, churches, mosques and motor parks became so frequent that it weakens the morale of the security forces and the government was forced to have a rethink of its strategies (Onodugo and Itodo, 2016). In the view of Ajey (2014), one of

the COIN strategies could have been to deploy asymmetrical war strategy in tackling insurgents which could have been useful to wage war against their sponsors, database, internet connection and other survival strengths of the insurgents. Further put, this means when you indirectly deal with someone. The Nigeria government can fight insurgents by trying to stop their sponsors, create a database malfunction, disconnect their internet connection and many more.

It can therefore be said that the nature of insurgency in the troubled area is innovative (it is an unpredicted way to fight a constituted authority) and unconventional (unexpected ways of attack like planting a bomb in a girl-child). The insurgents assassinate, lay ambush instead of combat, discretely penetrate government territory to cause harm instead of being aggressive and seek to embarrass the government by destroying its facilities and hyping its inability to protect and provide for the citizens. It propagates economic hardship and ethnic grievances as the handwork of the government and seduce the people to join its crusade to counter them (Lele, 2014).

Going further, it can be said that asymmetric warfare context adopted by insurgents in northeast, Nigeria, existed way before the 1980s as discussed in the history on page. Its purpose was to deliberately influence the psychological minds of the people and not to showcase themselves as powerful as Nigerian military. Hence, they emplaced fear and worries in the minds of the people in order to achieve their aims and objectives. They use violence to compel the people to give support to their activities and also in the process portends government in bad light so as to gather public sympathy (Onodugo and Itodo, 2016). Therefore, the guerrilla strategy was adopted by insurgents to counter government holistically. They carried out covert operations, avoided direct combat or exchange of gun fire with government security forces, unlike, the symmetric approach of conventional warfare where two military entities face each other and one produces a provable military superiority over the other side.

Again, Ukpong-Umo (2016) opines that insurgent in North-east, Nigeria, tries to gain public confidence by exposing government's weaknesses to the people and revealing to them areas where the government has neglected its duty to care for the people. They provided such care for the people and inculcate in their mindsets the feelings that government has no concern about them and they have no better option than to fight the government and obtain what rightfully belongs to them. Through this, the people (Nigerian citizens) give insurgents their support, shelter and even join them in the fight against government forces.

In the view of Ajey (2014), aside from the provisions of International Humanitarian law, tackling insurgency is unpredictable when compared with other forms of conflicts. Therefore, it is very difficult to utilise military strategy solely in the fight against insurgency. In the case of insurgency, the army has to critically study the strategies adopted by insurgents in order to plan very well for the encounter and this may take a lot of time. In some cases, they might be unable to utilise some equipment thereby making them confused and powerless.

Consequently, the use of non-conventional military approach was as a result of the strategy of attack adopted by insurgents in North-east, Nigeria. It is understandable that insurgents adopt series of tactics so as to penetrate protected places, access classified matters and make the people and government vulnerable to its goals. Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasise that during the stone age, use of asymmetric strategy is fundamental in any conflict situation, and in contemporary world, it is still regarded as a popular way of prosecuting a war. During war, asymmetric strategy is utilised to cause confusion in the camp of enemies and negatively affect the strength and strategies (Metz, 2001). David (2020) however observes that, in this modern age, snowballing use of asymmetric strategy to prosecute insurgency by rebels is fast becoming a major concern for both national and international organisations, due to dangers attached to it. Hence, insurgents break into clusters and operate discretely, with no trace of territorial identity. Boko Haram fighters can carry out a nefarious activity with less risk of being attacked by

government security forces, whilst those who were eventually eliminated are being portrayed as heroes and are symbols for getting new members to pursue the goals of insurgents.

Notwithstanding the above, it is the responsibility of each nation to respect the provisions of Human rights and enforce the rules of International Humanitarian Law in any critical situation, in order not to attract international sanction, felonious liability or criticism. Whilst sovereign states must abide by the provisions of the United Nations and respect the rights of citizens, girl child, women, journalists, health workers, among others, the rebellious have no obligation to obey any law and carries out actions based on its will. For example, insurgents in northeast, Nigeria, have carried out countless number of attacks on government officials, including security operatives, civilians, women, public facilities and international structures without regards for any authority. In September 2010, insurgents attacked Nigerian Correctional Service, Maiduguri. They set free 700 inmates, including members of the group (Hassan, 2014). Again, in June 2011, it attacked the Nigerian Police Headquarters, Edet House, Abuja and on 26th August 2011, an international structure was attached, the United Nations Headquarters, Abuja where 26 people were killed, including employees of the United Nations (Adewumi, 2014). They attacked international facilities to express their displeasure to influences and interests of developed nations to Nigeria.

Furthermore, on 2nd December 2013, many members of the Boko Haram group dressed in military camouflage, bearing heavy duty military weapons attacked Maiduguri and therein attacked the Nigerian Army Barracks and Nigerian Airforce Base. They destroyed several buildings, including five aircrafts. Whilst on 20th December, 2013, there was a replica of the attack in Bama, Borno State, when insurgents, without being provoked, attacked the Nigerian Army Barracks and killed many soldiers.

Others include killing of many opinion leaders, including clerics and chiefs, scores of security personnel, including a Deputy Commissioner of Police, attack on the Nigerian Police

Headquarters, Kanama, in December 2003; stealing arms and destroying several Nigerian Police Stations in 2004. Also, there was a well-arranged attack on Nigerian Army Barrack, Giwa, Maiduguri in March 2014, where more than a thousand boko haram members were forcefully freed from the military custody. All these attacks were consciously carried out by insurgents to ridicule the government, make the country ungovernable and perhaps take-over power (Adewumi, 2014; David, 2013). It is fair to say that, understanding how the insurgents work is pertinent to finding a lasting solution to bring a stop to their activities, this will put into consideration that a lot of damages have been done, and COIN operations should reduce its further consequences as stated in research question three.

Human Rights Violations during Counterinsurgency in Nigeria

Over time, insurgency operations in Nigeria have been characterised by a series of Human rights violations. Security operatives have, perhaps intentionally or otherwise, unleashed brutal revenge attacks on blameless citizens and rebels who according to Nigeria Constitution are assumed innocent until confirmed otherwise. Thus, Nigerians experience various forms of Human rights abuses whenever there is counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria. These abuses include the right to life, right to freedom of movement and others, even though these are fundamental rights as entrenched in the Nigeria Constitution of 1999 (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). There are some identified loopholes as seen in the introductory section of the thesis about the constitution- see pages eight and nine,

In the same vein, it is the statutory responsibility of the state to honour and preserve citizens right to life. This can be done by protecting them from external aggression or any form of attack. It also covers investigating human rights abuses and International Humanitarian Law misapplication promptly, conscientiously and independently. Others are ensuring perpetrators of such abuses are appropriately penalised, compensating victims and forestalling recurrence of such abuses (Akanni, 2019).

Further to this, United Nations in 2019 posited that any step taken by lawful authority in a country to discourage human rights abuse is recognised and permissible if such steps do not contravene provisions in International Human Rights Law. Article 4 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights allows states to, in case of emergencies, amend some duties under the treaty, particularly when such interferes on survival of the nation. However, in a case like this, states are required to fulfil some conditions and when such amendments are made, they must not be utilised beyond the period it was required. As such, internationally recognised organisations like United Nations have set out some principles to prevent misuse of such power by the states, so as to stop them from contravening human rights. Nonetheless, such amendment procedures have been arranged in a way that it does not evade rights of citizens (United Nations, 2019).

Arising from the above, Akanni (2019) highlighted the following as Human rights violations during counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria:

i. **Killing of Civilians during Counterinsurgency Operations:** One of the gravest abuses of Human Rights committed by Nigeria's security forces at counterinsurgency operation was the killing of civilians. The desecration of right to life of Nigerians, particularly in North-East was a key attribute of government's onslaught against Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR) documents that there were countless reports on how security agents inflicted varying degrees of harms on many civilians in Borno State, particularly Baga and Bama communities. It noted that in April 2013, some civilians were allegedly shot by counterinsurgency agents and, as a result, many people scrambled for safety and were displaced. According to OHCHR, preliminary findings by international observers revealed that Nigeria Army tortured, unjustly detained, starved and summarily killed

some civilians arrested, without formally engaging them or following any legal procedure (United Nations, 2019).

ii.   **Enforced Disappearance, Arrest, Detention and Ill-treatment of Detainees:** OHCHR, again, revealed that in the troubled areas of Borno State, Nigeria, there were reports of how young men were arbitrarily arrested and incarcerated by security agencies. As a result, some agile men preferred to join insurgents and secure their lives, rather than showing support for Nigeria and ended up being arrested and molested by its security forces (Akanni, 2019). However, Nigeria security forces denied these allegations and claimed that those arrested were suspected to be members of Boko Haram and they were arrested to help the government in its investigations about insurgents. Nonetheless, one of the arrested and detained recounted his ordeal at military barracks, Yola in Adamawa State. He noted that he was not allowed to communicate with any member of his family, maltreated and tortured daily. He maintained that an average of five persons die every day in Nigeria military cell where persons suspected to be members of Boko Haram were held. According to him and others who reported to OHCHR, they were not fed, nor given water to drink, whilst others fed on one another's urine (United Nations, 2019).

iii. **Use of Civilian Vigilantes:** It can be said that insurgence in northeast was able to reveal some of lapses in our military. According to reports, Nigeria security forces recruited local groups called vigilantes to assist in securing civilians from Boko Haram attacks. The authorities gave vigilantes necessary support and back up, as such, they greatly assisted in smoking out insurgents from their hide outs (Akanni, 2019). These vigilantes who later metamorphosed into Civilian Joint Task Force understand the terrain and operation environment very well. They gave useful information to government security forces in many encounters with insurgents. For example, in Maiduguri, North-East,

Nigeria, Civilian Joint Task Force or Kato da Gora ("man with a stick") started in early 2013 and was referred to as self-defence interest group. During the period, the group identified and arrested Boko Haram suspects, mount security check points, monitor and provide intelligence about movement of people and also assisted during gun fire exchange with Boko Haram members. Unfortunately, according to OHCHR, these civilian groups also commit series of abuses against people of Borno State. OHCHR reliably gathered that the group harassed and illegally detained civilians. They as well recruited children into their movement, thus, contravening government's advisory on prohibition of use of children and young persons in counterinsurgency efforts in North-Eastern States (Akanni,2019). It must be conceded that youthful exuberance and absence of military training often result in jungle justice and human rights abuses due to their overzealousness and youthful exuberance.

The Borno State Commissioner for Women Development and Poverty Alleviation narrated that she and her aides would have been lynched by Civilian Joint Task Force who mistook them for Boko Haram members, if not for God's intervention (Akanni, 2019; Yusuf, 2020). Nevertheless, there were mixed reactions about activities of the volunteers. Some researchers reported to OHCHR that the group has been able to restore order and sanity in many communities earlier taken over by Boko Haram members, while others opined that the group was sentimental in all its dealings. They observed that anyone who refuses to join them is considered a member of the sect. They identified Bama community as one of the places where predominantly everybody, especially male adults and adolescent joined Civilian Joint Task Force. Consequently, many people have been deprived of their means of subsistence. In conclusion, insurgency has heightened tension between neighbourhoods and various faith, raising the possibility of additional intercommunal bloodshed. The above will furnish the

understanding of how deep the COIN- related Human rights abuse are, hereby putting the thesis in a better position to answer research question three.

4.2 Overview of Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria

No doubt, insurgency remains a foremost menace to peace and security in Nigeria. It has manifested itself openly and covertly. It has caused severe damage to political, social and economic narratives of Nigeria (Osakwe and Umoh, 2013; Ewa, 2017). As a way of providing a lasting solution to this menace, particularly, the rising insurgence in North-Eastern part of Nigeria, the federal government decided to put in place measures that could curb insurgency and ensure the affected population receives necessary support from the government. This is to ensure the government retains the loyalty of the people and asserts its confidence in the minds of the people.

Some nations, such the United States of America and Nigeria, have an executive, legislative, and judicial branch of government. These three branches (executive, legislature and judiciary) of government participate in the policy-making process in Nigeria (Anyaegbunam, 2012). Public officials and security agencies make up the executive branch. To guarantee that government plans are carried out as intended, they carry out, enforce, and coordinate (Anyaegbunam, 2012). By repealing laws, the legislatures (National Assembly) have the power to revoke any decision (Eneanya, 2013; Ozumba, 2014). Laws and policies are interpreted by the judiciary, particularly when it comes to how they are to be applied specifically (Eneanya, 2013). As such, because of this, the National Assembly plays a significant role in counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria by establishing a legal framework and allocating finances for them (Anyaegbunam, 2012). Furthermore, this gives the government's efforts to stop insurgence a widely acknowledged framework. It also provides a place for bringing

together important government and civil society actors so that preventative, repressive, and remedial measures can be taken to stop the threat (Omale, 2013).

Anyaegbunam, (2012) also observed counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria involve issuance of policy statements that describe targets of the government. This may also be in form of Executive Orders, Administrative Rules and Statutes, Regulations, Legislative Statutes and Court decisions. He explained that such Executive Order or directive involves inputs from all arms of government - legislative, executive and judiciary. Thus, all these arms of government are vital in a successful counterinsurgency operation (Anyaegbunam, 2012). Going forward, part of counterinsurgency measures put in place by government was declaration of State of Emergency in affected areas in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.

According to Akinola and Tella (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014), Section 305 of the Nigerian Constitution (1999) gives the President the authority to issue various orders that may need the approval of the National Assembly. If the President believes there is a threat to the current condition of peace and security, he has the authority to proclaim a state of emergency anywhere in Nigeria. Anyaegbunam (2012) contends that in order for a declaration to be valid, a two-thirds majority of lawmakers must agree to it; otherwise, the National Assembly would declare it to be null and void. So, according to the Constitution, a state of emergency may be established for a period of up to six months in the first instance, and if normalcy or peace are not restored, the President may prolong it for an additional six months with the National Assembly's consent (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

Meanwhile, in the North-East of Nigeria, Boko Haram continues to cause havoc and mass deaths despite the proclamation of an emergency in these affected States. As a result, the government shut down telephone service in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe as part of its counterinsurgency efforts. The military served as the conduit for this, taking on the duty to enact, oversee, and assess the policy (Onapajo, 2017).

Other policies were adopted through presidential directives, administrative rules and regulations. Such policies are relocation of Military Headquarters to Borno State, deployment of troops and establishment of Internally Displaced Person camps (Campbell, 2014; Akinbi, 2015). In addition to this, the National Assembly, according to Ozumba (2014), Onuoha, (2014) and Dasuki (2013), passed the Terrorism Prevention Bill 2011 into law and further amended same in 2013, thus, providing a legal framework for fight against insurgence in Nigeria. Udeh (2013) noted that enactment of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2013 (as amended) was suitable to curb Nigeria's insurgence from a lawful perspective, with laudable contributions from statutory bodies like the National Defence, Ministry of Justice, Security Council and security agencies.

According to Ewa (2017), counterinsurgency operations have increased the value of regional collaboration and shared security to Nigeria's national security. Without the combined political and military efforts of neighbouring countries like Niger, Chad and Cameroon, he claimed, Nigeria's counterinsurgency operations would have been difficult to record any success. He emphasised that the objective of counterinsurgency should be to either rout, convince, or demean militants into reaching an agreement or making a favourable compromise to the national interest, to return the besieged territory and population to safety and normal life, and to provide a long-term enabling environment for the government to carry out its obligations to the people. Flowing from the above, it is necessary to state that federal government of Nigeria's counterinsurgency operation has meaningfully mitigated insurgence and upheld peace and stability across Nigeria, and by extension West Africa.

4.3 Human Security- A Concept

Before the concept of human security was introduced, international relations focus, in terms of security was centred on the state (Akokpari, 2007). The state and its well-being were at the

heart of all security concerns. According to the late former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, conflict prevention starts and finishes with the safeguarding of human life and the advancement of personal growth (Franche and Ebata, 2004). The aftermath of the Cold War made world leaders realise that an intervention was needed. According to Annan, if human security is prioritised by the international community, conflict can be avoided; hence, the move to conflict prevention. There was a paradigm shift from a realist to a liberal perspective. The ability of the state to defend itself against external perils had long been the definition of security, Annan noted, but it has now expanded to include a more comprehensive idea that focuses on protecting individuals. His claim is in line with the reality of the international community, where nations have historically prioritised defending their national interests and territorial claims while overlooking the security of their citizens. While from a liberal perspective, safety of people should be at the centre of the international community since they are more important (Slaughter, 2011). With the globe becoming much more liberal, human security has shifted from focusing only on the interests of nations to laying more emphasis on safety of its citizens.

For example, countries today take into account the affairs of the people as well as every attempt to guarantee that their insecurity is kept to a minimum at all costs by examining health, food, environmental, economic, community, personal, and political variables as determinants of human security. Human security has been recognised by the United Nations as a guiding principle for the international fora since the Cold War came to an end (Slaughter, 2011). Considering that it calls for prevention-oriented, context-specific, comprehensive and people-centred responses that strengthen the shield and emancipation of the citizens, the organisation believes that it can be helpful in assisting state members in detecting and tackling prevalent and intersecting contests to the existence, income, and self-worth of the citizens (United Nations Trust Fund, 2018). It is fair to acknowledge that more states are becoming welfare

states as power moves from the state to the people, acknowledging that welfare state means how the state provides social security for its people, Nigeria as a developing country, still struggles with this path. Nonetheless, it might be argued that despite this movement, public safety of states continues to be a key concern in international relations.

However still, it is becoming more challenging to ensure human security, particularly in poorer nations, due to the rising number of conflicts in the worldwide community. Concurring to the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, challenges to human security can be found in a number of sectors, including political, economic, food, and health security, as well as dangers to the environment, personal and environmental security. Economic security, it was stated, gives people the means to find job, enabling them to make money and meet their basic necessities (Tadjbakhsh, 2005; Akokpari, 2007). It is crucial that citizens have access to job in order for them to be able to earn and support their living as they are expected to take care of their own needs independently of the government. Finding a job is often difficult in developing nations like Nigeria because there do not seem to be as many jobs accessible as there are unaccountable job seekers (Nwamuo, 2022). In the long run, it is anticipated that economic security would end poverty.

Another trend is that having physical and financial access to enough healthy food and a balanced diet is a requirement for food security (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). Economic security is a prerequisite for achieving food security since it allows people to buy food and take care of themselves with the proper nutrients to survive. Likewise, health security is still another crucial element. It is described by Akokpari (2007) as having access to medical facilities, basic medical care including drugs, and safety from all types of non-communicable and infectious diseases. The government is required to create and maintain effective healthcare facilities for the populace (Akokpari, 2007). These resources should be available to all individuals, and the health industry needs to hire a sufficient number of qualified specialists. The majority of

developing nations have barriers to healthcare access, and there is a significant prevalence of subpar treatment due to undertrained medical staff. In turn, this causes a rise in mortality rates and an expansion of disease.

Going further, environmental safety is essential and entails safeguarding natural resources and ensuring their sustainable usage so that future generations' access to them is not jeopardised (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Pollution levels are higher and health problems are caused by environmental instability. The protection of the environment and natural resources from exploitation and damage by current generations depends on governments enforcing rules, regulations and laws. Whilst individual safety necessitates a lack of physical violence from the state, individuals or groups (Akokpari, 2007). Since that a focus on people is included in most definitions of human security, this sort of security appears to be highlighted more frequently. In Nigeria, individual states must ensure that their inhabitants are safe from bodily harm and have the freedom to access their needs, make decisions, and take actions without fear or compulsion. Although this kind of security is likely one of the most significant forms of human security, it is regrettable that the majority of states have not been able to achieve it. Further put, it is important to clarify that the Nigerian government is more state centric in its approach in safeguarding its citizens, more implications that are evident in its counterinsurgency campaign as a country.

Moreover, community security entails being able to freely belong to any community without fear of violence, bullying, or harassment (Tadjbakhsh, 2005, Akokpari, 2007). If this kind of security is achieved, it will help families remain together and may lessen instances of racial, ethnic, and religious violence. In contrast, political security means having the ability to freely hold personal political beliefs, ideologies, and parties, as well as to freely express those beliefs (Tadjbakhsh, 2005, Akokpari, 2007). One of the main forms of human security, and one that throughout time has led to human insecurity, is this kind of security. People are still divided

by politics, which leads to wars and the infringement of human rights. These factors have an impact on a nation's capacity to provide for its citizens in terms of human security vis a vis insecurity. This shows that one of the main threats to the security of people is conflict. According to some observers, it is possible to prevent conflict, which would result in the achievement of human security (Cilliers, 2004).

Furthermore, in the view of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, conflict may be avoided, he categorically emphasised this for far too long, he said that conflict in Africa has been viewed as either inevitable or unsolvable, or both. Neither are true. Conflict is brought about by human activity, as it is everywhere, and it can be resolved by human activity (Cilliers, 2004; Dutt and Bansal, 2012). Given that conflict is the outcome of human acts, it is possible to avoid it by addressing the actions that caused the conflict. Because of the persistent and the continuous increase to the infringements on Human rights that emerge during eras of clashes, the presence of dispute impedes the attainment of human security. Human security increases citizens' potential to become economically progressive, highlighting the importance of prioritising it in order to achieve growth and development in any country. This is due to the fact that human security increases citizens' ability to progress economically.

Considering the above, human security, according to the Africa Union Non-Aggressive and Common Defence Pact (AUNCDP) (2005), can be describe as this: as long as a person's basic requirements are met, they are considered to be in a state of human security. It also involves fostering the social, economic, political, environmental, and cultural conditions necessary for an individual's survival and dignity, safeguarding and upholding Human rights, practising good governance, and ensuring that every person has access to the opportunities and options necessary for achieving their full potential. (AUNCDP, 2005). According to the description given above, it can be said that human security pertains to people's ability to access and satisfy

their basic requirements, their desire for a supportive political, social, and military environment, their respect for Human rights. In order to achieve human security, it is crucial to take into account fundamental Human rights. Unlike the AUNCDP (2005)'s definition, another scholar defines human security as the absence of violence, threats, harm, and exploitation. (Cilliers, 2004).

Apparently, because conditions of extreme poverty or powerlessness are not qualitatively distinct from susceptibility to physical violence during war, human security comprises all of the aforementioned (Cilliers, 2004). Human security does not have a narrow emphasis; it takes into account all the things that make people feel unsafe in their communities. Human security prioritises the safety of the entire community, including each individual, local communities, states, and the global community as a whole. It extends beyond the interests of the state or individual citizens. Additionally, when developing plans to ensure human security, national structures that support violence and marginalise particular communities should be taken into account (Gomez and Gasper, 2013). To ensure complete human security for the populace, those systems/structures must be addressed within the framework of the human security concept.

Equally, Akokpari (2007) defines human security as the capacity to act independently and to be free from fear and want. While being free from want entails being free from hunger or poverty, being free from fear entails being free from conflict/violence or any other element that results in physical injury. It also requires having the courage to act despite external pressure or fear. But it is not entirely possible for someone to be able to act without any outside pressure or influence, to have complete access to their goals, or to live completely without fear. So, it might be claimed that this viewpoint is problematic and too generic (John, 2014).

Many scholars like Kettemann (2006) and Morgan (2009) have however criticised this definition, stating that attainment of absolute freedom is very challenging and unattainable. Moreover, there have been inquiries on the concept of terror, asking what precisely qualifies

as fear and from whom (Kettemann, 2006) The claim that this definition is too broad can be attributed to the lack of specific information regarding the type(s) of fear. According to Morgan (2009), there are various kinds of fear, including emotional, physical, mental, and psychological terror. Does having no mental, psychological, or emotional fear imply having a secure sense of self? Does having no physical dread equate to being secure? Finally, how can these liberties from fear and want, as well as the freedom to act, be assessed or quantified? As a result, human security should be viewed as a means to achieving a larger goal (Henk, 2005). As a result, rather than viewing human security as a separate goal that must be achieved on its own, it should be seen as a means to an end that will help achieve freedom from fear and desire. Strategically, the AUNCDP's (2005) definition of human security encompasses the individual/personal, local/community, national, regional, and international dimensions going ahead, in contrast to the collapsed form. Though, the foundation of human security is the absence of exploitations, wounds, bodily harm, and episodes of intimidations, other elements, such diseases, hunger and environmental contamination, can take precedence in achieving individual safety (Cilliers, 2004). Having established that human security is centred on the individual, it is necessary to implement or address the rights of each person. Human security will not be fully attained until world leaders recognise this fact. The idea that we can achieve complete human security is a fiction. This is a result of various factors, including rising levels of violence, a drop in the standard of living, an unstable economy, and environmental degradation, to name a few. As long as the state cannot monopolise force, insurgency and terrorism continue to thrive and spread across Africa, one of the continents with the highest rates of violence (Cilliers, 2004).

 Summarily put, pursuing the rights of the people continues to be the goal of human security, regardless of the various interpretations of that concept. These are all focused on the people, not the state, and this includes the right to quality healthcare, a healthy environment, freedom

from oppressive political ideas, access to quality nutrition and job, freedom from fear, and the ability to belong to any community of one's choice.

Causes of Human Insecurity

From the standpoint of a lack or absence of political, economic, human and social rights, one can see human insecurity. Ogege (2013) postulates further on insecurity, he characterised insecurity as a country's failure to meet its citizens' basic requirements, protect itself, and develop independently of persistent outside interference and any other inclinations that can jeopardise the cohesion, values, assets, and lives of its citizens. Human insecurity is therefore the absence of mechanisms to ensure that each individual has their freedom and rights within the state. This interferes with their capacity to live peacefully and without concern for dangerous interruption of their lives and property (Piazza, 2006). Human insecurity has frequently prompted people to migrate forcibly in quest of a higher level of living and to escape the violence in their home countries. Flowing from the above, the following has therefore been identified as causes of human insecurity:

Destitution and financial unpredictability: It is impossible to say which causes which because poverty and insecurity are interrelated (Akokpari, 2007). Human security has always been negatively impacted by rising destitution and financial instability, particularly in Nigeria. Over half of the world's population cannot access basic Human rights since more than 70% of people live in poverty (Shah, 2013). According to the UNDP data from 2005, Africa is the continent that suffers the most, with 40% of its people living in poverty (UNDP, 2005; Akopkari, 2007). As a result of their economic disadvantage, 40% of Africans live in economic vulnerability and instability and lack access to essential rights including excellent healthcare, education, and social rights. Most Africans live below the poverty line, which has been considered to make individuals more susceptible by depriving them their entitlements (Shah, 2013).

It is challenging for poverty-stricken individuals to acquire a quality education and a balanced nutrition. Due to their inability to afford decent education, those who are most impacted are further marginalised (Knight, 2013). It is difficult to acquire the skills required to enter the job market when one does not have access to high-quality education. As a result, they are unable to find employment that will allow them to escape poverty. This consequently impacts their ability to obtain a variety of wholesome foods and balanced diets. In essence, this results in recurrent periods of impoverishment throughout a person's life.

Due to its ephemeral nature, poverty is often bequeathed, as Akopkari (2007) observed. Children from poor families who lack the resources to give their children a quality education or the nutrition they require for growth end up malnourished and unable to find good jobs. This implies that such a person will have to accept menial jobs, which will result in poor salaries and long-term poverty (Shah, 2013). Also, children who are left without any assets from their relatives because of hardship are left without a safety net. Also, because of their low levels of education, they must live within their limits, which keeps them in the poverty line.

Additionally, citizens experience insecurity because they lack the ability to exercise their fundamental rights when the government is incapacitated to make available to its citizenry the necessary access to a high-quality education (Tadjbakhsh, 2005). Human insecurity is greatly exacerbated by not having the financial freedom to exercise one's rights, including access to high-quality education and healthcare. Although it may not be entirely the government's responsibility to provide for its citizens' human security, it nonetheless plays a significant part in doing so. The state should work on increasing its capabilities to create standard public schools, provides employment opportunities, state-of-the-heart healthcare services, as well as publicly subsidised and easily available food supply (Piazza, 2006; Shah, 2013).

To this effect, the Nigerian government should actively work towards tackling the accessibility issues that is prevalent among its citizens. Accessibility issues like access to good and skilled

jobs, which will ultimately help to alleviate poverty in the nation. Additionally, a certain proportion of individuals that lives in Nigerian may be inspired to pursue their own entrepreneurial endeavours and create their own riches if they have access to high-quality education. Most crucially, a country's economic volatility makes its poverty rate worse. A nation must ensure that its economy is stable, safeguard its domestic industry against foreign competition, and pursue global economic success (Piazza, 2006). The reduction of poverty as a result of this will promote the human security tales within a number of states in Nigeria.

Social unrest and political activity: People are oppressed by constitutional leaders in most societies where human insecurity is widespread. Political actions have a significant impact on how people feel whether they are safe or unsafe. A case study, such as human insecurity, constitutional leaders who have adopted corruption as part of their lifestyle by putting their own interests above those of the people, usually leads to loss of confidence in their leadership (Akopkari, 2007). For example, African countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Chad including Nigeria are known for their high level of human insecurity as well as exploitation, which are inextricably linked. The majority of African political leaders abuse public offices for their own gain and infringe the Human rights of their constituents, which has a detrimental effect on human security (Smith-Bingham, 2016). Citizens' Human rights and security start to erode when they are denied the freedom of speech or expression. As a result, some of them may be forced to move in an effort to reclaim their sense of security. They then start to feel anxiety towards the system and the government. This is due to the fact that critics of the government may face prosecution. The government's ongoing violations of Human rights make it difficult for citizens to live their daily lives in freedom (Piazza, 2006). Political leaders would rather safeguard their own interests than uphold the rights of their constituents, which makes human security a problem.

Notwithstanding, social unpredictability, poses a threat to both political stability and economic development in addition to being a factor that contributes to human insecurity (Knight, 2013). When social justice is absent, social problems grow and social progress is constrained, resulting in social unpredictability (Knight, 2013). Unfairness, uncertainty, and destitution are only a few factors that might contribute to social instability; these factors frequently result in joblessness and incompetence (Knight, 2013). Citizens are therefore unable to obtain fundamental education, healthcare and social services, as well as social benefits and justice. The level of security for people living in the state is impacted by not having the assurance of social justice and not having faith in the state to give one proper social representation and justice in the nation. A lack of basic social services that are necessary to keep children alive causes more than 20,000 children in Africa are reported as daily number of deaths. Most often, they are inaudibly taken away and not noted in the rising death rate brought on by a lack of social assistance provided by the government (Shah, 2013).

Further to that, despite being connected to political unrest, lack of political engagement and/or government complete unwillingness to allow citizens free and fair political engagement continue to have an impact on human security, with those who oppose the corrupt practises of the government typically paying dearly for it. As is common in most African nations, voting is typically the only time that residents play an active role in political affairs. Yet, voting is frequently disrupted by government officials, endangering the lives and freedoms of the electorates.

Consequentially, citizens are impacted (in this case negatively) by the lack of voting rights and the inability to choose the legitimate leader of their country since they are compelled to live under whoever takes office, even if that person does not meet their basic demands for human security. Whilst individuals are dissatisfied with the state of the nation, the political leaders, and the manner in which the nation is governed, they feel uneasy and lose faith in the system.

Some social groups may organise uprisings, revolutions, or insurrections in an effort to overthrow the system and conditions that lead to human insecurity (Piazza, 2006; Knight, 2013).

Food affordability and environmental concerns: Availability of food and environmental concerns are two of the most common factors contributing to human insecurity. Human security continues to be adversely affected by scarcity of food (Akopkari, 2007). Human security in developing nations, particularly in Africa, is seriously threatened by the food crisis. As a result of malnutrition brought on by the continent's ongoing food crisis, roughly 28% of children in Africa are underweight (UNICEF, 2017). In the same vein, several attempts to end hunger have been impossible because of food insecurity. Concurring to the most recent World Food Policy report, published in 2018, it confirms that malnutrition is on the rise (CNBC Africa News, 2019). When malnutrition impairs one's ability to operate effectively, that individual cannot exercise their Human rights or actively participate in society. Due to the high percentage of malnutrition among youngsters, for instance, they are unable to perform well in school and are more susceptible to illness (UNICEF, 2019). Malnourished patients are challenging to treat medically because their bodies require nourishment before responding to treatment.

Hence, food shortage leads to an increase in mortality throughout Africa, where increasing level of malnutrition and starvation continue to have an impact on people's quality of life and placing individuals at danger of death (Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations, 2019). In order to attain human security, it is crucial that the food issue be solved. When their lives are not in danger due to starvation, only then can people be encouraged to take on risks and overcome obstacles. Food security, according to the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO, 2019), is when all people, at all times, have physical, economic and social, access to enough, hygienic, and nourishing food that satisfies their dietary

needs and food choices for an active and healthy life (FAO, 2019). Food may occasionally be accessible, but because of inflation, it may not be within the people's means.

Whether or not the soil is productive for growing food depends in part on the status of the ecosystem. Thus, the production of food and human security are likewise impacted by environmental catastrophes. The state of the environment has a significant impact on the availability of agricultural products. Environmental issues like floods and droughts, according to Akokpari (2007), are a factor in Africa's food problem. Agricultural product is unable to flourish during floods because it is either washed away or the soil is too fragile to support it. Even worse, the extra water (flood) would have diluted and lost the soil's nutrients.

The soil gets too dry for plants to thrive, though, throughout the drought season, which is usually when the death of the seeds that were planted are highly recorded. Ironically, plants can also grow normally and be farmed to make food provision for the people when there is a balanced environmental state. Regrettably, flooding and drought regularly damage agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa and the northern parts of Africa, which leads to a food crisis and prevents the attainment of human security (Akokpari, 2007).

Climatic change, poor management of natural resources and land degradation, are typical examples of environmental crisis and all these invariably hamper human security (Foster, 2005).

Conclusively, the main cause of human insecurity includes conflict and bloodshed, social unrest and political unrest, as well as poverty and economic instability. All of the aforementioned factors that contributes to human insecurity are interconnected and affects one another. This is significant because when a society experiences conflict and violence, the level of human security plummets. As an illustration, individuals are uprooted from their homes, many endure pain, women and girls are raped as a form of warfare, and some children are kidnapped forcibly and trained to fight as child soldiers. In addition to the previously described

negative consequences, people lose faith in the system, their level of anxiety rises, and their freedoms or rights are subsequently taken away from them. Conflict not only results in displaced people, misery, and the recruitment of young soldiers, but it also raises the prevalence of poverty and creates economic instability, both of which eventually result in human insecurity. In countries where there is war, poverty rates frequently rise, and as the violence worsens, so do the economies of those states. To this end, political decisions and social unrest fuels and exacerbates war, that is they create a fertile ground for insurgency to grow. Generally, several conflicts emanate from political competition, bad governance as well as political decisions and all these factors inspires insurgency.

Security Challenges in the Six Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria

Arogbofa (2022) observe that the antecedents of what has developed into acts of insurgency in Nigeria today dates back to early political history of the country. According to Arogbofa (2022), the struggle for political supremacy after independence resulted into violent encounters between politicians all over the country. This led to various acts of insurgency, arson, violent crimes, secessionist agitations as well as ethnoreligious conflicts. These culminated into civil war which was fought between 1967 and 1970. Sequel to the three-year civil war, the rate of armed robbery increased geometrically. This can be probably adduced to proliferation of arms and poverty. Throughout the military regime, cases of violent crimes persisted in the country. Prominent among the vices were the "Maitatsine" religious riot and armed banditry in the North-West and South-South geopolitical zones of Nigeria.

Whilst Nigeria was celebrating the return to civil rule during the tenure of its former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the nation started experiencing new wave of criminal activities. Armed banditry festered in North-West and North-Central geopolitical zones, while Boko Haram insurgency activities crippled peace and development in the North-East geopolitical

zone since 2008. These criminals exploited the presence of ungoverned spaces within the aforementioned zones to perpetrate their activities. In the North-West geo-political zone, insurgents occupied Kiyansana forest which covers part of Zamfara, Katsina and Kaduna states, while in the North-East geopolitical zone, they retreated to Sambisa Forest and the Tumbu in Lake chad region. Towards Nasarawa, Plateau, and Benue, they have freedom of action in perpetrating their evil acts. Added to these are their activities in South-East, South-South and South-West geopolitical zones. The analysis of their activities in each geopolitical zone, according to Arogbofa (2022), Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu (2012) and Muázu (2011) are discussed below:

North-East Geopolitical Zone:

North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria comprises Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa, and Taraba States. Over the years, the prevalent security challenge in this zone has been perpetrated by Boko Haram insurgents and its allies, particularly by ISWAP. The modus operandi includes assassinations, suicide attacks on military and soft targets, kidnapping, and arson. Others are drugs addiction, youth restiveness, and religious extremism. Between 2011 and 2021, a total of 44,247 people were killed (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

North-West Geopolitical Zone:

This geopolitical zone is made up of Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, and Kebbi States. Prominent security challenges in this zone include armed banditry, kidnapping, farmers-herders' clashes, and religious bigotry. Between 2011 and 2021, there is daily despicable severity with which human lives are cut short with impunity. With no clear definition of what success is in the fight against insecurity, several rhetoric questions on when the war against

insecurity in this region would be won remains elusive. A total number of 12,743 were killed during the period (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

.

North-Central Geopolitical Zone:

North-Central geopolitical zone comprises of Kwara, Niger, Kogi, Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa states and the FCT. Regrettably, Plateau and Niger states are leading in the number of heinous crimes perpetrated within this zone. With the sophistication with which killings and kidnappings are strategically orchestrated and masterminded in this zone, speculations are rife that these violent acts against humanity are financially motivated or geared towards seizing of lands and eradicating western Education proposed by insurgents. From 2011 to 2021 10,119 deaths have been recorded (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

South-West Geopolitical Zone:

The security situation in South-West Nigeria covering Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Ekiti, Osun, and Lagos States has generated a lot of concerns to indigenes of these states. The activities of armed Fulani herdsmen, kidnappers, and bandits have been creating fears all over the states. Apart from these is the fear of small arms proliferation and other vices. A total of 3,534 deaths were recorded in this zone between 2011 and 2021 (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

South-South Geopolitical Zone:

South-South geopolitical zone includes Edo, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, and Cross River States. In this region, there are armed criminals, cultists, kidnappers, armed bandits,

vandals, assassins, and arsonists, to mention a few. The activities of these criminals have drastically reduced the barrels of crude oil produced per day within the region. This to a great extent has impugned on the economic prosperity of Nigeria. Between 2011 and 2021, a total of 5,710 deaths were recorded (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

South-East Geopolitical Zone:

South-East geopolitical zone consists of Enugu, Ebonyi, Anambra, Imo, and Abia States. The dramatic surge in the activities of the criminals described as unknown gunmen has not occurred in a vacuum. It is a result of separatists' agitation and associated state response and designation of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as a terrorist organisation by federal government of Nigeria that led to break down of law and order in some parts of this region, specifically Anambra, Enugu and Imo States. The deterioration of security of lives and property comes amid a growing campaign for Biafra staunchly championed by IPOB. Apart from this are the killing of innocent souls and kidnapping spree. Between 2011 and 2021, 3,020 deaths have been officially recorded in this zone (Arogbofa, 2022; Nwogwugwu, Alao, and Egwuonwu, 2012; Muázu, 2011).

The summary of deaths per zone is shown below:

Figure 3: Number of Deaths per Zone

NO. OF DEATHS

	North East	North West	North Central	South West	South South	South East

From the above, it can be deduced that the highest number of deaths recorded owing to security challenges in Nigeria is in northeast geopolitical zone. Obviously, it is due to the activities of insurgents, occasioned by ideological conflict pervading the region.

Figure 4: Number of Reported Deaths per State from 2011-2021

TOTAL: 77,850

Source: EONS Intelligence (2022)

Insecurity in Nigeria: Roles and Challenges of Elites

A society can be described as a social construct wedged together by a chain of sectors – security, political, economic, infrastructure and health so as to deliver sustainable development, peace and prosperity. Accordingly, in the Abraham Maslow's human hierarchy of needs, security is prominent and connected to all the stages of needs, as such, there can be no better period in human history to fully understand the place of security in human and national lives than these testy and volatile times of globalisation when the whole world has not only been collapsed into a global village, but are being ravaged by mismanagement of the sectorial chain (Nte, 2011; Arogbofa, 2022).

In the 21st Century, most people have experienced inadequacy of health provision one way or the other in their lifetime, this became a popular occurrence because of the Covid-19 pandemic- which can be interpreted as national or global insecurity. The global economic meltdown has taught us that a hobbled economy can become national insecurity, this is evident in most developing countries. The militancy in Niger Delta years back as well as floods currently experienced in Nigeria are reminders that mismanagement of the environment can be markers of insecurity. Also, it is widely known that inept leadership has thrown the world into monumental security crises and bred armies of Boko Haram, ISWAP, bandits and unknown gunmen in Nigeria can manifest as national insecurity. Whilst the above-mentioned instances can be listed as the contents and symptoms of insecurity, the elites who consist of the political, economic, traditional, religious and social genres are the dramatis personae whose activities or inactivity (classified as workable and failed strategies) determine the security or insecurity status of the nation (Arogbofa, 2022).

The politically influenced ones (citizens who because of what they will gain supports a particular political party) in Nigeria are apparently not ready to take any step to ameliorate the current challenges and work towards ensuring lives and property are secured. An examination of current situation in Nigeria reveals that those that are wealthy are not interested in the political desires and development of the country. Therefore, Nigeria has failed to realise its main value due to passive mobilisation of values connected with elitism. Today, security is not guaranteed anywhere in Nigeria, people are murdered and abducted at will. Tactlessly, those who live in fear and mostly affected by this menace are the masses, while those who are wealthy and politically exposed feel not concerned. Hence, Chapter II, Section 14(2b) of 1999 Constitution, Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) declares that the welfare and security of the populace must be the primary goals of governance. This means that only the government has the authority and means to guarantee safety (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

In the view of Omede (2011) security is an unpredictable situation that requires willingness and ability of state actors to curb any threat that may usurp existing peace, core values and interests within a territorial area. Practically, this covers provision of safe and secured environment for Nigerians and protection of the country's territorial vicinity. On the contrary, insecurity is the opposite of security, and it involves indices like danger (or threat), hazard, risk, doubtfulness, uncertainty, inadequate protection, being unsafe. These are all indicators that there exists a gap that could lead to harm, loss of lives, property and income. Consequently, the opinion of Nwolise (2017) will hold sway. According to him, he asserted insecurity when there is unnecessary loss of lives, destruction of property, need for self-help, frolicsome spending on personal security, unbated recruitment of thugs and private armies by the rich, many of whom portend danger to the society, local groups rising to protect their ethnic value, unchecked professional misconduct and negligence among agents of government. This also includes law enforcement officers who are supposed to protect value and unity, loss of

assurance in the capacity of government to defend the people, investment flight and foreign investors move their businesses to more secured countries, decrease in the number of foreign investors interested in visiting the country for a business transaction with locals, bad corporate image and perception about the country among external parastatals.

Notwithstanding the above, globally, elites are referred to as a group of politically connected personalities who are very wealthy, treated with honour and possesses political or communal contacts to influence many things. To this end, they are the most powerful, rich or talented persons that are respected when compared to other members of the society. According to Rosenau (2007), elites are persons who are technically qualified to hold a position of authority. They belong to a group of people that the society relies upon for professional and proficient breakthrough. These groups may fall within the public or private sector. They could be political elite, intellectual elite, traditional elite, and spiritual elite.

Arising from the above, Arogbofa (2022) notes that Nigeria elites are responsible for the preservation of national sanctity and advancement, which have direct influence on national security. Elites are, thus, considered as critical component in socio-political and economic life of every country. The stability of the nation, therefore, largely depends on organisation of the elites who can be described as agents of development.

Essentially, other responsibilities of the elites are:

a. Policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation

b. Setting the national standards

c. Ensure seamless synergies among national stakeholders

d. Exerts decision making power as a result of their statutory and institutional positions

e. Holds managerial positions and exerts administrative authority (Arogbofa, 2022).

Arogbofa (2022) again observed that the following challenges have hindered elites' ability to mitigate insecurity issue in Nigeria, here are the themes explored around the known challenges:

Constitutional impediment:

The constitutional impediment remains a major challenge militating against the elite's efforts at improving security in Nigeria. Some of the flaws in the constitution include concentration of power at the centre. Findings reveal that as long as these positions subsist, the elites would be constrained to formulate policies that can improve the security situation in the country (Arogbofa, 2022).

Lack of consensus among elites:

The lack of consensus among the elites on the necessity to use the appropriate measures against insecurity is another challenge. Globally, insurgents or terrorists are assumed to be unrepentant, but unfortunately in Nigeria, there are divergent views on the approaches to drastically deal with the malignant tumour. Some are of the opinion that insurgents should be reformed and accommodated into the community, while others believe that they should be treated like common criminals in line with the laws of the country. Both groups have canvassed strong arguments for their positions and this remains an impediment to the fight against insecurity (Arogbofa, 2022).

Inappropriate deployment of bureaucrats and technocrats:

Bureaucrats and technocrats are knowledge elites that are expected to be deployed in positions where their expertise can be optimised. In situations where such sensitive appointments are given to political cronies, it impacts negatively on national security and development. As such, policy formulation and implementation that can aid the socioeconomic growth of the country are compromised. This inadvertently promotes insecurity. Example of this includes the deployment of a Sociologist to handle internal security issue, among others (Arogbofa, 2022).

This inappropriate deployment therefore constitutes a challenge to national development with the attendant effect on Nigeria's insecurity.

Low level of technology:

Combatting insecurity requires kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The kinetic requires state of the art equipment that would aid firepower, mobility, gathering of credible intelligence, protection of forces, and seamless logistics. All these in modern day are technology based. In a situation where most of this hardware are at exorbitant costs that the nation cannot easily afford due to other competing demands, the ability to deal with the insecurity becomes difficult. Added to this is the fact that their acquisition has a lead time production which affects their delivery from original equipment manufacturers.

In the recent past, the Nigeria Army has succeeded in producing some Armoured Vehicles (Arogbofa, 2022). While appreciating these facts, they are not enough to cope with the present situation. Most of the hardware to contain the insecurity is still being imported based on available funding. Perhaps if this hardware is produced locally, accessibility to them could have been easier and cheaper. This clearly shows that the level of technology to support counterinsurgency operations is low and therefore constitutes an impediment for the military elites in combatting insecurity (Dauda, 2021).

Poor budgeting system:

A country at war usually devises means to sustain the momentum of its forces in combatting any prevalent menace. In order to achieve this, budgetary allocation to such forces are from the consolidated account. In Nigeria, why the military still receives its allocation through the bureaucracy of the National Assembly and Civil Service still remains a source of concern. At times, the budget allocations do not get to the recipients until June of the following year, as such, the security agencies are faced with the precarious situations whereby the acquisition of

the wherewithal to fight as well as capacity building of its personnel become more difficult. This situation therefore poses a challenge to the military elites in combatting insecurity (Ajibolade and Oboh, 2017).

Human Rights Protection in Nigeria

History of modern Human rights in Nigeria can be linked to the 1960 independence constitution and the rest after it. These constitutions provided for the protection of fundamental Human rights. The 1979 and 1999 Constitutions of Federal Republic of Nigeria as well provided a variety of rights. The Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of the state policies in Chapter two of these Constitutions also distinguish the economic, social, and cultural rights of citizens of Nigeria. The provisions in this chapter were meant to fashion out a State that guarantees better socio-economic wellbeing and political liberty for its people (National Human Rights Commission, 2013).

However, it can be easily deduced that Nigerian government, over the years and till now, has failed in this capacity. A lot of it can be attributed to wilful neglect and sectionalism (Ugbeta, 2020). From military leaders who acted like tribal leaders, to democratically elected governments who focused on where the most votes come from. The neglect has reached levels that pushed harmony to the backburner of national discussion. The implementation of human rights as written in the Constitution of Nigeria has become a matter of luxury instead of rights. According to Ugbeta (2020), even though Nigeria has endorsed fourteen out of the eighteen treaties, this includes elective procedures, as stipulated by the UN and African Union, and has indicated its readiness to execute the provisions of those treaties locally; yet these commitments appear to be on paper only. This is because Section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides that all international agreements must be domesticated, that is, enacted by the country's National Assembly, before they can be enforced as laws in the country. These treaties

and optional protocols, though ratified, are yet to be domesticated till date. The implication of this is that they cannot be implemented, queried or ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction within the country. What this implies is that, though the Nigerian government has signed up for these treaties protecting human rights, as stipulated by the United Nations, but Nigerians have no protection whenever their Human Rights are trampled upon. This alone makes it impossible to lay any claim against any arm or tool of the government, using the protocol as protection. This is why the government can clamp down on anyone protesting against economic hardship or the rising price of goods and services.

The law, as it is, absolves the government of responsibility when Nigerians demand a better economy or economic policies. The ramification here is that any right that Nigerians enjoy in any form is like a favour from the government, instead of the responsibility of the government. For instance, the Nigerian government considers the payment of bursary or scholarship awards to students as a favour and what should be done at the prerogative of the government, instead of considering it as the fundamental right of the students. This is not a reflection of United Nations declaration on rights to education. Evidence is Nigerian government's reaction to the recent #EndSARS (Special Anti-Robbery Squad) protests in Nigeria. The government refused to pull the "rogue unit" off the streets, despite international and local pressure. They promised a reform instead; the same reform that has been promised since 2016 with no tangible change. It was promised as a means to cool the polity, while they (the government) focused on "more important" matters. It is problematic to consider that the privileges of individuals are not fully safeguarded by laws of their own country. This is made evident by the fact that the SARS unit is back on the streets with harassment being reported in some quarters (Ekwunife et al, 2021). This has left Nigerians at the mercy of the government.

Human Rights provided as a luxury invariably implies that there are no Human Rights available to Nigerians. It is provided according to one's status in society. Human Rights protection, by

definition, should encompass every member of the society, regardless of status, tribe or religious leaning. A provision of these rights goes a long way in fostering economic freedom among other types of freedom. It would help to also foster economic growth, which is one of the reasons insurgencies became a norm in Nigerian society.

This, in itself, is a violation of certain rights. Under the military regime (government), it could be reasoned that rights will naturally be violated due to the nature of the government, but under the democratic dispensation which we currently experience, reports have revealed that there is no due diligence for human rights and this has remained unchecked by government. Onwuazombe (2017) in his view maintains that human rights exploitations and defilements in Nigeria, predominantly in oil-producing states ranges from one aspect of human rights desecrations to another without respect for rule of law. According to him, these abuses are drawn from numerous perspectives, directly and indirectly. On a regular occasion, government security agents and oil companies subject those who live in Niger Delta region of the country to countless human rights abuses on a daily basis (Onwuazombe, 2017). However, records have shown that perpetrators of rights violations are not held accountable for their deeds, due to several challenges bedevilling the Nigeria's judicial system.

Aside from the above, a typical Nigerian has lost faith in the nation's judicial system, as civil remedies are infrequently upheld by legal institutions. Also, it is observed that there is need to re-engineer Nigeria's criminal justice system as well as civil procedures. Over the years, the court has not been able to punish any security personnel for wrong doings (Amnesty International, 2015). Those at the helms of security affairs in Nigeria on several occasions flout court's order and nothing is done to remedy such a situation. This portends that Nigeria's judicial system is not independent, its corruption driven and it is saturated with political meddling, to mention a few (Onwuazombe, 2017).

The implication is that human rights of Nigerian citizens are not expressly guaranteed in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. For example, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) were branded militants in a linguistic effort to differentiate them from insurgents. This distinction is based mainly on religious and ideological leanings (Agbedo, Krisagbedo and Buluan, 2013). While MEND was fighting for emancipation of the Niger-Delta people from the abuses perpetrated by the government in collaboration with multinational oil companies, the government's initial reaction was to clamp down on the uprising instead of looking at the reasons for the uprising (Onwuazombe, 2017).

It was a clear statement indicating that their Human Rights do not really matter and that their grievances are seen more as a rebellion than anything else. It shows how rights are viewed by the government in Nigeria, irrespective of whether it is a military or civilian government. Besides, the civilian dispensation is a throwback to the military dispensation with the same men in power. The first time Nigeria experienced a democratically elected government with no throwback from the military dispensation, the Human Rights abuse by the government experienced a pause that eventually saw a decrease in the agitation by MEND (Chukwudi et al, 2019). This can be attributed directly to the ability of the government under the former Late President Yar'Adua's interest in listening to and recognising the problems that led to people's agitation.

Protection of the State

There is a dearth of literature when it comes to the protection of the state in context of understanding the defence of human rights, this is with specific reference to Nigeria. In this regard, debating about the Nigerian state and its quest to protect itself instead of protecting Human Rights. From the reaction to MEND to its present reaction to Boko Haram insurgency, one pattern that keeps recurring is that the state has focused on suppressing any form of opposition to its authority (with specific focus on the democratic regime), and this has mostly

focused on using force and vacuous assurances. The result of this has been more rebellion and complete distrust for the state. It has resulted in the breakdown of harmony and a weakness instigated by a divide that seems to grow deeper by the day. This divide in identity is one reason why people from certain regions view the insurgency as the problem of the North- hereby causing regional divisions. For instance, it is wrong to assume that a Hausa man who is from northern part of the country is a Muslim, because a Hausa man can either be a Muslim or a Christian, but a Fulani man would definitely be a Muslim because that is the only religion practiced by the ethnic group (Agbiboa, 2013b).

As expatiated upon by de Montclos (2014) that an average Nigerian citizen from the South views the cause of the insurgency as plots exerted by the North, to perhaps, hold on to power by blackmail. This was further buttressed by Alozieuwa (2012) that some Northerners viewed insurgency as a plot by the South to disrupt peace in the North. This can be viewed as direct result of government's interest to protecting itself and its institutions, instead of protecting the rights of the citizens of all regions. In a pluralist country like Nigeria, it is almost inevitable that fingers will be pointed in all directions apart from where it needs to be pointed (Bello and Abubakar, 2014). Nevertheless, if fingers are pointed at the state or questions are raised about the culpability of the state, one is automatically branded an enemy of the state (Bello and Abubakar, 2014; Alozieuwa, 2012; de Montclos, 2014).

Individuals in this dilemma are usually hunted down and made to keep quiet using one trumped-up allegation or the other (Amnesty International, 2015). Intimidation and disappearance are the preferred tools in this war against the Human Rights of the individual (Egede, 2007). This attitude towards Human Rights on the premise that the state needs to protect itself is the main reason the government has failed to domesticate the human rights treaty, as required by United Nations (Egede, 2007; Amnesty International, 2015). Domestication of treaties would put the government in the line of fire by its own laws. Instead

of owning up to its responsibilities, the Nigerian state has resorted to intimidation and propaganda. What this has done is expose the citizenry to onslaught of violent crimes committed by Boko Haram, and the adverse effects of counterinsurgency perpetrated by the state itself. The state protects itself by means of propaganda and gagging of the media (Egede, 2007; Amnesty International, 2015).

Apart from those apparatuses, the use of the police is also a weapon that has worked well for it. It has used power of the media to divert attention away from situations that show it in a bad light. The military losses are made to look insignificant or less devastating than it truly is. All of these have made the state unquestionable and unconscionable. It constantly makes bad decisions and irreversible mistakes that put both the State and the individuals at risk.

Effects of Neglect of Basic Rights

Yusuf (2013) identifies a gap in governance which has been identified as being responsible for hooliganism and enrolment of ill-mannered youths into violent and insurgents' activities. This is not far-fetched as it was perceived in the case of the long-time forerunner of the Boko Haram group, Abubakar Shekau, a disillusioned youth who developed himself through the Almajiri programme, the Almajiri programme that currently trains the highest number of youths without any direction (Yusuf, 2013). The neglect of their basic rights by the state such as education, healthcare, food, economy and security, leaves them vulnerable and ripe for recruitment by the insurgents. It also leaves them ripe for radicalisation when the insurgents can point to their suffering as evidence of a need to change the system to that which was ordained according to the tenets of their religion. In the end, society cannot exist with a vacuum in leadership (Yusuf, 2013).

According to Alain (2011), a community that lacks hardworking and capable leaders will be subjected to frustration at a micro level and anarchy at a macro level. This best describes

Nigerian society at this point. It has left a disillusioned youth population ripe and ready to be radicalised at the slightest opportunity. This situation has created a conveyor belt of new members for insurgency and other forms of rebellion in Nigeria. This is more so in the face of the dissatisfaction experienced by the average Nigerian, which seems to buttress the arguments and reasons given by the terrorists for their struggle and rebellion (Obodoeze, et al. 2013; Watt, 2013).

The rampant and widespread corruption ravaging the Nigerian state is also an impediment to the full exercise of human rights in the country. According to Umaru (2017), the situation in Nigeria has shown that corruption is ravaging every sector of the institution and by extension it has adversely affected counterinsurgency operation in northeast Nigeria, due to failure of former National Security Adviser, Col. Sambo Dasuki, rtd., to carry out due diligence while executing contracts awarded to his office. This failure that can be described as a national disaster led to the diversion of $2.1 billion arms fund meant for the purchase of arms and ammunition to counterinsurgency. Consequently, insurgents overrun the Nigerian military, thus, some local government areas in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States were taken over (Alain 2011). This assertion is accurate, even today, as the government has gone on counterinsurgency operations without any real change in results or change in approach.

The best the present government has done so far is to offer amnesty to ex-Boko Haram members, but it has not looked at stopping the conveyor belt of new entrants for Boko Haram. So, it gives amnesty while the insurgents gain new members mainly because of what the government is not doing right for the people. The Government has not stopped corruption that set Nigeria on a path where the army is unable to reinvent itself to counter the insurgents in a manner that considers human rights of the citizenry and those who bear the brunt of the struggle. Moreover, several accounts of corruption and brutality from the government forces have denied youths of their Human Rights and left them with no option but to find a means to

survive, even if it means joining the insurgents or forming groups to protect themselves. The effect of this situation can be seen in the advent of the CJTF (Civilian Joint Task Force). It was a group formed by hunters and youths who decided to take their own protection into their own hands. They came to a point where they no longer felt that the state could protect them and they decided to take the bull by the horns. The state itself did not bother to show any interest in protecting these people. In fact, it saw the CJTF as a welcome development and even aligned its activities with that of the army. It was an admittance of failure as the best signal that the army is helpless. The CJTF is a loose unit that is open to infiltration by the insurgents and it is a testimony of helpless status of the Nigerian citizens (Omeni, 2017; Oyeniyi, 2010; Sahara Reporters, 2019).

From the foregoing, the government failed woefully to uphold human rights of the people and it feels no remorse in this regard (Abidemi and Adeogun, 2022). For instance, there is a scenario where a government spokesperson blamed the farmers who were slaughtered by Boko Haram for their own deaths, because they did not have the licence to cultivate on their own farms (Human Rights Watch, 2012). It is another example of how the government has failed its responsibility to protect human rights of its citizens. This complete disregard for its responsibilities has led to the exposure of the civilians to the attacks of the insurgents as well as to that of the government forces directly or indirectly (Aderonke, 2015; Egbue, et al. 2015; Ogoloma and Sampson, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2012).

4.4. Empirical Review: Discourse Analysis

Discursive analysis research in the following sectors like political, economic, religious and social sectors has so far concentrated on insurgency, counterinsurgency as well as related fields. This study, therefore, focuses its attention on the humanitarian consequences of COIN and how Nigeria's COIN can produce a better tale in this perspective. Here is a detailed empirical review:

David (2020) studied *Addressing the Paradox: of Counterinsurgency in Human Rights and Women in Northeast, Nigeria*, to investigate accounts that surround an authorised dissertation on counterinsurgency operation and human rights violations in Nigeria. It however did not concentrate on conventional human rights violations by insurgents but investigates human rights violations by Nigeria's security forces and civilian volunteers during a counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria. Findings from the study revealed that the postulation of discordancy between human rights and national security explains why there is widespread violation of human rights during counterinsurgency operations in the North-East, Nigeria. The study, therefore, suggested a gender-sensitive-rights-based approach to counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria; as such, protection of human rights must be considered an essential objective in all counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria.

Akanni (2019) examined counterinsurgency and Human Rights violations in Nigeria following media outcry that counterinsurgency by government forces, and Human Rights of the citizens of the affected states where insurgents operate are usually violated. The study noted that Nigeria's security forces and the civilian volunteers in the discharge of their roles were accused of committing gross Human Rights violations that run contrary to both local and International Humanitarian Laws, leading to various losses and wanton destruction of personal and public infrastructures.

Akanni (2019)'s investigation revealed that it is doubtful to execute a counterinsurgency mission successfully without violating the provisions of human rights like rights to life, dignity of persons, liberty, opinion, movement, assembly, association, internal displacement, lost or missing relatives. It, therefore, suggested that Nigeria's security forces should engage in counterinsurgency operations with full adherence to the requirements of the International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law for military personnel, even in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of suspected insurgents.

Odumovo (2014) studied *Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria,* to investigate human rights implications linked with the government's counterinsurgency operation in Northeast, Nigeria. The study argues that unequal use of force by the Nigerian military in the North-east counterinsurgency operation has escalated and prolonged the spate of violence against civilians they are meant to defend in the area. It, therefore, analyses the impact of counterinsurgency on human rights in the area, whilst discussing the International Humanitarian Law provides for Human Rights protection during counterinsurgency operations. The research concluded by proposing policy options for mitigating security and human rights impact of Nigeria security forces' counterinsurgency operation. It further recommended that protection of human rights must be considered in any counterinsurgency operation to be adopted by the Nigerian security forces in countering insurgency. Also, Odumovo (2014) did not publicly reveal his research methodology, sampling techniques and other social science research techniques.

Mamman (2020) studied *public policy response to violence, with a case study of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria* in order to deepen the knowledge base of public policy procedures that were used to combat insurgent groups like BH from wreaking more damage on Nigerian populace. He further examined civic strategic actions that dealt with protection of citizens' essential entitlements underneath the Law. Using a qualitative research method and case study approach, the researcher through purposive sampling was able to determine conditions that led to social violence in Nigeria, policies and measures taken to curb BH insurgency in North-eastern part of Nigeria. Likewise, it critically assessed the viewpoint behind acts of violence carried out by BH.

Findings showed that insurgents activities in Nigeria was a by-product of frustration, poverty and religious bigotry and that the strategies employed by Nigerian government to tackle BH insurgency were innovative and flexible. It further discovered that Nigeria must put in place a

strong legal framework, dynamic enough, to counter Boko Haram; better research and intelligence in the counterinsurgency operation as the current counterinsurgency approach is laddered with mixed reactions from the people. The study then recommended better economic, political and social integration in order to prevent insurgency in any part of the country.

Omeni (2015) studied the Nigerian military's contribution to counterinsurgency, by carefully examining its organisational culture, institution, doctrine and operations. Utilising the COIN theory and data gathered from the field, the study was able to assess the culture, doctrine, operations and non-formal influences in Nigerian military situation. Results from investigations and arguments revealed that on the part of organisational culture and historical experience, Nigerian Army's identity and organisation were structured after the British model, being the colonial master. The study however noted that the Nigerian military failed to make necessary adjustments applicable to its environment and to adequately match emerging trends, thus undermining its legitimacy, political neutrality and other factors. Again, it was discovered that rather than concentrate on its mandate, the Nigerian military's interest diverted from developing the institution to participating in politics, leading to impunity, corruption, indiscipline, oppressive attitude towards citizens and many other factors that questioned the integrity of Nigerian military of the 20th and 21st century. These lethargies in the military organisational culture and doctrine interfered with and downplayed the admirable implementation of the counterinsurgency operation.

In the area of doctrine, the study revealed that the Nigerian military is greatly predisposed to copy and paste model, a circumstance where it directly invests foreign strategy on a Nigeria situation without considering its consequential effects on our culture and environment. Summarily put, the study, among other things, was able to unravel the different perspectives Nigerian security forces see Boko Haram insurgency, thus, the need for military to decode

these various perspectives and then coordinate them in a way that is beyond the collective approach but such that is fundamental to the nation (Omeni, 2015).

In a related development, Amalu (2015) investigated the *impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on human rights in Nigeria*, following the spate of violent attacks characterised by massive killings and abduction of the masses by members of the insurgents. The study adopted the thematic analysis format and therefore discovered that insurgence have claimed lots of lives in Northeast, Nigeria; it created scarcity despite the availability of food and other social needs in the area, therefore aiding the spread of infectious diseases. The insurgents have also denied the people rights to basic necessities of life and have caused them to constantly live in fear and anxiety. It resolved that BH insurgency has badly affected the safety of lives and therefore suggested that counterinsurgency operations would achieve desired results when government addresses issues of bad governance, corruption, nepotism, poverty and other socio-economic ills militating against Nigeria's progress.

Also, Ahmed and Eje (2015) carried out *discourse analysis of Goodluck Jonathan's response to the kidnapping of the Chibok Girls*, to investigate ex-President Jonathan's speech in response to the abduction of Chibok girls at their school in Borno State, Nigeria on 15th April, 2014. Adopting Norman Fairclough's critical discourse analysis approach and argumentation theory, it was discovered that former President Goodluck Jonathan's quietness was due to security advice was convincing but normatively inappropriate. The study confirmed that some of the arguments of former President Goodluck Jonathan in his speech were deduced from the central beliefs that aid government's interest. It identified economic challenges as one of the reasons the counterinsurgency operation failed, even though government agents were unable to curtail the activities of insurgents in the troubled area. The study however recorded that political stability and development are usually influenced by language, because language remains a veritable tool for resolving any political situation.

The works reviewed so far has shown the relationship between counterinsurgency operations and Human Rights abuse. Going forward, very little literature has critically analysed the rhetoric and speech delivery component in the TPA and counterinsurgency speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan; as well as the extent to which counter insurgency rhetoric may influence COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria. Hence, this study through the rigorous activity of analysing and unearthing every word in the discourse spills out the hidden meaning and hence the abuse which unavoidably fills in some certain gaps in the literature.

4.5. Demystification of Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and Human Rights

Apparently, the word "right" is attributed to privileges accrued to a particular person. That is, someone that is recognised by law and the same law makes provision for the person's protection, for the exchange of a duty or activity. However, in a situation where the person fails to fulfil his own duty, there will definitely be a punishment from the side of the Law. Strategically, human rights are enforceable rights of man from ages. It is assumed to be inherent to man and has assisted him in achieving desired goals. These rights are different from duties, because they are fundamental and are necessary for shield of humans in all their endeavours, irrespective of religion, age, gender, race, clan, native, nationality and stature (Esteinerte and Wallace, 2009).

Over the years, the idea of human rights has been viewed as sets of obligations that are needed to salvage human existence, no matter his or her origin. Accordingly, preservation of human rights remains one of the most essential objectives of United Nations Organisation. Article 1(3) of the United Nations Charter, 1945, emphasises the advancement and defence of human rights of citizens universally. Therefore, a careful consideration of treaties, declarations and conventions of United Nations bothers on protection of human rights. An example is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) of 1948 (Esteinerte and Wallace, 2009).

Subsequently, literature have revealed that the determination of most developed nations to prioritise preservation of human rights is responsible for the decision of United Nations to capture human rights enforcement as one of its cardinal points. So, UDHR was considered the basis for contemporary human rights enforcement across the globe. It has been observed that States have domesticated many provisions on human rights by UDHR, while developmental issues arising from the Law has also led to key decisions at international conventions. Due to this development, in 1966, many of the provisions of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) were adopted, as such, making it binding on any State that ratified them. In the lives of citizens of any country, human rights remain indispensable. Presence of human rights in the constitution of any nation or any legal instrument give a deep relief to citizens and give them sense of belonging to the right society. A legal document or adequate human-rights proof constitution serves as weapon for safeguarding people against unwanted harassment or intimidation. Likewise, it checks arbitrary use of power by state actors, thus, serves as encouragement for citizens to devote their resources and abilities for the development of the society. As a way of ensuring seamless enforcement of human rights, UDHR assists nations in drafting provisions of their constitutions and human rights policies.

Going further, in this section of the thesis, the Nigerian constitution will be used as a form of guidance to establish that all COIN-related activities should use it as its fundamental guidance, another purpose which is to showcase the policy position and recommendation. Civil and political rights are rights entrenched in the constitution to empower citizens. Just as it is in the constitution of Nigeria, civil and political rights are embedded in the constitution of most countries to promote justice. As such, constitutional lawyers have said a major breakthrough in the post-independence constitution of Nigeria is provision of sections that safeguard and uphold human rights. For example, preamble of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria was structured

in a way that shows determination of those in authority to promote good governance and prioritise peoples' welfare through provisions for principles of freedom, equality and justice. Aside from the preamble, several sections in chapters two and four of the constitution also discuss fundamental human rights as well as duties of the State. Whilst "Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy" are captured in chapter two of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, "Fundamental Human Rights" are captured in chapter four of same constitution. Sections 13 to 21 of Chapter Two exclusively discuss secondary rights of economic, social and cultural rights of citizens. These are rights that are not enforceable but considered duties of government to its citizens. These sets of rights are deemed necessary to cater for the well-being and development of citizens (Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

However, sections 33 to 43 of the chapter four of the constitution captures enforceable rights, as such, they are tagged fundamental human rights. The rights are covered under section chapter four of the constitution to ensure no one abuses it without being sanctioned, as such, they are rights that can be proved in courts and remedy sorted by affected persons. These rights include: right to life (section 33), right to dignity of human person (section 34), right to liberty (section 35), right to fair hearing (section 36), right to private life and family life (section 37), right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (section 38), right to freedom of expression (section 39), right to peaceful assembly and association (section 40), right to freedom of movement (section 41), right to freedom from discrimination (section 42) and right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria (section 43) (Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).

In furtherance of the above, the constitution in section 46 of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers any person who feels any of these rights has been infringed upon to approach a court of competent jurisdiction to seek redress, by requesting for

appropriate order, writs and directives as he or she may consider adequate for securing enforcement of the rights overstepped (Dada, 2012). However, Nigerian citizens still experience human rights abuses despite enforcement of fundamental human rights and several judicial orders upholding these rights. For example, counterinsurgency operatives in northeast, Nigeria, commits lots of human rights abuses against the people, just as insurgents also carry out similar abuses on the people. All these are without regards to provisions of International Humanitarian Law and other legal instruments.

To this end, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and developed worlds have continued to express worry over unabated human rights abuses in Nigeria, occasioned by insurgents and government agents as well. For example (the '*#EndSars'*), many people have been denied rights to movement, peaceful assembly and many others (Ekwunife et al, 2021). On a daily basis, people in troubled areas are subjected to one form of humiliation or the other, whilst many have been displaced from their homes. They are exposed to various harsh conditions that lead them to dehumanising situations. As seen during the field work exercise, they are housed at various camps made of shanties and have been deprived of rights to education, good health, and shelter, as such, there exist conspicuous deprivation of basic rights to the people. Also, they have no access to socio-economic and cultural amenities that could make life for meaningful for them.

Similarly, incursion of insurgents into some parts of northeast Nigeria, has turned several persons to refugees in neighbouring countries. During the heat period of attacks by insurgents, many persons have escaped to neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger and Cameroun, to seek refuge. In essence, being a refugee gives them a better chance, this gives the victims specific rights under international law. However, despite international treaties on human rights, these refugees have been subjected to series of human rights violation by their host. In some cases, some refuges have been airlifted back to Nigeria by Cameroon government, due to fear of being

attacked by insurgents. Insurgence has therefore drastically affected the kind of value placed on human lives, as there are continued cases of kidnap, killings, rape, looting and other illicit acts that endanger human existence. It can thus be concluded that human's right to life has been breached, owing to insurgency (Alobo, Inaku and Ipuole, 2018).

According to Alobo, *et al* (2018), statistics revealed by government indicates that since 2009 over 20,000 civilians, including children and women, have been murdered by insurgents. The insurgents have refused to spare the lives of men, women, girls, children and boys who are not armed. They slaughtered, amputated, shot, stoned, burned, drowned and bombed many civilians; whilst they use sophisticated weapons and gadgets to carry out massive attack on public infrastructure.

By so doing, insurgents render constitutional provisions meaningless in the troubled areas. For instance, people's rights to movement and association were infringed upon. People were no longer free to carry out their normal businesses, while those who dared the miscreants were abducted and made to join them as fighters or serve as labourers in their farms. They changed their orientation and made them to believe they are fighting a just cause. Also, women and girl child were victims of forced marriage by the insurgents. As such, Nigeria government, till date, could not account for the whereabout of some persons who are victims of kidnap and killings by insurgents.

Confirming this report was the widely reported kidnap of two hundred and seventy-six (276) school girls in Chibok, Borno State, on the 14th of April, 2014. The action which generated international concerns and condemnation revealed the ruthlessness and brutality of insurgents in northeast, Nigeria. Sadly, the security forces, too, at the same time, made arrests at random and harassed many civilians living within the troubled area in Nigeria, in a bid to elicit information about insurgents from them. Many civilians were detained by Nigeria military

without justification and in the process death of some of those arrested and being interrogated were reported (Habila, 2017).

Again, citizens right to property was breached during insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in northeast. To a large extent, property of citizens was destroyed intentionally and unintentionally by insurgents and government counterinsurgency forces. In some cases, Nigerian Airforce airstrikes destroy property of individuals, while insurgents also burgled and seized people's homes. International media report that insurgents gain territory by taking over houses belonging to civilians and converting them to armouries or place of shelter (Habila, 2017). They thereafter erect their insignia to show that they are in control of such places. All these negates provisions of the constitution and international treaties that are emplaced to ensure respect and protection of human rights. According to international laws, government must take steps to prevent people from committing offences, investigate where human rights and international humanitarian laws are breached, while those found culpable are to be prosecuted, in order to strengthen the position of the Law. However, Nigeria government failed woefully in this responsibility to its people, particularly as some government forces also engage in these abuses (Alobo, et al, 2018).

In summary, this chapter reveals the disposition of insurgency and counterinsurgency to some established laws and principles (the Nigerian constitution as explained above). Thus, it was able to juxtapose between position of the Law and what is obtainable in practical sense. Therefore, from a scholarly angle, it explains that both insurgents and counterinsurgency forces breached the provisions of the law for human right in northeast Nigeria. The next chapter is the data analysis chapter that answers research questions one and two.

5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

It is now evident that language lacks neutrality. Indeed, words do not just describe the world; they are the blocks with which the world is built. Language is never neutral, and it is employed to construe as well as shape the world in a way we desire (Wodak, 2001). Sociolinguistics and anthropologists agree that every language has a binary structure built into it, as such, almost every noun, verb and adjective come in pair with its direct opposite (Jackson, 2014). This underlying architecture of language makes word usage a matter of choice, one favours and the other devalues, as such, the preference of one over the other is deliberate and it conveys a subjective sense that the language employs.

Language plays a vital role in building or changing the world and it also plays an active role in moulding perceptions, creating cognition, and affecting the strategic choices we make in (re)ordering society. Also, the non-neutral nature of words means that words have histories which they cannot be completely dissociated from, and this makes choosing them deliberate and selective.

Going forward, the approach to the phenomenon that is being investigated in this study is premised on several critical assumptions. It asserts that discourse as a form of social practice is both constituted and is constitutive of the social world. It also asserts that discourse shapes social structures and social structures in turn shape discourse. Thus, there exists a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structures which makes them mutually reinforcing, whilst established facts have revealed that CDA assumes discourses have an ideological character and discursive practices play a legitimising role in the (re)production of social relations in the society. Specifically, this study draws upon notions of discourse as espoused by Foucault and Habermas and developed within CDA by scholars such as Fairclough, Van

Dijk and Wodak. Fairclough's perspective on CDA provides one of the most sophisticated methods suitable for analysing and explaining the effects of adoption and assumption of a certain kind of discourses over and above others. This chapter therefore elaborates in detail, the result of the analysis of rhetoric in the language and text utilised in TPA and counterinsurgency speeches presented by former President Goodluck Jonathan and the speech delivery techniques utilised.

5.2 Analysis of TPA and COIN-related speeches by former President Jonathan

In this section, each text has been examined for logos (enthymemes), ethos (apparent wisdom, excellent behaviour and benevolence) and pathos (anger, calmness, friendship, detestation, fear and confidence) leading to narratives and arguments as they are deployed to create support and fit in to counterinsurgency operations in North-East Nigeria. TPA was analysed, while the speeches analysed include the speech delivered in the Nigerian Senate on July 16, 2014, interview with BBC News on March 21, 2015, second term election bid speech at Eagle Square, Abuja, presented on November 11, 2014, former President Jonathan's speech at the "Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria" held in Paris on 17th of May 2014, speech at the 15th anniversary of the end of military rule on May 29, 2014, news conference on Africa's security, education, and economic development at Geneva Press Club, January 27 2016, former President Goodluck Jonathan's speech at the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, September 24, 2014, former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's announcement of a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states so as to maintain peace, public order and safety in the affected states of the federation in a simulcast on 14 May 2013, first broadcast of the year to the nation by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, on the first of January in year 2015, among others.

Accordingly, this section provides answers to research questions one and two: (1) what is the rhetoric utilised by the text composers in the TPA and COIN-related speeches presented by former President Goodluck Jonathan (FPGJ), as retrieved from the Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja? and (2) what are the speech delivery components used in the TPA and COIN-related speeches by FPGJ?

5.3. Rhetoric in the TPA and FPGJ selected speeches

Rhetoric is the technique employed by an orator to create proofs. Proofs can be rational (or logical), moral (or ethical), and sensitive (or emotional), so as to convince the audience. This particular section of the thesis will provide an answer to the study's first research question. The rhetoric in the TPA and FPGJ selected speeches will be analysed using three rhetoric proofs. As mentioned above these are logos (rational or logical proofs), ethos (moral or ethical proofs) and pathos (sensitive or emotional proofs), created by Goodluck Jonathan in his counterinsurgency speeches and were as well written in the TPA.

1.   Rational/Logical Proofs or Logos

The use of logic to create reasoning in a discourse or speech is referred to as logos. Herrick (2001) explains that logos is related to logic because it involves the study of reasoning and the creation of disorders. In using logos, the speaker is said to have delivered and proved the speaker's arguments using logical reasoning or proof. The essence of using the logos is to convince the listeners. There are two approaches to construct logical reasoning in accordance with Aristotle's rhetorical theory. It is done through the use of metaphors (enthymemes) or illustrations (strategic examples).

In selected COIN-related speeches, Goodluck Jonathan used enthymemes and illustrations to support his points logically while only the enthymemes exist in the TPA.

a. Enthymemes

The enthymeme, in Aristotle's opinion, was the most convincing proof. Enthymeme is used rhetorically to illustrate ideas, and people are more susceptible to persuasion when they believe that an idea has been shown (Rapp, 2011). Enthymeme is made up of plausible (probable) premises and a speculative (tentative) conclusion. Here are a few enthymemes that Goodluck Jonathan has used in the selected speeches for the study.

Excerpt 1:

> My strategy was to combat insecurity right away. I fought the insurgency using education as a tool over the long term, and counterinsurgency tactics and the military are highly crucial for this (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In this excerpt, Goodluck Jonathan made use of two plausible premises and one speculative conclusion. The first plausible premise is my strategy is to combat insecurity right away, and the second plausible premise is COIN tactics and the military are highly crucial for this. Both premises emanates or depend on each other with emphasis on 'my strategy is to fight insecurity right away'. Those two premises led to one conclusion- 'I fought the insurgency using education as a tool over the long term'.

1st minor premise: my strategy is to combat insecurity right away

2nd minor premise: COIN tactics and the military are highly crucial for this

Conclusion: I fought the insurgency using education as a tool over the long term

Excerpt 2:

> I have always thought that if we do not invest billions in educating our children
>
> today, we will be compelled to spend them battling insecurity in the future. And
>
> just because you feel uncertain, you do not have to spend money on education.
>
> It is also a wise decision to make (COIN speech-appendix E).

In this excerpt, Goodluck Jonathan argues that if Nigeria fails to spend on education of the youths, there is a tendency for the country to spend curtailing the youths from engaging in a series of crime which may lead the country to crisis and shedding of blood. In order to make his position sound more reasonable, he uses enthymeme to describe it. The former president created some premises in this extract that led to one conclusion which is to make education the priority in the country. Those premises result in one conclusion which is it is also the prudent thing to do.

1st minor premise: I have always thought that if we do not invest billions in educating our children today, we will be compelled to spend them battling insecurity in the future

2nd minor premise: And just because you feel uncertain, you do not have to spend money on education.

Conclusion: It is also a wise decision to make.

However, the enthymemes in the TPA are:

Excerpt 3:

> In the TPA, act of terrorism is defined as an intentional action carried out with malice or premeditation and which: first, may significantly harm a global organisation or a nation; second, is intended to, or that it can be assumed to have been intended to – third, unreasonably coerce a government or global entity into doing something or refraining from doing something, fourth, gravely frighten a populace, fifth, involves or causes- (a) kidnapping of an individual; (b) destruction of a stationary platform on the continental shelf, a government or public facility, a transportation system, an infrastructure facility, including a data system, a public space, or personal property, which is likely to put life in danger or cause significant financial loss… (TPA-appendix F)

In this excerpt, the Act logically argues that action that may influence the people, or the international and local reputation of the country as well as negatively affect the welfare of the people including property loss, or any act of attack or damage on public properties and infrastructure are termed as insurgency. This portrays the fact that the Boko Haram sect are insurgents who uses terrorist tactics. Those premises result in one deduction which is those acts may affect the stability and unity of the country.

Excerpt 4:

> A protest-related action that interferes with services yet is carried out in good faith or intention. Demonstrations or work stoppages, however, are not considered terrorist acts under this definition if they are not intended to cause any of the harms listed in example three above (TPA- appendix F).

In this excerpt, the TPA explains that any action that disrupts service or public peace but aimed at protesting or demonstrating against a public law or for public welfare is not termed as terrorism or insurgency.

1st minor premise: An action that interferes with services

2nd minor premise: yet is carried out in good faith or intention

Conclusion: Demonstrations or work stoppages, however, are not considered terrorist acts

Excerpt 5:

> i: a person who commits an offence under this Act by claiming to be a member of a prohibited organisation faces a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison if found guilty. ii. Political parties should not be seen as illegal entities, and no one should be handled unequally because of their political opinions, to avoid any confusion (TPA- appendix F).

In this excerpt, the TPA uses two plausible premises and one speculative conclusion. First, the plausible premise is an individual who claims to be a member of a prohibited group is guilty of an offence under this Act and the second probable premise is political parties should not be seen as banned entities. The duo premises results in one deduction which is no one should be treated differently due to their political views.

Excerpt 6:

> (1) A person who divulges to another anything that could jeopardise an investigation of any act of terrorism or tamper with information that could be used in a terrorist inquiry, commits a violation of this Act and, if found guilty, faces a maximum term of ten years in jail (TPA- appendix F).

> (2) It is a guard for an individual charged with a crime under subsection (I) of this section to demonstrate that he - (a) neither knew nor had any reason to believe that the information would have an impact on a terrorist enquiry; or (b) had a legitimate reason for disclosing or interfering (TPA-appendix F).

In this excerpt, the term logic was used. It was argued that anyone who interferes or truncates the process of investigation of any act of terrorism or insurgency will be charged. However, anyone who interferes unknowingly will not be charged. Therefore, the person is not a terrorist or an insurgent.

1st minor premise: A person who - (a) A person who divulges to another anything that could jeopardise an investigation into terrorism or tamper with information that could be used in a terrorist inquiry, commits a violation of this Act and, if found guilty, faces a maximum term of ten years in jail.

2nd minor premise: It is a guard for an individual charged with a crime under subsection (I) of this section to demonstrate - (a) neither knew nor had any reason to believe that the information would have an impact on a terrorist enquiry.

Conclusion: However, the said person is not a terrorist or an insurgent or an accomplice to terrorism or insurgency.

Excerpt 7:

> An individual who, either directly or through indirect means, offers or receives funds with the intent or knowledge that these funds will be used, in whole or in part, to perpetrate a crime in violation of an enactment listed in the schedule to this Act, but who is unaware of this, commits a violation of this Act and is

subject to imprisonment for a term of no more than ten years upon conviction. (TPA-appendix F)

In this excerpt, the first premise shows that anyone that provides funds for the act of terrorism or insurgency is a terrorist or an insurgent. The second premise indicates that even if the person provides this support indirectly (unknowingly). So, it can be concluded that this individual has done something illicit that carries a potential ten years jail term.

1st minor premise: An individual who, either explicitly or implicitly, offers or generates revenue with the goal to suppress or finance the use of that money, whether in whole or in part.

2nd minor premise: but lack knowledge of this,

Conclusion: commits a violation of this Act, and if found guilty will be subjected to a maximum jail sentence of ten years.

Excerpt 8:

> (1) With the President's approval, the National Security Advisor or the Inspector General of Police may seize any cash when they have good reason to believe it: (a) is going to be utilised for violent extremism; (b) classified as belonging to, or is being retained on confidence for, a prohibited organisation; or (c) was legitimately acquired through terrorist acts (TPA-appendix F).

In the excerpt above, it was logically explained in three premises that any money used for terrorism or insurgency purpose can be seized by the President of the country through properly constituted authority. The premises are:

1st minor premise: the cash - (a) is going to be utilised for violent extremism,

2nd minor premise: (b) classified as belonging to, or is being retained on confidence for, a prohibited organisation,

3rd minor premise: (c) legitimately acquired through terrorist acts.

Conclusion: With the President's approval, the National Security Advisor or the Inspector General of Police may confiscate any cash when they have justifiable reason to do so.

Excerpt 9:

> The judge in chambers cannot order the cash's seizure unless he is convinced that there are substantial reasons to think that the cash-. (a) is planned to be used for terrorism purposes; (b) contains assets from a prohibited organisation; or (c) is, or stands for, a possession or profits acquired from terrorist activities (TPA-appendix F)

The excerpt above indicates that the court of law or the government have no right to seize any citizen's cash for terrorism or insurgency, except it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The premises used here are three:

1st minor premise: the cash -. (a) is planned to be used for terrorism purposes;

2nd minor premise: contains assets from a prohibited organisation;

3rd minor premise: is, or stands for, a possession or profits acquired from terrorist activities.

Conclusion: The judge in chambers cannot order the cash's seizure unless he is convinced that there are substantial reasons to think that the source of the cash is totally questionable.

b. Example (or Illustrations)

Example is a method that can be used to re-create an idea, to enable the audience to painlessly comprehend the meaning of the idea (Griffin, 2012). In this study's selected COIN-related speeches, Goodluck Jonathan uses 'Examples' to define his idea. The examples used include:

Excerpt 10:

> I cut short my trip to South Africa and cancelled a scheduled state visit to Namibia. Since coming home, our intelligence services have given me comprehensive reports. These reports show that the danger to our territorial sovereignty and national integration is not only extremism or lawlessness, but rather an insurgency and rebellion by terrorist organisations. Already, some local government areas of Borno State have been taken over by factions whose loyalty is to another flags and beliefs (COIN speech- appendix E).

As seen in excerpt 10, Goodluck Jonathan made use of the example based on what he noticed about the state of the country's security, since he had to cancel his trip to Namibia and shorten his stay in South Africa. He makes an effort to persuade the audience to showcase the reasons, the measures as well as the actions he is taking against the insurgents in the country by giving explanation about what terrible things they have done.

Excerpt 11:

> They have assaulted facilities and buildings used by the government. They have killed governmental officials and unarmed individuals. They have burned down homes and kidnapped women and children. These measures essentially amount to a declaration of war as well as a calculated effort to undercut the legitimacy

of the Nigerian government and jeopardise her national sovereignty. This will not be tolerated by us as a responsible government (COIN speech-Appendix E).

Excerpt 11 shows how Goodluck Jonathan uses example to explain the level of damages the insurgents have done on the country. He observed that the insurgents have not only attacked the government facilities but also damaged private properties and industries and are also taking women and children in hostage. He used the example to persuade the audience to see the extent to which the insurgents in the country have undermine the nation's territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

Excerpt 12:

Notwithstanding our difficulties, we must applause our security forces. We must not lose sight of their valour and achievements in establishing peace and liberating countries, whether in Liberia, the Congo, Sierra Leone Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Mali or other locations throughout Africa and beyond. In various locations and at various times, our security personnel have paid the ultimate price (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 12, Goodluck Jonathan describes the impact of the security operatives of the country in bringing insurgency to an end and why people should believe in their ability. He gave examples of the successes of the gallantry shown by the security operatives across Africa and how they have been able to bring peace to those places they have operated. He said: We must not lose sight of their valour and achievements in establishing peace and liberating countries, whether in Liberia, the Congo, Sierra Leone Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Mali or other locations throughout Africa and beyond. The aim of Goodluck Jonathan using a comparison serves as evidence to point at the security details of Nigeria's security situation in order to deal with the situation headlong without fear.

Excerpt 13:

> Without a shadow of a doubt, what we are seeing in Nigeria today is an outworking of the same twisted and vicious worldview that took down the Twin Towers in New York, massacred unarmed civilians in Boston, and inspired the killing of helpless people in the southern Russian city of Volgograd. Terrorist actions have brought conflict and sufferings to Syria, Somalia, Mali, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These evildoers keep brainwashing and motivating naive young people to harm the defenceless. We cannot let this go on like this. (COIN speech- Appendix E)

Here, Goodluck Jonathan uses the example in an attempt to clear the air about the allegations of not doing enough to battle insurgency levelled against him and his administration and crave the indulgence of the people to oppose appeals of the opposition party that they should be rejected. He tries to convince the audience that insurgency is not limited to Nigeria, but a common phenomenon across the world and that it has caused the same level of damages among the nations of the world. In this excerpt, Goodluck Jonathan said, there is no question that the situation we are experiencing in Nigeria right now is an expression of the same twisted and vicious worldview that caused the Twin Towers to collapse in New York, massacred unarmed civilians in Boston, and motivated the killing of helpless inhabitants who live and work in the Southern Russian city of Volgograd.

Excerpt 14:

> You may recall that after the Gaddafi government was overthrown in August 2011, various non-state actors gained access to hi-tech (sophisticated) ammunitions, which led to an uptick in terrorist activity and volatility across Africa (mostly the North and the West) (COIN speech- Appendix E).

This rhetoric device is very effective as Goodluck Jonathan uses it to provoke thoughts on the part of the audience; to make the audience see why they must support his administration and believe that the insecurity in Nigeria is not as a result of weak military, but time. In excerpt 14 above, Goodluck Jonathan traces the surge in insurgency to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The former leader of Sudan is believed to have armed many youths in the country in order to combat the state security personnel that led to the surge in terrorism across Africa, with Nigeria inclusive. Goodluck Jonathan's goal in making the comparison is to highlight the unruly act of the former president of Sudan for giving arms to unauthorised people.

Excerpt 15:

> An individual who embraces, covers up, or aids and abets a terrorist, that is a person whom he knew had committed or been found guilty of a terrorist act, or against whom he knew that an arrest warrant or imprisonment for such an act had been issued, is liable under that Act and is punishable by a maximum ten-year jail term upon conviction (TPA-Appendix F).

This example used in the TPA is meant to clearly explain what the law means by those who harboured or concealed terrorist or insurgent. Anyone who has committed, been found guilty of, or knew there was a warrant out for their arrest or incarceration for a terrorist act—also referred to as a "terrorist" or "insurgent"—commits an offence under this Act, is hereby, liable to a maximum ten-year sentence if convicted.

Excerpt 16:

> The purpose of this section is to classify that: 'cash' refers to (a) coins and notes in any currency; (b) postal orders; (e) travelers' cheques; (d) bankers' draft; (e)

bearer bonds and shares; or (f) any other financial instruments that the Minister in charge of finance may designate by regulations. (TPA-Appendix F)

The example above helps to explain the meaning of cash as used in the TPA. The Act stipulates that the Inspector general of police and the National security adviser with the authority of the President may confiscate any cash where he has probable suspicion of that cash. This cash, according to the example, include coins or notes, traveler's cheques, postal order, bankers' drafts, among others. This example aids the proper understanding of the main term called cash.

Excerpt 17:

Any individual who intentionally consents to deliver teaching or coaching - (a) in the creation or use of a dangerous weapon or explosive; or (b) participating in terrorism act either to a member of a terrorist group or an individual who engages in or prepare to engage in the directive of a terrorist act is guilty of a crime and will face a maximum sentence of ten years in prison if found guilty (TPA- Appendix F).

The reason for the above example is to help understand the type of training being referred to in the TPA. The training includes teaching insurgents or terrorists how to produce explosives and lethal devices. The Act explains that such person training the insurgent or terrorist is liable to 10 years' imprisonment.

2. Ethos (Moral/Ethical Proofs)

Ethos is a persuasive proof. According to Herrick (2001), individuals are more inclined to believe what a speaker says if they believe that they are educated, trustworthy, and looking out for their best interests. The ethos proofs can be constructed using any combination of three

attributes. They include apparent wisdom, virtue, and benevolence (Griffin, 2012). The three qualities are exhibited in Goodluck Jonathan's counterinsurgency speeches and the TPA.

a. Apparent Wisdom

One strategy for persuading the audience is for the speaker to demonstrate his or her intelligence during the speech. The public is more inclined to be swayed when they believe a speaker to be competent and credible (Verderber, Sellnow, and Verderber (2012). Consequently, Goodluck Jonathan utilises 'apparent wisdom'- one of the proofs to persuade the public that his administration is working to counter insurgency in the country. Goodluck Jonathan used the following 'apparent wisdom' tactics in his speeches:

Excerpt 18:

> Sad to say, as I speak to you now, the invasion by international terrorism on our soil, which has claimed thousands of lives, threatens all the advances made during the previous 15 years of democratic administration in our nation. Nigeria, our beloved nation, is dealing with a fresh obstacle, a conflict has been released on us. Extremist foreign elements, cooperating with some of our ignorant countrymen, are concentrated on an endeavour to completely destroy our nation and the liberty and democratic values we adore and applaud today (COIN speech-Appendix E).

Goodluck Jonathan aims to provide accurate details regarding the number of years the extremist have been threatening the peace in Nigeria as seen in the above illustration (excerpt 18). Goodluck Jonathan reveals the real number of lives the insurgents have taken and this is much higher than the number that the public is originally aware of and by doing this, Goodluck Jonathan is showcasing his competency to the public, the citizens of Nigeria. Nevertheless, his

decision not to disclose the source of his information makes his speech sounds more convincing.

Excerpt 19:

> Without a shadow of a doubt, what we are seeing in Nigeria today is an outworking of the same twisted and vicious worldview that took down the Twin Towers in New York, massacred unarmed civilians in Boston, and inspired the killing of helpless people in the southern Russian city of Volgograd. Terrorist actions have brought conflict and sufferings to countries like Syria, Somalia, Mali, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These evildoers keep brainwashing and motivating naive young people to harm the defenceless. We cannot let this go on like this (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 19, Goodluck Jonathan aims to provide accurate details regarding the number of ferocious attacks on people and cities by the extremist around the world. He accurately points at the twin tower blast in New York city, terrorist attack on the Southern Russian city of Volgograd, as well as terror-related actions in countries like Yemen, Mali, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan and how they have been threatening the peace in the countries. He used his knowledge of history to make the audience understand and accept his side of the story.

Excerpt 20:

> Before my regime, the intelligence architecture of Nigeria was primarily focused on its regime's safety, but we were capable of developing capacity to the point where our security officials were able to track down and capture the terrorists responsible for such infamous attacks as the Christmas Day terror

attack of St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State (COIN speech-Appendix E).

Goodluck Jonathan uses his expertise to demonstrate his competency and trustworthiness while continuing to make an effort to persuade the audience through the use of apparent wisdom in his speech. According to Verderber, Sellnow, and Verderber (2012), an orator might demonstrate their expertise by sharing personal stories about events that demonstrates their expertise in particular subjects. His expertise as the most educated president in the history of Nigeria, having been a former lecturer who has the interest of people at heart. In excerpt 20, Goodluck Jonathan tells the public about his ordeal in security and intelligence. Also, he attempts to educate the public regarding the success of his administration in dealing with numerous insurgents' attacks in the country. By describing the ordeal, Goodluck Jonathan has proved to the public that his expertise is sufficient in defeating the rebels (Varin, 2016).

Excerpt 21:

> While it is true that the Federal Government of Nigeria is not responsible for basic and secondary education, I could not, in good conscience, tolerate the fact that 52.4% of men in Nigeria's North-Eastern region lack a formal western education. When you take into account the states most impacted by the insurgency, the number is considerably worse. In Yobe state, 83.3% of the male population lacks a formal western education. Borno state reports 63.6% (COIN speech-Appendix E)

In this excerpt, Goodluck Jonathan give an accurate data about the level of illiteracy in the North-Eastern region of the country and then relate this to the surge to the rate of insurgency in the region. He observed that 52.4 percent of men in Nigeria's northeast lack a formal Western education. When one observes the states most impacted by the insurgency, the number is

considerably worse. In Yobe State, 83.3 percent of the male population lacks a formal Western education. State of Borno reports 63.6 percent. By doing so, Goodluck Jonathan is demonstrating his skills to the listeners.

Excerpt 22:

> The Nigerian government is obligated to enforce the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of Terrorism effectively. This Act lays out standardised policies aimed at preventing, prohibiting, and combating of terrorist acts, as well as the funding of terrorist activities in Nigeria (TPA-Appendix F).

In this excerpt, the explanatory memorandum gives a vivid explanation about the areas the Act covered. The Act states that: this Act lays out standardised policies aimed at preventing, prohibiting, and combating of terrorist acts, as well as the funding of terrorist activities in Nigeria. This also includes the operational enforcement of the convention on the deterrence and battling of terrorism and the convention on the suppression of the funding of terrorist activities. By doing so, the enactor of the Act shows their intelligence to the public.

b. Virtue (Excellent Behavior)

Verderber, Sellnow and Verderber (2012) proposed that to demonstrate a speaker's virtue to its listeners, the speaker must build trust to enable the speaker to deliver a persuasive and effective speech. Experiences, beliefs, and motivations of the speaker can be used as persuasive strategies to win the audience's trust. Goodluck Jonathan uses his life experiences, convictions, and motivations to demonstrate his moral character and enhance his credibility. This includes:

Excerpt 23:

Let me repeat that we have a fundamental duty to preserve the safety of every member of our community and to defend the constitutional independence of our nation, even as efforts at persuasion and conversation continue. Hence, we will not hesitate under any circumstances to take reasonable steps are required to give the citizens the utmost safety they deserve, anywhere they are residing in the country (COIN speech- Appendix E).

In excerpt 23, Goodluck Jonathan demonstrates his virtue (excellent behaviour) by explaining his motive to the listeners which involves continuing to dialogue with the wary factions in the country. Goodluck Jonathan argues that the ultimate goal of his government is to safeguard the safety of the citizens of the country and protect the sovereign integrity of the country. Consequently, he tells the audience that he will do anything possible to ensure that he provides the fullest possible security for the citizens of the country. This example's final statement highlights his positive character trait of optimism.

Excerpt 24:

To fight a complete battle against extremism, I am passionate to defend our democracy, our national unity, and our political stability. Our nation's stability and unity, as well as the preservation of people's lives and property, are inalienable rights. I have authorised our security personnel to undertake a full-scale operation to stop the lawlessness of terrorists in our territory (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 24, Goodluck Jonathan attempts to showcase his moral conduct by informing the public about his eagerness to protect the democracy of Nigeria and ensure political stability by instigating an utter conflict against insurgency. It is primarily done for the benefit of his nation and its citizens. By stating this, it helps him to win the public's trust.

Excerpt 25:

> Also, I have given the law enforcement agencies permission to take any legal action required to make sure that this is done. Although the result will not be seen immediately but I can guarantee you that Nigeria will once again be safe and that these criminals will be pushed out. We will stop at nothing to accomplish this (COIN speech- Appendix E).

In excerpt 25, Goodluck Jonathan shows his trustworthy personality by informing the public about his intention to drive away all the thugs and miscreants in the country, using strategies that are within the law and order. Goodluck Jonathan argues that attaining security and peace in the country is not a day's job but would ensure that it is achievable. He also promises not to spare any effort to achieve the goal. His virtues, which is being optimist, is also demonstrated in this example's final statement. He maintained a sense of optimism, he declared that we would make every attempt to accomplish this aim.

c. Benevolence (Goodwill)

Goodwill is the impression an audience has of a speaker who they feel empathises with them, understands them, and responds to them (Verderber, Sellnow, and Verderber, 2012). When the audience has faith in the speaker's sincerity, they are more likely to accept what they are told. The researcher discovered that Goodluck Jonathan is particularly receptive to the public in this speech. He pauses his address to express his gratitude to the listeners for their enthusiastic response to Goodluck Jonathan's remarks. Goodluck Jonathan uses goodwill to gain positive judgments towards himself.

Excerpt 26:

I am confident that with your help and supplications (prayers), we can conquer these challenges and return our entire nation to the road of peace, prosperity, and advancement. (COIN speech- Appendix E)

Excerpt 26 is one of the evidences that Goodluck Jonathan has good intention to carry the people along in the quest to overcome insurgency in the country. He believed in the collaborative efforts of the people thus, the use of the clause 'I am confident that with your help and supplications (prayers)'. This is a powerful method to express empathy to the Nigerian citizens as well as to seek the support of the audience.

Excerpt 27:

Yes, we have difficulties, but we shall prevail. Nigeria is where we live. Nigeria is fortunate. For the sake of our children and ourselves, we shall all work together to safeguard, secure, and grow this nation (COIN speech- Appendix E).

In the counterinsurgency speech, Goodluck Jonathan admitted that the country is facing a very huge security issue but hold that the issue will be defeated. He emphasises the word "we" and "our" to targeted at the listeners. The aim is to give tribute to the listeners that they are very important in the quest to overcome the ailing security situation of the country.

Excerpt 28:

Thank you and God bless Nigeria. (COIN speech- Appendix E)

Excerpt 28 is one of the patterns of how sensitive Goodluck Jonathan is to listener's outcry. He usually reacts to the listener's outcry during his speech. It is a decent way to honour the public-here with specific reference to the Nigeria situation. This enables Goodluck Jonathan to

establish a strong rapport with the audience and gives them a sense of presence and involvement during the discourse.

3. Sensitive/Emotional proofs or Pathos

Pathos is frequently used to refer to the powerful or successful emotional appeals that give persuasive messages and power to drive the audience to action. But, in the view of Aristotle, emotion is associated particularly with the speaker's ability to alter the perception of the populace (Herrick, 2001). Pathos, or emotional proof, is an expression of the speaker's feelings through a speech. Severally, Goodluck Jonathan made use of pathos (a rhetorical proof) in his counterinsurgency speeches to persuade the public. It is the most important example he uses in his speech. The various rhetorical proof (in terms of emotions) that are analysed in Goodluck Jonathan's speeches include:

a. Anger

Griffin (2012) describe this as when people are unsuccessful in meeting a need, they become enraged and experience anger. Anger always stems from transgressions against oneself and always involves specific people. In the counterinsurgency speeches, Goodluck Jonathan arouses anger in the audience following increasing level of insurgency in the country and some sponsors of the malignant social problem.

Excerpt 29:

> The latest murder of security personnel by an unusual faction in Nasarawa State is intensely reprehensible. I have ordered that everyone who had anything to do

with the operatives' deaths be found and held accountable, no matter the cost.

(COIN speech- Appendix E)

Excerpt 29 shows that Goodluck Jonathan attempts to make the citizens' annoyance at the actions of Boko Haram in Nasarawa State has done to security operatives in Nigeria. He becomes angry after knowing cult group has wasted several security operatives who are trying to ensure a peaceful co-existence returns to the country. Nigerian government is spending a lot of money to nip the killing in the bud, but the killers and some citizens are frustrating the efforts of the government. For these reasons, he has become angry. The cause of Goodluck Jonathan's anger in example 18 is cult group's serial attacks on the security operatives of his country.

Excerpt 30:

> Sad to say, as I speak to you now, the invasion by international terrorism on our soil, which has claimed thousands of lives, threatens all the advances made during the previous 15 years of democratic administration in our nation. Nigeria, our beloved nation, is dealing with a fresh obstacle, a conflict has been released on us. Extremist foreign elements, cooperating with some of our ignorant countrymen, are concentrated on an endeavour to completely destroy our nation and the liberty and democratic values we adore and applaud today.
>
> (COIN speech- Appendix E)

In excerpt 30, Goodluck Jonathan expresses his anger because some of his countrymen (misguided citizens) are joining force with foreign extremist elements to bring insurgency into the country. Hauser (2007) claimed that people get furious because of something that has offended them. In excerpt 30, the reason of his annoyance is that some misguided citizens of the country are forming clique with enemies to bring war on the country.

b. Calmness

Anger is the antithesis of tranquility and being peaceful is the reverse of becoming furious. The procedure of calming down or suppressing anger is known as becoming calm. Notwithstanding, in Goodluck Jonathan increasing rage, he still manages to simmer down. Here are the excerpts that depicts 'calmness' in Goodluck Jonathan's speeches:

Excerpt 31:

> Let me reaffirm that we are charged with a fundamental obligation to preserve the safety of every member of our community and to defend the constitutional integrity of our nation, even as efforts at persuasion and conversation continue. Thus, we will under no circumstances hold back from taking whatever steps are required to ensure that all of our citizens are completely secure wherever they choose to live in the nation (COIN speech- Appendix E).

Excerpt 31 shows Goodluck Jonathan expressing his calmness. Rather than getting angry about the various reports in the press about his government not doing enough to halt the menace, the country is facing; he called on his people to remain calm and do away with fear by explaining the steps and activities of the Nigerian Army to stop the spread of the insurgency.

Excerpt 32:

> To defeat terrorism, we must fight together as a single force. To defeat the terrorists who now threatens everything we cherish, Christians, Fishermen, Muslims, Farmers, Teachers, Herdsmen, Attorneys, Clergy or Clerics, the rich,

the poor, and Nigerians from all regions of the nation must cooperate with our intelligence services and the military (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 32, Goodluck Jonathan calls for serenity from the citizens of his country and asks them to be united to win the war against insurgency. This is coming after various criticisms from the media pertaining to Jonathan's inability to fight the rising insecurity of the nation, Nigeria as a whole. He sees the security of the nation, Nigeria, as the work of everyone regardless of the religion bias, professional acumen or economic capacity.

Excerpt 33:

But a leader must focus on the future. You probably did not come here to listen to me speak about going backwards. Similar to other individuals, you are curious about what comes next (COIN speech- Appendix E).

Excerpt 33 shows Goodluck Jonathan conveying his composure. Instead of fighting and getting more enraged as a result of the fake report concerning his government's handling of the BH as well as other rebellious factions terrorising the nation, He chooses to maintain his composure and demonstrate to the public the proper course of action.

c. Friendship

Love or friendship is a positive feeling or emotion towards anyone. It represents wishes for someone and beliefs about amusing deeds done for the benefit of others.

Excerpt 34:

Our doors remain open for conversation and reunion with any of our countrymen who have joined forces with Al Qaeda and other foreign terrorists

in the mistaken idea that using violence to resolve their issues is acceptable (COIN speech- Appendix E).

In excerpt 34, it shows that Goodluck Jonathan believes in good things for his country, good people still exist among the insurgents who have been misguided by the international terrorist groups to believe in using violence to solve their problem. He opened the door for dialogue and reconciliation, only for those who are willing and ready to embrace peace.

d. Detestation

Even without self-inflicted wrongs, hatred is possible. Selected COIN speeches shows that a person who has despised someone wants to feel sorry for him, in some instances. This is the prevailing emotion that FPGJ articulates when delivering most of the selected COIN speeches. Goodluck Jonathan displays his disdain for the insurgents so that the public will also feel the same way. He frequently mentions in his speeches how he despises the insurgency in his nation and other nations which he views as the enemies of progress.

Excerpt 35:

Nonetheless, the insurgents and terrorists are pursuing their fanatical objective of mayhem, mass murder, division, and secession while trying to stop the government from executing its constitutional duties to the people (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 35, Goodluck Jonathan expresses his anger towards the insurgents, by doing this, he wants the listeners to share the same level of animosity. Excerpt 35 is showed as detestation because there is no indication that it is a direct offence by the opposition parties or critics to Goodluck Jonathan's government. According to Aristotle, a person who hates, seeks to feel sympathy for the person they have disliked, at some instances. Excerpt 35 demonstrates that

Goodluck Jonathan as the hater shows his sympathy to the war criminals by informing the listeners that insurgency has prevented him from carrying out his legal and constitutional obligations to the people.

Excerpt 36:

> Recent terrorist strikes have resulted in the deaths of several of our countrymen, the injury or maiming of many others, the destruction of entire towns and communities, and the risk of the economies of some of our states (COIN speech- Appendix E).

Goodluck Jonathan articulates his abhorrence towards the insurgency in excerpt 36. Excerpt 36 is regarded as an act of propagating hatred because it does not directly offend Goodluck Jonathan. To make the public despise the insurgency as much as he does, he simply informs them of its negative aspects.

e. Fear

Fear is an unpleasant emotion brought on by a vision of awful things that may occur in the future. Fear is also a result of a mental disorder and is experienced by people who think something bad will probably happen to them in the future by certain people, in a certain form, and at a certain time (Aristotle, 2005). Goodluck Jonathan expresses concern in his COIN speech that his nation will suffer if the insurgency is not tainted.

Excerpt 37:

> These insurgents and militants appear committed to seizing power and dominance over a portion of our beloved country and gradually engulfing the rest of it. The Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority have been

216

destroyed in several areas, and in their place, unusual flags that imply the exercise of alternative sovereignty have been flown (COIN speech-Appendix E).

Excerpt 37 show the worry of Goodluck Jonathan that his nation would experience awful things if the insurgents were not put under control on time. When Goodluck Jonathan is talking about insurgents' attack and activities, he describes their destruction of the Nigerian flag and other state symbols and their replacement with weird flags that represent the exercise of alternative sovereignty in order to convey his dread to the listeners. He fears this may put the country in jeopardy.

Excerpt 38:

The heinous kidnapping of schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State has made the ruthless savagery of these terrorists, who wish to incite an uprising and fracture our country, this is visible to the rest of the world (COIN speech-Appendix E).

In excerpt 38, he fears insurgents may balkanise the good name of his country to the global community and thus may lead the country to a state of anarchy. He informs the public that the heinous kidnapping of school girls from Chibok in Borno State has made him fearful, this is applicable in order to convey his concern in his country, a country feared by many foreign investors and entity to reside. He continues by providing thorough information regarding the country's deteriorating security situation. According to Griffin (2012), the speaker must construct a realistic image of the disaster to demonstrate its likelihood of happening in order for the listener to feel the speaker's terror. By providing the public with the specifics, the speaker aids them in imagining and feeling what they are afraid may befall their native land.

Excerpt 39:

> … if we do not invest billions in educating our children now, we will have to spend them battling insecurity in the nearest future (COIN speech- Appendix E).

In excerpt 39, Goodluck Jonathan fears that if his country cannot invest in youth education, they may be forced to spend more money getting equipment to fight insurgents in the nearest future. He articulates his fear by informing the people that delaying education of the youths' maybe one of the ways to put Nigeria in danger of falling to the hand of the insurgents.

f. Confidence

An individual's confidence develops when he or she succeeds continuously and feels that they are superior to others. In his COIN speech, Goodluck Jonathan displays his confidence by believing the problem of insecurity facing the country will be overcome and the country will prevail. He shows confidence in his speeches as stated below:

Excerpt 40:

> I want to reassure you all that whoever they may be and wherever they may go, we will track them down, we will catch them, and we will bring them to justice. This goes for collaborators as well as those directly or indirectly supporting any form of rebellion against the Nigerian government. It also goes for insurgents and terrorists who take pleasure in killing our security personnel. We will defeat terrorism no matter what it takes (COIN speech- Appendix E).

Excerpt 40 above indicates how Goodluck Jonathan shows his confidence in overcoming the security issues facing the country. He assures the audience that all the rebellion groups in

Nigeria and those who are delighted in killing the security operatives in the country will be hunted and killed in no time.

Excerpt 41:

> Even if the fight against terrorism may be challenging, there will eventually be peace. Terror is evil, and throughout history, evil has never lasted forever. Boko Haram's threat will undoubtedly be eliminated. I am convinced that we will finally triumph over the terrorists and all other bad forces because of your prayers, your bravery, your labour of love, faith, and sacrifice (COIN speech-Appendix E).

Goodluck Jonathan in excerpt 41 remains confident that peace will come to Nigeria again. This sense of assurance emanates from his conviction that he is putting everything in place to making sure that the insurgents are being controlled. He conveys to the listeners his sense of optimism by expressing his confidence.

5.4 Speech Delivery components in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Goodluck Jonathan's COIN-related speeches

Speech delivery involves making use of body language as well as the voice effectively. The points of speech delivery, according to Erika (2019), were related to the handling of the voice and for gestures (action). It was established that the voice should be modulated for the right tone, volume, and intensity, as well as for pauses and phrasing. In terms of action, orators received trainings in gestures, appropriate body stance and posture, managing of the pupil (eyes) as well as facial expressions (Erika, 2019).

The speech delivery components in the TPA and counterinsurgency speeches by Goodluck Jonathan include storytelling, body language, and tone of voice.

1. Storytelling

One of the media utilised in public speaking for a variety of goals by professional speakers is storytelling. Goodluck Jonathan told stories to convey some crucial ideas to the public. For examples, Goodluck Jonathan made use of the storytelling technique to inform the listeners about the origin of insurgency in Nigeria. In excerpt 42 below, he used storytelling to point at various place where the insurgents have struck in the past and how they have been able to face it.

Excerpt 42:

> Without a shadow of a doubt, what we are seeing in Nigeria today is an outworking of the same twisted and vicious worldview that took down the Twin Towers in New York, massacred unarmed civilians in Boston, and inspired the killing of helpless people in the southern Russian city of Volgograd. Terrorist actions have brought conflict and sufferings to countries like Syria, Somalia, Mali, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan. These evildoers keep brainwashing and motivating naive young people to harm the defenceless. We cannot let this go on like this (COIN speech- Appendix E).

A speech can be made memorable by employing storytelling to share information (Nikitina, 2011). When using the storytelling technique, Goodluck Jonathan satirises the characters in the history that is being shared. It adds interest to his speech, it also allows the public to visualise the actual scene. Whilst talking about how insurgents kidnapped the Chibok school girls, he narrated the story like he is the head of the school and explains how the issue happened as it is showed in excerpt 38. The purpose of telling the story is to make people believe his plan to bring back the girls.

Excerpt 43:

> I will not sit down and be waiting for the security operatives to come. I will stand up and approach them. I must be very sure of the lives of the children in the hand of the terrorists. I know if I tell the army; they allow thousands of internally displaced Nigerians to start returning to their homes and towns after taking back most of the neighbourhoods and areas that the militants had previously seized (COIN speech- Appendix E).

It must be understood here that Goodluck Jonathan used the storytelling technique in order to shed more light on more provocative matters as well as influence the listener's belief. According to Nikitina (2011), the most effective story to tell during a speech may contain a true anecdote from the speaker's own life. Hence, it is the most appropriate method for Goodluck Jonathan to persuade the listeners that he is capable enough to overcome the security issues.

2. Gesture (Body Language)

Gesture is a vital component of speech delivery. It facilitates the audience's ability to comprehend more of the speaker's messages. According to various psychological studies, nonverbal communication accounts for as much as 55% of the message that an audience receives (Nikitina, 2011). Whereas, Goodluck Jonathan delivers his counterinsurgency speeches, he uses body movements to emphasise crucial points to the public. To do the correct body movements, two factors must be considered. They are 'body positioning' or 'posture' and 'body placement'. According to Nikitina (2011), in order to make the audience feel at ease and engaged in the speech, the speaker should maintain a relaxed and upright posture by not leaning on or gripping the podium and to sway weight from one foot to another. Accordingly, Goodluck Jonathan when delivering the counter insurgency speeches, stands behind the

podium at all times. The researcher discovered that Goodluck Jonathan stands up straight during his speech and never leans against the podium. It is acceptable and this posture ensures that the listeners are paying close attention to the speaker. But he frequently grabs the podium halfway through the speech till it finishes.

Figure 5: Showing Goodluck Jonathan Standing upright against the Podium (Channels TV)

Figure 6 : Showing Goodluck Jonathan leaning on the Podium (Channels TV, 2014)

With the right positioning or movement, the speaker can immediately recover the audience's interest (Nikitina, 2011). Thus, making the right movements during a speech is essential since

they can influence the audience's focus on the speaker. The easiest method to connect with the audience and captivate their sympathies is to smile and pay attention to them as the speaker speaks (Nikitina, 2011). The findings revealed that Goodluck Jonathan makes an effort to connect with his audience by moving his body. He regularly moves his right hand throughout the discourse. But it becomes inappropriate due to the excessive left hand movement. In order to emphasise his message—that the best people exist—he also points with his right hand at the audience.

3. Voice (tone)

A speaker's confidence, emotional condition, and attitude can all be inferred from their voice tone. According to Nikitina (2011), the tone of voice makes up around 33% of the message that is communicated, meaning that the listener is more influenced by the speaker's voice than by the message itself. Pace, pitch, and volume are the three factors to be taken into account while assessing the calibre of the speaker's tone of voice.

a. Speech: the pace

The speed of the speech is determined by its pace. The speech should be delivered at the right tempo. It indicates that the speaker does not speak excessively quickly or slowly, which may distract the audience. The bulk of a presentation should be presented at a pace that enables the audience to understand and internalise the material. According to Nikitina (2011), a speech should be delivered at a rate of roughly 1000 words per seven minutes (around 140-150 words per minute). The researcher discovered that the majority of Goodluck Jonathan's counterinsurgency addresses have 1,029 words and last about 10 minutes. The researcher divided the number of words by the speech's duration to determine if Goodluck Jonathan speaks at an adequate pace (in minutes). At the end, Goodluck Jonathan is able to produce 103 words

per minute. According to Nikitina (2011), a speech should generally be delivered at a word-per-minute rate of between 140 and 150. We can get the conclusion that Goodluck Jonathan speaks at the suitable speed.

b. Pitch and Volume of the speech

Low-pitched speaking voices, which are associated with authority, credibility, strength, and self-confidence, are used by persuasive speakers (Nikitina, 2011). Relatively, Goodluck Jonathan primarily uses a low speaking voice or low pitch in his counterinsurgency speech. That is beneficial since it aids in his authority-building, boosts his reputation, and demonstrates his grit and self-assurance. When he wants to communicate his displeasure about the attack on the security personnel in Nasarawa, he speaks with a low voice or a loud pitch. According to Nikitina (2011), the loudness of the voice should not be too low, making the speaker hard to hear, or too high, giving the impression that the speaker is shouting. Despite the fact that Goodluck Jonathan used the appropriate tone (pitch, volume and space), this rhetorical technique has not put an end to the violence in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria.

Conclusively, the following rhetoric were identified in the selected COIN-related speeches and TPA: First, 'rational/logical proofs' also known as 'logos' which included 'enthymemes (metaphors)' which were in excerpts 1-9 and 'illustrations (strategic examples)' which were in excerpts 10-17. Second, 'moral/ethical proofs' also known as 'ethos' which included 'apparent wisdom (or perceived intelligence)' in excerpts 18-22, 'virtue (or excellent behaviour)' in excerpts 23-25, 'benevolence (or goodwill)' in excepts 26-28. Third, 'sensitive/emotional proofs' also known as 'pathos' which included 'anger' in excerpts 29-30, 'calmness' in excerpts 31-33, 'friendship' in excerpt 34, 'detestation' in excerpts 35-36, 'fear' in excerpts 37-39, 'confidence' in excerpts 40-41.

Also, the speech delivery components that have been identified in the TPA and selected COIN-related speech used by the Nigerian government to counter insurgency are: 'storytelling' as seen in excerpts 42-43, 'gesture'- (this includes pictorial evidence) and 'tone of voice (this includes pace, pitch and volume of the speech)'. The next chapter will discuss extensively on the answer to the third research question of the study.

6.0 CHAPTER SIX: DATA ANALYSIS RELATING TO RESEARCH QUESTION THREE

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the results of investigations conducted into the extent which counterinsurgency rhetoric has impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in insurgency prone areas in Nigeria. Here is a table (table 6.0), it represents the total number of each respondent and their profession as well as their location.

Table 6.0. Representation of Respondents Profession and Location

Respondents	Total collected per Profession	Total used	Not usable/void data	Main location
Human right Lawyers	45	45	0	Abuja, Nigeria
Journalists	30	30	0	Abuja, Nigeria
Humanitarian Workers	45	37	8	London and Nigeria
Security Personnel	30	26	4	Abuja, Nigeria
IDPs Camp Managers	35	26	9	Nigeria
Policy Makers	30	26	4	Abuja, Nigeria
Traditional Rulers	15	10	5	Abuja, Nigeria
Total number of void data	0	0	30	xxx
Total transcribed data	0	200	0	xxx

Choice of the Interviewees

According to table 6.0 below, two hundred and thirty interviews were conducted by the Principal Investigator (PI) but due to some unforeseen circumstance beyond the PI's control, thirty were not useful as at the time of transcription/analysis.

Human rights Lawyers- *Forty-five*

These are participants from the most credible legal parastatals in the Northern part of Nigeria. They were very happy to contribute to the project. They showed a high level of a positive attitude. They gave their consents, and there were no concerns. With this set of people, there was no language barrier as they were all able to communicate in English, which is the official language in Nigeria. Most

of them had their high profile of having dealt with fighting for the rights of war victims in the past, this consequentially makes the data collected richer in context.

Journalists - *Thirty*

The most sensitive profession right now in Nigeria is Journalism. Several arrests have been made and were in large numbers. Journalists are being harassed everyday as they do their job. Some were beaten by security forces, put in prisons and tortured unjustly. Some died in the process while some were released. The sad thing is that, in the end, the survivors will not receive any compensation for the maltreatment and ordeal. It must be emphasised that most of the victims died in prison without trial. After several attempts, the PI was able to speak to some of the survivors via phone while in Nigeria because they were afraid of another arrest. The PI did not make any physical contact with any of the participants in this sector.

Humanitarian/ Activists/ Local & International NGO Staff - *Forty-five*

The Humanitarian, was the most significant set of participants for this research study, as seen in the topic, Human rights abuse. Their opinions matter a lot as it is a step forward to publicise their point of view about the moral decadence and laxity in that area in Nigeria. Parts of the

people recruited for the study were the staff of the UNHCR London (who happily gave their recommendations), Amnesty International Nigeria, International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations (UN), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Human rights radio 101.1 FM Abuja Nigeria; the famous radio station were the PI was aired live during a widely known program (Brekete) where she discussed extensively about her thesis and also made notes of constructive responses. One of the respondents informed the Principal Investigator about the sensitivity of the topic and how she should be more careful in the remaining part of her trip at the time of contact.

Security Personnel- *Thirty*

Getting in contact with this set of participants was very difficult. After several failed visiting attempts, on the sixth visit, they attended to me because I went with an International NGO staff. In the analysis in chapter seven, quotes from this group will be represented with SP.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camp Managers- *Thirty-five*

This is another set of important participants in the fieldwork exercise, at this stage there was a significant problem, which was a language barrier, interpreters were very expensive to hire because most of the Internally Displaced Persons were of Hausa origin. The Government and the NGO found it useful to use Leaders who can communicate with them easily. For the Principal Investigator (PI) that was a thorn in the flesh, as the PI could not understand them until an interpreter was found.

So, five (5) interview sessions had to be removed because there were no interpreters to interpret at the transcription stage of the project. Due to some consent issues, four (4) interviews were not transcribed because their consent was not explicit enough; in the questionnaire, they ticked both 'yes' and 'no', and for majority of the open-ended questions, they left it blank. Also, in the

recordings, some of the respondent's voice were not clear enough. This was quite frustrating at the transcription stage, but at the long run, it did not affect the data, because the remaining two hundred (200) recorded interviews were sufficient for the study.

Policy Makers/Lawmakers/ Government Officials- *Thirty*

Engaging this group in the field exercise was quite significant.

This is because they make the rules, and they need to be aware of its consequences both directly and indirectly. The PI did not bother to analyse four (4) interviews after the transcription because the responses were entirely not relevant to the research aims and objectives, as most participants did not put a straightforward answer to the questions asked by the PI.

But Nigeria, as a highly cultured country, a younger person cannot stop them or shut them up when talking during the interview process.

Traditional Ruler- *fifteen*

Traditional Rulers are prominent figures in Nigeria, and they are accorded respect nationwide. I had the privilege to interview fifteen who were all from the Northern region of Nigeria, where the heat (Terrorism) is on the highest degree. This group of respondents are respectable member of the society, most time they tend to be diplomatic about government matters, five of the fifteen recorded responses were not useful due to the fact that the responses were not in conformity with research questions. As mentioned above, you cannot shut elderly people up, you just have to listen. Also refer to 'Population of Study and Sample Size' on page 121 for more clarification.

Generally, there were many limitations to reaching more willing participants i.e., funding constraints, language problems, etc. For example, the PI speaks English and Yoruba, and She is from the Western part of the country, while the research is on the Northern part of Nigeria,

where Hausa/Fulani speakers predominate.

TABLE 6.1: Showing whether the respondents at one time or the other read or listened to the whole or extracts of TPA and/or the counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	193	96.5%
2	No	07	3.5%
3	Not Sure	-	-
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.1 above reveals that 193 (96.5%) respondents said they have at one time or the other read or listened to the whole or extracts of TPA and counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan, while 07 (3.5%) respondents said they have not in any form read or listened to it. It can therefore be generalised that the majority of the respondents have read or listened to the whole or extracts of TPA and the counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan.

TABLE 6.2: Showing respondents answers to whether the TPA and counterinsurgency related speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan have helped combat insurgency in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	143	71.5%
2	No	45	22.5%
3	Not Sure	12	6%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.2 above reveals that 143 (71.5%) respondents said the provisions of TPA and counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan have assisted in combating insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, while 45 (22.5%) respondents said both TPA and the counterinsurgency speeches have not helped combat insurgency in North-East, Nigeria. 12(6%) respondents said they are not sure if the TPA and counterinsurgency speeches have been of assistance to the fight against insurgency. It can therefore be generalised that the TPA and former President Jonathan's counterinsurgency speeches have helped combat insurgency in the North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.3: Showing respondents answers to whether rhetoric utilised in fight against insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, impacted the success of the operations

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	178	89%
2	No	22	11%
3	Not Sure	-	-
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.3 above reveals that 178 (89%) respondents stated that rhetoric utilised in the fight against insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, impacted the success of the counterinsurgency operations, while 22 (11%) respondents said the rhetoric utilised did not influence the success of the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria. It can therefore be generalised that rhetoric utilised in the fight against insurgency impacted the success of the operation in North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.4: Showing respondents answers to whether Human Rights abuse dominates counterinsurgency operations in the North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	178	89%
2	No	22	11%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.4 above reveals that 178 (89%) respondents stated that Human Rights abuse dominates COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria, while 22 (11%) respondents stated that Human Rights abuse did not dominate counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria. It can therefore be generalised that Human Rights abuse dominates COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.5: Showing respondents answers to the kind of Human Rights abuse that dominates COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Right to life	68	34%
2	Right to human dignity	63	31.5%
3	Right to freedom of expression/opinion	22	11%
4	Right to freedom of movement	47	23.5%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

As a follow up to the response on Table 6.4 above, Table 6.5 reveals that 68(34%) respondents said abuse of right to life dominates counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, 63(31.5%) respondents said abuse of right to human dignity dominates counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria, 22(11%) respondents said abuse of freedom of expression/opinion dominates

counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, while 47(23.5%) respondents said abuse of right to freedom of movement dominates counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. It can therefore be generalised that abuse of rights to freedom of movement, life and human dignity dominate counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria.

TABLE 6.6: Showing respondents answers to whether the counterinsurgency rhetoric in anyway reduced COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the troubled areas in the North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	148	74%
2	No	35	17.5%
3	Not Sure	17	8.5%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.6 above reveals that 148(74%) respondents stated that counterinsurgency rhetoric reduced COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the troubled areas in North-East, Nigeria, while 35(17.5%) respondents stated that rhetoric did not reduce COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the troubled areas in North-East, Nigeria. 17(8.5%) respondents were undecided. From the above, it can be said that counterinsurgency rhetoric reduces COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.7: Showing respondents answers to how counterinsurgency rhetoric reduced COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the troubled areas in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Reduced intimidation of humanitarian workers	05	2.5%
2	Reduction in the force used by the military and respect for human rights	165	82.5%
3	Relaxation of movement restrictions	08	4%
4	Void	22	11%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.7 reveals that 05 (2.5%) respondents stated that counterinsurgency rhetoric has reduced intimidation of humanitarian workers in North-East, Nigeria, 165 (82.5%) said counterinsurgency rhetoric has reduced the force used by the military and also lead to respect for human rights in the troubled areas, while 08 (4%) respondents said counterinsurgency rhetoric has led to relaxation of movement restrictions. 22 (11%) responses were voided. It can thus be said that counterinsurgency rhetoric has ameliorate the use of force on the people by the military and calls for more respect for Human Rights. It has therefore positively impacted counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria.

TABLE 6.8: Showing respondents answers to whether with counterinsurgency/military presence in these areas, Boko Haram is still a primary threat to victim's security

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	23	11.5%
2	No	171	85.5%
3	Not sure	06	3%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.8 above shows that 23 (11.5%) respondents stated that despite counterinsurgency/military presence in these areas Boko Haram is still a primary threat to victim's security, while 171 (85.5%) respondents stated that since counterinsurgency/military presence in these areas Boko Haram is no longer a primary threat to victim's security. 06 (3%) respondents were undecided. From the above, it can be said that since the commencement of counterinsurgency operations and military presence in the North-East, Nigeria, Boko Haram has ceased to be a primary threat to victim's security at least to an extent. The cause for concern is still the 11.5% of the respondent, which still makes the study relevant, because every human counts according to Amnesty International (2015).

TABLE 6.9: Showing respondents answers to show the military's performance level in complementing counterinsurgency rhetoric that curtails COIN-related abuse in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	72	36%
2	No	128	64%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.9 above reveals that 72 (36%) respondents stated that the military's performance level is high in complementing counterinsurgency rhetoric that curtails COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria, while 128 (64%) respondents stated that the military' s performance level is low in complementing counterinsurgency rhetoric that curtails COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria. Considering the table, it can therefore be said that the military's performance level is critically low in complementing counterinsurgency rhetoric that curtails COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.10: Showing respondents views about counterinsurgency rhetorical strategy the Nigeria government is deploying to countering the Insurgents

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Very effective	51	25.5%
2	Effective	121	60.5%
3	Not effective	28	14%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.10 above shows that 51 (25.5%) respondents believe counterinsurgency rhetorical strategy the Nigeria government is deploying to counter insurgency is very effective, 121 (60.5%) said it is effective, while 28 (14%) said it is not effective. It can therefore be said that the counterinsurgency rhetorical strategy the Nigeria government is deploying to counter insurgency is effective.

TABLE 6.11: Showing respondents' answers to what ways can the government introduce that can mitigate the occurrence of Human Rights abuse in its counterinsurgency operations

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Ensure the military have respect for human rights	68	34%
2	Consistently use counterinsurgency rhetoric that condemn human rights abuse	76	38%
3	Introduce life-benefitting programmes	34	17%
4	Withdrawal of troupes	08	4%
5	Re-orientation of security operatives	14	7%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.11 above reveals that 68(34%) respondents stated that in order to reduce human rights abuse in its counterinsurgency operations, the Nigeria Government must ensure that the military have respect for human rights, 76(38%) said the Government should consistently use counterinsurgency rhetoric that condemn human rights abuse, 34(17%) said the Government should introduce life-benefiting programmes, 08(4%) said the human rights abuse will be reduced only if the Government withdraws its troupes, while 14(7%) said re-orientation of security operatives would help reduce human rights abuse during counterinsurgency operations. From the foregoing, it can be said that in order to reduce human rights abuse in its counterinsurgency operations, the Government should consistently use counterinsurgency rhetoric that condemn human rights abuse and ensure the military have respect for human rights.

TABLE 6.12: Showing respondents answers to what is responsible for the Nigeria government's inability to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Lack of political interest	77	38.5%
2	Intense sponsorship of Boko Haram by politicians	34	17%
3	Affiliation of insurgents with international terrorists' organisations	12	6%
4	Poorly equipped military	44	22%
5	Poverty	15	7.5%
6	Lack of education	06	3%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.12 above shows that 77(38.5%) respondents stated that lack of political interest is responsible for the Nigeria government's inability to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, 34(17%) respondents stated that intense sponsorship of Boko Haram by politicians has not enabled the Nigeria government to totally eradicate insurgency in northeast, Nigeria, 12(6%) respondents stated that affiliation of insurgents with international terrorists organisations has not enabled the federal government to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, 44(22%) respondents stated that poorly equipped military has not enabled the Nigeria government to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, 15(7.5%) respondents stated that poverty has not enabled the federal government to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria, while 06(3%) respondents stated that lack of education has not enabled the federal government to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria. Considering the frequency of percentages on the table above, it can be said that lack of political

interest is responsible for the Nigeria government's inability to totally eradicate insurgency in North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.13: Showing respondents answers to whether counterinsurgency rhetoric has contributed to the success of counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Yes	178	89%
2	No	22	11%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.13 above reveals that 178(89%) respondents stated that counterinsurgency rhetoric has contributed to the success of the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, while 22(11%) respondents stated that counterinsurgency rhetoric has not contributed to the success of the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria. Looking at the above, it can be said that counterinsurgency rhetoric has contributed to the success of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria.

TABLE 6.14: Showing respondents answers to why they think counterinsurgency rhetoric has contributed to the success of counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	It reinforces the determination of the government to secure and give a better lifestyle/relocate the people in the troubled areas	62	31%

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
2	It keeps the people informed about the consequences of insurgency	11	5.5%
3	It changes the orientation of some insurgents	14	7%
4	It causes faction (a contention) among the insurgents by influencing their mental thoughts	28	14%
5	It mobilises peoples support for the COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria	85	42.5%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.14 reveals that 62(31%) respondents believe counterinsurgency rhetoric has contributed to the success of COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria, because it reinforces the determination of the government to secure and give a better lifestyle/relocate the people in the troubled areas, 11(5.5%) believe it has assisted because it keeps the people informed about the consequences of insurgency, 14(7%) believe it has assisted because it changes the orientation of some insurgents, 28(14%) believe it has assisted because it causes faction (a contention) among the insurgents by influencing their mental thoughts, while 85(42.5%) believe it has assisted because it mobilises peoples support for COIN operations in the North-East, Nigeria.

TABLE 6.15: Showing respondents answers to different tactics the government could introduce to improve its rhetorical strategy in countering insurgency in North-East, Nigeria

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%

1	Engagement in more integrated communication strategies	49	24.5%
2	Continuous reading of riot acts to perpetrators of malevolent deeds	22	11%
3	Engagement of the services of rhetorical experts to compose and disseminate messages that would mobilise support for the government and persuade insurgents to drop arms	83	41.5%
4	Adoption of reinforcement strategies to gain the confidence of the people	05	2.5%
5	Media should be encouraged to set agenda for the counterinsurgency operations, while it also downplays activities of the insurgents	41	20.5%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.15 above shows that 49(24.5%) respondents stated that other things the government could do to improve its rhetorical strategy in countering insurgency in North-East, Nigeria is to engage in more integrated communication strategies, 22(11%) respondents stated that other things the government could do to improve its rhetorical strategy is to introduce the continuation of reading of riot acts to perpetrators of malevolent deeds, 83(41.5%) respondents stated that in order to improve rhetorical strategy the government should engage the services of rhetorical experts to compose and disseminate messages that would mobilise support for the government and persuade insurgents to drop arms, 05(2.5%) respondents said the rhetorical

strategy the government could use to enhance its fight against insurgency is to adopt reinforcement strategy that would improve the people's trust in the government, while 41(20.5%) respondents said other things the government could do to improve its rhetorical strategy is to that media should be encourage to set agenda for counterinsurgency operations, while it also downplays activities of the insurgents. It can thus be said that in order to improve rhetorical strategy the government should engage the services of rhetorical experts to compose and disseminate messages that would mobilise support for the government and persuade insurgents to drop arms.

Demographic analysis of respondents

TABLE 6.16: Showing the age distribution of respondents that attended to the questionnaire and interview guide.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	18-28	35	17.5%
2	29-39	47	23.5%
3	40 and above	118	59%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.16 reveals that 35 (17.5%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and interview guide fall within the age grade of 18-28 years; 47 (23.5%) respondents are between the ages of 29 and 39, while 118 (59%) are between the ages of 40 and above. It can therefore be said that majority of respondents that answered the questionnaire and the interview guide are 40 years old and above.

TABLE 6.17: Showing the Occupation of respondents that attended to the questionnaire and interview guide.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Humanitarian workers	37	18.5%
2	Journalists	30	15%
3	Human rights lawyers	45	22.5%
4	Security Personnel	26	13%
5	IDPs Camp Manager	26	13%
6	Policy makers	26	13%
7	Traditional Rulers	10	5%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.17 above demonstrates that 100(50%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide are Humanitarian workers, while another 100(50%) respondents that attended to the questionnaire and the interview guide are Journalists. It can therefore be stated that only Humanitarian workers and Journalists covering the troubled areas in North-East, Nigeria, were administered questionnaire and the interview guide.

TABLE 6.18: Showing the marital status of respondents that attended to the questionnaire and interview guide.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Single	22	11%
2	Married	171	85.5%
3	Widow/Widower	07	3.5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 6.18 above demonstrates that 22(11%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide are single, 171(85.5%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide are married, while 07(3.5%) respondents that attended to the questionnaire and the interview guide are widowed. It can therefore be said that majority of those that attended to the questionnaire and the interview guide are married.

TABLE 6.19: Showing the religion of respondents that attended to the questionnaire and interview guide.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	Christianity	48	24%
2	Islam	120	60%
3	Other beliefs	32	16%
	Total	200	100%

Table 6.19 above demonstrates that 48(24%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide are Christians, 120 (60%) are Muslims while 32 (16%) responded are of other religion. It can therefore be said that most of those that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide are Muslims.

TABLE 6.20: Showing educational qualification of respondents to the questionnaire and interview guide.

S/N	RESPONSES	FREQUENCY	PERCENTAGE/%
1	ND/NCE	45	22.5%
2	HND/Bachelor's Degree	108	54%

3	Master's Degree and Above	21	10.5%
4	Senior School Certificate	26	13%
	Total	200	100%

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table 6.20 above shows that 45(22.5%) respondents that responded to the questionnaire and the interview guide hold Ordinary National Diploma, 108(54%) respondents hold a Bachelors degree, 21(10.5%) respondents hold Masters degree and above, while 26(13%) hold Senior School Certificate.

6.2   Analysis of Interview Guide administered to IDP Camp Managers, Security Personnel, Traditional Rulers, Human Rights Lawyers and Policymakers

Upon face-to-face interaction with the above respondents, as expatiated in chapter three of this study, the following were the findings:

6.2.1   Respondents' perception about Boko Haram

All respondents agree that Boko Haram is a group of insurgents- who uses terrorism tactics, "criminal elements" who are poised to dis-stabilise existing peace as well as socio, political and economic development in Nigeria. It was further stressed that they are ruthless Islamist sect whose goal is barbaric and inhumane. They are opposed to western education and are determined to massively destroy lives and properties in North-East, Nigeria, in order to intimidate a constituted authority, uphold Islamic and nomadic beliefs and practices in the northern part of Nigeria, if not the nation, as a whole. It can therefore be said that all the respondents to the interview guide believes Boko Haram is an insurgent group- who uses

terrorism tactics in their modus of operandi, an Islamic sect and is responsible for massive damage of lives and properties in North-East, Nigeria.

6.2.2 Respondents' view to whether Human Rights law is relevant and applicable during counterinsurgency operations

There were mixed reactions about the perception of respondents about whether human rights law is of any relevance during counterinsurgency operations. The IDP Camp Managers, Human Rights Lawyers, Traditional rulers and Policymakers believes that Human Rights law should be considered in any counterinsurgency operation, while the Security Personnel were of the opinion that Human Rights law is not relevant during counterinsurgency operation, because there is no room for Human Rights in their rules of engagement. Others (Traditional rulers, Human Rights lawyers and Policymakers) also believe that Human Rights law is grossly abused during counterinsurgency operations. It can thus be said that Human Rights law should be considered in any counterinsurgency operation.

6.2.3 Respondents' perception on the effectiveness of counterinsurgency operation if Human Rights are considered

The IDP camp managers, Traditional rulers, Human Rights lawyers and Policymakers opine that adherence to the principles of Human Rights would not affect the execution of counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria; rather, it would make it more effective to produce desired result. They were of the view that the neglect of Human Rights is largely responsible for the uncooperative attitudes of some residents and has been invariably responsible for the wide condemnation of the Nigeria government's counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria. As a result, they are of the opinion that adherence to Human Rights during counterinsurgency operations would further boost Nigeria's reputation among

the international community. However, Security Personnel that attended to the interview guide were of the view that counterinsurgency operations will not be effective if the principle of Human Rights is to be fairly considered. They noted that most insurgents are pretenders and tend to hide under such right to eliminate security forces. They therefore noted that for the sake of national interest, territorial integrity and security of Nigeria, there is need to jettison Human Rights or any Humanitarian Law in dealing with insurgency in order to have a brilliant result. Considering the above discussion, since the number of respondents that believe that adherence to the principles of Human Rights would not affect the efficiency of counterinsurgency operations, but would rather ensure desired results are achieved speedily, it can be said that adherence to Human Rights during counterinsurgency operations does not affect the effectiveness of COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria.

6.2.4 Respondents' view on how Human Rights are affected during COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria

Aside from the Security Personnel who declined to answer this item on the interview guide, other respondents were of the opinion that since the commencement of COIN operations in North-East, some part of the region has been disconnected from the mobile network, thus, denying the people right to be informed or to make their opinions known. They also stated that the right of people to move freely have also been denied, because of the fear of being arrested illegally or unjustly. They observed that there were cases of illegal detention on indefinite term, while the military also raped and humiliated women and girls in the unsettled zones. Thus, denying the people their fundamental rights to life, human dignity, free movement and opinion of expression. It was also said that the people were not allowed to converge to worship or discuss any issue that has to be of utmost importance to them, while several of their homes were bungled by the military and properties lost.

6.2.5 Respondents' view on the effectiveness of Nigeria government's use of counterinsurgency rhetoric to curb Human Rights abuse in unsettled zones in North-East, Nigeria

As noted earlier, in the course of administering the interview guide the security personnel refused to agree that Human Rights is abused during counterinsurgency operations, they however admitted that the Federal Government uses counterinsurgency rhetoric to dissuade them from abusing Human Rights during COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria. Other respondents apart from the IDPs Camp Managers were of the view that counterinsurgency rhetoric has effectively curb Human Rights abuse in the disconcerted zones in North-East, Nigeria. Relatively, after various speeches and campaigns against Human Rights abuse by the Nigeria government, the military has moderated the use of force and abuses previously exerted on innocent citizens. They therefore desist from humiliating innocent citizens. On the other hand, IDPs Camp Managers were undecided, but noted that it will be difficult for COIN rhetoric to curb Human Rights abuse in the North-East, because the counterinsurgency operations is getting tougher day by day and the military is giving no chance to any factor that could be counter-productive. The IDPs Camp Managers however noted that if the military are properly monitored, counterinsurgency rhetoric would effectively curb Human Rights abuse.

6.2.6 Respondents' perception to the extent counterinsurgency rhetoric deployed by the government may have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria

Human Rights lawyers and Traditional rulers were of the opinion that counterinsurgency rhetoric deployed by the Nigeria government has accordingly reduced COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria, while IDP Camp managers, Security Personnel and

Policymakers were of the view that it has heavily impacted the military strategies and technicalities deployed to execute counterinsurgency operations in the North-East. They stated that there was a period the Nigeria government publicised its criticism against abuse of Human Rights by security operatives and since then it has drastically reduced the humiliation of the people, particularly innocent young men who are misconceived to be Boko Haram members, suffered from the military. Likewise, they observed that COIN rhetoric related to Human Rights violation has helped to unite the people and the military, thus, they now enjoy the support of the people in their operations. Going forward, it can therefore be said that to some extent counterinsurgency rhetoric have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Northeast, Nigeria.

6.2.7 Respondents' views on perceived gaps in the counterinsurgency rhetoric utilised by the Nigeria government

All the respondents pointed out various gaps they perceived in the counterinsurgency rhetoric utilised by the Nigeria government in fighting insurgency. The Security Personnel stated that the counterinsurgency rhetorical strategies of the Government of Nigeria is not well coordinated and there is need to deploy rhetoric that would build and sustain trust about the government in the minds of the people in North-East, Nigeria. They noted that this aspect has caused disloyalty and lack of confidence in the government, because most of the people believed that the federal government is only deceiving them and only profiteering from the counterinsurgency operations. The Human Rights lawyers, IDPs camp managers and traditional rulers believe that even though the government is deploying counterinsurgency rhetoric to tackle insurgency, the people are not adequately informed because there are no communication gadgets that could aid their listenership in affected areas, adding that the people live in fear every day. They also stated that there is no follow up about what is being said through the rhetoric, as such, most things are said and no action carried out.

6.2.8 Respondents' opinion on how the Nigeria government can improve its counter insurgency rhetoric in order to influence COIN-related Human Rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria

The respondents advised the Nigerian government to improve its counterinsurgency rhetoric by concentrating more on messages that publicise the dangers of belonging to insurgency groups, its implications to national security and development and the need for the people, particularly the youth to avoid such dangers in order to possess a promising future. They also stated that there is need for the government to re-assure the people through rhetoric of its readiness to own up to its responsibilities; part of which include the release of adequate funding to tackle insurgency from a holistic approach – which involves fighting poverty, providing education, creating jobs for the youths in order to ensure the youths are meaningfully engaged which will invariably weaken the recruitment base of the insurgents and many others.

They observed that the government needs to allow independent and international observers to freely monitor and criticise its counterinsurgency operations, so as to remind and call their attention to grey areas that need urgent attention. They maintained that the government on several occasions consistently condemn public statements and advice by these groups of people who are closer to the people and the insurgents than the government. According to them, only through understanding of the areas presented by these organisations or bodies can the government build a sustainable and formidable counterinsurgency rhetoric that would mitigate COIN-related Human Rights abuse in Nigeria. The respondents also said that the government needs to employ more competent hands to manage its COIN-related rhetoric in order to lessen or finally eradicate the level of Human Rights violation in North-East, Nigeria. They opine that when the military have adequate access to the COIN rhetoric and how interested the people are concerned about their activities, they would unconsciously adhere to IHL (International Humanitarian Law) including IHRL (International Human Rights laws) in their operations and

this would help in securing the goodwill of the people in their operations and more successes will be recorded because they would have more access to information from the Nigeria citizenry.

6.3 Discussion of findings

This research work investigated the impact of counterinsurgency rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights abuse by utilising critical discourse analysis and survey; the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, (2013) and selected counterinsurgency-related speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan were critically analysed to identify rhetoric and speech delivery techniques utilised in the former PGJ selected speeches, while 230 respondents were administered questionnaire and interview guide in order to determine the degree at which counterinsurgency rhetoric have impacted COIN-related Human Rights abuse in insurgency prone areas in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Critical Discourse Analysis, as presented earlier, was used to answer research questions one and two, whilst survey was used to elicit the opinions of respondents in order to answer research question three and the findings are discussed below:

Table 6.1 reveals that 193 respondents representing 96.5% said they have at one time or the other read or listened to the whole or excerpts of TPA and counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan. Thus, it means that majority of the selected population (Humanitarian workers, Journalists…. see table 6.0 on page 227) in North-East, Nigeria, are already familiar with the contents of the TPA and COIN speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan. This aligns with the theoretical framework, rhetorical theory, adopted for this research because the TPA and COIN speeches are predominantly part of the everyday operations of the respondents, just as rhetoric has found itself as part of the day-to-day counterinsurgency operations and it is one of the counterinsurgency devices implemented by the government of Nigeria in confronting insurgency.

Moreover, in line with Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, it can be generalised that the provisions of TPA and counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan and rhetoric in TPA and COIN speeches have assisted in combating insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria. This finding aligns with the findings of Mamman (2020) that in order to combat insurgency in the North-East Nigeria, the government must put in place a strong legal framework, dynamic enough, to counter BH (Boko Haram). The finding of this study also aligns with the view of Ahmed and Eje (2015) where it was said that some arguments in the speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan were selected from the major philosophies that favoured his government's interests and therefore it was concluded that language (rhetoric) has a significant impact on politics and political situation since most of political situations are initiated and experienced through language. Therefore, it aligns with the findings of this study that TPA and COIN-related speeches, though rhetoric and speech delivery technique, have assisted in combating insurgency in North-East, Nigeria. However, this study filled the knowledge gap that the study of Mamman (2020), Ahmed and Eje (2015) were unable to fill. Further put, it is adding to the body of knowledge, as it has critically analysed the TPA and COIN-related speeches and specifically identified the ethos, logos and pathos utilised by the text composers. Thus, it gives this study a qualitative edge when compared to existing studies.

Emphatically, this finding aligns with rhetorical theory because it has been established that the theory deals with the composition, forms, functions, means, venue, production, audiences, effects and criticism of discourse. It is therefore worthy of note here that the TPA and COIN speeches were loaded with rhetorical strategies that were intentionally put in place to persuade the people to believe in the government and form a coalition against insurgency. In combating insurgency, rhetoric was used in TPA and COIN speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan to appeal to the reasoning of the audience to agree that the Nigeria government is not folding its arms in efforts to curb insurgency. Further put, the TPA has assisted in the fight

against insurgency because its texts posit the determination of the government to prosecute insurgents and/or their sponsors. Thus, this finding also aligns with the theoretical framework of this study, rhetorical theory.

Upon investigation, it was also discovered that Human Rights abuse dominates counter insurgency operations in North-east, Nigeria, as 80% of the respondents were of the opinion that the military to a large extent abuse peoples' fundamental rights to life, freedom of expression/opinion and no respect for human dignity. This could be said to be occasioned by the fact that the Nigerian government militarised its counterinsurgency operations in North-east, Nigeria as seen in chapter one of the thesis, this is also according to the views of the US Government (2012). Meanwhile, Brechenmacher (2019) expatiates that a holistic strategy to counterinsurgency comprises the integration and synchronisation of economic, political, legal, security, developmental, and psychological operations to suppress insurgents while enhancing the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the populace- one of the major arguments of the thesis. Brechenmacher (2019) also opine that counterinsurgency is a combination of military and civilian efforts to combat insurgency as well as a large scale and all-evolving solution to a social, political or economic phenomenon, part of which includes the provision of security and social needs for the people. Likewise, findings from the interview guide indicate that it is the desire of the critical stakeholders (IDP Camp Managers, Human Rights lawyers, Traditional rulers and Policymakers, except Security Personnel), who decried the level of Human Rights abuse in counterinsurgency operations, that Human Rights framework should be considered in the counterinsurgency operations taking place in Northeast, Nigeria, however, security personnel did not agree that the Human Rights law is relevant during counterinsurgency operations. This is perhaps because of the environment, orientation, value and training they are exposed to.

Meanwhile, this finding is similar to the findings of David (2020) and Akanni (2019) where it was discovered that the assumption of compatibility between Human Rights as well as national security explains the prevalent violation of Human Rights related to counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, noting that protection of human rights must be viewed as the primary objective of all counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. Akanni (2019) in his finding stated that it is difficult to execute out a counterinsurgency operation successfully without violating the provisions of Human Rights like entitlement to life amongst others. Nevertheless, majority of the respondents believe that adherence to the principles of Human Rights would not affect the execution of counterinsurgency operation in North-East, Nigeria, rather, it would make it more effective to produce desired result, while they were of the view that the neglect of Human Rights is largely responsible for the uncooperative attitudes of some residents and consequently the basis for the wide condemnation of the Nigeria government's counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria. The above studies related to this finding did not highlight the various forms of Human Rights abuse perpetrated during counterinsurgency operations, but this study was able to capture specific Human Rights abuse committed by the military in the course of countering insurgency, thus, giving this study a well-defined scope and demystification of its subject area.

Again, Table 6.6 revealed that the majority of the respondents representing 74% stated that the COIN rhetoric to some extent reduced COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the distressed areas in North-East, Nigeria. This can be said to be based on the fact that the Nigeria government used various rhetoric devices as part of its counterinsurgency operations and this has further helped to persuade the military to desist from abusing Human Rights during the operations. This finding upholds the tenets of rhetorical theory which believes that the use of creative persuasive writings can be used to convince people on certain practices and beliefs. Thus, the use of rhetoric to counter Human Rights abuse in the COIN operations in the North-

East has reduced it, thus, aligning with the opinion of Aristotle that rhetoric involves the ability of a speaker to persuade an audience and subject them to his wishes.

According to statistics on Table 6.8, 85.5% of the respondents maintained that since the commencement of counterinsurgency/military presence in the troubled areas in the North-East, Nigeria, BH is therefore no longer the main danger to the safety of the victims, because there are record of attack of public and private facilities, including lives that have been reduced. It is therefore necessary to state that the approach of the Nigerian government to overrun the insurgents is systemically yielding results. Investigation has revealed that the government also utilise rhetorical strategy to facilitate its counterinsurgency operations, thus, contributing to the success of the operation. Hence, the Federal Government of Nigeria utilises *pathos* to appeal to the feelings and the sympathetic imagination as well as opinions and principles of the citizens in the affected areas. Moreover, on a popular stance, logos, ethos and pathos are integral part of rhetorical theory and very significant to writings, therefore, the role of rhetoric and the effectiveness of the Nigeria military in the counterinsurgency operations in the North-East cannot be overemphasised.

Further put, the interviewees generally perceive Boko Haram as insurgents. This therefore give credibility to this study that Nigeria government is engaging in counter insurgency operations and not counterterrorism operations. Credence to this is the fact that the respondents view BH as insurgents, "criminal elements" who are poised to destabilise existing peace together with socio-political and financial empowerment in Nigeria. The respondents added that they are ruthless Islamist sect whose goal is barbaric and inhumane and that there is need for the government to put in place certain strategic measures, such as, to reduce poverty, eradicate joblessness to the barest minimum, eradicate abuse of Human Rights and many others in the affected areas (Fieldwork, 2022). This finding that Nigeria is engaging in both counterterrorism operations and counterinsurgency operations (the two terms overlap most of the time in this

case study) align with the views of David (2020), Akanni (2019), Odumovo (2014) and Omeni (2017). However, this study was able to build on previous studies and was able to reveal that Nigeria government has not really deployed all counterinsurgency strategies to curtail insurgency in the northeast. Investigation through this study has revealed that Nigeria militarised the COIN operations, rather than effectively deploying other COIN strategies like poverty alleviation programmes, free education, and many more to combat insurgency and optimally secure the confidence and support of the residents, including the victims.

Interestingly and has presented in the findings, the Nigerian government uses discourse to subdue the effects of abuse from COIN but did not hesitate to make known the abuse that emanates from insurgents' activities-see page 98 "the ideological element of CDA positions it to systematically investigate and unearth the embellishment of unequal power of relations…….social order. Meanwhile, using Norman Fairclough (NF)'s CDA- see page 114, this page shows that the Nigerian government discourse relies heavily on discourse of citizens' safety (wellbeing) and traditional notions of security but this is not reflective in the fieldwork findings according to the fieldwork findings – the NF analytical tools on page 115-120, lays bare the theoretical understanding of this notion.

Recognising CSO's contribution as well as NGOs in formulating future CT laws have been pioneered by Howell (2014), Njoku (2022), Howell and Lind (2009), but the neglect or lack of constant review by the Nigerian government of these rhetoric has led to the submissions of this thesis that TPA as amended (2013) needs to be revisited and reviewed with immediate effect. Reiterating this argument, Njoku (2022)'s introduction of SECC (Strategic Exclusion, Co-option and Containment) is one of the bases or upholds of this study which is coupled with the findings, that the overall arching aim is emphatically calling for a review of the TPA to incorporate the interest of NGOs and CSOs alike. This will be in specific reference to Table 6.7 on page 235, 82.5% of respondents concurred that COIN rhetoric has alleviated the use of

force in Nigeria's COIN debate; so why is the government not re-enforcing this political discourse? Consequentially, engaging representatives of NGOs/CSOs in CT laws, structures, policies and practices, just like the Spanish government after the 2004 Madrid bombing (Howell and Lind 2009, 2020) will be one of the proactive steps for the Nigerian government at this moment in time.

Conclusively, it is also necessary to state that the military's performance level is not enough in complementing the counterinsurgency rhetoric that is supposed to curtail COIN-related abuse in the Northeast, Nigeria. Findings show that the military are the ones indulging in Human Rights abuse during the discharge of their duties. This finding is in tandem with the view of David (2020) where he submitted that there is an incompatibility between upholding Human Rights as well as safeguarding national security interests. Unlike David (2020), this study explains why it is generally assumed that there is no compatibility between Human Rights and protection of national (political) interest, by revealing that adherence to Human Rights is not contained in the rules of engagement for military operations (the TPA in this case- the only document for COIN in Nigerian till date). Thus, it has filled a knowledge gap by providing answers to emerging questions relating to why there is incompatibility between Human Rights as well as national interest (political interest). The findings of Akanni (2019) and Odumovo (2019) also align with the findings of this study that the Nigeria government did not follow the rules in IHL and IHRL and this study has gone beyond (as seen in respondents answers in chapter six) by concluding that the military personnel with the support of the Nigerian government (the use of the TPA to counter BH in Nigeria) have failed to protect its citizens while carrying out its duty which is the counterinsurgency operations in North-east, Nigeria.

7.0   CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1   Conclusion

Upon critical investigation, this study was able to propose a number of conclusions about the use of rhetoric in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act, 2013 and counterinsurgency speeches (2011-2015), speech delivery techniques used in the Terrorism Prevention Act and COIN speeches, as well as the extent to which counterinsurgency rhetoric impacts COIN-related Human Rights abuse in insurgency prone areas in North-East, Nigeria. This study has used the legal instrument (TPA, 2013) and selected speeches of the former President Goodluck Jonathan (of which, in this case represents the Nigeria government) used in countering insurgency between 2011 and 2022. It also relied on investigation conducted among some critical stakeholders in the confrontation against insurgency in North-East, Nigeria to expose the impact of rhetoric on COIN-related human rights abuse in North-East, Nigeria. It is therefore hoped that the thesis has provided a theoretically robust and empirically sound deliverables, having mined vast amounts of accessible secondary and primary sources. The combination of critical discourse analysis to analyse the TPA and COIN-related speeches and the use of questionnaire and interview to investigate critical stakeholders is rarely seen in a single study dealing with any aspect of human (in)security and counterinsurgency policing key-players in Nigeria. All these adds to the uniqueness of the study. Thus, this study is committed to breaking the frontiers of knowledge; hence the goal is to generate publishable scholarly outputs from this thesis. Going further, the following are conclusions generated from this study: Rhetoric is the technique employed by an orator to create proofs (rational, moral, and emotional proofs) so as to convince the public. It was therefore concluded through this study that the Federal Government of Nigeria utilised various rhetoric in its counterinsurgency operations

(rhetorical responses in this instance) in North-East, Nigeria. They are *logos* containing *enthymeme and illustration*; *ethos* containing *apparent wisdom, excellent behaviour* and *benevolence*; and *pathos* containing *anger, calmness, friendship, detestation, fear* and *confidence.* They are well embedded in TPA and COIN-related speeches of former President Goodluck Jonathan.

It was concluded that the text composers in the TPA and COIN-related speeches used *logos* to create logical reasoning in their arguments and speeches. In the speeches, the text composers proofed this with the use of enthymeme and examples, while only enthymeme was adopted in the TPA. This is due to the fact that enthymeme is well-thought-out to be a rhetorical demonstration, so people are effortlessly swayed when they believe something has been demonstrated. Thus, it was concluded that the text composers through enthymeme established probable premises in various sections of the TPA and some paragraphs in the speech which led to a conclusion so as to convince the listeners and the people to assist the Government in its counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast, Nigeria. Further put that this study resolved that the text composers of the COIN-related speeches and TPA utilised *examples* (or illustrations) to enable the audience and the people understand efforts of the government at combating insurgency, provoke their thoughts and enable them to know that insurgency in North-East, Nigeria is not because of weak military, but will be curtailed with time. Through this study, it was also concluded that *enthymeme*, a rhetoric device, was used in the TPA to help the people understand that it is a grievous offence to train insurgents on how to produce explosive and lethal device.

Going further, it was concluded that the former President Goodluck Jonathan used *ethos,* a rhetoric, to prove that he is knowledgeable about what is happening in North-East, Nigeria and has the best interest of the people at heart, thus, urging them to trust the capability of the government to overrun insurgents in North-East, Nigeria. The study concluded that the text

composer of the COIN-related speeches and TPA used *perceived intelligence (apparent wisdom)*, a rhetoric device, to convince the people and the audience that the Government is competent and credible and is working to counter insurgency in the country. It has been established, through this study, that the rhetoric device utilised has sustainably shared the experience of the former President about the security and intelligence in the country, this has also shown how he has dealt with various insurgent attacks in the past. The thesis further concludes that the use of *virtuous character*, one of the rhetoric devices, was adopted by the text composers to share the values and motives of Nigerian Government in its counterinsurgency campaign in North-East, and therefore establishes a concrete trust from the people.

Again, this study also concludes that part of the rhetoric used in the text investigated is *pathos.* As part of a regular pattern, it is right to conclude that the government consistently utilised it in various counterinsurgency related writings to appeal to the emotions of the people and move them to take actions that support counterinsurgency operations in northeast, Nigeria. It can be generalised that *Anger, calmness, friendship, detestation, fear* and *confidence* are the rhetorical device connected to pathos used in the COIN-related speeches of FPGJ.

In relation to research question two, it can be concluded that speech delivery components utilised in the TPA and COIN-related speeches are storytelling, body language and tone of voice. Story telling was used by the speaker (former President Goodluck Jonathan) to share stories of various instances related to insurgency in the northeast, Nigeria. It was concluded that part of this technique enabled the audience to recall how insurgency started in northeast, Nigeria and to evaluate its current state and how well the government has countered it. On the other hand, it can be established that body language was used by FPGJ to emphasise some important messages to the audience, to enable them to understand and to have interest in the counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria's North-East. Whilst it can also be concluded that in

the COIN-related speeches by FPGJ, the tone of voice was used as a speech delivery technique to express confidence, emotional state and attitude of the government towards winning the fight against insurgency.

In relation to research question three, it can be concluded that counterinsurgency rhetoric impacted some degree amount of success of counterinsurgency operations in Northeast, Nigeria, and it consequently impacted the reduction of COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the troubled areas, as it compels the Nigeria military to reduce the usage of force and observe respect for Human Rights in the implementation of the COIN operations, mobilise the support of people for COIN operations and reinforce the determination of the government to secure and give a better lifestyle to the people in the area. The study further concluded that adherence to the principles of Human Rights does not affect the efficiency of counterinsurgency operations but would speed up its success.

This study also concluded that lack of political interest (national interest) has not enabled the Federal Government of Nigeria to diligently conduct its counterinsurgency operations in Northeast, Nigeria. Also, the military is not acting as expected to complement the available counterinsurgency rhetoric that should have curtailed COIN-related abuse in North-East Nigeria, a review is therefore imminent.

7.2   Recommendations

Findings of this study has made it imperative to recommend some measures that could enhance the use of counterinsurgency rhetoric, and should continually strengthen her counterinsurgency rhetoric as part of strategies to counter insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria and to also mitigate COIN-related Human Rights abuse in the impacted area. The following recommendations are hereby proposed:

Consistent utilisation of COIN rhetoric: In order to win the combat against insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria and ensure COIN-related Human Rights abuse is eradicated or mitigated,

the Government of Nigeria is advised to consistently and aggressively utilise COIN rhetoric devices to reiterate its zero tolerance to insurgency, COIN-related Human Rights abuse and other vices hindering the smooth prosecution (activity) of the counterinsurgency operation in Northeast, Nigeria. The use of COIN rhetoric that condemns Human Rights abuse must be well-embedded in various speeches, policies and actions of the government. To achieve this, the government could engage the services of rhetoric experts to compose and disseminate messages that would mobilise support for the government and persuade insurgents to drop their arms. A well-coordinated and deployed COIN rhetoric in Northeast Nigeria would build and sustain trust about the government in the minds of the people. Through this, the government can re-build and sustain excellent corporate image and perception before the locals and international communities.

Re-orientation of Nigeria security personnel: Findings from this study have revealed that there is need for the Nigeria government to re-orientate and educate its security personnel on the need to comply with International Humanitarian Laws, Human Right Laws and other provisions of the law during counterinsurgency operations. Their neglect of these laws is responsible for most of the COIN-related Human Rights abuse, with a detrimental effect on the success of the operations as well as local and international perceptions about the ongoing COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria. Thus, the Security Personnel, particularly the military, should be sensitised on the need to complement COIN rhetoric with their actions, as it will produce a better achievement in this regard.

Introduction and implementation of other counterinsurgency strategies: Investigation has revealed that the Nigeria government is not fully implementing the counterinsurgency operations tactics by approaching it holistically, rather, the government militarised the entire operations. Thus, to achieve astounding success in the counterinsurgency operations in North-East, Nigeria, within a limited period of time, which will also put an end to COIN-related

Human Rights abuse, it is suggested that the government should introduce some socio-economic initiatives like job creation, skills acquisition, employment generation, poverty alleviation and economic development programmes that would improve people's quality of life in the North-East and weaken the recruitment base of the insurgents. This is necessary because COIN should be based on strong ethical, hypothetical, and experimental foundations, as highlighted by Jackson (2014). So, the contention is that if the state actors can understand the underlying causes of insurgency before designing their next COIN approach, then incidence of Human Rights violations and humanitarian crisis (or chaos) may be minimised, if not eradicated. The United Kingdom has rejigged its counterinsurgency strategy through its preventive strategy approach (Dunlap, 2016).

Adoption of integrated COIN communication strategy: To support COIN rhetoric utilised by the Nigerian government in the counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria's North-east, findings from this study have shown that the government need to engage in a comprehensive COIN communication strategy. This would involve mobilisation of the mass media, including the online media, to support the COIN operations in North-east, Nigeria, by using various rhetoric to downplay the activities of insurgents and publicise the dangers attributed to associating with any insurgent group, including its implication to national security and development. These rhetoric messages and other communication strategies will further dissuade the minds of the people about insurgency. Citizens would be inspired to join forces with the government which will lead to supporting Nigeria's unity as a result. As part of the integrated strategy, the government will also embark on follow-ups with deployed COIN rhetoric, to ensure it is backed up with actions. Through this integrated communication approach, the government will also remind the people of its readiness to carry out its responsibilities which includes, but not limited to, safeguarding the citizen's lives and property.

The need to amend the Terrorism Prevention Act to protect Human Rights during COIN operations: Policymakers need to do more in promoting good governance. They must come to the understanding that for a developing country like Nigeria, there is need to adopt a population-centric approach contrary to the conventional trend termed state-centric approach. By so doing, the TPA geared towards counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Nigeria should be amended to focus more on counterinsurgency in order to strengthen counterinsurgency operations. The TPA is not all-encompassing, neither is it a holistic approach to this problem, meaning essentially implies that the government will be unable to fully resolve insurgency by strictly following the tenets of the present policy. Going forward, there is need to amend the law to make provisions for abuse of human rights by state or social actors during counterinsurgency operations. This will safeguard the citizens and invoke confidence in the government's COIN operations. This will enable them to properly articulate and reflect it in a policy document in a manner that creates a balance and emphasises human security. This will portray where the state is headed in a quest to end insurgency. The law regulates how the court responds to cases related to terrorism or insurgency. The TPA protects the state. This invariably means that the state or its armed forces cannot be sued in cases of rights abuse in the name of countering insurgency. What this implies is that counterinsurgency cannot be viewed as a form of insurgency for any reason. The perception is different in most developed countries of the world. Ironically, the TPA represents more negative impacts when it is supposed to be an emblem of refuge for the Nigeria populace. In the Nigerian context, attempting to alleviate the reality of counterinsurgency and its effect on war victims' psyche and body will only lead to more insurgency. It will make the position of Boko Haram more tenable and make them out as the bearers of truth and justice. Critics or security experts can effortlessly turn the government and its armed forces to the enemy through concise or evidence-based- propaganda, which can be majorly attributed to their actions on the ground/battlefield.

This idea is embedded in Omeni (2017), where he argued that the insurgents often employed guerrilla warfare tactics to gain control of territories. Omeni (2017) implies that one of the reasons they hold the territory was for a constant supply of recruits. These recruits will most likely be further convinced when counterinsurgency operations by the government forces tramples on their rights and means of livelihood. This will invariably bring to force the issue of economic gains. Generally, a policy that does not consider this aspect of counterinsurgency is most likely going to struggle to make any dent on insurgency as a whole. It will further drive the people towards the embrace of the insurgents. The effect of this is a larger army of zealous young people fighting in the name of insurgency and religion with a bigoted viewpoint as the main fuel for their hatred. They will easily be convinced that the state is against them and that they have been abandoned to their fate. This makes the job of curbing the rise of the ideology more difficult. The longer it festers, the more the lines between good and evil get blurred by the day for those in the eye of the storm. These are the men and women who live every day with the insurgency's reality facing them every minute of their existence.

The need for the NGOs to support the Government and the Government to embrace constructive criticism: the Government of Nigeria needs to understand that the role of local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in crisis management is inevitable. International NGOs like Amnesty International, International Rescue Committee, The British Red Cross and many others in the sustenance of humanity during crisis is vital, as such, they will always be part of the rehabilitation effort wherever there is a conflict such as the one in Nigeria's North east. The NGOs should recognise the cumbersome nature of bureaucracy in Nigeria and the corruption that permeates the political and economic environment. Recognising these factors is the only means through which their efforts can be felt by the victims they have set out to look after. Corruption has made it impossible for the minutest efforts to reach their intended targets. The IDPs camps are a good example of how corruption can multiply the

effects and pains of conflict. Not that the idea of IDPs camps itself is not noble, but the implementation is overrun by corruption and ineptitude. The NGOs, in their quest to serve humanity, must recognise this failing on the part of humanity. Working with this in mind would help them reach the actual victims with relief without having to lose resources to the actions of corrupt middlemen. While NGOs' work is important, it has been said that they are way too easy to kidnap. Activities like this further fuel insurgency in the sense that they fetch ransom for the insurgents, which is reinvested in insurgency. So, their humanitarian work must be in collaboration with security operatives, despite the bureaucratic obstacles they are bound to encounter. Apart from the need to reach out to the needy, there is also the need to know who the most-hard hit individuals are. This becomes a vital aspect of their humanitarian efforts, and it requires an understanding of the people and their environment. This invariably implies that taking help from the locals cannot be pushed aside, no matter what risks it portends. In a crisis situation like that in the North-east, the most important humanitarian efforts are those that show their impact on the humans affected. Therefore, those who manage the IDPs camps must also be in the picture to achieve the ultimate aim of reducing human suffering. The most important resources needed in these camps are food, shelter and clothing. But this does not rule out the need for education, healthcare and security, the security of life, and security of rights. Education is important; it is one of the best ways to curb insurgency at the individual's psychological level. This helps pause the course of indoctrination and radicalisation, which happens to be the widest link road into the mind of an average insurgent; no individual is born an insurgent. It is learned through interaction with others of like mind. This implies that it can be unlearned. The IDPs camps hold huge potential in this regard if properly managed. Finally, NGOs can invest in the necessary infrastructure to avoid a future in which freedom and liberty are not sacrificed on the altar of ideology and religious bigotry, this is the main focus of this insurgency. The job of these NGOs is dangerous but very vital. It is the link to revitalise the

mind, the body, as well as the regions devastated by the BH insurgency. Education in the IDPs camps may not be easy due to the beliefs and mindsets of the victims of insurgency, but it is a foundation for physical and economic liberation. Likewise, the government should be ready to listen to the criticism by NGOs. The government should put in place policies that would allow independent and international NGOs to freely monitor, report and criticise COIN operations in North-East, Nigeria. This would enable these organisations that have first-hand information to call government's attention to critical areas that needs urgent attention. Most of the Humanitarian workers are in close proximity to both the people and the insurgents, than the government. The government should leverage on their influence to improve its intelligence base, because it is only through this that the government can achieve success in its COIN operations in North- East, Nigeria.

Constitution Amendment: The relevant sections of the Constitution that are viewed to be retrogressive to national security need to be amended, see the thesis's arguments of the adjustments needed on pages 24, 51, 132, 141, 146 and 156. Amending this sections would give impetus to necessary legal framework within which normalcy would return to Nigeria while the dichotomy and fault lines in existence would be eliminated. Some of the salient issues that need to be reviewed in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are: minimum qualification for political office holders, National Assembly member's emoluments, inclusion of the role of traditional elites, proper deployment of knowledge elites, like technocrats and bureaucrats to areas of their professional strength, amongst others, in order to enhance the security of the entire populace.

Establishment of Special Courts: The creation of a Special Court to try insurgents and bandits would help to expedite their prosecution and jail terms. Due to how slow the judicial system works in Nigeria, there are a large number of criminals of these classes in various Correctional Centres across the country. Some of these were among the 879 detainees including all the 68

detained Boko Haram suspects that escaped from Kuje Correctional Centre on the 5th of July 2022. A Special Court would have dealt with various cases thereby significantly reducing the number of escapees.

Establishment of National Technology Village: The establishment of National Technology similar to Silicon Valley in the United States of America would support low technology levels and improve civil-military collaboration in technological advancement. The time has come for Nigeria to prove its efficacy in exploiting her potentials which can take the country to the desired level. With this village in place, technology acquisition and innovation as well as transfer can be embarked upon. If the policy on this is well formulated and implemented, the village would serve as a catalyst to the nation's technological advancement through institutional collaborations. Nigeria stands a great chance of a geometric breakthrough in national security.

7.3   Limitations to the study

This study had limitations in the following areas:

Methodological limitation:

Incredibly, despite series of identifications and proofs that the principal investigator is an academic researcher, efforts to access more than 230 respondents was futile, perhaps, due to security reasons, but it is fairly known that most of the workers are presently scattered across the violence-dominated region, while others are at the Internally Displaced Persons camps. It is also necessary to state that persons at the camps are not allowed to grant interview or interact with anyone, except camp officials, due to security reasons. This is also a clause on my ethical approval certificate, not to interact with victims of war directly, as the principal investigator is not a trained or certified psychologists.

Similarly, it was also difficult getting in contact with the military to attend to the interview guide. After several failed visiting attempts, they eventually attended to the interview guide, because a former school mate (military officer) in the United Kingdom intervened and I was accompanied by an International NGO staff. This intervention (by the former military officer and the NGO staff) gave the researcher the opportunity to access two hundred and thirty respondents (see page 226-230 for further information about all respondents).

7.4   Suggestions for further study

A lot has been mapped out to be looked into in the future; the research activities in 2013 at Coventry University (To What Extent Does the Boko Haram Sect pose a National Security Challenge to the Nigerian state 2009-2013?), birthed this current study. Going forward, researchers through this study can further look into counterinsurgency rhetoric as utilised by the Nigeria Military. They could also carry out more studies that may focus on using quantitative approaches to understand how the COIN in Nigeria is discursively constructed to reach larger participants as respondents.

Future researchers should be empowered to contact victims of war themselves to participate in the study, as this aspect of the study was unachievable, because the Principal Investigator is not a trained psychologist and cannot handle a rape victim or someone who is bereaved, this was in line with the ethical approval.

7.5. Plans for Dissemination

Findings from this study are expected to be successfully dispersed, thereby making great impact in policy formulation and ultimately improving outcome for COIN operations in insurgency prone areas, especially in Nigeria. In real sense, studies of this nature have a real-time contribution to society as well as a knowledge base of the discipline involved. This

research work on discursive analysis of the impact of Counterinsurgency rhetoric on COIN related human rights abuse in Nigeria is one of such. To disseminate this research, certain strategies will be employed, and this would cover both local and international audience. To this effect, the following dissemination strategies are hereby presented below:

There are plans for the study's findings to be presented at conferences covering similar topics. For example, the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at St. Andrews University.

Efforts have been made as a PSA (Political Studies Association) and a BISA (British International Studies Association) member, these two platforms are good platform to present the findings of the research study.

There are plans for national and international dissemination. This means that the thesis would be presented at conferences. This will be in various forms like keynote addresses, plenary sessions as far as it fits into the theme of the particular conference in question. Depending on the nature of the conference, the presentation can be virtual or face to face.

Local dissemination would be via colleagues, family and friends. These people will have first-hand information about what the research represents, and the knowledge embedded in it. It will also be shared with research interest groups, departmental newsletters, forums, seminar at the workplace or educational institutions, local research conferences and workshops. It will also be on websites with combatting insurgency as a message.

Another avenue for dissemination is through publications. This can be via publications of conference papers or as abstracts, or as post-conference papers. This is known to create exposure, which will open door for further future research. I also intend to work with conference participants as well as interested scholars by offering to present my findings at the campus events or at professional conferences. These scholars can also be found through publications like professional organisation's newsletters.

Publishing information in newspapers, both local and international, is another way of disseminating the thesis's findings. This can be done in Nigeria to reach a target audience of policymakers. They (policymakers) can also be emailed directly, and they can be posted on their website for a larger audience to access some of the ideas herein which can lead to changes to policy in the long run.

Another avenue through which some vital information here can reach the people is faith-based organisations. They have more access to people in the eye of the storm than any governmental organisation. They can put some aspects of the project in the minds of the people. NGOs, too, can have access directly or through the websites. Local radio stations in the local languages will also be a useful dissemination tool.

During the duration of this research, I was able to start my long-term passion (creating an NGO for war victims in Nigeria); updates on activities can be found on the website https://nikkycaresfoundation.org and its Instagram handle: *@nikkycaresfoundation* (https://www.instagram.com/nikkycaresfoundation)- this is also a partial way of dissemination although not official but was very useful at the participants' recruitment stage of the project. The Instagram handle and website effortlessly made some form of awareness for this project.

The study's conclusions will eventually be published as a full book with the Nigeria Army's COIN unit as its intended readers. The book's objective is to synthesise all the identified ways to reduce human (in) security in Nigeria, with specific emphasis on the vital lessons that materialised from the counterinsurgency discourse in Nigeria, majorly with the aim of eliminating Human Rights abuse in the nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdu, A. and Shehu, S. (2019). The implication of Boko Haram insurgency on women and girls in North-East Nigeria. *Journal of Public Administration and Social Welfare Research.* 4(1), 9-21

Abidemi, I. and Adeogun, T. (2022). Women, security, and gender-based violence in the northeast, Nigeria. *Journal of International Women's Studies*, *24*(4), 6.

Abolurin, A. (2011). Terrorism: Nigerian and global dimensions. Ibadan: Gems Unique Multiventures

ACAPS (2015). Nigeria: Boko Haram insurgency. <Available at https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/acaps-briefing-note-nigeria-boko-haram-insurgency-20-january-2015> [Assessed Feb. 12 2022].

Adedoyin, A. (2013). Human security factor in agricultural transformation in Nigeria. In I., Albert, et al (Eds.) *The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies programme.* Ibadan: University of Ibadan

Aderonke, M. (2015). Terrorism and counter-terrorism in contemporary Nigeria: understanding the emerging trends. *Journal of Policy and Development Studies.* 9(4), 128-145

Adewumi, A. (2014). The battle of the minds: the insurgency and counterinsurgency in northern Nigeria. Nigeria: West Africa insight

Adibe, J. (2012). Assessing the government's initiatives to control noise pollution in Nigeria. *African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development.* 4(4), 275-284

Africanews (2016). Nigeria: 20,000 deaths, $5.9 billion damages in Boko Haram insurgency. < Available at https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.africanews.com/amp/2016/03/22/nigeri a-20000-deaths-59-billion-damages-in-boko-haram-insurgency/> [Assessed March 15, 2022]

African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (2005). *The Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly.* 1(1), 1-14

Agbedo, C., Krisagbedo, E. and Buluan D. (2013). Socio-pragmatic analysis of Boko Haram's language of insurgency in Nigeria: implications for global peace and security. *Developing Country Studies*. 3(8), 45-63

Agbiboa, D. (2013a). The Nigerian burden: religious identity, conflict and the current terrorism of Boko Haram. *Conflict, Security and Development*. 13(1), 1-29

Agbiboa, D. (2013b). The social dynamics of Nigeria's Boko Haram insurgency - fresh insights from the social identity theory. United Kingdom: University of Oxford

Agbiboa, D. (2014). Peace at daggers dawn? Boko Haram and the state of emergency in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 37(1), 41-67

Aghedo, I. and Osumah, O. (2012). The Boko Haram uprising: how should Nigeria respond? <Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254352957_The_Boko_Haram_ Uprising_How_should_Nigeria_respond> [Assessed Jan. 5 2021]

Ahmed, Y. and Eje, M. (2015). A discourse analysis of Goodluck Jonathan's response to the kidnapping of the Chibok girls. *Covenant Journal of Language Studies (CJLS).* 3(2), 39-53

Aiyede, E. (2015). Democratic security sector governance and military reform in Nigeria. In A. Bryden and F. Chappuis (Eds.). *Learning from West African experiences in security sector governance.* London: Ubiquity Press

Ajey, L. (2014). Asymmetric Warfare: A state vs non-state conflict. Oasis, 1(20),97-111

Ajibolade, S. O., & Oboh, C. S. (2017). A critical examination of government budgeting and public funds management in Nigeria. *International Journal of Public Leadership*, *13*(4), 218-242.

Akanni, N. (2019). Counter-insurgency and human rights violation in Nigeria. *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalisation.* 85(2), 15-23 DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/85-02

Akinbi, J. (2015). Examining the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and the quest for a permanent resolution of the crisis. *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences.* 3(8), 32-45

Akinola, A. and Tella, O. (2013). Boko Haram terrorism and Nigeria's security dilemma: rethinking the state's capacity. *International Journal of Innovative Social Sciences and Humanities Research.* 1(1), 70-78

Akokpari, J. (2007). The political economy of human insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. *Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trading Organisations.* 431(1), 1-65

Akpan, F., Ekanem, O., and Olofu-Adeoye, A. (2014). Boko Haram insurgency and the counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria. *Canadian Social Science.* 10(2), 151-155

Akubo, A. and Okolo, B. (2019). Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: implication for national security and restorative justice. <Available at https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/boko-haram-insurgency-in-nigeria/> [Assessed June 30, 2020]

Alain P. (2011). The leader phrase book. United Kingdom: Amazon Publishing

Alba-Juez, L. (2009). Perspectives on discourse analysis: Theory and practice. Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Alobo, E., Inaku, J. and Ipuole, R. (2018). The asymmetric nature of Boko Haram insurgency and its implications on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. *International Journal of English Literature and Social Sciences (IJELS)* 3(5), 882-892

Alozieuwa, S. (2012). Contending theories on Nigeria's security challenge in the era of Boko Haram insurgency. *Peace and Conflict Review*, *7*(1), 1-8.

Almukhtar S. (2015). How Boko Haram courted and joined the Islamic State. <Available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/11/world/africa/boko-haram-isis-propaganda-video-nigeria.html> [Assessed Feb 20, 2017]

Alumona, I., Oshita O., Onuoha, F. (2019). Introduction: understanding the crisis of internal security management in Nigeria. In O. Oshita, I. Alumona and F. Onuoha (Eds). *Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons*. Onitsha: Pele Publishers

Alvarez, R. and Rodriguez, J. (2010). Discursive deployments: mobilising support for municipal and community wireless networks in the US. In L. Berkeley (Ed.) *National Laboratory*. Hawaii: Pacific Northwest

Amalu, N. (2015). Impact of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Social Sciences*. 14(1), 35-42

Amnesty International (2018). Amnesty International Report 2017/18: the state of the world's human rights. United Kingdom: Amnesty International Ltd.

Anyaegbunam, E. (2012). Law making and the enabling legal framework in Nigeria: a critical overview. *NIALS International Journal of Legislative Drafting (NIJLD)*. 1(1), 54-73

Ardèvol-Abreu, A. (2015). Framing theory in communication research in Spain. Origins, development and current situation in Spain. *Revista Latin de Comunicacion Social*. 70(1), 423-450

Aristotle, (2005). Metaphysics. Sao Paulo: Loyola

Arogbofa, J. (2022). Insecurity in our nation: roles and challenges of elites. *Being a paper presented at the 2022 Edition of Basorun Seinde Arogbofa/*University of Ibadan Alumni Association, Ondo Alumni Lecture. 23 July

Arreguin-Toft, A. 2001. How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflicts.

International Security 26 (1): 94–128.

Ashcraft, K. and Simonson, P. (2016). Intellectual inquiry as gendered organising: re-viewing the history and historiography of communication and media studies. In P. Simonson and D. Park (Eds.) *The International History of Communication Study.* New York: Routledge

Austin, J. L. (1975). *How to do things with words*. Harvard university press

Azama, S. Z. (2017). Critical Analysis of Boko Haram Insurgency. US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth United States.

Baker-Beall, C., Heath-Kelly, C. and Jarvis, J. (2014). *Counter-radicalization: critical perspectives*. London: Routledge

Baktir, H. (2012). Speech act theory; Austin and Searle: Derrida's response and Deleuze's theory of order-word. *Language, literature and cultural studies.* 5(2), 3-18

Bamisaye, T. (2007). Essentials of English syntax. Lagos: BALFAK Educational Publishers

Beckett, I. (2007). Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrilla and their Opponents since 1750. New York: Routledge

Bello, A. and Abubakar, M. (2014). Challenges and solutions to Islamic banking system in a pluralistic-secular country like Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, *5*(6), 25-34.

Berger, A. (2000). Media and communication research methods: an introduction to qualitative and quantitative approaches. London: Sage

Blair, D. (2015). Boko Haram is now a mini-Islamic State, with its own territory. <Available at

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11337722/B

oko-Haram-is-now-a-mini-Islamic-State-with-its-own-territory.html> [Assessed 15 Aug. 2017]

Blank, S. (2004). Rethinking the concept of asymmetric threats in U.S. strategy. *Comparative Strategy*. 23(1), 345-346

Bolleyer, N., and A. Gauja 2017. "Combating Terrorism by Constraining Charities? Charity and CT Legislation Before and After 9/11." Public Administration 95 (3): 1–16.

Borowski, A. (2019). Weaponised language. *The Korea Times*. 25 June

Borum, R. (2011). Radicalisation into violent extremism I: a review of social science theories. *Journal of Strategic Security.*4(4), 7-36

Braun, V. and Clarke, V (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 3 (2), 77-101

Brechenmacher, S. (2019). Stabilizing North-East Nigeria after Boko Haram. <Available at https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042> [Assessed Feb. 15 2020]

Brinton, L. (2015). Historical discourse analysis. In D. Tannen, H. Hamilton and D. Schiffrin (Eds.) *The handbook of discourse analysis*, *Vol 2*. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc

Brown, G. and Yule G. (2003) Discourse Analysis. Cambridge: CUP

Burton, J. (1990). Conflict: Human needs theory. Springer.

Bryman, A. (2015). Social research methods *(5th ed.).* New York: Oxford University Press

Byman, D. (2007). Understanding Proto-Insurgencies. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation

Byman, D. and Kreps, S. (2010). Agents of destruction? Applying principal-agent analysis to state-sponsored terrorism. *International Studies Perspectives.* 11(1), 1-18

Cameron, D. (2001). Working with spoken discourse. London: Sage Publications Ltd

Campbell, J. (2014). United States policy to counter Nigeria's Boko Haram *(Council for Preventive Action Council Special Report No. 70). <Available at* https://www.cfr.org > [Assessed March 15, 2018]

Carpentier, N. (2010). Deploying discourse theory. An introduction to discourse theory and discourse theoretical analysis. *Media and Communication Studies Interventions*, 251-266.

Carter, R. and Mccarthy, M. (2014). Vocabulary and language teaching. London: Routledge

Celeski, J. (2005). Operationalizing COIN. *JSOU Report 05-2*. Hurlburt Field: Joint Special Operations University

Centre for Disaster Philanthropy (2022). Internally Displaced People. <Available at https://disasterphilanthropy.org/resources/internally-displaced-people/> [Assessed 15 Feb. 2020]

Channels Television (2014). Women protest 15 days after chibok girls' kidnap. <Available at https://channelstv.com > [Assessed July 8, 2019]

Chaudhary, S. (2009). Counterterrorism vs Counterinsurgency: Understanding Obama's Afghanistan Decision. <Available at https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2009/11/04/chaudhary_coinvct_1104/ > [Assessed Sept. 15, 2018]

Chukwudi, C., Gberevbie, D., Abasilim, U., and Imhonopi, D. (2019). IPOB agitations for self-determination and the response of the Federal Government of Nigeria: Implications for political stability. *Academic journal of interdisciplinary studies*, *8*(3), 179-194.

Cilliers, J. (2004). Human Security in Africa: A Conceptual Framework for Review. *African Human Security Initiative*. 10(1), 1-51

Clairede, T. and Edwin, S. (2003). International Criminal Law and Human Rights. London: Sweet and Maxwell

Clark, M. (2007). Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and response to terrorism. In B. Bongar (Ed.) *Psychology of Terrorism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Cole, D. (2008) Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism. New York: The New Press

Collier, P., Anke H. and Rohner, D. (2009). Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers New Series, 61(1). 1-27.

Cook, D. (2011). The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria. *<Available at* https://ctc.usma.edu/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria/ > [Assessed 15 May, 2019]

Cook, D. and Allison, O. (2008). Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations. Connecticut: Praeger Security International

CNBCAfrica News (2019). Report reveals global malnutrition on the rise. <Retrieved from https://www.cnbcafrica.com/videos/2019/03/27/report-reveals-global-malnutritionon-the-rise-2/> [Assessed Jan. 10, 2020]

Creswell, J. (2009). Research Design Qualitative and mixed methods approaches. India: Sage Publications Inc.

Crelinstein, R. (2009) Counterterrorism. London: Polity

Crystal, D. (2008). A dictionary of linguistics and phonetics. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing

Dada, J. (2012). Human Rights under the Nigerian Constitution: Issues and Problems. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science.* 10(1), 2(12)

Dauda, K. I. (2021). *The Impact of Foreign Defense Aid on the Fight Against Insurgency in Northern Nigeria* (Master's thesis, Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)-Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi (DAÜ)).

Dasuki, M. (2013). The fight against terrorism and piracy. *<Available at* https://issuu.com/thenation > [Assessed 01/03/2022]

David, A. (2013). The Upsurge of Insurgency and the Quest for National Development. London: Oxford University press

David, I. (2020). Addressing the paradox: counterinsurgency, human rights and women in northeast Nigeria. <*Available at* https://doi.org/10.17561/tahrj.v15.5829 > [Assessed 23/03/2022]

David, S. (2002). What is discourse analysis? London: Bloomsbury Publishing

De Montclos, M., (Ed.). (2014). *Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria* (p. 135). Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Dionne, S. (2016). Nigeria vexed by Boko Haram's use of women as suicide bombers. *New York Times*. 11 February

Drid, T. (2010). Discourse analysis: Key concepts and perspectives. Al-Atsar, 9, 20-25.

Drid, T. (2018). Language as action: fundamentals of the speech act theory. *Praxis International Journal of Social Science and Literature.* 1(10), 1-13

Dutt, S. and Bansal, A (2012). South Asian Security, 21st century discourses, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series. *Routledge Taylor and Francis Group London*.

Dunlap, A. (2016). Counter-insurgency: Let's remember where prevention comes from and its implications. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, *9*(2), 380-385.

Dunn, G. (2018). The impact of Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria on childhood wasting: a double-difference study. *Dunn Conflict and Health. 12(6), 1-12*

Ebijem, N. (2011). No force can stop Boko Haram-ACF. *Daily Trust*. February 10

Eemeren, F. (2010). Strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse: extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. *Philadelphia*: John Benjamins

Eemeren, F. and Garssen, B. (2010). In varietate concordia – united in diversity: European parliamentary debate as an argumentative activity type. *Controversia.* 7(1), 19-37

Egbue, N., Nwankwo, I. and Alichie, U. (2015). Curbing Boko Haram terrorist insurgency in Nigeria: imperatives of quadruple action package of limited military response, improved social services, conflict resolution initiatives and modified pacifism. *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*. 20(1), 13-29

Egede, E. (2007). Bringing human rights home: An examination of the domestication of human rights treaties in Nigeria. *Journal of African Law*, *51*(2), 249-284.

Ekong, S. (2016). Nigerian policy on child labour: an evaluation of the education sector preparedness for effective policy implementation (unpublished doctoral dissertation). *Walden University*, United States of America

Ekwunife, R, Oparah, O, Akpan, R, and Thomas, H, (2021). END SARS Protest and Centralized Police System in Nigeria. *Global Encyclopaedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer Nature. Switzerland. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_4353*, *1*.

Eneanya, A. (2013). Policy research, analysis and public policy-making. Ibadan: Ibadan University Printer

EONS Intelligence (2022). Analysis of Nigeria insecurity challenges*: from June 2011 to June 2021*. Lagos: Timeless Insight

Erika, B. (2019). A Historical View of the Pedagogy of Public Speaking. Voice and Speech Review, 13(1), 31-42

Esteinerte, R. and Wallace M. (2009). United Nations protection of human rights. London: University of London Press

Ewa, I. (2017). Insurgency, Counterinsurgency and National Security. *Journal for Security and Development.* 2(2), 44-58

Ezema, O. (2013). The socio-economic implications of the Boko Haram insurgence in Nigeria: 2009-2013. Nigeria: Caritas University

Fairclough, I. and Fairclough, N. (2012). Political discourse analysis: a method for advanced students. London: Routledge

Fairclough, N. (2000). Social theory and social research: the discourse of welfare reform. *Journal of Sociolinguistics.* 4(2), 163-195

Fairclough, N. (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis as a method in social scientific research. In R. Wodak and M. Meyers (Eds.). *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.* London: Sage

Fairclough, N. (2002). Language in new capitalism. *Discourse and Society.* 13(1), 63-166

Fairclough, N. (2003). Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research. Abingdon: Routlegde

Fairclough, N. (2004). Critical Discourse Analysis critical policy studies. *Critical Policy Studies,* 7(2), 177-197

Falode, J. A. (2016). The nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram war, 2010-2015: A strategic analysis. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, *10*(1), 41-52.

Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria with amendments. Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria

Federal Republic of Nigeria (2013). Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act. Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria

Feldman, M. and Skoldberg, K. (2002). Stories and the rhetoric of contrariety: subtexts of organizing (change). *Culture and Organisation.* 8(4), 275-292

Fearon, J. (2013). Ethics and cultural diversity by company. *Journal of Economic Growth*. 8(2), 195-222

Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (2019). *New UN report reveals that hunger in Africa continues to rise*. <Available at http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/ 118 0443/icode/> [Assessed April 15, 2022]

Foss, K. (2012). Rhetorical theory: encyclopedia of communication theory. Canada: Sage

Foster, G. (2005). A new security paradigm. *World Watch*. <Available at http://www.worldwatch.org/ system/files/EP181B .pdf> [Assessed May 19, 2022]

Franche, M. and Ebata, M. (2004). Conflict prevention: NHDR thematic guidance note. *United Nations Development Report Series*. 3(1), 1-54

Gelso, C. (2006). Applying theories to research: the interplay of theory and research in science. In F. Leong, and J. Austin (Eds.) *The Psychology Research Handbook.* Canada: Sage

Gianluca C, (2018). Small Drones and Geographic Observation. In G. Casagrande, A. Sik and G. Szabó (Eds.). Small Flying Drones: Applications for Geographic Observation. United States: Springer International Publishing

Gilbert, L. (2014). Prolongation of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: the international dimensions. *Research on Humanities and Social Science.* 4(11), 150-156

Green, S. (2004). A Rhetorical Theory of Diffusion. *Academy of Management Review.* 29(4), 653-669

Griffin, E. (2012). A first look at communication theory, *8th ed.* New York: McGraw-Hill

Gomez, O. and Gasper, D. (2013). Human security: a thematic guidance notes for regional and national human development report teams. *United Nations Development Program*. 10(1), 1-16

Gompert, D, and Gordon, J. (2008). War by other means: Building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation

Gumperz, J. (2015). Interactional sociolinguistics a personal perspective. In D. Tannen, H. Hamilton and D. Schiffrin (Eds.) *The handbook of discourse analysis.* New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons Inc.

Habila, H. (2017). The Chibok Girls: The Boko Haram Kidnappings and Islamic Militancy in Nigeria. Penguin UK.

Hafez, J. and Hatfeld, M. (2006). Do targeted assassination work? A multivariate analysis of Israeli counter-terrorism effectiveness during Al-Aqsa uprising. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 29(4), 359-382

Hammes, T. (2006). Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks. *Military Review*. 10(1), 20-21

Handa, C. (2004). Visual rhetoric in a digital world: a critical sourcebook. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's

Hartelius, E. and Browning, L. (2008). The application of rhetorical theory in managerial research: a literature review. *Management Communication Quarterly*. 22(1), 13-39

Hassan, M. (2014). Boko Haram insurgency and the spate of insecurity in Nigeria: manifestation of governance crises. *Research and Humanities and Social Sciences*. 4(18), 9-18

Hauser, G. (2007). Introduction to rhetorical theory. Detroit: Gale

Henk, D. (2005). Human Security: Relevance and Implications. *Parameters: US Army War College*. 35(2), 91-106

Herring, S. (2001). Computer-mediated discourse. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. Hamilton (Eds), *The handbook of discourse analysis*. U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishers Ltd

Herrick, J. (2001). The history and theory of rhetoric: an introduction. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon

Herring, S., and Androutsopoulos, J. (2015). Computer-mediated discourse 2.0. In D. Tannen, H. Hamilton and D. Schiffrin (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis*. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc

Hoffman, B. (2006) Inside Terrorism (Rev-Revised, 2). Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Hoffman, B. (2017) Defining Terrorism. Columbia: Columbia

University Press. ISBN:9780231544894

Hoffman, F. (2007). Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Human Rights Watch (2012). Boko Haram attacks telecommunication centres. *Daily Trust*. 27 June

Hussein, L. (2007). Discourse, War and Terrorism. In A. Hodges and C. Nilep (Eds.), *Discourse and Society.* Amsterdam: John Benjamin

Horgan, J. (2008). 'Deradicalisation or disengagement? A Process in need of clarity and a Counterterrorism initiative in need of evaluation'. Perspectives on Terrorism, 2 (4):3-8.

Howell, S., and Jamal, A., (2009). The Aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Citizenship and crisis: Arab Detroit after, 9(11), 69-100.

Howell, J., and J. Lind 2009. "Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society After 9/11 in Afghanistan." European Journal of Development Research 21 (5):718–736. doi:10.1057/ejdr.2009.40.

Howell, J. 2014. "The Securitization of NGOs Post-9/11." Conflict, Security and Development 14 (2):151–179. doi:10.1080/14678802.2014.903692.

Ibanga, M. (2002). The Importance of customary norms in the area of international Humanitarian Law. *University of Benin Law Journal*. 7(1), 50-53

Ibrahim, A. (2004). Conceptualisation of Guerrilla Warfare. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *15*(3), 112–124.

Idowu, J. (2013). Resolving and preventing the spread of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Ibadan: University of Ibadan press

Igbini, M. (2020). Insurgency in Nigeria: the prognosis and its effects on the Nigerian politics. *Journal of Danubian Studies and Research*. 10(1), 1-11

Institute for Economics and Peace (2022). Global Terrorism Index 2022: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney, March

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2020). Global report on Internal Displacement 2020. <Available at https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2020/> [Assessed Dec. 15 2020]

Iyekekpolo, W. (2019). The political process of Boko Haram insurgency onset: a political relevance model. *Critical Studies on Terrorism.* 12(3), 1-20

Jackson, R. (2006). Genealogy, ideology and counter-terrorism: writing wars on terrorism from Reagan to George W. Bush Jr. *Language and Terrorism*. 1, 163-193

Jackson, R., (2009) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda. London: Routledge.

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J. and Breen-Smyth, M. (2011). Terrorism: a critical introduction. *Critical Studies on Terrorism.* 4(3), 476-478

Jackson, J. (2014). Introducing language and intercultural communication. London: Routledge

Jarasch, J., Jamai, I. and Gumus, K. (2014). Speech act theory. <Available at www.Speech_Act_Theory_(Jarasch_Jamai_Guemuesh).pdf> [Assessed Jan. 20, 2022]

John, L. (2014). *A Critical Evaluation of the Concept of Human Security*. <Available at https://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/a-critical-evaluation-of-the-concept-of-humansecurity/> [Assessed Feb. 2022]

Jorgensen, M. and Phillips, L. (2002). *Discourse analysis as theory and method.* London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Kalemaj, S. (2014). Argumentation in contemporary persuasive discourse. *European Scientific Journal.*10(11), 77-87

Kane, J. and Patapan, H. (2010). The artless art: leadership and the limits of democratic rhetoric. *Australian Journal of Political Science.* 45(3), 371-389

Kendall, G. (2007). What is critical discourse analysis? Ruth Wodak in conversation with Gavin Kendall. <Available at https://nbn-resolving.de/um:nbn:de:0114-fqs0702297> [Assessed May 15, 2022]

Kettemann, M. (2006). The conceptual debate on human security and its relevance for the development of international law. *Human Security Perspectives.* 1(3), 39-52

Kielsgard, M. (2006) "A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism," *California Western International Law Journal:* Vol. 36: No. 2, Article 2. Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol36/iss2/2

Kienscherf, M. (2011).US counterinsurgency doctrine and the biopolitics of human (in)security. <Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010611423268> [Assessed March 15, 2017]

Kilcullen, D. (2005). Counter-insurgency redux. *Global Politics and Strategy.* 48(4), 111-130

Kilcullen, D. (2007). An Hour with Counterinsurgency Expert David Kilcullen. *Charlie Rose.* 5 October

Kilcullen, D. (2009a). Counterinsurgency Redux. In J. Robert and N. Kenneth (Eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Kilcullen, D. (2009b). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York City: Oxford University Press

Kilcullen, D. (2010). Intelligence. In R. Thomas and K. Thomas (Eds.), *Understanding COIN, Doctrine, Operations and Challenges.* New York: Routledge

Kim, M. (2002). Non-western perspectives on human communication. Canada: Sage

Klemperer, V. (2013). The Language of the Third Reich: LTI Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook. New York: Bloomsbury

Knight, J. (2013). The economic causes and consequences of social instability in China. *China Economic Review*. 25(1), 17-26

Krepinevich A. (2002). Defense transformation. *Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services*. 9 April

Lacquer, W. (2000) The New terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. England: Oxford University Press

Lavrakas, P. (2008). Encyclopaedia of research methods. London: Sage Publications Inc.

Lawrence, T. and Suddaby, R. (2006). Institutions and institutional work.In S. Clegg, C. Hardy, T. Lawrence and W. Nord (Eds.) *Sage Handbook of Organisation Studies.* London: Sage

Lazar, M. (2005).Politicising gender in discourse: Feminist critical discourse analysis as political perspective and praxis. In M. Lazar (Ed.), *Feminist critical discourse analysis: Gender, power and ideology in discourse.* London: Palgrave Macmillan

Lewinski, M. and Mohammed, D. (2013).Argumentation in political deliberation. *Journal of Argumentation in Context.* 2(1), 1-9

Libicki, M., Gompert, D., Frelinger, D. and Smith R. (2007). Byting back: Regaining information superiority against 21st-century insurgents. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation

Liolio, S. (2013). Rethinking Insurgency: A Case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria.(Unpublished doctoral thesis). European Peace University, Austria

Lowenthall, M. (2009). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. *4th Edition*. Washington, DC: CQ Press

Lutzke, J. and Henggeler, M. (2009). The rhetorical triangle: understanding and using logos, ethos and pathos. (Manuscript in preparation). Indiana University

Machin, D. (2004). Building the world's visual language: The increasing global importance of image banks in corporate media. *Visual Communication*. 3(3), 316–336

Mackinlay, J. (2013). Globalisation and Insurgency. Routledge

Mahan, S., and Griset, P. (2012). *Terrorism in perspective*. Sage Publications.

Mahmud, Y. (2021). Leveraging Technologies for Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria. Baze University: Abuja Nigeria.

Maingueneau, D. (2010). Literature and discourse analysis. *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia, International Journal of Linguistics*. 42(1), 147-157

Malande, M. and Masiolo, H. (2003). Juggling words, terms and idioms to advance political agenda in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania: profiling the electioneering and referendum discourse. *International journal of languages and literatures.* 1(1), 6-14

Mammadov, A. (2018). Studies in text and discourse. England: Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Mamman, E. (2020). Public policy response to violence: case study of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (unpublished doctoral dissertation). Walden University, United States of America

Mason, O. and Platt, R. (2006).Embracing a new creed: lexical patterning and the encoding of ideology. *College Literature,* 33(2), 155-170

Mbah, P., and Nwangwu, C. (2014). The counter-insurgence operations of the Joint Task Force and human rights abuses in northern Nigeria, 2011─2013. *Journal of Educational and Social Research*, *4*(5), 67.

McBurney, P., Hitchcock, D. and Parsons, S. (2006). The eightfold way of deliberation dialogue. *International Journal of Intelligent Systems.* 22(1), 95-132

McConnell, M. (2007).Overhauling Intelligence. *Foreign Affairs* 86(4), 49-58

Meagher K. (2014). Beyond terror: addressing the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria. Norway: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

Metz, S. (2001). Strategic Asymmetry. *Military Review*, 81(23), 25

Mey, J. (2001). Pragmatics: An introduction. New Jersey: Blackwell

Mia, B. (2007). Dying to Kill. New York: Columbia University Press

Morgan, J. (2009). The Importance of Fear and Risk. <Available at https://thefutureorganization.com/the-importance-of-fear-and-risk/ > [Assessed May 11, 2022]

Mu'azu, A. (2011). Understanding the emergent of terrorism in Nigeria: a case of Boko Haram and similar groups. A paper presented at the 5th policy executive forum on responding to the terrorism in Nigeria clean foundation. 11 May

Musa, A. (2015). Boko Haram and public health: the grave consequences (part 1). <Available at https://www.abusidiqu.com/boko-haram-and-public-health-the-grave-consequences-part-1-by-abubakar-musa/.3> [Assessed May 11, 2022]

Mutah, J. (2021). *Transnational Cooperation to Combat Boko Haram: The Multinational Joint Task Force (MJNTF)*. University of Baltimore.

Muzan, M. (2014).Nigerian newspapers framing of the Chibok school girl's abduction (a study of the Guardian, Daily Sun, The Trust and Leadership newspapers). *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences*. 3(8), 78-93

National Human Rights Commission (2013). National action plan for the promotion and protection of human rights in Nigeria 2009-2013. <Available at www.nigeriarights.gov.ng > [Assessed June 1, 2022]

Nationalia News (2020). 50 years after devastating Biafran war, lgbo grievances resurface again. <Availability at https://www.nationalia.info/new/10664/50-years-after-devastating-biafran-war-igbo-grievances-resurface-again> [Assessed Oct. 15, 2021]

NATO (2017). Counterinsurgency: A generic reference Curriculum. <Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_157593.htm > [Assessed July 9, 2022]

Nbete, A. (2012). The social contract theory: a model for reconstructing a true Nigerian nation-state. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences.* 2(15), 267-278

Neumann, P. and Smith, M. (2008). The strategy of terrorism: how it works and why it fails*. London: Routledge

Nikitina, A. (2012). Successful Public Speaking. <Available at https://bookboon.com/en/successful-public-speaking-ebook> [Assessed March 10, 2020]

Njoku, E. T. (2017). "Laws for Sale." The Domestication of Counterrrorism policies and Its Impact in Nigeria. In Romaniuk, S. et. al (eds). *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*. Palgrave Macmillan. London Pages 1003-1020. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55769-8_48

Njoku, E. (2022) Strategic exclusion, co-option and containment: towards an integrative theory of state-CSOs relations, *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2022.2111776

Njoku, E. T., & Martini, A. (2017). The Challenges of Defining Terrorism for Counter-Terrorism Policy. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy* (1 ed., pp. 73-89). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55769-8_3

Nte, N. (2011). Kidnapping, hostage taking and national security threats in Nigeria: a synopsis. *Mustang Journal of Business and Ethics.* 1(2), 57-70

Nwankpa, M. (2017). Conflict and Development in Nigeria: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism strategies towards the Niger Delta and Boko Haram conflicts. London: University of Roehampton

Nwamuo, C. (2022). Monetary policy and unemployment rate in Nigeria: An empirical investigation. *World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews*, *15*(3), 248-255.

Nwogwugwu, N., Alao, O. and Egwuonwu, C. (2012). Militancy and insecurity in the Niger Delta: impact on the inflow of foreign direct investment to Nigeria. *Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review.* 2(1), 23-37

Nwolise, O. (2017). Adekunle Fajuyi's fifty years of martyrdom: lessons and reflections on leadership and the value of life in our time. Ibadan: Gold Press Ltd.

Obodoeze, F., Ozioko, F., Okoye, F., Mba, C., Ozue, T. and Ofoegbu, E. (2013). The escalating Nigeria national security challenge: smart objects and internet-of-things to the rescue. *International Journal of Computer Networking and Communication.* 1(1), 57- 70

Odumovo, A. (2014). Insurgency, counter-insurgency and human rights violations in Nigeria. *The Age of Human Rights Journal.*3(1), 46-62

Ogbodo, S. (2010). Environmental issues and Nigeria's Niger- Delta crisis: Implication for sustainable development and global peace. *OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Development.* 12(2), 125-173

Ogbondah, C. and Agbese, P. (2018). Terrorists and social media messages: a critical analysis of Boko Haram's messages and messaging techniques. <Available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7121539/> [Assessed May 13, 2022]

Ogege, S. (2013). Insecurity and sustainable development: the Boko Haram debacle in Nigeria. *American International Journal of Social Science*. 2(7), 82-88

Ogoloma, F. and Sampson, B. (2015). Boko Haram and Human Rights violation in Nigeria. *ARC Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. 1(1), 1-9

OHCHR (2015). Violations and abuses committed by Boko Haram and the impact on human rights in the countries affected. *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for*

*Human Rights. <Available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A-HRC-30-67_en.docx > [*Assessed on 04/05/22].

Oke, R. and Labeodan, H. (2015). Boko Haram Insurgence, the Chibok Girls' Abduction and the Implication for the Girl Child in Nigeria. *Unraveling and Reweaving the Sacred Canon in Africana Womanhood*, 93-106.

Okoli, A. and Iortyer, P. (2014). Terrorism and humanitarian crisis in Nigeria: insights from Boko haram insurgency. *Global Journal of Human Social Science*. 14(1), 38-50

Okoli, A. C., & Lenshie, N. E. (2022). 'Beyond military might': Boko Haram and the asymmetries of counter-insurgency in Nigeria. *Security Journal*, *35*(3), 676-693.

Okpaga, A., Chijioke, U. and Eme, I. (2012). Activities of Boko Haram and insecurity question in Nigeria. *Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review.* 1(9), 20-25

Olojo, A. (2013). Nigeria's troubled north: interrogating the drivers of public support for Boko Haram. *<Available at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Nigeria%E2%80%99s-Troubled-North%3A-Interrogating-the-Drivers-Olojo/58d9bbe0de2dd5ed60b80961932342af96c7e5a9 >* [Assessed July 10, 2022]

Omale, D. (2013). Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy. *Canadian Social Science*, 9(3), 96-103

Omede, A. (2011). Nigeria: analysing the security challenges of the Goodluck Jonathan's administration. *Canadian Social Science.*7(5), 90-102

Omeni, A. (2017). Counter-insurgency in Nigeria: the military and operations against Boko Haram, *2011-2017*. London: Routledge

Omeni, A. (2018). Boko Haram's covert front. *Journal of African Conflicts and Peace Studies.* 4(1), 1-25

Omenma, J. T., Onyishi, I. E., and Okolie, A. M. (Eds.). (2023). *Ten Years of Boko Haram in Nigeria: The Dynamics and Counterinsurgency Challenges*. Springer Nature.

Omolewa, M. (2010). Human security in the African context: the education imperative. In Obasanjo, et al. (Eds.) *Human Security in Africa: perspective on Education, Health and Agriculture.* Abeokuta: Centre for Human Security, OOPL

Onapajo, H. (2017). Has Nigeria defeated Boko Haram? An appraisal of the counter-terrorism approach under the Buhari's administration. *Strategic Analysis.*41(1), 61-73

Oni, F. (2015). The rhetoric of collocations in Nigerian political discourse. Being a paper presented at the Schools of Arts and Social Sciences Seminar. 11 June

Onodugo, I. and Itodo, S. (2016). Insurgency and Nigerian socio-economic development. *National Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development.* 1(1), 08-12

Onuoha, F. (2014). Boko Haram and the evolving Salafi Jihadist threat in Nigeria. In M. Perouse de Montclos (Ed.) *Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria.* Netherlands: Ipskamp Drukkers

Onuoha, F. C., Nwangwu, C., & Ugwueze, M. I. (2023). Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: expounding the viscid manacle. In *Ten Years of Boko Haram in Nigeria: The Dynamics and Counterinsurgency Challenges* (pp. 69-94). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.

Onwuazombe, I. (2017). Human Rights abuse and violations in Nigeria: a case study of oil-Producing communities in Niger-Delta region. California: Golden gate University school of Law

Onyebuchi, E. and Chigozie, C. (2013). Islamic fundamentalism and the problem of insecurity of Nigeria: the Boko Haram phenomenon. In O. Mbachu and U. Bature (Eds.) *Internal security management in Nigeria. A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism.* Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited

Osakwe, C. and Umoh, U. (2013).The military and counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria. *Internal Security Management in Nigeria. A Study in Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism.* 1(1), 49-66

Oyeniyi, A. (2010). Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities, and Politics. *International Journal of Politics and Good Governance.* 1(1), 1-16

Ozumba, L. (2014). Multi-sectorial assessment of policy implementation in the Nigerian socio-political system. *Journal of good governance and sustainable development in Africa.* 2(1), 113-122

Pearson, E. (2018). Wilayat Shahidat: Boko Haram, the Islamic State, and the question of the female suicide bomber. In J. Zenn (Ed.). *Boko Haram beyond the headlines: analyses of Africa's enduring insurgency.* New York: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Pearson, E. and Zenn, J. (2021). Boko Haram, the Islamic State and the surge in female abductions in Southern Niger. Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism

Piazza, J. (2006). Rooted in poverty: terrorism, poor economic development, and social cleavage. *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 18(1), 159-177

Pratt, M. (2009). Harm's way: Language and the contemporary arts of war. *PMLA*. 124(5), 1515–1531

Prasad, B. (2008). Content analysis: A method in social science research. In D. Lal Das and V. Bhaskaran (Eds.) *Research Methods for Social Work*. India: Rawat

Rafael V (2012) Targeting translation: Counterinsurgency and the weaponisation of language. *Social Text*. 30(1), 55–80

Rapp, C. (2011). Aristotle's Rhetoric - Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. <Available at https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/win2011/entries/aristotle-rhetoric/ > [Assessed Oct. 15, 2021]

Richardson, L. (2007). Democracy and counterterrorism: lessons from the past. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace

Rineheart, J. (2010). Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 4(5), 31-47

Robert A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review*. 97(3), 355-357

Rogers, S. (2015). A critical evaluation of discourse analysis in the social and political world: the cases for British military intervention in Libya and Syria. (Manuscript in preparation). University of Bristol

Roland, A. (2016). War and Technology: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Rosenau, W. (2007). Subversion and insurgency. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation

Rosenberg, M. B., & Chopra, D. (2015). *Nonviolent communication: A language of life: Life-changing tools for healthy relationships*. PuddleDancer Press.

Rothe, D. and Collins, V. (2011).An exploration of system criminality and arms trafficking. *International Criminal Justice Review.* 21(1), 22-38

Sadock, J. (2004). Speech acts. In R. Horn and G. Ward (Eds.), *The handbook of pragmatics*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing

Sageman, M. (2004) Understanding Terror Network. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press.

Sahara Reporters (2019). Nigerian women who survived Boko Haram still face abuse and neglect, says Amnesty International. <Available at https://saharareporters.com/2019/03/08/nigerian-women-who-survived-boko-haram-still-face-abuse-and-neglect-says-amnesty > [Assessed Aug. 4, 2019]

Sanders, T. and Spooren, W. (2012). Discourse and text structure. <Available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46694984_Discourse_and_Text_Structure > [Assessed Aug. 8, 2022]

Schiffrin, D. (2006). Discourse. In R. Fasold and J. Connor-Linton (Eds.). *An introduction to language and linguistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Schmid, A. (2012). The Revised Academic Consensus Definitions on Terrorism. *Perspectives on Terrorism*. 6(2), 158-159

Schmid, A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. *ICCT Research Paper*.

Schmid, A. (2004): "Terrorism – The Definitional Problem". Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 36(2), p. 396.

Schmid, A. (2023) Defining Terrorism, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism March 2023, ISSN: 2468-0486, DOI: 10.19165/2023.3.01

Searle, J. (2014). What is a speech act?. In *Philosophy in America* (pp. 221-239). Routledge.

Shah, A. (2013). Poverty Facts and States. Global Issues. <Available at https://www.globalissues.org/article/26/poverty-facts-and-stats > [Assessed Jan. 9, 2022]

Shen, L. (2012). Context and text. *Theory and practice in language studies*, *2*(12), 2663.

Simon, H. Yesilada, Y. (2011). Emerging Technologies and Web Accessibility: Research Challenges and Opportunities focusing on vision issues, Disability and Rehabilitation: Assistive Technology. *Early Online.* 1(1), 1–19

Siollun, M. (2018). Civil military affairs and military culture in post-transition Nigeria. *The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics*, 273.

Slaughter, A. (2011). International relations, principles and theories. <Available at www.princeton.edu/~slaughtr/Articles/722_IntlRelPrincipalTheories_Slaughter_201105 09zG.pdf > [Assessed May 4, 2022]

Smith-Bingham, R. (2005). The utility of force: The art of war in the modern world. United Kingdom: Allen Lane

Smith-Bingham, R. (2016). Resilience amid disorder: steering a path through social and political unrest. New York: Marsh and McLenman Companies Inc.

Sobowale, I (2008). Scientific Journalism. Lagos: John West Publications

Sowinska, A. (2013). A Critical Discourse Approach to Analysis of Values in Political Discourse: The example of freedom in President Bush's State of the Union Addresses 2001-2008. *Discourse and Society.* 24(6), 792-809

Stahl, R. (2016). Weaponising speech. *Quarterly Journal of Speech*. 102(1), 376–395

Stam, H. (2007). Theoretical psychology. Canada: Sage

Stanley, J. (2018). How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them. New York: Random House

Strawhand, J. (2012). A History of Weaponised Language. *Huffington Post*. 26 May

Stuart, E. (2014). The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's war on terror. *The Geographical Journal.*180(4), 414-425

Suciu, L. (2019). Introductory Chapter: Discourse and Discourse analysis. A retrospective approach. In L. Suciu (Ed.) *Advances in discourse analysis*. Austria: IntechOpen

Tadjbakhsh, S. (2005). Human security: concepts and implications with an application to post intervention challenges in Afghanistan. *Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Science Po.* 10(1), 1-77

Tannen, Hamilton and Schiffrin (2015). The Handbook of Discourse Analysis. UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Taylor, S. (2001). Locating and conducting discourse analytic research. London: Sage Publications

Taylor, S. (2013). What is Discourse Analysis? London: Bloomsbury Publishing

Teamey, K. and Sweet, J. (2006). Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency. *Military Review*. 1(1), 24-29

Tejumaiye, A. (2003). Mass communication research: an introduction. Ibadan: Sceptre Prints Limited

Tincheva, N. (2015). Text and/versus discourse. <Available at https://www.researchgate.net/ publication/331286451_ Text_an dversus_Discourse> [Assessed April 10, 2019]

Tofe A. (2020). Chad will stop fighting Boko Haram outside its borders. <Available at https://www.theafricareport.com/26215/chad-will-stop-fighting-boko-haram-outside-its-borders/> [Assessed April 15, 2021]

Tomes, R. (2004). Relearning counterinsurgency warfare, parameters. United States: Army War College

Toros, H. (2016). Critical theory and terrorism studies: ethics and emancipation. In R. Jackson (Ed.) *Routledge Handbook of Critical Terrorism Studies.* United Kingdom: Routledge

Udeh, C. (2013). Boko Haram and counter-terrorism strategy in Nigeria: an exploratory anatomy. In O. Mbachu and O. Bature (Eds) *International Security Management in Nigeria: A study in terrorism and counter-terrorism*. Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers Limited

Ugbeta, E. (2020). Human rights protection in Nigeria; reflections on the legal regime, identified weaknesses and the need for reforms. United Kingdom: University of Kent

Ukpong-Umo, R. (2016). Insecurity in Nigeria and the challenge of nationhood. *Nigerian Journal of Rural Sociology.* 16(3), 64-69

Ulinnuha, R., Udasmoro, W. and Wijaya, Y. (2013). Critical discourse analysis theory and method in social and literary framework. *Indonesian Journal of Applied Linguistic.*2(2), 262-274

Umaru, U. (2017). Impact of corruption on insurgency in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. *IOSR Journal of Business and Management.*19(1), 19-25

UNDP (2005). Human Development Report. New York: Oxford University Press

UNICEF (2017). Annual report: Nigeria. <Available at https://sites.unicef.org/about/annualreport/files/Nigeria_2017_COAR.pdf > [Assessed May 18, 2018]

UNICEF (2019). Malnutrition. <Available at https://data.unicef.org/topic/nutrition/malnutrition/> [Assessed May 18, 2020]

United Nations (2004) Resolution 1566 (2004) / adopted by the Security Council at its 5053rd meeting, on 8 October 2004 UN. Security Council (59th year : 2004) Available at https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/532676?ln=es&v=pdf Assessed on 01/02/21

United Nations (2015). Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. <Available at https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/1_The_whole_Report_2015.pdf > [Assessed Jan. 7, 2017]

United Nations (2019). UN Human Rights Report. Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR)

United Nations (2021). What are human rights? <Available at https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/human-rights> [Assessed Dec. 15, 2021]

United Nations Trust Fund (2018). What is Human Security. <Available at https://www.un.org/humansecurity/what-is-human-security/> [Assessed Jan. 7, 2019]

United States Government (2012). *Guide to analysis of insurgency*. Washington, D.C: US Government

Varin, C. (2016). *Boko Haram and the war on terror*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Varin, C. (2018) Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria's counterinsurgency against Boko Haram, African Security Review, 27:2, 144-157, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2018.1489863

Van Dijk, T. (2003). Critical Discourse Analysis. *The handbook of discourse analysis*. 18, 352-371

Van Dijk, T. (2006).Politics, Ideology and Discourse. In K. Brown (Ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of language and linguistics*. New York: Pergamon Press

Van Dijk, T. (2010).Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. Schiffrin, D. Tannen and H. Hamilton (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis*. U.S.A.: Blackwell Publishers

Van Dijk, T. (2015).Critical Discourse Analysis. In D. Tannen, H. Hamilton and D. Schiffrin (Eds.), *The handbook of discourse analysis*. New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Van Leeuwen, T. (2005). Introducing Social Semiotics. Abingdon: Routlegde

Van Leeuwen, T. (2008). Analysing social semiotics. Abingdon: Routledge

Verderber, R., Sellnow, D. and Verderber, K. (2012). The challenge of effective speaking (15thed.) Boston: Wadsworth

Viotti, R. (2008). Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security. In R. Viotti, A. Michael and B. Nicholas (Eds.) *Terrorism and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically About Policy*. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press

Volti, R. (2009). Society and Technological Change *(7th ed.*). New York: Worth Publishers

Walker, A. (2012). What is Boko Haram? United States: Institute of Peace.

Watts, M. (2013). Silent violence: food famine and peasantry in northern Nigeria. Georgia: University of Georgia Press

Weaver, D. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing and priming. *Journal of Communication.* 57(1), 142-147

Weiss, G. and Wodak, R. (2003). Introduction: Critical Discourse Analysis, Theory and Interdisciplinarity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Wodak, R. (2001). What critical discourse analysis s about – a summary of its history, important concepts and its concepts. In. R. Wodak and M. Meyer (Eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis.*London: Sage

Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009). Critical discourse analysis: history, agenda, theory and methodology. In R. Wodak and M. Meyer (Eds.) *Methods of CDA.* London: Sage

Yusuf, H. (2013). Harvest of violence: the neglect of basic rights and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 6(3), 371-391

Yusuf, U. L. (2020). Community perception of the role of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in resisting Boko Haram culture of violence in Borno State, Nigeria.

Zagga, M. (2012). Azazi's bombshell and other issue. *The Guardian*. May 5

Zenn J. (2014). Boko Haram enlists female suicide bombers to kill 100,000; violence now akin to ISIS. In W. Morgan (Ed.), New York: International Business Times

Zenn, J., Kassim, A., Pearson, E., Barkindo, A., Hassan, I., Pieri, Z. and Mahmoud, O. (2018). *Boko Haram beyond the headlines: analyses of Africa's enduring insurgency.* <Available at https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/05/Boko-Haram-Beyond-the-Headlines.pdf > [Assessed June 9, 2022]

Appendices

Appendix A: Ethics Approval

APPROVED: FADAHUNSI 2018/55: Request for ethical review

From: Cali, Annabel annabel.cali@ntu.ac.uk
To: Fadahunsi, Adenike 2016 (PGR) adenike.fadahunsi2016@my.ntu.ac.uk
Cc: Dutt, Sagarika sagarika.dutt@ntu.ac.uk, Gorry, Jonathan jon.gorry@ntu.ac.uk
Date: Wed, 24 Oct 2018, 09:30

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 15 9 18.docx 15 KB
15.9.18. AMENDMENTS_Ethics form- Adenike Fadahunsi.docx 53 KB

Message sent on behalf of the Chair of the College Research Ethics Committee

Dear Adenike

Thank you for the recent resubmission of your application (No. 2018/55) to the College Research Ethics Committee (CREC) on 19 September 2018 requesting ethical clearance for the project entitled: *HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA.*

We are pleased to inform you that the Committee were happy to confirm that in its judgement there were no further outstanding ethical concerns that required further discussion or exploration prior to data collection and the reviewers are satisfied that your resubmission now meets with their ethical approval.

Note from Committee: We are still concerned that this application needs to be closely monitored and will raise this with your supervisors.

The Committee would like to wish you well in the completion of your project.

Sent on behalf of K Wheat
Chair CREC

Annabel Cali
Research and REF Administrator
Research Office
Nottingham Trent University
Arkwright Room B113
Tel: +44 115 848 8157
E-mail: annabel.cali@ntu.ac.uk

Appendix B: Participants Consent Form

Participant Consent Form

School of Social Sciences,
Nottingham Trent University,
Nottingham UK.

Project title: Discursive Analysis of the Influence of Counterinsurgency Rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights Abuse in Nigeria (2011-2022).

Locality: Northern Nigeria   Ethics committee ref:2018:55

Lead Researcher: Adenike Fadahunsi   Contact phone number: xxxxxx

Please read and confirm your consent to being interviewed for this project by initialling the appropriate box(es) and signing and dating this form

1.   I confirm that the purpose of the project has been explained to me, that I have been given information about it in writing, and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research

☐

2.   I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without any implications for my legal rights

☐

3   I give permission for the interview to be tape-recorded by research staff, on the understanding that the tape will be destroyed at the end of the project

☐

4.   I agree to take part in this project   ☐

_____   _____   _____
Name of respondent   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____
Name of researcher taking consent   Date   Signature

Appendix C: Participants Information Sheet

RESEARCH TOPIC: Discursive Analysis of the Influence of Counterinsurgency Rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights Abuse in Nigeria (2011-2022).

Dear Participant,

This academic research is on Counterinsurgency Rhetoric and COIN-related Human Rights issues in Nigeria. This data collection exercise is part of a study for the fulfilment of a PhD degree at Nottingham Trent University, United Kingdom. I will need your assistance to get some information.

Please respond to the following questions carefully and honestly to the best of your knowledge and belief. Please, be rest assured that your anonymity will be maintained and the information you provide will be treated with strict confidentiality. Also, be informed that the information you provide is strictly for academic purposes.

The aim of the study is to examine the influence of counterinsurgency rhetoric on COIN-related human rights abuse in northeast, Nigeria, and afterwards bring about reformed policies to curb the excesses of counterinsurgency operatives in Nigeria.

In other words, the study intends to investigate the use of rhetoric in the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 and former President Goodluck Jonathan's COIN speeches, and to examine the speech delivery techniques used in the COIN speeches, while it would also ascertain the extent to which COIN rhetoric has influenced COIN-related human rights abuse in the troubled areas in northeast, Nigeria.

This activity will involve coding of texts as well as administration of questionnaire and interview guide to critical stakeholders like IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), Camp Managers, Officials of International Non-Governmental Organisations, relevant public officials etc., which will be transcribed later.

The transcribed information is going to be stored immediately in a password protected file (in a memory stick). The transcripts will be destroyed ten years after data collection. The transcripts will be anonymised, and I will destroy the audio recordings once transcription has been completed.

Your anticipated co-operation towards the success of this project will be very helpful.

Please note: If at any stage of the project you wish to withdraw either yourself or your data, this is your right and there is no repercussion in doing so, please contact Adenike on
Adenike.fadahunsi2016@my.ntu.ac.uk

Appendix D: Fieldwork Questions

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JOURNALISTS AND HUMANITARIAN WORKERS

INTRODUCTION

My name is Adenike Fadahunsi. I am a postgraduate student at Nottingham Trent University, U.K. I am conducting a research study on "Discursive Analysis of the Influence of Counterinsurgency Rhetoric Speech on COIN-related Human Rights Abuse in Nigeria (2011-2022)". I need your assistance to get some information.

Please respond to the following questions carefully and honestly to the best of your knowledge. Please, be assured that your anonymity and the information you provide will be treated with strict confidentiality. Also, be informed that the information you provided is strictly for academic purpose.

Thank you.

- Have you at one time or the other read or listened to the whole or extracts of the Terrorism Prevention Act (Amendment) 2013 and/or the counterinsurgency speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan? Yes ( )   No ( )   Not Sure ( )

- Do you think the provisions of the Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 and counterinsurgency related speeches by former President Goodluck Jonathan has assisted in combating insurgency in the North-eastern part of Nigeria? Yes ( ) No ( ) Not Sure ( )

- Do you think rhetoric utilised in the war against insurgency in Northeast, Nigeria, one way or the other influenced the success of the operations? Yes ( ) No ( ) Not Sure ( )

- As widely reported in various local and national media, do you think human rights abuse dominates counterinsurgency operations in the northeast, Nigeria?

  Yes ( ) No ( ) Not sure ( )

- If yes, what sort of human rights abuse is dominant? …………………………………………………………………………………..

- As you are aware, the government is deploying all strategies to ensure the success of counterinsurgency operations and at the same time mitigating COIN related human rights abuse, do you think the counterinsurgency rhetoric in anyway reduced COIN related human rights abuse in the troubled areas in the northeast, Nigeria? Yes ( ) No ( ) Not Sure ( )

- If yes, in what way(s)?...

- The Nigeria government has directed the redeployment of soldiers and other military apparatus to the northeast, Nigeria, while the operational base of the Nigeria Army has also been relocated to Borno State, do you think with counterinsurgency/military presence in these areas, boko haram is still a primary threat to victim's security? Yes ( ) No ( ) Not sure ( )

- Do you think the military is doing well in complimenting the counter insurgency rhetoric effort towards arresting the coin related abuse in the north east Nigeria ? Yes ( ) No ( ) Not sure ( )

- How would you describe the counterinsurgency rhetorical strategy the Nigeria government is deploying to counter insurgency? Very effective ( ) Effective ( ) Not effective ( )

- How better can the government reduce human rights abuse in its counterinsurgency operations?...

- What do you think is responsible for the inability of the federal government of Nigeria to totally eradicate insurgency in northeast, Nigeria? …………………………………………………………………………………..

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR IDP CAMP MANAGERS, SECURITY PERSONNEL, TRADITIONAL RULERS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS

INTRODUCTION

My name is Adenike Fadahunsi. I am a postgraduate student at Nottingham Trent University, U.K. I am conducting research study on 'Discursive Analysis of the Influence of Counterinsurgency Rhetoric on COIN-related Human Rights Abuse in Nigeria (2011-2022)'. I need your assistance to get some information.

Please respond to the following questions carefully and honestly to the best of your knowledge. Please, be assured that your anonymity and the information you provide will be treated with strict confidentiality. Also, be informed that the information you provided is strictly for academic purpose.

Thank you.

1.What do you make of Boko Haram?

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………

2. Do you consider human rights law of any relevance during counterinsurgency operations?

………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………

3.Does taking into account human rights consideration contribute to an effective conduct of counterinsurgency operations? ……………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………

4.How are human rights affected by the implementation of counterinsurgency operations?

………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………….

5.What is your take on the effectiveness of Nigeria Government COIN strategy?

……………………………………………………………………………………..

……………………………………………………………………………………..

6.Federal government of Nigeria use of counterinsurgency rhetoric to curb human rights abuse in these troubled zones in northeast, Nigeria?...

7.To what extent has counterinsurgency rhetoric deployed by government influenced COIN-related human rights abuse in northeast Nigeria?

....
....

8.What are the gaps you noticed in the counterinsurgency rhetoric utilised by the federal government of Nigeria?...

9.In what aspect can the government improve its counterinsurgency rhetoric in order to influence COIN-related human rights abuse in northeast, Nigeria?.................................

....
....

Appendix E: Speeches of Former President Goodluck Jonathan

Retrieved Former President Goodluck Jonathan's speeches

President Jonathan delivered an important <u>speech</u> at the "Regional Summit on Security in Nigeria" held in Paris on May 17, 2014.

The speech is worth a close reading because it provides the President Jonathan administration's "narrative" on Boko haram, on international terrorism, and on the Chibok school girl kidnappings.

Predictably, President Jonathan firmly places the Boko haram insurgency in "the new frontier of the global war of terrorism…" narrative. He says that Boko haram "…is not anymore a challenge to Nigeria alone; it is a threat to each and every one of us in this room.

Yet, only weeks ago the Nigerian government was claiming that Boko haram was marginalised in the far northeast of Nigeria. President Jonathan in fact made reference to the Chibok school girl kidnappings only two weeks after the event.

Early on, military spokesmen falsely claimed to have rescued most of the girls. According to Nigerian media, President Jonathan's wife at one point even suggested that the kidnapping was a hoax perpetrated by the president's political enemies in the runup to the 2015 elections.

President Jonathan administration's shift from Boko haram as a marginal concern to be addressed primarily by local and state governments to an aspect of a worldwide threat -- including calling for the United Nations to <u>blacklist it as a terrorist organization</u> -- is likely a response to international and domestic pressure on behalf of the school girls and the manifest inability of the security services to find them.

In his Paris speech, President Jonathan continues utterly to deny the numerous reports from credible <u>human rights organizations</u> and the <u>Western media</u> of security service human rights violations. The Nigerian security services, he says "…were directed to adhere strictly to clearly [spelled out] rules of engagement and avoid any excesses that may amount to a violation of human rights. Careful regard for human rights has always been central to our counter-terrorism strategies, resulting in the adoption of rules and procedures to protect the civilian population from excessive collateral damage."

If only what the president says were true. Adopting "rules and procedures" is not the same thing as following them.

The *New York Times* and other media outlets report that the United States Department of Defense has signed an intelligence sharing agreement with Nigeria in the search for the school girls. Currently, there is a US team of experts consulting in Abuja to determine what further assistance the Nigerian government may need in the search.

The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is training the newly formed "Nigerian Rangers."

Some members of Congress appear prepared to embrace President Jonathan's account that Boko haram is the "new frontier of the war on terrorism," which could imply more US involvement. There have already been Senate and House hearings regarding this.

Nigeria Boko Haram crisis: President vows 'total war' (BBC News)

29th May 2014

Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan has vowed to wage a "total war" against militant Islamist group Boko haram.

Speaking on the 15th anniversary of the end of military rule, he said "international terrorism" threatened Nigeria's democratic gains.

Boko haram has waged an increasingly bloody insurgency since 2009 to create an Islamic state in Nigeria.

Its fighters killed 42 people during a raid on Gurmushi village in the north-east on Wednesday, a survivor said.

Villagers were shot and hacked to death, and many homes were torched, the female survivor, who spoke on condition of anonymity, told BBC Hausa.

Boko haram has been holding more than 200 schoolgirls captive since last month, demanding a prisoner swap.

BBC News examines the challenges facing Nigeria's president, in 60 seconds

Earlier this week, the BBC learned that the government called off a deal to swap some of the girls for Boko haram fighters in custody.

"With the support of Nigerians, our neighbours and the international community, we will reinforce our defence, free our girls and rid Nigeria of terrorists," President Jonathan said, in a televised speech to mark Democracy Day.

He added that he was determined to protect Nigeria's democracy.

"I have instructed our security forces to launch a full-scale operation to put an end to the impunity of terrorists on our soil," he said.

Mr Jonathan declared a state of emergency in May 2013, deploying more troops to the three northern states where Boko haram is most active - Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.

Boko haram retaliated by stepping up its bombing campaign in cities and launching mass attacks on small towns and villages.

In a major foreign policy speech on Wednesday, US President Barack Obama said that "no American security operation can eradicate the threat" posed by Boko haram.

"That is why we must focus both on rescuing those girls, but also on supporting Nigerian efforts to educate its youth," he said.

"Indeed, this should be one of the hard-earned lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, where our military became the strongest advocate for diplomacy and development," Mr Obama added.

The US, UK, China and France are among those countries to have sent teams of experts and equipment to help to locate the girls.

Time Magazine. Nigeria's President Vows to Find Abducted Girls Amid Mounting Pressure (May 5, 2014)

After weeks of silence, Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan pledged during a nationally broadcast speech on Sunday (4/5/2014) to find an estimated 276 Nigerian girls who were kidnapped from their school by insurgent group (Boko haram) in mid-April.

"Wherever these girls are, we'll get them out," said President Jonathan on live television on Sunday (4/5/2014).

However, he accused some of the victims' parents of withholding information about their daughters and called for "maximum cooperation" from parents.

President Jonathan's speech comes in the wake of heavy criticism both internationally and domestically of his government's fumbled response to the kidnapping and of the failure to quash Boko haram's increasingly brazen campaign of violence across the country, which has seen more than 1,500 people killed during the first four months of 2014.

Following a successful media campaign featuring the hashtag #BringBackOurGirls, thousands of people rallied across the world over the weekend demanding action from the Nigerian government.

"I think it's so important that the Nigerian government do a lot more in finding these women," Matilda Egere-Cooper, a demonstrator of Nigerian origin in London, told CNN during a protest on Sunday (04/05/2014).

Last Friday the President met with his top advisers and called for the creation of a "fact-finding committee" to investigate the April 14 2014 mass kidnapping in Chibok, Borno state. He also promised to beef up security measures in the nation following a string of bombings in Abuja last month.

"[The] government strongly believes that the people of Nigeria, standing together, will overcome the current security challenges," said the country's Minister of Information Labaran Maku, according to a press release published after the meeting.

"The President assures Nigerians that 'wherever the girls are in the world, we will get them back, apprehend and punish the culprits.'"

While the U.S. has been hesitant to provide security assistance to Nigeria because of ongoing human-rights concerns in the country, Secretary of State John Kerry promised to provide support to the beleaguered administration during a speech over the weekend.

"The kidnapping of hundreds of children by Boko haram is an unconscionable crime," said Kerry during a press conference in Ethiopia's Addis Ababa on Saturday.

"We will do everything possible to support the Nigerian government to return these young women to their homes and to hold the perpetrators to justice.

Nigerians must unite against Boko Haram, By Goodluck Jonathan
By Premium Times
May 29, 2014

"All the gains of the past 15 years of democratic governance in our country are threatened by the presence of international terrorism on our shores."

Fellow Nigerians,

I greet and felicitate with you all, today, as we mark 15 years of uninterrupted democratic governance in our beloved country.

Our dear nation, Nigeria, has certainly come a long way and made notable progress since our first Democracy Day on May 29, 1999 when the military finally relinquished power and handed over to a democratically-elected government, marking the true beginning of a government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Although I have ordered a low-key commemoration of this year's Democracy Day in deference to the current mood of the nation, there can be no doubt that the past 15 years, the longest period of sustained democratic governance in our country, have been a blessing to us, as a people.

As we commemorate 15 years of our Fourth Republic today therefore, I believe that it is fitting that we pay tribute once again to all those who played a part in restoring our nation to the true path of democratic governance, built on the foundations of rule of law and freedom of expression.

As a result of our collective efforts since 1999, democratic governance is now entrenched in our nation and institutions. I wholeheartedly believe that our people are the better for it. The scope of fundamental rights and liberties enjoyed by our people over the past 15 years has been expanded beyond measure.

On my watch, we have witnessed high national economic growth rates, steady improvements and expansion of national infrastructure including airports and roads, the restoration of rail transportation, the efficient implementation of a roadmap for improved power supply, a revolutionary approach to agricultural production, as well as advances in education, sports, youth development, healthcare delivery, housing, water supply and other social services.

In the oil and gas sector, our promotion of a sustainable local content policy, continues to guarantee equity and better opportunities for Nigerian entrepreneurs and skilled personnel.

Significant increase in mobile telephone and national broadband penetration, making Information and Communications Technology (ICT) one of the fastest growing sectors of the Nigerian economy. We have also developed strong financial markets and regulatory institutions. Our banks now have regional and global footprints.

Nigeria has also gained recognition as the largest economy in Africa, the most preferred investment destination in the continent and in terms of returns on investment, the fourth in the world. We are pleased that the world has noticed, as global leaders converged in Abuja early this month for the World Economic Forum in Africa.

The event not only witnessed a record attendance, but it also brought the prospect of an additional flow of investment into the Nigerian economy estimated at over $68 billion over the next few years.

In foreign relations, our country has equally done well within this period, by establishing and strengthening strong partnerships with all ECOWAS countries and the rest of the world. This

has helped to deepen Nigeria's leadership role in multilateral institutions including the United Nations.

Furthermore, under this administration, we have made consistent progress in improving the standard of elections in our country to ensure that they are ever more credible and truly representative of the people's free choice. The National Conference we initiated to deliberate and make recommendations on the best ways of resolving our current political and socio-economic challenges is ongoing. It is our expectation that its outcomes will help to further consolidate the gains we have made from democracy in the past 15 years and place our dear nation even more firmly on the path to greatness.

Dear Compatriots,

It is a sad fact that as I address you today, all the gains of the past 15 years of democratic governance in our country are threatened by the presence of international terrorism on our shores. Our dear country, Nigeria is facing a new challenge. A war has been unleashed on us. Extremist foreign elements, collaborating with some of our misguided citizens, are focused on an attempt to bring down our country and the democracy and freedom we cherish and celebrate today.

The despicable abduction of school girls from Chibok in Borno State has brought to the awareness of the entire world, the heartless brutality of these terrorists who want to instigate a descent into anarchy and balkanize our nation.

In recent years, terrorist attacks have claimed the lives of several of our compatriots, many have been injured or maimed, whole villages and communities have been destroyed and the economy of some of our states is in jeopardy.

There can be no doubt that what we are witnessing in Nigeria today is a manifestation of the same warped and ferocious world view that brought down the Twin Towers in New York, killed innocent persons in Boston and led to the murder of defenceless people in the Southern Russian city of Volgograd. Terrorist activities have brought war and pains to Mali, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These agents of evil continue to brainwash and incite ignorant young men and women to attack the innocent. We cannot allow this to continue.

I welcome the statements of solidarity from patriotic citizens and the global community in support of our efforts to stamp out terrorism. I applaud the understanding that in a democracy, such as we are building, people can have differences while sharing worthy values and standing together in opposition to the scourge of terrorism. Nigeria is the only country we have and we must all work to preserve it for present and future generations.

Despite the challenges we face, we must commend our security forces. We must not forget their gallantry and successes in liberating nations and in peacekeeping, from Liberia to Sierra Leone, Congo, Sudan, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and many places in Africa and beyond. Our forces have paid the supreme price in several places at several times.

Today, they face a different challenge, an unconventional war by terrorists. They are adjusting and are being equipped to tackle the new menace of terrorism. We must show confidence in their ability. I have no doubt that, with the support of Nigerians, our neighbours and the international community, we will reinforce our defence, free our girls and rid Nigeria of terrorists.

It is now 45 days since the horrifying abduction of the college girls of Chibok. I share the deep pain and anxiety of their parents and guardians and I assure them once again that government will continue to do everything possible to bring our daughters home.

I am determined to protect our democracy, our national unity and our political stability, by waging a total war against terrorism. The unity and stability of our country, and the protection of lives and property are non-negotiable. I have instructed our security forces to launch a full-scale operation to put an end to the impunity of terrorists on our soil.

I have also authorised the security forces to use any means necessary under the law to ensure that this is done. I assure you that Nigeria will be safe again, and that these thugs will be driven away – it will not happen overnight, but we will spare no effort to achieve this goal.

For our citizens who have joined hands with Al Qaeda and international terrorists in the misguided belief that violence can possibly solve their problems, our doors remain open to them for dialogue and reconciliation, if they renounce terrorism and embrace peace.

My government, while pursuing security measures, will explore all options, including readiness to accept unconditional renunciation of violence by insurgents, and to ensure their de-radicalization, rehabilitation and re-integration into the broader society.

Dear Compatriots,

We must remain united to win the war against terrorism. Christians, Moslems, farmers, fishermen, herdsmen, teachers, lawyers, clergy or clerics, the rich, the poor and Nigerians from all sections of the country must work together with our security agencies and armed forces to overcome the terrorists who now threaten all that we hold dear.

The war against terror may be difficult, but the days of peace will come again. Terror is evil; nowhere in history has evil endured forever. The menace of Boko Haram will surely come to an end. I believe that because of your prayers, your courage, hardwork, faith and sacrifice, we will ultimately prevail over the terrorists and all other evil forces.

We are a strong, resilient and courageous people. We will continue to partner with the civilized world, to confront international terrorism and every other challenge that comes our way with patriotic zeal and determination.

Fellow Nigerians,

Yes, we have challenges but we will surely overcome. Nigeria is our country. Nigeria is blessed. We will all collectively protect, defend and develop this country for ourselves, and our children.

Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Thank you and God bless Nigeria.

President Goodluck Jonathan delivered this speech on the occasion of the just celebrated Democracy Day on May 29th 2014.

We 'll dialogue with Boko Haram if… – Jonathan
January 26, 2012

By Uduma Kalu with agency reports

LAGOS— President Goodluck Jonathan has said that the federal government will dialogue with the violent Islamic sect, Boko Haram if the members would identify themselves and state clearly their demands as a basis for talks, while acknowledging that military confrontation alone will not end their insurgency.

This is the third time the Nigerian authorities are asking the sect for a dialogue. The first time was in June when Police in Maiduguri called on an extremist Islamic sect to declare a ceasefire and come to a dialogue.

Also, on Tuesday, January 3, 2012, Security Adviser to the President, General Andrew Azazi said Nigerian security services were considering making contact with moderate members of the Islamic sect Boko haram via "back channels", even though explicit talks were officially ruled out.

The sect killed more than 500 people last year and more than 250 in the first weeks of 2012 in gun and bomb attacks in the country, Human Rights Watch said this week. Coordinated attacks in the northern city of Kano killed 186 people on Friday in its most deadly strike to date, prompting Jonathan to visit surviving victims.

Speaking with Reuters in Abuja yesterday on Boko haram, President Jonathan said, "If they clearly identify themselves now and say this is the reason we are resisting, this is the reason we are confronting government, or this is the reason we destroy some innocent people and their properties … then there will be a basis for dialogue".

"We will dialogue, let us know your problems and we will solve your problems but if they don't identify themselves, who will you dialogue with?"

He cautioned that the Boko haram crisis would be much harder to resolve than the Delta conflict, which was largely defused in 2009 under an amnesty he helped broker. That was because the Islamist militants do not have a clear public figurehead or negotiable aims, he said.

"If anybody invited Osama bin Laden (to talks), he wouldn't have appeared … Boko haram, if you invite them, they will not come. They operate without a face, they operate without a clear identity, so it is difficult to interface with such a group.

"That is the greatest difference between Boko haram … and the Niger Delta issue," he said.

Boko haram was formed in 2003 in Maiduguri. It launched an uprising against the government in 2009 that security forces crushed in days of fighting with the sect that killed around 800 people.

The sect's leader Mohammed Yusuf was captured and died in police custody during those battles, triggering vows of revenge from surviving members of the sect which they now seem to be honouring in increasingly lethal attacks on security forces and authority figures.

Azazi had also told international media earlier this month that Nigerian security services were considering making contact with moderate members of Boko haram via "back channels".

Speaking a day after emergency meetings with President Goodluck Jonathan and top security officials in response to a spate of deadly Christmas Day bombings by the sect, National Security Adviser General Owoye Andrew Azazi told Reuters officials were looking at broadening efforts beyond pure security measures — including addressing northern economic grievances.

"Even if government has a policy saying that there's no negotiation, that you can't reach out to Boko haram, intelligence must find a way," Azazi said in an interview.

"I don't think it's everybody (in Boko haram) who believes in the level of violence … That's why you could have other channels for discussion … It's something we could pursue."

Azazi declined to comment on whether contact with moderate members of Boko haram had already been made.

"From our perspective, you try back channels. And when you are trying back channels, that's not when the president will come and announce to the whole of Nigeria that 'I'm talking to mister A or mister B,'" he said.

Azazi's comments signal an apparent shift from treating Boko haram purely as a security issue that needs to be tackled militarily. Jonathan has been criticised for ignoring political avenues that might heal the north-south rift partly underpinning the conflict.

Azazi ruled out explicit negotiations of the type that ended the conflict in the oil-rich Niger Delta last year, because the leadership of the radical sect was so secretive.

"For now, Boko haram is an invisible enemy. You don't have an identifiable person you can talk to," he said. By contrast, in the Niger Delta conflict, "at any time the government wanted a meeting, he rang them and said we'll come and talk. But nobody has come out openly and said 'we're Boko haram'."

In June last year, even though the Borno police boss did not mention Boko haram by name, he confirmed to AFP that his call to Boko haram was "a peace overture specifically aimed at members of Boko haram sect.

"The doors for dialogue and constructive criticism with the (Borno) state government remain open," said the statement.

Jonathan at Geneva: How I tackled Boko haram
January 27, 2016

Former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Wednesday gave a press conference at the Geneva Press Club to a packed audience of diplomats, policy makers and journalists where he gave details of his post presidential focus and touched on some of the roles his administration played in key areas of the Nigerian and West Africa polity, with particular emphasis on Security and Education.

Read speech below

Press conference on Security, Education and Development in Africa Geneva Press Club – Wednesday the 27th of January, 2016

Protocols

Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, I thank you for coming to hear me speak on the twin issues of education and security.

Though this event is billed as a press conference on a Better Security and Education for West Africa, for the sake of time, I will focus on my experience in government which gave me a practical demonstration of how education impacts on security.

I will thereafter touch on my post presidential focus which is on advancing democracy and good governance in Africa and increasing access to opportunity for wealth generation in Africa.

If you peruse the official UNESCO literacy rates by country, what you will find is that all of the top ten most literate nations in the world are at peace, while almost all of the top 10 least literate nations in the world are in a state of either outright war or general insecurity.

Lower education levels are linked to poverty and poverty is one of the chief causative factors of crime whether it is terrorism or militancy or felonies.

With this at the back of my mind, I began the practice of giving education the highest sectoral allocation beginning with my very first budget as President in 2011.

My policy was to fight insecurity in the immediate term using counter insurgency strategies and the military and for the long term I fought it using education as a tool.

As I have always believed, if we do not spend billions educating our youths today, we will spend it fighting insecurity tomorrow. And you do not have to spend on education just because of insecurity. It is also the prudent thing to do.

Nigeria, or any African nation for that matter, can never become wealthy by selling more minerals or raw materials such as oil. Our wealth as a nation is between the ears of our people.

It is no coincidence that the Northeast epicenter of terrorism in Nigeria is also the region with the highest rate of illiteracy and the least developed part of Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government actually does not have a responsibility for primary and secondary education, but I could not in good conscience stomach a situation where 52.4% of males in the Northeastern region of Nigeria have no formal western education.

The figure is even worse when you take into account the states most affected by the insurgency.

83.3% of male population in Yobe state have no formal western education. In Borno state it is 63.6%.

Bearing this in mind is it a coincidence that the Boko haram insurgency is strongest in these two states?

So even though we did not have a responsibility for primary and secondary education going by the way the Nigerian federation works, I felt that where I had ability, I also had responsibility even if the constitution said it was not my responsibility.

Knowing that terrorism thrives under such conditions my immediate goal was to increase the penetration of Western education in the region while at the same time making sure that the people of the region did not see it as a threat to their age old practices of itinerant Islamic education known as Almajiri.

For the first time in Nigeria's history, the Federal Government which I led, set out to build 400 Almajiri schools with specialised curricula that combined Western and Islamic education. 160 of them had been completed before I left office.

I am also glad to state that when I emerged as President of Nigeria on May 6th 2010, there were nine states in the Northern part of the country that did not have universities. By the time I left office on the 29th of May 2015, there was no Nigerian state without at least one Federal University.

Now the dearth of access to formal education over years created the ideal breeding ground for terror to thrive in parts of Nigeria but there are obviously other dimensions to the issue of insecurity in Nigeria and particularly terrorism.

You may recall that the fall of the Gaddafi regime in August 2011 led to a situation where sophisticated weapons fell into the hands of a number of non-state actors with attendant increase in terrorism and instability in North and West Africa.

The administration I headed initiated partnership across West Africa to contain such instability in nations such as Mali, which I personally visited in furtherance of peace.

And with those countries contiguous to Nigeria, especially nations around the Lake Chad Basin, we formed a coalition for the purpose of having a common front against terrorists through the revived Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Those efforts continue till today and have in large part helped decimate the capacity of Boko haram.

Another aspect of the anti-terror war we waged in Nigeria that has not received enough attention is our effort to improve on our intelligence gathering capacity.

Prior to my administration, Nigeria's intelligence architecture was designed largely around regime protection, but through much sustained effort we were able to build capacity such that our intelligence agencies were able to trace and apprehend the masterminds behind such notorious terror incidences as the Christmas Day bombing of the St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State.

Other suspects were also traced and arrested including those behind the Nyanya and Kuje bombings.

Not only did we apprehend suspects, but we tried and convicted some of them including the ringleader of the Madalla bombing cell, Kabir Sokoto, who is right now serving a prison sentence.

But leadership is about the future. I am sure you have not come here to hear me talk about the way backward. You, like everyone else, want to hear about the way forward.

I am no longer in office, and I no longer have executive powers on a national level. However, I am more convinced now than ever about the nexus between education and security.

My foundation, The Goodluck Jonathan Foundation, was formed to further democracy, good governance, and wealth generation in Africa.

Of course, Charity begins at home and for the future, what Nigeria needs is to focus on making education a priority.

Thankfully, the administration that succeeded mine in its first budget, appears to have seen wisdom in continuing the practice of giving education the highest sectoral allocation. This is commendable.

I feel that what people in my position, statesmen and former leaders, ought to be doing is to help build consensus all over Africa, to ensure that certain issues should not be politicised.

Education is one of those issues. If former African leaders can form themselves into an advisory group to gently impress on incumbent leaders the necessity of meeting the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recommended allocation of 26% of a nations annual budget on education, I am certain that Africa will make geometric progress in meeting her Millennium Development Goals and improving on every index of the Human Development Index.

Data has shown that as spending on education increases, health and wellbeing increases and incidences of maternal and infant mortality reduce.

In Nigeria for instance, Average Life Expectancy had plateaued in the mid 40s for decades, but after 2011, when we began giving education the highest sectoral allocation, according to the United Nations, Nigeria enjoyed her highest increase in Average Life Expectancy since records were kept. We moved from an Average Life Expectancy of 47 years before 2011 to 54 years by 2015.

I had earlier told you about the connection between education and insecurity.

I believe that it is the job of former leaders and elder statesmen to convince Executive and Legislative branches across Africa to work together to achieve the UNESCO recommended percentage as a barest minimum.

I intend to offer my services, through The Goodluck Jonathan Foundation, for this purpose and I invite interested organizations to help us make this happen.

Ladies and gentlemen of the press, this, in a nutshell are some of my thoughts for a Better Security and Education for Africa and I will now entertain your questions.

January 16, 2015 Video recording from Washington Post

"It's a sad thing to be talking about internally displaced persons. Nobody is happy that you will be displaced within your own land. Of course we know that the issue of terror is global, but the excess of Boko haram is quite traumatic for all of us. As the president, I feel traumatized whenever I hear about these excesses. I feel very burdened. Let me reassure all Nigerians and indeed, internally displaced people that government is working very hard to make sure you don't stay in these camps for too long."

President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria – U.N. General Assembly Speech (interview by Adam Nossiter)

President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria.Credit Christophe Karaba/European Pressphoto Agency

President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria is scheduled to speak at the United Nations General Assembly on Wednesday, Sept. 24.

What can other nations expect from President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria?

He will address the threat of Islamist militants in his speech to the General Assembly, a topic that he has discussed many times before.

Judging by past declarations, he is likely to say that Boko haram, the militant group that controls a chunk of his country's northeast, is an international menace that must be dealt with by a global coalition. But Boko haram is a homegrown problem, mostly arising from Nigerian economic and social circumstances, and its territorial and other ambitions, as well as its targets, are almost exclusively Nigerian.

Is Mr. Jonathan likely to ask the United Nations for help?

Help from outside Nigeria will not solve the problem.

Mr. Jonathan will most likely say that his military is on top of the Boko haram problem, but this is questionable. The group is currently rampaging virtually unchecked in the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, taking over towns and villages and massacring civilians. It is also closing in on the regional capital, Maiduguri.

Sometimes, when the Nigerian Army does confront Boko haram, the troops end up running away, leaving behind equipment, arms and ammunition. Years of corruption have left the army incapable of mounting an effective offense against Boko Haram.

What else might Mr. Jonathan have to tell other nations?

He will most likely boast about the Nigerian economy's growth rate. But success there has largely benefited a tiny elite. Poverty and inequality are on the rise in Nigeria. The president is unlikely to mention this in his address.

Jonathan at the UN general assembly.

Even though the United Nations Charter underlines the imperative to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", Goodluck Jonathan, President of Nigeria told the General Assembly today that the world continued to witness the ravages of war and human suffering, at times manifested as a "vicious and aimless" insurgency with "agonising consequences."

Mr. Jonathan, addressing the Assembly's annual general debate, said the involvement of foreign fighters has remained a common feature of terrorist groups, whether Al Qaida in the Maghreb, Al Shabaab in Somalia, Boko haram in Nigeria, or the newly emerging Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

"The new dimension introduced by (ISIL) to conquer territory and establish its destructive ideology, is a major challenge that must be collectively halted before it becomes the norm," he declared, adding that such actions also refocus attention on the need to review present tools for UN peacekeeping operations.

As for Nigeria, President Jonathan said the violent and criminal activities of Boko haram have continued to pose a potent challenge to his government and people. "Through a wave of terror, assassinations, bombings, and now abductions and kidnappings predominantly in the northeast of the country, Boko haram is attempting to truncate development, by murder and mayhem,"

he said, lamenting that in April, "our innocent daughters" were abducted from a Secondary School in Chibok.

Thanking all the countries and organizations that expressed solidarity with Nigeria, and which had continued to support its determined efforts to free the girls, he said that although it has been over three months since they were abducted, "we have never relented in our efforts to set them safely free. Together with our partners, we are working assiduously to free our daughters and reunite them with their families."

"We shall not waiver until we end this mindless war on the innocent and bring all the perpetrators to justice. We will triumph over terrorism."

Mr. Jonathan went on to say that while Africa, and in particular, West Africa, battles conflicts and terrorism, with progressive results, the region is now being devastated by the outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus. "While Nigeria was able to respond effectively to control the spread of the disease, the situation in Liberia and Sierra Leone requires sustainable, collective global action to contain," he said, underscoring that the indulging in "isolationist and discriminatory tendencies will only worsen an already critical situation."

GlobalPost By Thomson Reuters (March 24, 2015).

Boko haram headquarters captured

The Nigerian army said separately that its troops had captured the northeast town of Gwoza, destroying the headquarters of the insurgents.

Jonathan said in the speech that the Nigerian army had contained Boko haram Islamist insurgents in the northeast who were seen as the biggest security threat ahead of the election.

"They (the army) have recaptured most of the communities and territories formerly occupied by the insurgents, making it possible for thousands of internally displaced Nigerians to begin returning to their homes and communities," Jonathan said.

The past six weeks have seen a dramatic turnaround against the insurgency, with troops from Chad, Cameroon and Niger joining the battle to dismantle the group's hold on a territory

that in January was the size of Belgium. It is unclear, however, whether that will help Jonathan's re-election chances.

"Concerted and well-coordinated land and air operations have liberated Gwoza, the headquarters of their so-called caliphate which they renamed "darul hikima", the army said in a statement, adding that arms and ammunition were recovered and Boko haram's administrative headquarters was destroyed.

It said Nigerian troops had taken over enclaves and hideouts from the militants, who were fleeing towards border areas.

Nigerian president declares emergency in 3 states during 'rebellion'

By Greg Botelho, CNN

May 14, 2013

"We have taken robust steps to unravel and address the root causes of these crises, but it would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the Nigerian state and test our collective resolve," Jonathan said in a televised speech.

Insisting they weren't simply criminals, the president said, "terrorist groups" were staging a "rebellion and insurgency" that threatened Nigeria's "unity and territorial integrity." Some northern parts of Borno state have already been taken over by such groups, as Jonathan noted. Such violence over the years has been blamed on Boko haram, whose name means "Western education is sacrilege." According to Human Rights Watch, the group has killed more than 2,800 people in an escalating campaign to impose strict Islamic law on largely Muslim northern Nigeria.

Attempts at dialogue -- which will continue, the president said -- have failed to curb militants' efforts "to progressively overwhelm the ... country." He cited several recent examples of violence, including the killing of "innocent civilians and state officials," attacks on government buildings and facilities and the destruction of Nigeria's flag for "strange flags" instead.

"These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten her territorial integrity," Jonathan said. "As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this."

The president said he'll send more troops to the three states, adding that they and other security forces there have orders to "take all necessary action." They have the authority to detain suspects and those who illegally possess weapons, take over any building "used for terrorist purposes" and conduct searches.

"Those insurgents and terrorists who take delight in killing our security operatives -- whoever they may be, wherever they may go -- we will hunt them down, we will fish them out, and we will bring them to justice," Jonathan said.

"No matter what it takes, we will win this war against terror."

Goodluck Jonathan II
Letter to the Nigerian senate in July 16, 2014

Jonathan, facing intense criticism at home and overseas for his government's failure to curb a spreading campaign of violence by the Islamist militants, made the request in a letter read to Nigeria's Senate and House of Representatives.

His government is accused by critics of not doing enough to protect civilians in Africa's biggest economy and oil producer from Boko haram, which has killed thousands and abducted hundreds since launching an uprising in the northeast in 2009.

"You are no doubt cognisant of the on-going and serious security challenges which the nation is facing as typified by the Boko haram terrorist threat," Jonathan said in the request, read to deputies by the leaders of the Senate and House.

"For this reason, I seek the concurrence of the National Assembly for external borrowing of not more than $1 billion," the president said, adding this would be used to upgrade the equipment, training and logistics of the security forces.

Nigeria's parliament was expected to debate the borrowing request at a time when international attention on the Boko haram insurgency has increased since the abduction by its militants in mid-April of more than 200 schoolgirls. They remain missing.

Jonathan's letter said the upgrade for the security services could include a "government to government arrangement" but did not name any specific foreign country.

His request was expected to raise some questions, as Nigeria's 2014 budget already provides for nearly $6 billion in security spending. The government has also faced allegations by a former central bank governor, Lamido Sanusi, that billions of dollars of oil revenues failed to reach the national treasury.

Nigeria's military has started receiving training, advice and intelligence support from allies such as the United States, Britain, France and Israel.

But it is still struggling to counter almost daily raids, frequent kidnaps and targeted bomb attacks by Boko haram. The shadowy group, whose name means "Western education is sinful", says it wants to set up an Islamic state in Nigeria, whose population is split between Christians and Muslims.

Nigeria's military was once seen as a force for stability across West Africa, but it has suffered over the past two decades from a lack of investment in training, falling morale and failure to maintain equipment.

Authorities and military experts fear the insurgency, which has claimed bomb attacks in recent months in the capital Abuja and in the coastal commercial hub Lagos, is seeking to push its campaign into the more prosperous south.

Sky News Tuesday 1 October 2013 16:43, UK

The 55-year-old said there are lessons to be learned from the Syrian conflict and extremism remains a threat to all democracies throughout the world.

"Syria was once a peaceful, thriving, multi-cultural nation which played host to a mosaic of religions and ethnicities," Mr Jonathan said.

"But that once idyllic nation has today become a theatre of human misery of unimaginable proportions as a result of the activities of extremist forces."

Mr Jonathan's speech came after militants from the Islamic insurgent group Boko haram stormed a college campus in the early hours of the morning and killed at least 40 students in the town of Gujba in Yobe state.

The president condemned the act as barbaric and called it an example of the "extent to which evil forces will go to destabilise our nation".

Dear   Compatriots

It has become necessary for me to address you on the recent spate of terrorist activities and protracted security challenges in some parts of the country, particularly in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, Kano, Plateau and most recently Bayelsa, Taraba, Benue and Nasarawa states. These unfortunate events have led to needless loss of lives and property of many innocent Nigerians including members of our security forces.

The recent killing of security operatives by a cult group in Nasarawa state is particularly condemnable. I have directed that no effort or expense be spared in identifying and bringing to justice all those who had a hand in the killing of the operatives.

The activities of insurgents and terrorists have been reprehensible, causing fear among our citizens and a near-breakdown of law and order in parts of the country, especially the North. We have taken robust steps to unravel and address the root causes of these crises, but it would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilise the Nigerian state and test our collective resolve.

Since I returned to the country after cutting short my visit to South Africa and aborting a planned state visit to Namibia, I have received detailed briefings from our security agencies. These briefings indicate that what we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity. Already, some northern parts of Borno state have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies.

These terrorists and insurgents seem determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation and to progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. In many places,

they have destroyed the Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority and in their place, hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty.

They have attacked government buildings and facilities. They have murdered innocent citizens and state officials. They have set houses ablaze and taken women and children as hostages. These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten her territorial integrity. As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this.

Previously, we adopted a multi-track approach to the resolution of this problem through actions which included persuasion, dialogue and widespread consultation with the political, religious and community leaders in the affected states.

We exercised restraint to allow for all efforts by both State Governors and well-meaning Nigerians to stop the repeated cases of mindless violence.

Yet, the insurgents and terrorists seek to prevent government from fulfilling its constitutional obligations to the people as they pursue their fanatical agenda of mayhem, mass murder, division and separatism.

While the efforts at persuasion and dialogue will continue, let me reiterate that we have a sacred duty to ensure the security and well-being of all our people and protect the sovereign integrity of our country. Therefore, we shall, on no account, shy away from doing whatever becomes necessary to provide the fullest possible security for the citizens of this country in any part of the country they choose to reside.

We have a duty to stand firm against those who threaten the sovereign integrity of the Nigerian state. Our will is strong, because our faith lies in the indivisibility of Nigeria.

Following recent developments in the affected states, it has become necessary for Government to take extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. After wide consultations, and in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the provisions of Section 305, sub-section 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, I hereby declare a State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

Accordingly, the Chief of Defence Staff has been directed to immediately deploy more troops to these states for more effective internal security operations. The troops and other security agencies involved in these operations have orders to take all necessary action, within the ambit of their rules of engagement, to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists.

This will include the authority to arrest and detain suspects, the taking of possession and control of any building or structure used for terrorist purposes, the lock-down of any area of terrorist operation, the conduct of searches, and the apprehension of persons in illegal possession of weapons.

The details of this Proclamation will be transmitted to the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. But in the meantime, let me make it clear that within the purview of this Proclamation, the Governors and other political office holders in the affected states will continue to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.

I urge the political leadership in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states to co-operate maximally with the Armed Forces and the Police to ensure that the exercise succeeds. We call on the citizenry to co-operate with our security agencies to ensure a return to normalcy within the shortest possible time.

I am again approaching our neighbouring countries, through diplomatic channels, as done in the recent past, for their co-operation in apprehending any terrorist elements that may escape across the border.

Nigerians are peace-loving people; these sad events perpetrated by those who do not wish our nation well would have not changed the essential character of our people.

I want to reassure you all that those who are directly or indirectly encouraging any form of rebellion against the Nigerian state, and their collaborators; those insurgents and terrorists who take delight in killing our security operatives, whoever they may be, wherever they may go, we will hunt them down, we will fish them out, and we will bring them to justice. No matter what it takes, we will win this war against terror.

I am convinced that with your support and prayers, we shall overcome these challenges and together, we will restore every part of our country to the path of peace, growth and development.

Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Interview with France24.com (2015)

On diversion of funds by his security chief.

"The matters are being investigated and are in the Nigerian courts. In Nigeria, when issues are before the courts, you make no comments on it. It is considered prejudice. But one thing you do realize is that for us to have conducted elections across the country, all parts of the country that means that we have prosecuted the war against Boko haram to a reasonable level. Otherwise, we couldn't have been in position to conduct elections across the country, and we couldn't have fought Boko haram with bare hands. These issues of corruption, misuse of funds, are being investigated in the court.

I wouldn't want to compromise the position of the laws because while I served as the president of Nigeria, I made sure that the judiciary has their own independence. I made sure there is maximum separation of powers within all areas of government. So having left office, I don't think that I will be the person to say things that will be detrimental to the judicial process."

On the success of Buhari's government against Boko haram

"I cannot comment about what is happening now. It will not be proper as a former president to start making comments, positive comments or negative comments. But I can tell you that when Boko haram started in Nigeria, we had no terror experience. We had never experienced terror before. Yes, we had armed robberies and other common crimes, but terrorists are people that are not afraid to die. So, you need a different mechanism to confront terrorists. You need superior technology. So that you will be able to stop them even before they attack. So, we never had the equipment. But when we were confronted, we started acquiring and before I left office, we had built reasonable capacity, and I believe with what we left behind, and of course with what the new government will also acquire, they will be able to prosecute this terror war to a reasonable conclusion.

BBC News March 21, 2015

"They (Boko haram) are getting weaker and weaker by the days, and I am very hopeful that it will not take us more than a month to recover the whole territories that are still in their hands."

March 11, 2015, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan says fighters from Boko haram, the extremist group that controls large areas of northeastern Nigeria, have traveled to the Middle East for training with Islamic State militants.

In an interview with VOA Wednesday, President Jonathan said he long suspected Boko Haram of having alliances with international extremist groups. "We know the links are there," he said. "But even now, we may not know the degree of linkages as to how much funds are coming in from them, the kind of volume of weapons coming in from them." What he knew, the president told VOA reporter Chris Stein, is "that some of the Boko haram members go to have their training in the ISIS camp and come back." He declined to name the countries where the fighters have allegedly trained.

Jonathan's interview with VOA came less than three weeks before the March 28th presidential vote. His main opponent is retired General Muhammadu Buhari, who ruled Nigeria from the end of 1983 to August 1985.

Election officials postponed the vote from its original date in mid-February because the military said it could not provide enough troops to guard the polls. Since then, Nigerian soldiers along with troops from neighboring Chad, Cameroon and Niger have pushed Boko haram out of many towns and villages they occupied in the country's northeast.

In the interview, Jonathan credited both the intervention of Nigeria's neighbors as well as the acquisition of new weapons for turning the tide against the militants. He also responded to criticisms that the foreign troops aren't being allowed to push into Boko haram strongholds deep in Nigerian territory. He said restrictions on foreign troops were matters of coordination.

Jonathan dismissed the suggestion that Boko haram's insurgency has come to define his time in office. While he acknowledged it is the number one security issue Nigeria has as a nation, he said **"definitely you cannot define us by Boko haram."**

Jonathan predicted that the northeastern states of Yobe and Adamawa would be cleared of Boko haram before the middle of next week and expressed the hope neighboring Borno State, where the group started, will be cleared in the next three weeks.

His electoral opponent, General Buhari, told VOA last week he is not surprised that Nigerian soldiers have started to push Boko haram out of areas the militants had captured, but he attributed these advances to pressure caused by the presence of foreign forces. The joint operations with Chad, Niger and Cameroon, he said, forced the government to get more sophisticated weapons to Nigerian troops.

Nigeria's Jonathan Seeks Second Term, Vows to Beat Boko haram
<u>**World Reuters**</u> **Updated: November 11, 2014 8:40 pm**
Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan announced on Tuesday he would seek a second term in a February election and vowed to defeat a five-year-old northern Islamist insurgency that has blighted his leadership of Africa's biggest economy.

"After seeking the face of God, and in the quiet of my family, and after listening to the clarion call of Nigerians, I have accepted to present myself to serve a second term," Jonathan told cheering supporters at a rally in Abuja.

His widely expected announcement was a formality after he had already picked up nomination papers from his ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) last month, signalling the intent to run.

Jonathan, a southern Christian president in Africa's top oil producer, is seen as a strong incumbent despite a raft of multi-billion-dollar oil scandals and his government's inability so far to end the insurgency waged by Islamist group Boko haram, mostly in the Muslim north.

The announcement came a day after a suspected Boko haram suicide bomber attacked a school in the northeast town of Potiskum, killing at least 48 people.

Before speaking at the rally, Jonathan asked for a minute's silence in memory of the students killed on Monday.

Referring to Boko haram, Jonathan said: "This has cast a dark cloud over our nation, but we will surely win the war on terror."

His government has come under heavy criticism for failing to halt almost daily Boko haram attacks, and especially for the mid-April abduction by the group of more than 200 schoolgirls.

A ceasefire agreement with Boko haram unilaterally announced by his government last month has failed to stop the violence.

"We will surely get our daughters freed and defeat terror in our country," Jonathan said.
Thomson Reuters 2014

FRANCE 24
26/02/2015

With just one month to go ahead of March 28 elections, Nigeria's President Goodluck Jonathan visited the scene of a Boko haram massacre in the northern city of Baga on Thursday and vowed that the insurgency would soon be over.

But the Islamist insurgency gave a fresh indication of the scale of the task, with three separate bombings in the country's religiously tense central region and restive northeast that left dozens of people dead.

The bombings raised fears of a renewed wave of attacks against vulnerable targets in urban centres, as troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon make gains against the militants in rural areas.

Jonathan's visit to Baga, where hundreds of people, if not more, are feared to have been killed, came after his main election opponent, Muhammadu Buhari, accused him of a lack of leadership in the crisis.

The head of state, accompanied by military top brass and his national security advisor, told reporters in the Borno state capital Maiduguri after the trip that he wanted to see the devastation firsthand.

"I went to visit communities devastated by the excesses of Boko haram," he said. "I just went to see things for myself."

Jonathan and his administration have been widely criticised for failing to stop the violence, which has seen Boko Haram seize territory in the northeast and attack neighbouring countries.

Presidential elections scheduled for February 14 were delayed for six weeks as the military said the ongoing counter-offensive meant that troops could not provide security on polling day.

Boko haram has threatened to disrupt the elections with an upsurge in violence. In a video posted online last week, Boko haram's leader Abubakar Shekau said: "This election will not be held even if we are dead. Even if we are not alive, Allah will never allow you to do it."

But Jonathan and his government maintain that major gains will be made by the new election date, March 28, to allow voting to take place.

On Wednesday, the head of the Nigerian Army, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minimah told troops in Baga after its recapture at the weekend: "The war is almost ended."

Multiple attacks

Jonathan this week claimed the "tide had turned" against Boko haram, whose battle for a hardline Islamic state has left more than 13,000 people dead and some 1.5 million others homeless.

On Thursday, he said he was still "very hopeful this time around that the journey to end (the) Boko haram insurgency... will soon get to an end".

But 18 people were killed when a suicide bomber blew himself up at a crowded bus station in the town of Biu, southern Borno, while a second bomber was shot dead before he could detonate his explosives.

Hours later, assailants threw explosives from a moving car as they sped through a bus station in the central city of Jos, killing five.

The blasts came after 51 people were killed in two separate bombings on Tuesday in Kano, the north's biggest city, and Potiskum, the commercial capital of Yobe state.

With all the explosions at bus stations, the government issued a warning for increased vigilance, as well as at parks, schools and mosques.

"Fugitive terrorists" were "now resorting to attacking soft targets in the face of the onslaught unleashed by the military forces", said National Information Centre spokesman Mike Omeri.

"All the gains of the past 15 years of democratic governance in our country are threatened by the presence of international terrorism on our shores."
Fellow Nigerians,

I greet and felicitate with you all, today, as we mark 15 years of uninterrupted democratic governance in our beloved country.

Our dear nation, Nigeria, has certainly come a long way and made notable progress since our first Democracy Day on May 29, 1999, when the military finally relinquished power and handed over to a democratically-elected government, marking the true beginning of a government of the people, by the people, for the people."

Although I have ordered a low-key commemoration of this year's Democracy Day in deference to the current mood of the nation, there can be no doubt that the past 15 years, the longest period of sustained democratic governance in our country, have been a blessing to us, as a people.

As we commemorate 15 years of our Fourth Republic today therefore, I believe that it is fitting that we pay tribute once again to all those who played a part in restoring our nation to the true path of democratic governance, built on the foundations of rule of law and freedom of expression.

As a result of our collective efforts since 1999, democratic governance is now entrenched in our nation and institutions. I wholeheartedly believe that our people are the better for it. The

scope of fundamental rights and liberties enjoyed by our people over the past 15 years has been expanded beyond measure.

On my watch, we have witnessed high national economic growth rates, steady improvements and expansion of national infrastructure including airports and roads, the restoration of rail transportation, the efficient implementation of a roadmap for improved power supply, a revolutionary approach to agricultural production, as well as advances in education, sports, youth development, healthcare delivery, housing, water supply and other social services.

In the oil and gas sector, our promotion of a sustainable local content policy, continues to guarantee equity and better opportunities for Nigerian entrepreneurs and skilled personnel.

Significant increase in mobile telephone and national broadband penetration, making Information and Communications Technology (ICT) one of the fastest growing sectors of the Nigerian economy. We have also developed strong financial markets and regulatory institutions. Our banks now have regional and global footprints.

Nigeria has also gained recognition as the largest economy in Africa, the most preferred investment destination in the continent and in terms of returns on investment, the fourth in the world. We are pleased that the world has noticed, as global leaders converged in Abuja early this month for the World Economic Forum in Africa.

The event not only witnessed a record attendance, but it also brought the prospect of an additional flow of investment into the Nigerian economy estimated at over $68 billion over the next few years.

In foreign relations, our country has equally done well within this period, by establishing and strengthening strong partnerships with all ECOWAS countries and the rest of the world. This has helped to deepen Nigeria's leadership role in multilateral institutions including the United Nations.

Furthermore, under this administration, we have made consistent progress in improving the standard of elections in our country to ensure that they are ever more credible and truly representative of the people's free choice. The National Conference we initiated to deliberate and make recommendations on the best ways of resolving our current political and socio-economic challenges is ongoing. It is our expectation that its outcomes will help to further

consolidate the gains we have made from democracy in the past 15 years and place our dear nation even more firmly on the path to greatness.

Dear Compatriots,

It is a sad fact that as I address you today, all the gains of the past 15 years of democratic governance in our country are threatened by the presence of international terrorism on our shores. Our dear country, Nigeria is facing a new challenge. A war has been unleashed on us. Extremist foreign elements, collaborating with some of our misguided citizens, are focused on an attempt to bring down our country and the democracy and freedom we cherish and celebrate today.

The despicable abduction of school girls from Chibok in Borno State has brought to the awareness of the entire world, the heartless brutality of these terrorists who want to instigate a descent into anarchy and balkanize our nation.

In recent years, terrorist attacks have claimed the lives of several of our compatriots, many have been injured or maimed, whole villages and communities have been destroyed and the economy of some of our states is in jeopardy.

There can be no doubt that what we are witnessing in Nigeria today is a manifestation of the same warped and ferocious world view that brought down the Twin Towers in New York, killed innocent persons in Boston and led to the murder of defenceless people in the Southern Russian city of Volgograd. Terrorist activities have brought war and pains to Mali, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These agents of evil continue to brainwash and incite ignorant young men and women to attack the innocent. We cannot allow this to continue.

I welcome the statements of solidarity from patriotic citizens and the global community in support of our efforts to stamp out terrorism. I applaud the understanding that in a democracy, such as we are building, people can have differences while sharing worthy values and standing together in opposition to the scourge of terrorism. Nigeria is the only country we have and we must all work to preserve it for present and future generations.

Despite the challenges we face, we must commend our security forces. We must not forget their gallantry and successes in liberating nations and in peacekeeping, from Liberia to Sierra

Leone, Congo, Sudan, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and many places in Africa and beyond. Our forces have paid the supreme price in several places at several times.

Today, they face a different challenge, an unconventional war by terrorists. They are adjusting and are being equipped to tackle the new menace of terrorism. We must show confidence in their ability. I have no doubt that, with the support of Nigerians, our neighbours and the international community, we will reinforce our defence, free our girls and rid Nigeria of terrorists.

It is now 45 days since the horrifying abduction of the college girls of Chibok. I share the deep pain and anxiety of their parents and guardians and I assure them once again that government will continue to do everything possible to bring our daughters home.

I am determined to protect our democracy, our national unity and our political stability, by waging a total war against terrorism. The unity and stability of our country, and the protection of lives and property are non-negotiable. I have instructed our security forces to launch a full-scale operation to put an end to the impunity of terrorists on our soil.

I have also authorised the security forces to use any means necessary under the law to ensure that this is done. I assure you that Nigeria will be safe again, and that these thugs will be driven away – it will not happen overnight, but we will spare no effort to achieve this goal.

For our citizens who have joined hands with Al Qaeda and international terrorists in the misguided belief that violence can possibly solve their problems, our doors remain open to them for dialogue and reconciliation, if they renounce terrorism and embrace peace.

My government, while pursuing security measures, will explore all options, including readiness to accept unconditional renunciation of violence by insurgents, and to ensure their de-radicalization, rehabilitation and re-integration into the broader society.

Dear Compatriots

We must remain united to win the war against terrorism. Christians, Muslims, Farmers, Fishermen, Herdsmen, Teachers, Lawyers, Clergy or Clerics, the rich, the poor and Nigerians from all sections of the country must work together with our security agencies and armed forces to overcome the terrorists who now threaten all that we hold dear.

The war against terror may be difficult, but the days of peace will come again. Terror is evil; nowhere in history has evil endured forever. The menace of Boko Haram will surely come to an end. I believe that because of your prayers, your courage, hard work, faith and sacrifice, we will ultimately prevail over the terrorists and all other evil forces.

We are a strong, resilient and courageous people. We will continue to partner with the civilized world, to confront international terrorism and every other challenge that comes our way with patriotic zeal and determination.

Fellow Nigerians,

Yes, we have challenges, but we will surely overcome. Nigeria is our country. Nigeria is blessed. We will all collectively protect, defend and develop this country for ourselves, and our children.

Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Thank you and God bless Nigeria.

President Goodluck Jonathan delivered this speech on the occasion of the just celebrated Democracy Day on May 29th 2014

Former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Wednesday gave a press conference at the Geneva Press Club to a packed audience of diplomats, policy makers and journalists where he gave details of his post presidential focus and touched on some of the roles his administration played in key areas of the Nigerian and West Africa polity, with particular emphasis on Security and Education.

Read speech below

Press conference on Security, Education and Development in Africa Geneva Press Club – Wednesday the 27th of January, 2016

Protocols

Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, I thank you for coming to hear me speak on the twin issues of education and security.

Though this event is billed as a press conference on a Better Security and Education for West Africa, for the sake of time, I will focus on my experience in government which gave me a practical demonstration of how education impacts on security.

I will thereafter touch on my post presidential focus which is on advancing democracy and good governance in Africa and increasing access to opportunity for wealth generation in Africa.

If you peruse the official UNESCO literacy rates by country, what you will find is that all of the top ten most literate nations in the world are at peace, while almost all of the top 10 least literate nations in the world are in a state of either outright war or general insecurity.

Lower education levels are linked to poverty and poverty is one of the chief causative factors of crime whether it is terrorism or militancy or felonies.

With this at the back of my mind, I began the practice of giving education the highest sectoral allocation beginning with my very first budget as President in 2011.

My policy was to fight insecurity in the immediate term using counter insurgency strategies and the military and for the long term I fought it using education as a tool.

As I have always believed, if we do not spend billions educating our youths today, we will spend it fighting insecurity tomorrow. And you do not have to spend on education just because of insecurity. It is also the prudent thing to do.

Nigeria, or any African nation for that matter, can never become wealthy by selling more minerals or raw materials such as oil. Our wealth as a nation is between the ears of our people.

It is no coincidence that the Northeast epicenter of terrorism in Nigeria is also the region with the highest rate of illiteracy and the least developed part of Nigeria.

In Nigeria, the Federal Government actually does not have a responsibility for primary and secondary education, but I could not in good conscience stomach a situation where 52.4% of males in the Northeastern region of Nigeria have no formal Western education.

The figure is even worse when you take into account the states most affected by the insurgency.

83.3% of male population in Yobe state have no formal Western education. In Borno state it is 63.6%.

Bearing this in mind is it a coincidence that the Boko haram insurgency is strongest in these two states?

So even though we did not have a responsibility for primary and secondary education going by the way the Nigerian federation works, I felt that where I had ability, I also had responsibility even if the constitution said it was not my responsibility.

Knowing that terrorism thrives under such conditions my immediate goal was to increase the penetration of Western education in the region while at the same time making sure that the people of the region did not see it as a threat to their old-age practices of itinerant Islamic education known as Almajiri.

For the first time in Nigeria's history, the Federal Government which I led, set out to build 400 Almajiri schools with specialized curricula that combined Western and Islamic education. 160 of them had been completed before I left office.

I am also glad to state that when I emerged as President of Nigeria on May 6th 2010, there were nine states in the Northern part of the country that did not have universities. By the time I left office on the 29th of May 2015, there was no Nigerian state without at least one Federal University.

Now the dearth of access to formal education over years created the ideal breeding ground for terror to thrive in parts of Nigeria but there are obviously other dimensions to the issue of insecurity in Nigeria and particularly terrorism.

You may recall that the fall of the Gaddafi regime in August 2011 led to a situation where sophisticated weapons fell into the hands of a number of non-state actors with attendant increase in terrorism and instability in North and West Africa.

The administration I headed initiated partnership across West Africa to contain such instability in nations such as Mali, which I personally visited in furtherance of peace.

And with those countries contiguous to Nigeria, especially nations around the Lake Chad Basin, we formed a coalition for the purpose of having a common front against terrorists through the revived Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).

Those efforts continue till today and have in large part helped decimate the capacity of Boko Haram.

Another aspect of the anti terror war we waged in Nigeria that has not received enough attention is our effort to improve on our intelligence gathering capacity.

Prior to my administration, Nigeria's intelligence architecture was designed largely around regime protection, but through much sustained effort we were able to build capacity such that our intelligence agencies were able to trace and apprehend the masterminds behind such notorious terror incidences as the Christmas Day bombing of the St. Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State.

Other suspects were also traced and arrested including those behind the Nyanya and Kuje bombings. Not only did we apprehend suspects, but we tried and convicted some of them including the ring leader of the Madalla bombing cell, Kabir Sokoto, who is right now serving a prison sentence. But leadership is about the future. I am sure you have not come here to hear me talk about the way backward. You, like everyone else, want to hear about the way forward.

I am no longer in office, and I no longer have executive powers on a national level. However, I am more convinced now than ever about the nexus between education and security.

My foundation, The Goodluck Jonathan Foundation, was formed to further democracy, good governance and wealth generation in Africa.

Of course, Charity begins at home and for the future, what Nigeria needs is to focus on making education a priority.

Thankfully, the administration that succeeded mine in its first budget, appears to have seen wisdom in continuing the practice of giving education the highest sectoral allocation. This is commendable.

I feel that what people in my position, statesmen and former leaders, ought to be doing is to help build consensus all over Africa, to ensure that certain issues should not be politicized.

Education is one of those issues. If former African leaders can form themselves into an advisory group to gently impress on incumbent leaders the necessity of meeting the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recommended allocation of 26% of a nations annual budget on education, I am certain that Africa will make geometric progress in meeting her Millennium Development Goals and improving on every index of the Human Development Index.

Data has shown that as spending on education increases, health and wellbeing increases and incidences of maternal and infant mortality reduce.

In Nigeria for instance, Average Life Expectancy had plateaued in the mid 40s for decades, but after 2011, when we began giving education the highest sectoral allocation, according to the United Nations, Nigeria enjoyed her highest increase in Average Life Expectancy since records were kept. We moved from an Average Life Expectancy of 47 years before 2011 to 54 years by 2015.

I had earlier told you about the connection between education and insecurity.

I believe that it is the job of former leaders and elder statesmen to convince Executive and Legislative branches across Africa to work together to achieve the UNESCO recommended percentage as a barest minimum.

I intend to offer my services, through The Goodluck Jonathan Foundation, for this purpose and I invite interested organisations to help us make this happen.

Ladies and gentlemen of the press, this, in a nutshell are some of my thoughts for a Better Security and Education for Africa and I will now entertain your questions.

PRESIDENT GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN, GCFR DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY IN BORNO, YOBE AND ADAMAWA STATES IN ORDER TO RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER, PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE AFFECTED STATES OF THE FEDERATION IN A SIMULCAST ON 14 MAY 2013

Dear Compatriots,

It has become necessary for me to address you on the recent spate of terrorist activities and protracted security challenges in some parts of the country, particularly in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Gombe, Bauchi, Kano, Plateau and most recently Bayelsa, Taraba, Benue and Nasarawa states. These unfortunate events have led to needless loss of lives and property of many innocent Nigerians including members of our security forces.

The recent killing of security operatives by a cult group in Nasarawa state is particularly condemnable. I have directed that no effort or expense be spared in identifying and bringing to justice all those who had a hand in the killing of the operatives.

The activities of insurgents and terrorists have been reprehensible, causing fear among our citizens and a near-breakdown of law and order in parts of the country, especially the North. We have taken robust steps to unravel and address the root causes of these crises, but it would appear that there is a systematic effort by insurgents and terrorists to destabilize the Nigerian state and test our collective resolve.

Since I returned to the country after cutting short my visit to South Africa and aborting a planned state visit to Namibia, I have received detailed briefings from our security agencies. These briefings indicate that what we are facing is not just militancy or criminality, but a rebellion and insurgency by terrorist groups which pose a very serious threat to national unity and territorial integrity. Already, some northern parts of Borno state have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies.

These terrorists and insurgents seem determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation and to progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. In many places, they have destroyed the Nigerian flag and other symbols of state authority and in their place, hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty.

They have attacked government buildings and facilities. They have murdered innocent citizens and state officials. They have set houses ablaze and taken women and children as hostages. These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the Nigerian state and threaten her territorial integrity. As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this.

Previously, we adopted a multi-track approach to the resolution of this problem through actions which included persuasion, dialogue and widespread consultation with the political, religious and community leaders in the affected states.

We exercised restraint to allow for all efforts by both State Governors and well-meaning Nigerians to stop the repeated cases of mindless violence.

Yet, the insurgents and terrorists seek to prevent government from fulfilling its constitutional obligations to the people as they pursue their fanatical agenda of mayhem, mass murder, division and separatism.

While the efforts at persuasion and dialogue will continue, let me reiterate that we have a sacred duty to ensure the security and well-being of all our people and protect the sovereign integrity of our country. Therefore, we shall, on no account, shy away from doing whatever becomes necessary to provide the fullest possible security for the citizens of this country in any part of the country they choose to reside.

We have a duty to stand firm against those who threaten the sovereign integrity of the Nigerian state. Our will is strong because our faith lies in the indivisibility of Nigeria.

Following recent developments in the affected states, it has become necessary for Government to take extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. After wide consultations, and in exercise of the powers conferred on me by the provisions of Section 305, sub-section 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, I hereby declare a State of Emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

Accordingly, the Chief of Defence Staff has been directed to immediately deploy more troops to these states for more effective internal security operations. The troops and other security agencies involved in these operations have orders to take all necessary action, within the ambit of their rules of engagement, to put an end to the impunity of insurgents and terrorists.

This will include the authority to arrest and detain suspects, the taking of possession and control of any building or structure used for terrorist purposes, the lock-down of any area of terrorist operation, the conduct of searches, and the apprehension of persons in illegal possession of weapons.

 The details of this Proclamation will be transmitted to the National Assembly in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. But in the meantime, let me make it clear that within the purview of this Proclamation, the Governors and other political office holders in the affected states will continue to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.

I urge the political leadership in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states to co-operate maximally with the Armed Forces and the Police to ensure that the exercise succeeds. We call on the citizenry to co-operate with our security agencies to ensure a return to normalcy within the shortest possible time.

I am again approaching our neighboring countries, through diplomatic channels, as done in the recent past, for their co-operation in apprehending any terrorist elements that may escape across the border.

 Nigerians are peace-loving people; these sad events perpetrated by those who do not wish our nation well would have not changed the essential character of our people.

I want to reassure you all that those who are directly or indirectly encouraging any form of rebellion against the Nigerian state, and their collaborators; those insurgents and terrorists who take delight in killing our security operatives, whoever they may be, wherever they may go, we will hunt them down, we will fish them out, and we will bring them to justice. No matter what it takes, we will win this war against terror.

I am convinced that with your support and prayers, we shall overcome these challenges and together, we will restore every part of our country to the path of peace, growth and development.

Long live the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

New Year Broadcast to the Nation by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan, GCFR, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, January 1, 2015.

Dear Great People of our Nation,

I greet and felicitate with you all as we enter the New Year today. As we mark the beginning of this New Year, 2015, a new nation is being born. A new nation is being born because of the foundations we have all laid, working together for the good and progress of our dear fatherland. I join you all in thanking God Almighty who has brought us this far, for continually bestowing his grace upon us and for guiding our great nation safely through all the challenges of the past year. This year, as in the year past, I reaffirm my commitment to work to ensure a secure future for our dear country and the generations yet unborn. Last year, we celebrated our hundredth year of nationhood. The year brought us further progress, challenges and fresh opportunities. We have contended with the normal challenges of nation-building and the unusual challenges of terrorism. But we have continued to vigorously confront those who seek to destroy the bonds of unity that hold us together. On this first day of the New Year, I want to pay special tribute to the gallant officers, men and women of our Armed Forces and other security agencies who have been in the forefront of the war against terrorism and violent extremism in our country and sub-region. I also commend all Nigerians who have remained vigilant and cooperative with our security agencies in the fight against the common enemy. We are re-equipping and re-positioning our armed forces to enhance their capacity to win the ongoing war against terror and insurgency. Regrettably, terrorists have unleashed much pain and agony on our land. They have made widows of our mothers and sisters and orphans of our children. They have shut down businesses, desecrated places of worship and brought untold

hardship to both men and women. They have violated the culture and peaceful way of life in our country, which took generations to build. They have destroyed countless schools and displaced people from their communities, driving them into exile. I want to assure you that the terrorists will not get away with their atrocities: they will not win; they will be routed. As President, I feel the pain of all affected communities and families. I hear their cries and share their sorrow and pain. We will not forget; we will not look the other way. We have done a lot of painstaking planning and work to resolve the current security challenge. We will bring justice to the savage terrorists known as Boko haram. They will be defeated. That is the solemn commitment I make today as President of the Federal Republic, and Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces. By the special grace of God, the Federal Government, under my leadership, has continued, in the past four years to lead our country forward, even under the most trying circumstances. The progress we have made in priority areas bears us testimony. Amongst other achievements, we have rehabilitated and expanded our rail transportation network, successfully privatised power generation and distribution, significantly reformed and increased local participation in our oil and gas industry and improved nationwide access to potable water from 57% in 2010, to 70% at present. We have also made significant progress in improving access to primary, secondary and tertiary education by building and equipping more schools, including special Almajiri schools, and establishing additional universities to ensure that each state of the nation now has at least one Federal University. Our national economy maintained a steady growth rate of close to seven per cent in the past four years and millions of fresh employment opportunities were created for our people as a direct consequence. Recently, we launched the Youth Employment in Agriculture Programme (YEAP) and the $100 million dollars Government and Donor Fund for Agriculture Finance in Nigeria (FAFIN) to fast-track the positive transformation of our agricultural sector. The Youth Employment in Agriculture Programme (YEAP) targets 750, 000 market-oriented young agricultural producers while the $100 million dollars Fund is to provide affordable long-term financing to support the development of small and medium agribusinesses in the country. This is in addition to a N50 billion Farm Mechanization Support Fund set up by the Central Bank to establish 1,200 agricultural equipment-hiring enterprises. Both funds will become fully operational this year. Policies and programmes such as these to boost agricultural production remain topmost on the agenda of this administration. Being very conscious of the inherent perils of our over-reliance on income from crude oil exports for national development, we have focused on accelerating the diversification of our economy. The non-oil sector which has grown by an average of 8% in the last few years, is now a major driver of growth in our economy. The 2015

national budget, which is now before the National Assembly, is targeted at deepening our efforts at becoming a non-oil economy. The budget also includes measures to ensure that the downturn in the price of oil does not affect our development plans and our national economy too adversely. We are adjusting our financial processes to safeguard our economy. We are also taking steps to ensure that the poor and the low and medium income earners do not bear the brunt. In the year 2015, this administration will continue to lay the foundation for a vibrant economy that attracts significant Foreign Direct Investment and promotes policies that ensure economic stability. We will ensure stability in the value of the naira by striving to take away speculative behaviours that cause market exchange pressures. We will continue to build and maintain a healthy external reserves position and strengthen fiscal buffers. We will ensure the Naira remains strong and gives foreign investors the clarity and certainty that they need, to guide future investment decisions. We will continue to improve our payment systems and strengthen risk-based supervision mechanism for Nigerian banks to ensure overall health and stability of the banking system. We are introducing a broad spectrum of financial instruments to boost sector-specific enterprise areas in agriculture, Micro, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises (MSMEs), manufacturing, and oil and gas to enhance our aggregate supply capacity, reduce poverty, promote job creation and increase the general well-being of our people. These efforts and other measures being spearheaded by relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies, are geared to ensure a secure future for Nigeria and create a much more prosperous country, where people live more peaceful and fulfilled lives. Fellow countrymen and women, as we enter an election year, I assure you that our administration will remain fully focused on providing good governance and the delivery of better public services to our people. The coming campaigns and elections will not distract us from our ongoing work to significantly improve the living conditions of our people. And I urge all tiers of government not to be distracted as well. The elections are very important for us as a country. Their successful conclusion will further strengthen our democratic institutions and place our beloved country even more firmly in the comity of truly democratic nations. Given the challenges that have characterized some previous electoral contests in our country, the eyes of the world will certainly be on the conduct and outcome of our fifth post-military rule general elections. I reassure all Nigerians and the international community of our firm commitment to free, fair and credible elections. My commitment to free elections and one man, one vote remains unwavering. Our administration has worked hard in previous elections to prepare all key stakeholders including the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), security agencies and the electorate optimally, to ensure a progressively improved electoral process in

the country under my watch. We will continue to do so for the coming elections. We will continue to provide adequate funding to INEC and maintain the Commission's independence and isolate it from any form of interference or meddling in its day-to-day affairs. This shall continue to guarantee its impartiality and ability to conduct more credible and acceptable elections. National security agencies will also be given all necessary support to enhance their ability to ensure that the elections are peaceful and violence-free. The Nigeria Police has already established an Elections Security Planning and Monitoring Unit. I am optimistic that with the cooperation of all law-abiding citizens of the country, our commitment to have a peaceful and violence-free election will be actualised. I would like to say this, once again, to my fellow politicians and political leaders. None of our political ambitions is worth the blood of any of our countrymen, women and children. The improvement of their lives and living conditions ought to be our primary motive and the driving force of our quest for political power and leadership positions. Let us not promote sectionalism, disunity, intolerance, hate, falsehood or the malicious abuse of political opponents. Whatever we feel or seek, we must have a nation and a people before we can dream of political ambitions. Let us put the nation and the people first. Let us all conduct our electoral campaigns with the highest possible decorum and civility towards political opponents. Let us give INEC the fullest possible support and cooperation it requires to conduct credible and violence-free elections in 2015. After the 2011 general elections, some unpatriotic elements embarked on an orgy of violence, resulting in the destruction of lives and property. That will not be allowed to happen this time around. This government will act decisively against anyone who disrupts the public peace, before, during or after the 2015 general elections. All Nigerians, of voting age, are free to vote based on their convictions. It is our duty to defend and protect that basic right, and let no one be in doubt, we will. Fellow Nigerians, I urge all of you to enter the New Year with renewed zeal and patriotism, to serve our fatherland with love, honesty, faithfulness and hope for a greater tomorrow. As I have always maintained, none of the challenges before us is insurmountable. We must come together as a people and work with single-minded unity of purpose to overcome them. Nigeria is a key country in Africa. We must work together to maintain our strategic position and collaborate with others to move the continent forward. I call for peace in Africa and an end to all conflicts in our continent. I urge all Africans to promote democracy in their respective countries to ensure faster development of the continent and faster economic and political integration. We will continue to pray and offer hands of fellowship and assistance to our fellow Africans suffering from the Ebola Virus Disease. I urge all Nigerians to show compassion and contribute in whatever way we can to help our African brothers and

sisters. As we go into this New Year, I salute the indomitable and resilient spirit of our people in Nigeria and wherever they are in the world. Our spirit of enterprise and the doggedness to succeed amongst all odds has been our strength. With our collective prayers and efforts, we will grow our economy and our people will become wealthier. Government will continue with programmes deliberately designed to create more jobs for our youth, to enable them to contribute more to the growth and development of our nation. Let us continue our march to the future, towards the attainment of our collective vision of a strong, united, prosperous and harmonious nation – a secure nation for us and for our coming generations. I wish you all a happy and fulfilling 2015.   God bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Happy New Year, Nigeria!   I thank you all.

Appendix F: Legal Document: TPA (2011) and as amended (2013)

TERRORISM (PREVENTION) ACT, 2011

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

This Act provides for measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and for the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

It also prescribes penalties for violating any of its provisions.

TERRORISM (PREVENTION) ACT, 2011

ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS

SECTION:

TERRORISM (PREVENTION) ACT, 2011

A Bill

For

An Act to make provisions for and about offences relating to conduct carried out or purposes connected with terrorism.

[   ]

ENACTED by the National Assembly of the Federal Republic of Nigeria -

1.   **PART 1 – ACTS OF TERRORISM AND RELATED OFFENCES**   Prohibition of acts of terrorism.

(1) A person who knowingly –

(a) does, attempts or threatens to do an act preparatory to or in furtherance of an act of terrorism;

(b) commits to do anything that is reasonably necessary to promote an act of terrorism; or

(c) assists or facilitates the activities of persons engaged in an act of terrorism.

commits an offence under this Act.

(2) In this section. "act of terrorism" means an act which is deliberately done with malice. aforethought and which:

(a) may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization;

(b) is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to --

(i)   unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act,

(ii) seriously intimidate a population,

(iii)seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental

political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization, or

    (iv)   otherwise influence such government or international organization by intimidation or coercion; and

(c) involves or causes, as the case may be –

    (i)   an attack upon a person's life which may cause serious bodily harm or death;

    (ii)   kidnapping of a person;

    (iii)   destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property, likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;

    (iv)   the seizure of an aircraft, ship or other means of public or goods transport and diversion or the use of such means of transportation for any of the purposes in paragraph (b) (iv) of this subsection;

    (v)   the manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of biological and chemical weapons without lawful authority;

    (vi)   the release of dangerous substance or causing of fire, explosions or floods, the effect of which is to endanger human life;

    (vii)   interference with or disruption of the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource, the effect of which is to endanger human life:

(d) an act or omission in or outside Nigeria which constitutes an offence within the scope of a counter terrorism protocols and conventions duly ratified by Nigeria.

(3) An act which disrupts a service but is committed in pursuance of a protest. However, demonstration or stoppage of work is not a terrorist act within

the meaning of this definition provided that the act is not intended to result in any harm referred to in subsection (2) (b) (i), (ii) or (iv) of this section.

2. (1) Where two or more persons associate for the purpose of or where an organization engages in –

(a) participating or collaborating in an act of terrorism;

(b) promoting, encouraging or exhorting others to commit an act of terrorism; or

(c) setting up or pursuing acts of terrorism,

the judge in Chambers may on an application made by the Attorney General, National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police on the approval of the President declare any entity to be a proscribed organization and the notice should be published in official gazette.

(2) An order made under subsection (1) of this section shall be published in the official gazette, in two National newspapers and at such other places as the judge in Chambers may determine.

(3) A publication made under subsection (2) of this section shall contain such relevant particulars as the judge in Chambers may specify.

(i) a person who belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organization commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 20 years.

(ii) for the avoidance of doubts, political parties should not be regarded as proscribed organizations and nobody should be treated as such because of his or her political beliefs.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged under subsection (3) of this section to prove that the organization had not been declared a proscribed organization at the time the person charged became or began to profess to be a member of the organization and that he has not taken part in the activities of the organization at any time after it has been declared to be proscribed organization

(5) The Attorney General upon the approval of the President may withdraw the order if satisfied that such proscribed organization has ceased to engage in an act of terrorism.

(a) the proscribed organization or person affected by the order made

an application on notice; and

(b) he is satisfied that a proscribed organization has ceased to engage in the acts specified in subsection (1) of this section and that there is no likelihood of the organization engaging in such acts in the future and shall be published in the official gazette.

3.   A person who --   Terrorist meetings

(a) arranges, manages or assists in arranging or managing or participates in a meeting or an activity which he knows is connected with an act of terrorism;

(b) provides logistics, equipment or facilities for a meeting, or an activity which he knows is connected with an act of terrorism; or

(c) attends a meeting, which he knows is to support a proscribed organization, or to further the objectives of a proscribed organization, commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years

4.   (1) A person who knowingly, in any manner, solicits or renders support for --   Support for terrorism

(a) an act of terrorism; or

(b) a proscribed organisation or an internationally suspected terrorist group.

an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 20 years.

(2) without prejudice to subsection (2) of this section, where death results from any terrorist act. the penalty shall be death sentence:

(3) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, "support" includes -

    (a) incitement to commit a terrorist act;

    (b) offer of material assistance, weapons, including biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, explosives, training, transportation, false documentation or identification;

    (c) offer or provision of moral assistance, including invitation to adhere to a proscribed organization; and

    (d) the provision of, or making available, such financial or other related services as may be prescribed in this act.

5.   A person whether or not in the armed services who harbours, conceals or causes to be harboured or concealed, a person whom he knew to have committed, or to have been convicted of an act of terrorism or against whom he knew that a warrant of arrest or imprisonment for such an act had been issued commits an offence under that Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.   *Harbouring of terrorists.*

6.   Any person who, knowingly agrees to provide training or instruction -   *Provision of training for terrorist*

    (a) in the making or use of any explosive or other lethal device; or

    (b) in carrying out a terrorist act;

to a member of a terrorist group or a person engaging in, or preparing to engage in the commission of a terrorist act, commits an offence and shall on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

7.   (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of this section, where a person has information which he knows or believes to be of material assistance in   *Information about acts of terrorism*

        (a) preventing the commission by another person or an organization of an act of terrorism; or

        (b) securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of another person for an offence under this Act.

and that person fails to disclose to a law enforcement officer the information as soon as reasonably practicable; he commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

(2) It shall be a defence for a person charged under subsection (1) of this section to prove that he has reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.

(3) Subsection (1) of this section does not require disclosure by a legal practitioner of any information, belief or suspicion based on any other information, which he obtained in privileged circumstances.

(4) For the purpose of subsection (3) of this section, an information is obtained by a legal practitioner in privileged circumstances where it is disclosed to him by –

(a) his client in connection with the provision of legal advice, not being a disclosure with view to furthering a criminal purpose; or

(b) any person for the purpose of actual or contemplated legal proceeding, and not with a view to furthering a criminal purpose.

8.   (1) A person who –

(a) discloses to another anything which is likely to prejudice a terrorist investigation; or

(b) interferes with material which is likely to be relevant to a terrorist investigation.

Commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

(2) It is a defence for person charged with an offence under subsection (1) of this section to prove that he –

(a) did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the disclosure was likely to affect a terrorist investigation; or

(b) had a reasonable excuse for the disclosure or interference.

(3) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to a disclosure which is made by a legal practitioner to –

(a) his client in connection with the provision of legal advice, not being a disclosure with a view to furthering a criminal purpose; or

(b) any person for the purpose of actual or contemplated legal proceedings, and not with a view to furthering a criminal purpose.

9.   (1) The President may. on the recommendation of the National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police declare a person to be a suspected international terrorist where he –

   (a) reasonably suspects that the person –

      (i) is or has been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism;

      (ii) is a member of, or belongs to an international terrorist group, or recognized as such under the provisions of this act.

      (iii) has a link with an international terrorist group, and he reasonably believes that the person is a risk to national security;

   (b) is listed as a person involved in terrorist acts in any resolution of the United Nations Security Council or in any instrument of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States; and

   (c) the person is considered as a person involved in terrorist acts by such State or other organisation as the President may approve.

   (2) Where the President makes a declaration under subsection (1) (a) of this section. he shall. in such manner as he considers appropriate. cause the person declared to be a suspected international terrorist to be notified as soon as is reasonably practicable.

   (3) Where a person declared as a suspected international terrorist under subsection (1) of this section possesses the Nigerian citizenship other than by birth. such a person may be deprived of his Nigerian citizenship in accordance with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

   (4) The President may, on the recommendation of the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police, declare a group to be an International terrorist group if the group is –

   (a) subject to the control or influence of persons outside Nigeria and the President reasonably suspects that it is involved in the commission. preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism;

   (b) listed as a group or entity involved in terrorist acts in any resolution of the United Nations Security Council or in any instrument of the African Union and Economic Community of West African States; or

(c) considered as a group or entity involved in terrorist acts by the competent authority of a foreign State.

(5) A reference in this Act to a proscribed organisation includes a reference to an international terrorist group, and, whenever applicable, to a suspected international terrorist.

(6) The Attorney-General of the Federation may, with respect to any suspected international terrorist or an international terrorist group, make regulations to provide -

(a) for the freezing of his or its funds, financial assets or other economic resources, including proceeds derived from property, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by him or it, by persons acting on his or its behalf or at his or its direction;

(b) for the prevention of his or its entry into, or transit in, Nigeria;

(c) for the prohibition of the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer of arms, weapons, ammunitions, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, spare parts and related material, technical advice, assistance or training related to military activities; or

(d) that any person who contravenes any regulation made under this subsection commits an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of five years.

(7) The President shall give notice of a declaration made under subsections (1) and (4) of this section in the Gazette and in such other manner as he deems fit.

(8) For the purpose of this section, "act of international terrorism" means an act of terrorism involving –

(a) a non-citizen;

(b) a person possessing dual citizenship as specified in subsection (3) of this section; or

(c) groups or individuals whose terrorist activities are foreign based or directed by the countries or groups outside Nigeria or whose activities transcend national boundaries.

10. (1) A person who, directly or indirectly, provides or collects funds with the

Suppression of financing of

intention or knowledge that they will be used, in full or in part, in order to –

    (a) commit an offence in breach of an enactment specified in the Schedule to this Act; or

    (b) do any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian or any other person not taking active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a group of people or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act,

commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

(2) For an act to constitute an offence under subsection (1) of this section, it is not necessary that the funds were actually used to commit the said offence.

11.   (1) A person who knowingly –

    (a) seizes, detains or attempts to seize or detain; or

    (b) threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party to do, abstain from doing any act or gives an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage, commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

(2) In this section, a "third party" means a State, an international governmental organization, a natural or legal person or a group of persons.

PART II – TERRORIST FUNDS AND PROPERTY

12.   (1) The National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police with the approval of the President may seize any cash where he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the cash –

    (a) is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism;

    (b) belongs to, or is held on trust for, a proscribed organization; or

    (c) represents property obtained through acts of terrorism

(2) The National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may seize the cash if –

(a) the seizure is incidental to an arrest search; or

(b) The property is liable to forfeiture upon process issued by the court following an application made by the Attorney General, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police with the approval of the President

(3) The National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may exercise his powers under subsection (1) of this section, whether or not any proceeding has been brought for an offence in connection with the terrorist cash.

(4) The judge in Chambers shall not make an order for seizure of the cash unless he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash --

(a) is intended to be used for the purposes of terrorism;

(b) consists of resources of a proscribed organization; or

(c) is, or represents, a property obtained through terrorist activities.

(5) Subject to subsection (8) of this section, any order made under subsection (4) of this section shall remain valid for a period of 60 days by the Judge in Chambers until the production of the cash before the court in the proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected.

(6) The cash seized under this section shall be deposited in an escrow account by the officer who effected the seizure.

(7) The cash with the interest may be released to the owner by order of the Judge in chamber where-

(a) the conditions under subsection (4) of this section are no longer met; or

(b) the proceedings are not brought in connection with the cash seized.

(8) For the purposes of this section, 'cash' means

(a) Coins and notes in any currency;

(b) Postal order;
(c) Travelers' cheques;

(d) Bankers' drafts,

(e) Bearer bonds and bearer shares; or

(f) Such other monetary instruments as the Minister charged with the responsibility for Finance may, by regulations, specify.

13. A person who knowingly –

(a) Solicits, receives, provides or possesses monetary or other property or;

(b) enters into or becomes involved in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available, or is to be made available, for the purpose of terrorism or for a proscribed organization, commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

14. (1)A financial institution or designated non financial institution shall, within a period not more than 72 hours, forward reports of suspicious transactions relating to terrorism to the Financial Intelligence Unit which shall process such information and forward it to the relevant law enforcement agency where they have sufficient reasons to suspect that the funds -

(a)are derived from legal or illegal sources but are intended to be used for any act of terrorism;

(b)are proceeds of a crime related to terrorist financing; or

(c) belong to a person. entity or organization considered as terrorist.

(2)A financial institution or designated non-financial institution is not liable for violation of the confidentiality rules for every lawful action taken in furtherance of its obligations under sub-section (1) of this section.

(3)The details of a report sent by the institution or designated non-financial institution shall not be disclosed by the institution or any of their officers to any other person.

(4) A person who breaches of subsection (3) of this section commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to a minimum fine of N5,000,000.00 or a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5years.

(5) Where a breach of sub-section (1) of this section occurs and it is shown that the breach is not deliberate, the Financial Intelligence Unit shall impose such administrative sanctions as it may deem necessary.

(6) Where the institution continues with the breach, it shall, on conviction, be liable to a minimum fine of N5,000,000:00 or imprisonment for a maximum term of five years for the principal officers of the institution or the defaulting officer.

15. (1) A person who enters into, or is involved in, an arrangement which facilitates the retention of or control by, or on behalf of, another person, of a terrorist property in any manner including-

(a) concealment;

(b) removal from the jurisdiction; or

(c) transfer to any other person,

commits an offence under this Act and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years.

(2) It is a defence for a person charged under subsection (1) of this section to prove that he did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the arrangement is related to a terrorist property.

(3) Where a person is charged or about to be charged with an offence under this Act, the Attorney General of the Federation, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may apply to a Judge in Chambers in the presence of the counsel to the suspect for a provisional order to attach all monies and other property belonging to, or held on behalf of, the suspect.

(4) An order made under subsection (1) of this section may-

(a) prohibit a person from making money or property available to, or for the benefit of, the suspect; except in cases of critical need or

(b) provide for the granting of authority to make money or other property available to such persons and on such conditions as may be specified in the order; or

(c) require the suspect to provide information or produce such document as may be required or reasonably needed for an investigation under this Act, or

(d)include such other conditions as the Judge may impose.

(5) The Judge in Chambers may appoint an official receiver or any other suitable person to manage the property of the suspect during the period of operation of an order made under this section.

(6) The National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police shall -

(a)cause notice of the order to be published in the official Gazette and in two national newspapers, and

(b)give notice of the order to-

(i)banks, financial institutions and cash dealers, or

(ii)any other person who may hold or be vested with property belonging to or held on behalf of the suspect.

(7) An order under this section shall remain in force until the determination of any charge or intended charge under subsection (1) of this section and, in the event of a conviction, until an order for forfeiture is made by the court or proceedings relating thereto are concluded.

(8) Where an order under this section ceases to have effect, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police shall cause notice to be published in the official Gazette and two national daily newspapers.

(9) A payment, transfer, pledge or other disposition of property made in contravention of an order under this section shall be void.

(10) Where the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed, is committing or is likely to commit an act of terrorism or is in possession of terrorist property. he may, for the purposes of an investigation under this Act. apply to a judge in Chambers in the presence of the counsel for the accused person for an order compelling the suspect to deliver to him any document relevant to identifying, locating or quantifying any property belonging to. or in the possession or control of that person

16.   (1) Where a person is charged or about to be charged with an offence under this Act, the State Security Service (SSS) may apply to a Judge in Chambers for a provisional order to attach all monies and other property belonging to, or held on behalf of the suspect.   *Attachment of property.*

(2) An order made under subsection (1) may—

(a) prohibit a person from making money or property available to, or for the benefit of the suspect;

(b) provide for the granting of authority to make money or other property available to such persons and on such conditions as may be specified in the order;

(c) require the suspect to provide such information or produce such document as may be required or reasonably needed for an investigation under this Act; and

(d) include such other condition as the Judge may impose.

(3) The Judge in Chambers may, on the recommendation of the State Security Service (SSS), appoint an official receiver or any other suitable person to manage the property of the suspect during the period of operation of an Order made under this section.

(4) The State Security Service (SSS) shall—

(a) cause notice of the order to be published in the next issue of the Gazette and in two daily newspapers;

(b) give notice of the order to—

(i) banks, financial institutions and cash dealers;

(ii) any other person who may hold or be vested with property belonging to or held on behalf of the suspect.

(5) An order under this section shall remain in force until the determination of any charge or intended charge under subsection (1) of this section and, in the event of a conviction, until an order for forfeiture is made by the Court or proceedings relating thereto are concluded.

(6) Where an order under this section ceases to have effect, the State Security Service (SSS) shall cause notice to be published in the Gazette and two daily newspapers.

(7) Any payment, transfer, pledge or other disposition of property made in contravention of an order under this section shall be void.

17. (1) Where the State Security Service (SSS) has reasonable grounds to suspect   Property tracking
that a person has committed, is committing or is likely to commit an act of
terrorism or is in possession of terrorist property, it may, for the purposes

of an investigation under this Act, apply to a Judge in Chambers for an order—

    (a) compelling the suspect to deliver to him any document relevant to identifying, locating or quantifying any property belonging to, or in the possession or control of that person; and

    (b) requiring a bank or any other financial institution, trustee, cash dealer or custodian, to produce to him all information and deliver to him all documents regarding any business transaction conducted by or on behalf of the suspect.

(2) Where a person fails to comply with, is delaying or is otherwise obstructing an order made under subsection (1) (a) of this section, the Judge in Chambers may, upon information sworn to that effect by the State Security Service (SSS), authorise the State Security Service (SSS) or any officer authorised by it to enter any premises, including a bank or other financial institution and search the premises and remove any document for the purposes of executing such order.

PART III – MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND EXTRADITION

18.   (1) Where a foreign state makes a request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution and even extradition where there is mutual treaty of an offence related to terrorism, after due consideration, the Attorney General may   Requests from foreign States.

    (a) execute the request; or

    (b) inform the foreign State making the request of any reason for –

    (i)   not executing the requests, or

    (ii) delaying the execution of the request.

(2) Where the Attorney-General decided to execute a request for assistance under subsection (1) of this section, he shall apply to a judge in Chambers in the presence of counsel of any suspect for

    (a) an order in writing for -

    (i)   a search and entry of specified premises, or

    (ii)   a search of any specified person, or

    (iii)   the removal of any relevant document or material;

    (b) an attachment order; or

(c)a property tracking order

(d)an order for freezing or forfeiture of property in such manner as may be prescribed by the judge in chambers.

(3)The Judge in Chambers may make an order under this section imposing such conditions as to payment of debts, sale, transfer or disposal of any property as he deems fit.

19. (1)The Attorney-General may make a request to any foreign State to extradite a suspect if there is mutual extradition treaty, and/or

    (a) to provide evidence or information relevant to an offence under this Act; or

    (b) for the restraint and forfeiture of property located in that State and which is liable to be forfeited for being a terrorist property.

(2)The Attorney-General may, in respect of any proceeding for a offence under this Act, apply to a judge in Chambers for an order directed to any person resident in a foreign state to deliver himself or any document or material in his possession or under his control to the jurisdiction of the court or, subject to the approval of the foreign State for the purpose of giving evidence in relation to the proceedings

20. (1) The evidence taken, pursuant to a request under section 18 of this Act, in any proceeding in a court of a foreign State, may if it is authenticated, be prima facie admissible in any proceeding to which such evidence relates:

    Provided the circumstance and method of collecting evidence is normally acceptable to Nigeria

    (2) For the purpose of subsection (1) of this section, a document is authenticated if it purports to be –

    (a) signed or certified by a judge or Magistrate of a foreign State; or

    (b) authenticated by the oath or affirmation of a witness; or

    (c) sealed with an official or public seal –

    (i)   of a Ministry or Department of the Government of the foreign State, or

    (ii)   in the case of a territory, protectorate or colony of the person administering the Government of the foreign territory, protectorate

or colony or a person administering a department of that territory, protectorate or colony.

21.   (1) A request under section 18 or 19 shall be in writing, dated and signed by or on behalf of the person making the request.

(2) The request may be transmitted by facsimile or any other electronic device or means.

(3) The request shall –

(a) confirm either that an investigation or prosecution is being conducted in respect of a suspected offence related to terrorism or that a person has been convicted of an offence related to terrorism;

(b) state the ground on which a person is being investigated or prosecuted for an offence related to terrorism or detail of the conviction of the person;

(c) give sufficient particulars of the identity of the person;

(d) give particulars sufficient to identify any bank, financial institution, cash dealer or other person believed to have information documents or materials which may assist the investigation or prosecution;

(e) be to obtain from a bank, financial institution, cash dealer or any other person any information, document or material which may assist the investigation or prosecution;

(f) specify the manner in which, and to whom any, information, document or material obtained pursuant to the request is to be produced;

(g) state whether –

(i)   a freezing or forfeiture order is required, or

(ii)   the property to be the subject of such an order is identified; and

(h) contain such other information as may assist the execution of the request.

(4) A request shall not be invalidated for the purposes of this Act or any legal proceeding by failure to comply with subsection (3) of this section where the Attorney-General is satisfied that there is sufficient complaint to enable him

execute the request.

(5)Where the Anthony General considered it appropriate, either because an international arrangement so requires or permits or it is in the public interest. he may order that the whole or any part of the property forfeited under sections 18 and 19 of this Act, or the value thereof, be returned or remitted to the requesting State.

22. Offences under section 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of this Act are considered to be an extradition crime for which extradition may be requested. granted or obtained under the Extradition Act.   *Extradition.*

PART IV – INFORMATION SHARING, EXTRADICTION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE ON CRIMINAL MATERS

23. (1)The Attorney General ,the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of police may with the approval of the President, on a request made by the appropriate authority of a foreign state, disclose to that authority, any information in his possession or in the possession of any other government department or agency, relating to any of the following : -   *Exchange of information relating to terrorist groups and terrorist acts.*

   (a) the actions or movements of terrorist groups or persons suspected of involvement in the commission of terrorist acts;

   (b) the use of forged or falsified travel papers by persons suspected of involvement in the commission of terrorist acts:

   (c) traffic in explosives or other lethal devices or sensitive materials by terrorist groups or persons suspected of involvement in the commission of terrorist acts; and

   (d) the use of communication technologies by terrorist groups;

If the disclosure is not prohibited by the provision of any law and if, in the view of the Attorney General, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police will not be prejudicial to national security or public safety.

PART V – INVESTIGATION

24. (1)The National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may apply to the court for the issuance of a warrant for the purposes of terrorism investigation.   *Issuance of warrant.*

   (2)The court may issue a warrant authorizing the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police to –

(a) enter the premises specified in the warrant;

(b) search the premises and any person found therein; and

(c)Seize and retain any relevant material found therein

(3)The court shall not issue a warrant under subsection (2) of this section unless the court is satisfied that –

(a) the warrant is sought for the purpose of a terrorist investigation; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is a material on the premises which may be relevant to the terrorist investigation.

25.   (1)Where, in a case of verifiable urgency, a communication with the Judge in Chambers to obtain a warrant would cause delay that may be prejudicial to the maintenance of public safety or order, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may, without prejudice to the provisions of any other enactment or Act to seal up the premises while a search warrant is sought for and upon obtaining the order -   _{Search without warrant}

    (a) enter and search the same premises or place;

    (b)search any person or vehicle found on any premises or place which he is empowered to enter and search under paragraph (a) of this subsection:

    (c)stop, board and search any vessel, aircraft or vehicle if he has reason to suspect that there is in it evidence of the commission or likelihood of commission of an offence under this Act;

    (d)seize, remove and detain anything which is, or contains or appears to him to be or to contain or to be likely to contain evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act; or

    (e) arrest, search and detain any person whom he reasonably suspects of having committed or likely to commit an offence under this Act.

(2)The National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police shall take and record, for the purposes of identification, the measurements, samples, photographs and fingerprint impressions of all persons who may, from time to time, be in lawful custody for any offence under this Act.

(3) The Judge in Chambers may, pursuant to an expert application, grant an

order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 2 months.

(4) The Judge in Chambers may, pursuant to an exparte application, grant an order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 30 days.

(5) A person found on any premises or place or in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle may be detained by a law enforcement officer until the completion of the search under subsection (1) of this section.

(6) A person found on any premises which is a subject of investigation or place or in any vessel, aircraft or vehicle which is suspected to be part of crime scene may be detained by a law enforcement officer until the completion of the search under subsection (1) of this section.

(7) Where a seizure is effected under this section, a list of all the articles, documents and other matters seized shall be delivered to the –

(a) person on whom the search is made; or

(b) owner of the premises, place, vessel, aircraft or vehicle seized.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as derogation from the lawful right of any person in defence of person or property.

Nothing in this section shall be construed as derogation from the lawful right of any person in defence of their person or property.

26 (1) Without prejudice to any other Act or enactment, the Attorney General of the Federation, the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police may, for the purposes of the prevention or detection of offences or the prosecution of offenders under this Act, give such directions as appear to him to be necessary to any communication service provider. *Intelligence gathering.*

(2) Before giving an approval under this section, the National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police may consult with any communication service provider.

(3) A direction under this section shall specify the maximum period for which a communication service provider may be required to retain communications data.

(4) In this section –

" communication service provider" means a person who pervades

postal, information or communication services, including telecommunications service; and

"data" means any information, generated, sent, received, or stored, that can be retrieved by electronic, magnetic, optical or any similar means

27. (1) An authorized officer may issue a detention order in respect of a conveyance if he is of the opinion that –

    (a) a threat has been made to commit an act of violence against the conveyance or against any person or property on board the conveyance; or the conveyance is used for an act of illegality or intended to commit an offence under this act.

    (b) an act of violence is likely to be committed against the conveyance or against any person or property on board the conveyance.

(2) Where the operator of a conveyance fails to comply with a detention order under subsection (1) of this section, the authorized person may –

    (a) enter or authorize any other person to enter the conveyance; or

    (b) arrange for a person or thing to be removed from the conveyance.

(3) The authorized officer shall give written notice to the operator of the conveyance of any detention order issued under this section.

(4) Where the operator of a conveyance objects to a detention order, the Attorney General or the judge in chamber on the advice of the Attorney General may, after hearing the parties, confirm, vary or cancel the order.

(5) In this section "conveyance" means an aircraft, train, vehicle, vessel or any other mode of transportation.

(6) A person who –

    (a) without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with the requirement of a detention order, or

    (b) intentionally obstructs or hinders any persons acting in accordance with subsection (2) of this section,

commits an offence under this Act and shall on conviction be liable to a maximum fine of N1,000,000 or imprisonment for a maximum term of five years.

(7) For the purpose of this section, "an authorized officer" means the Head of an agency involved in an anti-terrorism initiative.

28. (1) Where a person is arrested under reasonable suspicion of having committed any offence under sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13 or 14, the National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police or a delegated officer not below the rank of Chief Superintendent of Police or its equivalent may, subject to this section, direct that the person arrested be detained in a custody for a period not exceeding 24 hours from his arrest, without having access to any person other than his Medical Doctor and legal counsel of the detaining agency.

Detention for offences related to terrorism

(2) A direction under subsection (1) of this section shall not be made unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that giving access to any person other than the medical doctor specified in that subsection will –

(a) lead to interference with or harm to evidence connected with an offence under sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 or 25 (6) or to interference with or physical injury to other persons;

(b) lead to the alerting of other persons suspected of having committed such an offence but not yet arrested for it, or

(c) hinder the tracking, search and seizure of terrorist property.

(3) As soon as direction is issued under subsection (1) of this section, the person detained shall be informed that he may, if he so wishes, be examined by a medical officer.

29 (1) A custody record shall be kept in respect of a person detained under section 27 of this Act.

Custody of records and video recording.

(2) A video recording shall be made and kept in respect of any person detained under section 25 of this Act.

(3) A video recording under this section shall be admissible in evidence.

(4) In this section, "video recording" includes the recording of visual images or sound by electronic or other technological means

PART VI – PROSECUTION

30. (1) Subject to the general powers of the Attorney General of the Federation to institute and undertake criminal proceedings on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria, he may delegate his power to any agency charged with responsibility of terrorists investigation to institute criminal proceedings against any person in respect of offences categorized in this

Prosecution for offence.

Act.

(2) For the purpose of consolidating criminal proceedings under subsection (1) of this section, the law enforcement agencies shall collaborate and cooperate with the investigating agency in the investigation or prosecution of any offence relating to terrorism under this Act.

31.   (1) The court may, on a motion by or on behalf of the prosecuting agency, protect a witness in any proceeding before it or its own motion where it is satisfied that the life of the witness is in danger and takes such measures as it deems fit to keep the identity and address of the witness secret.

(2) In particular, the measures which the court may take under sub-section (1) of this section may include the holding of the proceedings at a place to be decided by the court.

    (a) the holding of the proceedings at a place to be decided by the court;

    (b) avoidance of the mention of the name and address of the witness in its orders, judgments or records of the case accessible to the public; and

    (c) issuing of a direction for securing that the identity and address of the witness are not disclosed; and

    (d) a decision that it is in the public interest to order that all or any of the proceeding pending before such a court shall not be published in any manner.

(3) The court may, on motion by or on behalf of the prosecuting agency, in the interest of public safety or order, exclude from proceedings instituted for any offence under this Bill any person other than the parties and their legal representatives.

(4) A person who contravenes an order made under this section commits an offence under this Act.

32.   (1) The Federal High Court shall have the sole jurisdiction to try an offence and impose the penalties specified in this Act

(2) The court before which a person is convicted of an offence under this Act may, in addition to any penalty imposed by the court, order the forfeiture of –

    (a) the victim is a citizen of Nigeria or has a link with Nigeria or is

dealing with or on behalf of the Government of Nigeria;

(b) the alleged offender is in Nigeria ;or

(c) the alleged offender is in Nigeria and Nigeria does not extradite him.

(2) The Federal High Court shall have—

(a) jurisdiction to impose any penalty provided for an offence under this Act provided that the penalty for an offence does not exceed 20 years.

(b) power to order sentences imposed under this Act to be served consecutively provided that the term of such sentences does not, in the aggregate exceed 30 years.

(3)Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, the penalty incurred by a person convicted of an offence under this Act may be reduced in such manner as the court thinks just where that person has, before any proceeding, made possible or facilitated the identification of the other accused persons or who, after the commencement of proceedings, has made possible or facilitated the arrest of such persons.

Penalties

33.   (1) Subject to subsection (3) of this section a person who commits an offence under this Act is liable on conviction—

(a) in the case of an offence under sections 1 and 10 of this Act. to life imprisonment or to a fine of not less than 150 million Naira or both;

(b) in the case of an offence under sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12 and 14 to an imprisonment for a term of not less than 3 years and not exceeding 20 years;

(c) in the case of an offence under sections 6 and 7, to an imprisonment for a term of not less than 2 years and not exceeding 15 years;

(d) in the case of an offence under sections 25 and 29 to a fine not exceeding N1,000,000.00 or an imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or both; and

(e) where death results from any terrorist act, the penalty shall be life imprisonment.

(2)The court before which a person is convicted of an offence under this Act may, in addition to any penalty imposed by the court, order the forfeiture of -

34. Where in any proceedings for an offence under this Act, a question arises as to whether anything or substance is a weapon, a hazardous, radioactive or a harmful substance, a toxic chemical or microbial or other biological agent or toxin, a certificate purporting to be signed by an appropriate authority to the effect that the thing or substance described in the certificate is a weapon, hazardous, radioactive or harmful substance, a toxic chemical or other biological agent or toxic, shall be admissible in evidence.

PART VII - CHARITIES

35. (1) The Registrar General of the Corporate Affairs Commission responsible for the registration of charities/organization may sign a certificate refusing or revoking registration of charity based on security or criminal intelligence reports, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an applicant for registration as a registered charity has made, is making or is likely to make available any resources, directly or indirectly, to a terrorist group.

    (2) A copy of the signed certificate shall be served on the applicant or the registered charity, personally or by registered letter sent to its last known address, with a copy of the certificate.

    (3) The certificate or any matter arising out of it shall not be subject to review or be reinstated, prohibited, removed, set aside or otherwise dealt with, except in accordance with this section.

    (4) Within 60 days of receipt of the copy of the notice under subsection (1), the applicant or the registered charity may make an application to the Federal High Court.

    (5) Upon the filing of an application under subsection (4), a judge of that court shall –

        (a) examine the security or criminal or intelligence reports, considered by the Registrar General of the Corporate Affairs Commission before signing the certificate and hear any evidence or information that may be presented by or on behalf of the Minister;

        (b) provide the applicant or the registered charity with a statement summarizing the information available to the judge so as to enable the applicant or the registered charity to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the certificate, without disclosing any information the disclosure of which would in the judge's opinion, be prejudicial to national security or

endanger the safety of any person;

(c) provide the applicant or registered charity with a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and

(d) determine whether the certificate is reasonable on the basis of all the information available to the judge or not

(6) Where the judge determines, under subsection (5) that the certificate is reasonable or if no application is brought upon the expiry of 60 days from the date of service of the notice, the Registrar General of the Corporate Affairs Commission shall cause the certificate to be published in the official Gazette

(7) A certificate determined to be reasonable under subsection (5), shall be deemed for all purposes to be sufficient grounds for the refusal of the application for registration of the charity or the revocation of the registration of the charity referred to in the certificate

(8) Where the Judge determines the revocation order certificate is not reasonable, he shall order the registration or continued registration of the charity.

PART VIII – MISCELLANEOUS POWERS

36.   (1) The –

(a) operator of an aircraft or master of a vessel, departing from Nigeria; or

(b) operator of an aircraft or master of a vessel registered in Nigeria departing from any point outside Nigeria may subject to regulations made under subsection (5), of this section provide -

(i) to the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police any information in his possession, relating to persons on board, or expected to be on board, the aircraft or vessel, as the case may be; or

(ii) to the competent authority in a foreign State, any information in his possession, relating to persons on board, or expected to be on board, the aircraft or vessel, as the case may be.

(2) The Minister of Internal Affairs may, subject to regulations made under

subsection (5) where this mutual assistance provide to the competent authority in a foreign State any information in his possession relating to persons entering or leaving Nigeria by land.

(3) No information provided to the National Security Adviser or the Inspector General of Police under subsection (1) shall be used or disclosed by the National Security Adviser or Inspector-General of Police except for the purpose of protecting national security or public safety.

(4) The Minister of Justice and Attorney General may make regulations generally to give effect to the purposes of this section, including regulations –

> (a) Respecting the types or classes of information that may be provided under this section; and

> (b) Specifying the foreign States to which the information may be provided.

37. (1) The Minister of Internal Affairs' or other authorized officer under the laws relating to Immigration shall not grant an endorsement or other authority permitting a person to enter Nigeria if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has been, is or will be involved in the commission of a terrorist act.

Power to prevent entry and order the removal of persons.

(2) In the event of the person with respect to whom subsection (1) applies being already in Nigeria, the Minister of Justice or other authorized officer under the laws relating to immigration shall issue an order for the arrest. detention and removal of the person from Nigeria.

(3) A person with respect to whom an order stated in subsection (2) is made shall be extradited out of Nigeria and shall. so long as the order is in force, remain out of Nigeria.

(4) A person with respect to whom an order stated in subsection (2) is made may be detained in such manner as may be directed by the Comptroller-General of Immigration Services or Minister of Internal Affairs and may be placed on a vessel or aircraft leaving Nigeria.

38. The Minister of Internal Affairs may, having regard to the interests of national security and public safety, refuse the application of any person applying for status as a refugee, if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant has committed a terrorist act or is involved in the commission of a terrorist act.

Power to refuse refugee application.

39. (1) The Attorney General may, for the purpose of this Act, make such reasonable regulations as he thinks fit providing for –

Regulations.

(a) the types of financial or other related services which may not be provided to proscribed organisations; and

(b) the record of custody and video recording of suspects apprehended under this Act.

40. In this Act –

"act of terrorism" means any act specified in section 1 of this Act;

"bank" has the same meaning as in Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act and includes a person –

. (a) engaged in deposit-taking business and authorized to do so under the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act; and .

(b) who carries on any business or activity regulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria;

"cash dealer" means a person authorized under the Foreign (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Exchange Act to carry on the business of foreign exchange dealer or money changer;

"counter terrorism convention" refers to any of the following conventions when it is ratified --

(a) Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally protected Persons;

(b) International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages;

(c) International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing;

(d) Convention Against Terrorist Financing;

(e) Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft;

(f) Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft;

(g) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation;

(h) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation;

(i) Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of Detection;

(j) Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Maritime Navigation;

(k) Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf;

(l) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, whenever they are duly ratified; and

(m) or such other convention assented by the Nigeria Government.

"National Security Adviser" means The National Security Adviser to the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any delegated Officer by him.

"Director-General" means the Director of the State Security Service.

"Financial Institution" means any institution or person regulated by any of the enactments specified in the Schedule to this Act;

"Government" means the Government of the Federal Republic Nigeria or any State within Nigeria;

"Inspection General of Police" means The Inspector General of Police of Nigeria or any delegated Officer by him.

"law enforcement agency" means the –

(a) Nigeria Police Force;

(b) Department of State Services;

(c) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission;

(d) National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons;

(e) National Drug Law Enforcement Agency;

(f) National Intelligence Agency;

(g) Nigeria Customs Service;

(h) Nigeria Immigration Service;

(i) Defen ce Intelligence Agency;

(j) Nige ria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC); and

(k) Any other agency empowered by an Act of the National Assembly;

"President" means the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria;

"proceeds of terrorism" means any property derived or obtained from the commission of any terrorist act or acquired through funds traceable to a terrorist act and includes funds irrespective of the person in whose names such proceeds are standing or in whose possession they are found;

"proscribed organization" –

(a) Means an organization which has been declared to be a proscribed organization under section 2 of this Act, and

(b) Includes a group which has been declared to be an international terrorist group under section 9 of this Act;

traceable to a terrorist act and includes funds irrespective of the person in whose names such proceeds are standing or in whose possession they are found;

"prosecuting agency" means the –

(a) Nigeria Police Force;

(b) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission; and

(c) Department of State Services;

"terrorist" means any person involved in the offences under Sections 1 to 14 of this Act and includes his sponsor.

"terrorist investigation" means an investigation of –

(a) the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism or any other offence under this Act;

(b) any act or omission reasonably suspected to have been done in

furtherance of an act of terrorism or any other offence under this Act; and

(c) the resources of a proscribed organization;

"terrorist property" means a property which –

(a) has been, is being or is likely to be used for any act of terrorism;

(b) has been, is being or is likely to be used by a proscribed organization;

(c) is the proceeds of an act of terrorism; or

(d) is provided or collected for the pursuit of, or in connection with, an act of terrorism;

"Trustee" has the same meaning as in the Trustees Act and Companies and Allied Matters Act.

41.   This Act may be cited as the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011.   Citation

SCHEDULE

Section 10 (a)

1. Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (as amended).

2. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, Etc.) Act, 2004.

3. Insurance Act 2003.

4. National Insurance Commission Act.

5. Securities and Exchange Commission Act.

6. Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act.

7. Companies and Allied Matters Act, 1990.

8. Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 1990.

9. National Security Agencies Act 1986.

10. Any other subsequent relevant enactment of the National Assembly.

11. All ratified International Conventions and Protocols.

CERTIFY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2 (1) OF THE ACTS UTHENTICATION ACT, CAP. A2, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA 2004, HAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF THE BILL PASSED BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE ATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

SALISU ABUBAKAR MAIKASUWA, mni
CLERK TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

2ND DAY OF JUNE, 2011

SHORT TITLE OF THE BILL	LONG TITLE OF THE BILL	SUMMARY OF THE CONTENTS OF THE BILL	
Terrorism (Prevention) Bill, 2011.	An Act to make provisions for and about offences relating to conduct carried out or purposes connected with terrorism	This Bill seeks to provide for measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism, the financing of terrorism in Nigeria and for the effective implementation of the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It also prescribes penalties for violating any of its provisions.	

I certify that this Bill has been carefully compared by me with the decision reached by th
to be true and correct decision of the Houses and is in accordance with the provisions o
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.

SALISU AB
Clerk
2ᵈ D

I ASSENT.

DR. GOODL
President
3ʳᵈ Day

1