

The “New” Rhetoric of New Labour in Comparative Perspective: Ideological Election Rhetorics of Social Democratic-Labour Parties in Sweden, Germany and Great Britain

DETLEF JAHN and MATT HENN

West European Politics,

Vol. 23 (1), pp. 26-46. 2000.

DOI: 10.1080/01402380008425350

Over the last two decades, social democratic-labour parties (SDLPs) have been confronted by various challenges which have had a dramatic impact upon their ideological orientation. Not least of which, these include emerging challenger parties, as well as the Neo-Liberal discourse of the New Right. In this paper, we compare the ideological positioning of three parties in Sweden, Germany, and particularly in Great Britain. We conclude that the ideological profile of ‘New Labour’ now largely mirrors those of other SDLPs. The results are based upon a content analysis of the 1994 (Germany and Sweden) and 1997 (Great Britain) election rhetorics in party manifestos and television debates. The analysis centres on the extent to which the three SDLPs refer to the discourses of Socialism, the Welfare State, Neo-Liberalism, and Ecologism.

Since the 1980s neo-liberal ideology has encroached upon virtually all modern welfare states. This has had the effect of undermining support for welfare state-collectivist concerns, reflected in particular in terms of adjustments within the general orientations and programmatic commitments of western social democratic-labour parties (SDLPs). The erosion of traditional leftist-collectivist concerns has occurred at both economic and social levels. At the economic level, we have witnessed a gradual withdrawal of state intervention within the

economy, and a general de-industrialisation of society. As a result, various social structural changes have taken place within the electorate which have led to a reduction in the size of the social base for SDLPs. This in turn has led to a re-positioning of these parties to maintain core support and extend their appeal to new (predominately middle class) electoral constituencies. At the social level there has been a shift in emphasis from collectivist-rights notions of social policy (based on redistributive taxation and the collective provision of social services and resources) to a concern for the encouragement of individual responsibility in social life. Again, this neo-liberal rhetoric has been most obvious in terms of the programmatic shifts in emphasis of SDLPs away from traditional leftist-collectivist concerns and approaches.

In this paper, our intention is to summarise the various challenges and the consequent programmatic adjustments of three major social democratic-labour parties in Western Europe: the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party (SAP), the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the British Labour Party. To empirically test the extent of any programmatic adjustments, data is drawn from a quantitative content analysis of party election manifestos and television debates held in these three countries at the elections in 1994 (Germany and Sweden) and 1997 (Great Britain). The analytical categories used in this analysis are considerably more detailed than data from other research efforts in the field.ⁱ

This paper will give a brief overview of the most significant programmatic changes of the SAP, SPD and the Labour Party over the last two decades as they succumbed to neo-liberal rhetoric, and to the decline of collectivism at the economic and social levels. From this, we will address a number of important questions. Firstly, to what degree have SDLPs (and we include the British Labour Party loosely within the social democratic-labour *familles spirituelles* here, although recognising the problems in doing so)ⁱⁱ responded to the challenge of competing ideologies (including primarily neo-liberalism, but also environmentalism), and jettisoned welfare state-collectivist commitments?

Secondly, we intend to adopt a comparative approach in order to answer questions about the relative ideological positions of these parties in terms of their commitment to the welfare state and to their traditional emphases on the value of equality and solidarity. Much attention has been given to the changes which have taken place within the British Labour Party throughout the 1990s.ⁱⁱⁱ However, as Shaw^{iv} observes, ‘the shedding of traditional left-wing tenets in Britain is part of a general pattern in which social democratic parties have adjusted to free market consensus - extending even to its heartland in Scandinavia, where social democratic governments have been retrenching on welfare spending, deregulating financial markets and presiding over growing inequality and unemployment.’ However, the pace of change, together with the extent to which these developments appear to have taken firmest hold appears to be most obvious within the British Labour Party, leading some to conclude that ‘New Labour’ represents an irreversible break with traditional social democracy.^v The primary objective of this paper therefore involves an examination of the Labour Party in relation to the other two parties selected for study: Has the Labour Party shifted further from the left than the other two parties, or has it just adjusted to the general trend undergone by other SDLPs in Western Europe? Other comparative questions to be addressed include: To what extent have developments within the SAP reflected an adaptation to the neo-liberal agenda?; And, is the position of the SPD (confronted by the challenge

of both the Greens, and the burgeoning neo-liberal ideology) to be found at an intermediate point between Labour and the SAP, or does it take a more entrenched social democratic position?

IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE TO THE WELFARE STATE DISCOURSE

Like other parties, SDLPs are a result both of their political environment and of their strategy and ability to change this environment in their favour.^{vi} Maurice Duverger^{vii} has noted that SDLPs reflect societies' conflicts within their party organisation, in that there will inevitably be factions and groups competing for internal power, influence and control over the party. Furthermore, the strategy employed to change the external political environment is usually dependent upon the balance between often competing ideological positions and interpretations within an organisation. One of the most successful interpretations of society by SDLPs is the concept of the welfare state. This concept represents a dilution of socialist ideology and a compromise with Capital, and as such, is a practical concept rather than a utopia (such as socialism or communism).

However, the welfare state has very different forms and it changes over time.^{viii} We are able to broadly distinguish three different types of welfare state regime^{ix} which form quite distinct political environments for SDLPs. First, there is the social democratic welfare state which is characterised by universalism and the usurpation of the market. Typically in this type of welfare state regime, SDLPs have been most successful in shaping their political environment. Such parties have been able to promote social equality by at least partially overcoming the basic rules of the capitalist free-market economy. The redistributive effects in these states are also substantial. Examples of this type of welfare state include those in the Netherlands, and above all in the Scandinavian countries. In many respects, the leading country is Sweden, with its highly developed welfare state, and the long uninterrupted period of rule by the Social Democrats.^x

The least developed type of welfare state regime is the liberal or market-oriented welfare state. Here social benefits are modest and cover only minimal social needs. Entitlement rules are strict, and are often associated with stigma. Private insurance policies are encouraged by the state, and market differentiations are reinforced. Typical examples of this type of welfare state regime include Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Australia and the USA. The British welfare state, especially throughout the years of the Thatcher government, also qualifies for this category.

Finally, there is a group of countries that form an intermediate type between the market-oriented and social democratic variants of welfare state. Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1985) labels this type of welfare state the conservative or corporatist welfare state. Such welfare states often have their origins in pre-democratic or authoritarian states such as Bismark's Germany, and sought to use social policy as a means of defusing the threat of working class mobilisation. They are guided by the principle of "subsidiarity" (where the state supports and delivers only those forms of welfare which are not provided by other institutions such as the church or family). The conservative welfare state regime is defined by social policy which is attached to class and status. Although the level of state benefits are sufficient for the recipient, the impact of redistribution is negligible. This type of welfare state regime is most prominent in Germany, Austria, Italy, France and Belgium.

This discussion suggests that the three SDLPs selected for investigation in this study belong to three different welfare state regimes. As a consequence of this, we would expect them to face different ideological pressures, and that their election rhetorics will reflect this. The British Labour Party operates within a market-oriented welfare state regime. As a result, during the period from 1979 to 1997 when the Conservative Party was in government, Labour was exposed to a strong neo-liberal or New Right attack on the welfare state. Like the British Labour Party, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been in opposition since the early 1980s. However, the major government party in Germany, the Christian Democratic Party, subscribes to the principle of the conservative welfare state regime. The rhetoric of the New Right was mainly introduced by the smaller coalition party, the Liberals. In recent years, and largely as a result of severe economic problems following unification, the neo-liberal rhetoric has also become increasingly prominent in German politics.

The Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) operate within the most favourable political environment, and indeed were largely responsible for shaping the Swedish welfare state.^{xi} The uninterrupted government position of the SAP from 1932 until 1976 created the most advanced and developed welfare state in the Western world. Even the coalition government of non-socialist parties from 1976 until 1982 did not substantially change the welfare state. Ironically, it was the 1982-1991 Social Democratic government which initiated the process of welfare state retrenchment. However, neo-liberal rhetoric became increasingly dominant during the 1980s. The Conservative Party pushed New Right issues onto the political agenda, and by so doing established itself as the foremost opposition party. In achieving this position, it succeeded the Center Party which is still committed to many aspects of the welfare state. The same welfare state orientation holds for the Liberal and Christian Democratic parties.^{xii} The 1991-1994 non-socialist government, although divided, pushed neo-liberal issues onto the agenda. Aggressive attacks by the Conservative Party called into question the historical compromise represented by the Swedish welfare state. However, as a result of government policies during this period, unemployment reached unprecedented post-War heights. In this context, the SAP offered an alternative program at the 1994 election campaign which was predominantly welfare statist in orientation.^{xiii}

CHANGING DISCOURSES IN SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC-LABOUR PARTIES: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT

The tactics and ideological orientations of SDLPs are also susceptible to the political environment and party strategy. Besides a minor communitarian strand which was transformed into an anarcho-syndicalist ideology at the beginning of the 20th century in most West European societies, the dominant Marxist socialist strand focused on the redistribution of scarce resources and the socialisation of the means of production. The participation of workers and their representatives was seen as an essential step towards the transition from a capitalist society towards a socialist society. Another, social democratic variant took shape later on with the

establishment of liberal democratic regimes in these countries. This social democratic variant can be considered to be a dilution of socialist thinking, and accepts various aspects of political, and above all economic, liberalism. An early re-formulation of the socialist rhetoric appeared in the 1930s with the development of Keynesianism. However, the historical ideological development varied across the three countries investigated, and we will address these differences in turn.

Sweden

The Swedish version of this social democratic ideology was the SAP-developed concept of a “People’s Home”.^{xiv} This term was used by the former Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to outline his idea of a caring society. In the early 1930s, the SAP was able to put this ideology into practice. Herbert Tingsten^{xv} summarises the transition of the SAP in this period: ‘Socialisation has been replaced by social welfare, class conflict by “the people’s home”, democracy as a tactical means by democracy as the highest principle, the total conquest of power by compromise, agreement and collaboration...’. However, the Socialist discourse never entirely disappeared from the SAP. In particular the confederation of blue collar trade unions (LO) is deeply integrated within the SAP and has repeatedly sought to revive the Socialist discourse. One illustrative example is the attempt to introduce the wage earner funds in the mid-1970s.^{xvi}

By the 1980s, the welfare state was in retreat. The Social Democrats elected in 1982 introduced various elements of economic liberalism in their governmental program. In particular, Kjell-Olof Feldt, representing the more market-oriented wing of the SAP, occupied the crucial position of Finance Minister within the Government. Neo-liberal rhetoric increased in importance in Sweden during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This was a major contributing factor to the fall from power of the Social Democrats in the 1991 election where ‘... an economically more pro-market position would have benefited its performance’.^{xvii} However, increasing unemployment rates, together with severe cuts in the welfare state led to a decline in popularity of the non-socialist government. At the 1994 election campaign, the SAP emphasised what they considered to be the superiority of their social policy/welfare statist program over the Conservative’s neo-liberal agenda for solving the economic crisis.

Germany

Throughout the post-War period, the replacement of a Socialist by a Welfare State discourse became increasingly established among many Western societies. After the Second World War, German politicians from the major political camps were all largely critical of capitalism. However, it was the conservative forces who were by and large charged with, and indeed dominated the process involved in, the restoration of post-War Germany. Konrad Adenauer soon established a non-socialist government and the SPD remained in opposition until 1966. In these early years after the Second World War it became increasingly advocated

within social democratic circles that an anti-capitalist class struggle rhetoric would not be sufficient for defeating successive conservative governments. The Cold War and the division of Germany stigmatised the Socialist discourse in West Germany. These circumstances were translated in programmatic terms by the Godesberger Program in 1959, in which the SPD accepted the principles of the capitalist market economy and formulated a social democratic program. However, it was almost a whole decade before the SPD achieved governmental status, in coalitions first with the Christian Democrats (1966-1969) and then with the Liberals (1969-1982). From the early 1970s, the SPD formulated many social reforms under the Chancellorship of Willy Brandt. However, by 1976 the SPD, under the stewardship of Helmut Schmidt, turned increasingly toward economic liberalism, and introduced a series of austerity policies throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Following the Christian Democrats electoral victory in 1983, the SPD in opposition changed its priorities several times. However, these changes had more to do with left-libertarian challenges (above all from the Greens) than with welfare state policy. Later, German unification brought with it severe economic constraints, and also led to an increased neo-liberal rhetoric by the government. The SPD was not immune to this rhetoric, and from the mid-1990s, the party increasingly embraced a neo-liberal agenda.

Great Britain

Furthest away from what we might call a social democratic Welfare State discourse, and by contrast closest (historically) to a Socialist discourse, was the British Labour Party. As late as 1986, Labour leader Neil Kinnock^{xviii} distinguished his party from social democracy, and in so doing, reaffirmed by implication his party's 'socialist' mission: 'The essence of social democracy is that it is not concerned with the structure of property ownership or the transfer of economic power . . . not of eradicating inequality but relieving its most gross manifestations.'

Throughout the post-War period until the late 1970s, there was significant tension between the orthodox Socialist discourse and the increasingly dominant social democratic Welfare State discourse. This was perhaps best manifest in the debate over the status of Clause Four^{xix} at the Party conference in 1959. Party leader Gaitskell and the social democrats attempted to reshape the Labour Party in the quest for electability which they considered to be hampered by commitments to nationalisation through Clause Four, although they ultimately lost the debate.

When Labour were elected to governmental office in 1974, it was at a time of economic crisis which effectively undermined the post-War welfare state settlement. The response of Labour to the ongoing recession was to introduce an austerity program (largely at the behest of the International Monetary Fund) and to attempt to impose a policy of wage restraint on the trade union movement. This resulted in the 'Winter of Discontent', and a breakdown in the relationship between Labour and the unions. Almost inevitably, this confrontation led to defeat for the Labour Party at the General Election in 1979.

Over the course of the subsequent 18 years, the Labour Party in opposition underwent a series of dramatic internal organisational and ideological-programmatic changes. By 1983, it had taken a radical left turn. The defection in 1981 of the Gang of Four^{xx} from Labour to form the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was the result of a series of organisational and policy changes instigated by an alliance of the Party left-wing and the trades unions. These developments significantly weakened the social democratic grouping within the Party leadership. At the same time the period was one of ‘unprecedented left advance’.^{xxi} The Party then went on to adopt a radical transformative manifesto at the 1983 General Election, with plans, for instance, for increased nationalisation of key industries, import controls, a large public spending program to help reduce unemployment, increased welfare spending, the introduction of a wealth tax, industrial democracy, a reduction in the working week without loss of pay, withdrawal from the EEC, and unilateral nuclear disarmament.

However, with the social democratic-left vote split between Labour and the SDP, and against the backdrop of a military victory over the Falklands, the Conservatives won a landslide election triumph in 1983. The Labour Party only narrowly avoided being pushed into third place by the more social democratic-oriented SDP.^{xxii} As a consequence, the socialist agenda within Labour was marginalised. Some commentators claimed that the electorate was no longer pre-disposed to either a socialist or a social democratic agenda, and as a consequence, if the Labour Party was ever again to win governmental power, it needed to revise its traditional commitments and policies.^{xxiii}

After this and the later election defeat in 1987, the Party leadership under Neil Kinnock embarked upon a process of ‘modernisation’.^{xxiv} This involved the introduction of a program of organisational and policy changes which Gamble and Kelly^{xxv} claim were motivated by a hegemony of Thatcherite neo-Liberalism over political ideas, giving new legitimacy to individualism, choice and the free market as opposed to social democracy.

In the aftermath of another election defeat in 1992, Labour, under the steward-ship of Tony Blair, has become ‘New’ Labour, and continued the modernisation process with the rejection of traditional socialist priorities,^{xxvi} and the adoption of a more social democratic, and increasingly neo-liberal, orientation.^{xxvii} Gamble^{xxviii} claims that: ‘In endorsing the radical, anti-statist line of Thatcherism, Blair implies that this is the ground that Labour must take as well.’ It is generally agreed that this ‘New Labour’ project is one which has gained increased momentum, and now dominates the Labour Party. As a consequence, there has been a qualitative change in the political, organisational and ideological orientation of the Party.^{xxix} In many ways, the Party elite may consider that they have been vindicated with the direction in which they have steered Labour following its landslide General Election victory in 1997.^{xxx}

WELFARE STATE DISCOURSE UNDER SIEGE

In order to place this analysis of the discourse on the welfare state into context, it is useful to consider two important aspects which have been described as especially important for the future of the welfare state and the

transition of social democracy.^{xxxii} One is the status of the Socialist discourse in modern SDLPs. Herbert Kitschelt^{xxxiii} postulates that the Swedish and above all British SDLPs are too socialist to be vote- or office-maximising. However, this conclusion is based on an analysis of the parties conducted in the 1980s. How did the discourse change in the 1990s after the reforms initiated within the British Labour Party by Tony Blair, and after the Swedish SAP had time to adapt in its three-year-period of opposition? This question also poses another one: in which direction did the discourse change? The likelihood is that the Socialist discourse lost ground, and the Welfare State discourse became more prominent. Another possible development is that the predominant Welfare State discourse became infused with aspects of neo-liberalism. This is likely to be the case for all the parties studied. The degree to which the three SDLPs integrated neo-liberal elements in their electoral discourse will be the major focus of our study.

The other defining challenge to social democracy in modern societies is the Ecological discourse, which is part of the Left-Libertarian discourse. The ecological cleavage is differently mobilised in Western societies. For our selected countries, it is most highly mobilised in Germany, followed by Sweden, and finally in Great Britain.^{xxxiii} This means that it is very important for the German SPD to respond to the left-libertarian discourse, less so but still important for the Swedish SAP, and least important for the British Labour Party. Kitschelt's results^{xxxiv} demonstrate that the SPD is most open to left-libertarianism while '... the Swedish Social Democrats are moderately socialist but lack any libertarian issue leadership.' The SAP, according to Kitschelt's analysis scores even lower than the British Labour Party in this respect. This again may be the result of the influence of the Swedish blue collar union on the SAP.^{xxxv}

For Germany, the major problem confronted by the SPD is its vacillation between an ecological position and a conventional social democratic program.^{xxxvi} The Socialist discourse seems now to be relatively marginalised within the SPD: 'By the early 1980s, the Marxist-socialist Left in the SPD was virtually dead'.^{xxxvii} An important question to be addressed in this paper is which of these two poles (ecological or social democratic) dominated at the 1994 German election? The SPD program was relatively open to the Ecological discourse at the 1990 (re-unification) election under the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine.^{xxxviii} However, after this the discourse became more social democratic (emphasising, for instance, policies concerning unemployment, the inequality between the rich and the poor, and so on). The severe economic problems in Eastern Germany and their impact on Western Germany were also shifting the political agenda away from ecological concerns. As a consequence of this, by the mid-1990s the SPD were embracing various neo-liberal solutions within its agenda in order to address the problems the country faced. We intend to reveal how far this is reflected in the 1994 SPD election campaign rhetoric.

HYPOTHESES

Our data and research design preclude the opportunity for a longitudinal analysis. Instead the selected SDLPs will be assessed comparatively. We will examine the extent to which these parties differ from each other in

terms of the aspects outlined above. In addressing these questions by considering both the historical development of, and the literature on, the three SDLPs, our hypotheses are:

Hypothesis 1: Socialist Discourse

Although the British Labour Party has undergone substantial organisational and policy reform, we would expect that the Socialist discourse is nonetheless strongest within the British Labour Party, but not markedly different from either the Swedish SAP or the German SPD. The SPD abandoned this socialist rhetoric nearly forty years ago; furthermore it operates within a broadly corporatist welfare state regime which does not polarise welfare state concerns (and avoids radicalising them, as in the case of Britain). This hypothesis is also supported in that trade unions have a much stronger influence on party policy in Sweden and Great Britain than in Germany.^{xxxix} However, as an alternative hypothesis, the British Labour Party may also have moved so far away from its Socialist discourse that it now places less emphasis on socialist elements than either the SPD or the SAP. This would be an indicator for the degree to which Labour has been transformed under the leadership of Tony Blair from a party with a strong socialist discourse.

Hypothesis 2: Welfare State and Neo-Liberal Discourses

According to the earlier discussion concerning the political environment and the historical development of the selected SDLPs, the Welfare State discourse is likely to be most important in Sweden, followed by Germany and then Great Britain. This is because of the nature and historical strength of the Swedish welfare state, and the longevity of SAP rule. However, more important than that is the degree to which the three parties have incorporated elements of the Neo-Liberal discourse when referring to the welfare state. In this respect it is difficult to make profound statements since this development is relatively new, and the literature has, to date, not taken up the issue of how far SDLPs have opened their political agenda to the Neo-Liberal discourse. However, the recent changes within the British Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair suggest that there is a trend within these parties to adopt market-oriented solutions more readily than before. As mentioned above, the Swedish and German Social Democrats followed similar paths, even if they did this in a rather less pronounced way than the British Labour Party.

We might hypothesise that the transition of the Labour Party to the market-oriented welfare state regime may have resulted in it becoming more open to neo-liberal rhetoric than the other two parties which we have examined. The SAP as a 'Welfare State' party is likely to be most resistant to the neo-liberal rhetoric. The SPD on the other hand, faced with the economic pressures of unification, may have taken an intermediate position between the SAP and the Labour Party.

Hypothesis 3: Ecological Discourse

There is a substantial general literature on the left-libertarian discourse in SDLPs^{x1}, although this is comparatively very limited for the British Labour Party. The consideration of the political environment and party strategies of the three SDLPs selected for this study would lead to the conclusion that the SPD is most open to the Ecological discourse. For Britain and Sweden there are relatively few signs of any incorporation of environmental issues: ‘Overall, it is fair to conclude that the Swedish social democrats, like their British colleagues, missed the opportunity to seize the new issues and build electoral coalitions around ecology and feminism’.^{xii}

In this respect the SAP may be least open to the Ecological discourse because it is interwoven in corporatist politics.^{xiii} Furthermore, the relative success of the Swedish welfare state was also grounded in efficiency and economic growth.^{xiii} The British Labour Party is likely to take an intermediate position between the SAP and SPD.^{xiv} Its long period in opposition may have made the Labour Party relatively more receptive to the idea of integrating the Ecological discourse within its program in order to be more attractive to the new middle classes. As has already been mentioned, the SPD may have gone furthest down the road towards an Ecological discourse - even if it has not been consistent over time. The reasons for the openness of the SPD to this Ecological discourse is based on its lengthy period in opposition, as well as the high saliency of ecological issues in German society.

THE DATA

Given the different political environments and developments of these SDLPs, what would be the political discourse in the mid-1990s in the three countries under investigation? In order to address this question, we have conducted a comprehensive analysis of party statements made during the 1994 elections in Germany and Sweden, and the 1997 election in Great Britain.

However, it should be acknowledged that the ideological positions of political parties during election campaigns differs from their general positions. In election campaigns, party pronouncements on issues are shaped in such a way that they relate to a large proportion of the electorate. In this way party ideologies are ‘adjusted’ to political trends and situations. On the other hand, statements made during election campaigns are not entirely independent of the general party ideology. Thus, election campaigns mediate between the party ideology, political trends, situations and the voters.^{xv} Another key point to note is that we are not measuring party *positions* here as such, but rather party *images*. A party image in this sense is the picture a party presents of itself during the election campaign. As can be seen from the historical analysis conducted by the Party Manifestos Project, party images vary significantly more than party positions.^{xvi}

The following findings have been generated from a larger scale comparative research project. Different aspects of the campaign discourse of political parties have been analysed by means of a rigorous quantitative content analysis of election manifestos and the final television debates between leading party

candidates. The combined results of this data are reported here because the election manifestos and the television debates represent slightly different but nonetheless important aspects of election campaigns. The election manifestos are produced by the parties and represent an undisturbed positioning of the party. Party manifestos are normally approved by an authoritative party body: ‘In any case, the campaign document is the only statement of policy made with authority on behalf of the whole party’.^{xlvii} Statements made by party representatives during the journalist-led television debates are less controlled.

Election manifestos differ considerably in the three countries selected for this study. While these documents are relatively short in Sweden, they are typically more substantial documents in Britain and Germany. In order to reconcile our highly detailed content analysis, we decided only to analyse the preamble of the German election manifestos which, at between one and five pages, is of equivalent length and character to the Swedish election manifestos.^{xlviii} For the British Labour Party we decided to analyse the introduction, together with the preamble and summary for each of the policy and issue sections.

There were also some differences in the organisation of the television-debates. While in Sweden the party leaders participated in such a debate two days before the election, in Germany several debates with high ranking party officials took place. However, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was not willing to take part in these debates. Therefore, the main candidate for the SPD, Rudolf Scharping, also refused to participate. As a consequence, we decided to analyse one of the television debates broadcast with high ranking party officials which dealt with general political issues shortly before the election.^{xlix} The structure, format and timing of this debate came closest to the Swedish television debate. At the British General Election in 1997, it did initially appear that a historical precedent might be broken when the main party leaders floated the idea of meeting in a televised debate. However, as Tait¹ notes: ‘After more than two months of discussions, the negotiations broke down in the first week of the campaign in acrimonious circumstances, with the parties blaming one another and the broadcasters’. Consequently, we decided to use the Deputy Leader’s debate which was broadcast on the BBC on the Sunday before the General Election. This was the last such debate held during the pre-election campaign.^{li} For all the debates, participants covered a wide variety of social, economic, and political issues.

For this paper, the data refer to one variable which focuses on the issue content of election messages. This variable investigates the policy issues addressed by the parties from a list of around one hundred pre-defined categories. The coded unit of analysis is “statements”. A new statement is registered each time a change of value occurs concerning the variable which records an issue matter (switching from tax policies to environmental policies, for example).^{lii} In contrast to other studies in the field which rely on saliency theory^{liii} and which only count whether or not an issue is addressed, we coded statements in either positive or negative terms.^{liv} This means for instance, that we are able to distinguish between the preference to increase taxes on the one hand, and to lower taxes on the other.

INDICATORS OF THE DISCOURSES

In the following analysis we identify all those statements which refer to the Socialist, Welfare State, Neo-Liberal and Ecological discourses. We include only those directional statements which refer to the four discourses (and how much attention was given proportionately to each), and disregard all other statements. The operationalisation of the four different discourses is as follows:

Socialist Discourse

The Socialist discourse focuses on the dispute concerning public and private control over the means of production. Statements in this context include the demand for a higher state influence over the economy, and the demands for more socialism and radical left policies. Furthermore, statements such as a stronger influence from workers and trade unions within work-places, and industrial democracy more generally were also included in the index.

Welfare State Discourse

Statements used for the welfare state index are: support for the expansion or preservation of the public sector, support for taxes and social reforms, public health care and housing policy, and maintenance of labour market regulations.

Neo-Liberal Discourse

The neo-liberal index focuses on privatisation and the reduction of the public sector, free trade, reduced personal taxation, private health care, less support for social reforms and public housing, and deregulation of the labour market.


Ecological Discourse

Finally, we included a dimension to examine emphases on the Ecological discourse. The ecological position is determined by statements including a critique of expansionist economic policy and economic growth, and those emphasising the priority of environmental protection even at the cost of economic growth. It also includes statements such as the restructuring of society towards an ecological society, opposition to nuclear energy, and the limiting of private transport with support instead for public transport.

RESULTS

Figure i demonstrates that of the three parties examined, only the Swedish SAP made any reference to the Socialist discourse, and here only 13 per cent of statements referred to such an agenda. In contrast, all three of the SDLPs give top priority to the Welfare State discourse in their election rhetorics. However, it is surprising to note the degree to which these parties have opened their agendas to the Neo-Liberal discourse, which ranks second-place for all of the selected SDLPs. Substantial differences between the parties occur in terms of the Ecological discourse, which has greatest influence within the SPD and is completely absent from the SAP's 1994 election agenda. In the following discussion we examine these results in greater detail.

Figure i: Discourses of Social Democratic-Labour Parties in Sweden, Germany, and Great Britain in National Election Campaigns during the Mid-1990s (per cent).



The Relative Importance of the Socialist, Welfare State, Neo-Liberal and Ecological Discourses

Undoubtedly, the British Labour Party under Tony Blair has undergone significant changes since the 1992 General Election. This is confirmed by Ian Budge's longitudinal analysis, tracking Labour's movement on a left-right continuum throughout the post-War period.^{iv} Our data demonstrate that the Labour Party, like the German SPD, avoided reference to a Socialist discourse in its manifesto at the 1997 General Election. Indeed, the very term "Socialism" does not appear at all in the 1997 manifesto. As Freedman^{lvi} notes, 'instead, it is

alluded to via code words such as “outdated dogmatic doctrine”, or the “old left”. This is an indication of the radical programmatic change of the Labour Party. Our data confirm that, of the three parties examined, only the Swedish SAP remains wedded in any degree to a Socialist discourse, and even this is only a very limited commitment.

The Welfare State discourse clearly dominates in all three SDLPs. As predicted, the SAP focused on this discourse particularly strongly. The Labour Party also emphasised the Welfare State extensively. On the one hand, this result underlines the transition of New Labour, which is today quite a typical SDLP in its election discourse. On the other hand, the lower emphasis given to the Welfare State discourse within the SPD is largely a result of the relative saliency of the Ecological discourse in Germany (see below).

In respect of the Neo-Liberal discourse, the three SDLPs are remarkably similar. However, even if the differences among these three parties are relatively small, in some important respects the results vary from those that we had initially predicted. As we forecast, the Swedish SAP was least likely to embrace a free market agenda; however, rather unexpectedly, the German SPD pursued a Neo-Liberal agenda more vigorously than the British Labour Party. This suggests that the SPD is increasingly open to market oriented solutions as a means for attempting to overcome the severe economic problems following German unification. As far as the Labour Party is concerned, its emphasis on Neo-Liberalism is certainly not such as to set it apart from the other SDLPs we examined, and indeed is less so than for the SPD. This suggests that the Labour Party has not merely adjusted to the liberal welfare state regime, but has transformed from a socialist party into a welfare state party. However, it must be stressed that the integration of Neo-Liberal elements is a common phenomenon for all the SDLPs which we analysed. It is by no means unique to New Labour.

Interestingly, the three parties examined differ substantially in their respective integration of the Ecological discourse. However, the data confirm the hypothesis outlined earlier. The SPD clearly has a greater ecological orientation than the other two parties. More than a quarter of all statements made by the SPD in respect of the four discourses examined refer to the Ecological discourse. This is in sharp contrast to the SAP, which made no reference to the Ecological discourse in its program at all. Furthermore, the SAP actually focuses extensively on aspects which are opposed to a Green ideology, including economic growth, the use of nuclear energy, and so on.^{lvii} The degree to which the Labour Party mentioned ecological aspects was as expected. It is clearly behind the SPD in this respect, and can certainly not be labelled as a ‘Green’ social democratic party. However, unlike the Swedish SAP, it is not entirely closed to these kinds of aspects in its electioneering.

Welfare State Regimes and Characteristics of Social Democratic-Labour Parties

Even if the political environment is important for the programmatic adjustments of the SDLPs, the welfare state regime seems not to have a direct impact on the party positions. The Labour Party, operating as it does within a liberal welfare state regime, does not give more attention to the Neo-Liberal discourse than its counterparts in the other countries examined. However, there is some evidence that the SAP, working within

a welfare state regime, tends to emphasise the Welfare State discourse strongly. For the German SPD, the challenges of an increasingly emergent environmental agenda in general, and of the Green Party in particular^{lviii} have left profound marks on its program. Neither of the other two SDLPs in our study expressed nearly as many statements referring to the Ecological discourse.

The characterisation of the three SDLPs leads us to draw the following conclusions. The SPD is an ecological social democratic party. The SAP is a social democratic party with a strong Socialist discourse. According to the historical development and transition of social democracy^{lix} we may say that the SAP remains a traditional social democratic party while the SPD is a transformed social democratic party. This implies that the SAP remains faithful to the traditional discourses of the Welfare State and Socialism. The SPD has adopted positions which are broadly associated with the New Left, such as environmental issues.^{lx} The British Labour Party sits at an intermediate position between the SAP and SPD. There was no emphasis given by Labour to a Socialist discourse in its rhetoric at the 1997 General Election. However, it focused more strongly on welfare state issues and less so on environmental issues than the SPD. From this, we can conclude that the transition of New Labour is within the margins of the development of SDLPs in Western Europe. Alongside this development has been an integration of Neo-Liberal aspects which all the three parties in our study have in common.

CONCLUSION

The results of our analyses of the discourses of the three West European SDLPs selected suggest that the Welfare State discourse is dominant in all these parties. The Socialist discourse is now of only marginal influence. However, SDLPs are challenged by other competing discourses, the most significant of which is the challenge of the Neo-Liberal discourse. All three SDLPs integrated elements of this Neo-Liberal discourse into their respective election campaigns in the mid-1990s.

The response to the ecological challenge is less uniform. Only the German SPD, challenged by the Greens, opened their policy agenda to any significant degree to ecological issues. In very sharp contrast, the Swedish SAP did not integrate any elements of this discourse into their party appeal in the 1994 election. The Labour Party takes a position between these two parties, although it is closer to the SAP than the SPD.

Considering the fundamental changes which it has recently undergone, we conclude that the British Labour Party has adjusted to the trend of change experienced by SDLPs across Western Europe. In terms of statements made in its manifesto and during television debates, Labour does not appear to have positioned itself at an ideological location markedly different from either the SPD or SAP. Its development seems to match the generalised programmatic adjustment taken by other SDLPs in the 1990s.

Although all three West European SDLPs are quite similar in terms of their discourses, the processes which have led to these positions, and the directions they are taking are quite distinct. The SPD is an ecological social democratic party. The challenge of the Green Party also effects the intra-organisational policy of the SPD, and this is also confirmed by our data. The SAP, although open to the Socialist and Neo-Liberal

discourse, is closed to the Ecological discourse. This may be an indicator of the materialist and economic orientation of the SAP, which has also been confirmed in terms of its position with respect to other left-libertarian issues such as feminism.^{lxi} The Labour Party has undergone a fundamental transition. New Labour is certainly a social democratic party. However, in its 1997 election campaigning, the extent of its emphasis on Neo-Liberal aspects was not significantly different from either the SPD or SAP. From this point of view, the changes within the Labour Party may appear radical within the context of British politics. However, from an international comparative perspective, these adjustments merely parallel a common trend which is taking place elsewhere across Western Europe.

NOTES

-
- i. The key study in this field is the Comparative Party Manifestos Project (Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Hofferbert, Ian Budge and Paul Sabatier *Parties, Policies, and Democracy* [Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1994]). This project is largely based on only one aspect of the manifesto data, the frequencies of issues. However, in our study we not only coded issues, but also campaign styles, presentation of arguments, addressees, and other aspects of the manifestos and television debates. Moreover, the Comparative Party Manifestos Project measured the relevance of issues using saliency theory, a method which has been much criticised (e.g. Herbert Kitschelt *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994] pp.202-203). Therefore, wherever possible we coded all statements in a directional way in order to compare ideological positioning of the parties examined.
 - ii. Kitschelt ([note 1] p.261) for instance, concludes that the British Labour Party, and indeed the Swedish SAP are broadly social democratic parties, although places them in a 'left' camp, with a strong historical adherence "...to traditional socialist ideas about workers' empowerment and income distribution". However, more recently, the Labour Party under Tony Blair has embarked upon a "Third way" 'in the sense that it is an attempt to transcend both old-style social democracy and neoliberalism' (Anthony Giddens *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* [Cambridge: Polity Press 1998] p.26). As a consequence, some commentators have gone as far as describing it as having become a British-style Christian Democratic party (David Marquand 'The Blair Paradox', *Prospects* [20th May 1998] p.19).
 - iii. Stephen Driver and Luke Martell *New Labour: Politics After Thatcherism* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1998); Colin Hay 'That Was Then, This Is Now: The Revision of Policy in the "Modernisation" of the British Labour Party, 1992-97' *New Political Science*, 20 (1998) p.7-33; Mark Wickham-Jones 'The Reformist Trajectory Under Stress: Issues in the Study of New Labour and Business', *Contemporary Political Studies* (1998a); 'Labour's Adoption and Abandonment of the European Model', paper for the *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (Boston USA, 1998b).
 - iv. Eric Shaw 'The Determinants of the Programmatic Transformation of the British Labour Party', paper for the *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting* (Boston USA, Sept. 1998) p.3.
 - v. René Cuperus and Johannes Kandel 'The Magical Return of Social Democracy', in René Cuperus and Johannes Kandel *European Social Democracy: Transformation in Progress* (Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting, 1998) p.16.
 - vi. Gosta Esping-Andersen *Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985); Angelo Panebianco *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988).
 - vii. Maurice Duverger *Political Parties* (New York: Wiley 1954) pp.1-3 and 17-23

-
- viii. Christopher Pierson *Beyond the Welfare State* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1992) pp.187-93
- ix. Richard Titmuss *Social Policy* (London: Allen and Unwin 1974); Göran Therborn 'Welfare State and Capitalist Markets', *Acta Sociologica* 30 3/4 (1987) pp.237-254; Gosta Esping-Andersen *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990).
- x. Esping-Andersen (note 9); Henry Milner *Sweden: Social Democracy in Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989).
- xi. Esping-Andersen (note 6); Milner (note 10).
- xii. Detlef Jahn and Peter Esaiasson *The Meaning of The Left-Right Semantic: An Analysis of Ideological Positioning in the 1994 Election Campaigns in Sweden and Germany*, Manuscript (Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University and University of Göteborg 1998).
- xiii. The Swedish election study (Mikael Gilljam and Sören Holmberg *Väljarnas val* [Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik 1995] p.188) states that the crucial issues for the SAP victory in the 1994 election were unemployment, the economic situation and social welfare. For each of these issues, the SAP was seen as more competent than the Government parties. For instance, unemployment rose under the non-socialist government from 2-3 per cent in the early 1990s to 12 per cent in 1993.
- xiv. Tim Tilton *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy: Through the Welfare State to Socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1990) p.125-44; Hugh Heclö and Henrik Madsen *Policy and Politics in Sweden: Principled Pragmatism* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987) p.157.
- xv. Herbert Herbert Tingsten *The Swedish Social Democrats: Their Ideological Development* (Ottawa: Bedminster 1973) p.707.
- xvi. In 1976, the LO introduced the idea of collective share-ownership by endorsing the creation of so-called "wage-earner funds." Had the proposal been enacted, collective funds would gradually have acquired ownership in all large profitable corporations. However, the issue divided the labour movement. In particular, a rift developed within the confederation of the white collar trade unions (TCO), which in turn had a substantial disuniting effect on the SAP itself (Jonas Pontusson *The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1992]).
- xvii. Kitschelt (note 1) p.173.
- xviii. Neil Kinnock *The Future of Socialism*, Fabian Tract 509 (1986) p.9.
- xix. In 1918, Labour adopted various constitutional changes, with the new Clause Four advocating explicit socialist goals: "To secure for the workers by hand or by brain the full fruits of their industry and the most equitable distribution thereof that may be possible upon the basis of the common ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of popular administration and control of each industry or service." (Cited in B. Jones 'Clause Four and Blair's Brilliant Campaign', *Talking Politics* 8/1 [1995] pp.511-532).
- xx. The Gang of Four included four former Labour government ministers from the social democratic wing of the Party, and announced the formation of the SDP in March 1981. By the end of the year, they had been joined by a further 26 Labour MPs, and one Conservative MP.
- xxi. Eric Shaw *Discipline and Discord in The Labour Party* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1988) p.224.
- xxii. Labour received only 28.5 per cent of the vote, its worst result since 1918. In contrast, the SDP-Liberal Alliance won 26.2 per cent of the British vote.

-
- xxiii. Ivor Crewe 'The Labour Party and The Electorate', in Dennis Kavanagh (ed.) *The Politics of The Labour Party* (London: Allen and Unwin 1982); 'Great Britain', in Ivor Crewe and David Denver (eds.) *Electoral Change In Western Democracies* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
- xxiv. Robert Garner 'Modernisation and The Policy Review: The Labour Party Since The 1987 Election', in *Talking Politics*, 1/3 (1989) p. 101-104; 'Labour and The Policy Review: A Party Fit To Govern?', in *Talking Politics*, 3/1 (1990) p.31-36.
- xxv. Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly 'Making The Best of Thatcherism' in *New Statesman* (4th October 1996) pp. 26-29.
- xxvi. Perhaps the most significant marker for the demise of the 'socialist' agenda within New Labour is the abandonment of Clause Four by the Party at a special conference in April 1995. Former Deputy Labour Party leader, Hattersley, described the event as: "April 29, 1995 will become the day when Labour turned itself into a social democratic party" (cited in Patrick Seyd 'Tony Blair and New Labour', in Anthony King et al., [eds.] *New Labour triumphs: Britain At The Polls* [New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers Increase 1998] p.55).
- xxvii. For instance, Gamble ('The Legacy of Thatcherism, in Mark Perryman [ed.] *The Blair Agenda* [London: Lawrence and Wishart 1996] p.38) notes that new Labour has accepted much of the neo-liberal policy agenda it inherited from the Conservatives, including: ". . . most of the privatisation measures introduced by the Thatcher government; many of the education and health reforms; most of the trade union reforms; the restructuring of the civil service; the sale of council houses; the abolition of exchange controls; and the acceptance of much lower levels of direct taxation".
- xxviii. Gamble (note 27) p.35
- xxix. David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of 1997* (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998); Ben Pimlott 'New Labour, New Era' *The Political Quarterly* 68/4 (1997) p.325-34; Hay (note 3); Shaw, (note 4); Wickham-Jones (note 3).
- xxx. Labour defeated the Conservative Party by a margin of 44.4 per cent of the votes to 31.4 per cent, securing a 179 seat majority in the House of Commons.
- xxxi. Pierson (note 8); Kitschelt (note 1).
- xxxii. Kitschelt (note 1) pp.261-72.
- xxxiii. Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt *Policy and Party Competition* (New York and London: Routledge 1992) pp.49-52.
- xxxiv. Kitschelt's results (note 1) p.263.
- xxxv. Detlef Jahn *New Politics and Trade Unions. An Organization Theoretical Analysis of the Debate on Nuclear Energy in Swedish and German Trade Unions* (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1993).
- xxxvi. Andre Markovits and Philip Gorski *The German Left: Red, Green and Beyond*. (Cambridge: Polity Press 1993); Stephen Padgett 'The German Social Democratic Party: Between Old and New Left', David Bell and Eric Shaw (ed.) *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties* (London: Pinter 1994).
- xxxvii. Kitschelt (note 1) p.273.
- xxxviii For instance, the Basic Programme instituted in 1989 placed a heavy emphasis on ecological concerns (Giddens, 1998: 19)].
- xxxix. Stephen Padgett and William Paterson *A History of Social Democracy in Postwar Europe* (London: Longman 1991) pp.177-82.
- xl. See for instance: Hermann Schmitt *Neue Politik in alten Parteien: Zum Verhältnis von Gesellschaft und Parteien in der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1987); Thomas Koelble *The Left Unravelled* (London: Duke

-
- University Press 1991); David Arter 'The War of the Roses: Conflict and Cohesion in the Swedish Social Democratic Party' in David Bell & Eric Shaw (eds.) *Conflict and Cohesion in Western European Social Democratic Parties* (London: Pinter 1994); Kitschelt (note 1).
- xli. In the context of the left-libertarian discourse it is important to note that a feminism which is based solely on equality, gender solidarity and economic concerns is qualitatively different from the new, left libertarian feminism that insists on "women's self-organisation, the right to be different from men, and the expression of a new gender-based communitarian culture" (Kitschelt [note 1] p.271).
- xlii. The SAP still occupied key positions with other collective actors during periods of opposition. It was firmly tied to certain vested "economic" interests like trade unions, and was involved in various committees and organisations which were engaged in economic and social planning. Inevitably then, the SAP tended to emphasise an economic-productionist agenda at the expense of an anti-expansionist Ecological discourse.
- xliii. Tim Tilton 'The Role of Ideology in Social Democratic Politics', Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin, and Klas Åmark, (eds.) *Creating Social Democracy: A Century of Social Democratic Labor Party in Sweden* (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1992).
- xliv. Russell Dalton 'Responsiveness of Parties and Party Systems to the New Politics', in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard Stöss, and Bernhard Weßels (eds.) *Politische Klasse und Politische Institutionen. Probleme und Perspektiven der Elitenforschung* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 1991); Robert Rohrschneider 'New Party versus Old Party Realignment: Environmental Attitudes, Party Policies, and Partisan Affiliations in Four West European Countries' *Journal of Politics* 55/3 (1993) pp.682-701.
- xlvi. Jahn and Esaiasson (note 12).
- xlvi. Klingemann et al. (note 1).
- xlvi. Klingemann et al. p. 21 (note 1).
- xlvi. The problem of the length of the German party manifestos has also been noted in the Party Manifesto Project (Hans-Dieter Klingemann 'Electoral Programmes in West Germany 1949-1980', Ian Budge, David Robertson and Derek Hearl [eds.] *Ideology Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analysis of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987] p.301). In their study, they solved the problem by coding paragraphs instead of quasi-sentences as in all other countries. We focused on the preambles since their messages are rather similar to those of the Swedish manifestos. Furthermore, the preamble summarises the most important issues for a party and is therefore well-suited for the identification of the major messages.
- xlix. The participants of the German television debate were: Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), Theo Waigl (CSU), Klaus Kinkel (FDP), Oskar Lafontaine (SPD), Joschka Fischer (Greens), and Gregor Gysi (PDS).
- i. Richard Tait (1997) 'The Debate That Never Happened', paper for the *Political Studies Association EPOP Meeting* (University of Essex, Sept. 1997) p.1.
- ii. The participants were Michael Heseltine (Conservatives), Alan Beith (Liberal Democrats), and John Prescott (Labour).
- iii. For more methodological details see: Martin Brandorf, Peter Esaiasson, & Nicklas Håkansson 'Svenska Valfrågor: Partiernas Valdebatt 1902-1994', *Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift* 98/4 (1996) pp.1-36; Peter Esaiasson, Niklas Håkansson, and Detlef Jahn 'On the Nature of Negative Campaigning: Evidence from Germany and Sweden', paper presented at the *Europe Researched Conference* (Prague, Oct. 16-19 1997). The coding procedures are specified in a document and the issues coded are based on a lengthy coding scheme. Readers who are interested in further information about the issues and the specific aspects which led to the identification of the various discourses are invited to contact the authors of this paper.

-
- liii. Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies* (London: George Allen & Unwin 1983) pp.21-56; Klingemann et al. (note 1) pp.22-26.
- liv. Kitschelt ([note 1] p.202) notes that there are problems with attempting to map party ideology using saliency theory. For instance, in the Party Manifesto Study, many issues are not only coded in negative and positive terms, which violates the saliency theory and reintroduces spatial-positional (or directional) analogy directly, but also that crucial issues which are coded as salience questions are actually substantive alternatives on a single ideological dimension (e.g., internationalism, protectionism, education).
- lv. Ian Budge 'Great Britain: A Stable, but Fragile, Party System' in Paul Pennings and Jan-Eric Lane (eds.) *Comparing Party System Change* (London: Routledge 1998) p.126.
- lvi. Michael Freedman 'The Ideology of New Labour', in *The Political Quarterly*, 79/1 (1999) p.47.
- lvii. Jahn and Esaiasson (note 12).
- lviii. Detlef Jahn 'Changing Political Opportunities in Germany: The Prospects of the German Greens in an United Germany', *Current Politics and Economics of Europe* 4/4 (1994) pp.209-226; 'Green Politics and Parties in Germany', M. Jacobs (ed.) *Greening the Millennium? The New Politics of the Environment*, special issue of *Political Quarterly*, Oxford: Blackwell (1997) pp.174-182.
- lix. Pierson (note 8); Kitschelt (note 1); Jahn and Esaiasson (note 12).
- lx. Markovits and Gorski (note 36).
- lxi. Joyce Gelb *Feminism and Politics. A Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1989) p.176.