Verifying security protocols by knowledge analysis

Ma, X. ORCID: 0000-0003-0074-4192 and Cheng, X., 2008. Verifying security protocols by knowledge analysis. International Journal of Security and Networks, 3 (3), pp. 183-192.

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This paper describes a new interactive method to analyse knowledge of participants involved in security protocols and further to verify the correctness of the protocols. The method can detect attacks and flaws involving interleaving sessions besides normal attacks. The implementation of the method in a generic theorem proving environment, namely Isabelle, makes the verification of protocols mechanical and efficient; it can verify a medium-sized security protocol in less than ten seconds. As an example, the paper finds the flaw in the Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol and proves the secure properties and guarantees of the protocol with Lowe's fix to show the effectiveness of this method.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: International Journal of Security and Networks
Creators: Ma, X. and Cheng, X.
Publisher: Inderscience
Date: 2008
Volume: 3
Number: 3
Rights: Copyright © 2008 Inderscience Enterprises Limited. All rights reserved.
Divisions: Schools > School of Science and Technology
Record created by: EPrints Services
Date Added: 09 Oct 2015 10:10
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2017 13:21

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