Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test

Yu, N., Chmura, T. ORCID: 0000-0001-7476-2030, Pitz, T. and Sun, N., 2010. Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test. Economics Letters, 107 (2), pp. 115-118. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

This paper considers the situation in which two perfect complements belong to different owners. We calculate the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in the mechanism of k + 1 − price bargaining with private value, and did experiment to test the theory.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: Economics Letters
Creators: Yu, N., Chmura, T., Pitz, T. and Sun, N.
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: May 2010
Volume: 107
Number: 2
ISSN: 0165-1765
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.041DOI
Rights: Copyright © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Depositing User: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 24 Apr 2018 08:53
Last Modified: 24 Apr 2018 08:53
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33301

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