Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test

Yu, N, Chmura, T ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7476-2030, Pitz, T and Sun, N, 2010. Bargaining over perfect complements owned separately: with experimental test. Economics Letters, 107 (2), pp. 115-118. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

This paper considers the situation in which two perfect complements belong to different owners. We calculate the Bayesian–Nash equilibrium in the mechanism of k + 1 − price bargaining with private value, and did experiment to test the theory.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Economics Letters
Creators:	Yu, N., Chmura, T., Pitz, T. and Sun, N.
Publisher:	Elsevier
Date:	May 2010
Volume:	107
Number:	2
ISSN:	0165-1765
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.041 DOI
Rights:	Copyright © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	24 Apr 2018 08:53
Last Modified:	24 Apr 2018 08:53
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33301

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