Being “in Control” May Make You Lose Control: The Role of Self-Regulation in Unethical Leadership Behavior

Joosten, A, Van Dijke, M ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9974-5050, Van Hiel, A and De Cremer, D, 2014. Being “in Control” May Make You Lose Control: The Role of Self-Regulation in Unethical Leadership Behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 121 (1), pp. 1-14. ISSN 0167-4544

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Abstract

In the present article, we argue that the constant pressure that leaders face may limit the willpower required to behave according to ethical norms and standards and may therefore lead to unethical behavior. Drawing upon the ego depletion and moral self-regulation literatures, we examined whether self-regulatory depletion that is contingent upon the moral identity of leaders may promote unethical leadership behavior. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study revealed that regulatory resource depletion promotes unethical leader behaviors among leaders who are low in moral identity. No such effect was found among leaders with a high moral identity. This study extends our knowledge on why organizational leaders do not always conform to organizational goals. Specifically, we argue that the hectic and fragmented workdays of leaders may increase the likelihood that they violate ethical norms. This highlights the necessity to carefully schedule tasks that may have ethical implications. Similarly, organizations should be aware that overloading their managers with work may increase the likelihood of their leaders transgressing ethical norms.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Journal of Business Ethics
Creators:	Joosten, A., Van Dijke, M., Van Hiel, A. and De Cremer, D.
Publisher:	Springer
Date:	2014
Volume:	121
Number:	1
ISSN:	0167-4544
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1007/s10551-013-1686-2 DOI
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Jonathan Gallacher
Date Added:	04 Nov 2015 10:43
Last Modified:	09 Jun 2017 13:56
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/26143

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