Non-cooperative power control game in D2D underlying networks with variant system conditions

Al-Gumaei, YA, Aslam, N, Al-Samman, AM, Al-Hadhrami, T ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7441-604X, Noordin, K and Fazea, Y, 2019. Non-cooperative power control game in D2D underlying networks with variant system conditions. Electronics, 8 (10): 1113. ISSN 2079-9292

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Abstract

In this paper, the problem of power control using a game theoretic approach based on sigmoid cost function is studied for device-to-device (D2D) communications underlying cellular networks. A non-cooperative game, where each D2D transmitter and a cellular user select their own transmit power level independently, is analyzed to minimize their user-serving cost function and achieve a target signal to interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINR) requirement. It is proved analytically that the Nash equilibrium point of the game exists and it is unique under certain constraints. Numerical results verify the analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game with variant system conditions, such as path loss exponents, target SINR, interference caused by the cellular user, pricing coefficients, and sigmoid control parameter.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Electronics
Creators:	Al-Gumaei, Y.A., Aslam, N., Al-Samman, A.M., Al-Hadhrami, T., Noordin, K. and Fazea, Y.
Publisher:	MDPI AG
Date:	2019
Volume:	8
Number:	10
ISSN:	2079-9292
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.3390/electronics8101113 DOI electronics8101113 Publisher Item Identifier
Rights:	© 2019 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Divisions:	Schools > School of Science and Technology
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	03 Oct 2019 13:57
Last Modified:	03 Oct 2019 13:57
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/37900

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