Executive incentive schemes in initial public offerings: the effects of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate governance

Allcock, D ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6961-1470 and Filatotchev, I, 2010. Executive incentive schemes in initial public offerings: the effects of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate governance. Journal of Management, 36 (3), pp. 663-686. ISSN 0149-2063

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Abstract

Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis of the governance development process in threshold firms.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Journal of Management
Creators:	Allcock, D. and Filatotchev, I.
Publisher:	SAGE Publications
Date:	1 May 2010
Volume:	36
Number:	3
ISSN:	0149-2063
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1177/0149206308329962 DOI 1260664 Other
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Jill Tomkinson
Date Added:	23 Dec 2019 11:04
Last Modified:	23 Dec 2019 11:04
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/38904

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