Game-theoretic analysis of behaviour in the context of long-term relationships

Khodarinova, L, 2002. Game-theoretic analysis of behaviour in the context of long-term relationships. PhD, Nottingham Trent University.

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Abstract

In this thesis an approach for modelling social interactions in a context of long-term relationships is developed in order to investigate apparently altruistic behaviour. The common model of social interactions is based on Prisoners' Dilemma game. Considering the interaction of the players not in isolation but in the context of conditions in which it takes place leads to the conclusion that cooperative behaviour may be rational or evolved. In this thesis this idea is taken further to consider different contexts of interaction.

Firstly, a three-player model is introduced in which the third player interacts with two other players engaged in a single interaction Prisoners' Dilemma. The existence of the third player in the interaction changes the payoffs in such a way that the two players are induced to cooperate.

The Iterated Prisoners' Dilemma is generalized by allowing additional states to exist in the game. This provides the possibility of introducing completely new types of strategies such as "allocating tasks" strategies. These strategies are relevant to the explanation of apparently altruistic behaviour since the observed behaviour for them is: one player cooperates while the other defects.

It is shown that "allocating tasks with punishment" and "cooperating with punishment" strategies can be Nash Equilibria. Populations which consist of different mixtures of "allocating tasks (cooperating) without punishment" and "allocating tasks (cooperating) with punishment" players can be the end points of the evolutionary process. There are ranges of parameters in the model for which the non-cooperative strategies considered are not Nash Equilibria, nor are they evolutionarily or asymptotically stable. Therefore, it can be concluded that cooperative populations can evolve under the influence of natural selection and it is possible to evolve to cooperative types of populations from populations initially composed of a majority of uncooperative individuals.

Item Type:	Thesis
Creators:	Khodarinova, L.
Date:	2002
ISBN:	9781369325300
Identifiers:	Number Type PQ10290281 Other
Divisions:	Schools > School of Social Sciences
Record created by:	Laura Ward
Date Added:	25 Jun 2021 15:05
Last Modified:	13 Dec 2023 14:04
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/43246

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