CSR contracting, materiality, and their effects on financial and non-financial performance

Develay, E, Giamporcaro, S ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1150-4939 and Wang, Y ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5438-4255, 2022. CSR contracting, materiality, and their effects on financial and non-financial performance. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2022 (1). ISSN 0065-0668

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Abstract

Although the recent corporate governance initiative of tying environmental, social, and governance (ESG) targets to executive compensation is gaining popularity in developed economies, difficulties have been reported in their identification and selection due to a heterogeneity of stakeholder interests. Drawing on the agency and stakeholder theories, we apply the concept of materiality for the design of ESG targets in executive compensation and tests its effects on corporate financial and non-financial performance. By focusing on a unique sample of S&P 1,500 companies from 2011 to 2019, we find that material CSR contracting has a negative effect on market-based financial performance and a positive one on environmental performance. These results are robust to endogeneity and further tests suggest that this approach provide greater effects than simply adding general ESG targets in executive compensation. These findings imply a trade-off between corporate financial performance and corporate non-financial performance in the short-term which raises questions about the primary motivations of corporations and the soundness of shareholder-oriented materiality frameworks.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Academy of Management Proceedings
Creators:	Develay, E., Giamporcaro, S. and Wang, Y.
Publisher:	Academy of Management
Date:	August 2022
Volume:	2022
Number:	1
ISSN:	0065-0668
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.5465/ambpp.2022.12151abstract DOI 1620997 Other
Rights:	© 2022 Academy of Management.
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	24 Nov 2022 10:06
Last Modified:	24 Nov 2022 10:06
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/47494

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