Items where Author is "Young, G"

YOUNG, G., 2017. Integrating poor taste into the ongoing debate on the morality of violent video games. The Computer Games Journal. ISSN 2052-773X

YOUNG, G., 2017. A response to Coren's objections to the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility. Philosophia, 45 (3), pp. 1365-1380. ISSN 0048-3893

YOUNG, G., 2017. Objections to Ostritsch's argument in "The amoralist challenge to gaming and the gamer's moral obligation". Ethics and Information Technology, 19 (3), pp. 209-219. ISSN 1388-1957

WHITTY, M.T. and YOUNG, G., 2016. Cyberpsychology: the study of individuals, society and digital technologies. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Forthcoming)

DUNN, A.K. and YOUNG, G., 2016. Free will versus determinism. Psychology Review, 21 (4), pp. 28-29. ISSN 1750-3469

YOUNG, G., 2016. Resolving the gamer's dilemma: examining the moral and psychological differences between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9783319465944 (Forthcoming)

YOUNG, G., 2016. Selective scepticism over thought: am I ever justified in doubting that I think that thought but not this one? Cogent Arts & Humanities, 3. ISSN 2331-1983

YOUNG, G., 2016. The principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility: a way to avoid the Frankfurt counter-example. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. ISSN 0048-3893

YOUNG, G., 2015. Are there some things it is morally wrong to make-believe? An examination of imaginative resistance as a measure of the morality of pretence. Cogent Arts & Humanities, 2 (1), pp. 1-14. ISSN 2331-1983

YOUNG, G., 2015. Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction. Synthese. ISSN 0039-7857

YOUNG, G., 2015. Violent video games and morality: a meta-ethical approach. Ethics and Information Technology, 17 (4), pp. 311-321. ISSN 1388-1957

YOUNG, G., 2014. Amending the revisionist model of the Capgras delusion: A further argument for the role of patient experience in delusional belief formation. AVANT, 5 (3), pp. 89-112. ISSN 2082-7598

YOUNG, G., 2014. Capgras delusion. In: Magill's medical guide. Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press. ISBN 9781619252141

YOUNG, G., 2014. A meta-ethical approach to single-player gamespace: introducing constructive ecumenical expressivism as a means of explaining why moral consensus is not forthcoming. Ethics and Information Technology, 16 (2), pp. 91-102. ISSN 1388-1957

YOUNG, G., 2013. Capgras delusions [forthcoming]. In: H. PASHLER, ed., Encyclopedia of the mind. San Diego: Sage. ISBN 9781412950572

YOUNG, G., 2013. Enacting taboos as a means to an end; but what end? On the morality of motivations for child murder and paedophilia within gamespace. Ethics and Information Technology, 15 (1), pp. 13-23. ISSN 1388-1957

YOUNG, G., 2013. Ethics in the virtual world: the morality and psychology of gaming. Durham: Acumen.

YOUNG, G., 2013. Philosophical psychopathology: philosophy without thought experiments. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 1137329319

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2012. Coping with offline prohibited actions in gamespace: a psychological approach to moral well-being in gamers. International Journal of Ethics, 8 (3), pp. 237-262.

YOUNG, G., 2012. Coping with offline prohibited actions in gamespace: a psychological approach to moral well-being in gamers [forthcoming]. In: A.S. FRUILI and L.D. VENETO, eds., Psychology of morality. New York: Nova Science.

YOUNG, G., 2012. Delusions of death and immortality. A consequence of misplaced being in Cotard patients. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 19 (2), pp. 127-140. ISSN 1071-6076

YOUNG, G., 2012. In defense of misplaced being and the interactionist account. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 19 (2), pp. 149-152. ISSN 1071-6076

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2012. Transcending taboos: a moral and psychological examination of cyberspace. London: Routledge. ISBN 1136458239

YOUNG, G., 2011. Beliefs, experiences and misplaced being: an interactionist account of delusional misidentification. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 10 (2), pp. 195-215.

YOUNG, G., 2011. Irreducible forms of knowledge how in patients with visuomotor pathologies: an argument against intellectualism. In: A. NEWEN, A. BARTELS and E. JUNG, eds., Knowledge and representation. Palo Alto: CSLI Publications, pp. 31-57.

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2011. Judging all manner of ills: on the importance of psychology rather than morality as an arbiter of taboo permissibility within gamespace. In: K. POELS and S. MALLIET, eds., Vice city virtue: moral issues in digital game play. Leuven: Acco Academic.

YOUNG, G., 2011. On abductive inference and delusional belief: why there is still a role for patient experience within explanations of Capgras delusion. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 16 (4), pp. 303-325.

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2011. Progressive embodiment within cyberspace: considering the psychological impact of the supermorphic persona. Philosophical Psychology, 24 (4), pp. 537-560.

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2011. Should gamespace be a taboo-free zone? Moral and psychological implications for single-player video games. Theory and Psychology, 21 (6), pp. 802-820.

WHITTY, M.T., YOUNG, G. and GOODINGS, L., 2011. What I won't do in pixels: examining the limits of taboo violation in MMORPGs. Computers in Human Behavior, 27 (1), pp. 268-275.

YOUNG, G., 2010. Delusional misidentification. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc..

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2010. Games without frontiers: on the moral and psychological implications of violating taboos within multi-player virtual spaces. Computers in Human Behavior, 26 (6), pp. 1228-1236. ISSN 0747-5632

YOUNG, G. and WHITTY, M.T., 2010. In search of the Cartesian self: an examination of disembodiment within 21st century communication. Theory and Psychology, 20 (2), pp. 209-229.

YOUNG, G., 2010. Issues and Debates within Psychology. In: P. BANYARD, M. DAVIES, C. NORMAN and B. WINDER, eds., Essential psychology: a core textbook. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.

YOUNG, G., 2010. More than simply 'anomalous': elevating the role of phenomenal experience within delusional misidentification. In: A.M. COLUMBUS, ed., Advances in psychological research. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc..

YOUNG, G., 2010. Virtually real emotions and the paradox of fiction: implications for the use of virtual environments in psychological research. Philosophical Psychology, 23 (1), pp. 1-21.

YOUNG, G., 2009. Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: an argument against a reductive epistemology. Philosophia, 37 (2), pp. 341-360.

YOUNG, G., 2009. In what sense 'familiar'? Examining experiential differences within pathologies of facial recognition. Consciousness and Cognition, 18 (3), pp. 628-638.

YOUNG, G., 2008. Capgras delusion: an interactionist model. Consciousness and Cognition, 17 (3), pp. 863-876.

YOUNG, G., 2008. Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7 (2), pp. 177-189.

YOUNG, G., 2007. Clarifying 'familiarity': examining differences in the phenomenal experiences of patients suffering from prosopagnosia and Capgras delusion. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 14 (1), pp. 29-37.

YOUNG, G., 2007. Igniting the flicker of freedom: revisiting the Frankfurt scenario. Philosophia, 35 (2), pp. 171-180. ISSN 0048-3893

YOUNG, G., 2007. In defense of estrangement. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 14 (1), pp. 51-56.

YOUNG, G., 2007. On how a child's awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion. Consciousness and Cognition. ISSN 1053-8100

YOUNG, G., 2006. Are different affordances subserved by different neural pathways? Brain and Cognition, 62 (2), pp. 134-142. ISSN 1090-2147

YOUNG, G., 2006. Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts. Philosophical Psychology, 19 (6), pp. 823-837. ISSN 1465-394X

YOUNG, G., 2006. Preserving the role of conscious decision making in the initiation of intentional action. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 (3), pp. 51-68.

YOUNG, G., 2005. Do Carruthers' examples of absent-mindedness show arbitrariness with regard to phenomenal content? Anthroplogy and Philosophy, 6, pp. 89-101.

YOUNG, G., 2005. Ecological perception affords an explanation of object permanence. Philosophical Explorations, 8 (2), pp. 189-208.

YOUNG, G., 2004. Bodily knowing: rethinking our understanding of procedural knowledge. Philosophical Explorations, 7 (1), pp. 37-54.